J-S46005-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

BRIAN DANIELS,

Appellant No. 1286 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 11, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012667-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2016

Appellant, Brian Daniels, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 4 

to 8 years’ incarceration, followed by 5 years’ probation, imposed after he 

was convicted of aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly endangering 

another person (REAP), possessing an instrument of crime (PIC), and 

several firearm offenses. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the evidence presented at Appellant’s nonjury trial, as follows:

On July 10, 2011, an argument occurred between neighbors 

Latisha Dudley and Thea Knight on the 4500 block of Hurley 

Street. Latisha Dudley and her daughter confronted Thea Knight 

about a parking ticket Dudley received, blaming Knight for the 

ticket and insisting she pay it. Knight then went back inside her 

house and called her boyfriend, Troy Taylor (a.k.a. Lionel 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Tyson). Taylor returned home and also argued with Dudley. 

Dudley threatened to break the windows and slash the tires of 

Taylor and Knight's van. Taylor threatened to retaliate by 

pouring sugar in her gas tank. 

The following day, Taylor and Knight returned from a 

doctor's appointment to find their van had been vandalized. A 

tire had been slashed, the front passenger window was broken, 

and the radio console was missing. Knight brought her children 

inside, and Taylor walked to the end of the block to confront 

Appellant, Dudley's boyfriend. In the course of the 

confrontation, Appellant attempted to hit Taylor in the face, but 

missed. Taylor then swung at and hit Appellant. The fight was 

quickly broken up by other men in the neighborhood, and Taylor 

returned to his van to further inspect the damages. Knight 

watched the altercation from her house and saw Appellant 

walking back to his house with blood around his eye. When 

Appellant exited his house again he was holding a black 9-

millimeter [(9-mm)] gun. Taylor testified that as Appellant was 

walking down the front steps, he was loading bullets into the 

gun. Appellant lifted his gun, took a step or two towards Taylor, 

and then fired at Taylor. Taylor ducked behind the van and 

moved around it to avoid being shot. Appellant followed him 

around the van and fired his gun two more times at Taylor. 

Taylor was not struck by any bullets. After firing three shots, 

Appellant returned to his house. Knight witnessed this from her 

home across the street and called the police. 

Officer William Stephan and his partner responded to the 

report of a shooting on the 4500 Block of Hurley Street at 6:45 

p.m. Taylor was still on the street and met the officers to speak 

with them. Officer Stephan testified that when they initially 

spoke to Taylor, he was “very frazzled and excited.” Taylor 

described the incident and the individual who had shot at him. 

Officer Stephan found two fired shell casings on top of Taylor's 

van, and observed damage to the vehicle. Upon learning that 

Appellant had returned to his house following the shooting, 

Officer Stephan and his partner secured the house. Officer 

Stephan called his supervisor and suggested the premises be 

held for a barricade. 

SWAT officers arrived on the scene and began establishing 

a barricade around Appellant's house at about 7:00 p.m. At 

approximately 7:35 p.m., they entered the building. However, 
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nobody was found inside the home at that time. No weapons 

were found inside the home by SWAT. 

Detective Michael Alers was assigned to investigate the 

shooting and also arrived at the scene at about 7:00 that 

evening. He took photographs of the scene and recovered the 

fired 9-[mm] casings. In the course of his investigation into the 

shooting, Detective Alers also applied for two search warrants: 

one for a 2000 Ford SUV registered to Latisha Dudley, and 

another for a Lexus registered to Appellant. From the vehicle 

registered to Latisha Dudley, Detective Alers recovered the 

vehicle's insurance information, which listed both Ms. Dudley's 

and Appellant's names, the vehicle registration, several traffic 

citations, and a box of ammunition. The box of ammunition 

contained eleven live rounds and ten capped rounds (also 

described as blanks). The box was labeled “38 special” but 

contained “assorted ammo" according to Detective Alers. 

At trial, Appellant presented an alibi witness, Thomas 

Daniel, who worked with Appellant at the time of the shooting. 

Mr. Daniel also testified that he has been dating Appellant’s 

mother for “fifteen or so years.” Thomas Daniel works in air 

conditioning and refrigeration, and at the time of the shooting he 

had been working with Appellant and helping him secure a job in 

the same field. At trial, Mr. Daniel testified that on the day the 

shooting occurred, Appellant was in the Bronx, New York, 

accompanying him on several jobs. He referred to two job 

tickets, which listed work being done on July 11, 2011, from 

3:00 to 5:35 in the afternoon. Mr. Daniel testified that Appellant 

was with him during this time period in the Bronx. Mr. Daniel 

also testified that he did not see Appellant after 6:45 that 

evening until he woke up the next morning. Latisha Dudley, 

Appellant's girlfriend, also testified that she had dropped him off 

at the train station the day before the shooting to go to New 

York. 

Mr. Daniel was interviewed by Detective Alers on 

September 16, 2013. At that time he stated he had no 

documentation to reflect that Appellant had made repairs or 

been present in New York that day. He stated that since he 

worked with several people who were “off the books,” he did not 

keep attendance records. Latisha Dudley also gave a statement 

to Detective Alers on September 16, 2013. She had not spoken 

to the detective about taking Appellant to the train station prior 

to this statement. 
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Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/15/15, at 3-6 (citations to the record omitted).

Based on this evidence, the trial court convicted Appellant of 

aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a); simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 

2701(a); REAP, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705; PIC, 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a); carrying a 

firearm without a license, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1); carrying a firearm in 

public in Philadelphia, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108; and possession of a firearm by a 

person prohibited, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). On December 11, 2014, 

Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 4 to 8 years’ 

imprisonment, followed by 5 years’ probation. He filed a timely postsentence motion, which was denied by operation of law on April 21, 2015. 

Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal, and also timely complied with 

the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Herein, he 

presents four issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed 

reversible error when the court questioned defense witnesses in 

an unduly protracted manner.

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to 

suppress where the police executed a search warrant that lacked 

probable cause.

III. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law 

such that no reasonable fact finder could have found Appellant 

guilty of all the charges.

IV. Whether the findings of guilt are against the weight of the 

evidence.

Appellant’s Brief at 9.
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Appellant first contends that the trial court erred when it “conducted 

an unduly protracted cross-examination, akin to an interrogation,” of 

defense witnesses Thomas Daniel and Latisha Dudley. Appellant’s Brief at 

14. Before delving into the merits of Appellant’s argument, we must address 

the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant waived this claim by failing to raise 

the issue at trial. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower 

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). In 

reaching this conclusion, the trial court initially acknowledged that, 

[i]n Commonwealth v. Hammer, [494 A.2d 1054 (Pa. 1985),] 

the Supreme Court concluded that justice would not be served 

by strictly enforcing the waiver doctrine where the record 

revealed that objection by counsel would be meaningless and, in 

fact, would intensify judicial animosity. ... [Id. at] 1060.... In 

Hammer, the Supreme Court overlooked defense counsel’s 

failure to object to the trial judge’s questioning of witnesses and 

addressed the substantive issue of whether such questioning 

constituted reversible error. Id. 

TCO at 15. However, the trial court then explained why Hammer did not 

compel it to disregard Appellant’s failure to object to its allegedly improper 

questioning of defense witnesses, stating:

Subsequently, however, in Commonwealth v. Grant, [813 

A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002),] our Supreme Court abrogated Hammer, 

indicating that, generally, the appellate courts will not overlook 

defense counsel’s failure to object and, with regard thereto, an 

appellant may present claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

in a PCRA. ... [Grant, 813 A.2d at] 738.... Under these 

circumstances, this court is constrained to find Appellant’s ... 

claim waived.

Id. 
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On appeal, Appellant concedes that he did not object to the 

questioning by the court that he now challenges herein. He also 

acknowledges that Grant overruled Hammer, but nevertheless argues that 

this Court should disregard his failure to object because the Grant Court 

stated that waiver will ‘generally’ not be overlooked. Appellant explains:

[I]f the Supreme Court meant to say that appellate courts will 

ALWAYS overlook defense counsel’s failure to object[,] then [the 

Court] would have said always instead of using the term 

[‘]generally.[’] The Court’s use of this terminology allows the 

appellate court to review instances on a case by case basis and 

not to find a blanket waiver in instances where defense counsel 

did not object to the trial court’s questioning. 

Appellant asks this Honorable Court to find that the waiver 

doctrine does not apply under these circumstances.

Appellant’s Brief at 13-14 (capitalization emphasis in original). 

Even if we accept that Grant supports a ‘case-by-case’ analysis of 

waiver, Appellant does not provide any explanation of why the 

circumstances of this case justify our overlooking his failure to object to the 

court’s questioning. Instead, Appellant suggests that we should disregard 

his failure to object simply because the error he alleges was the court’s 

questioning of certain witnesses. In our view, Appellant is asking us to apply 

the Hammer exception, which we cannot do in light of Grant.

1

 Thus, we 

____________________________________________

1 Moreover, we note that even if Hammer had not been abrogated by 

Grant, Appellant does not explain how the record demonstrates that his 

objection would have been meaningless and/or intensify judicial animosity, 

so as to warrant application of the Hammer exception. See Hammer, 494 

A.2d at 1060 (“On this record, whereas it appears that objection would be 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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agree with the trial court that Appellant’s failure to object to the court’s 

questioning of defense witnesses constitutes waiver of his challenge to that 

questioning herein. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial 

motion to suppress evidence - namely, the box of .38 caliber ammunition -

discovered inside Latisha Dudley’s vehicle. Appellant argues that the search 

of Dudley’s vehicle was illegal because the affidavit underlying the search 

warrant for her car did not provide probable cause. We begin by noting:

Our standard of review for an appeal denying a motion to 

suppress is well settled.

In reviewing the decision of a suppression court, we must 

ascertain whether the record supports the factual findings 

of the suppression court and then determine the 

reasonableness of the inferences and legal conclusions 

drawn therefrom. We will consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and that defense evidence which remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the entire 

record.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 734 A.2d 864, 869 (Pa. Super. 

1999).

“In determining whether the warrant is supported by probable

cause, the magistrate may not consider any evidence outside the 

four-corners of the affidavit.” Commonwealth v. Sharp, 453 

Pa. Super. 349, 683 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1996) (citations omitted).

The legal principles applicable to a review of the sufficiency 

of probable cause affidavits are well settled. Before an 

issuing authority may issue a constitutionally valid search

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

meaningless to satisfy the reasons for raising objection and, as further 

reflection by this record, indeed intensified judicial animosity, justice is not 

served by the strict application of the waiver doctrine.”). 
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warrant, he or she must be furnished with information 

sufficient to persuade a reasonable person that probable

cause exists to conduct a search. The standard for 

evaluating a search warrant is a ‘totality of the 

circumstances’ test as set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 

U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and 

adopted in Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 

A.2d 921 (1985). A magistrate is to make a ‘practical, 

common sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 

including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons 

supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability 

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 

particular place.’ The information offered to establish 

probable cause must be viewed in a common sense, nontechnical manner. Probable cause is based on a finding of 

the probability, not a prima facie showing of criminal 

activity, and deference is to be accorded a magistrate’s 

finding of probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Dean, 693 A.2d 1360, 1365 (Pa. Super. 

1997) (citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted).

Commonwealth v. Ryerson, 817 A.2d 510, 513–14 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Here, the affidavit of probable cause for the search of Dudley’s vehicle 

is not contained in the certified record, Appellant’s brief, or the reproduced 

record he filed with this Court. “It is the obligation of the appellant to make 

sure that the record forwarded to an appellate court contains those 

documents necessary to allow a complete and judicious assessment of the 

issues raised on appeal.” Hrinkevich v. Hrinkevich, 676 A.2d 237, 240 

(Pa. Super. 1996) (citation omitted). Based on Appellant’s failure to provide 

this Court with the affidavit of probable cause that underlies his challenge to 

the search warrant for Dudley’s vehicle, we could deem his second issue 

waived. See id.
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Fortunately for Appellant, the Commonwealth attached to its brief a 

copy of the affidavit of probable cause; thus, because we are able to assess 

that document, we will not consider Appellant’s issue waived. However, for 

the reasons stated infra, our review of the affidavit reveals no error in the 

magistrate’s finding of probable cause to search Dudley’s vehicle. 

In the affidavit, Detective Alers (the affiant) stated the details about 

the fight that preceded the shooting, including that it started over a parking 

ticket, and that Dudley was present at the scene and involved in the dispute. 

See Commonwealth’s Brief (Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Probable Cause, at 2). The 

detective also explained the circumstances of the shooting, and stated that 

afterwards, Appellant reentered his home armed with the gun. Id. 

Detective Alers stated that when the SWAT team entered Appellant’s and 

Dudley’s home, neither of them were found inside, and no weapon was 

recovered. Id. As the scene was being processed by police, two fired 

cartridge casings were found, supporting Troy Taylor’s report that he had 

been shot at. Id. Police also confirmed that a parking citation had been 

issued to Dudley’s vehicle, further confirming Taylor’s and Knight’s story 

about how the altercation began. Id. 

Additionally, Detective Alers explained in the affidavit that, while police 

were still present at the scene, Appellant arrived driving a black Lexus. Id. 

Appellant’s car was immediately seized so police could obtain a warrant to 

search that vehicle. Additionally, Dudley arrived at the scene driving her 
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vehicle, which was also seized. In the affidavit, Detective Alers stated that 

Dudley “refused to cooperate with the investigation.” Id. 

Based on the totality of these facts, the magistrate reasonably 

concluded that there was a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 

crime” would be found in Dudley’s vehicle, namely, the firearm used by 

Appellant to shoot at Taylor. Ryerson, 817 A.2d at 514. Dudley was 

present at the scene during the initial dispute, and Appellant fled into their 

home armed with the gun afterwards. Because the SWAT team did not find 

Appellant, Dudley, or any firearm in their home, it was reasonable to suspect 

that Dudley or Appellant could have secreted the weapon in one of their 

vehicles. Further, Dudley’s uncooperative attitude when she arrived at the 

scene bolstered the probability that she was hiding something in her car. 

Therefore, we conclude that the affidavit of probable cause was sufficient to 

justify the search warrant for Dudley’s vehicle, and the trial court did not err 

in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered 

therefrom.2

____________________________________________

2 Because we conclude that the information set forth in the affidavit provided 

probable cause for the search warrant, we need not address Appellant’s 

contention that “the trial court incorrectly and improperly relied upon 

information sources outside of the warrant, thus erroneously denying [t]he 

motion to suppress.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. Even if the court did commit 

an error in this regard, we may affirm the trial court “on any valid basis, as 

long as the court came to the correct result....” Wilson v. Transport Ins. 

Co., 889 A.2d 563, 577 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted). 
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In Appellant’s next issue, he argues that the evidence was insufficient 

to support his convictions. 

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must 

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all 

elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 

133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact 

finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super. 

2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it 

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Here, Appellant has set forth in his brief the definitions of the various 

crimes for which he was convicted, but he does not explicitly identify which 

element(s) of those crimes the Commonwealth failed to prove. Instead, he 

simply stresses that the only witnesses who testified that he committed the 

shooting, i.e. Troy Taylor and Thea Knight, were incredible and had ample 

motive to fabricate their testimony. Appellant also emphasizes that there 

was no physical evidence, such as fingerprints or DNA, linking him to the 

spent shell casings found at the scene, and no firearm was ever recovered. 

Initially, Appellant’s assertions pertaining to Taylor’s and Knight’s 

credibility “go to the weight, and not the sufficiency, of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 629 A.2d 224, 227 (Pa. Super. 1997). 

Therefore, we will not assess these arguments in Appellant’s sufficiency-ofthe-evidence issue. Moreover, evidence of guilt is not insufficient merely 
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because there is a lack of physical evidence; rather, “[i]t is well established 

in Pennsylvania that circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to 

determine commission of a crime and convict the accused of it.” 

Commonwealth v. Cox, 333 A.2d 917, 918 (Pa. 1975) (citation omitted). 

Consequently, Appellant’s arguments are inapplicable and/or unavailing.

Moreover, our review of the record supports the trial court’s 

assessment of Appellant’s sufficiency claim. The court states:

Here, eyewitness testimony established that Appellant used a 

firearm to shoot at the complainant, Troy Taylor, three times 

following a confrontation. Appellant was seen exiting his home 

holding a black [9-mm] handgun and loading bullets into it prior 

to firing. Two spent shell casings were found by police on the 

complainant’s vehicle. The vehicle also had damage consistent 

with having been hit with bullets.

Although the firearm itself was not recovered, the 

circumstantial evidence, as well as the testimony from 

witnesses, was sufficient to show that Appellant had possessed 

and used a firearm on a public street at the time of the shooting. 

... There was a stipulation at trial that Appellant was ineligible to 

possess a firearm under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105. This evidence, 

taken together, makes it reasonable for the fact-finder to 

conclude that Appellant was guilty of the firearms violations as 

charged.

TCO at 14. The court’s analysis is supported by the record, and Appellant’s 

unconvincing and/or irrelevant arguments to the contrary do not 

demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s third issue is meritless.
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Next, Appellant asserts that the court’s verdict is contrary to the 

weight of the evidence.3 

A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 

Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial 

court's discretion; it does not answer for itself whether the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well settled 

that the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial 

based on a weight of the evidence claim is only warranted where 

the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks 

one's sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has 

been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge's 

discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted 

where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable 

abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135-1136 (Pa. 2011) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Preliminarily, in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, he presented four 

claims challenging the weight of the evidence. In two of those issues, 

Appellant asserted that the court failed to give proper weight to his alibi 

evidence. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 7/14/15, at ¶¶ 3 & 4. In his 

second two weight claims, Appellant stated that he was challenging:

____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth claims that Appellant waived his weight-of-theevidence challenge by failing to raise it in a post-sentence motion. Our 

review of that document reveals that Appellant stated, “The evidence 

presented by the Commonwealth lacked sufficient credibility to be worthy of 

belief.” Post-Sentence Motion, 12/22/14, at 2 (unnumbered). As attacks on 

the credibility of the evidence are properly characterized as weight claims, 

Gaskins, 629 A.2d at 227, we will deem this statement as constituting a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence. 
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5. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

because the court did not give the proper weight to the 

discrepancy that live bullets were never recovered from the front 

of 4533 Hurley Street despite testimony as to their existence, no 

testimony as to their recovery from the petitioner, any other 

civilian, or police officers despite the area being secured within 

minutes of the incident. The Commonwealth failed to sustain its 

burden to prove [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

6. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

because the court did not give the proper weight to the 

discrepancy of [Troy Taylor’s] written statement and sworn 

preliminary hearing testimony and his testimony at trial, 

including but not limited to his testimony of the events preceding 

the shooting. The Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden to 

prove [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at ¶¶ 5 & 6.

On appeal, Appellant presents numerous other arguments in support 

of his weight claim that we deem waived for our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in 

accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).4 In 

regard to the claims Appellant did preserve in his concise statement, we 

____________________________________________

4

For instance, Appellant devotes a large majority of his argument to 

pointing out inconsistencies in the testimony of Thea Knight and Troy Taylor. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 25-27. Even if Appellant preserved these claims, 

many of the discrepancies he cites between Knight’s and Taylor’s testimony 

regard corollary issues that clearly did not outweigh, in the trial court’s 

mind, the witnesses’ consistent claims that Appellant was the person who 

shot at Taylor. See id. (Appellant’s citing, inter alia, Knight’s and Taylor’s 

differing testimony about whether Appellant was loading the gun when he 

emerged from his house, or just holding it; whether Appellant fled back 

inside his home through the back of the house, or through the front door; 

and whether there was a television in Dudley’s car that was destroyed or 

stolen). 
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ascertain no abuse of discretion in the court’s rejecting them. In doing so, 

the court explained: 

In the instant case, multiple witnesses established that 

there had been an ongoing feud between Appellant's girlfriend 

and [Taylor’s] girlfriend regarding parking in their neighborhood. 

Threats exchanged by the parties eventually led to Appellant and 

[Taylor] getting into a brief physical altercation, which then led 

directly to the shooting. Both [Taylor] and his girlfriend testified 

that Appellant shot at [Taylor] following this confrontation. 

Officer testimony corroborated that the scene was consistent 

with a shooting, and two fired shell casings were found on the 

scene. Upon executing a search warrant, police found a box of 

bullets in a vehicle that was driven by Appellant and his 

girlfriend, Ms. Dudley.[5]In his defense, Appellant offered alibi 

witnesses who testified that he was not in Philadelphia at all on 

July 11, and could not be responsible for the shooting.

The finder of fact is always free to determine which 

testimony to believe and how much weight to give testimony. 

See Commonwealth v. Moore, 648 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 

1994). While Appellant did offer an alibi witness at trial, this 

witness did not make a statement to police until two years after 

the original incident, and had no documentation to corroborate 

that Appellant was working with him that day. Similarly, 

Appellant's girlfriend, Latisha Dudley, did not tell police that 

Appellant was out of town on the date of the shooting until two 

years after the incident. Ms. Dudley was also found to have been 

convicted of several crimen falsi [offenses], which made her a 

____________________________________________

5 We note that Appellant did not preserve, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, 

any issue concerning the weight the court afforded to the ammunition 

evidence, which did not match the caliber of the gun fired in the shooting. 

In his brief to this Court, Appellant only mentions the non-matching calibers, 

but offers no argument pertaining to why the court should not have afforded 

any weight to the ammunition evidence. In any event, we would conclude 

that the testimony that Appellant was observed shooting a 9-mm gun, which 

was corroborated by the 9-mm shell casings found at the scene, would be 

sufficient circumstantial evidence - that bore sufficient weight - to support 

Appellant’s convictions.
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less credible witness compared to someone without such prior 

convictions. 

Although no “live bullets” were recovered from the scene, 

several fired casings were found around [Taylor’s] vehicle, which 

was consistent with [Taylor’s] testimony. Officers on the scene 

also observed damage to the vehicle consistent with shots 

having been fired. This testimony was consistent with the 

testimony of [Taylor] and his girlfriend, who described Appellant 

chasing [Taylor] around the van and firing at him three times. 

Here, the finder of fact chose to credit the testimony of 

[Taylor], his girlfriend, and police officers, and gave this 

testimony more weight than the defense witnesses. Considering 

the delay of the defense witnesses in coming forward with this 

alibi, the lack of corroboration by other evidence, and the 

credibility of Ms. Dudley, it is not shocking to one's sense of 

justice for the fact-finder to have weighed the evidence in such a 

manner. For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant's claims that 

the verdict was against the weight of the evidence must also fail.

TCO at 11-12.

As stated supra, the majority of Appellant’s arguments on appeal 

address issues that were not preserved in his Rule 1925(b) statement. In 

regard to his preserved claims, Appellant only briefly mentions that Taylor 

gave inconsistent statements and testimony regarding how many shots were 

fired (changing from two to three), and he also points out that Taylor 

claimed to see Appellant dropping bullets on the ground as he loaded the 

gun, yet no live rounds were found at the scene. The trial court viewed 

these discrepancies as minor, and it did not find that they outweighed the 

totality of evidence demonstrating Appellant’s guilt. The trial court also 

offered a reasonable explanation for not believing Appellant’s alibi witnesses, 

i.e., the delay in their alibi claims, their inability to offer any corroborating 

evidence to support the alibi, and Ms. Dudley’s unreliability. Appellant has 
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not convinced us that the court abused its discretion in reaching these 

determinations. Thus, his final issue is meritless.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/9/2016