alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Ronald M. Calitri, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[815 NYS2d 779]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed January 21, 2005, which, inter alia, ruled that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because he was not totally unemployed.

Claimant, a professional economist, earned most of his income since 1996 working as a teacher. He resided in a rent-stabilized apartment and, beginning in 1980, started a business leasing rooms in the apartment to defray expenses. Claimant advertised for tenants, reported rental income on his income tax returns and took deductions related thereto. However, when he applied for unemployment insurance benefits in July 2003 after losing a teaching assignment, he did not report his rental business activities. At the time he filed his claim, his rent was $1,060.40 per month and he was receiving $1,900 per month from his two tenants. Although claimant initially received benefits of $3,394.50, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board subsequently found him ineligible to receive benefits because he was not totally unemployed, charged him with a recoverable overpayment pursuant to Labor Law § 597 (4) and reduced his right to receive future benefits by eight effective days. Claimant appeals.

Initially, we note that a claimant must be totally unemployed to receive unemployment insurance benefits *(see*Labor Law § 591 [1]) and what constitutes total unemployment is a question of fact for the Board to resolve *(see Matter of Aim [Commis*
      *1250
      *sioner of Labor],*302 AD2d 777, 778 [2003]). Notably, the Board has found that a claimant who receives rental income while receiving unemployment insurance benefits is not totally unemployed (see *e.g. Matter of Jagiello [Hartnett],*180 AD2d 859, 859-860 [1992]). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding of claimant’s ineligibility. Moreover, inasmuch as claimant did not report his receipt of rental income when certifying for benefits, he was properly charged with a recoverable overpayment pursuant to Labor Law § 597 (4) *(see Matter of Raspallo [Commissioner of Labor],*10 AD3d 751, 751 [2004]).

Mercure, J.P., Peters, Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
156 So.2d 601

#### Lynn KILPATRICK v. STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS.

No. 46884.

Oct. 9, 1963.

In re: Lynn Kilpatrick applying for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Parish of Bienville. 154 So.2d 439.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal its judgment is correct.
# L_2014124EN.01003201.xml

| 25.4.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 124/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.4.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 124/32

---

Corrigendum to Commission Regulation (EU) No 394/2014 of 11 April 2014 establishing a prohibition of fishing for skates and rays in Union waters of VIId by vessels flying the flag of the Netherlands

(
  Official Journal of the European Union L 115 of 17 April 2014
  )

On the cover, in the table of contents, and on page 20, in the title:

for:

‘(EU) No 394/2014’,

read:

‘(EU) No 393/2014’.

---
#### § 958.46 Contributions.

The committee may accept voluntary contributions but these shall only be used to pay expenses incurred pursuant to § 958.47. Furthermore, such contributions shall be free from any encumbrances by the donor and the committee shall retain complete control of their use.

[41 FR 36196, Aug. 27, 1976]
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the annual report of Cavico Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-K
for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, June Kim, Chief Financial
Officer, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:





(1) This
report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ June S. KimJune
      Kim
                Chief
      Financial OfficerDate:  April
      15, 2010
Page 1 of 2 

MIADOCS 21059362 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

for the 

Northern District of Florida 

 

EDGEFIELD HOLDINGS, LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

W.K. BRENT BROADERIP,

Defendant(s) 

_____________________________________/

) 

)

) Civil Action No. 

)

)

)

JUDGMENT CREDITOR’S AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF GEORGIA) 

COUNTY OF FULTON) 

Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Mark King who upon first being 

duly sworn, deposes and says that: 

1. I am over the age of eighteen (18), am of sound mind, am capable of giving an oath, 

and am fully authorized to swear to the statements contained in this affidavit. I make this affidavit 

based upon my personal knowledge. 

2. The last known addresses of the Judgment Debtor are: WK Brent Broaderip – 

Mailing Address: P.O. Box 6065, Miramar Beach, FL 32550 / Physical Address: 4260 Beachside 

Two 260, Miramar Beach, FL 32550 or 8924 E. Pinnacle Peak Road, Ste. 5, Scottsdale, AZ 85255. 

3. Florida Counsel for Judgment Creditor Edgefield Holdings, LLC is Shutts & Bowen 

LLP, whose address is 200 South Biscayne Blvd., Ste. 4100, Miami, FL 33133. 

4. The address for Judgment Creditor Edgefield Holdings, LLC is 221 16th St. N.W., 

#2, Atlanta, GA 30363. 

Case 3:20-cv-05940-MCR-HTC Document 1 Filed 11/12/20 Page 1 of 7
Case 3:20-cv-05940-MCR-HTC Document 1 Filed 11/12/20 Page 2 of 7
MIADOCS 21059362 1 

EXHIBIT A 

Case 3:20-cv-05940-MCR-HTC Document 1 Filed 11/12/20 Page 3 of 7
Case 3:20-cv-05940-MCR-HTC Document 1 Filed 11/12/20 Page 4 of 7
Case 3:20-cv-05940-MCR-HTC Document 1 Filed 11/12/20 Page 5 of 7
Case 3:20-cv-05940-MCR-HTC Document 1 Filed 11/12/20 Page 6 of 7
Case 3:20-cv-05940-MCR-HTC Document 1 Filed 11/12/20 Page 7 of 7
#### Anna E. Comer, Respondent, *v.*Charles Robinson, Appellant.

(Argued April 29,1884 ;

decided May 6, 1884.)

*Edward B. Whitney*for appellant.

*Charles H. Winfield*for respondent.

Agree to affirm; no opinion.

All concur.

Order affirmed.
5143.205 Contract clauses.

(c) The contracting officer may change the period in which the contractor may assert claims under

the clause at FAR 52.243-3, Changes—Time-and-Materials or Labor-Hours, to a period less than “30

days.”

Parent topic: Subpart 5143.2 - Change Orders
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JOHN DEREK WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:06-cv-716-WKW

)

BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD )

OF ALABAMA and )

NEW HORIZON CHURCH, )

)

Defendants. )

ANSWER

NOW COMES Defendant New Horizon Church in response to the Plaintiff’s Complaint and

states as follows:

1. Admitted.

2. Admitted.

3. Admitted.

FACTS

1. Admitted.

2. Admit that the Plaintiff left the employment of New Horizon Church in July 2004;

otherwise, denied.

3. Unknown to this Defendant.

4. Unknown to this Defendant.

5. Unknown to this Defendant.

6. Unknown to this Defendant.

Case 2:06-cv-00716-WKW-WC Document 7 Filed 09/13/2006 Page 1 of 3
7. Unknown to this Defendant.

8. Unknown to this Defendant.

COUNT ONE

E.R.I.S.A.

1. Defendant incorporates by reference ¶¶ 1-8 above as if fully set out herein.

2. Admitted.

3. Admitted.

4. Admitted that the action is an action to recover benefits but denied that Plaintiff is

due to benefits.

5. Admitted.

6. Unknown to this Defendant.

DONE this the 13 day of September, 2006. th

 s/ Micheal S. Jackson 

MICHEAL S. JACKSON 

Attorney for Defendant New Horizon Church

BEERS, ANDERSON, JACKSON,

 PATTY, VAN HEEST & FAWAL, P.C.

P. O. Box 1988

Montgomery, Alabama 36102-1988

(334) 834-5311

(334) 834-5362 fax

JAC015

mjackson@beersanderson.com

Case 2:06-cv-00716-WKW-WC Document 7 Filed 09/13/2006 Page 2 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 13, 2006, I electronically filed an ANSWER with the Clerk

of the Court using the AlaFile System which will send notification of such filing to the following:

J. Bernard Brannan, Jr., Esq.

THE BRANNAN LAW FIRM, P.C.

602 South Hull Street

P. O. Box 307

Montgomery, AL 36101

and I hereby certify that I have mailed byUnited States Postal Service the document to the following

NON-ALAFILE System participants:

 s/ Micheal S. Jackson 

OF COUNSEL

Case 2:06-cv-00716-WKW-WC Document 7 Filed 09/13/2006 Page 3 of 3
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2044

In Re: PETER PAUL MITRANO,

Debtor.

--------------------------

PETER PAUL MITRANO,

Debtor – Appellant,

v.

RJM ACQUISITIONS LLC; ECAST SETTLEMENT CORPORATION; PRA 

RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT, LLC; FAIRFAX COUNTY; ASSET 

ACCEPTANCE LLC; AMERICAN EXPRESS CENTURION BANK; DENOVUS 

CORPORATION LTD; VIRGINIA KELLY,

Creditors – Appellees,

and

ROBERT OGDEN TYLER; W. CLARKSON MCDOW, JR.,

Trustees - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:12-cv-00122-LMB-IDD; 11-14531-RGM)

Submitted: October 15, 2012 Decided: October 18, 2012

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
2

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Peter Paul Mitrano, Appellant Pro Se. Nancy F. Loftus, COUNTY 

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Fairfax, Virginia; Linda D. Regenhardt, 

BAILEYGARY, PC, Vienna, Virginia; Derek K. Prosser, TYLER, 

BARTL, RAMSDELL & COUNTS, PLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Peter Paul Mitrano appeals the district court’s order 

affirming the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing without 

prejudice his objections to proofs of claim filed by numerous 

creditors in his bankruptcy case. The district court also 

rejected Mitrano’s challenge to the transfer of venue from the 

Southern District of West Virginia to the Eastern District of 

Virginia, and warned Mitrano that further frivolous appeals to 

that court, including reargument of his challenge to the venue 

transfer order, will be subject to sanctions. We have reviewed 

the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm 

for the reasons stated by the district court. Mitrano v. RJM 

Acquisitions LLC, No. 1:12-cv-00122-LMB-IDD (E.D. Va. July 24, 

2012). We decline to address Mitrano’s challenge to the 

validity of his conviction entered in the District Court for the 

District of New Hampshire. We deny Mitrano’s motions to 

expedite and for a stay pending appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
placing him on the law library list was inadequate. Appellant failed to

demonstrate an impediment external to the defense to excuse his procedural defect. See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003). His lack of legal assistance did not constitute good cause to excuse the delay. See Phelps v. Dir., Nev. Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660, 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988). He also did not demonstrate that a three-week deprivation of access to a law library prevented him from filing a timely petition when he had an entire year to file it, nor did he provide specific facts to demonstrate that the prison's law library system interfered with his ability to file a timely petition. See Hargrove a State, 100 Nev. 498, 502,686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

Appellant also asserted that the procedural bar did not apply to him because he was challenging the jurisdiction of the district court to impose a habitual criminal enhancement and jurisdictional claims may be raised at any time. Appellant's assertion was without merit, as appellant's claims challenged the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence and did not implicate jurisdiction. See NRS 34.720(1); NRS 34.724(1); see also Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6; NRS 171.010. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying his post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus as procedurally barred. Accordingly,

we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Parraguirre

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA J. J. Picker:1i:

J. Saitta

2

(01 1947A eacc: Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, District Judge Andrew Jefferson Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA 3
(0) 1947A
Case 2:06-cv-00618-MEF-SRW Document 36-4 Filed 05/24/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 2:06-cv-00618-MEF-SRW Document 36-4 Filed 05/24/2007 Page 2 of 2
1301.000 Scope of part.

This part sets out general Department of Commerce Acquisition Regulation (CAR) policies, including

information regarding the maintenance and administration of the CAR, acquisition policies and

practices, and procedures for deviation from the CAR and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).

This part describes the Commerce Acquisition Regulation in terms of establishment, relationship to

the Federal Acquisition Regulation, arrangement, applicability, and deviation procedures.

Parent topic: PART 1301 - DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SYSTEM
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Eddie Canterbury, Chief Executive Officer,certify that: 

 

1.     Ihave reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Logan County BancShares,Inc.;

 

2.     Basedon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.     Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

(a)   Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b)   [Reserved];

 

(c)   Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

(d)   Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(a)   Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

(b)   Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

 
| Date: February 28, 2005 | /s/ Eddie Canterbury            |   |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------|--------|
|                    | Eddie Canterbury, President and |
|                    | Chief Executive Officer         |

 

----
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Richard Li Puma, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered March 7, 1969, convicting him of criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth degree (a class A misdemeanor), upon a guilty plea, and sentencing him to six months in the County Jail. Judgment modified, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, by suspending the execution of the sentence. Under the facts and circumstances adduced at bar, it is our opinion that the functions of a sentence would be more meaningfully fulfilled by the disposition made herein. Christ, P. J., Latham, Kleinfeld, Brennan and Benjamin, JJ., concur.
FILED

December 16, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

 AT KNOXVILLE

 NOVEMBER 1997 SESSION 

GREGG BAILEY, ) 

) C.C.A. No. 03C01-9701-CR-00026 

Appellant, )

) Sullivan County

V. )

) Honorable Frank L. Slaughter, Judge

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) (Post-Conviction) 

Appellee. )

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

Gregg Bailey, Pro Se John Knox Walkup

Route 1, TCIP, Annex Attorney General & Reporter 

Only, TN 37140

Timothy F. Behan 

Assistant Attorney General

450 James Robertson Parkway

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

H. Greeley Wells, Jr.

District Attorney General

Robert Montgomery

Assistant District Attorney General

P.O. Box 526

Blountville, TN 37617-0526

OPINION FILED: ___________________

AFFIRMED

PAUL G. SUMMERS,

Judge
-2-

O P I N I O N

In 1981 the appellant, Gregg Bailey, was convicted by a jury of armed

robbery and assault with the intent to commit second degree murder. On direct

appeal his convictions and sentence were affirmed by this Court. Thereafter, the

appellant filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief. This Court affirmed the

dismissal of that petition. In 1996 the appellant filed his second petition for postconviction relief alleging a double jeopardy violation. The trial court dismissed

the petition on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations.

It is well settled that any petitioner whose judgment became final on or

before July 1, 1986, had until July 1, 1989, to file a petition for post-conviction

relief. State v. Masucci, 754 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Therefore,

having filed his petition seven years after this deadline, the appellant’s petition is

time barred.

Accordingly, we find no error of law mandating reversal. The trial court's

dismissal of the petition is affirmed in accordance with Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App.,

Rule 20. 

__________________________
-3-

PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge

CONCUR:

______________________________

JOSEPH B. JONES, Presiding Judge

______________________________

J. CURWOOD WITT, JR., Judge
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3354 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3354

            To suspend temporarily the duty on Basic Blue 7.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              June 5, 2006

  Mr. Kennedy introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
            To suspend temporarily the duty on Basic Blue 7.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. BASIC BLUE 7.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

      

``      9902.31.20        Basic Blue 7 (CAS No.   Free      No change       No change       On or before 12/
                           2390-60-5) (provided                                              31/2009          ''
                           for in subheading                                                                   .
                           3204.13.80)..........

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
159 So.2d 288

#### W. C. WEIR v. C. E. WILLIAMS et al.

No. 47058.

Jan. 20, 1964.

In re: C. E. Williams and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company applying for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Natchitoches. 158 So.2d 376.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal there appears no error of law in its judgment.
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-14-00146-CR

IN RE: ROBERT BOYLER

Original Mandamus Proceeding

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

By way of petition for writ of mandamus, Robert Boyler,1 an inmate in the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice, D.B. Ellis Unit, asks that this Court direct the 176th Judicial 

District Court of Titus County, Texas, to rule on Boyler’s motion for a speedy revocation hearing 

or “dismiss the probation as time served.”

We may grant a petition for writ of mandamus when the relator shows there is no 

adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged harm and that the act to be compelled is purely 

ministerial. Aranda v. Dist. Clerk, 207 S.W.3d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (orig. 

proceeding). In proper cases, mandamus may issue to compel a trial court to act. In re Blakeney, 

254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding); see also Eli Lily & Co. v. 

Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. 1992) (orig proceeding) (trial court abuses discretion by 

refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion); Chiles v. Schuble, 788 S.W.2d 205, 

207 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding) (mandamus appropriate remedy to 

require trial court to hold hearing and exercise discretion). Trial courts are not required to 

consider or rule on a motion unless the motion is called to the court’s attention. See Blakeney, 

254 S.W.3d at 662.

Boyler’s petition is not accompanied by any proof that he brought this matter to the 

attention of the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k)(1). Boyler’s petition is not accompanied 

by a certified or sworn copy of the motion that is the subject of his complaint, as is required by 

the Texas rules. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A). Therefore, we are unable to determine if this 

 1

In the documents provided, the relator’s name is spelled as both “Boyler” and “Bolyer.”
3

matter has been brought to the trial court’s attention or whether the trial court has had a 

reasonable time in which to rule on Boyler’s motion. It is the relator’s burden to provide this 

Court with a sufficient record to establish the right to mandamus relief. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 52.3(k)(1)(A), 52.7(a)(1). Here, the record is inadequate to grant mandamus relief. 

Accordingly, we deny Boyler’s petition for writ of mandamus.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: August 28, 2014

Date Decided: August 29, 2014

Do Not Publish