SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0063- 22 A.U.B., 1 Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. E.L., Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted April 17, 2024

– Decided May 7, 202 4 Before Judges Currier, Firko, and Susswein. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FM- 04

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. Weinberg Kaplan & Smith, PA, attorneys for appellan t (David M. Lipshutz, on the briefs). Zucker Steinberg & Wixted, PA, attorneys for respondent (David Warren Sufrin, on the brief).

1 We utilize the initials of the parties involved in this matter to protect their privacy and their child. R. 1:38 -3(d)(3) and (13). NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 0063

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PER CURIAM Defendant E.L. appeals from the Family Part's June 27, 202 2 judgment of divorce (JOD) awarding her former husband, plaintif f A.U.B., sole legal and physical custody of the parties' child, S.B., born in April 2016. The judge awarded defendant parenting time on alternate weeke nds; prohibited the maternal grandparents from having contact with the child; and ordered defendant to engage in therapy to address various i ssues, including her inability

to resist her parents' influence. The judge found defendant and her parents had attem pted to alienate the child from plaintiff, repeatedly made decisions tha t were not in the child's best interests, and orchestrated a false weapons charge ag ainst plaintiff. In addition, defendant appeals from the August 12, 2022 order de nying her motion for reconsideration insofar as it restricted the matern al grandparents' access to the child. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decisio n in the JOD granting plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of S.B. However, we remand to the Family Part to modify its August 12, 2022 order to clarify the prohibition against the maternal grandparents' contact with S.B. restri cts defendant from allowing3 A- 0063

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her parents to visit the child until her therapist provide s the requisite opinion on her ability to resist their influence.
I. We summarize the facts developed in the record. T he parties married in
2014 in Virginia. They met in 2008 at an out- of -state drug recovery facility. Both parties have a history of serious substance ab use; plaintiff's sobriety dates back to 2001, and defendant's dates back to 2008. In addition to struggling with addiction, defendant has a history of traumatic eve nts, which included being molested in kindergarten, raped while at boarding s chool, and being drugged and gang raped as an adult. When the parties met, defendant worked as a secretary at a university and obtained a bachelor's degree in corporate communications. In 2013, plaintiff , who has a bachelor's degree in psychology, founded a substance use disorder treatment center. Defendant worked at the center as a therapist and later as plaintiff's executive assist ant. After they got married, the parties lived out of

state. In August 2016, the parties and their infant child moved to New Jersey where plaintiff opened a treatment facility, which he sold two years later. In 2019 plaintiff began working for a substance abuse policy group, which required4 A- 0063

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him to travel once or twice a week. Defendant was the child's primary caregiver during the parties' marriage. Domestic Violence The last week of January 2020, plaintiff left home for a business trip. He was scheduled to return on February 3, 2020. On Ja nuary 28, 2020, defendant went to the police station seeking to obtain a temp orary restraining order (TRO) against plaintiff. For reasons that are not entire ly clear in the record, defendant did not initial ly intend to report that plaintiff sexually assaulted her, but to report there was a rifle and a gun box in the attic before, it turns out, she knew it was there. Three days later, defendant and her sister searched the attic and actually found the rifle. They videotaped the search. Defe ndant and her sister left the rifle in the attic, and defendant went away on vaca tion. On February 3, 2020, defendant returned to the poli ce station, accompanied by her sister and her mother, C.L., and sought a TRO, alleging plaintiff had sexually, physically, and emotionally abused her. Defendant stated during her police interview that she "faked" all he r orgasms "100% of the time" during the parties' sexual relations, which plainti ff later countered negated her claims of rape. As a result of those disclosures, plaintiff was also charged criminally with a weapons offense and multiple sexu al assault charges. That5 A- 0063

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day, defendant obtained a TRO against plaintiff, wh ich prohibited him from having any contact with her or the child, and barre d plaintiff from the parties' home and the child's school. Defendant and her Florida treatment associates , who were also some of plaintiff's former colleagues , publicly posted the charges on social media. At the final restraining order (FRO) hearing condu cted three weeks later, defendant, who was the sole witness, testified abou t two incidents of rape and detailed episodes of physical and emotional abuse i nflicted on her by plaintiff. After the close of the evidence, the judge awarded defendant an FRO against plaintiff and continued the restraints in the TRO. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied. We affirmed E.B. v. A. B., No. A- 3241 -20 (App. Div. Feb. 6, 2023). In March 2020, a grand jury charged plaintiff with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C: 14 -2(a). He was incarcerated pending his criminal trial. The next month, plaintiff pled guilty to a reduced charge of fourth-degree criminal coercion, N.J.S.A. 2C :13 -5. He was sentenced to a three-year term of probation in accordance with the plea agreement and was rel eased on the day of6 A- 0063

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his sentencing. 2 Plaintiff was never charged or convicted of any fir earms violations, and the prosecutor ultimately returned the rifle to him. Zoom Calls While plaintiff was incarcerated, defendant and th e child moved out of state to where the maternal grandparents resided. After he was released from incarceration in April 2020, plaintiff wanted to mo ve back to the marital residence, but defendant refused his request, claim ing she was only visiting her parents and would return to New Jersey. Consequent ly, defendant moved into a hotel and later to an apartment where he was resi ding at the time of the divorce trial. Following his release from incarceration, plaintif f began having daily Zoom calls with the child, who was not yet four yea rs old. Defendant initiated the Zoom calls due to the child's young age. Many of the Zoom calls were

2 On September 24, 2020, plaintiff moved to vacate his guilty plea, claiming he was "forced" to accept this plea because "[his] house was s tolen, [his] child was kidnapped," the COVID-19 pandemic had begun, and a guilty plea would result in his immediate release. The trial court denied t he motion. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of that order was also denied. Plaintiff appealed from both decisions, and we affirmed. State v. A.U.B., No. A- 1942 -20 (App. Div. Feb. 6, 2023).7 A- 0063

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recorded by both parties. Conversations were also record ed between the parties and played at the divorce trial. The Divorce Litigation On June 23, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce, and defendant filed a counterclaim. Plaintiff sought sole custod y. The judge conducted a nonconsecutive fourteen-day trial from February 22 to May 17, 2022. The parties, one custody expert, and C. L.

— who is a lawyer

— testified during the trial. Plaintiff acknowledged his extensive stints in reha bilitation during his youth and his twenty-one years of sobriety. He stated he was successful in recovery after previous failures in high schools and programs, and explained his criminal record for check fraud and assaulting his drug deal er were re lated to his substance abuse issue. At the time of trial, plaintiff was unemployed, wh ich he attributed to defendant's publicizing her allegations against him and his role as a whistleblower against the "treatment industry" wher e he previously worked. Plaintiff testified that initially he was amenable to shared custody of the child, but he now sought sole custody because of defendant's false ac cusations against him and her interference with his visitation. In terms of false allegations of abuse, plaintiff stated defendant had filed "[eleve n ] . . . false [Division of Child8 A- 0063

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Protection and Permanency (Division)] complaints" a gainst him, which always arose just before the next court date. Plaintiff testified that in 2018, his father was m oving out of the country and brought "an old .22 caliber hunting rifle" for safekeeping to the parties' New Jersey home. According to plaintiff, he did not wa nt the gun , but accepted the rifle from his father in a locked box and never ope ned it . Plaintiff testified that since their child was a baby at the time, the parti es agreed to send the rifle to defendant's parents, who had firearms. Plaintiff " assumed" defendant brought the rifle to her parents because he never saw it again. Plaintiff denied the sexual assault allegations at the divorce trial, stating the parties' sexual relationship was consensual. H e testified that defendant was "a trained sex worker" who clearly conveyed when sh e wanted to have sex. Plaintiff stated they only had anal sex if defendan t initiated it, and it always stopped when she expressed any pain. Plaintiff ack nowledged using profane language against defendant, but denied doing so in the child's presence. Plaintiff presented portions of the parties' recor ded conversations. In one clip from a June 20, 2020 Zoom call, plaintiff accu sed defendant of "orchestrat[ing] this whole thing" against him, inc luding the weapons charge. Plaintiff presented another clip to support his ass ertion that the parties' sex was9 A- 0063

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consensual. In response to plaintiff's questions, in one clip defendant said, "a lot of it started off that way"

— meaning consensual sex

— but that it was "very complicated" due to their "power dynamics," which c aused her to feel "subservient" and as if she "had to comply." While plaintiff acknowledged the "pressure" and "power dynamics," he denied it const ituted rape. In the other clip, the parties discussed the alleg ed January 28, 2020 rape incident. Defendant claimed she had pneumonia at t he time, and the sex was not consensual. However, defendant also conceded s he had told the police the incident was consensual. But defendant added that the police had asked her if she "wanted to," and she responded "no." Plaintiff testified that in a recorded May 29, 202 0 Zoom call, defendant pressured him to sell the marital residence and the n "forced" the child to tell him that the child wanted a new home. In another recor ding, plaintiff told the child they were going to be "stuck" in New Jersey "foreve r," and the child echoed plaintiff's comments. Plaintiff introduced several clips to demonstrate his claim of parental alienation. In a July 16, 2020 clip, plaintiff ask ed the child for a "virtual hug" at the end of their Zoom call, and defendant interr upted, explaining that child psychologists recommend that children not be forced to hug goodbye. Plaintiff10 A- 0063

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testified the child was not resisting giving him a virtual hug and did not want to end the call. In an August 6, 2020 clip, the child told plaintiff that he did not want plaintiff to "take [him] away," and plaintiff "need[ed] to stop taking our money." Plaintiff also presented two recordings of defenda nt talking about circumcising the child, which plaintiff claimed was a "blackmail tactic" by her to obtain an "endless supply of money" from him. I n one of these recordings, defendant made a "snip, snip" gesture with her hand s after she reminded plaintiff that she had full medical "consent." In the record ing, defendant then said she would not circumcise the child, but that plaintiff would have to explain this decision to the child when he became a teenager. Plaintiff testified defendant then sought a court order authorizing circumcision, which was denied. In the second clip dated August 30, 2020, defendan t stated that her therapist recommended she avoid making "any big cho ices"

— including about circumcision

— even if she had legal decision-making authority. T he clip also reveals plaintiff stated defendant sought custody b ecause of her "malignant narcissism" and that she engaged in a "cancel cultu re campaign against [him]." Plaintiff testified that he was also granted super vised visits in addition to the Zoom calls. Despite being released from incarc eration in April 2020,11 A- 0063

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plaintiff stated his in-person visits did not comme nce until January 2021, and lasted until April 2021, at which time he began hav ing unsupervised parenting time. Plaintiff testified that he attributed the delay i n supervised visits to the maternal family's interference, stating he had prop osed four visitation supervisors, which had to be mutually agreed upon, but the maternal family rejected them all. Plaintiff stated defendant proposed E.T. as a visit ation supervisor. Plaintiff initially agreed to E.T., bu t withdrew his consent after he learned that defendant was romantically involved wi th E.T. and E.T. knew defendant's attorney. The record shows the parties finally agreed to two visitation supervisors

— R.O. and L.J. When R.O. could not supervise a visi t, plaintiff unilaterally substituted him with N.D., who was not approved. Plaintiff claimed he notified defendant and C.L. of the substitution, but they ob jected. Plaintiff construed defendant's response as further evidence that she a nd C.L. "shame[d]" and "attack[ed]" anyone who "trie[d] to support [him]." Plaintiff testified a confrontation ensued between himself and the maternal grandparents at the next visitation exchange when t hey demanded to know more about N.D. before allowing visitation to continue. The exchange was recorded12 A- 0063

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by both plaintiff and defendant's father, R.L., and played at trial. The recordings were lengthy and acrimonious. Plaintiff stated the visit was thwarted by defendant's parents even though he brought L.J., wh o was approved, along with N.D. to supervise. Plaintiff testified that L.J. supervised approxima tely twenty visits. During one visit, L.J. found a pocket in the child's overa lls that was sewn shut. Plaintiff explained that he ripped the stitching out and foun d a USB recording device in the pocket. Plaintiff testified that during their next visit, the child searched for the recording device in plaintiff's room so he coul d return it to C.L. Plaintiff stated the child was "freaking out about it for pro bably an hour," and submitted two clips verifying the child trying to get the rec ording device back from plaintiff, resulting in the child having a tantrum. After recovering the device, plaintiff testified t hat he discovered it contained inadvertently recorded conversations betw een defendant and C.L. , which he described as capturing their "campaign" ag ainst him. In one clip, plaintiff testified defendant and C.L. discussed wh o should take responsibility for planting the recording device if they got caugh t, with defendant offering to take the blame. In a second clip between defendant , C.L., and the child, after he brought home the book, "The Lorax," C.L. told th e child the book was boring13 A- 0063

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and "made [her] eyes bleed, it's so bad," and the child mimi cked her and said he wanted to "throw [the book] away" because it would make his "brain bleed." On the issue of alienation, plaintiff also testifi ed that towards the end of the trial, defendant's parents instructed the child 's school not to allow plaintiff's parents to pick him up. Plaintiff added that defen dant had "perjured" herself repeatedly when she: accused him of rape and domestic viole nce; described the weapon found in the home as an "assault rifle," as opposed to a hunting rifle; misrepresented that he and the child had dual citiz enship in Switzerland; and denied that she had moved to her parents' home out of state. Plaintiff initially wanted to share joint custody o f the child, but at trial opposed joint custody due to defendant's actions an d testified that he has not had access to the child's school, teachers, or medical records since his arrest, but admittedly never specifically asked to access this information. Plaintiff also stated that he wanted to participate in the child's therapy, but defendant had "lied" to his therapists and told them that he was not interested. In addition to seeking sole custody, plaintiff tes tified he objected to C.L. having any contact with the child. Plaintiff refer red to C.L. as a "racist," a
"f ****** monster," and a "deplorable pathetic excuse for a mother." He stated14 A- 0063

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C.L. should "go kidnap another grandchild" and "should rot in prison in this life and burn in hell in the next." During cross-examination, defense counsel played t wo recorded conversations between the parties, where defendant expressed her fear and mistrust of plaintiff. Plaintiff answered he had b een "sick," was facing pressure, and thus "acted out sexually." Pla int iff denied engaging in assaultive or violent behavior, but agreed he was manipulative. He also agreed with defendant's description that she was his "outlet for [his] rage and anger." Plaintiff testified he made these comments to take "accountability" for his behavior

— referring to his frequent absences from the home and his addicti on to video games and pornography

— but denied that his apologies were an admission to rape. Defendant testified that plaintiff regularly used profane and disparaging language against her in the child's presence, such as "[s]tupid bitch, whore, worthless c *** , ungrateful bitch, and piece of s***." She claime d that he did not want her to work outside the home and isolated her. Defendant recounted an argument between the parties when the child was young and claimed she tried to walk away with the child. But plaintiff grabbed the child's car seat from her, pressed her against a wall, and put his hand around her throat.15 A- 0063

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Describing another incident when the parties resid ed in Florida, defendant testified that plaintiff choked her, causing her to vomit. Defendant also stated that when she was pregnant, she had an ear infectio n and plaintiff had yelled at her so loudly that her ear drum "ruptured and blood came out," resulting in permanent hearing loss. Defendant reiterated portions of the testimony she gave at the FRO hearing. In particular, defendant testified that p laintiff had raped her for "[s]everal years" during their marriage. She conce ded they sometimes had consensual sex, but testified plaintiff forced her to have anal sex against her will once or twice a month, and estimated that he raped her "a significant number of times." In one instance, defendant recalled plaintiff chase d her and forced himself into the bathroom where she was hiding and raped he r. Defendant stated the child walked in to the bathroom and saw her crying. Defendant explai ned she had forgotten about this incident, but was recallin g incidents of abuse through her "therapeutic process." According to defendant, the last occurrence of sexual assault took place on January 28, 2020, when plaint iff left for a business trip. Defendant stated she believed plaintiff's abusive behavior adversely impacted their child and described him as "a functional mu te" because he rarely16 A- 0063

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spoke after the parties separated. Defendant also testified the child "used to wake up every morning screaming crying" and a few w eeks after plaintiff's arrest, this behavior stopped. Defendant claimed t hat the child sometimes imitated plaintiff by grabbing her throat. On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged she h ad worked as a stripper and had engaged in sex acts for money with her employer. Defendant admitted she started to "remember" the rape because her friends triggered her memory after she spoke to them because she had "blo cked it out." Regarding the rifle, defendant testified on cross- examination that she and her sister "searched for hours" before they found i t in a "green box" in the attic. Defendant claimed she knew nothing about the rifle or the green box, which, for all she knew, "could have been Christmas ornaments. " Defendant denied ever having a conversation with plaintiff about the rifl e and denied her father- in -law dropped it off at their prior home two years earlie r. At the divorce trial, defendant testified that she "ha[d] a fee ling" plaintiff obtained the rifle when patrolling on the back of a truck with the "Sandinistas." Defendant testified that the child often presented with unexplained injuries after visits with plaintiff, but denied mak ing any allegations to the Division or asking others to report on her behalf. While defendant stated she17 A- 0063

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did not think plaintiff was physically abusing the child, she thought that plaintiff "yell[ed] at him a lot" to get the child to be quie t. Plaintiff did not dispute that the child had bruises, but suggested defendant or C .L. "bruis[ed] him up themselves." Defendant requested a joint custody award and fear ed that sole legal custody to plaintiff would "eliminate [her] from [t he child's] life." Defendant stated she agreed to engage in parallel parenting, as suggested by the custody evaluator, Dr. Gregory M. Joseph, where each parent maintains separate parenting lanes and does not interfere in the other 's parenting choices. Defendant countered plaintiff's testimony and claim ed that she shared the child's medical, dental, and educational records wi th him in the past. In addition, defendant testified that she had given plaintiff's contact information to the child's therapist, but plaintiff was "anti-therapis t," and never returned the therapist's phone call. Defendant admitted she did not notify plaintiff that the child m ight have to repeat kindergarten, but claimed plaintiff was already aware of this. Defendant acknowledged that C.L. was too involved in the litigation, but said "her intentions were good." Defendant felt sh e made a lot of mistakes and testified that she had brought "shame to the family ," whereas C.L. was an18 A- 0063

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intelligent lawyer who "made a lot of good decision s in her lifetime." Defendant explained that her past mistakes harmed her relatio nship with C.L., and she thought following her mother's lead now would help to mend their relationship. The record shows that a heated exchange took place between counsel for the parties during defendant's cross-examination. The judge paused the proceedings and inquired about defendant's mental h ealth. In response, defendant listed information she had gathered on pl aintiff, his family, and his attorney. C.L. testified about a phone call between plaintiff and the child where plaintiff talked about the child being kidnapped an d commented that C.L. was "bad." C.L. testified that plaintiff repeatedly ac cused her and her husband of kidnapping the child. C.L. acknowledged she had se wn the recording device in the child's clothing, but testified she did so out of concern for him. C.L. denied asking the child to retrieve the device from plaint iff. Dr. Joseph, a psychologist, prepared an evaluation , interviewed the parties, the child, the maternal grandparents, and defendant's therapists. In his report, Dr. Joseph opined that defendant was a nurt uring and communicative parent, but noted she "struggled to effectively ass ert appropriate authority" and19 A- 0063

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appeared stressed by the child's anger and defiance , choosing to negotiate and compromise rather than set firm limits. At trial, Dr. Joseph concluded that defendant pres ented with "ongoing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms" and persec utory ideation. Dr. Joseph opined that defendant's past traumatic exper iences

— unrelated to plaintiff

— impaired her "perceptions, emotional regulation, an d impulse control," resulting in a tendency to "overperceive" and "overreact to" danger and harm, both in terms of her and the child's safety. Dr. Joseph explained that defendant's therapists f elt pressured by her to call the Division on three occasions to report: (1 ) emotional abuse because plaintiff had discussed the litigation with the chi ld; (2) red marks on the child's legs, which t he child said could be bug bites; and (3) the child's comments that plaintiff had "squished" him, which the Division co ncluded was a tight hug. None of the se allegations were substantiated by the Division. Dr. Joseph concluded that the abuse allegations we re unsupported by any evidence, and reflected defendant's negative percep tion of plaintiff. Dr. Joseph observed that defendant was "virtually incapable" o f viewing any interaction between plaintiff and the child as safe or positive . Based upon a conversation Dr. Joseph reviewed between defendant and C.L. from the recording device, he20 A- 0063

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found it was "their conviction that [plaintiff] is this dangerous person that's going to harm the child" and their "find[ing] ways to take him out of [the child's] life." Dr. Joseph testified that defendant and her family are so "entrenched in their way of seeing things" and "on the lookout for " abuse. In support of his opinion, Dr. Joseph testified about a visitation journal that the maternal family had provided him summarizing the child's visits and calls with plaintiff. After comparing the entries to the parties' recordings, D r. Joseph noted that the journal did not accurately reflect the recorded visits, and overly emphasized any negative aspects. Dr. Joseph agreed that the child sometimes refused or was reluctant to speak to plaintiff, but opin ed this is "fairly typical" for a child his age. W hen the child became upset about an upcoming visit, Dr. Joseph found the maternal family made "little effort to console or encourage him," and instead, watched
him have a tantrum or made comments about how it was " really sad" he had to speak to plaintiff. Dr. Joseph reviewed the Zoom calls and interpreted them as defendant's admission that she had falsified the allegations an d "orchestrated the gun charge" "to gain the upper hand in this litigation" by obtaining a TRO against21 A- 0063

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plaintiff. The expert also interpreted defendant's responses about the parties' sexual relationship as an admission it was consensu al and viewed defendant's behavior in the Zoom calls as contradictory of her claim that she was a victim of sexual abuse and feared plaintiff. Dr. Joseph opined defendant lacked confidence and was "very influenced" by C.L., who was "overzealous" and "calling the sho ts," with defendant "following rather than leading." He viewed C.L.'s comments about "The Lorax" as "damaging," noting the child "cherished" the boo k and wanted to share it with plaintiff, but C.L.'s actions "interfered with thei r connection on that level." Dr. Joseph noted the recording device

— and the child's attempt to retrieve it

— as another example of the child being "bandied about i n the case." Regarding plaintiff's parenting style, Dr. Joseph described it as having "high nurturance, communication, and control." Dr. Joseph observed plaintiff was "attenti ve to [the child's] needs," but gave him "greater lat itude to explore and express himself" than defendant. According to Dr. Joseph, plaintiff was "more demonstrative and authoritative" with the chi ld when he struggled with frustration and defiant behaviors. Dr. Joseph found plaintiff was "surprisingly hopef ul and determined" about the litigation, with "good control of his emo tions and solid frustration22 A- 0063

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tolerance." He criticized plaintiff for sh ar ing too much information about the litigation with the child, but noted plaintiff did so in response to the child's questions. Dr. Joseph opined that some of plaintif f's comments were "unhealthy" and "inappropriate," specifically refer encing a recording about killing defendant's attorney, but explained that plaintiff's "motivatio n [was] different" because he was frustrated and attempting to explain the litigation. Dr. Joseph noted plaintiff's psychological testing profile revealed "persecutory ideation" about his belief that he had been "framed," and it was not "unreasonable" for plaintiff to fear defendant would continue to make false child abuse allegations against him. Dr. Joseph spoke with the child separately and in bonding sessions with both parties. The expert described the child as ve ry aware of the parties' conflict evidenced by his repeated references to lawyers and jail. During the bonding sessions, Dr. Joseph noted the child gave lengthy, ro botic monologues about the litigation, which "appeared to have been coached," and echoed defendant's own complaints. The coached statements were inconsiste nt with "the steady comfort, love, and affection" that he otherwise displayed fo r plaintiff. Dr. Joseph recommended that the parties share legal and ph ysical custody of the child notwithstanding his concerns of aliena tion by defendant and her23 A- 0063

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family. However, Dr. Joseph cautioned that if defe ndant or her family continued interfering in the child's relationship with plaint iff, then the judge should consider "requiring supervision." Because of the p arties' behaviors, Dr. Joseph opined there was a "high risk" of the child "becomi ng alienated from [plaintiff]" since the child was still young and unable to separ ate his positive interactions with plaintiff from the negative comments he receiv ed from defendant and her family. Dr. Joseph expressed concern that the chil d presented with such "polarized perception" that he could, in the future , "resist or reject contact with [plaintiff]." Defense counsel played a few clips from the child' s Zoom calls with plaintiff during Dr. Joseph's testimony. In one ca ll, plaintiff spoke to the child about "monsters," allegedly referring to defendant' s family. In another call, plaintiff blamed "a very bad man"

— meaning defendant's attorney

— for his legal problems using child-friendly and legal terms to describe his comp laints. In response, the child said, "I will get rid of that b oy," referring to defendant's attorney, and plaintiff added, "I hope he dies." W hen the child threatened to "kill him with guns," plaintiff interrupted and tol d him not to say that, but continued with his complaints against defense couns el.24 A- 0063

- 22 The Judge's Decision The judge rendered an oral decision on the record, which was incorporated into the JOD, granting plaintiff sole legal and phy sical custody of the child. The judge awarded defendant parenting time on alternate weekends. In her decision, the judge determined defendant's testimony was inco nsistent and peppered with irrelevant and unrelated negative statements about plaintiff. The judge emphasized that defendant's inappropriate behavior had prompted [the judge] to interrupt the proceedings, "to see if [defendant] n eeded counseling or something." In addition, the judge referred to plaintiff as a "bully" who "was in control of the litigation," highlighting his disregard for court orders to stop talking and his effort to control the presentation of the evide nce. The judge described plaintiff as an "obnoxious difficult individual," w ho "was a jerk" to defendant and was "not a good guy," yet noted she chose to ma rry him and have a child with him. The judge summarized the events that precipitated the parties' separation. The judge found that, following a dispute between t he parties, defendant and her family "plotted" "to get rid of" plaintiff, "orches trated the whole thing," and criticized defendant for failing to consider how these tact ics impacted the child.25 A- 0063

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The judge found that defendant had "[c]learly made up" the weapons charge to "set [plaintiff] up," and rejected her testimony on this issue as "literally ma[king] no sense." The judge concluded that after defendan t reported the rifle to the police, "one lie [begot ] another," and it just kept snowballing," resulting in the sexual assault disclosure. The judge said she did not "know . . . what the situation was with th e sex with them" noting that defendant first said, "it wa s consensual, then it wasn't consensual, then it was consensual, then it wasn't consensual." Defendant "couldn't keep track of what it was," or when it ha ppened. The judge acknowledged that defendant's allegations may have been true, but did not know this "to be a fact" because "[n]one of it was shown to [the court]." The judge also was not convinced that defendant was afraid of plaintiff, based on her demeanor in the recorded conversations. The judge credited plaintiff's testimony that, aft er his release from incarceration, defendant intentionally barred plain tiff's access to the marital home and prevented his visitation with the child. The judge viewed defendant's family as "blocking [plaintiff] at every turn," includin g with the selection of the visitation supervisor.26 A- 0063

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The judge chastised both parties for recording one another and the child, and for posting their private disputes on social me dia. While the judge criticized plaintiff for dragging the child into the litigatio n and his "cross-examin[ation] of defendant and the child in the recordings, the j udge gave plaintiff "the benefit of the doubt" because he was trying to defend himse lf against defendant's allegations. Most disturbing in the judge's view w as defendant and C.L.'s decision to sew a recording device into the child's clothing, which the judge concluded was "inexcusable." The judge found "on balance" that defendant's behavior was "the worst," reasoning she and C.L. an d the rest of her family had alienated the child from plaintiff. The judge questioned Dr. Joseph's recommendation o f joint custody and said she "had to do something now" due to the parti es' inability to agree on anything and the judge's fear that an award of join t custody would "tear this child apart." In terms of who should be granted sole custody, the judge reviewed the fourteen statutory factors identified in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), namely:

the parents' ability to agree, communicate and cooperate in matters relating to the child; the par ents' willingness to accept custody and any history of unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse; the interaction and relationsh ip of the child with its parents and siblings; the histor y of domestic violence, if any; the safety of the child and the safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other27 A- 0063

- 22 parent; the preference of the child when of suffici ent age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelli gent decision; the needs of the child; the stability of the home environment offered; the quality and continuit y of the child's education; the fitness of the parent s; the geographical proximity of the parents' homes; the extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior to or subsequent to the separation; the parents' employment responsibilities; and the age and number of the children. [Ibid.] Reviewing the parties' past behaviors, the judge concluded that plaintiff was better suited to communicate and cooperate in m atters relating to the child (factor one). Similarly, highlighting defendant's deficiencies as a co -parent, the judge found that plaintiff would better accept the custo dial arrangement and facilitate parenting time (factor two). The judge noted that defendant lacked "the proper judgment to parent" because "she allowe d other people to push her around," prioritized her disputes with plaintiff ov er [the child 's ] relationship with him, and "destroyed any chance of cooperation between the parties." The judge noted defendant 's fear that plaintiff would harm the child, but foun d no evidence supported this fear. Instead, defendant " hurt" plaintiff's relationship with the child "every chance she got," including by maki ng false allegation to the D ivision and interfering with the parental grandparents' ac cess to the child.28 A- 0063

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With respect to the parties' interactions with the child's "parents and siblings" (factor three), the judge focus ed on defendant's negative behavior towards plaintiff. While defendant was child's pri mary caregiver, the judge stated she "systemically" took plaintiff "out of th e picture" and disparaged him both publicly and privately, including in the child 's presence. The judge next considered the parties' history of domestic violence (factor four). The judge noted that defendant never alleged that plaintiff hit her or the child, and thus viewed the FRO as "a neutral restra ining order situation" with respect to domestic violence and added that the FRO would protect defendant from any future harm. While reiterating that there was no threat of physi cal harm to the child (factor five), the judge found that defendant's family's actions in sewing a recording device into hi s clothing was "completely abusive," as were their attempts to have the child retrieve the device from plaintiff. In terms of stability of the home environment (factor eight), the judge said the parent who receives sole custody of the child w ould also receive the marital home to ensure "the quality and continuity of his education" (factor ni ne). The judge held that both parents were "minimally fit," but w eighed this factor in favor of plaintiff (factor ten ). Although both parties had launched29 A- 0063

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social media "campaign[s]" against one another, the court noted that defendant "started it," adding that she had "destroyed his li fe" with her false allegations and "reveled in it." The judge weighed in defendant's favor the "extent and quali ty of time spent with the child prior to the separation" (fact or twelve), as she was the child's primary caregiver. The judge also considered the parties' employment responsibilities (factor thirteen), stating that ne ither of them worked, thus this was "really pretty neutral on both ends." Because they had support from their respective families, the judge found that both parties were able to meet the child's needs. 3
The judge concluded that the factors weighed in plaintiff's favor and awarded him sole legal and physical custody. The j udge also ordered plaintiff to engage in anger management courses and ordered d efendant to continue therapeutic counseling to help her "understand what it means to be a co-parent." The judge also completely barred the maternal grandparents' from any contact with the child , explaining that until defendant's counselor reported " that she's able to withstand their control of her, " they could not have contact with the

3 The judge did not address factors six, seven, eleve n, or fourteen, as they are not relevant to this case.30 A- 0063

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child. The judge viewed the defendant's family's "manipulat[ion]" o f this case

as the biggest concern and viewed C.L. as the instigator, saying she "orchestrated the gun" with defendant, encouraged d efendant to keep plaintiff in jail, and when the weapons charge proved to be i nsufficient, defendant's family "started with the other stuff." Defendant moved for reconsideration of the JOD and to join C.L. as a party in the dissolution action. Plaintiff cross-m oved seeking to clarify possession of the former marital home and the right of first refusal to purchase it . On August 17, 2022, the judge denied most of the relief sought in the motions. However, the judge modified the JOD to cl arify visitation and phone contact and permitted plaintiff to relocate outside of the child's sc hool district. A memorializing order was entered. On September 8, 2022, defendant filed an emergent o rder to show cause seeking primary custody of the child, contending th at plaintiff was relocating outside the geographic limits set forth in the Augu st 17, 2022 order to a lesser quality school district. The application was denie d, with the judge finding plaintiff had moved to an apartment in a town less than ten miles from the former marital home whose school system was ranked higher than the child's prior school. This appeal followed.31 A- 0063

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On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred: (1) by awarding sole custody to plaintiff contrary to this State's legislative preference for shared cust ody and against the recommendation of Dr. Joseph, who recommended shared custody; (2) in failing to consider defendant's allegations of domestic violence and sexual abuse in the best interests analysis; (3) by not accepting as true all of the allegations se t forth in the TRO based on the doctrine of collatera l estoppel; and (4) in restricting the maternal grandparents' contact with the child, arguing such a prohibition exceeded the judge's authority.
II. Our review of a family court order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Generally, the family court' s factual findings "are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at 412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv's, Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). The scope of appellate review of a Family Part judg e's findings following a bench trial is limited. N.T. V. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411). The conclusions of Family Part judges regarding chi ld custody "are entitled to great weight and will not be lightly di sturbed on appeal." DeVita v.32 A- 0063

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DeVita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 123 (App. Div. 1976) ( citing Sheehan v. Sheehan , 51 N.J. Super. 276, 295 (App. Div. 1958)). Because this court recognizes "the special expertise of judges hearing matters in the Family Part," Parish v. Parish , 412 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Ces are, 154 N.J. at 412), we will only disturb the Family Part's factual findings if "they are 'so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova F arms, 65 N.J. at 483-84). An appellate court, in consequence, will only rever se the family court's conclusions if those conclusions are so "'clearly m istaken' or 'wide of the mark'" that they result in the denial of justice. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. at 48 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 8 8, 104 (2008)). The Family Part's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183 (2010). "Discretionary determinations, supported by the rec ord, are examined to discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci , 448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017) (citing G ac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547 (2006)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a tria l court's decision "rested on an impermissible basis, considered irrelevant or in appropriate factors, failed to consider controlling legal principles or made findi ngs inconsistent with or33 A- 0063

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unsupported by competent evidence." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks and cita tions omitted). Challenges to legal conclusions, as well as the trial court's interpretation of the law, are subject to de novo review. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 565 (citing Reese v. Weis , 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).
III. In claiming the judge erred in awarding plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the child, defendant asks us to conduct a de novo review of the decision, contending that the judge's findings were insufficient and unsupported by the record. We disagree. As stated above, our review of a court's factual findings is for an abuse of discretion. "In custody cases, it is well settled that the cou rt's primary consideration is the best interests of the children." Hand v. Ha nd, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007). The focus is on the "safety, hap piness, physical, mental and moral welfare" of the children. Fantony v. Fantony , 21 N.J. 525, 536 (1956). New Jersey carries a "legislative preference for cu stody decrees that allow both parents full and genuine involvement in the lives o f their children following a divorce." Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. at 485. To that e nd, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 provides that:34 A- 0063

- 22 [I]t is in the public policy of this State to assur e minor children of frequent and continuing contact with bo th parents after the parents have separated or dissolv ed their marriage and that it is in the public interes t to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effec t this policy. Notwithstanding the preference for joint custody, "the decision concerning the type of custody arrangement [is left ] to the sound discretion of the trial court[.]" Nufrio v. Nufrio, 341 N.J. Sup er. 548, 555 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 611 (199 5)) (alterations in original). Thus, a court may award joint custody, sole custody with a provision for "appropriate parenting time for the noncustodial pa rent," or another arrangement that "the court may determine to be in the best int erests of the child." N.J.S.A. 9:2 -4(a) to (c). The court must also "identify on the record the specific factors that justify the arrangement." See J.G. v. J.H., 457 N.J. Super. 365, 374 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 30 9, 322 (2017)). Here, it is readily apparent the judge was cogniza nt of her charge to review the fourteen statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 (c) when assessing custody. In rejecting joint custody, the judge expressed con cern about the parties' acrimony and their inability to shield the child fr om their disputes. The judge's35 A- 0063

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finding is supported by the dozens of recordings, wh ich demonstrate the parties' inability to protect the child from their adult con versations. "[A] successful joint custody arrangement" can exis t even where the parents disagree, so long as they are "able to isol ate their personal conflicts from their roles as parents," "spar[ing]" the child from "whatever resentments and rancor the parents may harbor." Beck, 86 N.J. at 4 98-99. Here, the record clearly establishes that the parties were unable to exercise such restraint. As the judge appropriately found, the parties had a distrust of one another, and they repeatedly resorted to airing their disputes on soc ial media, even after she instructed them to not do so. The judge was well within her discretion to deviat e from Dr. Joseph's recommendation of shared legal and physical custody . A factfinder is free to accept or reject, in full or in part, the opinions of qualified experts. Brown v. Brown, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 478 (App. Div. 2002). While a custody expert's opinion "should be carefully considered by a judge when appropriate, such opinions do not relieve the trial judge from the ultimate responsibility of determining what type of custody arrangement is in the best interest of the child." D.A. v. R.C., 438 N.J. Super. 431, 454 (Ap p. Div. 2014). This determination remains "the exclusive obligation of the trial judge." Ibid.36 A- 0063

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Moreover, Dr. Joseph recognized the difficulties s hared custody would create and was "pessimistic" about its likelihood o f success, particularly noting defendant's "entrenched" negative view of plaintiff . Referring to N.J.S.A. 9:2- 4(c), the judge concluded that plaintiff was better suited as the primary custodial parent, and an award of sole custody was in the chi ld's best interests. The record supports that determination, including the judge's extensive credibility findings, which are entitled to "great deference." D.A., 438 N.J. Super. at 451. Defendant challenges the judge's overall assessmen t of the custody factors, contending the judge did not afford proper weight to her domestic violence and sexual assault allegations. Defendant interprets the judge's finding as contrary to the legislature's presumption that c ustody should be awarded to the non-abusive spouse. However, domestic violence is just "one of several factors requiring consideration" when determining custody in a divorc e proceeding. R.K. v. F.K. , 437 N.J. Super. 58, 65 (App. Div. 2014). See also Terry v. Terry, 270 N.J. Super. 105, 119 (App. Div. 1994) (reversing custody award to the mother where "the only differentiating factor" was the father's concession to one act of physical abuse and his "lack of credibility in his denial of non-physical abuse"). Thus, in custody disputes within a divorce procee ding

— as compared to when a37 A- 0063

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custody determination is part of a domestic violenc e hearing, which is governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(11)

— there is no "mechanical presumption" in favor of the non-offending spouse. R.K., 437 N.J. Super. at 66. The expectation is that the Family Part judge will "weigh the seriousness o f the history of domestic violence against the other N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 factors." Ibid. Here, the judge did not explicitly determine wheth er plaintiff raped defendant. The judge found defendant's allegations were contradictory and inconsistent, but observed there may be some truth to her claims. And, the judge did not reference the findings made by the judge wh o presided over the FRO hearing, but acknowledged the existence of the FRO and construed it as "a neutral restraining order situation." Saliently, t he judge found the domestic violence allegations did not involve the child. Mo reover, the judge considered how the domestic violence related to the child's be st interests. Dr. Joseph's evaluation did not reveal the child was exposed to or aware of any domestic violence. Thus, even if defendant's allegations we re true, the judge properly considered the impact of any domestic violence on t he child's best interests. A court's failure to consider a child's exposure to domestic violence may undermine its best interests analysis. See , e.g. , J.D. v. M.A.D., 429 N.J. Super. 34, 45 (App. Div. 2012) (in the context of a FRO pr oceeding, the trial court erred38 A- 0063

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in giving temporary custody to the parent accused o f the abuse, where the children witnessed the abuse and had "an inappropri ate awareness of the problems between their parents"). Domestic violenc e is but one factor to consider. R.K., 437 N.J. Super. at 65. We are sat isfied weighing this factor more heavily in defendant's favor would not have ch anged the outcome. The judge highlighted that plaintiff was the parent better able to communicate, cooperate, and facilitate parenting ti me in considering factors one and two. N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). In contrast, the judg e found that defendant's alienating behaviors undermined her ability to fost er a relationship between plaintiff and the child. A parent's repeated inability to co-parent and inte rfere with the other parent can support an award of sole legal custody t o the other parent. Nufrio , 241 N.J. Super. at 555. Se e also Beck, 86 N.J. at 499 ("[W]hen the actions of [an uncooperative] parent deprive the child of the kind of relationship with the other parent that is deemed to be in the child's best interest s, removing the child from the custody of the uncooperative parent may we ll be appropriate as a remedy of last resort.").
As Dr. Jos ep h explained, defendant was incapable of finding any positive element in plaintiff's relationship with the child, and her inability resulted in her39 A- 0063

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alienating behavior and interference with parenting time. And, defendant did very little to promote plaintiff's relationship wit h the child. According to Dr. Joseph, while the child's young age allowed him to separate his positive experiences from defendant's negative descriptions of plaintiff, there was a genuine threat that the child eventually would reje ct plaintiff if defendant's behavior persisted. The record supports this deter mination. Referencing plaintiff's shortcomings in co-parenti ng and communicating, the judge ultimately concluded that defendant's def iciencies far outweighed those of plaintiff. Thus, the judge did not err in weighing factors one and two in plaintiff's favor. When assessing whether either party posed a risk o f physical harm to the child under factor five, the judge aptly concluded neither party did. However, the judge found defendant's family placed the child at risk of emotional harm. There was also support in the record for the judge' s conclusion that while both parties were "minimally fit," defendant was less fi t due to her purported false allegations against plaintiff, alienating behaviors, an d lack of awareness of how this impacted the child under factor ten. The reco rd supports the judge's findings and conclusions as to factors five and ten.40 A- 0063

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Factor twelve was the only factor the judge weighe d in defendant's favor because she was the child's primary caregiver throu ghout his life. However, Dr. Joseph noted

— and the judge found

— both parties had a warm, loving relationship with the child. The judge performed the required best interests an alysis under N.J.S.A. 9:2 -4(c) and addressed all the relevant factors. Cont rary to defendant's contention, the judge did not make an erroneous dec ision in granting sole custody to plaintiff. The judge aptly concluded, b ased upon the substantial credible evidence in the record, it would be in the best interests of the child for plaintiff to have sole custody. The record support s the judge's findings and conclusions, and we discern no basis to disturb the judge's decision on custody and parenting time.
IV. Next, for the first time on appeal, defendant argu es the judge misapplied the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Defendant clai ms the judge allowed plaintiff to re-litigate the rape allegations underlying the FRO even though the issues were formerly adjudicated and proven by a preponder ance of the evidence. Collateral estoppel prevents the re-litigation of i ssues formerly adjudicated and fully disposed of. Barker v. Brine gar, 346 N.J. Super. 558, 565-41 A- 0063

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66 (App. Div. 2002). The notion of judicial effici ency prevents the duplication of lawsuits with the same issues, the same parties, and the same witnesses. Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 26 (19 89); see also State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 186 (1977) (explaining that collateral estoppel bars relitigation of any issue decided in prior action). For collateral estoppel to apply, the issues must b e identical to the ones presented in the prior proceedings, the issues must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding, the court must have entere d a final judgment, the issues raised in the new complaint must have been essentia l to the prior judgment, and the party against whom collateral estoppel is asser ted must have been a party in the earlier proceeding. Olivieri v. YMF Carpet, In c., 186 N.J. 511, 521 (2006). Here, collateral estoppel did not prevent the judge from re-hearing testimony and re-deciding issues that were d is cussed in the FRO hearing. In L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J. Super. 76, 86-89 (App. Div. 2014), we declined to give preclusive effect to an FRO hearing in a civil acti on based on the same allegations because of the procedural differences b etween the two proceedings. In L.T., the plaintiff alleged assault in a Law Div ision tort case after successfully obtaining an FRO against the defendant . Id. at 81-82. The trial court applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel a nd barred the defendant from42 A- 0063

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defending against the plaintiff's allegations of as sault. Id. at 83-84. Noting the summary nature of an FRO trial as compared to the p rocedure in the Law Division, and the higher standard of proof for the punitive damages sought by the plaintiff in the intentional tort action, we re versed. Unlike the situation in L.T., here plaintiff did no t testify at the FRO hearing. Thus, the judge issuing the FRO could only make f actual findings and credibility determinations based on the testimony a nd evidence adduced during the FRO hearing. Here, the trial judge heard from and was able to observe both parties during the divorce trial. In the matter under review, the evidence at the FRO hearing was largely limited to defendant's testimony against plaintiff, most likely because of the criminal case pending against him at the time. The re was no discovery or expert reports or opinions. Therefore, plaintiff's abilit y to defend against defendant's allegations in the TRO was severely limited. L.T., 438 N.J. Super. at 87-88. In contrast, both parties testified at the dissolution hearing, presented numerous video and audio recordings to support their positio ns

— which were made after the FRO hearing

— and retained Dr. Joseph as a joint custody expert. Our review of the record de novo convinces us the judge did no t err because collateral estoppel is inapplicable here.43 A- 0063

- 22 V. Finally, defendant asserts the judge erred in rest ricting the maternal grandparents' contact with the child on the basis i t was contrary to his best interests. The JOD provides: "[C.L.] and [R.L.] shall have no contact with the m inor child at all until the [c] ourt receives a report from defendant's counselor i ndicating that [defendant] is capable of making decisions independ ent from the [maternal grandparents'] influence." Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, (1) arguing that the judge did not have the authority to limit the maternal gr andparents access to the child because they were not parties to the litigation, an d (2) asking to join the maternal grandparents to the litigation. The judge denied her application, agreeing that the maternal grandparents were not parties to the divorce proceeding. The judge stated that the mat ernal "grandparents don't have any rights" except through defend ant. 4 The judge also expanded on her findings for restricting the materna l grandparents' access to the child, stating "they conspired to destroy" the chil d's relationship with plaintiff

4 The judge also mistakenly stated that "grandparents don't ha ve any visitation rights in the State of New Jersey." See N.J.S.A. 9:72-7.1 (the grandparent visitation statute).44 A- 0063

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and defendant "was too weak" to stop them. While t he judge attributed this primarily to C.L. , she implicated R.L. as well, finding that the maternal grandparents "operate[d] as a unit," R.L. was prese nt in various recordings, he was married to C.L., and he was unable to "speak up to" her. The judge found that their actions were detrimental to the child's best interests. On appeal, defendant argues there was no evidence that the maternal grandparents conspired to destroy the child. Defendant argues any misbehavior was warranted because plaintiff had raped defendant

. Defendant also questions the restriction on R.L.'s contact, given hi s limited role. The Family Part has the authority "to make judgmen ts or orders concerning care, custody, education and maintenance " of a minor child who is the subject of a custody dispute. N.J.S.A. 9:2-3. The focus of every custody and parenting time determination is "on the 'safety , happiness, physical, mental and moral welfare' of the children." Hand, 391 N.J . Super. at 105 (quoting Fantony, 21 N.J. at 536). As articulated by our Supreme Court in Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276,
317 -18 (1997):

The "best-interest[s]- of

- the -child" standard is more than a statement of the primary criterion for decisi on or the factors to be considered; it is an expression o f the court's special responsibility to safeguard the int erests45 A- 0063

- 22 of the child at the center of a custody dispute bec ause the child cannot be presumed to be protected by the adversarial process. Our courts have relied on the above cited language as authority to restrict a parent from exposing the child to a third party, if such exposure is contrary to the child's best interests. This authority is view ed as an extension of the court's parens patriae authority. DeVita v. DeVita, 145 N. J. Super. 120, 127-28 (App. Div. 1976) (citing Clemens v. Clemens, 20 N.J. Supe r. 383, 389 (App. Div. 1952) ). Implicit in these holdings is the Family Part's authori ty to craft custody and parenting time in a manner that furthers the ch ild's best interests. While R.L.'s conduct certainly did not rise to the l evel of C.L.'s, the judge found both of them had assisted defendant in "orche strating" charges against plaintiff, and both int er fered with visitation, as evidenced in the recordin gs. Moreover, Dr. Josephs' report included an interview with R.L., who echoed defendant's and C.L.'s complaints about plaintiff a s an abuser. When reviewing a denial for reconsideration, the ap pellate court will affirm the trial court's decision "unless it represe nts a clear abuse of discretion." Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020) (q uoting Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994)). H owever, to the extent the trial46 A- 0063

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court's decision implicates questions of law, those legal rulings are reviewed de novo. Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187, 197 ( App. Div. 2020). Because the maternal grandparents' interfering beh aviors were well documented, and Dr. Joseph expressed similar concer ns about their interactions with the child, the judge's determination was suppo rted by substantial credible evidence in the record. Thus, there was no abuse o f discretion in denying defendant's motion for reconsideration. We affirm the judge's determination to restrict C. L.'s and R.L.'s access to the child until further order of the court. Howeve r, we remand to the Family Part to enter an amended JOD to place the obligatio n on defendant to restrict the maternal grandparents from having access to the chi ld until further order of the court because the maternal grandparents are not par ties to this action. To the extent we have not specifically addressed d efendant's remaining claims, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to wa rrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11 -3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed in part, remanded in part. We do not ret ain jurisdiction.