United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on

Armed Services

U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

2:30 p.m., EDT

Thursday

March 21, 1996

DOD RESERVE

COMPONENTS

Issues Pertaining to

Readiness

Statement of Richard Davis, Director, National Security

Analysis, National Security and International Affairs

Division

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues pertaining to the readiness

of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) reserve components. When DOD

adopted the Total Force policy in 1973, it intended to better integrate the

active and reserve forces so that they could effectively carry out the U.S.

national security strategy. The strategy during the Cold War required that

U.S. forces be able to meet the demands of a global conflict with the Soviet

Union and the Warsaw Pact. Since the end of the Cold War, new regional

dangers have replaced the global Soviet threat, and reserve forces must

adapt to meet these new challenges. Our work suggests that at least one

reserve component has not sufficiently adapted to the new challenges and

therefore may not be prepared to carry out its assigned missions. Our

work also shows that too much force structure exists in some areas, which

results in an inefficient use of defense resources. These findings are

significant because both DOD and Congress are concerned with the

long-term readiness of U.S. forces and are attempting to find the necessary

funds within the defense budget to modernize the force.

My testimony discusses the following three specific areas. We believe

changes in these areas could help achieve a more effective force structure

through better use of resources.

• The Army National Guard has considerable excess combat forces at the

same time that the Army has a substantial unfilled requirement for combat

support units.

• The ability of some Army National Guard combat brigades to be ready for

early deployment missions to support the defense strategy is highly

uncertain. This uncertainty brings into question whether the roles and

missions of the Army Guard need to be modified.

• The Air National Guard has forces dedicated to the continental air defense

mission. This dedicated force is not needed today. Considerable moneys

could be available for other critical needs if the dedicated forces were

eliminated and the mission was assigned to existing forces.

I will discuss each of these issues in more detail, but first I want to provide

some information on the reserve components.

Background The reserve components of the Army and Air Force include both the

National Guard and Reserves. These components account for about

85 percent of the total reserve personnel and funding. The Navy, Marine

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130
Corps, and Coast Guard have only Reserves. Because the Coast Guard

Reserve is such a small force—about 8,000 personnel in 1996—and is

under the Department of Transportation, we are not including it in our

discussion.

Size of Reserve

Components

Table 1 shows that all the reserve components have been reduced in size

since fiscal year 1990. Except for the Marine Corps, the components are

projected to be reduced even further by fiscal year 2001. Between fiscal

years 1990 and 2001, the reserve components are expected to decline by

slightly more than 20 percent.

Table 1: Size of DOD’s Reserve

Components Reserve component 1990 1996 2001

Army National Guard 436,965 373,000 367,000

Army Reserve 299,145 230,000 208,000

Air National Guard 116,150 109,460 106,665

Air Force Reserve 77,390 73,970 73,215

Naval Reserve 149,350 98,610 96,400

Marine Corps Reserve 44,530 42,000 42,000

Total 1,123,530 927,040 893,280

The Guard and Reserve comprised about 35 percent of DOD’s total military

force in 1990, and they are projected to comprise about 38 percent of the

force by the end of fiscal years 1996 and 2001. However, the active and

reserve composition of each of the services differs considerably. For

example, the Guard and Reserve are projected to comprise slightly over

50 percent of the total Army for fiscal years 1996 and 2001, but the

Reserves are projected to comprise less than 20 percent of the Naval and

Marine Corps total forces for the same years.

Budget According to DOD’s fiscal year 1996 budget request, the reserve

components were projected to receive about 7 percent of total DOD funding

for fiscal years 1996 and 2001. This percentage is slightly higher than the

percentage in 1990. Table 2 shows the distribution of funds by component

for fiscal years 1990, 1996, and 2001.

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130
Table 2: Budgets for Guard and

Reserve (Dollars in millions)

Reserve component 1990 1996 2001

Army National Guard $5,389 $5,541 $6,077

Army Reserve 3,166 3,213 3,368

Air National Guard 3,320 4,044 4,585

Air Force Reserve 1,726 2,296 2,504

Naval Reserve 2,534 2,182 2,427

Marine Corps Reserve 393 452 521

Total $16,528 $17,728 $19,482

Critical Capabilities in the

Reserve Components

The reserve components are expected to provide critical capabilities that

are projected to be needed for two major regional conflicts, the military

strategy articulated in DOD’s 1993 bottom-up review. Examples of these

capabilities are as follows:

• The Army reserve components provide all or significant portions of many

of the Army’s support functions, including 100 percent of the forces that

provide fresh water supply, over 95 percent of the civil affairs units, about

85 percent of the medical brigades, about 75 percent of the chemical

defense battalions, and about 70 percent of the heavy combat engineer

battalions.

• The Air Force reserve components provide about 80 percent of aerial port

units, over 60 percent of tactical airlift and air rescue and recovery units,

and about 50 percent of aerial refueling units.

• The Naval Reserve contributes 100 percent of the heavy logistics support

units, over 90 percent of the cargo handling battalions, and about

60 percent of the mobile construction battalions.

Experience in the Gulf War The Gulf War was the first major test of the Total Force policy. Over

200,000 reservists served on active duty either voluntarily or as a result of

involuntary call-up. Very few of the combat units in the reserve

components were called up for the war; however, the support units were

deployed extensively. According to a study by the Institute for Defense

Analyses for DOD’s Commission on Roles and Missions, many reserve

component combat and support units that were deployed for the war

demonstrated their ability to perform to standard with little

postmobilization training.1

 However, the experience among the services

was mixed, according to the study. For example, the Marine Corps called

1

Reserve Component Roles, Mix, and Employment, Institute For Defense Analyses, May 1995.

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130
up and deployed more of its Reserve combat units than the other military

services, and the units carried out their missions successfully. The Air

Force deployed few of its reserve component combat forces, but the

forces that were deployed demonstrated that they could perform in a war,

if needed. The Army did not deploy National Guard combat brigades that

were associated with active divisions because those divisions were

deployed on short notice and the Army believed the brigades needed

extensive postmobilization training.

In a 1991 report, we stated that the three Army National Guard brigades

activated for the Gulf War were inadequately prepared to be fully ready to

deploy quickly.2

 Army officials have testified that, although combat

brigades were intended to participate in contingency conflicts, the

envisioned conflicts were not of the immediate nature of the Gulf War. We

found that when the three brigades were activated, many soldiers were not

completely trained to do their jobs; many noncommissioned officers were

not adequately trained in leadership skills; and Guard members had

difficulty adjusting to the active Army’s administrative systems for supply

and personnel management, which were different from those the Guard

used in peacetime. The activation also revealed that the postmobilization

training plans prepared by the three brigades during peacetime had

underestimated the training that would be necessary for them to be fully

combat ready.

About 140,000 of the 200,000 reservists called up for the Gulf War were

from the Army reserve components, and most of those individuals were in

support units. We reported in 1992 and testified in 1993 that the Army had

difficulty providing adequate support forces.3

 In our testimony, we stated

that the Army used a large portion of some types of support units, such as

heavy and medium truck units and water supply companies, and totally

exhausted its supply of other units, even though it had deployed only

about one-quarter of its combat divisions.

Participation in Peace

Operations

Reserve component personnel have been involved in virtually every

contingency operation since the Gulf War. For example, over 1,300 Army

Reserve and National Guard personnel were activated for Uphold

2

National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War

(GAO/NSIAD-91-263, Sept. 24, 1991).

3

Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces

(GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar. 10, 1992) and Army Force Structure: Attention Needed to Ensure an Ample

Supply of Ready Support Forces (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-1, Apr. 20, 1993).

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130
Democracy in Haiti to replace individuals deployed from home stations,

provide transportation and logistics, and bolster special operations

capabilities such as civil affairs. The Air Force relied on reserve

component volunteers to provide airlift, aerial refueling, and operational

relief of fighter squadrons for Provide Promise and Deny Flight in Bosnia

and Provide Comfort in Iraq. Marine Corps reservists provided security for

refugee camps at Guantanamo Bay, and Naval reservists participated in

Caribbean operations to intercept refugee vessels.

Thousands of reservists have participated in recent peace operations. For

example, the President, using his Selected Reserve Callup authority,

authorized the activation of up to 4,300 reservists to support operations in

Bosnia. As of February 22, 1996, 3,475 reservists had been mobilized, and

according to DOD Reserve Affairs officials, the first reserve rotation is in

place. Additionally, about 960 volunteers have been deployed. Our recent

work on the use of volunteers has shown that they have had the necessary

skills and qualifications to perform their jobs and have performed well.

Army National Guard

Has Excess Combat

Forces While

Shortages Continue to

Exist in Support

Forces

Last week we reported that the Army National Guard’s combat forces far

exceed projected requirements for two major regional conflicts.4

 Army

National Guard combat forces consist of 8 divisions, 15 enhanced

brigades, and 3 separate combat units.5

 Today, about 161,000 Guard

personnel are in these combat units, including about 67,000 in the 15

enhanced brigades. We stated that the Guard’s eight combat divisions and

three separate units are not required to accomplish the two-conflict

strategy, according to Army war planners and war planning documents

that we reviewed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not assigned these

divisions and units for use in any major regional conflict currently

envisioned in DOD planning scenarios. Moreover, although the Joint Chiefs

of Staff have made all 15 enhanced brigades available for war planning

purposes, the planners have identified requirements for less than 10

brigades to achieve mission success in a war. According to DOD documents

and Army officials, the excess forces are a strategic reserve that could be

assigned missions, such as occupational forces once an enemy has been

4

Army National Guard: Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces Accordingly

(GAO/NSIAD-96-63, Mar. 14, 1996).

5

The enhanced brigade concept, described in the 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review, became

effective on October 1, 1995. The concept provides for 15 separate brigades that are required to be

ready to deploy at the Army’s highest readiness level within 90 days of mobilization. According to the

report, these brigades are to receive more training and resources than those provided to the Guard’s

other combat forces.

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130
deterred and rotational forces. However, we could find no analytical basis

for this level of strategic reserve.

State and federal laws generally authorize the Guard to provide military

support to state authorities for certain missions, such as disaster relief.

Support skills, such as engineering and military police, are most often

needed for state missions. The Guard primarily supplements other state

resources for these missions. According to a recent study by RAND’s

National Defense Research Institute,6

 the Guard has used only a small

percent of its total personnel over the last decade to meet state

requirements.

At the time of our review, the Army was studying alternatives to redesign

the Guard’s combat structure to meet critical shortages that the Army had

identified in its support capabilities. The Army’s most recent analysis

projects a shortage of 60,000 support troops, primarily in transportation

and quartermaster units. Furthermore, a recent Joint Chiefs of Staff

exercise concluded that maintaining sufficient support forces is critical to

executing the two-conflict strategy. DOD’s Commission on Roles and

Missions concluded in its report that reserve component forces with lower

priority tasks, such as the Guard’s eight combat divisions, should be

eliminated or reorganized to fill shortfalls in higher priority areas.7

 The

Commission also reported that, even after filling the shortfalls, the total

Army would still have more combat forces than required and

recommended that these forces be eliminated from the active or reserve

components.

The end of the Cold War and budgetary pressures have provided both the

opportunity and the incentive to reassess defense needs. Because the

Guard’s combat forces exceed projected war requirements and the Army’s

analysis indicates a shortage of support forces, we believe it is appropriate

for the Army to study the conversion of some Guard combat forces to

support roles. Therefore, in our recent report, we recommended that the

Secretary of the Defense, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army

and the Director of the Army National Guard, validate the size and

structure of all the Guard’s combat forces and that the Secretary of the

Army prepare and execute a plan to bring the size and structure in line

with validated requirements. We also recommended that, if the Army study

suggests that some Guard combat forces should be converted to support

roles, the Secretary of the Army follow through with the conversion

6

Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard, RAND, 1995.

7

Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Department of Defense, 1995.

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130
because it would satisfy shortages in its support forces and further provide

the types of forces that state governors have traditionally needed.

Moreover, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense consider

eliminating any Guard forces that exceed validated requirements. DOD fully

concurred with our recommendations.

Combat Brigades’

Ability to Be Ready

for War in 90 Days Is

Uncertain

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Army adopted a new training strategy

that was designed to prepare combat brigades to deploy within 90 days of

mobilization. The strategy refocuses peacetime training goals on

proficiency at the platoon level and below, rather than up through the

brigade level, for mission-essential tasks and gunnery. The strategy also

includes efforts to improve individual job and leader training and

implements a congressionally mandated program that assigned 5,000

active Army advisers to the brigades.

In June 1995, we reported on 7 of 15 brigades that were scheduled to

become enhanced brigades.8

 We selected these seven brigades because

they were roundout or roundup brigades to active component divisions

and had received preference for training and resources.9

 They had also

been required to be ready to deploy at the Army’s highest readiness level

within 90 days of mobilization. Therefore, their deployment criteria did not

change when they became enhanced brigades.

We reported on the readiness status of the seven combat brigades during

1992 through 1994, the first 3 years the new training strategy was tested,

focusing on whether (1) the new strategy had enabled the brigades to meet

peacetime training goals, (2) the advisers assigned to the brigades were

working effectively to improve training readiness, and (3) prospects for

having the brigades ready for war within 90 days were likely. For the most

part, none of the brigades came close to achieving the training proficiency

sought by the Army. The brigades were unable to recruit and retain

enough personnel to meet staffing goals, and many personnel were not

sufficiently trained in their individual job and leadership skills. Even if the

brigades had made improvements in individual training, their 23-percent

personnel turnover rate would quickly obliterate such gains. Collective

training was also problematic. In 1993, combat platoons had mastered an

8

Army National Guard: Combat Brigades’ Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain

(GAO/NSIAD-95-91, June 2, 1995).

9

Roundout brigades are National Guard units designated to fill out active component divisions to the

standard mobilization configuration of three brigades. Roundup brigades are National Guard units

designated to augment active component divisions beyond the standard three-brigade configuration.

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130
average of just one-seventh of their mission-essential tasks, compared with

a goal of 100 percent, and less than one-third of the battalions met gunnery

goals. Although gunnery scores improved for four brigades in 1994, the

brigades reported no marked improvement in the other key areas.

The adviser program’s efforts to improve training readiness were limited

by factors such as (1) an ambiguous definition of the advisers’ role;

(2) poor communication between the active Army, advisers, brigades, and

other National Guard officials, causing confusion and disagreement over

training goals; and (3) difficult working relationships. The relationship

between the active Army and the state-run Guard was characterized by an

“us and them” environment that could undermine prospects for significant

improvement in the brigades’ ability to conduct successful combat

operations.

We also reported that it was highly uncertain whether the Guard’s

mechanized infantry and armor brigades could be ready to deploy 90 days

after mobilization. Models estimated that the brigades would need

between 68 and 110 days before being ready to deploy. However, these

estimates assumed that the brigades’ peacetime training proficiency would

improve to levels near those envisioned by the training strategy, thus

shortening postmobilization training. One model, which included the

possibility that the strategy’s goals would not be met, estimated that as

many as 154 days would be required to prepare the brigades to deploy.

In commenting on our report in April 1995, DOD generally agreed with our

conclusions, however, DOD said it was too early in the implementation of

the initiatives to evaluate improvement in the brigades’ readiness.

In February 1996, we obtained the latest information on the enhanced

brigades’ training proficiency from the Army’s U.S. Forces Command.

According to Command officials, some of the same problems we identified

in our report continue to exist and the enhanced brigades have not

reached platoon-level proficiency. Specifically, the officials told us that the

brigades experienced training difficulties during 1995, which precluded the

units from being validated at platoon-level proficiency. Some of the

problems that had a negative impact on unit training were (1) low

attendance by personnel at annual training, (2) shortages in junior and

senior enlisted personnel and officers, and (3) severe deficiencies in

individual skills proficiency. For example, one brigade reported that

36 percent of its soldiers were not qualified in their individual military

occupational skills. Despite the problems, Command officials said some

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130
brigades are improving, however, they have minimal data to support that

position.

The training situation with the enhanced brigades calls into question

whether the current strategy of deploying National Guard combat brigades

within 90 days is realistic.

Dedicated Continental

Air Defense Is No

Longer Needed

The continental air defense mission evolved during the Cold War to detect

and intercept Soviet bombers attacking North America via the North Pole.

This mission is carried out primarily by dedicated Air National Guard

units. In his 1993 report on roles and missions, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had determined that the United States no longer needed a

large, dedicated continental air defense force.10 Consequently, the

Chairman recommended that the dedicated force be significantly reduced

or eliminated and that existing active and reserve general purpose forces

be tasked to perform the mission. The Secretary of Defense agreed with

the Chairman’s recommendations and directed the Air Force to reduce the

dedicated force but retain the mission primarily as an Air Force reserve

component responsibility. To date, the Air Force has not aggressively

implemented the Chairman’s or the Secretary of Defense’s

recommendations. Rather, the Air Force continues to keep a dedicated

force for the air defense mission and has reduced the force by less than

20 percent.

We reported in May 1994 that a dedicated continental air defense force

was no longer needed because the threat of a Soviet-style air attack

against the United States had largely disappeared.11 As a result of the

greatly reduced threat, the air defense force had been focusing its

activities on air sovereignty missions. However, those missions could be

performed by active and reserve general purpose and training forces

because they had comparable or more capable aircraft, were located at or

near most existing continental air defense bases and alert sites, and had

pilots capable of performing air sovereignty missions or being trained to

perform such missions. We stated that implementing the Chairman’s

recommendations could result in significant savings. The amount of

savings would depend on whether the dedicated air defense units were

disbanded or assigned another mission.

10Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, February 1993.

11Continental Air Defense: A Dedicated Force Is No Longer Needed (GAO/NSIAD-94-76, May 3, 1994).

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130
The Air Force reduced its dedicated Air National Guard force from 180 to

150 aircraft. We do not believe this reduction is in line with the Chairman’s

recommendation. Moreover, we believe that retaining 150 dedicated

aircraft would unnecessarily drain operation and maintenance funds. We

asked the Congressional Budget Office to estimate the savings from the

1995 defense plan if all the air defense units were disbanded and their

missions assigned to existing units. On the basis of a force of 150 aircraft,

the office estimated a total savings of about $1.8 billion from fiscal years

1997 through 2000.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

address any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may

have.

(701083) Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-130
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