The Defense Technology Base: Introduction

and Overview

March 1988

NTIS order #PB88-192562
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Defense Technology Base:

Introduction and Overview–A Special Report, OTA-ISC-374 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, March 1988).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-600517

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword

Keeping ahead of the Soviet Union technologically is a central element of U.S.

national security strategy, and the Nation spends a large amount of money in

order to do so. In recent years, however, there have been troubling indications

that the U.S. technological lead is slipping, and that it is increasingly difficult

to maintain a meaningful edge.

These concerns–expressed both by the Administration and within Congress—

prompted the Senate Committee on Armed Services to request that the Office

of Technology Assessment (OTA) undertake a major assessment on “Maintaining the Defense Technology Base. ’ This special report is the first product of that

assessment. It provides an overview of the subject, including specific concerns

about the health of the defense technology base and the related issues before Congress. Subsequent reports will probe aspects of this immense problem in greater

detail.

Concern centers on the health of those industries, both defense-oriented and

civilian, that provide the technology that winds up in defense systems, and on

the management of the Defense Department technology base programs and technology facilities. Within the Department, management is being reorganized in the

wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act (Public Law 99-433). This report reflects the state of that management system as of February 1, 1988.

The cooperation of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Office of the Secretary

of Defense are gratefully acknowledged.
Defense Technology Base Advisory Panel

Walter B. LaBerge, Chairman

Vice President of Corporate Development

Lockheed Corp.

Michael R. Bonsignore

President

Honeywell International

William Carey

Consultant to the President

Carnegie Corp. of New York

Thomas E. Cooper

Vice President

Aerospace Technology

General Electric

John Deutch

Provost

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Robert Fossum

Dean, School of Engineering and

Applied Sciences

Southern Methodist University

Jacques Gansler

Senior Vice President

The Analytic Sciences Corp.

B.R. Inman

Admiral, USN (retired)

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

Westmark Systems, Inc.

Paul Kaminski

President

H&Q Technology Partners, Inc.

Lawrence Korb

Dean, Graduate School of Public &

International Affairs

University of Pittsburgh

George Kozmetsky

Executive Associate for Economic Affairs

University of Texas System, and

Director, IC2 Institute

University of Texas, Austin

Ray L. Leadabrand

Senior Vice President

SAIC

Jan Lodal

President

INTELUS

Edward C. Meyer

General, USA (retired)

Robert R. Monroe

Vice Admiral, USN (retired)

Senior Vice President, and

Manager, Defense and Space

Bechtel National, Inc.

William J. Perryl

Managing Partner

H&Q Technology Partners, Inc.

Richard Pew

Principal Scientist

BBN Laboratories, Inc.

Herman Postma

Senior Vice President

Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.

Judith Reppy

Associate Director

Cornell Peace Studies Program

Richard Samuels

Professor, Department of Political Science

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

John P. Shebell

Manager, RAMP Engineering

Customer Service Systems Engineering

Digital Equipment Corp.

Michael Thompson

Executive Director

Integrated Circuit Design Division

AT&T Bell Laboratories

S. L. Zeiberg

Vice President Technical Operations

Martin Marietta Electronics and Missiles

Group

‘Ex officio member from OTA’S Technology Assessment

Advisory Council.

iv
Project Staff—Defense Technology Base

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager

Alan Shaw, Project Director

Gerald L. Epstein

William W. Keller

Congressional Research Service

Michael E. Davey

Contributor

Administrative Staff

Jannie Home Cecile Parker Jackie Robinson

Contractor

P. Robert Calaway

v
CONTENTS

Page

Part I: Overview

Chapter 1: Introduction and Principal

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Why Be Concerned? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Principal Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Chapter 2: Summary.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

What Is the Defense Technology

Base? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Department of Defense

Mechanisms for Making

Technology Policy and Technology

Investment Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . 10

DoD Technology Base Funding . . . . 12

The Management of Government

Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Foreign Dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

“Dual-Use” Civilian High-Tech

Industries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Defense Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Supply of Scientists and Engineers 18

Exploiting the Defense Technology

Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . . 18

How the Defense Department Makes

and Implements Technology

Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Roles of the Component Research

Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Navy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Department of Energy . . . . . . . . . . . 24

The National Aeronautics and

Space Administration . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Other Federal S&T Activities . . . . . 24

University Research Programs . . . . 25

Part II: Background and Analysis

Chapter 3: Maintaining Defense

Technology Capacity: Policy

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Introduction: An Interactive

Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Policy and the Health of the Defense

Technology Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

DoD Technology Base Program

Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

DoD Technology Base Program

Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Page

Management of Government

Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Military Dependence on Foreign

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Health of the Dual-Use Commercial

High-Tech Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Problems in the Defense Industries 46

Supply of Scientists and Engineers 51

Chapter 4: Managing Department of

Defense Technology Base

Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Funding Categories for DoD’s

RDT&E Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

An Overview of Defense Research

Programs (6.1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Technical Review of Research

Proposals and Programs . . . . . . . . 57

An Overview of DoD’s Technology

Base Activities in the

Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Special Technology Base Initiatives 58

Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Oversight and Management in the

Office of the Secretary of Defense 61

The Department of the Navy . . . . . . . 64

Management of the Navy’s

Research (6.1) Program . . . . . . . . . 64

Management of the Navy’s

Exploratory Development and

Advanced Technology

Development Programs (6.2&

6.3A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

The Department of the Air Force, . . . 71

Management of the Air Force’s

Research (6.1) Program . . . . . . . . . 72

Management of the Air Force’s

Exploratory and Advanced

Technology Development

Programs (6.2 and 6.3A) . . . . . . . . 73

The Department of the Army. . . . . . . 75

Management of the Army’s

Research (6.1) Program . . . . . . . . . 77

Army’s Management of

Exploratory and Advanced

Technology Development

Programs (6.2 and 6.3A) . . . . . . . . 78

The Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency (DARPA) . . . . . . 80

vi
CONTENTS—Continued

Page

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Programs and Priorities . . . . . . . . . . 81

The Strategic Defense Initiative

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Chapter 5: Research Institutions and

Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Defense Department Laboratories . . . 85

Army Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . 85

88 Navy Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Air Force Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Department of Energy National

Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Organization and Management . . . . 93

Multiprogram Laboratories . . . . . . 95

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration Laboratories and

Centers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Background, Organization, and

Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Field Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Other Federal Activities . ..........103

National Science Foundation .. ....103

Department of Commerce . .......103

Department of Transportation ....105

Other Federal Agencies . .........106

Small Business Innovative

Research (SBIR) Program . ......107

Private Nonprofit Laboratories. .. ...108

Federally Funded Research and

Development Centers . ..........108

University Affiliates . ............109

Independent Nonprofit

Laboratories . . . . ..............109

Glossary of Acronyms . ..............111

Figures

Figure No. Page

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

Technology Base Funding,

1964-1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Management of the Department of

Defense Technology Base Program . 62

Navy Organization for Science and

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Office of Naval Research. . . . . . . . . . 66

Office of Naval Technology . . . . . 68

Navy 6.2 Program Structure . . . 69

Navy 6.2 Program Strategy . . . . . . . 70

Air Force Systems Command R&D

Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Air Force Office of Scientific

Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Army Research and Development

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Army Materiel Command R&D

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Army Technology Base Investment

Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Management Structure for DOE

Field Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

National Bureau of Standards .. ...104

Tables

Table No. Page

1.

2.

Department of Defense Fiscal Year -

1988 Funding of Technology Base

Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Department of Defense Fiscal Year

1988 Funding of Technology Base

Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

vii
Part I: Overview
Chapter 1

Introduction and Principal Findings

WHY BE CONCERNED?

For roughly three decades, U.S. national

security planning has rested heavily on the

premise that superior technology can offset Soviet advantages in numbers of military personnel and major military equipment. But in

the past few years there has been mounting

concern that the United States is not maintaining the necessary technical lead. If the

United States cannot maintain a meaningful

technological lead and there are no fundamental changes in the competition between the two

superpowers, the nation will be faced with a

choice among accepting a significantly decreased level of security, relying more heavily

on our allies, or making major increases in the

size of its armed forces.

There are several ways to assess a technological lead, but in defense the most important

indicator of technological advantage-perhaps

the only one that ultimately matters—is the

technological lead in fielded military equipment. Wars are not fought or deterred by engineering drawings, but by existing forces.1 However, major technical advances that are still

under development can have profound effects

on superpower relationships, as the Strategic

Defense Initiative (SDI) has illustrated.

Maintaining a technological lead in fielded

military equipment is a far more difficult task

than catching up.2 It requires a dynamic, creative, and innovative technology base, as well

as an efficient industrial structure that can rapidly translate technical developments into

meaningful numbers of effective products in

‘Quality of equipment is not the only factor that matters. Numbers, particularly numbers of the most advanced equipment actually in the field, are important. So are factors such as training, leadership, geography, and logistics.

‘The difficulty of maintaining a meaningful technological lead

may itself call into question the validity of relying on a strategy that requires such a lead. That, however, is a separate topic.

This report begins with the premise that the United States seeks

to maintain its technological lead.

the field. In trying to close the technology gap,

the Soviets have the advantage of following

rather than leading. They can learn from U.S.

successes and failures, saving billions of dollars by adopting existing technology and

avoiding activities already demonstrated to be

unpromising. Furthermore, their massive military production capacity can quickly turn new

system designs into large numbers of fielded

systems. The Soviets could never overcome our

lead if they only played catch-up, but they can

also draw on a large and improving technology base of their own.

There are troubling indications that the U.S.

technological lead in fielded equipment, as well

as in some underlying technologies, is eroding.

The Defense Department’s position is that “In

recent years, the U.S.S.R. has significantly reduced the lead previously held by the United

States and its Allies in technologies of military importance.”3 Both the time to produce

the next generation of major items of equipment (tanks, airplanes, ships, missiles, etc. ) and

the time to translate new technological discoveries into fielded equipment are increasing. The

latter is particularly ominous because once a

technology is discovered, the United States is

more or less in a race with the Soviets to get

it into the field. If, for example, the United

States develops a particular technology 3 years

before the Soviets learn about it, but takes 4

years longer than the Soviets do to turn it into

fielded equipment, the U.S. lead will have been

negated. Furthermore, if each year the Soviets

produce three times as many pieces of equipment using that new technology as the United

States does, the United States will find itself

behind in fielded capability.

U.S. equipment tends to be complex and

costly, and therefore tends to get built slowly

‘U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1986,

p. 103.

3
4

once production starts. Much time is taken getting the “bugs’ out of new systems and training crews to be proficient in their use. This

reflects a technological emphasis on higher military performance at the expense of factors

such as cost and maintainability, and an emphasis on the technology of design over the

technology of production. Cost reductions on

the subsystem and component levels generally

fail to translate into less costly systems. On

the bright side, once the bugs are out, many

recent U.S. systems have proven more reliable, available, maintainable, and operable than

their predecessors. And as Soviet equipment

becomes more complex it also tends to be

plagued with the problems attributed to U.S.

systems.

Congress is concerned over the health of the

defense technology base. Particular concerns

include the apparently lengthening time to

translate laboratory advances into effective

and dependable fielded systems; declining U.S.

leadership in vital high-technology industries;

and a downward trend in the proportion of the

defense budget devoted to the technology base.

The Senate Committee on Armed Services has

asked the Office of Technology Assessment

(OTA) to examine the health of the U.S. defense technology base and suggest options for

exploiting its strengths and remedying its

weaknesses. This special report is the first

product of that project. It describes the defense technology base, presents significant

technology base problems now facing the Nation, and discusses the issues Congress will

confront in dealing with those problems. It also

describes how the Department of Defense is

organized to manage its technology base programs and discusses the roles of the major government research organizations that contribute to the defense technology base. In the

course of the discussion it mentions, but does

not analyze, solutions that have been proposed

to some of the problems. These suggested solutions, and others, will be explored in later

OTA work.4

The remainder of this chapter presents the

principal findings of this special report. Because this is an interim product, these are

largely observations of the staff and outside

experts. Chapter 2 is a summary of the report,

which elaborates on the principal findings and

provides background material. Chapters 3

through 5 present the data and analyses on

which these findings are based.

‘Solutions have been suggested and analyzed in the 1987 Defense Science Board Study on Technology Base Management,

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, March

1988.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The health of the defense technology base

depends on many complex factors and is affected by policy in diverse areas. It responds

to actions Congress takes regarding the Defense Department technology base programs;

overall government science and technology policy; and industrial, trade and fiscal strategies

that are relevant to vital high-technology industries. In deciding what to do about the defense technology base, Congress faces two

broad issues:

1. Are the government programs that affect

the health of the defense technology base

appropriately organized, staffed, managed, and funded; and what can be done

to ensure that they are?

2. Do government policies toward industry

support the existence and maintenance of

a healthy industrial technology base, both

defense-oriented and commercial, from

which defense developments can be

drawn; and what can be done to ensure

that they do?

Resolving these broad issues will entail addressing a number of component issues.

● The defense technology base resides in a

broad range of institutions that includes
DoD laboratories, other government laboratories, universities, private research facilities, defense industries, and ‘‘dual-use’ civilian industries. As the civilian industries

move increasingly to the cutting edge of

technology, the defense technology base becomes embedded in—and largely inseparable

from-the national technology base. The Defense Department technology base programs are major contributors to the defense

technology base, but they are far from all

of it.

 The Defense Department’s system for managing its technology base programs has

recently been overhauled as part of the general reorganization of the acquisition system. But it remains to be seen whether this

will lead to fundamental improvements in

the way technology base programs are planned and managed. One basic question is

whether the system works as well as can be

expected, or whether major improvements

can be brought about.

● Observers in government and industry believe that DoD is finding it increasingly

difficult to attract and keep the skilled management personnel necessary to the functioning of its technology base programs.

This appears to be, at least in part, a result

of Civil Service salary structures and Congress’ efforts to limit the movement of personnel between industry and the Defense

Department.

● Funding for technology base programs is

particularly vulnerable during times of tight

budgets. The rapid spend-out rates of technology base programs mean that cuts in

R&D go farther toward reducing deficits

than similar size cuts in procurement programs. And the lack of obvious, tangible outputs from R&D projects makes the value

of individual programs difficult to define.

Technology base programs are particularly

vulnerable to “raiding’ to support programs

in procurement or the later stages of development. Congress will have to determine

what it thinks are proper levels of funding,

which may entail acting as an advocate for

5

technology base funding when DoD seeks

to reduce it. The optimal level of funding is

difficult, if not impossible, to gauge accurately. However, funding that fluctuates

widely from year to year is inefficient and

can be very disruptive. Congress faces the

very difficult decision of whether it should

be actively involved in the selection of technology base programs and the determination of specific funding levels, or whether

instead it should give DoD managers wide

latitude to construct programs within

agreed overall funding levels.

The government laboratories that together

perform about one-third of the technology

base program work have been the subject

of a vast amount of study and discussion.

There has been significant concern over the

quality and value of their work, and the ability of the laboratories to attract and keep

top-quality personnel. Many experts perceive them as uneven in quality and utility.

Suggestions have been made regarding

changing the relationships of some laboratories to their parent organizations, altering laboratory management structures (i.e.,

removing them from Civil Service), and improving their ability to compete for and compensate researchers.

The United States is becoming increasingly

dependent on foreign sources for defense

technology. Some of this-like increasing involvement in NATO cooperative programs

—is intentional. But much of it is a consequence of the movement abroad of high-technology industries, particularly those that

deal primarily in the commercial marketplace. Reliance on foreign sources makes

more technology available, distributes the

costs of technical advances, and ties the Nation closer to its allies. But dependence on

others risks losing access to technology, if

political or economic conditions change. The

United States faces basic policy issues of

how much dependence on others for defense

technology is advisable, and how much the

Nation should spend to retain domestic

sources of technology.
—

The foreign dependence issue is most pronounced in the “dual-use” sector: those hightechnology industries that sell primarily in

the international commercial marketplace,

but provide important technology and products as components of defense systems.

High-technology products are increasingly

manufactured outside the United States,

raising concern that the ability to design at

the leading edge will follow manufacturing,

reducing DoD’s access to the technology it

needs. Other nations have national policies

to attract, nurture, and protect hightechnology industries. These tax, trade, and

other policies contribute to the continuing

deterioration of U.S.-based industries. Failure to counter conditions which cause U. S.-

based companies to move offshore will allow the deterioration to continue, affecting

national defense. If Congress chooses to address these issues, it is important that national security be part of that consideration.

The defense industry is highly regulated.

Government controls and regulations tend

to discourage innovative small- and medium-sized companies from entering the

business and create competitive advantages

for those companies with experience in the

specifics of selling to the government.

Detailed specifications for military hardware tend to limit the availability of commercial products for defense needs. Moreover, many in industry believe that the

government maintains an adversarial relationship with industry, to the detriment of

the defense effort.

There is concern that, in the defense sector,

government regulations inhibit both product innovation and the application of advanced manufacturing technology to plant

modernization. Companies can recover part

of the cost of innovation from the government through the Independent Research

and Development (IR&D) reimbursements.

But this program has been controversial, in

part because it has become complex and difficult to understand.

Despite the United States’ superior graduate education programs, there is concern—

particularly within DoD and the defense

industries-that U.S. citizens are not becoming scientists and engineers at a sufficiently

high rate.

Many experts believe that the long delays

in getting new technology into the field arise

not in the technology base, but in the subsequent programs that translate the products

of the technology base into new systems.

Full-scale development and production

times are increasing, and the longer it takes

to develop and build a system, the older its

technology will be when it finally reaches

the field. Unfortunately, adding new technology to a system already under development is likely to delay it still further. Inserting new technology through retrofitting

fielded systems or block upgrades of systems in production might get new technology into the field faster than waiting for

an entirely new system to be developed.

Changes in the organizational links among

developers, planners, operators, and technologists also have the potential for speeding the progress of technology into the field.
Chapter 2

Summary

WHAT IS THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE?

The defense technology base is that combination of people, institutions, information, and

skills that provides the technology used to

develop and manufacture weapons and other

defense systems. It rests on a dynamic, interactive network of laboratory facilities, commercial and defense industries, sub-tier component

suppliers, venture capitalists, science and engineering professionals, communications systems, universities, data resources, and design

and manufacturing know-how. It includes laboratories run by the Department of Defense

(DoD), other government departments and

agencies, universities, and industrial concerns.

It draws on the work of scientists and engineers in other nations. Information circulates

both through formal routes dictated by chains

of command, research contracts and other

agreements, and through informal contacts

within specialized technical communities, interdepartmental projects, seminars, etc.

Department of Defense technology base programs-and the accumulated results of these

programs-are an important part of the defense technology base, but are far from all of

it. Although DoD officials tend to speak of the

defense technology base and the Department

of Defense technology base programs interchangeably, they are not the same. The defense

technology base is an accumulation of knowledge, skills, capabilities, and facilities, while

the Defense Department’s technology base

programs are a collection of thousands of individual research projects funded through the

DoD budget, the results of which contribute

to the defense technology base.

Almost all research and technology development can be drawn upon in producing defense

systems, so that with the exception of classified

research available only for defense applications,

the defense technology base is largely the same

as the national technology base as a whole. Of

course, not all technology is of interest for defense applications, and not all is equally accessible to defense. Any research published in open

sources (e.g., scientific journals) is available

for use by engineers and scientists for defense

applications. This includes foreign research

and development, even work done in the Soviet Union. Proprietary work that is conducted

by private companies, and remains unpublished in order to preserve competitive advantages, may also find its way into defense systems as those companies build the systems,

subsystems, or components.

There are some practical limitations-amplified by recent government policy–on the

transfer of technology between the defense and

civilian sectors. ’ First, much defense technology is classified. Hence it is only available to

those working on defense projects. Second, researchers and engineers working on defense

projects tend to forma community that interacts through mechanisms such as defenserelated professional society meetings. Communication with those in similar fields doing nondefense work exists, but is often more limited.

Indeed, in companies that do both defense and

commercial work, engineers in either “side of

the house” tend to be isolated from those in

the other.

There are also mechanisms that reduce technology transfer and communication from nondefense areas to researchers and engineers doing defense work. Companies that develop commercial products seek to protect their investments by concealing their best technology as

long as possible. Thus, cutting edge technology may remain inaccessible to DoD until after it has been introduced into the commercial

‘For example: Department of Defense Directi\e 5230.25, NOIT.

6, 1984; and Executi\’e Order 12356. For more detail see Science Policy Stud~’ Background Report No. 8. Science Support

By The Department of Defense, prepared by the Congressional

Research Ser\ice for the Task Force on Science Polic~’ of the

House Committee on Science and Technology, December 1986.

7
8 —

marketplace. Additionally, some scientists and

engineers prefer not to do defense-related work.

Finally, regulations on doing business with the

government tend to enforce a separation between companies that work for the government

and those that do not—including separations

between divisions of the same company. Knowing how to do business with the government

creates a competitive advantage for some,

while government regulations and contracting

procedures present barriers against others. Indeed some observers argue that the problems

of doing government business—close scrutiny,

regulation of profits, and excessive military

specification of product characteristics-tend

to discourage innovative small- and mediumsize companies and steer them away from government work.

Thus, while in principle the defense sector

can draw from a very wide technology base,

there is some degree of isolation. Not all of that

more general technology base flows into defense applications with equal ease.

DoD organizes its technology base programs

into three categories which provide a working

definition of the kinds of work and information that are considered part of the technology base. DoD’s technology base programs

consist of research into basic and applied sciences (funded under budget category 6.1), the

exploratory development of practical applications of that research (budget category 6.2),

and the building of prototypes to demonstrate

the principle of an application (budget category

6.3A). Work funded under the remainder of the

Defense Department’s budget for research, development, test, and evaluation (most of DoD’s

RDT&E budget) is not part of the technology

base.’ In DoD jargon, “the tech base is 6.1,

6.2, and 6.3 A,” but the defense technology base

is actually the accumulated results of those 6.1,

6.2, and 6.3A programs and much more.

‘Strictly speaking, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense

definition, the technology base programs are 6.1 and 6.2. Technology base plus 6.3A are the science and technology programs.

However, these definitions are often used interchangeably, and

in recent years common useage has been to refer to 6.1, 6.2,

and 6.3A as technology base programs while 6.3B and 6.4 are

specific system developments linked closely to procurement.

Basic research, by definition, is almost entirely non-specific in its potential applications.

Most could lead just as easily to defense applications, commercial applications, or no practical applications whatsoever. There are, however, a few areas in which the Department of

Defense has a specific interest in basic research

because the connection to defense systems is

clear. Examples are underwater acoustics (important for submarine detection and hiding)

and the physics of explosive nuclear reactions

(of obvious application to the nuclear weapons

programs run by the Department of Energy

(DOE)).

As science leads to technology, potential applications become clearer, and a sharper delineation of technologies with defense applications

becomes possible. Some technologies are almost

entirely military while others have little, if any,

defense application. This separation is heightened as military programs become classified.

Nevertheless, many technology areas are pursued for both military and commercial applications.

As technologies lead to the development of

defense systems, developments that had been

pursued primarily for commercial reasons can,

and do, work their way into the defense systems. Prime contractors call on subcontractors

for subsystems, and subcontractors call on

lower tier suppliers for the components of their

subsystems. Many of these lower tier suppliers

sell to both military and commercial buyers,

and use their commercial technology to develop

products that are used in defense systems.

Commercial components are sometimes designed directly into defense subsystems.

A diverse group of organizations contributes

to the defense technology base. A large portion of basic research is performed at universities, which also train the next generation of

scientists and engineers. University research

is funded by the Department of Defense, other

parts of the federal government (e.g., the National Science Foundation and the Department

of Energy), industry, and various private funds

and endowments. DoD’s university research

program is growing and appears to have gen-
9

erated significant interest in the academic community. There appears to be more interest and

capability than available funding permits DoD

to support.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force maintain

systems of research laboratories. Of the more

than 140 individual laboratories, research and

engineering centers, activities, and test facilities run by the Armed Services (Army, Navy

and Air Force), about half contribute significantly to the technology base. The rest concentrate on activities such as testing production aircraft. In addition to conducting

research, some of these laboratories fund and

monitor research by other organizations.

Other government laboratories–primarily

the Department of Energy national laboratories, the National Bureau of Standards, and

NASA’s research centers–contribute both

directly and indirectly to the defense technology base. DoD contracts with the national laboratories and engages in cooperative research

projects with NASA in areas of mutual interest. The results of research conducted at these

institutions is generally available to organizations engaged in defense work.

A substantial part of the defense technology base is embedded in the defense industrial

base, and in the broader national industrial

base. Much of the technology that finds its way

into defense systems is developed by defense

contractors and subcontractors, and by commercial high technology companies. In addition, some companies—e.g., AT&T, IBM, and

UTC–run research laboratories that do a great

deal of basic and applied research, most of

which is available for defense applications.

The large defense contractors—e.g., Lockheed, Martin-Marietta, General Dynamics,

McDonnell-Douglas, Rockwell–primarily design, develop, and produce weapons and other

defense systems. They develop technology inhouse and draw on technology developed elsewhere. They are both users of, and contributors to, the defense technology base. Because

the defense industry sells only to the government, it operates under a special set of regulations. 3 And because there is only one customer

(albeit one with many branches) and a limited

type of competition, the defense market has

evolved a unique set of business characteristics. There is controversy over whether this

is the most efficient way to produce defense

systems, and how to maintain sufficient capacity to meet surge requirements in the event

of a conflict. These production issues are not

a focus of this study, but the business structure of these companies strongly influences

how they invest in technology. A more relevant issue is identifying the best methods for

stimulating these companies to develop cutting edge technology for defense applications,

draw on developments elsewhere, and incorporate the latest technology into products and

production.

The industrial sector includes not just the

defense industries that produce major defense

systems, but also civilian industries. The socalled “dual use” industries, which produce primarily for the civilian market, provide components for defense systems, and stimulate

technological advances that find their way into

defense systems. Perhaps the best-known example of a dual-use industry is the semiconductor industry, the subject of a recent Defense

Science Board study. In addition, laboratories

run by companies that do very little defense

work provide important basic technology that

is eventually engineered into defense systems.

In some areas, civilian industries merely

keep pace with or lag behind technologies that

are being developed in the defense sector. But

in other areas it is the commercial firms that

drive the pace of technological development.

In general, the Department of Defense exerts

strong influence on industries that are primarily devoted to defense and on newly emerging

technologies. But DoD has far less influence

with industries that have large commercial

markets. For those industries it is very much

a minor customer: the civilian market shapes

the industry and dictates the large investment

in and consequent rapid progress of technical

‘Those divisions of defense companies that sell in the civilian

marketplace operate differently.
10

development. Defense production is a consumer of technology from these industries; defense interests are far less able to stimulate

technology development in these industries

than they are in the defense industries. If technologies that are dominated by the commercial market could not be transferred into defense applications, the defense sector would

have to rely solely on technology developed in

isolation, and would likely end up buying less

advanced technology than is available in the

commercial marketplace.

A major focus of this OTA study is identification and evaluation of the factors behind the

erosion of important dual-use U.S. industries at

the leading edge of technology, and the implications of this erosion for national defense. The

concern here is much less shaping technology

development—defense is often a minority customer with only limited leverage on the industries–than it is ensuring that the technology

and technical capacity will be available when

needed. If these industries deteriorate substantially, the source of the technology will be in

question, and if they leave the United States,

DoD may find that the technology is no longer

available and secure. Thus DoD has a vital interest in the future of these industries. The government as a whole has an interest both from

a national security perspective and a national

economic perspective, although these two perspectives may not always coincide.

ISSUES

Maintaining this diverse defense technology

base raises a large number of individual issues,

which fall generally into the following seven

categories:

1. DoD’s mechanisms for making technology

policy and determining investment strategy to implement that policy;

2. funding for DoD technology base programs;

3. the management of DoD laboratories and

other government research institutions;

4. foreign dependence;

5. dual-use civilian high-technology industries;

6. the defense industries; and

7. the supply of scientists and engineers.

This section discusses these individual issues

and the concerns from which they arise. These

issues and concerns raise analytical questions

that are not generally amenable to definitive

answers, but provide a basis for analysis and

informed debate. This section also presents—

but does not analyze-some solutions that

have been proposed. OTA reports these suggestions because they appear to merit exploration as Congress considers the issues, but

OTA does not endorse them. OTA will explore

some of these proposed solutions in further

work on this project.

Department of Defense Mechanisms

for Making Technology Policy and

Technology Investment Strategy

The DoD science and technology program

is a complex and sometimes bewildering array

of 160 program elements encompassing thousands of individual projects, whose success is

often difficult to judge. Consequently, there

is widespread uneasiness that DoD may not

be making the most effective use of its technology budget, and that its program may not

be efficiently run. Some critics charge that

technology base programs do not receive attention at a sufficiently high level, that Pentagon bureaucracies have no equivalent of a

corporate vice president for research and development. Recognizing this problem, DoD has

recently taken steps to address the situation.

Other observers believe that the management

system has developed the wrong focus: that

performance is emphasized too highly over cost

and quality, and product technology is emphasized to the virtual exclusion of process (manufacturing) technology.

There is also concern that “requirements

pull” and “technology push” may be out of

balance. Some argue that overly strict application of relevance tests in determining
11

projects to be funded maybe stifling creativity,

while others point out that excessive loosening of the ties between research projects and

military needs could lead to a technology base

program that produces little practical benefit.

There is an overriding concern that communications between developers of technology and

military operators and planners are not sufficiently well developed. Developers could be

more aware of military needs and planners

could be more attuned to technological opportunities.

Research is by nature disorderly and risky,

Its twin goals of seeking breakthroughs–

including serendipitous, unanticipated discoveries—and evolving previous discoveries into

useful applications are somewhat contradictory. Overconcentration on either is a prescription for disaster sooner or later. It maybe that

the apparent chaos of defense R&D programs

is a reflection of these contradictions, and that

it cannot and should not be managed in any

more orderly fashion than it now is. Or it may

be that valuable gains can be made through

more effective management. Clearly, orderly

evolution can benefit from orderly programs,

but overly focused and controlled programs

will inhibit the wide-ranging exploration that

produces breakthroughs.

An area of growing concern is that of highly

classified or "black" programs.4 Congressional

and bureaucratic oversight of these programs

is very limited. Critics charge that black programs retard the diffusion and exploitation of

important technology, while providing cover

for poorly managed programs. Others claim

that freedom from excessive oversight allows

much more rapid progress and more efficient

management. Some observers claim that technology transfers out of black programs slowly,

if at all, but others claim that much of the technology in black programs came from “white”

programs and only became highly classified

when potential applications were identified.5

‘See, for example, Alice C. Maroni, “SpecialAccess Program

and the Defense Budget: Understanding the ‘‘Black Budget, ‘‘

Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief IB87201, Dec. 2,

1987,

‘Of course, these contentions can only be verified by those

with access to the black programs. However, both are logical.

Some observers suggest that large-scale

demonstration programs ought to be pursued

as engines of technological innovation. They

point out that projects such as Polaris and

Apollo have served to focus the efforts of creative people and have produced much important technology. Like Apollo, such projects

need not be confined to military goals. Some

cite SD I and the National Aerospace Plane as

current examples of such large-scale technology drivers. Others fear that such programs

consume too much funding, driving less dramatic efforts out of existence, and that while

providing a dramatic stimulus to technical and

scientific development they are an indirect and

inefficient path to developing the technology

that is desired. These critics argue that such

programs take on lives of their own, and that

as funding levels decrease the secondary goal

of spinning off technology is sacrificed to the

primary goal of completing the program.

Each Service runs its own R&D program,

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD) coordinates these along with the efforts

of the Defense agencies, the Strategic Defense

Initiative Organization, and a few special projects. The Armed Services have different systems for setting R&D policy and for implementing that policy. These systems, and OSD’s,

have recently been reorganized. (Current organizations for making R&D policy are described

briefly in a later section of this summary and

in more detail in the main body of this report.)

It is reasonable to ask whether each Service’s

management system is optimized for its unique

needs, or whether organizing them all along

the same lines would be preferable, taking the

best features of the three existing systems.

Some observers believe that it would be useful to adopt management techniques used by

other organizations that plan and manage

R&D activities, such as private corporations

and foreign governments. They claim that

some of these organizations are better than

DoD at setting and realizing technological

If few people know about a project, there will be few opportunities to envision other applications for the technology. Very little technology is born highly classified; it only becomes worthwhile to limit access to information when its potential

applications have been identified.
12

goals and moving technology forward into

products. Some in industry believe that DoD’s

systems suffer from the lack of a chief technical officer at a very high level, and from an emphasis on managing programs rather than setting policy.

Some observers argue that DoD’s ability to

attract and keep skilled management personnel is declining. They point out that skilled people can work effectively within a flawed system, but that even a perfect system cannot

function well without top-quality people. They

see these problems flowing at least in part from

legislated restrictions on career paths, particularly those aimed at closing the “revolving

door” between industry and government. People may be willing to sacrifice salary to serve

their country, but are much less willing to sacrifice their careers.

Congress faces some fundamental issues regarding technology base program management, including that of whether the DoD organization needs yet another shakeup, or a radical

new management approach. Even if the system is less than ideal, it may not make sense

to reorganize it frequently rather than allow

it to settle down and do its job. Congress will

be making implicit or explicit decisions regarding the extent to which it should be involved

in detailed problems like organizing the DoD

staff or selecting R&D programs and specifying their funding levels. Congress may wish

to involve itself in the complex process of selecting technologies to be pursued and determining funding levels for each program. Alternatively, it may choose to limit its role to

ensuring that the technology base programs

have proper goals, adequate funding, and capable management.

DoD Technology Base Funding

Intimately tied to the issue of how DoD

manages its technology base programs is that

of the funding levels for those programs. This

is a more immediate issue, since Congress wrestles with the budget each year. There are concerns that current levels may be inappropriate, and that within the overall totals funding

may be misallocated. Imbedded in this latter

concern is a worry that tech base program

funding may not be adequately protected from

“raiding” to support specific systems developments that are well beyond the tech base.

Similarly, there is concern that large development programs like SD I or the Advanced Tactical Fighter tend to drain funds from technology base programs, and that the increasing

emphasis on prototyping will be funded not

with new dollars, but out of the existing technology base program. If the diversion of technology base budgets to support other programs turns out to be a significant problem,

Congress may wish to consider taking measures to protect technology base program

funding.

Gauging a proper level of technology base

funding is difficult, as is the allocation of funding within that overall level. Since the output

of a technology base program cannot be measured with any precision, the effect of adding

or subtracting any particular sum of money

cannot be calculated as it could be for programs

such as procurement or maintenance. Some observers believe that it is most important to

maintain a level of funding that is predictable

and avoids dramatic fluctuations: constant

changes in funding make it difficult to attract

and keep staff.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) accounts for more than 40 percent of the technology base funding, and almost all of the increase in technology base funding since 1981.

But SDI is outside the system that controls

the remainder of the technology base programs. Major changes in SDI could have implications for technology base funding as a

whole, particularly since many programs that

have more general utility are funded through

SDI.

If Congress sets, or endorses, guidelines on

basic R&D policy issues–such as the proper

balance within the program between the orderly exploration and exploitation of known

phenomena and the search for new breakthroughs in areas that are not yet recognized–

is there a straightforward methodology that
13

can be employed to determine the allocation

of funding to implement those guidelines?

The Management of

Government Laboratories

There is concern that the large array of government research institutions that contribute

to the defense technology base does not form

a coherent system to support technology

needs. At issue is whether it could, and whether

coherence is, on balance, desirable. There is also

concern that some reorganization or consolidation may be in order, particularly among the

DoD laboratories, and that they could function more productively if the organizations

that operate them—or their relationships to

those organizations—were changed.

Many of the Service laboratories are attached to systems commands with charters to

develop specific classes of military hardware

(e.g., airplanes, communications equipment,

missiles). These laboratories are more like product centers run for their ‘customer’ than they

are technology centers. Others, like the Naval

Research Laboratory, which the Navy views

as a corporate lab and not a product lab, have

greater latitude in their technical programs.

There is concern that important areas of technology may be overlooked because of the narrow focus of parent organizations, and that

innovative technologies that might ultimately

benefit the overall mission of the command will

be overlooked because they do not support the

current major products of that command. Furthermore, unlike the contractor-operated Department of Energy laboratories, DoD’s laboratories appear to have a relatively difficult

time shifting as the focus of technology shifts,

or otherwise adapting to change. Others believe that a product focus is necessary and

proper if the labs are to produce anything useful, pointing out that ultimately the task is to

put systems into the field. They claim that

many labs are not responsive enough.

The actions that Congress may wish to take

will depend on understanding whether there

are laboratories with unnecessarily redundant

programs, substandard programs, unnecesssary functions, or functions that could be performed more effectively elsewhere. Depending

on the answers to these questions, Congress

may wish to take measures to ensure more efficient use of government laboratories—e.g.,

closing, merging, or consolidating facilities;

altering the command of Service laboratories;

making greater use of non-DoD laboratories;

or setting up systems to enhance technology

transfer.

Service R&D managers claim that it is becoming more difficult for the Service laboratories to attract and keep top technical talent,

and that the United States may be risking deterioration of these important assets that have

been built up over many years. Civil Service

salary scales, never competitive with industry,

are now in many instances not competitive

with academia either. Aging physical plants

are becoming increasingly less attractive relative to industry and academia. Finally, government service is becoming less prestigious.

If these trends continue, are there measures

that Congress could take to make defense laboratories more attractive to top scientists and

engineers? Changing the management structure of these laboratories to allow compensation beyond that permitted under Civil Service rules has been suggested. This is being tried

on a limited basis at the Naval Weapons Center (China Lake).

Foreign Dependence

This issue is intimately bound up with the

next two—erosion of important civilian hightechnology industries and problems in the defense industries. The United States is part of

a global economy, particularly in high-technology industries. Foreign components are engineered into important defense systems, and

other nations lead us in some areas of technology that are key to building defense systems.

This is, at least in part, a result of the success

of post-war U.S. policy to build up the economies of friendly states. Many economists argue that the United States has no choice but

to buy what it wants on a dynamic global market, and that to do otherwise will have major

adverse effects on our own economy.
14

But we are caught on the horns of a dilemma.

The least-risk approach from a national security perspective is to satisfy all our needs from

domestic suppliers, so that our ability to get

what we need is under U.S. control alone. This

is, however, almost certainly not the least-cost

approach. And it may ultimately risk losing

access to important technology that either is

not developed here or can only be developed

here at a prohibitive cost or with a significant

delay. Saving money through foreign sourcing, while generally appealing as a principle,

can become much less attractive on a case-bycase basis when the specific economic impacts

of funding a foreign project rather than its

American alternative are examined.

Thus, some argue that the United States is

becoming (or is in danger of becoming) too dependent on others for our defense technology.

Others take the opposite position, that we are

missing out by failing to take full advantage

of the technological capabilities of our friends

and allies.

Foreign dependence can be helpful and desirable, harmful and avoidable, or just unavoidable. In general, it is a mixture of all of these,

complicating policy formulation. In a perfectly

competitive world market, exploiting the technology of our allies would permit a more efficient division of labor, with each nation concentrating its technological efforts on what it

does best, rather than duplicating effort and

spreading national resources too thin. It would

allow us to exploit superior foreign technology

where it exists, by contracting for foreign technology development, licensing foreign technology, or buying foreign products. In the real

world of today’s marketplace, realizing these

benefits may require taking measures to ensure that the U.S. share of this pie is maintained. Some observers have suggested that

the United States make a serious effort to

exploit foreign technology by establishing

organizations to target, transfer, and exploit

leading edge foreign technology. This might

include reverse engineering of foreign products

(i.e., analyzing them to understand how they

are designed).

But this dependence risks cut-off of supplies

for either economic or political reasons. Foreign high-technology companies may be reluctant to commit resources to design specific

items required by DoD when they find it more

profitable to turn their energies in other directions. If the United States lacks a base of technical knowhow in a particular technological discipline in which foreign sources cannot be

induced to make developments in militarily significant directions, the Nation would be faced

with a choice between stimulating domestic

development or doing without the desired technology.

If other nations dominate industries based

on technologies that are important to U.S. defense efforts, the United States will have to

decide either to buy what it needs from foreign sources, or to invest whatever is necessary to develop and keep a viable domestic

technology and production base. This latter

approach might involve inefficient measures

to ensure domestic markets for domestic suppliers.

Ultimately, interdependence among nations

may prove more advantageous to the United

States than dependence on others. As the

United States gets more deeply involved in

reciprocal buy/sell relationships with its allies

(particularly those with whom we have formal

alliance ties), the risk inherent in relying on

foreign suppliers is mitigated by mutual and

interlocking military and economic dependence. Ties and interdependence are the political basis of alliance cohesion. This is qualitatively different from a situation in which the

United States buys high-technology products

in the international marketplace, and is at the

mercy of the policies (or whims) of other

nations.

Interdependence appears to be increasing in

both the defense and commercial sectors.

Within NATO, the United States participates

in a number of groups working on cooperative

development programs, and is involved in several major international development programs. The international nature of high-technology industry has led to interdependence
among companies in various countries for components and finished products.

Congress is faced with the complex issues

of whether the United States should: 1) exploit

foreign technology to a greater degree; 2) look

for ways to reduce foreign dependence; or 3)

encourage development of strategic U.S. hightechnology capabilities, insulating them from

foreign competition, or at least preventing

damage from unfair competition. A basic policy issue is how much the United States should

become involved in cooperative defense programs, thereby increasing its dependence on

allies and third parties for military technology.

The United States will also have to decide how

to respond to the movement offshore of hightechnology industries that ultimately supply

key technologies to defense systems, and to

foreign ownership of U.S. high-technology

companies.

Resolving these issues will involve understanding whether, on balance, it is in the national interest to rely on friends and allies for

selected military technologies and to allow

those capabilities to diminish in the United

States. This will, in turn, depend on how confident we are that our friends will remain our

friends and technology will remain available.

Fostering economic, political, and defense interdependence may help. It will also depend

on developing criteria to identify those areas

in which increased foreign dependence would

be desirable or undesirable, and on determining the risks to national security of certain

technologies moving offshore. Ultimately, the

United States will have to identify those technologies for which it is most important to maintain a domestic technology base. It maybe that

some technologies are so important to national

security that the United States cannot accept

foreign dependence under any circumstances.

This may be particularly so in the case of technologies that are important to many systems.

Some believe that dependence for any important military technology is unacceptable. Realistically, what are the options to stop this

movement and/or to take compensatory meas15

ures that will preserve a domestic technology

base despite market forces?

“Dual-Use” Civilian

High-Tech Industries

The foreign dependence problem is most pronounced in those industries—e.g., semiconductors, computers, machine tools, structural materials, and optics—that are vital lower tier

suppliers for defense projects, but do most of

their business in the commercial marketplace.

These industries are the sources of much of

the innovation in their fields. But the Department of Defense has relatively little influence

over them.

The degree of foreign dependence varies from

industry to industry. In some, such as semiconductors and machine tools, foreign companies hold a majority of the market and control

a major share of the technology. In industries

like computers and materials, the United

States still holds a decisive lead in the technology, but foreign companies are taking an

increasing share of the market. As the market

shares move to foreign companies, the technology is likely to follow. In the past, many

major technologies began in the defense sector and expanded into commercial markets, reducing DoD’s share and leverage. This pattern

is still strong, although perhaps not as prevalent as it once was.

These industries are strongly influenced by

the global market. If political or market forces

move them toward foreign manufacture, foreign management, or foreign ownership, or

away from developments of interest to defense,

that is where they are likely to go. There is a

twofold danger in this. First, defense contractors may find it increasingly difficult to obtain the latest high-technology products. Some

U.S. manufacturers believe that foreign suppliers of machine tools and computer parts sell

U.S. companies products employing technology that is 2 to 3 years behind that of the products they sell their domestic customers. Second, DoD may find it increasingly difficult to

induce those foreign companies that dominate
16

a technology to use their R&D talents to develop specialized devices for military applications that are remote from most of their business. Ultimately, if the technical expertise

moves entirely out of the United States, the

Services would have little idea what new technical developments they should request of the

foreign suppliers. This latter stage would mean

an obvious decline in U.S. technological leadership over the Soviets, and to some degree a

leveling of U.S. and Soviet access to the same

advanced technology.

The government faces two problems with regard to these industries. First, from both defense and national economic perspectives, it

faces the problem of keeping these industries

viable here in the United States. Second, it has

the problem of keeping the companies interested in doing business with the Department

of Defense.

A number of rules and regulations pertaining to doing business with the Department of

Defense inhibit companies from seeking government business and limit the flow of commercial products into defense systems. Innovative small- and medium-sized companies are

particularly discouraged by conditions such as

close scrutiny of their business, “red tape, ”

and regulation of profits. Military specifications (MILSPECs) can have much the same

effect, keeping out high-technology products

that might be able to do the job but have not

been designed to meet a complex list of specifications. These regulations by and large serve

useful functions, but their utility should be

weighed against the roles they play in keeping companies and products out of defense.6

They have served to create a situation where

experience in doing business with the government is an important company asset in competing for more government business, and lack

of such experience is a major obstacle to companies trying to enter the market. Indeed,

within some companies separations exist between divisions that sell to the government and

those that do commercial business, stifling the

transfer of technology within the company.

‘Some in industry see many of these regulations as unfair.

Most modern industrial nations have industrial policies and specific bureaucratic organizations responsible for industry. The movement of high-technology industries offshore

can be attributed, at least in part, to other governments following policies that nurture these

industries more effectively than do U.S. policies. Partnerships with industry, and the availability of ‘patient capital, which encourages

long-term results rather than short-term returns, are examples of the ways in which other

governments encourage their industries. Developing and marketing high-technology products tends to be capital-intensive. The cost and

availability of capital affect both the ability

of companies to undertake long-term developments (which pay off handsomely but not soon)

and their ability to rush a product to market

once it is ready. The schedule for bringing a

product to market can have a major effect on

its share of the market. Some observers believe

that the United States should be building the

structure for a government-industry partnerhip to replace the current adversarial relationship. As Congress grapples with these problems, it will be important to understand the

relationship between government policies and

the deterioration of domestic high-technology

industries that are important for defense. Are

there realistic policy options that could reverse

these trends?

This problem will raise before Congress the

issue of whether the United States should have

a more active national industrial strategy, and

if so, what it should be, and what government

agency should be responsible for it. It will be

necessary to determine how defense needs

would be taken into account and balanced

against other needs in the formulation and implementation of that policy. Should the United

States seek to maintain a viable domestic base

for all industrial technologies that are of value

for defense? Or would it make more sense to

stimulate the international competitiveness of

some U.S. industries and rely on the world market to meet the needs U.S. companies cannot

provide? If the former is chosen, should the

United States attempt to maintain, through

government-funded projects, technical capa-
17

bilities that are being lost in the commercial

sector?

Defense Industries

For most technical developments of military

significance, the road from laboratory to field

runs through the large defense contractors.

Each of these companies can perform a variety of important tasks, but their major roles

are as prime system integrators, the companies that assemble the products of subcontractors and component developers into finished

missiles, airplanes, submarines, etc. These

companies, which both consume and develop

new technology, have a unique niche in the

economy, which results in unique business conditions.

There is longstanding concern that these

conditions can inhibit technical development

and efficient application of new technology.

Like many corporations selling in the commercial market, defense contractors in the last few

years have tended to plan for the short term

rather than the long term. This de-emphasizes

the value of investing in new technology which

may only pay off 5, 10, or more years downstream.

Government procurement habits tend to

reinforce this mode of planning. The method

of government contracting has also tended to

discourage both plant modernization and product innovation: the higher costs of operating

inefficient plants can be charged to the customer, but the risk of failure due to trying new

technology cannot. Much of the benefits from

plant improvements–particularly large-scale

improvements that pay back over relatively

long terms—accrue to the government, further

decreasing incentives for companies to fund

such improvements. Of course, a company that

can bid lower costs, because it will employ modern manufacturing technology or can produce

a more capable product due to better technology, has an advantage in the competition for

a contract. But it risks losses if it loses the competition despite investing in better technology.

Congress may wish to consider whether government policies are inhibiting investment in

modern manufacturing technology and what,

if anything, should be done to stimulate these

companies to develop and invest in better manufacturing technology. Related issues are

whether (and how) government policies inhibit

the transfer of technology to defense companies, discourage the entry of innovative companies into defense work, or encourage shortterm planning rather than long-term planning.

What options are available to correct these

problems?

The IR&D (independent research and development) program has been controversial, especially within Congress, for many years. IR&D

allows companies to recover some part of the

cost of research programs initiated and funded

by the company by treating it as a cost of doing business with, and developing products for,

the Department of Defense. The cost is recovered as an allowable expense, similar to overhead, in contracts with DoD.7 The companies

decide what areas to work in and keep the commercial rights to their work. DoD judges the

relevance of the work to defense needs and decides how much of the cost can be recovered,

within an overall ceiling set by Congress. The

remainder of the company’s R&D costs are

funded out of corporate profits.

In the view of the participating companies

and other experts, IR&D benefits DoD because

it allows the companies to stay current in areas

of technology that are important to defense,

and it encourages the generation of research

ideas by company scientists and engineers.

IR&D is treated very seriously by most companies and receives high-level corporate scrutiny. Industry spokesmen point to long lists

of specific systems that have originated in

work funded through IR&D. The companies

contrast this to contract research-which they

also do—in which, for the most part, government officials decide what areas to pursue, and

exercise greater control over research projects.

The companies are concerned that what they

see as overcontrol by DoD will strangle IR&D.

‘The results of IR&D recovery (reimbursement) improve a company’s competitive position by improving its technology base,

but the addition to the company’s cost basis reduces its competitiveness on future contracts.
18

DoD, on the other hand, is concerned about

keeping IR&D relevant to defense needs. The

program tends to create friction between OSD

—which supports the latitude for innovation

that IR&D is supposed to provide–and the

Services, who want greater control over how

their money is spent. Both DoD and industry

agree that one benefit of the IR&D program

is the communication it forces between government and industry researchers.

Congressional and other critics see IR&D as

little more than a government giveaway, letting the companies bill the government for expenses they would incur anyway. They assert

that the program is being abused. There is also

concern that the incentives of the IR&D program are oriented toward short-term applications in which relevance can be demonstrated

and cost recovered quickly, rather than to longterm advanced technology. One significant

problem of IR&D is its complexity: even if all

parties could agree that its goals are worthwhile, understanding the mechanisms of the

program is very difficult. Some have suggested

that the IR&D program be abolished in favor

of simpler means to support company-initiated

R&D.

Supply of Scientists and Engineers

Ultimately, a vibrant domestic defense technology base depends on a steady supply of

highly capable scientists and engineers. Yet

in recent years the rate at which U.S. citizens

become scientists and engineers has fallen behind that of our allies and the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, a large percentage of graduate

students studying technical disciplines in the

United States are foreign nationals, often supported by State and Federal grants and subsidies. Although about two-thirds remain in the

United States at least 5 years after completing their degrees, many go home once their education is complete (or a few years thereafter),

and contribute their talents to foreign companies competing with U.S. high-technology companies. As long as these foreign nationals remain in the United States, they contribute to

the technology base. The fact that so many

choose to study in the United States is an indication of the quality of U.S. technological

training.

This raises the issue of whether there is a

need for additional scientific and engineering

manpower-either across the board or in selected disciplines–to satisfy both national

security and commercial needs, and if so, what

steps Congress could take to increase the supply. These might include measures to increase

the attractiveness of science and engineering

careers to U.S. citizens, and measures to increase the general quality of education. Congress may wish to consider the role of foreign

nationals in the defense technology base, and

whether steps are necessary to influence the

number of foreign graduate students in U.S.

universities.

EXPLOITING THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE

An important element of getting new tech- cited the VHSIC program as an example of

nology quickly into the field is how well the DoD’s failure to get new technology rapidly

technology base can be exploited. Indeed, some into the field:

observers believe that the major problems lie

not in developing or maintaining the technology base, but in exploiting it, and that the major source of delay in getting technology from

the laboratory to the field is not producing and

developing the technology, but successfully designing it into military systems once it has

been developed. Dr. Robert Costello, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, has

While over 60 systems have VHSIC products in their plans, VHSIC parts are only in

one current, deployed system . . , The technology is available and proven; and the Japanese

are already using equivalent technology in

commercial applications . . .8

8Quoted in Defense Daily, Dec. 3, 1987, p.203.
Exploiting the technology base is not,

strictly speaking, part of maintaining it. But

in practice, the two are inseparable. No clear

line separates developing technology from developing technology for applications. Part of

creating a technology is developing the means

to build something based on that technology.

It is precisely in this area of manufacturing

technology that many observers believe the

United States has sustained the greatest losses

in technological capability. They believe that

the United States is not so much slipping in

applied science and the development of product technology, as it is in the craft and knowhow of manufacturing devices: process technology must develop along with product technology if the product technology is to appear

in actual devices. Moreover, designing a new

technological advance into a useful device is

itself a technology and may draw on several

disciplines. For example, now that materials

having superconducting properties at relatively high temperatures can be produced, the

search is on both to find applications for these

materials, and to fabricate them into useful

forms.

A related problem is that many program

managers are reluctant to design new technology into their systems. Over the several years

it takes a system to go through full-scale development and into production, the technology in some of its subsystems and components

is likely to fall behind the state of the art, especially in areas that are evolving rapidly. Ignoring new technology results in a system that

is behind the leading edge, but changing the

system to include new technology will introduce delays. Adding, new technology carries

a risk that unforeseen factors will lead to additional delays. Thus, Service program managers have incentives to stay with the tech19

nology they know in order to minimize risks

of schedule slippage.

One proposed solution is to insert new technology in retrofits to existing systems. Retrofitting takes less time than new developments

and, therefore, gets the technology into the

field faster. It also has the advantage of upgrading fielded capabilities without waiting for

a new generation of major equipment.

A related approach is to include new technology in scheduled block upgrades of systems

in production. Introducing new technology

subsystems would not have to wait for the design and introduction of an entire new generation of the major system. A company that is

now building a particular fighter airplane

might also be working on an upgraded design

that it would switch over to in a year or two.

Both of these approaches are now used to some

extent. Both require some degree of prior planning to ensure that new technology can be inserted with minimum disruption.

Yet another approach is through the organizational links between technology and systems

development. For example, the Air Force has

reorganized its technology base programs to

be closely linked to the systems commands

which are responsible for developing and buying equipment. This is an approach with attractive features, because it is supposed to

make program managers more aware of new

technology and make technology development

more responsive to the needs of program development, thereby speeding the introduction

of technology into systems. But linking technology too closely to development also risks

stifling creativity-especially in areas that program managers do not currently recognize as

being relevant to their missions.

HOW THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MAKES AND

IMPLEMENTS TECHNOLOGY POLICY

The Defense Department’s ability to man- fiscal year 1988 DoD invested $8.6 billion in

age its technology base programs is central to technology base activities. (See table 1.) Onemaintaining the defense technology base. In third of the work was conducted “in-house;”
2 0

Table 1 .—Department of Defense Fiscal Year 1988 Funding of Technology Base Programs

(in millions of dollars)

Army Navy Air Force DARPA Total

Research (6,1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $169 $342 $198 $ 8 3 $ 902’

Exploratory development (6.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $556 $408 $557 $512 $2,033

Advanced exploratory development . . . . . . . . . $319 $227 $754 $202 $1,502

Total services and DARPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,437

Strategic Defense Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $3,604

Other defense agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 564

Total DoD technology base programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $8,605

aThis sum Includes $I1O miflion forthe URl which OSD has not yet allocated among the three SWViCes and DARPA.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1988, from data supplied by the Officeof the Secretaryof Defense

more than half was contracted to industry,and

universities performed the rest. Efficient management of the program-deciding what technology base policy is, allocating resources to

implement that policy, avoiding unnecessary

duplication of effort, and ensuring that important areas donot’’fallbetween the cracks’’that

separate the elements of the program--will become all the more important if budgets become

increasingly constrained.

Generally speaking, each Service department assembles a technology base program to

suit its particular needs. OSD exercises oversight, and attempts to ensure that these programs are balanced and coordinated into a coherent whole with those of the defense agencies

and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (which accounts for over 40 percent of

DoD’s technology base program funding). How

all this works in detail is rooted in the structures of the various organizations within OSD

and the Services that make R&D policy, but

is not entirely determined by them. These

structures are still undergoing reorganization

in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act (Public Law 99-433). Consequently,

what follows may well change in the months

ahead. Once the structures are settled, it may

take even more time for the process to adjust

to the structure.

The three Services and the defense agencies

(particularly the Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency (DARPA)) formulate their

technology base programs with overall guidance from OSD. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition has principal responsibility for all RDT&E activities except those

of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), which reports directly to the Secretary. For the Services, the principal focus

for this guidance and the principal point of

contact is the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology

(DUSD(R&AT)), a deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. After the Services have formulated their programs, the role

of the DUSD(R&AT) is to structure the overall program across service lines in order to eliminate gaps and overlaps, and enhance the return on investment. DUSD(R&AT) works

continually with the services to help them

achieve mutual interests and balance in their

science and technology programs. DUSD

(R&AT) coordinates activities with other government agencies and the scientific community.

Although DUSD(R&AT) is involved in coordinating Service programs with those of

DARPA and the other defense agencies, he

does not have oversight for the technology

base programs of the defense agencies. However, since DARPA contracts most of its programs through the Services, much of its effort

in fact receives DUSD(R&AT) oversight. The

DUSD(R&AT) and the directors of all the defense agencies except DARPA report directly

to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), who reports to the Under

Secretary for Acquisition. The Director of

DARPA is also the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Technology (ASD(R&T))

and reports directly to the Under Secretary

for Acquisition.
DUSD(R&AT) runs some programs directly.

The Computer and Electronics Technology

Directorate of the DUSD(R&AT) manages: the

Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC)

program; the Microwave/Millimeter Wave

Monolithic Integrated Circuit (MIMIC) program; and the Software Technology for Adaptable Reliable Systems (STARS) program.

The three Service departments maintain

structures for managing their technology base

programs that are similar in some ways, but

nonetheless have significant differences. Each

has been planned to take into account the peculiar needs of the Service, and each is rooted

in its own history. Each of the Services conducts an annual “top down, bottom up” planning exercise. From the top, each receives

OSD’s annual Defense Guidance Manual (as

well as specific Service guidance), and from the

bottom each research institution contributes

a technology base plan. Outside advisory

groups and in-house technical directors and

staffs also contribute. Planning includes a review and evaluation of the previous year’s programs. It culminates with decisions to start

new programs, continue or terminate existing

programs, or transition programs into a new

category (e.g., from 6.1 to 6.2).

Of the three Services, the Navy has removed

its technology base management institutions

farthest from its procurement institutions. But

relevance to Navy needs remains a powerful

factor in selecting projects, particularly those

beyond 6.1. Although it has the smallest overall technology base program, it has the largest

research (6. 1) program, and performs the largest fraction of the work in-house. The 6.1 and

6.2 programs are run, respectively, by the Office of Naval Research and the Office of Naval

Technology, both of which report to the Chief

of Naval Research, who in turn reports directly

to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,

Engineering, and Systems. Some Navy laboratories are run by the Office of Naval Research

and others are run by the Space and Naval

Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR),

which also reports directly to the CNO. Until

recently the laboratories now run by SPAWAR

21

were run by the “buying commands” such as

the Naval Air Systems Command and the Naval Sea Systems Command. The decisions regarding 6.2 work to be done in SPAWAR laboratories are made by the Office of Naval

Technology. Of the three Services, the Navy

has the smallest advanced technology demonstration (6.3A) program; it is run directly by

the Office of the CNO (OPNAV).

In contrast to the Navy’s program, which

is structured for finding and developing new

technology of use to naval missions, the Air

Force structure puts greater emphasis on getting technology into the field. The Air Force

6.3A program, which the Air Force sees as

transition money, is five times as large as the

Navy 6.3A budget. The technology base programs are run by Systems Command, the individual divisions of which are the Air Force’s

“buying commands. ” These divisions run the

laboratories which conduct and manage the 6.2

and 6.3A programs. Roughly two-thirds of the

work is contracted out. The 6.1 programs are

administered by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, which is also part of Systems

Command. Within Systems Command, the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Technology and Plans

has oversight responsibility for the science and

technology programs, but these programs

must be approved by the Director of Science

and Technology Programs in the Office of the

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. The Air Force has recently taken a

decision to treat its technology base program

as a “corporate investment’ that deserves a

fixed fraction of the total Air Force budget.

The Army’s structure is perhaps the most

complicated and decentralized of the three

Services. The Army has the smallest headquarters staff and relies the most on elements outside headquarters to run the technology base

programs. Some aspects of the Army system

are analogous to the Air Force system, while

others are similar to the Navy ’s. About threefourths of the science and technology programs

are run by the Army Materiel Command (AMC);

other S&T programs are run by the Surgeon

General of the Army, the Corps of Engineers,

and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
22

Personnel. The offices within these organizations that are responsible for the S&T programs all report for oversight by Army headquarters to the Deputy for Technology and

Assessment who, in turn, reports to the combined Office of the Assistant Secretary of the

Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition (RD&A) and the Deputy Chief of Staff

for RD&A. Within the Office of the Deputy

for Technology and Assessment, it is the Director of Research and Technology who has

responsibility for planning and coordinating

the entire technology base program. The Army

Materiel Command is analogous to the Air

Force Systems Command.9 It is organized into

mission-specific “buying commands, ” which

run laboratories and technology base programs, and Laboratory Command (LABCOM)

which, like the Office of Naval Research, runs

laboratories and conducts generic research.

Under LABCOM, the Army Research Office

is responsible for AMC’s 6.1 programs. Unlike

the Office of Naval Research, the Army Research Office has no in-house capabilities and

contracts all of its work out.

The Navy equivalent, the Naval Material Command, was eliminated a few years ago in a reorganization. The component

commands-e. g., the Naval Air Systems Command-now report directly to the CNO.

ROLES OF THE COMPONENT RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

Nearly 200 Federal Government laboratories, research and engineering centers, activities, and test facilities contribute to the defense technology base. About 65 of these play

a major role. Of these major centers, roughly

50 belong to the Army, Navy, and Air Force

Departments, and the rest are run by the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, and the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA). Many of the Department of Energy laboratories are Government

Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) facilities,

permitting the hiring of personnel outside the

Civil Service system. The defense agencies do

not operate laboratories; however, DARPA

maintains a close liaison with some Service laboratories.

Army

Within the Army Materiel Command, six

“mission specific’ systems commands run research, development, and engineering centers

that conduct exploratory and advanced technology development into areas that are specific

to the command’s mission, while the Laboratory Command (LABCOM) operates laboratories that are focused on generic research and

development, primarily at the 6.2 and 6.3

levels. The Army’s research (6.1) program is

almost entirely contracted out. Some of the

mission-specific centers are more influential

than LABCOM, and greatly influence the

structure and priorities of the Army S&T

program.

LABCOM runs the Electronic Technology

and Devices Laboratory, the Materials Technology Laboratory, the Human Engineering

Laboratory (the Army’s lead lab for manmachine interface and robotics), the Ballistic

Research Laboratory, the Atmospheric Science

Laboratory, and the Vulnerability Assessments Laboratory. It also runs Harry Diamond Laboratories, which is involved in a variety of areas including ordnance electronics,

electromagnetic effects, and advanced electronics devices. These laboratories do most of

their work in-house, but contract out a substantial portion.

The facilities belonging to the systems commands conduct some exploratory development, but the main thrust is toward the ‘‘ma-
23

ture” end of the S&T program, leading to

components, products, and systems. These

centers conduct some in-house work, but the

bulk is contracted out. For the most part, they

bear the names of their parent commands, and

their missions are specified by their names: the

Armaments, Munitions, and Chemical Command; the Aviation Systems Command; the

Missile Command; the Tank Automotive Command; the Communications Electronics Command; and the Troop Support Command.10 The

Missile Command Research and Development

and Engineering Center has the capability to

carry a concept nearly to production almost

without outside help. The Night Vision and

Electro-optical Laboratory, run by the Communications Electronics Command, is a recognized leader in infrared and other night vision devices for all three Services.

Navy

The in-house R&D capabilities of many Navy

laboratories are substantial, through the tech

base and into full-scale engineering development. Some can carry a system through development and almost to production, like the

Army’s Missile Commmand Research and Development and Enginering Center does. At

least one Navy laboratory–the Naval Research Laboratory—does a substantial part of

its work as the result of proposals by lab personnel to conduct R&D for the other Services

and other parts of the government. The Naval Weapons Center has developed major missile systems to the production stage.

The Office of Naval Research oversees the

activities of several laboratories—including the

Naval Research Laboratory, the Naval Ocean

Research and Development Center, and the

Naval Environmental Prediction Research Facility. The Naval Research Laboratory is the

Navy’s principal research laboratory and, in

some areas, DoD’s. It conducts a broad-based

program that includes such diverse fields as

‘°For example, the Armaments, Munitions, and Chemical Command runs the Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center and the Chemical Research, Development, and

Engineering Center.

computer science, artificial intelligence, device

technology, electronic warfare, radar, materials, directed energy, sensor technology, space

technology, and undersea technology.

Aside from ONR’s laboratories, all Navy development centers and activities are assigned

to the Space and Naval Warfare Command.

Although these facilities perform 6.2 and 6.3A

work, the emphasis is on development. The major centers are the Naval Air Development Center, the Naval Ocean Systems Center, the Naval Weapons Center, the Naval Ship Research

and Development Center, the Naval Surface

Warfare Center, the Naval Undersea Systems

Center, and the Naval Coastal Systems Center. Science and technology programs in these

centers include electro-optics, acoustics, microwaves, artificial intelligence and knowledgebased systems, ocean science, bioscience, electronic materials, structural materials, ship

magnetics, hydrodynamics, and charged particle beams.

Air Force

All of the Air Force laboratories are run by

the systems divisions of Systems Command—

Armaments Division, Aeronautical Systems

Division, Electronic Systems Division, Space

Division, and Human Systems Division—in

support of the division’s specific mission. Exploratory and advanced development (6.2 and

6.3A) are funded directly by the divisions, while

research (6.1) is funded and managed by the

Air Force Office of Scientific Research. The

centers are the Air Force Armaments Laboratory, the Rome Air Development Center, the

Geophysics Laboratory, the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, the Air Force Astronautics

Laboratory, the Human Resources Laboratory, the Aeromedical Laboratory, and the

Wright Aeronautical Laboratories. The Wright

Aeronautical Laboratories is a cluster which

includes the Aeropropulsion Laboratory, the

Avionics Laboratory, the Flight Dynamics

Laboratory, and the Materials Laboratory.

Managed outside Systems Command, but coordinated with it, is the Air Force Engineering and Services Laboratory.
24

Department of Energy

The Department of Energy’s laboratory system, established during World War II to develop nuclear weapons, has grown dramatically

in scope and size. About 60 institutions employing 135,000 people and having a replacement cost of about $50 billion conduct research

into physics, chemistry, cosmology, biology,

the ecosystem, geology, mathematics, computing, and medicine, as well as a broad range of

technologies that spring from these disciplines.

Nine multiprogram laboratories and 30 specialized laboratories are involved in these fundamental science and technology activities.

These laboratories maintain close ties with academic researchers, often subsidizing part of

their work at the DOE facilities.

A primary focus of DOE work for national

defense is the nuclear weapons programs.

Moreover, some of the major multiprogram

laboratories–Sandia National Laboratory,

Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory, and Oak

Ridge National Laboratory–do 10 to 15 percent of their work under contract to DoD on

defense related research not directly related

to nuclear weapons, and most of their work is

available for exploitation by DoD or its contractors. Several other laboratories—Argonne,

Brookhaven, Lawrence Berkeley, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Pacific

Northwest Laboratory–do little or no work

for DoD, although they do basic and applied

research that is available for exploitation for

defense purposes.

The National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA)

NASA runs a number of major facilities,

many of which are dedicated almost exclusively to the design and testing of space-launch

systems and space systems. Several others,

while they also support the space program,

have a broader mandate. The major NASA

field centers are the Ames Research Center,

the Lewis Research Center, the Langley Research Center, the Goddard Space Flight Center, the Marshall Space Flight Center, the

Johnson Space Center, the Kennedy Space

Center, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

These centers conduct work in aeronautics,

space, communications, propulsion, and computers, among other fields.

Other Federal S&T Activities

By far, the majority of federal science and

technology activities with potential defense applications are conducted within DoD, DOE,

and NASA. There are pockets of activity

within other agencies that can, and do, contribute to the defense technology base.

The National Science Foundation funds

three times as much university research as

DoD. But NSF conducts no research of its own,

and does not contract for research; it funds unsolicited proposals. NSF supports research

projects in almost every area of science and

technology.

The Commerce Department’s National Bureau of Standards conducts a number of applied research projects that contribute to the

defense technology base. NBS researchers, in

partnership with others from industry, government, or academia, investigate areas such

as electronic technology, information processing, biotechnology, chemistry, and manufacturing technology. This partnership arrangement is designed to get the technologies

quickly into applications. NBS technical work

is carried out in the National Measurement

Laboratory, the National Engineering Laboratory, the Institute for Computer Sciences and

Technology, and the Institute for Materials

Science and Engineering.

The Department of Transportation-particularly the Federal Aviation Administration

and the Coast Guard-the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior’s U.S. Geological Survey, and the National Ocean and

Atmospheric Administration all share interests with DoD, and conduct some research and

development with potential defense applications.
2 5

University Research Programs

University laboratories perform a substantial portion of the basic and applied research

conducted in the United States. They work in

all areas of basic research and most areas of

applied research and exploratory technology.

University research is an area of potentially

high leverage for DoD, since DoD funds less

than 25 percent of it, but has access to almost

all of it. DoD has generated great interest in

its new programs for university research; many

more requests have been received than could

be funded. The two most significant are the

University Research Instrumentation Program, to upgrade laboratory equipment, and

the University Research Initiative, most of

which goes to multidisciplinary research programs and programs to promote scientific

training. DOD has also put money into creating university “centers of excellence” in

selected disciplines.

83-207 - 0 - 88 - 2
Part II

Background and Analysis
Chapter 3

Maintaining Defense Technology

Capacity: Policy Overview

INTRODUCTION: AN INTERACTIVE PERSPECTIVE

The technology base on which our defensive

strategy and capacities rest is a dynamic, interactive network of commercial and military

industries, laboratory facilities, sub-tier component suppliers, venture capitalists, science

and engineering professionals, communication

systems, universities, data resources, and

design and manufacturing know-how. These

highly interrelated elements of the technology

base are driven by and react to international

market forces and policies of foreign governments that cannot be precisely anticipated by

military or civilian planners, Congress, the executive branch, Wall Street, or anyone else. Yet

Congress, even if it cannot exert close control,

can do much to affect the general directions

in which the technology base moves—if it is

clear about its objectives and willing to incur

the costs.

Conceptually, domestic technological structure can be divided into four broad groupings:

1) technologies and industries that are defense

oriented, 2) those dual-use technologies that

respond both to defense and to commercial demands, 3) those that are commercially dominated, but are useful for some defense purposes, and 4) those that are purely commercial

in nature. There will always be extensive gray

areas and overlaps when it comes to specific

cases. It is also not unusual for particular technologies to start in one area and end up in

another. Historically, analysts have argued

that the direction of the progression has been

predominantly from the defense sector into the

dual-use arena. But there is substantial evidence that the flow from commercial industry

has increased markedly in recent years.

If this shift corresponds to a change in the

center of gravity for militarily relevant technological innovation and development, then it

may presage or necessitate large-scale alterations in the way that business is conducted

within the Pentagon and in the military sector of the economy. Some analysts argue that

DoD will ultimately have to adapt its procurement regulations and contracting procedures

to accommodate private sector business practices if it is to draw efficiently on the vast resources of the commercial economy. This would

entail the elimination of many bureaucratic and

regulatory barriers that have inhibited relations between DoD and commercial industry

in the past. At a minimum, they suggest, DoD

would have to exchange military for commercial specifications where possible.

The use of gallium arsenide (GaAs) wafers

for semiconductor fabrication illustrates the

fluidity of technology transition among the

military, commercial, and dual-use sectors of

the economy. GaAs wafer technology was developed by the military because of specialized

needs for higher speed processing and radiation hardness. Today, it is entering the dualuse category as evidenced by increasing Japanese commercial R&D and marketing of GaAs

processes and products. Japanese Government

and industrial sources predict that the market for GaAs and related compound semiconductors could exceed $5 billion by 1992.1 In

such a market, the Defense Department would

still be a major customer. But if the market

for GaAs-related products and processes follows the pattern set by silicon-based microelectronics, it would increase by an additional order of magnitude by the late 1990s and would

become dominated by the commercial sector.

And in that case, significant barriers between

‘Richard C. Eden, et al., “Integrated Circuits: The Case for

Gallium Arsenide, ” IEEE Spectrum, December 1983, p. 33.

29
3 0

DoD and civilian suppliers-or a failure of U.S.

GaAs producers to enter commercial markets

—would have serious implications for the availability of such technologies for weapon systems in the future.

Each year the military Services compile lists

of key technologies that are critical to the national defense. These include such dual-use

items as fiber optics, high-temperature superconductivity, advanced semiconductors, very

large-scale integrated (VLSI) circuit chips,

supercomputing, biotechnology, and advanced

materials. These are pervasive technologies

that cannot easily be protected by special arrangements between the prime defense contractors and the Department of Defense. In

many cases, they depend on continuous innovation on a scale that can only be stimulated

by the competitive forces and the massive

capitalization generated by commercial markets. At the same time, national assets in dualuse technologies appear especially vulnerable

to erosion by world market forces as well as

domestic fiscal, monetary, antitrust, and tax

policies which have tended to encourage offshore production.

An initial step in disaggregating the technology base is to isolate a specific technology

and ask how and to what degree it contributes

to the national security. Is the orientation primarily to promote military security, or is it to

contribute to economic competitiveness, or

both? When this exercise is conducted, some

technologies appear uniquely military in character, such as “brilliant” guidance, high-power

directed energy, and broad spectrum signature

control. It is difficult to imagine civilian applications to which these technologies could

profitably be put. Indeed, some are contraindicated, such as the application of stealth

technologies to commercial aviation.

But the matter does not end there. What the

military calls brilliant guidance is a subspecies

of precision navigation, and precision navigation technologies are used in commercial products. If the technology is traced backward from

the military systems or prime contractor level,

many of the subsystems and components

would have much in common with a range of

commercial products. The subsystems that go

into brilliant guidance include computers, sophisticated microchips, sensors, mapping systems, and inertial guidance equipment. These

are usually produced to military specification

by second and third tier military subcontractors. But if these subsystems are further disaggregate, it is clear that some of the enabling and many of the pervasive2 technology

products will have been ordered off the shelf

from suppliers whose business is primarily oriented toward civilian buyers.

The task of specifying technologies that are

civilian or uniquely commercial is equally difficult. Even agricultural and medical technologies that are developed and marketed specifically to the commercial sector of the economy

have military applications. Food produced by

means of new fertilization, genetic alteration,

and pest control technologies will be consumed

by soldiers. And many commercial medical

technologies, which are quickly adopted by military doctors, would become even more valuable and critical to the Armed Services in time

of war.

The question is not whether a particular technology contributes to national security or to

economic competitiveness goals, but rather,

what actions Congress can take to ensure that

DoD will be able to obtain technology that is

necessary for the national defense in the future. In part the policy question turns on the

issue of how the Department of Defense should

invest $170 billion annually in procurement

and RTD&E to maximize military security. It

is also a question of how best to stimulate and

organize the techno-industrial infrastructure

that supports both national economic and security goals.

‘The term “enabling technology is used in some military circles to designate a technology that makes possible the development of a specific weapons system, and “pervasive technologies”

are those that can be applied to more than one—hopefully

many—system concepts. Project Forecast 11, Find Report [u],

vol. 1, Director’s Report [u], June 1986, pp. 7-8.
31

POLICY AND THE HEALTH OF THE

DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE

In OTA’s discussions with OSD and the individual Services, and with lab directors, academics, contractors, critics, businesspersons,

congressional staff, high-ranking military officials, and others, a wide array of questions and

concerns were voiced regarding the overall vitality of the technology and industrial sectors

on which the national defense relies. These are

grouped below in seven issue areas: 1) DoD

technology base management, 2) funding for

DoD technology base programs, 3) management of government laboratories, 4) military

dependence on foreign technology, 5) health

of the dual-use sector, 6) problems in the defense industries, and 7) supply of scientists and

engineers.

DoD Technology Base

Program Management

The fiscal year 1988 DoD Science and Technology Program is an $8.6 billion enterprise

involving a complex matrix of DoD laboratories, research and development centers,

universities, non-profit organizations, and industry. It includes the technology base programs of the Services, as well as those of the

Strategic Defense Initiative Organization

(SDIO), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the other defense

agencies. (The structure of the DoD technology base program is described in chapter 4 of

this report.)

Perhaps because of the magnitude of the

S&T program, DoD technology policy lacks

focus when it is compared to R&D programs

in industry. There is no single chief technology officer as is found in large corporations.

Instead, science and technology policy and

strategy are formulated by a network of individuals located in diverse offices spread across

the formal structure of the DoD S&T program.

A principal concern is that this network may

not be capable of producing a coherent, coordinated policy, and that techniques used to implement current policies may be insufficient

to manage effectively an enterprise of this magnitude.

Stemming from this concern, recent discussion has focused on four basic issues that affect the overall shape and functioning of science and technology programs within DoD.

First, is the question of how best to balance

“technology push” against “requirements

pull. ” On the requirements side, the basic

thrust is to organize technology base programs

in response to the user and the situation he

will face under battlefield conditions. If the

warfighting requirement, for example, is for

firepower with a designated range and accuracy, then technologies can be refined or invented for that purpose. Proponents of this approach often cite NASA’s Apollo Program as

a very successful example of requirements pull,

where the President specified the goal of putting a man on the moon, and technologies were

developed to satisfy that requirement.

Critics contend that requirements pull and

relevance tests dominate the planning process

within the DoD science and technology programs. They argue that radically different

technological solutions—technology push—

can change the nature of warfare and the way

that we think about it. The introduction of nuclear weapons and satellites come readily to

mind. These kinds of capabilities are not generated as a response to specific requirements

in the field. Instead, major dramatic applications become apparent when new ideas are extended to their logical and technical limits.

Some SDI technologies, such as high-energy

lasers and railguns, have been funded on this

basis—where the possibility of an application

is suggested because the physics and principles of the potential technology are understood. On the negative side, some analysts argue that these SD I technologies demonstrate

the weaknesses of technology push strategies

in R&D management. They contend that enor-
32

mous sums have been pumped into weapon

systems that cannot be made to work and will

never be deployed. The difficulty, of course,

is to ascertain the best mix of both approaches,

so that the specific threat is met, but at the

same time, new technological opportunities are

fully realized.

A second and closely related problem is the

question of how much managerial emphasis

should be placed on evolutionary development

of known technologies as opposed to reaching

for revolutionary breakthroughs where the

U.S. achieves technical advances that its adversaries cannot quickly counter or duplicate.

With the evolutionary approach, it is reasonable to expect technological progress that gradually enhances the military capacity of various systems over time. In this environment,

it is easier to predict the magnitude of the investment that is required, and to balance it

against the nature of the upgraded capability.

In striving for revolutionary technological advances, there is greater uncertainty, both with

regard to costs and with respect to the ultimate success of the project. But the potential

payoff—both in terms of new military capacities and in terms of deterrence—may be very

great indeed.

R&D management strategies that support

incremental approaches tend to place the allocation authority in the hands of midlevel managers in the Services, who assess the state of

a particular weapon system and ask what R&D

is necessary to improve performance of the system. The alternative strategy would favor placing the funding decision in the hands of lab

directors (or within special programs), and encouraging them to support higher risk projects

designed to generate qualitatively different

technical approaches. In many technology base

projects, however, the greatest “measure of

merit” is how quickly the new technology can

be injected into weapon platforms or made operational in the field. Critics contend that this

emphasis introduces a conservative bias into

the technology development process, minimizing the likelihood that significant and unexpected breakthroughs will occur.

When it comes to allocation of resources,

there will always be a tension and a need for

balance between concentration on moving new

technology out to the field as quickly as possible, and funding more indirect research that

may have broad potential implications that

cannot now be explicitly stated or exactly envisioned. Responsible and seasoned opinion

supports both sides of this question. Some observers contend that the technology base programs must methodically provide new and improved technology to the user on a regular

basis. Others emphasize the importance of supporting more abstract work by talented scientists who may make dramatic progress if they

are permitted to operate in an environment

where they can set the direction of the enquiry.

A third concern focuses on the appropriate

management role that the Office of the Secretary of Defense should assume in the overall

DoD Science and Technology Base Program.

The issue is how much OSD should centralize

and directly manage tech base programs, and

how much authority it should exert in coordination and oversight of the Services. In recent

years, an increasing percentage of research and

development has been consolidated within

OSD. The establishment of the SDIO in 1983

effectively split the Science and Technology

program into two parts, planned and organized

by two different administrative structures. The

S&T program that preceded the establishment

of SDIO is largely conducted by the individual Services and DARPA. In fiscal year 1988,

it includes Research (6.1), Exploratory Development (6.2), and approximately one-third of

DoD’s Advanced Technology Development

(6.3A). All phases of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), however, are administered by

OSD, and are funded under 6.3A. In fiscal year

1988, SDI accounted for about 41 percent of

all DoD Science and Technology funds.

Those who adopt a Services-oriented perspective on this question argue that the Services need to operate the technology base programs and in-house labs so that they are in

a position to obtain technology not only for

future systems, but also for those in full-scale
33

engineering development (FSED) or procurement. As it stands today, the linkage between

R&D resources of the Services and projects

that are already in or beyond FSED is weak

because there is a tendency to contract out for

needed technology, which could overlook relevant work in the universities and the DoD labs.

Increasing OSD control over the S&T program

would only encourage the Services’ buying

agents to ignore technology in the DoD labs

because they would see the labs as outside of

their primary organization and areas of influence and responsibility. In this view, the proper

role for OSD is to provide general guidance and

coordination, and to act as an advocate with

Congress for the specific programs of the Air

Force, Army, and Navy. Moreover, effective

science and technology base programs must

be geared closely to the needs of the user in

the field, at sea, and in the air. The only way

to ensure this fit is for the Services to conduct

their own largely independent programs, constantly subjecting them to the scrutiny of

those for whom they are ultimately developed.

Advocates of a stronger, more assertive role

for OSD contend that a more integrated management system, beginning at the R&D level,

is necessary to overcome longstanding interService rivalries, and to obtain maximum

cross-fertilization of research efforts. Some argue that it is necessary to promote commonality and inter-Service operability of military

systems at the earliest possible stage of development. This can best be accomplished if

the S&T programs are more directly controlled

by a central authority. They suggest that

higher level coordination is necessary to contain waste and eliminate duplication of effort

which results from a decentralized system. As

an example, they point to the fact that the

Services have developed independent and

largely incompatible communication systems

for the field.

Some observers believe that DoD could learn

a great deal from the organization, policies, and

working methods of successful, large-scale

R&D operations in foreign nations. Although

the tremendous scale and scope of DoD programs tend to place the agency in a class by

itself, important lessons might be learned by

examining management techniques used by

other governments as well as some private sector R&D functions. Japanese officials appear,

for example, to be able to identify promising

new areas of technology development at a national level, and then to assist industry with

a variety of state resources to exploit those

areas for economic gain.

Questions regarding congressional guidance

and oversight of DoD’s technology base programs raise a final set of concerns. With respect to the DoD Science and Technology program, there is considerable controversy as to

what congressional action, if any, would be

productive and appropriate—given the extraordinary complexity and technical breadth of

DoD’s activities in this area. Advocates of a

strong oversight role for the Congress argue

that the committees of jurisdiction should review the specific program elements (PEs) and

allocate funds based on that review.

Those who reject the idea of congressional

micro-management of defense programs urge

caution. They point out that the DoD Science

and Technology program is comprised of approximately 160 program elements, which are

the basic “building blocks” of DoD’s Planning,

Programming, and Budgeting System, and

that each PE is subdivided into many projects,

which number in the thousands. Congress

would be wasting its time to try to look into

the intricacies of the S&T program-because

this is daunting even for specialists who spend

all of their time doing nothing but trying to

understand and manage the existing system.

In this view, Congress should confine itself to

setting an overall direction for the S&T program consistent with the larger issue of national security policy, leaving the supporting

science and technology apparatus in the hands

of professional administrators.

Some Members of Congress have chosen to

concern themselves with the overall health and

maintenance of the defense technology base

in the United States. Part of that choice in-
34

volves developing some yardsticks with which

to judge the organization, management, and

content of DoD science and technology base

programs. Does the present system result in

the most efficient and equitable division of effort and funding? Does it provide an overall

approach with sufficient integration and coordination? Does it result in an optimal balance between technology push and requirements pull, and between evolutionary and

revolutionary R&D strategies? And finally,

what lessons might DoD learn from other organizations that manage large-scale technology

programs?

DoD Technology Base

Program Funding

Funding for DoD Science and Technology

programs (budget categories 6.1,6.2, and 6.3A)

has varied considerably over the past 20 years.

The funding issue has generated a great deal

of confusion, even among persons generally

knowledgeable in defense matters. There are

several distinctions that can help to clarify the

situation, and there are unmistakable trends

that can be sorted out. S&T funding must be

clearly distinguished from the larger Research,

Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)

budget, of which it is only about 20 percent.

Figure 1 shows both RDT&E funding and S&T

funding from the early 1960s to the late 1980s.

The graph on the left shows the magnitude of

the S&T budgets in relation to the much larger

RDT&E budgets. In its discussions, OTA

found that many persons mistakenly believe

that funding for basic research (6.1) was substantially increased during the Carter-Reagan

defense buildup because they knew that funding for RDT&E had increased by almost 100

Figure 1 .—Technology Base Funding, 1964-1987 (1988 dollars)

Total Department of Defense

Research, Development, Test,

& Evaluation

40 Science & Technology .
35

percent. But a quick glance at the graph on

the right indicates that in constant dollars

funding for basic research has been relatively

stable over the past 20 years and has not benefited substantially from recent increases in

defense spending.

On the other hand, funding for exploratory

development (6.2) fell dramatically from a high

of approximately $4.6 billion3 in 1964 to about

$2.6 billion in 1974, reaching $2.5 billion in

1984. The trend for advanced development

(6.3A), however, more nearly parallels the funding history of basic research (6.1), if the funds

for SD I are excluded. The non-SD I advanced

development (6.3A) figures are approximately

as follows: $0.9 billion for 1964, $0.8 billion for

1974, and $1.7 billion for 1984. When the

figures for 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3A are aggregated,

exclusive of SDI, the overall trend is a sharp

drop in funding throughout the late 1960s into

the late 1970s with a modest recovery that

levels off at about $5.2 billion after 1984. This

represents a real decrease in funding of about

25 percent from 1964 to 1984.

Recent trends look very different if funds

for SD I are considered as part of the S&T program than if they are treated as a separate

‘‘add-on. The graphs in figure 1 indicate that

this is a matter of some significance because

they were authorized by DoD and treat SDI

as a distinct category. The Strategic Defense

Initiative has accounted for over 40 percent

of the S&T budget for the past two fiscal years,

and has been exclusively funded through the

advanced development (6.3A) budget category.

Some analysts believe that SDI funds do not

contribute substantially to the overall DoD

S&T program, that R&D conducted by the

SDIO is highly specific to anti-ballistic missile (ABM) warfare. Others contend that SDIO

programs make and will continue to make a

strong contribution to R&D throughout DoD’s

Science and Technology base programs.

If SD I funding is aggregated with the rest

of the S&T budget, then the numbers alone in3A11 budget figures in this and the following paragraph are

taken from figure 1 and are in constant 1988 dollars.

dicate a dramatic increase in advanced development (6.3A), which almost doubles overall

S&T funding since 1983. But even in this case,

basic research (6.1) which has not been affected

by SDIO funding has remained constant, even

in a period of rapid buildup of defense spending. Accordingly, any substantial reduction in

funding for basic research to accommodate

overall decreases in defense appropriations

would reduce basic research to its lowest level

in 20 years. The same argument can be made

for exploratory development (6.2). Finally, if

SDI funds are excluded, a reduction in funding for advanced development (6.3A) of $0.8

billion would put that budget category at its

lowest level in 20 years. These kinds of figures

have led to a concern that Congress and military planners may not have provided for adequate reinvestment in the technology base.

Two major considerations bear on the question of whether congressional appropriations

have been sufficient to maintain the DoD technology base. The first centers on the difficulty

of measuring the impact of research and exploratory development on the military security of the Nation. Most observers accept the

principle—as an article of faith-that research

builds the foundation on which future technological advances rest. But the connection between today’s specific research projects and

future military products and technologies is

not obvious, cannot be quantified, and is extremely difficult to render in explicit terms.’

As a result, while everyone agrees that research is important, it is difficult to make an

argument that research funding should be supplemented in any given appropriation.

By contrast, it is comparatively easy to argue that a particular weapon system would enhance the force structure and contribute to the

“’Studies of technological innovations have shown them to

depend on research results that are decades old and often in

seemingly unrelated fields . . . A highly successful basic research

effort may never generate technological innovation or economic

payoff if other factors in the economy are not conducive to technological change, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Research Funding as an Investment: Can We Measure

the Difference? OTA-TM-SET-36 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1986), p. 5.
military security of the Nation. While the contribution of today’s research may not become

evident for 10 to 15 years or more, funds allocated for anew missile or bomber can be justified as necessary expenditure to meet a clear

and present threat. Moreover, the results of

cutting funds for technology base programs

may not show up for years, and even then, it

would be difficult to demonstrate a one-to-one

or causal type relationship between insufficient

R&D funding and future weaknesses in the

force structure. It is far easier to grasp the implications of cutting funds for new military

hardware-where a budget cut of $100 million

would translate into a definite reduction in the

number of new tanks or fighter aircraft that

could be procured. For these reasons, while

almost everyone would advocate increased

R&D funding in the abstract, few are willing

to trade more tangible programs for the vagaries of indefinite technological advances in

the future.

These circumstances have contributed to a

low priority status for technology base funds.

But perhaps more important is the disproportionate vulnerability to which R&D funds are

subjected during a period of budget reduction.

Suppose, for example, that the Navy is instructed by the Secretary of Defense to cutoutlays by $150 million. This could be achieved

in a number of ways. One method would be

to cut all programs across the board. Opponents of this strategy contend that it fosters

mediocrity by strapping the really good programs and by prolonging the lifespan of inferior projects. Another way to achieve the reduction would be to cancel the decision to build

a new aircraft carrier. This is an unlikely decision because it would sacrifice a $3 billion carrier to save only about $150 million in the first

year.

R&D, on the other hand, has a very high payout of approximately 50 percent. By cutting

$300 million in R&D funding (which would, of

course, be a draconian measure), the controller

could gain the same savings as canceling an

entire carrier. Thus funding for technology

base programs is subjected to a kind of double jeopardy. In the first instance, its promoters and advocates are few and far between. And

in the second, there are strong incentives for

powerful program and budget managers to

‘‘raid’ R&D funds as a means of saving more

advanced, more visible and, therefore, more

pressing programs.

The second funding issue focuses on internal allocation of funds within the technology

base programs that takes place subsequent to

and largely independent of congressional appropriation. There is concern that technology

base funds (6.1 and 6.2) may not be allocated

most efficiently among a variety of competing interests, that they may ultimately not find

their way to the areas in which the most important technology research is taking place.

There is a tendency for funds to go where it

is easiest for them to go, instead of where they

would do the most good. This is often tied to

institutional mechanisms, and to historically

based claims that may be difficult or impossible to resist. Critics argue, for example, that

some DoD laboratories, which may not contribute significantly to the technology base,

are nevertheless funded because closing them

would be politically unpopular.

The policy issues related to funding of the

technology base have not received a great deal

of attention in the past. Is it necessary to take

measures to change the allocation of funding

among technology base programs? Is the technology base adequately funded relative to the

overall DoD budget? With regard to this question, analysts have pointed out that technology base programs are historically the first to

be cut during a budget crisis, and that they

are among the last to be restored when fuller

funding becomes available. Some have argued

that the technology base functions best when

funding is level and predictable. And they suggest that even if it may not be possible or advisable to put all of DoD on a multiyear budget

cycle, it might make sense to put R&D programs on such a footing. And finally, is there

significant misallocation of funding within the

tech base programs? Are technology base

funds redirected toward projects that are not

tech base, and if so, what actions can Congress

take to correct the situation?
Management of Government

Laboratories

The U.S. Government supports an extensive

network of laboratories funded principally by

the Department of Defense, the Department

of Energy, and NASA. Over the past decade,

these labs, and particularly those run by DoD,

have been the subject of many studies which

have focused on problems such as inadequate

pay, aging facilities, quality of work, and inappropriate allocation of workloads and resources.

There is considerable concern that the network of government laboratories does not form

a coherent system to support technology needs

—not for the military and not for commercial

endeavors that also support military production. This concern is closely linked to the problem of hiring and retaining first rank scientific

and engineering talent, particularly in the DoD

laboratories. Some analysts suggest that the

quality of personnel recruited for the defense

labs will not be raised significantly until salaries are made competitive with industry. In

some instances, they note, salaries in the DoD

labs have failed to keep pace with salaries for

similar positions in the universities.

Policy questions concerning the role of the

government labs in the defense technology

base focus on four concerns. First, is the work

of the DoD labs skewed too strongly toward

the development side of R&D and, if so, what

are the implications of this trend? In recent

years, basic research at DoD has become a

progressively smaller proportion of the administration budgets. By any measure, research

is a minuscule part of the Federal budget. And

within DoD, basic research consumes only

about 10 percent of Science and Technology

funds.

Some observers argue that basic research is

slighted or overlooked because its value as an

activity cannot be quantified and does not result directly in new products or weapon systems in the field. Basic research is treated in

some quarters as an expendable activity, they

suggest, because it has few long-term advo3 7

cates who are in a position to remind Congress

and the public of its value. High-level appointees at the Pentagon tend to gloss over the importance of the research function in favor of

high profile, big ticket acquisitions. Most hold

their jobs for no more than a few years, and

cannot be expected to take the long-term, apolitical perspective which is needed to understand and promote funding for basic research

in a highly competitive, acquisition-dominated

DoD environment.

Advocates of increased funding for basic research argue that of all R&D-related activities,

basic research is probably the most amenable

to centralized coordination and funding mechanisms. This is because the objective is to answer questions about the nature of physical

reality and technology, and not to apply what

has been learned. Applied research necessitates

a specialized dialog, usually between the researcher and the ultimate user, to make sure

that the products of the former are compatible with the needs of the latter. This relationship favors a decentralized organization. Basic

research, on the contrary, presupposes no end

user, and could, accordingly, be organized in

a highly centralized manner. Proponents of

such a move believe that consolidation of government research into a central organization

would not only create new efficiencies, but

would also give this activity the sponsorship

and visibility that it presently lacks.

A second area for policy consideration concerns the role of the DoD labs as intermediaries between the government and industry.

To what extent should the labs maintain inhouse capacities as opposed to contracting out

research and development work? There are

clearly two extremes that most observers agree

should be avoided. The first is for the government to contract out so much R&D that it loses

the capacity to assist the Services directly

when a need arises, or loses the ability to set

direction for and evaluate the work of contractors. At the other extreme, a lab or system of

labs might find itself in direct competition with

industry, denying commercial or contractor access to proprietary information developed in

government labs.
38

Some industry spokespersons contend, for

example, that the Navy does what it wants to

do in its labs, and keeps what it does for the

Navy. They claim that the Navy, which contracts out approximately 40 percent of its

R&D, maintains excess in-house capacity. In

this view, some major research facilities have

set up rigid barriers that have introverted

operations, withholding valuable information

from DoD contractors. Some contractors feel

that they are in competition with the Navy

labs, and are, accordingly, far less willing to

share their data and results with the Navy.

They agree that the Federal Technology

Transfer Act may help to ease this situation,

but argue that the root of the problem is that

government should not be in competition with

the private sector.

Some observers suggest that the boundary

between the government labs and industry

needs to be a good deal more fluid than it presently is. Government labs should not be conducting research that has already been completed successfully in industry and vice versa.

In this view, DoD needs to institute some

mechanism to ensure that the labs and industry cooperate more closely and do not duplicate each others research when it is unnecessary.

The question of rigid mission orientation

versus a more flexible approach to R&D forms

a third issue area for laboratory management.

All three Services attempt to construct plans

and budgets on a mission-oriented basis. Indeed, the Congress required this approach in

the 1974 Budget Reform and Impoundment

Control Act. But there is considerable difference of opinion, both within and outside of Congress, concerning the interpretation of this requirement. Some suggest that the linkage

between technology base activity and specific

military mission ought to be tenuous and tentative in character.

If the work of the labs and their contractors

is too closely tied to a particular mission or

application, they contend, then the overall focus for R&D will be short range at best, and

may lead to a kind of tunnel vision. This is particularly true of basic research, where the future applications and benefits of today’s work

cannot be known—almost by definition. Some

observers argue that the Services should place

a higher priority on basic research, and take

a longer range view of the whole problem of

generating technology for future weapons systems. Such a scenario is politically difficult because there is tremendous pressure to get

equipment into the field as soon as possible

in order to meet the threat and to have something to show for vast outlays of taxpayer and

borrowed dollars.

A final policy problem centers on increasing coordination and cooperation between the

extensive laboratory operations of the DoD,

DOE, and NASA. Within DoD, there are different laboratory commands for each of the

Services, and some believe there are too few

institutional mechanisms for cross-fertilization

between the DoD operations and the more expansive laboratory facilities both at NASA and

at DOE. Some analysts suggest that the present decentralized system is necessary to meet

the highly individualized needs of the various

different organizations. They suggest that if

the individual Services had to rely on a centralized system for R&D, it would greatly inhibit the process by which technology is transitioned into engineering development, and the

essential connection to the end-user would be

lost.

Others contend that the United States pays

a price for operating a highly fragmented system with diverse R&D agendas. Such a system could result in unnecessary duplication of

effort and in government support of labs that

have long since stopped contributing to the

leading edge of technology research and development. They believe that the present configuration of laboratory facilities is a consequence

of tradition and uneven historical growth,

rather than rational planning geared to late

20th century conditions of high-technology

warfare and international economic competition. Some analysts suggest that the United

States should identify a set of national technological goals, and then reorganize and con-
3 9

solidate its system of national labs to meet

those goals. They attribute the success of the

Apollo project to the fact that a goal was set,

and resources were organized to meet the goal.

They believe that the United States might already be in a good position to take a lesson

from the Japanese, who have achieved remarkable success by selecting national technological milestones and working toward them. Various schemes—ranging from a single executive

technology agency to a system of lead agencies, each associated with a different national

technological goal-have been proposed. Proponents argue that the resulting benefits could

be realized both by the military and by the commercial sector at the same time.

What steps, if any, should Congress take to

ensure more efficient use of government laboratories, including closing, merging, or consolidating facilities? What actions might be

taken to enhance technology transfer among

the various labs and between the government

and the commercial sector? What impediments

could be removed? Are there measures that

could be taken to make government laboratories more attractive places to work? Are programs being unnecessarily constrained because of the narrow focus of their parent

organizations, and are important areas of research being overlooked? What alternatives to

the present system might contribute significantly to the health of the defense technology

base in the future?

Military Dependence on

Foreign Technology

In recent years, complex weapon systems

have come to exhibit some of the internationalization of labor, materials, and component

parts that has long characterized the commercial sector. There is increasing concern that

DoD is not immune from the larger economic

forces that have produced the world car.

A coherent policy on military dependence on

foreign technology will have to balance benefits obtained from access to foreign technology and products against the loss of technology base capacities that results from long-term

dependence on other nations. It should be

based on an assessment of whether or not internationalization of the defense technology

base poses a threat to military security, and

if so, it should take cognizance of the reasons

for the decline of key technology areas in the

United States. This, in turn, may suggest strategies that the United States can pursue to resist or reverse dependence on foreign sources.5

Policy should be informed with the reality that

some forms of dependence maybe harmful and

avoidable, others helpful and desirable, and

some others unavoidable whether we like it or

not.

There are two significant dimensions to the

problem of increasing military dependence on

foreign technology. The first centers on growing foreign leadership and market domination

in important dual-use technologies, i.e., technologies that have significant commercial as

well as military applications. In some instances

the United States appears to be losing market share in high-technology products as well

as the leading edge in development of new technologies. In others, advanced technology already exists in foreign countries, but is not

produced competitively in the United States.

In part, this problem is compounded by continuous pressure for DoD to take advantage

of efficiencies and superior products that international competition has brought to the

commercial world. In the future, DoD may be

driven to buy a larger share of foreign military

products, particularly if foreign suppliers can

achieve economies of scale, high quality, and

low cost that have eluded domestic producers

in recent years.

There are significant potential liabilities in

dependence associated with commercial loss

of capacity in dual-use technologies. It may

be that the United States will be forced to

maintain certain technologies because of their

strategic importance. Military dependence on

‘This dependence has not yet reached significant proportions

in a great many technological areas. Many analysts believe that

the United States still holds a commanding lead in most technologies that are military in character.
4 0

foreign dual-use technology will always have

to be scrutinized when the technology is pervasive in character-i. e., essential to the production and maintenance of a great many military systems—especially when the domestic

capacity is appreciably below state-of-the-art.

This is precisely the situation that the Defense Science Board (DSB) addressed in a

study recommending the establishment of a

semiconductor manufacturing technology institute, since named Sematech. The DSB report stated that U.S. military strategy depends

on leading edge electronics, and specifically on

semiconductors, that are essential to support

U.S. warfighting strategy and capabilities. The

DSB argued that decreased competitiveness

by U.S. semiconductor makers would soon

translate into loss of manufacturing know-how

and the ability to fabricate future generations

of semiconductors. At some point, loss of manufacturing technique would lead, inexorably,

to an inability to design the most sophisticated

chips domestically. The study concluded, accordingly, that the military would shortly depend on foreign sources to supply advanced

semiconductors, and that this is an unacceptable condition.

Some observers argue that the Sematech

concept addresses the symptoms and not the

heart of the problem. The real issue, they contend, is the question of how the United States

can stay at the leading edge of technologies

that are crucial to the military defense of the

Nation. Sematech may provide the near-term

ability to design and fabricate silicon-based dynamic random access memory chips, but it will

do nothing to maintain state-of-the-art capacity if global market forces push subsequent

generations of equipment into gallium arsenide

or optically based technologies. From this perspective, the real question centers on how to

structure policy and markets to keep and maintain technological capacity in the United

States.

Dependence on pervasive, dual-use technologies might be a critical factor even in peaceful and prosperous times, when trade is mutually advantageous between two countries.

Consider a scenario, perhaps in the year 2000,

when DoD would place an order for the next

generation of sophisticated GaAs-based integrated circuits made only in Japan. The Japanese, who reportedly expect a substantial

commercial market by the turn of the century,

might then be unwilling to produce the parts

to military specification, at a price the United

States could afford. The DoD order might not

be large enough to justify the cost of new manufacturing technology or the diversion of technical resources from more profitable commercial markets. In this scenario, the alternative

would be to attempt to build the chips in the

United States. But if the domestic industry

was not already fabricating the chips for commercial markets, the cost would be prohibitive

because the order would have to pay for new

factories as well. It is even possible that the

capacity to design the desired product might

no longer reside in the United States. And without recent experience, it is likely that the chips

that could be produced would not match Japanese performance and reliability. Considering the military need for enhanced computational speed and for radiation hardness, such

dependence would clearly be undesirable, even

in the best of times.

On the other hand, depending on allies for

advanced dual-use technology can be beneficial on a number of grounds. First, it increases

economic interdependence which, if properly

managed, leads to strong incentives for continued alliance and cooperation. Second, it can

provide access to state-of-the-art technologies

that simply are unavailable in the United

States. In today’s global economy, it is no

longer possible for the United States to dominate—and at present the United States is not

even competitive in—a full range of commercial technologies and markets. And finally, in

many cases, internationalization of technology

makes possible a wide range of economies of

scale and manufacturing expertise that would

be difficult to achieve domestically.

The second significant dimension of the issue of military dependence on foreign technology arises because DoD prime contractors pro-
duce major weapon systems that incorporate

components and subsystems developed by foreign defense firms. Both economic and political considerations contribute to “offset” agreements where U.S. allies contract to buy a

portion of the run for a particular missile, airplane, or submarine, thereby lowering the unit

cost of procurement and increasing military

and economic cooperation within the alliance.

In return, the prime contractors agree to purchase a certain percentage of the components

and subsystems from participating allies. In

addition, the United States has entered into

a number of cooperative agreements for conventional defense development programs with

its NATO allies pursuant to congressional

direction.

There are substantial benefits to be realized

from mutual and interlocking dependence

among allies in the development of military

technologies. To this end, the United States

participates in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, is a major supporter of the SHAPE Technical Center located

in the Hague, and is a member of the NATOsponsored Advisory Group on Aerodynamic

Research and Development in Paris. Technological interdependence tends to strengthen

the alliance itself because it raises the costs

for any ally that would choose to withdraw

from the alliance. International division of labor also creates an opportunity for the United

States to gain access to superior military component technologies that it cannot get at home.

Few observers believe it is still possible in a

global economic environment for any country

to maintain leading edge technology across the

entire range of significant military capabilities.

Just as international competition creates winners and losers in commercial markets, innovation and leadership in military technologies

is increasingly dispersed across a spectrum of

highly capable firms with different national orientations and loyalties. Under these conditions, maintaining state-of-the-art military capabilities requires that the United States draw

on the best products emerging from an international defense technology base.

On the other hand, certain liabilities are associated with dependence on foreign components

used in U.S. weapon systems. One can envision an international division of labor where

the United States would produce the components and systems for which it had developed

the requisite technology base, and then would

buy or trade with its allies to procure parts

and systems supported by their leading edge

technologies. While this kind of cooperation

is probably necessary and unavoidable in some

technology areas, it presupposes a peaceful

world in which free and open trade are the norm

in an interdependent world economy. Citing

rising international economic tensions and

increasing regional military conflict, some

analysts argue that the relatively stable postwar economic and political order may be rocked

by significant changes in the future. For this

reason, they caution that excessive military

dependence should be avoided, even with allies and friendly trading partners.

There is, in addition, the issue of timely delivery of parts or components of military importance. In some cases, it might be more lucrative for a firm to delay its deliveries to the

Department of Defense, giving priority to a

preferred customer. If the company is located

in the United States, DoD or the prime contractor would have more leverage to press for

delivery of scarce items. It is much more difficult to ensure continuity in timing and supply when the firm in question is located in

another country.

Governments now and in the future will seek

to create market advantages for their own domestic firms irrespective of whether they are

organized primarily for commercial or military

production. While a blanket policy that opposes military dependence on foreign technology might enhance security in the near term,

it might also tend to undermine significant benefits that are realized through selected and intelligent cooperation with our allies, even

though such relationships might ultimately

lead to a system of interlocking dependencies.

It is, accordingly, important to look at the

issue of foreign dependence not as an article
42

of faith, but rather in relation to specific technologies, industrial sectors, and political and

economic realities that constrain our choices.

Under what circumstances should the United

States rely on its allies and trading partners

for selected military technologies, even when

such reliance leads to diminished domestic capacities? By what criteria could areas be identified in which the United States should reduce

dependence on foreign technology? What policies—R&D, tax, trade, or otherwise—might

help minimize dependence, and at what cost?

And finally, what and how severe are the risks

to United States national security when selected dual-use technology industries move

offshore?

Health of the Dual-Use Commercial

High-Tech Sector

Strong interaction between the military and

the civilian economy has characterized the

growth of high technology in the United States

in the post-WWII period. Today, commercially

produced dual-use technologies-e. g., microelectronics, computers, fiber optics, and advanced composites—are necessary for the design and production of a wide range of weapon

systems. Recent losses in competitiveness and

leading edge technical capacities by commercially oriented domestic firms raise concern,

principally for two reasons.

The first is that DoD depends on the dualuse sector to develop and transfer new technologies that are of military significance. This

can be a critical resource, even when the military uses only a small fraction of the products

resulting from a given technology. Civilian contributions to new and evolving technologies

are especially important because military hardware in some fast-moving areas can be 5 or

more years behind the leading edge of the commercial sector.

The second cause for concern is that the military relies on commercially oriented firms for

high-technology products that are incorporated into military hardware. In general, the

Pentagon will designate a single prime contractor both for the development and manufacture

of a major weapon system. If the project is on

the scale of a nuclear submarine, for example,

the prime will contract, in turn, with hundreds

of subcontractors for the design and production of subsystems and specific components.

Some of the subcontractors may execute additional agreements with other companies, and

soon down the line. At some point in this chain,

many of the components and parts that end

up in the final product will be bought off the

shelf from corporations that do most of their

business in civilian markets.6

In terms of defense technology policy, decline in critical dual-use high-technology industries can be addressed both from an in-house

and from an economy-wide perspective. In the

first case, DoD can create a new capacity, or

“farm industry, ” within the defense contractor community and in the government laboratories to meet specified needs for advanced

technology. In the VHSIC (very high speed integrated circuit) program, for example, OSD

sought to extend conventional silicon technologies and to increase the pace of development

in design tools, advanced production equipment, and semiconductor device designs.7 But

high-ranking Pentagon officials indicate that

the VHSIC technologies have only been deployed in one weapon system to date. This kind

of remedial action is extremely expensive, and

can probably only be maintained on a modest

scale.

The second option is to stimulate, directly,

those high-technology industries in the commercial sector that are deemed necessary to

the development and manufacture of the next

generation of military hardware. In many

cases, however, the DoD share of the market

for a given technology is not enough to pull

the industry forward. Under such conditions,

the resources and capital formation of commercial markets are necessary to stimulate development and leadership in high technology. It

‘In addition, the Pentagon buys a great deal of office equipment, such as computers and typewriters, directly from commercial firms.

‘Kenneth Flamm, Targeting the Computer: Government Support and International Competition (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 77-78.
43

is likely, for example, that loss of competitiveness in high-volume semiconductor markets

by U.S. companies would lead, in time, to military dependence on foreign sources for a wide

range of enabling technologies. Accordingly,

the continued ability to produce state-of-theart weapon systems that are superior in the

field may finally depend on the Nation’s capacity to produce high-technology products

that are competitive in world commerce.

Because both of these options have severe

limitations, it maybe necessary to go beyond

the arena of defense policy and to consider additional alternatives from a broader economic

perspective. Some analysts argue that avoiding dependence on foreign high technology

requires a better understanding of the relationship between the development of new knowledge, the manufacturing process itself, and the

formation of capital for industrial purposes.

They suggest that one strategy, sometimes

pursued by the Japanese, is to begin operating in a technology area where an industry

must accept a certain degree of foreign dependence at the outset. But a primary objective

(en route to establishing a viable market share)

is to acquire technological know-how and the

manufacturing ability as a national asset,

severing relations with foreign industry as domestic capacity increases. To accomplish this

transition, industry must have access to domestic arrangements and sources for capital

formation that are superior to those extended

in foreign countries.

Executives in high-technology industries argue that when the venture is capital-intensive,

the ability to design new leading edge products will be closely tied to the manufacturing

process, which will be physically located where

the most advantageous arrangements for capitalization can be made. It will also be tied to

the ability to transition new concepts and technology breakthroughs into an efficient production process. In this view, the capacity to mobilize the technology base is a technology in its

own right—one that must be mastered before

competitive new products can be introduced

to the marketplace. For example, it requires

specialized skills and techniques to discover

a new high-temperature superconductor. But

once it is made the first time, and the research

is published, other researchers can duplicate

the process. Even so, designing high-temperature superconductors into products that are

useful and producible is extremely difficult. It

is costly and will require sophistication and

further research in a wide range of technologies.

In addition, the capital requirements for

mobilizing a new technology-of bringing new

ideas out of the universities and into efficient

mass-market production operations—can be

enormous. The difference between a capital

cost of 7 percent and one of 9 percent may make

the difference between success and failure. Cost

of capital affects the time it takes to get the

product to market, and determines, in part, the

kinds of activities that stockholders are willing to fund. When two companies are in competition to produce a comparable product, the

one that can acquire an equity base that enables it to get its product to the market 1 year

before the other will win. Some business persons are concerned that government does not

understand the relationship between the cost

of capital and the capacity of their companies

to transition new technology into the marketplace. They cite the easy credit arrangements

that governments of some Pacific Rim and

European nations extend to industry. They believe that anti-trust law can significantly disadvantage American manufacturing, particularly in high-technology sectors, because it has

tended to block the formation of combined capital resources that may be required if an industry is to survive in the international competition.

Under such conditions, a failure to provide

capital incentives to locate high-technology industries in the United States will have predictable consequences on the process of technology innovation. These can be expressed as

three distinct steps in losing a technology. In

the first, an industry moves its manufacturing operations offshore, perhaps because

cheaper capital can be obtained or because production costs, including labor, are lower. The

United States may also retain a manufactur-
44

ing capability, but may not be able to produce

at a competitive cost. Second, when the technology evolves to the next generation, the U.S.

part of that industry may find that it has lost

the ability to manufacture the new products

on a stateof-the-art, competitive basis. At this

stage, costs of getting back into the manufacturing end of the business maybe prohibitive.

And finally, when the technology evolves yet

again, and is now two or three generations

away from the original product line, it will be

difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. companies

to design leading edge new products. To do so,

the industry would have to find designers with

access to the proprietary information generated in the production process associated with

the previous generation. In this scenario, a nation loses a high-technology industry because

it fails to pursue capital incentives sufficient

to keep the industry at home, and this leads,

in turn, to a simultaneous degeneration of process and design know-how which may be combined with loss of market share and investment

capital.

Some observers believe that government policies have contributed to an overall decline in

the competitiveness of American industry.

They argue that government has not only

failed to stem the migration of U.S. factories

to foreign countries, but has also neglected to

support the interests of American business at

home and abroad. In this view, U.S. companies have had to compete with foreign industry that enjoys advantages-such as protected

home markets, low cost capitalization, and

R&D subsidies-that are the constituent parts

of carefully orchestrated national industrial

strategies. One result, they claim, is that the

dual-use infrastructure of domestic technology

is weakening. In addition, fiscal and monetary

policies have, until recently, kept the dollar artificially propped up against foreign currencies, making imports relatively less expensive

than domestically produced goods. A massive

trade imbalance, high interest rates, and excessive foreign investment have exacerbated

a comparative disadvantage in capital formation for domestic firms. In addition, some argue that tax incentives, like the investment

tax credit, are not carefully enough tailored

to benefit most industries upon which the military depends.

Others think that U.S. free trade policies

have led Congress and the administration to

be indifferent to the inability of technologically

oriented American companies to compete more

successfully in world markets and with foreign

competitors at home. They argue that American business cannot “go it alone’ against unfair combinations of state power and industrial

might in the international marketplace. The

belief that American companies can sustain

market share against the concerted national

economic policies of their trading partners is,

they contend, a potentially disastrous holdover

from a bygone era of American military and

economic hegemony.

There is great diversity of opinion as to what

Congress should do about the loss of world

market shares of some American high-technology industries, and the resulting damage to

the dual-use technology base in the United

States. Some observers believe that Congress

should do nothing because it is faced with what

amounts to an intractable dilemma. If the Pentagon pursues a policy of buying the best available high-tech products at the lowest price,

then it will introduce foreign dependence to the

weapons procurement process over the long

run. This course of action would tend to advantage foreign competitors at the expense of

American companies. But these circumstances

might also create strengths in the military capacity of our allies, encouraging them to shoulder more of the defense burden in the future.

On the other hand, if the United States adopted

a policy to buy only from American companies,

then it would lose access to some state-of-theart technology, and might have to pay excessive costs associated with domestic production. In this view, Congress should continue

to stay on the sidelines because any course of

action is likely to create extensive dislocation

and unacceptable adjustment costs.

Advocates of a more coherent industrial

strategy argue that the United States cannot

afford to lose certain essential industries. They
45

point out that other countries have taken steps

to avoid such losses, steps that have, in some

cases, damaged U.S. economic interests. Under these circumstances, the United States

should now consider legislative action not only

to protect critical high-technology markets,

but also to adopt tax and monetary policies

which guide American business toward greater

productivity and profitability. Such a perspective, they acknowledge, envisions a more central role for government in the affairs of business. But they also contend that such measures

will be necessary if U.S. corporations are to

remain competitive in the face of what amounts

to concerted Japanese and European economic

policies that are structured to create advantages for domestic firms in foreign markets.

At a minimum, they argue, government should

adjust macro economic and other policies to

slow or halt the decline of American hightechnology industry. They do not expect a return to the overwhelming economic and military leadership that the United States enjoyed

in the immediate postwar decades, but they

would hope to arrest its decline.

Others oppose both the “do nothing” and

the “high-tech industrial strategy” scenarios

in favor of a negotiated middle ground. They

contend that Congress must not allow the demise of a range of technological capabilities

and industries that are of strategic military

importance. They seek national economic selfsufficiency and independence for a limited

group of high-technology industries that are

necessary for numerous weapon systems.

While it is not possible for the Department of

Defense to underwrite every industry that

produces high-tech products for military systems, careful planning and prudent investment

might support a stable of technical capacities

that are essential to the national security.

Some argue that DoD could do a great deal

more to support the dual-use technology base

in the United States. In this view, DoD has

concentrated too many of its resources in a

small number of defense prime contractors on

the assumption that R&D and procurement

funds will ultimately filter down to the lower

tier subcontractors where many dual-use technologies are developed. They contend that the

R&D base for the dual-use infrastructure of

American industry could be enhanced if DoD

would commit a greater percentage of its funds

directly to the sub-tier industries. But they also

note that this approach would require major

simplifications in DoD contracting and reporting processes, as well as substantial substitution of commercial for military specifications

in future weapon systems.

Many analysts believe that the United

States should seek to avoid dependence on foreign manufacturers for high-technology products that are critical for the defense of the Nation. This objective is particularly difficult to

achieve in many dual-use industries, where the

Department of Defense is at best a minor customer. Nevertheless, if the United States is to

avoid foreign dependence, then state-of-the-art

design and manufacturing capacities must remain in the United States for an array of technologies that are critical to the development

of defense systems.

A central difficulty is that for many of the

most important technologies, the pace and

direction of rapid innovation are driven by developments in the commercial sector by industries that are typically multinational in scope.

Moreover, the capital requirements for R&D,

design, and manufacture of successive generations of many high-technology products are

enormous. Because DoD cannot fund the full

spectrum of technologies that are essential to

the national defense, the health of these industries will depend on profits from sales in the

commercial marketplace.

High-technology manufacturing in the

United States cannot be expected to survive

if the American market is dominated by foreign imports. The United States has pursued

a trade policy that assumes fair and open trade,

and encourages Americans to purchase goods

of the lowest price for a given quality, regardless of where they were made. In pursuit of

lowest cost or access to foreign markets, many

American firms have moved manufacturing

operations offshore. In addition, many foreign
46

firms sell goods in the United States. At the

same time, many foreign governments prohibit

U.S. firms from selling similar products in their

home markets.

Recognition of the power of governments to

create and alter international economic environments through trade, tax, non-tariff barriers, and various industrial policies has led

some observers to propose new approaches to

structuring the U.S. high-technology market

and industrial base that go well beyond the

limits of existing U.S. policy. One such approach would impose prohibitions against importing key high-technology products made by

foreign industry as well as by American-owned

operations located in foreign countries. Instead, both U.S. and foreign-owned firms

would be required to manufacture those key

products in the United States if they intended

to sell them in the United States. Such a policy would force some definite portion of the

high-technology manufacturing base to be located permanently in the United States. Presumably, other countries would institute similar restrictions. Reciprocal arrangements

would have to be negotiated to establish mutually acceptable manufacturing and merchandizing rights among participating nations,

with the result that each nation would consider

the interests of the larger trading block in forming its own policies. Proponents agree that

while this approach might create more stable

manufacturing conditions, the turmoil of transition would be unprecedented.

Most observers agree that it is essential to

view the issue of the health of the dual-use industries both in terms of military needs for the

next generation of weapon systems, and from

the perspective of structural dislocation of the

wider economy. Is it necessary and feasible to

establish policies to preserve selected hightechnology industries, together with governmental institutions to carry them out? If so,

how would DoD’s interests be represented?

What degree and kind of government intervention, if any, will be necessary to ensure the future health of the dual-use sector of the American economy? Are there specific government

policies that have weakened important domestic high-technology industries? Are there areas

where government inaction has contributed to

the problem?

Problems in the Defense Industries

For most technical developments of military

significance, the road from laboratory to field

runs through a select and highly concentrated

group of large defense contractors. While these

companies can perform a variety of major

tasks, their principal role is to act as prime system integrators. These are the companies that

assemble the products of subcontractors and

component makers into finished missiles, aircraft, submarines, and other defense systems.

Over time, the prime contractors have developed a unique relationship of mutual dependence with the government. Unusual business

conditions have created a situation in which

there is only one buyer, the Department of Defense, and following contract award, only one

supplier. The trend over the past quarter century has been toward greater concentration

and fewer contracts, resulting in winner-takeall sweepstakes for many major weapon systems.

Because the defense industry both consumes

and develops new technology, there is longstanding concern that its unique relationship

with the government may inhibit technical development and the most efficient application

of new technology. The most prominent of

these concerns fall into three closely related

areas, each of which influences the health of

the defense technology base: 1) unstable business conditions, 2) inducements for corporate

R&D, and 3) outmoded manufacturing technology.

The Department of Defense and the prime

contractors have argued for years that Congress should adopt a multiyear budgeting cycle which would provide greater stability in the

complex and demanding business of building

advanced technology weapon systems. If DoD

could authorize a prime contractor to produce

500 aircraft at a rate of 50 per year for 10 years,

stable business conditions could be achieved.

Instead, economies of scale and other efficiencies are sacrificed when Congress appropriates
4 7

funds for limited production runs on a yearto-year basis. Or, alternatively, OSD or one of

the Service buying commands may decide to

shift funds away from a particular program,

creating the same perturbations. Under these

circumstances, rational business principles and

planning processes cannot readily be applied.

Critics argue that unstable business conditions exist in all markets, and that establishing predictability is what planning and marketing is all about. Like many firms in the

commercial sector, defense contractors tend

to plan only in the short term of 12 to 24

months. Preoccupation with near-term sales

discourages the defense sector from making

long-range investments in basic and applied

research. Such practice, they contend, deemphasizes the value of investing in new technical developments, a kind of investment that

may not pan out for as much as 5 to 10 years.

Government procurement processes and regulations may reinforce this trend, providing

few inducements for defense contractors to put

money back into the technology base.

A second and highly related problem concerns independent research and development

(IR&D), a principal mechanism through which

government encourages the defense contractors to develop technologies that can result in

new products with defense applications.8 As

presently constituted, IR&D is a major factor in building and maintaining the defense

technology base because the cost to DoD is

equivalent in size to approximately one-fourth

of the overall science and technology base

activities (6. 1-6.3A, including SDI) funded by

the Department of Defense. As it stands now,

administration of DoD’s funding of IR&D is

so complex that even senior administrators

and experts who study the problem have difficulty agreeing on the basic components and

concepts of the program. Accordingly, a cen8For a comprehensive review of the history and present status of the IR&D question, see U.S. Congress, Congressional

Research Service, “Science Support by the Department of Defense” (transmitted to the Task Force on Science Policy, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Science Policy Background Report No, 8, Serial II,

Washington, DC, December 1986), ch. VIII.

tral policy issue is the question of what incentives the IR&D mechanism actually provides

for industry, and whether it is an efficient device for meeting national goals. Congress may

wish to leave it alone, adjust its operation, or

abolish the IR&D mechanism—substituting

in its place a program that offers significant

inducements for company R&D, but which can

be more easily monitored and evaluated.

In general, research and development conducted by the DoD contractors is either carefully specified under contract with the government or it is initiated independently (and not

under any contract). Under the IR&D funding mechanism, a portion of the costs of independent research is recovered as part of an

overhead charge on all contracts which a company enters into with DoD. Typically, major

defense contractors will present to DoD a

description of the IR&D they propose to conduct–to receive a technical evaluation, and to

negotiate the terms and conditions for reimbursement. Although it is often referred to as

a “program” by DoD officials, and Congress

annually approves a ceiling for IR&D on an

advisory basis, there is no line item for IR&D

funds in the defense budget.

Companies that choose to conduct IR&D,

and receive DoD approval of their work, are

able to recover a portion of their IR&D costs

as an additional, negotiated increment of overhead (historically about 2 percent of the contract cost) on their contracts with the Department of Defense. In addition, these companies

retain proprietary and data rights for the R&D

that is conducted. Such rights become a significant asset for the company, can generate

future contracts with DoD, and can lead to additional future IR&D.

Within DoD there are actually two mechanisms–IR&D and B&P (bid and proposal)–

which are managed as essentially a single element, although the objectives and criteria of

each are different. IR&D is research, development and design activity conducted by defense

contractors that is not directly in support of

funded DoD contracts. The word “independent” is used to indicate that the companies re-
48

— . -. — —

tain final authority on what research is conducted, but it is somewhat confusing because

DoD usually reviews and evaluates the research in advance. In addition, the term is used

to distinguish non-contractual (independent)

R&D from R&D that is performed under contract with DoD. (It can also refer to R&D that

the company performs on its own that is not

submitted to DoD for reimbursement.) The

term “B&P” refers to costs that contractors

incur when they respond to government RFPs

(request for proposals) or prepare unsolicited

proposals directed toward anticipated military

needs.

DoD requires that B&P efforts not be directed toward actual design and development.

In addition, data rights do not result from

activities conducted with B&P funds because

the purpose of these reimbursements is to offset the costs of submitting project proposals

to the Department of Defense. In actual practice, however, companies do intermingle IR&D

and B&P funds, and it is difficult for DoD to

impose accountability and control mechanisms

in this area. Indeed, regulations now permit

companies to shift costs between prenegotiated B&P and IR&D cost ceilings for any given

year, and B&P is not monitored as closely as

IR&D. Critics charge that companies are able

to conduct virtually any type of activity they

deem necessary to gain and maintain a competitive edge, and that the government pays

without obtaining any rights to the design data

or the right to procure the product from

another source. While it is true that government does not acquire proprietary or data

rights, and the companies do have wide latitude in the selection of IR&D projects, DoD

has placed substantial controls on IR&D/B&P

reimbursements in an effort to ensure that such

work, when conducted by industry, is directed

toward the needs of the national defense.

There is considerable debate as to the effectiveness of the DoD regulations that control

IR&D. Many industry leaders and some DoD

managers believe that DoD regulations go well

beyond those envisioned by Congress when it

enacted Section 203 of Public Law 91-441,

which contains the requirement that IR&D

activities show potential military relevance

(PMR). Due to ambiguity in the language of

Section 203, however, some projects that are

used to calculate the IR&D/B&P ceilings do

not meet the PMR test. DoD administrators

maintain that they have brought this matter

to the attention of Congress, and that Congress

has not taken corrective action. In the absence

of further congressional direction, DoD requires that “the total portion of the ceiling allocable to DoD contracts must be matched by

IR&D work having a potential relationship to

a military function or operation, ” even though

individual IR&D funded projects may not meet

the PMR requirement.9

Detailed IR&D Technical Plans are prepared

by participating companies each year. These

submissions include future plans as well as a

review of past activities. Through OSD, the

military Services review these plans to ensure

that a potential military relationship exists,

and to assign numerical scores, based on the

technical quality of the plans. In addition to

this technical documentation by each company

and the rating process by DoD, onsite reviews

of IR&D efforts are conducted at major companies on a 3-year cycle. These reviews are

often quite detailed, typically requiring 2 or

3 days of presentations to the review team.

While this review process is costly and timeconsuming, the fact remains that the bulk of

the defense contractors receive almost automatic approval of their IR&D plans. In addition, IR&D is highly concentrated in a few

companies. Roughly 90 companies receive 95

percent of IR&D funds, with wide distribution

of the remaining 5 percent to approximately

13,000 firms.

The initial funds to conduct IR&D/B&P activities are committed by the individual companies, and the portion of the costs deemed

“allowable” by DoD negotiators is accepted

for allocation to all of the company’s business.

DoD does not permit the entire costs of company R&D to be recovered, and government

‘DoD fact sheet entitled “DoD Implementation of Public Law

91-441, Section 203. ”
‘‘share’ is negotiated annually.10 For example,

in fiscal year 1986, US defense contractors told

DoD that they spent roughly $7.39 billion for

IR&D/B&P ($4.97 billion for IR&D and $2.42

billion for B&P). Of that, DoD recognized $5.26

billion ($3.51 billion for IR&D and $1.75 billion for B&P) as costs that could legitimately

be associated with products sold both to government and to commercial customers. Of this

total, the government’s share came to $3.50

billion ($2.16 billion for IR&D and $1.34 billion for B&P). The overall ceiling for IR&D is

set annually by Congress.11

The propriety of IR&D/B&P reimbursements has been questioned by several Committees of Congress, and has been the object

of sustained controversy over the past 20

years. The defense contractors argue that

IR&D is the lifeblood of their business, providing a means for them to conduct innovative research that contributes to the maintenance of the defense technology base in the

United States and results in major new weapon

systems. From their perspective, it is analogous to new product R&D conducted in the

commercial sector, with the difference that the

element of risk is largely shifted to the government because DoD has agreed to cover its

share of the costs in advance.

A panel of senior officials with extensive defense experience has concluded that:

the substantial R&D undertaken by U.S.

defense industry (reimbursed in part by the

Department of Defense) has changed significantly in its character. While this effort

was highly innovative in the 1950s and

‘

nThe government “share’ of accepted costs is allocated as

overhead to government contracts and the government’s “allocable share” is determined as a percentage of the total business that the firm does under contract with the government.

The level of costs to be allowed is usually negotiated. Firms

recover a larger portion of B&P costs then IR&D costs from

DoD, either as a percentage of incurred or accepted costs. See

U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, 4’DefenseRelated Independent Research and Development in Industry, ”

(prepared by Joan Dopico Winston, CRS Part No, 85-205S,

Washington, DC, Oct. 18, 1985), app. III.

11 In fiscal Vear 1986, DoD tended to be more generous in its

reimbursem~nt for B&P than for I R&D, reimbursing 76.6 percent of recognized B&P and only 61.2 percent of recognized

IR&D.

49

1960s, it has become increasingly conservative in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, it has

become far more an effort to reduce technical risk than to innovate. In some measure

the Pentagon is responsible for the new emphasis. The main criterion for reimburse

ment used to be the innovativeness of the

work; today the controlling question is apt

to be whether industry’s R&D is sufficiently

related to an ongoing weapons program.12

Defense industry executives argue that

IR&D is the mechanism through which their

companies build up internal technology bases.

They contend that IR&D is not a partnership

with the government, but rather that relations

with DoD are sometimes strained and that

there is a good deal of tugging and pulling over

this issue. Many see IR&D as a creative alternative to government regulation. In this view,

when the government lets an R&D contract,

it is DoD bureaucrats and not industry technologists who determine the direction of R&D

programs within industry. The IR&D mechanism has the benefit that it originates in the

defense companies and represents the best

thinking on technology that the private defense sector can provide. It is, they contend,

the central mechanism that enables industry

to tell the government where major R&D emphasis and projects should be placed. According to industry executives, IR&D proposals

receive internal corporate review at the highest levels of management and represent fundamental decisions concerning the direction

of future corporate research.

Some observers contend that IR&D is, at

best, an inefficient means of supporting research in the defense industries, and at worst,

a gigantic government giveaway. They point

out that the bulk of IR&D goes to fewer than

20 contractors, and argue that it tends to

strengthen existing companies and to inhibit

competition by handicapping new firms that

are not already doing business with DoD.

Others are concerned that IR&D funds are targeted toward short-term technical applications

1 jFrom ‘‘Discriminate Deterrence, Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (January 1988), p. 46.
5 0

for which relevance can easily be demonstrated

and costs recovered quickly. In this view, it

contributes little to long-term research and development on which the health of the defense

technology base depends.

Are the interests of government best served

by the IR&D/B&P system as presently constituted? Is industry technically enhanced as a

result of IR&D, or could these funds more effectively support the defense technology base

through some alternative mechanism? Does

the system of IR&D reimbursements discourage new companies from contributing to the

defense technology base? Does IR&D inhibit

DoD from drawing more widely on the commercial sector?

A third area of concern centers on antiquated

and inefficient manufacturing practices within

the defense industries. For more than two decades, DoD has supported the Manufacturing

Technology Program (ManTech) and, more recently, the Industrial Modernization Incentives Program (IMIP).13 But these efforts have

not provided sufficient incentives to encourage

modernization of many plants that build advanced weapons systems. The result is that

inefficiencies and excessive costs, that would

not be tolerated in the commercial sector, have

come to characterize a large portion of the defense industries.

Critics charge that many prime contractors

have largely neglected the manufacturing process, despite the fact that a few have built stateof-the-art demonstration facilities. In this view,

contractors have tended to emphasize laborintensive product technologies that strive to

reach the outside limits of performance. They

contend that many contractors concentrate on

fancy, expensive new product technologies

lsThe Nation~ Rese~ch Council concluded, “The actual impact of the [ManTech] program, however, was limited . . . Several groundless but widely held myths have been used to support the erroneous belief that manufacturing technology was

either an unimportant or an inappropriate concern of DoD. Continued acceptance of these myths could be devastating for the

next generation of weapon systems. ” National Research Council, Manufacturing Technology: Cornerstone of a Renewed Defense Industrial Base (Washington, DC: National Academy

Press, 1987), p, 16.

that will catch the eye of some project manager

in DoD. When the contract comes through,

they assert, the defense companies have not

developed sophisticated manufacturing facilities capable of delivering the new product on

time, at agreed costs, and up to military specifications. They conclude that a myopic focus

on super high-tech, complex systems, has led

to shortfalls in manufacturing technologies

that cannot be sustained indefinitely.

Other observers contend that the system of

government contracting, particularly the costplus-fee instrument, creates disincentives for

firms that would like to modernize their manufacturing processes.14 They argue that such

contracts encourage high production costs because profit, overhead, and other fees are calculated as a percentage of the total cost of production. In the defense industry, where firms

are comparatively more insulated from international competition, supply, demand, and

other market forces, there is less incentive (and

less progress) to contain costs and to increase

efficiency by upgrading outmoded manufacturing practices. Indeed, increased manufacturing costs can translate into increased profits

and other fees on future contracts.

There are additional disincentives. If a contractor attempts to modernize manufacturing

technology, he must face the risk that the new

process may not work in the short run, or may

introduce significant delays into production

that may result in angry program managers,

negative publicity, investigative reporting, audits, and congressional ill will. In addition,

some analysts contend that government has

failed to provide sufficient inducements to support research, development, and implementation of costly new process technologies, ManTech and IMIP to the contrary notwithstanding.

And finally, some observers argue that when

industry makes major investments in more ef14’’ The defense procurement system creates a business environment that provides inadequate incentives for process improvement. Both the nature of competition among contractors

and the contract pricing policies act to inhibit emphasis on production efficiency.” National Research Council, The file of DoD

in Supporting Manufacturing Technology Development (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1986), pp. 10-11.
51

ficient process technology and manufacturing

plant, the benefits accrue only to the government, and may even damage the position of

the defense contractor. This would occur typically when a future contract is negotiated with

the government, and the company’s cost base

is reduced, decreasing profits and other fees.

In such circumstances, the company might be

unable to recoup the investment that it had

made in new manufacturing technology. This

mechanism, it is argued, encourages small and

incremental improvements where the costs can

be recovered in a single contract run. It is a

direct disincentive to major upgrading of manufacturing facilities, and acts particularly to

the detriment of small companies that cannot

withstand losses which would result from less

favorable terms on future contracts.

With regard to the defense industries, the

policy question turns on the issue of what can

be done to stimulate large defense contractors

to plan and invest in longer range technology,

and to invest in modem manufacturing or process technologies. Should Congress substantially alter the relationship between DoD and

the defense contractors? Do government policies inhibit the transfer of technology to defense companies or the entry of innovative

companies into the defense business? Does the

emphasis on short-term planning inhibit technological innovation and, if so, what government policies would have to be changed to reverse this orientation?

Supply of Scientists and Engineers

Because the vitality of the defense technology base ultimately depends on the supply of

qualified scientists and engineers, demographic trends that forecast shortfalls and a

change in the national character of the supply

have aroused widespread concern. Is there a

military or economic requirement that a certain number of American citizens be trained

as scientists and engineers? If so, is it likely

that sufficient numbers of Americans will enter advanced degree programs in technical

fields over the next decade?

Various studies indicate that over the next

10 years the United States will experience a

decline of up to 25 percent in the number of

young people entering college. This includes

an expected increase of 20 to 30 percent in the

number of minority students who, historically,

have not entered advanced degree programs

in science and technology in large numbers.

If these trends persist, they could exacerbate

an already significant decline in the number

and percentage of U.S. citizens receiving advanced degrees in science and engineering. In

previous work, however, OTA has found this

scenario unconvincing. OTA concluded in 1985

that “it is entirely possible that supply of people trained in science and engineering will not

decline at all, despite the drop in college-age

population." 15

The decrease of U.S. citizens entering these

advanced degree programs has generated special concerns both within DoD and in the defense industries because demand for engineers

and scientists in specialized fields significantly

outpaces supply. In 1981, for example, there

were 10 jobs for each new degree holder in computer sciences and 4 jobs for each new nuclear

engineer. Defense analysts also cite shortfalls

in the area of aeronautical engineers, and in

the fields of avionics, computer software, and

electrical systems, among others.l6

Recent strong demand has been coupled with

a long-term increase in the number and percentage of foreign nationals enrolled in graduate degree programs in science and engineering. In the 20 years between 1964 and 1984,

the proportion of foreign Ph.D. candidates in

these disciplines increased from 17 to 26 percent. Among engineering Ph.D. candidates

alone, the proportion of foreign nationals ad-

‘

sU.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Demographic Trends and the Scientific and fi~ngineering \$’ork

Force-A Technical Afemorandum, OTA-TM-SET-35 (\f’ashington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1985), p.

4. Issues concerning the supply of technical personnel are discussed further in the forthcoming OTA assessment, 13ducating Scientists and Enp”neers: Grade School to Grad School,

OTA-S13T-377 (in press), anticipated to be released in May 1988.

l~Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on University Responsiveness to National Security Requirements, January 1982, DTIC ~ADA 112070, pp. 2-3 and 2-4.
52

vanced from 22 to 56 percent.17 Some observers

are alarmed at the growth in the percentage

of U.S.-trained foreign scientists and engineers,

which has occurred at the same time as a reduction in the number of U.S. citizens trained

in technical areas. The total number of students in graduate school has increased, while

Ph.D. degrees have remained the same.

If present trends continue, the DoD labs and

the companies that do business with the military will be faced with three choices. They

could elect to employ fewer persons, but hire

only American citizens. They could maintain

the number of American scientists, but pay

more to attract them. And finally, they could

elect to hire increasingly more foreign nationals

over time. A principal security consideration

is that it is difficult to exercise effective national controls over persons whose citizenship

and allegiance is with another country.

The broader problem, of course, centers on

the possible loss of domestic capacity to undertake leading edge scientific research and development. Here, the dual-use technology industries are as much at risk as the government

*’U.S. General Accounting Office, “Plans of Foreign Ph.D.

Candidates: Postgraduate Plans of U.S. Trained Foreign Students in Science/Engineering,” GAO/RCED-86-102FS, p. 7, The

GAO data is taken from “Foreign Citizens in U.S. Science and

Engineering: History, Status and Outlook, ” NSF 86-305 (Washington, DC, 1985).

laboratories and contract industries specifically associated with the Department of Defense. Some analysts suggest that the role for

foreign scientists may be in the industries

which support both commercial and military

technologies. They assert that increasing numbers of foreign scientists and engineers plan

to live permanently in the United States, and

they urge immigration authorities to facilitate

the stateside plans of these valuable persons.

The other side of the coin is that many U. S.-

trained scientists and engineers return to their

own countries. Indeed, many Japanese and

European nationals have received their training in the United States, but have gone to work

for firms at home that are in direct competition with companies in the United States.

The policy question centers on what steps,

if any, should be taken to increase the number

of projected U.S. scientists and engineers, and

whether it is necessary or wise to take steps

to affect the number of foreign graduate students in U.S. universities.18 Is there a need for

additional scientific manpower to satisfy both

national security and commercial needs? What

roles should foreign scientists play in the defense technology base in the United States?

“See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, J3ducating Scientists and Engineers: Grade School to Grad School,

OTA-SET-377 (in press), ch. 4, anticipated to be released in May

1988.
Chapter 4

Managing Department of Defense

Technology Base Programs

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense (DoD) appropriation for its technology base programs1 exceeds $8.6 billion in fiscal year 1988, of which

almost half (see table 2) is funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SD I). This represents

less than 4 percent of the entire DoD budget.

Nevertheless, many inside and outside of the

Pentagon consider DoD’s technology base programs a crucial investment in the Nation’s

overall national security. The military’s technology base programs consist of a broad spectrum of ‘front-end” technology development,

beginning with a broad base of basic research

support and extending through the demonstration of technology that may make up future

defense systems. The scope of interests within

DoD’s technology base programs ranges

across diverse technological concerns from

meteorology to autonomous guided missiles

capable of differentiating among various

targets.

‘For purposes of this study, technology base programs refer

to budget categories 6.1 (basic research), 6.2 (exploratory development), and 6.3A (advanced technology development). DoD

usually considers 6.1 and 6.2 as its technology base programs,

with 6.1 through 6.3A normally referred to as its “science and

technology programs. ”

In fiscal year 1988, more than half of the Pentagon’s technology base program was performed by industry, another third by DoD’s

own in-house laboratories, and the remainder

by universities. According to DoD, each of

these performers plays an important part in

the successful operation of its technology base

program, and extensive cooperative efforts

among the three groups yields a significant return on DoD’s investment.

The universities perform over 50 percent of

DoD’s basic research activities. In addition,

DoD contends that its in-house laboratories

provide the Armed Services with the ability

to meet special military needs that cannot be

met by the Nation’s industrial base. These laboratories focus attention on short- and longterm defense needs, and they enable the military to act as a smart buyer of technology and

equipment. The primary role of private industry is to develop technology and apply it in

new military systems. z

‘Martin, Dr. Edith W., “The DoD Science and Technology

Base Programs: Some Management Perspectives, ” Army Research, Development, and Acquisition Magazine, Sept. -Oct.

1983, p. 3. At the time this article was written the author was

DUSD(R&AT).

Table 2. —Department of Defense Fiscal Year 1988 Funding of Technology Base Programs

(in millions of dollars)

Army Navy Air Force DARPA Total

Research (6.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $169 $342 $198 $ 8 3 $ 902’

Exploratory development (6.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $556 $408 $557 $512 $2,033

Advanced exploratory development . . . . . . . . . $319 $227 $754 $202 $1,502

Total services and DARPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,437

Strategic Defense Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $3,604

Other defense agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 564

Total DoD technology base programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $8,605

‘Thl~ ~u~ ,nClud~~ $110 ~llllOn for the URI ~hl~h OSD has not yet allocated ‘fllOflg the three services and DARPA

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment. 1988, from data supplied by the Off Ice of the Secretary of Defense.

53
54 —

Goals and

According to DoD,

Objectives

its diverse technology

base programs attempt to achieve six major

goals:’

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Offset Soviet Numerical Superiority. The

U.S. does not attempt to match the Soviet Union and the Warsaw bloc on a person-for-person or weapon-for-weapon basis. It relies instead on technology to

achieve the desired military advantage.

Keep Ahead of the Growing Soviet Threat.

Although this is increasingly more difficult, the United States must maintain its

technological lead in order to offset the

Soviet threat.

Reduce Complexity and Costs. The technology that is produced by the military

must be designed to reduce the cost and

complexity of future weapon systems.

Improve Productivity of the Industrial

Base. Maintenance of a strong industrial

base, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, is one of

the most important advantages for the

United States.

Sponsor the Highest Quality of Science

and Technology (S&T) Work. DoD must

make sure that the S&T work performed

by industry, universities, and its in-house

labs is of the highest quality and scientifically sound.

Enhance Return on Investment. Finally,

DoD always tries to receive the greateest

possible return on its S&T investment.

The Department of Defense contends that

the military’s science and technology programs

have played, and will continue to play, a crucial role in maintaining the military and civilian science and technology (S&T) base. Examples of this include:

● early development of lasers and incorporation of their unique capabilities into

weapon systems;

● early development of integrated circuits

and their application to mission-critical capabilities;

‘Ibid., p. 4.

development of aircraft technology which

provides substantially improved capabilities in maneuverability, flight, fire control, and firepower; and

development of the carbon-carbon composite material nosetip for the TRIDENT

D-5 re-entry vehicle.

Funding Categories for DoD’s

RDT&E Activities

The Department of Defense does not employ

the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) familiar categories of basic research, applied research, and development when reporting its

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

(RDT&E) activities.’ Instead the Pentagon

uses a series of six RDT&E functional categories numbered 6.1 to 6.6. They are defined by

DoD as follows:5

●

●

6.1 Research. Includes scientific study and

experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those

fields of the physical, engineering, environmental, biological, medical, and behavioral-social sciences related to long-term

national security needs. It provides fundamental knowledge for the solution of

military problems. It also provides part

of the base for subsequent exploratory and

advanced development in defense-related

technologies and of new or improved military functional capabilities in various scientific fields.

6.2 Exploratory Development. Includes

all the efforts directed towards the solution of specific military problems, short

of major development projects. This type

of effort may vary from fairly fundamental applied research to quite sophisticated

‘Accordimz to NSF, when DoD .rxovides NSF with its RDT&E

spending levels, DoD breaks it down into NSF’s three corresponding categories in the following manner: 6.1 research is

reported as “basic research’ 6.2 exploratory development is

reported as “applied research”; and categories 6.3-6.6 are reported as “development.”

5U.S. Department of Defense, INST 7720.16 (OPNAV

3910. 16). enclosure(3), p.2-7 and 2-8. Department of the Navy,

Budget Guidance Manual, 7102.2. Quotations in the following

section are from this source; the remaining material is

paraphrased from this source.
breadboard hardware, study programming efforts.

. . . The dominant characteristic of this

category of effort is that it be pointed

toward specific military problem areas

with a view toward developing and evaluating the feasibility and practicability

of proposed solutions and determining

their parameters.

6.3 Advanced Development. Includes all

projects which have moved into the development of hardware for experimental or

operational test. It is characterized by line

item projects, and program control is exercised on a project basis. The focus of Advanced Exploratory Development (6.3A)

lies in the design of items being directed

toward hardware for testing of operational

feasibility, as opposed to items designed

and engineered for eventual Service use.

6.4 Engineering Development. Includes all

those development programs being engineered for Service use but which have not

yet been approved for procurement or

operation. This area is characterized by

major line item projects and program control by review of individual projects.

6.5 Management Support. Includes research and development efforts directed

toward support of installations or operations required for general research and development use. Included would be: test

ranges; military construction; maintenance support of laboratories, operations

and maintenance of test aircraft and ships;

and studies and analysis in support of the

R&D program. Cost of laboratory personnel, either in-house or contract-operated,

would be assigned to appropriate projects

or as a line item in the Research, Exploratory Development, or Advanced Development Program areas, as appropriate. Military construction costs directly related

to a major development program will be

included in the appropriate element.

6.6 Operational Systems Development.

Includes research and development efforts

directed toward development, engineering

and test of systems, support programs,

vehicles, and weapons that have been ap5 5

proved for production and Service employment. 6.6 is not an official category as are

6.1-6.5, but is a term used for convenience

in reference and discussion. Thus, no program element will exist numbered 6.6.

All items in this area are major line

item elements in other programs. Program control will thus be exercised by

review of individual research and development effort in each Weapon System

Element. Activities in categories 6.3-6.6

receive the bulk of RDT&E funding (91.5

percent in fiscal year 1987 estimated).

Funding for DoD’s technology base programs is appropriated to the individual Services, SDIO, and the Defense agencies such as

the Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Nuclear

Agency (DNA). As table 2 indicates, in fiscal

year 1988, SDIO supported the largest technology base program, followed by the Air Force

Army, Navy, and DARPA.

An Overview of Defense

Programs (6.1)

Research

The Armed Forces have supported research

since the early days of the Nation. The 1804

expedition of Lewis and Clark, for example,

was funded by the Army. With the establishment of the Office of Naval Research (ONR)

in 1946, the military became the first Government organization to support a major program

of university-based basic research. This commitment continued with the establishment of

the Army Research Office (ARO) in 1951, and

the Air Force Office of Scientific Research in

1952. The Advanced Research Projects Agency

(ARPA, later DARPA) was established in 1958

as part of the U.S. response to Sputnik.

DoD funded the bulk of federally sponsored

research prior to the establishment of such

Federal research agencies as the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In the 1950s

and early 1960s, DoD sponsored about 80 percent of all federally funded basic research.

However although DoD funds about 66 per-
56

—

cent of all Federal R&D, it is the fourth largest

supporter of basic research, accounting for approximately 13 percent of all federally sponsored basic research.

In fiscal year 1988 DoD will spend about 2.1

percent of its RDT&E budget ($902 million)

on basic research. This is down from an average of 4.6 percent in the 1960s and 3.6 percent

in the 1970s. During fiscal year 1988, approximately 50 percent of DoD’s research will be

performed by universities, with another 30 percent by DoD’s in-house laboratories, and the

remaining 20 percent by industry and nonprofit organizations.

The Department of the Navy will support

the largest research program in fiscal year

1988, funding 37 percent of all DoD’s research.

The Army and Air Force will support about

19 and 23 percent respectively, with DARPA

and the other Defense agencies supporting the

remaining 21 percent.

The Pentagon views its research program as

a crucial source of its future technology. However, DoD research activities differ from other

technology base activities because research is

not necessarily expected to result directly in

a military product. The Services support research into the nature of basic processes and

phenomena, and contend that they select research projects based on the quality of science

and their potential relationship to the DoD

mission.

The three Services and DARPA support research activities in such fields of science as:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

physics

astronomy

electronics

mathematics

mechanics

materials

oceanography

atmospheric sciences

behavioral sciences

radiation sciences

astrophysics

chemistry

computer science

energy conversion

●

●

●

aeronautical sciences

terrestrial science

medical and biological sciences

Work in these fields is applied to space technology, computer science, electronics, surveillance, command and control, communications,

propulsion, aerodynamics, night vision, chemical and biological defense, structures, medical and life sciences, and other areas of military importance.6

Most successful research programs lead to

further efforts in exploratory development (category 6.2) which focus on more applied configurations with military relevance. This research and development process led, for

example, to the injection of laser technology

into military systems. The laser was primarily supported by DoD soon after the time of

its invention, when its potential military relevance appeared quite remote.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

and the Services contend that research accomplishments are transferred or quickly passed

onto the military R&D community and potential laboratory program managers.

Extramural contractors, primarily universities and industry, are not expected to justify

their (6.1) research proposals in terms of possible DoD applications. However, in-house researchers, because of their laboratory association, are expected to demonstrate a closer

association to specific military applications.

The most important criterion for funding research is the quality of science, followed by its

potential relationship to the DoD mission.

Other criteria include:

●

●

●

●

the potential of the proposed research to

lead to 6.2 work;

whether a civilian R&D agency should

support the proposed research;

the possibility that the research will lead

to radically new scientific discoveries;

the track record of the researcher(s) submitting the proposal; and

8C01. Donald I. Carter, ‘‘The Department of Defense Statement on Science in the Mission Agencies and Federal Laboratories, ” before the Task Force on Science Policy of the House

Committee on Science and Technology, Oct. 2, 1985, p. 7.
5 7

● the extent to which a proposal fits into

a particular Service’s 6.1 funding priorities.

The basic research programs in the three

Services are comprised of three major program

elements (PE):7 Defense Research Science; the

In-House Laboratory Independent Research

Program (ILIR); and the University Research

Initiative (URI). The Defense Research Science

program is the largest of the three programs,

making up 90 percent of the 6.1 budget. At

6 percent of the research budget, ILIR is designed to give laboratory directors flexibility

in order to take advantage of new technological opportunities and to help maintain a research base in the laboratories. (DARPA and

the Army do not support ILIR programs.) The

remaining 4 percent of the research budget is

devoted to the URI program.

Pursuant to the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act, all of the Services and DARPA

publish an annual broad agency announcement

(BAA). The BAA outlines the specific research

interests of each Service and DARPA, and the

procedures for submitting research proposals.

DoD contends that all proposals falling within

the guidelines of each BAA are considered competitive and satisfy the Act.

DoD believes that supporting 6.1 work is important for its in-house laboratories. By supporting the military’s research program, DoD

feels laboratory researchers are able to keep

abreast of new discoveries and engage in important interactions with the scientific community. According to DoD, laboratory performance of research increases the technical

abilities of the laboratories and helps to attract

imaginative scientists and engineers.

Technical Review of Research

Proposals and Programs

Each of the Services, and DARPA, conducts

an extensive technical review of all research

‘The PE is the basic building block in DoD’s program, planning, and budgeting system (PPBS). There are approximately

180 PE’s in DoD’s entire technology base program, with each

PE consisting of all costs associated with a research activity

or weapon system.

proposals. The Army Research Office subjects

proposals to a three-level technical review process: a peer review in the external scientific community for technical excellence, an Army laboratory review both for excellence and military

relevance, and an ARO internal review to make

a final funding decision. The Services encourage researchers to discuss their proposal

ideas with the appropriate DoD technical person before submitting a formal proposal. Those

researchers who follow this suggestion have

an approximate 50-percent success rate, compared to a lo-percent funding rate of proposals

received without prior contact.

The Navy’s technical review is completed

primarily in-house by their scientific officers.

Of the three Services’ research programs, the

Office of Naval Research has the largest number of staff scientific officers, about 80. Due

to a smaller professional staff, the Army Research Office (ARO) and the Air Force Office

of Scientific Research (AFOSR) rely primarily on outside review of their research proposals

although they also use in-house expertise to

review proposals. (Each has about 40 professional people located at its research office.) The

National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has a contract with the ARO and AFOSR to arrange

formal technical reviews of research proposals.

DARPA relies primarily on the three Services

and the external scientific community to review its research proposals.

In most cases, the Service laboratories form

technical review panels, made up of the laboratory director and various technical program

directors, to decide which research proposals

will be funded within the laboratory. The Naval Research Laboratory, for example, uses a

Research Advisory Committee, consisting of

the laboratory and program directors, that determines which in-house research proposals

will be supported.

An Overview of DoD’s Technology

Base Activities in the Laboratories

The Department of Defense laboratories perform research and development in diverse

areas of science and technology in support of

military and civil works programs of DoD.

83-20 7 - 0 - 88 - 3
58

There are currently 68 DoD RDT&E laboratories (31 Army, 23 Navy, and 14 Air Force)

that have a combined annual cash flow of

nearly $10 billion for technology base and other

development activities. The responsibilities

and operations of the various laboratories differ within the three Services in order to meet

their individual mission requirements. DoD’s

laboratories actually perform only about onethird of the technology base activities, while

industry performs over 50 percent and the Nation’s universities and nonprofit organizations

perform the remainder.

The Pentagon contends that its laboratories

play a crucial role in solving science and engineering problems, deficiencies, and needs that

are unique to the military. DoD states that the

primary purpose of its laboratories is to develop new technologies to support each of the

respective Service’s missions. According to

DoD, the role of the laboratories in the development and improvement of technology and

weapons systems is fundamental to improving

national security. DoD believes that the laboratories have a responsibility to maintain a

strong continuity of scientific activities, free

from commercial pressures, directed toward

meeting specific military needs. Further,

according to DoD, the laboratories provide a

fast reaction capability to solve immediate critical problems that may confront the Services.

Other responsibilities include the following:

1.

2.

3.

4.

ensure the maintenance and improvement

of national competence in technology

areas essential to military needs;

avoid technological surprise and ensure

technological innovation;

pursue technology initiatives through the

planning, programming, and budgeting

process; allocate work among private

sector organizations and government

elements;

act as a principal agent in maintaining the

technology base of DoD;

Where is about an equal number of other centers that do not

perform traditional RDT&E activities, but rather are special

facilities with very specific missions, such as flight testing new

or refurbished aircraft. The R&D activities of DoD’s laboratories are discussed fin-ther in chapter 5.

5. provide material acquisition and operating system support;

6. stimulate the use of technical demonstrations and prototypes to mature and exploit U.S. and allied technologies; and

7. interface with the worldwide scientific

community; provide support to other government agencies.9

The Pentagon asserts that its technology

base capabilities should serve as a strong complement to the civilian technology base, as emphasized in a recent DoD report to the Senate

Armed Services Committee:

A strong free enterprise economy and industrial base–here and abroad–are the essential underpinning of our defense posture.

Investment in our technology base and maintenance of our technology strength are critical to the long term security of the U.S. and

our allies.l0

Over the past several years DoD officials

have been trying to resolve a number of difficult laboratory issues. The Pentagon has been

struggling with such concerns as improving

communications within and among the different laboratories, increasing the management

flexibility of the individual laboratory directors, meeting scientific and technical personnel needs, upgrading facilities, developing

mechanisms for evaluating the performance

of the laboratories, and improving DoD’s overall management of its laboratories.

Special Technology Base Initiatives

DoD has initiated a number of special programs to help address specific technology base

problems. Most of these initiatives center

around such concerns as communication between DoD and various research performers,

scientific communications and technology

transfer, and support of the research infrastructure.

In 1982, DoD established the 5-year, $150

million University Research Instrumentation

‘U.S. Department of Defense, “Report (for the Committee on

Armed Services) on the Technology Base and Support of University Research, ” Mar. 1, 1985, p. 42.

IOIbid., p. 53.
Program (URIP) to improve the capability of

universities to perform research in support of

the national defense. This program provides

funding for large items of equipment ($50,000

to $500,000) that would not be funded in a typical research grant.11 This program was considered a success by DoD. But judging by the response, it will not come close to meeting all

the instrumentation requests; in the first year

alone, it received 2,500 proposals seeking a total of 646 million dollars’ worth of equipment.

In 1983, at the recommendation of the Defense Science Board, DoD established the DoD

University Forum. The Forum consists of an

almost equal number of DoD and university

members and was originally co-chaired by the

Under Secretary of Defense for Research and

Advanced Technology and the President of

Stanford University. The Forum has issued

reports dealing with such subjects as scientific

secrecy and technology export control, engineering and science education needs, and

DoD’s response to those needs. More recently,

the forum’s working group on engineering and

science education issued a report which endorsed the major components of the University Research Initiative (URI) to foster greater

DoD-University cooperation.

According to the Department of Defense, the

URI would “address some of the concerns expressed by Congress regarding DoD support

for the infrastructure of science and technology in the United States, ” particularly at colleges and universities.12 DoD proposed to

spend $25 million in fiscal year 1986 and $50

million in fiscal year 1987 for the University

Research Initiative. Congress responded by appropriating $88.5 million in fiscal year 1986,

$35 million in fiscal year 1987, and $110 million in fiscal year 1988.

DoD’s URI program consists of two major

program elements. The first element consists

1‘According to DoD, funding for a typical l-year single investigator research contract would fall in the range of $50,000 to

$100,000.

“CO]. Donald I. Carter., USAF Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology, Testimony Before the Subcommi ttee on Research and Development

of the House Armed Services Committee, Apr. 2, 1985.

59

of multidisciplinary research contracts designed to enhance interdisciplinary research

efforts between universities, industry, and

DoD laboratories. Generally, these contracts

will receive support for 3 to 5 years, with review and evaluation after 3 years. These research centers will conduct research in a range

of disciplines (mathematics, engineering, and

the physical, biological, and social sciences) important to the Pentagon. The centers will increase overall defense funding for high risk

basic research in support of critical defense

technologies, as well as continue support (in

place of URIP) for equipment and instrumentation. 13

The second major URI program element is

the “Programs to Develop Human Resources

in Science and Engineering. ” This program element is designed to increase DoD’s support

for fellowships, postdoctoral, young investigators, and scientific exchange programs, in

order to promote interaction between scientific

and engineering personnel in DoD laboratories

and universities conducting DoD-sponsored research.

DoD asserts that its laboratories are in the

forefront of the effort to transfer technological expertise from the Federal Government to

State and local governments and private industry. The Federal Laboratory Consortium

for Technology Transfer was originally established by the Department of Defense in 1972.

Further, in response to the Stevenson-Wydler

Technology Innovation Act, the Department

of Defense established its domestic technology transfer program under the responsibility of the Deputy Under Secretary for Research

and Advanced Technology. The primary goal

of this effort is to accelerate the domestic transfer of unclassified technical and scientific expertise to both the university community and

the private sector.

DoD sponsors a number of educational programs to help ensure an adequate supply of

‘3U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary

of Defense for Research and Engineering, fiscal year 1986

University Research Initiative Program Overview, December

1985, p. 2.
60

highly trained scientific and engineering personnel. All three Services support a large number of science and engineering graduate students as well. DoD’s direct funding for research

at universities provides the Pentagon with its

largest base of graduate student support. A

1980 study, conducted by the Office of Naval

Research, estimated that on average a million

dollars of university research funding supported 10 to 15 full-time or part-time graduate students. Based on those figures, the Pentagon estimated that it supported between

4,000 and 4,500 graduates students in fiscal

year 1987.

At the graduate level all three Services sponsor activities to increase the supply of scientific personnel. The fellowship programs of

both the Army and Navy support graduate

students in such fields as computer sciences,

electrical engineering, and life sciences. The Air

Force fellowship program is aimed at more

mission-specific activities, sponsoring students

in such areas as advanced composite structures

and aircraft propulsion technology. According

to DoD, the Services supported about 200

graduate fellowships in fiscal year 1987; of this

total, the Navy supported about 145. The Services also provide opportunities for faculty and

undergraduate and graduate students to conduct research at various DoD laboratories during the summer months.

Planning

All of the Services conduct an extensive annual top-down, bottom-up planning exercise

in order to develop a 5-year program objective

memorandum (POM) and annual technology

base investment strategy. From the top the

Services receive the annual Defense Guidance

Manual, prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which provides them with

guidance on developing their entire RDT&E

programs. Planning usually begins with a review and evaluation of the previous year’s

research activities. When this review is completed, the Services decide which activities to

continue, which to transition (e.g., from 6.1 into

6.2 programs), and which activities to stop.

Each of the Services develops an annual technology base strategy, such as Army’s Mission

Area Material Process, or utilizes special studies—such as the Air Force Forecast II project—which serve as major guides for their

respective research programs.

The laboratories attached to a particular

Armed Service contribute to its technology

base plan. Outside advisory bodies such as the

National Academy of Sciences, the National

Science Foundation, individuals in the scientific community, and in-house technical directors and their respective staffs also make

recommendations. The Services also have scientific advisors or science boards that participate in planning activities. The individual Services can also request that their science boards

conduct a review of some particular area of the

technology base programs to assure its scientific merit and/or responsiveness to particular Service needs. There are inter-Service cooperative groups, such as the Joint Logistics

Commanders and the Joint Directors of Laboratories, which meet and review past and future laboratory activities to reduce duplication

while increasing awareness of existing laboratory activities.

Finally, DoD has an elaborate scientific and

technical advisory mechanism, with ad hoc and

permanent scientific advisory committees at

many levels, to advise individual laboratories,

military Service chiefs, and OSD. At the level

of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the

Defense Science Board deals with both specific

and broad policies that address such issues as

scientific manpower, defense industrial preparedness, the quality of the technology base,

technology transfer, and standardization of

weapon systems in NATO. Each branch of the

military also has a scientific advisory body

analogous to the DSB: the Army Science

Board, the Naval Research Advisory Committee, and the Air Force Scientific Advisory

Board.14

“Science Policy Study Background Report No. 8, “Science

Support by the Department of Defense, ” prepared by the Congressional Research Service for the Task Force on Science Policy, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 99th Congress, p. 405. Hereafter referred to as

“Science Support by the Department of Defense. ”
61

— —

OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT IN THE OFFICE OF

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Office of the Secretary of Defense exerts oversight responsibility for all of DoD

technology base programs. Oversight refers

to the process of formulating and developing

policy guidance for a particular program, in

this case DoD’s technology base programs. It

includes: developing an investment strategy

for a particular program; assigning management responsibility for the program; coordinating research programs; establishing policy;

developing program evaluation procedures;

and recommending appropriate programmati c

changes.

OSD is primarily concerned with making

sure that DoD’s technology base programs are

well balanced and reflect the overall needs of

DoD. In addition, the Services and DARPA

each assign specific individuals within their

respective organizations oversight responsibilities for technology base programs. At this

level, individuals responsible for oversight are

primarily concerned with protecting and helping to manage and coordinate their organization’s technology base programs.

Programmatic management involves the direct day-to-day management of a certain technology base activity. Programmatic management includes responsibility for the successful

completion of an R&D activity, including:

timely completion of R&D tasks; meeting projected costs; evaluation of R&D activities; and

facilitating the transitioning or phasing out

of research activities. The Services, DARPA,

and SDIO each assign specific individuals,

within their respective organizations, day-today management responsibility of various

technology base activities.

As a result of the Military Reform Act of

1986 (sometimes referred to as the GoldwaterNichols Act), DoD has reorganized the management of its RDT&E activities. The Act

abolished the office of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and

replaced it with the Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition (USD(A)). The legislation also

re-created the Director of Defense Research

and Engineering (DDR&E), who reports to the

USD(A).

Until 1986, the Under Secretary of Defense

for Research and Engineering had responsibility for the research and development activities of DoD and chaired the Defense System

Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), which

made decisions about which major weapon systems to purchase. In 1985 the functions of the

Office of the Under Secretary were trimmed

when Secretary of Defense Weinberger removed from the office “primary responsibility y for overall production policy and some key

production decisions. ” The effect of the reorganization, according to Science magazine, was

to drive a wedge between those responsible for

research and development and those responsible for production, with the hope that fewer

faulty weapon systems would get from the laboratory to the factory.15 The President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (known as

the Grace Report) and the Packard Commission had criticized the combination of research

with production. Consequently the GoldwaterNichols Act created the Under Secretary for

Acquisition (USD(A)) and the DDR&E to

maintain a separation between R&D and acquisition decisions. ’G

The USD(A) has oversight responsibility for

DoD’s technology base program, with the exception of SDIO (see figure 2). The DDR&E

has oversight responsibilities for the Services

and the DNA’s technology base programs.

According to the USD(A), the DDR&E has

five primary responsibilities: 1) to oversee development and acquisition of weapon systems

through full scale engineering development; 2)

to oversee force modernization; 3) to oversee

design and engineering; 4) to oversee develop-

‘5R. Jeffrey Smith, “DoD Reorganizes Management, ” Science,

Feb. 8, 1985, p. 613.

“For further details see Science Support by the Department

of Defense, ” p. 63.

83-207 - 0 - 88 - 4
62

—

Figure 2.-Management of the Department of Defense Technology Base Program

Secretary of

Defense

Director,

Strategic Defense

Initiative

Organization

[, ‘

Under Secretary

of Defense,

Acquisition

[USD(A)]

I 1

Director, Defense

Research and Assistant Secretary of Defense,

Engineering

[DDR&E]

Research and Technology

[ASD (R&T)]; and Director,

Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency

Deputy Under

Executive Director, Secretary of Defense,

Defense Science Research and Director, Defense

Board

Advanced Nuclear Agency

Technology

[DUSD (R&AT)]

I

mental test and evaluation; and 5) to oversee

basic research, exploratory development, and

advanced technology development. As figure

2 indicates, the Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Executive Director of the

Defense Science Board, which is the principal

advisory body within the OSD, also report to

the DDR&E.

As a “corporate guardian” of DoD’s entire

technology base program (except for SDIO),

the DDR&E is responsible for ensuring that

the technology base programs of the three

Services, DARPA, and DNA are following

overall technology base guidance developed by

the OSD. The DDR&E also acts to ensure that

disagreements pertaining to technology base

responsibilities and priorities are settled in a

way that best represents the science and technology interests of the Department of Defense.

According to DoD, the Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Research and Technology—

ASD(R&T)—will also serve as the Director

of the Defense Research Projects Agency

(DARPA). The Director of DARPA reports to
the USD(A), but will work closely with the

DDR&E to coordinate DARPA’s technology

base programs, which are contracted through

and managed primarily by the three Services.

Prior to the recent reorganization, the Deputy

Under Secretary of Defense for Research and

Advanced Technology (DUSD(R&AT)) reported

directly to the Under Secretary of Defense

Acquisition (USD(A)). However, the DUSD

(R&AT) now reports to the USD(A) through

the DDR&E. The primary responsibility of the

DUSD(R&AT) office is to provide oversight

for the three Services’ technology base programs, and to serve as their DoD point of contact. The primary functions of R&AT are to:

structure the technology base program across

Service lines, in order to eliminate overlaps and

gaps; resolve technical differences; and enhance return on investment.

The R&AT office also develops the planning,

programming, and budgeting system (PPBS),

writes the technology base portion of the Defense Guidance Manual, and if required responds to the Services’ Program Objective

Memoranda. The R&AT office must also review the 2-year budget proposals of the Services and assure that those expenditure plans

have the appropriate balance among the various proposed programs. Finally, the DUSD

(R&AT) is supposed to work continually with

the Services to help them achieve mutual science and technology interests.

With overall guidance from the Office of the

Secretary of Defense and the R&AT office (primarily through the annual publication of the

Defense Guidance Manual), the three Services

and DARPA formulate their technology base

programs. Determining the scope of technology base work involves an evaluation of the

operational needs of each participant and the

technological opportunities for meeting those

needs. The needs are primarily derived through

a comparison of the future projected military

threat with planned U.S. military capability

and doctrine. Finally, the R&AT office must

be sure the Service technology base programs

establish new research initiatives in order to

meet the long-term science and technology requirements of the three Services.

63

The Research and Advanced Technology office has itself recently been reorganized into

five major directorates, as shown in figure 2.

There are approximately 30 professional scientists and engineers spread among the five

directorates. The Research and Laboratory

Management Directorate is responsible for:

oversight of the Service research (6.1) programs; oversight of the DoD laboratories; related research and development in the industrial sector, including Independent Research

and Development (IR&D);17 and the flow of scientific and technical information. The office

meets with representatives from the three

Services, DARPA, and SDIO to: coordinate

research-related policymaking; help facilitate

inter-Service cooperation; suggest solutions to

managerial problems; and address urgent research needs. In addition to coordinating research in-house, the Research and Laboratory

Management office also works with different

Federal R&D agencies, such as the National

Science Foundation (NSF), and with the U.S.

scientific community. The remaining four directorates have oversight responsibilities-and

in one instance management responsibility—

for exploratory (6.2) and advanced technology

development (6.3A) conducted in-house by

DoD labs or extramurally by outside contractors.

The Electronic Systems Technology Directorate is responsible for oversight of programs

in surveillance, communications, electronic

warfare, optical countermeasures and tactical

directed energy weapons. In the area of search

and surveillance, concepts are being refined

to improve day/night/all-weather capabilities.

This particular research complements thrusts

in precision-guided weapons and activities to

develop automatic high-resolution target identification, classification, and tracking technology.

The Engineering Technology Directorate is

often referred to as the “firepower and mobility” directorate, with oversight responsibility

for four related areas: combat vehicles, propul-

‘

7 See ch. 3 for a discussion of IR&D.
64

sion and fuels, conventional weapons, and materials and structures. One of the major goals

of the directorate is to facilitate technology

transition through advanced technology demonstration to better match the technological

needs of the various Services. Consequently,

this directorate has oversight responsibilities

for a large portion of DoD’s advanced technology development activities (6.3A). This directorate also has responsibility for spacecraft

propulsion and the National Aerospace Plane,

for logistics R&D, and for the Army Corps of

Engineers laboratories.

The Environmental and Life Sciences Directorate deals with four supporting disciplines:

training and personnel technology; medicine

and life sciences; chemical warfare and chemical/biological defense; and environmental factors. In the area of training, work is being conducted in the area of computer-based training

and performance aids for operations and maintenance tasks. In the environmental sciences,

major efforts involve modernizing data acquisition and processing capabilities and the upgrading of DoD’s radar technology, tactical

sensors, and tactical decision-aid capabilities.

The Computer and Electronics Technology

Directorate operates differently than the other

four directorates. This directorate is what DoD

refers to as a “thrust directorate” because

it manages considerable program funding. In

addition to oversight responsibilities, its director has a direct management role in the planning, execution, and evaluation of various programs. The director has direct management

responsibility for the SEMATECH program,l8

the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC)

program, the Microwave/Millimeter Wave Monolithic Integrated Circuit (MIMIC) program, the

Software Technology for Adaptable Reliable Systems (STARS) program, and several others.

DoD contends that this directorate’s direct

management responsibilities address three important management needs: 1) to focus the military’s needs on computer and electronicsrelated technology, 2) to ensure that both the

hardware and software receive appropriate attention, and 3) to place more emphasis on the

transition of computer and electronics technology to operational systems.

‘sThe SE MATECH program will attempt to rectify the problem of U.S. competitiveness in worldwide semiconductor markets by pooling the resources of the semiconductor industry,

with assistance from the Federal Government. These resources

will be used to create a central production facility from which

new manufacturing processes would be made available to the

U.S. semiconductor industry. Congress has agreed to begin funding for this proposal and has provided $100 million in funding

(to be managed by DoD) for fiscal year 1988.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

The Office of Chief of Naval Research (see

figure 3) is responsible for the Department of

the Navy’s basic research (6.1) and exploratory

development (6.2) programs. The Chief of Naval Research reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering,

and Systems and to the Chief of Naval Operations for policy guidance, planning, and execution of the Navy’s basic research and exploratory development programs. The Chief

of Naval Research serves as the scientific advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and

the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).

Since 1985 he has also had oversight responsibility for all Navy’s laboratories.

Management of the Navy’s Research

(6.1) Program

The Office of Naval Research (ONR, see figure 4) is responsible for the daily activities of

the Navy’s research programs. The director

of ONR reports to the Chief of Naval Research,

who is ultimately responsible for planning, review, and approval of the Navy’s various research activities. ONR was established by Congress in 1946 as the first Federal organization

to support university-based basic research.

ONR was responsible for developing a number

of mechanisms which are still in use today to
Figure 3. –Navy Organization for Science and Technology

Secretary

of the

Navy

SOURCE: Office of the Chief of Naval Research

support research at the Nation’s universities.

They include:

●

●

●

●

funding project grants for individual researchers at colleges and universities;

establishing a peer review process to

evaluate research proposals;

purchasing of expensive specialized

equipment;

funding the construction of large facilities,

operated by a consortium of universities;

and

65

● funding for special-purpose research at institutions such as Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute.l9

According to ONR, the primary goals of its

research programs are:

● to sustain U.S. scientific and technical superiority for Naval power and security;

“U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Research,

Federal Research and Development Programs Hearings, Nov.

18., 1963, p. 33.
66

—

Figure 4. -Office of Naval Research

Office of

Naval Research

Planning and

.

Assessment

SOURCE: Office of Naval Research

Naval Research

Laboratory

(NRL)

Naval Ocean

Research and

Development

Activity

(NORDA)

● to provide a source of new concepts and

technical options;

● to support theoretical and experimental

research in each directorate;

● to retain a vigorous scientific manpower

and laboratory base; and

● to apply the results of research to Naval

warfare and warfare support areas.

The research program of ONR supports a

broad spectrum of scientific disciplines. ONR

plans to fund 342 million dollars’ worth of research in fiscal year 1988. Sixty percent of

those funds will go to universities. ONR’s four

laboratories (the Naval Research Laboratory,

Institute for

Naval

Oceanography

(INO)

Naval

Environmental

Prediction

Research Facility

(NEPRF)

the Naval Oceanographic Research and Development Activity, the Institute for Naval

Oceanography, and the Navy Environmental

Prediction Research Facility) will receive 21

percent; other Navy laboratories will get 12

percent; and for-profit and nonprofit organizations will receive the remaining 7 percent.

Founded in 1923, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) is the principal laboratory of

ONR. It receives almost 90 percent of the 6.1

funds that go to the ONR laboratories. This

research funding is about 24 percent of the

laboratory’s total in-house funds, and it plays

a major role in NRL's total in-house operation.
67

The NRL performs and supports research in

a broad range of areas including computer science and artificial intelligence, directed energy

weapons, electronic warfare, space science and

technology, materials, radar, information management, surveillance and sensor technology,

environmental effects on Naval systems, and

underwater acoustics.

ONR relies on four major research directorates to carry out its contract research programs: Mathematics and Physical Sciences,

Environmental Sciences, Engineering, and Life

Sciences. As might be expected, the directorate

which receives the largest share of research

funds is Environmental Sciences, with its focus on oceanography activities. The Navy’s

Ocean Sciences Division covers the range of

disciplines from physical oceanography of both

the open ocean and coastal zones, through

ocean biology and ocean chemistry, to marine

meteorology.

A fifth ONR directorate, the Applied Research and Technology Directorate, has primary responsibility for adapting and extending generic basic research toward applied

research, thereby helping to transition research

results into the Navy’s exploratory development program. This directorate is also responsible for working closely with the Navy’s exploratory development program in order to

identify and implement high-leverage opportunities for joint research and exploratory development funding. The Navy is the only Service that operates a research directorate with

this type of responsibility.

The Applied Research and Technology Directorate is also an agent and a project manager for selected programs sponsored by the

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare, DARPA, the Strategic Defense

Initiative Organization (SDIO), and other defense organizations and industry. The ONR,

with the assistance of this directorate, manages the largest SDIO basic research program

of the three Services. ONR expects to manage

between $80 and $90 million, primarily in the

research category, for SDIO in fiscal year 1988.

Forty percent of ONR’s research program

consists of Accelerated Research Initiatives

(ARIs) designed to concentrate resources in

specific areas of research which offer a particularly attractive scientific or Naval opportunity.

ARIs, which are normally funded for 5 years,

are sprinkled throughout the four research

directorates and the laboratories of ONR.

These initiatives represent an accelerated or

enhanced program in a basic scientific area

which is potentially attractive to future Navy

needs.

Some of the ARI research areas include: arctic oceanography, composites, interracial science, and electrochemical properties of membrane proteins as the basis of specialized

cellular functions. ARIs are selected from research options developed by the scientific community and by ONR’s scientific officers, and

are reviewed and ranked as part of ONR’s annual research planning and budgeting process.

ARI selection is based on how well the proposed activity meets the goals of the Navy’s

research program and is done through an expert panel-based peer review process.

Management of the Navy’s

Exploratory Development and

Advanced Technology Development

Programs (6.2 & 6.3A)

The Navy’s entire exploratory development

program is managed by the Office of Naval

Technology (ONT) within the Office of Chief

of Naval Research. ONT (see figure 5) was created in 1980 by the Secretary of the Navy to

“provide for a more clearly defined process of

planning, execution and transition of programs

within the technology base and into advanced

technology development . . .“ ONT currently

has a professional staff of 55 people to carry

out its responsibilities.20

‘°From 1980 through 1985, ONT reported to the Deputy Chief

of Naval Material (Technology) [DCNM(T)]. In May 1985, when

the Naval Material Command was abolished, the CNR was assigned the additional responsibility of managing those Naval

R&D Centers that had reported to the Chief of Naval Material.

In 1986, management of the Navy’s R&D centers were placed

under the newly created Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).
68

Antiair/Antisurface

Warfare and

Surface/Aerospace

Technology Directorate

●

Antisubmarine

Warfare and Undersea

Technology Directorate

Support Technologies

Directorate

(see below)

Low Observable

Directorate

Support Technologies Include:

● Command, Control, and Communications

● Mission Support Technologies

(Personnel and Training; Biomedical; Logistics; Chemical/Biological/Radiological Defense)

● Systems Support Technologies

(Electronic Devices; Materials; Human Factors; Oceanography; Computer Hardware, Software, and Architecture;

Artificial Intelligence)

SOURCE: Office of Naval Technology

ONT is primarily responsible for all programmatic oversight of the Navy’s exploratory development program, which includes such activities as program planning, approval, funding,

review, and evaluation. One of the most important activities of the ONT is the development of the investment and mission area strategies, which are the heart of the 6.2 program

management system. These strategies are developed in consultation with OSD, the Office

of the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, the

Commandant of the Marine Corps, ONR, the

Director of Navy Laboratories at the Space and

Naval Warfare Systems Command

(SPAWAR), and the other Naval System

Commands.

The Director of Navy Laboratories (DNL)

at SPAWAR, where about half of the ONT’s

6.2 program is performed, is responsible for

establishing laboratory policy and management procedures. This includes resolving disputes-between the laboratories involving research emphasis and responsibilities. However,

the DNL does not have any responsibilities for

the development and selection of research

projects that are supported by the various

SPAWAR laboratories.

Through its R&D Centers, the Navy performs much more of its 6.2 and 6.3A program

in-house than do the other Services, for which

6.3A work is primarily performed by industry.

Navy R&D Centers have a much stronger emphasis on development activities beyond the

tech base than do the laboratories of the other

Services.

In fiscal year 1988, the Navy will support

the smallest exploratory development program

of the three Services, conducting 59 percent

of its 6.2 activities in-house. Industry will con-
duct 31 percent, universities 7 percent, and the

remainder will be conducted by other government agencies. Although the Navy has over

20 laboratories, the majority of 6.2 and 6.3A

activities are performed by the eight SPAWAR

R&D Centers and the three ONR laboratories.

As figure 5 indicates, ONT consists of six

major directorates. Three of them—the Antiair/Antisurface Warfare and Surface/Aerospace Technology Directorate, the Support

Technologies Directorate, and the Antisubmarine Warfare and Undersea Technology Directorate—fund about 80 percent of the Navy’s

6.2 program. The remaining three directorates

have specific responsibilities primarily with

oversight and coordination of related exploratory development programs.

The Industry IR&D Directorate is responsible for all oversight of the Navy’s IR&D programs. The office is responsible for working

with industry insetting IR&D priorities, evaluating IR&D activities, and maintaining yearly

records of what type of IR&D activities are

actually conducted.

The entire 6.2 program is built around the

Navy’s 13 mission area strategies. ONT conducts an extensive top-down, bottom-up process to define its key mission area strategies.

Since the six different Navy systems commands (SYSCOMS) are the ultimate users of

the technology, they play an important role

in the overall development of the Navy’s exploratory development investment and mission area strategies. Besides the SYSCOMS

and the laboratory/center technical directors,

other inputs are sought from the Navy Secretariat, from the maritime strategy developed

by OPNAV, from the CMC, and from internal

and external scientific advisory groups.

The Navy develops a strategy for each of its

13 mission areas based on such concerns as

current mission deficiencies, near-and far-term

technological opportunities, the needs associated with DoD’s overall maritime strategy, and

potential military threats. According to ONT,

a mission area strategy should be described

where possible in terms of objectives that relate to a specific technology. For example, the

69

Navy has broad mission strategies for antisurface ship warfare, anti-submarine warfare,

and mine warfare. Because mission areas do

not often change, the focus of this activity is

on updating the strategy associated with each

mission area.

In developing each mission area strategy,

ONT establishes what it calls technology

thrusts (see figures 6 and 7). According to ONT

each technology thrust has a single operational/performance objective or several very

closely related ones supporting the warfighting objectives of its mission area. ONT utilizes

two definitions of technology to help identify

a particular technological thrust:

● a science or engineering discipline specific

to an application, such as:

–laser communication technology,

Figure 6.–Navy 6.2 Program Structure

Research

Performer

}

c

I

a

i

m

a

n

t

s

23)

—

ONT

ONT Directorates (3)

Program Elements (14)

Mission Areas (13)

Thrusts (95)

SOURCE: Office of Naval Technology
70

Figure 7.–Navy 6.2 Program Strategy

Mission

Area ● Offensive Antiair Warfare

Objectives

● Long-Range Missile

Technology

Thrust ● Wide Area Surveillance

Objectives ● Long-Range Target

● Propulsion Technology

Projects ● Guidance and Control

SOURCE: Office of Naval Technology

–fiber optic sensor technology, and

—optical signal processing; or

● a group of technologies applied to the

same or closely related warfare, weapons,

or platform objectives, such as:

—ocean surveillance technology,

—airborne electronic warfare,

—air launch weaponry, and

—torpedo propulsion.

In fiscal year 1987, the Navy supported its

95 technological thrust areas through the

establishment of 62 block programs. A block

program is an integrated group of technology

projects with closely related applications

and/or technical objectives; each block program is assigned to a given lead laboratory or

SYSCOM program manager. For example, the

Naval Air Development Center is responsible

for a block program in airborne surveillance,

while the SPAWAR SYSCOM is responsible

for the block program in directed energy technology. Usually a block program encompasses

the 6.2 program’s effort (with an average funding level of $7 to 8 million) in a warfare technology area, as identified above. It is most

often composed of a number of projects, each

of which may address a different technology

thrust and/or mission area. Each project consists of a number of specific tasks performed

by a particular researcher or group of researchers.

Beginning in the fall of each year, all block

programs are reviewed by ONT and the various SYSCOMS. This review is followed by an

evaluation of the current mission area strategies, which leads to the establishment of new

technological thrusts as well as new block programs for the following fiscal year.

ONT also sponsors an Independent Exploratory Development program, which provides

the technical directors of the Navy R&D

Centers with a small amount of funding (usually about 5 percent of their 6.2 programs) to

support activities aimed at achieving the

centers’ assigned missions. Through this mechanism, the technical directors are allowed to

support innovative programs without the formal approval process which could delay funding of a new idea. Normally, a specific program

cannot be supported with Independent Exploratory Development funding for more than

3 years.

The Navy’s advanced technology demonstration (6.3A) program, with a proposed fiscal year 1988 budget of about $30 million, is

the smallest of the Services’. The Navy is the

only Service that manages its 6.3A program

separately from its 6.1 and 6.2 activities.

Within the office of the Assistant Secretary of

the Navy (Research, Systems, and Engineering), the Director of Research, Development,

and Requirements (Test and Evaluation)—

DRD&R(T&E)–has oversight responsibilities

for the 6.3A program. The 6.3A program is

managed by the Technology Assessment Office, which reports to the DRD&R(T&E). The

Navy is now in the process of rebuilding its

Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD)

program. In fiscal year 1988, the ATD program

will sponsor three to five advanced technology

demonstrations. The technologies are selected

by the ATD director with the assistance of

OPNAV, the SYSCOMS, and ONT, and are

performed at the appropriate SYSCOM for up

to 3 years.
71

THE DEPARTMENT

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Technology

and Plans- DCS(T&P)-of Air Force Systems

Command (AFSC) is responsible for the daily

operations and oversight of Air Force technology base programs (see figure 8). The DCS

(T&P) reports to the Commander of the Air

Force Systems Command, who reports to the

Air Force Chief of Staff. The DCS(T&P) was

created in October 1987 with the merger of the

offices of DCS for Science and Technology with

the DCS for Plans and Programs. The primary

purpose of the merger was to enhance communication and coordination between the office

Aircraft

● Aircraft Programs

● Aeromechanics

Technology

● Avionics

Technology

OF THE AIR FORCE

Figure 8.–Air Force Systems Command R&D Organization

responsible for evaluating and planning new

weapon systems and the office that is responsible for conducting the research and advanced

technology development for the new systems.

Within the office of the Secretary of the Air

Force, the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition

–ASAF(A)–is responsible for the entire Air

Force’s RDT&E program. And within the

ASAF(A) office, the Director of Science and

Technology (DS&T) is responsible for oversight of the Air Force technology base programs. The DCS(T&P) (in the headquarters of

Deputy Chief of Staff,

Technology and Plans

Administrative

Services

● Offensive Systems

● Defensive Systems

● Air Base Operability

● Human Systems

Command, Control,

Communications,

and

Intelligence (C31)

● Plans and Programs . C3

I Technology

. Technology ● C

3 I Programs

● Computer Technology

m

International

R&D

● Cooperation

. Disclosure

Plans and Programs

● New Concepts and

Initiatives

● Program Control

● Investment Planning

SOURCE Air Force Systems Command
72

AFSC) works with the DS&T (in the Office of

the Secretary of the Air Force) in developing

both an annual and a 5-year technology base

investment strategy for the Air Force. One of

the primary responsibilities of the DS&T is to

ensure that the DCS(T&P) investment strategy is well balanced and capable of meeting

the short- and long-term needs of the diverse

Air Force technology users.

To help raise the visibility of its science and

technology programs, the Air Force now treats

its entire technology base program asa‘‘corp~

rate investment. ” Consequently, when budgets

are being examined by the Air Force, the entire technology base program, rather than the

44 individual program elements, is examined

for proper balance and emphasis. The goal is

to raise technology base funding to 2 percent

of the Air Force’s total obligational authority.

The technology base program is now classified

as 1 of the 35 executive Air Force programs,

equal in stature to such executive programs

as the Advanced Tactical Fighter.

Management of the Air Force’s

Research (6.1) Program

The Air Force Office of Scientific Research

(AFOSR) is responsible for the planning and

management of the Defense Research Science

program and the University Research Initiative program of the Air Force. The In-House

Laboratory Independent Research Program

(ILIR) is managed directly by each individual

laboratory director. The Commander of the

AFOSR reports to the Systems Command

DCS(T&P), who has oversight responsibilities

for AFOSR programs and for the integration

of 6.1 research with 6.2 and 6.3A programs.

AFOSR supports research which has a “potential relationship to an Air Force function

or operation. ” It conducts a program of extramural research contracts and grants (primarily grants); oversees the research programs

(in-house and extramural) of the Air Force Laboratories; and manages three subordinate units.

The three subordinate units are the European Office of Aerospace Research and Development in London, AFOSR Far East in Tokyo,

and the Frank J. Seiler Research Laboratory

in Colorado Springs. The London and Tokyo

offices gather information about foreign research and act as liaisons between Air Force

scientists and engineers and their foreign counterparts. The Seiler Laboratory performs inhouse research in such areas as optical physics,

aerospace mechanics, fluid mechanics, and

chemistry.

Of the $198 million the Air Force will spend

on research in fiscal year 1988, about 60 percent will be given to colleges and universities.

The Air Force in-house laboratories will receive

15 percent, industry and nonprofits 20 percent,

and the remaining 5 percent is for overhead.

As figure 9 indicates, the AFOSR science

programs are divided into six areas: Aerospace

Sciences, Chemical and Atmospheric Sciences,

Electronic and Material Sciences, Life Sciences, Mathematical and Information Sciences, and Physical and Geophysical Sciences.

Each of the program areas has a scientific director, who is responsible (along with the Commander and Technical Director of AFOSR) for

planning, managing, and implementing the

various research programs. As might be expected, the majority of AFOSR research funds

are spent in aerospace sciences, chemical and

atmospheric sciences, and electronic and material sciences.

The AFOSR supports a number of special

research programs to further strengthen the

Air Force technology base program. They include the Air Force Thermionic Engineering

Research Program, the Research in Aircraft

Propulsion Technology Program, the University Resident Research Program, the Resident

Research Associateship Program, the Laboratory Graduate Fellowship Program, the Advanced Composite Structures Program, the

Graduate Student Summer Support Program,

and the Summer Faculty Research Program.

In conjunction with industry, the AFOSR

sponsors university-based manufacturing research centers at Stanford University and at

the University of Michigan. Students perform
I

Figure 9.-Air Force Office of Scientific Research

Contracts

staff

Judge

Advocate

I

Aerospace

Sciences

Electronic and

Material

sciences

I

European Office

of Aerospace Research

a n d

I Reserve I

73

Life sciences

SOURCE: Air Force Office of Scientific Research

L

Air Force Office

of Scientific

Research, Far

East

1

Physical and

Geophysical

sciences

Mathematical and

Information

Sciences

research at the university centers or at participating companies. The Air Force provides

the assistantship funds for M.S. and Ph.D. candidates, with Stanford and Michigan responsible for selecting the students. AFOSR funding for the two centers is scheduled to be

phased out at the end of fiscal year 1988 as

industry support increases.

Management of the Air Force’s

Exploratory and Advanced Technology

Development Programs (6.2 and 6.3A)

The DCS(T&P) serves as the “corporate

manager” of the Air Force’s technology base

program and is primarily responsible for developing the overall investment strategy that
74

guides laboratory operations. The primary

responsibility of the DCS(T&P) is to ensure

proper integration and balance of these programs, while meeting the needs of the various

operational commands, in line with OSD and

Air Force Headquarters guidance. While having traditional oversight responsibilities for the

6.1 and 6.2 programs, the DS&T in the Air

Force Secretariat exerts more active influence

and direction on the large advanced technology development (ATD) program.

The office of the DCS(T&P), with approximately 70 professionals, consists of five major research directorates: Aircraft; Armament

and Weapons; Strategic and Space; C3I; and

Combat Support. Each of the five Directorates

works primarily with a particular AFSC product division and has oversight and coordination responsibilities for that division’s lab(s).

The Director of the Aircraft Directorate works

with the four laboratory directors assigned to

the Aeronautical Systems Division. The Armament and Weapons Directorate coordinates

with the Armaments Laboratory of the Armament Division and the Weapons Laboratory

of the Space Technology Center of Space Division. The Strategic and Space Directorate

oversees the activities of the other two Space

Division laboratories. The Director of C3I is

responsible for the research activities of the

one laboratory assigned to Electronic Systems

Division. Finally, the Combat Support Directorate works with the three laboratory directors of the Human Systems Division and the

Air Force Engineering and Services Center.

However, this laboratory oversight arrangement does not mean that the director of a particular laboratory conducts research for only

one of the five directorates. Obviously, the interdisciplinary nature of research requires the

various laboratory directors to manage 6.2 and

6.3A activities for a number of product divisions and applications that cut across the major air commands.

Within the office of the DCS(T&P), the director of Plans and Programs works with the

directors of the five research directorates to

ensure their broad technology base investment

strategy considers both the near- and longterm technological needs of the various Air

Force users. The Plans and Programs office

also works with the directorates to ensure that

their respective technological thrusts are capable of meeting current and future needs of

the Air Force.

Since 1980, the laboratories of the Air Force

have been aligned under the parent product

divisions: Electronics System Division (ESD),

Armament Division (AD), Human Systems Division (HSD), Space Division (SD), and Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD). Each of the

Divisions has responsibility for one or more

laboratories which perform research, exploratory development, and advanced development

in support of that division’s mission as well

as the missions of other divisions. For example, the Materials Laboratory, under ASD,

meets the technology needs of Space Division

as well. Unlike the other two Services, the Air

Force laboratories are not full spectrum R&D

laboratories. With the exception of the Rome

Air Development center, which performs some

6.4 work, the remaining laboratories primarily conduct 6.1-6.3A activities. The Air Force

supports the smallest in-house technology base

program, actually conducting only 20 percent

of its activities in its 14 laboratories. In contrast, the Air Force supports the largest 6.3A

program, reflecting its interest in technology

transition.

The directors of the laboratories have a dual

reporting responsibility. The directors report

their laboratory activities and accomplishments to both the DCS(T&P) as well as to the

commander of their respective product divisions. (The four laboratory directors at WrightPatterson Air Force Base report through the

Commander of the Wright Aeronautical Laboratories to the Commander of ASD.) As with

the other Services, each of the laboratory directors is ultimately responsible for the activities in his laboratory. This includes determining research priorities, developing new

initiatives, determining who will be responsible for managing various research projects,
75

whether to use in-house or outside expertise,

and when to transition or stop a research

activity.

The Air Force contends that placing its laboratories within the product divisions increases

the linkages between the developers and ultimate users of the various weapon systems. The

Air Force asserts that closer interaction between the product divisions and their respective laboratories will strengthen long-term

technology base planning capabilities and the

transition of mature technologies into systems

applications. Further, the Air Force believes

that this closer coupling will reduce the time

it takes to develop and deploy more reliable

and less expensive weapon systems.

The Air Force’s advanced technology development (ATD) program has grown from $159

million in fiscal year 1975 to almost $754 million in fiscal year 1988 (see table 2). The ATD

program represents 50 percent of the entire

Air Force technology base program. Almost

all of the ATD program is conducted by defense industries under contract to the different product division laboratories. The Air

Force believes that its contractors will incorporate new technological advances more rapidly if they actually participate in the successful development and testing of a new

technology.

Like the other Services, the Air Force conducts an annual iterative planning activity.

Much of the planning and programming activ -

ities at the Air Force laboratories are primarily driven by the future needs of the combat

commands. This process begins in the second

quarter of each fiscal year, when the DCS(T&P)

develops an investment strategy to guide planning for the next 5 years. The results of this

investment strategy, along with other guidance from DS&T, OSD, and inside and outside

scientific advisory groups, are used to refine

short-term plans and develop long-term plans

by the laboratories. As part of their overall

planning responsibilities, the product divisions

identify a number of potential next generation

system concepts to meet future warfighting

needs. These warfighting requirements, in

turn, are defined by the users.

The Air Force’s Project Forecast II is

another key consideration for developing an

overall technology base strategy in the laboratories. Completed in 1986, the primary goal of

Forecast II was to identify potential technological opportunities that could change the

nature and design of future systems, while concomitantly improving the Air Force’s warfighting capabilities. The Project was chartered by

the Secretary of the Air Force and directed by

the Commander of Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). It was supported by a team of

175 military and civilian experts drawn from

within AFSC, the operational commands, and

various outside advisory panels. From the

ideas generated by the Air Force laboratories,

industry, universities, and technology panels,

40 technological initiatives were identified for

funding within the technology base. Research

progress in these technological initiatives is

monitored, and appropriate changes of emphasis are made as the technology matures. The

purpose of this planning activity is to ensure

that the Air Force technology base program

is sufficiently broad to prevent technological

surprise by potential adversaries, while at the

same time is in position to take advantage of

new technological opportunities.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The newly created office of the Deputy for ASA(RD&A)–who replaced the Deputy Chief

Technology and Assessment (DT&A) is re- of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisponsible for the Department of Army’s en- sition—DCS(RD&A) —(see figure 10). The

tire technology base program. The DT&A Army has combined both military and civilreports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army ian oversight responsibilities for its RDT&E

for Research, Development, and Acquisition— program in one office.
76

Figure 10. -Army Research and

Development Organization

Secretary of the Army

■

I I

Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Research, Development, and

Acquisition)

1

Director, Director,

International Program and

Cooperation Technology

Assessment

■

I

Director, Director,

Research and Space and

Technology strategic

Systems

SOURCE: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research , Development, and Acquisition).

As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,

the Army has also designated the DT&A as

its Program Executive Officer (PEO) for the

technology base programs. The DT&A provides programmatic planning guidance to the

Army’s 31 Research and Development organizations. DOD’s planning guidance is used

by the Army to help develop its annual and

5-year technology base Program Objective

Memorandum (POM).

Subordinate to the DT&A is the office of the

Director of Research and Technology (DR&T,

see figure 10), which is responsible for planning and coordinating the Army’s entire technology base program. The remaining three

offices under DT&A, the Director of International Cooperation, the Director of Program

and Technology Assessment, and the Director of Space and Strategic Systems, work with

the DR&T on various special aspects of the

technology base program. Since this is a completely new organization, the exact responsibilities of these offices have yet to be determined.

The Army operates its technology base programs differently from the other Services and

tends to have a more complicated organizational structure. The Army divides its technology base programs among four major components: the Army Materiel Command (AMC),

the Surgeon General of the Army (TSG), the

Corps of Engineers (COE), and the Deputy

Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). For

oversight purposes, the directors of all four of

these organizations report to the Deputy for

Technology and Assessment at Army headquarters.

AMC is responsible for the development and

acquisition of all the Army’s combat and combat support systems (see figure 11). AMC receives 75 percent of the Army’s technology

base funding and is programmatically respon -

sible for eight research, development, and engineering (RDE) centers, seven army laboratories, the technology base work of the project

Figure 11.-Army Materiel Command

R&D Organization

Army Materiel Command

I

I I

9 other Army Laboratory

Commands Command

I I

I

8 Research, Development 1

7 Labs and the

and Engineering Centers Army Research Office

SOURCE: Army Materiel Command
77

manager for training devices, and the Army

Research Office. The Surgeon General manages 14 percent of the technology base programs and is responsible for medical R&D

activities at the Army’s nine medical laboratories. The Corps of Engineers operates four

laboratories and utilizes 6 percent of the technology base funding to support research in

such areas as construction engineering, cold

weather combat, and hydrology. The Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI), which reports to the DCSPER,

receives about 1 percent of the technology base

funding for research in personnel-related areas.

The remaining 4 percent is for overhead and

the ILIR program. However, due to budgetary constraints the Army did not propose any

funding for ILIR in fiscal year 1988.

Management of the Army’s Research

(6.1) Program

The Army is the only Service that manages

its basic research program through more than

one office. The majority of the 6.1 program is

managed by the Army Research Office (ARO),

located at Research Triangle Park in North

Carolina. ARO is under the Army’s Laboratory Command (LABCOM) structure, with the

Director of ARO reporting to the DT&A

through LABCOM and AMC. Compared to

equivalent organizations in the other Services’

research offices, ARO is lower in the chain of

command and appears to have less visibility.

In fiscal year 1988, AMC will receive a little

over two-thirds of the Army’s 6.1 budget. Half

of AMC’s 6.1 funding will go to the ARO and

the other half will go to the AMC laboratories

and RDE centers. Although ARO does not

manage the portion that goes to the Army laboratories and centers, it does make recommendations to the Director for Research and Technology, Army Headquarters, regarding the

in-house research program content and size.

The ARO program is a mix of short- and

long-term programs that are responsive to the

needs of the Army laboratories. Recently, ARO

has worked closely with the Army Training

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and its

schools to assist in shaping ARO’s research

program according to Army mission area

needs. TRADOC, along with AMC, is responsible for evaluating the current and future technological needs of the Army.

The ARO provides the major interface between the Army and the university community. The university community receives 83

percent of ARO’s 6.1 budget; industry gets 10

percent and nonprofit organizations receive the

remaining 7 percent. The ARO research program consists of seven divisions: Electronics,

Physics, Chemistry and Biology, Engineering,

Material Science, Mathematics, and Geosciences.

The laboratories’ in-house research programs

are organized along the lines of the laboratories’ mission responsibilities. For example,

each laboratory research effort is supported

by a single project fund (SPF) more closely tied

to its mission, rather than to some specific scientific discipline. The content of each SPF is

determined by each laboratory’s technical director and his staff. Research in the laboratory

is really designed to be the first step in the development chain. ARO contends that research

tasks within an SPF are intended to lead eventually into development programs. The technical content of each SPF is reviewed annually

by each Command headquarters and by the Deputy for Technology and Assessment (DT&A).

Since 1982, ARO has sponsored a “centers

of excellence” program, supporting selected

colleges and universities. ARO operates

centers in five research areas: electronics,

mathematics, rotary wing aircraft technology,

artificial intelligence, and optics. These centers

are usually funded from 5 to 10 years. Each

center has a program advisory panel with members from the different universities, ARO, the

appropriate laboratory within AMC, and industry. For example, the Army Aviation Systems Command Research Development and

Engineering Center works with three universities that are the Army’s rotocraft centers of

excellence.
78

Army’s Management of Exploratory

and Advanced Technology

Development Programs (6.2 and 6.3A)

The Director for Research and Technology

(DR&T) is also responsible for the exploratory

and advanced technology development programs of the Army. There are four Deputy Assistant Directors that have specific responsibilities for various aspects of the Army’s

science and technology programs. These four

areas are: 1) aviation—unmanned air vehicles

and missiles, etc.; 2) ballistics-sighting mechanisms, armaments, munitions, chemical warfare, etc.; 3) electronics-artificial intelligence,

command, control, communications, and intelligence, robotics, etc.; and 4) soldier support–

ground combat, troop support, and ground vehicles.

Within the office of the DR&T there are five

science and technology professionals (the Director and the four Deputy Assistant Directors) responsible for planning, budgeting, and

setting priorities for the Army’s technology

base programs. Consequently, the Army utilizes a much more decentralized management

approach in operating its laboratories than do

the other Services. Although the DT&A has

primary oversight for planning, budgeting, and

setting priorities, many of these activities are

directed and performed by the Army Material

Command (AMC) office and the newly created

Laboratory Command (LABCOM) (see figure

11).

The Army’s LABCOM has only been in existence for a little over 2 years. According to

Army officials, the long-term goal of AMC is

to have ARO and the seven laboratories under LABCOM primarily responsible for generic

technology base work, while the eight Research, Development, and Engineering Centers

would be primarily responsible for engineering and development activities that are more

systems related. The goal is to have the laboratories “hand-off” certain technology base

programs to the RD&E centers to initiate

appropriate systems engineering and development activities.

In 1986 LABCOM published its first comprehensive technology base investment strategy. According to the Army, the purpose of

the investment strategy is to meet future user

battlefield requirements while preserving the

Army’s ability to exploit technological opportunities. The investment strategy is also used

to determine resource allocation for technology base activities, and it provides a strategic vehicle for articulating the direction of the

AMC technology base activities. The AMC

breaks its strategy into four basic elements

(see figure 12): next generation and notional

systems (NGNS); emerging technologies (ET);

chronic problems; and supporting analytical

capabilities.

Nearly half of the AMC’s technology base

resources are planned for next generation/notional systems. Next generation systems are

usually defined as those beyond the systems

currently in engineering development; they

represent relatively well-defined solutions to

battlefield problems of the next 5 years. Notional systems, on the other hand, are more

conceptual solutions to problems anticipated

10 to 15 years down the line. This distinction

provides a range of targets for technology base

efforts, from mid-range to long term.

As figure 12 indicates, emerging technologies support 25 percent of the technology base

strategy. These are technologies such as robotics, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology which may not yet have coalesced into spe

cific systems applications. The Army admits

that the difference between ETs and NGNS

is “fuzzy;” nevertheless, ETs are judged to be

so important that they deserve special emphasis through visibility and funding emphasis.

Most of the ET activities are focused on exploring new technological concepts that could

be used by the Army 15 to 30 years in the

future.

Certain chronic problems, such as corrosion

prevention and manufacturing problems, are

endemic to the ability of the Army to perform

its mission but often do not receive technology base support. Although these may be less
79

Figure 12.-Army Technology Base Investment Strategy

●

●

●

Artificial Intelligence

Robotics

Directed Energy Weapons

 

Acoustic Devices

Advanced Materials/

Material Processing

Advanced Signal Processing

and Computing

Biotechnology

Power Generation/

Storage/Conditioning

Space Technology

Low Observables

System Science

●

●

●

●

●

●

L

Reduction

C

Prev/Contro

Physical/Functional

Survivability

Lightening the Force

Manufacturing Technology

Manprint/Human Factors

Engineering

Training

● Hardware in the Loop

Simulators

● Modeling/Simulation

● Assesment Technology

● Test and Evaluation

● Special Purpose Equipment/

Computers

SOURCE: Army Materiel Command/Laboratory Command

glamorous than developing new weapon systems, 15 percent of the technology base support is now devoted to these concerns.

Supporting analytical capabilities include

modeling, simulation, advanced demonstration

projects (ADP), and other infrastructure activities aimed at increasing the Army’s ability

to perform quality R&D and improve its acquisition across the entire spectrum of the material life-cycle. This category, representing the

remaining 10 percent of technology base funding, is devoted to future operational capabilities and improving the research infrastructure.

The Army asserts that the AMC laboratories

and the RD&E centers, ARO, and to a lesser

extent the Corps of Engineers’ laboratories are

required to formulate their technology base

strategies within this investment strategy

framework. However, this does not necessarily

mean that every lab or center must be working on every element of the strategy, or that

its budget must reflect the exact percentage

allocation for each element. Nevertheless it

does mean that:

... each organization should plan their technology base work to address (within their mission area) the technological barriers represented by the specific set of NGNS, and that

they should give emphasis to the other elements of the strategy before pursuing other

work, which may nevertheless be important

in its own right. 2 1

“A LAl?COM White Paper “The AMC Technology Base Investment Strategy, ” June 7, 1987, p. 43.
80

The technology base investment strategy is

developed through an annual analysis of the

Army’s 13 major mission areas (e.g., close combat (light), close combat (heavy), air defense,

mine/counter-mine, etc.). The mission area analyses, which are conducted by TRADOC with

support from AMC, COE, TSG, and ARI, result in the publication of a Battlefield Development Plan that outlines both near- and midterm battlefield deficiencies and opportunities.

Directed by AMC, the Army then conducts

what is called a mission area materials process (MAMP) to address the various deficiencies and opportunities in the context of the four

elements of the mission area strategy.

The technology base investment strategy

and the MAMP drive the technology base

activities in several ways. They are used as

strategic planning tools, laying out the projected development time schedules of the systems planned for the future. Further, both

TRADOC and AMC review the 13 mission area

strategies for duplication and opportunities for

collaborative efforts among the labs and

centers to help meet deadlines and reduce technology base costs.

Since the next generation and notional systems are intended to focus on near- and longterm technological barriers, a large percentage of the 6.2 and 6.3A budget is spent in this

area. For example, almost all of the 6.3A budget is spent on approximately 60 specific technology demonstrations. Each year the Army

publishes a document that describes the “Top20’ demonstrations and identifies the laboratory responsible for managing the demonstration. Each demonstration can last from 3 to

5 years.

Like the other Services, the Army performs

an annual top-down, bottom-up guidance and

direction exercise. This evaluation begins

in the fall when each lab and center presents

a review of its accomplishments, along with

plans for meeting next year’s technology base

strategy. The Army utilizes a Technology Base

Advisory Group to set project priorities. This

group works with representatives from

TRADOC and the Department of the Army

headquarters in establishing the overall project

priorities for the technology base investment

strategy.

THE DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

(DARPA)

At just under $800 million in fiscal year 1988,

the technology base program of the Defense

Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA)

is larger than those of the other defense agencies combined. The other agencies are: the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA); the Defense

Communications Agency (DCA); the National

Security Agency (NSA); and the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). DARPA was established

in 1958 partly due to the pressures forced by

the launching of the Sputnik satellites. The

President and Congress also recognized that

DoD needed an organization which could take

the “long view” regarding the development of

high-risk technology. DARPA was thus setup

to be DoD’s “corporate” research organization,

reporting to the highest level (currently the

USD(A)) and capable of working at the “cutting edge” of technology. DARPA’s organization allows it to explore innovative applications

of new technologies where the risk and payoff are both high, but where success may provide new military options or applications—or

revise traditional roles and missions. In theory, since DARPA has no operational military

missions, it should be able to maintain objectivity in pursuit of research ideas which promise quantum technology advancement.

DARPA executes its programs mainly

through contracts with industry, universities,

nonprofit organizations, and government laboratories. DARPA now has a limited inhouse contracting capability. This means that

DARPA can contract directly with defense

contractors, rather than going through the
81

Services. However, the Services and other government agencies usually provide this function.

In these cases, technical monitoring and support are often provided as well, thus establishing a “joint program atmosphere. According

to DARPA, close relationships with the Services facilitate subsequent technology transfer

when research projects reach a mature stage

and are linked to operational requirements.

Organization

The DARPA organization is tailored for the

agency’s role and is often “adjusted” to accommodate priorities. DARPA consists of the

Director’s office (including the new Prototype

Office and two Special Assistants-one for

Strategic Computing and one for the National

Aerospace Plane), two administrative support

offices, and the following eight technical

offices:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Tactical Technology Office,

Strategic Technology Office,

Defense Sciences Office,

Information Science and Technology

Office,

Aerospace Technology Office,

Naval Technology Office,

Directed Energy Office; and

Technical Assessment and Long-Range

Planning Office.

—

DARPA’s programs are divided into two

broad categories: Basic Technology Projects

and Major Demonstration Projects. The Basic

Technology Projects focus on long-term research in the areas that are related to a specific technical office. As some of these techTHE STRATEGIC DEFENSE

Headed by a Director who reports directly

to the Secretary of Defense, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) is a centrally managed defense agency with both technical and administrative offices. The offices

address ongoing scientific research, broad policy issues, and overall funding issues. There

are five technical program directorates (Surnology investigations begin to show promise,

feasibility demonstrations are conducted, often

in cooperation with the military Services, in

an attempt to transfer the technology as rapidly as possible into system development—

thus matching technology with requirements.

The Prototyping Office was established this

past year in response to a recommendation of

the Packard Commission on Defense Acquisition. Prototype projects will consist of “brassboard” models, feasibility demonstrations, and

experimental vehicles. Some concerns have

been expressed that this new responsibility,

if improperly managed, could jeopardize

DARPA’s basic charter-that of examining

high-risk technologies, proving feasibility, and

quantifying risk without the pressures for demonstrating military applications. It is too early

to tell if this concern is justified.

Programs and Priorities

DARPA’s scope of programs and responsibilities is broad and appears to be growing as

more joint programs are being added to

DARPA’s overall responsibilities. Among the

key projects underway are the X-29 Advanced

Technology Demonstrator, being conducted in

conjunction with NASA Ames Research Center; the X-Wing Demonstrator; Advanced

Cruise Missile Technology; Particle Beam

Technology; Strategic Computing; and a highpriority effort to examine technology for armor/anti-armor. DARPA also has a growing

materials program investigating advanced

composites, other complex materials, and electronic materials including gallium arsenide.

INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION

veillance, Acquisition, Tracking, and Kill

Assessment; Directed Energy Weapons; Kinetic Energy Weapons; Systems Analysis and

Battle Management; and Survivability, Lethality and Key Technologies) and a program

manager for Innovative Science and Technology. Although the entire SDI program is

funded under the Advanced Technology De-
82

velopment category (6.3A), much of the work through the Services (Army, Navy, and Air

supported by the Innovative Science and Tech- Force), with some additional efforts through

nology office could be classed as generic re- other executive agents including DARPA,

search or exploratory in nature. DNA, the Department of Energy, and the NaAs with the “traditional” S&T program, spe tional Aeronautics and Space Administration.

cific SDI projects are executed primarily

SUMMARY

The Department of Defense will invest

almost $9 billion in technology base activities

in fiscal year 1988. DOD’s complex technology base program is planned, organized, and

implemented by DARPA, SDIO, and the three

Services, with oversight and guidance provided

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

The majority of the technology base program

is conducted by industry (50 percent), with

universities performing 20 percent and the

DOD in-house laboratories conducting the remaining 30 percent. The primary goal of the

technology base program is to counter Soviet

numerical manpower and weapons superiority

through the development of superior technology for future weapons systems. Thus, DOD

contends a growing technology base program

is critical to the successful execution of the Nation’s defense policies.

Within the last 3 years, each of the three

Services and the OSD have reorganized their

technology base programs. As a result of the

Goldwater-Nichols Act, the USD(A) was established and given responsibility for all RDT&E

activities except for those of the Director of

SDIO, who reports directly to the Secretary of

Defense. The Goldwater-Nichols Act also reestablished the Director of Defense Research and

Engineering (DDR&E) as the primary spokesman for DOD’s technology base activities.

Within OSD, the DDR&E is primarily responsible for providing an overall corporate

emphasis and balance for DOD’s entire technology base program, except for SDI. Once the

Services have formulated their technology base

programs, the primary role of the DUSD

(R&AT) is to ensure that their proposals have

responded to OSD guidance. The Deputy for

R&AT must also be sure that the Services’ programs are well balanced, do not duplicate effort, and attempt to meet the current and future technological needs of DOD.

Each of the three Services operates and manages its technology base activities differently.

The Army uses a more decentralized approach

in managing its technology base programs; it

relies its major field commands-AMC headquarters, the Corps of Engineers, the Surgeon

General, and the DCS for Personnel–to help

develop and implement its technology base investment strategy. This is primarily due to the

small size of the Army’s technology base headquarters staff. The Deputy for Technology and

Assessment (DT&A) is considered to be the

Army’s Program Executive Officer (PEO) for

the technology base programs. The DT&A is

responsible for coordinating technology base

programs of AMC, the Surgeon General, the

Corps of Engineers, and the DCS for Personnel. AMC headquarters is responsible for oversight and management of the Army’s eight laboratories, seven RD&E Centers, the project

management training device, and the Army

Research Office.

Unlike the other Services, the Navy, which

recently reorganized its laboratory organization, performs the majority (60 percent) of its

technology base programs in-house. Many of

the Navy laboratories are considered to be full

spectrum labs, capable of performing the entire range of RDT&E activities. The Navy’s

basic research program is the oldest and

largest of the Services, whereas its advanced

technology demonstration program is the

smallest. The Navy contends it is in the process of rebuilding its advanced technology de-
83

velopment program, which, unlike the other

Services, is not managed in the same office as

its 6.1 and 6.2 programs.

As of November 1, 1987, the Deputy Chief

of Staff for Technology and Plans was established to oversee the Air Force technology base

programs. The DCS(T&P) is also the PEO for,

and the single manager of, the Air Force technology base program. The Air Force Chief of

Staff has recently designated the technology

base program as a “corporate investment” to

help raise its visibility and to provide a longterm stable funding base. The Air Force operates the largest extramural technology base

program. Its technology base activities are

more centralized than those of the other Services. The Air Force laboratories are more

closely linked to product divisions than are

those of the other Services, and this linkage

influences the types of 6.2 and 6.3A activities

each laboratory performs.

The role of DARPA appears to be changing

with the recent establishment of the Prototyping Office. There is some concern that this

might compromise DARPA’s support of highrisk technologies (only 11 percent of DARPA’s

budget is for research), as well as its role of

proving feasibility and quantifying risk without the pressure for demonstrating military

application. The majority of DARPA’s budget is contracted through the three Services

to industry (75 to 80 percent) and universities

(20 percent), with only a small fraction of

DARPA’s technology base activities actually

conducted by the military.

The SD I program is centrally managed with

its director reporting to the Secretary of Defense. Less than 5 percent of the SDI budget

is spent on basic research, with the remainder

divided between exploratory development and

advanced technology development. The majority of SDI projects are executed through the

Services, with some additional efforts through

other executive agents including DARPA,

DNA, the Department of Energy, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Chapter 5

Research Institutions and Organizations

The Department of Defense technology base and it also discusses how civilian government

program has been described in chapter 4 of this agencies foster the technology base that is

special report, and the contribution of private drawn on by the Department of Defense. In

industry is addressed in chapter 3. This chap- addition, various types of nongovernment,

ter describes the contributions made to the de- nonprofit laboratories are discussed at the end

fense technology base by government-funded of the chapter.

laboratories—both defense and non-defense—

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT LABORATORIES

Defense Department laboratories are owned

and operated—under a variety of different

philosophies-by the military services. Their

activities are coordinated, to some degree, by

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and they

are staffed mostly by Civil Servants and some

military officers rotating through on short

tours of duty.

Army Laboratories

Department of the Army technology base

work is performed by 31 research and development organizations attached to the Army

Materiel Command (7 laboratories, 8 research,

development, and engineering centers, the

Army Research Office, and the Project Manager Training Device), the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army (9 laboratories), the

Army Corps of Engineers (4 laboratories), and

the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel ( 1 laboratory). The major Army laboratories are described below.

Army Materiel Command (AMC)

Laboratory Command (LABCOM).–Laboratory Command, within the Army Materiel

Command, operates seven facilities that are

responsible primarily for 6.2 and 6.3 research

in specialized areas of technology relevant to

Army requirements. These are:

Atmospheric Sciences Laboratory (ASL),

White Sands Missile Range, NM (390).1

–The

Atmospheric Sciences Laboratory is AMC’s

principal laboratory for atmospheric and

meteorological technology and equipment development. Basic investigations into atmospheric sensing technologies and applications

are conducted to assess the potential impact

of atmospheric conditions on advanced Army

weapons and systems.

Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD (730). –This laboratory conducts research into the vulnerability

and lethality of Army weapons (e.g., guns, cannons, missiles). It addresses weapons systems

from the drawing board to the field and from

small arms and ammunition to large missiles

and their warheads.

Electronics Technology and Devices Laboratory (ETDL), Ft. Monmouth NJ (310).–This

is the primary Army laboratory for electronics,

electron devices, and tactical power supplies.

This laboratory is the lead laboratory for the

Army for the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) and Microwave/Millimeter Wave

Monolithic Integrated Circuit (MIMIC) programs.

‘The numbers in parentheses give the total work force (scientists, engineers, managers, support staff, administration, etc.).

8 5

83-207 - 0 - 88 - 5
86

Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Adelphi, MD (730).—Harry Diamond Laboratories

is involved in exploratory and advanced development of a variety of technologies including fuzing, target detection and analysis, ordnance electronics, electromagnetic effects,

materials, and industrial and maintenance

engineering. This laboratory is AMC’s lead lab

oratory for fluidics and nuclear weapons

effects.

Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL),

Aberdeen, MD (220).–This laboratory is responsible for the “man-machine’ interface for

advanced Army systems. It has assumed the

role of lead Army laboratory for robotics research and human factors engineering.

Materials Technology Laboratory (MTL),

Watertown, MA (660).–The Materials Technology Laboratory is responsible for managing and conducting research and exploratory

development programs in materials and solid

mechanics, including basic research in advanced metals, composites, and ceramics.

Vulnerability Assessment Laboratory

(VAL), White Sands Missile Range, NM(260).

–This laboratory provides an independent

assessment of the vulnerability of Army weapons and communications electronics systems

to hostile electronic warfare (e.g. jamming).

Research, Development, and Engineering

(RDE) Centers.–The six Systems Commands

of the Army Materiel Command each operate

one or more research, development and engineering centers which conduct exploratory and

advanced technology development in support

of the specific commands’ mission responsibilities. These centers are organizational entities and are not necessarily physically located

at a single site. (If there is no single primary

site, the location given below is that of the parent Systems Command.) Although the RDE

Centers conduct some in-house research and

development, the bulk of their work is contracted out to industry (the largest contributor), nonprofit organizations, and some universities. The centers are oriented toward the

development end of the technology program,

leading to components, products, and systems.

Armament RDE Center (ARDEC), Picatinny Arsenal, NJ (4,150).—ARDEC concentrates its efforts on two main areas-weapons

and munitions. ARDEC is managed by the

Armaments, Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM), centered at Rock Island,

IL.

Chemical RDE Center (CRDEC), Aberdeen

Proving Ground, MD (1,400).–CRDEC is the

Defense Department’s lead laboratory for

chemical and biological defense-related matters. Like ARDEC, CRDEC is an RDE center

for the Armaments, Munitions, and Chemical

Command.

Aviation RDE Center, St. Louis, MO (1,430).

–This center, operated by the Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM), is responsible for

Army aviation research and development including airframes, propulsion systems, and

avionics. Two major activities are operated in

support of Army aviation R&D efforts. First

is the Aviation Research and Technology Activity, co-located with NASA’s Ames Research

Center, Moffett Field, CA. This Activity has

subordinate offices at (or near) two other

NASA centers: Lewis Research Center and

Langley Research Center. These locations reflect the close relationship between Army aviation and NASA’s research into advanced short

takeoff and landing (STOL) flight concepts and

propulsion systems. The second Activity supporting the Aviation RDE Center is the Avionics Research and Development Activity, Ft.

Monmouth, NJ, which is co-located with the

Army’s electronics and communications experts—the Communications-Electronics Command and the Laboratory Command’s Electronic Technology and Device Laboratory.

Communications-Electronics Command

(CECOM) RDE Center, Ft. Monmouth, NJ

(1,930).–The CECOM RDE center is responsible for research in the areas of command, control, communications, intelligence, and electronic

warfare. In addition to the Ft. Monmouth effort, a number of subordinate facilities and

centers focus on specialized electronics and sensor research and development. The Night Vision and Electro-Optical Laboratory, Ft. Bel-
87

voir, VA, is a recognized leader in infrared and

other night vision devices for all three Services. The Signals Warfare Laboratory, Vint

Hills Farms Station, VA, conducts programs

related to surveillance, reconnaissance, and

electronic warfare (including signals intelligence, communications intelligence, electronic

countermeasures and electronic counter-countermeasures). Other activities under the

CECOM RDE Center include: the Electronic

Warfare and Special Sensors group; the Airborne Electronics Research Activity, Lakehurst, NJ; the Center for C3 Systems; and the

Life-Cycle Software Engineering Center.

Missile Command (MICOM) RDE Center,

Redstone Arsenal, AL (1 ,470).—This center is

responsible for the development, acquisition,

and production of all Army missile systems.

It is the Army’s lead organization for guidance

and control, terminal homing, and high power/

high energy laser technology. With the capability to carry a concept through to prototype

almost without outside help, it is very influential in the overall direction and progress of

Army guided weapons programs.

Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) RDE

Center, Warren, MI (810).–This center is responsible for technologies and systems associated with vehicular propulsion, structure,

and advanced armor. As exemplified by its

location, it has a close relationship with the

U.S. automotive industry. Substantial exploratory work is also underway on robotics, vetronics (integrated vehicle electronics), propulsion,

and vehicle survivability.

Belvoir RDE Center, Fort Belvoir, VA

(1,080).–The Belvoir RDE Center is responsible for combat engineering, logistics support,

materials, fuels, and lubricants. It falls under

the Troop Support Command (TROSCOM),

headquartered in St. Louis, MO, which is responsible for developing systems and equipment to support the soldier.

Natick RDE Center, Natick, MA (l,090).–

The Natick RDE Center, also falling under the

Troop Support Command, is dedicated to ensuring the maximum survivability, supportability, sustainability, and combat effectiveness

of the individual soldier in all combat environments.

Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG)

The Army Medical Research and Development Command, under the authority of the

Surgeon General of the Army, operates nine

laboratories that investigate medical areas of

interest to the Army. These laboratories employ a total of 2,710 personnel. The largest is

the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research

(1,000 personnel), which performs research in

the areas of military disease hazards, combat

casualty care, Army systems hazards, and

medical defenses against and treatments for

chemical weapons. Other facilities also examine these topics and others such as crew workload and stress; treatment of dental injuries;

investigation of the problems, complications,

and treatment of mechanical and burn injury;

the biomedical effects of military lasers; the

effects of temperature, altitude, work, and nutrition on the health and performance of soldiers or crews; acoustics; and vision.

Corps of Engineers (COE)

The Corps of Engineers operates four laboratories.

Cold Regions Research and Engineering

Laboratory (CRREL), Hanover, NH (300).–

This facility investigates problems faced by

the Corps of Engineers in cold areas of the

world.

Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL), Champaign, IL (260).–This laboratory conducts research and development in

facility construction, operations, and maintenance.

Engineer Topographic Laboratories (ETL),

Fort Belvoir, VA (300).–This laboratory provides the military community with research

and development in topographic sciences and

terrain analysis.

Engineer Waterways Experiment Station

(WES), Vicksburg, MS (1,660).–The five technical laboratories at this facility-the Hydraulics, Geotechnical, Structures, and En-
88

vironmental Laboratories and the Coastal

Engineering Research Center–support the

military and civilian missions of the Army,

other federal agencies, and allied nations.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnell/Army

Research Institute for Behavioral

and Social Sciences

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

(DCSPER) operates one laboratory, the Army

Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Sciences (ARI). This lab, employing 400 personnel, is the Army’s lead lab for soldieroriented research.

Navy Laboratories

The Navy’s research and development system, as described in chapter 4, incorporates

a greater in-house research and development

capability than that of the Army or the Air

Force. Many Navy laboratories and development centers not only have the capability to

conduct in-house research and exploratory development (6.1 and 6.2), but also can carry a

design almost to the production level through

the more “mature” stages of advanced systems development (6.3B) and engineering development (6.4). The various Navy laboratories

are described below.

Office of Naval Research (ONR)

The Office of Naval Research operates four

laboratories.

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Washington, DC (3,540/l,550).2 -Founded in 1923, NRL

is the Navy’s principal “in-house” research laboratory. Indeed, in some areas of technology,

it is DoD’s principal laboratory. NRL conducts

a vigorous research program in the fields of

computer science, artificial intelligence and information management, device technology,

electronic warfare, materials, directed energy

*The first number in parentheses gives the total number of

employees at the lab and the second gives the number of scientists and engineers. Note that the definitions of scientist and

engineer may vary from facility to facility, and therefore these

numbers may not be directly comparable.

weapons, surveillance and sensor technology,

and undersea technology. In addition, a major space systems technology effort has recently been undertaken by the Laboratory.

Roughly one-fourth of NRL’s activity is funded

by the Navy’s research budget. The balance

of the activity is funded as a result of proposals

by NRL personnel to conduct R&D for Navy

development work, other DoD/Service laboratories, and other U.S. Government departments. The “contracts” won by NRL involve

6.1, 6.2, 6.3A/B, and 6.4 activities. NRL also

maintains an active exchange program with

other laboratories, both in the United States

and internationally, and with universities.

Other ONR Laboratories (490/250).-In addition to the Naval Research Laboratory, the Office of Naval Research operates smaller laboratories conducting research in specialized

subject areas. The Naval Oceanographic Research and Development Activity (NORDA)

and the Institute for Naval Oceanography

(INO), in Bay St. Louis, MS, conduct research,

development, test, and evaluation programs

in ocean science and technology and in ocean

forecasting, respectively. The two labs employ

424 people, 215 of whom are scientists or engineers. The Navy Environmental Prediction Research Facility (NEPRF) in Monterey, CA, conducts research and development in various

areas of atmospheric science.

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command

(SPAWAR)

Prior to the 1985 reorganization of the Navy

science and technology program, each of the

major Naval Systems Commands (e.g., Naval

Air Systems Command) had responsibility for

the operation of mission-specific development

activities and centers. This concept has been

replaced by one wherein the Space and Naval

Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)

serves as the focal point for most exploratory

(6.2) and advanced technology (6.3A) development activities. The other Systems Commands

(e.g., the Naval Air Systems Command, the

Naval Sea Systems Command, and the Naval

Space Command) have primary responsibility

for developing “platforms” (e.g., aircraft,
89

ships, space systems). Basic “safety-of-flight’

or “sea-keeping” equipment remain their responsibilities as well, but mission payloads and

other specialized equipment are increasingly

becoming the responsibility of SPAWAR. In

line with this philosophy, all Naval Development Centers and activities have been assigned

to that Command. This gives SPAWAR a

“high-leverage’ role in the Navy’s overall

strategy for systems development.

In addition to their responsibility to SPAWAR

for carrying out the science and technology program, the Centers retain a role in providing

technical management for major systems programs. In this capacity, the Centers are responsible to their pre-1985 “masters”; i.e., the Systems Commands charged with developing the

respective air, sea, and space systems. Seven

major development centers are now the responsibility of SPAWAR.

Naval Air Development Center (NADC), Warminster, PA (2,310/1,510).—This Center is responsible for the development of aircraft and

aircraft systems, including electronic warfare

and anti-submarine warfare systems. In addition to weapons system development, science

and technology programs there involve electrooptic, acoustic, and microwave technologies.

Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC), San

Diego, CA (2,970/l,540).--The Naval Ocean Systems Center is the Navy’s lead Center for surface command and control and for combat direction systems. It has been a continuing

leader in ocean surveillance systems (e.g.,

acoustic, electromagnetic, etc.), and is emerging as a leader in artificial intelligence and

knowledge-based systems to support the

Navy’s combat-decision-aid programs. The

Center is also the Navy’s development organization for undersea weapon systems. S&T

activities include ocean science, bioscience,

electronics, and electronic materials research.

Naval Weapon Center (NWC), China Lake, CA

(4,970/1,820).-China” Lake is responsible for the

development of air-to-air weapons and Naval

air-delivered ordnance. The AI M-9 Sidewinder

missile was developed initially by China Lake

more than 20 years ago, and versions of the

missile are still state-of-the-art as a result of

the Center’s continuing efforts. The development of anti-radiation missile technology and

weapons has been carried to a mature state

by China Lake. Additionally, China Lake engineers and scientists are considered leaders in

sensor technologies (infrared, electro-optic) and

missile engineering.

China Lake is of particular interest in that

it is one of the sites where the Navy is experimenting with a more flexible salary structure for scientific and technical personnel. Government laboratory managers have stated that

Civil Service pay scales for technical personnel, lagging behind industry and even academia, have hampered efforts to maintain highquality technical staffs.

David W. Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center (NSRDC), Carderock, MD and

Annapolis, MD (1,130/580).—This Center is responsible primarily for hull designs and advanced ship protection systems (e.g., demagnetizing systems, etc.). It maintains major

modeling and test facilities and provides technical management for surface and submarine

propulsion systems. Its S&T activities include

ship acoustics, magnetics, materials and structures, hydrodynamics, advanced propulsion,

and ship survivability.

Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), White

Oak, MD (4,870/2,430).—This Center, with its

major subordinate facility for weapon systems

at Dalghren, VA, serves to develop Naval surface warfare systems, including weapons and

systems for the detection and attack of surface and subsurface targets. In addition to

weapons system development, NSWC also has

a strategic role, serving as the Program Office for the submarine-launched ballistic missile. A broad range of S&T activities are supported at the Center, including energetic

materials, charged-particle beams, and sensors.

Naval Undersea Systems Center (NUSC), Newport, RI (3,490/1,930).—AS the Navy’s primary

organization for anti-submarine warfare, the

Naval Undersea Systems Center is responsible for advanced developments in sonar and

other undersea detection technologies. The
Center also provides technical direction for

submarine combat systems.

Naval Coastal Systems Center (NCSC),

Panama City, FL (1,130/580).-This Center is responsible for mine countermeasures and shallow water undersea weapons. Significant test

and evaluation facilities are maintained and

operated there.

Summary

The Navy’s laboratories and Development

Centers have historically been influential

throughout the acquisition cycle, up to–and

including-production phases. The management reorganization in 1985 that eliminated

the Chief of Naval Material-the Navy analogue of the Army Materiel Command and the

Air Force Systems Command-consolidated

all Naval Development Center activity under

SPAWAR. Nevertheless, the job functions,

reporting responsibilities, and priorities of

many of the scientists and engineers in the field

did not change substantially.

Air Force Laboratories

Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)

The exploratory (6.2) and advanced technology (6.3A) development elements of the Air

Force S&T program are conducted under the

five Systems Divisions which report directly

to AFSC: Aeronautical Systems Division, Armaments Division, Electronic Systems Division, Human Systems Division, and Space Division. Each Division provides oversight for

one or more laboratories, through which research, exploratory development, and advanced technology development are conducted

in support of Air Force-wide requirements. The

laboratories in the AFSC organization are described below, with staffing levels given in

parentheses for each laboratory. Not explicitly

described here is the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, also part of Air Force Systems Command. This Office is responsible for

the Air Force basic research (6.1) program,

which is conducted primarily outside the Air

Force laboratories. The AFSC laboratories are:

Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories

(AFWAL), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,

OH (see staff breakdown below) .–Under the

Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) is a

“cluster” of laboratories which comprise the

Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories—

four laboratories, a staff and a Signature Technology Office.

The Aeropropulsion Laboratory (490) is responsible for exploring and developing technologies associated with aircraft and aerospace

vehicle power, including turbine engines, ramjets, aerospace power components, fuels, and

lubricants.

The Avionics Laboratory (870) is the lead

Air Force laboratory for the development of

avionics systems and technologies. Major efforts are underway in microelectronics, microwave devices, advanced electro-optics, target

recognition technologies, radar systems, and

electronic warfare.

The Flight Dynamics Laboratory (1,000) is

responsible for aerodynamics, aircraft design,

aerospace structures (including research into

applications of complex composites), and

flight-control systems such as fly-by-light systems. Basic investigations are being conducted

into advanced flight mechanisms including

hypersonic flight, short take-off and landing,

and advanced maneuvering technologies. The

Forward Swept Wing (X-29) Program has been

a major effort in conjunction with DARPA and

the NASA Ames Research Center.

The Materials Laboratory (420) is responsible for materials research and development,

including electronic and electromagnetic materials, metals, composites, and the recently

discovered high-temperature superconductors.

The Materials Laboratory conducts comprehensive nondestructive testing and nondestructive evaluation programs as part of its

ongoing effort to develop advanced, highstrength, low-weight structures for aircraft and

aerospace vehicles.

Air Force Armament Laboratory (AFATL),

Eglin Air Force Base, FL (530).—This laboratory reports directly to, and is co-located with,
91

the Armaments Division. It is charged by the

Armaments Division to explore technologies

applicable to Air Force non-nuclear weapons,

both offensive and defensive. Thus substantial efforts are underway in munitions, seekers

(electro-optical, radiofrequency, etc.), structures, and advanced guidance systems for airto-surface and air-to-air weapons. Although

much of the effort involves technology development, a substantial analytical capability can

be found there, particularly in the areas of vulnerability, weapons effectiveness, and simulators.

Rome Air Development Center (RADC),

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (1,210).–Rome Air

Development Center is the only laboratory

operated by the Electronics Systems Division.

Among its main activities are investigations

into advanced C3 concepts, information processing, and ground-based and strategic surveillance systems. It is conducting a vigorous pro

gram in support of SDIO’s battle management/

C

3 effort. RADC maintains two directorates

at Hanscom Air Force Base, MA—Electromagnetics and Solid-State Sciences. The first

is involved in basic investigations into antennas and electromagnetic phenomena, and

the second focuses on solid-state electronics,

devices, materials, and systems. An effort

underway at the latter facility is focused on

radiation-hardened electronic technologies—

of interest to both SDIO and the Air Force’s

strategic C3 missions.

Air Force Geophysics Laboratory (AFGL),

Hanscom Air Force Base, MA (560).-This laboratory reports to the Air Force Space Division through the Air Force Space Technology

Center, a management headquarters at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, NM. It supports the Air Force’s mission in developing and

deploying space, airborne, and ground-based

systems. Research is conducted into atmospheric science, Earth sciences, infrared technology, and other disciplines related to the

space and terrestrial environment.

Air Force Weapons Laboratory (AFWL), Kirtland Air Force Base, NM (1,110).—The Air Force

Weapons Laboratory, like the Air Force Geophysics Laboratory, reports to Space Division

through the Space Technology Center. It is the

lead laboratory involved in the development

of technologies related to nuclear weapons effects, directed energy weapons, and radiation

hardening. A close association has therefore

developed between the Air Force Weapons

Laboratory and the two Department of Energy

laboratories in New Mexico that are involved

in nuclear weapons–Sandia National Laboratories and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The Air Force Weapons Laboratory has

assumed an increasingly important role in the

SDI program, especially with regard to the

weapons development efforts. The Laboratory’s experience and ongoing activities in advanced radiation technology and high-power

laser technology have placed it as a leader in

directed energy weapon research.

Air Force Astronautics Laboratory (AFAL),

Edwards Air Force Base, CA (400).-The Astronautics Laboratory, formerly the Rocket Propulsion Laboratory, is the third laboratory

reporting through the Space Technology Center to Space Division. It plans and executes

research, exploratory development, and advanced development programs for interdisciplinary space technology and rocket propulsion.

Human Resources Laboratory (AFHRL),

Brooks Air Force Base, TX (410).—The Human

Resources Laboratory manages and conducts

research, exploratory development, and advanced development programs for manpower

and personnel, operational and technical training, simulation, and logistics systems.

Harry G. Armstrong Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory (AAMRL), Wright-Patterson

Air Force Base, OH (980).—The three divisions

of AAMRL seek to protect Air Force personnel against environmental injury and provide

protective equipment; study human physical

and mental performance so that human capabilities can be integrated into systems with

maximum effectiveness; and identify and

quantify toxic chemical hazards created by Air

Force systems and operations.
92

Air Force Engineering and Services Laboratory

(AFESL), Tyndall Air Force Base, FL (100)

Not formally part of Air Force Systems Command, the Engineering and Services Laboratory is the lead agency for basic research,

exploratory development, advanced development, and selected engineering development

programs for civil engineering and environmental quality technology. It is part of the Air

Force Engineering and Services Center, which

has responsibility for developing and providing the technology base for the tools and traintively contract with industry, rather than performing substantial research and development

in-house. This philosophy brings programs out

into private industry earlier, introducing competition at an earlier stage. Therefore, Air

Force labs are not generally viewed as being

in competition with the private sector; in fact,

Air Force exploratory development programs

are viewed by industry as important “seed”

programs that will serve to build a company’s

future business base.

ing of the military engineer.

Summary

Unlike the Navy, the Air Force philosophy

emphasizes developing the expertise to effecDEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL LABORATORIES

Background

The Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) National Laboratory structure is comprised of

about 60 facilities, including the nuclear weapons production facilities, that are involved in

a broad range of research, advanced development, and production. With activities located

in almost every State, the fiscal year 1986 budget for this complex was over $10 billion (excluding the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and

the Power Marketing Administrations). Approximately 135,000 people are now employed

within this Laboratory system. Only about 5

percent of these are Federal employees; theremainder are employed by the industries and

universities which operate most of the facilities. The replacement cost of all field facilities

is estimated to total well over $50 billion.

Stemming from the Manhattan Project of

World War II, the DOE National Laboratory

system has now evolved in several major directions. One major responsibility is the design

and production of all U.S. nuclear weapons,

including uranium enrichment and special nuclear materials (e.g., enriched uranium and

plutonium) production. DOE is also responsible for development and production of nuclear

reactors for the Navy’s submarine fleet. Research and development, production and maintenance, and nuclear materials production for

nuclear weapons and other defense activities

are each funded at a level of about $2 billion

annually.

The research functions and capabilities of

the Department of Energy have also broadened

beyond their original concentration on nuclear

physics to encompass a wide spectrum of research into fundamental sciences. The present

scientific and technological capabilities of the

DOE National Laboratories make possible investigations including the study of chemical

reactions, cosmology, the operation of biological cells, the process of genetic information coding, the ecosystem, the geosphere, mathematics and computing, and medicine. There are

nine “multiprogram” laboratories and some

30 specialized laboratories involved in these

fundamental science and technology activities,

accounting for slightly more than 40 percent

of the total field budget and employing more

than 60,000 people—more than half of whom

are scientists, engineers, and technicians.

DOE research and technology areas of interest, and its major test and evaluation facilities,
93

make possible significant

areas of direct relevance to

nology base.

contributions in

the defense techThe DOE laboratories interact with private

industry and with the academic community

through mechanisms such as cooperative programs, visiting staff appointments, patent

licensing, subcontracting, and use of DOE facilities. Major, capital-intensive, and often

unique experimental facilities located at the

DOE laboratories are made available to academic researchers for fundamental scientific

experiments without cost, provided that the

research results are published. Cooperation extends to major U.S. universities, industrial researchers, and international scientists.

Organization and Management

The complexity of DOE’s mission and the

diversity of its laboratory complex have resulted in an equally complex management

organization. Figure 13 outlines the management structure emanating from the Washington, D.C. headquarters. Of particular concern

to the defense technology base are the activities

and responsibilities of the Energy Research,

Defense, and Nuclear Energy programs. The

key functions of the DOE headquarters management offices are summarized below.

Energy Research

The Office of the Director of Energy Research (figure 13) manages the bulk of DOE

Figure 13.– Management Structure for DOE Field Facilities

Secretary of

Energy

Assistant

Secretary,

Conservation

and Renewable

Energy

Laboratories

Power Marketing

and Transmission

Assistant

Secretary,

Fossil

Energy

Energy Tech

Centers

Reserves

Other Special

Projects

Assistant

Secretary,

Nuclear

Energy

Laboratories

Naval Reactors

Gaseous

Diffusion

Plants

I

Director,

Energ y

Research

Multiprogram

Labs:

Argonne

-- Brookhaven

Lawrence

Berkeley

Oak Ridge

-- Pacific

Northwest

Other Labs

Assistant Secretary,

Defense

Programs

Multiprogram

Labs:

Idaho

Lawrence

Livermore

Los Alamos

Sandia

Other Labs

Production

Weapons

SOURCE: Department of Energy
94

fundamental scientific research programs, including: high-energy physics; nuclear physics;

the physical, biological and mathematical sciences; magnetic fusion energy; and environmental and health effects. It also supports

university research and university-based education and training activities. Moreover, the

Director of Energy Research serves as scientific advisor to the Secretary of Energy for all

DOE energy research and development activities. The Office also maintains oversight of

the multiprogram and other laboratories under the jurisdiction of the Department, with

the exception of the nuclear weapons laboratories. Five multiprogram laboratories and 14

program-dedicated facilities are administratively assigned to the Office of Energy Research.

Defense Programs

The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (figure 13) manages DOE’s

programs for:

. nuclear weapons research, development,

testing, production, and maintenance;

● laser and particle-beam fusion;

● safeguards and security programs;

● international safeguards programs; and

● information classification.

In addition, this Office is responsible for the

nuclear materials production program, the defense nuclear waste programs, and oversight

of the DOE nuclear weapons production

complex.

Nuclear Energy

The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy (figure 13) manages DOE programs for:

●

●

●

●

●

nuclear fission power generation and fuel

technology;

the evaluation of alternative reactor fuelcycle concepts, including nonproliferation

considerations;

development of space nuclear power generation systems;

Navy nuclear propulsion plants and reactor cores; and

nuclear waste technology.

Much of the Nuclear Energy effort is directed toward technology and engineering development programs.

Conservation and Renewable Energy

The Office of the Assistant Secretary for

Conservation and Renewable Energy (figure

13) manages a series of programs focused on

developing technologies to increase usage of

renewable energy sources (including solar heat

and photovoltaic energy, geothermal energy,

biofuels energy, and municipal waste energy)

and to improve energy efficiency (e.g., transportation, buildings, industrial, and community systems, etc.). These programs involve the

support of high-risk, high-payoff research and

development that would not otherwise be carried out by the private sector; results of this

research are disseminated to private and public sector interests.

Fossil Energy

The Office of the Assistant Secretary for

Fossil Energy (figure 13) has the responsibility to develop technologies that will increase

domestic production of fossil fuels. Specifically, this office supports long-term research

toward an improved capability to convert coal

and oil shale to liquid and gaseous fuels, and

to increase domestic production and use of coal.

Laboratory Management

Eight major operations offices and a series

of specialized field offices provide administrative services and day-to-day oversight of the

management and operation of DOE’s field

complex. Much of DOE contracting for R&D

and other services is done by these operations

and field offices. With the exception of its national security activities, DOE uses its budget more as a catalyst for the development of

generic technologies than for acquiring goods

and services for its own use. This process involves a significant Federal assistance effort

with universities, non-profit organizations, and

state and local governments.

A unique feature of DOE laboratory management philosophy is the “Government

Owned–Contractor Operated” (GOCO) con-
95

cept in extensive use throughout the laboratory system. This concept, which was initiated

during the Manhattan Project, permits DOE

to provide the massive capital investment necessary to create and maintain field facilities

and, at the same time, obtain experienced management under contract with industry and

universities.

Multiprogram Laboratories

DOE nuclear weapons R&D and nuclear materials production are of obvious interest to

DoD, but the DOE multiprogram laboratories

also make extensive contributions to the defense technology base in general. These laboratories all conduct defense-related research

and development not directly associated with

nuclear weapons. Some of them–notably

Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia

National Laboratories–have DoD as a significant “customer,” with an average of 15 percent of these laboratories’ work done under

contract to DoD. However, DOE restricts the

amount of “work-for-others” that its laboratories can perform to keep them from becoming too dependent on funding not under DOE

control. The missions and program priorities

for the nine multiprogram laboratories are described below.

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL),

Albuquerque, NM; Livermore, CA;

Tonopah, NE (8,250 total employees)

The principal mission of Sandia National

Laboratories is to conduct research, development, and engineering for DoD’s nuclear

weapon systems—except for the nuclear explosive itself. Operated by AT&T Technologies, Inc., Sandia also conducts energy research programs in fossil, solar, and fission

energy and in basic energy sciences. In these

and other fields, Sandia has the capability to

conduct large, interdisciplinary engineering

projects that are sophisticated, but are considered technologically risky. Sandia’s management seeks to combine fundamental understanding with technological development—

thus generating new products and processes

that are unlikely to be produced as readily in

universities or industrial laboratories. Nearly

60 percent of Sandia’s work is dedicated to nuclear weapon development and production, and

17 percent represents more broadly based research and advanced development for DoD.

Much of this research is related to SDI.

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),

Los Alamos, NM (8,010)

The Los Alamos National Laboratory was

established in 1943, as part of the World War

II “Manhattan Engineer District,” to develop

the world’s first nuclear weapons. Operated by

the University of California, Los Alamos’ primary mission today is the application of science and technology to problems of nuclear

weapons and related national security issues.

Nuclear weapon R&D thus remains a primary

responsibility, including the design and test

of advanced concepts. A broad spectrum of

energy-related research in nuclear fission and

nuclear fusion technologies is also conducted

at Los Alamos, with additional programs in

life sciences, health, environmental sciences,

and basic energy sciences. The latter involve

materials; chemical, nuclear, and engineering

sciences; and geoscience.

Nuclear weapons research and development

accounts for nearly one-half of Los Alamos’

DOE-supported activity; an additional 15 percent is in support of DoD programs including

SDI, non-nuclear weapons research, conventional ordnance, and materials technology. An

emerging role for Los Alamos, in conjunction

with the Air Force Weapons Laboratory and

Sandia National Laboratories, is support of the

SDI program. The Laboratory has also been

conducting research into the manufacture of

high-temperature superconductors and is seeking a major national role in this area.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

(LLNL), Livermore, CA (8,060)

The University of California operates the

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory as

a scientific and technical resource for the Nation’s nuclear weapons programs. While Livermore is involved in other programs of national

interest, the Laboratory’s primary role—like

that of Los Alamos–is to perform research,

development, and testing related to design
96

aspects of nuclear weapons at all phases in a

weapon’s life cycle. Other important programs

underway at Livermore involve inertial fusion,

magnetic fusion, biomedical and environmental research, isotope separation, and applied energy technology.

Nuclear weapons-related programs at Livermore account for nearly 50 percent of the

Laboratory’s DOE-funded activities. Another

12 percent of the lab’s activity is “on-contract”

work for DoD.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL),

Oak Ridge, TN (4,960)

This Laboratory is primarily involved in all

aspects of the nuclear fission fuel cycle, with

a secondary but growing involvement in the

development of nuclear fusion energy technology. Oak Ridge National Laboratory also conducts generic research into problems related

to energy technologies such as materials, separation techniques, chemical processes, and

biotechnology. Energy technology development includes residential and commercial

energy conservation, renewable energy

sources, and coal conversion and utilization.

The Laboratory is also the major national

source of stable as well as radioactive isotopes.

Oak Ridge is operated by Martin Marietta

Energy Systems, Inc.

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL),

Argonne, IL (3,900)

Established by the Atomic Energy Act of

1946, Argonne National Laboratory conducts

applied research and engineering development

in nuclear fission and other energy technologies. A primary Argonne role is to develop

and operate research facilities for members of

the scientific community. In doing so, it maintains a close relationship with universities and

industry and aids in the education of future

scientists and engineers. To fulfill this role, Argonne directs scientific and technical efforts

in several related areas. Nuclear fission programs focus mainly on breeder and other advanced reactor systems. These programs emphasize fast-reactor physics, reactor safety and

analysis, steam supply, and the exploration of

new design concepts for reactor facilities using

“inherently safe” features and cost-competitive design. In the field of fossil fuel energy,

ANL concentrates on advanced conversion

systems, including instrumentation and control and related technologies. Argonne also has

applied research programs in nuclear applications, materials, and solar conversion systems.

Argonne conducts a variety of basic research

projects in areas such as chemistry, atomic and

nuclear physics, materials science, and biological and environmental sciences concerning nuclear and non-nuclear effects on organisms. The

laboratory is operated under contract by the

University of Chicago and performs nearly 90

percent of its work for DOE; 2 percent of the

laboratory’s work is “on-contract” for DoD.

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL),

Upton, NY (3,220)

The Brookhaven National Laboratory, operated by Associated Universities, Inc., designs,

develops, constructs, and operates research facilities- for studying the “-fundamental properties” of matter. Brookhaven also conducts

basic and applied research in related technology areas, including high energy, nuclear, and

solid-state physics; chemistry; and biology.

The physical, chemical, and biological effects

of radiation, and chemical substances involved

in the production and use of energy, are also

studied. Other research programs are directed

toward combustion research (processes and

emissions, physical and chemical cleanup of

combustion gas, meteorological dispersion,

etc.), atmospheric chemistry, structural biology, the development of radiopharmaceuticals,

and nuclear medicine applications. The research facilities at Brookhaven include: the 33

GeV Alternating Gradient Synchrotrons; the

High-Flux Beam Reactor; the Tandem van de

Graaf Facility; and the National Synchrotrons

Light Source. In addition, there are several

smaller accelerators, a medical research reactor, and two scanning transmission electron

microscopes. DoD work, such as evaluating the
97

effects of radiation on microcircuits, constitutes 1 percent of Brookhaven’s budget.

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL),

Berkeley, CA (2,520)

Operated by the University of California, the

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory was founded

in 1931 to advance the development of the cyclotron invented by Ernest Lawrence. Today,

LBL’s primary endeavors include conducting

multidisciplinary research in energy sciences,

developing and operating national energy experimental facilities, educating and training

future scientists and engineers, and linking

LBL’s research programs to industrial applications. The Centers for Advanced Materials

and X-Ray Optics have been created to enhance interaction with industry.

In addition to LBL’s experimental programs, major research efforts are underway

in nuclear and high-energy physics, materials

science and chemistry, medical and biological

science, energy conservation and storage, environmental dynamics, instrumentation, and advanced accelerator designs. Advanced electron

microscopes and heavy-ion accelerators are

operated at LBL and are available for use by

industrial and other researchers. DoD-sponsored research constitutes a very small fraction of LBL activities.

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

(INEL), Idaho Falls, ID (5,750)

This Laboratory was established in 1949 primarily to build and test nuclear reactors and

support equipment. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory now focuses on nuclear

waste management. Among its tasks are reprocessing and recovering of spent nuclear fuel

from selected test reactors, the Navy’s nuclear

fleet, and other nuclear noncommercial reactors, and the processing of liquid waste into

calcine form for intermediate storage. To accomplish these tasks the laboratory operates

a radioactive waste management complex for

storage and disposal of low-level waste, and

it conducts associated programs in materials

testing, isotope production, irradiation services and training, and test support. Other

INEL activities include:

●

●

●

●

serving as the lead laboratory for the

multi-megawatt space reactor program

and fusion reactor safety research;

supporting DOE non-nuclear energy research (e.g., research and development in

geothermal and industrial conservation);

supporting R&D by other laboratories (at

INEL) on defense and civilian nuclear

power; and

directing the Three Mile Island “Technical Information and Examination Program. ”

With the exception of nuclear waste transportation and management, INEL conducts virtually no work for DoD—basic research or

otherwise.

Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL),

Richland, WA (2,570)

The Pacific Northwest Laboratory has two

principal missions: first, to develop and apply

technologies for energy security; and second,

to provide technical support and environmental surveillance for operations at the colocated Hanford weapons material production

reactors. Current applied research programs

include advanced nuclear reactor systems, nuclear waste management, dense materials production, energy conservation, and renewable

energy systems. PNL also studies the environmental and health effects of radionuclides, inorganic chemicals, and complex organic mixtures encountered in energy production.

PNL maintains a staff of scientists and engineers skilled in the relevant disciplines. These

disciplines are grouped to form technical “centers-of-excellence” in life sciences, materials

sciences and technology, earth sciences, chemical technology, engineering development, and

the information sciences. Operated by Battelle

Memorial Institute, PNL works closely with

the private sector and also maintains strong

ties with university research teams. PNL’s

activities include a substantial percentage ( 10

percent) dedicated to DoD research and development.
98

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

LABORATORIES AND CENTERS

Background, Organization,

and Management

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was established in 1958 as

a successor to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) to oversee the Nation’s efforts in the research and exploration

of technologies related to aeronautics and

space flight. The program has grown into a

multidisciplinary effort which involves the

management of a diverse complex of laboratory activities and flight test centers. For fiscal year 1988 the NASA budget is $9.0 billion.

NASA Headquarters in Washington, DC,

exercises management over the space-flight

centers, research centers, and other installations through six program offices. These offices

formulate programs and projects; establish

management policies, procedures, and performance criteria; and evaluate progress at all

stages of major programs. Because of the

highly public nature of NASA’s work and the

resulting political sensitivity, there appears to

be a stronger “top-down” management emphasis than in DOE—or even DoD.

The Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology is responsible for planning, executing,

and evaluating all of NASA’s research and

technology programs. These are programs conducted primarily to provide a broad fundamental technology base and to evaluate the feasibility of a concept, structure, component, or

system which may have general application to

the Nation’s aeronautical and space objectives.

This office is responsible for Ames Research

Center, Mountain View, CA; Langley Research

Center, Hampton, VA; and Lewis Research

Center, Cleveland, OH.

The Office of Space Flight is responsible for

developing concepts and systems for manned

space flight and other space transportation

systems. The Office plans, directs, executes,

and evaluates the research, development, acquisition, and operation of space flight programs. Included in these programs is the National Space Transportation System, of which

the Space Shuttle is a key element. The Office

of Space Flight also develops and implements

policy for all shuttle users and promotes improvements in safety, reliability, and effectiveness. Further responsibilities of the Office of

Space Flight include the use of expendable

launch systems for NASA and other civil government programs and other developmental

space-based transportation systems. The Office of Space Flight has institutional responsibility for the Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX; the Kennedy Space Flight Center, FL;

the National Space Technologies Laboratory,

Bay St. Louis, MS; and other facilities such

as the White Sands Test Facility in New Mexico and the Slidell Computer Complex in

Louisiana.

The Office of Space Station is responsible

for overall policy and management aspects of

the Space Station program. This has become

a highly visible office in light of the “political

and fiscal heat” the program is taking-heat

that is likely to continue. The goals of the

program include developing a permanently

manned Space Station by the early 1990s, encouraging other countries to participate in the

program, and promoting private sector investment in space through enhanced space-based

operational capabilities. NASA centers responsible for the Segments, or principal portions,

of the Space Station are the Johnson Space

Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, and Lewis Research

Center.

The Office of Space Science and Applications

is responsible for NASA’s unmanned spaceflight program. Directed toward scientific investigations of the solar system, the program

utilizes ground-based, airborne, and space techniques, including sounding rockets, Earth satellites, and deep-space probes. This has historically been one of the most successful and

cost-effective U.S. space programs, and its sci-
99

entific contributions have been continuous and

substantial.

This Office is responsible for research and

development leading to the application of space

systems, space environment, and space-related

or space-derived technology. These activities

involve engineering and scientific disciplines

such as weather and climate, pollution monitoring, Earth resources survey techniques, and

Earth and ocean physics; active programs are

also underway in life sciences and microgravity

sciences and applications. The Office is responsible for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA, and Goddard Space Flight Center,

Greenbelt, MD.

The Office of Space Tracking and Data Systems is responsible for activities related to the

tracking of launch vehicles and spacecraft–

and for the acquisition and distribution of technical and scientific data obtained from them.

This Office is also responsible for managing

NASA’s communications systems and for

operational data systems and services.

The Office of Commercial Programs is responsible for encouraging the commercial use

of space. The Office is responsible for the

“Technology Utilization Transfer” program,

the Small Business Innovative Research program, new commercial applications of existing space technology, “unsubsidized” initiatives for transferring existing space programs

to the private sector, and establishing Centers

for the Commercial Development of Space.

Field Centers

Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA

(3,500 employees at Moffett and

Dryden facilities)

Founded in 1940 by the National Advisory

Committee for Aeronautics as an aircraft research laboratory, the Ames Research Center

became part of the new NASA organization

in 1958. In 1981, the Dryden Flight Research

Center (see below) was merged with Ames, and

the two installations are now referred to as

“Ames/Dryden” and “Ames/Moffett.”

Ames/Moffett specializes in scientific and exploratory research and applications for space

and aeronautics in a wide and growing number of fields. Today, the Center’s program

interests include computer science and applications, computational and experimented aerodynamics, flight simulation, flight research,

hypersonic aircraft, rotorcraft and poweredlift technology, aeronautical and space human

factors, space sciences, solar system exploration, airborne science and applications, and infrared astronomy. As the lead NASA center

for research in the life sciences, continuing programs relate to medical problems of manned

flight, both space and atmospheric.

The Center also provides technical support

to DoD programs, the Space Shuttle, and civil

aviation projects. Recent NASA/DoD efforts

include providing design leadership for the airframe studies for an advanced, supersonic

short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft, a joint U.S./U.K. study effort. These “extramural” projects and responsibilities will

evolve as NASA’s internal needs (and budgets)

change.

Roughly 60 percent of the personnel at the

two Ames facilities are Federal employees,

with the balance being contractor personnel.

Ames maintains a close link with universities

through cooperative projects; a significant

number of university students and university

faculty members work at the center.

Ames Research Center/Hugh L. Dryden

Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA

(staff included in Ames/Moffett total)

Ames/Dryden provides NASA with a highly

specialized capability for conducting flight research programs. The facility’s location, at Edwards Air Force Base in California’s Mojave

Desert, is at the southern end of a 500-mile

high-speed flight corridor and is adjacent to

a 65-square-mile natural surface for landing.

The site provides almost ideal weather for

flight testing.

Primary research tools include a B-52 “carrier” aircraft, several high-performance jet

fighters, and the X-29 Forward Swept Wing
100

aircraft. Ground-based facilities include a hightemperature, loads-calibration laboratory for

ground-based testing of complete aircraft and

structural components under the combined effects of loads and heat, an aircraft flight instrumentation facility, a flight-systems laboratory (capable of avionics system fabrication,

development, and operations), a flow visualization facility, a data-analysis facility for processing flight research data, a remotely piloted

research vehicles facility, and extensive test

range communications and data transmission

capabilities. The Facility participated in the

approach and landing tests for the Space Shuttle Orbiter Enterprise and will continue to support Shuttle orbiter landings and ferry flights.

A close association has naturally evolved between Ames/Dry den and DoD S&T programs

—especially with Dryden’s “collocation” at Edwards AFB with the Air Force Flight Test Center. One of Ames/Dryden’s major DoD cooperative projects is the X-29, in which NASA

and DARPA are exploring a variety of advanced technologies. Another joint NASA/

DoD program is the Advanced Fighter Technology Integration F-1 11, conducted in conjunction with the Air Force Flight Dynamics

Laboratory.

Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, OH

(3,690 total staff)

NASA’s Lewis Research Center was established in 1941 by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, and developed an early

reputation for its research on early jet propulsion systems. Today Lewis is NASA’s lead center for research, technology, and development

in aircraft propulsion, space propulsion, space

power, and satellite communications. In this

role, numerous joint programs have been conducted with DoD components, with one of the

most recent being the development of engines

to power advanced supersonic STOVL aircraft.

Lewis also had managed two launch-vehicle

programs, the Atlas-Centaur and the ShuttleCentaur; however, the Shuttle-Centaur program was terminated after the explosion of the

Space Shuttle Challenger.

Lewis has recently assumed the responsibility for developing the space power system for

the Space Station, the largest ever designed.

In addition, the center will support the Station in other areas, such as auxiliary propulsion systems and communications. In support

of the Department of Energy’s Solar Energy

programs, Lewis is working on wind energy

systems. Initial testing is on a 100-kilowatt

wind turbine—with larger sizes to follow. Solar photovoltaic arrays are also being tested

and demonstrated under this effort.

Major facilities include a zero-gravity drop

tower, wind tunnels, space environment tanks,

chemical rocket-thrust stands, and chambers

for testing jet-engine efficiency and noise.

Lewis also operates NASA’s Microgravity Materials Science Laboratory, a unique facility

to qualify potential space experiments. The

Center is staffed by 2,690 Federal employees

and approximately 1,000 onsite contractors.

Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD

(3,680 Civil Service personnel)

This Center has one of NASA’s most comprehensive programs of basic and applied research directed toward expanding NASA’s

knowledge of the solar system, the universe,

and the Earth. It is responsible for the development and operation of several near-Earth

space systems, including the Cosmic Background Explorer, which will measure radiation

generated early in the universe’s history when

the universe was much hotter and denser than

it is today; the Gamma Ray Observatory,

which will gather data on the processes that

propel energy-emitting objects of deep space

(e.g., exploding galaxies, black holes, and quasars); and the Upper Atmosphere Research

Satellite, which will look back at the Earth’s

upper atmosphere to gather data on its composition and dynamics. Goddard also has responsibility for the development of science instruments and the operations, maintenance,

and refurbishment of the Hubble Space Telescope—a large, space-based optical telescope

to be deployed by the Space Shuttle.
Goddard is also the responsible Center for

NASA’s worldwide ground and spaceborne

communications network, one of the key elements of which is the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System with its orbiting Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and associated

ground tracking stations. One of the prime missions for this system will be to relay communications to and from the Space Station.

For the Space Station, Goddard is responsible for Segment III, an external, free-flying

platform to be placed in polar orbit. The Center is also responsible for developing instruments attached to the outside of the Station

and the orbiting platform.

A portion of the Center’s theoretical research

is conducted at the Goddard Institute for

Space Studies in New York City. Operated in

close association with universities in that area,

the Institute provides supporting research in

geophysics, astronomy, and meteorology. Goddard’s Wallops Island Facility, located off

the coast of Virginia, prepares, assembles,

launches, and tracks space vehicles, and acquires and processes the resulting scientific

data. Its facilities are utilized by NASA’s scientists and engineers, other governmental

agencies, and universities.

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL),

Pasadena, CA (4,110 total staff)

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a federally

funded research and development center managed by the California Institute of Technology,

is engaged in activities associated with automated planetary and other deep-space missions. These activities include subsystem and

instrument development, data reduction, and

data analysis. JPL also has the capability to

design and test flight systems, including complete spacecraft, and to provide technical direction to contractor organizations. In addition

to the Pasadena site, JPL operates the Deep

Space Communications Complex, one station

of the worldwide Deep Space Network located

at Goldstone, CA.

Current JPL projects include the planetary/

solar probes Voyager, Galileo, Magellan, and

the Mars Observer, and major instruments for

other NASA missions. Non-NASA work at

JPL currently includes tasks for DoD, DOE,

and the Federal Aviation Administration. JPL

has been supporting DoD programs in many

areas, including artificial intelligence, tacticaldata fusion, and specialized training systems

based on “Expert System” technology.

Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA

(2,910 Civil Service personnel)

Langley’s primary mission involves applied

research and development in the fields of aeronautics, space technology, electronics and

structures. The Center also conducts programs

for environmental monitoring, having developed a range of instruments for atmospheric

measurements.

In aeronautical technologies, programs have

been directed primarily toward improving the

efficiency of transport aircraft and high performance supersonic military aircraft. The Center is also developing technology for future

transonic transport aircraft and has been active in studies of hypersonic powerplants. A

variety of wind tunnels are available to support basic and applied aeronautical research.

Research interests at Langley include materials, flutter, aeroelasticity, dynamic loads

and structural response, fatigue fracture, electronic and mechanical instrumentation, computer technology, flight dynamics, and control

and communications technology. Langley is

now assuming a role in developing technologies

for the National Aerospace Plane, and has continuing work on the Space Shuttle and Space

Station (e.g., experiments, sensors, communications equipment, and data handling systems). Other research programs include investigations of effects such as heat, vacuum, noise,

and meteoroids on space vehicles; the use of

advanced composite and polymeric materials

for structures and thermal control systems;

and electronics technology.

Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL

(3,450 Civil Service personnel)

Marshall serves as one of NASA’s primary

centers for the design and development of
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space transportation systems, elements of the

Space Station, scientific and application payloads, and other systems for present and future space exploration. It has the principal role

for large rocket propulsion systems, Spacelab

mission management, the design and development of large, complex, and specialized automated spacecraft, solar and magnetospheric

physics, and astrophysics. Using the gravityfree environment of space, Marshall seeks to

develop materials processing techniques to enhance Earth-based processes and to fabricate

space-unique materials.

Marshall has responsibilities for manned

space vehicle development such as the Spacelab and has sustaining engineering duties in

support of the Space Shuttle. Advanced program efforts focus on the analysis and definition of propulsion/transportation systems to

meet the nation’s needs over the next 25 years.

Marshall is currently leading the planning for

an unmanned cargo version of the Space Shuttle called Shuttle-C; efforts for an Advanced

Launch System are also underway.

Marshall also plays a principal role in payload development, instrument development,

and mission management for space science and

applications missions as assigned. Responsibilities include the Hubble Space Telescope,

the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility,

and automated servicing/resupply/retrieval

kits. Its Space Station responsibilities include

the development of pressurized structures,

crew and laboratory modules, logistics, environmental control, and life support.

Two other sites are managed by Marshall:

the Michoud Assembly Facility, New Orleans,

LA, where the Space Shuttle external tanks

are manufactured, and the Slidell Computer

Complex, Slidell, LA, which provides computer

services support to Michoud and Marshall.

Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center,

Houston, TX (3,440 Civil Service personnel)

Johnson Space Center manages the design,

development, and manufacture of manned

spacecraft; the selection and training of astronaut crews; and the conduct of manned

space flight missions. Its principal roles include

Space Shuttle production and operations, production of the replacement Orbiter, and support to NASA Headquarters management for

the Shuttle system. It also has responsibility

for the development of new manned space vehicles and supporting technology.

Johnson is a major development center for

specific Space Station elements, including the

truss structure, airlocks and nodes, and additional subsystems. It has principal program

activity in the field of life sciences and medical research to solve space medical problems,

and it has supporting roles in lunar and planetary geosciences, technology experiments in

space, and remote sensing. It is also responsible for directing the operations of the White

Sands Test Facility, located on the western

edge of the U.S. Army White Sands Missile

Range in New Mexico.

Kennedy Space Center, FL

(2,200 Civil Service personnel)

Kennedy Space Center, located east of

Orlando on the Atlantic Ocean, serves as the

primary NASA center for the test, checkout,

and launch of space vehicles. This responsibility includes ground operations for Space Shuttle preparation, launch, and landing and refurbishment. Other responsibilities include

Expendable Launch Vehicle operations. The

Space Station effort at Kennedy Space Flight

Center includes system integration and engineering, operational readiness, and delegated

ground support equipment program management.

National Space Technology Laboratories,

Bay St. Louis, MS (150 Civil Service personnel)

The National Space Technology Laboratories provide NASA’s prime test facility for

large liquid propellant rocket engines and

propulsion systems such as the Space Shuttle

main engines. It also conducts applied research

and development in the fields of remote sensing, environmental sciences, and other selected

applications. The Laboratory provides facilities and support through interagency agreements to other Federal government agencies

and the States of Mississippi and Louisiana.
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OTHER FEDERAL ACTIVITIES

By far, the majority of Federal Science and

Technology activities with potential defense

applications are conducted within DoD, DOE,

and NASA. There are “pockets” of S&T activit y within other government departments and

agencies which contribute to the defense technology base. However, because of the magnitude of investment in military technology by

DoD, one often finds the reverse is the case;

for example, U.S. Coast Guard technologies

and systems often result from U.S. Navy research and technology programs.

A major exception in which non-DoD funding dominates research in a field of relevance

to the defense technology base is medical technologies. The National Institutes of Health

(NIH) of the Department of Health and Human Services will finance more in health research in its fiscal year 1988 budget than DoD

will spend in its entire research and exploratory development (6.1 and 6.2) program. NIH’s

fiscal year 1987 research budget was near $6.0

billion, $3.6 billion of which supports university research. For reference, the entire Federal

FY87 budget for basic research was $9 billion,

of which the DoD 6.1 program constituted less

than $1 billion. Less than $0.5 billion of those

DoD 6.1 funds supported university research.

In the past, biological sciences have not been

as important to the defense technology base

as physical sciences and engineering. In the

future, however, biotechnology will likely become increasingly important to the defense

technology base, and more of the government

investment in life sciences may have direct rele

vance to DoD needs.

National Science Foundation

The National Science Foundation (NSF) was

established in 1950 to advance scientific

progress in the United States. NSF supports

scientific and engineering research and related

activities, and under congressional pressure

has more recently devoted some attention to

improving science and engineering education.

NSF does not conduct research itself nor does

it typically contract for research. It provides

most of its support in the form of grants in

response to unsolicited research proposals.

Proposals are evaluated through a review process that selects primarily on the basis of scientific or technical merit. Most NSF grants

result from proposals submitted by academic

institutions. Small businesses also submit

unsolicited research proposals and receive

awards; however, most NSF awards to small

businesses are grants made in response to

proposals under the Small Business Innovative Research program.

NSF supports basic research projects in

nearly every conceivable area of science and

technology, including physics, chemistry,

mathematical sciences, computer research, materials research, electrical, computer, and systems engineering, chemical and processing

engineering, civil and environmental engineering, mechanical engineering and applied mechanics, physiology, cellular and molecular biology, biotic systems and resources, behavioral

and neural sciences, social and economic sciences, information science and technology, astronomical sciences, atmospheric sciences,

earth sciences, ocean sciences, and interdisciplinary combinations of these. NSF also supports science resources studies, policy research

and analysis, and studies in industrial science,

technological innovation, and other scientific

and technical areas.

For fiscal year 1987, NSF-sponsored university basic research totaled about $1 billion, approximately twice that of DoD. The total NSF

R&D budget that year was $1.5 billion.

Department of Commerce

National Bureau of Standards

The National Bureau of Standards (NBS) is

the Nation’s central reference laboratory for

physical, chemical, and engineering measurements. The measurement and data services

that NBS provided in 1987 included calibrations, production and distribution of standard
104

reference materials and data, and laboratory

accreditation. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and

Defense Agencies (including their contractors)

make extensive use of these services.

While the Federal Government has a substantial capital investment in instrumentation

and facilities at NBS, the actual research budget is modest and is augmented by cooperative research projects conducted jointly between NBS and other organizations. NBS

conducts specialized research programs for the

Department of Defense on a contractual basis. These programs draw on NBS’s unique capabilities, and range from fundamental physics

and chemistry studies to more applied work,

such as developing calibration techniques for

a particular piece of defense hardware. Research topics encompass fields such as electrooptics, microwave and millimeter wave measurements, electronics, physical measurements

(e.g., temperature, pressure, shock, and vibration), automated metrology, materials characterization, and applications of computer systems. NBS also hosts technical conferences

and workshops for DoD and consults on a variety of subjects, particularly those relating

to instrumentation and measurement.

NBS is the only Federal laboratory with a

primary mission of supporting U.S. industry.

To accomplish this mission, NBS is organized

into four laboratories and institutes (figure 14):

the National Measurement Laboratory, the

National Engineering Laboratory, the Institute for Materials Science and Engineering,

and the Institute for Computer Sciences and

Technology.

The National Measurement Laboratory

(NML) conducts research in physics, radiation

chemistry, analytical chemistry, and chemical

properties and processes. NML produces fundamental measurements and data that underlie national measurement standards. It also

furnishes advisory and research services to

other government agencies and provides standard reference data and calibration services.

The National Engineering Laboratory (NEL)

conducts research in electronics and electrical

engineering, chemical engineering, manufacturing engineering, mathematical sciences, and

the construction and performance of buildings

and fire protection. This laboratory produces

new engineering knowledge, techniques, and

databases for the design, development, prediction, and control of industrial processes. Improved quality assurance and reduced costs

of manufacturing are two principal goals of the

work.

The Institute for Materials Science and

Engineering (IMSE) performs research in maFigure 14. –National Bureau of Standards

Programs, OFFICE OF Administration

Budget and THE DIRECTOR and Staff

Personnel Functions

Institute for

Materials Science

and Engineering

SOURCE: National Bureau of Standards
105

terials characterization, nondestructive evaluation, metallurgy, polymers, and ceramics; it

produces measurement methods, standards,

data, and other technical information on processing, structure, properties, and performance

of materials. The goal of these activities is to

support generic materials technologies to permit manufacture of advanced materials with

increased reliability and quality and reduced

cost.

The Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology (ICST) performs research in computer

sciences and engineering. This research is designed to establish Government-wide standards and guidelines for automated data processing systems. The Institute also provides

technical support for the development of national and international voluntary standards.

Under Public Law 100-202, the Final Omnibus Appropriation Bill for fiscal year 1988,

NBS is to establish “Regional Centers for the

Transfer of Manufacturing Technology. ”

These centers will be designed to accelerate

technology transfer to organizations that need

to implement new automated manufacturing

techniques. Such techniques are being developed for the Navy in NBS’s Automated Manufacturing Research Facility. This facility is

developing applications of automated manufacturing technology in piece-part manufactur -

ing at shipyards and depots.

NBS fiscal year 1988 appropriations are

$145 million. Total resources for the same year,

totaling $314 million, include $95 million in

work for other Federal agencies, $22 million

from the sale of calibrations, testing services,

and standard reference materials, and $52 million in private sector contributions of staff and

equipment. Total full-time equivalent NBS

staff for fiscal year 1988 is 3,090.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) explores, maps, and

charts the global oceans and their mineral and

living resources. The agency monitors and predicts the characteristics of the physical environment and warns against impending hazards

such as hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, seismic

sea waves, and other destructive natural

events. NOAA monitors the gradual changes

of climate and environment and predicts the

impact of such changes on food production, resource management, and energy utilization.

NOAA provides a focus within the Federal

Government for the objective scientific assessment of the ecological consequences of specific

actions, such as petroleum exploration, development, and shipment, and marine mineral extraction. The major operating elements of

NOAA are:

●

●

●

●

●

●

the National Weather Service,

the National Ocean Service,

the National Marine Fisheries Service,

the National Environmental Satellite,

Data, and Information Service,

the Environmental Research Laboratory,

and

the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research.

Department of Transportation

The Federal Aviation Administration and

the U.S. Coast Guard-components of the Department of Transportation (DOT) –develop

and acquire hardware and systems. However,

the bulk of DOT’s research is analytical in nature and is directed toward setting and enforcing regulations and toward investigating deviations (e.g., accidents). DOT’s research branch

is the Research and Special Programs Administration, which has the responsibility for planning and management of programs in all fields

of transportation research and development.

Research and Special Programs Administration

The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) maintains the capability to

perform program management, “in-house” research and development, analysis in transportation planning and socioeconomic effects, and

technological support in response to DOT

policies. Particular efforts are made on transportation systems problems, advanced transportation concepts, and on “multi-modal”
106

transportation. RSPA also develops and maintains vital statistics and a related transportation information database.

RSPA is composed of the following functional groups:

The Transportation System Center provides support to DOT and other Federal

agencies in the fields of technology assessment, industry analysis, strategic planning support, and research management

for transportation systems.

The Materials Transportation Bureau is

responsible for the safe transportation of

all hazardous materials. As part of this

mission, it establishes and enforces hazardous materials and pipeline safety regulations.

The Office of Program Management and

Administration coordinates the university

research program, which focuses on highpriority transportation problems (e.g.,

issues pertaining to transportation systems engineering, advanced transportation planning, and telecommunications).

Its Transportation Safety Institute, located at the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City, OK, develops

and conducts training programs.

The Office of Emergency Transportation

coordinates the development and review

of emergency preparedness policies, plans,

and related programs.

Federal Aviation Administration

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

has a research and development program that

is largely oriented toward establishing standards for the design and performance of aircraft

monitoring, communications, and navigation

equipment and toward the acquisition and

management of air traffic control systems. In

this regard, there is a substantial convergence

of interest and activities with DoD—especially

the Air Force. For example, the structure and

management of the Nation’s air traffic control

system and planned conversion to the microwave landing system require close cooperation

with the Air Force. Because of the size of the

Air Force budget in these areas, the “technology transfer” from the Air Force to the FAA

may be substantially greater than vice versa.

However, the joint USAF/FAA responsibilities and interests remain, with attendant contributions to defense technology.

U.S. Coast Guard

The U.S. Coast Guard is involved in the development and acquisition of the communications systems and facilities, aircraft, and vessels which are required to accomplish its

coastal monitoring mission. A close association naturally exists between the Navy and the

Coast Guard in this regard and a significant

technology transfer process exists. The Coast

Guard simply does not have a budget of sufficient size to conduct a broad and independent

R&D program; it must rely on the Navy research budget. However, Coast Guard requirements and deployment concepts contribute to

the formulation and execution of Naval and

other DoD research science and technology

projects. Thus there is, as with the FAA/Air

Force relationship, a synergistic effect–albeit

not substantial in financial terms.

Other Federal Agencies

There are scores of other Federal agencies,

departments and special groups involved in

some way in science and technology which

would have applications to and could contribute to the defense technology base. The Department of Agriculture and the Department

of the Interior/U.S. Geological Survey conduct

modest research programs which can have defense technology base fallout.3 Examples are

the remote sensing programs which are sponsored in these departments. Utilization of data

from LANDSAT, defining collection requirements, and supporting spacecraft and sensor

development programs can complement DoD’s

me Department of Agriculture supports a university research

program which amounts to roughly $200 million per year.
107

image processing and remote sensing requirements. Although the magnitude of funding

available on the defense side may “overpower’

these programs, the expertise growing in applications and the cost-effective utilization of

remote sensing systems could have beneficial

returns to defense programs.

The Federal Communications Commission

exerts influence over telecommunications policies, which can affect DoD programs. Thus,

the Commission’s activities are closely coordinated with DoD, and its actions impact on requirements (if not on actual programs themselves).

Small Business Innovative Research

(SBIR) Program

An interesting government program offering incentives to the private sector that can

stimulate contributions to the defense technology base is the Small Business Innovative Research program.4 The SBIR program was established with the enactment of the Small

Business Innovation Development Act in

1982. In 1986, the program was reauthorized

through fiscal year 1993. Under SBIR, Federal agencies with research and development

budgets which exceed $100 million must establish an SBIR program, with the funding contribution derived from fixed percentages established for each participating agency. Eleven

Federal agencies now participate in SBIR:

Department of Agriculture,

Department of Commerce,

Department of Defense,

Department of Education,

Department of Energy,

Department of Health and Human

Services,

Department of Transportation,

Environmental Protection Agency,

‘For additional information on this program, see the Science

Policy Study Background Report No. 8, “Science Support by

the Department of Defense, ” prepared by the Congressional

Research Service for the Task Force on Science Policy, Committee on Science Policy, U.S. House of Representatives, 99th

Cong., pp. 310-314.

● NASA,

 National Science Foundation, and

 Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The program consists of three phases of contracting and is designed to encourage small

business to overcome their “angst” when dealing with the Federal Government (e.g., too

much paperwork, complete auditing procedures, etc.). Phase I contracts are focused on

evaluating the scientific and technical merit

and/or feasibility of an idea. Awards are normally up to $50,000, with an average period

of performance of 6 months. Under Phase II

the results of Phase I feasibility studies are

expanded to pursue further any development

opportunities. Only those small businesses

which have conducted Phase I contracts are

eligible for Phase II. The size of the contracts

are normally $500,000 or less and the period

of performance roughly 2 years. Under Phase

III, the government seeks to commercialize the

results of Phase II through the use of private,

or non-SBIR Federal, funding (e.g., DoD

RDT&E funds).

The participating agencies and departments

publish their lists of SBIR solicitation topics

on a quarterly basis. DoD—the Departments

of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency; the Defense Nuclear Agency; and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization-lists hundreds

of topics. Most of these topics would be classed

in the research and exploratory development

categories of DoD’s S&T program. Since the

program’s inception in fiscal year 1983, more

than 5,000 Phase I and 1,000 Phase II contracts have been awarded and the total dollar

amount is in excess of $655 million. In fiscal

year 1986,$98 million in Phase I and $200 million in Phase 11 programs were awarded and

roughly $400 million will be awarded for both

phases in fiscal year 1987. A quick review of

the DoD topic list reveals that the return in

defense-related technology development could

be substantial.
108

PRIVATE NONPROFIT LABORATORIES

A considerable amount of DoD technology

base work is performed by federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) and

other nonprofit laboratories that, in many

ways, have organizational characteristics between those of government laboratories and

those of private corporations. Like government

laboratories, these facilities need not consider

potential profitability in their choice of research activities. However, they have more

flexibility in their operating procedures—and

particularly in their personnel policies—than

do government laboratories.

FFRDCs serve various branches of the Federal Government. Ten are sponsored by Department of Defense. Six of these–the Center for Naval Analyses, the Institute for

Defense Analyses, three divisions of the Rand

Corp. (Project Air Force, Rand National Defense Research Institute, and the Arroyo Center), and the Logistics Management Institute

—primarily conduct studies and analyses for

the Services and the Office of the Secretary

of Defense and do not perform much technical

research or development. The other four—The

Aerospace Corp., the MITRE Corp. C3I Division, the Software Engineering Institute, and

Lincoln Laboratory–have a significant technical role and are described below.

Other nonprofit institutions, organized

differently than FFRDCs, also perform significant technical work for the Defense Department and other federal agencies. Their management structures range from university

affiliates to independent, nonprofit organizations. Selected examples of these institutions

are also presented below.

Federally Funded Research

and Development Centers

The Aerospace Corp., El Segundo, CA

(3,800/2,100)5

The Aerospace Corp. performs technical

work on military space systems and related

‘(Total Staff/Scientists and Engineers).

technologies. Its services are provided principally for for the Space Division of the Air

Force Systems Command, although it also

works for other agencies. Aerospace Corp. provides general systems engineering and integration services, which involve formulating

requirements, designing specifications, monitoring technical progress, resolving problems,

certifying completion, and assistance during

operation. Its single largest responsibility involves certifying spacecraft and launch vehicles for launch.

The MITRE Corp., C3I Division, Bedford, MA

and Washington, DC (4,000/2,140)

The C3I division of MITRE Corp. performs

systems engineering and integration services

in the field of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3

I) under Air Force

sponsorship. Its primary sponsor is the Electronic Systems Division of the Air Force Systems Command. (Metrek Division, another division of MITRE Corp., serves as a nonprofit

contractor for civil agencies of the government. )

Software Engineering Institute,

Pittsburgh, PA (14O/1OO)

The Software Engineering Institute is operated by Carnegie Mellon University under contract to the Electronic Systems Division of the

Air Force Systems Command. However, it

works for all the Services to promote use of

the most effective technology to improve the

quality of operational software in missioncritical computer systems.

Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA (2,100/760)

Lincoln Laboratory’s particular emphasis is

on electronics. It is operated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under prime contract with the Electronic Systems Division of

the Air Force Systems Command. Established

in 1951 to assist the Air Force with the thenemerging technology of digital computers, it

continues as a pioneering technical center in

the areas of radar, communications, and com-
109

-.

puters. Programs range from fundamental

solid state science to the design, development,

and demonstration of prototype systems. It

works for all the Services and for several DoD

agencies. The Air Force limits the degree of

participation of other clients to less than 50

percent.

University Affiliates

Many federally funded laboratories are managed by universities under a variety of different structures such as FFRDC (e.g., Lincoln

Laboratory, managed by MIT for the Air

Force) and management contract (e.g. Los

Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Lawrence

Berkeley National Laboratories, managed by

the University of California for the Department of Energy). Yet another management approach is as an independent university division, such as the Johns Hopkins Applied

Physics Laboratory. This laboratory, and other

examples of university-affiliated research

centers, are described below.

Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory,

Howard County, MD (2,800/1,600)

The Applied Physics Laboratory is a division of the Johns Hopkins University, operating in parallel with the university’s academic

divisions. The lab is run primarily under a single contract with the Navy’s Space and Naval

Warfare Systems Command, but it performs

work for all DoD-sponsored activities and most

other Federal activities. With a history of work

in proximity fuzes, guided missiles, and systems engineering, the lab currently works in

the areas of Navy ship systems, submarine systems, strategic systems, naval warfare analysis, space research and development, aeronautics, and biomedical research. Basic and

applied research are also conducted in a number of areas that underlie current and future

laboratory interests.

Georgia Tech Research Institute,

Atlanta, GA (1,360/580)

The Georgia Tech Research Institute is a

nonprofit organization affiliated with the Georgia Institute of Technology. It performs engineering, scientific, and economic research in

electronics, electromagnetic, energy, materials sciences, and a number of other areas. Various defense and non-defense government agencies are the principal clients, but up to 20

percent of the work is done for private industry.

IIT Research Institute, Chicago, IL

(1,750/1,200)

The I IT Research Institute is a nonprofit research organization affiliated with the Illinois

Institute of Technology. It works for both government and private clients, with the number

of projects about evenly split between the two,

but with Federal contracts representing about

80 percent of its funding. Research topics include electronics, communications, toxicology,

chemical defense, environmental science, petroleum research, ordnance, and advanced

manufacturing technology.

Independent Nonprofit Laboratories

Battelle Memorial Institute,

Columbus, OH (7,800)

Battelle is an independent, nonprofit, international organization providing research and

development, technical management (primarily management of the Department of Energy’s

Pacific Northwest Laboratory), and technology commercialization services. Battelle’s research and development is now being concentrated primarily in the areas of advanced

materials, biological and chemical sciences,

biotechnology, electronics, engineering and

manufacturing technologies, and information

systems.

Charles Stark Draper Laboratory,

Cambridge, MA (2,000/1,000)

Draper Labs, at one time affiliated with the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is now

an independent nonprofit research institution.

Its major business activities are avionics, strategic systems, undersea vehicle systems, precision pointing and tracking, and advanced

space systems. Draper has had major responsibility for guidance, navigation, and control
110

systems for strategic ballistic missiles, NASA

spacecraft, and a variety of Air Force systems.

SRI International, Menlo Park, CA (3,600)

SRI International is an independent nonprofit research institute once affiliated with

Stanford University. It is organized into four

divisions–Engineering; International Business and Consulting; Sciences (Physical and

Life); and the David Sarnoff Research Center.

The Sarnoff research center, originally the

RCA corporate research laboratory, was sold

to SRI when RCA was acquired by General

Electric. About 60 percent of SRI’s work is

for the Federal Government, with the remainder for private clients.
Glossary of Acronyms

AD

ADP

AFAL

AFATL

AFESL

AFGL

AFOSR

AFSC

AFWAL

AFWL

AMC

AMCCOM

ARDEC

ARI

ARI

ARO

ARPA

–Armaments Division (Air

Force Systems Command)

—Advanced Demonstration

Project

—Air Force Astronautics

Laboratory (Air Force Systems

Command)

—Air Force Armament

Laboratory (Air Force Systems

Command)

–Air Force Engineering and

Services Laboratory

—Air Force Geophysics

Laboratory (Air Force Systems

Command)

–Air Force Office of Scientific

Research

–Air Force Systems Command

–Air Force Wright Aeronautical

Laboratories (Air Force

Systems Command)

–Air Force Weapons Laboratory

(Air Force Systems Command)

–Army Materiel Command

—Armaments, Munitions, and

Chemical Command (Army

Materiel Command)

–Armament RDE Center (Army

Materiel Command)

–Accelerated Research Initiative

(U.S. Navy)

–Army Research Institute

(Army Deputy Chief of Staff

for Personnel)

—Army Research Office

–Advanced Research Projects

Agency (now DARPA)

ASA(RD&A) –Assistant Secretary of the

Army for Research,

Development, and Acquisition

ASAF(A) –Assistant Secretary of the Air

Force for Acquisition

ASD —Aeronautical Systems Division

(Air Force Systems Command)

ASD(R&T) —Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Research and Technology

ASL —Atmospheric Sciences

Laboratory (Army Materiel

Command)

ASN(RE&S) –Assistant Secretary of the

Navy for Research,

Engineering, and Systems

ATD

AVSCOM

B&P

BRL

C

3

I

CECOM

CMC

CNO

CNR

COE

CRDEC

CREL

CRREL

CRS

DARPA

DCA

DCS(T&P)

DCSPER

DDR&E

DMA

DNA

DNL

DoD

DOE

DOT

DR&T

–Advanced Technology

Demonstration

–Aviation Systems Command

(Army Materiel Command)

–Bid and Proposal

—Ballistics Research Laboratory

(Army Materiel Command)

–Command, Control,

Communications, and

Intelligence

–Communications-Electronics

Command (Army Materiel

Command)

–Commandant of the Marine

Corps

–Chief of Naval Operations

–Chief of Naval Research

–Corps of Engineers (U.S.

Army)

–Chemical RDE Center (Army

Materiel Command)

–Construction Engineering

Research Laboratory (Army

Corps of Engineers)

–Cold Regions Research and

Engineering Laboratory (Army

Corps of Engineers)

–Congressional Research Service

–Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency (formerly

ARPA)

—Defense Communications

Agency

–Deputy Chief of Staff for

Technology and Plans (U.S.

Air Force)

–Deputy Chief of Staff for

Personnel (U.S. Army)

–Director of Defense Research

and Engineering

–Defense Mapping Agency

–Defense Nuclear Agency

—Director of Navy Laboratories

—Department of Defense

–Department of Energy

—Department of Transportation

–Director of Research and

Technology (U.S. Army)

DRD&R(T&E)–Director of Research,

Development and

Requirements, Test and

Evaluation

111
112

DSARC —Defense System Acquisition

Review Council

DSB –Defense Science Board

DT&A –Deputy for Technology and

Assessment (U.S. Army)

DUSD(R&AT)–Deputy Under Secretary of

ESD

ET

ETDL

ETL

FAA

FFRDC

FSED

GaAs

GOCO

HDL

HEL

HSD

ILIR

IMIP

INEL

INO

IR&D

JPL

LABCOM

LBL

Defense for Research and

Advanced Technology

—Electronic Systems Division

(Air Force Systems Command)

–Emerging Technologies

–Electronics Technology and

Devices Laboratory (Army

Materiel Command)

—Engineer Topographic

Laboratory (Army Corps of

Engineers)

–Federal Aviation

Administration (U.S.

Department of Transportation)

–Federally Funded Research

and Development Center

—Full-Scale Engineering

Development

—Gallium Arsenide

–Government Owned/Contractor

Operated

–Harry Diamond Laboratories

(Army Materiel Command)

–Human Engineering

Laboratory (Army Materiel

Command)

—Human Systems Division (Air

Force Systems Command)

—In-House Laboratory

Independent Research

Program

—Industrial Modernization

Incentives Program

–Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory (U.S. Department

of Energy)

–Institute for Naval

Oceanography (Office of Naval

Research)

–Independent Research and

Development

–Jet Propulsion Laboratory

(National Aeronautics and

Space Administration)

–Laboratory Command (Army

Materiel Command)

–Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

(U.S. Department of Energy)

ManTech

MICOM

MILSPEC

MIMIC

MTL

NADC

NAS

NASA

NATO

NBS

NCSC

NEPRF

NGNS

NIH

NOAA

NORDA

NOSC

NRL

NSA

NSF

NSRDC

NSWC

NUSC

NWC

–Manufacturing Technology

(Program)

–Missile Command (Army

Materiel Command)

–Military Specifications

–Microwave/Millimeter Wave

Monolithic Integrated Circuit

–Materials Technology

Laboratory (Army Materiel

Command)

–Naval Air Development Center

(Space and Naval Warfare

Systems Command)

—National Academy of Sciences

–National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

–North Atlantic Treaty

Organization

–National Bureau of Standards

(U.S. Department of Commerce)

–Naval Coastal Systems Center

(Space and Naval Warfare

Systems Command)

—Navy Environmental Prediction

Research Facility (Office of

Naval Research)

–Next Generation and Notional

Systems

–National Institutes of Health

–National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration

(U.S. Departmemt of

Commerce)

–Naval Oceanographic Research

and Development Activity

(Office of Naval Research)

–Naval Ocean Systems Center

(Space and Naval Warfare

Systems Command)

–Naval Research Laboratory

(Office of Naval Research)

–National Security Agency

—National Science Foundation

–Naval Ship Research and

Development Center (Space and

Naval Warfare Systems

Command)

–Naval Surface Warfare Center

(Space and Naval Warfare

Systems Command)

–Naval Undersea Systems

Center (Space and Naval

Warfare Systems Command)

–Naval Weapons Center (Space
113

ONR

ONT

OPNAV

OSD

OTA

OTS G

P E O

P M R

P N L

POM

PPB S

R&AT

R&D

RADC

RD&A

R D E

RDT&E

RFP

RSPA

S & T

SBI R

SCC

and Naval Warfare Systems

Command )

–Office of Naval Research

–Office of Naval Technology

–Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations

–Office of the Secretary of

Defense

–Office of Technology

Assessment

–Office of the Surgeon General

(U.S. Army)

–Program Executive Officer

—Potential Military Relevance

–Pacific Northwest Laboratory

(U.S. Department of Energy)

—Program Objective

Memorandu m

–Planning, Programming, and

Budgeting System

—see DUSD(R&AT)

–Research and Development

–Rome Air Development Center

(Air Force Systems Command)

–Research, Development, and

Acquisition

–Research, Development, and

Engineering

–Research, Development, Test,

and Evaluation

–Request for Proposal

—Research and Special Programs

Administration (U.S.

Department of Transportation)

–Science and Technology

—Small Business Innovative

Research

–Slidell Computer Complex

(National Aeronautics and

Space Administration)

S D —Space Division (Air Force

Systems Command)

S D I –Strategic Defense Initiative

SDI O —Strategic Defense Initiative

Organization

SEMATECH –Semiconductor Manufacturing

SPA WAR

SPF

STARS

STOVL

SYSCOM

TACOM

TBAG

TRADOC

TROSCOM

TSG

URI

URIP

USD(A)

VAL

VHSIC

VLSI

WES

Technology Institute “

–Space and Naval Warfare

Systems Command (U.S. Navy)

–Single Project Fund (U.S.

Army)

–Software Technology for

Adaptable Reliable Systems

—short take-off/vertical landing

–Systems Command

—Tank Automotive Command

(Army Materiel Command)

–Technology Base Advisory

Group (U.S. Army)

—Training and Doctrine

Command (U.S. Army)

–Troop Support Command (U.S.

Army)

–Surgeon General of the Army

–University Research Initiative

–University Research

Instrumentation Program

–Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition

–Vulnerability Assessment

Laboratory (Army Materiel

Command)

–Very High Speed Integrated

Circuit

—Very Large Scale Integration

—Waterways Experiment Station

(Army Corps of Engineers)

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