NO. 07-09-0077-CR 

NO. 07-09-0078-CR 

NO. 07-09-0079-CR 

NO. 07-09-0080-CR 

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

 AT AMARILLO 

 PANEL B 

 JULY 20, 2010 

 ______________________________ 

 SIDNEY LYNN WEEKS, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

 THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Appellee 

 _________________________________ 

 FROM THE 46TH DISTRICT COURT OF HARDEMAN COUNTY; 

 NOS. 4088, 4089, 4090, 4091; HON. DAN MIKE BIRD, PRESIDING 

 _______________________________ 

Memorandum Opinion

_______________________________ 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

 Sidney Lynn Weeks (appellant) appeals his four convictions for aggravated 

sexual assault. Via twelve issues, he contends that the trial court erred in 1) denying 

his motion for severance, 2) denying his motion to suppress, 3) admitting extraneous 

evidence, and 4) refusing to charge the jury per art. 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal 
2 

Procedure. He also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the four 

convictions. We affirm. 

Background 

 The circumstances before us involve appellant’s repeated sexual assaults upon his 

stepdaughter while she was between the ages of thirteen and sixteen. When finally 

contacted, the police began an investigation into the crimes. Pursuant thereto, law 

enforcement officials called appellant and advised him that he was being investigated. 

Eventually, a meeting was arranged between appellant and a DPS ranger (Foster); but 

when same was scheduled via phone, appellant was not advised of his Miranda rights. 

Nevertheless, the two did meet in person, and at the meeting, appellant was mirandized 

before providing the ranger with a statement. Moreover, during the exchange, the 

ranger advised appellant that he was subject to punishment anywhere from probation to 

ninety-nine years in prison and that the district attorney would be told of appellant’s 

cooperation in the investigation if a statement was given. 

 At trial, the victim testified, as did Foster. Furthermore, the trial court admitted 

appellant’s written statement, though his oral comments were excluded. Ultimately, the 

jury found him guilty of all four charges. 

Issues One and Six

 We address issues one and six since they are logically connected. Via issue one, 

appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to sever each count into 

separate trials. This allegedly was wrong because the admission of extraneous 

offenses somehow prejudiced him. Via his sixth issue, he posits that it was error to 

admit the extraneous offenses. We overrule the issues. 
3 

 Regarding the admission of the extraneous offenses, the latter consisted of 

instances wherein appellant engaged in “anal and oral” sex with the victim. This should 

have been excluded, according to appellant. Yet, evidence of extraneous acts involving 

the accused and the victim may be admissible under art. 38.37 of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure.1

 Appellant does not explain why that statute is inapplicable. Moreover, the 

State contends that the instances in question had a bearing on relevant matters such as 

the state of mind of both appellant and victim and the nature of their prior relationship. 

The trial court’s agreement with the State did not fall outside the zone of reasonable 

disagreement. See Hernandez v. State, 205 S.W.3d 555, 558 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 

2006, pet. ref'd) (stating that the standard of review for issues encompassing the 

admission of evidence is that of abused discretion and discretion is abused when the 

decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement). 

 The inappropriate relationship between appellant and his stepdaughter covers 

several of the youth’s teenage years and evinced frequent assaults. As such, it could 

be viewed as relevant to the relationship between the two and their respective states of 

mind. The statements could also be viewed as tending to rebuff appellant’s attack upon 

the victim’s credibility. He did ask the jury to ponder upon why she waited so long to 

disclose the supposed misconduct and why it was disclosed during an argument with 

the assailant’s wife (i.e. the victim’s mother). Implicit therein is the suggestion that 

maybe the events were fabricated. Admitting appellant’s own comments about the 

 1

According to that provision, “[n]otwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, 

evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant against the child who is the victim 

of the alleged offense shall be admitted for its bearing on relevant matters, including: (1) the state of mind 

of the defendant and the child; and (2) the previous and subsequent relationship between the defendant 

and the child.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, §2 (Vernon Supp. 2009). 
4 

nature and extent of the sexual activities in which the two engaged would serve to 

illustrate that the victim did not simply fabricate the incidents. See Smith v. State, No. 

07-05-0277-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6004 *3-6 (Tex. App.–Amarillo July 30, 2007, pet. 

dism’d) (not designated for publication) (wherein the court held that it was not error to 

admit instances of prior sexual activity between the accused and appellant, despite an 

objection founded on Rule 403, because, among other things, the evidence tended to 

bolster the victim’s credibility). 

 We further note that it was within the realm of reason to deduce that while 

reference to “anal and oral” sex may carry with it prejudicial effect, that effect would be 

no greater than the impact arising from the evidence of appellant engaging in vaginal 

intercourse with his thirteen-year-old stepdaughter. And, no one can deny that the latter 

evidence was admissible given the allegations contained in the indictment. So, we 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the evidence both relevant 

and admissible despite appellant’s Rule 401, 403, and 404(b) objections.2

 See Hitt v. 

State, 53 S.W.3d 697, 704-05 (Tex. App.–Austin 2001, pet. ref'd) (recognizing that, in 

cases involving the sexual abuse of children, article 38.37, section 2 supersedes the 

application of Texas Rules of Evidence 402 and 404). 

 As for the matter of severance, appellant concedes that the causes were properly 

joined. However, he posits that they should have been severed because their joinder 

caused him to suffer prejudice. The prejudice, in his view, arose from the State’s use of 

 2

Rule 401 of the Texas Rules of Evidence states: “’[r]elevant evidence’ means evidence having 

any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 

more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 401 (Vernon 2003). 

Rule 403 states: “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 

considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” And, Rule 404(b) 

states: “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 

order to show action in conformity therewith . . . .” 
5 

the aforementioned evidence of extraneous offenses. How severance would have 

precluded the State from invoking art. 38.37 went unexplained, however. Indeed, 

having concluded above that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

evidence when the causes were joined, we have difficulty understanding why the same 

evidence would be inadmissible if the causes were tried separately. Nor does appellant 

address that. So, under the circumstances before us, the trial court cannot be said to 

have abused its discretion in trying the causes together. Salazar v. State, 127 S.W.3d 

355, 365 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (noting that the pertinent 

standard of review is one of abused discretion). 

Issues Two through Five - Admission of Appellant’s Confession and the 

 Evidence of the Extraneous Offenses Therein 

 Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting his written 

statement into evidence. This was so, according to him, because the statement 1) was 

involuntary, and 2) was obtained in a manner that violated due process and article 38 of 

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We disagree and overrule the issues. 

Regarding the issue of voluntariness, appellant suggests his statement was 

involuntary because it was given in response to the ranger’s promise to speak with the 

district attorney if appellant cooperated and his representation that the crime for which 

appellant was being investigated could carry a sentence ranging from probation to 

ninety-nine years in prison. Neither of these grounds was urged at trial as basis for 

finding his confession less than knowing and voluntary, however. That is, he did not 

argue that the confession was involuntary because it arose from a promise or 

representation of the type which would induce someone to speak untruthfully. 

Therefore, this particular argument was not preserved for review. Heidelberg v. State, 
6 

144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that the legal basis of a complaint 

raised on appeal cannot vary from that raised at trial). 

 As for due process and article 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, both were 

purportedly violated because appellant was not mirandized prior to undergoing the 

custodial interview. This is allegedly true even though the ranger actually mirandized 

appellant before he signed his confession. We find no error. 

 It is clear that a suspect undergoing custodial interrogation must be warned of his 

right to remain silent, his right to have legal counsel, his right to have counsel appointed 

if he is impoverished, and of the potential consequences arising from his refusal to 

remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 

Such warnings are not necessary, though, if the interview occurs outside the realm of 

custodial interrogation. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

The trial court found, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, that the statement at bar 

was not the product of such an interrogation. And, we find no fault with that 

determination. 

According to the record, the police chief contacted appellant about meeting to 

review the allegations raised by his stepdaughter. Appellant agreed and appeared at 

the offices of the Department of Public Safety. There he met with Ranger Foster for one 

hour and forty-nine minutes. Foster testified that appellant was free to go at any time 

and that if he left, the ranger would have simply continued his investigation without 

appellant. So too did the ranger testify that appellant was not denied any basic 

necessity such as “food, or water, or cigarettes or anything like that.” And, once the 

interviewed ended, appellant left. It may well be that appellant was a suspect in an 
7 

ongoing investigation. But being a suspect alone does not cause any ensuing interview 

to rise to the level of custodial interrogation. Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1990) (citing Beckwith v. State, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 

(1976)); accord, Samuel v. State, No. 02-08-341-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1372, *17 

(Tex. App.–Fort Worth February 25, 2010, no pet.) (not designated for publication) 

(stating the same). Moreover, we cannot forget that appellant was actually mirandized 

before executing his written confession. And, upon receiving those warnings, he not 

only indicated to the ranger that he understood them but also that he wished to proceed 

without counsel. 

Missing from the record is any evidence of threats. Nor do we have before us 

evidence of appellant being physically restrained in any manner. And, that Foster 

informed appellant about the potential range of punishment for the alleged offense and 

stated he would let the district attorney know that appellant cooperated falls short of 

evincing psychological coercion. Indeed, appellant himself characterized the 

representations (in his appellate brief) as “seem[ing] innocuous enough.” Furthermore, 

they could have been reasonably interpreted, by the trial court, as an effort to impress 

upon appellant the gravity of the situation and as a means of fully informing him of 

potential ramifications arising from the allegation. In other words, the ranger may have 

simply been attempting to provide appellant with all the information available to assist 

him in making an informed choice. And, if placed within that perspective, we cannot say 

that they alone or in conjunction with the other circumstances then present somehow 

obligated the trial court to conclude that appellant was neither free to leave nor able to 

terminate the interview at will. 
8 

 Simply put, the trial court had basis to legitimately conclude that the interview 

was not tantamount to a custodial interrogation. As stated in Martinez v. State, 131 

S.W.3d 22 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2003, no pet.), when the circumstances show that 

the individual acts upon the invitation or request of the police, and there are no threats, 

express or implied, that he will be forcibly taken, then that person is not in custody at 

that time. Id. at 32. Those are the indicia here. Thus, the decision to deny suppression 

of the statement because appellant was not mirandized at the beginning of the interview 

was not error. 

Issue Eleven – Jury Charge

 Via issue eleven, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to submit a 

limiting instruction to the jury regarding the purposes for which it could consider the 

evidence of the aforementioned “anal and oral” sexual acts. We disagree and overrule 

the issue. 

 The party opposing effort to admit evidence admissible for a restricted purpose 

has the burden of requesting a limiting instruction when the evidence is introduced. 

Hammock v. State, 46 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). That is, to be effective, 

such an instruction must be given when the evidence is admitted. See Rankin v. State, 

974 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). If it is not, then the information simply 

becomes part of the general evidence and may be considered by the jury for all 

purposes. See Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 862, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). We say 

this since appellant did not request a limiting instruction before, during or immediately 

after the written confession was offered, admitted into evidence, and read to the jury. 

Consequently, his statement was admitted for all purposes. See Hammock v. State, 46 
9 

S.W.3d at 895 (holding that when a party fails to ask for a limiting instruction until later 

in the trial, the evidence is admitted for all purposes); Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 412, 

424 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that when a party requests a limiting 

instruction concerning a witness's testimony after the witness testifies, the evidence is 

admitted for all purposes). 

Issues Seven through Ten – Sufficiency of the Evidence

 In his next four issues, appellant contends that the evidence is both legally and 

factually insufficient to establish that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with the 

victim when she was fourteen or younger and seventeen or younger. We overrule each 

issue for several reasons. 

 First, the assertion is premised on the exclusion of his confession. Since we 

overruled the issues attacking the trial court’s decision to admit the confession, the 

foundation of his argument is missing. 

 Second, within the confession lay appellant’s own admission to engaging in 

sexual intercourse with the child. To this we add the child’s own testimony about her 

age when the two first coupled, i.e. thirteen years old. Those activities continued, 

according to the victim, during the time the family lived in both Quanah and Wichita 

Falls. So too did appellant’s stepdaughter testify that after she left Wichita Falls and 

returned to Quanah at the age of sixteen, appellant picked her up from work. On the 

way home, he told her that he would make her get out of the car and walk if she did not 

have sex with him. She complied with the demand, according to the girl. 

 It is well settled that "[t]he testimony of a victim [,] standing alone, even when the 

victim is a child, is sufficient to support a conviction for sexual assault." Ruiz v. State, 
10 

891 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1994, pet. ref'd) (citing Villalon v. State, 

791 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1990)). Here, the child’s own words coupled with 

appellant’s confession constituted some evidence from which the jury could rationally 

deduce beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was fourteen and under when the 

sexual activity began and continued while she was between the ages of fifteen and 

seventeen. Moreover, such a conclusion would not be supported by weak evidence, or 

overwhelmed by contrary evidence, or manifestly unjust. 

Issue Twelve – Jury Instruction Pursuant to Art. 38.22

 Via his last issue, appellant posits that he was entitled to a charge per art. 38.22, 

§7 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and that the trial court erred in refusing it to 

him. We overrule the issue. 

 Per the aforementioned statute, when question regarding the legality by which 

evidence is obtained “is raised by the evidence, the trial judge shall appropriately 

instruct the jury, generally, on the law pertaining to such statement." TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §7 (Vernon 2005). If no such evidence (irrespective of whether it 

is strong, weak, contradicted, impeached or unbelievable) exists, then it is not error to 

omit such an instruction. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex. Crim. App.1993). 

By evidence, it is meant evidence creating a fact issue encompassing the manner in 

which the proof was secured. See Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 509-10 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007). If no such fact issue exists, then an instruction need not be given. Id. 

 According to appellant, there existed a fact issue as to whether he was in 

custody or whether he underwent a custodial interrogation when providing his 

statement. Yet, we are cited to nothing of record illustrating that the factual 
11 

circumstances from which his statement arose were in dispute or otherwise 

contradicted. Nor did we find any such evidence. Instead, it appears that appellant 

simply wanted the jury to have the opportunity to apply the test for what constitutes a 

custodial interrogation to the undisputed evidence. That falls outside the scope of art. 

38.22. See Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d at 511-13. 

Having overruled each issue, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

 

 Brian Quinn 

 Chief Justice 

Do not publish.