SUMMARY

October 10, 2019

2019COA152

No. 16CA0048, People v. Knox — Crimes — Attempt to 

Influence a Public Servant — Criminal Extortion

A division of the court of appeals considers whether police 

officers are “public servants” under section 18-8-306, C.R.S. 2019. 

The division concludes that the statute is ambiguous; thus, it relies 

on the statutory scheme to determine that the General Assembly 

intended to include police officers in the broader category of public 

servants for purposes of section 18-8-306. 

The division further holds that a defendant may be charged 

multiple times for distinct offenses under section 18-8-306 when 

the discrete offenses were separated in time and location and 

comprised separate volitional departures. See Quintano v. People, 

105 P.3d 585, 592 (Colo. 2005). 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
Finally, the division concludes that a threat of litigation to 

cause economic hardship does not constitute criminal extortion 

because it is not an “unlawful act,” which is necessary to prove 

criminal extortion under section 18-3-207(1)(a), (b)(1), C.R.S. 2019.

 Accordingly, the division affirms the judgment in part and 

vacates the criminal extortion conviction.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA152

Court of Appeals No. 16CA0048

Jefferson County District Court No. 14CR3169

Honorable Todd L. Vriesman, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ashley Rae Ruth Knox,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART

AND VACATED IN PART

Division I

Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN

Freyre and Pawar, JJ., concur

Announced October 10, 2019

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State 

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1

¶ 1 Defendant, Ashley Rae Ruth Knox, appeals the judgment of 

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of criminal 

extortion and three counts of attempt to influence a public servant.1 

Knox raises two contentions on appeal: first, the district court erred 

in concluding that police officers are public servants under section 

18-8-306, C.R.S. 2019; and second, her threat of litigation absent 

settlement of a potential personal injury claim did not constitute 

criminal extortion under section 18-3-207(1)(a), (b)(I), C.R.S. 2019. 

Because we disagree with her first contention, we affirm her 

convictions for attempt to influence a public servant. However, 

because we agree with her second contention, we vacate her 

conviction for criminal extortion.

I. Background

¶ 2 On November 26, 2014, Amber Diedrichs-Giffin was turning 

left in her car when she heard a “bang” as Knox forcefully placed 

her hands on the hood of the car. When Diedrichs-Giffin asked if 

Knox was okay, Knox responded that her “leg kind of hurts.” 

 

1 The jury also found her guilty of two counts of false reporting; 

however, Knox does not appeal those convictions.
2

Diedrichs-Giffin provided her insurance and contact information; 

however, Knox declined to contact law enforcement officials and 

asked for “weed” or money, stating, “We could settle this now.” 

Knox walked away — seemingly uninjured — after Diedrichs-Giffin 

directed Knox to contact Diedrichs-Giffin’s insurance company.

¶ 3 Shortly afterward, Diedrichs-Giffin called 911 to report the 

accident, expressing her uncertainty about who was at fault. The 

dispatcher told her that, without an injury, she did not need to file 

a report; but if Knox contacted law enforcement officials later, they 

could refer to the recording of Diedrichs-Giffin’s call.

¶ 4 Later the same day, Knox sent Diedrichs-Giffin a series of text 

messages asking to settle matters outside of court. The particular 

text message underlying the eventual criminal extortion charge and 

conviction stated:

Hey amber, this is Ashley the young lady, u 

hit..i have a little amount of time if i want to 

pursue, court action...im already on pain 

management and am going through hard times 

like everyone..im sure..id rather u help me out 

we agree to a one time feesable amount. We 

can even sign something if u want..to keep out 

of a long court proceeding going back to court 

over several months, insurance goin up, and 

my medical bills, since im in and out of 

hospital already[.] Let me know, if that works 
3

for you, or u would rather draw it out in court. 

Thanks[.]

Diedrichs-Giffin did not respond to the message and testified that 

she perceived it as an attempt to “make a one-time deal with me so 

that way we didn’t have to pursue it in court.”

¶ 5 Six days later, Knox walked to an area near where the incident 

occurred and called 911, reporting that she had just been injured in 

a hit-and-run accident. Among other things, she claimed that the 

driver had refused to wait for police and she could not walk home 

because her leg and hip hurt.

¶ 6 Arvada police officers Dustin LeDoux and Donald Smith 

responded to Knox’s report. Knox described Diedrichs-Giffin and 

her vehicle to Officer Smith and provided him with her license plate 

number. During the subsequent ambulance ride to the hospital, 

she provided a more detailed account to Officer LeDoux.

¶ 7 Officer LeDoux tracked down Diedrichs-Giffin and learned that 

the incident had, in fact, taken place six days earlier. He also 

procured a copy of the text Knox had sent to Diedrichs-Giffin the 

day of the incident. Officer LeDoux interviewed Knox at the hospital 

after hearing Diedrichs-Giffin’s account. She initially maintained 
4

her version of events, but when confronted with the text message, 

she admitted that the incident had occurred six days earlier. She

explained that she had lied about the timing because she feared not 

receiving medical treatment otherwise.

¶ 8 The district attorney charged Knox with criminal extortion, 

false reporting, and three counts of attempt to influence a public 

servant. The jury rejected her arguments that she was guilty only 

of false reporting and that the prosecution had failed to prove that 

she staged the accident or faked her injuries. She was convicted of 

all counts, and this appeal followed.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 9 Knox contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that she committed three offenses of attempt to 

influence a public servant; thus, she argues that we must vacate 

her convictions because the evidence was insufficient to establish 

her guilt. Before determining whether there was sufficient evidence 

to convict Knox of attempting to influence a public servant, we must 

address two preliminary questions — (1) whether police officers are 

public servants and (2) whether Knox could be convicted of three 

offenses or only one offense.
5

A. Attempt to Influence Public Servants

¶ 10 Knox argues that the district court erred in concluding that 

police officers are public servants for purposes of attempting to 

influence a public servant under section 18-8-306. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 11 Sufficiency of the evidence claims may be raised for the first 

time on appeal and are not subject to plain error review. McCoy v. 

People, 2019 COA 44, ¶ 19, 442 P.3d 379, 385. 

¶ 12 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. 

People v. Sena, 2016 COA 161, ¶ 10, 395 P.3d 1148, 1150. 

¶ 13 When interpreting a statute, we look first to the language of 

the statute, attributing plain and ordinary meanings to all words 

and phrases. McCoy, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d at 389. We read the statute in 

context with its broader statutory scheme, “giving consistent, 

harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts, and we must 

avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases 

superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results.” Id. at ¶ 38, 442 

P.3d at 389. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, 

we apply the provision as written. Id. If, on the other hand, we 

conclude that the statute is reasonably susceptible of multiple 
6

interpretations, we turn to other interpretive methods to ascertain 

the legislature’s intent and resolve the ambiguity. Id. In so doing, 

we may refer to canons of statutory construction, legislative history, 

and the statute’s purpose. Id. 

2. Applicable Law and Analysis

¶ 14 In Sena, a division of our court concluded that, by its plain 

language, “police officers are public servants as contemplated in 

section 18-8-306.” Sena, ¶ 15, 395 P.3d at 1151. Knox contends 

Sena was wrongly decided. We agree with the holding in Sena. 

However, although we agree with the Sena division’s conclusion 

that a police officer is a public servant, we reach that conclusion 

after determining that the statute is ambiguous, requiring 

additional interpretation. 

¶ 15 On the one hand, the reading of the statute and the 

accompanying statutory scheme relied on by Knox suggests that the 

legislature intended to distinguish police officers from public 

servants by enacting separate statutes to address conduct against 

them in certain circumstances. On the other hand, the Sena

division concluded, based on the plain language of the statute, that 

police officers are included in the broad definition of public 
7

servants. Because section 18-8-306 is amenable to two reasonable 

interpretations, we conclude it is ambiguous.

¶ 16 The statute governing the crime of attempt to influence a 

public servant provides:

Any person who attempts to influence any 

public servant by means of deceit or by threat 

of violence or economic reprisal against any 

person or property, with the intent thereby to 

alter or affect the public servant’s decision, 

vote, opinion, or action concerning any matter 

which is to be considered or performed by him 

or the agency or body of which he is a member, 

commits a class 4 felony.

§ 18-8-306.

¶ 17 Section 18-1-901(3)(o), C.R.S. 2019, defines “public servant,” 

generally, as “any officer or employee of government, whether 

elected or appointed, and any person participating as an advisor, 

consultant, process server, or otherwise in performing a 

governmental function, but the term does not include witnesses.” 

Section 18-8-101(3), C.R.S. 2019, explicitly cross-references and 

adopts section 18-1-901’s general definition; however, section 18-8-

301(4), C.R.S. 2019, expands on the definition’s scope, as relevant 

here for purposes of section 18-8-306, to include “persons who 

presently occupy the position of a public servant as defined in 
8

section 18-8-101(3) or have been elected, appointed, or designated 

to become a public servant although not yet occupying that 

position.” 

¶ 18 Section 18-1-901(3)(o)’s definition of “public servant” does not 

use the term “peace officer.” Title 16, on the other hand, includes 

police and law enforcement officers in the definition of “peace 

officer.” § 16-2.5-101, C.R.S. 2019; § 16-2.5-105, C.R.S. 2019; see 

also § 18-8-101(2.5) (“‘Peace officer’ has the same meaning as 

described in section 16-2.5-101, C.R.S.”).

¶ 19 Some statutes distinguish offenses against a public servant 

from offenses against a peace officer. Based on these statutes, 

Knox contends police officers are not public servants. Specifically, 

she notes that two sets of statutes create separate offenses for 

conduct against police officers and public servants.

¶ 20 First, section 18-8-102, C.R.S. 2019, states that a person 

commits obstruction — a class 3 misdemeanor2 — of government 

operations by intentionally obstructing, impairing, or hindering the 

 

2 A class 3 misdemeanor is punishable by up to six months 

imprisonment, a $750 fine, or both. § 18-1.3-501(1)(a), C.R.S. 

2019.
9

performance of a governmental function by a public servant. 

Meanwhile, section 18-8-104, C.R.S. 2019, states that a person 

obstructs a peace officer — a class 2 misdemeanor3 — when “such 

person knowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the enforcement of 

the penal law or the preservation of the peace by a peace officer, 

acting under color of his or her official authority.”

¶ 21 Similarly, the General Assembly established separate offenses 

for impersonating a peace officer, section 18-8-112, C.R.S. 2019, 

and impersonating a public servant, section 18-8-113, C.R.S. 2019. 

Impersonating a peace officer is a class 6 felony,4 and 

impersonating a public servant is a class 3 misdemeanor. § 18-8-

112(2); § 18-8-113(3).

¶ 22 While the General Assembly delineated some offenses against 

peace officers separately from offenses against public servants, 

other statutes mention only public servants. In fact, title 18, article 

8, part 3 only discusses public servants. Nevertheless, in In re 

 

3 A class 2 misdemeanor is punishable by up to 364 days 

imprisonment, a $1000 fine, or both. Id. 

4 A class 6 felony is punishable by up to eighteen months in prison 

with a one year mandatory period of parole, a $100,000 fine, or 

both. § 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. 2019.
10

Elinoff, 22 P.3d 60, 62 (Colo. 2001), the supreme court affirmed the 

suspension of an attorney for three years for bribing two police 

officers under section 18-8-302(1)(a), C.R.S. 2019. Similarly, as the 

Sena division noted, another division of our court in People v. Van 

De Weghe, 2012 COA 204, ¶ 13, 312 P.3d 231, 234, accepted 

without question that the defendant attempted to influence a public 

servant under section 18-8-306 when he provided false information 

to a police officer. 

¶ 23 Though these decisions are not dispositive, they are consistent 

with a plain reading of the statutory scheme, which suggests that 

the General Assembly deliberately separated some offenses against 

peace officers from those against public servants, while 

encompassing peace officers in the broader category of public 

servants for purposes of title 18, article 8, part 3. The General 

Assembly may have intended to punish more harshly crimes 

against peace officers in the circumstances noted above, 

considering that those offenses carry harsher sentences.5 

 

5 See supra notes 2–4.
11

¶ 24 Moreover, the General Assembly did not enact alternative 

legislation defining an attempt to influence a peace officer, and we 

do not believe it intended to leave such an act unregulated. 

¶ 25 Knox argues that an interpretation of section 18-8-306 that 

considers peace officers to be public servants renders superfluous 

the offense of false reporting to authorities under section 18-8-111, 

C.R.S. 2019. We disagree, and instead adopt the holding in People 

v. Blue, 253 P.3d 1273, 1278 (Colo. App. 2011). There, the division 

concluded that false reporting does not constitute a specific 

instance of attempt to influence a public servant. Id. Indeed, the 

crime of false reporting does not require an intent to influence the 

actions or decisions of a public official; rather, it “penalizes those 

who provide untruthful information to public officials.” Id. Thus, 

our interpretation of section 18-8-306 does not render superfluous 

the offense of false reporting — instead it establishes a separate 

offense with a separate mens rea. An individual can provide false 

information with no intention of influencing authorities, such as 

when a celebrity uses a pseudonym to protect his or her privacy. 

See id. at 1277. A defendant may be convicted of both attempt to 

influence a public servant and false reporting to authorities. Id.
12

¶ 26 Accordingly, we conclude that police officers are public 

servants for purposes of section 18-8-306.

B. Multiple Convictions for Attempt to Influence a Public Servant 

¶ 27 Knox argues that her convictions for attempt to influence a 

public servant are multiplicitous in violation of her right to be free 

from double jeopardy. She claims that her convictions stemmed 

from a single, continuous course of conduct; thus, the court erred 

in entering judgment against her on one count of attempt for each 

law enforcement official with whom she spoke. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 28 We review this unpreserved double jeopardy issue for plain 

error. See McCoy, ¶ 19, 442 P.3d at 385; Scott v. People, 2017 CO 

16, ¶ 12, 390 P.3d 832, 835. We reverse an unpreserved error only 

if an error was both obvious and substantial and “so undermined 

the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as to cast serious 

doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Hagos v. 

People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14, 288 P.3d 116, 120. “Plain errors or 

defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they 

were not brought to the attention of the court.” Crim. P. 52(b).
13

2. Applicable Law

¶ 29 The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and 

Colorado Constitutions preclude multiple convictions and 

punishments for the same crime. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; 

Colo. Const. art. II, § 18. 

¶ 30 The related concept of “[m]ultiplicity is the charging of the 

same offense in several counts, culminating in multiple 

punishments.” Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585, 589 (Colo. 2005). 

An individual’s protection from double jeopardy prohibits 

multiplicitous charges for the same offense but does not insulate a 

defendant from being prosecuted for distinct offenses under the 

same statute. Id. at 590. It also does not bar punishment for the 

same criminal conduct under multiple statutes. Woellhaf v. People, 

105 P.3d 209, 214 (Colo. 2005).

¶ 31 We determine whether the statute authorizes conviction on 

discrete charges by measuring the prescribed unit of prosecution,

which is “the manner in which a criminal statute permits a 

defendant’s conduct to be divided into discrete acts for purposes of

prosecuting multiple offenses.” Id. at 215; Quintano, 105 P.3d at 

589. Once we identify the unit of prosecution, we look to the 
14

evidence to determine whether the defendant’s conduct constituted 

factually discrete offenses. People v. Vigil, 251 P.3d 442, 448 (Colo. 

App. 2010). 

To determine whether offenses are factually 

distinct, courts have considered (1) whether 

the acts occurred at different times and were 

separated by intervening events; (2) whether 

there were separate volitional acts or new 

volitional departures in the defendant’s course 

of conduct; and (3) factors such as temporal 

proximity, the location of the victim (e.g., if the 

victim was moved), the defendant’s intent as 

indicated by his or her conduct and 

utterances, and the number of victims.

People v. McMinn, 2013 COA 94, ¶ 22, 412 P.3d 551, 558. 

If we determine that the statute intended to create an ongoing and 

continuous offense, we must conclude that multiplicitous charges 

under the statute violate the defendant’s double jeopardy rights.

¶ 32 Therefore, because the prosecution charged Knox with 

committing distinct offenses under the same statute, we apply a 

two-tiered analysis — “(1) whether the unit of prosecution 

prescribed by the legislature permits the charging of multiple 

offenses; and (2) whether the evidence in support of each offense 

justifies the charging of distinct offenses.” Quintano, 105 P.3d at 

590. 
15

¶ 33 This analysis requires us to look to the statutory language to 

“ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent.” Woellhaf, 105 P.3d 

at 215. Thus, we, again, apply principles of statutory interpretation 

to determine whether section 18-8-306 authorizes charges of the 

same offense in multiple counts. Supra Part II.A.1. In so doing, we 

are mindful of the presumption against classifying a crime as a 

continuing offense. People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d 1188, 1192 

(Colo. 2003); People v. Johnson, 2013 COA 122, ¶ 14, 327 P.3d 305, 

307; People v. Pérez, 129 P.3d 1090, 1092 (Colo. App. 2005).

3. Unit of Prosecution

¶ 34 As noted, section 18-8-306 states, in pertinent part:

Any person who attempts to influence any 

public servant by means of deceit . . . with the 

intent thereby to alter or affect the public 

servant’s decision, vote, opinion, or action 

concerning any matter which is to be 

considered or performed by him or the agency 

or body of which he is a member, commits a 

class 4 felony.

We look first to the plain language and agree with the People’s 

contention that the relevant actus reus is an “attempt to influence.” 

The statute does not define “attempt”; however, as relevant here, 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term as “[t]he act or an instance 
16

of making an effort to accomplish something, esp. without success.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary 158 (11th ed. 2019). We do not believe that 

the statutory definition of “attempt,” defined in section 18-2-101, 

C.R.S. 2019, applies to section 18-8-306. See People v. Riley, 2015 

COA 152, ¶¶ 27-29, 380 P.3d 157, 163-64 (concluding that 

incorporating the statutory definition of “attempt” would be illogical 

because section 18-8-306 “proscribes attempting to influence a 

public servant,” and there is no offense of “influencing a public 

servant”).

¶ 35 Thus, to attempt to influence a public servant, a person must 

knowingly make an effort to influence a public servant. We 

conclude, just as the McMinn division did when it considered the 

units of prosecution for vehicular eluding and eluding a police 

officer, that the plain language of section 18-8-306 considers “a 

particular volitional act against a particular officer.” McMinn, 

¶¶ 25, 31, 412 P.3d at 558-59. However, the discrete offenses are 

not defined by the number of officers involved, but rather by the 

distinct volitional acts of attempt to influence. See id. at ¶ 26, 412 

P.3d at 558. 
17

¶ 36 We agree with Knox that defining the number of offenses solely 

by the number of officers involved would lead to an absurd result —

for instance, if a person were charged with five offenses for 

simultaneously lying to five officers. Nevertheless, this scenario is 

distinct from one in which a person lies to five officers at five 

separate times, with each act isolated in time and constituting a 

volitional departure in the course of conduct. See Quintano, 105 

P.3d at 592.

¶ 37 Accordingly, we hold that a defendant may be charged with 

multiple offenses of attempting to influence a public servant arising 

from a single criminal episode when the discrete offenses were 

separated in time and location and comprised separate volitional 

departures. See id.; see also McMinn, ¶ 31, 412 P.3d at 559.

4. Evidence in Support of Each Offense

¶ 38 We next apply the unit of prosecution to the circumstances 

present here. In so doing, we ask whether Knox’s conduct 

constituted discrete offenses supporting her three convictions for 

attempting to influence a public servant.

¶ 39 The People argue that Knox’s report to the dispatcher, her 

account to Officer Smith, and her statement to Officer LeDoux were 
18

three separate incidents. The evidence at trial supports this 

conclusion: (1) Knox called dispatch to inaccurately report her 

involvement in an accident that had just taken place; (2) Officer 

Smith testified that he arrived on the scene and immediately took 

Knox’s initial statement, gathering details to enable him to locate 

the alleged perpetrator; and (3) as she was transported to the 

hospital for treatment, Knox gave a more detailed statement to 

Officer LeDoux.

¶ 40 Each of these statements took place at distinct times, were 

recited to different public servants, and were separated by 

intervening events — the dispatcher called police to the scene; 

Officer Smith took Knox’s statement before the ambulance arrived; 

and after the ambulance arrived, Officer LeDoux spoke with Knox 

during their ride to the hospital. Moreover, each statement was 

given in furtherance of her goal to seek medical attention and, 

likely, initiate a police report to enable Knox to file a claim against 

Diedrichs-Giffin’s insurance company.

¶ 41 Accordingly, we disagree with Knox’s contention that all three 

statements arose from a single course of conduct — the 911 call. 
19

Instead, we uphold her three convictions for attempt to influence a 

public servant.

C. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

¶ 42 Having determined that police officers are public servants 

under section 18-8-306 and that the statute allows for multiple 

convictions, we address Knox’s argument that the prosecution 

failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that she committed 

the three attempts to influence a public servant. She supports this 

contention by alleging that (1) the prosecution failed to prove that 

police officers are public servants and (2) she did not possess the 

necessary mens rea to attempt to influence the dispatcher. We 

disagree.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 43 We review de novo whether the evidence presented at trial was 

sufficient to sustain a conviction. Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 

807 (Colo. 2005).

2. Applicable Law

¶ 44 We engage in a substantial evidence test to determine whether 

the evidence presented at trial sufficiently sustains the conviction. 

Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010). Under this test, 
20

we ask “whether the relevant evidence, both direct and 

circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support 

a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of 

the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting People v. 

Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 130, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (1973)). We give 

the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference that may 

fairly be drawn from the evidence, and we do not consider vague, 

speculative, or imaginary doubt to be reasonable doubt. Id. at 

1292.

3. Analysis

¶ 45 Having already established that Officers Smith and LeDoux 

were public servants, we need only address whether the prosecution 

proved that the dispatcher was a public servant and that Knox 

attempted to influence the dispatcher.

¶ 46 First, the prosecution established that the dispatcher worked 

for the Arvada Police Department, a government agency, and was 

legally authorized to answer incoming emergency 911 calls and 

dispatch those calls for service. When the dispatcher responded to 

Knox’s call and dispatched police officers and emergency 
21

responders, she was working in accordance with her official duties. 

We conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, reasonable jurors could conclude that the 

dispatcher was a public servant, particularly under the relevant, 

jointly approved jury instruction: 

“Public servant” means any officer or employee 

of government, whether elected or appointed, 

and any person participating as an adviser, 

consultant, process server, or otherwise in 

performing a government function, but the 

term does not include witnesses.

Accord COLJI-Crim. F:306 (2018).

¶ 47 Second, by contacting dispatch, Knox intended to “alter or 

affect” the dispatcher’s actions (i.e., sending police and emergency 

responders),6 as outlined in section 18-8-306. Thus, we conclude 

that reasonable jurors could also conclude that Knox intended to 

influence the dispatcher’s actions, not merely convey information.

 

6 Knox does not make a similar factual argument regarding the two 

police officers, instead maintaining only her earlier argument that 

they were not public servants.
22

III. Criminal Extortion

¶ 48 Knox contends, the People concede, and we agree that Knox’s 

threats of litigation to cause “economic hardship” were insufficient 

to prove her guilty of criminal extortion.

¶ 49 As pertinent here, a person commits criminal extortion if

(a) The person, without legal authority and 

with the intent to induce another person 

against that other person’s will to perform an 

act or to refrain from performing a lawful act, 

makes a substantial threat to . . . cause 

economic hardship . . . to . . . the threatened 

person or another person; and 

(b) The person threatens to cause the results 

described in paragraph (a) of this subsection 

(1) by: 

(I) Performing or causing an unlawful act to be 

performed . . . .

§ 18-3-207. Thus, as a Colorado federal district court decision 

explained, proof of extortion requires the prosecution to prove 

(i) a person, lacking legal authority to do so, 

ma[de] a threat to . . . cause economic . . . 

harm to the victim, with the intent of coercing 

the victim to perform an act or refrain from 

performing an act, and (ii) the person 

propose[d] to do so by resorting to an unlawful 

act or by threatening to invoke action by a 

third party, such as law enforcement. 
23

Witt v. Snider, Civ. A. No. 16-cv-01303-MSK-CBS, 2017 WL 

2215252, at *5 (D. Colo. May 19, 2017). However, making a threat 

to do something while lacking express legal authority is not 

tantamount to committing an unlawful act. See Whimbush v. 

People, 869 P.2d 1245, 1249 (Colo. 1994). The defendant must 

have made a threat to commit an unlawful act. Id. 

¶ 50 Because no Colorado court has addressed this issue, we look 

to the decisions of other jurisdictions that reached this conclusion. 

As both parties mention, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 

addressing the unlawful act requirement in the federal analogue

conclude that “[a] threat to litigate, by itself, is not necessarily 

‘wrongful’ within [this context]. After all, under our system, parties 

are encouraged to resort to courts for the redress of wrongs and the 

enforcement of rights.” United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 

1206 (11th Cir. 2002); see Deck v. Engineered Laminates, 349 F.3d 

1253, 1257–58 (10th Cir. 2003); Rendelman v. State, 927 A.2d 468, 

481 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007), aff’d, 947 A.2d 546 (Md. 2008); see 

also Zueger v. Goss, 2014 COA 61, ¶ 42, 343 P.3d 1028, 1038 (Colo. 

App. 2014) (“Settlement implies a compromise; it does not establish 

conduct against one’s will.”).
24

¶ 51 Accordingly, Knox’s threat to sue Diedrichs-Giffin did not 

suggest that she intended to act unlawfully; instead, she gave 

Diedrichs-Giffin the option to settle her alleged claim to avoid 

litigation. We join other jurisdictions in concluding that the threat 

of litigation does not constitute criminal extortion. Accordingly, we 

vacate Knox’s conviction for criminal extortion.

IV. Jury Instruction on Mens Rea

¶ 52 Knox contends that the district court erred in not instructing 

the jury on the mens rea for each element of the criminal extortion 

charge. We need not address this issue because we vacate her 

criminal extortion conviction.

V. Conclusion

¶ 53 Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed in part, and the criminal 

extortion conviction is vacated.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.