J-S01007-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ROOSEVELT-BENTMAN TRUST FOR 

AMERICAN VOTERS INTER VIVOS 

TRUST

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: HONORABLE PETER J. 

WIRS, TRUSTEE OF THE INTER VIVOS

TRUST

:

:

: No. 796 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered February 4, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Orphans' Court Division, No(s): Control No. 97-141397 

No. 608 IV of 2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 29, 2016

Peter J. Wirs (“Wirs”), as Trustee of the Roosevelt-Bentman Trust for 

American Voters Inter Vivos Trust (“the Trust”), appeals from the Order 

dismissing, with prejudice, the Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award (“the 

Petition to Confirm”) filed by the 59th Republican Ward Executive Committee 

(“the 59th Ward”).1 We affirm.

The trial court concisely summarized the relevant factual and 

procedural history in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, and we adopt it for the

 

1 Wirs is an Officer of the 59th Ward, which is not a party to the instant 

appeal.
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purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/15, at 1-5.2, 3

Following the filing of the Notice of Appeal, the trial court did not order 

Wirs to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal. Wirs did not file a concise statement. In its Opinion, the trial court 

explained that “Wirs was not ordered to submit a Statement of Errors 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) based on his prior filings[,] which were 

confusing, prolix and non-responsive either to the [trial c]ourt’s inquiries or 

the issues.” Id. at 5.

On appeal, Wirs presents the following issue for our review: “Did the 

court below err by failing to apply the mandatory provision of the 

 

2 As an addendum, we observe that the amount of the arbitration award 

entered against the Republican National Committee (“RNC”) was 

approximately $20 million dollars. According to Wirs, “[t]he RNC, on 

February 26, 2009, pledged $20 million to the Trust, to supersede fundraising efforts proposed by Dr. John Templeton, Jr. The RNC then reneged 

on its $20 million pledge.” Reply Brief for Appellant at 3 (footnotes 

omitted). 

3 Wirs advanced scant facts in his brief (merely one sentence plus a 

footnote), and provided no citation to the record concerning the facts he did 

discuss. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117 (governing the requirements for the statement 

of the case). Notably, Wirs failed to identify the arbitrator(s) who presided 

over the alleged arbitration hearing, but acknowledged that he was an 

arbitrator. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellant at 5 (stating that “there were 

three co-trustees serving as arbitrators”). In its Opinion, the trial court 

observed that while Wirs “failed to specifically identify the arbitrator, since [] 

Wirs is the only Trustee ever mentioned or identified, this leads to the 

inescapable conclusion that [] Wirs was in fact the arbitrator for the 

arbitration hearing.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/15, at 7. We discern nothing 

in the record to contradict the trial court’s finding in this regard, and like the 

trial court, are troubled by Wirs’s lack of transparency in disclosing the 

essential facts. See id. at 11 (disapproving of “[t]he unwillingness of [Wirs] 

to permit the tribunal’s actions to be viewed with transparency”).
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Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act [], 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7342(b), for 

confirmation of an arbitration award and entry of judgment when each 

statutory qualification for the confirmation is uncontroverted[?]” Brief for 

Appellant at 1.4

As Wirs’s challenge to the trial court’s failure to properly apply section 

7342(b) turns on a question of law, our scope of review is plenary, and the 

standard of review is de novo. Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 124 

A.3d 1229, 1240 (Pa. 2015).

An arbitration award in a common law arbitration is binding, and may 

only be vacated or modified where “it is clearly shown that a party was 

denied a hearing or that fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity 

caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable or unconscionable award.” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 7341; see also Andrew v. CUNA Brokerage Servs., 976 A.2d 

496, 500 (Pa. Super. 2009). An “irregularity” that requires reversal of a 

common-law arbitration award refers to the process employed in reaching 

the results of the arbitration, not to the result itself. Chervenak, Keane & 

Co., Inc. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs, Inc., 477 A.2d 482, 485 (Pa. 

Super. 1984). The party challenging a common law arbitration award “bears 

 

4 There are two arbitration acts in Pennsylvania, the Uniform Arbitration Act, 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7301 et seq., governing statutory arbitration, and 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 7341 et seq., governing common law arbitration. Moscatiello 

v. Hilliard, 939 A.2d 325, 327 (Pa. 2007). The instant case implicates the 

provisions regarding common law arbitration. The provision Wirs relies 

upon, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7342(b), sets forth a 30-day time limit for challenging 

common law arbitration awards. 
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the burden to establish both the underlying irregularity and the resulting 

inequity by clear, precise, and indubitable evidence.” Andrew, 976 A.2d at 

500 (citation omitted).

Arbitration, while not surrounded by the technical 

procedural safeguards incident to litigation, is not a wholly 

informal process and requires for its validity the observance of 

certain minimum standards indispensable to the securing of a 

fair and impartial disposition of the merits of a controversy. 

These minimum standards require that both parties are provided 

with notice, all the arbitrators must sit at the hearing, each side 

is entitled to be heard and to be present when the other party’s 

evidence is being given and, unless the submission allows a 

decision by a majority of the arbitrators, all must join in the 

award. 

Id. at 501 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (citing Allstate 

Ins. Co. v. Fioravanti, 299 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 1973) (stating that once a 

dispute has been submitted to arbitration, the parties are entitled to a 

hearing with “the necessary essentials of due process, i.e., notice and 

opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to 

the nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause.”)).

Initially, we observe that in Wirs’s Argument section, he presents 

numerous distinct allegations of error, many of which are not fairly 

suggested by the sole issue set forth in his Statement of Questions 

Presented, and were not raised before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) 

(stating that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in the 

statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”); Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) (stating that a claim cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
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By requiring that an issue be considered waived if raised for the 

first time on appeal, our [appellate C]ourts ensure that the trial 

court that initially hears a dispute has had an opportunity to 

consider the issue. This jurisprudential mandate is also 

grounded upon the principle that a trial court must be given the 

opportunity to correct its errors as early as possible.

In re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 1201, 1212 (Pa. 2010) (citations and ellipses 

omitted). To the extent that Wirs’s several claims are not fairly suggested 

by the issue raised in his Rule 2116(a) statement, and/or were not 

preserved in the trial court, these claims are waived. See In re F.C. III, 2 

A.3d at 1212 (finding waiver under Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) where the appellant 

failed to raise certain issues before the trial court); Krebs v. United Ref. 

Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (finding waiver under Pa.R.A.P. 

2116(a), and observing that this Court will not ordinarily consider any issue 

that is not set forth in or suggested by the statement of questions 

involved).

5

Wirs argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the Petition to 

Confirm, as the court was required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7342(b) to confirm the 

arbitration award and enter judgment against RNC. See Brief for Appellant 

at 4-6. Section 7342(b) provides, in relevant part, that “[o]n application of 

 

5

In so holding, we observe that the trial court’s decision not to order Wirs to 

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement does not thereby allow him to 

present on appeal claims that he neither preserved below nor set forth in his 

statement of questions presented. Indeed, the trial court determined that it 

would be unwise to order Wirs to file a concise statement, given his 

“confusing [and] prolix” prior filings. To the extent that Wirs challenges the 

trial court’s “framing the issues on appeal” in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 

Brief for Appellant at 15, we discern no error or abuse of discretion, as the 

court merely framed the relevant issues presented by Wirs’s verbose filings.
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a party made more than 30 days after an award is made by an arbitrator 

under section 73416(relating to common law arbitration), the court shall

enter an order confirming the award and shall enter a judgment or decree in 

conformity with the order.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7342(b) (emphasis added); see 

also Brief for Appellant at 4-6. Wirs contends that because RNC did not 

contest the Petition to Confirm, the trial court was obligated by section 

7342(b) to confirm the arbitration award and enter judgment against RNC. 

Brief for Appellant at 5, 6 (relying on Beriker v. Permagrain Prods., 500 

A.2d 178, 179 (Pa. Super. 1985) (observing that use of the word “shall” in 

section 7342(b) must be interpreted as mandatory)); see also Brief for 

Appellant at 7 (asserting that “[Wirs’s] legal arguments should end on the 

fact that there was no answer [by RNC] to the Petition to Confirm.”). 

Additionally, Wirs argues that the trial court “erred by questioning the 

arbitrators’ jurisdiction[,]” since “[a]ny challenge to the arbitrators’ 

jurisdiction was required to be raised before the arbitrators[;] if not timely 

raised before the arbitrators, any challenge on jurisdictional grounds is 

 

6 Section 7341 is particularly relevant to this appeal, and provides as 

follows: 

The award of an arbitrator in a nonjudicial arbitration which is not 

subject to Subchapter A (relating to statutory arbitration) or a similar 

statute regulating nonjudicial arbitration proceedings is binding and 

may not be vacated or modified unless it is clearly shown that a 

party was denied a hearing or that fraud, misconduct, corruption or 

other irregularity caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable or 

unconscionable award. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7341.
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irrevocably waived.” Brief for Appellant at 10 (capitalization omitted). 

Moreover, Wirs argues that “[t]he [trial court] erred by failing to recognize 

that the [a]rbitrators did not violate the RNC’s right to due process by 

proceeding in absentia, because the RNC did not deny that it had due 

notice.” Id. at 12; see also Reply Brief for Appellant at 3 (averring that 

“RNC received notice of [the arbitration a]ward on June 10, 2009[,] by 

email.”).

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court addressed Wirs’s 

claims, set forth the applicable law, and determined that Wirs is not entitled 

to relief because (1) the arbitration forum failed to establish in personam 

jurisdiction over RNC; and (2) the arbitration award was unenforceable 

under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7341, in that RNC was not given proper notice of the 

alleged arbitration hearing, which resulted in the entry of an award that was 

unjust, inequitable and unconscionable. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/15, 

at 7-9 (beginning first full paragraph on p. 7); see also id. at 11 (stating 

that “[t]he unwillingness of [Wirs] to permit the tribunal’s actions to be 

viewed with transparency, and the failure to prove the necessary elements 

of due process, left the [t]rial [c]ourt with no recourse but to have dismissed 

this matter.”). The trial court’s sound analysis is supported by the law and 

the record, and we affirm on this basis with regard to Wirs’s claims on 

appeal, see id. at 7-9, albeit with the following addendum.
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There is no merit to Wirs’s contention that the trial court was 

statutorily bound to confirm the arbitration award under 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 7342(b). As mentioned above, section 7342(b) specifically references an 

award by an arbitrator under section 7341. As the trial court properly 

determined, the arbitration award entered in this case was unenforceable 

under section 7341 because “the apparent identity of forum, moving party, 

and arbitrator render[ed] the award unjust, inequitable, and 

unconscionable.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/15, at 7 (referencing 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 7341); see also Andrew, 976 A.2d at 500. For this reason, 

Wirs’s reliance upon Beriker, supra, is unavailing. Beriker merely stands 

for the proposition that where a valid and enforceable arbitration award is 

entered, and the prevailing party seeks to confirm the award after more 

than thirty days had elapsed from the date of the award, section 7342(b) 

requires the trial court to confirm the award. See Beriker, 500 A.2d at 

179. In the instant case, the award entered after the arbitration hearing 

(presuming such hearing actually occurred) was never enforceable because 

of lack of jurisdiction and a violation of section 7341.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed the 

Petition to Confirm the arbitration award. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/29/2016
1The Republican National Committee was the Respondent listed in the Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award. ; 

However, the Superior Court docket lists the Charitable Trust and Organization Section of the Pennsylvania Office 

of the Attorney General as Appellee and the Republican National Committee as a Participant. The Attorney · General's Office did not actively participate in the Trial Court proceedings. 

"Petitioner"), established the Roosevelt-Bentman Trust for American Voters, 

The 59th Republican Ward Executive Committee, (hereinafter referred to as 

Facts and Procedural History 

Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General.1 

National Committee and the Charitable Trust and Organization Section of the 

Committee's Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award. Appellees are the Republican · 

dated February 2, 2015, dismissing the 591h Republican Ward Executive 

Voters, (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Wirs"), appeals from the Trial Court's Decree 

Appellant, Peter Wirs, Trustee of the Roosevelt-Bentman Trust for American 

OPINION 

Inter Vivos Trust 

ROOSEVELT-BENTMAN TRUST FOR AMERICAN VOTERS, 

Control No. 141397 

O.C. No. 608 IV of 2014 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 

Ill I I Ill 11111111111111111111111 

20140060807036 

Roosevelt Bentman Trust For Tne American Voter. In 

. .· .. '" ,,, ·~.- .•...•.• 1••.·-,.· Circulated 01/27/2016 11:10 AM
2 

2 Petition to Confirm Arbitration A ward, p. 2. 

3 Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award, p. 3. 

4 On The Record Conference, N.T. 10/02/14, p. 13-15. 

5 Petition to Confirm Arbitration A ward, p, 3-4. 

6 Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award, p, 4. 

7 Decree Dated 05/2 J /14, Control # 14140 I. 

of the arbitration award which he sought to enforce. 7 ;, 

r , 

provisions, violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure as the petition was not !n 

paragraph form and was unnecessarily anecdotal, prolix, and devoid of necessary 

specific factual allegations which would justify relief, and failure to include a copy 

to request specific relief, failure to identify issues, respondents, and relevant Trust · 

on May 21, 2014 due to numerous irregularities and deficiencies, including: failure 

referred to as "Mr. Wirs' Petition"). The Trial Court dismissed Mr. Wirs' Petition 

Wirs filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment on behalf of the Trust, (hereinafter 

On the same date as Petitioner's Petition to confirm the arbitration award, Mr. 

National Committee. The award purportedly became effective June 12, 2009,5 and 

Petitioner sought confirmation of the award and entry of judgment.6 

a Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award, alleging that an arbitration hearing had 

been held, which resulted in an award entered in its favor and against the Republicb 

On May 2, 2014, Petitioner 59th Republican Ward Executive Committee filed 

i 

denies any involvement with, or any interest in the Trust.4 

National Committee is alleged to be a qualified beneficiary of the Trust,' however' it 

(hereinafter referred to as the "Trust"), on October 4, 2007.2 The Republican 
3 

8 Decree Dated 07/9/14, Control #141401. 

9 N.T. 10/2/14, p. 6. Mr. Wirs identified himself on the record as: "I am Peter J. Wirs. I am the Trustee ofithe 

Roosevelt Bentman Trust. And for the record, I am an officer of the Settlor, so - but I am here today as the Trustee 

and the Settlor, as well as the Republican National Committee, as well as all political party committees are (my 

beneficiary {sic}, ... " l 

to Decree Dated 10/06/14, Control #141397. 

Republican National Committee.'? 

judgment, and 2) whether the arbitration forum had obtained jurisdiction over the 

i 

the Orphans' Court is the proper venue to confirm the arbitration award and entera 

t 

Memorandum of Law, discretely and concisely addressing two issues: 1) whether 

the conference, the Trial Court ordered both parties to submit, within 60 

Esq. for the Petitioner and Mr. Wirs as Trustee and Settlor.9 At the 

specifically to challenge propriety of service. Also present were Lawrence Otter, 

and Britain Henry, Esq. for the Republican National Committee, who appeared 

to Confirm Arbitration Award. Present at the hearing were Jonathan Goldstein, Esq. 

remaining outstanding Petition of the 59th Republican Ward Executive Committee 

On October 2, 2014, the Trial Court held an On the Record Conference on the 

Court's ruling on Exceptions. 

praecipe for withdrawal.' No appeal was taken by any of the parties to the Trial 

The Trial Court dismissed the Exceptions on July 9, 2014 before receiving the 

Mr. Wirs filed Exceptions, but then withdrew his Petition on July 3, 2014. 
4 

II Respondent's Motion to Strike, Control #144010. 

12Petitioner's Motion for Filing to be Deemed as Filed as of Submission Date, Control # 150022. 

dismissing the Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award. Similar to Mr. Wirs' prior 

On March 6, 2015, Mr. Wirs, as Trustee, appealed the Trial Court's decision 

process in attempting :10 confirm an arbitration award, even where the Court does 

not have jurisdiction to confirm the award itself. 

Court has jurisdiction to determine whether an inter vivos trust has used a lawful 

inequitable, unconscionable and in violation of due process. Further, the Orphans' 

1· 

not be given legal recognition. Given the circumstances, the award was unjust, 

prejudice. The Trial Court found that the arbitration forum did riot have jurisdictfon 

over the Republican National Committee and therefore the purported award could 

The Republican National Committee replied on January 8, 2015. 

On February 2, 2015, the Trial Court entered a Decree and Memorandtlm 

dismissing the 59th Republican Ward Executive Committee's Petition with 

Petitioner filed a Motion for Filing to Be Deemed Filed as of Submission Date.12 

a Motion to Strike Petitioner's Untimely Memorandum of Law, 11 and in response, 

Thereafter, on December 11, 2014, the Republican National Committee fil~d 

t 

Executive Committee's was received on December 9, 2014. 

Pursuant to the Trial Court's Decree, the Republican National Committ,ee 

filed its Memorandum on December 4, 2014, and Petitioner 59th Republican Ward 
5 

13 Attorney Young previously !med a Withdrawal of Appearance on behalf of the Trust on 9/22/2014. _ 

asserted on the record that Mr. Young is counsel to him, as Trustee, and his address for service is c/o Mr. Young. l~LT. 

10/2/14, p. 37-39. Mr. Young has not attempted to either clarify his role or prevent the representation that he is counsel 

by advising the Court to what degree he is herein involved, or the nature of his involvement. · 

2. Was the Trial Court correct in finding, based on the procedures used ,by 

the arbitration forum, that the award entered was unjust, inequitable and 

unconscionable and that the arbitration hearing was held in violationi of 

due process? 

1. Did the Trial Court err in finding the alleged arbitration award has no 

legal effect based on the forum's lack of in personam jurisdiction over the 

Republican National Committee? 1 

The issues are as follows: 

confusing, prolix and non-responsive either to the Court's inquiries or the issues. 

Errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. l 925(b) based on his prior filings which Wyre 

in a succinct, orderly fashion. Mr. Wirs was not ordered to submit a Statementiof 

The Trial Court shall address the issues upon which this matter was decided 

Statement of Issues 

Committee or by the Republican National Committee. 

No appeal was filed by the Petitioner 59th Republican Ward Executive 

further uncertainty as to Mr. Young's role." 

are Peter J. Wirs, and the appeal was signed by Mr. Wirs himself, which has led.to 

the cover sheet for the appeal indicates that the filing attorney and the filing party 

indicating "c/o Victor A. Young, Esq., General Counsel," as his address. Moreover, 

filings with the Court, the Notice of Appeal used the same cunous language 
6 

An arbitration award in a nonjudicial arbitration is binding and may not 

be vacated or modified "unless it is clearly shown that a party was denied a 

hearing or fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity caused tile 

rendition of an iunjust, inequitable, or unconscionable award." 42 Pa.C(S. 

§7341. The type of irregularity "refers to the process employed in reaching 

more fully set forth as follows: 

·; 

',· 

The pertinent secticlns of the Trial Court's Memorandum of February 2, 2015 ~re 

: ~ ' 

3. The Orphans' Court has jurisdiction to determine whether an inter vi~os 

trust is being used for improper purposes. 

: '. 

2. The Trial Court correctly found, based on the procedures used by the 

arbitration forum, that the award entered was unjust, inequitable and 

unconscionable and that the arbitration hearing was held in violationof 

due process. 

1. The Trial Count did not err in finding the alleged arbitration award has 

no legal effect based on the forum's lack of in personam jurisdiction over 

the Republican.National Committee. 

Decree, is incorporated herein by reference in this Opinion, as it directly discusses 

the first three issues on appeal: 

Memorandum enteredl on February 2, 2015 contemporaneously with the Court's 

In the interest of judicial economy, the discussion section of this Court's 

Discussion 

4. Does Mr. Wirs, the arbitrator who entered the purported award, have 

standing to appeal the Court's Decree nullifying his decision? 

3. Does the Orphans' Court have jurisdiction to determine whether an inter 

vivos trust is being used for improper purposes? · 
7 

the result of the [arbitration, not the result itself." Gwin Engineers v. Cricket 

Club Estates Development Group, 555 A.2d 1328 (Pa.Super. 1989) citing 

Chervenak, Keane & Co., Inc. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., Inc. 477 A.2d4~2 

(Pa.Super. 1984). : 

In the present matter, the Court ordered Petitioner to address the issue 

of Jurisdiction and Venue. Not only did it fail to do so, it failed to supply the 

most essential of information, not only in its petition but also in its 

memorandum. It failed to identify the arbitrator, the date and place of the 

arbitration hearing, and the details of notice and/or service to establish 

jurisdiction. · . While petitioner failed to specifically identify the arbitrator, since Mr. 

Wirs is the only Trustee ever mentioned or identified, this leads to the 

inescapable conclusion that Mr. Wirs was in fact the arbitrator for the 

arbitration hearing. Given his position as Trustee, as well as an officer of the 

Petitioner 59th Republican Ward Executive Committee and the party initiating 

the arbitration and seeking confirmation of the award, he was anything but 

impartial. . • 

In addition to Petitioner's failure to provide indication of even tp.e 

semblance of a hearing, it is unquestionable that the arbitration forum lacked 

in personam jurisdiction over Respondent. In order for an arbitration forum 

to have jurisdiction over an entity, it must be proven that the entity was 

properly served. Reco Equip., Inc. v. John T. Subrick Contracting, Inc., 78.0 

A.2d 684, 687 (Pa. Super. 2001). Where service has not otherwise been agreed 

to, service pursuant to our Rules of Civil Procedure (which are applicable-in 

Orphans' Court matters) is required. , 

Petitioner, willfully failed to disclose facts which would have 

constituted service, thereby establishing jurisdiction over Respondent, 

Instead, Petitioner chose to 'make the bold, unsupported assertion in ~ts 

Memorandum that jurisdiction had been waived. ; 

Petitionerj s factual allegations, scant as they are, depict a proceeding 

which is foreign to our concept of due process. Except for the 1960's 

television comedy about the fictional town of"Mayberry," no one, learnedjin 

the law or not, believes that in America, a judge, party, and prosecutor who 

all share the same identity can render a decision that is given the weightof 

law. Even in "Mayberry," the fact that the sheriff was also the justice of the 

peace and the mayor was part of the ridiculous scenario that made the show 

laughable. : } 

Petitioner;' s failure to disclose all pertinent facts leaves the Court with 

the conclusion that the apparent identity of forum, moving party, and 

arbitrator renders the award unjust, inequitable, and unconscionable. 
8 

14 On the Record Conference.N .T. I 0/2/14, p. 21, Exhibit P-1. 

' 

Despite ~eing given a second opportunity by this Court's Decreelof 

October 6, 2014 to provide specific facts concerning jurisdiction, and upon 

Petitioner's complete failure to do so, we conclude that the arbitration forum 

never obtained jurisdiction over Respondent by either actual service or by 

voluntary submission. i 

While the Trustee in this matter, Mr. Wirs, has exhibited great 

knowledge of legal terminology, nowhere has he or his attomey(s) attempted 

to address the I question of jurisdiction and service, except to offer the 

untenable representation that neither is applicable. The failure to render ;an 

explanation as required by this Court's order is fatal to the claim and this Court 

cannot give the arbitration hearing any legal recognition whatsoever. , 

This Court is greatly concerned that an astute Petitioner and more than 

one lawyer have failed to render what is, in our country a universal right, due 

process of law.J Due process protects an entity from being subject to the 

binding judgments of a forum with which there are no meaningful "contacts, 

ties, or relations." Kubick v. Letteri, 614 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Pa. 1992); Irtt'l 

Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 

326 U.S. 310, 3!19, 66 S. Ct. 154, 160 (1945). "At a minimum, due process 

requires notice and right to be heard." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 

470 U.S. 532, 512, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985). , . 

Further, an arbitration hearing is "not a wholly informal process and 

requires for its validity the observance of certain minimum standards 

indispensable td the securing of a fair and impartial disposition of the merits 

of the controversy." Andrew v. CUNA Brokerage Servs., Inc., 976 A.2d 4~6, 

501 (Pa. Super.!2009) quoting, Scholler Bros v. Otto A.C. Hagen Corp., t44 

A.2d 321, 322 (Pa. Super. 1945). These minimum standards require thatall 

parties are provided with proper notice, all the arbitrators sit at the hearing, 

each side is entitled to be heard and to be present when the other party's 

\ ·. 

evidence is being given, and, unless the submission allows a decision by a 

majority of the arbitrators, all must join in the award. Id. 

Respondent Republican National Committee was never given ran 

opportunity to be heard at the arbitration hearing. The only notice it received 

was an email notification sent two days before the alleged award was tojbe 

effective.14 The email notification failed to provide the specific details of the 

alleged arbitratibn hearing, such as the actual date the hearing was held, file 

place where thelarbitration hearing was held, the arbitrators of the hearing.ias 

well as the parties present at the hearing. The Petitioner's failure to provide 

this information' further illustrates the lack of fundamental fairness and shows 
9 

standing to appeal the\ Trial Court's decision dismissing the 59th Republican Ward 

l ., 

Executive Committee'is Petition. The arbitrator is not a "party," nor is the arbitrator 

i ?: 

i 

"aggrieved" by the dismissal. 

i 

I 

! 

Mr. Wirs, who was arbitrator of the alleged arbitration hearing, 

I 

i ' 

4. Peter J. Wirs, {he arbitrator who entered the purported award, does not 

! ; 

have standing to appeal the Trial Court's Decree nullifying his decision. 

I 1 

! 

Memorandum of the ~on. Matthew D. Carrafiello, A.J. on Roosevelt-Bentman Trllst 

for American Voters (ffeb. 2, 2015) (filed under O.C. No. 608 IV of 2014, control 

number 141397). 

that the arbitration hearing was not a "fair and impartial disposition of the 

merits of the controversy." Id. In summary, Petitioner cannot raise an issue, 

give the Respondent no notice of the hearing, prosecute that issue, decidelin 

his own favor, and then expect a court to give it judicial recognition and 

enforceability by entering a judgment on its decision. 

Section i 11 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, states 'as 

follows: " ... the nurisdiction of the court of common pleas over the following 

shall be exercised through its orphans' court division: ... (3) Inter vivos trust 

- the administration and distribution of the real and personal property of inter 

vivas trusts andlthe reformation or setting aside of any such trust ... " 20 Pa. 

c.s. § 711(3). \ 

The Petition currently before this Court was originally filed in Orphans' 

Court but obviously does not fall within the grant of the jurisdiction to this 

Court. With the] dearth of facts, we are forced to assume that the inter vivos 

trust here was ~he arbitration forum, and the only property sought to be 

distributed was\ the property of Respondent, who is obviously not a trust. 

Therefore, at fi~st glance, this is not a matter of trust administration and/or 

distribution. ; · However J since this Court is confronted with an inter vivas trust acting 

ostensibly outside its sanctioned usual activities with a cavalier disregard for 

propriety and legality, this Court has jurisdiction to see that its administration 

conforms to law. It is certainly within the province of Orphans' Court; to 

prevent inter vivos trusts from being illegally used for improper purposes.] 

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may not be called to testify as to what transpired before the arbitrators." Pa. 

Rule 1311 (b ). If an a~bitrator is not permitted to even testify as to what natmeneo 

during an arbitration proceeding, then it seems illogical that an arbitrator 

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deemed an aggrieved !party capable of appealing the confirmation or denial of 

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arbitration award by tlhe Trial Court. 

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aggrieved party for the purposes of1itigating the same issue. 

Moreover, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure state that "an .,, ..... ,,. .. .,,,,." .. 

disputes between parties, especially by means of formal arbitration." Black's Law 

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Dictionary 45 (4th pocket ed. 2011). One cannot be deemed both a neutral and 

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be entered, because ah arbitrator by definition is "a neutral person who resolves 

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Wirs is not aggrieved ~y this Court's determination that the arbitration award cannot 

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Under Pennsylvbia law, "An appeal may be taken from: ... (3) A court order 

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confirming or denying\confirmation of an [arbitration] award," in the same manner, 

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within the same time Jpd to the same extent as an appeal from a final order of court 

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in a civil action. 42 P~. C.S. § 7320. While it initially appears that Mr. Wirs has 

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standing to appeal this Court's dismissal of the Petition to Confirm Arbitration 

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Award, under the Penrsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, any party appealing 

an order must be an "aggrieved party." Pa. R.A.P. Rule 501. As the Arbitrator, Mr. 

10 
11 

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Jonathan Goldstein, Esq. 

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Lawrence Barth, Esq. \ 

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Mark A. Pacella, Esq. I 

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Britain Henry, Esq. 

Peter J. Wirs 

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Dated: _sJzz/L f 

affirmed. 

In that all issues\ have been fully addressed, and the Trial Court having ente1ed 

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its decision in accordance with controlling law, it is respectfully submitted that it.be 

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requirements. 

The unwillingness of the Petitioner to permit the tribunal's actions to 1be 

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viewed with transparency, and the failure to prove the necessary elements of due 

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process, left the Trial Cour; with no recourse but to have dismissed this matter.i If 

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an arbitration award i~ to be given the effect and force of law, then the award itself 

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must be demonstratedlto have been obtained without violating our most basic legal 

Conclusion