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29–574 PDF 2006

S. HRG. 109–553

VIDEO CONTENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 31, 2006

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

(

(II)

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

LISA J. SUTHERLAND, Republican Staff Director 

CHRISTINE DRAGER KURTH, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

KENNETH R. NAHIGIAN, Republican Chief Counsel 

MARGARET L. CUMMISKY, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SAMUEL E. WHITEHORN, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Democratic Policy Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on January 31, 2006 ......................................................................... 1

Statement of Senator Dorgan ................................................................................. 44

Statement of Senator Stevens ................................................................................ 1

WITNESSES

Fawcett, Daniel M., Executive Vice President, Business and Legal Affairs 

and Programming Acquisition, DIRECTV, Inc. ................................................. 26

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 28

Gorshein, Doron, Chief Executive Officer/President, The America Channel, 

LLC ........................................................................................................................ 33

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35

Lee, Robert G., President/General Manager, WDBJ Television, Inc.; on Behalf 

of the National Association of Broadcasters ...................................................... 13

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14

Polka, Matt, President/CEO, American Cable Association .................................. 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Pyne, Ben, President, Disney and ESPN Networks Affiliate Sales and Marketing .................................................................................................................... 2

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3

Waz, Jr., Joseph W., Vice President, External Affairs and Public Policy Counsel, Comcast Corporation ..................................................................................... 18

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20

APPENDIX

Ensign, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from Nevada, prepared statement .................. 57

Feld, Harold, Senior Vice President, Media Access Project, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 58

Goodman, John, President, Coalition for Competitive Access to Content 

(CA2C), prepared statement ................................................................................ 64

Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii, prepared statement ........... 57

Letters to Hon. Ted Stevens and Hon. Daniel K. Inouye from: 

Brunner, Michael E., Chief Executive Officer, National Telecommunications Cooperative Association (NTCA), dated January 30, 2006 ........... 74

C. Michael Cooley, President and Chief Executive Officer, The Sportsman 

Channel, dated January 31, 2006 ................................................................ 72

Keith A. Larson, General Manager, Dakota Central Communications, 

dated January 30, 2006 ................................................................................ 70

Luis Torres-Bohl, President, Castalia Communications, dated February 

2, 2006 ............................................................................................................ 73

(1)

VIDEO CONTENT 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2006

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room 

SD–562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens,

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon. This is a strange day around 

this place, State of the Union day. I’m sorry to proceed with the 

hearing, but we feel it’s necessary to keep going, get these hearings 

that we have scheduled through so we can start the markup process on the bills that are before us. 

We do appreciate your all being willing to come and join us today 

in this hearing. My colleagues are involved—have sent word to me 

that they’re involved in some meetings. They should be along in a 

few minutes. I want to start and just make a few comments myself 

and then we’ll see how many people can be here by the time we 

start listening to your presentations. 

Retransmission consent allows broadcasters to negotiate compensation for their popular over-the-air content. And the big-four 

broadcasters—ABC, NBC, CBS, and FOX—have used retransmission consent to negotiate carriage for both their over-the-air 

programming and programming of cable channels in which they 

have invested. 

Some small cable companies have contended that the broadcasters use retransmission consent to go further than Congress intended. And some of the small cable companies want to offer family 

tiers, but the contracts the programmers offer would require them 

to air content not appropriate for children and for the majority of 

their viewers. Other rural providers have told us the price they are 

asked to pay programmers for the content is substantially higher 

than their urban counterparts. And we have been asked to hear 

from an independent programmer who states that his ability to get 

carried on cable is affected by this concept. 

We want to give cable and satellite providers a chance to respond 

and detail how they carry out this retransmission concept. 

Some satellite carriers have argued that the so-called ‘‘terrestrial 

loophole’’ allows larger cable companies to lock up exclusive rights 

to sports programs, and we want to listen to comments about 

2

whether or not these lead to anti-competitive rates for those programs. 

I’m told that exclusive contracts are not allowed for any sports 

delivered by satellite, but that rule does not apply to content delivered by cable. And I expect we’ll hear from both sides of that issue 

today. 

And we’re well aware of the FCC’s consideration of the Adelphia 

merger. It’s not our goal to focus on that transaction here today, 

but, of course, you’re free to comment, if you wish. 

We postponed the hearing for video franchises this morning, and 

I am sorry that we had—felt compelled to do that. But the hearing 

will be rescheduled for February 15th at 10 a.m. We’ve invited the 

FCC to appear that day, but we have not yet received the nomination for the fifth commissioner, so we decided to reschedule that 

hearing and take up the one we postponed for this morning. I 

apologize for that inconvenience to those people affected by this 

change. 

We really are trying, as I said, to proceed as rapidly as we can 

with the Committee’s agenda of hearings that have been requested 

in order that we can get to the legislation which is pending before 

us to update our communications laws. 

Now, there is no one I can ask if they want to make an opening 

statement, so we will proceed to the list of our witnesses before us. 

We do have a letter here from NTCA to me and Senator Inouye 

which I have been asked to put in the record, and we’ll do so, because of the statement that it represents over 560 rural-community-based telecommunications providers. It will be printed in the 

record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I believe we’ll just proceed in the line that’s 

just from left to right. We’d be happy to hear from you first, Mr. 

Ben Pyne, the president of Disney and ESPN Networks Affiliate 

Sales. And happy to have your statement. Thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF BEN PYNE, PRESIDENT, DISNEY AND ESPN 

NETWORKS AFFILIATE SALES AND MARKETING 

Mr. PYNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. My name is Ben 

Pyne, and I am the President of Disney and ESPN Networks Affiliate Sales and Marketing. In that capacity, I supervise negotiations 

for the distribution of all of the Disney and ESPN cable and satellite services, as well as retransmission consent negotiations for 

the ABC-owned television stations. 

This afternoon, I would like to make three simple and direct 

points: 

First, there was widespread and authoritative agreement that a 

la carte distribution of cable and satellite programming networks 

would increase costs and drain revenues within the distribution 

system, with the result that consumers would pay more and get 

less. 

Second, our company offers our ABC-station programming, Disney Channel, and ESPN individually to cable and satellite operators. And we do not require operators to take any other services to 

get ABC, Disney Channel, or ESPN. And, again—this is a very important point—our company offers our ABC-station programming, 

Disney Channel, and ESPN on a stand-alone basis to cable and satVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:21 Sep 07, 2006 Jkt 029574 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\29574.TXT JACKF PsN: JACKF
3

ellite operators, and we do not require operators to take any other 

services to get ABC, Disney Channel, or ESPN. 

Third, retransmission consent represents the fundamental American business principle that if another business wants to sell content that we have created and assembled, they need to first get our 

permission and then compensate us appropriately. Our retransmission consent negotiations reflect our interest in a fair exchange 

of value for either cash or carriage of our other services or products 

in ways tailored to expand our distributors’ service to their customers and otherwise meet their needs. 

Our opponents would have you believe the broadcast networks 

dominate and abuse the retransmission consent process nationwide, but this simply is not true. ABC owns only ten television stations. The other 215 stations that comprise the ABC television network are owned by other broadcasting companies. As a result, our 

company is only involved in retransmission consent negotiations 

with cable and satellite operators in ten markets across the country. We are not even in the room for the retransmission consent negotiations in the other 215 markets. 

In the ten markets where we do negotiate retransmission consent, we strive to strike a fair bargain. ABC invests more than $3 

billion annually to create or acquire programming. It is plainly unreasonable for any distributor to expect to take that product and 

sell it to consumers without compensating us. And we offer tremendous flexibility in the kinds of compensation that we are willing to 

accept. 

First, in the ten markets where we are part of the negotiation, 

we always offer a cash stand-alone option for carriage of just our 

ABC station. Attached to my testimony is an economic study that 

would support a cash price as high as $2 per month, yet we charge 

less than $1 per month. We have made it our policy to work particularly hard to accommodate the needs of smaller cable operators. 

Although we had no legal obligation to do so, we have negotiated 

agreements for all of the Disney, ABC, and ESPN services with the 

National Cable Television Cooperative. These co-op deals give 

small operators the buying power of an 8-million-subscriber multiservice operator. 

We also work hard to accommodate the small operators on retransmission consent. We have just completed negotiations with 

more than 60 small cable operators. Some elected to pay cash and 

have no obligation to carry any of our other services as part of that 

process. The majority of these small operators declined to pay cash, 

however, and we were extremely flexible in crafting deals to meet 

their needs. 

Our success in completing all of these negotiations belies the assertion that there is a widespread problem requiring government 

intervention in this process. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pyne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BEN PYNE, PRESIDENT, DISNEY AND ESPN NETWORKS

AFFILIATE SALES AND MARKETING

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman and Members of the Committee. My 

name is Ben Pyne and I am the President of Disney and ESPN Networks Affiliate 

4

* Letter has been retained in Committee files. 

Sales and Marketing. In that capacity, I supervise negotiations for the distribution 

of all of the Disney and ESPN cable and satellite services as well as retransmission 

consent negotiations for the ABC television stations. 

This afternoon I would like to make three simple and direct points:

1. There is widespread and authoritative agreement that a la carte distribution 

of cable and satellite programming networks would increase costs and drain 

revenues within the distribution system with the result that consumers would 

pay more and get less.

2. Our company offers our ABC station programming, Disney Channel and 

ESPN individually to cable and satellite operators and we do not require operators to take any other services to get ABC, Disney Channel or the ESPN network.

3. Finally, retransmission consent represents the fundamentally American business principle that if another business wants to commercially exploit content 

that we have created and assembled, they need to first get our permission. Our 

retransmission consent negotiations reflect our interest in a fair exchange of 

value for either cash or carriage of other of our services in ways tailored to expand our distributor’s service to their customers and otherwise meet their 

needs.

Let’s start with a la carte. Some would have you believe that a la carte is a panacea for every perceived ill from cable rates to indecency. In fact, it is not. The expanded basic bundle has emerged as the most prevalent form of subscription television offering because it provides great value to the consumer and is the most economically efficient way to deliver the product. A la carte would both increase costs 

and drain revenues from the system so that even consumers who selected only a 

few channels would pay more than they pay today for expanded basic. Costs would 

rise because of the need to provide expensive addressable set-top boxes on every consumer television set and because individual networks would need to dramatically 

increase promotional expenditures. Revenues would be drained because advertisers 

on both the national and local level would flee from channels with significantly reduced distribution. The record in the a la carte proceeding at the Federal Communications Commission contains letters from leading advertising agencies confirming 

the likely drop in advertising revenue. Of course, a model that increases cost and 

decreases ad revenue inevitably leads to higher consumer prices. That is why expanded basic is rightly, and so widely, perceived to be more economically efficient 

and better for consumers. 

There is a broad and authoritative consensus that a la carte is not the answer. 

A completely independent study conducted by the General Accounting Office did not 

embrace a la carte. The leaders of popular American sports organizations including 

Major League Baseball, The National Hockey League, The National Football League 

and The Big Ten Conference all submitted letters to the FCC opposing a la carte. 

Ten leading economists including Gustavo Bamberger, Michael Baumann, Jay 

Ezrielev, John Gale, Tom Hazlett, Michael Katz, Kent Mikkelsen, Jonathon Orszag, 

Bruce Owen and Robert Willig, representing a broad cross-section of economic philosophy, filed with the FCC stating that a la carte distribution ‘‘would harm consumers, programmers, MVPDs, and overall economic efficiency.’’

Various financial analysts have similarly concluded that a la carte makes little 

sense for consumers or as a business proposition. A December 2005 Sanford Bernstein report noted that if Viacom’s BET service was offered a la carte and every African-American family in America (17 percent of our population) subscribed to it, 

‘‘its monthly price (i.e., affiliate fee) would need to rise by 588 percent for BET to 

remain revenue neutral. If just half opted in—still a wildly optimistic scenario—

then the price would rise by 1,200 percent.’’

It is for this reason that in addition to these groups, the Congressional Black Caucus * and others concerned with the diversity of voices in our media have also raised 

strong opposition to a la carte. Niche programming services will clearly suffer or 

cease to be available in an a la carte world. 

The Bernstein reports sums it up as follows:

‘‘The result would be monthly cable bills similar to today’s but with each customer receiving a small number of channels for roughly the same total price as 

the large number they get today. Many niche programming options would cease 

to exist. And new channel launches would likely stop altogether (who would opt 

for a channel they never heard of ? ).’’

5

1Senate Report 102–92, Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1991 at 35. 

2 Id.

3 Id.

* The information referred to has been retained in Committee files. 

But you don’t need to rely on economic theory or analysis. Disney has actual experience with a la carte distribution of the Disney Channel and we can confirm that 

expanded basic distribution produces far greater consumer welfare. Originally Disney Channel was offered a la carte available only to those children and families who 

could afford to pay an additional $10 to $16 dollars per month just for it. Despite 

the strength of the Disney brand, penetration hovered on average in the 9–10 percent range. Subscriber turnover ran about 5 percent to 6 percent per month or more 

than 60 percent per year requiring massive promotional expenditures to replace lost 

subscribers. Today, Disney Channel is offered on expanded basic in more than 87 

million cable and satellite homes. This expanded distribution has enabled us to improve our programming, increase our ratings and serve a broad and diverse cross 

section of American families. 

In sum, the GAO, America’s major sports institutions, 10 leading and diverse 

economists, Wall Street and Disney’s own experience all demonstrate that a la carte 

is not the answer. 

Turning to the allegation of ‘‘bundling’’ channels, I want to assure you that the 

most popular ABC, ESPN and Disney services can be licensed individually by cable 

and satellite operators. An operator that wishes to carry just ESPN or just ABC or 

just Disney Channel may do so without any obligation to carry any other service 

or network that we own. Of course, like any other American business, the more of 

our services you buy, the more flexible we will be on pricing and the more overall 

value we will bring. 

Turning to retransmission consent, some have argued that retransmission consent 

is a government intervention into the free market that is causing unanticipated consequences. Nothing could be further from the truth. The only requirement of this 

law is that before one business entity commercially exploits the product of another 

business entity, it must negotiate for permission. It is hard to imagine a more fundamental principle of American business. In its report on the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1991, this Committee observed that, ‘‘cable systems use 

these [broadcast] signals without having to seek the permission of the originating 

broadcaster or having to compensate the broadcaster for the value its product created for the cable operation.’’ 1 In explaining the new retransmission consent requirements, this Committee stated ‘‘cable operators pay for the cable programming 

services they offer to their customers; the Committee believes that programming 

services which originate on a broadcast channel should not be treated differently.’’ 2

Further, this Committee specifically anticipated that the compensation paid by the 

cable operator to the broadcast station could take the form of ‘‘the right to program 

an additional channel on a cable system.’’ 3

Our opponents would have you believe that the broadcast networks dominate and 

abuse the retransmission consent process nationwide. But, this cannot be true. ABC 

owns only 10 television stations. The other 215 stations that comprise the ABC television network are owned by other broadcasting companies. As a result, our company is only involved in retransmission consent negotiations with cable and satellite 

operators in 10 markets across the country. We are not even in the room for the 

retransmission consent negotiation in the other 215 markets. 

In the 10 markets where we do negotiate retransmission consent, we strive to 

strike a fair bargain. ABC invests more than $3 billion annually to create or acquire 

programming. It is plainly unreasonable for any distributor to expect to take that 

product and sell it to consumers without compensating us. We offer tremendous 

flexibility in the kinds of compensation that we are willing to accept. First, in the 

10 markets where we are a part of the negotiation, we always offer a cash standalone option for carriage of just our ABC station. Notwithstanding an economic 

study that would support a significantly higher price, during the next retransmission consent cycle ending in 2008, our cash price remains under $1 a subscriber, 

an amount that is exceedingly reasonable by any marketplace comparison. That 

study by Economists, Inc. is supported by three different analytic approaches. * 

Unfortunately, immediately after the enactment of retransmission consent, the 

major cable operators announced that they would not pay cash retransmission consent fees to broadcasters. For example, on August 18, 1993, the Wall Street Journal 

reported that ‘‘nearly all of the Nation’s largest cable operators have vowed to forego 

paying cash to local TV stations.’’ This prospective refusal to pay cash for retransmission rights was so uniform that the Co-Chairman of this Committee, Senator 

Inouye, asked the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission to invesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:21 Sep 07, 2006 Jkt 029574 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\29574.TXT JACKF PsN: JACKF
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tigate whether the cable companies had violated anti-trust laws by improperly 

colluding with each other. Faced with the refusal of cable operators to pay cash, 

broadcasters accepted from operators the opportunity to program other channels as 

the consideration for broadcast retransmission rights. Broadcasters bargain for carriage of local news channels, local weather channels or other channels that they 

own. The facts are clear. The practice of granting broadcast retransmission consent 

in return for carriage of commonly owned cable channels (1) is simply an alternative 

to the always available cash stand-alone option; (2) was specifically anticipated and 

approved in the Senate report; and (3) was insisted on by the cable operators themselves. 

Finally, in our retransmission consent negotiations we have been extraordinarily 

flexible with smaller operators. Currently, we have over 100 separate agreements 

in place with small operators dealing with over a dozen Disney or ESPN product 

lines, covering everything from linear program services to broadband and pay per 

view. A couple of small operators have even agreed to pay cash for retransmission 

consent. Our mission is clear: to get these deals done using a reasonable approach 

in each circumstance and we have been quite successful in that effort. That is not 

surprising given the value of the programming we produce and the very positive relationship we have built with the small operator community and the National Cable 

Television Cooperative (NCTC). While each retransmission consent negotiation has 

traditionally been handled on an individual system or company basis, the overall 

relationship we have cultivated with the NCTC over many years is reflected in the 

umbrella purchasing agreements we have with them for rights to our non-broadcast 

programming services. Through those agreements, its members, representing 8 million subscribers, get the same volume discount opportunities we offer our large MSO 

customers in negotiations for our cable and satellite products and services. 

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. And all statements will 

be printed in full in the record. Sorry, I forgot the button, myself. 

We will print all the statements in the record that you have, gentlemen, but I appreciate the attachment to this. This also would be 

kept in the record. 

Our next witness is Matt Polka, president of the American Cable 

Association. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MATT POLKA, PRESIDENT/CEO, AMERICAN 

CABLE ASSOCIATION 

Mr. POLKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. 

My name is Matt Polka, and I am the President and CEO of the 

American Cable Association. ACA represents 1,100 smaller and 

medium-sized cable companies providing video, data, and telephone 

service in smaller markets and rural areas in every State. Today, 

I will focus my remarks on retransmission consent. 

For ACA members and the rural customers they serve, the main 

problem is this. Broadcasters’ escalating retransmission consent demands are resulting in higher cable costs, less choice, and carriage 

of unwanted channels. Today, powerful networks and affiliate 

groups are demanding ever-increasing retransmission consent payments from smaller cable companies. That payment may be in the 

form of cash-for-carriage. The price is not determined by market 

forces; rather, it depends on the size and market power of the 

broadcaster. When you’re a small cable operator, you get squeezed 

the hardest. 

The price may also come in the form of unwanted satellite programming channels tied to retransmission consent. To gain access 

to local broadcast signals, we and our customers have to pay for 

those unwanted channels. In the current round, we estimate, in our 

service areas alone, that these demands are adding between $500 

7

and $800 million to the cost of basic cable. This amounts to a 

transfer of wealth from our rural customers to corporate headquarters in New York, Los Angeles, and elsewhere. 

Broadcasters claim that retransmission consent preserves localism in this regard. But this is cynical, because how does forced carriage of unwanted channels and sharply rising cable costs preserve 

localism? It does not. Here is the part of the problem that is not 

well understood. At the same time broadcasters are demanding escalating retransmission consent prices, they are using regulations 

and contracts to exclude access to lower-cost substitutes. The results are predictable: prices go up, consumers pay more for the 

same channels. 

An example: Take one of our members in a market where Disney 

owns the ABC station. The company serves a few thousand subscribers on the outskirts of the market. Disney is reportedly demanding either 85 cents per subscriber per month or requiring that 

the company add, and pay for, multiple Disney-controlled channels 

and Internet content. This small company could pick up ABC from 

a neighboring market at a lower price. The problem? Disney/ABC 

blocks access to the out-of-market station. By contrast, in the rare 

circumstances where a small cable operator can get access to an 

out-of-market station, the price for the in-market station comes 

down. 

More and more voices are calling for retransmission consent reform, including smaller telephone companies represented by 

OPASCO and the very important rural telephone co-ops represented by the National Telecommunications Cooperative Association. Two weeks ago, you heard from our biggest competitor, 

EchoStar, saying the same. Just yesterday, an independent study 

issued by Arlen Communications confirmed that broadcasters are 

exploiting the current retransmission consent regime. The study 

describes how broadcasters’ use of exclusivity and escalating demands are hurting consumers in smaller markets, and, in some 

areas, are impeding the roll out of broadband services. 

Another key point from the Arlen study: Broadcasters gain more 

than $4 per subscriber per month in advertising revenues from the 

subscribers delivered by cable. This suggests that broadcasters 

should be paying cable for carriage, not the other way around. 

To remedy these problems, we ask that Congress reform the retransmission consent laws in several ways: 

First, when broadcasters seek a price for retransmission consent, 

allow us a right to shop. ACA members want to carry local signals, 

but when the price is artificially inflated, we should be allowed to 

consider neighboring markets. You need to break down the barriers 

of exclusivity so that the marketplace can moderate retransmission 

consent demands. As everybody knows, it pays to shop. 

Second, apply the FCC’s News Corp conditions to all broadcasters. Under the FCC’s conditions imposed on the DIRECTV 

deal, FOX cannot pull its signal during the course of negotiations. 

This single condition has made those negotiations more orderly and 

reasonable. This condition should apply to all broadcasters when 

dealing with small- and medium-sized cable companies. 

Finally, ACA members would like to offer more choices to consumers using tiers, including family-friendly offerings which are 

8

important to this Committee. The problem is that we can’t. The 

tying and bundling practices of the media conglomerates prevent it. 

We need your help to make this possible. 

In conclusion, ACA supports this Committee’s work to address 

concerns about content, cost, and choice. However, it has become 

increasingly clear that without Congressional or regulatory involvement, broadcasters will continue to use scarce public spectrum, 

granted for free, to extract ever-increasing profits from rural consumers. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Polka follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MATT POLKA, PRESIDENT/CEO, AMERICAN CABLE

ASSOCIATION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is Matt 

Polka, and I am the President and CEO of the American Cable Association. ACA 

represents 1,100 smaller and medium-sized cable companies providing advanced 

video, high-speed Internet access and telephone service in smaller markets and 

rural areas in every state. 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today and will focus most of my remarks on retransmission consent. As I will explain, especially when dealing with 

smaller cable companies, broadcasters’ escalating retransmission consent demands 

are resulting in higher cable costs, less choice, and, in some cases, required carriage 

of objectionable content. I will also address the related problem of forced bundling 

and tie-ins—how the major media conglomerates require us to distribute, and our 

customers pay for, channels that our customers do not want. We believe the current 

system of regulations have unintentionally fostered much of the trouble. We also believe practical solutions exist and look forward to sharing our ideas with you today. 

Unique Perspective 

ACA brings a unique perspective to this hearing. Our members are smaller cable 

providers that do not own programming or content, and that are not affiliated with 

large media companies. This independence enables us to see what’s good and what’s 

bad in the current video market without being blinded by competing and conflicting 

interests that many of the vertically integrated companies face. Our sole mission is 

simple: we want to deliver high-quality advanced services and desirable programming that our local communities want. 

Obsolete Laws and Regulations 

We believe that current laws and regulations inhibit our ability to best serve our 

customers, who also happen to be your voters. After 20 years in the cable business, 

I have seen increasingly how retransmission consent abuse and wholesale programming practices impede our ability to best serve our local communities. To help remedy this, I urge you to continue your inquiry into video programming, pricing, and 

packaging. In doing so, I know Congress can benefit consumers by spurring innovation, competition, and flexibility. 

Mr. Chairman, the crux of our concerns comes from the unfortunate and unintended consequences of the retransmission consent regime, a law governing the carriage of local broadcast television stations that was put into place in the 1992 Cable 

Act. In the 14 years since its enactment, the world of media has fundamentally 

changed. Through unprecedented consolidation, broadcasters and media companies 

have become much more powerful. When dealing with smaller cable companies, 

broadcasters no longer need the protection given them in 1992. Now, broadcasters 

are using retransmission consent in ways that restrict choice, raise costs, and force 

consumers to take channels they don’t want. Retransmission consent today as used 

by the media giants, hurts ‘‘localism’’ rather than enhances it. Retransmission consent continues to be the root cause of the primary concern of so many: increasing 

consumer rates for cable and satellite television. 

Just yesterday, an independent study issued by Arlen Communications confirmed 

that broadcasters are exploiting the current retransmission consent regime when 

dealing with smaller providers. The Arlen study describes how broadcasters use of 

exclusivity and escalating demands are hurting consumers in smaller markets and, 

in some areas, impeding the rollout of broadband. I encourage you and your staffs 

to give careful consideration to the Arlen report. 

9

Retransmission Consent ‘‘Payment’’

Under the current retransmission consent regime, powerful networks and affiliate 

groups demand payment from cable providers for their broadcast network. That 

‘‘payment’’ may be in the form of cash-for-carriage, which for ACA members is often 

an astronomical price unfettered by any correlation with actual, identifiable market 

value, or cable operators may ‘‘choose’’, and pay for, affiliated non-local programming on their cable system. If cable operators opt to carry affiliated programming 

on their system, programmers dictate channel placement and set minimum penetration requirements that leave our members with no option but to include the affiliated programming on the expanded basic lineup. In other words, their ‘‘must-have’’ 

broadcast network that has been granted extensive protections by Congress in order 

to preserve ‘‘localism’’ now gives them leverage to force the carriage of their affiliated programming onto our channel lineup and into our consumers’ homes. 

Here is the part of the problem that is not well understood: While broadcasters 

are demanding escalating retransmission consent prices, at the same time they are 

using regulations and contracts to exclude access to lower cost substitutes. Put another way, retransmission consent ‘‘prices’’ are not disciplined by a competitive market. The result is predictable, prices go up and consumers are harmed. In short, 

broadcasters have gamed a system that has its roots in legal and regulatory fiat, 

not market-based mechanisms. We urge you to change that situation. 

Family Tiers/Programming Contracts 

With regards to children’s programming, I want to commend those cable operators 

like Time Warner and Comcast who are working to offer a family-friendly tier to 

answer this Committee’s call to clean up the airwaves. My members are ready and 

willing to offer the same service option, offering packages of customized content 

based on the markets we serve. However, our lack of clout with the programmers 

whose contracts mandate carriage of their channels does not allow our members to 

offer tiers and we are still trying to find a way to provide new tiers of service that 

does not put us in legal jeopardy with our programming partners. The programming 

conglomerates will have to loosen their vice-grip on tying and bundling, and lower 

their penetration requirements before more tiering choices can ever become the 

norm in the cable and satellite pay-television marketplace. 

I believe nothing exemplifies the severity of this problem more than the fact that 

ACA shares the same views on this matter as EchoStar, one of our biggest competitors. EchoStar has the same unfortunate experience in retransmission consent negotiations as ACA members because they, too, do not own programming, and therefore 

do not have market leverage when negotiating with the media conglomerates. 

In fact, contractual obligations have already had a negative impact on the familyfriendly tiers being rolled out by Time Warner and Comcast. Members of this Committee noted at the indecency hearing held just two weeks ago that while the tiers 

were a step in the right direction, they were limited in the channels they offered. 

There was concern among some Senators who observed the lack of marketability in 

the tiers that offered G-rated programming only and eliminated sports altogether 

from the package. What the cable companies who are offering the tiers didn’t tell 

you, most likely due to the non-disclosure agreements in their contracts, is that 

these are the only channels the conglomerates would allow them to offer on such 

a tier! Furthermore, those companies offering family-friendly tiers are already saying they will have to cap the number of subscribers that can sign up for the family 

friendly tier. That is because if too many consumers want this offering, they will 

not meet their contractual penetration obligations dictated by the programming 

owners. I’m sure the programmers are not about to waive their penetration requirements for us should family friendly tiering become popular. However, if you can ask 

them if they would release us from those obligations so that we can meet your call 

for more family oriented programming tiers, we would be able to offer a much more 

robust and appealing suite of programs to your constituents. 

There was also question at the indecency hearing as to why the market cannot 

determine what is offered on tiers. We at ACA have the exact same question. We, 

who live and work in the communities we serve, believe we should have the ability 

to answer our consumers’ desires and the market’s demand by offering the channels 

our subscribers want to watch. Instead, it is the tying and bundling of programming 

in the take-it-or-leave-it contracts extended to us by the conglomerates in Hollywood 

and New York that determine what is offered on the lineup of the cable television 

in the 8 million, predominantly rural homes we serve across America. 

I know the issue of indecency on television has been one of recent concern to this 

Committee, and in particular to you, Chairman Stevens. Let me point out that the 

most objectionable and adult-oriented channels on our lineup are carried because 

they are tied to one of the must-have broadcast networks that is broadcast on public 

10

airwaves, or even more alarming, are tied to the carriage of popular children’s programming, as in the case of Logo, the gay and lesbian network, being tied to one 

of the Nickelodeon services. 

Additionally, in many markets today a cable or satellite provider that wants to 

carry family programming, such as Nickelodeon, must also carry much more suggestive and sexually explicit programming on MTV and Spike TV, AND must put that 

programming on the same tier as the children’s programs! Essentially, to get 

Spongebob Squarepants, a well-known children’s program, cable and satellite providers and their customers have to also take Undressed or Stripperella, two highly 

sexual, adult programs. Here’s what MTV’s website says about its program, Undressed: ‘‘Not getting enough action before you go to bed? Undressed will definitely 

be changing that! This season is sure to titillate your senses—so tune in!’’ Did Congress intend to perpetuate this type of situation and allow the use of the public airwaves to be used as leverage to carry such programming? 

A la Carte 

I must say there is great irony in the recent announcement that companies like 

Time Warner and Comcast will offer a family-friendly tier. The programmers and 

MSOs have said for years that tiers and a la carte offerings would destroy economic 

models, and have dismissed the notion that offering such services could ever happen. With pressure from this Committee and the real threat of legislative action, 

their strident position managed to change within a week’s time. Furthermore, these 

same programmers, who were the strongest opponents of flexible, market-based offerings, are now selling their individual programming on iTunes, where customers 

can go online and download an individual program and watch it on their handheld 

iPod device. I believe most casual observers would call this kind of offering ‘‘a la 

carte’’ as it allows consumers not to select just the network they want to watch, but 

the specific program they desire. While ACA has called for greater marketplace innovation and flexibility to distribute programming to consumers, programmers have 

historically forced us to distribute the one size, take-it-or-leave-it offerings because 

they claimed any other model would destroy the fragile balance that they rely upon 

to stay profitable. Hopefully, now Congress and the FCC realize that the market is 

much more resilient than they had claimed and no longer has to take our word for 

it, they can see it in the actions of the programmers themselves. 

And certainly networks can’t really fight to keep retransmission consent in its 

current form for the sake of preserving localism: not when they are selling their 

prime programming product they produce for free over-the-air television and bypass 

their own affiliates. They are selling their highest-rated programming stripped of 

any local advertising and without giving the affiliate a share of the $1.99 charged 

to the consumer for the download. As the market moves toward this model, there 

is no doubt affiliates’ ad revenues will be reduced as viewers no longer need to 

watch their station to view their prime programs, which will eventually have an impact on the quality of local news and services offered by those affiliates. 

How does this approach protect ‘‘localism?’’ It appears to me that nothing may imperil the financial viability of local stations more than this new business model. The 

conglomerates have undermined their own argument that they are for localism and 

they should no longer be able to use the tool of retransmission consent to hide their 

interests. In fact, the localism they worry so much about is safe due to another regulatory tool that should be retained. The ACA believes that ‘‘must carry’’ should remain the governmentally-granted tool to ensure that local stations are not shut out 

from any market. 

Cash or Tying 

Today, programmers have two sources of revenue: one is the fees they charge operators to gain access to the programming and the other comes from the advertising 

fees they charge. For this reason, the programmers demand channel placements on 

basic or expanded basic tiers in order to get their offerings in front of the maximum 

number of eyeballs possible, which helps drive up their advertising profit. The largest programmers who have broadcast and cable channels effectively bypass market 

forces and bundle their broadcast channels with their affiliated programming, and 

force distributors to charge consumers for channels they don’t even want—and in 

many questions, channels they find objectionable. If an operator opts out of the retransmission consent agreement and wants to take a stand-alone channel, the cashfor-carriage demand is most often an unreasonable price with no market basis, and 

is significantly greater than the price of the bundle of channels offered. To make 

matters worse, those programmers demanding such costs, channel placement, and 

carriage of additional channels are able to hide behind nondisclosure provisions in 

11

their contracts, further complicating the ability to address the abuse of retransmission consent practices. 

Price Discrimination 

Additionally, the wholesale price differentials between what a smaller cable company pays in rural America compared to larger cable operators in urban America 

have little to do with differences in cost, and much to do with disparities in market 

power. These differences are not economically cost-justified and could easily be replicated in the IP world as small entrants are treated to the same treatment our 

members face. 

For instance, ACA members have reported wholesale programming price differentials between smaller companies and major cable companies of up to 30 percent, and 

in one case, 55 percent. In this way, smaller cable systems and their customers actually subsidize the programming costs of larger urban distributors and consumers! 

We even end up with worse pricing than satellite companies DIRECTV and 

EchoStar, who are the main competitors to our rural cable systems. Price discrimination against smaller cable companies and their customers is clearly anti-competitive conduct on the part of the programmers—they offer a lower price to one competitor and force another other competitor to pay a 30–55 percent higher price FOR 

THE SAME PROGRAMMING. The effect of these practices by the programmers is 

that three MVPDs in the same town pay wildly different rates for the same product 

that each is distributing in that town. 

Forced Carriage Eliminates Diverse Programming Channels 

The practices of certain programmers have also restricted the ability of some ACA 

members to launch and continue to carry independent, niche, religious and ethnic 

programming. The main problem: requirements to carry programmers’ affiliated 

programming on expanded basic eliminate ‘‘shelf space’’ where the cable provider 

could offer independent programming. 

If video providers are to provide outlets for niche programming that appeals in 

their markets (i.e., Spanish communities), you must ensure that they are not subject 

to the handcuffs current law allows to be placed upon them. The programmers 

argue that their affiliated programming would not get carriage without retransmission consent, which would minimize subscribers’ viewing choices. However, there 

are numerous independent channels that want to be carried but do not have a 

broadcast network to bundle with their channel. Even if they present programming 

a cable operator wants to launch in his market area, he often does not have the 

‘‘shelf space’’ to do so because of the forced carriage of affiliated programming by 

the programmers. If the programmers are so certain they have valuable programming, why are they so relentless in their fight to preserve their right to tie their 

affiliated programming to their broadcast network? Why not let the market determine what is desirable? If the programmers produce must-have content, consumers 

will demand it and cable operators will carry it. They should not be allowed to use 

their leverage of public airwaves to get carriage of affiliated programming. 

Remedies 

To fix this situation, Congress must update and reform: (1) the retransmission 

consent and (2) program access laws. 

Retransmission Consent Reform 

• Smaller cable operators should have the ‘‘right to shop’’ for the most economical 

programming package to offer their subscribers. Broadcasters use a combination 

of regulations and contracts to block cable operators from retransmitting stations from outside a broadcasters’ market. Exclusivity is now being exploited by 

broadcasters to raise the cost of retransmission consent for smaller cable operators and their consumers. In other words, the conglomerate-owned station 

makes itself the only game in town, and can charge the cable operator a monopoly ‘‘price’’ for its must-have network programming. The cable operator needs 

this programming to compete. So your constituents end up paying monopoly 

prices.

ACA believes there is a ready solution to this dilemma. When a broadcaster seeks 

a ‘‘price’’ for retransmission consent, give small cable companies the ability to shop 

for lower cost network programming for their customers. 

Accordingly, in its March 2, 2005 Petition for Rulemaking to the FCC, ACA proposed the following adjustments to the FCC’s retransmission consent and broadcast 

exclusivity regulations:

One: Maintain broadcast exclusivity for stations that elect must-carry or that 

do not seek additional consideration for retransmission consent.

12

Two: Eliminate exclusivity when a broadcaster elects retransmission consent 

and seeks additional consideration for carriage by a small cable company.

Three: Prohibit any party, including a network, from preventing a broadcast station from granting retransmission consent to a small cable company.

On March 17, 2005, the FCC released ACA’s petition for comments. By opening 

ACA’s petition for public comment, the FCC has acknowledged that the current retransmission consent and broadcast exclusivity scheme requires further scrutiny. 

Before codifying a new regulatory regime for video services utilizing IP, Congress 

should ask similar questions and make the important decision to update current law 

to rebalance the role of programmers and providers.

• Tying through retransmission consent must end. The law should prevent the 

media giants from holding local broadcast signals hostage for monopolistic cashfor-carriage demands or more carriage of affiliated media-giant programming, 

which was never the intention of Congress when granting this power.

• Codify the News-Hughes conditions made by the FCC when approving the News 

Corp acquisition of DIRECTV. The FCC acknowledged the disproportionate 

market power News Corp would have as a programmer and a distributor when 

they sought to acquire DIRECTV. The FCC imposed conditions on News Corp. 

to apply during their retransmission consent negotiations. The three key components of those conditions include: (i) a streamlined arbitration process; (ii) the 

ability to carry a signal pending dispute resolution; and (iii) special conditions 

for smaller cable companies. ACA believes conditions like these applied to 

smaller and medium-sized cable operators would improve the current retransmission consent process.

Program Access Reform

• Price discrimination must end. The programming pricing gap between the biggest and smallest providers must be closed to ensure that customers and local 

providers in smaller markets are not subsidizing large companies and subscribers in urban America. The programming media giants must disclose, at 

least to Congress and the FCC, what they are charging local providers, ending 

the strict confidentiality and nondisclosure dictated by the media giants. Confidentiality and nondisclosure mean lack of accountability of the media giants.

• Transparency must be created if consumer rates are of concern to you. Most programming contracts are subject to strict confidentiality and nondisclosure obligations, and ACA members are very concerned about retaliation by certain programmers should they discuss the specifics of any deal. For instance, if you ask 

me today what a specific ACA member pays a certain programmer, I could not 

tell you without fearing legal action by the media giant. Programmers could 

agree to waive nondisclosure for purposes of this hearing or even in our contracts, but they never do. Ask them today, and I’d be shocked if they would disclose specific terms and conditions. Ask them why this confidentiality and nondisclosure exists.

Who does it benefit? Consumers, Congress, the FCC? I don’t think so. Why is this 

information so secret when much of the infrastructure the media giants benefit from 

derives from licenses and frequencies granted by the government? 

Congress should obtain specific programming contracts and rate information directly from the programmers, either by agreement or under the Committee’s subpoena power. That information should then be compiled, at a minimum, to develop 

a Programming Pricing Index (PPI). The PPI would be a simple yet effective way 

to gauge how programming rates rise or fall while still protecting the rates, terms, 

and conditions of the individual contract. By authorizing the FCC to collect this information in a manner that protects the unique details of individual agreements, 

I cannot see who could object. 

Armed with this information, Congress and the FCC would finally be able to 

gauge whether rising cable rates are due to rising programming prices as we have 

claimed or whether cable operators have simply used that argument as a ruse. A 

PPI would finally help everyone get to the bottom of the problems behind higher 

cable and satellite rates. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, let me reiterate that ACA members are eager to offer their customers more choices and lower costs. Today, broadcasters and programmers prevent 

that. The roll-out of family-friendly tiers two weeks ago proved that more consumer 

choice is achievable, and with help from this Committee, I believe we as operators 

can do more to create marketable tiers of programming. The retransmission consent 

13

and broadcast exclusivity regulations have been used by the networks and stations 

to raise rates and to force unwanted programming onto consumers. This must stop. 

If a station wants to be carried, it can elect must-carry. If a station wants to charge 

for retransmission consent, let a true competitive marketplace establish the price. 

Mr. Chairman, ACA members would prefer mutually beneficial carriage arrangements with programmers. For this to occur, certain media conglomerates would 

need to temper economic self-interest with a heightened concern for the public interest in localism, consumer choice, and reasonable cable rates. However, it has become 

increasingly clear that without congressional or regulatory involvement, these companies will continue to abuse retransmission consent using scarce public spectrum 

granted them for free to extract ever-increasing profits from rural consumers.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Dorgan just arrived. 

Did you have an opening statement, Senator? 

Senator DORGAN. I’ll wait for the witnesses, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Our next witness is Robert G. Lee, President and General Manager at WDBJ Television of Roanoke. 

Sir? 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. LEE, PRESIDENT/GENERAL

MANAGER, WDBJ TELEVISION, INC.; ON BEHALF OF THE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS 

Mr. LEE. Thank you, Chairman Stevens. 

My name is Bob Lee, and I am President and General Manager 

of WDBJ Television, a family-owned station in Roanoke, Virginia. 

I’m testifying today on behalf of the National Association of 

Broadcasters, of which I am also a board member. NAB, as you 

know, is a trade association that advocates on behalf of more than 

8,300 free, local, over-the-air radio and television stations, as well 

as the broadcast networks, before Congress, the FCC, and occasionally before the courts. 

Before the Cable Act, cable operators were not required to seek 

the permission of a broadcaster before carrying its signal, and cable 

was not required to negotiate for reselling broadcasters’ signals. 

Cable companies would just pick up a local station’s programming 

and leverage it to attract subscribers. Then operators would use 

those subscriber fees to create new cable channels that would directly compete with local broadcasters for advertising dollars, our 

sole means of support. In short, Congress and the FCC found that 

local television stations were being forced to subsidize our competitors. 

Congress corrected this imbalance by creating a marketplace in 

which broadcasters could negotiate for cable’s use of our programming. The retransmission consent system is, in fact, working, and 

consumers have been the ultimate beneficiaries. 

But don’t take that from me. Listen to the expert agency. The 

FCC’s report from September of 2005 recommended no changes to 

the existing structure, and the Commission found that the retransmission consent process is fair. The report states, ‘‘As a general 

rule, the local television broadcaster and the MVPD negotiate in 

the context of a level playing field.’’ In light of this report, complaints from my cable friends ring hollow. 

ACA, you see, wants it both ways. On one hand, operators complain about paying broadcasters to use their signals. Yet, in the 

14

next breath, these same companies say that negotiating for carriage of additional programming is also unreasonable. Ironically, it 

was the cable industry’s resistance to cash payments that resulted 

in cable companies carrying additional programming produced by 

the broadcaster as a form of consideration. And television viewers 

benefit from the innovative local programming offerings that have 

resulted. 

A good example is here in Washington, where the ABC affiliate, 

Channel 7, through its retransmission consent agreement, has been 

able to expand its News/Channel 8, a local cable news network offering news, weather, and public-affairs programming. And Belo 

uses retransmission consent to obtain carriage of its regional cable 

news channel in serving viewers in Oregon, Washington, Montana, 

Alaska, California, and Virginia. And LIN Television uses retransmission consent to provide local weather information on separate 

channels carried by cable systems, just as my station does. 

In short, retransmission consent enables broadcasters to offer 

viewers more locally oriented programming. Again, this is what 

Congress intended. In fact, this very Committee wrote, in its report 

on the Cable Act, that while some broadcasters would receive cash 

for their signals, other broadcasters would, ‘‘negotiate other issues 

with cable systems, such as the right to program an additional 

channel on a cable system.’’

Now, before I close, let me address two misconceptions. ACA contends that broadcasters wield inordinate market power in these negotiations because of their size. Well, the facts belie that argument, 

especially in smaller markets. And we’re the 68th-largest market, 

so I can speak on this with some experience. In the 110 smallest 

cable television markets, a majority of cable subscribers are served 

by one of the four largest cable companies. By way of contrast, only 

about 3 percent of the television stations in these markets are 

owned by one of the top ten television groups. So, I ask, Who really 

has leverage in these negotiations? 

Second, Mr. Polka’s group released a study yesterday, as he said, 

arguing that broadcasters should pay cable operators for carriage 

of our signals. This study is riddled with flaws, but, in the interest 

of time, let me say this. On page 1, the study notes how valuable 

and essential broadcast signals are to cable companies. The rest of 

the study is then spent arguing that broadcasters should be paying 

cable to carry it. ACA wants it both ways. And that won’t work. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, ACA would ask that we turn back the 

clock to the ‘‘bad old days’’ when cable got their broadcast signals 

for nothing and got their kicks for free. Such an unfair arrangement would put free local television, our viewers, your constituents, 

in very dire straits, indeed. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. LEE, PRESIDENT/GENERAL MANAGER, WDBJ 

TELEVISION, INC.; ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS

Good afternoon, Chairman Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye, and Members of the 

Committee, my name is Robert G. Lee. I am President and General Manager of 

WDBJ Television, the CBS affiliated station in Roanoke, Virginia. As a local broadcaster, I have firsthand experience with the issues being discussed by the Committee at this hearing. I am also a member of the Television Board of Directors of 

15

the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB). NAB is a trade association that advocates on behalf of more than 8,300 free, local radio and television stations and 

also broadcast networks before Congress, the Federal Communications Commission 

and the Courts. 

From their hollow complaints about the alleged unfairness of retransmission consent, multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) clearly want to have 

their retransmission cake and eat it to. In one breath, MVPDs complain that broadcasters are unreasonable in negotiating cash payment for carriage of their local signals; in the next, they claim that negotiating for carriage of additional programming 

is also unreasonable. In essence, MVPDs argue that retransmission consent is invalid simply because broadcasters should give away their signals to MVPDs without 

compensation in any form. But there is no reason that broadcasters—unique among 

programming suppliers—should be singled out not to receive compensation for the 

programming provided to MVPDs. This is especially true today, given the rapidly 

increasing competition by MVPDs with broadcasters for national and local advertising revenue. 

Congress Established Retransmission Consent to Create a Marketplace in 

Which Broadcasters Could Negotiate for Compensation for MVPDs’ Use 

of Their Signals 

Because Congress created the retransmission consent marketplace nearly 15 years 

ago, I begin my testimony by reminding us all here today why Congress granted 

broadcasters retransmission consent rights in the first instance. In short, Congress 

adopted retransmission consent to ensure that broadcasters had the opportunity to 

negotiate in the marketplace for compensation from MVPDs retransmitting their 

signals. As the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently concluded, retransmission consent has fulfilled Congress’ purposes for enacting it and has benefited broadcasters, MVPDs and consumers alike. 

Prior to the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 

cable operators were not required to seek the permission of a broadcaster before carrying its signal and were certainly not required to compensate the broadcaster for 

the value of its signal. At a time when cable systems had few channels and were 

limited to an antenna function of improving the reception of nearby broadcast signals, this lack of recognition for the rights broadcasters possess in their signals was 

less significant. However, the video marketplace changed dramatically in the 1970s 

and 1980s. Cable systems began to include not only local signals, but also distant 

broadcast signals and the programming of cable networks and premium services. 

Cable systems started to compete with broadcasters for national and local advertising revenues, but were still allowed to use broadcasters’ signals—without permission or compensation—to attract paying subscribers. 

By the early 1990s, Congress concluded that this failure to recognize broadcasters’ 

rights in their signals had ‘‘created a distortion in the video marketplace.’’ S. Rep. 

No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. at 35 (1991) (Senate Report). Using the revenues they 

obtained from carrying broadcast signals, cable systems had supported the creation 

of cable programming and services and were able to sell advertising on these cable 

channels in competition with broadcasters. Congress concluded that public policy 

should not support ‘‘a system under which broadcasters in effect subsidize the establishment of their chief competitors.’’ Id. Noting the continued popularity of broadcast 

programming, Congress also found that a very substantial portion of the fees that 

consumers pay to cable systems is attributable to the value they receive from watching broadcast signals. Id. To remedy this ‘‘distortion,’’ Congress in the 1992 Cable 

Act gave broadcasters control over the use of their signals and permitted broadcasters to seek compensation from cable operators and other MVPDs for carriage of 

their signals. See 47 U.S.C. § 325. 

In establishing retransmission consent, Congress intended to create a ‘‘marketplace for the disposition of the rights to retransmit broadcast signals.’’ Senate Report

at 36. Congress stressed that it did not intend ‘‘to dictate the outcome of the ensuing 

marketplace negotiations’’ between broadcasters and MVPDs. Id. Congress correctly 

foresaw that some broadcasters might determine that the benefits of carriage were 

sufficient compensation for the use of their signals by cable systems. Id. at 35. Some 

broadcasters would likely seek monetary compensation, while others, Congress explained, would ‘‘negotiate other issues with cable systems, such as joint marketing 

efforts, the opportunity to provide news inserts on cable channels, or the right to 

program an additional channel on a cable system.’’ Id. at 36. 

Thus, even at the outset, Congress correctly recognized that, in marketplace negotiations between MVPDs and broadcasters, stations could appropriately seek a variety of types of compensation for the carriage of their signals, including cash or carriage of other programming. And while retransmission consent does not guarantee 

16

that a broadcaster will receive fair compensation from an MVPD for retransmission 

of its signal, it does provide a broadcaster with an opportunity to negotiate for compensation. 

The FCC Recently Recommended That No Revisions Be Made to

Retransmission Consent Policies 

After some years’ experience with retransmission consent, Congress in late 2004 

asked the FCC to evaluate the relative success or failure of the marketplace created 

in 1992 for the rights to retransmit broadcast signals. This evaluation shows that 

MVPDs’ complaints about retransmission consent disadvantaging them in the marketplace or somehow harming competition are groundless. In its September 2005 report to Congress about the impact of retransmission consent on competition in the 

video marketplace, the FCC concluded that the retransmission consent rules did not 

disadvantage MVPDs and have in fact fulfilled Congress’ purposes for enacting 

them. The FCC accordingly recommended no revisions to either statutory or regulatory provisions relating to retransmission consent. FCC, Retransmission Consent 

and Exclusivity Rules: Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 208 of the Satellite 

Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004 (Sept. 2005) (FCC Report). 

In its report, the FCC concluded that local television broadcasters and MVPDs 

conduct retransmission consent negotiations on a ‘‘level playing field.’’ Id. at ¶ 44. 

The FCC observed that the retransmission consent process provides incentives for 

both broadcasters and MVPDs to reach mutually beneficial arrangements and that 

both parties in fact benefit when carriage is arranged. Id. Most importantly, according to the FCC, consumers benefit by having access to the broadcasters’ programming carried via MVPDs. Id. Overall, the retransmission consent rules have, as 

Congress intended, resulted in broadcasters being compensated for the retransmission of their stations by MVPDs and MVPDs obtaining the right to carry broadcast signals. Id. 

Given these conclusions, the FCC recommended no changes to current law providing for retransmission consent rights. Moreover, the FCC explained that the retransmission consent rules are part of a ‘‘carefully balanced combination of laws and 

regulations governing carriage of television broadcast signals.’’ Id. at ¶ 45. Thus, if 

Congress were to consider proposals to restrict broadcasters’ retransmission consent 

compensation, the FCC cautioned that review of other rules, including must carry 

and copyright compulsory licensing, would be necessary as well ‘‘to maintain a proper balance.’’ Id. at ¶ ¶ 33, 45. 

MVPDs’ Complaints About Retransmission Consent Are Groundless 

Especially in light of this recent FCC report, the various repetitive complaints of 

MVPDs about the alleged unfairness of retransmission consent ring hollow. For instance, some cable operators have complained about the retransmission consent fees 

purportedly extracted from them by broadcasters. These complaints are especially 

puzzling because, as the FCC recently reported, cable operators have in fact consistently refused to pay cash for retransmission consent. FCC Report at ¶ ¶ 10, 35. As 

a result, ‘‘virtually all’’ retransmission consent agreements have involved ‘‘a cable 

operator providing in-kind consideration to the broadcaster,’’ and cash is not yet ‘‘a 

principal form of consideration for retransmission consent.’’ Id. at ¶ 10. This in-kind 

consideration has included the carriage of affiliated nonbroadcast channels or other 

consideration, such as the purchase of advertising time, cross-promotions and carriage of local news channels. Id. at ¶ 35. Given that cable companies rarely pay cash 

for retransmission consent of local broadcast signals, this Committee should reject 

any MVPD claims that broadcasters’ retransmission consent fee requests are unreasonable or are somehow the cause of continually increasing cable rates. In fact, in 

late 2003, a General Accounting Office study did not find that retransmission consent has lead to higher cable rates. See GAO, Issues Related to Competition and 

Subscriber Rates in the Cable Television Industry, GAO–04–8 at 28–29; 43–44 (Oct. 

2003). 

Complaints from MVPDs that some broadcasters attempt in retransmission consent negotiations to obtain carriage for additional programming channels are ironic, 

to say the least. As the FCC found, broadcasters began to negotiate for carriage of 

additional program streams in direct response to cable operators’ refusal to pay cash 

for retransmission consent of broadcast signals. FCC Report at ¶ 10. Certainly any 

claims that cable operators somehow have been forced to carry unwanted programming as the result of retransmission consent are disingenuous. Under the retransmission consent regime, no cable operator is compelled to carry any channel, whether a local broadcast channel or an allegedly ‘‘bundled’’ programming channel. And 

if a cable operator prefers not to carry any channel beyond a broadcaster’s local signal, cash alternatives are offered in retransmission consent negotiations. For examVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:21 Sep 07, 2006 Jkt 029574 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\29574.TXT JACKF PsN: JACKF
17

ple, EchoStar recently completed negotiations with Hearst-Argyle Television for a 

cash-only deal at a marketplace rate. 

Clearly, MVPDs want to have their retransmission cake and eat it too. In one 

breath, MVPDs complain that broadcasters are unreasonable in requesting cash 

payment for carriage of their local signals; in the next, they assert that negotiating 

for carriage of additional programming is also unreasonable. In essence, MVPDs 

argue that retransmission consent is somehow inherently invalid because broadcasters should give their consent to MVPDs without compensation in any form. But 

there is no legal, factual or policy reason that broadcasters—unique among programming suppliers—should be singled out not to receive compensation for the programming provided to MVPDs, especially given MVPDs’ increasing competition with 

broadcasters for advertising revenue. Indeed, when enacting retransmission consent, 

Congress noted that cable operators pay for the cable programming they offer to 

customers and that programming services originating on broadcast channels should 

be treated no differently. Senate Report at 35. 

Some cable operators have also presented an inaccurate picture of the video marketplace by contending that, in rural areas and smaller markets, powerful broadcast 

companies have undue leverage in retransmission consent negotiations with local 

cable operators. This is not the case. The cable industry as a whole is concentrated 

nationally and clustered regionally and is dominated by a smaller and smaller number of larger and larger entities. This consolidation will only continue assuming that 

the pending acquisition of Adelphia Communications by Comcast and Time Warner 

is approved. In contrast, a strict FCC duopoly rule continues to prohibit broadcast 

television station combinations in medium and small markets. In fact, a majority 

of cable subscribers in Designated Market Areas 100+ are served by one of the four 

largest cable MSOs, while only about three percent of the television stations in 

these markets are owned by one of the top ten television station groups. Thus, in 

many instances in these 100+ markets, small broadcasters—which are facing severe 

financial pressures—must deal with large nationally and regionally consolidated 

MVPDs in retransmission consent negotiations. In sum, local broadcasters in medium and small markets do not possess unfair leverage over increasingly consolidated cable operators. 

Indeed, in small and large markets alike, nationally and regionally consolidated 

MVPDs have been able to exert considerable market power in retransmission consent negotiations, at the expense of local broadcasters. In actual retransmission consent agreements, broadcasters have frequently had to accept a number of egregious 

terms and conditions, especially with regard to digital carriage. 

For example, it is not uncommon for MVPDs in retransmission agreements to 

refuse to carry a station’s multicast digital signal that contains any religious programming and/or any programming that solicits contributions, such as telethons or 

other charitable fundraising programming. MVPDs have refused to carry any digital 

multicast signal unless the channel is broadcasting 24 hours a day, seven days a 

week. This requirement is very difficult for most digital stations (especially small 

market ones) to meet, and thereby makes it virtually impossible for many stations 

to obtain carriage of digital multicast signals. Under other retransmission agreements, the MVPD agreed to carry only the high definition portion of a broadcast 

station’s digital signal, and the carriage of any portion of the broadcaster’s non-highdefinition digital signal (including even the primary digital signal) remained entirely at the discretion of the MVPD. Other MVPDs have declined to carry the primary digital signals of non-big four network affiliated stations, unless these stations 

achieved certain viewer rankings in their local markets. Thus, the digital signals 

of many stations, including WB/UPN affiliates, Hispanic-oriented stations, religious 

stations and other independent stations, would not be carried by these MVPDs. It 

seems highly unlikely that broadcasters would accept such disadvantageous provisions in retransmission agreements, unless the MVPDs were in a sufficiently powerful marketplace position so as to insist on such provisions. 

In light of these real-world examples, Congress should skeptically view any complaints from MVPDs as to how they are at the mercy of powerful broadcasters in 

marketplace retransmission consent negotiations. The current retransmission consent rules also already protect all MVPDs by imposing an affirmative obligation on 

broadcasters to negotiate in good faith and providing a mechanism to enforce this 

obligation. See 47 CFR § 76.65. In fact, EchoStar was the complainant in the only 

‘‘good faith’’ case to be decided on the merits by the FCC. In that case, the broadcaster was completely exonerated, while EchoStar was found to have abused the 

FCC’s processes. EchoStar Satellite Corp. v. Young Broadcasting, Inc., 16 FCC Rcd 

15070 (2001). Unwarranted MVPD complaints about retransmission consent certainly cannot undermine the FCC’s conclusion that MVPDs are not disadvantaged 

by the existing retransmission consent process. See FCC Report at ¶ 44. 

18

Consumers Benefit From the Retransmission Consent Process 

Finally, I would like to elaborate on the FCC’s conclusion in its report that retransmission consent has benefited the viewing public, as well as broadcasters and 

MVPDs. As the FCC specifically noted, broadcasters’ ability to negotiate carriage of 

additional programming through retransmission consent benefits viewers by increasing consumers’ access to programming, including local news channels. See FCC 

Report at ¶ 35. One excellent example is Allbritton Communications Company’s 

NewsChannel 8 here in the Washington metropolitan area. NewsChannel 8 is a 

local cable news network launched as a result of retransmission consent negotiations over the carriage of Allbritton’s television station WJLA–TV. It provides local 

news, weather and public affairs programming, along with coverage of local public 

events. Further, this programming is zoned separately to better serve viewers in 

Washington, D.C., the Maryland suburbs and Northern Virginia. 

Similarly, Belo used retransmission consent to obtain carriage of its regional cable 

news channel NorthWest Cable News (NWCN) on cable systems serving over two 

million households in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Alaska and California. 

NWCN provides regional up-to-the minute news, weather, sports, entertainment 

and public affairs programming to viewers across the Northwest. These efforts are 

coordinated with Belo’s television stations in Seattle, Portland, Spokane and Boise. 

In addition to local news channels, broadcasters have used retransmission consent 

to provide local weather information on separate channels carried by cable systems. 

For example, LIN Television provides these local weather channels in several markets, including ones with a history of frequent weather emergencies such as Indianapolis. And beyond this use of retransmission consent to gain carriage for local news 

and weather channels, broadcasters have recently used retransmission consent negotiations to obtain carriage of their digital signals, thereby both benefiting viewers 

and, according to the FCC, furthering the digital transition. See FCC Report at ¶ 45. 

Conclusion 

As my testimony makes clear, Congress intended in the 1992 Cable Act to give 

broadcasters the opportunity to negotiate in the marketplace for compensation from 

MVPDs retransmitting their signals. The FCC concluded less than six months ago 

that retransmission consent has fulfilled Congress’ purposes for enacting it, and recommended no changes to either statutory or regulatory provisions relating to retransmission consent. This Committee should accept the FCC’s conclusion and continue to let broadcasters and MVPDs negotiate in the marketplace for retransmission consent. Especially in light of the FCC’s conclusion that local broadcasters 

and MVPDs generally negotiate on a ‘‘level playing field,’’ Congress has no basis for 

altering the retransmission consent marketplace. FCC Report at ¶ 44. Thank you for 

your time and attention this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

The next witness is Dan Fawcett, Executive Vice President for 

programming for DIRECTV——

What? Excuse me, I skipped you, Mr. Waz. I’m running through 

this day faster than I want to, I guess. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Or maybe I want to run through faster than I 

can. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize. 

Joseph Waz, Vice President of External Affairs at Comcast. 

Mr. Waz? 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. WAZ, JR., VICE PRESIDENT,

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC POLICY COUNSEL,

COMCAST CORPORATION 

Mr. WAZ. Thank you, Chairman Stevens. I’ll try to keep it moving, as well. And I appreciate the opportunity to be here this afternoon. 

Two years ago, the FCC said, ‘‘The vast majority of Americans 

enjoy more choice, more programming, and more services than at 

19

any time in history.’’ Today, that’s an understatement. Competition 

in video distribution and video content is booming, and that really 

is the heart of my testimony today. 

Virtually every cable consumer in every community that Comcast 

serves can choose from at least three multichannel video providers, 

or MVPDs. Two DBS providers—DIRECTV, which is on the panel 

with me here today, and EchoStar—now serve over 27 million 

American homes nationwide. Both companies are larger than every 

cable company but Comcast. We also compete with providers like 

RCN and Knology, and with phone companies like Verizon and 

AT&T, which promise an aggressive entry into video. 

Meanwhile, 15 to 20 million American homes still prefer to rely 

on broadcast television. Most Americans also rent and buy DVDs 

and videotapes in record numbers. And the competitive distribution 

outlets keep growing. From iPods to mobile phones to digital video 

recorders, everything is becoming a video device. 

To respond to all of this competition, Comcast has invested over $40 billion to expand capacity so we can offer over 200 channels 

or more to our customers. We’ve added dozens of international, foreign language, and high-definition channels. We are the leaders in 

video-on-demand, which lets our customers choose what they want 

to watch, when they want to watch it, over 3,000 different choices 

today and growing fast. And on-demand is clearly the direction the 

world is heading. 

This explosion of distribution outlets and channel capacity has 

ignited a corresponding explosion in video content. When the 1992 

Cable Act was passed, there were only 68 national programming 

networks. Most were vertically integrated—that is, owned at least 

in part by a cable company. And that was largely because no one 

else would risk investing in them at the time. 

Fast forward to 2006. Now there are 388 national programming 

networks and nearly 100 regional networks. Vertical integration 

has plummeted from 57 percent in 1992 to 23 percent today. And 

Comcast has a financial interest in only about 7 percent of the networks that we carry. So, there’s vastly more competition in content 

and distribution than there was in 1992. 

Against that backdrop, let me review two rules that Congress 

adopted in that year: the program-access and program-carriage 

rules. 

Program access was intended to help competitors to cable. It ensured that vertically integrated satellite-delivered programming 

services were available to competitors on terms and conditions comparable to those that were available to cable operators. 

Program carriage was intended to help independent programmers. It ensured that, in an era when cable had little competition, 

cable companies could not unfairly block independent programmers 

from reaching consumers. 

In adopting program-access requirements, Congress did not try 

to turn all programming into a commodity. The rules don’t apply 

to non-vertically integrated programming or to terrestrially distributed programming. Congress consciously limited the reach of the 

rules, and we think Congress knew exactly what it was doing. 

Those rules have worked. Or, more accurately, the marketplace 

has worked. There have been fewer than 50 complaints on program 

20

1 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 

Programming, 10th Annual Report, 19 FCC Rcd. 1606 ¶ 4 (2004). 

access filed in 14 years. Almost none has led to an adverse ruling. 

In fact, most have been settled. And in recent years program-access 

complaints have dwindled. 

Despite this record of success, DIRECTV and others have spent 

most of the past decade insisting the sky is falling. For a decade, 

they have warned that cable programming would be moved from 

satellite delivery to terrestrial delivery to evade the rules. For a 

decade, they’ve alleged that they would be denied programming. 

But the truth is, it didn’t happen. Today, DIRECTV and every 

other competitor has access to more programming—sports, news, 

entertainment, and otherwise—than ever before. 

The program-carriage rules have almost never been used—again, 

because the marketplace works. If you have an attractive programming idea, a sensible business plan, a willingness to negotiate 

terms that work for the programmer and the distributor, and something unique to the marketplace, you have the opportunity to build 

a business. 

The America Channel has not filed a program-carriage complaint 

with the FCC, but they have used every other opportunity—and I 

think they’ll be using this hearing today—to get the government to 

force Comcast to carry it. 

I’ve addressed both of these situations in my written statement, 

but I would say, in brief, that there are so many competitive alternative distribution outlets available today that a carriage agreement with Comcast is not essential to viability. Let me be clear. 

Comcast carries a huge amount of independent programming. We 

want the best programming for our customers, no matter the 

source. 

Mr. Chairman, the video marketplace looks nothing like it did in 

1992. It’s robust, dynamic, and irreversibly competitive. And rules 

intended for a very different time and place should be candidates 

for elimination, not expansion. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Waz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. WAZ, JR., VICE PRESIDENT, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AND PUBLIC POLICY COUNSEL, COMCAST CORPORATION

Chairman Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye, and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss issues relating to video 

content. 

Two years ago, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) concluded that: 

‘‘[T]he vast majority of Americans enjoy more choice, more programming and more 

services than any time in history.’’ 1 Two years later, that statement can be made 

with even more conviction. It is undeniable that American consumers now enjoy access to an unprecedented array of video programming delivered in a growing number of ways by an ever-increasing number of competing providers. Comcast is one 

of those providers. And in every community that we serve, we are competing with 

DIRECTV, with DISH Network (EchoStar), often with companies like RCN, Knology 

and WideOpenWest (WOW), and any day now with companies like AT&T and 

Verizon. 

This competition has driven our company, and the entire cable industry, to improve. But more importantly, it has given the American consumer the richest cornucopia of video programming in the world, with huge diversity of voices and content, 

meeting almost every conceivable need and interest. 

21

2 H.R. Rep. No. 102–628, at 41 (1992) (noting that there were ‘‘68 nationally delivered cable 

video networks’’ ). 

Competition in Distribution 

When Congress and the FCC assess competition in video distribution, they have 

tended to confine their analysis to what they call the ‘‘multichannel video programming distributors,’’ or ‘‘MVPDs.’’ These include traditional cable television operators, 

‘‘broadband service providers’’ like RCN, WOW and Knology, direct broadcast satellite (DBS) providers like DIRECTV and DISH Network, local exchange carriers 

like Verizon and AT&T, providers of Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service, 

electric utilities, and satellite master antenna TV systems. Taken as a whole, the 

growth of these competitors has been extraordinary since Congress passed the Cable 

Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (1992 Cable Act). At 

that time, nearly 14 years ago, Congress foresaw the possibility of significant potential competition from these providers of multichannel video services, and it took 

measures to promote that competition. Today, that competition is real, robust, and 

thriving, as the most recent data from the FCC and other sources affirm. 

The headline story is the extraordinary growth of DBS. DIRECTV and EchoStar 

each offer their services to almost every household in the United States, and they 

have captured over 27 million customers. Each year for the past five years, the DBS 

companies have added two to three million new customers, while the cable industry’s basic subscribership has remained flat. Each of those two companies is now 

larger than every cable company in America except for Comcast. 

The Bell Operating Companies are also making a large-scale entry into the multichannel video marketplace, and we believe they, too, will be formidable competitors. 

Not every consumer chooses to take service from a MVPD, however. Anywhere 

from 15–20 million households prefer to rely on over-the-air television. And in several markets, local broadcast stations are banding together to create a multichannel 

over-the-air alternative offering dozens of cable networks to compete with cable and 

satellite. U.S. Digital Television is now operational in four cities (Albuquerque, Dallas, Salt Lake City, and Las Vegas), and for $19.95 per month provides its customers with 25–40 channels, including all the local broadcast stations (and their HD 

signals) and many of the most popular cable networks. 

We think that the rapidly changing video marketplace compels Congress and the 

FCC to view ‘‘video competition’’ even more broadly. Today, tens of millions of Americans also supplement their viewing with DVD and videotape rentals and purchases, 

and Netflix has become a national phenomenon. In addition, an increasing number 

of Internet streaming and download options are emerging—witness the incredible 

explosion of services and devices at the Consumer Electronics Show earlier this 

month. From iPods to mobile phones to digital video recorders, everything is becoming a ‘‘video download’’ device. 

The problem with television in America is not lack of choice—the problem is how 

a consumer can manage all of that choice! 

In this unbelievably dynamic marketplace, neither Comcast nor anyone else can 

rest for even a moment. Each and every day, we compete to attract new customers 

and to keep our existing customers happy. This is why we have spent over $40 billion since 1996 to add the capacity to let us deliver 200 or more video channels to 

almost every home we pass... and added dozens of international and foreign-language channels... and added a dozen or more high-definition television (HDTV) 

channels in every market... and have become the industry leader in providing 

video-on-demand (VOD), offering our digital homes over 3,000 different programming choices any time, day or night, in every conceivable niche, including more local 

programming. We have to work hard to remain the first choice of our customers—

and the way that we do that is by constantly investing in more capacity so that we 

can add new programming, new channels, and new features. 

In short, the video distribution marketplace is more competitive and diverse than 

ever. As Congress looks to the future, it’s wrong to view television as we viewed it 

in 1992—it’s a fundamentally different medium, and it has become fundamentally 

and irrevocably competitive. 

Competition in Content 

The explosion of distribution outlets has launched a corresponding explosion in 

content. When the 1992 Cable Act was passed, there were approximately 68 national programming networks (and only a dozen or so regional networks) in operation in the U.S. 2 The majority of them were owned by cable companies (largely 

because independent programmers, the broadcast networks, and the Hollywood studios were not very interested in investing in cable programming at the time)—in 

fact, 57 percent of cable networks had ‘‘some ownership affiliation with the operVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:21 Sep 07, 2006 Jkt 029574 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\29574.TXT JACKF PsN: JACKF
22

3 Id. (noting that ‘‘39 [of the 68], or 57 percent, have some ownership affiliation with the operating side of the cable industry’’ ). 4 A customer must purchase Limited Basic in order to purchase any of the other packages listed here. This is because Congress prohibits cable operators from providing any tier of cable service to any customer who does not buy a tier that includes all local broadcast channels, as well 

as public, educational, and governmental channels. 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(7).

ating side of the cable industry.’’ 3 The average household did not have cable at all, 

and those that did normally had access to about 36 analog channels of programming. 

Fast forward to 2006—incredibly, there are over 388 full-time national programming networks in operation today, and nearly 100 regional networks as well. The 

number of ‘‘vertically integrated’’ channels has dropped to 23 percent, and Comcast 

has a financial interest in approximately seven percent of the networks that we 

carry. Eighty-five percent of all American TV households take service from a MVPD, 

and a typical MVPD household enjoys access to over 200 video channels. In addition, many producers—both majors and independents—are creating programming 

for video-on-demand, and some may use VOD exposure as a springboard for the creation of new full-time channels. 

There are three important reasons for this proliferation of programming choices:

• First, the cable industry’s dedication to invest over $100 billion to expand our 

distribution networks and tens of billions more to improve the quality and diversity of our programming offerings;

• Second, the emergence of DBS and other distribution media to provide additional outlets for programming;

• And third, the freedom that the law has given us to package and promote this 

programming in ‘‘tiers,’’ and to create tiers and packages that respond to consumer demand, makes economic sense for our industry, and allows us to respond to competition from DBS and other providers.

To elaborate on the third point, it is important to note that having the freedom 

to create programming tiers and bundles lowers key costs and improves the economics of programming in ways that help to support those hundreds of channels. Program tiers lower transaction costs because it is easier, less confusing to customers, 

and less costly to cable operators to sell a bundle of services in a tier with a single 

transaction than to try to sell hundreds of different services on an a la carte basis. 

Tiers reduce marketing costs because program services sold in a tier do not have to 

spend as much to market the service (or to retain subscribers) as they would if customers were required to make (and could constantly change) individual purchase decisions for each service. Tiers lower distribution costs because the distribution cost 

per subscriber is the same regardless of the number of channels delivered, so the 

more channels subscribed to, the lower the average cost of distributing a channel. 

Tiers increase the value of advertising because they expand viewership by capturing 

occasional and spontaneous viewers. And tiers reduce equipment costs because the 

only way in which to deliver services sold a la carte is to require customers to purchase or lease addressable set-top boxes for every TV in their homes. 

The benefits of tiering in this fashion are widely understood and appreciated by 

both network programmers and would-be programmers. That is why so many of 

them have so vigorously opposed calls to require distributors to sell programming 

a la carte. The fact that a la carte would result in consumers paying more for less 

has been recognized in virtually every informed analysis done to date, including 

studies by the FCC’s Media Bureau, the Government Accountability Office, Bear 

Stearns, Boaz Allen, and Paul Kagan, among others. 

Tiering and bundling of programming are entirely consistent with promoting both 

consumer choice and the economic viability of programming. Take Comcast’s Arlington, Virginia system as an example. Our customers today can choose from over 

1,000 program and price combinations to create a mix of services to meet any program interest or financial requirement: 4

• Limited Basic: 32 channels, including all local broadcast stations, C–SPAN and 

C–SPAN2, News Channel 8, TV Guide, ABC Family, WGN Superstation, three 

Arlington Public School channels, a local government channel, and a leased access channel.

• Expanded Basic: 45 services, including CNN, ESPN, Discovery, Nickelodeon, 

Bravo, Food Network, Weather Channel, History Channel, and BET.

• Premium Services: services offered on a stand-alone basis, including HBO, 

Showtime, Cinemax, The Movie Channel, STARZ, ART (Arab Radio & Television), TV Asia, and Zee TV (an Indian-language channel).

23

5 Comcast does not charge separately for this programming but only for the HD-capable settop box needed to receive it. With respect to premium services, customers receive only the HD 

versions of services they purchase. 6See 47 U.S.C. § 521(6). 7 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, § 12, Pub. L. No. 102–

385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 548). 8 Id. § 19 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 536). 

• Digital Classic: an interactive programming guide, VOD access, 45 music channels, and 20 digital services, including Discovery Kids, Noggin, Fine Living, and 

Toon Disney.

• Digital Plus: Digital Classic services plus 23 additional digital services including National Geographic, three Discovery channels, Sundance, and 12 Encore 

channels.

• Digital Silver: Digital Classic services, Digital Plus services, and one premium 

service including the service’s multiplexed channels and subscription VOD service.

• Digital Gold: Digital Classic services, Digital Plus services, and three premium 

networks including the services’ multiplexed channels and subscription VOD 

services.

• Digital Platinum: Digital Classic services, Digital Plus services, and five premium services (HBO, Cinemax, Showtime, The Movie Channel, and STARZ) including the services’ multiplexed channels and SVOD services.

• Hispanic Tier—CableLatino: An add-on package for any subscriber that has the 

Digital Classic or Digital Plus services. This package is comprised of 18 Hispanic language services, including Discovery en Espanol, CNN en Espanol, and 

Toon Disney Espanol.

• Sports Tier: An add-on package for any subscriber that has the Digital Classic 

or Digital Plus services. The Sports Tier is comprised of three out-of-market regional sports networks and Gol TV, NBA TV, and FOX Sports World.

• HDTV Channels: A package of 14 networks transmitted in HDTV, including 

ABC, NBC, CBS, FOX, WB Network, two PBS signals, iNHD, ESPN–HD, 

Comcast SportsNet–HD, HBO HD, Showtime HD, Cinemax HD, and START 

HD. 5

Additional flexibility is provided by the ability to add premium channels and services in various combinations, our pay-per-view and VOD programming options, as 

well as the new Family Tier that we announced in December and will roll out company-wide over the next few months. 

The Role of Regulation in the Licensing of Program Content 

Policymakers have always understood that market forces are superior to government regulation in enhancing consumer welfare, and that is no less true in the area 

of video content. 

Back in 1992, when DBS had yet to launch its first satellite and sign up its first 

customer, the cable industry faced little direct multichannel competition. In response to consumer complaints, and in the absence of meaningful alternative 

sources of programming, Congress passed strict regulations governing the cable industry. But even then, Congress expressed a strong preference for competition over 

regulation, and put significant emphasis on encouraging competitive entry. 6 In the 

years since, multichannel video competition has taken deep root, and today is irreversible. As a result, many of the regulations that currently govern the cable industry were intended to address less competitive market conditions that have long since 

changed. 

Two of those regulations that are relevant to this hearing are the so-called ‘‘program access’’ provisions of the 1992 Act, 7 and the ‘‘program carriage’’ provisions of 

that Act. 8 The relevant provisions of the program access statute were intended to 

ensure that national satellite-delivered cable programming services in which cable 

operators had an attributable financial interest would be made available to the industry’s competitors on rates, terms, and conditions comparable to those available 

to cable companies. The program carriage provisions were intended to ensure that, 

at a time when cable companies were perceived to be the sole providers of multichannel services, those companies could not play a ‘‘gatekeeper’’ role through actions 

that unfairly barred or conditioned distribution of independent programmers. 

24

9See In re Implementation of Sections 12 and 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection 

and Competition Act of 1992: Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming 

Distribution and Carriage, First Report & Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 3359 (1993). 10For reasons known only to RCN, that company has claimed for several years that it has 

not received access to Comcast SportsNet (Philadelphia) on reasonable terms and conditions. 

However, RCN has had the contractual right to carry Comcast SportsNet (Philadelphia) from 

the day it signed on the air, and RCN still has those rights today, on the same terms and conditions that Comcast and other cable companies carry the network. And in fact, RCN has carried 

the network on those terms since day one—even though Comcast is under no obligation to make 

it available. 

Program Access 

The program access provisions, implemented into rules by the FCC, 9 ensured that 

fledgling DBS providers and other competitors would have access to programming 

perceived as critical to their success. These provisions represented a major departure from normal competition policy, which would encourage investment and innovation in exclusive programming. Exclusive programming permits competitors to 

distinguish themselves from one another. For example, DIRECTV has for several 

years had exclusive rights to the complete package of National Football League 

games, which has helped it to distinguish itself from both its cable and satellite 

competitors and contributed to the company’s success. 

In adopting program access requirements, Congress clearly did not intend to 

commoditize all video programming. The relevant provisions of the statute do not 

apply to any programming in which a cable operator does not have an attributable 

financial interest, nor does it apply to terrestrially distributed cable networks (of 

which there were more than a dozen in operation when the 1992 Act was passed). 

Nor does the statute require that all programming be sold to everyone or sold at 

the same price to all distributors. Thus, in adopting this striking exception to freedom of commerce, Congress specifically limited its marketplace intrusion, with full 

knowledge of what it was doing. 

It can be said that the program access provisions have been a great success—

though it would probably be more accurate to say that the marketplace is working. 

In the 14 years since Congress enacted these provisions, there have been far fewer 

program access complaints with the FCC than either the FCC or Congress envisioned (we estimate fewer than 50 in total), and almost none of these complaints 

has resulted in a ruling adverse to the programmer—in fact, most have been settled. 

Importantly, as competition has grown, the number of program access complaints 

has dwindled, not increased. What is clear in today’s marketplace is that national 

programming networks, whether or not affiliated with a cable operator, desire broad 

distribution of their services and have every incentive to ensure that as many consumers as possible can see their programming, including the 27 million DBS subscribers and the customers of other MVPD competitors. 

Perhaps the most frequently reiterated complaint under the program access rules 

concerns Comcast SportsNet (Philadelphia). The FCC (twice) and the courts (once) 

have thoroughly considered and rejected complaints by DIRECTV and EchoStar that 

Comcast’s creation and distribution of this high-quality regional sports network violated the program access rules. All have concluded that Comcast was within its 

rights to make the economically sound decision to terrestrially distribute this network using a pre-existing terrestrial distribution system. 10 And while the DBS companies and others have cried wolf for nearly a decade, claiming that the FCC’s decision would encourage companies to move their most valuable programming off of 

satellite (and therefore beyond the reach of the program access rules), the fact of 

the matter is that that has not happened. In fact, each of the four regional sports 

networks launched by Comcast since it created the Philadelphia network has been 

satellite-delivered, again for sound economic reasons. 

DIRECTV and EchoStar both claim that Philadelphia professional sports programming is ‘‘must-have’’ programming and that they cannot compete in that region 

without it. The facts, however, do not support that claim. 

Since the mid-1990s, nearly a hundred local Philadelphia professional sports 

events have been available on local broadcast stations, but the DBS companies did 

not carry these signals (which are available to them free of charge) until they were 

required to by Federal law. It is difficult to understand why, if this is ‘‘must-have’’ 

programming, they would not bother to carry it for free. 

Moreover, based on the latest data from Media Business Corp. (as of 9/30/2005), 

it is clear that DBS penetration in Philadelphia is higher than or comparable to that 

in many other urban markets. Philadelphia has a DBS penetration of 12.04 percent—higher than Hartford (8.6 percent), Providence (9.39 percent), Springfield-Holyoke (8.65 percent), and Laredo, TX (7.92 percent); comparable to Boston (10.73 perVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:21 Sep 07, 2006 Jkt 029574 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\29574.TXT JACKF PsN: JACKF
25

cent), Las Vegas (10.96 percent), El Paso (11.01 percent), and Palm Springs (11.80 

percent); and not significantly lower than New York (15.24 percent), Tampa (14.03 

percent), Baltimore (14.15 percent), Milwaukee (15.08 percent), Norfolk (14.22 percent), or Harrisburg (13.29 percent), among others. And in fact, in the last five 

years, the DBS companies have tripled their market share in Philadelphia. 

As I noted earlier, most programmers—including cable companies that own programming—want maximum distribution for most of their products. But that should 

not mean that cable companies, DBS companies, and others should not have the 

freedom to create and invest in some original and exclusive programming as well, 

in order to distinguish themselves from one another in the marketplace. In fact, 

Congress and the FCC should consider that the program access rules (and the corresponding restrictions that now apply to DIRECTV as a consequence of its merger 

with News Corp.) may now be having the perverse effect of reducing investment by 

the beneficiaries of these rules (including two of the three largest MVPDs in America, DIRECTV and EchoStar) in original programming—why invest and create when 

you can have access to someone else’s work on the cheap? 

Program Carriage 

The program carriage rules were intended to be a guarantee against the ability 

of a cable operator, who 14 years ago might be presumed to have ‘‘monopoly gatekeeper’’ status, to bar or handicap independent programming networks from gaining 

distribution. These rules have almost never been invoked, again largely because the 

marketplace works. Anyone who has an attractive programming idea, a sensible 

business plan, and a willingness to negotiate carriage terms that make sense for 

both the programmer and the distributor, has had the opportunity to build a business. 

In the past year, one company (Mid-Atlantic Sports Network, or ‘‘MASN’’ ) has 

filed a program carriage complaint, invoking these little-used provisions of law—the 

first such complaint ever filed against Comcast. A second company (The America 

Channel, or ‘‘TAC’’ ) has steadfastly refused to file a program carriage complaint, but 

it has attempted to leverage every other opportunity to get the government to force 

Comcast to carry it. 

Let me address the MASN situation first. The Baltimore Orioles, as part of a deal 

with their affiliate, TCR, and Major League Baseball, created a new sports network 

(MASN) with the intention of carrying Baltimore Orioles games in 2007. And in an 

unprecedented move, Major League Baseball also granted to the Orioles organization control over the television rights of the new Washington Nationals baseball 

club. Comcast SportsNet (Washington/Baltimore) (CSN) has the television rights to 

Orioles games through the 2006 season, and it paid millions of dollars for the right 

to negotiate exclusively for renewal of those television rights and for the right to 

match any third-party offer received after that period of negotiation expired. For the 

Orioles’ organization to agree to transfer to MASN the rights to Orioles games for 

annual license fees, and to declare that the Orioles games would be available only 

on MASN starting in 2007 without providing CSN the opportunity to match this 

deal, was a blatant breach of CSN’s contractual rights. CSN is pursuing its rights 

in court. Meanwhile, TCR filed a complaint at the FCC alleging that Comcast’s decision not to carry MASN violates the program carriage rules. Without detailing here 

the lack of merit of TCR’s filings (we would gladly provide to the Committee upon 

request copies of relevant public documents filed at the FCC), it should be noted 

that some of TCR’s allegations at the FCC were so frivolous and so outrageous that 

a consultant for Major League Baseball—which is the business partner of the Orioles—intervened on his own motion to denounce and refute those allegations. 

Comcast wants to carry Orioles and Nationals games. But Comcast also wants to 

protect the contractual rights negotiated and paid for by CSN. We hope for a timely 

resolution that is in the best interest of our company, our customers, and the teams’ 

fans. 

Now let me briefly address the complaints by TAC. This is a would-be network 

that asserts that its inability to negotiate a carriage agreement with Comcast is an 

absolute bar to its viability. The fact is that TAC has done none of the things necessary to establish a viable network. It lacks a secure source of financing; it has 

not assembled any programming expertise; it has no coherent business plan; and—

most importantly—it has created no programming. Not surprisingly, with a single 

exception, no established cable or DBS operator has entered into a carriage agreement with TAC. 

TAC asserts that independent program networks cannot succeed without a carriage agreement from Comcast and Time Warner, and it claims that those companies will not work with independent program networks. 

26

* The information referred to has been printed in the Appendix, page 73. 

In response to the first point, I am attaching to my testimony a column by C. Michael Cooley of The Sportsman Channel, which appeared in the October 3, 2005 edition of Multichannel News, whose headline sums it up: ‘‘How I Started a Network 

Without Comcast.’’ * Moreover, there are many networks that have become viable 

with no cable carriage, reinforcing the point that there are a sufficient number of 

U.S. MVPD households served by competitors to support such programming. 

In response to the second point, marketplace facts refute TAC’s assertion. 

Comcast carries scores of independent networks. In fact, it has no choice but to 

carry a significant number of independent programmers because customers demand 

it. 

The fact of the matter is Comcast owns an attributable financial interest (which, 

for purposes of the FCC’s rules, can be as little as five percent) in only about seven 

percent of the channels it carries. In other words, 13 out of every 14 channels carried by Comcast are owned by companies that are completely independent of 

Comcast. This should not come as a surprise—it is our goal, and a competitive necessity, to provide the best programming and the best value for our customers, regardless of who owns or produces the programming. 

TAC lacks any basis for invoking the program carriage rules, which is the likeliest 

explanation for TAC’s failure to file a complaint with the FCC. In the meantime, 

we have had continuing discussions with TAC over the past year, and we remain 

open to a meaningful dialogue. But it is important to remember that TAC is entirely 

in control of its own fate—and its failure to secure any meaningful carriage commitment from any of our established competitors suggests that the problem lies not 

with Comcast, but with TAC’s business plan. 

I anticipate that some parties at today’s hearing may raise other complaints or 

allegations regarding the operation of the program access or program carriage rules, 

and I stand ready to provide information to the Committee that would respond to 

any such complaints. 

Conclusion 

Over the past 14 years, competition in the video marketplace has exploded. When 

the 1992 Cable Act passed, the majority of consumers had little choice from whom 

they purchased multichannel video service and comparatively limited programming 

choice. Today, almost every consumer in America can choose from among at least 

three MVPDs, each offering hundreds of programming services. And the number of 

viable programming alternatives aimed at the consumer market continues to increase with telephone company entry, innovations by terrestrial broadcasters, the 

emergence of the Internet as a viable video medium, and other distribution options. 

The video marketplace is robust, dynamic, and hotly competitive. In light of the 

changes in both distribution and content creation over the past 14 years, this is the 

time for Congress to consider reducing, not expanding, regulation of video content. 

I urge this Committee to demand the facts from those on this panel who would 

argue otherwise, because the facts do not support their calls for regulation. 

I thank the Committee for this opportunity to appear today.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Dan Fawcett, Executive Vice 

President for programming of DIRECTV, in El Segundo, California. 

Mr. FAWCETT. Thank you——

The CHAIRMAN. Sixty years ago, I would have been delivering 

your local newspaper. 

Mr. FAWCETT. Oh, really? El Segundo? 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL M. FAWCETT, EXECUTIVE VICE

PRESIDENT, BUSINESS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS AND

PROGRAMMING ACQUISITION, DIRECTV, INC. 

Mr. FAWCETT. Chairman Stevens, Senator Dorgan, my name’s 

Dan Fawcett, and I’m the Executive Vice President for Programming Acquisition at DIRECTV. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to be here today. 

27

My testimony focuses on program access and the threat to video 

competition arising from the proposed Adelphia transaction. 

Over the last decade, Congress has helped foster the competitive 

video marketplace that exists today. With DIRECTV leading the 

way, DBS has grown from fewer than 10 million subscribers in 

1999 to more than 27 million today. Increased competition means 

consumers have more choices, customer service is more responsive, 

and innovation is flourishing. But these advances cannot be taken 

for granted. I am here to discuss how this progress is now being 

threatened. 

Comcast and Time Warner, the Nation’s two biggest cable companies intend to divide Adelphia’s subscribers between them and to 

swap many of their current subscribers. The sole purpose of this 

transaction is to create concentrated regional monopolies across the 

country. If allowed to proceed without safeguards, Comcast and 

Time Warner will use this local dominance to deny competitors key 

regional programming, especially must-have local sports. And, in 

doing so, consumers will be harmed and fair competition will be 

impossible. 

I know this, because I’ve seen it all before. My job at DIRECTV 

is to negotiate carriage deals with programmers, including regional 

sports networks. Over the years, I’ve seen how cable operators have 

managed to deny access to local sports programming in their effort 

to undermine competition. 

Let me give you some examples: 

Philadelphia is the poster child. The city is served almost exclusively by Comcast, which created an RSN with rights to the Phillies, Flyers, and 76ers. It then denied this network to Comcast 

competitors. For almost 10 years, satellite customers have had to 

give up the right to root for their home teams. 

Just this year, in Charlotte, Time Warner secured a cable exclusive deal with the Charlotte Bobcats, meaning that, here, too, local 

fans face a grim choice, giving up watching the local team or give 

up the right to choose their video provider. 

In Chicago, Comcast gained a regional monopoly by purchasing 

AT&T’s cable systems in 2002. Comcast next purchased the rights 

of the Bulls, Blackhawks, Cubs, and White Sox, and launched its 

own sports network. Comcast made it available to DIRECTV, but 

at double the price DIRECTV had been paying to carry the exact 

same games. 

Time Warner and Comcast are trying to follow the Chicago playbook for the new Mets channel. Both companies have an ownership 

interest in this channel and want DIRECTV to pay the astounding 

amount of over $17 million for one season of baseball or forego the 

games and give Time Warner and Comcast an exclusive. 

In Ohio, where Time Warner will gain a regional monopoly from 

the Adelphia transaction, they are doing the same thing for the 

Cleveland Indians channel. 

There is one constant in each of these scenarios: the cable operator obtains regional market power, which it then uses to secure 

local sports rights, which then enables it to use this must-have programming as a weapon against competitors. This is why the 

Adelphia transaction is so troubling. This deal will create regional 

monopolies all across America. 

28

In Boston, Comcast will have over 75 percent of pay-TV subscribers, 70 percent in Pittsburgh, 67 percent in West Palm Beach. 

In Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Columbus, Time Warner’s market 

share will be 60 percent or more. These high levels of concentration 

will allow Comcast and Time Warner to do the same thing in these 

cities that they have done in Philadelphia, Charlotte, and Chicago. 

Put simply, this plan puts at risk the more than 10 years of 

progress that Congress set in motion with the program-access statute. 

To prevent this outcome, Congress can do two things: 

First, we ask you to support DIRECTV’s call for the FCC to narrowly condition the Adelphia transaction. In particular, the FCC 

should prohibit exclusive deals for RSNs in the regions where the 

Adelphia transaction will create market power. Distributors should 

also be permitted to seek an independent third-party review to ensure nondiscriminatory and fair pricing to competitors. 

Second, we ask you to re-examine the program-access statute to, 

number one, close the terrestrial loophole; two, address discriminatory pricing schemes that circumvent the intent of the law; and, 

three, make the ban on exclusives permanent. 

Cable operators were once the only game in town. As a result, 

prices were high, choices were limited, and customer service was 

legendarily bad. But at least in most places competition is now the 

order of the day, and the results are remarkable: unprecedented innovation, service improvements, more responsive pricing, and more 

choices than ever before. 

On behalf of millions of Americans who benefit from the competition that we and others provide, we ask you to ensure a competitive video marketplace for the future. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to present DIRECTV’s 

views on these important matters, and I’d be happy to answer any 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fawcett follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL M. FAWCETT, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, 

BUSINESS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS AND PROGRAMMING ACQUISITION, DIRECTV, INC. 

Chairman Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye, and Members of the Committee, my 

name is Dan Fawcett and I am the Executive Vice President, Business and Legal 

Affairs and Programming Acquisition, at DIRECTV, Inc. Thank you for inviting me 

to testify today on video competition, program access, local sports programming, and 

the threats to competition arising from the proposed Adelphia transaction. 

A key development in the American economy over the past twenty years has been 

the rise of a competitive video marketplace. Today, competition means consumers 

have more choices; customer service and pricing are becoming more responsive; 

technological innovation is flourishing, and tens of thousands of jobs have been created. 

This is no accident. Rather, it is the direct result of public policies that promote 

competition. But today, this progress is being threatened. 

Comcast and Time Warner, the Nation’s two biggest cable companies, intend to 

divide Adelphia’s subscribers between them and to swap many of their current subscribers. If allowed to do so, Comcast and Time Warner will control access to approximately 6 in 10 of the Nation’s cable subscribers and almost half of all pay-TV 

subscribers. Of greater concern, the proposed transaction will create concentrated 

regional monopolies across the country where one of the two companies will become 

the single dominant video provider. 

If allowed to establish such regional monopolies, without adequate safeguards, I 

can assure you that Comcast and Time Warner will deny key regional programming—especially local sports—to their competitors. Maybe they will do so directly, 

29

1This, of course, wasn’t the only strategy employed by cable to retain its monopoly. Some 

Members of this Committee might remember ‘‘Primestar,’’ the cable industry’s attempt to launch 

its own satellite service as a ‘‘stalking horse’’ to block competitive DBS entry—in part by obtaining scarce DBS licenses. In the end, the Department of Justice and 45 states sued Pnmestar 

and obtained a consent decree curbing the most obviously anticompetitive tactics. 

because the program access rules will not prevent them. Or maybe they will do so 

indirectly by increasing the price of this programming, which the program access 

rules also allow. Either way, tens of millions of consumers will be harmed, and fair 

competition will be impossible. 

I know this because I’ve seen it all before. My job at DIRECTV is to negotiate 

carriage deals with programmers, including the regional sports networks (RSNs) 

that carry teams like the Indians and the Mets and the Red Wings in their hometowns. Over the years, I’ve seen how cable operators have managed to deny their 

competitors local sports programming in places like Philadelphia, where DIRECTV 

subscribers still cannot watch the Phillies, 76ers, and Flyers; and Chicago, where 

the price DIRECTV pays for sports programming has increased at exorbitant rates. 

This should not be the model for the rest of the country. To prevent this, we have 

asked the FCC to place safeguards on the Adelphia transactions and we also urge 

Congress to update and strengthen the program access rules. Taken together, these 

regulatory and legislative recommendations will help to ensure that the competitive 

video marketplace that exists today will continue to flourish in the future. 

I. Where Cable Operators Have Gained Sufficient Regional Concentration, 

They Have Withheld or Raised the Price of Key Local Sports

Programming 

Not so long ago, there was no such thing as video competition. If you wanted multichannel programming, your local cable operator was the only place to go. Over the 

past 15 years, however, sound public policy decisions by Congress have helped foster 

the rise of a truly competitive video marketplace. With DIRECTV taking the lead, 

DBS has grown from fewer than 10 million subscribers in 1999 to more than 26 million today—proof that when it comes to video, Americans want choice. 

Thanks to this increased competition:

• DIRECTV and others have invested billions in new innovations.

• DIRECTV itself has invested billions to make local broadcast signals available 

to more than 93 percent of television households, and is investing billions more 

to create the capacity to provide 1,500 high definition local broadcast channels.

• Customer service and choice have improved throughout the video industry.

• Rural customers now have access to the latest products and services.

Because of the competitive marketplace this Committee helped create, all Americans—not just DIRECTV subscribers—are enjoying a better television experience. 

But it almost never happened. Some Members of this Committee may remember 

that, when satellite first appeared on the scene, cable responded as any monopolist 

would—by trying to protect its monopoly. One strategy was to deny key programming to its satellite rivals. 1 Cable hoped that, if it could prevent satellite from carrying the most desirable programming services, it could strangle competition in its 

infancy. So cable operators refused to sell programming they controlled to satellite 

and used their market power to secure exclusive contracts with key unaffiliated programmers. 

But to cable’s chagrin, Congress stepped in. In 1992, Congress created program 

access requirements designed to prevent such abuses of market power. Under these 

rules, cable operators were prohibited from negotiating exclusive or ‘‘sweetheart’’ 

deals for cable-affiliated programming. The idea was that, with a level competitive 

field, new entrants such as DIRECTV could compete on the merits of their offerings, 

and consumers would benefit from their efforts to win customers from each other. 

The rules have been an unmitigated success: without them, satellite television 

would never have gotten off the ground. 

In recent years, however, cable operators have devised increasingly sophisticated 

ways around Congress’s pro-competitive rules. The program access rules no longer 

provide any real barrier to cable giants such as Comcast and Time Warner. Thus, 

we now find ourselves in much the same situation as before Congress enacted the 

program access rules—in regions where a cable operator possesses market power, 

it will deny or raise the price of key programming to its competitors. In particular, 

cable will seek to withhold the kind of local sports programming that the FCC has 

determined to be ‘‘must-have’’ for distributors. 

Let me give you some examples: 

30

2 In 2002, the last time Comcast had a big merger pending, it was persuaded to make Comcast 

SportsNet available to cable overbuilders such as RCN. But it has never made this programming available to satellite. 3When Congress was drafting the program access provisions in 1992, it wanted to allow exclusive deals for local cable news channels. The idea was that, if a cable system spends a lot of 

money creating a local cable news channel, it shouldn’t have to make that channel available 

to its competitors. At the time, local cable news was primarily delivered to cable offices over 

telephone wires. Other programming (such as ESPN, CNN, etc.) was delivered to cable offices 

via satellite. So Congress decided to restrict exclusive contracts only for ‘‘satellite cable programming’’ (that is, ‘‘video programming which is transmitted via satellite’’ ). 

A. Pure Withholding of Affiliated RSN—Comcast in Philadelphia 

The poster child of local sports withholding is, of course, Philadelphia. Because 

Philadelphia is Comcast’s hometown, Philadelphia was one of the first ‘‘clustered’’ 

markets. While some metropolitan areas are served by many different cable operators, Philadelphia is served almost exclusively by Comcast. Armed with such regional market power, Comcast created ‘‘Comcast SportsNet’’—an RSN with rights 

to the Philadelphia Phillies, Flyers, and 76ers. It then decided not to make this network available to Comcast’s competitors. 2

It was able to do this because of what has since come to be known as the ‘‘terrestrial loophole.’’ The program access rules only apply to programming delivered to 

cable systems by satellite. 3 Because it delivers Comcast SportsNet to its cable systems via fiber, Comcast argues that Comcast SportsNet is not subject to the program access rules and need not be made available to customers of their competitors. 

DIRECTV has always thought this was, at best, an evasion of the 1992 Cable Act. 

But the FCC (and, later, the DC Circuit) concluded that a plain reading of the statute’s reference to ‘‘satellite programming’’ allows Comcast to freeze out its competitors in Philadelphia. And this is exactly what Comcast has done. To this day, fans 

of the Phillies, 76ers, and Flyers must either give up the right to root for their home 

teams or give up their right to subscribe to the video provider of their choosing. Is 

it any wonder that satellite’s market share in Philadelphia is less than half of what 

it is nationally? 

B. Pure Withholding of Unaffiliated RSN—Time Warner in Charlotte 

Comcast found it easy to deny satellite subscribers local sports programming in 

Philadelphia because it owned the RSN in that market. But cable doesn’t need to 

own a sports channel in order to deny it to satellite subscribers—just ask DIRECTV 

subscribers in Charlotte. 

In Charlotte, Time Warner controls a regional monopoly similar to that enjoyed 

by Comcast in Philadelphia. In fact, Time Warner controls so many subscribers in 

Charlotte that, when Carolina Sports and Entertainment Television (‘‘C–SET’’) 

launched last season with rights to the NBA’s Charlotte Bobcats, Time Warner was 

able to establish an exclusive deal to carry the team’s games. Because C–SET was 

not affiliated with a cable operator, the program access rules did not prohibit this 

exclusive deal. Since then, C–SET has gone out of business. But just a few months 

ago, Time Warner secured yet another deal with the Bobcats (this time without C–

SET). And the Bobcats are still not available to satellite. And so here too, as in 

Philadelphia, local fans face the same grim choice: give up watching the team, or 

give up the right to choose video providers. 

C. Uniform Price Increases—Comcast in Chicago 

Cable operators have found that refusing to sell local sports programming to competitors, although effective in boosting market share, is a fairly blunt tool. Savvy 

cable operators have thus resorted to more subtle—but equally anticompetitive—tactics. 

Take Chicago, for example. In 2002, Comcast purchased AT&T, and in the process 

established a regional monopoly in Chicago similar to its dominance of Philadelphia 

(and similar to the level of concentration that the Adelphia acquisition could create 

in markets across the country). Comcast next purchased the rights to the Bulls, 

Blackhawks, Cubs and White Sox and launched its own sports network, CSN Chicago. When DIRECTV sought carriage of this critical programming, Comcast made 

it available to DIRECTV—but at double the price DIRECTV had been paying to 

carry these same games. Unwilling to forgo this must-have programming, DIRECTV 

had no choice but to accede to Comcast’s demands. 

The program access rules do not prohibit this kind of behavior so long as Comcast 

pays the same high price. But that restriction is of no concern to Comcast because 

even inflated payments are simply a transfer of money from one division of Comcast 

Corporation to another. 

31

Comcast thus has every incentive to jack up the price of CSN-Chicago (and similar RSNs) in the future. If DIRECTV doesn’t pay the higher prices, Comcast gets 

a de facto exclusive for the channel. If on the other hand DIRECTV pays the artificially high price, Comcast extracts a supra-competitive rate and drives up 

DIRECTV’s costs. This, in turn, makes it more difficult for DIRECTV to compete 

with Comcast on price. Either way, Comcast wins—and consumers lose. 

D. ‘‘Stealth Discrimination’’ of Affiliated RSN—Comcast in Sacramento 

Sometimes, a cable operator with a regional monopoly doesn’t even need to ‘‘officially’’ raise RSN prices in order to distort competition. In Sacramento and San 

Francisco, as in Chicago, Comcast was able to establish a regional monopoly when 

it purchased AT&T’s cable systems. And, as in Chicago, it went out and created its 

own Sacramento RSN, CSN West, with rights to only one professional team, the 

Sacramento Kings. 

In my experience, RSNs only offer their programming in the territory established 

for the team by its league. But this is not the case for CSN West. Comcast has mandated a service area for CSN West much larger than the area in which the NBA 

permits CSN-West to carry Kings games. Under Comcast’s pricing scheme, however, 

DIRECTV must pay for subscribers to whom it can’t even show the Kings games. 

In fact, DIRECTV pays for more subscribers who cannot watch the games than 

those who can. These customers account for one-third of the total license fees paid 

for the network. Cable operators, with much smaller service areas, do not face this 

dilemma. 

E. The Trend Continues . . . 

One might think that, with a gigantic merger pending before the FCC and the 

FTC, Comcast and Time Warner might at least slow down their effort to undermine 

competition through the acquisition and withholding of sports programming. But 

even the threat of government oversight does not appear to faze them. 

Time Warner stands to gain enormous market share in Ohio through the 

Adelphia transactions. So it recently announced that it will help launch a new RSN 

to carry Cleveland Indians games. Following the playbook used by Comcast in Chicago, Time Warner has proposed a rate for this single-team, part-time channel that 

is almost 90 percent of what DIRECTV was paying for four teams: the Indians, 

Cavaliers, Reds and Blue Jackets. 

Time Warner and Comcast are trying to do the same thing in New York, where 

they control many subscribers. Both have an ownership interest in SportsNet New 

York, the new Mets channel. SportsNet New York wants to charge DIRECTV a 

higher price than it pays on a per game/per subscriber basis for the YES network—

which carries the Yankees. This is an astronomical rate, particularly considering the 

fact that the ratings for the Mets games on FOX Sports New York/MSG have historically been less than half the ratings for the Yankees games on YES. 

Again, Comcast and Time Warner have nothing to lose by this behavior. They can 

set ‘‘nondiscriminatory’’ high prices, knowing that they will recoup the cost through 

their ownership interest in the RSN. If DIRECTV refuses to go along, DIRECTV 

subscribers will lose Indians and Mets games. For Clevelanders and New Yorkers 

who want to watch their local teams, DIRECTV will not be an option, to the delight 

of Comcast and Time Warner. If, on the other hand, DIRECTV pays the inflated 

price, our costs go up. Again, Comcast and Time Warner win, and consumers lose. 

II. The Adelphia Transactions Will Make This Behavior Possible in Many 

More Markets 

There is one constant in each of the scenarios I’ve just described to you. In Philadelphia and Charlotte and Chicago and Sacramento, a single cable operator enjoys 

a very high market share. Thus, Comcast could only withhold Philadelphia sports 

programming because it controls a regional monopoly in Philadelphia. And it could 

only raise the price of sports programming in Chicago after it gained a regional monopoly there in 2002. This is for a simple reason—as a cable operator controls more 

subscribers in a particular area, an RSN operating in that area gains more from 

distribution on the cable system and loses less if it denies distribution to the cable 

operator’s rivals. 

This is why the proposed Adelphia transactions are so dangerous. Comcast and 

Time Warner propose to split up Adelphia’s systems, and swap systems among 

themselves, for the stated purpose of increasing regional concentration. Indeed, they 

are selling this merger both to Wall Street and to regulators as one that will increase what they call ‘‘geographic rationalization.’’ 

One way to measure the extent of concentration that will result from this merger 

is through a tool called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a widely used and 

accepted measure of market concentration. Under the Department of Justice Merger 

32

Guidelines, a merger resulting in an HHI greater than 1800 and a change of more 

than 100 is presumed to create market power. As described in the table below, the 

HHI’s resulting from this transaction would dwarf those thresholds in the pay-TV 

markets in many RSN service areas.

RSN HHI HHI 

Change 

C–SET 4,210.6 403.7

Comcast SportsNet Philadelphia 4,156.7 376.9

FSN Florida 2,529.2 580.7

Sun Sports 2,515.2 578.0

FSN Ohio 2,395.7 837.8

FSN West/West 2 2,216.9 740.5

Mid-Atlantic Sports Network 2,168.7 358.6

Comcast/Charter Sports Southeast 2,148.6 325.8

Comcast SportsNet MidAtlantic 2,126.4 390.8

FSN Pittsburgh 2,080.1 576.9

In terms of market share, this means that Comcast will have over 75 percent of 

pay-TV subscribers in the Boston DMA, 70 percent in Pittsburgh, and 67 percent 

in West Palm Beach. Time Warner’s share in Los Angeles will go from 9 percent 

to 48 percent and in the Cleveland, Cincinnati and Columbus pay-TV markets, Time 

Warner’s market share will be 60 percent or more. 

Think about what this means. In markets such as Philadelphia, Chicago, and 

Charlotte where Comcast and Time Warner already have regional monopolies, they 

have withheld sports programming from competitors or raised its price to competitors. With the Adelphia transaction, Comcast and Time Warner seek to create the 

conditions that would allow them to do the exact same thing in Boston and Pittsburgh and Cleveland and Los Angeles and West Palm Beach. Which means fans of 

the Red Sox , the Pirates, the Indians, the Cavaliers, the Dodgers, and the Clippers 

could all find themselves over a barrel—forced to either give up the right to watch 

their home town teams or give up the right to choose video providers. With the 

number of markets affected by the Adelphia transaction, this threatens the progress 

Congress set in motion over a decade ago. 

III. The FCC Should Impose Conditions on the Adelphia Transactions 

If Comcast and Time Warner are successful in their plans, we could be looking 

at a return to the ‘‘bad old days’’ of cable monopoly. DIRECTV has thus asked the 

FCC to impose narrowly-tailored conditions on the proposed Adelphia transactions. 

These recommendations closely mirror the conditions imposed by the FCC in the 

News Corporation/DIRECTV merger. 

First, the FCC should prohibit exclusive deals (including ‘‘cable only’’ exclusives) 

for RSNs, regardless of delivery mechanism or affiliation, in the regions where the 

Adelphia transaction will create market power. This will prevent Comcast and Time 

Warner from taking advantage of the ‘‘terrestrial loophole’’ (as Comcast has done 

in Philadelphia). It will also prevent Comcast and Time Warner from entering into 

exclusive deals with unaffiliated RSNs in highly concentrated markets (as Time 

Warner has done in Charlotte). 

Second, the FCC should prevent ‘‘price discrimination’’ by permitting distributors 

to seek arbitration when negotiations break down. This would simply allow a competitor to seek an independent third party review to ensure nondiscriminatory and 

fair pricing to competitors. An integral component of this recommendation is that 

competitors must be permitted to continue providing this ‘‘must-have’’ programming 

to consumers while any arbitration is pending. 

These conditions are not exceptional in the video service industry. In fact, the 

FCC has consistently noted that the rise of regional monopolies poses a threat to 

competition and that it is appropriate to exercise regulatory authority to prevent 

such monopolies from exercising their market power to the detriment of competition. 

Only through these narrow conditions can the FCC address the very real anticompetitive consequences of the merger that I have described to you. I would thus 

ask this Committee to urge the FCC to approve this transaction only with these or 

similar safeguards. 

IV. Congress Should Re-Examine the Program Access Rules 

For those concerned about competition in the video market, the Adelphia transactions are plainly the immediate priority. In the longer term, however, Congress 

should consider re-examining the program access rules. In particular, it should close 

33

the terrestrial loophole and ensure that the rules apply to the other forms of discrimination I have described. 

As discussed above, the terrestrial loophole allows cable operators to deny programming from their competitors so long as the programming is not delivered to the 

cable systems. The rationale for this was to encourage cable operators to develop 

their own local news channels. The exception certainly was never intended to apply 

to local sports programming, which was delivered at the time via satellite. There 

is, moreover, simply no need for Congress to encourage the creation of local sports 

programming. Such programming, as the FCC has determined on several occasions, 

is among the most valuable on television. It also cannot be ‘‘created’’ through Congressional encouragement—each team is unique, and games involving that team 

cannot be duplicated in the way that, for example, local news can. 

When it created the program access rules, Congress surely never expected regional sports programming to be subject to exclusive deals. Congress should remedy 

this by closing the terrestrial loophole (at least as for RSNs), and make it clear that 

the full panoply of the program access restrictions in the 1992 Cable Act apply to 

RSNs, however they may be delivered to cable systems. 

When it examines the program access rules, moreover, Congress should also consider how to address the other sorts of anticompetitive activities that I have described, but that the existing rules appear not to reach. There is simply no reason 

why cable operators should be allowed to engage in the kind of behavior exhibited 

by Comcast in Chicago and Sacramento. It should also ensure that the program access rules will continue to apply beyond their current expiration date. 

Cable operators were once the only game in town. As a result, prices were high, 

choices were limited, customer service was legendarily bad. But, at least in most 

places, competition is now the order of the day and the results are remarkable: unprecedented innovation, service improvements, more responsive pricing and more 

choices than ever before. 

But all that has been gained could yet be lost. If allowed to proceed with the 

Adelphia transaction without adequate safeguards, Comcast and Time Warner will 

have both the incentive and the ability to undermine competition in market after 

market throughout the country. This will undo the progress Congress set in motion 

with the program access rules over ten years ago. On behalf of the tens of millions 

of consumers who want continued access to their local teams at reasonable prices, 

I ask you not to let that happen. 

Chairman Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye, and Members of the Committee, thank 

you for allowing me to present DIRECTV’s views on these important matters. I 

would be happy to take your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Our last witness is Doron Gorshein, Chief Executive Officer and 

President, The America Channel, of Heathrow, Florida. 

Press the button. 

Mr. GORSHEIN. Are we on? OK. 

The CHAIRMAN. I wasn’t on. Now I’m on. We’re going to get one 

automated one of these years. 

Mr. GORSHEIN. It works. 

STATEMENT OF DORON GORSHEIN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE 

OFFICER/PRESIDENT, THE AMERICA CHANNEL, LLC 

Mr. GORSHEIN. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify. 

The America Channel is a new nonfiction programming network 

set to launch later this year. It will explore and celebrate America, 

profiling its diverse communities, local heroes, and ordinary people 

who accomplish the extraordinary. 

The America Channel was founded after 9/11, when television no 

longer resonated with my sensibilities as an American consumer. 

Indeed, our stellar market research and consumer and system feedback confirmed that Americans want more relevant programming 

about what makes America special, more community, more 

connectivity, more authenticity on television. We believe that The 

34

America Channel could be the most resonant new product to come 

along in quite some time. 

In recent months, we’ve secured distribution with no less than 

six telcos, close to 90 percent of the projected telco video space, including Verizon, AT&T, and others. Channels that have 90 percent 

of the cable space have been around for 25 years. In telco, we did 

it in 5 months. 

In contrast to our success in telco, after close to 3 years we’ve 

had virtually no progress getting carriage from the dominant cable 

operators. Without distribution on the largest cable operators in 

key markets controlled by them, a channel is not viable. Of the 92 

channels that have reached the critical viability threshold of 20 

million homes, not a single one did so without at least two of 

Comcast, Time Warner, and Adelphia; 91 out of the 92 got both 

Comcast and Time Warner. John Malone said that an independent 

channel has no chance whatsoever if Comcast doesn’t carry it. 

We found that each of the top two cable operators, over a twoand-a-half-year period carried on a nonpremium, national basis, 

only 1 out of 114 channels with no affiliation—no media affiliation. 

And that’s less than 1 percent. The single one that got carriage is 

the one referred to in Comcast’s submission. In contrast, most of 

the channels affiliated with a cable or broadcast company got carriage on one or both of the top cable operators. Comcast carries 100 

percent of its own channels, and almost all of them, if not all of 

them, on analog. Affiliated channels are also typically given 11 

times the number of homes, on a median basis. 

A number of studies, including one by the GAO, confirmed that 

the top cable operators are much more likely to carry their own 

channels than independent channels. Such disparities cannot be 

explained on the basis of free-market considerations alone. Affiliation is a major factor. 

Why are independent channels locked out by cable? Because 

independent channels are direct competitors to cable-affiliated 

channels on several fronts—for viewers, ad dollars, technical capacity—and the asset value is independently owned. Independent 

channels apply downward pricing pressure on affiliated channels. 

Cable-affiliated channels, on average, cost more than three times 

the cost of an independent. One top cable operator derives 40 percent of its operating income from its television networks. That operator has strong incentive to exclude less expensive and better 

products to protect increased rates for its own channels. 

A fully distributed channel is typically valued in the billions of 

dollars and generates annual revenue in the hundreds of millions. 

Cable operators want to own that. So, there’s an inherent conflict 

of interest that prevents the best and cheapest products from entering the market. 

The results? Cable rates have doubled in 10 years. Only one 

other consumable has matched this: gasoline. Other telecom services have all gone down—telephone, wireless, long distance, 

broadband. If better and cheaper content competitors are kept out 

of the market, consumer prices will rise, and there will be adverse 

effects on consumer choice, competition, diversity, and decency. 

What are the solutions? On the distribution side, nothing could 

be more important than expeditious enactment of telco video franVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:21 Sep 07, 2006 Jkt 029574 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\29574.TXT JACKF PsN: JACKF
35

chise relief. Telcos must be allowed to compete in local markets. 

And competitors, like DIRECTV, EchoStar, and RCN, should have 

the same fair access to sports nets and other must-have programming. 

The other half of the problem is on the content side. The stifling 

of competition and abuse of gatekeeping power requires urgent action. One solution is for the FCC to impose conditions on the 

Adelphia merger, as we and others have urged them to do. 

Congress might consider other solutions. For example, going forward, 50 percent of all new channel capacity on Comcast and Time 

Warner should be designated for independent networks with no 

cable or broadcast affiliation. After all, Comcast and Time Warner 

have indicated that capacity will increase if they are permitted to 

acquire Adelphia. 

Section 25 of the Cable Act of 1992 provides sound precedent. 

There, Congress took steps to ensure access for a valuable type of 

programming that had difficulty reaching the public. 

Certainly, there are other creative solutions. We look forward to 

working with you to craft fair remedies for all, most importantly 

to the public. Foreclosure of opportunities for independent channels 

is a detriment to competition, consumer choice, consumer pricing, 

diversity of information sources, decency, and the national discourse. We must have a free-market environment which permits 

new market entrants to compete on their substantial merits. It is 

my hope that we can address these systemic problems that play out 

to the detriment of all Americans. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gorshein follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DORON GORSHEIN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER/PRESIDENT, 

THE AMERICA CHANNEL, LLC 

Overview 

The stifling of competition in the content space has led to cable rates which have 

increased 60 percent in 5 years, and doubled in 10 years. Only one other 

consumable has matched this dismal record. Virtually every other service to the 

home—for which there is competition—has stayed the same or gone down, including 

broadband, dial-up, long distance, wireless, etc. 

In contravention of the clear intent of Congress and the FCC, Comcast and Time 

Warner have become unreasonable gatekeepers with the ability, and the incentive, 

to prevent competitive independent products from reaching key thresholds of viability. This power will be enhanced and consolidated by the proposed Adelphia transactions. 

Existing FCC carriage laws, which prohibit discrimination against channels on 

the basis of affiliation, have to our knowledge never been formally enforced in 13 

years since their enactment. Horizontal and vertical ownership limits, mandated by 

Congress to protect the industry and the public from the harms that would result 

in unchecked consolidation, have proven ineffective—in part because of the severe 

concentration of Comcast and Time Warner systems on a regional basis in 23 of the 

top 25 markets. 

The evidence shows that, as a result of their size and dominance of the top television markets, Comcast and Time Warner’s market power is severe and vastly exceeds their national market share. Carriage by both is required for any ad-supported network to survive. 

The major telcos are embracing video competition and have agreed to carry The 

America Channel and other independently owned channels. Unlike the telcos, the 

top cable operators are vertically integrated—they own channels. Thus, independent 

channels are direct competitors to cable-affiliated channels on several fronts—for 

viewers, ad dollars, technical capacity, and the asset value which is independently 

owned. New independent channels also create downward pricing pressure on affiliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:21 Sep 07, 2006 Jkt 029574 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\29574.TXT JACKF PsN: JACKF
36

1 New York Times. 07–25–2005. For Gore a Reincarnation on the Other Side of the Camera. 2MB Docket 04–207, Comments of A&E Television Networks 

3Two CSPAN networks are distributed to more than 20 million households. Because of the 

unique nature of CSPAN, we did not count these networks as either affiliated or independent.

ated channels. The availability of independent channels promotes competition, better consumer pricing, greater consumer choice, and improves the diversity of ideas 

and the national discourse. 

The record shows that the top cable operators have prevented independent channels from competing, in favor of networks owned by cable or broadcast conglomerates. This clear record of exclusion, along with the top cable operators’ power and 

economic incentive to stifle competition, combine to create a ‘‘perfect storm’’ against 

independent channels. The Adelphia transactions may lead to the permanent end 

of new independent channels. 

At stake is the health of competition, consumer pricing, consumer choice, the diversity of ideas in the marketplace, and the quality of the national discourse, all 

of which are damaged by the foreclosure of opportunities for independent programming networks. 

1. Severe Market Power in the Cable Marketplace—Two Gatekeepers

Control Channel Entry and Survival 

‘‘Basically, the consolidation of the business has got to the point where I don’t believe that an independent programmer has any chance whatsoever of doing anything 

unless he’s heavily invested in and supported by one of the major 

distributors... There’s no way on earth that you can be successful in the U.S. distributing a channel that Brian Roberts (of Comcast) doesn’t carry, particularly if he 

has one that competes with it.’’—John Malone, CEO of Liberty Media.

Despite Congress and the FCC’s clear intent to prevent such consolidated market 

power, and to the detriment of competition, consumer pricing, consumer choice, the 

diversity of ideas in the marketplace and the quality of the national discourse, two 

cable companies currently stand as gatekeepers to network viability. Time Warner 

and Comcast already exercise extreme influence over the health of competition in 

the marketplace, influence which far exceeds their market share. The proposed 

Adelphia transactions will only exacerbate this situation. 

A. Control of Subscriber Thresholds 

Revenue for any advertising-supported network is dependent primarily on distribution, both to a sufficient number of households and to the top television markets. As such there are certain ‘‘viability factors’’ which must be achieved in order 

for a network to survive. The first is to acquire (at a minimum) carriage into 20 

to 25 million homes, at which point the network may be able to acquire a rating 

by Nielsen Media Research. The second threshold is to increase carriage to 50 million homes because, as many media companies have stated on the record, most national advertisers view 50 million homes as a minimum distribution base—networks 

with subscriber counts below this level will receive substantially smaller allocation 

of these advertisers’ funds, or not be considered at all. 

The inability of an advertising supported network to compete for national advertising dollars severely impacts the long-term survivability of a network. The New 

York Times on July 25, 2005 reported the following: ‘‘Generally, the threshold of success for aspiring cable or satellite channels is about 50 million homes, said Tom 

Wolzien, a media analyst . . .’’ 1 A&E Television Networks (owner of at least 5 ad 

supported networks) filed comments at the FCC which put the long-term viability 

threshold even higher, stating ‘‘In order to attract sufficient advertising revenue to 

afford to pay for and provide a meaningful quantity of original programming, the 

network must reach approximately sixty million subscribers.’’ 2

Reaching 50 million subscribers without carriage by Comcast and Time Warner 

is virtually impossible, even today, and requires carriage by nearly every single 

other cable provider and on each provider’s most widely distributed platform (i.e. 

analog basic). In addition, empirical evidence demonstrates that carriage by both 

Comcast and Time Warner is required for a cable channel to reach even half that 

amount—25 million subscribers. 

Looking at the 92 cable channels which we found to have reached the first viability threshold of 20 million subscribers (required for Nielsen ratings): 3

• Only 3 of the top 50 cable channels are independent—they have no ties to a 

cable operator or broadcaster.

• Only 9 of the top 92 cable channels have no ties to a cable operator or broadcaster.

37

4Kagan Media Money. April 26, 2005 at 7. Multichannel households is herein defined as any 

household which receives television programming from an MVPD. 5Data source: the television advertising bureau, www.tvb.org. Note: TVB’s analysis grouped 

DBS with other ‘‘alternate delivery sources,’’ which include Large Dish satellite, satellite master 

antenna systems (SMATV), and multipoint distribution systems (MDS). 

• 91 of the top 92 channels secured carriage from both Comcast and Time Warner.

• 1 of the top 92 secured carriage from only one of Comcast or Time Warner—

but it also secured carriage from Adelphia.

• Not a single channel was able to reach even the critical first viability milestone 

of 20 million homes, without 2 of the 3 transacting parties. After the Adelphia 

transaction, it will therefore be empirically impossible for an independent channel to be viable without both of Comcast and Time Warner.

That carriage by both Comcast and Time Warner is required for a network to surpass even 25 million households, overrides a strict market share analysis. Kagan Research estimates that there are approximately 92.6 million multichannel households 

in the United States. 4 According to their joint filing for the Proposed Transactions 

(MB Docket 05–192), there are nearly 70 million households which Comcast does 

not serve and there are 53.4 million subscribers which neither Comcast nor Time 

Warner serve. Therefore, theoretically a sizeable ‘‘open field’’ exists from which cable 

programming networks should be able to reach these minimum distribution thresholds without carriage by Comcast or Time Warner. The fact is, however, that it has 

not happened. Comcast and Time Warner’s market power exceeds their large market 

share. This aggregation of market power is due, in part, to their regional dominance 

of top television markets. 

B. Importance of Top Markets in Market Power 

Raw subscriber numbers alone do not guarantee network viability. In order to 

compete effectively for advertising dollars, networks must also be carried in the top 

television markets. There are 210 Designated Market Areas (DMAs) in the U.S., but 

nearly 50 percent of all television households reside in the top 25 DMAs. An advertising supported cable channel which is unable to reach these households is at an 

extreme disadvantage in the battle for national advertising dollars. Similarly, a new 

advertising supported cable channel which cannot project carriage over time to these 

top markets may not be able to forecast the profitability needed to generate investment and enter the marketplace as a competitor. 

As a result of the Adelphia transactions,

• Comcast and Time Warner will serve customers in 23 of the top 25 DMAs and 

38 of the top 40 DMAs. Comcast or Time Warner will serve an average of 50.3 

percent of the multichannel homes in each of these 23 DMAs.

• Comcast and Time Warner will serve more than 50 percent of all multichannel 

households in at least 12 and perhaps as many as 16 of the top 25 DMAs as 

well as a majority of households in Manhattan.

• 13 of the top 25 DMAs will see an increase in the percentage of subscribers controlled by a single MSO. (This does not include the several DMAs which will 

see change in system ownership but not an increased consolidation, such as 

Dallas.)

Further, it is important to note that this regional dominance in top markets is 

something which is not replicated by DBS providers who may have substantial subscriber totals, but as a result of their national dispersion do not share Comcast’s 

and Time Warner’s apparent pocket monopolies and gate-keeping ability with respect to top markets. In fact, DBS penetration in the top 25 DMAs is 18 percent 

lower than the national average. 5 Across the U.S., DBS has just over 23 percent 

of television households. In the top 25 DMAs, DBS’s share is only 19.3 percent. 

Therefore, carriage by both DBS providers on their most widely distributed packages would at best enable a cable channel to reach one-fifth of the households in 

the top markets. 

That the top 25 markets contain nearly 50 percent of all television households 

makes them undeniably important to any advertiser. However, research shows that 

these markets are disproportionately valued by advertisers—that advertisers put 

more resources toward reaching a viewer in a top television market than they do 

toward reaching the average television viewer. Consequently, foreclosure of those 

markets by Comcast and Time Warner is even more damaging to an advertising 

supported network than the numbers would imply. 

38

6MB Docket 05–192, Reply comments of Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America 

at 22–23. 7 Nielsen’s National People Meters are dispersed according to Census data. DMA ranking is 

done by the number of television households. There is a positive but not perfect correlation between the percentage of total U.S. television households in a DMA and the percentage of national people meters located therein. 8 CableWorld. April 4, 2005. ‘‘How Come the Vultures Don’t Flock to Cable? ’’ by Simon 

Applebaum. 9Source: ‘‘Is Comcast Too Big?’’ Broadcasting and Cable, July 25, 2005. 

This preference of advertisers for top markets was proven by researchers from 

Consumers Union and Consumer Federation of America, who looked at the relationship between the share of television households in a DMA and the share of overall 

television advertising dollars spent on that DMA. 6 Among other things, their independent analysis revealed:

• Television advertisers spend 20 percent more to reach each household in the top 

25 markets than they do the average U.S. household. The top 25 DMAs were 

found to have 49 percent of television households yet receive 59 percent of the 

TV ad revenue.

• Television advertisers spend 32 percent more to reach each household in the top 

11 markets than they do the average U.S. household. (The top 11 DMAs are 

all served by the transacting parties.) The top 11 DMAs contain roughly 31 percent of the television households but receive 41 percent of the TV advertising 

revenue.

What Drives the Disproportionate Value Placed on Top Markets? 

Factors which we confirmed with advertising industry veterans, which contribute 

to the preference of advertisers for the top television markets, include: population 

density (which provides the opportunity for greater numbers of people to see the 

spots, see the products in use, and for word of mouth to spread), the density of retail 

outlets (urban areas give viewers significantly more opportunities to act on the advertising messages they see), younger populations (18 to 34 is the age bracket most 

desired by advertisers, and this age bracket tends to live in the urban areas which 

comprise the top markets), disposable income (the average household in a Top 10 

DMA has 19 percent more disposable income than the national average; the average 

household in a Top 25 DMA has 8 percent more disposable income than the national 

average), and product adoption patterns and the presence of major press (national 

trends are set in large urban areas, where population density contributes to rapid 

word of mouth exposure, and national press outlets can accelerate a product into 

the mainstream). 

Foreclosure from the top markets can also hinder a network’s survival by materially impacting its ability to be reliably rated by Nielsen. The majority of Nielsen’s 

National People Meters (which collect ratings data) are located in the top DMAs. 7

Networks that are not available in these markets have a smaller population of meters from which to derive the statistically significant data upon which media buyers 

rely, and may not meet Nielsen’s reporting standards. 

C. Impact of Market Power 

As discussed in the above sections, Comcast and Time Warner, because of their size 

and dominance of top television markets, wield unreasonable power over network 

survival. A national cable network that is denied carriage by Time Warner and 

Comcast cannot be economically viable in the long term. Therefore, the denial of 

carriage by these two market leaders signals to the market that a channel is unlikely to survive, and hence has a preclusive effect on the ability and willingness 

of other cable operators to embrace a channel. The majority of smaller operators are 

hesitant to dedicate the channel capacity, marketing and other resources necessary 

to distribute a product from a programmer whose survivability is uncertain. Gary 

Lauder, who runs Lauder Partners, a VC firm with a long track record in cable investment, stated recently, ‘‘Sure, there are other big MSOs and plenty of small or 

midsize operators VCs could approach with a promising enterprise. The problem is, 

so many of the other MSOs wait until [they see] what Comcast or Time Warner does. 

So that creates a problem.’’ 8

Others from the venture capital community share this assessment of Comcast and 

Time Warner’s market power. Richard Bilotti, the respected cable analyst for Morgan Stanley recently stated, ‘‘Without distribution from Comcast, it would be virtually impossible for any network to be profitable.’’ 9 And an April CableWorld article 

reported on the Venture Capital community’s hesitation to fund cable startups, stating ‘‘VCs are holding back. Their number one hurdle: Any cable-related venture that 

39

10 CableWorld. April 4, 2005. ‘‘How Come the Vultures Don’t Flock to Cable?’’ by Simon 

Applebaum. 11 ‘‘Brian Roberts Comes to Sand Hill Road,’’ Technik: Thoughts on the new New New Thing, 

Duncan Davidson Blog, June 17, 2005. Available: http://yelnick.typepad.com/technik/2005/06/

brianlrobertslc.html. 12MB docket 05–192 Application 05–18–2005, Exhibit W. 13Time Warner Inc. 2004 Annual Report. 14 Id. 15Ownership Affiliation And The Programming Decisions Of Cable Operators. Michael E. 

Clements and Amy D. Abramowitz. U.S. Government Accountability Office, p18. 

seeks funding must have a deal in place with Comcast or Time Warner Cable. If one 

or both multi-system operators isn’t on board, kiss the capital goodbye.’’ 10

If Comcast and/or Time Warner decline to permit access to a new independent 

network, there is strong disincentive for other cable systems, for competitors and 

for investors to embrace it—as they all know the survivability of such a network 

is in doubt. Adelphia, which is one of only ten cable MSOs with more than 500,000 

subscribers (out of more than 1000 MSOs total) has at times provided an important 

pathway for independent channels to launch and reach at least the first distribution 

milestone of 20 million homes. The absorption of Adelphia into Comcast and Time 

Warner will exacerbate the existing market imbalances to the further detriment of 

competition, consumer pricing, consumer choice and the diversity of ideas in the 

marketplace. 

2. Discrimination Against Independent Networks 

‘‘He (Brian Roberts) was then challenged on any room for new [programming] services. He started with a story that CNN and other new channels were pushed by entrepreneurs not the cable companies, and then went on to essentially say Comcast was 

going to learn how to be an innovator of services and not let that happen again.’’ 11

Section I demonstrated that a few large, vertically integrated MVPDs have the 

ability to restrict competition in the marketplace and impede the flow of diverse programming to the consumer. This section addresses their strong economic and competitive incentive to do so, and notes a track record which demonstrates that networks affiliated with MVPDs and major broadcasters are routinely favored over 

those which are independently owned. These interests and behaviors create for independent networks a ‘‘perfect storm,’’ in which the sole companies endowed with the 

power to bestow viability on an independent network have a growing stake in preventing competition from reaching the marketplace. 

A. Incentives to Favor Affiliated Networks 

Vertically integrated media companies have strong disincentive to embrace new 

networks. New independent networks are competitors. They compete directly with 

operator-owned networks on several levels: competition for viewers, competition for 

advertising dollars (including in local markets), and competition for channel capacity. And, cable operators know that a fully distributed network can be worth a billion dollars or more in asset value—and such value in the hands of independent persons or groups is foregone value to an operator. 

Time Warner and Comcast have incentive to prevent content competition from entering the marketplace. Comcast Corporation currently has an interest in at least 

twenty networks and is developing additional ones. Comcast’s attempt to acquire 

Disney, and its string of recent channel launches, including TV One, G4, PBS Kids 

Sprout, and the upcoming NY Mets regional channel and Sony-based networks, 

demonstrate a strategy of augmenting its cable channel assets. Time Warner Cable’s 

parent company owns and operates at least 10 advertising supported networks in 

the United States. 12 While Time Warner does not break out financial data for each 

network individually, overall its television networks (which includes its ad-supported networks, premium networks, international networks and WB broadcast network) contributed 40 percent of Time Warner’s operating income. 13 By comparison, 

Time Warner’s cable division contributed only 28.6 percent of operating income. 14

One way to protect the value of these assets, would be for Time Warner and 

Comcast to deny linear carriage to potential independent programming competitors, 

in favor of affiliated program networks who evidently either have the leverage to 

secure carriage, or have the ability to grant carriage to the MSO’s networks in return. Clements and Abramowitz of the U.S. GAO, in their study of the impact of 

affiliation on programming carriage write, ‘‘Vertical integration between cable networks and operators may be induced by transaction efficiencies, but serve to foreclose 

opportunities for new independent entrants.’’ 15

In addition, the value to an operator of carrying an independent network, even 

a network which gives partial ownership to the operator in exchange for carriage 

40

16Ownership Affiliation And The Programming Decisions Of Cable Operators. Michael E. 

Clements and Amy D. Abramowitz. U.S. Government Accountability Office, p16. 17 Id. at 14. Majority ownership by a cable operator added 27.78 percentage points to a network’s likelihood of gaining carriage. 18 Id. at 16. 

19This study is limited by the availability of public announcements regarding channel 

launches. Sources of data: All launch dates are according to company filings with the National 

Cable and Telecommunications Association, as well as publicly available sources. Ownership information, subscriber data and carriage information are all from publicly available sources, including the National Telecommunications Association, industry news sources such as Multichannel News and Kagan Research, as well as corporate announcements, filings and marketing 

materials.

and shares advertising revenue with the operator, cannot approach the value of carrying a channel which is owned completely—100 percent of the equity and revenue 

of an affiliate, versus approximately 5 percent of an independent. 

B. Track Record of Preference 

Preference by MVPDs for affiliated networks over independent networks has been 

well documented by independent research. Clements and Abramowitz of the U.S. 

GAO found that cable operators in general were 62 percent more likely to carry affiliated programming over independent programming. 16 Furthermore, of the ten 

variables tested in the study, ownership by a cable operator had by far the largest 

marginal effect on predicting carriage of a network. 17 The researchers concluded, 

‘‘These results can also indicate the foreclosure of competition in the upstream cable 

network market, as independent cable networks are less likely to be carried than are 

affiliated networks.’’ 18

We reviewed the adoption of new affiliated and independent networks by Comcast 

and Time Warner, based on publicly available information during the period of January 1, 2003 to May 15, 2005 (a nearly 21⁄2-year period). 19 Only networks which 

sought initial launch of their programming service during the period were included 

in this study. The results are stark and confirm severe dysfunctions in the cable 

marketplace. Ultimately these lead to higher consumer pricing, lower consumer 

choice, a stifling of competition and entrepreneurialism, and an adverse effect on 

our democracy and the diversity of ideas in the marketplace. Some highlights of the 

study are as follows:

• Over a 21⁄2 year study period, less than 1 percent of independent channels secured national, non-premium carriage at either Comcast or Time Warner (1 out 

of 114 independent channels), and only 7 percent of independents received local 

carriage by either operator. In contrast, Comcast and Time Warner granted carriage to nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of affiliated channels which launched 

during the study period.

• Overall, 95 percent of networks affiliated with an operator or broadcaster received carriage of some kind vs. 13 percent of independents.

• Affiliated networks launching during the study period also achieved considerably greater distribution than independents—11x greater on a median basis, 

and more than 2x greater on a mean basis.

Furthermore, we believe that Comcast employs a different standard for launching 

its own networks than it does for independents. In the case of TV One (a Comcast 

affiliate), Comcast committed carriage to ‘‘a significant number of our markets’’ and 

$60 million in financing prior to the network hiring a CEO, hiring a head of programming and filling other key positions, securing a carriage commitment from any 

other operator, or (to our knowledge) producing or acquiring any programming. All 

of the deficiencies cited above were addressed by TV One months after Comcast 

made its commitment of carriage and financing. In fact, the scheduled launch of the 

channel had to be delayed because key management positions were still vacant, and 

TV One finally launched without carriage from any operator besides Comcast. 

When Comcast’s and Time Warner’s preference for affiliated networks and behavior toward independents are considered in light of their market power, a dismal picture for independent networks emerges. It is the combination of these elements 

(ability to restrict competition, powerful incentive to restrict competition, and observable patterns of discrimination) within two vertically integrated MVPDs, which 

allows us to fully understand the reluctance of the venture capital community to invest in new independent networks. 

41

20Government Accountability Office, ‘‘Issues Related to Competition and Subscriber Rates in 

the Cable Television Industry,’’ October 2003, at 20. 21 Economics of Basic Cable Networks 2006, 12th Annual Edition, Kagan Research, p55. 22 NBC, for example, is launching a new linear channel, Sleuth, in January 2006. Despite the 

fact that Sleuth has no original programming, the Wall Street Journal reports a license fee of 

13 cents per subscriber per month, ‘‘a high fee for a new cable network.’’ (WSJ, 11/3/2005, NBC 

Plots a Crime Channel.) In terms of fee per subscriber, this would immediately put Sleuth in 

the top 33 percent of the 123 networks ranked by Kagan’s 2006 annual cable report. 

3. Exclusion of Independent Channels Leads to Higher Consumer Prices, 

Reduced Competition and Other Public Harms 

A. Consumer Pricing 

The dramatic increase of cable rates is a common complaint from consumers, of 

which Congress regularly takes note, and a common response from the cable community is to cite higher license fees demanded by networks. Indeed, the GAO report 

on Competition confirms that the increase in programming costs is a major contributor to overall cable price increases. 20

Of course, one reason for this is that certain cable programming networks are 

‘‘must-haves’’ and their differentiation from other networks puts upward pressure 

on the license fees that operators pay. However, an examination of programming license fee data shows that average fees and average price increases for affiliated 

channels, are significantly higher than for unaffiliated channels. 21 New channels 

owned by large media companies are also more likely to charge license fees in their 

first year(s) of operations. 22

The exclusion of independent channels therefore could directly contribute to rising 

cable costs which are well in excess of the rate of inflation. As such, there is a significant public interest in protecting free competition from independent programmers, on the basis of the merits without regard for affiliation. Among the findings: 

Average License Fees 

• The average license fee in 2005 for networks affiliated with MVPDs is 225 percent greater than the average license fee for independent networks.

• The average 2005 license fee for networks (excluding ESPN) that are affiliated 

with a media company is 161 percent greater than the average 2005 license fee 

for independent networks.

• The average 2005 license fee for Time Warner owned networks is 341 percent 

greater than the average 2005 license fee for independent networks.

• The average 2005 license fee for Comcast owned networks is 121 percent greater

than the average 2005 license fee for independent networks.

License Fee Increases, 2002 to 2005

• Over the past three years (2002 to 2005), the license fees charged by networks 

affiliated with an MVPD or broadcaster increased more, on average, than did 

the fees charged by independent networks.

—The average license fee increase from 2002 to 2005 for a network affiliated 

with an MVPD was 88 percent greater than that of an independent network.

—The average license fee increase for a Time Warner affiliated network was 

5.1¢, more than double that of an independent network.

—The average license fee increase for a Comcast affiliated network was 3.3¢, 

more than 30 percent greater than that of independent networks.

Excluding ESPN (which posted the highest increase in license fees), the average 

license fee increase for a network affiliated with any media company (MVPD 

or broadcaster) was 40 percent greater than that of an independent network. 

The percentage was higher when including ESPN.

B. Competition 

As discussed above, the addition of independent networks to a cable system is less 

likely to increase cable rates than the addition of comparable networks affiliated 

with MVPDs or broadcasters. In addition, free competition from these independent 

networks for carriage, tier placement, channel assignments and more would also put 

downward pressure on the license fees which MVPDs are required to pay to many 

comparable networks, affiliated and independent. The removal of unreasonable barriers to entry for cheaper and more efficient independent networks and the competition which such entry brings can cause high-priced affiliated networks to become 

more efficient, reduce their rates or otherwise improve their value proposition—all 

of which would redound to the benefit of the consumer. 

42

It is not the entry of one more Viacom or Time Warner network that will create 

this downward pressure on consumer pricing. These and other conglomerates who 

own the majority of widely distributed networks have little incentive to encourage 

price competition among networks. The public, however, has an interest in fair access for entrepreneurial ventures—independent programmers—which will expand 

competition in the marketplace and likely place downward pressure on license fees 

paid. The continued restrictions on entry have had and will continue to have the 

opposite effect: steady increases in programming costs and hence, upward pressure 

on consumer pricing. 

C. Diversity 

The top cable operators have purported that there are 196 independent networks 

(a number which has been deconstructed in various FCC filings), and that this 

proves diversity. But the facts demonstrate an increasingly narrow ownership structure, and a market which is becoming increasingly off-limits to independently-owned 

ideas. A quick look at the list of 92 networks distributed to more than 20 million 

households reveals that roughly 76 percent are owned in whole or part by one of 

six companies Disney, Viacom, NBC Universal, News Corp, Time Warner and 

Comcast. In addition, only 9 of the 92, and only 3 of the top 50, are not owned in 

whole or part by a large broadcast company or MVPD. 

In a typical marketplace, the preferences of the buyers determine what goods will 

ultimately be created and offered by sellers. Production companies will not invest 

resources to develop programming for which there is no market. It is the network, 

the purchaser of the content, which ultimately determines which content will be produced, who will produce it and importantly, how the production will handle the underlying subject matter. Network ownership brings control or influence over the selection of top management, who, in turn, are responsible for these editorial decisions. Hence, diversity of television programming is ensured by increasing the diversity of network ownership. 

4. The Future of Independent Networks 

Despite the best intentions of Congress and the FCC, two cable operators have 

emerged as gatekeepers to network survival and the free entry of competition into 

the marketplace. These two operators have incentive to prevent additional competitors from entering the market, and a track record of denying competitive opportunities to independent networks. 

Independent networks serve several crucial roles in the programming marketplace. They introduce new competition among programmers and apply downward 

pressure on programming fees. They can often create an entirely new market for 

programming of a specific genre or niche, and in doing so increase opportunities for 

independent producers; they also increase the number of potential buyers for more 

mainstream original programming concepts and existing content and this competition in turn promotes investment in independent production companies and leads 

to the creation of high quality programming. 

The health of competition, consumer pricing, consumer choice, the diversity of 

ideas in the marketplace, and the quality of our national discourse depend on a level 

competitive playing field for independent programming services.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much. And we appreciate 

your brevity. 

Mr. Polka, one part of your statement you did not read pertained 

to the past discussions on this Committee of the problem of decency 

on television, and you mentioned the question of putting together 

packages that included items that had high sexual content when 

you were trying to put together a children’s program. What was the 

outcome of that negotiation? 

Mr. POLKA. Well, sir, the outcome is that the program services 

that you were referring to were carried, and that’s the nature and 

the function of the contracts today. When we talk about cable programming and how it’s packaged and priced and dictated, in terms 

of contract, the wholesale programming practices that we refer to, 

that is what is causing the problem. Where you have situations 

where family-oriented program that we want to carry is oftentimes 

bundled and required to be carried with other program services. 

43

The fact is that, at the end of the day, in most cases those services are carried, because that is the best way to carry that familyoriented programming at the cheapest price. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you use a rating system in your programming? 

Mr. POLKA. We do not. We do not use a rating system. But I can 

tell you that our customers tell us about what they think about the 

programs on television. I can think of cable systems where more 

than half of our subscribers walk into our cable systems month 

after month to pay their bills, and I can tell you, based on their 

rating system, that they’re not happy. And they’re telling us—and 

we are here to say that we would like to provide more choices to 

our customers, and that means programs that we could package in 

tiers of service that we could do today—it’s not a mandated a-lacarte system, but tiers and packages of services that we could put 

together in our marketplaces today that would meet our local community’s needs, working with our customers to provide them more 

family-oriented programming. The problem is that the contracts 

that we have to take from the major media conglomerates force us 

to carry those services, their services, on either the basic or the expanded basic level of service. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Pyne, do you charge the smaller cable companies more for 

programming? When you say that you charge the price, is the price 

for smaller cables larger than a price to the larger cable company? 

Mr. PYNE. Mr. Chairman, there is something known as the National Cable Television Cooperative, which conglomerates, or is a 

co-ops of systems that represent roughly 8 million subscribers. And 

through that co-op, we license smaller cable operators, and we treat 

that group as if they were an 8-million-subscriber MSO in an effort 

to bring price parity to the smaller cable operators. And we do that 

across our networks, from the ESPN side to the Disney Channel, 

ABC Family, and so forth. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lee, how would you be affected if retransmission consent was changed to prohibit requiring bundling of programming in the case of small cables with few subscribers? 

Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman, in our world, the world of a local television station, there’s very little bundling involved. In my negotiations with the MVPDs, there are companies that pay us cash, because that’s what they prefer, there are companies that take one 

extra channel, there are companies that take two extra channels, 

and, in that case, they do so because that works better for them. 

In our part of the world, satellite subscription is at almost 40 percent of television households, and suddenly the cable operators 

have become my new best friend. They tell me they want programming that is unique to them. A cable operator will often say to me, 

‘‘What can you produce for us that our subscribers won’t be able 

to get on DIRECTV or DISH Network? So, I think the marketplace 

is solving this question rather efficiently. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’m going to yield to my colleague, Senator Dorgan, for comment or questions. 

44

STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

First of all, I thought the testimony was interesting and very 

well done, from different perspectives. I’m not sure I’m better informed as a result of it. It is really pretty complicated, number one, 

and, number two, there are some very significant competing interests. And I’m not sure where all the merits exist at this point. And 

I want to ask a number of questions. 

First, Mr. Pyne, I suppose I would not purchase a cable service 

if it didn’t have ESPN attached to it, just my preference as a consumer. I’ve had a fellow that runs a small cable service in North 

Dakota for years constantly complain to me about the increased 

cost of content coming up through, for example, ESPN. I don’t 

know what your price increases are year to year, but he says, you 

know, ‘‘I’ve got to pay whatever it is, because I can’t offer cable 

service without ESPN.’’ So, tell me—I mean, I assume that’s the 

case, whatever it is you pass along, that cable operator’s going to 

have to pay in order to have ESPN on their cable menu, because 

otherwise people are going to say, ‘‘Wait a second, we won’t take 

your cable service.’’ What kind of inhibiting factor exists to keep 

your prices down, on ESPN, for example? 

Mr. PYNE. Well, over the last several years, we have actually negotiated with virtually all of our major providers, including the National Cable Television Cooperative, which would represent smaller 

operators, cable operators. And, as part of those negotiations, we 

actually are committed by contract to certain price increases. And 

over a period of time, those increases went from a level—20 percent 

down a level of 7 percent, through the aspect of these long-term 

agreements. So, by law, I mean, we have an agreement with the 

National Cable Television Cooperative that specifies exactly what 

our rate increases or price increases each year are. 

Senator DORGAN. All right, I will——

Mr. PYNE. And——

Senator DORGAN. Perhaps we can talk at some other point. I’m 

kind of interested in this notion of—you’re able to pass along almost anything. I mean, I understand you have a contract here, but 

we see these announcements of prices that are paid for various 

events and so on, and it just gets passed along to the consumer out 

there by a cable operator that can’t afford not to have ESPN. And 

I say that in a complimentary way, because I think what you offer 

is something I want and many other consumers want. 

Let me get to this question of—Mr. Gorshein and Mr. Fawcett, 

I guess, both—The America Channel. Is it America or America’s 

Channel? 

Mr. GORSHEIN. America. 

Senator DORGAN. America Channel. You, in your testimony, 

talked about the difficulty of getting access. Can you describe your 

difficulty in getting access? And you’re quoting others to say, you 

know, there’s just no chance for an independent to start up here 

and have access and be successful. And then, let me ask the folks 

on the other side of this transaction to tell me about your difficulty 

or what they perceive is your ease of getting access if you have the 

45

right programming, I suppose. So, why don’t you tell me, first of 

all, What are the impediments for an independent? 

Mr. GORSHEIN. The impediments for an independent are that we 

compete with Comcast and Time Warner, in effect, today. So, when 

they look to an independent, they say, ’’Well, gosh, it can give me 

incremental value, in terms of receptivity at the consumer level. 

But their own networks give them 100 percent of the equity, 100 

percent of the revenue, 100 percent of the ad avails, and their own 

networks are positioned in a way so that—you know, we compete 

for viewers, for capacity, for ad dollars; and because we’re a free 

channel for several years, we apply downward pricing pressure. So, 

there is an inherent economic disincentive to work with an independent channel. 

We have always said that this is not about us. Let’s assume that 

The America Channel isn’t the best product in the world and that 

the telcos are all crazy for embracing us. The fact is that you cannot run away from the statistics, from the empirical evidence on 

the ground. And the empirical evidence is that less than 1 percent 

of independent channels over a two-and-a-half-year study period 

got national carriage, most affiliated channels—that is, affiliated 

with a cablecaster or a broadcaster; and we have different definitions of what independent is; they believe it’s everybody other than 

Comcast—they carry 100 percent of their channels. They carry 

close to 100 percent, if not 100 percent, of their channels on analog. 

So, the basic difficulty is that I’m a competitor. 

Senator DORGAN. And, Mr. Waz, what are the standards that 

Comcast would use to determine whether to carry an independent 

network? And are they the same standards that you would use to 

make a decision about carrying an affiliated network? 

Mr. WAZ. Senator, our standard is, we always want to offer the 

best programming we can from whatever source it may derive. And 

if we don’t, DIRECTV will. And if DIRECTV doesn’t, EchoStar will. 

And if they don’t, as the telephone companies enter the market, 

they will. So, we get scores of new ideas brought to Comcast every 

year, from large and small media companies, for new programming 

concepts. The ones that succeed are the ones that have a strong 

programming concept, something to show us, actual content, which 

The America Channel doesn’t have, financing that’s in order, programming talent—they show they know how to operate a network, 

and they have operating experience; if it’s an existing network, we 

like to see that they have some Nielsen ratings and a commitment 

to get the product started. The America Channel, I know, has 

slipped its starting date several times now, and I don’t know when 

they really intend to sign on the air. They’re not on the air at this 

time. 

I would contrast The America Channel situation with something 

called The Sportsman Channel, which is one of several new independents we’ve had in the last several years. Michael Cooley did 

an article in Multichannel News that I submitted for the record, 

and I thought he stated the situation for independent programmers 

very clearly ‘‘it is incumbent upon a programmer to make the case 

to a Comcast, a DIRECTV, a DISH Network as to what the business reason is for them to be carried.’’ Interestingly, The America 

Channel has, with one small exception, reached an agreement with 

46

no cable operator, with no company, like RCN or Knology, or 

WOW! It has not reached an agreement with DIRECTV and has 

not reached an agreement with EchoStar. I think that says something about the caliber of what’s being sold. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Gorshein, go ahead. 

Mr. GORSHEIN. The letter from the channel that the gentleman 

from Comcast is referring to—that’s the one out of 114 channels 

that got carriage during our two-and-a-half-year study period. 

Comcast and Time Warner have market power which exceeds their 

market share. If you don’t get carriage at Comcast, you are viewed 

with skepticism elsewhere. And we’ve been told that by other cable 

companies. Comcast will not fund and produce and do all of the 

things necessary with one of their own channels until Comcast 

commits to carry their own channels. They know that. So, the critical barrier to entry is for Comcast to say, ‘‘We will let you in.’’

Senator DORGAN. Let me ask—Mr. Lee, I think you’ve said that 

the retransmission consent issue is working just fine. The marketplace exists and is just fine. You——

Mr. LEE. I believe it is. 

Senator DORGAN. You, I think, also said, you know, perhaps in 

an agreement someone might ask that you carry another channel. 

Mr. LEE. Yes. 

Senator DORGAN. Isn’t it the case that sometimes it’s more than 

another channel? A couple of channels, more channels than that, 

even? 

Mr. LEE. Senator, in the case of our own television station in Roanoke, it is, in fact, a fact that, in addition to the primary channel, 

we produce and offer to the MVPDs two other channels, some carry 

both the other channels, some carry one other channel, and some 

carry only the primary station. 

Senator DORGAN. I’ll follow up on that, but let me ask about—

I had some people come in to visit with me about the question of 

whether someone who’s providing content, a video distributor trying to offer a channel, and whether the distributor—if the distributor feels that channel is inappropriate for that local market, 

whether they ought to be able to determine it be on another tier. 

We’ve had some complaints about that. Should a video distributor, 

for example, be able to, in these negotiations, prescribe on which 

tier a channel is aired, or a video programming is aired? 

Mr. LEE. Senator, I’d be inclined to defer to my colleagues who 

are in the MVPD——

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Polka? 

Mr. LEE.—business to comment on that. 

Mr. POLKA. Yes, sir, we believe they do. We believe that operators in the community who are closest to their customers and who 

know their customers, would be the best ones to make that decision. 

Senator DORGAN. And that is not now the case? 

Mr. POLKA. That is not now the case, because of the nature of 

the contracts for those programs, which mandate that carriage of 

channels are carried on either the basic or the expanded lowest levels of service. So, despite the fact that we receive numerous complaints from our customers concerning content today on television 

47

carried on expanded basic, there is nothing we can do about it as 

it relates to these contracts. 

And there’s one other thing I would say about your question concerning rates and disclosure, particularly with the National Cable 

Television Cooperative. There is no way for you to know, unless 

you could actually someday see the contract. But, today, that will 

never happen, because of disclosure and confidentiality provisions 

in contracts that prohibit you, the FCC, my consumers, local franchising authorities from finding exactly what the price increases 

are year after year. And the only thing I would suggest to that is 

that the FCC annually surveys cable rate increases, why shouldn’t 

the FCC also annually survey programming rate increases, programming rates, terms, and conditions? That way, you would be 

able to answer that question. You can’t answer that question today. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, this is an interesting and a 

complicated area, and I’m trying to understand more about it and 

will. I read some about it last evening, and have some just casual 

acquaintance. But, as a last question, we’ve had some discussion 

about the Adelphia transaction, and I know that when News Corp 

acquired DIRECTV, there were some conditions imposed with respect to that acquisition, and I’m interested. Several of you actually 

mentioned the issue of Adelphia and the potential of a lockup of 

local sports arrangements. Perhaps we could have a bit of point/

counterpoint about that. 

Who believes very strongly that need to be some conditions imposed on the Adelphia? Mr. Fawcett? 

Mr. FAWCETT. Yes, the conditions that DIRECTV has been suggesting on the Adelphia transaction are very similar to those imposed on News Corp when it purchased the interest in DIRECTV. 

The difference there is that News Corp—DIRECTV only owned 13 

percent, or controlled 13 percent of the households in the U.S. In 

these local markets where Comcast or Time Warner will become 

hugely dominant, they will control 70 or 80 percent of the subscribers in a market, it’s much easier for—when you have that type 

of market share—to negotiate exclusive contracts or to, you know, 

hold the competitors, DIRECTV or EchoStar, which owns less than 

20 percent of the market, up for ransom and extraordinary rates, 

which, frankly, are passed on to the consumers. And it’s programming that has been deemed to be must-have programming by the 

FCC, and we can show, in markets where we don’t have local 

sports programming, our growth has been much slower than it has 

been in our—our market share is much less than it would be had 

we had the sports. 

Senator DORGAN. And who thinks Mr. Fawcett is losing sleep 

over a nonissue? 

Mr. WAZ. I’ll take a shot at that, Senator. 

Senator, the Adelphia transaction deserves to be approved, and 

it deserves to be approved in a timely fashion for several good reasons. The first is——

Senator DORGAN. With conditions or without conditions? 

Mr. WAZ. Without conditions, sir. 

The first is, the company is in bankruptcy and is not being operated for the future. So, millions of cable customers in Adelphia 

communities across the country are not getting video on demand, 

48

they’re not getting telephone service. Their systems are not being 

managed for the future. Comcast and Time Warner, between the 

two, are prepared to invest a $1.5 billion to make the future happen. So, we would like to see timely approval, without conditions. 

The conditions that are being described by Mr. Fawcett are unnecessary and are not relevant to the merger transaction. In most 

of the markets that he talks about, Comcast is growing a fraction 

of a percent or a few percent. There is not a substantial change in 

the market share that Comcast has in most of the markets where 

there are sports networks. 

And I’d be delighted to speak to his point about the inability of 

DIRECTV and DISH Network to compete in markets where they 

don’t have sports rights. There’s exactly one market that I’m aware 

of that—where Comcast is involved—where DBS does not have the 

sports rights. That’s Philadelphia. 

In Philadelphia, DIRECTV and DISH Network have a market 

share of about 12 percent. That’s higher than Boston, higher than 

Springfield, higher than New Haven, almost as high as Baltimore, 

higher than several other major urban markets. So, there has to 

be something else at work besides the absence of sports programming on DIRECTV in that market to account for those numbers. 

They’re larger than many of the other markets I mentioned. 

And one additional point. Both DIRECTV and DISH Network 

had available to them, in the late 1990s, over a hundred games of 

the Phillies, the Flyers, and the Sixers for free if they would carry 

the local broadcast station in Philadelphia that offered those signals. They had the right to start carrying that signal for free in 

1999. They did not choose to carry that signal until their version 

of the must-carry rule kicked in, in 2001. So, you would think, if 

this is essential content, that they would have carried the games 

that were available for free. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, you and I, in years past, have 

both expressed concern about concentration in broadcasting and so 

on. I think the bottom line with respect to all of this testimony and 

these discussions is about the marketplace. Is the marketplace a 

marketplace that functions? Is there competition? Are the normal 

forces in the marketplace working to provide the best for the consumers in this country? Because only in a marketplace that works 

will we have, I think, the kind of opportunities that we would want 

to have exist for America’s consumers. 

And I don’t know that I know the answers at this point, but I 

think the testimony offered today is helpful, and I appreciate very 

much, Mr. Chairman, your holding the hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you. I find, really, we’re both going 

to be the mouthpiece for questions that others would ask if they 

were here. And sometimes I have difficulty understanding the 

question I’m supposed to ask you. So, it becomes a little bit of a 

problem. 

But let me go to you, Mr. Waz. Exclusive contracts are forbidden 

for satellite-delivered programming only. Now, why should we not 

remove that and make the concepts that are applied by FCC apply 

across the board? 

Mr. WAZ. Senator, again, when the 1992 Cable Act passed, Congress did not apply these rules to all satellite-delivered programVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:21 Sep 07, 2006 Jkt 029574 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\29574.TXT JACKF PsN: JACKF
49

ming. A program network that is owned by a Disney or a Viacom 

or NBC Universal or another company that’s not in the cable business is not reached by these rules. And terrestrial programming, as 

you’ve suggested, is not reached by these rules. There were about 

a dozen terrestrial networks in operation when Congress passed 

this bill in 1992, so we think Congress knew exactly what it was 

doing in exempting terrestrially delivered programming. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s just because we didn’t have a crystal 

ball. 

Mr. WAZ. Well, I think the crystal ball worked, sir, because I 

think you were trying to place predominant reliance on the marketplace. You said, ‘‘We’re not going to try to turn every program into 

something that has to be given away, so that no one can have any 

exclusivity.’’ And, frankly, I think some amount of exclusivity in 

programming is what permits us and DIRECTV and EchoStar and 

the phone companies to distinguish ourselves from one another. 

The terrestrially delivered programming, in particular, tends to be 

local programming. It can be news, it can be public affairs, it can 

be sports. And Congress said, at the time, you did not want to chill 

investment in better local programming. 

The CHAIRMAN. What difference does it make, if they’re bundled 

when you get the programming out? 

Mr. WAZ. Well, Senator, I know there’s been a lot of discussion 

of how programming is sold in bundles this morning with retransmission consent. We’re not a broadcaster, so we don’t have a bundling issue of the sort you’re describing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is the so-called ‘‘terrestrial loophole,’’ 

as I understand it—does not that affect cable-delivered programming? 

Mr. WAZ. It does. Terrestrially delivered programming that is 

created by a cable operator or a phone company or anyone else 

would be exempt from those rules. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you oppose eliminating this difference between the satellite-delivered programming and all other programming? 

Mr. WAZ. Senator, with so much competition in the programming 

marketplace today, with DIRECTV having access to so much programming, and we do, and all the other competitors do, I think 

there’s less reason for expanding regulation, and more reason to reduce it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go back to the statement that you made, 

Mr. Gorshein. You said, ‘‘We have secured distribution no less than 

six telcos, close to 90 percent of the projected telco video spaces, including Verizon, AT&T, and others. Channels that have been 90 

percent off cable—of cable space have been around for 25 years. In 

telco, we did it in 5 months, in contrast to our success in telco, 

after close to 3 years, we had virtually no progress in getting carriage from dominant cable operators.’’

Now, my question to you is, Why do you need it, if you’ve got all 

that other type of access? 

Mr. GORSHEIN. The telcos have big names and lots of customers. 

The problem is, they’re not video customers today. Our fate is inextricably linked to theirs, so that if they can penetrate local markets 

quickly, that certainly helps us. And so, we’re very much in favor 

50

of telco relief. That will give us more outlets, and independent competitors like us more outlets. 

Statistically, empirically, if you look at the data, there are 92 

channels which hit the critical viability threshold of 20 million. 

That’s the minimum you need to get Nielsen’s. And the cable operators and the broadcasters have gone on record at the FCC to say 

50 million is actually the bare minimum you need to have a profitable venture. 

Of the 92 channels that hit 20 million, 91 of them had to secure 

carriage at Comcast and Time Warner, one secured carriage at one 

of Comcast or Time Warner, but also secured Adelphia, which suggests that, post-transaction, it will be empirically impossible for a 

new channel to succeed without the transacting parties. 

I will also say that there’s no precedent for a satellite-only channel reaching that viability threshold. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as you know, we’ve been exploring the concept of having some means to have a family tier offered, no matter 

what the source of the programming. All right? And to have, in 

connection with that family tier, a rating system so that whether 

you’re using the V-chip or whatever kind of thing that’s available 

to you, the family has a way to check what they do not want their 

children to view. 

Now, if we did that, tell me, right down the line, how would that 

type of legislation affects your business? 

Mr. Pyne, how would it affect you? 

Mr. PYNE. I think we have come out to say that we support the 

decency standards for broadcasts across all of our networks, whether that’s ABC Family, Disney Channel, ESPN, and so forth. Sports 

and news are generally not rated, and we support not rating 

sports, specific sports and news——

The CHAIRMAN. You’d support it, but it doesn’t really affect the 

way you do business. 

Mr. PYNE. No, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Polka? 

Mr. POLKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The more information, the better. That’s very helpful—to myself, 

as a parent who makes decisions for my children, as well as for our 

customers. However, at the end of the day, even with a different 

rating system, the channels still would be coming into the home, 

and they would have to be blocked, they would have to be kept 

away from those that parents might want to keep it from, whether 

it’s their children or otherwise. So, the point is that the programming that you find most objectionable is still coming into the home. 

The only way that we can actually make changes to actually give 

consumers more choices is to get them into the process. They are 

actually not in this process of deciding what’s on their television 

today. And if they were, in conjunction with their operators, then 

packages of programming services would be developed in local communities that they would take and pay for. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as far as this Senator is concerned, I don’t 

think we should mandate what happens. I think we should mandate that there should be a system where parents can control what 

their children have access to. 

51

Now, having said that, the difficulty is, I don’t know if you went 

down to see this, Senator—when we went down to see the rating 

system, guess what was left out? Sports. Sports aren’t rated. History concepts, they weren’t rated. Now, how do we get into the system so somehow or other we achieve the objective I think we all 

want, and that is—no, I don’t want my grandchildren watching 

some sort of smut, but I don’t object to it being out there if someone else wants it. I want my children to have the right to block it. 

OK? Now, why can’t we get together and find some way to do that? 

There seems to be a resistance to the rating system. There’s a resistance—there’s general agreement on the block. We haven’t had 

a witness that has—well, we did have one that came on. He represented, really, the people who are providing the programming of 

very highly sexual content, but he also agreed it should be rated. 

But what’s your solution for that? You say you’d like to do it, but 

you don’t want us to do it, right? 

Mr. POLKA. That’s right. We don’t think Congress needs to. We 

think that—again, just as you said, I mean, you can look at content, and you can make a decision. You can determine whether or 

not you find it objectionable or not and whether you would like to 

pay for it on this particular tier or not. And that’s essentially what 

we’re suggesting. Rather than allowing the content to continue to 

come into the home without any accountability or change whatsoever, basically giving consumers more choices, working with their 

operators, to be able to say, as they say to us month after month, 

‘‘We would not—we would prefer not to have this channel on expanded basic. Can you please sell us that, or not sell it to us, so 

we don’t have to take it?’’

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think, Mr. Lee? 

Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I’ll speak to this more as a parent than 

as the operator of a local television station. I think a solution may 

be in place already. We have a daughter who’s now 24 years old, 

but in her youth there were a couple of cable channels I found objectionable. And, to the credit of the local cable company, when I 

called and made that observation, they had, by the following day, 

come out to the house, taught me how to block it on the set-top box, 

and then trapped it on the pole, so the channels that I found objectionable were, within 24 hours, gone. 

The CHAIRMAN. That required you to know in advance what 

channels were bad, right? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, but I could tell pretty readily. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then you’re better than I am, because I remember sitting there and watching ‘‘Rome,’’ and I thought it would 

be a great historical program, and suddenly I found out to the contrary. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LEE. But, Mr. Chairman, if I could——

The CHAIRMAN. I enjoyed the program, but I would not have 

wanted my granddaughter sitting next me. 

Mr. Waz? 

Mr. WAZ. Senator, David Cohen from Comcast came before this 

Committee a couple of weeks ago and talked about the family tier 

that Comcast has established with some great family-friendly 

52

brand names, like National Geographic, Disney and Discovery. So, 

we are trying to be responsive to those in the marketplace who 

really want a family tier alternative. 

To your broader point, absolutely, parents need to know about 

ratings systems. And parents need to have the tools to be able to 

act on ratings and to be able to decide what’s appropriate for their 

families. We are strong supporters of making sure that people 

know what the rating system is, how it works, and how to use the 

equipment we can make available to them to make all television 

in their homes family-friendly. 

The CHAIRMAN. My staff director reminds me that the contract 

we had from our State was that it was not possible to offer a family 

channel, because networks require that the vast majority of the 

customers—that their customers receive, in terms of channels, are 

all aimed at adults. And unless the programmers agree to change 

the contract, there’s not going to be a family tier in Alaska. 

Now, Mr. Fawcett, you said you go up Alaska, right? 

Mr. FAWCETT. Sorry? 

The CHAIRMAN. Does your programming go to Alaska? 

Mr. FAWCETT. Sure. And—I mean, on—just on this point, I’d like 

to—you know, my testimony here in November revolved around the 

fact that DIRECTV, since day one, has been 100 percent digital, 

and every subscriber to DIRECTV has the power and the ability to 

block out channels through our locks-and-limits feature, which is 

not just channels——

The CHAIRMAN. How do they know that in advance? 

Mr. FAWCETT. There’s a channel on DIRECTV that shows that 

information every half hour. It’s in the owner’s manual, and our installers——

The CHAIRMAN. That’s how you block it, but how do they know 

about the content? 

Mr. FAWCETT. Well, there are ratings that are passed through by 

the programmers, so each program that is rated, that information 

is passed through, and then, through the locks-and-limits feature, 

that would be blocked, if that’s what you chose—if that’s what you, 

as a parent, chose to do. If it’s not rated, our technology allows you 

to block unrated programming or programming of—you know, on 

any specific channel or at any specific time of the day. So, our subscribers that are parents have full power to block any programming 

coming through on DIRECTV. 

The CHAIRMAN. We’re informed that the meeting that our colleagues are at, on both sides, will not end in time for them to be 

here. So, I’m informed that they would like to have the right, some 

of them, to offer questions that we would submit to you. I would 

hope that you would give us the courtesy of responding to their 

questions. I apologize for the problem that’s going on right now 

with regard to these meetings of the two sides of the aisle. 

The CHAIRMAN. My last question would be to you, Mr. Fawcett. 

If Comcast says it maintains a competitive marketplace for video 

content, and it’s working, why aren’t there enough options for 

sports programs contracts available to DIRECTV to respond to the 

large cable companies reaching sports networks? Why aren’t there 

enough there for you? 

53

Mr. FAWCETT. Well, as I said, we have been able, until recently, 

to provide local sports programming. It’s what’s been happening. In 

Philadelphia, obviously, we’ve never had the ability to provide local 

sports programming, and our penetration in Philadelphia is the 

lowest of any of the top 25 DMAs. And, contrary to what Mr. Waz 

says, in San Diego and in New Orleans, where we also do not have 

local sports programming, our penetration in those markets, as 

well as EchoStar’s, is much lower than it should be. 

We have submitted a report to the FCC that has a regression 

analysis and smooths out the differences in some of the markets 

that he pointed out that we’re also low in. In Philadelphia, for example, when it’s adjusted, our report shows that our penetration 

should be twice what it is currently. And we—and that’s really because we haven’t been able—been afforded the right to carry the 

local sports team. There’s no substitute for local sports programming. And what they would like to do, and what they have done 

over the past year, is not deny us access completely, but give us 

the Hobson’s choice of a very high rate. And, if we choose it, great, 

everybody—they make out, because they own the—they own the 

network, and, if we don’t carry it, then they have exclusivity. So, 

cable has a huge market advantage in a market where they have 

70 and 80 percent penetration in market share. 

The CHAIRMAN. Your discussion disturbs me a little bit, because 

I’ve been one who believed, primarily, that the concept of competition would ultimately lead to lower consumer prices and to greater 

access for consumers. But the conclusion I get here, that it’s because of some of these concepts, which may be exceptions to the 

rules that we try to lay down, are leading to increased control of 

some entities over the marketplace and denying access to some 

people who have selected one provider, like for example, ESPN or 

to some program that they want. Now, I don’t know that we can 

legislate it, but I certainly would be willing to look at any suggestion any of you have to level this playing field so that we—how 

long are these contracts you all enter into, by the way? 

How long are the retransmission consent contracts? Who sets 

the——

Mr. LEE. In the case of broadcast, 3 years. 

Mr. POLKA. It’s 3 years. The cycle is 3 years, that’s correct, Mr. 

Chairman. However, in case of the affiliated programming contracts that are oftentimes tied to those, those contracts are oftentimes for 5 years or more. And that’s typically a tactic that we see 

in wholesale programming practices, where, in return for the carriage of the station, we’re required to carry an affiliated channel 

for more than 3 years. In 3 years, they can come back and ask for 

another channel. So, more content then results on expanded basic 

that consumers have to take and pay for, whether they want it or 

not. 

The CHAIRMAN. Has anyone explored the possibility of a provision in our law that says if you offer a contract to one entity, you 

must, up to your capacity, be willing to offer a similar contract to 

any other entity that seeks that service? 

Mr. POLKA. We would support that. 

Mr. PYNE. Senator Stevens, can I——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you oppose that, Mr. Waz? 

54

Mr. WAZ. Well, Senator, I guess one good example is with the 

NFL, which DIRECTV has exclusively. Comcast cannot get NFL 

games. Its competitor, DISH Network, cannot get NFL games. One 

could pass a law that says all the NFL games have to be available 

to all competitors, just as one could pass a law saying all Philadelphia sports has to be available to all competitors. But I think we’re 

at a point in the competition among networks here where we’re 

better off if DIRECTV can compete with Comcast by having something unique, and Comcast can compete with Verizon by having 

something unique, and so on. The competition among those providers is a better way to make sure consumers are served better, 

because we’re differentiating ourselves from one another. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, but doesn’t it end up, as one of—I think it 

was Mr. Fawcett who indicated that some communities are shut off 

from their own team? 

Mr. WAZ. No, Senator. In Philadelphia, as I indicated in my prepared testimony, there are over 100 Flyers, Sixers, and Phillies 

games on broadcast television; games that DIRECTV chose not to 

carry for 2 years when they were available to them. And when we 

acquired the rights of the Philadelphia 76ers, the previous owners 

had taken all the games off broadcast TV. We chose to put them 

back on because we wanted all fans in Philadelphia to be able to 

see the hometown teams. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fawcett, it looks like——

Mr. FAWCETT. Can I respond to that? 

The CHAIRMAN.—you want to respond. 

Mr. FAWCETT. I was astounded to see, in Comcast’s testimony, 

that we have the right to carry sports events on local broadcast stations. We did not get that right until SHVIA, in—so, we didn’t have 

the right before, and once we obtained the right, we launched satellites, at considerable expense, and we carry all the broadcast stations that carry those local sports events in Philadelphia. A lot of 

those sports events, however, have left the broadcast television stations and have migrated over to Comcast SportsNet Philadelphia, 

which is a network they refuse to give—let us carry. 

And the distinction between NFL SUNDAY TICKET is one that 

shouldn’t go unnoted here. And that is, SUNDAY TICKET, which 

is our exclusive service, enables you to, in addition to getting your 

local team’s games or the local games carried on the local broadcast 

networks, to get every other game played in the NFL. And that—

you know, we negotiated that—for that right with the NFL. The 

NFL had open negotiations. And Comcast was in there bidding for 

the same rights. And, you know, as a—we had 13 percent market 

share, and the NFL wanted to grant exclusivity to that. But, again, 

it’s an enhancement to what customers already receive. I’m from 

Pittsburgh, and if you said—if you’re a fan of a Pittsburgh team 

and you can’t get Pittsburgh sports on DIRECTV, you’re never 

going to become a DIRECTV subscriber; you’re going to stay with 

Comcast. So, it’s a different—local sports are different than having 

this enhanced package of all games. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, on behalf of our Committee, I thank you 

very much. And, again, I’m sad that this has taken place at a day 

when I think many people that have different questions than I’ve 

asked you are not here, I urge you to give us your response to their 

55

questions as quickly as you can. And I thank you very much for 

your courtesy of appearing here today. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(57)

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

Access to video content has become a particularly complicated matter over the 

years. As the methods of distribution have matured so have the rivalries and disputes. It appears that every party involved has one grievance or another. 

The issues we are examining today have wide-ranging impact. Subjects like retransmission consent and contract exclusivity have the potential to affect the digital 

TV transition, prices for video programming, the future success of independent programming, and much more. We must be vigilant to ensure that exclusive arrangements for video content do not hinder robust competition and entry in the video 

market. 

It is my hope that we can find a way to balance the competing perspectives in 

a manner that gives consumers more options while promoting full and fair competition. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

I want to thank Chairman Stevens for these hearings. I am excited that we are 

embarking on an aggressive series of hearings to examine all of the key issues related to telecommunications modernization. I also understand that we postponed the 

hearing on franchise reform this morning because of the Alito vote at 11 a.m. and

my car accident yesterday—thank you to Chairman Stevens and Co-Chairman 

Inouye for thinking of me—I am pretty sore today. But I am very anxious to participate in the video franchising hearing when it gets rescheduled. 

I believe that the current system of requiring new entrants into the video business to go city-by-city across the United States and engage in lengthy, expensive negotiations is anti-consumer and anti-competitive. We have heard loud and clear from 

the telephone companies that they want to deploy an exciting new service—IPTV—

and invest billions of dollars and create jobs doing it. The problem is we have an 

outdated monopoly-era regulatory structure in place in the form of 33,000 plus local 

cable franchise authorities that are stalling deployment of these exciting new services. Presuming that we can pass a bill to reform these outdated impediments to 

IPTV deployment, a critical issue we must also address is the ability of these new 

entrants to have programming to provide for their consumers to enjoy.

There is a precedent for Congress acting on this issue. In 1992, when Congress 

successfully helped create new competitors in the form of satellite providers (DISH 

Network and DIRECTV), we recognized the need to help these new companies get 

access to the content of vertically integrated cable companies. Congress understood 

in 1992 that the incentives would be all wrong for a cable company that also owned 

video programming—cable channels—to make them available to their new competitors. So, in 1992, Congress implemented what is now Section 628 of the Communications Act. 

In my legislation, the Broadband Investment and Consumer Choice Act—S. 1504, 

I would include an modernized Section 628 to extend a similar provision for any new 

entrants into the video space. To be consistent with the rest of my legislation, we 

have taken the existing Section 628 and amended it to eliminate the distinctions 

between cable and satellite and IPTV wherever possible. This is a technology neutral approach to ensuring consumers get the programming they want, to help speed 

competition in the video sector. We do not prescribe rates, or terms of the agreements, but rather encourage commercial arrangements between companies. 

Just as Congress did in 1992, we have included sunset language (in fact the same 

sunset language)—the thought being that IPTV and other new video entrants will 

have 10 years to try to develop programming and content of their own so they can 

negotiate fairly with vertically integrated cable companies. If they are unable to develop market power to be able to successfully negotiate, the FCC will have the same 

exact authority to extend beyond 10 years that Congress granted satellite in 1992. 

58

1These rules, put in place by Congress in 1992 when cable was clearly a monopoly, prohibit 

certain anticompetitive practices. Unfortunately, Congress phrased the law in terms of the practices and distribution technology of 1992. In 1992, cable television operators distributed programming via satellite to cable head-ends. As a result, the 1992 Act made programming distributed in such a fashion subject to the program access rules. When technology permitted cable 

operators to distribute programming, particularly regional programming, terrestrially, the FCC 

found that the program access rules did not reach terrestrially distributed programming (the 

‘‘Terrestrial Loophole’’). It is also unclear whether new programming, like video on demand, is 

covered under the existing rules. Finally, unless the FCC takes action before February 2007, 

even the existing program access rules will end. 

Franchising reform is the critical first step, and this video content language will 

help ensure that competition is successful and that consumers have the programming they want. 

I look forward to working with Chairman Stevens and my colleagues as we work 

to address these issues. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HAROLD FELD, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, MEDIA ACCESS

PROJECT

THE ‘‘SWITCHING EQUATION’’ AND ITS IMPACT ON THE VIDEO PROGRAMMING MARKET

AND MVPD PRICING

One of the most frequently debated questions in media policy is whether direct 

broadcast satellite (DBS), terrestrial cable overbuilders, or potential new entrants 

such as the incumbent telephone companies, provide competition to traditional incumbent cable operators, such as Comcast. Specifically, competitors to cable say that 

if Congress does not provide access to regional sports programming and other programming not covered under the existing ‘‘program access rules.’’ 1 then cable will 

continue to raise rates and control the programming market. Independent programmers say they have no chance to get distribution unless they satisfy the demands 

of the two largest cable companies, Comcast and Time Warner. Cable companies, 

however, argue that if they raise prices too high or favor inferior affiliated programming over better independent programming, customers will switch to competitors. 

Until now, the economic debate between parties has focused primarily on the incentives of the programmers, competitors, and cable incumbents. This white paper 

suggests that a focus on competition should focus on the consumer. In particular, 

if Congress intends to adopt policy on the basis of predicted competition between 

incumbent cable operators and potential competitors, Congress must first determine 

whether or not consumers are likely to switch to competitors. If consumers are unlikely to switch, particularly if the incumbents can use existing market power to 

prevent successful entry by competitors, then a policy based on deregulation will 

fail. Cable incumbents will not feel pressure to change either pricing or programming practices if they can reliably predict that few consumers will switch to competitors. 

The shift in focus to the consumer shows why large incumbent cable companies 

continue to exercise market power over consumers, programmers, and other related 

market actors. Briefly, the average cable subscriber finds it too much of a hassle 

to switch to a competitor. As long as the cable incumbents can reduce the value of 

competing offerings by control of ‘‘high value’’ programming like regional sports and 

drive up costs to competitors by controlling the price of new services like video on 

demand, cable operators can keep the bulk of subscribers from switching. Since the 

market power to engage in these tactics derives from a combination of existing market share and increased regional and national concentration, incumbent cable operators can stymie effective competition indefinitely. 

Without Congressional action to promote competition and reduce the ability of incumbents to exercise market power, cable operators will continue to raise prices 

above competitive levels and make programming decisions based on affiliation rather than quality. 

Defining Market Power 

Parties in the ‘‘cable wars’’ frequently use terms that have precise meaning to 

economists, but very imprecise meaning to non-specialists. Before moving on to the 

basics, it is therefore useful to define some terms for purpose of this paper. Market 

power means control over so many customers or other valuable resources that the 

company that has ‘‘market power’’ can tell other people ‘‘take my terms or else’’ and 

everyone listens. In a monopoly (i.e., where one company controls everything), this 

is obvious. But it can happen in other markets as well. For example, if one company 

59

2 Contrary to the claims of cable operators, not everyone has a choice of competing MVPD provider. Many people lack an unobstructed view of the portion of the southern sky occupied by 

DBS satellites. In addition, exclusive contracts with landlords prevent many apartment and 

condo dwellers from using a terrestrial overbuilder. See GAO, ‘‘Direct Broadcast Satellite 

Subscribership Has Grown Rapidly But Varies Across Markets’’ (2005) (GAO 2005). 3 In theory, a tie will go to the current incumbent because an ‘‘indifferent’’ consumer will simply stay with the existing system. But the average person does not weigh his or her choices in 

the neat mathematical fashion these equations suggest. 

controls most of the customers, called market share, that company can have market 

power because everyone wants access to its huge customer base. While market share 

doesn’t always give market power, it helps—particularly where customers have a 

hard time switching to a competitor. 

In 1992, when Congress made a first pass at creating competition in what the 

FCC calls the multichannel video programming distribution (MVPD) market, Congress concluded that cable’s monopoly power at the local level gave it power over 

customers and that the power to prevent video programmers from reaching customers (foreclosure) gave cable operators power over programmers. Today, however. 

most people 2 appear to have a choice between several MVPD providers. If that’s 

true, then how does cable retain market power? 

The answer lies in the way consumers behave. For many consumers ‘‘I’d rather 

pay than switch’’ is, in fact, a rational decision even in the face of high prices and 

better programming on rivals. This consumer behavior lets cable keep customers 

and gives incumbent cable operators market power over programmers. 

Some Basic Cable Competition Math 

Why does anyone buy a good or a service? Because they think that what they get, 

what I will call ‘‘value’’ (or ‘‘V’’) is worth the cost (or ‘‘C’’) of the service. We can 

write this as a mathematical equation, which makes it easier to understand visually. 

Generally, a consumer will buy a service where Value is greater than or equal 

to Cost, or

Vs=>Cs

Where Vs is the value of the service and Cs is the cost of the service. 

So I buy cable when it is worth it for me to have it. Since cable is a subscription 

service, I theoretically make this calculation every month I don’t cancel the service. 

So, why don’t I drop the service when the cable company raises the price? In part, 

it is because I may discover the service is more valuable when I use it, so I will 

pay more for it. But it is also because turning off the service may have costs of its 

own. whether in the form of money costs like a termination fee or the cost of hassle. 

But the equation is different when a competing service, like a Direct Broadcast 

Satellite (DBS) company or overbuilder, is trying to pull a customer away from 

cable. This introduces something called ‘‘switching costs.’’ A ‘‘switching cost’’ is any 

cost associated with switching from one product to another that is over and above 

the actual price of the new product. This includes not merely money (for example, 

a termination fee if I end the contract early), but also the general hassle associated 

with calling in a new provider, terminating the old system, learning the new system, etc. 

Let us assume that Vi is the value of the incumbent service (the one the consumer 

already uses). Ci is the cost of maintaining that system. Vn is the value of a comparable service. Cn is the cost of the new, comparable service. SW is the switching 

cost of moving from the old service to the new service. 

The Switching Equation:

Vi-Ci<Vn¥SW¥Cn

In plain English, it is not enough for the new service to be ‘‘as good as’’ the old 

one or even just a bit better. Either the new service must be much better, or the 

cost must be lower, by more than the difference of the switching cost. 3

This applies universally but doesn’t impact most daily buying decisions because 

the things we buy on a regular basis, like groceries, have little or no switching cost. 

For example, when I decide to buy a new box of cereal, there is no switching cost 

if both brands are in my local supermarket because I am out of cereal and need 

to buy more anyway. My decision about which brand to buy will be determined by 

cost and whatever value I perceive in the brand I chose (do I want to try something 

new? Do I perceive one brand as better for me? ). 

But cable is a subscription service. Unless I move to a new house, switching from 

cable to a competitive rival has significant non-monetary switching costs to consumers. I need to deal with the cable company to turn off the cable, deal with the 

60

4Some of these apply even if I am moving to a new house. 

5See, e.g., Andrew S. Wise and Kiran Duwadi, ‘‘Competition Between Cable Television and 

Direct Broadcast Satellite—It’s More Complicated Than You Think,’’ FCC Media Bureau Staff 

Research Paper (2005) (‘‘Wise & Duwadi 2005’’); GAO 2005. The issue of ‘‘hassle’’ as a switching 

cost for consumers, and the need to impose a regulatory solution to encourage effective competition, is well established in telecommunications markets. For example, to make competition a reality in the competing telephone market and cell phone market. Congress and the FCC created 

rules to let consumers move phone numbers from one service to another. Why? Because switching phone numbers was such a hassle to consumers that if they had to change numbers to 

switch, not enough of them would do so to bring about the benefits of competition. 6GAO 2005 (observing lowest penetration of DBS in urban areas). 

7The empirical data in GAO 2005 is generally confirmatory. GAO 2005 reported that an increase in incumbent cable capacity (offering more channels) or offering additional services such 

as VoD or broadband (all of which increase Vi) reduce DBS penetration. Similarly, denial of local 

programming to DBS (reducing Vn) significantly impacts competitor penetration. See also Wise 

& Duwadi (2005) (finding that DBS demand is suppressed when DBS denied regional sports programming). When considering the implications for policy, it is important to remember these are 

aggregate trends. The specific values, and therefore specific responses, change for each consumer. DBS can attract some customers by offering steep discounts and free equipment (cutting 

Cn), free installation (cutting SW), or free TiVo (increasing Vn). But, because of the way cable 

can exercise market power, it can keep DBS costs sufficiently high and network value sufficiently low to avoid losing a critical mass of customers. 

DBS provider, waste a day (at least) waiting for the install, and overcome my fear 

of learning a new system when I don’t know for sure I’ll like it better. 4 Statistics 

from the last few years of cable/DBS competition suggest that consumers are much 

more sensitive to switching costs and network value than they are to price. 5

This is the key to market power and competition in video. As a matter of public 

policy, we want competition to keep down prices, protect consumers from abusive 

service, and make sure that we have enough diverse news and viewpoints in the 

media to maintain a healthy democracy. But if competition is an illusion, because 

we can prove that not enough consumers will switch to make a difference for these 

things, then policy has to address the issue by making it easier for competitors to 

get customers. 

When Congress passed the 1992 Act, only 60 percent of the country subscribed 

to cable and the largest cable systems controlled at most a quarter of that number. 

Cable systems were scattered around the country, minimizing the ability of any single cable system to block a programmer from an entire geographic region. Today, 

90 percent of the country subscribes to cable or some other kind of MVPD (mostly 

DBS). The remaining ten percent has been stable for some time, and is unlikely to 

sign up with an MVPD in mass numbers anytime soon. 

According to the most recent FCC Report on MVPD competition, incumbent cable 

operators have approximately 70 percent of the total MVPD market (with the five 

largest providers controlling the bulk of cable subscribers). That means that any 

competitor must pull new customers away from cable. That would be hard enough, 

given the problem of overcoming switching cost and consumer uncertainty. But it 

gets worse for two reasons. First, the national number marks the much higher levels of regional concentration. Not all customers are equal, and clusters of customers 

in the wealthiest urban areas subscribe to incumbent cable operators, 6 making the 

level of regional concentration in areas dominated by large cable companies much 

more concentrated than the 70 percent national figure. Because a few large cable 

companies dominate these regions, these cable companies still have market power. 

Using the market power of their existing subscribers, they can take steps to make 

it much harder for these customers to switch to competitors and can therefore raise 

prices, deny programming to rivals, and favor affiliated programming over unaffiliated programming. 

Implications for Pricing 

Recall the Switching Equation:

Vi¥Ci<Vn¥SW¥Cn

We can now explain why cable can keep raising the subscription price even in the 

presence of a competitor. The ‘‘SW’’ provides a cushion. The cable operator can raise 

Cn to just about Ci+SW, unless a competitor offers a high enough Vn. At the same 

time, the cable companies can use their market power to increase the cost to the 

competitor or lower the value of their competing network in ways described below. 

So the competitor either can’t raise Vn enough to justify the added expense of the 

switching cost, or drop Cn enough to compensate for switching cost, to attract a lot 

of new customers. 7

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8They have responded to terrestrial competitors with price cuts, suggesting that consumer uncertainty diminishes when the service ‘‘looks the same,’’ making comparisons easier and consumers more likely to switch. At the same time, they have also been more vigorous in using 

regional market power to disadvantage terrestrial overbuilders. See GAO, ‘‘Wire-based Competition Benefitted Consumers in Selected Markets (2004). The differences in the nature of competition from different competitors goes beyond the scope of this paper. Given the state of competition in the video marketplace, however, in which incumbent cable operators continue to control 

the overwhelming share of the market and where DBS is the most significant competitor by national market share, the differences are not important for the basic competition math. 9We could therefore tweak our equation to reflect this, as Vi¥Ci<(Vn/U)¥(SW*U)¥(Cn*U), 

where ‘‘U’’ represents the uncertainty caused by a combination of less than perfect information 

and risk aversion. But that starts to get too complicated. It’s enough to say that the less information a customer has, and the less certain they are about the network value, the less they 

will value the competitor’s network and the more they will worry about switching costs and actual costs. 10For example, in 1997, Microsoft rescued its long-term rival, Apple, from possible bankruptcy 

by investing $150 million. 11The fact that most viewers only reliably watch a fraction of the number of available channels also leads consumers to devalue additional capacity. If I can’t find more than five good 

channels with 125 channels on cable, why do I think adding 75 more channels will help? 

Positive and Anticompetitive Responses By Cable To Competition 

Cable operators generally have not responded to DBS competition with price cuts 

(in fact, they have raised prices faster than inflation for the last five years) 8 Instead, incumbent cable operators have worked to increase the value of its network 

(the good response to competition) and have leveraged market power to suppress the 

value of rival MVPDs or drive up costs to rivals (the anti-competitive or ‘‘bad’’ response). For example, cable operators have increased the value of their package by 

expanding capacity and introducing additional services, such as video on demand 

(VoD) and broadband. At the same time, DBS providers like DIRECTV respond by 

offering free TiVo service (increasing their own Vn), offering free equipment (decreasing Cn) and offering free installation (decreasing SW). Terrestrial overbuilders 

respond by offering a combination of video, voice and broadband for a ‘‘triple play’’ 

service. These are the positive effects competition policy should encourage. 

At the same time, however, cable operators leverage their market power to reduce 

the value of new competitors, artificially suppressing Vn. Withholding regional 

sports network programming is one example of decreasing Vn. Another method is 

to raise costs to the competitor, artificially inflating Cn. For example, the cable owners of the iN Demand VoD service charge DBS four times as much for programming 

as they charge other incumbent cable systems. DBS can either not offer the service 

(reducing Vn) or offer the service and eat the additional cost (since they must keep 

Cn low to compensate for switching costs). 

Lack of Information and Uncertainty 

In addition to switching costs, lack of information and uncertainty will prevent 

a number of consumers from switching. A new user has no idea whether he or she 

will actually like a competitor better, or how much hassle is involved in switching. 

This uncertainty and lack of information will cause the consumer to devalue the 

competing network and exaggerate the switching costs. 9 The more ‘‘risk averse’’ the 

consumer, the more impact uncertainty and lack of information has on how the consumer assesses value and makes a choice. The most optimistic (or ‘‘risk indifferent’’) 

will assign the highest potential value to the new system and the lowest value to 

the switching costs. The most risk averse consumers will assign the minimum value 

to the competing network and the maximum value to the switching costs. Where 

folks fall on this scale determines when they switch from one system to another. 

Again, it is important to recognize that a cable operator does not need to keep 

every customer to maintain market power. It only needs to keep enough customers 

to maintain market power. In fact, a strategic thinking cable operator will want 

enough competition in the market to prevent an unavoidable appearance of monopoly and resultant regulation, but not enough to pose a competitive risk. 10 As long 

as cable operators can consolidate regionally and nationally to keep control of sufficient numbers of high value customers, slight changes in the overall national numbers for MVPDs won’t make much difference on real market power. 

The cable strategies of increasing their own value while diminishing the value of 

competitors thus complement each other synergistically. Although consumers can 

easily evaluate price, lack of information or experience makes it hard to judge other 

kinds of value. When DBS offered 200 channels and cable systems only offered 30, 

the value difference for DBS looked more impressive than if DBS offers 200 channels and cable offers 125 channels. 11 Again, it is important to stress that, as with 

62

12To keep things simple, I’m not going to talk about how local broadcasters and broadcasting 

networks like CBS enter the equation. The American Cable Association has recently (January 

30, 2006) released a study addressing this issue. For purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to 

note that the presence of broadcast networks and local broadcasters in the equation does not 

work to the advantage of cable competitors. 13This is an illegal practice alleged to be widespread in the cable industry. The cable industry 

denies it has market power to force such ‘‘equity concessions’’ as a ‘‘price’’ of carriage. 14 ‘‘Incremental value’’ means how much does this one change make a difference in overall 

value of the service. For some programming this may be very high, but for most, it is pretty 

low. 15This should also explain why Blockbuster, video iPods, and free TV are not competitors to 

cable, as sometimes argued. The value proposition between a system that provides hundreds of 

channels of news and entertainment on a dynamic 24/7 basis, as opposed to the value proposition of a service that merely rents movies and games (or stores them for future play), is so 

different that no consumer would ever consider them substitutes. Similarly, because free TV is 

offered as part of the cable package, its value is completely captured in the cable package. It 

does not ‘‘compete’’ in any usual sense of the word. Rather, it is a question of whether the added 

value is worth the cost. For the 10 percent of television homes that do not subscribe to cable 

or other pay service, the answer appears to be ‘‘no.’’

the ability to raise price, the switching cost provides a cushion on how much a cable 

operator must improve service. The cable operator does not have to make Vi=Vn. It 

is enough that Vi>=Vn¥SW. So 125 channels is ‘‘close enough,’’ especially when the 

uncertainty about the value of the new networks makes the customer assign it an 

artificially low value. (‘‘Is getting Current really worth switching to DIRECTV? Nah, 

it can’t be that good... ’’) 

Impact on Programming 12

The Switching Equation and information problems allow cable operators to control 

the access of independent programmers to the home. Cable operators claim that if 

they consistently favored programming for reasons other than quality, such as to 

force an independent to give the cable operator an ownership interest, 13 the cable 

operators would lose customers to competitors with better programming. But the incumbent doesn’t need the ‘‘best’’ programming because the incumbent doesn’t need 

to maximize the value of its network. The switching cost provides a cushion. As long 

as programming remains ‘‘good enough,’’ the switching cost will keep the subscriber 

from following the ‘‘better’’ programming to a competitor. 

New independent programmers also have a serious information problem that 

makes the threat that subscribers will ‘‘chase it’’ to a rival almost non-existent. Let’s 

say programming denied by the incumbent is absolutely wonderful. The incumbent 

viewer is never going to see it, because it is on the other system. Rival programming 

channels, oddly enough, are unlikely to take advertising to help viewers discover 

programming better than their own (unless, of course, the two networks are owned 

by a single owner, an increasingly common event). How is the incumbent viewer 

going to acquire an appreciation of the high value for the ‘‘superior’’ programming 

network if he or she never sees it? Given that the incremental value of anew network to any viewer is likely to be fairly low, 14 it is rather far fetched that the incumbent cable operator will seriously fear that denying carriage to independents 

will cost so many subscribers as to overcome the other economic advantages of favoring affiliated programming. Or, more bluntly, as long as the cable operator programming doesn’t stink so badly it actively drives viewers away. the cable operator 

can safely ignore new independents. 

Regional Sports Programming and ‘‘Marquee’’ Programming 

The argument that the incremental value of programming gives programmers no 

leverage is not universally true. Some programming is more ‘‘high value’’ than others. In general, local broadcast stations and some well established cable networks, 

like ESPN or CNN, are so valuable that any MVPD that wants to compete needs 

to have it. Such high value programming also raises the question of substitutability. 

If I can’t have a specific network, is another similar network an acceptable substitute for consumers? 

The answer is, sometimes ‘‘yes’’ and sometimes ‘‘no.’’ Some consumers will be 

happy with any 24/7 news channel. But someone who values the perspectives and 

opinions of FOX News will not readily accept the BBC World Report or CNN instead 

because they are both ‘‘news,’’ and certainly will not accept Comedy Central’s ‘‘Daily 

Show’’ as a substitute even though both are ‘‘video programing,’’ 15 In economic 

terms, the person that regards CNN and FOX News as equally acceptable regards 

them as close substitutes. The person that grudgingly accepts CNN over FOX News 

if he or she has no choice regards them as substitutes, but not close substitutes. 

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16See generally Wise & Duwadi (2005) (attempting to break out numerous factors with regard 

to competition in MVPD markets, including programming preferences). 17 A baseball team in Boston. They have a longstanding rivalry with the New York Yankees. 18 Basketball teams. 19 Both baseball teams. Like the Red Sox, the Cubs have a devoted following despite consistently losing. 20 A football team popular in Boston. 

Needless to say, not being able to get the programming you want on the competing 

system, even if it is a ‘‘substitute,’’ diminishes the value of the competing network. 16

Which gets us back to sports. Cable likes to argue that ESPN (which is owned 

by Disney, not a cable company) and things like NFL Sunday Ticket (a football 

package on DIRECTV) neutralize any advantage cable operators get from withholding regional sports networks or other local programming. After all, sports is 

sports, right? 

As a simple experiment, ask any Red Sox 17 fan if he or she thinks watching the 

Cleveland Cavaliers play the Los Angeles Lakers 18 is ‘‘the same’’ as watching the 

Red Sox play the Yankees because they are both ‘‘sports games.’’ Then ask if watching the Chicago Cubs play the St. Louis Cardinals 19 is ‘‘the same.’’ Ask if the Red 

Sox fan will give up watching Red Sox games in exchange for all the football he 

or she can watch, including the New England Patriots. 20

Any Red Sox fan reading this knows the answer. Watching generic ‘‘sports,’’ or 

even another baseball team with a romantic ‘‘curse’’ doesn’t cut it when the Red Sox 

are playing the Yankees. There are plenty of sports fans who like to watch ‘‘generic 

sports’’; that’s why ESPN is such a popular network. But just because someone likes 

to watch generic sports doesn’t make it a substitute for a local team. For many people, local sports and ‘‘generic sports’’ are not even substitutes, never mind close substitutes. 

Worse, the demand for popular local sports teams varies. I might only watch the 

Red Sox when they play the Yankees or when they make it to the playoffs. But 

when I want to watch them, I really want to watch them. If I have to give up watching local sports to switch, that looks like a huge loss of value to me, even if I only 

actually watch games not carried on broadcast television (and retransmitted on the 

competitor) a few times a year. Because many people appear to assign a huge value 

to this loss of unique programming, denial of regional sports programming seriously 

devalues the competing network despite the presence of other ‘‘generic’’ sports packages. 

Cable Replies 

Generally, cable operators argue that government regulation is ‘‘bad’’ and ‘‘picks 

winners.’’ By contrast, they maintain, deregulation creates ‘‘an open market’’ that 

is ‘‘competition driven.’’ Finally, cable operators they need ‘‘a level playing field’’ to 

compete ‘‘fairly’’ with would-be competitors. 

The ‘‘level playing field’’ is a myth. Cable did not achieve its current market 

share, and therefore its existing level of market power, by winning any ‘‘fair fights’’ 

in an ‘‘open, competitive market.’’ It got them because the government made cable 

a virtual monopoly in 1984 when it passed the first Cable Act. Congress tried to 

correct the damage in 1992, then changed the rules back to ‘‘fair’’ in 1996. As a result, any new entrant is already running uphill. If the government lets cable companies slap on a pair of leg-irons by refusing to regulate anti-competitive behavior, 

competition becomes impossible. 

The second argument cable operators make is that they invested lots of money 

in upgrading their systems, so they should be allowed to get a return on investment. 

I agree. But, like the rest of us, cable operators need to work for a living rather 

than just leverage their market power. If I buy a shotgun in the expectation I can 

rob my neighbors, I am not entitled to a ‘‘return on investment.’’ If I build a cable 

network in the expectation I can use it to deny regional programming to my competitors so I will be able to charge monopoly-level prices to my subscribers, I’m not 

entitled to a monopoly-level ‘‘return on investment.’’

Policy Recommendations 

Policy must address the market reality. A preference for competition over regulation may be a valid starting point for consideration, but where competition does not 

emerge, or can be predicted not to emerge, Congress and regulators must step in 

to take action. 

As a Nation, we depend on the widespread availability of affordable video distribution. The Supreme Court has said that ensuring to the people of the United 

States a video distribution system that provides needed news and diverse views to 

64

21Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1997). 

all Americans as ‘‘a government purpose of the highest order.’’ 21 If Congress intends 

to rely upon competition to ensure that the Nation’s video distribution systems are 

affordable and provide innovative and informative programming reflecting the diversity of our citizenry, then it must craft policies that genuinely promote competition 

in the MVPD market. 

This paper provides a suitable framework for addressing regulation to promote 

competition. In analyzing the existing MVPD market, policymakers should consider 

policies that make competition viable by limiting the power of incumbent cable operators to manipulate the value of a competitor’s offering, drive up the cost of a competitor’s offering, or increase the switching cost to a subscriber from a cable network 

to a rival network. These policies should include, at the least, limits on regional and 

national concentration by cable incumbents (reducing market power directly) and 

enhanced program access rules (extending existing rules beyond the February 2007 

deadline and including both terrestrially distributed programming (such as regional 

sports) and new ‘‘non-linear’’ programming services (such as video on demand). 

In making these assessments, Congress and the FCC should reject simplistic arguments about ‘‘deregulation’’ and ‘‘level playing fields.’’ Unless subscribers can 

switch from one service to another with reasonable ease, the expected benefits of 

competition—lower prices, innovation, and diverse high-quality programming—simply will not emerge. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN GOODMAN, PRESIDENT, COALITION FOR COMPETITIVE

ACCESS TO CONTENT (CA2C) 

The Coalition for Competitive Access to Content (CA2C) submits three documents 

as reference to its position regarding assured access to content for all current and 

future competitors regardless of the technology used or network ownership. 

The current program access rules have been successful and essential for the development of satellite (DBS) and other new competitors that resulted from the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The development of new and expanded competition is 

still a primary goal of Congress. However, the current rules have been outdated by 

massive technology changes and continuing structural changes within the industry. 

Despite these changes, assured access to content is still a necessary foundation for 

the development of distribution competition that will expand services and bring better choice to consumers. 

Since their inception in 1992, both the FCC and Congress have consistently endorsed the need for these rules. The FCC extended the current rules in 2002, and 

has also imposed conditions that assure program access as part of merger or acquisition proceedings. The FCC has also determined, however, that new legislation is 

needed for it to go beyond satellite delivered content that is also subject to vertical 

integration. In addition, the current program access rules are scheduled to sunset 

in 2007. 

The CA2C has developed specific policy proposals to address these program access 

issues. A copy of this proposed legislation is attached. The CA2C firmly believes that 

Congress should update the current rules as an essential part of telecom reform 

that is currently being pursued. The CA2C has reviewed these documents with both 

committee and member staff and look forward to our continuing discussions about 

this vital policy issue. 

Current members of the CA2C include: AT&T (formerly SBC), BellSouth, BPLIA, 

BSPA, EchoStar, ITTA, Media Access Project, OPASTCO, RCN, US Telecom, and 

Verizon. 

PRESERVE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO PROMOTE VIEWER CHOICE

Access to Video Content Is Necessary for Effective Competition 

The world of telecommunications is rapidly changing. The advent of cable brought 

new competition to the broadcast networks and new choices for the American viewing public. Digital Broadcast Satellite (DBS) did the same. Now, broadband is bringing more competition and more choices. At each stage, new competitors have depended on access to programming—without access to the content that subscribers 

want, competitive entry is foreclosed and the viewing public is left with fewer 

choices and higher prices. 

65

1 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–385, 

106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (1992 Cable Act). 

Congress Intended a Level Playing Field 

In 1992, Congress recognized that the cable industry could use its control over access to video programming to stifle competition. To prevent this, and to ensure a 

level playing field, Congress prohibited vertically-integrated cable companies—those 

that have ownership interests in programming networks—from refusing to make 

their content available to competitive multichannel video programming distributors 

(e.g. DBS and non-incumbent cable companies). As a technical matter, Congress tied 

this prohibition to how cable companies received cable programming at the time—

satellite feeds from video programmers to ‘‘head-ends’’ around the country. The legislative vehicle for this requirement was the Cable Act of 1992, in which Congress 

added Section 628 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 548). 

Technological Advances Have Opened a Loophole 

Today, satellite transmission is no longer the only method of transmitting programming to the head-end. Fiber-based terrestrial networks have become economical alternatives, particularly for regional sports and news programming controlled 

by regionally clustered cable operators. The current version of Section 628 did not 

foresee these developments, so vertically-integrated cable companies which distribute their programming terrestrially are not covered by the legislation. These 

cable companies have already demonstrated their willingness to make use of this 

loophole to freeze out competition—the industry vigorously fought reauthorization of 

Section 628 in its current form in 2002. 

Update Section 628, Close the Loophole, and Restore Congressional Intent 

Section 628 protection was key to the development of satellite-based competition 

like DIRECTV and EchoStar. It also supplied the necessary foundation for early 

broadband development, allowing [satellite- and ground-based] broadband service 

providers to offer bundles of voice, video, and high-speed data/Internet services directly to homes and small businesses across the country. Updating Section 628 to 

account for non-satellite methods of program distribution will close the loophole 

opened by advancing technology, restore Congressional intent, and preserve competition in the delivery of video services. 

COALITION FOR COMPETITIVE ACCESS TO CONTENT (CA2C) BACKGROUND AND

SUMMARY OVERVIEW

Coalition for Competitive Access to Content (CA2C) 

The CA2C has been organized as a very broad-based Ad Hoc Coalition to pursue 

legislation assuring fair access to content. The current members of the coalition include the AT&T (formerly SBC), BellSouth, BPLIA, BSPA, EchoStar, ITTA, Media 

Access Project, OPASTCO, RCN, US Telecom, and Verizon. Many other businesses 

and organizations are expected to join the CA2C in support of content access legislation. Other parties that have expressed support for content access legislation include 

ACA, Consumers Union, and NATOA. The support for content access legislation is 

expected to include all the major parties that lobbied to extend the sunset of the 

current program access rules in 2002, and others who have developed an interest 

in the issue since that time. 

The CA2C believes that assured fair access to content is one of the most vital 

strategic policy issues that must be addressed in new telecom legislation. New competing networks must have fair access to the content their potential subscribers 

want or they will fail. The vertical integration of major MSOs into content ownership continues to expand and the ability to use this vertical integration to foreclose 

access to content stands as a growing and unique threat to the success of competitive entry. The current legislation related to content access has been historically effective but the existing language has narrow application to satellite delivered content that does not relate to today’s new technology and the current rules are scheduled to sunset. The CA2C believes that new legislation is needed to address program access issues regardless of which distribution technology is used by competing 

networks. 

Legislative Background 

In 1992, Congress recognized that the cable industry could use its control over access to video programming to stifle competition and it enacted as part of the 1992 

Cable Act 1 the statutory prohibition on exclusive cable distribution of vertically inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:21 Sep 07, 2006 Jkt 029574 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\29574.TXT JACKF PsN: JACKF
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2 47 U.S.C. § 548. 

3 1992 Cable Act, at § 2(a)(5).

4 Examination of Cable Rates: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Comm., 105th Cong. (July 28, 1998) (statement of Rep. Billy Tauzin) (emphasis added). 5See 138 Cong. Rec. H6540 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (Rep. Eckart) (cable operators ‘‘know that 

if they maintain their stranglehold on this programming, they can shut down competition—even 

the deep pockets of the telephone companies for a decade or more.’’); 138 Cong. Rec. H6533–

34 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (‘‘[My] amendment, very simply put, requires the cable monopoly to stop refusing to deal, to stop refusing to sell its products to other 

distributors of television programs. In effect, this bill says to the cable industry, ‘You have to 

stop what you have been doing, and that is killing off your competition by denying it 

products’... Programming is the key... Without programming, competitors of cable are . . . stymied... What does it mean? It means that cable is jacking the price up on its 

competitors so high that they can never get off the ground. In some cases they deny programs 

completely to those competitors to make sure they cannot sell a full package of services. So the 

hot shows are controlled by cable . . . It is this simple. There are only five big cable integrated 

companies that control it all. My amendment says to those big five, ‘You cannot refuse to deal 

anymore.’ ’’) (emphasis added). 6 47 U.S.C. § 548(b).

7 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 102–862, at 93 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231, 1275. 8 Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 

Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution: Section 628(c)(5) 

of the Communications Act, Sunset of the Exclusive Contract Prohibition, Report and Order, 17 

FCC Rcd 12124 (2002) (‘‘Program Exclusivity Prohibition Extension Order’’). 9 Id. at 12138. 

tegrated programming and other discriminatory conduct involving access to programming—Section 628 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. 2 In doing 

so, Congress recognized that ‘‘vertically integrated program suppliers have the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated cable operators over other multichannel 

programming distributors using other technologies.’’ 3 Representative Billy Tauzin, 

one of the principal architects of the 1992 Cable Act has recalled that, in 1992: 

[Congress] awakened to the sad realization that we had forgot one crucial element, and that was cable controlled programming. And that controlling programming was a way of making sure that there would be no competitors. If a 

competitor couldn’t get the programming, it certainly wasn’t going to launch the 

[system]. 4

Through Section 628, Congress sought to break the cable industry’s unique leverage over programming, which had historically been exercised through exclusivity arrangements and other market power abuses exercised by cable operators and their 

affiliated programming suppliers. These anticompetitive practices denied programming to competitive technologies, or made programming available on discriminatory 

terms and conditions. 5 Section 628 contains the general provision that: 

It shall be unlawful for a cable operator, a satellite cable programming vendor 

in which a cable operator has an attributable interest, or a satellite broadcast 

programming vendor to engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices, the purpose or effect of which is to hinder significantly or to prevent any multichannel video programming distributor from providing satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers. 6

Congress, through Section 628, also directed the FCC to adopt rules to ‘‘address 

and resolve the problems of unreasonable cable industry practices, including restricting the availability of programming and charging discriminatory prices to noncable technologies’’ and provided further specific guidance. 7 Section 628(b)(2) requires such rules to prohibit, among other things, discriminatory treatment by programmers in which a cable operator has an attributable interest between such cable 

operator and unaffiliated competitors. Section 628(b)(2)(D) specifically required the 

FCC to prohibit exclusive contracts between cable operators and cable programmers 

in which such operators have an attributable interest. 

The current 628 rules were scheduled to sunset in 2002. Many members of the 

CA2C successfully lobbied for extension of the current rules. The FCC concluded on 

June 28, 2002, in the Program Exclusivity Prohibition Extension Order, that the prohibition on program exclusivity should be extended for at least another five years. 8

In that order, the FCC found that ‘‘access to vertically integrated programming continues to be necessary in order for [competitive] MVPDs [multichannel video programming distributors] to remain viable in the marketplace’’ 9 and that [f]ailure to 

secure even a portion of vertically integrated programming would put a nonaffiliated 

cable operator or competitive MVPD at a significant disadvantage vis-a-vis a comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:21 Sep 07, 2006 Jkt 029574 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\29574.TXT JACKF PsN: JACKF
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10 Id. 11 Id. at 12125. 12 Id. at 12139. 

petitor with access to such programming.’’ 10 The FCC also observed that ‘‘vertically 

integrated programmers generally retain the incentive and ability to favor their 

cable affiliates over nonaffiliated cable operators and other competitive MVPDs to 

such a degree that, in the absence of the prohibition [on exclusive contracts with 

affiliates], competition and diversity in the distribution of video programming would 

not be preserved and protected.’’ 11 Further, the FCC found, ‘‘[d]espite the progress 

that has been made in the 10 years since the enactment of the 1992 Act, a considerable amount of vertically integrated programming in the marketplace today remains 

‘‘must-have’’ programming to most MVPD subscribers,’’ and that ‘‘if [competitive 

MVPDs] were to be deprived of only some of this ‘‘must-have’’ programming, their 

ability to retain subscribers would be jeopardized.’’ 12

Section 628 protection was essential for the development of Satellite based competition and it was a necessary foundation for the early development of BSPs and 

other new competition. However, new technology has no protection under the limited and specific language of the existing statute as it specifically applies to satellite 

delivered content. Terrestrial distribution has emerged as a preferred and pervasive 

alternative to satellite based distribution. Local sports and news content that is not 

delivered by satellite has grown in importance. Section 628 also has no application 

to any form of IP technologies used to deliver video or other content to PCs, TVs 

or other end use appliances. The CA2C members believe that the same basic market 

conditions that existed in 1992 exist today but they relate to a broader range of competing technologies and a stronger market position of vertical integration and likely 

abuse if allowed. 

SECTION 628 [47 U.S.C. SECTION 548]. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION AND

DIVERSITY IN VIDEO PROGRAMMING DISTRIBUTION

(a) Purpose.—The purpose of this section is to promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity by increasing competition and diversity in the multichannel 

video programming market, to increase the availability of MVPD programming and 

satellite broadcast programming to persons in rural and other areas not currently 

able to receive such programming, and to spur the development of communications 

technologies. 

(b) Prohibition.—It shall be unlawful for an MVPD, an MVPD programming 

vendor in which an MVPD has an attributable interest, or a satellite broadcast programming vendor to engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive 

acts or practices, the purpose or effect of which is to hinder significantly or to prevent any MVPD from providing MVPD programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers. 

(c) Regulations required.—

(1) Proceeding required.—Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this 

section, the Commission shall, in order to promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity by increasing competition and diversity in the multichannel 

video programming market and the continuing development of communications 

technologies, prescribe regulations to specify particular conduct that is prohibited by subsection (b).

(2) Minimum contents of regulations.—The regulations to be promulgated under 

this section shall—

(A) establish effective safeguards to prevent an MVPD which has an attributable interest in an MVPD programming vendor or a satellite broadcast 

programming vendor from unduly or improperly influencing the decision of 

such vendor to sell, or the prices, terms, and conditions of sale of, MVPD 

programming or satellite broadcast programming to any unaffiliated 

MVPD;

(B) prohibit discrimination by an MVPD programming vendor in which an 

MVPD has an attributable interest or by a satellite broadcast programming vendor in the prices, terms, and conditions of sale or delivery of 

MVPD programming or satellite broadcast programming among or between cable systems, cable operators, or other MVPDs, or their agents or 

buying groups; except that such an MVPD programming vendor in which 

an MVPD has an attributable interest or such a satellite broadcast programming vendor shall not be prohibited from—

68

(i) imposing reasonable requirements for creditworthiness, offering of service, and financial stability and standards regarding character and technical quality;

(ii) establishing different prices, terms, and conditions to take into account 

actual and reasonable differences in the cost of creation, sale, delivery, 

or transmission of MVPD programming or satellite broadcast programming;

(iii) establishing different prices, terms, and conditions which take into account economies of scale, cost savings, or other direct and legitimate economic benefits reasonably attributable to the number of subscribers 

served by the distributor; or

(iv) entering into an exclusive contract that is permitted under subparagraph (D);

(C) prohibit practices, understandings, arrangements, and activities, including 

exclusive contracts for MVPD programming or satellite broadcast programming between an MVPD and an MVPD programming vendor or satellite 

broadcast programming vendor, that prevent an MVPD from obtaining 

such programming from any MVPD programming vendor in which an 

MVPD has an attributable interest or any satellite broadcast programming 

vendor in which an MVPD has an attributable interest for distribution to 

persons in areas not served by an MVPD as of the date of enactment of 

this section; and

(D) with respect to distribution to persons in areas served by an MVPD, prohibit exclusive contracts for MVPD programming or satellite broadcast programming between an MVPD and an MVPD programming vendor in 

which an MVPD has an attributable interest or a satellite broadcast programming vendor in which an MVPD has an attributable interest, unless 

the Commission determines (in accordance with paragraph (4)) that such 

contract is in the public interest.

(3) Limitations.—

(A) Geographic limitations.—Nothing in this section shall require any person 

who is engaged in the national or regional distribution of video programming to make such programming available in any geographic area beyond 

which such programming has been authorized or licensed for distribution.

(B) Applicability to satellite retransmissions.—Nothing in this section shall 

apply (i) to the signal of any broadcast affiliate of a national television network or other television signal that is retransmitted by satellite but that 

is not satellite broadcast programming, or (ii) to any internal satellite communication of any broadcast network or cable network that is not satellite 

broadcast programming.

(C) Exclusion of Individual Video Programs. Nothing in this section shall 

apply to a specific individual video program produced by an MVPD for 

local distribution by that MVPD and not made available directly or indirectly to unaffiliated MVPDs, provided that: (i) all other video programming carried on a programming channel or network on which the individual video program is carried, is made available to unaffiliated MVPDs 

pursuant to subsection (c)(2)(D), and (ii) such specific individual video program is not the transmission of a sporting event.

(D) MVPD sports programming. The prohibition set forth in Section 

628(c)(2)(D), and the Commission’s rules adopted pursuant to that section, 

shall apply to any MVPD programming that includes the transmission of 

live sporting events, irrespective of whether an MVPD has an attributable 

interest in the MVPD programming vendor engaged in the production, creation, or wholesale distribution of such MVPD programming.

(4) Public interest determinations on exclusive contracts.—In determining 

whether an exclusive contract is in the public interest for purposes of paragraph 

(2)(D), the Commission shall consider each of the following factors with respect 

to the effect of such contract on the distribution of video programming in areas 

that are served by an MVPD;

(A) the effect of such exclusive contract on the development of competition in 

local and national multichannel video programming distribution markets;

(B) the effect of such exclusive contract on competition from multichannel 

video programming distribution technologies other than cable;

69

(C) the effect of such exclusive contract on the attraction of capital investment 

in the production and distribution of new MVPD programming;

(D) the effect of such exclusive contract on diversity of programming in the 

multichannel video programming distribution market; and

(E) the duration of the exclusive contract.

(5) Sunset provision.—The prohibition required by paragraph (2)(D) shall cease 

to be effective 10 years after the date of enactment of this section, unless the 

Commission finds, in a proceeding conducted during the last year of such 10-

year period, that such prohibition continues to be necessary to preserve and protect competition and diversity in the distribution of video programming.

(d) Adjudicatory proceeding.—Any MVPD aggrieved by conduct that it alleges 

constitutes a violation of subsection (b), or the regulations of the Commission under 

subsection (c), may commence an adjudicatory proceeding at the Commission. The 

Commission shall request from a party, and the party shall produce, such agreements between the party and a third party relating to the distribution of MVPD 

programming that the Commission believes to be relevant to its decision regarding 

the matters at issue in such adjudicatory proceeding. The production of any such 

agreement and its use in a Commission decision in the adjudicatory proceeding shall 

be subject to such provisions ensuring confidentiality as the Commission may by 

regulation determine.

(e) Remedies for violations.—

(1) Remedies authorized.—Upon completion of such adjudicatory proceeding, the 

Commission shall have the power to order appropriate remedies, including, if 

necessary, the power to establish prices, terms, and conditions of sale of programming to the aggrieved MVPD.

(2) Additional remedies.—The remedies provided in paragraph (1) are in addition to and not in lieu of the remedies available under Title V or any other provision of this Act.

(f) Procedures.—The Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement this 

section. The Commission’s regulations shall—

(1) provide for an expedited review of any complaints made pursuant to this section, including the issuance of a final order terminating such review within 120 

days after the date on which the complaint was filed;

(2) establish procedures for the Commission to collect such data, including the 

right to obtain copies of all contracts and documents reflecting arrangements 

and understandings alleged to violate this section, as the Commission requires 

to carry out this section; and

(3) provide for penalties to be assessed against any person filing a frivolous 

complaint pursuant to this section.

(g) Reports.—The Commission shall, beginning not later than 18 months after 

promulgation of the regulations required by subsection (c), annually report to Congress on the status of competition in the market for the delivery of video programming.

(h) Exemptions for prior contracts.—

(1) In general.—Nothing in this section shall affect any contract that grants exclusive distribution rights to any person with respect to satellite cable programming and that was entered into on or before June 1, 1990 or any contract that 

grants exclusive distribution rights to any person with respect to MVPD programming that is not satellite cable programming and that was entered into on 

or before July 1, 2003, except that the provisions of subsection (c)(2)(C) shall 

apply for distribution to persons in areas not served by an MVPD.

(2) Limitation on renewals.—A contract pertaining to satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming that was entered into on or before 

June 1, 1990, but that is renewed or extended after the date of enactment of 

this section shall not be exempt under paragraph (1). A contract pertaining to 

MVPD programming that is not satellite cable programming that was entered 

into on or before July 1, 2003, but that is renewed or extended after the date 

of enactment of this provision shall not be exempt under paragraph (1).

(i) Definitions.—As used in this section:

70

(1) The term ‘‘satellite cable programming’’ has the meaning provided under 

Section 705 of this Act, except that such term does not include satellite broadcast programming.

(2) The term ‘‘satellite cable programming vendor’’ means a person engaged in 

the production, creation, or wholesale distribution for sale of satellite cable programming, but does not include a satellite broadcast programming vendor.

(3) The term ‘‘satellite broadcast programming’’ means broadcast video programming when such programming is retransmitted by satellite and the entity retransmitting such programming is not the broadcaster or an entity performing 

such retransmission on behalf of and with the specific consent of the broadcaster.

(4) The term ‘‘satellite broadcast programming vendor’’ means a fixed service 

satellite carrier that provides service pursuant to Section 119 of Title 17, United 

States Code, with respect to satellite broadcast programming.

(5) The term ‘‘MVPD programming’’ means:

(A) Video programming primarily intended for the direct receipt by MVPDs 

for their retransmission to MVPD subscribers (including any ancillary data 

transmission); and

(B) Additional types of programming content that the Commission determines 

in a rulemaking proceeding to be completed within 120 days from enactment of this provision is, as of the time of such rulemaking, of a type that 

is primarily intended for the direct receipt by MVPDs for their retransmission to MVPD subscribers, regardless of whether such programming 

content is digital or analog, compressed or uncompressed, encrypted or 

unencrypted, provided on a serial, pay-per-view, or on demand basis, and 

without regard to the end-user device used to access such programming or 

the mode of delivery of such programming content to MVPDs; provided 

that in evaluating the additional types of programming content to be included within this definition, the Commission shall consider the effect of 

technologies and services that combine different forms of content so that 

certain content or programming is not included within the foregoing definition solely because it is integrated with other content that is of a type that 

is primarily intended for the direct receipt by MVPDs for their retransmission to MVPD subscribers.

(C) Any interested MVPD or MVPD programming vendor may petition the 

Commission to modify the additional types of programming content included by the Commission within the definition of MVPD programming in 

light of the purpose of this section, market conditions at the time of such 

petition, and the factors to be considered by the Commission under subsection (i)(5)(B).

(6) The term ‘‘MVPD programming vendor’’ means a person engaged in the production, creation, or wholesale distribution for sale of MVPD programming, but 

does not include a satellite broadcast programming vendor.

(7) The term ‘‘MVPD’’ shall mean multichannel video programming distributor.

(j) Common Carriers.—Any provision that applies to an MVPD under this section shall apply to a common carrier or its affiliate that provides video programming 

by any means directly to subscribers. Any such provision that applies to an MVPD 

programming vendor in which an MVPD has an attributable interest shall apply to 

any MVPD programming vendor in which such common carrier has an attributable 

interest. For the purposes of this subsection, two or fewer common officers or directors shall not by itself establish an attributable interest by a common carrier in an 

MVPD programming vendor (or its parent company).

[Uncodified provision: Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this provision, the Commission shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to implement the amendments to this section made by such Act.] 

DAKOTA CENTRAL COMMUNICATIONS

January 30, 2006

Hon. TED STEVENS, 

Chairman,

Hon. DANIEL K. INOUYE, 

Co-Chairman,

71

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC.

Dear Senators Stevens and Inouye:

I am the General Manager of Dakota Central Telecommunications Cooperative located in Carrington, North Dakota. I would like to submit a few comments in regard 

to the hearing you are holding January 31, 2006 concerning video content. In addition, I would like to thank Senator Dorgan for his assistance in allowing us to submit these comments as well as thank Senators Stevens and Inouye for the opportunity. 

Dakota Central is a small progressive cooperative that provides telephone, highspeed broadband and video services to its customers through a number of transmission mediums including copper, fiber and wireless technologies. As a result of 

the RUS Broadband Loan Program, Dakota Central was able to construct, over the 

past two years, a Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) network in a nearby community that 

was lacking in broadband access. 

Since the FTTH technology has very large bandwidth capabilities, we were also 

able to provide video over the network and incorporated this service into our business plan. Although the FTTH technology incorporates video rather seamlessly, 

there have been many obstacles to overcome unrelated to the technology utilized. 

In our situation, most of the issues revolve either around the cost or the ability 

to acquire the video programming content. The cost of the video content is the largest single expense we incur to provide video service. It consumes in excess of 55 percent of the retail amount we charge for the service. In 2006, our video programming 

costs overall are increasing over 9 percent from the previous year with some of the 

content providers raising their individual rates 20 percent. These large rates increases are not just a one time occurrence but have been occurring annually for a 

number of years throughout the marketplace. These huge increases seem to be excessive when inflation has been running less than 3 percent during these same periods. 

As a small video provider, we have very little leverage to obtain lower rates and 

believe the large incumbent cable operators receive significant discounts from the 

rates we are charged. To make matters worse, many of the video content providers 

offer suites of channels and in order to obtain their best rates, it is necessary to 

subscribe to channels that our customers may have no desire to view. Ultimately, 

the end user customer ends up paying more as a result of the tying arrangements. 

As a result of deploying a FTTH network, we are able to offer a multitude of channels to our customers without exhausting our bandwidth availability. However, this 

is not the case with many small providers that utilize other technologies. They are 

not able to carry hundreds of video channels. Consequently, they pay higher rates 

because they are not able to offer the content provider’s full suite of channels to obtain the best pricing. 

In addition to the cost increases we incur from the national content providers, we 

are now being asked to pay retransmission fees from the local affiliates. With the 

expiration of our local retransmission agreements at the end of 2005, some of the 

affiliates have requested per subscriber transmission fees be paid going forward. 

Exclusive video content contracts with incumbent cable providers are an additional frustration when entering the video marketplace. At this time, we have been 

unsuccessful in obtaining sporting event content from a local content provider as the 

result of an exclusive agreement with the incumbent. In this particular instance, it 

is the end user consumer that loses as the customer who migrates from the incumbents service has to be satisfied without the content he was accustomed to. 

An additional issue we have been battling relates to video transport. Since the 

beginning of 2005, we have been seeking authorization from the content providers 

to transport the video content we receive at our digital headend to adjacent telephone companies entering the video business. The sharing of a digital headend facility provides economies of scale that they would not achieve by constructing their 

own headend. Sharing equipment and staffing requirements would decrease their 

costs significantly to enter the video business. However, this has been a difficult 

process with a number of the content providers. Even though the closed transport 

network is secure and encryption technologies would be deployed, many of the content providers have been reluctant to provide authorization. 

Based on our experience, I am hopeful the Committee will consider the following 

in order that small video providers, such as we, are able to enter to the video marketplace and provide affordable video service to our telephone and broadband customers in rural America:

• Excessive increases in video programming must be curtailed. 

72

• Program rates and terms should be non-discriminatory. 

• Exclusive programming contracts must be prohibited. 

• Shared head-ends must be allowed.

It seems the burden of passing along the continued excessive video programming 

costs has been placed on the end-user video providers. To our detriment, the public 

views the increases as being created by the video providers and not the content providers who are at the root of the problem. The content providers escape the negative 

publicity of the rate increases as a result of their insulation from the public. We 

are hopeful that this information sheds light on some of the unique problems faced 

by a rural telecommunications carrier trying to enter the video market. We also 

hope that these issues will be discussed and addressed as the Committee looks to 

update our communications laws. 

I respectfully request that this letter be submitted as part of the official hearing 

record. Thank you for your consideration and please feel free to contact me with any 

questions you may have. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH A. LARSON, 

General Manager. 

THE SPORTSMAN CHANNEL

January 31, 2006

Hon. TED STEVENS, 

Chairman,

Hon. DANIEL K. INOUYE, 

Co-Chairman,

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye, and Members of the Committee:

I was asked to comment on one of the issues up for discussion during the video 

content hearing on January 31, 2006. Among the points that are likely to be raised 

is the question: Can a cable network be viable without securing a carriage agreement with Comcast? I write you today to let you know that the answer to that question is an emphatic, ‘‘Yes!’’

The Sportsman Channel is living proof that start-up networks can survive and be 

successful without carriage on Comcast’s cable systems. While other start-up networks have tended to rely on the fiction that obtaining a carriage agreement with 

Comcast is a prerequisite to getting carriage contracts with other multichannel 

video providers, we have taken a different approach: Provide a superior quality 

channel that attracts subscribers, and charge affiliates lower subscriber fees while 

providing quality customer service and first-class marketing tactics. 

We also took the strategy of setting a launch date for The Sportsman Channel 

and keeping to it, even when we did not have a single carriage agreement signed 

by that date. It did not take long after our launch for us to secure our first carriage 

contract, and soon others followed. We successfully aired our network for over two 

and a half years before just recently convincing Comcast to sign a carriage agreement, the last large cable operator to sign. 

For your convenience, I have attached an article I wrote last October that provides more information about The Sportsman Channel and how we successfully 

launched our network with quality programming, a solid business plan, and an experienced management team, but without Comcast. I hope you have an opportunity 

to see our programming some day so that you too understand why quality programming is the key to any successful network, and why we have been successful by taking the approach of: ‘‘If you can prove yourself, they will come.’’

Very truly yours, 

73

* C. Michael Cooley is president and CEO of The Sportsman Channel. 

C. MICHAEL COOLEY, 

President and Chief Executive Officer. 

ATTACHMENT

Multichannel News, Volume 26 No. 41, October 3, 2005

HOW I STARTED A NETWORK WITHOUT COMCAST

by C. Michael Cooley * 

It has been said of late that if a network doesn’t secure Comcast Corp., the Nation’s largest MSO, then it will have a tough time even getting a foot in the door 

to start talks with the remaining cable providers. 

Perhaps these folks haven’t considered The Sportsman Channel (TSC) and how 

we had already secured the remaining cable operators: Time Warner Cable, Charter 

Communications Inc., Adelphia Communications Corp., Cox Communications Inc. 

and 14 other of the top 25 MSOs, all without the security or assistance of having 

Comcast. We are living proof that channels can survive without Comcast, contrary 

to the belief of many. TSC has been around for over two years and our channel, 

which is dedicated exclusively to hunting and fishing programming, is not just surviving, but flourishing. 

Other start-up networks tend to have the approach of ‘‘If you have Comcast, they 

will come.’’ Securing carriage is the key, but there is a formula: Provide a superior 

quality channel with lower subscriber fees that draws subscribers. Our team focuses 

on quality customer service and first-class marketing tactics to our affiliates, for an 

‘‘If you can prove yourself, they will come’’ approach. 

Another successful method for an independent channel employed at TSC was setting the launch date and keeping it. 

The date never moved, even though we didn’t have any agreements signed when 

the champagne popped on April 7. Our team approached the launch with 100 percent confidence in our product. 

It certainly didn’t take long after we drank the champagne for us to secure our 

first contracts with the National Cable Television Cooperative. This gained the attention of MSOs in the top 10—and eventually deals were struck in 2004. 

We just recently completed our agreement with Comcast, which makes them the 

last of the top five MSOs to come on board, not the first. This proves that we didn’t 

need a deal with them to validate our channel or secure distribution with other 

MSOs. 

Some pessimists believe Comcast only launches channels if it is financially involved. TSC is an independent, and Comcast is, after all, still a business. It will 

launch channels that it believes will keep it competitive and increase subscriber 

counts. 

No one knows better than me that starting a new channel in this market is a 

daunting and difficult task. But it can be done, and I am not sure if holding 

Comcast responsible is entirely the reason for the high level of complexity we experience as channel presidents. 

That’s especially true since there are 70 million other cable subscribers, plus another 25 million DBS subscribers out there. 

Just because you are unable to be first to reel in a big fish doesn’t mean the ocean 

won’t provide you with a worthy catch. 

CASTALIA COMMUNICATIONS

February 2, 2006

Hon. TED STEVENS, 

Chairman,

Hon. DANIEL K. INOUYE, 

Co-Chairman,

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

RE: SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE JANUARY 31 HEARING ON VIDEO CONTENT

Dear Senators Stevens and Inouye,

As the president of Castalia Communications, a company that was created 16 

years ago as an independent distributor and producer of cable/satellite television 

74

channels, I have had the pleasure of launching a variety of ethnic-based and general 

entertainment channels in the U.S. and around the world. More recently, these 

channel offerings have included services targeting the Mexican television viewer as 

well as audiences interested in the cultures and programming of Japan, China, Russia and Brazil, among theirs. 

Recently, Castalia Communications has begun to work in collaboration with 

Comcast Corporation to reach American audiences with such channels as TV Globo 

Internacional from Brazil, Once Mexico, Mexico 22 and CBTV. In addition to these 

four channels, we are also exploring other opportunities to launch additional networks on Comcast systems. Overall, our experience with Comcast has been a positive one. Comcast has been very cooperative in giving us the opportunity to launch 

distinctive multicultural channels in the U.S. marketplace. 

We believe that if you study and understand a marketplace, you can create and 

find opportunities. This is the approach that we have used in our effort to launch 

the aforementioned channels on Comcast systems. We did our homework, we shaped 

the concepts of our channel offerings to suit the needs of the audience and the marketplace, and we were able to make our channels attractive and valuable not only 

to Comcast, but also to other distribution companies like DIRECTV Charter and 

EchoStar’s DISH Network. 

Suffice it to say, we have found that there are not barriers to working with the 

largest video distributors if you deliver quality. If you have programming that has 

value to audiences, Comcast, like every other large and small distributor, will buy 

it or help you to get it to the consumer. But if your programming is not in demand 

or has no relevance to the viewer, or you don’t have a business plan that makes 

sense to the cable and satellite competitors, then you will not find your role in the 

marketplace. That’s the beauty of our democratic commercial system—the marketplace decides. 

At the same time, there are numerous technical changes afoot in the entertainment business which open the door to a variety of delivery systems, of which 

Comcast is only one. If your channel concept isn’t suited to Comcast’s business 

model or distribution strategy, there are many other delivery systems available to 

reach the intended viewer. 

First, there are a plethora of other multichannel system cable operators throughout the U.S. Second, there are satellite distribution networks like DIRECTV and 

EchoStar’s DISH Network. And with the advent of broadband, online and wireless 

applications, you can now deliver your programming direct to the consumer via 

Internet service providers like Google Video and Yahoo!, as well as via video on demand offerings available through iTunes and every wireless phone company. All of 

them are eager to make content distribution deals for almost any programming 

imaginable. 

These technology innovations have made it possible for anyone who has a compelling concept to break into the production and distribution business in the U.S. and 

have a shot at the big brass ring. 

I understand that a witness has appeared before your Committee this week demanding that the government direct Comcast to carry their services. We think that 

would be wrong. It is utterly inappropriate for the government to skew the marketplace by involving itself in determining what programming people will see and in 

what form or package that programming will be delivered. That is offensive to 

American values. 

In our experience, Comcast is a forward-looking company that makes programming decision in its customers’ best interests, and is open to working with independent programmers with viable ideas, sound business plans and a win/win attitude. 

Castalia Communication continues to operate as a successful independent company. Our dealings with Comcast have also been positive and mutually beneficial. 

This is why we oppose the efforts of those who would have the government making 

the programming decisions for Comcast or any other distributor in this marketplace. 

Sincerely, 

LUIS TORRES-BOHL, 

President. 

NTCA 

January 30, 2006

Hon. TED STEVENS, 

Chairman,

Hon. DANIEL K. INOUYE, 

75

Co-Chairman,

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC.

Dear Senators Stevens and Inouye:

I am writing as the representative of over 560 rural, community-based telecommunications providers regarding the important hearing you are holding on January 31, 2006 on video content. 

Due to the fact that no rural community-based traditional telecommunications 

provider was invited to testify, I thought providing the perspective of this industry 

would be invaluable to the Committee as it explores the issues surrounding content 

and access to content. 

In addition to the basic and advanced telecommunications services all NTCA 

members offer to their customers, the vast majority also currently offer or are planning to offer video services. Our members offer video services to their subscribers 

utilizing various methods including traditional CATV coaxial, fiber cable, or Direct 

Broadcast Satellite (DBS). However, more and more of NTCA’s members are utilizing the so-called Telco-TV model, providing video service via alternative 

broadband infrastructures and technologies, such as Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) 

over copper facilities. 

Traditional telco entry into the video market is an exciting prospect for rural 

Americans. NTCA member companies serve the most rural segments of this country, 

where the cost and difficulty of providing service is the greatest. In many areas, 

NTCA member companies are the only providers of video service to these customers. 

For other areas, the NTCA member company is a new competitor. Our members are 

doing their best to ensure their communities have access to the most advanced communications services there are. 

Small video providers, however, face many obstacles when trying to obtain video 

programming from content providers and attempting to enter new markets. Unreasonable rates, exclusive dealing arrangements, abuse of market power through nondisclosure agreements, tying practices, predatory pricing, shared head-end reservations, and prohibitions on Internet protocol (IP) and analog transport are some of 

the barriers faced by small video providers. In addition, small providers lack the leverage necessary to negotiate a better rate from the video programmers, forcing consumers in rural America to pay a premium for video service. 

I have outlined for your consideration the barriers faced by rural providers below. 

It is my hope that your committee will review these barriers and take into account 

these situations in any legislative remedies the committee may be considering.

• Non-disclosure agreements must be prohibited. Virtually all of the contracts negotiated between content providers and large MSOs include non-disclosure 

agreements. By restricting the flow of information, the content providers make 

it virtually impossible to establish any semblance of ‘‘market rates.’’ Consequently, smaller carriers must enter into their negotiations at a significant 

disadvantage, as they possess far less information than the party with whom 

they are negotiating.

• Automatic escalation clauses must be reasonable. Contracts for programming 

typically contain automatic escalation clauses forcing prices up by a certain percentage each year. Small video service providers lack the leverage necessary to 

negotiate a better rate from the video programmers, forcing rural Americans to 

pay a premium for video service.

• Tying arrangements must be prohibited. Many networks require a carrier to 

take additional networks, as many as 12, in order to have access to a flagship 

network. The end result is that the small carrier must pay a higher price in 

order to ensure access to the desired flagship network. This problem is much 

more dramatic for a small carrier with limited capital resources than for a large 

MSO that can afford to pay for the extra networks.

• Program rates and terms should be non-discriminatory.

• Predatory pricing by large incumbent cable operators must be prohibited. As new 

providers enter the market, the large incumbent cable operator may drop its 

price for service way below the cost in the areas where it faces competition, 

making it impossible for the new entrant to gain a foothold. The incumbent 

cable operator is able to afford this practice by increasing the price for service 

in areas where there are no competitors.

• Exclusive programming arrangements must be prohibited. Some incumbent 

cable operators use their market power to make it difficult for competitors to 

obtain programming. The incumbents know that without access to certain proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:21 Sep 07, 2006 Jkt 029574 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\29574.TXT JACKF PsN: JACKF
76

gramming, competitors cannot make their service attractive to subscribers. Certain large cable incumbents are known to have entered into exclusive programming arrangements. Contracts are written in such a way as to bar new entrants 

from access to local or regional sports or news programming. Local subscribers 

expect programming and are unlikely to switch to a new provider that is unable 

to provide it.

• IP-transport must be allowed. New small Telco–TV/IP–TV providers are facing 

discriminatory practices concerning their ability to get into the video services 

marketplace and gain access to video content because some content providers 

prohibit their video content from being distributed through DSL or the Internet. 

They claim that IP-transport prohibition is required to prevent the piracy of 

their content on the Internet. This concern however, is easily addressed through 

today’s encoding and encryption capabilities that enable IP-transport to be more 

secure than traditional cable transport.

• Shared head-ends must be allowed. Many small video companies have created 

an opportunity to provide video services to their communities by pooling their 

resources and jointly purchasing a head-end or leasing a head-end from another 

head-end owner. Sharing a head-end with several small companies substantially 

reduces initial investment and allows small video providers the opportunity to 

give consumers an affordable video services offering. Without the shared headend option, many rural consumers would not have video service or would be 

limited to direct broadcast satellite service (DBS) without any other competitive 

offering.

• Encryption must not be mandatory for traditional CATV providers. Some content providers are insisting that small analog cable TV providers upgrade their 

systems to support encryption. Many small rural video providers do not have 

the economies of scale and scope to incur the cost of providing encryption on 

their networks. Mandatory encryption would result in such a substantial increase in rates to consumers that it would effectively put the small company 

out of the video business and leave the residents in the community with possibly only one option for video services—DBS.

I respectfully request that this letter be made a part of the official permanent 

hearing record. Thank you for your time and consideration. 

Sincerely, 

MICHAEL E. BRUNNER, 

Chief Executive Officer.

Æ