SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4978-16T2

JOSE LUIS ROSARIO, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LILLIAN ROSARIO, 

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Argued January 8, 2019 – Decided March 14, 2019

Before Judges Vernoia and Moynihan.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, 

Docket No. FM-02-1442-07.

Lillian Rosario, appellant, argued the cause pro se

(Joseph Rakofsky, on the brief).

Jose I. Bastarrika argued the cause for respondent 

(Bastarrika, Soto, Gonzalez & Somohano, attorneys; 

Jose I. Bastarrika, of counsel; Andrew Burroughs, on 

the brief). 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Lillian Rosario appeals from the Family Part judge's June 14, 

2017 order that denied her motion to reconsider a March 21, 2017 order and 

granted plaintiff Jose Luis Rosario's cross-motion providing the following relief:

finding her in contempt for violating the final judgment of divorce and the March 

21, 2017 order; directing that she pay $94,535.04 to plaintiff, and entering 

judgment against her in that amount in favor of plaintiff, to cover the balance 

due pursuant to the March 2017 order that required defendant to reimburse

plaintiff $193,117.07; appointing plaintiff the attorney-in-fact for the sale of 

properties in Connecticut; and awarding plaintiff counsel fees.

1

 The March 2017 

order held defendant in violation of litigant's rights and directed that she pay 

plaintiff for various costs associated with the mortgage, taxes, utilities and 

repairs made to the marital home prior to its sale.

In her merits brief, defendant argues:

I. JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE 

"PROOFS" CONSISTING OF FORGERIES (AND 

OTHER INSTANCES OF FRAUD) SHOULD NOT 

BE TOLERATED BY ANY JUDGE AND SHOULD 

 

1

 Defendant listed only the June 2017 order – not the March 2017 order – as 

appealed in the notice of appeal and civil case information statement she filed. 

We have made it clear that we will not address an order if the appellant "did not 

indicate in his [or her] notice of appeal or case information statement that he [or 

she] was appealing from the order." Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. 

Super. 455, 460-61 (App. Div. 2002). As such, we only consider defendant's

appeal from the June order.
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NOT BE RELIED UPON TO PREJUDICE AN 

INNOCENT PARTY, WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT 

OCCURRED TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IN 

[THE TRIAL JUDGE'S] COURTROOM.

II. JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE 

THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ABUSE OF DISCETION, 

REFLECTED IN [THE] DECISION TO REFUSE TO 

INVESTIGATE WHY EXPENSES PRESENTED 

(FOR "2011 EXPENSES") BY PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE WERE FIRST REPRESENTED TO THE 

COURT IN 2011 AS $58,000 AND THEN, LATER, IN 

2017, WERE AGAIN PRESENTED BY PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE TO THE COURT, BUT THIS TIME

WERE BLATANTLY MISREPRESENTED IN

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S SO CALLED "PROOFS" 

WHICH NOW REQUESTED $124,000 (FOR THE 

VERY SAME "2011 EXPENSES"), AS WELL AS 

INSTANCES OF FORGERY AND OTHER ACTS OF 

FRAUD, PERPETRATED BY PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE, CLEARLY PREJUDICED 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, WHICH WILL 

RESULT IN EXTREME HARM TO DEFENDANT, IF 

PERMITTED TO STAND.

III. JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED 

BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION, NOT ONLY REFLECTED IN HIS . . . 

DECISION TO REFUSE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

A HANDWRITING EXPERT AND A FORENSIC 

EXPERT, BUT ALSO IN HIS . . . SURPRISING 

REFUSAL TO ORDER A HANDWRITING EXPERT 

AND A FORESNIC EXPERT, SUA SPONTE, TO 

INVESTIGATE THE SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF 

FORGERY, WHICH WERE CLEARLY 

ARTICULATED ON THE RECORD, IS 

PREJUDICAL ERROR, WHICH WILL RESULT IN 
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EXTREME HARM TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, 

IF PERMITTED TO STAND.

IV. JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED 

BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION, REFLECTED IN HIS HONOR'S 

DECISION TO REFUSE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

DISCOVERY CLEARLY PREJUDICED 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, WHICH WILL 

RESULT IN EXTREME HARM TO DEFENDANT IF 

PERMITTED TO STAND.

V. JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED "IN THE 

INTEREST OF JUSTICE" AS AN APPELLATE 

REVIEW AND GUIDANCE ARE IMMEDIATELY 

NECESSARY, OTHERWISE THE RULING BELOW, 

IF PERMITTED TO STAND, WILL IRREPARABLY 

INJURE DEFENDANT.

VI. JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED 

BECAUSE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 

DEMONSTRATE AN OBJECTIVELY 

REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE TRIAL 

COURT'S IMPARTIALITY BECAUSE THE 

COURT'S RULING WAS BASED ON ARBITRARY 

GROUNDS AND THE PUNITIVE MEASURES 

IMPOSED UPON DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ARE 

UNREASONABLE AND DISPROPORTIONATE.

VII. JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED 

BECAUSE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS 

DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

VIII. THIS HONORABLE COURT SHOULD 

PROVIDE RELIEF TO DEFENDANTAPPEL[L]ANT PURSUANT TO RULE 4:50-1, 

WHICH SPECIFICALLY CONTEMPLATES 

"FRAUD" AND "MISREPRESENTATION" AS 
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BASES FOR RELIEF TO AVOID A "GRAVE 

INJUSTICE."

We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of 

discretion. Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996). An 

abuse of discretion occurs "when a decision is 'made without a rational 

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an 

impermissible basis.'" U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467-

68 (2012) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)). 

Reconsideration is appropriate if "1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based 

upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt 

either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, 

competent evidence." Cummings, 295 N.J Super. at 384 (quoting D'Atria v. 

D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)); see also Fusco, 349 N.J. 

Super. at 462.

In her brief to the Family Part in support of the motion for reconsideration, 

defendant recognized the foregoing legal tenets and "assure[d] [the] reviewing 

[Family Part] court the motion herein relies on the record as originally presented 

and improperly represented. The facts are the same, it's the untainted version 

that warrants reconsideration." She tellingly admitted that she was "not seeking 
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to 'expand' the record before the court, but rather reexamine it based on the truths 

and the proofs."

During the original motion hearing, the Family Part judge repeatedly

pointed to defendant's failure to prove her allegations. During the 

reconsideration hearing, defendant's counsel represented that defendant had 

provided counsel with "some significant information that was not available . . . 

prior to the hearing." On the day of the hearing, she requested the judge to 

consider those documents, including a certification from a repair man – who had 

allegedly been unavailable due to his travel schedule – asserting the amount paid 

on certain repairs was exaggerated by plaintiff. The certification was submitted 

to the court the day of the hearing and was not previously sent to plaintiff or 

plaintiff's counsel. The judge ruled the certification was not properly before the 

court. 

Counsel then argued that defendant's signatures, appearing on cashed 

insurance checks covering repairs to the marital home – also presented to the 

court for the first time on the day of the hearing – were forged. The judge 

responded, "All [defendant] did [was] mention that there were proceeds from 

[an insurance claim for damage caused by Superstorm Sandy], but there was 

nothing in . . . those documents[] to demonstrate . . . how . . . any of the properties 
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were damaged by Sandy[.]" The judge also noted defendant did not file a 

complaint with the insurance company or prosecutor's office alleging forgery. 

Defense counsel further argued that the marital home was not sold for over nine 

years, a delay she alleged was caused by plaintiff's insistence that the house be 

sold well above market value. The judge replied he "was looking for supporting 

documentation as to that assertion" but "didn't see any appraisals for the property 

as part of your papers that showed" the property's value. Defendant's counsel 

admitted that "all this information was provided to me post-filing." 

The only reason advanced by defendant for the failure to submit proofs, 

other than the repairman's unavailability, is her lawyer's failure to properly 

represent her. She contends "[t]he facts here provide incontrovertible evidence 

that the expenses were improperly presented, woefully misrepresented and 

substantially exaggerated." She has not shown, however, that any documents 

she now relies on to support her opposition to relief sought in plaintiff's crossmotion were not obtainable prior to the March hearing. Indeed, the motion had 

been carried to February 2017 from November 2016, at request of defendant.

2

 

2

 Defendant's request for an adjournment of the March hearing in order to allow 

her to obtain substitute counsel was denied. 
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Reconsideration is not an appropriate vehicle to bring to the court's 

attention evidence that was available but not presented in connection with initial 

argument. Fusco, 349 N.J. Super. at 463. We perceive no abuse of discretion 

by the judge in denying defendant's motion for reconsideration. Defendant's 

dissatisfaction with the judge's ruling and her counsel's performance is obvious 

but does not present a basis for reversal where the judge's decision is supported 

by the record. Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 

310 (App. Div. 2010).

We determine the balance of defendant's arguments are without sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.