Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for

Antarctica

September 1989

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 89-600718

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword

Few places remain on the Earth where rules for allocating natural resources and

regulating their development are not at least reasonably well established. On land and within

relatively narrow strips of adjacent coastal waters, dominion over resources-and thus the

power to allocate and regulate-is largely settled. Although not universally accepted, general

rules have even been established to regulate any future mineral exploitation of the deep

seabeds, the vast ocean areas beyond national jurisdiction. Antarctica, by virtue of extreme

isolation and a unique political history, is the last major area of the world without some system

of governance for mineral resource activities. Rules establishing such a system, although not

yet in force, are embodied in a new treaty, the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic

Mineral Resource Activities. The treaty does not presume that minerals will ever be developed

in Antarctica. Rather, it establishes a framework for considering whether activities may be

allowed and for regulating any activities that are permitted.

Four committees of the Congress, the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and

on Merchant Marine and Fisheries asked OTA to evaluate the implications of this new treaty

for the United States. The Senate has a constitutional responsibility to give its advice and

consent to ratification of the treaty. Both houses of Congress will have to pass legislation to

implement the treaty should it be ratified. OTA’s report on the Minerals Convention is

intended to provide a timely and useful reference to the Congress as it considers these topics.

This report identifies U.S. interests in Antarctica and evaluates the Minerals Convention

relative to these interests. It examines the status of knowledge about the resources of

Antarctica, the potential impacts of minerals development, and the technical, economic,

environmental, geological, and political constraints to development in Antarctica.

We received substantial assistance from many individuals and organizations in the course

of this study. Special thanks go to OTA’s Antarctica Advisory Panel; to participants in the

three workshops convened during the study; to the project’s contractors; and to experts in the

National Science Foundation, the Department of State, the Department of the Interior, the

Marine Mammal Commission, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

We also gratefully acknowledge our sister congressional agency, the Congressional Research

Service, for again sharing its expertise. However, OTA remains solely responsible for the

contents of this report.

JOHN H. GIBBONS
OTA Antarctica Advisory Panel

Norman Anderson

Anderson, Genssler & Schwab, Inc.

Don Anthony

BP Exploration, Inc.

James Barnes

Environmental Policy Institute

Jonathan I. Charney

School of Law

Vanderbilt University

Robert H. Rutford, Chairman

President, University of Texas, Dallas

Paul Dayton

Scripps Institution of Oceanography

Ira Dyer

Department of Ocean Engineering

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David Elliot

Byrd Polar Research Center

Ohio State University

Robert Friedheim

School of International Relations

University of Southern California

Joseph N. Gittelman

Shell Western E&P, Inc.

James Jackson

American Petroleum Institute

Lee Kimball

World Resources Institute

Deborah Shapley

Freelance Writer

Brian Shoemaker

Former Commander, Naval Support Forces,

Antarctica

Simon Strauss

Consultant on Metal Markets

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members.

The panel does not however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the

report and the accuracy of its contents.

iv
OTA Antarctica Study Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Robert W. Niblock, Oceans and Environment Program Manager

Project Staff

William E. Westermeyer, Project Director

William Barnard, Senior Analyst

Peter Johnson, Senior Associate

James E. Mielke, Specialist in Marine and Earth Sciencesl

Contributing Staff

John Newman, Analyst, Energy and Materials program

Contractors

Melvin Conant, Conant & Associates

John Garrett

Edward Horton, Deep Oil Technology

Lauriston King, Texas A&M University

Maurice Magee, Magee Consulting

Bernard Oxman, University of Miami

Denzil Pauli

Deborah Shapley

James Smith, University of Houston

Administrative Staff

Kathleen A. Beil, Administrative Assistant

Sally Van Aller, Secretary

l~nwwlon~ Re=~ch ~Niw, Sc]encc Policy Division, Librag of ConiTss

v
Contents

Page

Chapter l. Summary, Issues, and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 2. U. S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention . . . . . . 37

Chapter 3. The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . . . . 57

Chapter 4. Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Chapter 5. The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and

Minerals Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Appendix A. Development of an Antarctic Oil Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Appendix B.Metal Mining in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Appendix C. The Antarctic Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Appendix D.The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities. . 186

Appendix E. Selected Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Appendix F. OTA Workshop Participants and Other Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

Appendix G. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Appendix H. Acronyms and Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Chapter 1

Summary, Issues, and Options

Photo credit Ann Hawthorne
CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

THE CURRENT REGIME AND UNITED STATES POLICY FOR ANTARCTICA.. 6

THE CONVENTION ON THE REGULATION OF ANTARCTIC MINERAL

RESOURCE ACTIVITIES .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..+. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Why Was the Minerals Convention Negotiated’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

How Does the Convention Work’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

RATIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Is the United States Better Off With the Minerals Convention or Without It’?.... . . . . 12

Does the Agreement Advance U.S. Interests’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Are There Different Types of Agreements That Would Be Better Than

the Minerals Convention’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Can Provisions of the Existing Agreement Be Made More Satisfactory If We

Choose Not To Ratify It in Its present Form? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

THE RESOURCE POTENTIAL OF ANTARCTICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR

OIL DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR

HARD MINERALS DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Advancing the Foreign Policy Goals of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Establishing a Regulatory and Institutional Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Data and Information Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The Liability Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Figure

Figure Page

l-l. Antarctica . $........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. O. .. ... ... O....... . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter 1

Summary, Issues, and Options

SUMMARY

Antarctica, home to penguins, seals, and

whales and long of interest to explorers and

scientists, is under increasing scrutiny as a

potential source of valuable minerals. Although

little is currently known about Antarctica’s

mineral resources and no mineral deposits of

commercial interest have been discovered

yet, the potential that a discovery may be

made is increasing. Moreover, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the basic agreement governing the

continent, did not establish guidelines for mineral resource activities. As a result, the United

States and other Parties to the Antarctic Treaty

launched negotiations in 1981 leading to the

conclusion of the Convention on the Regulation

of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities in

1988.

The Convention on the Regulation of

Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities would

provide a framework to guide future decisions on whether Antarctic minerals should

be developed, and if so, under what circumstances. While the Convention would establish

rules governing minerals development, it does

not presume that any exploration or development will ever take place.

Like virtually all treaties, the Minerals Convention is a compromise agreement. It took 7 years

to negotiate and brokers the interests of claimants and nonclaimants, of developed and developing countries, and of countries with interests

in mineral resources and countries mainly concerned with the environment. Alternatives to the

Convention include declaring Antarctica off

limits to any minerals activities. Given the

history of Antarctic claims, the multilateral

nature of the negotiation, and the conflicting

interests at stake, it is doubtful that a fundamentally different compromise could have

been negotiated.

For over three decades, the United States has

advanced four main interests in Antarctica:

maintaining the region as a zone of peace,

preserving the freedom of scientific research,

protecting the environment, and preserving an

opportunity for U.S. industry to develop Antarctic resources if and when it becomes feasible to

do SO.

If a major minerals discovery is made in

the absence of an international agreement

about Antarctic minerals, an unregulated

“gold rush” could follow, unraveling the

Antarctic Treaty System and damaging all

U.S. Antarctic interests. The Minerals Convention would help maintain the continent’s

longstanding peace and stability. It would enable consideration of mineral resource activities.

And, although some environmental groups would

prefer banning all minerals development in

Antarctica, the Convention is one of the strongest international environmental protection agreements negotiated to date. OTA concludes that

ratification of the Minerals Convention would

advance U.S. interests.

OTA does not expect that either an oil

deposit or metal mine would be developed in

Antarctica sooner than about three decades,

if ever. Geologic, economic, environmental,

and political constraints to minerals development there currently are substantial. A commercial oil or hard mineral deposit in Antarctica

would have to be of world-class size and quality

to be developed economically. Probably only a

handful of such undiscovered resources are left

in the world.

Any development that does occur will inevitably cause local environmental impacts. More

1 Herelnaf~r refem~ 10 aS hC ‘‘ Minerals Convcntlon, or, more simply, as the ‘‘ COnvMHIOn.

-3–
4 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

significant impacts might result from a major oil

spill. Even the strong environmental standards

established by the Minerals Convention—

including the provision that no exploration or

development is to be allowed until technology

and procedures are available for safe operations—

cannot guarantee prevention of all developmentrelated accidents.

U.S. ratification of the Convention does not

presume that the United States will sponsor

prospecting, exploration, or development. However, if the Convention enters into force, the

United States will have to decide which agency

or agencies will represent it in Convention

institutions. As well, domestic implementing

legislation should address the need for a regulatory structure to manage any minerals activities

the United States may sponsor.

Domestic legislation should also address the

data and information needs that are likely to

grow if U.S. minerals-related activities increase.

Even if the United States does not itself sponsor

such activities, environmental baseline data will

be required to help the United States effectively

monitor activities of other nations and to participate influentially in the Convention’s institutions.

Because the United States may expand environmental data gathering, monitoring, and minerals

reconnaissance and would need to regulate any

Operators it sponsors, the Congress should

consider institutional arrangements for future

U.S. Antarctic activities. The present approach,

which assigns primary authority to the National

Science Foundation, may serve adequately. Or,

Congress could consider granting responsibility

for minerals activities to the Department of the

Interior, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration, or perhaps to a small Minerals

Commission or a new U.S. Antarctic Agency.

Applied research needs related to potential

minerals activities do not at this time appear to

be more important than the basic research that

has been the focus of the U.S. program under the

Antarctic Treaty. However, modest funding for

data acquisition would help advance long-term

U.S. interests; cooperative projects among Parties to the Minerals Convention would help

reduce the high costs of both applied and basic

research.

Before exploration and development may be

considered in Antarctica, a supplemental agreement on liability must be negotiated. The U.S.

Senate must consider whether to give its advice

and consent to ratification of the Minerals

Convention before the Liability Protocol is

negotiated or wait until it has been finalized.

INTRODUCTION

Antarctica has intrigued mankind for more

than two centuries, certainly at least since

Captain James Cook attempted to prove the

existence of the southern continent as part of his

second great voyage beginning in 1772. Speculation about the possibility of finding valuable

resources in Antarctica began early. However,

until recently the practicality of developing

mineral resources in this coldest, stormiest, and

most isolated land mass on Earth seemed too

farfetched to deserve serious consideration.

Mineral resource development in Antarctica is

probably about three decades away under the

most optimistic scenarios, and it may possibly

never occur. Still, the countries most involved in

Antarctica (the signatories to the 1959 Antarctic

Treaty) determined in the mid-1970s that it

eventually would be necessary to negotiate a

regulatory framework for managing mineral

resource activities there. In 1981, after they had

concluded an agreement for regulating exploitation of marine living resources, they began to

negotiate a minerals regime.

On June 2, 1988, after a 7 year effort, the

United States and 32 other nations completed

negotiation of a treaty to regulate possible future

prospecting, exploration, and development of

oil and other minerals in Antarctica. The treaty,

known as the Convention on the Regulation of

Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, provides
Chapter I-Summary, Issues, and Options ● 5

a framework for determining what, if any,

minerals exploration and development will be

allowed to take place in Antarctica and for

regulating any minerals activities that are permitted. Before the Convention can take effect,

however, it must be ratified by at least 16

members of the subset of participants to the

Minerals Convention who have special interests and responsibilities in Antarctica. The

United States, long one of the most active and

influential countries in Antarctica, is a prominent member of this group, known as the

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs).

Additional members include the other original

signatories of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and 10

more recent signatories that currently conduct

research in Antarctica.2 The United States also

is one of nine countries that, individually, could

determine the fate of the Minerals Convention:

If the United States, the Soviet Union, or any

one of the seven countries with territorial

claims in Antarctica do not become a party to

the Convention, it will not enter into force.

However, ratification by the United States

could encourage others to do so.

This assessment addresses the questions surrounding whether the United States should

ratify the Minerals Convention, and, if it does,

how the Federal effort could be organized to

address the needs created by U.S. ratification.

Central to this study is the description and

analysis of the Minerals Convention in chapter

3. The Convention, and specifically implications of ratifying or not ratifying it, cannot be

completely understood in isolation, so chapter 2

presents a brief history of the United States in

Antarctica, a review of current U.S. interests,

and a summary of why the United States and

other countries decided to negotiate the Minerals Convention. Chapter 4 describes the mineral

resource potential of Antarctica, and chapter 5

describes the environmental impacts of minerals

activities. The status of technologies for exploiting Antarctica’s mineral resources and a brief

discussion of the economic feasibility of development are in appendixes A and B. The

complete texts of the Antarctic Treaty and the

Minerals Convention are included as appendixes C and D, respectively.

This first chapter summarizes OTA’s findings and presents several options for organizing

the Federal effort in Antarctica if the Minerals

Convention is ratified. The United States has a

strong interest in preserving the Antarctic Treaty

System. The Minerals Convention supplements

and strengthens this unique system of governance. Its entry into force would help ensure that

Antarctica remains peaceful and demilitarized

and that the current spirit of cooperation among

ATCPs prevails. The Minerals Convention is

not intended to, and does not, promote

Antarctic minerals development. Equally it

does not ban minerals development altogether. Rather, it sets out a framework of

standards and principles (including stringent

environmental standards) with which any permitted activities must comply and establishes

institutional mechanisms to evaluate proposed

activities. Although not completely satisfactory

to either commercial or environmental interests,

the Convention, OTA finds, strikes a workable

balance between environmental protection and

resource development.

It is unforeseeable whether Antarctic minerals will ever be developed: however, several

nations will continue to conduct geological and

geophysical research that may lead to a discovery. Political, environmental, geologic, economic, and technological hurdles to minerals

development will continue to be significant.

Technological hurdles may be the least difficult

to overcome. By establishing a framework

regime, the ATCPs have taken a large step

toward ensuring that minerals questions do not

become a source of conflict and, hence, that

Antarctica is maintained as a zone of peace.

2~e tom “m~r of ATCps is now 22; an addllion~ 17 states arc sl~atorles of tie An~ctic Treaty. Thirty-k states attended the find m~lng

of k Minerals Convention. A complete list is given m ch, 2, p, 25.
6 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

THE CURRENT REGIME AND

UNITED STATES POLICY FOR

ANTARCTICA

Antarctica is the only continent with no

commonly recognized national boundaries. Seven

of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties

(ATCPs) have made claims to parts of Antarctica, of which three overlap.3 Neither the United

States nor any other nonclaimant country has

recognized these claims. However, both the

United States and the Soviet Union have reserved the right to make future claims in

Antarctica based on their historic activities. The

lack of an agreed legal status for Antarctica

is a key consideration in any effort to manage

activities on the continent. To date, governance has been achieved through negotiation and

consensus, not exclusive sovereign control. This

unique regime was established by the Antarctic

Treaty and applies to the area south of 60

degrees south latitude (figure l-l).

The Antarctic Treaty emerged in the wake of

the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year,

during which scientists from 12 nations established research stations throughout Antarctica

and, in the process, developed cooperative

relationships that both scientists and diplomats

felt should be continued. In negotiating the 1959

Treaty, the 12 original parties pledged to use the

continent for peaceful purposes, established an

inspection system, and froze the dispute over

claims. Claims would neither be accepted,

denied, qualified, nor clarified; instead, the

claims issue was sidestepped. They also agreed

in the treaty that freedom of scientific research

would continue, and that research plans, personnel, and results would be freely exchanged; that

there would be neither nuclear explosions or

weapons testing of any kind nor disposal of

radioactive wastes in the Treaty area; and that

ATCP-designated observers would have free

access—including aerial observation—to any

area and could inspect all stations, installations,

and equipment.

The Antarctic Treaty, while limited in its

objectives, is a highly successful multilateral

agreement. The Treaty has fostered cooperative

activity in Antarctica and has kept it demilitarized for the nearly 30 years since its inception

in 1961. One of the Treaty’s limitations (although it did not seem important at the conclusion of negotiations in 1959) is that it does not

address the ownership or regulation of Antarctica’s mineral resources. However, in the past

ATCPs have been able to respond to issues

when it has become important to do so, and,

under the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty, have

agreed on a number of additional measures

regulating activity in Antarctica. For instance,

environmental concerns were initially addressed

in the 1964 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. These conservation measures prohibited the killing, capturing, or molesting of any mammal or bird native

to Antarctica without a permit. They also

established the basis for creating Specially

Protected Areas.

Over the last 17 years, three additional

conventions have been added to create what is

now commonly known as the Antarctic Treaty

System (ATS). In 1972 the Convention for the

Conservation of Antarctic Seals, which sought

to prevent the overexploitation of seals, was

adopted. It entered into force in 1978. The

Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic

Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR—see ch.

5) was adopted in 1980 and entered into force in

1982 as a means to foster conservation and

prudent management of the living resources of

the Southern Ocean, particularly Antarctic krill

and finfish. The 1988 Minerals Convention is

the most recently negotiated agreement. Unlike

s~e ~ven cl~a[ ~a~s are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The claims of Mgentia, Chic,

and the United Kingdom overlap.
Chapter 1-Summary, Issues, and Options ● 7

Figure l-l—Antarctica

 ,, I ,

, South Moz

,1 

1

Argentina ,

 Chile

■ ✍ 

.

, 

. , 

Antarctica , 

, 

1.

■ Scientific research station

New

Zealand Ill

–+— . .

— .

Antarctica covers an area of about 5.4 million square miles, making;t the fifth

beneath a thick continental ice sheet.

largest continent. About 98 percent of Antarctica IS buried

SOURCE U S. Government, 1982
8 ● Polar prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

the Antarctic Treaty and CCAMLR, its decisionmaking procedures

consensus.

The United States

interests in Antarctica:

1.

2.

3.

4.

maintaining the

peace,

do not always rely on

has four fundamental

region as a zone of

preserving freedom of scientific research,

preserving the Antarctic environment,

and

providing an opportunity for U.S. private industry to exploit Antarctic resources if and when it becomes feasible

and appropriate.4

The United States has an interest in promoting

political stability in the region, so the region

does not become, in the words of the preamble

to the Antarctic Treaty, ‘‘the scene or object of

international discord. There is, of course, some

inherent tension among all these U.S. interests.

Should minerals development commence, the

tension between exploitation, environmental

protection, and scientific research can be expected to increase. To further these interests

during the past 30 years, the United States has

striven to become an influential force in all

elements of the Antarctic Treaty System.

Since 1965 U.S. Antarctic policy has been

coordinated and managed by the Antarctic

Policy Group (APG), an inter-agency task force

established by a directive from President Johnson. It includes representatives of the Secretary

of State (chairman), the Director of the National

Science Foundation (NSF), the Secretary of

Defense, and of other agencies as appropriate.

On February 5, 1982, President Reagan issued

a policy memorandum essentially reiterating

long-standing U.S. policy that the U.S. Antarctic Program (administered by NSF’s Division of

Polar Programs) would be maintained “at a

level providing an active and influential presence in Antarctica designed to support the range

of U.S. Antarctic interests. ’ Important means

for realizing these interests have been promotion

of international scientific cooperation and continued efforts to strengthen the Treaty System.

This “presence ‘‘ includes the conduct of scientific research in major disciplines; year-round

occupation of the South Pole and two coastal

stations; and maintenance of a continent-wide

logistics capability. The NSF has primary responsibility for budgeting, logistics, and support

of scientific research. The National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was directed in 1984 (under the Antarctic Marine

Living Resources Convention Act) to fund and

conduct directed research projects related to the

marine living resources of Antarctica.

THE CONVENTION ON THE

REGULATION OF ANTARCTIC

MINERAL RESOURCE

ACTIVITIES

Why Was the Minerals Convention

Negotiated?

Until relatively recently, there was little

perceived need to establish rules for regulating

the exploitation of nonliving resources in Antarctica. Antarctica is isolated and among the

most difficult places in the world to operate.

During the 1970s, however, a combination of

scientific, technological, and political factors

began to change perceptions of Antarctica’s

mineral resource potential and to increase Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties sense of

urgency about developing a minerals regime.

The ATCP’s negotiated an agreement governing the possible future exploitation of Ant4U. S$ ~~ctic interests have been discussed in ‘‘The U.S. Anmctic ~o~~,’ a report submitted by the Office of Management and Budget to the

Committees on Appropriation of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, May 1983. See also, David A. Colson, Aswtant Ugal Adviser,

Department of State, “l%e United States Position on Antarctica, ” Cornelf Inrernationaf Law Journaf, vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 1986, pp. 291-300, and

Anmrctica, f984. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, ‘Ikdmology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation. 98th Cong., 2d SCSS. Statement of R. Tbcker Scully, Director, Oceans and Polar Affairs, Department of State. pp. 7-9.

s~te HOW Memm~dum 6646, United States Antarctic Policy and FYogriiIM. Feb. 5, 1982.
Chapter 1-Summary, Issues, and Options . 9

Pbto credit. US Geological .%fV@y

McMurdo Station on Ross Island, the main U.S. research

base in Antarctia Observation Hill is in the background.

arctic minerals for a number of interdependent

reasons. The Antarctic Treaty itself is silent

about regulation of mineral resource activities.

This posed few problems in the first two decades

of the Treaty’s existence. However, scientific

study of the continent has caused what was

virtually terra incognita in 1959 to become

geologically better known by the early 1980s.

Occurrences of minerals have been found which,

if discovered in large and rich deposits, could

attract commercial interest. In addition, technology to exploit resources has improved. Although such technology has been developed for

use in other regions, some of it could be adapted

to recover offshore hydrocarbons or to mine

Antarctic minerals.

As early as 1%9 several ATCP governments

received inquiries from companies interested in

geophysical oil prospecting offshore. Both the

dramatic rise in oil prices in 1973 and scientific

drilling in the Ross Sea stimulated further

commercial interest. (The Ross Sea drilling did

not necessarily indicate an oil or gas deposit. )

No agreed procedures were in effect at the time

to authorize prospecting, and the governments

which were approached believed that if they

allowed their nationals to prospect, they could

upset the stability of the ATS. In 1977 the

ATCPs adopted a recommendation urging voluntary restraint on ‘‘exploration and exploitation’ conditional on progress toward a minerals

regime. Over the years both claimants and

nonclaimants alike had developed a strong stake

in the preservation of the ATS.

From 1972 on, Antarctic mineral resource

discussions became a regular item on the agenda

of ATCP meetings. At their eleventh meeting in

Buenos Aires in 1981, the ATCPS formally

decided to negotiate a minerals regime for

Antarctica. As negotiations got underway in

1982, separate negotiations to establish the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea were winding down. Some in the United

Nations questioned the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ATS and proposed that Antarctica be

considered in a broader international forum as

ocean issues had been. Because of their active

involvement in Antarctic activities, ATCPs

have long held that they possess special interests

and responsibilities in Antarctica, and that they

manage a legitimate international legal system

for the continent. They have therefore resisted

all attempts to transfer authority over Antarctica

to the United Nations. Indeed, heightened U.N.

interest in Antarctica provided the ATCPs

additional motivation to conclude negotiations

already underway.

How Does the Convention Work?

The Minerals Convention provides a framework for determining the acceptability of mineral resource activities and for regulating any

activities determined to be acceptable. The 67

main articles and 12 annex articles of the

Convention establish the general principles,

specify the legal obligations of the Parties, and

create the institutions and procedures necessary

for decisionmaking. No minerals activity is to

take place except in accordance with the

Convention and unless significant environmental impacts can be avoided.6

6.ktS. 3 and 4.
10 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Of necessity, the Minerals Convention is a

carefully crafted compromise agreement Negotiators had the difficult task of dealing with the

reality of the differing juridical positions of

claimant and nonclaimant countries. They also

had to try to balance the interests of the

developed and developing states among the

group, of states with free market and centrally

planned economies, and of states stressing

environmental protection versus states stressing

a regime that would facilitate minerals development activities. In addition, the value of Antarctica for other uses, such as science, tourism,

wilderness, and the harvesting of marine living

resources had to be given appropriate weight.

Hence, the Minerals Convention is complicated,

even though it provides only a framework and

not a complete and detailed code for regulating

mineral resource activities.

The Minerals Convention would establish

five institutions: a Commission, Regulatory

Committee(s), an Advisory Committee, a Special Meeting of Parties, and an Arbitral Tribunal, plus a Secretariat to serve all five. The

Commission and any Regulatory Committees

established are the only decisionmaking institutions. 7 The Commission includes ATCPs and

any other Parties actively engaged in resource

activities or related research. It has broad

authority for determining whether and where

mineral resource activities may take place and

for establishing general rules and procedures

applicable to all minerals activities. The details

of regulating these activities will be worked out

after entry into force of the Convention and

when and if interest is expressed in such

activities. The Commission is also charged with

determining the composition of Regulatory

Committees and may review some of their

actions.

No exploration or development would be

allowed unless specifically authorized by the

Commission. One of the Commission’s most

consequential decisions will be to decide whether to allow consideration of exploration and

development in specific areas. This threshold

decision to ‘‘identify”8 an area would trigger a

process that could ultimately result in developing a deposit. Such a decision would require a

consensus of all (presently 22) Commission

members and must be based on adequate

data and information. Reaching consensus

among this many diverse parties on such an

important decision may well be very difficult.

If the Commission decides to identify an area

of Antarctica for exploration and development

of a particular mineral resource, a Regulatory

Committee for that area would be established.

Regulatory Committees would be comprised of

a total of four claimant states and six nonclaimant states, and would in all cases include

the United States, the Soviet Union, and the

relevant claimant(s) (if any) in the area identified. States conducting approved activities in the

area would also become members. Regulatory

Committees would be responsible for specifying detailed requirements for exploration and

development of the area. These requirements

would have to be consistent with any general

guidelines established by the Commission, but

the Regulatory Committees, and not the Commission, would be the primary managers of any

development activities in their respective areas.

The Scientific, Technical, and Environmental

Advisory Committee will give expert advice to

the Commission and Regulatory Committees on

all scientific, technical, and environmental aspects of minerals resource activities. One of the

most important functions of the Advisory Committee is to evaluate environmental and technical assessments of proposals to ‘identify" areas

and of plans for exploration and development.

Membership is open to all Parties to the

Minerals Convention, but the Advisory ComT~e ~1~~ Tfib~aJ can only mn&r decisions for disputes refemd tO k

Ems is &tem Udin the Minerals Convention to refer to opening an area for possible exploration and developrnew
Chapter 1--Summary, Issues, and Options ● 1 I

mittee has no independent decisionmaking power.

Likewise, the Special Meeting of Parties, whose

function is to advise the Commission on whether identification of an area for exploration and

development is consistent with the provisions of

the Minerals Convention, has no independent

decisionmaking power.

Some groups are concerned about the relative

power of the Commission and Regulatory

Committees, as well as the lack of decisionmaking authority of the Advisory Committee.

Groups opposed to development prefer that

most power be vested in the Commission where

more votes are required to take any action. They

mistrust the smaller Regulatory Committees,

which, they believe, would have a greater

interest in accommodating development. Some

countries (i.e., developing and nonconsultative

parties) preferred vesting the Commission with

more authority so that they could play more of

a role in decisionmaking. Pro-development

groups, 10 conversely are concerned that the

Commission has too much power. Also, the

claimant states preferred that Regulatory Committees be allocated substantial decisionmaking

power. The checks and balances built into the

institutions, including their composition and

voting procedures, as well as the authority of

each, reflect the compromises that were

necessary to achieve a mutually acceptable

agreement in a complex, multilateral setting.

The United States and the Soviet Union will be

represented on all Regulatory Committees as

well as on the Commission.

Resource activities are divided into three

distinct phases in the Minerals Convention:

prospecting, exploration, and development. To

engage in any of these activities, a potential

developer (an ‘Operator’ in Convention terms)

must be sponsored by one of the Parties to the

Convention. Sponsors must evaluate and certify

the fitness of Operators and oversee their

activities to ensure their compliance with the

Convention. Sponsors that fail to ensure that

their Operators are able to meet Convention

obligations could incur liability for damages.

Sponsoring States must also support and defend

the interests of their Operators in institution

meetings. If the United States decides to sponsor

minerals activities, it must prepare to regulate

Operators that may apply.

Prospecting is subject to the same standards

as exploration and development, but oversight

of prospecting is primarily the responsibility of

the Sponsoring State. Prospecting as defined in

the Convention is not normally expected to have

a significant or long-lasting impact on the

environment. Exploration and development-if

allowed in specific areas—would be regulated

in accordance with detailed prescriptions and

more extensive oversight by the institutions, in

addition to that by the Sponsoring State.

Once an area is “identified’ and the Regulatory Committee established for that area determines specific application requirements, an

Operator would be required to obtain an exploration permit. Permission to explore must be

based on information adequate to enable informed judgments to be made by the institutions. The permit is granted if two-thirds of the

Committee members (which must include majorities of both claimants and nonclaimants on

the Committee) approve the application. Successful applicants are granted exclusive rights to

explore for a specific resource, subject to

specific terms and conditions of a Management

Scheme (i.e., contract). The Operator is also

granted an exclusive right to develop any

deposits found, but this right is subject to review

after the development application (which requires a complete description of development

plans) is submitted. Modifications to the development plan may or may not be requested by the

Committee. There are conflicting interpretagFor ~xmp]e, tie &ttwctjc md Southern Coalition, an enwronrncntid ~brella iWuP

l~or exmple, tie ~encm Mintng Congress and the American pe~olctm ~[i[u~
12 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

tions as to whether development is automatically

approved if the requisite majority in the Committee cannot agree about what modifications

are necessary or if there must be positive

agreement on modifications before development may proceed. The details of this process

are described and evaluated in chapter 3.

Before it can enter into force, the Minerals

Convention must be ratified by 16 of the 20

founding ATCPs.11 Moreover, before any exploration and development can take place, a

number of conditions must be met. Significantly, the details of a liability system must first

be negotiated and ratified in a separate protocol

(see page 33). In addition to the sufficiency of

information requirements noted above, the environmental standards must be met and technology and procedures must be available for safe

operations and for compliance with environmental regulations. There must also exist a

capacity to monitor key environmental parameters and ecosystem components and to respond

effectively to accidents.

RATIFICATION

CONSIDERATIONS

The United States Constitution states that the

President “shall have Power, by and with the

Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make

Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators

present concur. . . ‘‘ Thus, the Senate must pass

judgment on whether completed treaties should

be ratified by, and become binding on, the

United States.12

U.S. ratification of the Minerals Convention

involves consideration of many questions, but

they seem to boil down to 4 basic concerns:

1. Is the United States better off with or

without this agreement?

2. Does the agreement advance U.S. interests?

3.

4.

Are there different types of agreements

that would be better than the Minerals

Convention?

Can the provisions of the existing agreement be made more satisfactory if we

choose not to ratify it in its present form?

Is the United States Better Off With the

Minerals Convention or Without It?

The consequences of not ratifying the Minerals Convention depend in part on whether an oil

or mineral deposit that is, or could become,

economically exploitable is found in Antarctica.

If none is discovered, failure to ratify the

Minerals Convention probably will not have

significant economic or environmental implications. Political implications, however, could

still be significant because the inability to reach

agreement would portend a weakening of the

ATS.

Despite their varying attitudes about the

desirability of developing Antarctic minerals,

ATCPs have concluded a framework regime to

make later decisions as to whether any part of

Antarctica shall be opened for exploration or

development. Hence, although some environmental groups have sought to ban any minerals

activities, ATCPs declined to take such action.

If the Convention does not enter into force

and countries have not otherwise prohibited all

resource development in Antarctica, the unclear

legal status of Antarctic minerals may deter

potential investors from risking large sums of

money on exploration and development. Hence,

a significant discovery may be less likely if the

Convention is not in force. However, scientists

could make a major discovery in the course of

their research there. So could other parties

engaged in prospecting thinly veiled as research.

If a major deposit is discovered and the Conven1 IS= ch. 3 for details, table 3-1, p. a.

lzcon~ssio~ Research Service, Librtuy of Congress, ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, ” a study

prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984).
Chapter 1---3 Summary, Issues, and Options ● 13

.

. 

Photo credit US. Geological Survey

Mt. Erebus, the 12,447-foot volcano forming the apex of Ross Island. McMurdo Station is a tiny speck at the tip of the snow and

ice-covered peninsula to the right of the volcano’s summit.

tion has not entered into force, ATCPS may feel

they are no longer bound by the “voluntary

restraint’ policy in effect since 1977.

Most of the parties involved in the Convention negotiations believe that a major discovery made in the absence of the Convention

could initiate an unregulated “gold rush,”

which could lead to the unraveling of the

entire Antarctic Treaty System. The Parties

decided they needed an agreement prior to a

major minerals discovery, because it would be

harder to reach an agreement afterwards. An

agreement concluded after a major discovery is

made might have fewer environmental safeguards or be less balanced between nonclaimant

and claimant interests.

In the absence of an agreed multilateral legal

framework, exploitation might be subject only

to the laws of the country sponsoring it or to

conditions agreed bilaterally between a Sponsoring State and a claimant state. In either case

the rules would not necessarily be designed to

protect the Antarctic environment. Moreover,

whatever regulations were deemed to apply may

not be in the interests of the other countries that

contend they also have a stake in Antarctica’s

resources. Friction could result if any state

decided to act unilaterally or with one other,

ignoring others’ interests in the region. The

potential for friction is especially great in the

Antarctic Peninsula, the continent most hospitable area. The Peninsula is claimed by three

states: Chile, Argentina, and the United King-
14 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

dom. The 1982 Falkland Islands war is a

reminder that military conflict can occur in the

region.

If the Convention is not ratified and an

important mineral deposit is found, claimant

states could conclude they have much to lose by

compromise with others. Dormant claims could

be reasserted by a claimant willing to risk good

relations among fellow ATCP members for the

sake of exclusive benefits from resources in

‘ ‘its’ area. Likewise, nonclaimants that attempt

resource exploitation in a claimed area would

risk the hostility of other ATCP members and of

the relevant claimant(s). Even unregulated exploitation of the single unclaimed “slice” of

Antarctica could potentially undermine or destroy the ATS.

The United States is a prime architect and

supporter of the ATS. Consistent with this

interest, it took a lead role in negotiating the

Convention to strengthen the System by filling

a large gap. Even though the Minerals Convention does not address all details of how minerals

development shall be regulated, it is a key

evolutionary step, without which the ATS

would be incomplete.

Since there is potential for breakup of the

ATS if a major discovery were made in the

absence of the Convention, the Parties are better

off with regulations than without them. An

important consideration in whether the required

number of ATCPs will ratify the Convention is

how fairly they perceive they have been treated

on the claims issue. Protection of the juridical

positions of both claimant and nonclaimant

countries is an essential element in this and other

agreements of the ATS. The Minerals Convention does not resolve the claims issue, but skirts

it like other ATS agreements. Conceivably,

some nonclaimant states could reject the Convention because they believe it goes too far in

recognizing special interests of claimants. Conversely, some claimant countries may consider

rejecting it because ratification would mean

recognition that claimants do not have exclusive

mineral rights in areas they claim. To reach an

agreement, ATCPs have had to compromise on

issues related to claims; negotiators for both

claimant and nonclaimant states appear to have

recognized that doing so is in their mutual

interest.

If the Convention is ratified, ATCPs may then

be able to devote more attention to other

pressing Antarctic issues, including the present

problematic rise of tourism in the region,

and-in light of the recent vessel accidents in

Antarctic waters—improved vessel safety and

pollution control and a general liability regime

to cover pollution incidents. Even if no exploration and development occur, the Convention at

least provides a clearer regime for prospecting.

Does the Agreement Advance U.S. Interests?

As mentioned, the United States has a strong

interest in strengthening the ATS as a means of

keeping the region peaceful. The Convention

advances this interest by keeping the territorial

dispute frozen and by addressing the longstanding gap in the ATS on mineral resources.

The United States was key in negotiating the

Antarctic Treaty in order to prevent Antarctica

from becoming ‘‘the scene or object of international discord. ’ The Treaty prohibits any measures of a military nature, including establishment of military bases, carrying out of military

maneuvers, or testing of any weapons. 13 The

Treaty also ensures that the United States

benefits from its sizable past investment in

Antarctica and current expensive year-round

presence there. It enables freedom of access to

the entire region. The United States has been a

strong leader in the development of the Antarctic Treaty System. The United States can ensure

that its leadership role continues through ratification of the Convention and continued participation in elaborating it.

By carefully prescribing conditions under

which activities could take place, the MinerIJAntarctic Treaiy, Art. 1.
—

Chapter I-Summary, Issues, and Options ● 1 5

als Convention advances the U.S. interest in

preserving the Antarctic environment. In

terms of environmental protection, the Convention may be one of the strongest international

agreements negotiated to date.14 If minerals

exploration and/or development goes forward,

there could nevertheless be serious environmental consequences. The Convention does not

detail all elements of the environmental protection program. Moreover, how compliance and

enforcement would work and how strong the

regime would be in practice is uncertain at this

stage. Nevertheless, prospecting, exploration,

and development will have to meet stringent and

binding environmental standards and be subject

to rigorous impact assessment procedures. While

the Convention makes development possible

under certain circumstances, it does not

presume that any development will take

place.

The United States also has an interest in

providing an opportunity for U.S. private industry to develop Antarctic resources if and when

such development is feasible and appropriate.

The regime established by the Convention is not

intended to promote Antarctic minerals development. In fact, it contains some stringent

controls on development. The hurdles that a

potential developer would have to clear before

proposed minerals development could proceed

are demanding. On balance, the Convention

appears to be weighted more toward restricting development than assisting it. Potential

developers are concerned about environmental

protection requirements and also about having

to satisfy the concerns of many different countries before being allowed to proceed with a

project. Like environmentalists, they worry that

elements of the regime are ambiguous.15 Some

have argued that the Minerals Convention

discriminates against private entrepreneurs and

favors state-controlled enterprises that receive

government funds, but this conclusion is difficult to prove.

Despite these concerns, U.S. private companies who have studied it generally support

ratification of the Convention, if somewhat

unenthusiastically. The current Convention is

preferable to no agreement, they argue. U.S.

companies already are used to complying with

stringent regulations in the United States and

abroad, so they should be able to do so in

Antarctica if the potential economic gain is

adequate. U.S. companies would not be interested in Antarctica’s minerals resources in the

absence of an established legal regime.

Achieving an appropriate and workable balance between environmental protection and

resource development is difficult in any context.

In the Antarctic, both must be weighed against

the primary U.S. interest of strengthening the

ATS and its underlying principles. In the long

run, issues of concern to both commercial

and environmental interests may be secondary, so long as these underlying principles,

which assure the political stability of the

region, are maintained.

Are There Different Types of Agreements That

Would Be Better Than the Minerals

Convention?

The most discussed alternative is banning all

mineral resource activities in Antarctica, possibly by designating the entire continent as a

world park or ATCP-administered wilderness

reserve. Several ATCPs have indicated opposition to mining in Antarctica and stated that they

would prefer a “full protection option” if the

Minerals Convention is not ratified.l6 T h e

Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, which

lq~tkr frm ~~b~l, In~m~m~ ~ti[ute for fivironment ~d &velopment-North America, to Jacques-Yves Cousteau, the Cousteau

Society, Sept. 19, 1988.

15s=, for Cxmplc, tie diwusslm abut the appropriate interpretation of M. 54, in ch. 3! P. 80.

16& of AU*W 1989 two c]~~t co~~es, Fr~ce ~d Aus~~ia, had not si~~ tie Convention. Each has stated that 1[ k COtlKITLS ilbolll lk

environmental impacts of mineral resource activities. Signature indicates an intent to ratify but is not required for ratification or accession. SIX ‘Australia

Advocates ‘Wddemess’ Status for Antarctica,” Chmrian Science Monitor, May 24, 1989, p. 4,
16 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

represents a number of environmental organizations, has recently urged adoption of an Antarctic Conservation Convention instead of the

Minerals Convention.17 A ban on development

would eliminate controversy over minerals activities and would advance U.S. environmental

interests. But unanimous support among the

ATCPs for an outright ban would be difficult to

achieve. Certain states, including the United

States, also wish to assure access to the continent’s resources, with the proviso that no

significant harm should be inflicted on its

environment. This option has no chance of

success unless all states with policies of maintaining national access to Antarctic minerals can

be persuaded to change them.

Even if some resource development is allowed, the vast majority of Antarctica, including

most of the 2 percent that is ice-free, is likely to

remain essentially undeveloped. In addition, the

Minerals Convention effectively bans mineral

resource activities absent a consensus decision

to allow them in a specific area. Even then, a

separate consensus decision is required to open

each area considered.

Other theoretical alternatives include:

1.

2.

3.

4.

scrapping the present Antarctic Treaty

System in favor of a regime managed by

the United Nations,

recognizing the claims and treating Antarctica as no different from any other area

under sovereign control,

convincing claimants to exchange their

exclusive claims for a condominium in

which all ATCPs would jointly own Antarctica’s resources, or

doing nothing, hoping that the status quo

would not be challenged by a major

resource discovery.

For different reasons, it does not appear that an

international consensus could be reached for any

of these potential alternatives. Regarding the

first alternative, ATCPs have strongly opposed

involving the United Nations in the past and

believe only those countries with demonstrated

special interests in Antarctica should be fully

entitled to participate in establishing and operating a regime for the continent. They also realize

their own influence would be diluted in the

broader U.N. forum.

On possible recognition of claims, alternative

2, neither the United States, which reserves the

right to make a claim of its own, nor other

nonclaimants have been willing to seriously

consider changing long-held claims policies. In

the case of the overlapping claims of Chile,

Argentina, and the United Kingdom, which

claim should be accepted? And if the United

States or Soviet Union should ever decide to

make claims, the situation would become even

more difficult. Likewise, alternative 3, canceling claims in favor of a condominium, has

always been rejected by the claimants. It also

becomes more problematic as the number of

ATCPs continues to increase. In general, given

the history of the claims, the multilateral

nature of the negotiation, the conflicting

interests at stake, and the unique juridical

status of Antarctica, it is unlikely that a

fundamentally different regime could have

been negotiated.

Can Provisions of the Existing Agreement Be

Made More Satisfactory If We Choose Not To

Ratify It in Its Present Form?

The provisions of the Minerals Convention

were negotiated as a package, and compromise

was the price of an agreement. The Convention

cannot be amended until 10 years after it enters

into force. The Convention must either be

ratified or accepted as is or rejected. The United

States, with its veto, as well as each of the

seven claimant states and the Soviet Union,

can unilaterally prevent the Convention from

entering into force. A veto would carry no

17An~ti~ ~ so~~cm ~ ~~tion, “Permanent Protection for Antarctica: A Conservation Convention is Urgently Needed, ” ASOC

Information Paper No. 2, May 11, 1989.
Chapter 1--Summary, Issues, and Options ● 17

assurance that the parties would try to negotiate

a different accord. If the Convention does

enter into force, the United States or any

other Commission member could prevent

exploration and development later by exercising its veto at the area identification stage.

Ratification of the Minerals Convention would

advance important U.S. interests in Antarctica,

including securing nondiscriminatory access to

Antarctica’s mineral resources and protecting

the environment, as well as in maintaining the

peace and strengthening the ATS. There are no

compelling reasons for the United States to

reject the Minerals Convention. As a member of

all the regime’s institutions, the United States

could be influential in the continuing evolution

of the Minerals Convention, as well as in

protecting U.S. interests. Moreover, implementing legislation required to enable domestic

agencies to carry out resource-related responsibilities in Antarctica provides an opportunity for

Congress to define environmental and development interests and to clarify U.S. interpretations

of ambiguous elements of the regime.

THE RESOURCE POTENTIAL

OF ANTARCTICA

Although several countries are conducting

geologic research in Antarctica and interest

in prospecting is growing, little is currently

known about its actual mineral resources.

There are no known mineral deposits of

commercial interest. The limited knowledge

about Antarctica’s mineral resources has been

gained through fieldwork by geologists and

geophysicists, mostly in the 2 percent of the

continent that is not covered by ice or on the

surrounding continental shelves. Some insight

into the possible prospects for ore mineralization or petroleum accumulation in Antarctica

has been gained through knowledge of the

deposits that have been found on the surrounding continents in related geological environments. This has been possible because Antarctica is thought once to have been part of a larger

Photo credit U S Geo/ogca/ survey

Aerial view of the U.S. South Pole Station.

continent called Gondwana that, before breakup, included South America, Africa, southern

India, and Australia.

The best prospects for petroleum exploration

are the offshore sedimentary basins surrounding

Antarctica. Sedimentary basins on the continent

are covered by the thick ice cap, and thus, in the

absence of significant technological developments, are inaccessible for exploitation. Based

on what is currently known about the thickness,

organic content, age, and thermal history of

sediments in offshore basins, the most interesting areas are the Weddell and Ross embayments

in West Antarctica, and Prydz Bay and the

Wilkes Land margin in East Antarctica.

Until detailed exploration in these sedimentary basins is carried out, including

extensive seismic surveys and exploratory

drilling, meaningful estimates of resource

potential cannot be made. Past estimates of

Antarctica’s oil potential have been based on

virtually no data and may be very misleading.
18 ● Polar prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

While some Antarctic basins may ultimately

attract commercial interest, the sedimentary

basins in the surrounding continents that have

counterparts in Antarctica are not, for the most

part, major petroleum producing areas. The U.S.

Geological Survey estimates that a general

reconnaissance program for all of Antarctica

could cost about $250 million over a 10-year

period, the largest cost element being logistical

Support (See ch. 4 ).

Scientists have discovered small amounts,

termed occurrences, of many different types of

metallic and nonmetallic minerals in Antarctica.

However the only known substantial mineral

accumulations, or deposits, in Antarctica are

iron ore and coal. Low-value, high-volume

deposits such as these, which are plentiful

elsewhere in the world, would not be of

economic interest in Antarctica. It is highly

unlikely that an export market for Antarctic coal

or iron ore would develop.

The Antarctic Peninsula presents the best

opportunity for finding hard mineral deposits on the continent, in part because of the

greater proportion of exposed rock there.

Based on the geology of the Peninsula, the best

prospects for discovery are base metal (copper,

lead, and zinc) and precious metal (gold and

silver) deposits. Outside the Antarctic Peninsula, the chances of finding mineral deposits in

exposed areas are small. One exception could be

the Dufek Intrusion in the northern Pensacola

Mountains 300 miles from the coast, although

little of it is exposed. This intrusion has a

possible analog in the mineral-rich Bushveld

Complex in southern Africa, and thus, could

host platinum group metals, chromium, copper,

cobalt, and/or nickel. Virtually all of the potentially economic minerals known to occur in

Antarctica are currently abundant in other, more

accessible areas of the world.

The prospects for finding placer deposits or

deposits enriched by weathering are also low

throughout Antarctica. The required nearsurface weathering processes and significant

particle transport by running water have not

occurred in Antarctica since the onset of glaciation 35 to 40 million years ago. Furthermore,

these types of deposits tend to be found in

lowland areas rather than on mountain tops,

which comprise most of the exposed rock in

Antarctica.

ENVIRONMENTAL

CONSIDERATIONS

The potential for minerals development in

Antarctica raises concerns about the impacts

that minerals activities could have on the area’s

terrestrial and marine ecosystems and atmosphere. The Minerals Convention includes binding general standards and procedures designed

to ‘ensure that any resource development that

does take place occurs in an environmentally

sound manner. However, the Convention does

not provide detailed environmental regulations.

The key to minimizing and mitigating adverse

environmental impacts will be future elaboration of more detailed criteria and regulations

to interpret and apply the general standards,

guidelines, and procedures. United States implementing legislation may provide a measure of

the environmental protection regulations and

programs that eventually will be developed

collectively by the Parties. In addition, much

more environmental data and information will

be needed before decisions about the acceptability of minerals activities can be made.

The Minerals Convention contains important

compliance and enforcement provisions. However, there are important questions about how

well these provisions will work in practice.

Strong enforcement provisions have been difficult to agree on in the Antarctic context because

they are interpreted by claimants as bearing on

their rights to police their national territory. Any

issues that touch on claims may not be treated as

thoroughly as those in which sovereign rights

are not an issue.
Chapter 1--Summary, Issues, and Option ● 19

Local impacts from any minerals development that does take place will be unavoidable. Mere construction of facilities, for instance,

not to mention land-based mining itself, will

have significant but probably only very local

impacts. Siting of facilities in any case may be

difficult: facilities will likely be constructed on

solid ground, and good facility sites are rare and

potentially already occupied by wildlife or

scientific bases. It is doubtful that resource

activities will be allowed in environmentally

sensitive areas or in areas important to science.

A major oil spill from a tanker accident, such

as the recent Exxon Valdez accident in Alaska,

or a well blowout, although rare events, would

be two of the more significant unintentional

impacts associated with development and would

have regional as well as local impacts. In

particular, such a spill in a coastal area could

have substantial and long-lasting effects on

large numbers of birds and/or marine mammals;

a similar spill in the open ocean would be of less

concern. As illustrated by the recent oil spill

by the Argentine supply and tourist vessel

Bahia Paraiso, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties are not now adequately prepared to contain and clean up offshore oil

spills in Antarctica. (To its credit, however, the

U.S. National Science Foundation mounted its

response effort quickly). Improvements in technology and response capability could—and

undoubtedly will—be made prior to any Antarctic oil development; however, oil spill equipment and countermeasures for use in harsh

environments are limited at present. Although it

is essential to be as prepared as possible, it is

unlikely that significant amounts of oil could be

recovered from a major accident in any harsh

operating environment, including Antarctica,

using today’s best recovery technology.

Environmental impacts from past activities in

Antarctica would probably be considered by

most people to be insignificant. Most impacts

(e.g., disposal of wastes generated by normal

human activities) have been restricted to the

terrestrial and nearshore marine environments in

the immediate vicinity of the 48 year-round and

19 summer research stations operated by 18

nations. Undoubtedly, the most significant past

impacts have been caused in offshore areas by

overharvesting fur seals, whales, and fish.

However, human activity has been increasing in

Antarctica and is likely to continue to grow.

Future impacts can be expected to increase as

well. Minerals development per se is not ex -

pected to be an immediate concern. Of more

importance in the near-term will be activities

related to science, tourism, harvesting of living

resources, and perhaps minerals prospecting.

Environmental impacts associated with geological and geophysical prospecting are likely to be

insignificant and no different from those associated with similar science activities, unless done

on a large scale by many countries.

Mineral resource development in Antarctica,

and especially accidents resulting from exploration or development, could adversely impact

some research projects and the value of Antarctica as a science laboratory. Projects dealing

with biological processes or ecosystem dynamics would likely be most affected by nearby

development activities or oil spills. However,

most Antarctic research would probably not be

adversely impacted by resource activities. Understanding of oceanography, marine ecology,

meteorology, and cold-region engineering could

be improved by the research needed to prepare

for resource recovery.

TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC

CONSIDERATIONS FOR OIL

DEVELOPMENT

Whether oil companies will have the technical capabilities to develop any large fields found

in Antarctica depends on both the specific

environmental and geological conditions where

the field is located and on the status of’ technology. Whether they will have the incentive to

develop a field depends on profitability and risk,

both political and financial. Considering eco-
20 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

nomic and political constraints, as well as the

long lead times that would be required to

produce oil in Antarctica, OTA does not

expect that any oil production would take

place in Antarctica sooner than the next 30

years, if ever.

It is unlikely that anything smaller than a

world-class giant (500 million to 5 billion

barrels of recoverable oil) or super-giant (over 5

billion barrels) field with high productivity will

ever be economic to develop in Antarctica (see

ch. 4 and app. A). Probably only a handful of

such large, high-quality fields are left to be

found in the entire world, so a discovery in

Antarctica would be likely to attract commercial

interest.

The rigorous environment of Antarctica is

such that oil production there will probably be

more difficult than production thus far anywhere

else in the world. Most of Antarctica is colder,

stormier, and more isolated than other challenging areas in which the oil industry has operated,

and it has a continental shelf three to six times

deeper than the global mean. Even so, required

technologies for some types of Antarctic

development will probably not be substantially different from those now used, or

contemplated for use, by major firms in other

harsh operating areas. Offshore technologies

have evolved in discrete, incremental steps over

the last 20 years, as industry has moved into ever

more difficult areas. Exploration is currently

underway, for instance, in the relatively shallow

but seasonally ice-covered Beaufort and

Chukchi Seas offshore Alaska and Canada; the

iceberg-prone region between Greenland and

eastern Canada; and the North Sea, North

Atlantic, and Norwegian Sea. To date, the most

significant production experience in harsh environments has been in the North Sea, but

production in very deep water has begun in such

areas as the Gulf of Mexico and offshore Brazil.

The easiest type of offshore development that

can be contemplated-and likely the first type of

development that would be tried in Antarctica—

would be one in an area relatively free of

icebergs. For this type of development, most of

the technology is available, although a complete

system would require combining technologies

developed for ice-covered areas and for deep

water. The industry does not yet have much

experience operating in environments characterized by both deep water and seasonal sea ice

and/or icebergs.

In areas where icebergs are likely to be a

problem, additional technology development,

some of which is underway now in other hostile

areas, will be needed. Since long lead times and

appropriate economic incentives will be needed

in any case to bring a field into production in

Antarctica, the required technology is likely to

be available by the earliest credible date a

project could be brought on stream. Technologies for use in other hostile areas (e.g., the

iceberg-prone Labrador Sea) are likely to continue to be improved, and these would be

available for use in Antarctica.

It will likely be technically possible to

produce oil from under Antarctica’s ice shelves

and moving ice cap some day; however, new

technology will be needed to develop any fields

found in these areas.

OTA constructed several hypothetical scenarios (see app. A) to illustrate likely technology

requirements for offshore oil development in

Antarctica and to gain some insight into the

economics of producing oil there. This modeling exercise, although fraught with uncertainty,

indicates at least a doubling of current world oil

prices would be required to develop a very large

oil deposit on a commercial basis in Antarctica.

OTA assumed very favorable circumstances in

its scenarios: first, that a world-class giant field

is discovered in an area in which production is

technically feasible; second, that the timing of

development is far enough in the future so that

all pre-production activities can be accomplished and all needed technology is available;
Chapter 1--Summary, Issues, and Options ● 21

and third, that the Parties determine that development in the area in which the field is located

is consistent with the standards of the Minerals

Convention and that they assure the developer

rights to produce the field. If these assumptions

are not realized, an Antarctic development

prospect probably would not go forward.

OTA also examined briefly the potential for

producing Antarctic oil in the context of future

world liquid fuels supply and demand. Given the

many uncertainties involved in projecting what

may occur 30 years or more from now, definitive statements are not possible. There appear to

be enough proven reserves of conventional oil

on hand to satisfy world oil demand at least

through 2020. Also, many alternatives to the use

of conventional oil exist--ego, unconventional

heavy oil, tar sands, and oil shale-which given

higher prices could ultimately contribute significant amounts of energy to the world supply.

Conservation and the greater use of alternatives

to liquid fuels may become more important as

the price of oil rises. Global warming could

induce countries to decrease the use of fossil

fuels. All these factors would tend to delay or

deter serious consideration of Antarctic oil.

Even so, the discovery of a large oil field

anywhere in the world, including Antarctica,

will attract commercial interest. If such a field is

found in Antarctica and could be developed at a

profit, chances are high that someone will wish

to do SO.

TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC

CONSIDERATIONS FOR HARD

MINERALS DEVELOPMENT

Some insight into the technical feasibility of

developing a hard minerals mine in Antarctica

can be gained from the experience of mining in

the High Arctic. Mining has been conducted in

severe winter climates north of the Arctic Circle

for more than 30 years, and technologies for

both open pit and underground mining have

evolved to cope with the attendant difficult

operating conditions. The costs to develop

Arctic mines are much higher than those for

mines in more temperate climates. Thus, only

world-class deposits in relatively accessible

areas, like the Polaris lead-zinc mine located

along the coast of Little Comwallis Island in

northern Canada, have been economic to develop. Such deposits typically contain in situ ore

valued at more than $200 per ton.

In general, mining operations in most of

Antarctica will be even more difficult and costly

than operations in the Arctic, given Antarctica’s

greater isolation and more severe climate. Mines

would have to be located on land masses

generally free of snow and ice. Transportation of

fuel and concentrates would be difficult and

costly tasks. Port facilities would be expensive

and hard to locate, build, and maintain. However, world-class deposits of equal or greater

size and quality to those now being mined in

the Arctic could probably be mined economically in the reasonably accessible parts of

Antarctica, such as coastal locations on the

Antarctic Peninsula. Existing mining, processing, and transportation technology could be

adapted for use in these areas. In place ore values

of from $200 to $400 per ton, depending on the

location, would probably be required.

The hard mineral deposits with the best

prospects for economic recovery in Antarctica would be low-volume, high-value deposits such as gold, particularly if found on the

Antarctic Peninsula. A reasonably accessible,

high-grade gold deposit would be a relatively

good economic prospect because the gold product would not be as costly to transport as bulkier

ore concentrates. The likelihood of economic

exploitation of hard minerals outside the

Antarctic Peninsula is low, especially in the

relatively inaccessible inland areas. Developing a mine in the interior of Antarctica would be

extremely difficult, and it is unlikely that mining
22 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

USGS field camp at Lake Vanda in Dry Valley area near McMurdo.

initially would be conducted year round in harsh

interior areas. The transportation system for

interior operations also would be very expensive.

It is not obvious whether a hard mineral

deposit or an oil field would be the first to be

exploited in Antarctica if resources are discovered and exploration is allowed. Either would be

of interest if it were of world-class quality. it is

clear, however, that before any adequate assessment of resources can be made, much more

Photo credit U.S Geological Survey

geology and mineral

will need to be assemknowledge about the

potential of Antarctica

bled; furthermore, before any deposit could be

exploited, temporal data about the operating

environment will be needed, and detailed and

expensive exploration of specific sites would

have to be undertaken. Although one study has

been optimistic about the feasibility of developing mineral resources in Antarctica’s interior,

OTA has concluded that this study has underestimated the costs and difficulties of Antarctic

mining. 18

18M. Magee, ‘ ‘Assessment of Mhung and Process ‘Ikchnolo~~ for Antarcmc Mineral Development, ” OTA Contractor report, Nov. 1988. See also

D.K. Beike, “An Engineering Evaluation of Mining m Antarctica: A Ca..c Study of I%mnum,” Master’s Thesis, University of’ ‘lkxas at Austin, May

1988.
Chapter 1---Summary, Issues, and Options . 23

IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS

Introduction

The Senate must give its advice and consent

to U.S. ratification of the Minerals Convention.

If the Convention is ratified and enters into

force, both Houses will have to approve implementing legislation so the Federal Government

can meet at least its minimal obligations as a

party to the Convention (e.g., designating representatives to the Commission, Regulatory Committee(s), etc.).

The minerals negotiations have been the

driving force in the recent evolution of the

Antarctic Treaty System. The United States,

through the policies, programs, and institutional

arrangements it chooses now, can influence the

evolution of the Antarctic regime and help

assure that Antarctica remains a zone of peace.

Congress has an opportunity, beyond meeting

minimal legal requirements, to guide U.S.

Antarctic policy through the implementing legislation it adopts.

At one level, implementation requires that the

broad foreign policy, political, and national

security interests of the United States are

fulfilled. At a second level, domestic regulatory,

operational, and scientific needs related to any

minerals activities the United States may choose

to sponsor need to be considered. These needs

would vary, depending on the scope of minerals

activities the United States decides to undertake

or promote. The more involved the United

States becomes (or plans to become) in Antarctic resource development, the larger the required

Federal effort may need to be.

This section begins with a brief discussion of

the steps that should be taken in implementing

legislation to ensure that the foreign policy

interests of the United States are safeguarded.

The primary requirement is to designate Federal

agency representatives to the institutions established by the Minerals Convention.

Ratification of the Minerals Convention

does not require or presume that the United

States will itself become involved in minerals

prospecting, exploration, or development, or

even that it engage in minerals-related research. Other countries may undertake minerals

activities, however, even if the United States

does not; thus, the United States must have some

capability to evaluate proposed activities of

others. If the United States decides to sponsor

prospecting itself, it must establish the added

capability to evaluate and regulate Operators it

may sponsor. A U.S. decision to sponsor

exploration and development in the future

would require an even broader capability. An

important aspect of implementing legislation

will be to establish a regulatory and institutional

structure for managing any minerals activities

the United States may sponsor in Antarctica.

The second part of this section considers general

regulatory needs and evaluates four possible

lead agencies for Antarctic minerals affairs. A

fifth alternative, creation of a United States

Antarctic Agency, is considered as a future

possibility if general U.S. activities in Antarctica increase significantly.

Data and information needs are likely to grow

in proportion to the level of U.S. involvement in

Antarctic minerals activities. These needs are

discussed in the third part of this section in

relation to the type and timing of minerals

activities the United States could undertake.

Since a separate protocol on liability is

required to be negotiated and ratified before any

exploration or development in Antarctica may

be allowed, the Senate may wish to consider the

implications of ratifying the Minerals Convention before this protocol has been negotiated and

of delaying ratification until after a protocol has

been concluded. A discussion of this issue is

presented in the last part of this section.
24 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Advancing the Foreign Policy Goals

of the United States

The most important justification for ratifying

the Minerals Convention is to safeguard and

promote the foreign policy and political objectives of the United States-that is, to protect the

ATS and preserve Antarctica as a zone of peace.

If the Convention is ratified, the United States

can advance these objectives and maintain a

continuing leadership role among the ATCPs by

actively participating in it. At a minimum then,

the United States will have to decide which

agency or agencies will represent it in the

Convention institutions and participate in

relevant policy determinations. The United

States is entitled to be represented in all

institutions created by the Minerals Convention.

The interagency Antarctic Policy Group (APG)

determines U.S. Antarctic policy. All U.S.

representatives to the institutions of the Convention would be bound by the policies established

by this group. As Chairman of the APG and lead

negotiator on Antarctic policy issues, the Department of State currently represents the United

States at all ATS meetings. Other Federal

agencies and private sector organizations are

represented on U.S. delegations to these meetings. The U.S. representative to the Minerals

Convention Commission and to the Special

Meeting of Parties must have the authority to

represent the broad spectrum of specific U.S.

interests in Antarctica. Hence, the Department

of State is the most appropriate candidate to

represent the United States at meetings of these

institutions; other U.S. agencies could be included in the delegation as appropriate. Because

the Department of State represents the United

States at other ATS meetings, it is also the

Federal agency best qualified to coordinate

responsibilities under the Minerals Convention

with other ATS responsibilities.

The Convention establishes an Advisory

Committee responsible for providing advice to

the other institutions on the full range of

Photo credif U S Geological Survey

All directions point north from the South Pole. The geodesic

dome at the U.S. South Pole Station is in the background.

scientific, environmental, and technical issues.

Each Party’s representative must have suitable

scientific, technical, or environmental competence or be accompanied by experts and advisors. Either the State Department, as overall

coordinator of U.S. Antarctic policy, or a

technically qualified U.S. expert could represent

the United States on the Advisory Committee. In

any case, it will be essential to draw on the

expertise available in the National Science

Foundation, the Department of the Interior, the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the

Marine Mammal Commission, the academic

community, and industry. Wide-ranging exper-
Chapter1--Summary, Issues, and Options ● 25

tise will also be required to make the decisions

assigned to the Regulatory Committees, if and

when they are established.

Establishing a Regulatory and Institutional

Structure

At the present time, little or no interest exists

in resource development per se, but several

nations appear to be interested in prospecting. A

major policy issue for the United States is to

decide whether to sponsor prospecting. Even if

it does not become a sponsor, other countries are

likely to do so. Thus, if the United States wishes

to be actively and responsibly involved in the

institutions of the Minerals Convention and,

specifically, in ensuring that others comply with

the Convention’s environmental and other provisions, it will need to establish some capability

for evaluating the prospecting (and potentially

also the exploration and development) activities

of Operators sponsored by other countries.

If the United States decides to sponsor

prospecting itself, a basic obligation would be to

ensure that the Operators it sponsors act in a

manner consistent with the principles of the

Minerals Convention. In this case, implementing legislation would need to address how to

regulate the Operators it sponsors, what information is required to make informed judgments

about prospecting (and how to obtain it), and

which agency or agencies will be in charge of

any program established to carry out these

activities.

The agency assigned to handle sponsorship of

prospecting would need to have the capability to

guide preparation of the prospecting notification

to the Commission, to evaluate and possibly

prepare environmental impact assessments, and

to monitor the activities of Operators. Implementing legislation might include procedures

and information requirements for sponsoring,

evaluating, and certifying U.S. Operators seeking to undertake Antarctic mineral resource

activities; procedures for meeting environmental

impact assessment requirements; procedures

and criteria for determining that an operator has

and maintains the necessary substantial and

genuine link with the United States; procedures

and criteria for determining the financial and

technical qualifications of operators; procedures

and criteria for suspending or terminating sponsorship; provisions to make violations of the

Convention violations of U.S. law; and provisions establishing at least an interim liability

regime for prospecting pending entry into force

of the liability protocol.

Initially, there may actually be little that a

Federal entity responsible for prospecting would

be required to do. The data and information

requirements to demonstrate consistency with

Minerals Convention standards will be relatively small compared to what would be required for exploration and development, and the

impacts associated with prospecting are expected to be negligible. In addition, the amount

of activity likely to take place in the near term

is not likely to be great. Hence, new responsibilities could probably be accomplished by a small

staff. A similarly small program would be

indicated if the United States decides not to

sponsor prospecting itself but only to establish

the capability to evaluate and monitor Operators

from other countries. In designing a program

and assigning responsibility for evaluating and

overseeing prospecting, Congress and the Administration may want to keep in mind that the

same entity may be called on later to consider

and regulate exploration and development.

Currently, no existing agency has the full

range of experience and capabilities to implement a prospecting program (and potentially an

exploration and development program as well).

Beyond its major role in coordinating and

advancing U.S. Antarctic policy, the Department of State is not equipped to play a major role

in regulating minerals activities. It does not have

the experience, the mandate, or the technical

expertise to evaluate and regulate operators or to

manage any directed research. Indeed, only

three executive agencies approximate the
26 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

legislative mandate and experience required

to meet the major demands of the Minerals

Convention: the National Science Foundation, the Department of the Interior, and the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the Department of Commerce.

The National Science Foundation (NSF)

The National Science Foundation has been

active in Antarctica since 1957 and responsible

for U.S. research activities there since 1971. The

Foundation’s United States Antarctic Program

is responsible for research, operations, and

logistics. The Program’s budget requests are

made and defended by NSF. Unless there is a

major change in U.S. Antarctic policy, NSF will

continue to play a major role on the continent.

There are four reasons why NSF might be

chosen to administer a mineral resource program. First, the Foundation’s support for Antarctic research has provided a sound basis for

addressing the environmental and resource information needs required if prospecting, exploration, and development are undertaken. Second, any effort in Antarctica must depend on

reliable logistics, experience, and capability.

The National Science Foundation, in close

cooperation with the U.S. Navy, has developed

the necessary skills and has the specialized

equipment required for working in the continent’s hostile environment. It could provide

useful advice to commercial operators in Antarctica. Third, NSF has established strong ties to

the relatively small community of academic

researchers and program managers whose expertise will be critical for addressing the resource and environmental assessment issues

central to the Convention. Finally, successive

administrations have charged the Foundation

with responsibility for a wide range of U.S.

Antarctic activities; thus, NSF has an established legitimacy domestically and internationally.

There are, however, limits to an expanded

NSF role. The National Science Foundation’s

overall mandate is to be the primary Federal

patron for basic academic research. One consequence has been a deep reluctance to support in

any sustained fashion the environmental monitoring, survey, or baseline activities anticipated

by the Minerals Convention and typically performed by mission-oriented agencies, and a

similar reluctance to support directed research

aimed at determining the resource potential of

Antarctica. 19 Although NSF has been responsive to proposals generated by academic scientists, it has not assumed leadership for development of the kinds of resource assessment

programs of increasing interest to other government agencies, environmentalists, or commercial interests. For example, the Foundation did

not play a prominent role in the negotiation of

the marine living resources treaty (CCAMLR)

or the Minerals Convention. Even with additional funds, NSF’s academic constituency would

be reserved in its enthusiasm for such an

expanded role, particularly since it could mean

that funds for basic research would be diverted

to support the applied work needed to support

U.S. minerals activities. However, NSF could

acquire the capability to undertake long-term

monitoring in Antarctica if directed to do so.

More generally, NSF has expressed little

interest in developing long-range policies for the

U.S. Antarctic Program outside the continued

support for basic research and logistics. For

example, it does not support a separate policy

and planning staff that addresses issues such as

tourism and resource development except as

I~e ~tenti~ fmconfllct wl~ ml=lon age~ies Wm su=e~~ by the U.S. Gdog]cd Survey, which ~gud I.M t-he ‘ ‘dhated shofi-te~ ~~~ch’

called for in President Reagan’s 1982 policy statement did not meet long-term needs in earth sciences. Furthermore, the charge to NSF to support

university and Federal agency research in Antarctica put federal agencies m competition with academic instituhons for funds, rather than establishing

funding opportunities that would nurture complementary agency and university programs. The Role of the Natwnai Science Foundation m Polar

Regwrts-A Report to the National Science Board (NSB-87-128), p, 8.
Chapter 1--Summary, Issues, and Options ● 27

they affect NSF’s basic science mission.20

Moreover, the Foundation has no natural resource management experience or responsibilities.

To assign NSF the responsibility for implementing the Minerals Convention would require

additional staff experienced in the administrative, procedural, technical, and economic dimensions of resource management, and would mark

a significant departure from the Foundation’s

traditional basic research mission.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA)

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration includes among its missions responsibility for directed and applied research to

support marine resource management. Its areas

of direct responsibility include fisheries, marine

mammals (in conjunction with the Fish and

Wildlife Service), marine and estuarine pollution, and the implementation of the 1980 Deep

Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, including

assessment of the environmental impacts of

deep seabed minerals development. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

is generally perceived as more responsive than

other resource management agencies to the

concerns of environmental interests, and has

also received the support of the deep ocean

mining industry for its responsiveness to the

special requirements of that industry.

Although NOAA’s field experience in Antarctica is limited relative to NSF’s, NOAA

scientists have conducted research in the Southern Ocean. The y have also conducted research in

the Arctic in support of the U.S. Alaskan Outer

Continental Shelf leasing program.21 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

also has extensive environmental data archiving

capabilities. For example, the National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service

compiles and maintains a variety of Antarctic

data sets. In response to the requirements of the

Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention

Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-623), NOAA has

been given responsibility for directed research

on the living marine resources of Antarctica.

The information generated by this program will

be essential for environmental impact assessments of proposed oil and gas activities on the

Antarctic continental margin.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration also has research and management

responsibilities for deep seabed hard minerals.

The Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act

of 1980 (Public Law 96-283) mandated that

NOAA establish procedures for the orderly

exploration and commercial recovery of manganese nodules from the deep seafloor. The act is

relevant to the Antarctic Minerals Convention

because it provides a regulatory framework for

the management of mineral resources beyond

the limits of U.S. jurisdiction. The absence of

territorial control required that the United States

base its jurisdictional claims on the power of the

United States to regulate activities of its citizens

outside its territory.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration grants licenses for exploration and

permits for commercial recovery for areas of the

deep seabed selected by an applicant who must

prove financial and technological capability to

conduct the proposed work. The agency is also

required to prepare an environmental impact

mA ~mpmhenslvemvlew of NSF’s rolc in polar regions indirectly acknowledged that the Foundation hid not playd a pmmticnt rok in policy issues

when it remmmended that it become more active in policy analysis and decision-making on Arctic and Antarctic policy issues through evaluation of

potential policy issues and options. The Role of the National Science Foundation in Polar Regiom, ibid., p. 52.

zlwl~out ~=~ng s~ll~tles ~f=, the exwneme ~ tie arctic is instructive. Prior to 1973, there WitS little information available with which to

assess the impact of oil and gas development, particukuly along the Alaskan margin. Because the Depanrnent of Interior’s Bureau of Land Management

(BLM) lacked the inhouse capabilities to work on the Alaskan shelf, it contracted with NOAA in 1974 to design and manage an environmental studies

program, the Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Assessment Program (OCSEAP) for Alaskan Studies. The program has since become one of the

most comprehensive programs of its kind for the collation and assessment of arctic environmental information. NOAA contracted with the U.S.

Geological Survey for much of the geology and gwphysical wok cmduc[ed. Oil and (2ZJ Technologies for the Arcfic and Deepvater, (Washington,

DC: U,S, (lmgrcss, Office of lkchnology Assessment, OTA-O-270, May 1985), p. 165.
28 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

statement before granting a license or permit,

both of which are contingent on steps to protect

environmental quality and to conserve the

mineral resource. Although commercial deep

ocean mining has yet to occur, NOAA has

established a framework to accommodate these

activities once they become economically attractive. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration also has a fleet of vessels

capable of conducting and supporting research

in Antarctica.

However, NOAA has much less experience in

Antarctica than NSF. Moreover, it has had no

legal mandate, research experience, or management responsibility for onshore minerals.22

While NOAA has developed a scheme to

manage deep ocean mining, it has so far no

experience in managing development of these

resources. More generally, assignment of sole

responsibility to NOAA for both scientific and

minerals management responsibilities could undermine NOAA’s identity in the environmental

community as a resource conservation agency.

The Department of the Interior

Interior has a clear legislative responsibility

as well as broad experience on a wide range of

mineral and environmental resources in the

United States and U.S. Exclusive Economic

Zone (EEZ). Interior’s activities are pursued

through several agencies in the department, in

particular, the Minerals Management Service

(MMS), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM),

the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the

Bureau of Mines (BOM).

Minerals Management Service-MMS is

responsible for offshore minerals leasing and

lease management under provisions of the Outer

Continental Shelf Lands Act. The Minerals

Management Service has programs to:

. manage the leasing of oil and gas and other

minerals in offshore areas under the juris-

●

●

●

diction of the United States (including U.S.

Arctic areas),

supervise mineral exploration, development, production, and operations in accord

with permits and leases issued by the

department,

collect and distribute revenue due the

Federal Government from onshore and

offshore mineral leases, and

assess environmental impacts associated

with minerals development in offshore

areas subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

In 1973, Interior initiated the Environmental

Studies Program to gather information for

accelerated leasing on the U.S. outer continental

shelf (OCS). First located in BLM, and then

moved to the MMS when it was established in

1982, the program generates environmental

information used by the Secretary of the Interior

and by the environmental assessment and leasing management divisions of MMS to meet their

responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act and the OCS Lands Act. Most

of the work of this program is contracted to

university researchers.

Bureau of Land Management—The Bureau

is responsible for conducting programs for the

conservation, development and management of

both surface and mineral resources on the

nation’s public lands (including U.S. Arctic

areas). The Bureau’s main task is to manage

these holdings and their resources from a

multiple use perspective by seeking the best mix

of uses that an area can sustain to provide the

greatest public benefit. Specific energy and

mineral programs include resource evaluation,

leasing, and supervision of Federal and Indian

coal, oil and gas, geothermal resources, oil

shale, tar sands, and nonenergy minerals. In

addition, BLM prepares environmental impact

assessments of proposed minerals development,

implements measures to mitigate negative envi-

= the other hand, Antarctica’s cmshore minerals are not, according to the U.S. view, within our national jurisdiction, and in this sense they are

similar to deep seabed minerals. NOAA argues that it should be in charge of all rmcmrces beyond national jurisdiction, whether on land or at sea
Chapter I---Summary, Issues,and Options ● 2 9

ronmental effects, and administers laws governing mining on public lands and the sale of

minerals.

U.S. Geological Survey-The Survey is

charged with enlarging the Nation’s knowledge

about the extent, distribution, and character of

water and other natural resources, and the

geological processes, structures, and hazards

that affect the development and use of the land.

It pursues this mandate through a program of

mapping, geological research, and mineral and

energy resource assessments on land and in the

EEZ. Specifically, USGS researchers produce

geophysical, geological, and geochemical maps

and analyses which show the distribution, age,

composition, structure, and physical properties

of the rocks and mineral deposits at and beneath

the Earth’s surface. It also provides information

on geologic hazards such as earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides, and land subsidence that affect

human safety, urban development, and engineering design of sensitive structures. More

generally, USGS provides data and analysis for

use by other Federal and State agencies in the

management of public lands, wilderness studies,

and multiple use planning, and in national policy

determinations including energy development

and mineral resource availability. Several USGS

scientists have experience doing geological and

geophysical research in Antarctica.

Under the National Mineral Resources Assessment Program (NAMRAP), USGS has conducted systematic regional assessments of mineral resource potential in the United States. The

assessments have been used for land use decisions as well as by private industry exploring for

specific deposits. Based on NAMRAP experience and related geological studies and subject

to congressional appropriations, the Survey

could conduct a two-part program for Antarctica

if the Convention enters into force: first, a

regional resource assessment of the entire continent; and second, a more detailed study of areas

that could have deposits of economic value.

Bureau of Mines—The Bureau of Mines is

the principal Federal agency responsible for

conducting research on mineral reserves and the

production, consumption, and recycling of mineral materials. The Bureau’s mission is to help

assure that the United States has the mineral

supplies necessary to maintain national security

and economic growth at low social and environmental costs. The Bureau also fosters and

encourages minerals production by the private

sector so that national needs can be supplied by

domestic sources.

If emphasis is to be on the management

aspects of Antarctic minerals prospecting, exploration, and development, then assigning a

major role to Interior would be a reasonable

choice, given the experience of the domestic oil,

gas, and minerals industry with the procedures

and regulatory requirements of the various

Interior agencies. Such an orientation would

also be compatible with the historical emphasis

on resource development in the Department of

the Interior. Together, USGS, MMS, BLM, and

BOM have the experience and expertise to

conduct exploratory studies, establish realistic

terms and conditions for minerals activities in

both onshore and offshore areas of Antarctica,

and to establish the regulatory requirements

associated with these efforts.

Despite this experience with environmental

and resource assessment, Interior has had little

experience managing resource activities outside

the continental United States. Were it to be

assigned major responsibility for Antarctic mineral affairs, it would need to choose a lead

agency within Interior. Otherwise. responsibility and visibility for Antarctic affairs would be

diffuse and fragmented.

A New, Independent Commission—Rather

than assigning regulatory responsibility to an

existing Federal agency, a new institution could

be created, such as a small commission. It could
30 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

resemble the Marine Mammal Commission,23

for instance. An Antarctic Minerals Commission could be given responsibility to monitor

interest and trends in Antarctic minerals activities, initially tracking and evaluating proposals

of other countries. The new agency could be

designed to grow and take on additional responsibilities as the need arises. If the United States

decides to sponsor prospecting, for instance, the

commission could become the focal point for

evaluating and regulating U.S. operators. With

an appropriate budget, environmental and resource information needs could be contracted to

the appropriate Federal agencies and/or to

universities or private contractors.

One advantage of a new institution is that turf

battles among present agency responsibilities

could be set aside. It could also coordinate the

activities of several interested Federal agencies.

A disadvantage could be its likely low visibility;

it also may have little to do in the near term.

Without the protection of a cabinet department,

it could be vulnerable to budget cuts. Also,

because it would be small, it would succeed or

fail on the strength or weakness of only a few

individuals.

Additional Considerations Should the United States Decide to Sponsor Exploration and

Development— Most experts would agree that

there is no urgency to develop details of the

larger Federal effort that would be required if at

some future date the United States decides to

sponsor exploration and development. These

activities are unlikely to attract interest for at

least several decades. If the United States

eventually decides to sponsor exploration and

development, the institutional structure we may

establish to oversee prospecting could be expanded to handle the additional responsibilities

that sponsorship of exploration and development would entail. Any of the four agencies

discussed could be assigned added responsibilities. On the other hand, U.S. involvement in

development activities would signal a much

higher level of U.S. activity of all kinds in

Antarctica than exists today or is likely in the

near future. When the level of U.S. activity does

increase significantly, however, it may be useful

to meld all or most U.S. Antarctic activities into

one organization. The United Kingdom and the

Soviet Union have already done so.

Creating a U.S. Antarctic Agency (USAA),

an independent agency with responsibility for

the full range of U.S. interests on the continent,

would be a major departure in the management

of Antarctic policy. The essential features of

such an agency would be its independent status

and comprehensive responsibility for planning,

implementing, and managing all U.S. activities

in Antarctica, including logistics. Establishment

of such an agency would be premised on the

assumption that U.S. activities in Antarctica will

increase in the future; that realization of U.S.

security, environmental, economic, and scientific interests will require increased involvement

in these activities; and that present Federal

institutional arrangements are ill-prepared to

respond to these needs.

The United States Antarctic Agency could be

charged with responsibility for resource and

environmental assessments and management,

for support of scientific research, and for

maintaining the infrastructure required to continue the national presence in Antarctica, including logistics. Technical responsibilities could be

funded by the USAA but performed by other

agencies. For example, NSF could continue to

fund basic research projects without being

encumbered by pressure to conduct directed

research or to provide and manage logistics. The

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration could continue to conduct assessments and

research on marine living resources. The Geological Survey could conduct studies on geological resources and natural hazards. Although

some funding might come from agency budgets,

m~e mem~Comlssion is a small, independent executive branch agency with responsibility for developing, reviewing, and tig

recommendations on actions and policies for all Federal agencies with respect to marine mammal protection and conservation,
Chapter I---Summary, Issues, and Options ● 31

most could be allocated to the USAA and

directed according to a long-range plan to

whichever agency was most appropriate to carry

out a specific task.

Such an agency would provide a clear political, administrative, and managerial focus for

Antarctic affairs in the United States and meet

the need for greater coordination among agencies with Antarctic responsibilities. Because it

would be charged with comprehensive responsibilities, it would be in a good position to contend

with the interrelationship of issues. Accountability for U.S. Antarctic policy would be

clearly defined, both for political oversight and

international collaboration. The Agency could

have the ability to integrate plans, priorities, and

national interests with budgets, and hence be in

a strong position to pursue the full range of U.S.

interests within funding constraints.

Efforts to establish an independent agency for

Antarctica could be challenged on several

grounds. First, there is an innate resistance to

increasing the number of government agencies.

A number of simpler institutional alternatives

for implementing Antarctic policy already exist.

Second, creation of an independent agency

would elevate Antarctic affairs to a level of

visibility that is arguably not warranted at this

time. The issue-by-issue approach which has

characterized U.S. involvement over the past

decade has seemed to provide an adequate

response to realizing international obligations

and national interests on the continent. Third,

the APG now plays a significant interagency

coordinating role and may resist creation of a

new agency that would diminish its authority.

Fourth, development of a comprehensive, coordinated Antarctic program, implicit in the creation of an independent agency, implies a much

higher level of funding than may be acceptable

politically at present. Finally, a new institution

may threaten the resources devoted to basic

research in Antarctica.

Data and Information Needs

The United States is not obligated to undertake any basic or directed research as a consequence of ratifying the Minerals Convention.

Data and information requirements at the prospecting stage will be relatively minor, but

requirements for exploration and especially for

development—if they occur—will be substantial. Available information about the Antarctic

environment is not now sufficient for making

informed decisions about opening parts of

Antarctica for exploration and development (or

for regulating activities in areas once they are

opened).

Two categories of information will be especially important:

baseline environmental information with

which to assess the significance of changes

in the ecosystem likely to result from

minerals activities, and

information about the basic geological,

geophysical, and geochemical characteristics of Antarctica.

To date, there has been virtually no effort to plan

or to support the long-term commitment of

funds for long-term environmental monitoring. 24 

AS for geological survey and assessment,

an important implementation issue is the extent

to which the government will contribute to

resource assessments to assist domestic minerals companies in identifying those areas worthy

of more detailed evaluation and possibly development.

A program to acquire data and information

should be tailored to the level of resource

activity anticipated. A first step in meeting

information needs could be to compile relevant

databases and information on research programs

and agency plans and then identify priority

research needs, logistics requirements, and funding estimates. As for directed environmental

24A ~xcc@on h~ ~n tie CC-R fiays~m Moni[ormg ~o~am, reali~ h tie Unitd S[a[es through the LJ, S Antarctic Marine Living

Resources Program administered by NOAA.
32 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

research, the United States might wish, at a

minimum, to begin compiling environmental

baseline data. Such data would be essential for

evaluating potential impacts if the United States

decides to become involved in mineral resource

activities and/or to evaluate the impacts of plans

of other countries that may decide to sponsor

activities. The United States does have a small

program to gather some oceanographic data

pursuant to its responsibilities under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine

Living Resources, even though it does not now

fish in Antarctic waters and is unlikely to do so

in the near future.

As far as decisionmaking in the institutions of

the Minerals Convention is concerned, there

would be little need for the results of mineralsrelated research in Antarctica until an area is

under consideration to be opened for exploration

and development. Considering the current low

level of industry interest in Antarctica and the

high probability that Antarctic resource development is three or more decades away, there

does not appear to be a compelling need at

this time for a major Federal effort to assess

Antarctica’s resources A modest reconnaissance

program may be justified if the United States

wishes to promote long-term U.S. commercial interests in Antarctica and/or to acquire

additional influence in institution meetings.

Some U.S. researchers want to establish a more

aggressive minerals assessment program. Several countries have acquired more offshore

geophysical data than the United States, so a

U.S. program could help the United States

remain competitive with other interested countries. Specific requirements for reconnaissance

data are discussed in chapter 4. In general,

industry presumably will be responsible for

assessing resource potential beyond basic reconnaissance and for obtaining information needed

for environmental impact assessments for specific areas.

The lead agency designated for managing

Antarctic minerals activities will most likely be

assigned responsibility for defining data and

information needs even if other agencies, academic institutions, and/or the private sector are

contracted to carry out some of the work. The

agency designated to handle data and information might initially be assigned the relatively

simple responsibility for verifying information

provided by applicants (including non-U.S.

applicants) for prospecting, and, ultimately, for

exploration and development. It could also be

given responsibility for obtaining information

needed to predict and detect impacts. If desired,

broader authority could be assigned the agency

to assess resource potential as well. Alternatively, responsibility for acquiring environmental and resource data could be delegated to

several agencies. Capabilities for acquiring and

evaluating environmental and resource information could be an important consideration when

designating a lead agency. As noted, no single

agency currently has all the capabilities required.

A model for a directed research program is the

plan implementing CCAMLR. After ratifying

CCAMLR in 1982, the United States established the Antarctic Marine Living Resources

Program to provide information for conservation and management of marine living resources

in the oceans surrounding Antarctica. The

National Science Foundation was directed to

continue supporting basic research of Antarctic

marine ecosystems while NOAA was directed to

design an applied research program to provide

information needed to detect, monitor, and

predict the effects of fishing and associated

activities on target, dependent, and related

species and populations. The National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration’s plan describes priority research needs for the implementation of the Convention, identifies which

of those needs are to be fulfilled by the United

States, and specifies the design of the directed

research and funds, personnel, and facilities

required for the research.
Chapter 1--Summary, Issues, and Options ● 33

An important consideration in designing a

research program will be its cost. Conceivably,

NSF could be directed to allocate more of its

existing basic research budget to mineralsrelated activities. However, funding for minerals research within a fixed budget could only be

accomplished at the expense of other research.

Currently, applied research does not appear

more important or timely than basic research

that may have to be sacrificed. Given the present

slight interest in minerals development, modest

funding for data acquisition seems acceptable. If

interest increases, a larger effort would be

justified.

Cooperative projects among the Parties to

the Minerals Convention would help reduce

the high costs of basic and applied research.

United States’ backing of joint research would

further its longstanding goal of international

cooperation in Antarctica. Joint research also

would avoid unnecessary duplication and assure

all participants equal access to data. The National Science Foundation’s Deep Sea Drilling

Program and its successor, the Ocean Drilling

Program, should be considered as models. As

for prospecting, under certain conditions (e.g.,

when efforts would otherwise be duplicated)

“group shoots ” could be considered, in which

companies pool their resources to conduct initial

seismic exploration in frontier areas. Finally,

ATCPs should be encouraged to make their

seismic and other scientific data freely available

as intended under the terms of the Antarctic

Treaty. Countries which have not been as

diligent as the United States in releasing seismic

data should be encouraged to do so.

The Liability Protocol

Liability issues are covered in Article 8 of the

Minerals Convention. However, the Convention

does not treat liability issues in detail. The

Parties agreed that before any minerals exploration and development can occur, a protocol

specifying the details of a system of liability for

environmental damage related to minerals activities must be negotiated and ratified in the

same manner as the Minerals Convention.25 It

may include limits on liability, how unmet

liability will be satisfied, and what means to use

to assess and adjudicate liability claims.26

If the Minerals Convention is ratified before

the liability protocol is ratified, prospecting (but

not exploration and development) may begin,

subject to the general provisions of Article 8 and

other specified interim measures. During this

period, Parties are to ensure that recourse will be

available in their national courts for adjudicating

liability claims, including possible claims by the

Commission itself, against any Operator(s) they

may sponsor. However, domestic legislation

and/or agency regulations will have to interpret

the Article 8 guidelines for prospecting; the

liability regime for prospecting cannot be articulated solely through judicial proceedings.

The specific provisions of the liability protocol—

and, in particular, those relating to limits on

liability--could have an important impact on

future minerals activities in Antarctica. Should

the United States Senate give its advice and

consent to ratification of the Minerals Convention before the liability protocol is negotiated or wait until after it has been negotiated?

Several arguments favor ratification of the

Convention prior to negotiating and/or ratifying

the liability protocol:

Even without additional liability measures,

ratification of the Convention would strengthen the ATS.

Exploration and development may not

proceed under any circumstances until the

liability protocol has been ratified. Interim

liability measures need only be considered

for prospecting, and impacts associated

2SS= ch. 3, p, 86, for *tils.

?.6Neg@~i~s fm tie Li~ility ~otml ~ve not commenc~ as of September 1989, but could kgti kfore tie end of tie Yem.
34 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

with prospecting are not expected to be

significantly different from those associated with similar research activities already

taking place.

It may take several years to negotiate and

ratify the liability protocol. In the meantime, a resource discovery could be made---

a situation the Parties would like to avoid

in the absence of a regulatory framework.

The representatives from the countries that

negotiated the Minerals Convention are,

for the most part, still active and involved

in Antarctic affairs. They constitute an

institutional memory of how and why the

minerals regime was negotiated. In several

years these participants may be doing other

things. Unless the Convention is ratified in

the next few years, this institutional memory may be lost, and with it, the best

opportunity for ratifying the Convention.

The United States could set an early

standard for effective implementation of

the Minerals Convention. A domestic liability regime included as part of implementing legislation could be used to strengthen the U.S. position in negotiating the

protocol as long as it did not unduly tie its

delegation’s hands. Thus, Congress and the

Executive Branch would be the arbiters of

the competing interests asserted by domestic industry and environmental groups on

the liability question.

Two arguments favor waiting to ratify the

Minerals Convention until the liability protocol

has been negotiated.

The remaining unnegotiated aspects of

liability are potentially important. For instance, what will be the requirements for a

backup source of liability if an Operator

cannot pay or if limits on liability are

exceeded?

The U.S. may have more leverage over the

content of the liability protocol if it makes

ratification of the Minerals Convention

contingent on negotiating satisfactory terms

for the protocol. This strategy is available

to other countries as well, however, and, if

many countries pursue it, may be counterproductive. Special interest groups, in particular, may favor negotiating the protocol

before ratifying the Convention: industry is

concerned about the protocol because it

fears the limits on liability may be set too

high, thereby making economic operations

much more costly, if not impossible. Some

environmental groups, correspondingly, fear

that limits to liabilitv mav be set too low.
Chapter 2

J

.
CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

ANTARCTICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

EVOLUTION OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

UNITED STA= ANTARCTIC INTERESTS ● * * . * * . . . * * * * * * . * . * . . * . . * * . * .*.***... 46

Geopolitical and Strategic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Environmental Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

Scientific Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

Economic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

WHY THE CONVENTION? WHY NOW? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

THE ATCPs AND THE UNITED NATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Figure

Figure Page

2-1. Antarctic Territorial claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

Table

Table Page

2-1, Antarctic Treaty Nations **. .** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
Chapter 2

U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the

Origin of the Minerals Convention

SUMMARY

The United States has a long history as a leader in

Antarctic exploration and research. It has also

influenced the development of the Antarctic Treaty

System, The 1959 Antarctic Treaty is largely a

product of U.S. efforts.

U.S. interests in Antarctica can be grouped into

four categories: geopolitical and strategic, environmental, scientific, and economic. The paramount

geopolitical and strategic interest of the United

States is to maintain Antarctica as an area of peace

and cooperation. Environmental and scientific interests are driven by the desire to preserve the unique

ecological systems of the continent, study the

relationship of Antarctica to the global environment,

and use Antarctica as a laboratory for the study of

natural processes. Economic interests are future

oriented. It is uncertain whether hydrocarbons or

other minerals, if discovered, would be economically recoverable. However, the United States shares

with other consumers and importers of hydrocarbons

and minerals an interest in assuring nondiscriminatory access to Antarctic resources.

The vehicle through which the United States has

pursued these interests is the Antarctic Treaty

System (ATS). The Antarctic Treaty System includes the Antarctic Treaty, recommendations adopted

by consensus at consultative meetings, and separate

conventions adopted at special consultative meetings. The ATS establishes a framework within

which those nations making claims to parts of

Antarctica and those, such as the United States,

which neither recognize such claims nor assert ones

of their own, can cooperate without prejudice to their

legal positions. The ATS serves U.S. interests in

stability, free access to all of Antarctica, participation in regulation of Antarctic activities for environmental and other purposes, and avoidance of conflict

with the Soviet Union or others.

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs)

formally decided in 1981 to negotiate an agreement

governing exploitation of Antarctic minerals. Several reasons contributed to this decision:

First, the Antarctic Treaty itself is silent about

mineral resource activities since, in 1959, there was

no pressing need to address them and the negotiators

understood the practical difficulty of achieving a

more comprehensive agreement,

Second, by enabling scientists unhindered access

to ail parts of the continent, what was virtually terra

incognita in 1959 was better known by the early

1980s, Occurrences of many minerals have been

identified in Antarctica that, if found in large enough

and rich enough deposits in relatively ice-free areas,

would attract commercial interest.

Third, technology to exploit resources has improved significantly since the Antarctic Treaty was

negotiated. Oil companies are venturing into offshore areas in the Arctic and mining companies. are

operating in high latitude areas of Alaska, Canada,

Sweden, and the Soviet Union. While some new

technology will still have to be developed, technology is no longer a decisive limiting factor in

Antarctic development.

Fourth, as early as 1969 commercial enterprises

expressed some interest in prospecting in Antarctica.

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties realized

that permitting such activities without an agreed

regulatory system could upset the stability of the

Antarctic Treaty.

Fifth, ATCPs perceived that they would be much

more likely to reach an agreement before any major

discoveries were made. The maintenance of political

stability must therefore be viewed as a primary,

although not exclusive, reason for negotiation of the

Minerals Convention.

A factor which spurred ATCPs to complete

negotiations that were already underway was the

increasing interest of the United Nations in Antarctica. ATCPs have long held that by virtue of the

existence of claims and bases for claims and of a

long history of successful administration of Antarctica, they possess special rights and responsibilities

there. They have resisted any attempts to consider

Antarctic issues in the United Nations.

-37-
38 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

The cornerstone of the ATS, the Antarctic

Treaty, runs indefinitely. However, any of the

Consultative Parties may call for a conference to

review operation of the Treaty once 30 years after its

entry into force have elapsed, i.e., beginning in 1991.

This date is probably not as significant as some have

suggested, but perceptions are important. Having a

minerals regime in place before 1991 would be

strong evidence that the ATCPs are capable of

dealing with problems as they arise.

INTRODUCTION

Although negotiated as a separate treaty, the

Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral

Resource Activities does not stand alone. It is the

most recent of a series of agreements concerning

conduct of activities in Antarctica. To understand

why the Convention was negotiated and why it took

the form it did-and, therefore, the consequences of

accepting or rejecting the Minerals Convention—it

is necessary to know something about creation of the

Antarctic Treaty in 1959 and of the evolution of the

Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).

The United States has played a major role in

development of both the ATS and the Minerals

Convention. This chapter examines the history of

U.S. involvement in Antarctica and summarizes

U.S. Antarctic interests. It also reviews the Antarctic

Treaty and elements of the Treaty System, Finally,

it discusses why the Minerals Convention was

negotiated and the relationship between the Antarctic Treaty signatories and the United Nations.

Chapter 3 describes and evaluates provisions of the

Minerals Convention.

HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT

IN ANTARCTICA

There is evidence that an American sealer, Captain Nathaniel B. Palmer of Stonington, CT, may

have been the first to sight the continent of Antarctica in November 1820, although both Great Britain

and the Soviet Union claim similar honors. This is of

some significance not only for nationalistic pride,

but also since, historically, discovery has sometimes

been an element in establishing sovereign rights.

Initial mention of the continent goes back to the

ancient Greeks who postulated that a great southern

land mass existed to ‘‘balance” the continents in the

north. The Maoris of New Zealand also have vague

legends of a white kind somewhere to the south,

Maps produced in 16th century Europe depict an

Antarctic continent, Terra Australis Re, which bears

a strong resemblance to Antarctica on modem maps,

yet historical records indicate the continent was not

yet discovered.2

Documented Antarctic history begins with the

voyages of Captain James Cook of the British Navy.

Captain Cook sailed completely around the continent between 1772 and 1775. His two ships probed

south at several points, but each time were turned

back by heavy pack ice without sighting land. He did

observe birds that he believed came from land

further south. One significant accomplishment of

Captain Cook’s in the Antarctic region was his

discovery of South Georgia Island in the South

Atlantic. Here he reported seeing fur seals, an

observation which soon served as a magnet drawing

American and British seal hunters further south.

It seems likely that seal hunters were the first to

actually sight Antarctica. However, since they

frequently kept their discoveries secret to protect

their hunting areas, there are no existing records of

the discovery of Antarctica before 1820. On January

30th of that year, a British ship under Captain

Edward Bransfield reported sighting what may have

been the mainland or what may have been an island

off the coast of the Antarctic Peninsula. During the

same year two Russian ships under the command of

Admiral Thaddeus Bellingshausen sighted at several

places what might have been land or might have

been icebergs frozen in the pack ice, Bellingshausen

would make no claim until he was sure. Finally, on

January 28, 1821, he saw a mountainous coast that

he named Alexander I Land. Alexander I Land has

since been shown to be a large island separated from

the continent.

Meanwhile, on November 18, 1820, the American

Captain Nathaniel B. Palmer sighted the continent

near the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula. On February

7, 1821, another American, Captain John Davis, sent

IHeK~~~r refe~~ to as tie ‘‘~er~s convention,’ or, more simply, &$ the ‘‘Convention. ’

ZJ.G Weihaupt, “Historic Cartographic Evidence for Holocene Changes in the Antarctic Ice Cover, ” EOS, VOI. 65, No. 35, Aug. 28, 1984, pp.

493-501.
Chapter 2-U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convenationn . 39

a boatload of men to look for seals on the shore of

what is now called Hughes Bay on the continent

itself. Captain Davis wrote in his logbook, ‘‘I think

this Southern Land to be a Continent. ”3 He was

right, but it took nearly 20 years before enough

sightings had been made along the coast to be sure.

The proof largely came from an expedition in

1838-42 led by Lieutenant Charles Wilkes of the

U.S. Navy, who sighted land at numerous points

along the coast over a distance of 1,500 miles. This

was the first Antarctic expedition sponsored by the

U.S. Government. The existence of a continentsized land mass was firmly established by the early

1840’s as two other expeditions (British under

James Ross, and French under Dumont d’Urville)

added their sightings of land at several other points

around the coast of Antarctica.

Following the discovery period, there was little

activity in Antarctica for the next 50 years. Interest

renewed by the end of the century, spurred by new

methods of whaling, scientific curiosity, and the

spirit of adventure. The first expedition to winter

over in the Antarctic was a Belgian expedition who

spent the winter of 1898 aboard its ship which had

inadvertently become frozen in the ice pack. The

next year a British expedition spent the winter in a

hut on land near the western entrance to the Ross

Sea. These two expeditions began what has become

known as the heroic period of Antarctic exploration

during which the United States was relatively

inactive in Antarctica.

In rapid succession followed the British National

Antarctic Expedition under Captain Robert Scott

(1901 04), the German Antarctic Expedition (1901-

03), the Swedish Antarctic Expedition (1901-03),

the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition (1902-

04), the French Antarctic Expedition (1903-04), the

British Antarctic Expedition (1907-09), the Second

French Antarctic Expedition (1908- 10), the Amundsen expedition (1910-12), the second Scott expedition (1910-1 3), the Japanese expedition (191 1-1 2),

a second German expedition (1911-12), the Australian Antarctic Expedition (191 1-14), and the British

Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition (1914-16). Nearly

all of these had some assistance from their governments, although contributions from scientific societies and wealthy industrialists were also important.

Curiously, two of the earliest nations to explore

Antarctica, Russia and the United States, were

relatively inactive in Antarctica at this time. Tsarist

Russia was preoccupied with wars, revolution, and

an Arctic sea route to Siberia; the United States was

preoccupied with the insular possessions it had

acquired from Spain, Alaskan gold, and Arctic

exploration. Increasing numbers of whalers were

active in Antarctica during this time. Many of them

investigated places not previously seen and mapped

harbors and other features. In 1905-06, the Norwegians sent the frost factory ship to Antarctic

waters, freeing whalers from the need for land

stations. The remains of several whaling stations can

still be seen on South Georgia Island.

The heroic period reached its climax in 1911 and

1912 when the South Pole was reached. The first to

arrive was the Norwegian explorer, Roald Amundsen, and his party, followed a month later by Captain

Robert Scott and four other Englishmen. Scott and

his party perished on their return. When their

remains were recovered a year later, they were found

to have with them 30 pounds of rocks, gathered for

their scientific value. World War I brought an end to

the “heroic age” of Antarctic exploration.

The United States returned to Antarctica following World War I, and with that return came the

modem era. The war had given rise to aviation, and

aviation brought the United States to the forefront of

Antarctic exploration, a position it retains to the

present day. Airplanes were not the first machines in

Antarctica. The heroic age had been served by the

steamship, and tractors had been tried experimentally on the land. But the new generation of Antarctic

explorers were aviators in search of exploits, as

much as explorers eager to seize novel tools for

geographic discovery.4

Between the heroic age and the International

Geophysical Year (IGY) in 1957-58, the United

States dominated Antarctic exploration. The leading

figure of this effort was Admiral Richard E. Byrd.

The Byrd expedition of 1928-30 was the first of a

series of Antarctic expeditions in which Byrd and

others, on behalf of the United States, saw, mapped,

and claimed more land than expeditions of any other

3u.s. ~~[ic proj~~ Officer, /nrroduction (o Atiarcncu,Jmwy 1%1. p. 12.

4S.J. ~ne, The /cc, A journey t.o Anmrcmu (New York, NY: Batlantmc Books, 1986), p. 96.
40 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Photo credit. Steve Zimmer

Biscuits and marmalade, frozen for 75 years, inside Robert

Scott’s hut at Hut Point on Ross Island. The hut is

preserved as a site of historic significance.

nation. 5 During this expedition Byrd and three

companions became the first to fly over the South

Pole, This expedition also made significant overland

journeys and established that the continent was

bisected by a single mountain range, now called the

Transantarctic Mountains. Byrd led his second

Antarctic expedition in 1933-35; his third, with the

U.S. Antarctic Service, in 1939-41; his fourth, with

the Antarctic Developments Project of the U.S.

Navy, in 1946-48; and his last, as honorary chief of

Operation Deep Freeze (which supported the American contribution to the IGY), in 1954-58.

Through Byrd’s efforts an American presence was

firmly reestablished in Antarctica, and a generation

of explorers and scientists gained polar experience

who would staff future American expeditions. By

the time of the IGY, the United States had seen and

established a basis of claim (although a U.S. claim

has never officially been made) for 80 percent of

Antarctica.6 This area overlaps the claims of all of

the other claimants and is symbolically reflected in

the continuous U.S. occupation of a station at the

South Pole. In addition, through the use of aircraft

and the Pole station as an inland refueling site, the

United States has maintained the capability to reach

any point on the continent. The United States has

sponsored more scientific research in Antarctica

than has any other nation.

Another American Antarctic explorer to capture

the imagination of the public was Lincoln Ellsworth.

Ellsworth’s ambition was to fly across the continent

of Antarctica. In 1935, he succeeded in flying the

length of the Antarctic Peninsula but was forced to

land 16 miles short of his goal. Ellsworth and his

pilot walked the rest of the way to Little America,

Byrd’s earlier base on the Ross Sea.

World War II brought a temporary halt to

American activity in Antarctica. Following the war,

despite emerging as a global power, the United

States did not carry out its pre-war plan to establish

permanent stations in Antarctica. Instead, the next

American Antarctic activity was to mount a massive

expedition in 1946-47 given the code name Operation Highjump. This expedition, involving 13 ships,

4,700 servicemen, and 51 scientists and observers

was under the effective command of Rear Admiral

R.H. Cruzen, although Admiral Byrd was Officer in

Charge. Operation Highjump was the largest assault

ever mounted in Antarctica. Participants in the

expedition discovered more of Antarctica than all

previous expeditions combined. The following year

the U.S. Navy carried out a second expedition, called

Operation Windmill. One of its major purposes was

to relate aerial pictures taken the previous year to

precise ground points so the areas discovered by

Operation Highjump could be mapped accurately.

In 1950, a group of American and British scientists suggested a global International Geophysical

Year during 1957-58 to correspond to a predicted

period of unusual sunspot activity. The proposal was

presented to the International Council of Scientific
Chapter 2-U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention ● 41

Unions (ICSU), which endorsed it in 1951. The

18-month IGY, which began on July 1, 1957, was

the first world wide scientific effort to involve

Antarctica. Previous cooperative efforts, the First

and Second Polar Years (1882-83 and 1932-33) had

stressed the Arctic. Now, however, advances in

logistics and technology that had grown out of

World War 11 made feasible geophysical studies in

Antarctica. Consequently, Antarctica was a major

element in the IGY.

Despite conflicting territorial claims in Antarctica

and East-West tensions during the 1950s, the

international cooperation achieved in Antarctica

proved that scientific research could transcend

political differences. The International Geophysical

Year opend the “age of science” in Antarctica,

which legacy continues.7 A dozen nations participated in Antarctic studies, establishing 50 stations

there. Today, there are 22 nations with substantial

research programs in Antarctica. The International

Geophysical Year activities in Antarctica made

significant contributions to a number of fields,

including upper atmospheric physics, glaciology,

meteorology, and studies of the Earth’s magnetic

field. Seismic data were gathered and overland

traverses were made by the United States, Soviet

Union, Great Britain, and France. These countries

obtained a wealth of information on ice temperature,

density, and thickness; on surface elevations; and on

magnetic and gravity fields, The United States

established a station at the South Pole, which it has

occupied year-round ever since. By virtue of its

technology, long history of Antarctic exploration,

mapping, its extensive scientific research, and

basis for a huge potential claim, the United States

had become a dominant power in Antarctic

matters.

By the time the IGY was drawing to a close at the

end of 1958, scientists and diplomats believed that

the program in Antarctica was too valuable to

terminate and that the international cooperation

achieved during this period should be maintained.

This common desire by the diplomats and scientists,

particularly those of the United States, led to the

conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.

EVOLUTION OF THE ANTARCTIC

TREATY SYSTEM

Seven countries claimed sovereignty over territory in Antarctica in the first half of the 20th century

(figure 2-l). These countries are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the

United Kingdom. Several criteria, doctrines, or

principles have been put forward as a basis of

establishing territorial claims. One is discovery,

which is the basis for the British claim to the

Antarctic Peninsula and the France’s claim in East

Antarctica. The more common criterion is the sector

principle, which is based on the concept of continuity or proximity under which some northern coastal

nations claim offshore islands by extending boundaries from the ends of their main landmass toward the

North Pole. Arctic islands, however, are nearby and

geologically continuous with their respective landmasses of Asia and North America, whereas vast

distances separate southern countries from their

claims in Antarctica. Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and Chile have invoked sector claims based

on contiguity with Antarctica and sectoral extensions from their coasts. Another criterion is continuous occupation, also invoked by Argentina who has

operated a weather station on Laurie Island since

1904. Norway also bases its claim to two islands and

a coastal region on early occupation and use of the

areas by its whaling captains.

The United Kingdom was the frost country to

claim territory in Antarctica. It did so in 1908 by

claiming a sector reaching to the Pole south of the

Falkland Islands including the South Sandwich

Islands, South Georgia, South Shetland, and South

Orkney Islands, and the Antarctic Peninsula. This

claim was further refined in 1917 to avoid inadvertently claiming part of the Chilean and Argentine

mainland. New Zealand was the next claimant in

1923, soon followed by France in 1924 (France’s

original claim was to the coastal area but was

enlarged to include a sector to the Pole in 1938),

Australia in 1933, Norway in 1939, Chile in 1940,

and Argentina in 1943.

All announced claimants except Norway have

claimed wedge-shaped sectors terminating at the

South Pole. Norway has claimed the coastal area

TIbid., p, 16,
42 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Figure 2-l—Antarctic Territorial Claims

---- - 50------ _

I “ 1 ,

South Atlantic Ocean “’’’’.,, /’ \

/’ . .

7

Sco t ia / S e 8

Argentine’M@ 

-%

British claim -

Chiiean claim Beh q

/’

/’

.

- .

. .

.

/

\

\, k

\

\

!

,. ‘ \

\

‘\ .

- --

.

.

,

\

.

\

120’-’ , /

\

‘.

‘\

\

““ -

I

Indian 

 , “O c e a n

/’”

,. ‘\ /

,

”

‘\

I

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So u~th Pacific Ocean .. ~

... ’

Seven ciaims have been made to parts of Antarctica. The claims of Argentina, Chiie, and the United Kingdom overlap in the Artarctc

Peninsuia area. One section of Wst Antarctica has never been ciaimed.

SOURCE: U.S. Government, 1989.
Chapter 2.--U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention ● 43

between 20° W. and 45° E., but has left the northern

and southern boundaries of its claim vague, apparently to avoid undercutting its claim in the Arctic.

The claims of three of the countries, Argentina,

Chile, and the United Kingdom, overlap and conflict

in the area of the Antarctic Peninsula, which is south

of Cape Horn. Territorial claims in Antarctica have

not received general recognition by the international

community. Mutual recognition of claims has been

limited to Australia, France, New Zealand, Norway,

and the United Kingdom. Although Chile and

Argentina do not recognize each other’s claims, in

1941 they issued a joint declaration stating that the

only countries with sovereignty over the Antarctic

Peninsula are Chile and Argentina. The United

States and the Soviet Union have made no

territorial claims in Antarctica and do not recognize the claims of others. However, both have

‘‘reserved” their ‘‘rights” to assert claims in the

continent. By not recognizing other claims and by

placing one of its IGY stations in the middle of the

large unclaimed sector and another at the South Pole

where six claims converge, the United States became a strong moderating influence on the claims

issue during the IGY. The Soviet Union provided an

additional moderating influence by seeking a stake

in the region rather than a specific territorial claim

and by insisting on being part of any political

solution.

The International Geophysical Year successfully

submerged the issue of the territorial status of

Antarctica to avoid political controversies that might

be detrimental to scientific cooperation. Earlier, in

1948, the United States had proposed a solution to

territorial claims in Antarctica through governance

by a claimant condominium (which the United

States would join by announcing a claim), but the

proposal drew slight interest from only two of the

claimants. In 1956, India presented a trusteeship

proposal before the United Nations, but the proposal

was unsuccessful. By then, the United States had

abandoned the decision to announce a claim and was

seeking a cooperative agreement along the lines of

a plan by Julio Escudero Guzman of Chile (the

Escudero proposal), who proposed a moratorium on

the Antarctic sovereignty dispute while concentrating on scientific research.

It became clear to the 12 nations involved in

Antarctic research that there would be a significant

benefit if the work begun during IGY could be

continued. On May 2, 1958, the United States

proposed to the other participants, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand,

Norway, the Soviet Union, the Union of South

Africa, and the United Kingdom, that they should

join ‘‘in a treaty designed to preserve the continent

as an international laboratory for scientific research

and insure that it be used only for peaceful purposes. ’ Preliminary talks in Washington were

stalled by Chilean and Argentine reluctance to agree

to international control and by Soviet objections to

the existing Antarctic claims of other nations. A

treaty was negotiated and signed on December 1,

1959. The United Kingdom became the first nation

to ratify the Antarctic Treaty on May 31, 1960.

United States ratification followed on August 18,

1960, and the treaty entered into force on June 23,

1961. The entire text of the Treaty, which contains

only 14 articles, is presented in appendix C.

The Antarctic Treaty transformed a region

beset by international rivalry to one characterized by peace and cooperation. Short, simple in its

language, and deliberately lacking institutions, the

Treaty has significantly diffused actual and potential

disputes. The Treaty is administered through regular

consultative meetings of all ATCPs, hosted by each

participating nation in turn. The Treaty dealt with

the most difficult question, sovereignty and nonrecognition of claims, in a simple and pragmatic

manner. Article 4 provides that nothing in the Treaty

shall be interpreted as a renunciation or diminution

of a claim or basis for a claim and that no acts taking

place while the Treaty is in force shall constitute a

basis for supporting an existing claim or for establishing a new one. Any other attempt to resolve this

issue, by opting for one solution or another, would

likely have led to no solution at all and probably to

continued rivalry. 9 Yet it is on the basis of this

agreement that disputes about sovereignty have

Bus. conwe~~, HOW Comlflm on Foreign Relations, Subeommitttx on National Stxurity POllCy and SCienUfiC Evelopmenth T~ pofiric~

Legacy of the International Geophysmd Year, Committee Print by Harold Bullis, Congressional Research Semice, 1973, p. 57.

9F,0. Vicuna, “Antarctic Conflict and International Cooperation, ” Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment (Washington, DC: National Academy

hSS, 1986), p. 61.
44 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

-..

’- 

.

Photo credit : Ann Hawthorn

Geodesic dome at the U.S. South Pole Station. The U.S. base is located at the convergence of the Antarctic claims.

come to be controlled. This same pragmatic approach also made possible the successful conclusion

of the Antarctic Minerals Convention.

The original Parties to the Treaty were the 12

nations that were active in conducting research in the

Antarctic during the International Geophysical Year

of 1957-58 (table 2-l). They have the right to attend

meetings provided for in article IX of the Treaty

(consultative meetings) and are accordingly known

as Consultative Parties. In addition, the Antarctic

Treaty provides for other states who have acceded to

the Treaty and have demonstrated significant scientific activity in Antarctica to become Consultative

Parties. Ten additional countries have become Consultative Parties by this process. Only Consultative

Parties may participate in decisionmaking.

On the basis of Treaty provisions and through

consultative meetings a growing complex of

arrangements for regulating activities of states in

Antarctica has evolved. This complex of arrangements is known as the Antarctic Treaty System

(ATS). It includes recommendations adopted at

consultative meetings and separate conventions

adopted at special consultative meetings. States

party to the Treaty must give appropriate effect to the

conventions and measures adopted pursuant to them.

There have been nearly 150 agreed recommendations to governments since 1961. These cover a wide

spectrum of activities in Antarctica including the

following:

. cooperation in meteorology and in the exchange of meteorological data;
Chapter 2--U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention ● 45

Table 2-l—Antarctic Treaty Nations

(In chronological order by year of accession)~

Consultative nations Acceding nations

Original Treaty members Poland (1961)b

(1959):

Argentina

Australia

Belgium

Chile

France

Japan

New Zealand

Norway

South Africa

Soviet Union

United Kingdom

United States

Czechoslovakia (1962)

Denmark (1965)

The Netherlands (1967)

Romania (1971 )

German Democratic Republic

(1974)b

Brazil (1975)b

Bulgaria (1978)

Federal Republic of Germany

(1979)b

Uruguay (1980)b

Papua New Guinea (1981 )

Itaiy (1981 )b

Peru (1981 )

Spain (1982)b

People’s Republic of China

(1983)b

titer cosultative nations: India (1983)b

Poland (1977) Hungary (1984)

Federal Repubiic of Finiand (1984)

Germany (1981 ) Sweden (1984)b

Brazii (1 983) Cuba (1984)

India (1983) Republic of Korea (1 986)

Peopie’s Repubiic of Democratic People’s Republic

China (1985) of Korea (1987)

Uruguay (1985) Greece (1987)

German Democratic Austria (1987)

Republic (1987) Ecuador (1987)

Itaiy (1987) Canada (1988)

Spain (1988) Colombia (1 989)

Sweden (1988)

ah Of M I, 1888.

bNow m-mdtative parties.

SOURCE: Natlonai Sclenc@ Foundation, Antafcfk Journal of the Urvted

●

●

●

●

●

Sfates, vol. XXIII, No 4, D-mber 1988, p 8; March 1989,

p. 6.

cooperation in telecommunications, including

procedures for communicating among stations

in Antarctica;

cooperation in air transport and logistics;

control of tourism, including development of

guidance for visitors to Antarctica;

a recommended code of conduct for stations in

Antarctica and recommendations for developing procedures to assess impacts of operations;

and

the preservation of historical sites;

In addition, consultative meeting recommendations have led to the negotiation of separate agreements and conventions. In 1964 the parties to the

Antarctic Treaty adopted the Agreed Measures for

the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora.

The original measures were supplemented in 1972

and 1985. As the Agreement now stands, its

provisions:

●

●

●

●

●

Forbid the killing, wounding, capturing, or

molesting of native mammals or birds without

a special permit.

Oblige treaty members to minimize harmful

interference with Antarctic living conditions

and to alleviate pollution of nearshore waters.

Protect biological communities within Specially Protected Areas (SPAS) where research,

plant and animal collection, and vehicular

access are denied. There are now 17 SPAS.

Another 28 sites have been protected for

research purposes through their designation as

Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). It

is also likely that additional areas will be

specially designated in the future for tourism

and or multiple uses so that the impacts on these

areas can be better controlled.

Prevent the importation of nonindigenous species. Any such species must be issued a permit

and kept under controlled conditions, removed

from Antarctica, or destroyed.

Encourage the alleviation of water pollution.

The United States ratified these measures in 1978

through passage of the Antarctic Conservation Act

(Public Law 95-541). In accordance with this law,

the Director of the National Science Foundation

prescribes regulations, designates protected areas,

and issues permits for actions that would otherwise

be prohibited.

After some limited harvesting of seals in 1964, the

14 parties to the Antarctic Treaty drew up the

Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic

Seals, which was signed in 1972 and entered into

force in 1978. The Convention totally protects the

fur, elephant, and Ross seals from exploitation;

prohibits the taking of seals that are in the water,

except in limited numbers for scientific purposes;

and sets annual quotas, seasons, and capture zones

for crabeater, leopard, and Weddell seals. 10 Enforcement of the agreed-upon conservation measures

depends entirely on the self-policing policies of the

signatory nations.

10D.B. Smiff, ‘‘Living Resources: Seals, Oceanus, vol. 31, No, 2, Summer 1988, pp. 71-74
46 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

The Convention on the Conservation of

Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)

was developed in the 1970s in response to heavy

fishing and the consequent depletion of fish stocks.

It entered into force in 1982 for all water within.

about 1,000 miles of Antarctica.1112 The United

States ratified this convention in 1984 through

passage of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources

Convention Act (Public Law 98-623). This convention encourages the study, management, and conservation of living resources within Antarctica’s overall

marine ecosystem, rather than focusing on individual species of commercial importance. Here again,

each of the 23 nations signing the treaty is responsible for unilateral implementation of its provisions

and any agreed-upon conservation measures.

Since its very beginning, the Antarctic Treaty

System has been science oriented. The scientific

community was instrumental in bringing the negotiators together to conclude the Treaty itself. A

nongovernmental body, SCAR (Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research), that had been formed to

coordinate IGY scientific activities in Antarctica,

was made a permanent committee of the International Council of Scientific Unions even before the

Treaty entered into force. The Scientific Committee

on Antarctic Research continues to be an important

vehicle through which scientists formulate and

coordinate their research activities in Antarctica.

Equally important, SCAR serves as a scientific

advisory body to Consultative Parties. Recently, at

the initiative of the United States, the Managers of

National Antarctic Programs (MNAP) established

itself as a new and separate organization to work in

conjunction with SCAR. The Scientific Committee

on Antarctic Research continues to frame research

that is international in scope and MNAP considers

the means of coordinating the implementation of

meritorious projects. The Managers of National

Antarctic Programs also reviews air safety, waste

management, and other technological areas.

The system that has evolved under the Antarctic

Treaty is both simple and pragmatic, which is also

largely why it has been flexible and innovative in

responding to challenges. In contrast to most other

collective international undertakings, the Antarctic

Treaty System has created new institutions and

techniques only when necessary. This decentralized,

evolutionary approach has permitted the institutions

themselves to be tailored to the function they were

designed to perform.13 This functionally-oriented

system demonstrates how Consultative Parties deal

with new challenges, such as those generated by

resource issues. Indeed, the emergence of both

living and mineral resource issues has been a

major impetus to the evolution of the system and

may well be the key to its future.14

UNITED STATES ANTARCTIC

INTERESTS

The first comprehensive statement of U.S. interests in Antarctica was issued by the National

Security Council (NSC) in 1948, 11 years before

conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty.l5 The National

Security Council stated that:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes

only and shall not constitute a source of

international discord;

U.S. rights and interests throughout Antarctica

must be protected;

freedom of exploration and scientific research

should be guaranteed;

there should be free access to develop natural

resources;

activities in Antarctica should be guided by

established nonpreferential rules; and

sound orderly administration of the area should

be established.

U.S. interests in Antarctica have evolved since 1948,

but they have been characterized much more by

continuity than by change. When in 1965 Harlan

1 IK. s~~~ and A.F. Ryan, ‘‘Antarctic Marine Living Resources, ’ Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 59-63.

lzSIWmV ~auon~ ~ CCA~ include tie prlnclp~ fishing ~~~ties of the world, including Japan with 13 percent of the world’s catch, tie soviet

Union with 12 percent, China with 8 percent, and Chile and the Umted States with 6 percent each.

ISR.T. Scully, * ‘The Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System—The Institutional Perspective, Antarcric Treaty System AtJ Assessment ( Washington,

DC. National Academy Press, 1986), p. 405.

IdIbid., p. 406.

IsOffice of M~agernen[ ~d Budget, ‘ ‘The U.S. Antflctic ~O~tlm, ’ a report to the Commlttem on Appropnatlon of the U.S. Scna(c md }{(~u.se of

Rcptt~tiUiVC& Mily 1983, ilpp, A.
Chapter 2-U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention ● 47

Cleveland, then Assistant Secretary of State for

International Organization Affairs, articulated U.S.

objectives, they were much the same as in 1948.

Important new elements in 1965 were the U.S.

support for the Antarctic Treaty—the vehicle which

established an orderly administration for Antarcticaand the U.S. objective of making a special effort ‘to

preserve Antarctic animal and plant life. ’ 16

Five years later President Nixon noted that U.S.

interests consisted of maintaining the Antarctic

Treaty and ensuring that Antarctica will continue to

be used only for peaceful purposes and shall not

become an area or object of international discord.

U.S. interests would focus on fostering cooperative

scientific research for the solution of worldwide and

regional problems, including environmental monitoring and prediction and assessment of resources;

and protecting the Antarctic environment and developing appropriate measures to ensure the equitable

and wise use of living and nonliving resources.17

Although this reformulation gives greater emphasis

to U.S. environmental interests in Antarctica, the list

is similar to those of 1948 and 1965, and remains

essentially the same as of 1989.

U.S. interests in Antarctica can be grouped into

four different categories: geopolitical and strategic, environmental, scientific, and economic.

Geopolitical and Strategic Interests

Since conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959,

relations among states active in Antarctica have

been relatively stable. This stability has been maintained despite the existence of fundamental legal and

political differences regarding the status of Antarctica and the rights of states and private parties to

conduct activities in Antarctica. Three basic political facts about Antarctica are central:

1. seven states have made territorial claims over

parts of Antarctica, and some claims overlap;

2. the United States, the Soviet Union, and other

nonclaimants do not recognize those claims,

and assert a right (subject to their treaty

obligations) for themselves and their nationals

to conduct activities anywhere in Antarctica

without being subject to the consent or control

of a foreign government; and

3. the United States and the Soviet Union each

believe that they have a basis for making a

claim over Antarctica.

These facts give rise to two potential sources of

conflict:

1.

2.

conflict between existing or future territorial

claimants where claims overlap; and

conflict between territorial claimants and

states that do not recognize the territorial

claims.

The broader issue of potential conflict between rival

blocs for military superiority in Antarctica looms in

the background.

The Antarctic Treaty represents an attempt to

minimize existing sources of conflict, avoid new

sources of conflict, provide a framework for cooperation in the common interest, and address conflicts

that may arise. It achieves this by demilitarizing

Antarctica, opening all Antarctic areas and stations

to inspection, providing for freedom of scientific

research, preserving claimant and nonclaimant positions, and establishing a system for consultation and

regulation of activities by the states concerned for

scientific, environmental, and other purposes. It

does not resolve the underlying differences regarding territorial claims but, in essence, attempts to

sidestep them. Thus far, the Antarctic Treaty and

related agreements that now comprise the Antarctic

Treaty System have furthered U.S. interests in

avoiding or minimizing conflict in Antarctica, and it

is in the interest of the United States to continue to

support these agreements. 18

The greatest potential challenge to the system

derives from the territorial claims. It would be naive

to expect that the territorial claimants would long

accept the compromise embodied in the Antarctic

Treaty if they thought perfection of their territorial

16u.s. ~n=ss, !jju~omlt~ on ~rnt&~ m-j Insular Affairs, Committee on Lnterior and Insular Afftir$ Antarctic Report I %f. Hearings, H.

Rep. 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 30.

ITOffiW of ~c white How RWS Swmtary, October 13, 1970, ‘ ‘U.S. Antwctic policy, ” Hearing, Subcommittee on Oceans and International

Environment, Cornmitt& on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 1975, p. 30.

ISJ.D. Negroponte, ‘‘The Success of the Antarctic Treaty, ’ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Pubhc Affairs, Washington, DC, current policy No.

937, Apd 1987.
48 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

claims could be achieved at an acceptable price.

Argentina and Chile, in particular, are subject to

strong nationalistic pressures on the issue. A challenge for U.S. policy is to avoid encouraging

perceptions abroad that U.S. opposition to foreign

territorial claims is weakening.

Another potential threat to the stability of the

system is posed by increasing interest in Antarctic

minerals. This has revived the question of sovereignty and spurred interest in Antarctica by the

United Nations General Assembly. The Antarctic

Treaty System has succeeded in part because it

limits participation in decisions to states that conduct significant levels of activity there. All Antarctic

Treaty decisions are made by consensus, and key

Minerals Convention decisions would be made by

consensus. In general, the larger a decisionmaking

group becomes, the more difficult consensus is to

achieve. However, even as ATCPs worry about

dilution of influence as participation grows, they

have encouraged participation in the ATS as the only

legitimate regime for Antarctica.

In general, U.S. political and strategic interests, particularly with respect to any system

governing Antarctic mineral resources, would be

promoted by seeking to:

●

●

●

●

maximize U.S. influence with respect to

decisions regarding any aspect of Antarctica;

maximize the influence of states substantially affected by the decisions being taken;

avoid steps that could raise the expectations

of the territorial claimants regarding special

influence over their claimed areas; and

discourage demands for global participation

in decisionmaking.

Environmental Interests

The Antarctic environment is unique and largely

unspoiled: Antarctica supports unique wildlife; its

ice comprises most of the world’s fresh water;

marine mammals and birds migrate there from great

distances to feed on abundant krill and fish. However, much remains to be learned about Antarctic

ecosystems and about the relationship of the Antarctic environment to the global environment,

Interest in preserving wilderness suggests no

minerals activities at all should be allowed in the

areas to be preserved. Careful study of potential

environmental impacts and requirements is needed

to minimize the impacts of minerals-related activities.

Environmental values are potentially at risk by

any resource development allowed in Antarctica.

Preservation of a vast wilderness on an increasingly

settled and developed planet has esthetic, scientific,

and moral value itself. Minerals development brings

with it—as a trade-off against the benefits of the

processed materials-infrastructure that has some

unavoidable environmental impacts. Some mining

techniques could alter the landscape for long periods. A significant oil spill from a rig or tanker could

destroy many creatures and despoil significant areas

for a long period of time given the slow rate of

decomposition in frigid climates. Risks of accident

in such a harsh climate are higher than in more

amenable areas.

In general, these environmental interests suggest

●

●

●

that the United States should:

maximize the incentives to observe sound

environmental practices;

maximize research and the disclosure of

data about Antarctica; and

with respect to the system governing Antarctic mineral resources, avoid direct or indirect incentives (e.g., the absence of taxes or

royalties) that might make Antarctica more

attractive for development than other parts

of the world.

Scientific Interests

Given its location and characteristics, and because

it is largely uninhabited by man, Antarctica is a

unique laboratory for scientific research. The information gained directly by scientists, and indirectly

from others conducting activities in Antarctica, can

greatly enhance knowledge not only about Antarctica but about natural processes and phenomena in

general. Experience also demonstrates that new

knowledge, no matter how remote from practical use

it may seem at the time, can become the basis for

significant practical developments in the future.
Chapter 2--U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention ● 49

The availability of knowledge is maximized if

minimum restrictions are placed on the conduct of

scientific research, and if public release of data and

information by scientists and others, including those

engaged in resource activities, is encouraged. At the

same time, the unique value of Antarctica as a

pristine natural laboratory (e.g., for research on

global climate change) is maximized if human

activity that might significantly alter that environment is restricted.

In general, these interests parallel and reinforce environmental interests and have many

formal expressions within the ATS. They also

suggest the following objectives with respect to

the system governing Antarctic mineral resources:

. minimize interference with scientific research;

. maximize controls on minerals activity that

may diminish scientific values; and

. maximize the incentives for disclosing data

and information about Antarctica at all

stages of minerals development.

Economic Interests

It is not clear if or when extraction of Antarctic oil

and gas or other mineral resources, if discovered,

would prove attractive to investors. This depends in

large measure on prices for the commodity, alternative sources of supply, and the value of a given

resource deposit in comparison to the substantial

investments required and risks posed by an extremely harsh and remote physical environment.

The United States shares with other consumers

and importers of hydrocarbons and minerals an

interest in assuring that Antarctic resources are

available for extraction in response to market forces

in order to meet world demand at minimum prices.

The United States also has an economic, and to some

extent political and strategic, interest in the diversity

and security of its sources of supply of important

commodities so as to avoid concentrated dependence on foreign sources subject to political or

military disruption or manipulation. This interest

generally points in the same direction as the

consumer interest, although it may introduce a

preference for greater involvement by American or

allied companies.

In addition, the United States has an interest in

maximizing the opportunities for productive economic activity by its nationals. This interest generally is advanced if extraction and processing of

Antarctic mineral resources generates American

employment and revenues directly or indirectly

through utilization of American products and services.

The United States also has an interest in minimizing the costs of administering any system of

governance for Antarctic mineral development. To

the extent those costs are not passed onto miners, the

American taxpayer will bear a share of those costs.

To the extent the costs are passed on to miners,

investment may be discouraged.

In general, these economic interests suggest the

following objectives for the United States with

respect to the system governing Antarctic mineral

●

●

●

●

resources:

facilitate investment in response to market

forces by establishing necessary ground rules,

ensuring predictability and security of investment, and otherwise minimizing the

restraints on investors;

minimize the influence of governments or

organizations hostile to the economic interests of United States over the resource

regime;

maximize the opportunity for investment by

American companies; and

minimize the cost of the system of governance.

The present ATS serves U.S. interests in political

stability, access to all of Antarctica now and in the

future, participation in the regulation of Antarctic

activities for environmental and other purposes, and

avoidance of conflict with the Soviet Union or

others. Moreover, the United States has been a leader

throughout the development of the Antarctic Treaty

System. The Antarctic Treaty itself is in large

measure a U.S. proposal, and the United States has

long pursued its interests in part through a policy of

‘‘active and influential presence’ on the continent.

Continued U.S. participation in the ATS will help

ensure a continued leadership role for the United

States.
50 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

There is inevitably some tension among the

different political, economic, scientific, and environmental interests of the United States in Antarctica. The Antarctic Minerals Convention, discussed

in some detail in the next chapter, reflects judgments

about the balance among conflicting U.S. interests,

between the interests of the United States and other

states involved in the negotiation, and about the

relative priority to be accorded those interests,

WHY THE CONVENTION?

WHY NOW?

Though historically there was little perceived

need for rules concerning mineral resource exploitation in Antarctica, by the 1970s a combination of

scientific, technological, and political factors began

to change the Antarctic Treaty Parties’ perception of

the need for rules governing mineral resource

development.

The sticky issue of the territorial claims was

sidestepped in 1959 in order to reach a limited but

still important agreement. The compromise, enshrined in article IV of the Antarctic Treaty,

provided the glue which held the Treaty together and

enabled the Parties to continue unhindered scientific

research throughout Antarctica, prevent the continent’s militarization, prohibit the use of Antarctica

for disposal of nuclear waste, and, in general,

promote cooperative activities.

By enabling scientists unhindered access to all

parts of the continent, what was virtually terra

incognita in 1959 was better known by the early

1980s. To be sure, scientists still have only

“scratched the surface’ of the 2 percent of the

continent that is exposed, but they know that

Antarctica is geologically similar to other continents

under the ice. It contains occurrences of many

minerals that, if found in large enough and rich

enough deposits in relatively ice-free areas, would

attract commercial interest. Scientists have also

discovered that Antarctica was once a part of a

supercontinent that has long since broken apart, now

known as Gondwana or Gondwanaland.

Although there is evidence that Antarctica’s

continental shelves may contain oil and gas, no

commercial drilling has been done, and whether any

large hydrocarbon deposits exist is unknown. Commercial interest has also been dampened by the

extremely difficult operating conditions that would

be faced by producers in Antarctica. Nevertheless,

many experts believe that if large deposits are found

in Antarctica, they may one day be exploited.

Technology to exploit resources has improved

significantly since the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated. For instance, technology has evolved for

exploiting offshore oil—a resource that might be of

particular interest if found in sufficient quantities in

Antarctica (see app. A). Oil companies are venturing

into ever deeper water in search for new prospects

and into seasonally ice-covered areas of the Arctic

and sub-Arctic. 19 Moreover, mining companies are

already operating several mines in high latitude

arctic areas of Alaska, Canada, Sweden, and the

Soviet Union under conditions similar in some ways

to those that would be found in some parts of

Antarctica, notably the Antarctic Peninsula (see app.

B). In some cases, for instance, in the case of a

high-grade gold deposit in the Antarctic Peninsula,

technology may already be available to profitably

develop a high-grade resource. In most instances, at

least some if not a significant amount of technology

will still need to be developed before exploitation

may proceed (particularly in environmentally sound

terms and with regard to safety and economics).

Nevertheless, technology developments are no longer seen to be a limiting factor.

As early as 1969 at least three inquiries were

received by ATCP governments from companies

interested in geophysical prospecting in Antarctica.20 While prospecting does not normally require

a legal system for protecting investments in a

particular site, it does raise questions of the legal

right to prospect and of environmental regulation. In

theory, any territorial claimant might regard its

existing domestic mining laws as applicable to its

Antarctic territory. Yet, if it purported to regulate

prospecting based on its territorial claim, it could

provoke a dispute over the legal status of Antarctica.

I$JU.S. ~n=W, Office of lkchnology Assessment, Oil and Gas Technologies for the Arctic and Deepwater, OTA-O-270 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Ofiice, May 1985).

T,M. Aubunt, Amurctic Luw and Politics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 243.
—

Chapter 2--U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention . 51

Similarly, if a nonclaimant purported to regulate

prospecting in a claimed area, it could provoke a

dispute. Thus, not only were no common and agreed

procedures in effect at the time for issuing permits

for prospecting activities, but the countries approached by commercial firms understood that if

they issued permits unilaterally, they could upset the

stability of the Antarctic Treaty.

In 1973 the price of oil rose dramatically, an event

which further stimulated interest in Antarctica’s

resources by commercial firms and by ATCP

governments. 21 Sometime in early 1975, for example, Texas Geophysical Instruments applied to the

U.S. State Department for a permit to prospect in the

Ross and Weddell Seas .22 The permit was not issued.

Over the years the “claimants” and “nonclaimants’ alike had developed a strong stake in the

preservation of the Antarctic Treaty, which despite

its shortcomings, has enabled unhindered scientific

research and has kept Antarctica peaceful and

demilitarized, The Antarctic Treaty Consultative

Parties and other parties to the Antarctic Treaty were

aware of new developments in science and technology and thus of the increased probability that at least

a few potentially valuable deposits would possibly

be discovered in the ice-free areas of Antarctica.

Outside the ATCP group, some environmentalists

expressed the hope that no resource development

activities would ever be allowed in Antarctica.

These groups argued that the mere existence of a

minerals regime would unduly promote resource

development there. Thus, in establishing a regulatory system, no matter how stringent its elements,

legal uncertainty is removed, making it easier for

potential developers to risk undertaking minerals

activities. Few ATCPs were willing to consider

banning all resource activities in Antarctica. They

were convinced, however, that if no minerals agreement existed, disputes could arise over minerals.

They feared that a major discovery in the absence of

a regime would encourage a developer to proceed,

subject only to its national laws or those of a

territorial claimant.23 Further, they perceived that

they would be much more likely to reach an

agreement before any major discoveries were made.

The maintenance of political tranquility must therefore be viewed as a primary, although not exclusive,

reason for negotiation of the Minerals Convention.

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties began

to respond to the gradual increase in interest about

the resource potential of Antarctica by 1970. Initially, only informal discussions were held. The

minerals issue first appeared on an ATCP meeting

agenda at their seventh official meeting in 1972. At

this time ATCPs agreed to initiate a study of the

effects of mineral exploitation and to discuss this

subject in more detail at the next regular ATCP

meeting in 1975. During the interim, scientists

aboard the Glomur Challenger discovered traces of

natural gas near Antarctica, 24 OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) established

its oil embargo, and the Soviet Union established a

research base near the Dufek Mass if ‘to prospect for

minerals over a 5-year period. ’25 Also. a very rough

estimate by the U.S. Geological Survey of the ‘‘in

place” oil and gas resources of Antarctica appeared

in the press, for the first time making official figures

of Antarctica’s resource potential available.26 The

estimate, although based on virtually no data and

since discredited, took on a life of its own and fueled

speculation that Antarctica could be a significant

new source of much-needed oil.

At the 1975 Consultative Party meeting, the

ATCPs resolved to hold a special preparatory

meeting on the sensitive minerals issue and directed

the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research to

prepare a report on the environmental impact of

minerals development, 27 The Special meeting, held

21shq]ey, op. CIL, fOOmOte 5! p. IX’

22u,s. conge~s, su~ommlttw on &ems ~d Intematjond Envirortrnent, Committee on Foreign Relations, ‘ ‘U.S. Antarctic poll~Y, ’ He~ng, U.S.

Senate, 94th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 1975, p. 18.

~L A K~b~, T& An~rctlc M1mraL con}e~wn, s~i~ Repofi of tie Intemation~ kf.ituw for Environment and Development-–North America,

Jdy 198i, p. 27.

24~owevcr, ~ ~~~ out in Ch, 4, ~s l~ely h~ no significance wi~ reg~d to tie formation of PW_O]ellm.

uAubm, op. Cit., foo~ok 201 p “

MAubm, op. Clt,, fOOtIlOk 20* p ‘s’

27~e ~.n iS ~om ~ heE-Arep~, for Environment~ ~p~l Assessment of Mmer~ Resouce Exploration md Exploitation in httiI’CUCa,

It was edited and published in 1979 by SCAR as “Possible Envlronrnenud Effects of Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in Antarctica. ”
52 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

in Paris in 1976, made it clear that the ATCPs had

many differences about how to handle the minerals

issue. One important result, however, was an informal moratorium on exploration and exploitation

pending a timely solution to the problem. A formal

recommendation urging voluntary restraint while

progress is made toward an agreed minerals

regime was adopted by the ATCPs at the ninth

Consultative Party meeting in London in 1977.

Increasing attention was given to the minerals

issue at the ninth and tenth Consultative Party

meetings in 1977 and 1979, and recommendations

concerning minerals were adopted at both meetings.

Nevertheless, the development of a regime to

regulate nonliving resources took a back seat to the

question of living resources during this period. The

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties tackled living

resources first because some fishing and harvesting

of krill was already occurring in Antarctica and

increased unregulated exploitation-potentially enough to jeopardize some species-was expected.

Also, living resources were judged by many to be a

far easier issue with which to deal than nonliving

resources, and successful negotiation of a living

resources agreement might smooth the way for more

difficult minerals negotiations.

A formal decision to negotiate a minerals regime

for Antarctica was made at the eleventh ATCP

meeting in Buenos Aires in July, 1981. Specifically,

Recommendation XI- 1, which evolved from recommendations made at the previous two meetings,

recommended that ‘‘a regime on Antarctic mineral

resources should be concluded as a matter of

urgency. ” The Recommendation endorsed the convening of a special consultative meeting (subsequently termed the Fourth Special Antarctic Treaty

Consultative Meeting), and it established principles

by which the new regime would be governed. The

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties agreed that:

1. the Consultative Parties should continue to

play an active and responsible role in dealing

with the question of Antarctic mineral resources;

2. the Antarctic Treaty must be maintained in its

entirety;

3. protection of the unique Antarctic environment and of its dependent ecosystems should

be a basic consideration;

4. the Consultative Parties, in dealing with the

question of mineral resources in Antarctica,

should not prejudice the interests of all mankind in Antarctica; and

5. the provisions of article IV of the Antarctic

Treaty should not be affected by the regime.28

Principles 2 and 5, in particular, express the

ATCP’s desire that the new convention be an

integral part of the Antarctic Treaty System, that it

in effect strengthen the System by filling a significant gap in the collection of agreements governing

Antarctica, Principle 5 recognizes the sensitivity of

the claims issue, but also expresses the desire and

willingness of ATCPs to negotiate a minerals regime

that sidesteps the issue—just as was done in the

living resources agreement. Principle 4 denotes in

essence that the ATCPs consider that only those

states with significant interests in Antarctica-the

ATCPs themselves-should be involved in negotiating the new regime (but that they intend to ‘‘bear

in mind” the interests of other countries). And

principle 5 reveals one of the important reasons for

negotiating. These basic principles are restated in a

slightly different form in the preamble to the

Minerals Convention.

THE ATCPs AND THE

UNITED NATIONS

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties do not

view Antarctica as being similar to other uninhabited regions of the world-e. g., the seabeds beyond

the limits of national jurisdiction-that may be

susceptible to international management or control.

Because of the existence of claims and bases for

claims and of the long history of successful

administration of Antarctica, ATCPs have long

held that they possess special rights and responsibilities there. Some developing countries not party

to the Antarctic Treaty actively dispute the view that

a relatively small group of countries have earned the

right to decide what is in the interests of the entire

international community, what the ‘‘entry fee’ will

be for Consultative Party status, or generally how

Antarctica will be regulated. The Antarctic Treaty

Consultative Parties have therefore vigorously resisted U.N. attempts to increase its influence in

~R~~en~on XI-1, Antarctic Mineral Resources, paragraph 5.
Chapter 2--US. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention . 53

Antarctica. The ATCPs contend that the Antarctic

Treaty meets all criteria for a regional agreement

under chapter VIII, article 52 of the United Nations

charter and is thus consistent with the principles and

purposes of the United Nations. In the early 1970s

representatives of several developing countries tried

to include Antarctica in the Law of the Sea

discussions and to designate it, along with the deep

seabeds, as part of the “common heritage of

mankind, The ATCPs, including Chile and Argentina, the two original developing-country consultative parties, resisted these attempts.29

In the wake of the ATCPs decision to start

negotiating a minerals regime for the continent and

as the Law of the Sea negotiations were winding

down at the end of 1982, the interest of U.N.

members in Antarctica grew. The question of

Antarctica was first placed on the U.N. General

Assembly agenda in 1983, subsequent to a speech in

which the Malaysian Prime Minister argued that the

‘‘uninhabited lands’ of Antarctica did not belong to

the colonial powers claiming them and that it was

time to negotiate a new international agreement for

the continent.30

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties

have continued to resist any attempt to consider

Antarctic issues in a broader forum. Each year,

however, the question of Antarctica is considered in

the U.N. General Assembly. Most recently, the

General Assembly expressed “its conviction that

any minerals regime on Antarctica, in order to be of

benefit to all mankind, should be negotiated with the

full participation of all members of the international

community, ’ and further expressed ‘its deep regret

that the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties have

proceeded with negotiations and adopted [the Minerals Convention], ’31

A global negotiation would challenge the underlying premise of the Antarctic Treaty, namely that

decisionmaking should be limited to states with

substantial scientific activities in Antarctica. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties perceive that this

challenge could threaten the stability achieved by

the Antarctic Treaty System. In part, the decision to

complete an Antarctic Minerals Convention now,

within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty System, represents an attempt to preempt efforts to deal

with the question in the United Nations or some

other multilateral forum.

Although ATCPs have been steadfastly unwilling

to negotiate a new, more fully international agreement for Antarctica under the auspices of the United

Nations, they have taken some steps to respond to

U.N. concerns. They have, for instance, made

information about their deliberations more available, enlarged the role of observers, and expanded

relations with international organizations having

scientific and technical interests in Antarctica. Over

time, also, more countries have acceded to the

Antarctic Treaty. Although the number of countries

is still in the minority, 39 nations have now acceded,

22 of which are now also Consultative Parties. With

the addition of China and India, more than

three-fourths of the world’s population is represented. Moreover, virtually all countries with

direct and substantial interests in Antarctica

have acceded to the Antarctic Treaty and related

agreements. If the Minerals Convention is not

ratified, U.N. efforts to establish an alternative

regime could be given renewed impetus.

Concern about U.N. efforts to supplant the ATS

was an additional reason for ATCPs to complete

negotiations for a minerals convention. One final

reason relates to the provision of the Antarctic

Treaty that enables any of the Consultative Parties to

call for a conference of all Parties to review

operation of the Treaty beginning 30 years after its

entry into force, that is, any time after June 23,

1991.32 The 1991 date is probably not as significant

as some authors have suggested. Consultations

among ATCPs are already extensive, occurring now

at the biennial Consultative Meetings, at meetings of

the Living Resources Convention, at meetings of the

Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, etc., as

well as during negotiations of the Minerals Convention itself. Hence, ATCPs regularly review operation

of the Treaty. Moreover, the possibility for amending the Antarctic Treaty at the review conference, as

29shw]ey, op. cit., footnote 5 I P. 222

30 Shwlcy, op. cit., footnote 5) P 218“

31um~ N~om (jeneral As~mbly, 43d WSS., ‘‘Quesuon of Antarctica, ’ A/RES/4Y83, Agenda Item 70, Jan. 26, 1989.

32AnMmic Treaty, art. 12(2a).
54 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

suggested in article 12, can already be done at any

time, and the process by which the Treaty could be

amended in the review conference is the same as the

process by which the Treaty is generally amended.

It will be as procedurally difficult to modify the

Treaty in 1991, or thereafter, as it is now.33

Nevertheless, perceptions are important, and having

a minerals regime in place before 1991 would be

strong additional evidence that ATCPs are capable

of dealing with problems as they arise. And, having

just dealt with one of the most difficult issues

threatening the stability of the Treaty System,

ATCPs would be free to turn their attention to other

important upcoming Antarctic matters.

33sh@ey, op. cit., fOOUIOE 5* P. 231“
Chapter 3

The Convention on the Regulation

of Antarctic Mineral Resource

Activities

Photo credit: Ann Hawthorne

South Pole and Flags
CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GENERAL PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INSTITUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Regulatory Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Scientific, Technical, and Environmental

The Arbitral Tribunal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

Advisory

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Special Meeting of Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DECISIONMAKING AND COMPROMISE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A FRAMEWORK REGIME AND UNCERTAINTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prospecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Identification of an Area for Exploration and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SUSPENSION, MODIFICATION, CANCELLATION, AND PENALTIES . . . . . . . . . . .

BUDGET AND REVENUE CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OPERATORS AND SPONSOR STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIABILITY AND RESPONSE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE MINERALS CONVENTION . . . . . . . .

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

58

59

62

62

62

64

64

64

65

65

67

68

68

71

74

79

84

84

85

86

87

89

Figures

Figure Page

3-1. Prospecting: Articles 37 and 38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

3-2. Opening an Area: Articles 39-41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

3-3. Exploration: Articles 4 and 43-51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

3-4. Development: Articles 53 and 54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Table

3-1. What Must Occur

Antarctica . . . . . . .

Before Exploration

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

and

+.. .

Development Can Take Place in

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

3-2. The Institutions of the Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-3. Prospecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-4. Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-5. Blocking Power on a Regulatory Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-6. Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-7. Dispute Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

63

70

78

79

80

89
Chapter 3

The Convention on the Regulation of

Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities

SUMMARY

The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic

Mineral Resource Activities creates the means for

determining the acceptability of resource activities

and for regulating any activities determined to be

acceptable. It is a compromise agreement. Its final

form is due in large part to the fact that seven claims

have been made to parts of Antarctica, but that no

other states accept the validity of those claims. It is

also a result of the need to find a way to balance the

interest of many countries in protecting Antarctica’s

environment, yet still allow for the possibility of

minerals development in and around the continent.

The attempt to balance competing interests is key to

understanding the composition, voting procedures,

decision-making authority, and other checks and

balances established by the Minerals Convention. It

is also key to understanding provisions for regulating resource activities and protecting the environment. The Convention is not intended to promote

resource development: it seeks to be neutral, neither

promoting nor prohibiting development.

The Minerals Convention is intended to be an

integral part of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).

It compensates for the fact that the Antarctic Treaty

does not address mineral resource questions. If left

unaddressed, the Treaty Parties believe this omission could lead to instability and possibly a breakdown of the ATS. Such a breakdown is not in the

interest of the United States: on the contrary, the

United States has long held the ATS as a model of

effective international cooperation.

The Minerals Convention is a framework regime.

It does not contain a detailed mining code but relies

on general guidelines and some specific requirements and prohibitions, much as a general statute

delegating authority to an administrative agency

might do. The Parties avoided detail because of the

difficulty of anticipating all regulatory requirements. The institutions created in the Minerals

Convention, in particular the Commission and the

Regulatory Committee(s), will be responsible for

establishing details of the regime.

The Minerals Convention contains potentially

strong environmental protection provisions. For

instance, binding dispute settlement procedures will

apply to all measures related to environmental

protection. The principal uncertainties regarding

environmental protection are how well the compliance and enforcement provisions of the Convention

will work in practice and what terms such as

‘‘adequate and ‘‘significant” mean in relation to

environmental measures.

The hurdles a potential minerals developer would

have to clear before a proposed development could

proceed are demanding. Initiating exploration and

development under the terms of the Convention will

be difficult. However, commercial enterprises recognize that they are better off with a minerals

agreement than without one.

Minerals prospecting, exploration, and development must be sponsored by a Party to the Convention. Sponsoring states must evaluate Operators they

sponsor and oversee their activities. Sponsors must

also be prepared to support and defend the interests

of their Operators in institution meetings.

One of the most difficult issues the Antarctic

Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) faced was the

issue of liability for activities that result in damage

to the Antarctic environment. The Minerals Convention contains general liability provisions, but the

ATCPs must negotiate a separate Liability Protocol

before any exploration and development can be

considered in Antarctica. Prospecting may proceed,

subject to the general liability provisions of the

Convention.

Ratification of the Minerals Convention would

advance important U.S. environmental, scientific,

economic, and political and strategic interests in

Antarctica. For different reasons, developmentminded and environmental groups see the Convention’s lack of detail as a shortcoming. In the long run,

this concern may be less important than whether the

Convention helps to maintain peace and stability in

the region.

–3 l –
58 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

INTRODUCTION

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs)

recognized in the 1970s that an agreement about

potential minerals activities in Antarctica eventually

would be needed. They perceived that knowledge

about Antarctica’s geology was steadily increasing,

that the technical feasibility of developing any

mineral resources that might be found in Antarctica

was improving, and that a major resource discovery

in the absence of an agreed regime for managing

minerals activities could lead to a weakening of the

Antarctic Treaty System. A formal agreement to

establish an Antarctic minerals regime was made at

the ATCP’s 1981 Buenos Aires meeting. It was not

immediately apparent, however, that a mutually

acceptable agreement could be reached. While the

ATCPs were generally agreed that the ATS must be

preserved and that the Antarctic environment must

be protected, not all Treaty parties had the same view

about how to accomplish these and other ends. How

would the interests of claimant and nonclaimant

states be balanced without compromising the juridical positions of either? Could Antarctica’s environment be adequately protected (and if so, how)

without banning all minerals development there?

How were revenues derived from any permitted

minerals activities to be divided? Who would pay

(and how much) in the event of an accident such as

an oil spill? The Convention on the Regulation of

Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities addresses

these and other issues. This chapter describes and

evaluates this new treaty.

The Minerals Convention was adopted on June 2,

1988, after 6 years of negotiations. It applies to the

same area as the Antarctic Treaty, or all land, ice

shelves, islands, and continental shelves south of 60°

s.

1 The Convention creates the means for determining the acceptability of mineral resource activities

and for regulating any activities determined to be

acceptable. The 67 main articles and 12 annex

articles of the Minerals Convention establish the

general principles, specify the legal obligations of

the Parties, and create the institutions and procedures necessary for decisionmaking. In effect,

Parties to the Convention have said that in some

circumstances Antarctica% resources may be

developed, but only if significant environmental

impacts are unlikely to result from development

and only if established uses of Antarctica are not

jeopardized.

The Minerals Convention does not automatically

open Antarctica to resource development activities.

Although the Convention does not prohibit the

possibility of developing any mineral resources

discovered in Antarctica, neither is it intended to

promote development. Indeed, certain standards and

procedures established by the Convention impose

stringent requirements on resource development

considered acceptable. Second, the Minerals Convention does not automatically close all of Antarctica to

resource development, While development of those

parts of Antarctica designated as Specially Protected

Areas (SPAs) or Sites of Special Scientific Interest

(SSSIs) is automatically prohibited, all other areas

may be considered for development activities. Many

of the areas considered for resource development

will be eliminated, however, if it is determined that

development would have significant adverse effects

on the environment or on scientific or historic

values. Obviously, the Minerals Convention does

not completely satisfy those intent on preserving all

of Antarctica in a pristine state, nor does it completely satisfy potential developers, who would

benefit from a less restrictive regime regulating

access to the continent. Third, the Minerals Convention is not intended to be a detailed mining code,

specifying how all possible situations are to be

handled and eliminating all uncertainty. It is intended, rather, that more detailed rules and regulations will be developed when and if necessary by the

institutions established by the Convention. Thus, it

is a framework regime, to be considered as another

step forward—not the final step-in the evolution of

the Antarctic Treaty System.

The Minerals Convention is a carefully crafted

compromise. Negotiators had the difficult task of

dealing with the differing juridical positions of

claimants and nonclaimants and of balancing the

interests of developed and developing states, of

states with free market and centrally planned economies, and of states with varying attitudes about the

environment. The relative importance of competing

‘‘uses’ of Antarctica-minerals development, science, tourism, pristine wilderness, etc.—also had to

1~ exW@on is ~nti~n~ SheIVCS south of 60” S. which extend from islands north of 60” S.
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 59

be considered. As a result, the Minerals Convention

is a complicated agreement, despite its framework

nature. Like similar multilateral agreements, it was

negotiated as a package deal. That is, the United

States and other participants in the negotiations must

now either accept the Convention as it is or reject all

of it. Changes in the Convention will not be

considered. Table 3-1 indicates what must occur

before minerals development can commence in

Antarctica.

An explicit hierarchy of actors with a stake in

Antarctic minerals issues exists. At the top of this

hierarchy are the Antarctic Treaty Consultative

Parties or ATCPs. The ATCPs are the most influential set of Antarctic actors and the only group with

rights to participate in decisionmaking under the

terms of the Antarctic Treaty. ATCPs, as of November 25, 1988, are automatically accorded decisionmaking status under the Minerals Convention.2 At

present, there are 22 ATCPS.

3 They are the original

12 signatories of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the

10 additional states that have subsequently demonstrated a special interest in Antarctica through the

conduct of substantial scientific research there.

Seventeen other Parties to the Antarctic Treaty do

not have Consultative Party status. However, any

Party to the Antarctic Treaty, in addition to ATCPs,

may become a Party to the Minerals Convention

(and any member of the United Nations may become

a Party to the Antarctic Treaty). On June 2, 1988, 13

of the then 16 non-ATCP Parties to the Antarctic

Treaty adopted the Minerals Convention along with

the ATCPs. All Parties to the Minerals Convention

may participate in the Scientific, Technical, and

Environmental Advisory Committee and in the

Special Meeting of Parties, but these institutions do

not have any decisionmaking authority. Any Party to

the Minerals Convention, which undertakes substantial minerals-related research or which sponsors

exploration or development, may participate in the

decisionmaking organs of the Convention while it is

carrying out these activities. Observer status to the

Commission and Advisory Committee established

by the Minerals Convention is open to any Party to

the Antarctic Treaty not participating in the Minerals

Convention and may be accorded, as appropriate, in

the Commission, the Advisory Committee, and the

Special Meeting of Parties to international organizations, including non-governmental organizations,

with special interests in Antarctica. Only other

Parties to the Minerals Convention may send observers to Regulatory Committee meetings,

Two other types of actors play significant roles in

the Convention. A Sponsoring State—one sponsoring resource activities-may be any Party to the

Minerals Convention, regardless of ATCP status.

Operators—those undertaking resource activities—

must be sponsored and may be a Party, an agency of

a Party, a juridical person established under the law

of a Party (e.g., a corporation), or a joint venture

consisting of any combination of these entities.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Several important general principles are established in chapter 1 of the Convention. Among the

most important is that the Convention is an integral

part of the Antarctic Treaty System, in effect filling

a gap in it. As part of the ATS, Parties strove to make

the Convention consistent with other agreements of

the system, including the Antarctic Treaty and the

Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (art. 10). Parties considered

it especially important that their positions on

territorial claims continue to be protected, and

thus article 9 of the new treaty essentially repeats

article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty, the modus vivendi

employed to sidestep the claims issue. The Minerals

Convention, thus, does not resolve conflicts over

claims, but provides the means by which resources

may be developed (or at least considered for

development) despite differences. If the Convention

is successfully implemented, it would be unnecessary to resolve the claims issue, which may be

unsolvable in any case, and the unique jurisdictional

arrangement in Antarctica would continue as before.

One important way in which the Minerals Convention is directly tied to the Antarctic Treaty is that

those Parties to the Minerals Convention that were

also Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty on

the date the Convention was opened for signature

(20 of the current 22) are automatically entitled to

2New AT~~ *1]] & ~rd~ ~lslom~lng status In tic co~lsslon ~less one-third of commission mcmbcrs obj~(. Ar_t, ] 8(4).

s~gentina, Aus~~ia, Bel~um, Br~il, Chl]e, China, Federal Rcpubilc of Germany, France, German Democrauc RCPUIIC, ~dw 1t~Y~ Japm, New

Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Swden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.
60 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Table 3-l-What Must Occur Before Exploration and Development Can Take Place In Antarctica

1. The Minerals Convention must be formally signed.

Signature may take place during a l-year period beginning Nov.

25, 1988,n The 20 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs)

and 13 Non-Consultative Parties (NCPs) that participated in the

last session, where the Convention was adopted by consensus,

are eligible to sign. The United States signed the Convention on

NOV. 30, 1988.

2. The Minerals Convention must be ratified by 16 of the 20

ATCPs that adopted it. Among the 16 must be 11 developed and

5 developing ATCPs. Also among this group must be all 7 of the

ATCP claimant countries; the United States and the Soviet Union

(the 2 non-claimants that reserve the right to make a claim); and

at least an additional 7 non-claimant ATCPs, 3 of which must be

developing nations. This configuration assures participation by

all of the states necessary to meet the membership requirements

of ail of the Convention’s institutions. The ratification process

could take several years.b

3. A Protocol to the Minerals Convention elaborating additional

rules and procedures regarding liability must be negotiated and

ratified in the same manner as the Minerals Convention. Negotiations to complete the Protocol could begin in 1989 or 1990. They

may take several years.c

4. The Commission must consider adopting additional measures related to, inter alia; a) protection of the Antarctic environment; b) safe and effective expiration and development techniques; c) prospecting; d) the availability and confidentiality of

data; e) maximum block sizes; f) the circumstances under which

Management Schemes may be suspended, modified, or canceled; g) financial regulations; h) fees payable for applications;

and 1) levies payable by Operators engaged in exploration and

development. d

5. Prospecting would likely take place. Some prospecting may

occur before the Liability Protocol is completed. It can be done

without prior authorization by the institutions established by the

Convention and is subject to the same standards of acceptability

as expiration and development.”

6. On behalf of an Operator, a Party to the Convention must

propose a specific geographic area of Antarctica to be opened

for expiration and development. This would be expected to

occur once some prospecting had been done by one or more

Operators and areas of interest had been identified.f

7. Once an area is proposed, a consensus decision to open

the area must be made by the Commission. Supporting information, including a detailed environmental impact assessment,

must accompany a request to open an area. Information adequate to enable informed judgments must be available. The

Commission must elaborate opportunities for joint ventures or

other forms of participating.g

8. The environmental assessment must conclude that the

activity will not result in any significant adverse environmental

impacts; that technology and procedures are available for safe

operations and for compliance with environmental regulations;

that the capacity exists to monitor key environmental parameters

and ecosystem components; and that the capacity exists to

respond effectively to accidents.h

9. Following the Commission decision to open an area, and

before any specific applications to conduct exploration/

development may be considered, the Regulatory Committee for

the particular geographic area must be established. The Committee must draft general requirements governing applications and

terms and conditions, giving effect to the standards in Article 4.I

10. Inspection procedures must be provided for each area

identified for possible expiration and possible development.]

%rt. 60.

b~t 62 ~d thg Fln~ ~

cArt. 8(7).

ht. 21.

e~t. 37

‘Art, 39,

gkt. 39 and 41.

W. 4 .

‘Art. 43(3).

JArt, 12(8).

SOURCE: OffI- of Technology Assessment, 1989.

membership on the Commission established by the

Convention. Membership is also granted non-ATCP

Parties currently sponsoring exploration or development or currently engaged in research related to the

Convention (art. 18(2)). Only these ATCPs have

automatic voting privileges and the right to participate in many key decisions.

To further promote consistency with other elements of the Antarctic Treaty System the Parties

specified that all decisions should take into

account the need to respect other established uses

of Antarctica, including scientific research, long

the most important activity there; the conservationincluding rational use-of marine living resources; and tourism, an important and rapidly

growing activity. The Convention makes clear that

the Parties must consider possibly conflicting established uses in determining whether to open an area

to exploration and development (art. 41(lb)). The

Convention grants inspectors designated according

to rules established in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty

rights to inspect all stations, installations, equipment, etc. related to minerals activity in the Antarctic Treaty area. It also provides for the designation

of inspectors by each member of the Commission

and by the Commission as a group. Thus, consistency with the inspection provisions of the Antarctic

Treaty is also promoted.
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 61

Photo credlt US. Geological Survey

Looking north along the western side of the Sentinel Range. Located near the base of the Antarctic Peninsula, the highest mountains

in Antarctica are found here.

Another important general principle is that no opposite of the exploitation principle established for

exploration or development may take place un- the marine living resources of Antarctica under the

less specifically authorized. The standards and Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Maprocess for authorizing exploration and development rine Living Resources (CCAMLR), wherein fishing

take up much of the Convention. This principle is the activities are deemed acceptable unless specifically
62 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

prohibited. The prohibition of resource activities

unless authorized would not affect activities by

countries that are not party to the Minerals Convention. While in theory this could be a problem, in

practice virtually all countries that have the capability to exploit resources in Antarctica were involved in negotiating the Convention. Moreover, as

long as the Convention retains its legitimacy, any

attempt to exploit resources outside the Minerals

Convention would be looked on with disfavor by the

Parties and would probably not succeed. Prospecting, unlike exploration and development, does

not require specific authorization.

As a general rule, authorization for a specific

project depends on a finding that the project will

not cause significant adverse effects on atmospheric, terrestrial, or marine environments, including significant effects on:

● air and water quality;

. species of flora or fauna;

● endangered or threatened species; and

● biological, scientific, historic, aesthetic, or

wilderness areas of special significance (art. 4).

Cumulative effects are also to be taken into account,

as are activities that could cause significant adverse

effects on global or regional climate or weather

patterns. Interpretation of the term “significant

impacts’ is left up to the Commission or Regulatory

Committee members, as the case may be, with

advice from the Advisory Committee. Authorization for an activity also depends on the existence of adequate technology, the ability to

monitor key environmental parameters, and the

ability to respond effectively to accidents.

INSTITUTIONS

The Minerals Convention provides for the establishment of five institutions (i.e., a Commission,

Regulatory Committee(s), an Advisory Committee,

an Arbitral Tribunal, and a Secretariat) and a Special

Meeting of Parties. Table 3-2 identifies membership,

decisionmaking authority, voting procedures (if

applicable), and key functions for each of these

institutions.

The Commission

The Commission is one of the two decisionmaking institutions established by the Minerals Convention and the only one to which all of the Parties

eligible to participate in making decisions belong.

Unlike the Regulatory Committees, which wield

authority only within designated areas of Antarctica,

the authority of the Commission extends to all of the

area covered by the Minerals Convention. The

Commission has broad authority for establishing

general rules and procedures applicable to all

prospecting, exploration, and development, and to

dispute settlement. Many of the details for these

processes have not yet been elaborated, so the

Commission will have much important work to do

if the Minerals Convention is ratified. The Commission is also charged with determining the composition of Regulatory Committees and with reviewing

some of their actions. One of the Commission’s most

important responsibilities is to determine, by a

consensus vote, whether or not to identify an area for

possible exploration and development for a particular resource. An affirmative decision would trigger

the process that could ultimately result in developing

a deposit.

Regulatory Committees

If the Commission decides to “identify” (open)

apart of Antarctica for exploration and development,

a Regulatory Committee will be appointed by the

Commission for that area. Regulatory Committee

members are chosen from the Commission and thus

form a subset of Commission members. This subset

is selected to include Parties with knowledge of the

particular area and to achieve a political balance,

particularly between claimants and nonclaimants

and between developed and developing countries.

Each Regulatory Committee is responsible for

formulating detailed requirements for exploration

and development within its area consistent with the

general guidelines established by the Commission.

The Regulatory Committees, therefore, and not the

Commission, will be the primary managers of any

exploration and development that may occur within

the identified area.

As the primary managing bodies, Regulatory

Committees will have the power, among other

things, to set general requirements for the conduct of

exploration and development within the designated

area, to issue or deny exploration and development

permits, to devise Management Schemes (contracts), and to suspend, modify, or cancel Manage-
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 63

Table 3-2—The Institutions of the Convention

The Commission

Membership: 1 ) All Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties—there

are 22-as of Nov. 25, 1988; 2) Any other Party that undertakes

substantial research relevant to decisions about mineral activities;

3) Any Party that sponsors exploration or development during the

period that the relevant Management Scheme for the exploration

or development is in force. Art. 18.

Decsionmaking authority Yes.

Voting Procedures Consensus voting on the decision to identify

an area for exploration and development, on budgetary matters,

and on elaboration of the principle of non-discrimination; threequarters majority of the members present and voting on matters

of substance; a simple majority of members present and voting on

procedural matters. Art. 22.

Key functions:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

To designate areas in which resource activities shall be

prohibited or restricted. Arts. 13(2) and 21 (lb).

To adopt measures for the protection of the Antarctic environment. Art. 21(c).

To determine whether or not to identify (open) an area for

possible exploration and development. Arts. 21 (Id), 41, and

To adopt general measures relating to prospecting. Arts. 21 (1 e)

and 37(13).

To establish and determine the composition of Regulatory

Committees. Arts. 21(1 k) and 29.

To review the actions of Regulatory Committees, in particular,

decisions to approve Management Schemes or to issue

development permits. Arts. 21(1 1) and 49.

To adopt measures related to international participation and

joint ventures, especially with developing country Parties. Arts.

6, 21(1 m), and 41 (id).

To adopt general measures relating to the circumstances under

which Management Schemes may be suspended, modified, or

canceled. Arts. 21(1 n) and 51(6).

To make decisions on budgetary matters and to adopt financial

regulations. Arts. 21(1 o) and 35.

To adopt measures regarding fees and levies payable by

Operators. Arts. 21 (1p) and 21 (1q).

To draw attention to activities by Parties that affect compliance

with Convention obligations. Arts. 7(7) and 21(1 s).

To determine the disposition of revenues. Art. 21 (r).

To establish additional procedures for third-party dispute

settlement. Arts. 21(v) and 59.

To adopt measures on availability and confidentiality of data

and information. Arts. 16 and 21(1 h).

Regulatory Committees

Membership: 1 ) Each Committee to consist of 10 members

selected from the group of Commision members, 4 of which must

be claimants and 6 of which must be non-claimants. Included on

all Committees formed must be: a) the member(s) that have made

claims in the area being considered; and b) the United States and

the Soviet Union, neither of which have made claims but both of

which assert a basis of claim in Antarctica. Three of the ten

members must be developing countries. In addition to the basic

10: 2) the Commission member that proposed opening the area

If that member is not otherwise a member of the Committee, until

such time as an application for an exploration permit is lodged; 3)

Parties that lodge exploration permits during the period the

application is being considered; and 4) Parties whose applications

result in approved Management Schemes for as long as the

Management Scheme is in force, Art. 29.

Decisionmaking authority Yes

Voting procedures: A two-thirds majority of those present and

voting for key votes (i.e., approval of Management Schemes or of

modifications to Management Schemes), the two-thirds majority

to include both a simple majority of the claimants and a simple

majority of non-claimants on the Committee; a similar “chambered” two-thirds majority, with “at least half” from each chamber

for decisions concerning adoption or revisions of general guidelines for exploration and development; a simple two-thirds

majority on other matters of substance; a simple majority of those

present and voting on procedural matters. Art. 32.

Key functions:

● Subject to general measures adopted by the Commission, to

prepare for managing the area for which it was formed, i.e., to

divide the area into blocks, to establish fees and procedures for

handling applications, and to determine a method of resolving

competing applications. Arts. 31(a) and 43(2).

● To adopt general guidelines for exploration and development,

Arts. 21 (la), 43(3), and 43(5).

● To consider applications for exploration and development. Art.

31 (lb).

. To issue exploration permits and approve Management

Schemes, the specific terms and conditions for exploration and

development. Arts. 31(1c) and 44-48.

● To issue development permits. Art. 54(5).

● To monitor exploration and development activities. Art. 31(d).

. To suspend, modify, or cancel Management Schemes if it is

determined that unanticipated and/or unacceptable impacts

have resulted or are about to result. Arts. 31(1 e), 51, and 54.

The Scientific, Technical, and Environmental Advisory

Committee

Membership: All Parties to the Convention. Art. 23.

Decisionmaking authority No.

Key functions:

●

●

●

To provide advice on scientific, technical, and environmental

issues to the Commission and Regulatory Committees. Arts.

26(2), 26(3), 27, 40(1 ), 43(6), 45(3), 51(2), 52, and 54(6),

To evaluate environmental and technical assessments to assist

decisions by the Commission and Regulatory Committees. Art.

26(4).

To provide advice to interested developing country Parties and

other Parties on issues within its competence, including training

programs related to scientific, technical, and environmental

matters bearing on Antarctic mineral resource activities and

opportunities for cooperation among Parties in these programs.

Art. 26(6).

The Arbitral Tribunal

Membership: One arbitrator from the Party commencing the

dispute proceedings; one arbitrator from the other Party to the

dispute; a third arbitrator chosen jointly by the parties to the

dispute (from a list of arbitrators composed of representatives

from each Party to the Convention, as are the other two) and

unconnected to either of the Parties. Where there are more than

two parties to the dispute, the Parties having the same interest

appoint one arbitrator. Annex Art. 3.

Decisionmaking authority: Yes--for those disputes referred to it.

Voting procedure: All decisions in areas within its competence by

majority vote; all arbitrators must vote. Annex Art. 12.

Key functions: To resolve disputes between two or more parties.

Annex Art. 10.

Continued on next page
64 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Table 3-2-The Institutions of the Convention-Continued

The Secretariat Comment The Special Meeting of Parties gives an opportunity to

Key function: To serve the Institutions of the Convention. all Parties-not just those who have qualified to participate in the

Special Meeting of parties decision-making institutions-to express their opinions about

Membership: All Parties to the Convention, Art. 28(2). whether exploration and development in areas being considered

Decisionmaking authority No. for “identification” would be consistent with the principles of the

Key function: Convention.

. To consider whether identification of an area for exploration and

possible development by the Commission is consistent with the

Convention, Arts. 28 and 40(3).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989

ment Schemes. Some of the decisions of the

Regulatory Committees are subject to review by the

Commission, but the Commission is limited in its

ability to require Regulatory Committees to alter

decisions. Other Regulatory Committee decisions

are subject to binding dispute settlement.

The Scientific Technical, and Environmental

Advisory Committee

This committee, to be composed of representatives with relevant specialized expertise, was established to give expert advice to the Commission and

Regulatory Committees on all scientific, technical,

and environmental aspects of minerals resource

activities. The Committee also provides a forum for

consultation and cooperation for the collection,

exchange, and evaluation of information. One of the

most important functions of the Advisory Committee is to evaluate comprehensive environmental and

technical assessments of proposals to open areas to

exploration and development and of exploration and

development plans (art, 26(4)). Membership is open

to all Parties-that is, to Convention signatories

without voting rights as well as to Commission

members-to the Minerals Convention, but the

Advisory Committee has no independent decisionmaking power. The reports of the Advisory

Committee must reflect the conclusions reached at

its meetings and all views expressed by members of

the Committee. While lacking decisionmaking authority, the advice of the Advisory Committee is

nevertheless likely to be taken seriously by the

Commission and Regulatory Committees, for substantive and political reasons.

There has been some concern that Parties’ designated representatives on the Advisory Committee

may be subject to pressures to ignore their “technical” role and provide opinions that reflect political

decisions taken within their countries. There appears

to be no way to prevent this; it can only be guarded

against by the ‘‘sunshine’ provisions in the regime

(open meetings and reports) and by the international

and public pressure likely to result from abuse of

their technical function.4

The Arbitral Tribunal

Parties to disputes arising out of the interpretation

or application of the Minerals Convention are

encouraged to try to resolve them on their own.

When this cannot be accomplished within 12

months, a three-person Arbitral Tribunal may be

established or the dispute may be submitted to the

International Court of Justice (art. 56(1)), Disputes

related to the discretionary powers of the Commission or Regulatory Committees are not subject to the

authority of the Arbitral Tribunal, and other limitations to the types of disputes that maybe decided by

the Tribunal apply. However, for those disputes

submitted to the Tribunal, decisions are intended to

be final and binding. Tribunals will consist of one

arbitrator from each of the two disputing parties (or

group of parties with a similar interest) and a third

arbitrator acceptable to both disputants,

The Secretariat

The Commission may establish a Secretariat staff,

as necessary, to support the work of the other

institutions of the Minerals Convention. Parties to

the Convention on the Conservation on Antarctic

Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) found it

4LA Kimb~], “’l%e Antarctic Minerals Convention, ” Special Report, International Imtitute for Environment and Development-North

America, July 1988, p. 29.
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 65

necessary to establish a Secretariat to support living

resources activities; however, a secretariat has yet to

be established to support Antarctic Treaty activities.

At issue is whether the establishment of a permanent, central staff will prejudice the juridical positions of countries. Some claimant states, in particular, have been opposed to creating a permanent

secretariat for the Antarctic Treaty meetings, preferring instead to continue the current practice of

rotating secretariat functions.

Special Meeting of Parties

Like the Advisory Committee, the Special Meeting of Parties is composed of representatives of all

Parties to the Convention but has no independent

decisionmaking authority. The sole function of this

body is to advise the Commission on whether

identification of an area for exploration and development is consistent with provisions of the Convention. The Special Meeting of Parties is designed to

afford some opportunity for all Parties to participate

in the institutions of the Minerals Convention.

Although the Special Meeting of Parties lacks any

formal power, it maybe difficult for the Commission

to ignore an opinion that development in a specific

area would be inconsistent with the Convention.

DECISIONMAKING AND

COMPROMISE

The decisionmaking systems of the Convention,

like most voting systems in international organizations, proceed on the assumption that each state

casts one vote.5 They attempt to accommodate states

with more substantial interests by using two basic

techniques, often in combination. The first is to

confine some or all decisions to organs with small

membership, thereby maximizing the affirmative

and negative voting power of the small group of

members, some of whom may be guaranteed permanent membership. This is true of the Commission

and especially of Regulatory Committees. The

second is to maximize protection for negative

interests by requiring more than a simple majority

for some or all decisions, running the gamut from a

two-thirds majority to consensus, and possibly

including concurrent votes of certain states or

groups of states. Under the Convention, the Commission requires three-quarters majority votes or

consensus for decisions, while the Regulatory Committees utilize simple two-thirds majorities for less

important matters of substance and concurrent

two-thirds majorities of its constituent groups (claimants and nonclaimants) for the most important

matters.

This system has an unavoidable trade-off. The

more a state seeks to enhance its own blocking

power, the more it is compelled to grant similar

power to at least some other states, thereby making

an affirmative decision more difficult. b It is possible

to convert negative power into affirmative power by

insisting on approval of one’s affirmative agenda as

a condition for allowing approval of someone else’s

affirmative agenda. The difficulty is that every state

or group of states with negative power can do the

same thing.

The question of U.S. influence concerns not only

the direct voting power of the United States, but the

voting power of states likely to share U.S. interests

or otherwise inclined to accommodate those interests. Where underlying interests are complex, support can be difficult to predict. Some governments

with which the United States has very good bilateral

relations attach considerable importance to their

relations with Third World leaders or other voting

blocs in international organizations. Some major

industrial states and U.S. political and military allies

are territorial claimants in Antarctica. U.S. interests

and theirs might diverge on matters affecting the

claims. At least juridically, the Soviet Union’s

approach to Antarctica is similar to that of the United

States, yet its behavior in decisionmaking for a could

be influenced by the general state of U.S.-Soviet

relations and divergent political, economic, or strategic interests.

The Parties had to balance the interests of

claimants, nonclaimants, and other cross-cutting

5We1@t~ “Otlng, in ~hlch each s~te is accord~ a different number of voux in accordance with a fOITnu]a designed tO reflWt relative inkrest Or

contribution, is uwd in some commodity arrangements and funding institutions.

%e virtues and problems of negative voting power are amply dcmonsLrated by the voting system in the UN. Security Council. According a veto

to each of the five permanent members tends 10 assure adequate suppon from the major powers for deasions with Important international security

implications, and seines to protect each of them and their allies from adverse dwislons. At the same tune, the veto power cam substantially limit the

responsiveness of the Council to situations in which affu-matlve deciswns are deemed useful by the United States or others.
66 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

interest groups in order to achieve an agreement. The

checks and balances embodied in the responsibilities, decisionmaking authority, voting procedures,

and composition of each institution try to achieve

this political compromise. A certain amount of

‘‘horse-trading’ by the claimant and nonclaimant

groups and by market and centrally planned counties

was necessary in order to obtain a mutually acceptable result.

Some will see the compromises made in the

Minerals Convention as going too far and prejudicing the legal positions of either claimant or

nonclaimant groups or of surrendering too much to

either environmental protection or of development.

The Minerals Convention is the first Antarctic

agreement in which any special rights are

accorded to the seven claimant States as claimants. In no other ATS agreement has a claimant been

given an express right to a special position by virtue

of being a claimant, or been accorded any express

right to a special role with respect to the particular

area it claims. The Convention explicitly establishes

a decisionmaking structure for Regulatory Committees that divides claimants and nonclaimants into

separate groups. Moreover, a state with a territorial

claim to a particular area has, by virtue of that claim

to that particular area:

●

●

●

●

●

a right to serve on a Regulatory Committee

established for an area that includes the area it

claims (art. 29);

a right to influence which of the other territorial

claimants will sit on that Regulatory Committee (art. 29);

a right to demand that the Regulatory Committee ‘‘have recourse’ to it in considering an

application for an exploration permit and the

related Management Scheme (art. 46);

a possible argument that its interests are entitled to special respect in any disposition of

surplus revenues from the area it claims (art.

35); and

a possible argument that it has a duty to take

measures in the area it claims to ensure

compliance with the Convention (art. 7).

On the other hand, if claimants ratify this Convention, they will forgo ever having exclusive rights to

any resources found in their claimed territory

(although in return they will gain access to all

Antarctic resources and a role in all Commission

decisions). While claimant States’ expectation of

exclusive rights to resources in ‘‘their’ areas may

have been unrealistic, it might be argued that the

Convention is the latest and most serious erosion of

claimant ‘‘rights’ in Antarctica, beginning with the

Antarctic Treaty, and despite treaty language stating

that preexisting judicial positions will not be affected by it.

The special interest of the United States and the

Soviet Union as states having a basis for a claim in

Antarctica is also specifically recognized in the

Convention. The United States and Soviet Union

must be represented on all Regulatory Committees,

and, hence, have been accorded many of the same

special rights as claimant states. Arguments about

whether claimants or nonclaimants benefit more

from the Convention will probably remain inconclusive.

Even though some states will have a larger voice

in the Regulatory Committees, the general interests

of all Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties are

protected by the functions of the Commission. All

Parties also may express their concerns in the

Advisory Committee and Special Meeting of Parties.

Claimants wanted the Regulatory Committee to

have more discretionary powers because they were

wary of the nonclaimant majority on the Commission, But many nonclaimants wanted the Commission to be strong and to review Regulatory

Committee actions.7 In the end, the Commission was

given power to set parameters for rulemaking by the

Regulatory Committees and to review certain Regulatory Committee actions. Hence, neither the claimant nor the sponsoring state within the Regulatory

Committee, nor the Committee itself, have blanket

discretion. Each is limited by the functions assigned

to the Commission and subject to the advice of the

Advisory Committee on technical and environmental issues.8 Although the United States had

preferred all decisions to be made by less than

unanimous votes, so that no single state would have

a veto, U.S. negotiators went along with the consen-
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 67

sus rule for the ‘‘trigger’ decision on whether to

open an area-so long as less than unanimous votes

were used in the Regulatory Committees after

investments had begun.

Some environmental groups criticize this division

of authority, which gives Regulatory Committees

important independent power. They argue that the

Commission should have the ultimate authority to

approve or deny all key decisions.9 Env ironmentalists

fear the smaller Regulatory Committees are likely to

be composed of states seeking to cut a deal to

promote development, and thereby will sacrifice

environmental safeguards. Although the Commission may review Regulatory Committee actions,

they argue, it will not have the power to overturn

decisions that could harm the environment. While a

Commission with the authority to overturn Regulatory Committee decisions might be more responsive

to environmental concerns, there is no guarantee that

it would be. Also, a Regulatory Committee would

have difficulty ignoring the Commission’s guidelines when developing a Management Scheme, as

well as later suggestions made by the Commission,

the advice of the Advisory Committee, or the views

of individual States with strong environmental

concerns.

Finally, since the Commission has the responsibility to open areas to exploration and development

and to designate members of the Regulatory Committee for each area, it can assure a balance of

development and environmentally inclined states in

each Regulatory Committee. Given the diversity of

interests of the Parties, it is difficult to see how an

agreement could have been reached that vested all

important power in just one of the institutions.

A FRAMEWORK REGIME—AND

UNCERTAINTY

The Minerals Resource Convention has been

termed a framework regime. It does not contain a

detailed mining code or regulations. Rather it relies

on general guidelines and some specific requirements

and prohibitions, much as a general statute delegating authority to an administrative agency might

do. The details of many of the elements of the new

regime have not yet been specified and will not be

specified until it is necessary to do so. With respect

to exploration and development, most of the regulatory system will be put into place for each area of

Antarctica when that area is identified (opened) by

the Commission for receipt of applications for

exploration and development. Some of the conditions and guidelines will be specified by the

Commission at the time it identifies the area. The

remainder will be determined by the Regulatory

Committee established for the particular area, either

by general regulation or in the context of the

Management Scheme applicable to a particular

Operator in a particular block within the larger area

for which the particular Regulatory Committee is

competent. Even though many details remain to be

worked out, the Convention is still elaborate and by

far the lengthiest of the ATS agreements.

The flexibility of this system is an advantage to

the Parties to the Minerals Convention. Too much

detail is probably not desirable now since it is

impossible to anticipate all requirements the Convention must meet. On the other hand, the gaps

remaining in the regime may be seen by potential

Operators as disadvantages.

Some of the regime’s lack of detail (and in

several cases ambiguity) is seen as a shortcoming

by both development-minded and environmental

groups. 10 For example, investors in resource development generally want to know the ‘‘rules of the

game” early so that, before making substantial

investments, they can decide if the expected returns

are worth the risks. The Convention does not specify

what levies Operators will have to pay to support the

Convention or the amount of ‘*payments in the

nature of, and similar to taxes, royalties, and

payments in kind. ” Also unknown are the Operator’s specific liabilities. However, much uncertainty

should be resolved in a Management Scheme prior

to the time an Operator must commit substantial

capital to an operation, and uncertainty at the

prospecting stage would not be costly.

Security and predictability are also important to

investors, especially once a Regulatory Committee

approves a Management Scheme and issues an

9AIKUCUC and Soutiem (lean (hhtion, ‘ ‘Analysis of the ConventIon on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, ’ ASOC

Information Paper 19884 October 1988, p. 6.

1OS= ~tuc~c@sou~cm~~c~l[ion, ibid,;~~,QT’A w~rk~~p on tic An[~Cti~ ~lnerii]s Coil}’cllllon, ~, 15, 1~~~,
68 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

exploration permit (see below). Can development be

stopped even after significant investments in exploration have been made and performance criteria have

been met? Article 54, discussed in more detail

below, is ambiguous on how this decision would be

made.

Similarly, environmental groups are concerned

that some aspects of uncertainty and ambiguity in

the Convention may work to the disadvantage of

environmental protection. For instance, the Minerals

Convention requires that information ‘adequate’ to

enable informed judgments be available before

major decisions (such as opening an area) can be

made (art. 4(1 )). Also, no minerals activity is to take

place unless it would not cause “significant”

adverse effects on air and water quality (art. 4(2a)).

Although words such as “significant” and “adequate” are subjective, it would have been difficult to

tie the Parties down to more specific terms and still

reach agreement. These terms will be defined in

more detail by the institutions as necessary.

THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

PROCESS

The Convention divides resource activity into

prospecting, exploration, and development (tables

3-3, 3-4, and 3-6).

Prospecting

Prospecting is the first phase in the resource

exploitation process (figure 3-1 and table 3-3). It

consists of those methods and techniques that help

miners determine targets for more intensive exploration. Successful prospecting may lead to exploration

and development if economic conditions warrant

and if the environment would not be ‘significantly

harmed.

The methods used in prospecting are not easily

distinguishable from those methods scientists employ in acquiring basic geophysical, geochemical,

and geologic knowledge, nor are the results. Also,

the geophysical research of some countries in

Antarctica is carried out by the same organizations

that would conduct prospecting activities. The

difference between scientific research and prospecting is largely a matter of intent. The distinction is

relevant because the Minerals Convention allows

prospecting data to be held as proprietary whereas,

under terms of the Antarctic Treaty, the results of

scientific research must be made freely available to

all.

Exploration and development, as defined in the

Minerals Convention, have not yet commenced in

Antarctica. This is due in large part to the fact that

there is little current interest in such activities. In

1977 the Antarctic Treaty Parties formally agreed to

refrain from exploration and exploitation in Antarctica pending progress toward a regime governing

these activities.11 But geophysical and other surveys

have been conducted as scientific research-though

they may produce information of potential commercial value-and thus, have not been subject to the

voluntary restraint agreement on exploration. Unfortunately, the data from some past “research’ surveys

have not been released yet, thus raising speculation

about whether these data were collected for research

or for commercial purposes. Moreover, there have

been varying interpretations of when data should be

released.

The Minerals Convention clearly distinguishes

between prospecting and exploration. The Final Act

of the Convention extends the policy of voluntary

restraint the Parties adopted in 1977 pending entry

into force of the Minerals Convention. The policy

now specifically applies to prospecting as well as to

exploration and development. Geophysical and other

surveys may still be carried out as scientific research, but as research, the results must be made

freely available. One result may be that fewer

geophysical surveys will be undertaken until the

Convention enters into force. Potential prospectors

are unlikely to run the risk of engaging in any

‘‘questionable’ scientific research that may be

viewed as prospecting prior to entry into force of the

Minerals Convention, for they could lose their

proprietary rights to this data.12

Prospecting under the Minerals Convention is

subject to much less oversight by the Convention’s

institutions than exploration and development. It

may be undertaken prior to the opening of an area to

these activities, Explicit authorization is not reI IR~omm~&on IX- 1, 9th ATCM, Lmdon, 1977.

lzwb~], op. cit., footnoted, p. 4.
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 69

Potential operator

submits relevant

data to Sponsor.

Sponsor notifies

Commission of

Operator plans, transmits environmental

and other information.

Figure 3-l—Prospecting: Articles 37 and 38

Sponsor on behalf of Commission meets to

operator, provide take “appropriate

clarification. action.”

No

No

Sponsor responsible I

for ensuring Operator

modifies plans or

activities.

Yes

I

1

1

No

Prospecting not

allowed or canceled.

Data released.

SOURCE: Offio@ of Technology Asaeasment, 19S9.

quired because prospecting activities are expected to prospecting may be prohibited or canceled or plans

have no greater impact than similar scientific may be altered if Commission members have

research. Thus, for ‘the most part, prospecting sufficient concerns about planned or ongoing activiactivities are expected to be of short duration and to ties.

leave little trace behind. Prospectors are subject to

the same general requirements and obligations set Prospectors may hold data they obtain as proprieforth in the Convention, however, including those tary for at least 10 years if it has commercial value,

meant to safeguard the Antarctic environment. And but significantly, prospecting confers no special
70 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Table 33-Prospecting

Definition: Activities, including logistic support, aimed at identifying areas of mineral resource potential for possible exploration

and development, including geological, geochemical, and geophysical investigations and field observations, the use of remote

sensing techniques, and collection of surface, seafloor, and

subice samples. Such activities do not include dredging or

excavations, except to obtain small-scale samples, or drilling,

except shallow drilling not to exceed 25 meters. Art. 1(8).

General provisions:

•

●

●

●

Does not confer upon any Operator any right to Antarctic

mineral resources. Art. 37(1 ).

Does not require authorization by the institutions of the

Convention. Art. 37(2).

Data of commercial value may be retained, as long as the

Sponsoring State certifies that they continue to have commercial value. Art. 37(10).

Notification of prospecting by Sponsoring State must be

accompanied by fees (yet to be established) and by: a)

identification of the general area for prospecting, b) identification of the mineral resource(s) under investigation, c) a

description of the methods to be used and the general work

program, d) an assessment of the possible environmental

impacts of the prospecting, e) measures to be used to avoid

and/or to mitigate any harmful impacts, and f) proof that the

Operator has a substantial and genuine link with the Sponsoring State and is financially and technically qualified to carry out

the prospecting. Art. 37(7a-f).

Institutional oversight

● Minimal, but if a Commission member is concerned that

prospecting is not being conducted in a manner consistent with

the Convention or that planned prospecting would not be

consistent with it, the member may ask for a clarification. If it is

still concerned, in concert with at least five other Commission

members, it may call a meeting to take appropriate action. Art.

38.

SOURCE: Offkx of Technology ksiewment, 19S9.

rights to an area. Exclusive rights to explore and

develop an area may be obtained only after the

relevant area has been opened, competing applications to explore the same parts of the area have been

resolved, and an exploration permit has been issued.

It does not appear that this uncertainty will operate

as a significant deterrent to the oil and gas industry

in prospecting. This industry is generally used to a

system under which investments in prospecting will

not necessarily entitle them to exclusive rights to

explore or exploit in the area in which they

conducted prospecting. The mining industry, on the

other hand, neither has the financial resources that

the oil and gas industry has for prospecting and

exploration nor is as used to spending large sums

without the certainty that it will acquire rights to its

discoveries.

. The Commission may adopt additional general measures

concerning prospecting applicable to all operators. Arts. 37 and

38.

● As appropriate, the Advisory Committee provides advice to the

Commission. Art. 26(2a).

Key sponsor obligations:

●

●

●

●

●

●

To notify the Commission on behalf of its Operator at least 9

months before planned prospecting, the notification to include

the information listed above. (Presumably, in cases where

Operators and Sponsors are independent of each other, the

Operator will supply this information to the Sponsor, who will in

turn certify it and forward it to the Commission.) Art. 37.

To ensure that Operators are qualified to undertake prospecting in conformance with the Convention, and especially

that they have the appropriate financial and technical means to

respond to threats to the environment. Art. 37.

To ensure that Operators have the financial capacity to meet

liability standards, Art. 37.

To ensure that Operators conduct themselves with due regard

to the rights of other Operators in the area. Art. 37.

Where modifications to a proposed prospecting plan or to

ongoing prospecting are deemed necessary, to ensure that the

plan or activity of the Operator is modified. Art. 38.

To ensure that response action is taken in the event that the

Operator fails to do so. Art. (37(3a)).

Operator obligations

● Maintain the financial and technical means to conduct all

activities in compliance with the Convention. Art. 37.

. Maintain a substantial and genuine link with the Sponsoring

State. Art. 37.

● Conduct all activities with due regard to other Operators’ rights.

Art. 37.

. Unless waived, remove all installations and equipment after

prospecting ceases and rehabilitate the site. Art. 37.

Some prospecting is likely to occur at a

relatively early date if the Minerals Convention is

ratified and enters into force--even if near-term

interest in developing Antarctica’s resources

remains slight. Companies and nations that take a

“long view” about exploiting Antarctica’s resources may wish to be in a position to evaluate the

economic and technical feasibility of resource exploitation, anticipating that prices will eventually be

higher. 13 Prospecting may not lead immediately to

exploration and development, however, in part

because the economics of development may not

warrant proceeding beyond the prospecting phase.

For this reason, when the United States considers

implementing legislation for the Minerals Convention, it may wish to devote somewhat more effort to

developing regulations applicable to domestic pros-

‘31bid., p. 4,
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 71

pectors. There is likely to be additional time in

which to formulate domestic implementing legislation for exploration and development of Antarctica’s

resources,

Identification of an Area for

Exploration and Development

One of the most important decisions specified by

the Convention is how an area of Antarctica is

opened for exploration and development. If a

prospector determined that there was sufficient

incentive to proceed with intensive exploration of a

particular site, the prospector would request that its

Sponsor ask the Commission to identify (open) the

area in question (figure 3-2). The Commission’s

decision to open an area must be made by

consensus. This is the decision that triggers the

formation of a Regulatory Committee, consideration

of exploration and development permits, development of a Management Scheme, and, in general,

greatly increased activity. The Commission must

decide whether identifying all or part of the area is

consistent with Convention standards, and, in theory, Commission members will base their vote on all

relevant information submitted by the requesting

Party, other interested Parties, the Advisory Committee, and the Special Meeting of [All] Parties.

To the extent that the United States is reluctant

for any reason, such as environmental concerns, to

allow an area of Antarctica to be opened to

exploration, the consensus voting requirement ensures that opening the area can be blocked. However,

if the United States wants an area opened, any other

member of the Commission could block its request.

Since some state member might oppose opening an

area on environmental or other grounds or seek to

impose conditions which effectively do the same

thing, the U.S. interest might be thwarted. An

environmental group’s opposition, if based on plausible evidence, might serve as the pretext for a state’s

negative vote.

It is not clear what financial, temporal, or other

disincentives to proceeding with exploration might

deter a state or company from seeking to have an

area opened to exploration applications relatively

early. While OTA predicts that actual development

is unlikely absent a very valuable find and extremely

favorable projected market conditions, it is less clear

how far in advance a serious effort would be made

to ‘‘trigger’ the system by seeking to open an area.

One of the biggest deterrents to opening an area is

likely to be the need for adequate information, One

incentive for early application to open areas to

exploration and development is the provision that

prospecting data must be made public after 10 years,

although there are also provisions to extend the

10-year protection of such data (art. 37).

It is likely that the more important an area is likely

to be to consumers, the greater will be the pressure

on the Commission members to approve a request to

open it. The ‘‘nightmare’ scenario of a Western

country, in desperate need of oil, being frustrated by

Commission vetoes is improbable. If the situation

were that critical to the West, a threat to denounce

the Convention would presumably be real. In that

case the possible collapse of the Convention (and

likely the entire Antarctic Treaty System along with

it) would be viewed by all Parties with alarm.

The Commission includes some oil exporting

states (e.g., the United Kingdom and Norway). None

has thus far associated itself with a cartel, However,

it is possible the consensus requirement could

inspire a member of OPEC (the Organization of

Petroleum Exporting Countries) to invest in the

Antarctic research necessary to join the Commission, so as to gain a veto over the decision to open

Antarctica to oil exploration and development.

However, an economically motivated move by an oil

exporter to restrain Antarctic production would

likely unite the existing group of states active in

Antarctica, in part because most are consumers and

in part because they perceived that their system was

being manipulated for outside ends. In such an

atmosphere, it is not likely that the attempt to block

consensus would long survive. The same argument

is likely to be true for hard minerals exporters.

Would the presence of the Soviet Union on the

Commission likely be a problem for the United

States? The Soviet Union is certainly capable of

using its veto for purely political ends. Whether, in

particular circumstances, it would do so is another

matter. If the question arose at a time when the

Soviet Union was seeking better relations with the

West or more Western capital and investment, the

chances of a veto are reduced. If the question arose

at a time of high tension, the Soviet Union would
72 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Figure 3-2-Opening an Area: Articlea 3941

Special meeting of

States Parties to

advise Commission. Advisory

Committee

advises

Commission.

i

Commission considers

 ommia -

all relevant information

sion to identify an area submitted by requestfor exploration and ing Party, other Parties,

development of a Advisory Committee,

particular resource and Special Meeting of

States Parties

Yes t

Area size adjusted

Sea exploration off limits part not

flow chart. considered further.

Adjustments made.

Yes

 No further No 4

action.

Yes

I

Area Opened for

exploration and

development.

Yes

No

SOURCE: Office of Technology Asewment, 1989.
Chapter 3—The Convention on (he Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 73

nevertheless have to consider its interests in maintaining the stability of the Antarctic system and its

interests as a consumer of the commodity concerned.

The Soviets would also have to consider whether

they have an interest in developing Antarctic mineral resources themselves. If that country considers

undertaking mineral development, it might be deterred from vetoing a U.S. request so as not to trigger

a U.S. veto of its own request.

While these scenarios are unsettling, they are not

very likely. Two other scenarios are likely to be of

more concern: 1) when there is genuine disagreement about the environmental hazards of opening an

area, and 2) when other states demand to participate

in a proposed minerals activity, whether the United

States or some other state sponsors the activity.

Genuine Disagreement Over Environmental Hazards—This situation may be less unsettling for the

United States because U.S. interests include an

interest in protecting the environment, because the

United States is already among the more environmentally concerned Commission members, and

because U.S. companies have substantial experience

in working with environmental constraints and

bearing their added costs. Any proposed development that is likely to survive our domestic political

process is unlikely to attract strong and genuine

foreign opposition on environmental grounds. This

is particularly true since U.S. environmental procedures and standards are likely to apply to any

decision by the U.S. Government to propose the

opening of an area or to sponsor an applicant. At the

same time, any environmental organizations that

actively oppose opening an area can be expected to

focus lobbying efforts on those countries most likely

to cast a dissenting vote,

Demands for Participate---Intemational participation, especially by developing country Parties, is

encouraged by the Convention (art. 6). Demands for

participation could come from a variety of sources

and for political or economic reasons. A territorial

claimant, for instance, might demand to participate

in a venture in order to establish the principle that

exploitation in ‘‘its’ area requires its participation,

thereby guaranteeing de facto accommodation of its

claims. Alternatively, developing countries might

demand to participate for ideological reasons (one

could find the economic interests of a state or of

private companies in one or more proto-industrial

states behind the ideological rhetoric),

A foreign state’s demand to participate may

increase the cost of the venture to the Operator. On

the other hand, development of Antarctic resources

is likely to be so expensive that investors will most

likely spread the risk by forming joint ventures (app.

A presents a scenario of how a joint venture might

work).

The Convention limits the role of the Commission

‘‘to ‘elaborating opportunities’ for joint ventures or

different forms of participation’ (art.41 ( Id)). There

is also helpful interpretive language in the Final Act

concerning the ‘‘freedom of choice’ of an investor

regarding partners in a joint venture, including terms

of their partnership. Nevertheless, there will be

ample opportunity for bargaining. Potential investors will have to consider that even if a veto in the

Commission can be avoided, both the Soviet Union

and a territorial claimant over the area in question

will wind up on the relevant Regulatory Committee,

and would thus be in a position to influence future

decisions if their interests are not accommodated.

It is also possible that one or more Commission

members will demand a price for their cooperation

in supporting a decision to open an area. Such price

may be unrelated to the Antarctic minerals regime,

in which firm diplomacy may contain Antarctic

bargaining to Antarctic issues. However, if the price

of support is relevant to the Antarctic minerals

regime or other Antarctic diplomacy, then ‘‘logrolling, a time-honored characteristic of collective

decisionmaking bodies, is likely.

The Convention’s provisions for opening an area

for exploration and development:

●

●

●

●

guarantees that no area will be opened over the

objections of the United States;

comes close to guaranteeing that no area will be

opened for development over well-founded

environmental objections;

does not assure that any area of Antarctica will

be opened; and

subjects states that seek to open an area to a

variety of demands that may have to be

accommodated to open the area.
74 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

The consensus requirement supplies a great deal

of protection for U.S. environmental and scientific

interests, but little protection for potential U.S.

economic interests. It protects U.S. interests in

stability in Antarctica by guaranteeing the consent of

all substantially interested states before exploration

and development is undertaken. If, however, significant concessions to territorial claimants are made as

the price of a decision to open an area, the consensus

requirement may prejudice the long-term stability of

the current Antarctic system, and long-term U.S.

political, legal, economic, and environmental interests.

From the point of view of the petroleum and

mining industries, the number of sovereign states

involved in the decisionmaking process, as exemplified by the requirement for a consensus decision to

open an area, is worrisome. United States international oil companies are accustomed to, and adept at,

negotiating with all sorts of governments on an

individual basis. But to have to satisfy a large group

of countries, each with somewhat different interests,

is daunting, even if the Sponsor is the more directly

involved party in the process.14 Private companies,

whether domestic or foreign, might indeed prefer

dealing with a single sovereign power in Antarctica

if such an option were possible.

Exploration

Once an area has been opened for exploration and

development, Operators may seek approval for

exploration (figure 3-3 and table 3-4).

Application Procedures

The Regulatory Committee must initially establish procedures for receipt of applications for

exploration or development permits. Subject to any

decisions by the Commission regarding maximum

block size and application fees, the Regulatory

Committee will then divide the area into blocks and

set the relevant application fees.

The Regulatory Committee will also establish

procedures for resolving competing applications for

the same block where the applicants have not

resolved the matter themselves. Those procedures

must include priority for the application with the

broadest participation among interested Parties,

including developing countries in particular.

These decisions require a two-thirds majority of

the states present and voting, that is 7 out of the

normal 10 votes. (States that abstain are normally

not considered to be ‘voting.’ Four negative votes

would be necessary to block a decision if there were

no abstentions or only one abstention. If there were

two to four abstentions, three votes would be

sufficient to block (table 3-5).

To the extent that an issue arises that relates to a

difference in principle with the territorial claimants,

four claimants, if united, will be able to block any

decision favored by six nonclaimants.

To the extent that an issue arises that relates to the

general interests of Western consumer nations, the

United States should not normally find it too

difficult to find three additional negative votes (or

two additional negative votes and two abstentions)

to block adverse decisions. The four territorial

claimants on the Committee will come from among

the following group of seven: Argentina, Australia,

Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand, and the

United Kingdom. At least two of the four might

normally be expected to share many of the same

interests as the United States, or at least favor

accommodation of substantial United States concerns. In that case, the United States would need to

persuade only one of the five other nonclaimants of

its point of view. It is probable that the nonclaimant

group will include at least one additional Western

state, for example an European Economic Communit y member or Japan, particularly if the four

claimants include only two Western states.

The Regulatory Committee can, if it wishes,

establish a limit on the number of blocks that may be

accorded to any given Party (art. 43(2)). A block size

limitation could pose a problem for Operators, who

desire as much assurance as possible that the area in

which they are granted exclusive rights will be large

enough to contain the size deposits necessary for

economic development. If individual blocks are

large enough in the first place, the potential problem

can be avoided. Moreover, given the multinational

nature of the oil and mining industries, and their

14j.N. G~~, “me Anwctlc wer~s Regime: A pe~ole~ Industry perspective, ’ OTA contractor report, November 1988.
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 75

capacity to establish subsidiaries with substantial

and genuine links to foreign states, the extent to

which the risk of an adverse decision on this point

should give rise to serious underlying economic

concerns is unclear.

Guidelines

The Regulatory Committee is required to adopt

guidelines identifying the general requirements for

exploration and development in the area of its

competence. These will cover the detailed items

normally associated with mining regulations.

The adoption of such guidelines requires, in

addition to a two-thirds majority, the votes of half

the claimants and half the nonclaimants present and

voting. Blocking power is thereby increased. A

territorial claimant, including the state with a

territorial claim in the area in question, would need

to persuade only two other claimants of its point of

view in order to block a decision, even if there are no

abstentions. Under this formula, the United States or

another nonclaimant would need to persuade at least

three other states to vote ‘‘no’ in order to block a

decision in the absence of abstentions.

An impact of this formula is to increase the power

of the claimants in general, and of the claimants

making claims within the area in question in

particular. It could therefore strengthen their ability

to extract practical or legal concessions to the

territorial claims. An extreme but unlikely example

would be a demand that the guidelines conform in

significant respects to the mining laws of the state

that claims sovereignty in the area.

The Application for an Exploration Permit

Subsequent to the preparatory work undertaken

by the Regulatory Committee, the Sponsoring State,

on behalf of the Operator, may submit an application

for an exploration permit. The application must be

accompanied by the fees established by the Regulatory Committee and, according to article 44, contain:

. A detailed description of the Operator, its

structure, financial composition, and resources

and technical expertise. If the Operator consists

of a group of countries, i.e., a joint venture, the

application must include a detailed description

of the degree (including equity composition) to

which the parties are involved in the venture.

●

●

●

●

A detailed description of the proposed exploration activities and, to the extent possible, a

detailed description of the proposed development plan.

A detailed assessment of environmental and

other impacts of the proposed activities, and a

description of the Operator’s capacity to respond to accidents, especially those with potential environmental effects.

Certification by the Sponsor of the capacity of

the Operator to comply with the guidelines

established by the Regulatory Committee; of

the technical competence and financial capacity of the Operator; and that the relationship

of the Operator to the Sponsor is substantial and

genuine.

A description of any proposed joint venture or

other participation terms.

Approval of Exploration Permit and

Management Scheme

The Regulatory Committee has the authority to

approve an exploration permit and Management

Scheme (contract). The approval of an exploration

permit and Management Scheme for a specific block

accords an Operator exclusive rights to explore for

the resources identified and the exclusive right to

develop those resources, subject to subsequent

issuance of a development permit. The Management

Scheme sets out the specific terms and conditions for

both exploration and development. Those governing

development will only be as detailed as the information available at this stage and are subject to review

at the development stage. Terms and conditions

must be consistent with the Convention and applicable regulations and guidelines adopted either by the

Commission or the Regulatory Committee, and

would include procedures for settlement of disputes

between the Operator and the Regulatory Committee.

When considering the application and Management Scheme, the Regulatory Committee is required

to “have recourse’ to certain of its members: the

Sponsoring State, any state making claims in the

area with respect to which the Regulatory Committee is competent, and, as may be required, one or

two additional members of the Committee (art. 46).

The meaning of this requirement is not specified. A

procedural right to be deeply involved in the process,
Figure 34-Exploration: Articles 4 and 43-51

I 1

Area opened for exploration and

development for a particular resource. I

+

Commission establishes Regulatory

Committee for area.
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 77

I

\ ● ● ●

$! o

1 I
78 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Table 3-4-Exploration

Definition: Activities, including logistic support, aimed at evaluating specific mineral occurrences or deposits, including exploratory drilling, dredging, and other surface or subsurface excavations required to determine the nature and size of mineral

resource deposits and the feasibility of their development, but

excluding pilot projects or commercial production. Art. 1(9).

General provisions:

Exploration prohibited unless specifically authorized. Art. 4.

The decision to authorize exploration and possible development in a particular area must be based on information

adequate to enable informed judgments, including a description of the physical and environmental characteristics of the

area, an environmental impact assessment, and likely scale of

development, methods used, and types of resources sought.

Arts. 4 and 47.

Any authorized activities subject to the specific terms and

conditions prescribed by Regulatory Committees in Management Schemes. Art. 47.

An exploration permit accords exclusive rights to the Operator—

subject to consideration of needs for modifications to the

Management Scheme prior to development-to explore and to

develop mineral resources in accordance with the Management Scheme. Arts. 48, 53, and 54.

Management Schemes subject to modification if new information suggests greater than anticipated impacts or if an

Operator has failed to comply with the Convention. Art. 51.

Institutional oversight

●

●

●

●

●

A consensus decision must be made by the Commission

members to allow exploration and development in a particular

area. Art. 41.

The Special Meeting of Parties advises the Commission on

whether allowing exploration in an area is consistent with the

principles of the Convention. Art. 41.

The Advisory Committee reviews information submitted to the

Commission and Regulatory Committee and gives advice. Arts.

40,45, 51, and 52.

If exploration and development are considered to be consistent

with the Convention, a Regulatory Committee is constituted for

the area. The Committee is responsible for subdividing the area

into blocks, adopting procedures for handling applications, and

adopting general guidelines for exploration and development in

the area. Arts. 29 and 43.

The Regulatory Committee examines each application, issues

an exploration permit or denies exploration, and devises

Management Schemes which prescribe specific terms and

conditions under which exploration and development may

proceed. Arts. 45-48.

SOURCE: - of Technology Assessment, 19S9.

rather than any decisionmaking power as such, is

suggested. The provision may imply a core negotiating or drafting group, or some less structured form

of consultation. The reference to ‘‘one or two’

additional members may imply that the United

States and the Soviet Union are to be included in all

cases, although there appears to be no formal

decision in the Convention or Final Act to this effect.

The approval of a Management Scheme by the

Regulatory Committee constitutes authorization for

The Regulatory Committee may suspend, cancel, or modify a

Management Scheme if unanticipated unacceptable impacts

could result or if the Operator has failed to comply with the

Convention. Art. 51.

Any member of the Regulatory Committee or any six members

of the Commission may request a review by the Commission of

the Regulatory Committee’s decision to approve a Management Scheme or issue a development permit, and the Commission may request that the Regulatory Committee reconsider its

decision. Art. 49,

Key sponsor obligations:

● On behalf of an Operator, to submit an application for an

exploration permit. The application must be accompanied by

appropriate fees and by detailed information about the Operator and about proposed exploration activities, including a

detailed assessment of environmental and other impacts of the

proposed development. (Most likely, the Operator will supply

much of this information to the Sponsor. Sponsors will need to

establish domestic procedures for accepting and reviewing this

information.) Art. 44.

. To certify the capacity of the Operator to conform to the

standards of the Convention and to certify the Operator’s

technical competence and financial capacity, Art. 44(c-d).

Operator obligations:

‘In concert with the Sponsor, to provide the data and information

●

required for the Commission to consider identifying an area for

exploration and development and for the Regulatory Committee to consider issuing an exploration permit. Arts. 39 and 44.

Exercise its rights with due regard to the rights of other

Operators. Art. 50.

To live up to the specific terms and conditions of the Management Scheme, which relate, inter alia, to duration of exploration,

measures and procedures for protection of the environment,

response action to environmental mishaps, performance requirements, technical and safety specifications, monitoring and

inspection, liability, resource conservation, financial obligations, provision of data and information, and removal of

installations and equipment at the end of exploration and/or

development. Art. 47. Suspension, modification, or cancellation

of a Management Scheme may occur if an Operator fails to

comply with the Management Scheme. Art. 51.

Subject to procedures to be established by the Commission,

Operators may request the Arbitral Tribunal andl/or other body

to review a denial of an exploration or development permit,

cancellation of a Management Scheme, etc. Art. 59.

the issuance without delay of an exploration permit.

The decision to approve the Management Scheme

requires a two-thirds vote of the Regulatory Committee, including a majority of the votes of claimants

and a majority of the votes of nonclaimants. Absent

abstentions, this means that either two claimants or

three nonclaimants could block the decision (table

3-5).

This formula increases the ability of the United

States to block an adverse decision. Absent ab-
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 79

Table 3-&Blocking Power on a Regulatory Committee

A. Votes Requiring a 2/3 Majority

Present and voting Absent or abstention Negative votes to block

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

4

4

3

3

3

2

2

2

1

B. Additional Blocking Options Where 2/3 Vote Must Include

Half the Claimants and Half the Non-Claimants

Claimants Claimants Claimants

present and voting absent or abstention negative votes to block

4 0 3

3 1 2

2 2 2

1 3 1

Non-Claimants Non-Claimants Non-Claimants

present and voting absent or abstention negative votes to block

5 1 3

3 3 2

2 4 2

1 5 1

C. Additional Blocking Options Where 2/3 Vote Must Include

Majority of Claimants and Majority of Non-Claimants

Claimants Claimants Claimants

present and voting absent or abstention negative votes to block

4 0 2

3 1 2

2 2 1

1 3 1

Non-Claimants Non-Claimants Non-Claimants

present and voting absent or abstention negative votes to block

6 0 3

5 1 3

4 2 2

3 3 2

2 4 1

1 5 1

SOURCE: B.H. Oxman, “Evaluating the Antarctic Minerals ConventIon: The Decwon-Makmg System,” OTA

contractor report, Jan. 9, 19S9.

stentions, the United States would need to persuade

either two other nonclaimants, or two claimants, to

vote ‘‘no . It also increases the difficulty of

achieving affirmative decisions because only two

claimants would be needed to block the decision. On

the other hand, since the Management Scheme

fashioned by the Regulatory Committee or a subset

thereof must be consistent with guidelines adopted

by the Regulatory Committee, many if not most

potential objections may already have been reSolved.

Development

The holder of an exploration permit pursuant to an

approved Management Scheme may apply to the

Regulatory Committee at any time through its

Sponsor for a development permit for the block and

resources covered. The application must be accompanied by the established fees, and, among the

several requirements, must contain an updated

description of planned development activities, a

detailed assessment of the environmental impacts of
80 ● Polor Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Photo credit: Ann Hawthorne

Victoria Valley, Dry Valley area near McMurdo.

the planned development, and a recertification by

the Sponsor of the technical competence and financial capacity of the Operator to undertake the

planned development (table 3-6).

In considering an application for a development

permit, the Regulatory Committee must determine

whether modifications are necessary in the Management Scheme. The Convention sets forth only two

reasons for such modifications:

1. if the application reveals modifications by the

Operator to the development planned in the

original Management Scheme, and

2. if as a result either of changes in the planned

development or in light of increased knowledge, the development would cause impacts on

the environment that were previously unforeseen.

The process for obtaining a development permit

(figure 3-4) is described in article 54. Paragraph 5 of

article 54 has drawn special attention from potential

investors and environmentalists alike due to its

ambiguity. At issue is whether a specific vote is

required to block development if there has been no

agreement on modifications to the Management

Scheme.

The paragraph provides that ‘‘if the Regulatory

Committee in accordance with Article 32 approves

modifications [to the Management Scheme], or if it

does not consider that such modifications are

necessary, the Regulatory Committee shall issue

without delay a development permit. Article 32,

paragraph 1, of the Convention provides that deciTable 3-6-Developrnent

Definition: Activities, including logistic support, which take

place following exploration and are aimed at or associated with

exploitation of specific mineral resource deposits, including pilot

projects, processing, storage, and transport activities. Art. 1(1 O).

General provisions:

. A development permit is required. Art. 53.

. Additional data-updating that required for exploration—must

accompany the permit, including an updated description of

planned development, any modifications requested to the

approved Management Scheme, and a detailed assessment of

environmental and other impacts of the planned development.

Art. 53.

● If exploration is authorized and a Management Scheme is in

force, an Operator may develop deposits it finds, subject to

modifications which may be required to the Management

Scheme in light of changes to the planned development or

previously unforeseen impacts on the environment. Art. 54.

Institutional oversight

● Regulatory Committee must approve the development plan.

Art. 54.

. Under certain circumstances, the Commission may review the

Regulatory Committees’ decision to approve an application for

development and may request that the Committee reconsider

its decision. Art. 49.

. The views of the Advisory Committee to be considered. Art. 54.

Key Sponsor obligations:

. At any time during the period in which an approved Management Scheme and exploration permit are in force, the Sponsor

may submit an application for a development permit to the

Regulatory Committee on behalf of the Operator it sponsors.

Art. 53(1 ).

. Sponsor must recertify the Operator it sponsors regarding

technical competence, financial capacity, ability to comply with

general requirements related to exploration and development,

and maintenance of the link with the Sponsor. Art. 53.

Operator obligations:

● To provide its Sponsor with: a) an updated description of

planned development, specifically noting any proposed changes,

b) the information required to assess the environmental and

other impacts of planned development, and c) the information

required for recertification of technical competence, financial

capacity, and capacity to comply with the general guidelines for

exploration and development in the area.

. To live up to the specific terms and conditions of the Management Scheme, including changes made in the Management

Scheme by the Regulatory Committee.

. To maintain a substantial and genuine link with its Sponsoring

State.

SOURCE: ~ of Technology Assessment, 19S9.
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 81

sions by a Regulatory Committee “pursuant to’

article 54(5) shall be taken by a two-thirds majority

vote, including a majority of the votes of claimants

and a majority of the votes of nonclaimants This is

the same majority required for original approval of

the Management Scheme, Absent abstentions, either

two claimants or three nonclaimants could block the

decision.

The approval of modifications to the Management

Scheme would be a decision “pursuant to” article

54(5) requiring the concurrent majorities specified

in article 32, paragraph 1. It would be relatively easy

to block such a decision (table 3-5). It is clear that

once modifications are approved, the development

permit must be issued. However, states might seek

to block modifications either because they opposed

them or because they favored a package of more

extensive modifications.

What happens if the requisite majority does not

vote in favor of any modifications to the Management Scheme? If there is not enough support for

modifications (i.e., if the concurrent majorities

necessary for modifications cannot be obtained),

does this mean that the development permit is

automatically issued without delay? Is an additional

affirmative vote required that modifications are not

necessary? Is there a point when the negotiating

process over modifications is deemed completed

and no further negotiation permitted?

Potential investors are concerned about the ambiguity of this article because they are opposed to the

separation of the exploration and development

stages.15 They would prefer an interpretation of

article 54(5) that does not require reapproval.

Investors argue that exploration in Antarctica will be

too costly to undertake unless they are certain that

they will be able to proceed from exploration to

development. Another vote could derail planned

development activities after substantial investments

have been made. They also note that the initial

exploration permit must discuss proposed development activities in as much detail as possible, the

Regulatory Committee will already have a fairly

good idea of what impacts to expect from development.

Some environmental groups, on the other hand,

argue that there must be the possibility of a negative

decision at the development stage. 16 These groups

point out that development could have a much

greater impact on the environment than exploration,

Therefore, the Regulatory Committee and the Commission should have the authority to deny a fullscale commercial development permit, They therefore prefer that article 54(5) is interpreted to mean

that an affirmative decision to issue or to decline to

issue a development permit is intended and also that

if an affirmative decision to approve modifications

cannot be reached, this does not mean that the

development permit is automatically approved or

that modifications are not necessary.

Supporters of the argument that article 54(5) is

intended as a modification procedure rather than a

reapproval procedure can argue that while it is true

that investors run the risk that a two-thirds majority

might alter the Management Scheme for stated

environmental reasons under article 5 l—which

refers to general circumstances under which a

Management Scheme may be suspended, modified,

or canceled-that is far less onerous than running

the risk that two or three states, by blocking the

issuance of a development permit, could render the

investment in exploration useless. Their position

would be that the stringent requirements for consensus in the Commission to open an area, and for

concurrent majorities in the Regulatory Committee

to approve the Management Scheme, represent the

appropriate time for according a minority the power

to block economic activity, namely before substantial investments have been made.

In this connection they might also note that even

where a two-thirds majority modifies a Management

Scheme under article 51, the text contemplates the

possibility of compensation to the investor (art.

51(6)). No such provision appears in article 54. It

would be anomalous to argue that a small minority

is empowered to impair investments without compensation, while a two-thirds majority is not.

The potential disagreements posed by the

ambiguity in article 54 may not be as great as they

appear. It is reasonably clear that the only

relevant issue under article 54 relates to previlsIbid., p. 31.

16AnWCW md So@rn Ocean Coalition, op. Cll,, footnok 9, P. 5
82 ● Polar prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Figure -Development: Articles 53 and 54

As a result of exploration,

Operator finds resource and

wishes to develop.

b

Operator assembles required Sponsor certifies data; applies

info, including info on for development permit on

environmental impacts of + behalf of Operator; submits

development detailed data and fees to Regulatory

description of plans. Committee.

I I ,

I

Advisory Committee 4 Regulatory Committee

provides advice. evaluates application. *

Further information No 4

sought from

Sponsoring State.

f Yes

I No

w

application contain

modifications to the plan

unforeseen environmental

Yes

Scheme necessary to assure Advisory Committee

provides advice. evaluates modifications and/

or environmental impacts

approved by a two-thirds Yes

/f no agreement on modifications,

additional vote may be required

to block development: ambiguous b
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 83

Figure 34-Development: Articles 53 and 54-Continued

Advisory Committee 4 Regulatory Committee Development plan altered,

provides advice. considers changes in +

Management Scheme. suspended, or canceled.

,

I

I 1

I I Yes

v

Commission Yes Development continues No 0 - - reviews Committee member permit under unaltered plan.

J

Development permit issued;

o @ development under approved

plan proceeds.

/’ /

No

‘ \

\

SOURCE Offlc8 of Technology Assessment 1989
84 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

ously unforeseen impacts on the environment,

either as a result of modifications to the planned

development previously envisioned or in light of

increased knowledge. Politically difficult issues,

such as participation, will already have been settled

at the time the Management Scheme was originally

approved. Thus, it does not seem very likely that

potential problems will involve more than an accommodation of new environmental concerns. From this

perspective, the investor may be better off resolving

new environmental problems before proceeding

with additional significant investments associated

with actual development. The alternative, should the

environmental critics turn out to be correct in

predicting new environmental risks, could be a far

more costly suspension of operations or modification of a management scheme under article 51 at a

later stage.

Given the fact that article 54 is not a model of

clarity, and that differing interpretations may be

proffered not only by different states but by different

groups in the United States, it might be prudent to

attach a specific statement of interpretation on this

point, approved by the Senate, to any instrument of

ratification. Such a statement is, however, no guarantee that other states or, if the matter is brought to

arbitration, a tribunal, will agree.

SUSPENSION, MODIFICATION,

CANCELLATION, AND

PENALTIES

Regulatory Committees have the power to suspend, modify, or cancel a Management Scheme as a

result of impacts on the environment beyond those

judged acceptable at the time relevant decisions

regarding the opening of the area and the Management Scheme were taken. Committees can also take

such action, or to impose a monetary penalty, in the

event an Operator (miner) violates the Convention,

measures adopted under the Convention, or the

Management Scheme. The response must be proportional to the seriousness of the violation.

The power of the Regulatory Committees is

subject to general measures previously adopted by

the Commission. Those measures could include

provision for compensation to the miner, presumably for certain losses incurred as a result of action

taken by a Regulatory Committee. The power of the

Regulatory Committees in these respects will also be

subject to arbitration. If the Arbitral Tribunal finds

that a Regulatory Committee acted unlawfully, it

would presumably have the authority to award

damages to the Operator, determine that the Committee may not take the action contemplated, or both

(art. 59).

Decisions of the Regulatory Committee on these

matters require a two-thirds vote. There is no

requirement of concurrent majorities. Thus, without

abstentions, the United States or any other Party

would have to obtain three other negative votes to

block a decision. Given the availability of arbitration, the size and likely composition of the Regulatory Committees, and the possibility that the Commission’s general measures will add protections for the

investor, it is unlikely that Regulatory Committees

will arbitrarily y or unreasonably exercise their power.

BUDGET AND REVENUE

CONSIDERATIONS

The Parties established several mechanisms for

generating revenues from resource development

activities to support the Convention’s institutions.

However, in the period before revenues are sufficient to cover all or part of the regime’s operating

costs each Commission member will contribute to

its operation. Initially, each of the 22 members will

contribute equal shares to the budget, but as soon as

possible a more equitable formula will be established, by consensus, that will take into account each

member’s ability to pay (art. 35). It is unlikely that

revenues will significantly offset expenses for the

foreseeable future.

In the event that resource activities do commence,

revenues will begin to offset some of the regime’s

expenses. At some point revenues may be able to

cover all of the Minerals Convention’s operating

costs, and surpluses may be generated. What to do

with possible revenue surpluses was one of the more

difficult problems in the negotiations. Claimant

states hoped that a portion of excess revenues

automatically would be allocated to the relevant

claimant in recognition of its ‘special interest. The

final text specified that excess revenues would be

used in three ways:
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 8.5

1.

2.

3.

This

to reimburse operational expenses paid by

Commission members in years before revenues begin to offset some or all of the regime’s

expenses (art. 35(lb));

to promote scientific research in Antarctica by

all Parties (especially by developing country

Parties), particularly research related to the

environment and resources of Antarctica (art.

35(la); and

to ensure that ‘‘the interests of the members of

Regulatory Committees having the most direct

interest in the matter in relation to the areas in

question are respected in any disposition of

that surplus” (art. 35(7b)).

last vague statement could be interpreted to

apply primarily to claimant states. Given the other

claims on excess revenues and the fact that all

budgetary decisions—including allocation of excess

revenues—require a consensus vote, it is far short of

the guaranteed share of revenues that claimant states

hoped to acquire.

The Convention specifies three methods for

generating revenue:

1.

2.

3.

Operators will be required to pay fees to cover

the handling costs of notifications for prospecting and identification of an area and for

applications for exploration and development;

Operators will be responsible for levies on

exploration and development activities, where

the principal purpose is to offset the operating

expenses of the Convention; and

Operators will be obligated to make payments

‘‘in the nature of and similar to taxes ,royalties,

or payments in kind (art. 47(k)).

The amount Operators would be required to pay

is not specified in the Convention. The Commission

is to adopt general rules governing revenue at a later

date. The relevant Regulatory Committee will specify the specific financial obligations of each Operator as part of each Operator’s Management Scheme.

Fees covering the administrative costs of notifications and applications are unlikely to be a burden to

Operators. However, levies to finance the costs of

the institutions and taxes, royalties, and other

financial payments could be significant. These

might be important factors for an Operator in

determining whether to proceed with a project.

Regulatory Committees may have difficulty specifying the amounts or percentages of Operator

obligations. An Operator is unlikely to proceed

unless there is a financial incentive to do so, that is,

unless it can be assured of an adequate rate of return

after these obligations are met. (Apps. A and B

contain more information about development costs.)

OPERATORS AND SPONSOR

STATES

The relationship between an Operator and its

Sponsor in the Convention is important. On the one

hand, Sponsors are to evaluate Operators and

oversee their activities. For instance. they must

ensure at each stage in the process that their

Operators are qualified to undertake resource development activities without violating provisions of the

Minerals Convention. In particular, they must ensure

that Operators have the financial capacity and

technical competence to respond to threats or harm

to the environment. Sponsors must also ensure that

Operators maintain a substantial and genuine link

with them; that data and information supplied by

Operators is acceptable; and that activities of their

Operators do not infringe on the rights of other

Operators.

On the other hand, Sponsors will need to support

and defend the interests of their Operators. On behalf

of Operators, Sponsors must notify the Commission

in advance of prospecting, promote Operator interests in identifying areas for exploration and development, and submit applications for exploration and

development permits to the Regulatory Committees.

In helping to develop Management Schemes to

guide Operator activities, the oversight and support

roles of Sponsors intermingle and could potentially

conflict.

Significantly, an Operator-at least one based in

a free market economy like the United States—is

free to choose its own Sponsor. The presumption

that a multinational company with headquarters in

the United States will want or need to select the

United States as its Sponsor may not be correct, The

selection of a Sponsor will depend in part on how

willing the Sponsor is to defend Operator interests.

One important factor in establishing industry confidence in the Minerals Convention is the degree to

which the Sponsoring State will expedite procedural

matters for the applicant and defend his position in
86 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

the controversial situations that may arise from time

to time.17 If an Operator does not perceive that the

United States can provide this help and support, it

may seek a Sponsor elsewhere. Without a supportive

Sponsor, Operators may find it too difficult to

participate in Antarctic minerals activities.

Operators are also likely to consider a prospective

Sponsor’s procedural requirements. Sponsors with

complicated or time-consuming procedures would

be less appealing than Sponsors with easier ones, all

other things being equal. Operators also might see

some advantage in choosing as Sponsor the country

claiming the area of interest. A claimant state, for

instance, might be more inclined to cast its vote in

favor of opening an area if an Operator selected that

claimant to sponsor its activities and/or perhaps

made other concessions that facilitated development.

The United States could establish elaborate regulations for potential Operators only to find no

Operators interested in being sponsored by it. This

will occur if standards in other countries are less

stringent and if the United States does not offer

offsetting advantages, However, if the United States

stands behind its Operators, its support, given its

longstanding leadership role in Antarctica, could be

valuable. Conversely, its lack of support could hurt:

the United States can always veto development at an

early stage, and it has substantial influence at all

stages to affect the outcome of decisions. Operators

could find the United States to be a valuable ally.

LIABILITY AND RESPONSE

ACTION

One of the most difficult issues the Parties

faced was the issue of liability and response

action for activities that result or threaten to

result in damage to the Antarctic environment.

The underlying difficulty involved ensuring that

damages and injuries would be adequately compensated without making activities prohibitively difficult or expensive to undertake. Article 8 of the

Convention establishes general provisions for liability and response action, but negotiators were unable

to reach agreement on several important liability

concerns. They decided that once negotiations on the

Minerals Convention were complete, they would

begin negotiating a separate Liability Protocol to the

Convention. The Protocol is to be adopted by

consensus and ratified by the same procedure as the

Convention. Pending its entry into force, no exploration or development will be allowed.

The framework established in article 8 requires

that Operators take “necessary and timely” response action for all activities that damage or

threaten Antarctica’s environment. Operators are

‘‘strictly liable’ for all environmental damage

arising from mineral resource activities, including

but not limited to clean-up and restoration costs.

Strictly liable is defined as meaning an Operator is

liable for damages whether it is later found at fault

or not. Thus, for example, the Operator must pay if

there is no restoration to the status quo ante

following damage to the environment. How much is

not specified. It is unclear who is entitled to payment

when there is no personal injury or damage to private

property. Presumably, damage payments would be

collected and expended by the Commission. It is

also presumed that claims by territorial claimants for

environmental damage to claimed areas as such

would not be permitted.

A contentious subject of the negotiations concerned the defenses or limits on liability that would

be available to Operators. Two defenses are specified

●

●

in the Convention (art. 8(4)):

the Operator is not liable to the extent damage

was caused directly by a natural disaster of

exceptional character that could not reasonably

have been foreseen, and

by armed conflict, or by an act of terrorism

against which no reasonable precautionary

measures could have been taken.

The Operator’s right to seek contribution or

indemnity from another party that caused or contributed to the damage is unaffected, but this does

not limit the Operator’s liability to a plaintiff. Even

a negligent plaintiff may collect damages from the

Operator, Only if the plaintiff caused the damage by

an intentional or grossly negligent act is the Operator

relieved in whole or in part of the duty to pay for

damages (art. 8(6)). Pursuant to this system, an

17GMRu, 0p. cit., foomote 14
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 87

Operator might well be liable for environmental

damage if, for example, a ship crashes into the

Operator’s offshore drilling rig.

In addition, to the extent the Operator or some

other source does not satisfy all claims, the Sponsoring State is liable for damage caused by the Operator

that would not have occurred had the Sponsoring

State adequately supervised the Operator (art. 8(3)).

The Sponsoring State is also responsible for ensuring that its Operators maintain the necessary

financial and technical capacity to undertake any

required response and to meet any potential liability.

Any Sponsor that was lax in this regard could be

liable for a large proportion of damages in the event

of an accident. However, Parties could not agree that

the Sponsoring State would be required to satisfy

unmet claims on its Operator if the Sponsoring State

carried out its duties in a responsible manner.

Permits for exploration and development may not

be issued until the Liability Protocol enters into

force. Prospecting, on the other hand, may go

forward after the Minerals Convention is ratified.

Pending the entry into force of the Protocol, claims

against prospectors may be brought in national

courts pursuant to provisions of the Convention and

national law implementing those provisions (art.

8(10)).

The Minerals Convention specifically states that

the Protocol include rules and procedures on liability

to protect the Antarctic environment, including

appropriate limits on liability, where such limits can

be justified; ensuring that means are available for

immediate response action where the Operator is

incapable of doing so; and ensuring that all liability

is satisfied (e.g., in those cases where the Operator

is not financially able to meet its obligations in full

or where damages exceed limits on liability) (art.

8(7)). A fund or funds for covering outstanding

claims may be established, to be financed by

Operators or on an industry-wide basis. Presumably,

the Protocol will also have to interpret the defenses

to liability noted above.

The Minerals Convention and accompanying

Protocol aim to establish a very stringent liability

regime that reflects underlying environmental values. However, mining companies and their Sponsors

and insurers may be reluctant to accept such

potential liability if it is open-ended. Thus, the

economic acceptability of these provisions depends

on the Protocol that remains to be negotiated and, in

particular, on any liability limits fixed in the

Protocol and associated fund arrangements. The

Convention also leaves open the possibility of

establishing an international claims tribunal in the

Protocol by which claims against Operators may be

assessed and adjudicated.

The liability provisions of the Convention deal

almost exclusively with environmental considerations. All that is said about liability for personal

injury to or death of a human being or injury to

property not involving environmental or related

damage is that it is regulated by ‘ ‘applicable law and

procedures” (art. 8(5)). The Protocol may be an

appropriate place in which to define these issues

more fully.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AND THE MINERALS

CONVENTION

The environmental requirements and sanctions of the Minerals Convention establish a

potentially strong environmental regime. At this

stage, it would appear that the main uncertainty

with the framework established by the Convention is how compliance and enforcement would

work and how strong the regime would be in

practice. No mineral resource activities are to take

place unless information adequate to enable informed judgments is available; unless it is judged,

based on assessment of possible impacts, that the

activity would not cause significant effects on air

and water quality or significant changes in atmospheric, terrestrial, or marine environments or significant changes in the distribution, abundance, or

productivity of populations of species of fauna or

flora; unless technology and procedures are available for safe operations; or unless there exists the

capacity to respond effectively to accidents (art. 4).

Moreover, Regulatory Committees may suspend,

modify, or cancel Management Schemes and exploration and development permits, and they may

impose monetary penalties for failure to comply

with the provisions of the Convention (art. 51).

The environmental provisions of the Minerals

Convention appear to be as strong as+or stronger than-similar provisions in other interna-
88 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

tional agreements. However, although the text

forms the basis for a strong environmental regime,

many points are not defined, such as what constitutes

a ‘‘significant’ environmental impact and how

much information about a prospective area is

“adequate” or “sufficient.” The definitions of

these terms vary and may in the end be determined

on the basis of political considerations. Even apparently clear parts of the text may be subject to

different interpretations, so a strong environmental

regime is hardly ‘‘writ in stone. ”18

Also, environmental concerns, mostly abstract by

necessity at this stage, may be brushed aside if and

when resource development becomes a reality.

Thus, when environmental regulation becomes a

practical rather than anticipatory necessity, a growing number of states may regard strict environmental

requirements as an impediment to their investors—

both directly and because the state that sponsors

mining may itself become liable for inadequate

supervision of its Operators. 19 Some states may

argue that a strict environmental regime favors the

most advanced companies from the wealthiest

states. On this basis, less developed countries may

be inclined to pass less strict rules to attract

Operators. However, the unusually strong environmental requirements of the Convention itself, coupled with compulsory dispute settlement and a

strong Liability Protocol, may be sufficient insurance against the possibility that some states may be

significantly less concerned about the environment

than others.

Even where environmental regulations are strict,

ensuring compliance with them is difficult and

requires political will. The Convention has general

provisions concerning compliance in article 7 and

also provides for inspection, monitoring, reporting

on Operator activities, and for observers in Commission and Advisory Committee meetings. However,

‘‘enforcement issues are difficult to agree on in the

Antarctic context, because they relate so directly to

the rights of a sovereign state in its territory. Both

claimants and nonclaimants wish to avoid any

provisions in the Convention that prejudice their

position on sovereignty in Antarctica. ’ ’20 Each Party

is asked to take appropriate measures ‘‘within its

competence’ (this term is used to avoid prejudicing

positions on sovereignty) to ensure compliance with

the Convention. Specific rights are not assigned,

also to avoid implications of sovereignty.

The Convention thus presumes a system of “flag

state enforcement’ for environmental protection,

which may be less effective than other systems. But

other systems of enforcement are impractical because of the sovereignty issue. At present, Parties are

largely responsible for policing themselves with

respect to scientific and other activities carried out

under the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty. The

Treaty System has no centralized review mechanism

or regulatory authority to oversee national activities

in Antarctica, and at present the ATCPs are reluctant

to criticize each other’s activities. Criticism might

easily lead to uneasy discussions about who is

entitled to what rights and who may enforce

obligations. For example, environmental groups

have criticized French construction of an airstrip in

an environmentally sensitive area near the Dumont

D’Urville research base. But other Treaty states do

not have the authority to review the French plans.

The Convention improves on this situation by more

clearly defining binding legal rights and obligations

and subjecting Parties to binding dispute settlement

in most cases.

Some have suggested that an international environmental protection agency be established for

Antarctica. The difficulty with this proposal, again,

is that an agency with sufficient independent authority would be virtually impossible to establish in the

multilateral context of Antarctica and given the

reality of the dispute over sovereignty. Given these

constraints, an Antarctic EPA would not necessarily

have any advantages over the system established in

the Minerals Convention.

The power of Regulatory Committees to suspend,

modify, or cancel Management Schemes is important. Support for outright cancellation of projects

perceived to be causing unforeseen damage to the

environment may be difficult to achieve once

activities have started; however, support for modifications to Management Schemes if problems arise

16B. H, m, ‘‘Ev~uating the Antarctic Minerals Convention: The Decision-Making System, ’ OTA contractor report, November 1988, p. 7.

l%id., p. 13.

WCimbd, op. cit., footnote 4, P. 18.
Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 89

ought to be much easier. Ultimately, the effectiveness

of environmental protection under the Minerals

Convention rests largely with the political will of the

Parties.

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

The Convention specifies that the Parties shall

submit to compulsory arbitration or adjudication of certain disputes (table 3-7). This system

could prove useful when a state is accused of

violating the Convention (e.g., by failure to fulfill its

duty to supervise compliance by its Operators with

environmental requirements). In addition, the Convention contemplates the establishment of an arbitral mechanism pursuant to which Operators can

challenge certain decisions by a Regulatory Committee regarding their Management Schemes and

permits.

However, the Convention text places significant

constraints on the jurisdiction of any tribunal to

review ‘‘the exercise by an institution of its discretionary powers in accordance with this Convention’

(art. 57(5)). It is unclear how broadly these constraints will be construed by a tribunal, They could

be construed in a manner that is consistent with the

traditions of many countries regarding judicial

review of administrative agencies, namely that it is

up to the reviewing tribunal to decide whether the

agency had the discretion to act as it did under the

Convention, but that it is not the function of the

tribunal to substitute its judgments for those of the

agency. It is also possible for the constraints to be

construed to require almost complete deference to

any decision by the Commission or a Regulatory

Committee that can be characterized as ‘‘discretionary. ”

The United States may wish to include an

interpretive statement on this topic in connection

with any instrument of ratification. Such a statement

could note that the constraints on the jurisdiction of

a tribunal to review the exercise of discretion by an

institution established by the Convention do not

preclude it from determining whether that institution

had the power to decide as it did under the

Convention, whether the decision violated a substantive or procedural provision of the Convention,

or whether that organ otherwise exceeded or abused

its powers.

Table 3-7-Dispute Settlement

General provisions:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Either’ the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the Arbitral

Tribunal established by the Convention may be used to settle

disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the

Convention, Art. 56.

Parties to the dispute are requested, first, to try to settle

disputes among themselves by any agreed means, Art, 57(1).

Disputes are automatically referred to one of t he above dispute

settlement bodies if agreement cannot be reached. Art. 56 and

57.

Neither the ICJ nor the Arbitral Tribunal shall have authority to

settle disputes related to claims. Art, 57(4).

Neither the ICJ nor the Arbitral Tribunal shall have authority to

settle disputes between Parties with regard to the exercise by

an institution of its discretionary powers. Art. 57(5).

Any Party may exclude some types of disputes from being

referred to a dispute settlement body without its consent, but

may not do so regarding disputes about provisions of the

Convention: a) on protection of the environment, b) on

compliance with the Convention, c) on response action and

liability, d) on inspection, e) on non-discrimination, f) on other

uses of Antarctica, and g) on prospecting. Art. 58 (1a-g).

Additional dispute settlement procedures for Operators will be

established by the Commission, for example, providing a

means by which an Operator may dispute a decision to decline

a Management Scheme. Art. 59.

Institutional oversight

● The Arbitral Panel is responsible for settling all disputes

submitted to it. Annex Art. 10.

. A dispute may be referred for discussion to the Institution which

adopted the instrument in question if the dispute is still

unresolved after 6 months of consultation by the disputing

parties. Art. 57(3a).

Obligations of disputing parties:

. To consult among themselves as soon as possible, using any

agreed means to resolve the dispute, Art. 57(1),

● If unable to resolve the dispute among themselves, to comply

with the decision of the Arbritral Tribunal (Annex Art, 11 ) or ICJ,

. To provide the Arbitral Tribunall where relevant, with all

applicable documents and information, and enable it, when

necessary, to call witnesses or experts and receive their

evidence. Annex Art. 8.

SOURCE” OffIoe of Technology Assessment, 1989

* **

The Minerals Convention establishes the framework for deciding what, if any, resource activities

will be allowed to take place in Antarctica and for

regulating any activities that are allowed. What do

we currently know about what mineral resources

may at some time be worthwhile to develop and

what effect development could have on the environment? These are the subjects of the next two

chapters.
Chapter 4

Potential Mineral Resources

in Antarctica

Photo credit: U.S. Geological Survey

Byrd Glacier
CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GEOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Relationship to Adjacent Continents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Offshore Shelf Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ANTARCTICA IN THE CONTEXT OF FUTURE MINERALS SUPPLY . . . . . . . . . . .

Prospecting and Exploration in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Probabilities of Discovering Antarctic Mineral Deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SELECTED MINERAL RESOURCES ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Oil and Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chromium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Copper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Gold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Iron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Molybdenum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Platinum-Group Metals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rare-Earth Metals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Diamonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

93

96

99

102

103

105

110

111

111

114

114

115

116

117

118

119

119

120

122

Boxes

Box Page

4-A. Mineral Resources and Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

4-B. Geologic Time Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

4-C. Icebergs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Figures

Figur e Page

4-1. Antarctic Mineral Occurrences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

4-2. Geologic Provinces of Antarctica and Their Relationship to

Adjacent Gondwana Continents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

4-3. Reconstruction of Gondwana in Early Cretaceus Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

4-4. Exposed Rock Outcrop in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

4-5. What Antarctica Would Look Like If the Ice Were Removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

4-6. Multichannel Seismic Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

4-7. Sedimentary Basins in Antarctica

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,.. , 112

Tables

Table Page

4-1. Desirable Research for Evaluating Resource Potential of Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

4-2. Research Required To Ensure That Petroleum Resources Are Safely and

Efficiently Recovered With Minimum Environmental Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

4-3. Estimated Number of Major Mineral Deposits in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Chapter 4

Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica

SUMMARY

Scientists have discovered occurrences (small

amounts) of several minerals in Antarctica, but

there are no known mineral deposits of commercial interest. Mineral deposits are likely to have

formed in Antarctica, just as they have on adjacent

continents once connected to Antarctica, but because nearly 98 percent of the continent is covered

by ice, few mineral deposits are likely to be exposed.

Development of any resources found in Antarctica will be expensive. At current prices, a metallic

mineral deposit found in Antarctica would not be

economic to develop unless of world class size or

grade with an in-place value of $200 to $400 per ton,

depending on location. An oil field would have to

contain at least several billion barrels of recoverable

oil. Even at this size, world oil prices would at least

have to double before the field could be economically developed. Mineral development in Antarctica

could be driven by political or strategic motives

rather than by a quest for profit. Some believe these

motives may become important; OTA does not view

them as being as significant as market incentives.

The probability of finding mineral deposits is

highest on the Antarctic Peninsula, in part because

more rock is exposed there. Outside the Antarctic

Peninsula the probability of finding mineral deposits

in exposed areas is small. Based on the geology of

the Peninsula region, the deposits most likely to be

found are base metals (copper, lead, and zinc) and

precious metals (gold and silver). The hard mineral

deposits with the best prospects for economic

recovery in Antarctica are low-volume, high-value

deposits, such as gold, particularly if such deposits

can be found in accessible locations. The Dufek

intrusion in the northern Pensacola Mountains could

host platinum-group metals, chromium, copper,

cobalt, and nickel. However, discovery of a mineral

deposit in a relatively inaccessible inland area, such

as the Pensacola Mountains, would greatly diminish

its prospects for economic recovery. Virtually all of

the potentially economic minerals known to occur in

Antarctica are currently abundant in other, more

accessible areas of the world.

The offshore sedimentary basins surrounding

Antarctica offer the best prospects for petroleum

exploration. The Weddell and Ross embayments in

West Antarctica, and Prydz Bay and the Wilkes

Basin in East Antarctica are among the basins most

likely to contain petroleum, based on what is known

about the thickness, organic content, age, and

thermal history of the sedimentary rock. However,

until these basin areas are more fully explored,

particularly by drilling, meaningful estimates of

petroleum potential cannot be made. For the most

part, the sedimentary basins on the surrounding

continents that have analogs in Antarctica are not

major petroleum producing provinces.

INTRODUCTION

The resource potential of Antarctica is receiving

increased global attention as a result of technological developments, continued scientific research, and

the drive to develop additional sources of energy and

minerals supply. At present there are no known

economic mineral deposits in Antarctica. However,

scientists postulate that high grade mineral deposits

exist there, as they do in all large land masses. Such

mineral deposits would be difficult to locate: the

extensive ice cover and limited opportunity for

exploration are likely to preclude discovery of all but

a tiny fraction of any potential ore bodies. Furthermore, the mineral deposits most likely to be economic, which would be high concentrations of

metals in ore bodies, tend to be localized features

hidden by overburden or otherwise difficult to locate

even under more hospitable conditions. In addition,

since the onset of glaciation, enrichment processes

related to near-surface weathering and water movement, such as occur in more temperate regions,

would not have occurred in Antarctica. Despite these

caveats, it is entirely possible that some mineral

deposits might be found in Antarctica which could

at some future time be of sufficient economic value

that their extraction might be considered.

A great variety of mineral occurrences have been

found in Antarctica, but no mineral occurs in

sufficient concentration or grade to be commercially

minable. The term ‘‘mineral occurrence’ is used to

refer to small amounts of a mineral that in larger

-93-
94 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

volumes in other parts of the world has been mined

or is an indicator of a minable deposit. The term

‘‘mineral deposit” is used to refer to a large amount

of some mineral without reference to its economic

value. The term ‘‘mineral commodity’ is used here

to refer to the mineral itself or the refined product

made from it. Other than ice, only two mineral

commodities, a sedimentary iron ore formation in

the Prince Charles Mountains of East Antarctica and

coal beds in the Transantarctic Mountains, are

known to be of sufficient size even to be classified

as “deposits.” Because of their inaccessibility in

Antarctica and abundance elsewhere, neither is

considered a commercial deposit.

Mineral deposits can be divided into several

categories based on a combination of geologic and

economic criteria according to a system developed

jointly by the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S.

Bureau of Mines. ] Known deposits are either demonstrated or inferred and can range from subeconomic resources to reserves (box 4-A). Reserves

are identified mineral deposits that are economically

recoverable with current technology. Subeconomic

resources are those that have been identified but are

not recoverable under current economic conditions

and technology. In Antarctica, identified fresh water

(ice), coal, and iron ore deposits would be classified

as subeconomic. Speculative resources are unknown or undiscovered deposits outside districts

where economically extractable mineralization is

known to have occurred. With few exceptions, the

mineral resources of Antarctica would be classified as speculative at this time.

While the classification of mineral resources will

change with time, most experts would agree that

classification of Antarctic minerals is not likely to

change before the end of this century and probably

not for several more decades. Any change would

depend on what, if anything, is found, where it is

found, and the supply and demand situation at the

time of discovery. To be economically viable at

current prices, a metallic mineral deposit in Antarctica would likely have to be world class in size or

grade and have an ore value of $200 to $400 per ton

depending on its location. For a gold deposit, this

would be approximately 10 times the grade of

● ’. ,

- ,.

*

.

‘%

Photo credit. Am Hawthorne

Transantarctic Mountains en route to the

South Pole from McMurdo.

deposits currently being developed in the western

United States. In the case of petroleum, afield would

have to contain several billion barrels of recoverable

oil or about three orders of magnitude larger than

would be economic onshore in the United States.

The following sections discuss the geological

inferences regarding the formation and location of

mineral deposits in Antarctica, assess the probabilities of discovering Antarctic mineral deposits, and

offer some perspective on a selection of mineral

commodities that might exist in Antarctica. The

individual commodities discussed are not intended

to represent all minerals likely to be found in

Antarctica, but were chosen to provide a selection of

1 I ‘~ciples of a Reso~ce/Re~Nc Classification for Minerals, from Geological Survey Circular 831, 1980, Mineraf Commodity Summu ries 1988,

U.S. Bureau of hfiXICS, pp. 184-187.
Chapter 4--Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 95

Box 4-A—Mineral Resources and Reserves

A general classification for describing the status of mineral occurrences was developed by the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Bureau of Mines in 1976. The so-called ‘‘McKelvey Box” named after the thendirector of the USGS, Vincent McKelvey, further simplified the understanding of the of the economic relationships

of the mineral-resource classification system:

Cumulative

production

ECONOMIC

MARGINALLY

ECONOMIC

IDENTIFIED RESOURCES

Demonstrated

Inferred

Measured ] Indicated

Reserves I

Inferred reserves

Marginal reserves I

Inferred

marginal reserves

Inferred Demonstrated subeconomic

subeconomic resources resources

I

UNDISCOVERED RESOURCES

Probability range

Hypothetical (or) Speculative

1

plausibe examples covering a range of geological other publications and papers in press by U.S.

environments. Data on mineral occurrences in ‘Ant- Geological Survey personnel. Data on world mararctica in the following sections are largely taken kets were abstracted from the U.S. Bureau of Mines,

from publications of the U.S. Geological Survey and Mineral Commodity Summaries. Data on coal and
96 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

uranium are from publications of the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of

Energy and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency.

The ratio of reserve base (see box 4-A) to current

production was used in the sections devoted to

specific mineral commodities to gain perspective on

the future supply and market potential. These ratios

are presented only for comparative purposes. Even

in cases where the reserve base is large relative to

current production (long term supply), this does not

necessarily imply that if a high grade opportunity

can be found in Antarctica, it would not attract

interest. The reserve base rather than reserves was

chosen because it includes not only reserves, which

are currently economic, but also resources that are

marginally economic and, to an undefined extent,

some of the subeconomic resources. The reserve

base is a broader term than reserves and, thus, for the

purpose of defining future supplies, perhaps a better

indicator. The broader category of “resources”

could also have been used, resulting in a larger ratio.

This might be more appropriate because, with few

exceptions, the mineral resources of Antarctica

would be classified no higher than speculative at this

time. However, since for the purpose of projecting a

future market it must be assumed that a deposit in

Antarctica has been found, it would seem more

realistic to project it in competition with known

mineral resources reasonably likely to be developed

in the future.

Current production is the other aspect of the

reserve base to production ratio. Considering the

variables in past minerals production, no attempt

was made to project future production or to assess

future needs based on changes in technology.

Beyond short term fluctuations, decreases in annual

production rates are generally less likely than

increases. Obviously, higher annual production rates

would reduce reserve base to production ratios,

assuming there were no additions to the reserve base.

Historical trends would suggest, however, that there

will be additions to the reserve base. Projecting the

extent to which this may offset increased future

minerals production would depend, to some extent,

on one’s level of optimism.

Mineral development in Antarctica, if it were to

occur, could also be driven by political or strategic

concerns rather than by economic viability. Some

believe that these concerns may become important.

Therefore, strategic and critical materials concerns

of the United States, if any, are also briefly

summarized for the commodities discussed.

GEOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS

Antarctica can be divided into two parts on the

basis of geology and topography, East Antarctica

and West Antarctica. These areas are separated by

the long mountain belt of the Transantarctic Mountains (figure 4-l). The line of division corresponds

roughly to the division between the Eastern and

Western Hemispheres or more closely to the 30°W.

150oE. meridian. East Antarctica is roughly twice as

large as West Antarctica and is geologically older. It

is a vast ice-covered plain with mountain peaks and

ice-free areas only around the edges. Completely

ice-covered mountain chains lie under the ice cap.

East Antarctica is mostly a shield2 area consisting

of very old (Precambrian) igneous, metamorphic,

and deformed sedimentary rocks locally overlain by

younger (Paleozoic through lower Mesozoic) sedimentary and igneous rocks of the Beacon Supergroup and their equivalents (box 4-B). The younger

rocks are generally flat-lying and are especially

widespread in the Transantarctic Mountains, which

border the East Antarctic shield and provide a link to

the younger sedimentary and volcanic rocks of West

Antarctica. The geological picture, in general, is one

of progressive addition through West Antarctica of

younger belts of rock to the East Antarctic shield.

The rocks of East Antarctica are rarely exposed

except along the coast and in the Transantarctic

Mountains. In a few places near the coast, ice-free

areas are found as ‘‘dry valley s,’ where receding

glaciers and arid climate have left moraines and

brackish lakes on the valley floor. The shield of East

Antarctica contains a wide variety of mineral

occurrences of a wide variety, as do shield areas of

other continents. In contrast to the East Antarctic

shield, relatively few mineral occurrences of interest

have been found in the Transantarctic Mountains—

2’MYIIS hat appear in the glossary (app. G) are in bold the first time they appw.
Chapter 4-Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 97

Figure 4-l-Antarctic Mineral Occurrences

Antarctic Mineral Occurrences

, Nunataks

W

SOURCE. U.S. Geological Survey, 19SS,

Prince

Charles

Mts

SOUTH POLE

Shelf Edge

Queen Mary

Coast

o Kilometers 2000

with the exception of the Dufek Massif in the Mineral deposits of moderate size and grade could

northern Pensacola Mountains near the Weddell be present in the Transantarctic Mountains. Among

Sea. 3 The Dufek intrusion is one of the world’s the most likely host rocks for ore mineralization

largest layered mafic igneous complexes and is would be:

similar in certain respects to the mineral-rich Bush- • layered mafic intrusions such as the Dufek

veld complex of South Africa. (platinum-group metals, chromium, cobalt, nickel);

3petcr D, Rowley, pau] L, Williams, and Douglm E fide; ‘‘Mineral Occurrences of Anhwctwa, ’ pt’tWICW and Mined Resources of Atiarctica,

John C. Behrendt (cd.), U.S. Geological Survey Circular 909, 1983, p. 27,
98 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Box 4-B-Geologic Time Scale

Began Duration in

(millions of millions of

Time interval Major event years ago) years

Cenozoic Era

Quaternary Period

Holocene Epoch

Pleistocene Epoch

Tertiary Period

Pliocene Epoch

Miocene Epoch

Oligocene Epoch

Eocene Epoch

Paleocene Epoch

Mesozoic Era

Cretaceus Period

Jurassic Period

Triassic Period

Paleozoic Era

Permian Period

Pennsylvanian Period

Mississippian Period

Devonian Period

Silurian Period

Ordovician Period

Cambrian Period

Precambrian Era

SOURCE: Geologmal !k-mety of Armzica, 1983.

Man abundant 0.01 0.01

Man appears 1,6 1.59

5.3 3.7

Mammals diversify 23.7 18,4

Grasses spread

36.6 12.9

Mammals develop rapidly 57.8 21,2

66.4 8.6

Dinosaurs become extinct, 144 77.6

Flowering plants appear

Birds appear 208 64

Primative mammals appear, 245 37

Dinosaurs appear

Reptiles appear 286 41

Insects abundant 320 34

360 40

Fish abundant 408 48

Amphibians appear 438 30

Land plants and

animals appear

Fish appear 505 67

Marine invertebrates appear 570 65

Simple marine plants 3,800? 3,230?

. sequences of marine sediments that incorporate

substantial proportions of intermediate to silicic volcanic materials (copper, lead, zinc,

silver); and

● porphyritic intrusions of intermediate t. sili.

cic composition (copper, molybdenum, silver,

gold). 4

West Antarctica contains mountain ranges and

of scattered islands or group of islands surrounding

the submerged Byrd Basin, which would connect

with the Ross Sea, the Amundsen Sea, and the

Weddell Sea.

The exposed rocks of West Antarctica in the

Ellsworth orogen, between the Ross and Weddell

Seas, are Paleozoic sediments and Mesozoic intrusions generally devoid of known metallic mineraliisolated peaks, called nunataks, that extend through zation. The probability that significant mineral

the ice and snow cover. Overall, the West Antarctic deposits are present in this zone appears to be poor.

ice surface is much lower topographically than that The thick sequences of sedimentary rocks like those

of East Antarctica. If the present ice cover were exposed in the Ellsworth Mountains do not appear

removed, West Antarctica would appear as a series likely to host metallic ores, although the presence of

4fq, A. wright@ p, L. wil]i~s, Miwrd Resources of Antamica, U.S. Gtx3iogic2d SWey CifCUi~ 705, 1974, p. 22.
Chapter 4--Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 99

Photo credit: Ann Hawthorne

Collecting samples on Mt. Oliver in Upper Wright Valley.

Mesozoic intrusive rocks in the Whitmore Mountains suggests somewhat more favorable conditions

there.5

A substantial part of the Antarctic Peninsula

consists of igneous intrusions of Mesozoic and

Tertiary age that form a composite magmatic arc;

arc-related volcanic and sedimentary rocks of similar age also occur. The volcanic and intrusive rocks

of the Antarctic Peninsula belong to the calcalkaline magmatic suite, rocks which in other parts

of the world are associated with copper-lead-zinc

ores. Consequently, the peninsula is a favorable

geologic environment for copper, molybdenum,

lead, zinc, tin, tungsten, silver, gold, and other

mineral deposits.

Relationship to Adjacent Continents

One way of assessing the mineral potential of

Antarctica is by analogy with mineral deposits found

in similar geologic settings on surrounding continents, Antarctica’s relationship to the surrounding

continents can be explained by the process of plate

tectonics. According to the theory of plate tectonics,

the Earth’s rigid outer layer, called the lithosphere,

is a mosaic of slablike plates that move with respect

to one another at rates averaging a few centimeters

per year. The plates ride on a hot, plastic layer of the

Earth’s mantle called the asthenosphere. Plate

movements are thought to be driven by convection

currents or density changes in the mantle and cause

a seafloor-spreading process, in which molten material from the asthenosphere rises through the lithosphere to form new ocean crust at ridges on the ocean

floor. Newly created oceanic crust moves outward

from the mid-ocean ridge spreading centers. if the

oceanic crust meets a continent on another plate, it

may sink under the continent and be drawn down

into the mantle in a process called subduction, (This

process occurs along the Pacific coast of South

America where Pacific crust plunges beneath the

western margin of the continent. ) Alternatively, if a

continent is on the same plate as the new seafloor, it

is carried along as though on a raft. (New ocean floor

generated in the Atlantic Ocean carries the American

continent westward toward the Pacific. ) In general,

the continents are carried passively by the lithospheric plates, which grow by seafloor spreading and

occasionally collide to form mountain belts such as

the Himalayas.

Reconstructing the former locations of continents

based on the geologic record of plate movement

indicates that approximately 200 million years ago

the major land masses of the Southern Hemisphere,

including what is now Antarctica. were joined

together into a giant continent called Gondwana or

Gondwanaland. In particular, the geological record

shows that the western two-thirds of Australia, India,

and part of southern Africa were close to East

Antarctica at least during the Late Paleozoic and

Early Mesozoic Eras.

The core areas of the continents are the old

Precambrian shields. In the reconstruction of Gondwana, the Brazilian shield, African shield, Indian

shield, Australian shield, and East Antarctic shield

are all brought into close juxtaposition like pieces of

a puzzle (figure 4-2). South America, though not

‘[bId., p. 23.
100 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Figure 4-2--Geologic Provinces of Antarctica and Their Relationship to Adjacent Gondwana Continents

<

/A >

SHIELD

/-/ EAST

SOURCE: J.C. Behrendt, “Are There Petroleum Resourc=m m Antarctica?’< Petroleum and Mineraf f?esomxs of Antarchea, J.C. Behrendt (cd.), U.S.

Geologml Survey Circular 909, 1983, p 6.

contiguous with East Antarctica, was close to deposits of Mount Isa and Broken Hill, Australia;

Africa.6 Numerous mineral occurrences are found in and diamond-bearing pipes of South Africa, India,

the shield of East Antarctica. Many of these occur- and Australia.7 The Brazilian shield also contains

rences are similar to the mineralization of major important deposits of these types. Thus, since the

economic deposits in comparable shield areas f the shield areas of the adjacent continents in the

adjacent continents, These major deposits include Gondwana reconstruction have major mineral deiron-formations and bedded manganese in Austra- posits similar to the types of mineralization found in

lia, India, and Africa; conglomeratic placer gold- the East Antarctic shield, it would seem reasonable

uranium deposits of the Witwatersrand in South to expect that similar deposits were formed in

Africa; chromite, nickel-copper, platinum, and mag- Antarctica,

netite-vanadium deposits of the stratiform Not only are the shield areas related, but analogs

Bushveld intrusion of South Africa; copper-cobalt can also be found among the other geologic provdeposits of Zambia and Zaire; nickel deposits in inces of Antarctica. The Ross deformational belt of

intrusions in Australia; gold deposits in mafic the Transantarctic Mountains extends into central

volcanic rocks in Australia; lead-zinc-copper-silver Australia. The Flinders Ranges north of the city of

61bid., pp. 18-19.

Tpeter D. Rowley, paul L. Williams, and Douglas E. pride, ‘ ‘Metallic and Nonmetallic Mineral Resources of Antarctica, ” The Geology of Antarctica,

R,J, Tingey (wI,), Oxford University Ress (in press).
Chapter 4-Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 101

Adelaide lie within the Adelaide orogen and appear

to correlate with parts of the Transantarctic Mountains. Numerous deposits of copper with associated

gold, lead, zinc, silver, barium, manganese, antimony, and other metals are found in the Flinders

Ranges in rocks of Late Precambrian and Early

Paleozoic age. The deposit types include veins,

stockworks, and replacement bodies generally related to Early Paleozoic igneous activity. Porphyry

copper deposits and stratiform lead-zinc deposits are

also found in the area. In the same general area is the

recently discovered ore body at Roxby Downs,

which is rich in copper, gold, silver, uranium, and

rare-earth minerals. Further to the east, a belt

referred to as the East Australian erogenic province

(also called the Tasman orogen) consists of progressively younger sediments, volcanic rocks, and intrusions extending into the Early Mesozoic. This

province, a portion of which geologically resembles

part of north Victoria Land (the Borchgrevink

orogen) in Antarctica, contains deposits of copper,

lead, and zinc associated with submarine volcanism

and tin, tungsten, molybdenum, bismuth, gold, and

other metals apparently associated with subsequent

granitic intrusions.

The extension of the Ross orogen toward Africa

is less clear, but radiometric dating suggests that

metamorphic activity occurred in eastern Africa at

roughly the same time as the Ross orogeny, but no

ore deposits have been found that can be associated

with this event. The younger Cape orogeny of

southernmost Africa strongly folded Late Paleozoic

rocks but did not produce any metamorphism,

intrusion, or ore mineralization. This event could be

correlated with the Ellsworth orogen of Antarctica,

which has also been found to be lacking significant

mineral occurrences. In South America, the region

comparable to the Ellsworth orogen lies between the

shield and the Andes and has relatively few ore

deposits, particularly in the Paleozoic to Lower

Mesozoic stratigraphic section.

In general, it may be useful to think of the

Transantarctic Mountains and West Antarctica as

representing a set of Paleozoic to Early Mesozoic

orogens that are progressively younger away from

the East Antarctic shield toward the Pacific, Mineralization generally decreases in intensity eastward in

Australia (this would be toward the Pacific Ocean in

Antarctica; see figure 4-1) and is even weaker in

Photo credit: Ann Hawthorne

Helicopter leaving Mt. Feather after ferrying geology field

part to site. Helicopters are indispensable in Antarctica.

New Zealand. Thus, by analogy, mineralization may

decrease westward in West Antarctica exclusive of

the younger Andean orogen. Consequently, the

probability that significant mineral deposits are

present in Antarctica in the zone between the

Transantarctic Mountains and the Andean orogen

would seem to be poor.

The youngest geologic province of Antarctica is

the Andean orogen. The Andean magmatic and

deformational belt extends northward from the

Antarctic Peninsula through the Andes of South

America, and in the opposite direction from Ellsworth Land and Marie Byrd Land through New

Zealand to form the southern margin of the currently

geologically active circum-Pacific volcanic belt. In

the northern and central Andes, this belt is one of the

richest metal-producing areas of the world. However, the southern Andes are not as rich in mineral

deposits as the northern and central Andes. The

geologic break seems to be where the Chile Ridge is

subducted beneath South America at the boundary of

the Nazca and Antarctic plates. Subduction of the

oceanic plate is still active to the north but has

slowed or stopped to the south where the Antarctic

plate has moved at an acute angle to South America.

Compared to the mineral-rich northern and central

Andes, where ores tend to be localized near the tops

of intrusive masses, the southern Andes and Antarctic Peninsula have a different geological history. In

the peninsula, glaciation may have more deeply

eroded the intrusive bodies, removing the tops where
102 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

ore deposits may have been located.8 The different

geological history and environmental conditions

suggest that the Antarctic Peninsula, Ellsworth

Land, and Marie Byrd Land may be less richly

mineralized than the north and central Andes.

Nevertheless, by analogy with the Andes, the

Antarctic Peninsula appears to be one of the more

likely places in Antarctica for significant basemetal deposits and possible associated gold and

silver.

Offshore Shelf Areas

Marine sedimentary basins are of primary interest

to petroleum geologists. The fragmentation of Gondwana, which began about 175 million years ago,

with the final split beginning about 28 million years

ago, led to the deposition of thick sequences of

Cretaceus and Tertiary sediments in mid-continent

rift basins and on the newly created continental

shelves where formerly the continents had been

joined. Sediments of these ages also accumulated in

basins that were later uplifted to become parts of the

continents. Seismic surveys and exploratory drilling

for petroleum have now been carried out on almost

all the land and continental shelves of those areas

that once touched Antarctica. Several relatively

modest oil and gas fields have been discovered in

southern South America, southern Africa, Australia,

and New Zealand. Through the Gondwana reconstruction, these producing areas can be related to

specific regions of Antarctica. However, this does

not assure that petroleum will be found in the

analogous areas in Antarctica due to differences in

time of formation, sediment thickness, history of

deformation, migration of any hydrocarbons, and

other factors. For example, if oil producing sediments accumulated off Australia along time after the

breakup of Gondwana, this would not necessarily be

evidence of oil in an adjacent area of Antarctica.

Several petroleum producing areas on the adjacent continents may have analogs in Antarctica. The

San Jorge and Magallanes Basins are petroleum

producing regions in Argentina that can be related in

a number of ways to the Larsen Basin of the

Antarctic Peninsula (figure 4-3).9 The San Jorge

Basin contained proven reserves of 1.6 billion

barrels in rocks of Jurassic or Early Cretaceus age.

Sedimentary rocks of the same age are found in the

Larsen Basin, but this in itself does not indicate

hydrocarbon potential.

Mossel Bay off southern Africa is a minor

petroleum producer. This basin bears a paleogeographic relationship to the Falkland Plateau, but may

not be indicative of the hydrocarbon potential of the

Weddell embayment.

Minor hydrocarbon accumulations have been

found off the east coast of India in the Bay of Bengal

and in Upper Cretaceus rocks in the Palk Bay area,

which, through reconstruction, could correspond to

the Prydz Bay area of Antarctica (Amery Basin) in

which Cretaceus sediments have also been identified. The Prydz Bay area may also bear a relationship to the West Australian continental margin

where producing fields are found near Perth.

The Cooper Basin in central Australia lies in a

broad geologic province that possibly extended

southward into Wilkes Land prior to their separation

around 80 million years ago. 10 The Cooper Basin is

an oil and gas producing province in Permian

through Cretaceus rocks. No commercial petroleum discoveries have yet been made in the Great

Australian Bight, Eucla, or Duntroon Basins (figure

4-3), which may, in part, be the conjugate margin to

the Aurora Basin in the Wilkes Land region of

Antarctica. The Otway and Bass Basins of Australia,

which in the Gondwana reconstruction extend offshore toward Wilkes Land, are only minor producers.

The Gippsland Basin, in the Bass Strait between

Tasmania and Victoria, is a major petroleumproducing province. However, the tectonism that

formed the petroleum-bearing structures in this

basin is not part of the southern Australian marginal

rift system. Because Antarctica and Australia were

already separated at the time of formation of the

hydrocarbon-bearing structures in the Gippsland

Basin, the basin has no analog on the Antarctic

margin. 11

8~1d.

9D.H. E]ll@, “~~ctlca: IS mcm AIIy CM] and Natural Gas’?” Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2. Summer 1988, p. 38.

IOlbid.

11’ ‘~~~pe~olem Re~sin Antarctica?’ Petroleum and MineraJ Resource$ of Anwccica, John C. Behrendt (cd.), U.S. Geological Sumey

Circular 909, 1983, p. 20.
Chapter 4--Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica • 103

Figure 4-3-Reconstruction of Gondwana in Early Cretaceus Time

(120 Million Years Ago)

Early Cretaceus

Godavari R.

Mahanadi R.

Larsen “

-,

. .

Edge of continental shelf

~ Sedimentary basin s

Campbell

Plate a u

● Producing field s

A Sapropelic bed s Taranaki ‘ ‘- .

K Cretaceu s

J- Jurassic New Zealand - “-– “

The proximity of Antarctic sedimentary basins is shown in relation to basins in formerly adjacent

continents and to producing 011 and gas fields.

SOURCE D H Elhot, “Antarctica. Is There Any 011 and Natural Gas?” Ocxwws, VOI 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, p 37

The Campbell Plateau is the conjugate margin to

the Ross Sea region, The Taranaki Basin off the

North Island of New Zealand is primarily a gasproducing region and probably has no relationship to

the Ross Sea continental shelf. Thus, for the most

part, the sedimentary basins on surrounding

continents that have analogs in Antarctica are not

major petroleum producing provinces.

ANTARCTICA IN THE CONTEXT

OF FUTURE MINERALS SUPPLY

The long-term availability of raw materials has

been a recurring concern over much of the past

century. This concern attained a new measure of

public awareness in the 1970s when the price of oil

and other commodities increased sharply. The public quickly realized that certain essential materials

may be in finite supply and, hence, would become

more costly and difficult to obtain. As a result of

these concerns, exploration and exploitation of

Antarctic minerals began to be seriously discussed.

Ore deposits form by relatively unusual combinations of natural processes, and, consequently, large,

economic deposits are not common in the Earth’s

crust. For metallic minerals, these processes can be

described as falling into three general classes, The

two most important are magmatic differentiation

and deposition from hydrothermal solutions. Surface or near-surface enrichment is the third. Magmatic differentiation is the process whereby the various

elements are distributed into the rocks formed

during cooling and crystallization of a magma;

locally concentrated deposits of certain minerals

may be formed, Hydrothermal solutions or hot saline

fluids pass through fractures or pore spaces in rock,

dissolving or dislodging metals that are subsequently redeposited as sulfides, oxides, or even

native metal, as the fluids cool or other conditions
104 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

change. Surface or near-surface enrichment is simply the further concentration of metals by weathering or leaching by groundwater.

An ore deposit represents a special set of geologic

circumstances and only becomes an economic proposition if a number of factors are favorable. 12 The first

is discovery of the deposit itself. A vigorous

exploration program does not automatically lead to

the discovery of a new mineral deposit rich enough

to mine. In Antarctica, a continent mostly covered

by ice, the probability of discovery is greatly

diminished.

Finding an ore deposit of sufficiently high grade

is not enough. Accessibility is also very important.

Deposits found near existing infrastructure will be

mined before more remote deposits, other considerations being equal. In Antarctica, there is essentially

no infrastructure.

A third factor controlling the development of

mineral resources is the size of the deposit. Not only

must the deposit be rich, but it must also be large

enough to warrant the investment needed to develop

it. In general, as the remoteness of the location

increases, so must the size of the deposit necessary

to offset the costs of the new infrastructure that will

be required to develop it. Antarctica is the most

remote continent in the world, Consequently, only

large deposits, if any, will likely be developed. If

first generation development were to occur and an

infrastructure created, then costs of development of

smaller deposits nearby, if any, may be lowered.

The largest deposits of a specific mineral or

minerals are the easiest to find and tend to be

discovered first. For any specific metallic resource,

the few largest-tonnage deposits contain the majority of the total metal mined. For example, out of 165

porphyry copper deposits, the 16 largest deposits

contain 64 percent of the metal content (past

production plus resources), and the 82 largest

deposits contain 94 percent of the metal. 13 For

nickel, only 7 deposits account for more than 50

percent of the metal in a total of 156 nickel deposits;

for tungsten, 3 deposits among 32 account for 59

percent of the tungsten; and for molybdenum, 3 of 34

porphyry molybdenum deposits account for 65

percent of the metal. Thus, based on past experience,

if a very large ore deposit were found in Antarctica, it would likely be found in the earlier stages

of serious exploration and could, if developed,

make a significant contribution to the world

inventory of that mineral commodity.

Much the same case can be made for large

petroleum accumulations. A suitable environment

had to have been present to have produced organicrich source sediment. The source beds must have

been buried and over time the temperature raised by

the flux of geothermal heat (the internal heat of the

Earth) to a degree sufficient to maturate the organic

material and produce oil. The depth of this timetemperature range in which maximum oil generation

occurs is known as the “oil window. ’ The oil

window generally occurs at depths between 2,500

and 16,000 feet and at temperatures between 150 and

300 “F. Natural gas is formed below the oil window.

In areas of higher than normal geothermal heating,

the oil window exists at shallower depths, is

narrower, and encompasses younger sediments.

Petroleum must be retained in a structural or

stratigraphic trap in order to produce a reservoir

and prevent migration to the surface as probably

occurred for much of the petroleum that has formed

during the Earth’s history. In Antarctica, not only

must all of these conditions be met, but also any

reservoir will have to be located in an area where

production is physically possible, and the field

will likely have to be very large to be commercially viable.

The same two principles that apply to ore bodies

apply to world oil distribution as well. First, most oil

is contained in a few large fields, but most fields are

small. Second, in any region the large fields are

usually discovered first. Since exploration for oil

began in the early 1860s, some 40,000 oil fields have

been discovered worldwide. The two largest classes

of fields are the supergiants (fields larger than 5

billion barrels of recoverable oil) and the world-class

giants (fields with 500 million to 5 billion barrels of

recoverable oil). Only 38 supergiant oil fields have

been found worldwide, and these few fields origi12s=, for example, F.E. ‘Trfiert “Potentially Recoverable Resources—How Recoverable’?” Resources Policy, March 1982, pp. 41-52.

13Job H. Byowg Jr, and Donald A. singer, ‘‘Physical Factors That Could Rcsrnct Mineral Supply, ’ Econom/c Geology, 75th hnivers~ volume,

1981, pp. 942-943.
Chapter 4-Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 105

nally contained more than half of all of the oil

discovered thus far. Twenty-six of these supergiants

are in the Persian Gulf region, Three are in the Soviet

Union; the United States, Mexico, and Libya each

have two supergiants; and Algeria, Venezuela, and

China have one each. The nearly 300 known

world-class giant fields plus the 38 supergiants

together account for about 80 percent of the world’s

discovered recoverable oil. Petroleum experts estimate that there are probably less than ten supergiants

remaining to be discovered. It is probable that

nothing smaller than world-class giants or supergiants would be economic in the harsh Antarctic

environment. 14 Because large fields are usually

found early (the biggest structures are more easily

located and, therefore, are drilled first), it is likely

that if any large fields exist in Antarctica, they will

be discovered relatively early during exploration

drilling.

In Antarctica, even a large field may not in itself

be enough. The character of the reservoir is also

important. For example, a reservoir will have to be

relatively thick so that it can be drained by a

minimum number of strategically placed wells. This

is because the high cost of drilling and operating in

polar regions limits the number of wells and

production facilities that a field can support. Consequently, a large field with a relatively thin pay zone

spread over a great area, may not be economically

producible. Past experience has shown that a relatively small percentage change in world petroleum

supply can have a substantially greater effect on the

price of oil. Consequently, a relatively small shortage in available petroleum supply can have a

magnifying effect on the price of oil and change the

economics of field development.

Prospecting and Exploration in Antarctica

Prospecting and exploration in Antarctica would

be extremely difficult. Mean air temperatures are

much lower than those of any other large area of the

Earth’s surface, and winds generally are stronger and

more constant than elsewhere. prospecting and

exploration would likely be conducted only during

the summer months. Transportation to most interior

locations would likely be by air. This can be

hazardous because weather forecasting is not highly

developed in Antarctica and adverse weather conditions en route or at the destination may not be known

when a flight begins. The logistics of transportation

and supply commonly dominate decisions on where

field work can be conducted, and areas that might

deserve detailed study may not be accessible at times

or have to be studied hastily,

Most geologic investigations conducted thus far

have been purely scientific and not designed to

explore for and identify mineral deposits. No mineral occurrences have been explored by drilling. The

geochemical patterns that result from alteration and

mineralization in various areas of Antarctica are

virtually unknown. In addition. glaciation could

have removed near-surface deposits formed by

weathering, and since the onset of glaciation, the ice

cover has prevented enrichment processes related to

near-surface weathering from occurring. Moreover,

there has been little surface drainage during the past

30 million years, thus, the erosion and sorting

necessary to form alluvial placer deposits would not

have occurred. Older placer deposits, if any exist,

would be in stream channels or basins now covered

by ice.

Because nearly 98 percent of the continent is

covered by ice, few mineral deposits are likely to

be exposed (figures 4-4 and 4-5). The total area of

exposed rock is comparable in size to the State of

Colorado, but it is spread over an area larger than

that of the United States and Mexico combined.

Therefore, the logistics for any prospecting or

exploration program are immense. Most of the

exposed areas have been so little studied that they

remain among the least geologically and geophysically explored areas of the world. Some large rock

outcrops have never been visited.

Offshore, the situation is little better. Although

over 54,000 nautical miles of marine multichannel

seismic reflection survey lines have been collected

around Antarctica since 1976, most of this information has not been published or otherwise made

available (figure 4-6). The United States is the only

country that has published and made freely available

all of its seismic data as required under the Antarctic

Treaty. This, however, represents less than 4 percent

of the total collected by those conducting research in

Antarctica. Very little is openly known about the

14’ &e mere pe~oleum Resources in Antarctica? op. Cit., IOOtIVJtC I I, p. s.
106 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Figure 4-4-Exposed Rock Outcrop In Antarctica

Antarctic Peninsula

Weddell Sea

.

0 South Pole

WILKES LAND

$

06

w,

.

.

●

X$t+ Ice-free areas

Only 2 percent of Antarctica is exposed. Ninety-eight percent of the continent IS covered by a thick ice sheet.

SOURCE: U.S. Gee@@ Survey, 1989
Chapter 4--Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 107

Figure 4-5-What Antarctica Would Look Like If the Ice Ware Removed

SOURCE. Generahzed from U.S. Geological Survey, 1989

detailed subsurface structure and petroleum potential of the continental shelf areas. The failure to

release data and the fact that many surveys have been

run by groups owned in large part by oil companies

has led to speculation that much of the offshore

geophysical data gathered thus far has been focused

on assessing petroleum resource potential rather

than acquired for scientific purposes. In any event,

the seismic lines run thus far are too widely spaced

to be of more than reconnaissance value. Exploration for oil would be conducted on a much

tighter grid. However, geological interpretations of

the geophysical data can only be verified by drilling

into the deeper sediments of each basin.

Five different types of reconnaissance surveys

would be desirable to evaluate Antarctica’s resource

potential. The surveys described below would also

provide additional data to supplement ongoing

geologic and geophysical research. All the technology required to conduct these surveys is presently

available.

Offshore Geophysical Surveys

There are more than 20 major sedimentary basins

and sub-basins on the continental margin around

Antarctica. A typical offshore geophysical survey

would involve collecting multichannel seismicreflection data, high resolution seismic-reflection

data, bathymetric data, magnetic data, gravity data,

and sonobuoy wide-angle seismic data. To date, the

small number of U.S. geophysical surveys have

focused primarily on the Ross Sea.

Scientific Drilling

Until pre-glacial rock samples are collected from

deep within some of the basins surrounding Antarctica, all estimates of hydrocarbon potential must be
108 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Figure 4-6-Multichannel Seismic Data

+ +-

-+

SOURCE J C Behrendt, U S Geologlcd Survey, 1989
Chapter 4-Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 109

viewed as highly speculative. According to the

Minerals Convention, scientific drilling can be

carried to any depth. Since 1972, the United States

has been involved in 6 major scientific programs,

which have drilled holes at more than 50 sites

located in and around Antarctica. The greatest

advances in our understanding of Antarctic geology

over the next decade are likely to come from

scientific drilling, if such projects are funded.

Offshore Geohazard Survey

Geohazard studies are critical to understanding

geologic processes on the seafloor that could be a

hazard to oil recovery structures. Such hazards

might include faults, slumps, and significant topographic features. Geohazard surveys typically involve the collection of single channel seismicreflection data, high resolution seismic-reflection

data, precision bathymetric data, multibeam sonar

data, seafloor cores and dredge material, and measurements of various sediment characteristics.

Onshore Aerosurveys

Aerosurveys in selected onshore areas of Antarctica have provided the principal information on ice

thickness and sub-ice geologic structure. These

surveys collect imagery data, such as photographs

and radar information, and geophysical data such as

magnetic, gravity, and radio echo sounding information. Logistics difficulties, poor navigation, and high

costs have limited the quality of past aerosurveys.

Onshore Geophysical Transects

These transects would probably involve the collection of seismic reflection/refraction data and

measurements of magnetism and gravity. Newly

developed seismic equipment can be rapidly towed

across the ice, thereby increasing the amount of data

that can be collected over a given period of time.

If the United States decides to fund a comprehensive reconnaissance effort, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that it would cost

about $250 million over a 10-year period (see table

4-1).15 Some surveys would require all 10 seasons to

complete; others only 3 to 5 seasons. Rather than

Photo credit: Bill Westermeyer

Don Juan Pond in Wright Valley, one of the “Dry Valleys”

near McMurdo.

surveying the entire continent, limited areas of the

continent (e.g., only the ice-free areas) could be

individually surveyed at a lower cost. However, the

cumulative cost of many separate and smaller

surveys conducted over a longer time period would

likely be significantly higher than indicated in table

4-1,

A similar comprehensive survey is being conducted within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone

(EEZ), the offshore area within 200 nautical miles of

the U.S. coastline. The EEZ was formally established by Presidential proclamation in 1983, thereby

giving the United States resource jurisdiction over

approximately 2.3 million square nautical miles of

largely unexplored territory. This action led to a

national effort-jointly conducted by the USGS and

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) with additional effort from academic institutions and private industry-to learn

more about the geologic framework, seafloor processes, and nonliving resources of the EEZ. 16

15Alm K, (Impr, Eval~~n8 A~uchca’~ H@ro~~bon (uti &finer~l,) po[e~~~eos~lence DUU Requiremetis and costs, U.S. Geological

Survey, Menlo Park, CA. Special report for U.S. Congrew, Office of Technology Assessment, Feb. 21, 1989 (unpublished).

16U4S, cmwc~~, of~cc of W~oIoN ~Wsaent, Marine ~inerds E,@oring Our New Ocean Frmtier, OTA-O-M2 (w~h~~m, DC: U’S

Government Printing Office, July 1987), p. 3.
110 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Table 4-1-Desirable Research for Evaluating Resource Potential of Antarctica

Relative importance for: Estimated 10-yr

Type of research Oil Minerals cost (millions)

Offshore seismic surveys . . . . . . . . . . . .

Onshore/offshore drilling . . . . . . . . . . . .

Offshore geohazards surveys . . . . . . . .

Onshore aerosurveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Onshore geophysical surveys . . . . . . . .

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., , .

Aircraft support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

High Medium $ 3 0

High high 50

Medium Low 20

Medium Medium 25

Low Medium 25

1 5 0

100

$250

SOURCE: A. Cooper, U.S. Geolog~al Survey, February 1989

There are important differences between the

U.S. EEZ and Antarctica’s offshore environment.

First, the United States has exclusive rights to

develop any resources in its EEZ, whereas U. S.-

sponsored Operators would have to compete with

others for resource rights in Antarctica. Second, the

proximity of the EEZ to the United States simplifies

its exploration. Antarctica is more than 10,000 miles

from the United States. Finally, the exploitation of

at least some of our EEZ resources (e.g., sand and

gravel) is likely to be possible in the near future.

Exploitation of Antarctica’s resources will probably

not be seriously considered for a few decades, if at

all.

Consequently, a major effort to undertake a

detailed reconnaissance of our own EEZ is more

easily justified than a similar effort for Antarctica. However, for the purpose of promoting

potential, long-term U.S. commercial interests in

Antarctica, a modest reconnaissance program in

selected promising areas might be appropriate. In

fact, a fairly good indication of Antarctica’s mineral

potential could probably be obtained for about half

the cost of the comprehensive survey described in

table 4-1. Since activity in Antarctica is generally

increasing, it may be even more important in the

near-term to devote relatively more attention to

acquiring baseline environmental data than resource

assessment data. Before the recovery of any petroleum resources is attempted, research will be required to ensure that development can be conducted

safely and efficiently with a minimum of environmental impacts. Several tens of millions of dollars

would probably be required to address the research

topics listed in table 4-2 adequately, although a

rigorous cost evaluation was not conducted,

Table 4-2-Research Required To Ensure That

Petroleum Resources Are Safely and Efficiently

Recovered With Minimum Environmental impact

Basic research and information requirements:

● geotechnical studies of continental shelf sediments

. oil spill tracking and cleanup techniques

. improved techniques for forecasting weather, sea state, and

pack ice conditions

Research requiring extended time-series measurements:

. circulation patterns and sea ice drift over the continental shelf

. iceberg size, frequency, movement, and scouring of the

continental shelf

● adverse short-and long-term effects (e.g., toxicity) of oil dispersants on Antarctic phytoplankton, krill, seals, and benthic

communities

SOURCE: Office of Technology Aasesement, 1989,

Providing a firm scientific basis on which to

estimate Antarctica’s mineral resource potential will

be a costly venture. These high costs could be

reduced considerably through a cooperative international research program sponsored by all parties to

the Minerals Convention. Alternatively, different

parts of an agreed-upon research program could be

conducted by different countries. Industry involvement, although potentially desirable, could complicate the situation somewhat. If such a program were

instituted and paid for by private industry, its

conduct would then fall under the purview of the

Minerals Convention. Industry data could then be

considered proprietary for at least 10 years.

Probabilities of Discovering

Antarctic Mineral Deposits

A statistical exercise conducted by the U.S.

Geological Survey in the early 1970s attempted to

estimate the total number of mineral deposits likely

to have formed in onshore areas of Antarctica and

the number of those deposits likely to be discovered.
Chapter 4--Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 111

This exercise apparently has been the only attempt

at such a projection.

17It should be emphasized,

however, that it is a paper exercise only and is not

tied to an exploration effort.

The USGS began by reconstructing Gondwana

and correlating Antarctica’s major tectonic belts

with the corresponding tectonic belts on the adjacent

continents (refer to figure 4-2). Known mineral

occurrences in each of the tectonic belts on Gondwana continents adjacent to Antarctica were divided

into four categories: ( 1 ) ferrous metals, (2) base

metals, (3) precious metals, and (4) other deposits

(uranium, aluminum, tungsten, asbestos, rare earths,

etc.). The density of each type of mineral occurrence

in each tectonic belt was calculated. The results were

extrapolated to Antarctica to estimate its resource

potential in each of the continent’s four major

geologic provinces (Andean, Ellsworth, Ross, and

Antarctic shield). The number of deposits expected

in exposed areas in Antarctica was calculated based

on the ratio of exposed area to total land area in each

province. This number was then further reduced by

an assumed success ratio in discovering deposits.

These results (without reduction for success in

discovery) are given in table 4-3.

Success in discovering mineral deposits in Antarctica is not only a function of the number of

deposits expected to exist but also of the intensity of

search. For example, the number of precious metal

deposits estimated to exist in exposed areas of the

Andean erogenic belt in Antarctica is 3.5. Assuming

a one percent chance of discovery, the expected

number of deposits found on any single exploration

attempt would be 0.035 or about three chances in a

hundred. Even this may be high for this region.

Again, this exercise is purely an abstract statistical approach and is not based on actual exploration

efforts. In addition, what might constitute a commercial deposit elsewhere may not be economically

viable in Antarctica. In any event, table 4-3 illustrates that, other than in the Antarctic Peninsula

(Andean Province), the chances of finding mineral deposits in exposed areas are small, and that

base metal and precious metal deposits are the

best prospects for discovery in the Antarctic

Peninsula.

SELECTED MINERAL

RESOURCES

Oil and Gas

Prospects for Antarctica

Sedimentary basins are located on the continental

margin of Antarctica and in the interior of West

Antarctica. Sediments also probably occur inland of

the East Antarctic ice margin (figure 4-7).18 The

major Antarctic basins of interest to petroleum

exploration are in the Weddell embayment, Ross

embayment, Prydz Bay, and Wilkes Land margin.

Other sedimentary basins exist along the East

Antarctic margin, the west coast of the Antarctic

Peninsula, and probably on the broad continental

shelves of the Amundsen and Bellingshausen Seas

off West Antarctica. Offshore sedimentary basins

hold the best prospects for petroleum exploration

because of the character and thickness of sediments and access for seismic exploration.

Based on seismic evidence and the results of the

Ocean Drilling Program’s (ODP) Leg 113, the

Weddell embayment contains possibly as much as

46,000 feet of sediment. Other than for the margin of

the Larsen Basin and off Queen Maud Land,

virtually nothing is known of the age and nature of

the sediments. The older strata probably date back to

the early stages of formation of the basin in the Late

Jurassic period (around 150 million years ago), and

consist of terrestrial and marine sediments. These

deposits might have contained organic material that

could have provided potential hydrocarbon source

rocks. These beds are overlain by as much as 10,000

feet of glacially derived sediment, laid down over

the last 30 million years, with no source rock

potential. The thermal history is unknown, but the

oil window has been estimated to lie within the

deeper parts of the basins. The Larsen Basin, in

particular. on the western side of the Weddell

embayment, is estimated to have a moderate potential for hydrocarbon formation. To the east, off

Queen Maud Land, the oil window is estimated to lie

below the organic-rich beds on the continental shelf.

~~wri@t ad WI]l I~s, op. cit., foomote 4, pp. 24-27.

18)31110[, op. Clt,, footnote 9, p. 33.
112 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Table 4-3-Estimated Number of Major Mineral Deposits in Antarctica

Type of deposit

Geologic province Base metal Ferrous Precious Other

Andean:

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 60 82 63

In exposed areas . . . . . . . 7.5 2.5 3.5 2.5

Ellsworth:

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 90 8 16

In exposed areas . . . . . . . 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.2

Ross:

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10 5 8

In exposed areas . . . . . . . 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.5

Shield:

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 138 66 73

In exposed areas . . . . . . . 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1

SOURCE: N.A. Wright and P.L. Williams, “Mineral Resources of Antarctica,” US. Geologcal Survey Circular 705,

1974, pp. 24-27.

Figure 4-7-Sedimentary Basins in Antarctica

●

●

1

I ‘k +4 ‘-a I

--- “ -

I

The major Antarctic basins of interest to petroleum exploration are in the Weddell embayment, Ross

embayment, Prydz Bay, and Wilkes Land margin.

SOURCE: D.H. Elliot, “Antarctwx is There Any 011 and Natural Gas?” Ocearws, VOI 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, p. 33.

If this is the case, there would be little potential for The Ross embayment contains three identified

petroleum formation in the Queen Maud Land basins of which the Victoria Land Basin off Ross

margin. Island would appear to have the best prospects for
Chapter 4-Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 113

petroleum formation. This basin contains as much as

46,000 feet of sediment in a rift zone that has

relatively high heat flow. Heavy hydrocarbon residues were recovered from a scientific drill site on the

western margin of the Victoria Land Basin in 1986.

The asphaltic residue indicates that hydrocarbons

formed in the area but have migrated, possibly

millions of years ago. Of the other two basins, the

Central Trough and Eastern Basin off Marie Byrd

Land, only the deepest portions would lie within the

oil window. Drill cores from both of these basins

have shown traces of gaseous hydrocarbons, but

these are from glacial marine sediments and most

likely represent local decomposition of organic

material not related to the formation of petroleum.

Another rift zone in Prydz Bay, called the Amery

Basin, also contains as much as 46,000 feet of

sedimentary rock. Cores taken in this area have

likewise shown traces of gas. Of more significance

geologically is the recovery of Cretaceus sediment,

indicating a long history of deposition in preglacial

times and, consequently, the possibility of suitable

source rock.

The Wilkes Basin is a marine basin extending

inland under the ice and offshore onto the continental shelf. This basin contains as much as 20,000 feet

of sediment on the shelf including organic-rich

material of Early Cretaceus age with source rock

potential.

The other sedimentary basins are less prospective

for hydrocarbon accumulation. This includes the

Brartsfield Trough off the western tip of the Antarctic Peninsula, where hydrocarbons were found in

relatively shallow cores from a young (2 million

years) and thin sedimentary sequence. While the

thermal gradient is sufficiently high in this area to

maturate organic material at shallow depth, the thin

sedimentary section argues against the likelihood of

significant hydrocarbon accumulations. Consequently,

it might be presumed that the hydrocarbons being

formed in this basin are probably seeping onto the

sea floor where they are being degraded by natural

processes.

World Resources

Current annual world crude oil production is

around 21 billion barrels and has been fairly stable

at about that amount for several years. Oil is

produced by many countries. The three largest

producers, the Soviet Union, the United States, and

Saudi Arabia, account for nearly half of annual

world production. Until 1987 world proven recoverable reserves were calculated at about 657 billion

barrels. Since then, revised estimates, largely of

Middle East reserves, have raised this figure to 956

billion barrels. 19 Based on the 956 billion barrel

figure the average world reserves to production ratio

is 46. Undiscovered recoverable reserves of conventional crude oil are estimated at around 400 billion

barrels.

If the remaining recoverable, conventional oil in

the world were distributed evenly and exploration

and development proceeded at past rates, world oil

production could be sustained for nearly 50 years

before being constrained by a declining resource

base. A steep drop in world oil production of more

than 50 percent in 10 years would then be likely.20

At that time, if not before for other reasons (and

demand were still high), oil prices could be expected

to rise sharply. If a commercial oil field is discovered

in Antarctica in the future, OTA’s analysis (app. A)

indicates that it will only be developed profitably if

oil prices are much higher than today. However,

higher oil prices tend to decrease demand and to

encourage additional conservation and the use of

alternative fuels, Environmental concerns about the

burning of fossil fuels, such as ozone depletion and

climate change, may also reduce petroleum consumption and hold prices lower.

Discussion of declining conventional petroleum

reserves invariably raises the question of the potential for developing unconventional sources of crude

oil, namely by developing heavy oil, tar sands, and

shale oil, and by using enhanced oil recovery

techniques. While some unconventional deposits are

being produced today, the annual amount of petroleum derived from them is currently relatively

insignificant compared to world consumption: high

19s1nw ~rOv~ ~e=mcs MC ~~ of tie ~ua[lon ~~ by OpEC In dc[crmmmg produ~llonquo:as(~ con[en~ousmatter), them IS some question as

to the techmcal basis for some of the new estimates.

~Jowph p, R,va Jr,, T& ~~)rld’,y Convenhoml oil produ< ~lon copubl[l~ proje(ted /nfo [/LC Fu&re @ country, Congressional Research StXVIU?,

Report for Congress, No. 87-414 SPR, May 1987, p, 15.
114 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

rates of production cannot yet be achieved. I n

addition, current production from unconventional

sources is largely from sites with the most favorable

characteristics, as would be expected. Projecting

significantly greater production from unconventional sources through future technological developments is much easier to envision than accomplish.

Consequently, as long as the world is dependent

on petroleum there will be an incentive to locate

and produce conventional deposits.

A decision to develop a promising Antarctic

discovery could be made even if development would

not be profitable. In particular, it is sometimes

suggested that energy-poor countries, such as Japan,

may wish to undertake unprofitable development to

obtain an assured source of supply. OTA does not

think that this motivation is as strong as the profit

motive, in part because energy-poor countries have

less expensive or less technologically challenging

alternatives available to them (e.g., Brazil’s sugar

cane to ethanol program), and these alternatives are

likely to become more diverse and more available in

the future as the price of oil rises. Also, Antarctica

would not likely be the most secure source of supply

in times of emergency.

Energy security is of sufficient concern to the

United States that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve

(SPR) was created to provide an emergency supply

of petroleum in the event of a disruption in imports.

At present the SPR contains about 550 million

barrels of oil held in caverns leached from salt domes

in the Gulf Coast.

As for the possibility that an Antarctic claimant

country might try to develop an unprofitable oil field

to solidify a claim, neither the Antarctic Treaty nor

the Minerals Convention would support this. Even if

these agreements were disregarded, a claimant could

undertake other, less expensive activities to have the

same practical effect.

Although petroleum development in Antarctica is

considered unlikely in the near term, OTA has

developed a hypothetical scenario for oil field

development there. This scenario (found in app. A)

explores technology capabilities and needs, addresses economic considerations, and presents several alternative approaches to development.

Coal

Prospects for Antarctica

Coal is found principally in Permian and Triassic

rocks around the perimeter of East Antarctica. Thick

beds are most notably in the Beacon Supergroup of

the Transantarctic Mountains and in the Beaver Lake

area of the Prince Charles Mountains. The deposits

all seem to have formed on flood plains in shallow

swamps that were rapidly being filled with sandy

material. Most of the coal deposits are in a Permian

sandstone sequence that is more than 1,600 feet thick

and found in both the Prince Charles and Transantarctic Mountains. Although individual coal beds as

much as 20 feet thick have been reported, most of the

beds are less than 12 feet thick and tend to be lens

shaped and have a limited horizontal extent. While

some coal seams have been traced over a considerable distance, the horizontal extent of most of the

individual beds that have been reported is less than

half a mile,

The coal is commonly of a high rank, ranging

from medium-volatile bituminous to anthracite and

generally having a high ash and low sulfur content.

Most of the coal occurs in mountainous areas at a

considerable distance from the coast. None of the

known deposits are economically minable. Deposits

near coastal areas would have the greatest potential

for export. The conventional wisdom has generally

been that while Antarctic coal may not be economic

to export, it could possibly be used for local heating

or power production. However, even the Soviet

station at Beaver Lake, adjacent to exposed coal in

the Prince Charles Mountains, finds it more economical to meet energy needs with imported oil.

World Resources

World hard coal (anthracite and bituminous)

production in 1987 was nearly 3,6 billion short tons.

Although coal is mined in a large number of

countries, the three largest producers are China, the

United States, and the Soviet Union. Recoverable

reserves total 719 billion short tons. The reserves to

production ratio is 200. In addition, there are 300

billion tons of recoverable reserves of lignite. It is

highly unlikely that an export market for Antarctic coal would develop in the foreseeable future.
Chapter 4-Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 115

Uranium

Prospects for Antarctica

Uranium occurs in many geologic settings. Among

the more important categories are quartz-pebble

conglomerate deposits, deposits related to erosional

surfaces in Precambrian rocks, disseminated and

contact deposits in igneous and metamorphic rocks,

vein deposits, and sandstone deposits of various

ages. Again, some insight can be gained by comparing Antarctica with the surrounding Gondwana

continents. South Africa contains an abundance of

uranium and is a major uranium producer. However,

most of the uranium produced in South Africa is a

byproduct of gold mining, principally from the

Precambrian quartz-pebble gold conglomerates of

the Witwatersrand region. Australia is also a major

uranium producer. In Australia, most of the known

uranium resources are contained in deposits spatially related to erosional surfaces in Precambrian

rocks. The South African and Australian deposits

suggest that uranium might be present in the

Precambrian rocks of East Antarctica.

Uranium minerals, or anomalous levels of radioactivity, have been found in several locations in

Antarctica, particularly in Enderby Land, the Adelie

Coast, and the Transantarctic Mountains of Victoria

Land in East Antarctica. No known occurrences of

radioactive minerals in Antarctica contain commercial quantities. However, larger deposits might

be present in sedimentary basins that existed prior to

the break up of Gondwana.

World Resources

Reported world uranium production in 1986

totaled 40,900 short tons. Reactor requirements were

43,200 short tons with the difference being made up

from stocks. Exclusive of China, Eastern Europe,

and the Soviet Union for which data are not

available, the four largest producers were Canada,

the United States, South Africa, and Australia

followed by Namibia, Niger, and France. Total

known resources, which include the reasonably

assured resources and the estimated additional

resources based on direct geological evidence, total

3.9 million tons. The ratio of known resources to

reactor requirements currently stands at 91 or nearly

a century of supply. In addition, undiscovered

resources are estimated at over 1.8 million tons.

Even with the projected moderate growth in

nuclear power production, supplies of uranium

should be adequate for the foreseeable future. In

the long term, advances in nuclear power generation

and enrichment technologies are expected to reduce

the requirements for natural uranium. Even though

the cost of uranium in current prices may be higher

in the long term, the cost of finding and producing

uranium from Antarctica would likely be much

higher still.

Chromium

Prospects for Antarctica

Of the many minerals that contain chromium, the

only ore mineral is chromite, an oxide of chromium

and iron. Primary chromite deposits occur as stratiform or podiform bodies in certain types of ultramafic rocks composed primarily of olivine and

pyroxene minerals, or rocks derived from them.

Chromite is also found in placer deposits derived

from the weathering of primary deposits. Stratiform

chromite deposits are found in layers of up to several

feet thick of fairly uniform composition extending

over large areas. The Bushveld Complex in the

Republic of South Africa and the Stillwater Complex in Montana are deposits of this type. Most of the

world’s identified chromium resources are in stratiform deposits. Podiform deposits are generally

smaller and, as implied by the name. the ore is in

irregular pods or lenses within the host rock.

The Dufek intrusion in the northern Pensacola

Mountains of the Transantarctic Mountain chain is

a very large stratiform body with a composition

similar to that of the Bushveld and Stillwater

Complexes. While concentrations of minerals containing chromium have not been found in the Dufek,

anomalous trace amounts of chromium, nickel, and

cobalt have been reported in some of the rock

analyses. Consequently, there is speculation based

on geochemical comparisons and interpretation that

the Dufek intrusion may contain significant amounts

of chromium, nickel, and platinum-group metals in

the lower unexposed portions. Chromite has also

been found disseminated and in thin layers in a small

ultramafic intrusion on Gibbs Island in the South

Shetland Islands. In addition to chromium, the
116 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

intrusion may also contain nickel and cobalt minerals, However, the chromite occurrence does not

appear to have commercial potential.21

World Resources

Chromium has important uses in the metallurgical

industry to enhance such properties as hardenability,

impact strength, and resistance to corrosion, oxidation, and wear. Ferrous alloy production, mainly

stainless steels, accounts for most of the chromium

consumed. Chromium also has uses in refractory

materials and chemical products. Chromium is

considered a strategic and critical material for

National Defense Stockpile purposes; several forms

of chromium-bearing materials are contained within

the stockpile.

World mine production of chromite in 1988 was

12.4 million short tons. The Republic of South

Africa and the Soviet Union each produced nearly

one-third of the total. The world reserve base of

chromite is 7.5 billion tons of which 84 percent is in

South Africa and 11 percent is in Zimbabwe. The

reserve base to production ratio is 658. World

resources total about 36 billion tons of chromite, of

which over 99 percent is in southern Africa. In

summary, there is enough chromium in known

deposits to last for centuries, although the fact that

most of it is concentrated in one region may be of

concern. At current prices in South Africa of

about $56 per ton, it would hardly be economic to

develop a chromite deposit anywhere except

under special circumstances. However, if the

circumstances included a complete cut off in supply

from South Africa over a long term, the economics

of the world market would certainly change. The

economics of a chromite mining operation in Antarctica could also improve if there were associated

coproducts of higher value such as platinum or

cobalt. In addition, a strategic rather than an

economic incentive could drive interest in prospecting for chromium in Antarctica.

The difficulties of hard rock mining in Antarctica

are discussed in appendix B with regard to both an

inland location such as the Dufek Mass if and at a

more accessible coastal location. Because the ore,

type, and location of any hypothetical mine site are

so completely speculative, and because there are too

many other variables, at present, it was not considered possible to develop a specific scenario for hard

rock mining that would provide any additional

insight. However, by comparison with selected hard

minerals mines in the Arctic, some speculative

estimates can be made of technological problems

and ore values needed for a commercial Antarctic

mine.

Copper

Prospects for Antarctica

Although copper is found in several types of

deposits including porphyry, sedimentary, and volcanic, porphyry copper deposits include the largest

known deposits and make up 52 percent of the world

resources of the metal. Many of the more important

porphyry copper deposits also contain commercially

important quantities of molybdenum, while others

contain gold and silver. Most copper occurrences in

Antarctica have been found in the Antarctic Peninsula and on islands off the coast of the Peninsula.

The most promising copper occurrences are on

islands off the west coast of the Peninsula and are

associated with the youngest intrusions of the

Andean belt. Economically promising deposits, if

any are found in this region, would likely be of the

type found in porphyritic igneous rock and may be

associated with possible vein deposits. Veins containing a variety of metals are found throughout the

Antarctic Peninsula.

Extensive products of mineralization on King

George Island, including pyrite, hydrothermally

altered rock, and large veins have led some investigators to speculate that there maybe a porphyry-type

copper deposit at depth on King George Island. The

hydrothermally altered rocks containing mineralization are interpreted as representing the upper or

near-surface portion of a large intrusive body. In

addition, the pyrite contains anomalously high

copper and cobalt values, suggesting that the intrusive body may be rich in copper. Others, however, do

not find the evidence for an underlying porphyry

copper deposit compelling, and they suggest that the

observed minerals represent normal separation during solidification of an intrusive body of this sort.

21Row@ et al., op. Cit,, fOOUIOte 3, p. @
Chapter 4-Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 117

Other copper occurrences have been reported in

the South Shetland Islands. Two localities on

Livingston Island contain copper associated with

igneous intrusive bodies. In one place, the copper

minerals may represent the remains of a deeply

eroded copper-molybdenum porphyry deposit, Vein

and porphyry-type alteration and mineralization

took place on a number of other islands and coastal

locations throughout the region. Copper occurrences

are found in about 30 places along the east coast of

the Antarctic Peninsula. Low grade porphyry copper

and vein deposits also are found in the southern part

of the Peninsula. Three locations, in particular,

contain porphyry copper mineralization. One is a

low grade copper-molybdenum deposit in the Copper Nunataks of the central Lassiter Coast. Another

is in the Sky-Hi Nunataks, and the third is in the

Merrick Mountains of eastern Ellsworth Land.

Minor amounts of copper minerals have also been

found in some of the metamorphic and intrusive

rocks of East Antarctica and the Transantarctic

Mountains. Sedimentary rock units of the Transantarctic Mountains could also be prospective hosts for

stratiform copper deposits.

World Resources

Copper has been one of the more important

materials in the advance of industry, technology, and

the arts. The largest use of copper is in electrical

applications such as motors, generators, power

distribution facilities, industrial controls, communications equipment, and wiring. The U.S. Government Stockpile goal for copper is 1 million tons,

whereas the inventory is 22,000 tons.

World mine production of copper in 1988 totaled

9.4 million short tons of recoverable copper metal.

Chile and the United States were the two major

producing countries, with other major producers

including Canada, the Soviet Union, Zaire, Zambia,

Poland, and Peru. The world reserve base of copper

is about 620 million short tons of recoverable

copper, of which Chile and the United States

together have nearly 40 percent. The ratio of world

reserve base to production is 66. Land-based world

resources are estimated at 1.8 billion tons of copper,

and resources in deep sea nodules are estimated at

0.8 billion tons, In view of the relative abundance

of copper resources, there would appear to be

little economic incentive to extract copper from

Antarctica, given the added costs of operating in

such an environment, unless it were an exceedingly rich and accessible deposit. Porphyry copper

deposits are typically low grade, high volume ore

bodies. Any associated coproducts such as precious

metals (gold, silver, and platinum), molybdenum or

other base metals (lead and zinc), or cobalt could

improve the economics.

Gold

Prospects for Antarctica

Gold is found as a trace mineral in certain course

sediments, and in a series of deposits of deep-seated

origin that are somewhat difficult to classify. Gold

occurs widely in gravels as a placer deposit.

Typically, these are fluviatile deposits near the

headwaters of fast-flowing rivers where gold particles are trapped between pebbles or in bedrock

irregularities. In Antarctica, placer deposits could

only have occurred before the onset of glaciation and

would now probably be buried under ice. The gold

deposits of the Witwatersrand in South Africa occur

in Precambrian conglomerate. This may suggest that

similar deposits could exist in the Precambrian

shield of East Antarctica, although they would

probably need to be of higher grade to be economic

in Antarctica.

Other types of gold deposits are associated with

magmatic, hydrothermal, or metamorphic activity.

For example, gold is commonly found in quartz

veins and related deposits cutting through a variety

of host rocks. In continental tectonic belts, gold

deposits are found that are broadly related to the

hydrothermal phases of calc-alkaline and alkaline

igneous rocks. In hydrothermal deposits, metallic

minerals are precipitated from high-temperature

aqueous solutions, either by changes in temperature

and pressure or by evaporation of the liquid.

Minerals are deposited in the cavities, cracks, or

interstices of the host rock. Many porphyry copper

deposits contain important amounts of gold, and

many have an alluvial dispersion of gold around

their outcrops. While gold could occur throughout

many regions of Antarctica, perhaps the most

promising region for its discovery and possible

development might be the Antarctic extension of the

Andean magmatic and reformational belt. This

region includes the Antarctic Peninsula and the
118 . Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

coastal regions of Ellsworth and Marie Byrd Land.

Although the Antarctic Peninsula may be less metal

rich, this belt in the northern and central Andes is one

of the richest metal-producing areas in the world.

The volcanic and intrusive rocks of the Antarctic

Peninsula belong to the calc-alkaline magmatic suite

with which many of the world’s copper-lead-zinc

and similar ores, often containing silver and gold,

are associated. In addition, the Antarctic Peninsula

and nearby islands are the most ice-free and accessible region in Antarctica, thus, making both mineral

discovery and potential development more feasible.

No significant concentrations of gold have been

recorded in Antarctica. Minor gold and silver have

been reported in assays of sulfide minerals from

several locations in the Antarctic Peninsula region,

Traces of gold and silver have also been found in the

Cape Denisen area of the Adelie Coast and in

Victoria Land,

World Resources

In 1988, world mine production of gold reached

55 million troy ounces valued at about $24 billion.

About 35 percent of this production came from the

Republic of South Africa. The next largest producers

in decreasing order were the Soviet Union, the

United States, Australia, and Canada. The world

reserve base is over 1.5 billion ounces of which more

than half is in the Republic of South Africa. The

reserve base to production ratio is over 28. The

world’s gold stocks, excluding gold in industrial

usage, total about 2.7 billion ounces, of which 1.23

billion ounces are official monetary stocks and 1.44

billion ounces are privately held as coin, bullion, or

jewelry. Total world resources of gold are estimated

at 2.4 billion ounces, of which 15 to 20 percent are

byproduct resources. The Republic of South Africa

has about one-half of the world resources, and the

Soviet Union, Brazil, and the United States about 12

percent each. At current world market prices, if a

rich gold deposit were discovered in Antarctica,

particularly in the region of the Antarctic Peninsula, there would likely be economic interest in

considering its extraction.

Iron

Prospects for Antarctica

Iron is the fourth most abundant rock-forming

element, chemically making up about 5 percent of

the Earth’s crust. The largest concentrations of iron

are found in banded sedimentary iron formations of

Precambrian age. These formations supply most of

the world’s iron ore and comprise the bulk of the

world’s iron resources. The most extensive iron

deposits in Antarctica are in East Antarctica, where

a Precambrian banded iron-formation (jaspilite),

similar to the Lake Superior-type ores, is found. The

largest of these deposits is in the Prince Charles

Mountains, notably at Mount Rucker, where individual jaspilite beds up to 230 feet thick alternate

with slate, siltstone, ferruginous quartzite, schist,

and metamorphosed igneous rocks. In addition,

although not exposed in outcrop, large magnetic

anomalies, some extending for over 100 miles under

the ice, almost certainly indicate additional iron

deposits. In general, scattered exposures of bedrock

and glacially transported boulders indicate that iron

formations occur between western Wilkes Land and

western Enderby Land, covering a large area of East

Antarctica.

Based on their limited exposure, the Mount

Rucker deposits appear to be of lesser grade than

commercial banded iron-formation elsewhere in the

world, except for deposits near industrialized areas.

The average iron content is 34 percent whereas, for

example, the Hammersley Basin deposits of northwestern Australia contain huge reserves averaging

around 55 percent iron. For this reason and because

the Mount Rucker deposits are nearly 400 miles

from the coast, it is highly unlikely that they will

become economically developed.

An iron oxide vein subprovince occurs in western

and central Queen Maud Land where quartzmagnetite and garnet-magnetite veins from 2 to 15

feet wide are found in gneissic country rock at the

contacts with mafic intrusions. Numerous iron

occurrences are found throughout the region in veins

and stockworks of various ages, some associated

with copper and other metals.22

up.D. Rowley, A,B. Ford, P.L. Williams, and D.E. tide, ‘‘Metatlogenic provinces of Antarctica, ’ Anmrctic Earth Science, R,L, Oliver, P.R. James,

and J,B. Jago (cds.j (Carnbndge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 416.
Chapter 4-Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 119

World Resources

World mine production of iron ore in 1988 was

918 million long tons. The two countries producing

the largest amount were Brazil and the Soviet Union.

The world reserve base of iron ore is estimated at213

billion long tons, of which approximately one-fourth

is located in the Soviet Union and one-fifth in

Australia. Large amounts are also found in Brazil,

Canada, India, South Africa, and the United States.

The reserve base to production ratio is 245. Consequently, at the current annual rate of production, the

reserve base would last nearly two and one-half

centuries. Furthermore, world resources are estimated to exceed 800 billion long tons. Thus, it is

reasonable to conclude that there will be no

market for Antarctic iron ore in the foreseeable

future.

Molybdenum

Prospects for Antarctica

Most molybdenum deposits are of three major

types:

. porphyry or disseminated deposits, including

stockworks and breccia pipes, in which metallic sulfides are dispersed through relatively

large volumes of altered and fractured rock,

. contact-metamorphic zones and bodies of silicified limestone adjacent to intrusive granitic

rocks, and

● quartz veins.

All three of these types are hydrothermal in origin

and represent nearly all of the molybdenum mined in

the world. In addition to the porphyry deposits in

which molybdenum occurs as the principal metal

sulfide, many porphyry copper deposits contain

smaller amounts of molybdenum as an important

byproduct. In Antarctica, molybdenum is found

associated with copper mineralization in the Antarctic Peninsula region. In addition, molybdenum

minerals are widespread in dikes and pegmatites in

Wilkes Land in East Antarctica and at a number of

localities along the Adelie Coast. None of these

occurrences is of economic significance. The best

prospect for locating a significant molybdenum

deposit in Antarctica would likely be in association

with a copper porphyry in the Antarctic Peninsula

region.

World Resources

Molybdenum is a refractory metallic element used

primarily as an alloying agent in steels, cast irons,

and superalloys to enhance hardenability, strength,

toughness, and resistance to wear and corrosion.

Mine production was 189 million pounds of recoverable molybdenum metal in 1988 of which the United

States produced over 39 percent. Other major

producers were Chile, Canada, Mexico, and Peru.

The reserve base to production ratio for molybdenum is 145 or enough to maintain production at

current levels well into the 22nd century. Over 45

percent of the world’s reserve base is located in the

United States. Identified resources amount to about

46 billion pounds worldwide. Molybdenum resources are adequate to supply world needs for the

foreseeable future. It is difficult to envision a

situation wherein a molybdenum mining operation in Antarctica could compete in the world

market for quite some time without additional

revenues from associated coproducts.

Platinum-Group Metals

Prospects for Antarctica

The platinum-group metals are geochemically

associated with mafic or ultramafic rocks and occur

as segregations in layers or pods, Because of their

relatively high specific gravity, platinum-group

metals also are found in placer deposits sometimes

associated with gold. The world’s premier platinum

deposit is the layered lode deposit in the Merensky

Reef of the Bushveld complex in the Republic of

South Africa. Although much younger than the

Bushveld complex, the Dufek intrusion in the

northern Pensacola Mountains of Antarctica is a

similar layered mafic igneous complex of considerable extent. It approaches the Bushveld complex in

size and is an order of magnitude larger than any

other known body of this type. The great size of the

Dufek intrusion and its similarity to other mafic

igneous intrusions, nearly all major examples of

which contain economically significant resources of

one or more metals, has prompted considerable

speculation regarding its mineral potential.23

Comparison to the Bushveld and other similar

intrusions suggests that if the Dufek contains

significant quantities of platinum-group metals, they

Zwcn & Wit, Minera& ad Mining in Antarctica (Oxford: Clarcndon Pros, 19~5).
120 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

likely would be within the unexposed basal parts. To

date, no platinum-group minerals have been identified in the Dufek intrusion, although some rock

analyses have shown trace amounts of these elements. The extent to which age is a factor in

assessing the mineral potential of the Dufek intrusion is unknown. Most other stratiform mafic

intrusions containing economically significant resources are Precambrian in age, whereas the Dufek

intrusion is Jurassic. Another consideration that

would affect the economics of developing a mineral

deposit in the Dufek intrusion is the fact that the

exposed portions, which represent only a few

percent of the intrusion, are more than 300 miles

from the ocean. Based on geophysical evidence, the

intrusion itself is believed to extend out under the

Filchner and Ronne Ice Shelves.

World Resources

The uses of the platinum-group metals are related

to their chemical inertness over wide temperature

ranges, excellent catalytic qualities, and high melting points. Three of the group, platinum, palladium,

and iridium, are considered strategic and critical for

purposes of the National Defense Stockpile. The

stockpile inventory of each, however, is less than

half the desired goal.

World mine production of platinum, palladium,

iridium, osmium, rhodium, and ruthenium together

totalled over 8.9 million troy ounces in 1988. The

major producer countries are the Republic of South

Africa and the Soviet Union. The world reserve base

of platinum-group metals is estimated to be 2.14

billion troy ounces of which 1.9 billion ounces (89

percent) are in South Africa. The ratio of world

reserve base to production is 268 or enough to last

over two and one-half centuries at current production rates. World resources of platinum-group metals are estimated to be 3.3 billion ounces of which

the United States holds about 300 million ounces.

Considering the difficulties of mining in the

interior of Antarctica, unless there were a major

disruption of supplies from South Africa there

would probably be little economic incentive to

develop a platinum deposit in Antarctica if one

were found. The deposit would have to be exceedingly rich to provide an economic incentive.

Strategic and critical mineral concerns could

provide sufficient incentive to develop a platinumgroup metals deposit in Antarctica, even if it were

not commercially viable. On the other hand, new

developments in catalysts that could replace platinumgroup metals could reduce critical mineral concerns.

24

Rare-Earth Metals

Prospects for Antarctica

The rare-earth elements, sometimes called the

lanthnides, are a group of 15 chemically similar

elements with atomic numbers 57 through 71,

inclusive. Although not a lanthanide, yttrium, atomic number 39, is often included with the rare-earth

metals because it commonly occurs with them in

nature, having similar chemical properties. Some

members of the rare-earth group of metals are

relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust, such as

cerium, neodymium, lanthanum, and yttrium, whereas

others are considered rare. The rare-earth elements

and yttrium are minor constituents in over 100

minerals, but in only a few are they sufficiently

concentrated to be considered ore minerals. The two

minerals that are the primary sources of rare-earth

elements are bastnasite and monazite of which

bastnasite is the major source. These minerals

generally occur in granitic rocks more commonly

than in basic rocks, Monazite is general1y recovered

from beach sand deposits as a byproduct of other

heavy minerals recovery such as ilmenite, rutile,

zircon, and gold. Xenotime is a yttrium phosphate

mineral found in the same environment as monazite,

and is a major source of yttrium.

In Antarctica, airborne radiometric surveys have

found radioactivity anomalies that have been shown,

on field inspection, to be related to thorium- and

uranium-bearing minerals as well as to rare-earth

and tin-bearing minerals within sandstone of the

basal (Devonian) parts of the Beacon Supergroup in

the Darwin Glacier area of the Transantarctic

Mountains.25 Upper Permian or Triassic nepheline

syenite plutons in western Queen Maud Land of East

Antarctica contain zirconium and the rare-earth

elements, lanthanum and cerium,

~R~n~y Ford Motor CO. annoumxxl that it has discovered a potential substitute for plathm used in Catidyt.iC converters.

~Rowley et al., op. cit, footnote 7.
Chapter 4-Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 121

Box 4-C—Icebergs (Fresh Water)

Although, technically, ice is a mineral resource there

was agreement among the Consultative Parties that the

definition of mineral resources in article 1 (6) of the

Convention (defined as nonliving, natural, nonrenewable resources) does not include ice. During the

negotiation of the Minerals Convention, there was a

specific decision to exclude ice from coverage of the

minerals regime. The Final Act of the Special Consultative Meeting notes that harvesting ice from the

coastal region of Antarctica, particularly if land-based

facilities were required, could raise some of the

environmental and other issues addressed in the

Convention. Consequently, representatives at the meeting agreed that the question of harvesting Antarctic ice

should be further considered by the Consultative

Parties at the next regular meeting.

It is estimated that Antarctica contains over 90

percent of the world’s fresh water in the form of ice and

snow that accumulated over millions of years. ] Precipitation in most of Antarctica is very light. Annual

snowfall at the South Pole is less than an inch water

equivalent, making it drier than some desert areas

elsewhere in the world. Although difficult to estimate,

the overall water budget of the continent is thought to

be roughly in balance with most of the gain from

annual precipitation offset by the loss to the sea in the

form of icebergs and melting glaciers. If all the ice

should melt, the oceans would rise between 200 and

300 feet.

The possibility that fresh water from Antarctica

might become available in the form of captured

icebergs towed to areas of need is of recurring interest

to arid or drought-stricken coastal areas of the world.

The volume of ice annually entering the oceans from

Antarctica is estimated at 1.5 trillion short tons, of

which 900 billion tons is from ice shelves, 500 billion

tons is from glaciers and ice streams, and 50 billion

tons is from the edges of ice sheets. Because a great

amount of energy is required to move icebergs, it is not

economically feasible at present. Snow and ice are

converted to potable water for local use in Antarctica.

Desalination is also used in coastal locations including

the U.S. stations, McMurdo and Palmer.

Photo credit: Ann Hawthorne

Seaward edge of the Ross Ice Shelf, source of

numerous tabular icebergs, the shelf is 80 feet above

the water at this point.

World Resources

The unusual properties of the rare-earth elements

are responsible for their important uses in catalysts

(especially for petroleum refining), as iron and steel

alloying agents, glass and ceramics additives, permanent magnets, and phosphors for television and

lighting. Although 504 short tons of rare-earth

oxides remain within the National Defense Stockpile, they are no longer classified as strategic and

critical for the purposes of the stockpile, and the goal

has been reduced to zero, There is also no stockpile

goal for yttrium.

World mine production of the rare-earth metals in

1988 was over 55,000 short tons of rare-earth oxide,

of which the United States and China each produced

nearly one-third of the total. Other major producing

countries are Australia, Malaysia, India, and Brazil

in order of output. The world reserve base is 52
122 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treat-y for Antarctica

million tons, of which over 75 per cent is contained

in a huge bastnasite deposit in China; most of the rest

of the reserve base is in the United States. The ratio

of reserve base to production is over 1,340. Total

world resources are believed to be very large relative

to expected demand. With prices for high purity

oxides ranging from $9 per pound for lanthanum to

over $2,200 per pound for lutetium, there is some

likelihood that if a high grade deposit of bastnasite

were found in an accessible area of Antarctica, it

might well be economic to develop. However, in

terms of strategic or resource scarcity concerns,

there would be little incentive

rare-earth deposit in Antarctica.

Diamonds

Prospects for Antarctica

Diamonds have not been found in

to develop a

Antarctica, but

ultramafic rocks similar to the diamond-bearing

rocks of Africa and Australia have been mapped in

the Prince Charles Mountains and other locations in

East Antarctica. In comparing Antarctica with the

surrounding continents in the Gondwana reconstruction, the rich diamond deposits of southern Africa

and Australia suggest that Antarctica may also

contain such deposits. Many of the diamond-bearing

pipes of Africa are Cretaceus in age; hence, if

diamond-bearing pipes of the same age are present

in Antarctica they most likely would be intrusions

in areas of older rock. Thus, based on age, prospective areas would include exposed rocks in the

Transantarctic Mountains and other parts of East

Antarctica rather than in geologically younger areas

of West Antarctica. However, individual pipes have

cross sections of only a few tens or hundreds of

meters, and only a small percentage of the pipes

contain diamonds in economic quantities.

Most of the diamonds initially discovered in

Africa and more recently in Australia were located

in alluvium (placer deposits). Placers are still major

sources of diamonds in Australia, Angola, Namibia,

South Africa, and Zaire. Because of extensive ice

cover and consequent lack of water transport and

sorting, placer deposits would be extremely rare in

Antarctica. Any placer deposits that may have

formed prior to the extensive glaciation would likely

be in former stream channels or basins now buried

under ice cover. The best available places to

prospect would be beaches and shallow shelf areas

of East Antarctica.

In Africa and western Australia, diamond placers

were traced to the lode sources in kimberlite pipes.

Kimberlite is an altered, dark-green basic rock of

igneous origin and is the main source of primary

diamonds. Although approximately 1,000 occurrences of kimberlite have been reported throughout

the world, diamond has not been observed in most of

them. The odds against finding a diamond-bearing

pipe in Antarctica, essentially by blind drilling,

would be astronomical. Detecting a valuable mineral

in which the ratio is from 15 to 30 million parts of

waste to 1 part of value, as is the case for diamonds,

is exceedingly difficult even in areas where bedrock

is accessible. Massive kimberlite may be detected by

magnetic means.

World Resources

Diamonds that are unsuitable as gem stones are

used for industrial purposes, such as cutting, grinding, and drilling, and are considered strategic and

critical materials for the National Defense Stockpile.

The inventory of industrial stones is currently in

excess of the stockpile goal.

World mine production of gem and industrial

diamonds was approximately 86 million carats in

1988. The major producing countries are Australia,

Botswana, Zaire, South Africa, and the Soviet

Union. The world reserve base of industrial diamonds is 1.9 billion carats. World gem diamond

reserves are estimated to be about 300 million carats,

including near-gem grade, and the reserve base is

substantially larger but difficult to estimate because

of changing economic evaluations. Most of the

reserves are in southern Africa, the Soviet Union

(Siberia), and western Australia. The reserve base to

production ratio for industrial diamonds is 35 and

the ratio is either comparable or lower for gem

diamonds. If good gem quality diamonds were

discovered in Antarctica, they would likely find a

world market. Although, as stated above, the

odds of discovering such a deposit are small.
Chapter 5

The Antarctic Environment and

Potential Impacts From Oil

and Minerals Development

—. —

. . . . . .. A -

---- I

Photo credit: Ann Hawthorne

Mt. Erebus, killer whales, penguins
CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Environmental Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Biological Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Ongoing Research Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

POTENTIAL IMPACTS FROM MAN’S ACTIVITIES IN ANTARCTICA . . . . . . . . . . 135

Prospecting Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136

Oil Exploration and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Probability of Oil Spills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137

Potential Impacts From Oil Spills in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Oil Spill Cleanup Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Mineral Exploration and Mining Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Dredging With Open-Water Disposal of the Dredged Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Development of Support Facilities and Transportation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

IMPACTS FROM MAN’S PAST ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Scientific Research Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Tourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Harvesting of Fish, Seals, and Whales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Avoiding Sensitive Areas and Rehabilitating Impacted Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

REG1ONAL AND GLOBAL IMPACTS FROM ANTARCTIC DEVELOPMENT . . . 148

Research Required to Better Predict Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Boxes

Box Page

5-A. An Oil Spill Off the Antarctic Peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

5-B. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

5-C. Oil Spilled in the Marine Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Figures

Figure Page

5-1. The Comparative Size of Antarctica and the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

5-2. Extent of Pack Ice Around Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

5-3. The Antarctic Marine Ecosystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

5-4. Krill Distribution Around Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

5-5. Distribution of Seals Around Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

5-6. Research Stations on Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

5-7. Specially Protected Areas and Sites of Special Scientific Interest on Antarctica . . . 150

Tables

Table Page

5-1. NSF-Supported Scientific Research in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

5-2. Oil Spill Probabilities for the Navarin Basin, Bering Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

5-3. Presence of Scientists and Tourists on Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

5-4. Worldwide Populations of Whales Commonly Found in the Southern Ocean . . +. . 148

5-5. Basic Research Required to Evaluate Possible Environmental Impacts Prior to

Resource Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Chapter 5

The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts

From Oil and Minerals Development

SUMMARY

Any serious consideration of mineral development in Antarctica requires abetter understanding of

likely ecosystem impacts. Primitive terrestrial flora

and fauna sparsely populate Antarctica’s ice-free

coastal areas. The waters surrounding the continent

are nutrient-rich and contain an abundance of

plankton, benthic organisms, fish, squid, seals,

whales, and sea birds. The ice cap, which covers 98

percent of Antarctica, has virtually no life forms.

Of the potential impacts from development activities that might occur in Antarctica, oil spills from

tanker accidents or blowouts would probably produce the most significant short- and long-term

environmental impacts. Due to the extremely cold

temperatures found around Antarctica, the total

recovery of coastal areas impacted by oil spills

would probably require several decades, or perhaps

longer. Far offshore, spills would tend to break up

naturally and disperse, causing much less damage

than coastal spills.

Mining operations and land-based activities required to support onshore and offshore development

would permanently destroy or significantly impact

local terrestrial flora and microfauna. Ice-free coastal areas would probably be most prone to impacts,

both because of their relatively easy accessibility

and because they would be the only practical

locations for most facilities. It would probably not be

possible or practical to restore most areas impacted

by minerals activities to their original condition, so

future human activities will need to be planned to

minimize impacts from the beginning. Local terrestrial impacts are not expected to have a significant

regional effect on the marine ecosystem. Of some

concern, however, is the potential of onshore activities to compete with wildlife and research bases for

scarce ice-free sites.

Prospecting prior to resource exploration and

development would generally produce environmental impacts similar to those caused by onshore,

offshore, or airborne scientific research. Thus, impacts are expected to be insignificant.

Despite continuing research, there are still significant uncertainties about the environment of Antarctica. For example, baseline data on the marine

ecosystem are still incomplete. Environmental research required before and during offshore petroleum development could amount to several hundred

million dollars.

To date, the most significant environmental impacts to the terrestrial and nearshore marine environments have occurred near the few dozen year-round

scientific research bases in Antarctica. These impacts, generally involving small, accidental releases

of fuel and other chemicals and the disposal of

wastes are considered by many to be insignificant. A

notable exception is the oil spill from the 1989

sinking of the Bahia Paraiso off the Antarctic

Peninsula, an incident which will provide insight

into the environmental impacts of future spills.

INTRODUCTION

The continent of Antarctica, which covers an area

almost 1.5 times the size of the United States, is a

vast, largely untouched frozen wilderness dominated by majestic views and bleak, but beautiful

landscapes. In fact, about 90 percent of the world’s

ice is locked up in Antarctica’s mile-thick ice sheet.

Although the mineral resource potential of Antarctica has been a subject of much speculation over the

years, exploration and development has only recently been seriously considered.

As indicated in chapter 3, the Antarctic Minerals

Convention provides many general standards and

procedures that are designed to ensure that any

future minerals development would occur in an

environmentally sound manner. For example, no

mineral exploration or development is allowed

without adequate information about possible environmental impacts that such activities might generate. Opening an area for exploration and development by the Commission requires the consensus of

all voting parties. Technical advice about decisions

is provided by a Scientific, Technical, and Environmental Advisory Committee.

-125-
126 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Protecting Antarctica’s environment may conflict with issues of sovereignty, politics, logistical

convenience, financial considerations, and the facilitation of scientific research.1 Environmental groups

are, therefore, concerned about the scope of procedural and informational requirements for reviewing

proposed projects and regulating development activities, especially in light of potentially large

financial and political incentives associated with

minerals development.234 Liability for environmental impacts from serious accidents is also an

issue. The detailed procedures for addressing these

issues will be worked out only after the Convention

has been ratified.

If minerals development proceeds within the

framework of the Minerals Convention, future

debates will likely focus not on decisionmaking

procedures, but on the definitions of the Convention’s many qualitative terms such as “adequate,’

“effective,” “ acceptable,” “significant,” “safe,”

etc. These terms can only be defined within the

framework of scientific knowledge and uncertainties

about Antarctica’s environment. Therefore, this

chapter provides general background material on the

marine and terrestrial ecosystems of Antarctica and

evaluates what is known about potential impacts

from minerals activities.

EnvironmetilSe#”n#67 8

Antarctica covers almost 10 percent of the Earth’s

land surface, or about 5.4 million square miles (14

million km2). (See figure 5-1.) Most of the continent

is buried beneath an ice cap that depresses the

underlying land mass and averages about 6,000 feet

(2 km) thick. Fed by falling snow, the ice slowly

migrates north at rates that vary from about 10 feet

(3 m) to a few thousand feet (1,000 m) per year. The

surface of most of the icecap lies between 6,500 feet

(2,000 m) and 13,000 feet (4,000 m) above sea level,

making the mean elevation of Antarctica three times

higher than other continents. The depth of the

continental shelf ranges from about 1,200 feet (400

m) to 2,600 feet (800 m), much greater than the

global mean.

Of the seven continents, Antarctica is the least

hospitable to human activities. Summer temperatures average about O ‘C (+32 ‘F) along the coast and

-30 “C (-22 “F) in the interior winter temperatures

average about -20 “C (-4 ‘F) along the coast and

-65 “C (-85 “F) in the interior. The most moderate

climate is found on the Antarctic Peninsula where

average temperatures generally range from about

O “C (32 “F) to -15 “C (-5 “F). During the winter

months (i.e., mid-June to mid-September) the Sun

never rises over the continent’s interior and much of

its coastal areas. During the summer months (i.e.,

mid-December to mid-March) it remains up all day.

Days and nights are of more equal length during the

spring and fall.

Antarctica’s interior is essentially a frozen desert.

Snowfall is about 10 inches (25 cm) per year.

Coastal areas annually receive about 80 to 300

inches (200 to 800 cm) of snow. Coastal areas also

tend to be cloudy, but rarely foggy. Blizzards and

hurricane force winds with velocities of over 100

miles per hour (50 m/see) occur frequently along the

coast of Antarctica. In fact, the Southern Ocean

between 40° S. latitude and the Antarctic Circle (i.e.,

66° S. latitude), commonly referred to as the

‘‘roaring forties, ’ has the strongest sustained winds

IF.M. Auburn, Anfa7ctjc LUW andpoljtics (Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 274-277.

2J.1 ~cy (~.), 1‘Fu~e s~~e~= for ~ AntMctic Minerals Resource Regime.-Can the Environment Be htccted?’ T~ Ntw Natio~km

and the Use of Common Spaces: Issues in Marine Polhuwn and the Exploitation of Antarctica (Totowa, New Jersey: Allenheld, Osmun Publishers,

1982), pp. 216-217.

SL$A. Kimbd], ‘ ‘me ~~ctic Minerals Convention, ’ ‘ Special Report, World Resources Institute, July 1988, p. 36.

4L+A+ ~m~l, 1‘~vir~en~ ISSUC,S in the &tarctic Minerals Negotiations, ’ L.M. Alexander and L.C. Hanson (eds.), Antarctic Pofirics and

Marine Resources Critical Choicesfor tk 1980s (Kingston, RI: Center for Ocean Management Studies, 1985), pp. 204-214.

5&m~ ~wlliWnce Agency, N~~ Foreign ~ssments Center, Po/ar Regio~ /lr/~, GC 78-10040, my 1978, pp. 35-39.

6D.H. Elllot, 1‘A Fr~e~o~ fm ~~ss~g fivlronmcnt~ ~p~ts of possible Antarctic hfi~r~ Development, ’ The hlstitute Of POhM Stll&CS,me

Ohio State University, January 1977, Part 1, NTIS PB-262 750, pp. vii, xvi, 11-10, V-15.

7R.H. Rutford, “Reports of the SCAR Group of Specialists on Antarctic Environmental Implications of Possible Mineral Exploration and

Exploitation (AEIMEE), ” Scientific Canmittee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions, 1986, pp. 18-19.

8J.H. zm~ge (cd.), “Possible Env ironmental Effects of Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in Antarctica, ’ Scientific Committee on Antarctica

Research, March 1979, pp. 17, 18,59,
Chapter S--The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 127

Figure 5-1-The Comparative Size of Antarctica and the United States

8

\

SOURCE: U.S. Geological Survey, 19S9

found anywhere on Earth. High winds and large grows a maximum of 900 miles out from the

waves make navigation in this part of the world continent during the winter and covers about 8

especially dangerous. million square miles (20 million km2), an area larger

than the continent itself. Since about 85 percent of

As shown in figure 5-2, the icepack around the sea ice melts during the summer, the new ice

Antarctica (excluding the permanent ice shelves) formed during the winter has a relatively uniform
128 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

thickness of about 3 to 6 feet (1 to 2 m). In the March minimum, the sea ice covers about 1 million

summer, the icepack breaks up as it melts and is square miles (2.5 million km2

) of the Southern

dispersed northward by strong winds that can move Ocean. Due to wide temperature ranges, sea ice

broken ice up to 40 miles (65 km) per day. At its coverage varies substantially from year to year.
—

Chapter 5--The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development • 129

Photo credit: Earth Observation Satellite Company

The iceberg B-9 with a number of smaller tabular bergs.

The Ross Ice Shelf is to the right. B-9 is about twice the size

of Rhode Island.

Huge tabular icebergs break off the Ross,

Ronne, and other floating ice shelves and drift

around Antarctica at speeds of up to 10 mph. At any

one time a dozen such icebergs exceeding 15 miles

(25 km) in length may be floating around the

continent. Some have dimensions of more than 60

miles (100 km) by 35 miles (60 km). Tabular

icebergs can rise some 250 feet (75 m) above the sea

surface, and extend to water depths of up to 1,500

feet (450 m). Movement of grounded icebergs can

produce gouges on the seafloor measuring 100 feet

(30 m) wide, up to 15 feet (5 m) deep, and 2 miles (3

km) long. Small icebergs that break off the many

glaciers at the edge of Antarctica are also found

along the coast of Antarctica throughout the year.

Biological Communities

The biological environment of Antarctica is

composed of two distinct and very different ecosystems: a terrestrial ecosystem (including freshwater

lakes and streams) and a marine ecosystem. Landbased plants and microorganisms are distributed

primarily along ice-free coastal regions of Antarctica in discontinuous patches characterized by typically low population densities. Marine organisms,

on the other hand, are widely distributed around

Antarctica, often in patches with high population

densities. Some marine mammals, such as seals and

sea birds, spend some time both on land and at sea.

Sea birds also supply land-based plants with vital

nutrients, 9 but terrestrial organisms provide no

nutrients for marine flora or food for marine fauna.

Due to higher population densities, greater complexity, and greater continuity, the marine ecosystem of Antarctica is probably somewhat more

resilient to impacts than is the land-based ecosystem.10 The impacts of man’s harvesting activities on

fish, seals, and whales from the Southern Ocean are

discussed in a later section of this chapter.

The Terrestrial Ecosystem

A total of about 200 mostly microscopic species

of terrestrial fauna permanently inhabit the continent. These species include protozoans, rotifers

(i.e., microscopic multicelled aquatic invertebrates),

nematodes (i.e., round worms), tardigrades (i.e.,

microscopic arthropods with four pairs of legs that

usually live in water or in damp moss), insects, and

mites; there are no land-based vertebrates. With

several hundred different kinds of lichen and

mosses, plant species outnumber animal species by

about 4 to 1. Some grasses are found on the

9M.w. Holdgate and J. Tinker, “Oil and Other Minerals in the Antarctic: ‘Ile Environmental Implications of Poss]ble Mineral Exploration or

Explomttion in Antartmca, ” results of a Rockefeller Foundation workshop held in Bellagio, Italy, March 1979, p. 20.

l~u~ord, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 24.

~~E]]io~ op. cit., footnote 6, pp. ix, U-3 ~ 5.

lzzw~rr, op. cit., fcotnote 8, pp. 434$.

1 J&nU~ In~lligence Agency, op. cit., fOOtnote 5, p, 5~.

1

4 J.H. W. Hain, “A Reader’s Guide to the Antarctic, ’ Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 34.
130 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Antarctic Peninsula, but there are no trees, shrubs, or

vines. Poorly developed soils also contain bacteria,

algae, yeast, and other fungi.11 121314

The majority of land-based and freshwater organisms of Antarctica are found on or near its ice-free

coastal areas, which cover a combined area about the

size of Colorado. Antarctica’s coastline is about

three times longer than that of the United States, but

there is probably less ice-free shoreline during the

summer than exists between Boston and Washington.15 Potential resource development raises concerns about competition between development

activities and wildlife for ice-free terrestrial

environments. Avery few terrestrial species are also

found in ice-free areas of the Transantarctic Mountains.

The Marine Ecosystem16

The nutrient rich and highly productive waters

surrounding Antarctica are characterized by an

abundance of phytoplankton, zooplankton, fish,

squid, benthic (i.e., bottom-dwelling) organisms,

seals, whales, and birds. There are more marine than

terrestrial species, but fewer marine species than are

typically found in most temperate or tropical marine

environments. A simplified diagram of the Antarctic

marine ecosystem is shown in figure 5-3.

The base of the marine food chain is supported by

about 100 species of phytoplankton-mostly diatoms--

and zooplankton. But the marine ecosystem in areas

of the ocean covered by seasonal ice is dominated by

Antarctic krill, a small shrimp-like crustacean. As

shown in figure 5-4, patchy swarms of krill provide

the principal source of food for many Antarctic

vertebrates, including whales, seals, fish, squid,

penguins, and other sea birds.17

Although small amounts of krill have been

harvested from Antarctic waters for human consumption since 1973, the long-term potential of krill

as a food and/or protein source for man is not clear.

More than 20 species of squid also provide an

important component of the diet of seals, sea birds,

and sperm whales in the open ocean.18 Benthic

organisms, such as sponges, starfish, and clams are

very common in shallow, nearshore waters. 19

Of the approximately 20,000 species of finfish

found worldwide, about 100 species inhabit the

Southern Ocean around Antarctica; most of these

species are found only in this area of the world. With

commercial fisheries from over a half dozen countries, the potential for overfishing has grown significantly over the last two decades .20

Six species of seals live in Antarctic waters; four

species live and breed on the pack ice around

Antarctica, as shown in figure 5-5. Crabeater seals,

with a population of about 15 to 30 million, are the

most abundant of these seal species. The southern

fur seals are commonly found not only on Antarctica, but also on many islands in the Southern Ocean

north of Antarctica.21 22

Seven species of whales are found in Antarctic

waters during the summer. Of these seven species,

blue, fin, humpback, sei, and minke whales feed

exclusively on the rich supplies of plankton and

krill. Sperm and right whales are found both in

Antarctic waters and in other temperate waters of the

world’s oceans.

1 IEllio(, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. ix, 11-3 & 5.

lzzm~rge, op, cit., footnote 8, pp. 43-44.

IJCen~~ Intelligence Agency, op. cit., footnote 5* P. 50.

1

4 J.H.W. Hain, ‘‘A Reader’s Guide to the Antarctic, ’ Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, S ummer 1988, pp. 34.

15Holdg~, op. cit., footnote 9, P. 31.

16J.L. Bengtsort, ‘Review of Antarctic Marine Fauna, Selected Papers Presented to the Scientific Committee of the Cornmissionfor the Conservation

of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1982-1984, Part 1, pp. 1-219.

17Elliot, op. cit., footnote 6, p. ix.

ISR.M. Laws, ‘ ‘The Ecology of the SOuthem Ocean, ’ Arnertcan Scientist, vol. 73, January -Februq 1985, pp. 26-40,

lyEHiot, op. cit., footnote 6, P. H-16.

mJ,R. ~dm~on and I. Everson, “The Assewment of Explolted Antarctic Fish Stocks, ’ Selected Papers Presented to the Scient$ic Committee of

the coremission for the Conservaoon of Antarcac Marine Llvmg Resources 1982-1984, Part 1, pp. 385-394.

ZID,B. Slniff, ‘ ‘Living Resources: StdS, Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 71-74.

%entral Intelligence Agency, op cit,, footnote 5, p. 51.
Chapter 5-The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 131

Figure 5-3-The Antarctic Marine Ecosystem

I . H

Crabeater seals 1

1

Sperm whales and killer whales

Seals

Weddell —

Elephant

Lec

Fur

d

Ross

Minke & Sei

Fin & Blue

Humpback

SOURCE: Offkx of Technology A8eownent, 19S9
132 . Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Figure 54-KriIl Distribution Around Antarctica

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o Soo t 000 nauticel nrI!4s ,W Cam@ell I .-

———.

;50 /

/’”

———.—

30URCE: U.S. Government, 1978.

About 50 species of sea birds, with a total principally Adelie penguins, comprise close to 90

population that may approach 200 million, are found percent of the biomass of all bird populations. Other

at least seasonally around Antarctica. Penguins, Antarctic birds include albatrosses, petrels, shags,
Chapter S---The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 133

Photo credit: Ann Hawthorne

Weddell Seal, Hutton Cliffs, Ross Island.

prions, shearwaters, skuas, gulls, fulmars, and terns.

Krill account for almost 80 percent of bird diets. All

penguins and many other sea birds are dependent on

pack ice and exposed, ice-free shorelines for breeding. 2324

Ongoing Research Activities

Scientific research has long been the most important activity occurring in Antarctica. In fact, research

is the primary means by which countries maintain a

presence in Antarctica for political purposes. Currently, there are about four dozen year-round scientific research bases in Antarctica, plus many other

temporarys ummer camps.

25Most research bases are

located in coastal regions; only three permanent

bases---one United States, one Japanese, and one

Soviet—are located in inland areas. The United

States base at McMurdo Sound is the continent’s

largest scientific base and logistical facility with 150

buildings, plus 200 year-round and up to 1,300

summertime personnel.

The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research

(SCAR) was formally established in 1958 by the

international scientific community following the

1957-58 International Geophysical Year. Although

not a formal part of the Antarctic Treaty system,

SCAR initiates, promotes, coordinates, and reviews

ongoing scientific activity in Antarctica. The 18 full

members and 7 associate members of SCAR meet

every other year to discuss ongoing research and

~Laws, op. cit., foomote 18, PP. 2W.

mzmbr~, ~. cit., foomotc & P. 22.

~The nuder of research stations varies somewhat from year to year. Eight of these research stations are located north of 60” S.
134 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

/

South

120’

I

/

Indian

Ocean

SOURCE: U.S. Qove-nment, 1978.

other issues related to waste disposal, environmental consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty to

impacts, and the exploitation of Antarctic living and provide advice on scientific, technical, and environmineral resources.26 SCAR is often requested by the mental matters, or to undertake special studies.

~David J, Drcwry, ‘‘The Chalkngc of Antarctic !kienw, ” Oceanu.s, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 5-10.
Chapter 5-The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development • 135

Photo credit: Steve Zimmer

Lone skua over open water near McMurdo.

Through the Division of Polar Programs, the

United States’ National Science Foundation (NSF)

annually supports about 75 research projects in

Antarctica involving about 330 scientists and technical staff. (See table 5-1.) These projects cost about

$15 million per year. An additional $20 million of

NSF funding goes toward direct support of scientific

research (e.g., ship and aircraft time). Another $90

million of NSF funding and about 1,200 people

provide operational and logistical support for United

States research activities. 27 Although there is little

comprehensive data on other nation’s research

budgets, a few Antarctic experts estimated that the

United States probably supports about 20 to 30

percent of all research on Antarctica.

The United States, through its National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration, supports another

$2 million of fisheries research in the Southern

Ocean each year. This is at most about 10 percent of

the total international budget for this type of

fisheries research.

POTENTIAL IMPACTS FROM MAN’S

ACTIVITIES IN ANTARCTICA

Future minerals exploration and development in

Antarctica, if it occurs, would most likely involve

exploring for and recovery of oil from offshore

deposits, and/or the mining of minerals from ice-free

coastal regions. Such activities would unavoidably

generate some significant local environmental impacts (i.e., within a few square miles), and perhaps

some minor regional impacts (i.e., extending over

tens of square miles). Ice-free coastal areas, and

benthic nearshore areas are the habitats most

likely to be significantly impacted by onshore or

offshore resource development and any support

activities. 28

The impacts of resource development activities

on the Antarctic environment could be either more

or less severe than these activities would generate in

other parts of the world. Impacts from development

activities are naturally site-specific, and should be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis relative to the

potential benefits from the proposed development

activities. Monitoring of ongoing development activities is essential. Impacts from Antarctic development would be easier to detect due to the relatively

pristine nature of the surrounding environment;

however, it will be difficult and expensive to

implement effective monitoring programs because

of Antarctica’s remoteness and adverse working

conditions. Cumulative impacts are very difficult to

accurately predict.

The impacts that could be expected from different

types of activities in Antarctica are discussed below,

based on information from similar activities in other

parts of the world. These activities include: prospecting, oil exploration and development, landbased minerals exploration and development, and

dredging with open-water disposal of the dredged

material. All of these activities would require

support facilities and transportation systems. These

are addressed in a separate section. This discussion

is followed by additional material on: impacts from

man’s past activities in Antarctica, the potential for

rehabilitating locally impacted areas, regional and

mNationaI Saence Foundar.mn, ‘ ‘The Role of the National Science Foundation in Polw Reg]ons: A Report to the Nauonal Science Board, ’

NSB-87-128, June 1987, pp. 45-48.

~Rutfod, Op. CIL, fOO~E 7, pp. 24,35.
136 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Table 5-1-NSF-Supported Scientific Research in Antarctica

Percentage of

United States

Research categories: typical research areas research

Meteorology/climate: atmospheric processes and chemistry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Oceanography: ooean circulation and ice/sea/air interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Earth sciences: tectonics, paleoclimates, and geophysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Glaciology: ice sheet dynamics and sea ice/iceberg formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

A8tronomy/upper atmosphere: aurora and magnetic field dynamics. . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Biology/ecology: biological processes and ecosystem dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Medicine/health: human physiology and immune system disorders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Engineering: facility and transportation system construction,

waste disposal, and oil spill cleanup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . 1

SOURCE: NSF, “The Role of the National Ekxenm Foundation in Polar Regions: A Report to the National Scienoe

Board,” NSB-S7-12S, June 19S7, p. 57; figures for annual funding from NSF.

global impacts from Antarctic development, and

research required to better predict environmental

impacts.

Prospecting Activities29

Prospecting for mineral resources is conducted

prior to commercial exploration and development

using onshore, offshore, and airborne techniques

similar to those used for basic research. A prospecting party might consist of several geologists and

technicians and several dozen additional support

staff. 30 Like scientific research, prospecting activities would generally occur during the summer

months. Although some geophysical research resembling prospecting has been conducted in Antarctica, there has been no prospecting, at least as it is

defined by the Antarctic Minerals Convention.

Chapter 3 explains the Convention’s definition of

and provisions for prospecting.

Prospecting for offshore petroleum might include the collection of sediment cores and other data

on seabed conditions in offshore areas; seismic

reflection profiling; bathymetric, magnetic, and

gravimetric surveys; and the mapping of geologic

formations. Prospecting for land-based minerals

might include the collection of rock samples from

surface outcrops; magnetic, gravimetric, and electrical conductivity surveys; mapping of geologic

formations; collection and interpretation of aerial

photographs; and surface drilling with portable rigs,

As defined by the Minerals Convention, prospecting

activities would not include dredging, excavation,

and drilling into rock or sediment to depths greater

than 82 feet (25 m).

Since prospector often use the same techniques

used by geologists and geophysicists for basic

research, it will be very difficult to distinguish

between scientific research and prospecting activities. In addition, the impacts to Antarctica’s terrestrial and marine environments from the vast majority

of prospecting activities will be very similar, except

perhaps in scale, to those generated by ongoing

land-based and offshore geologic research.31 In

most cases, the impacts generated by prospecting

would be insignificant relative to the impacts

from full-scale development activities.32

Oil Exploration and Development

The development of offshore oil deposits in

Antarctica, if allowed, would produce numerous

environmental impacts. The sea floor will be significantly, but locally disrupted by the drilling of wells

zg~id., pp. 14,43-58, 63.

s~l]lot, op. cit., fm~ 6* P. IV-2.

31~id., pp. XV, W1-8.

321+oidgatc, op. cit., fOOtIIOte 9, p. 24.

33u,s,~ww~lwof ~~oloW &~mt, Oi/ ~G~ Techrwfogies for the Arctic and Deepwater, OTA-O-270 (Washington, ~: U.S.

Government Printing Office, May 1985), pp. 163-201,
Chapter S-The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 137

and the laying of pipelines. Some benthic marine

organisms will be smothered by discharges of

drilling muds.34 The construction of land-based

support facilities will generate impacts in coastal

areas. However, the accidental spillage of oil,

especially in coastal waters, would probably

produce the greatest short- and long-term impacts of any resource development activities,

especially oil development.35 36 The recent sinking

of the Bahia Paraiso off the Antarctic Peninsula and

the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Alaska,

highlight the significance of impacts associated with

oil spills. (See box 5-A, box 5-B, and box 5-C.)

Major oil spills often result from a damaged

and/or sinking oil tanker, or from a well blowout.

Antarctic tanker spills would, by definition, occur in

remote locations, and could involve the rapid release

of large amounts of oil. Although there are several

measures that can be taken to help prevent tanker

accidents (e.g., double-hulled ship construction,

weather forecasting, iceberg tracking, and sophisticated navigation equipment), even with tight regulations, human error can still occur. If shipping is

confined to summer months, any tanker accident

would occur when the resident seals and penguins

and other birds are clustering and breeding along

Antarctica’s coast.

A blowout is a sudden, uncontrolled escape of

hydrocarbons from an exploratory or production

well. Oil discharge rates will probably be slower for

leaking wells than for tankers, but releases from

wells may continue for longer periods of time,

especially if the well cannot be quickly controlled.

Blowouts that occur on the sea floor in water depths

of a few thousand feet or beneath ice-covered seas

would be extremely difficult to control, especially

during the winter months, Oil produced during the

winter months in Antarctica may need to be stored

for transport during the summer. If so, these

land-based or offshore storage facilities could be an

additional source of oil spills.

The following discussion briefly addresses the

likelihood of oil spills, their potential impacts on the

marine environment, and the effectiveness of different technologies for dispersing oil spills and/or

cleaning them up.

Probability of Oil Spills37

It is possible to project scenarios for exploration

and development of offshore oil deposits in Antarctica, as shown in appendix A. The likelihood of oil

spills from future oil development has been estimated for the relatively shallow water (450 feet) of

the Bering Sea, based on current production activities in the Gulf of Mexico. These figures, which are

summarized in table 5-2, suggest that for each

billion barrels of oil produced, four spills of 1,000 to

10,000 barrels in size, and two spills larger than

10,000 barrels can be expected. The probabilities of

spills from oil development off Antarctica would

likely be higher due to 1) water depths of a few

thousand feet, 2) ice islands and numerous large

icebergs that could threaten sea surface and seabed

operations, and 3) extreme working and navigation

conditions.

Perhaps the most likely oil spills around Antarctica may result from accidents involving ships

resupplying bases or used for tourism. In the last 4

years four ships have sunk in Antarctica: one supply

ship, one tourist ship, one tourist/supply ship, and

one research vessel. Only the Bahia Paraiso, a

tourist/supply ship that ran aground off the Antarctic

Peninsula in January 1989, spilled a considerable

amount of fuel oil. (See box 5-A).

Mm= have ~n ~ver~ s~~cs of & ~~nti~ lrnp~ts ~ &ctic marine environment producd by tk discharge of filling muds contaminated

with heavy metals and other potentially toxic substances. These studies indicate that major impacts on the marine cnvuonmcnt are unlikely, except in

restricted areas such as shallow coastal waters or protected bays (Rutford, op. cit., focxnote 7, p. 17; Elliot, op. cit., foomote 6, p. VI14).

35 RUtford, op. cit., fOOmO~ 7! P. 8.

~Elliot, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. XVI, VII-26.

371J,S. tigress, op. cit., footnote 33, pp 185-186.
138 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

1

Box 5-A—An Oil Spill Off the Antarctic Peninsula

On January 28, 1989, the Bahia Paraiso, a 435-foot, double-hulled transport/tourist ship operated by the

Argentine navy, ran aground in clear weather off the northern tip of the Antarctic Peninsula, The 81 tourists and

crew of 235 safely abandoned the ship before it rolled over on its side 4 days later in 50 feet of water. It had a 30-foot

gash in its side.

About 250,000 gallons of diesel fuel were stored on board, in bulk and in 55-gallon drums; about 170,000

gallons of fuel were lost. Within a few days after the accident a 15-mile-long slick covered an area of about 10 square

miles and had reached the beaches and rookeries surrounding the United States’ Palmer Station research center,

killing krill and oiling seals, penguins, cormorants, skuas, and giant petrels, The entire brood of skua chicks in the

Palmer area was lost.

The NSF responded within 36 hours by sending 52 tons of U.S. Navy cleanup equipment along with 15 oil

spill experts from the United States, Argentina, and Chile. NSF has spent about $2.5 million to date on its response

efforts. Removing the fuel remaining on board will cost about $3 to $5 million, Another $50 to $60 million might

be required to remove the ship and to sink it in the open ocean,

The accident highlights the following points:

. Antarctica’s environment is vulnerable to accidental oil spills, even without petroleum development.

● Most countries conducting research in Antarctica are ill-prepared to deal with oil spills. Even if cleanup

equipment is available, much valuable response time can be lost shipping the equipment to the spill site.

. The impacts associated with a spill of crude oil will likely be longer lasting than the impacts from the Bahia

Paraiso spill due to the greater abundance in crude oil of organic compounds with low volatility.

. Since the early 1960s, NSF has spent about $80 million on the Palmer Station and its biological research.

This research will provide excellent baseline data for evaluating the effects of the spill, but many ongoing

projects at Palmer and other U.S. stations have been significantly impacted.

● Studies of the fate and effects of the Bahia Paraiso spill will help scientists predict likely impacts from larger

oil spills in Antarctica, should oil exploitation occur in the future.

. Appropriate response action and liability for accidents-dealt with in articles 4 and 8 of the Minerals

Convention, respectively-are essential elements of arty plan for future resource development.

SOURCE: Informtati on gticd from vsrious sources, including the Nntionsl Sciemx FoundAti~ April 1989 newslet- from The Antasctican SOciq; New

Scwnsf, Feb. 11, 1989, p. 31; and B. Renskgcr, Washington Posf, Jan. 31, 1989, Feb. 1, 1989, Feb. 3, 1989, and Feb. 4, 1989.

Potential Impacts From Oil Spills in and onto coastal beaches and rookeries. Organisms

(e.g., plankton, birds, and fur seals) that come into

direct contact with floating oil would likely be

Although a major oil spill in Antarctica would

likely be a rare event, the impacts from such a coated and killed. Benthic organisms would also be

spill would probably be damaging and long- smothered by sinking oil.

lasting. Marine organisms in Antarctica would

experience the greatest short-term impacts from oil Many organisms living in the water column

spills, especially if they drifted into nearshore areas would suffer lethal or sublethal impacts by directly

3Szu~@,~. cit., footnote 8, pp. 17,22, 26.32136138

WRutiord, ~. cit., footnote 7, pp. 22, 35.36.

@Elliot, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. xiv xv, VU-l, 5,6,28, IX-2, 3.

41J.H. Zumbergc, “Potcndat Mineral Resource Availability and Possible Environment Problems in Antarctica, ” J.I. CharnCy (cd.), The New

Nahonali.rtn and tk Use of Common Spaces: [ssues ifl Marine Pollutwn and Exploitatwn of Antarctica (1’btowa, New Jersey: Allenheld, Osmun

Publishers, 1982), pp. 143-144.

42u.s. Depment of State, ‘‘Final Environmental Impact Statement on the Negotiation of an International Regime for Antarctic Mineral Resources,’

August 1982, pp. 6-18 to 6-26.
Chapter S--The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 139

Photo credit: Ted DeLaca, National Science Foundation

The Bahia Paraiso.

ingesting oil or eating oil-contaminated organisms.

43 However, there seems to be very little

evidence of increased accumulation of oil in higher

levels of the food chain.44 Marine organisms and sea

birds are numerous enough and widely enough

dispersed around Antarctica that mortalities from a

small spill would probably not permanently impact

overall populations of marine organisms. Many

small spills or a few large spills, however, could

have significant and long-lasting adverse impacts.

Long-term impacts on marine organisms from oil

spills in Antarctica are not well-understood. It is

known, however, that crude oil takes 20 to 50 times

longer to degrade at 5 “C (41 o

F) than it does at 25

oC (77 o

F).45 Oil would require art even longer time

to degrade in Antarctica. Many biological processes

(e.g., growth, sexual maturation, etc.) affecting

individual organisms and entire populations also

seem to occur at slower rates in cold environments.

Some scientists have therefore hypothesized that the

responses of the Antarctic marine ecosystem to an

oil spill will be similar in type and magnitude to

impacts from oil spills in other temperate marine

environments.

Due to the cold temperatures of Antarctica, the

subsequent recovery of impacted areas is likely to

require an extended period of time 46-perhaps

several decades-rather than the several years required for warmer regions.47 Ongoing studies of the

short- and long-term impacts of the recent oil spill

off the Antarctic Peninsula will help to resolve many

of the current uncertainties about the impacts of oil

spills from the potential development of petroleum

resources.

Oil Spill Cleanup Techniques48

The limited experience with oil spills in the

Arctic suggests that significant amounts of oil

could not be recovered from a major spill in

Antarctica, even with the most up-to-date equipment and well-formulated cleanup plans. The

effectiveness of most cleanup technologies in Antarctica would be adversely affected by extremely

cold temperatures, significant concentrations of

broken and unbroken ice,49 long periods of darkness

during the Antarctic winter, and typically high winds

and large waves. However, technologies and procedures could be improved over the next two or three

decades to address some of these problems.

Three approaches for dealing with oil spills in

Antarctica are discussed below. The usefulness of

each technique depends largely on the nature and

location of the spill; no single technique is ideally

suited for all situations.

1) Oil Dispersion: Chemical dispersants can be

used in some situations to enhance the breakdown of

oil into smaller droplets more easily dispersed by

winds and waves and more readily broken down by

43 S@uds ando~cr marine rnamm~s CarI ingest oil directly or indirectly during ftxciingor when they clean their furor feathers. Although the @eStiOn

of oil may not lead to fatalities, it can produce abnormal behavior which can in turn lead to abnormally tugh mortalities. For example, afler ingesting

oil from the rexxnt spill in Antarctica, adult skuas began behaving abnormally and even attacked their own young. Within a week, about 60 percent of

the skuaa had disappeared from their nesting areas.

44N~~ R~~h Couci], Oj/ in the Sea lnpuu, Fates, and Effects (Washington, DC: National Academy Pres 1985). p. 6.

ds~~~ ~~lh=nce Agency, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 28.

W3.A. Robilliard and M. Busdosh, ‘*Need for Real World Assessment of the Environmental Effects of Oil Spills

Environments, Proceedings of the Sixth Interrumonal Conference on Port and Ocean Engineering under Arctic Conditiom,

vol. 11, pp. 937-944.

qTNsIj~~ R&arch council, op. cit., footnote 44, p. 487.

.MU,S. con-, op. cit., footnote 33, PP. 188-197.

49Ru~ord, op. cit., fOOtX30~ 7, P. 20.

In Ice-infested Marine

Quebec, Canada, 1981,

20-604 0 - 89 - 4 : (JL 3
140 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Box 5-B—The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill

On March 24, 1989 the 987-foot, single-hulled tanker Exxon Valdez struck a reef in clear weather in Prince

William Sound about 25 miles from the oil loading terminal at Valdez, Alaska. Soon, 10 million gallons of oil spilled

from several 20-foot gashes in the tanker’s bottom, overwhelming efforts at control. The result was the largest oil

spill in U.S. history. Driven by heavy seas and 70-mph winds, the slick covered more than 1,000 square miles of

ocean and hundreds of miles of beaches.

Despite the existence of several industry and government contingency plans, the Exxon response to the spill

was hampered by an insufficient amount of operating cleanup equipment, by a lack of trained people, by unclear

lines of responsibility and authority, and by confusion over appropriate courses of action. Oil booms, skimmers,

dispersants, and burning were all tried at various times during the cleanup effort, but with very limited success. This

disaster contrasts with the success over the last 12 years of tanker operations between Alaska and the west coast

of the United States. During this time more than 8,700 tankers with oil from Valdez had spilled only about 200,000

gallons of oil near Valdez and another 2 million gallons along the tanker route. The impacts of the Exxon Valdez

spill on the fish and wildlife of Alaska are still being studied, but will undoubtedly involve the loss of thousands

of birds, otters, and other types of wildlife.

This spill highlights the following points related to the potential development of petroleum resources in

Antarctica:

. Even under the best of circumstances, it is difficult to clean up significant amounts of oil from large spills

given the current state-of-the-art of cleanup technologies; improvements could result from further research.

● Although the chances of accidents can be minimized through the use of advanced technologies (e. g., for

navigation), good planning, worker training, etc., it is difficult to avoid all human error.

. Written plans must clearly designate responsibilities for all parties involved in oil spill cleanup operations.

● The Exxon Valdez spill, although linger and more widespread than the Bahia Paraiso spill, will probably

not have as long-lasting effects, since it occurred in warmer waters where recovery rates are faster.

SOURCES: E. Marshtt, “W(k: ‘rhO kdiCtCdOil Spill,” and L. Roberts, ‘‘Long, Slow Recovery Predicted for Alaska, ” Science, vol. 244, Apr. 7, 1989, pp.

X)-M; Tk National Response Tcun, “W tkron W&z 011 Spdl: A Repat to the Congrcs, “ May 1989, p. 37; c. MIXXXl and J. hhh3WS, “spilt

Ra.iBcs Doubts cm Oil Indusuy,” WmhingIO/I ~OSf, Apr. 2, 1989.

photochemical oxidation, metabolic transformation weather is stormy and the seas are exceptionally

within organisms, microbial degradation, and other

natural processes.50 Dispersants in current use are

less toxic than oil; however, dispersing oil in

shallow coastal areas may also cause some harm. In

such situations, one would have to consider whether

even more harm would occur by not using dispersants and allowing the oil to reach shore. Currently

available dispersants are only effective in a limited

number of situations; they are most effective when

applied within about 5 hours after a spill occurs. The

current potential for using dispersants in Antarctica

is probably not very high due to the cold temperatures, the presence of broken ice, high chemical

costs, and logistical problems involved in rapidly

applying large volumes of dispersants to sizable

spills.

Natural dispersion may be appropriate in the open

ocean, and perhaps the only alternative, when the

rough and/or when the spill is large or remote. The

lighter components of oil are often eliminated from

the water by evaporation.

2) In Situ Burning: Burning spilled oil may be

the best method available for oil spill cleanup in

certain situations. Cold Antarctic temperatures would

tend to increase the viscosity of oil and reduce its

ability to spread, thereby increasing its amenability

to burning. At the same time, cold temperatures

make ignition more difficult. Combustion efficiencies generally range from 20 to 80 percent by

volume. Greater efficiencies can often be achieved

if the oil can be naturally or artificially contained.

Burning works best on lighter oil fractions which

tend to evaporate within several days.

One drawback of burning could be the possible

loss of the ship or platform in the process; but the

%Iational Research Council, op. cit., footnote 44, pp. 10-11.
——.—

Chapter S--The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 141

Box 5-C-Oil Spilled in the Marine

Environment

Of the approximately 22 million barrels of

petroleum hydrocarbons entering the marine environment, about 37 percent comes from industrial,

municipal, urban, and river runoff; about 34 percent

from tanker operations and accidents; about 12

percent from other shipping accidents and sources;

about 8 percent from natural sources; and about 2

percent from offshore petroleum production.

To date, the world’s largest spill occurred in 1978

when the Amoco Cadiz ran aground off the coast of

France and spilled 68 million gallons of crude oil

along about 250 miles of shoreline. The largest

recent blowout occurred near the Mexican coast

during a 10-month period in 1979-80, discharging

over 125 million gallons of crude oil into the Gulf

of Mexico.

so~~: otl IA h Sea. l+uds, Fa&s, and Effects (lhhngton, DC:

Naticd t%tiy Press, 1985), pp. 82,561.

Table 5-2-(Oil Spill Probabilities for the

Navarin Main, Bering Sea (per billion barrels

of oil produced)

Number of oil spills (by size)

Source of spill (>1 ,000 barrels) (>10,000 barrels)

Platform . . . . . . . . 1.0 0.4

Pipelines . . . . . . . . 1.6 0.7

Tankers at sea . . . 0.9 0.5

Tankers in port . . . 0.4 0.2

Total . . . . . . . . . 3 . 9 1.8

80URCE: Mmarals Management Service, Navarin Basin Leaae Offering.

Final Environmental Impact Statement, November 1983.

cost to replace equipment destroyed by fire may

ultimately be less than the cost to clean up the

environment. Burning also produces air pollution

and a bum residue and thus could have negative

impacts on, for example, birds and seal rookeries

during the summer breeding season. Considering the

alternative of letting the oil reach sensitive areas,

burning may still be appropriate in some circumstances.

3) Mechanical Recovery: Over the last two

decades considerable effort has gone into developing surface booms and water jets to limit the spread

of oil spills, and surface craft to mechanically skim

and collect oil from floating slicks.51 Such equipment, however, has its limitations even under the

best of circumstances. Most currently available

skimmers are incapable of cleaning up large amounts

of spilled oil. Historically, skimmers have rarely

been able to recover more than 10 percent of the oil

from any large spill. In Antarctica, the performance

of most oil recovery equipment would be adversely

impacted by high winds, large waves, strong currents, cold temperatures, and ice. Any recovered oil

would also have to be disposed of, possibly by

landfilling or by incineration in air-transportable

units.

Mineral Exploration and Mining

Activitie s

52535455565 7

Chapter 4 indicates that the potential for recovering hard minerals from Antarctica is for the most part

unknown. However, the mining of high-grade mineral deposits in ice-free areas of the Arctic has been

underway for the past two decades. (See app. B.) For

example, COMINCO operates a year-round, leadzinc mining operation on Canada’s Little Cornwallis

Island about 600 miles north of the Arctic Circle.

Open pit or underground mining operations of this

sort typically involve considerable drilling, blasting,

and the generation of rock waste, dust, and noise.

Ore processing (e.g., crushing, grinding, and flotation) typically requires substantial amounts of energy and water, and generates large volumes of mill

51~lwgc~t her~&~ticis a &.foot S]rtgle-purpose, catamaran that use-s continuously movtig, ~so~nt$ polypropylene rope to SOP uP

oil; under actual operating conditions recovery rates could range from about 5 barrels (e.g., about 150 gallons) to about 30 barrels (i.e., almost 1,000

galhs) per hour.

52M. me, $ ‘A-merit of Mintig ad ~~ ‘Rd.noiogy for Antarctic Mineral Development-Volume I,” OTA contract report, January 1988,

p. 114.

53Ru~ofi, op. cit., footnote 7, pp. 33, 58, 45, 46.

%EUi~L ~p. ~it., ftio~ 6, pp. xiii, xv-xvi, [v-7, 12, ]7, 18, V-1 to 19, VII- I to 4, 8,9.11 to 16, IX-~* 2

55zmk&,~. cit., foomote 8, pp. 23-25, 36! 44~5

%%mberge, op. cit., foomote 41, pp. 143-144.

STU.S. mp~cnt of State, op. cit., footnote 42, PP. 6-11 to 6-18.
142 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

tailings and other wastes. Any ores mined in

Antarctica would probably be shipped off-site for

smelting.

Impacts on terrestrial flora and microfauna in the

immediate vicinity of these mining and ore processing activities should probably be considered permanent total natural recovery of adjacent areas would

require many decades to a few centuries. The

physical disturbance (e.g., modification of terrain,

destruction of soil and wet permafrost) and/or

chemical pollution (e.g., accidental spills of fuel oil

and other chemicals, etc.) from mining, ore processing, and associated construction activities in Antarctica will likely impact soils, ice-rich permafrost, and

the terrestrial ecosystem (e.g., mosses and lichens)

in the vicinity of mining operations. However,

mining operations are unlikely to occur on a large

enough scale to pose a significant threat to the

overall terrestrial ecosystem of Antarctica.

The most significant potential impacts from

mining operations in Antarctica would probably

be associated with the disposal of mill tailings

from ore processing and any subsequent leaching

of heavy metals from such tailings.58 Mill tailings

could conceivably be disposed in the ocean, in

inland lakes, in abandoned parts of the mine, in

specially designed dammed or diked containment

areas in ice-free regions, or perhaps on the ice. Land

disposal of tailings and the subsequent treatment of

any discharged water to meet stringent environmental standards is technically feasible, but often

quite expensive.

The potential for mining Antarctic mineral

deposits raises concerns about competition between mining activities scientific research, tourism, and wildlife for ice-free terrestrial environments. Seals and sea birds using the coastal environments surrounding Antarctica would be disturbed by

noise from mining and associated kind-based development activities located near breeding grounds,

congregating areas, or migratory corridors. Marine

organisms would also be adversely impacted by

accidental spills of chemicals and oil. Any areas of

the marine ecosystem that might be locally impacted

by mining activities would probably recover naturally; total recovery, however, could require several

decades.

Scientists have speculated that the production and

settling of dust from large-scale mining and construction activities in Antarctica could decrease the

highly reflective character of its snow-covered

areas.

59 However, volcanic ash that has been widely

dispersed over large areas of Antarctica by past

eruptions apparently had no such effect. Instead,

these layers are apparently quickly buried by subsequent snowfalls.60

Dredging With Open-Water Disposal of the

Dredged Material616263

The construction of docking facilities along

Antarctica’s coast may require the dredging of

nearshore areas and the subsequent disposal of the

dredged material, presumably in open-water areas.

Some dredging may also be required to bury

pipelines from underwater wellheads, or perhaps to

mine offshore placer deposits.@ It is also conceivable that mill tailings from land-based mining

operations could be disposed in nearshore marine

environments, thereby generating impacts similar to

those produced when dredged material is disposed in

open-water environments.

Turbid plumes of fine-grained suspended material

are usually found within a few hundred to several

hundred feet of most dredging and open-water

disposal operations. Such turbidity will decrease

phytoplankton photosynthesis and may adversely

SSM.b,op. cit., footnote 52, p. 114.

59’ ‘~~’* is &fiwtion of ~c~g Il@t or r~~on mat is refl~(~, Snow<oveti areas have a high al~o; dark surfaces that absorb in~ming

radiation have low albedos.

%hnberge, op. cit., foomote 41, pp. 134-136.

61U.S, ConWss, ~tu of ~~olW ~Wssment, w~tes in Marim Enviro~n~, OTA-()-334 (Washin@on, DC: U.S. Government printing

Office, Apd 1987), pp. 243-246.

&US. Cm=s, ~fi= of ~~ology As=ssment, Mari~ Minerals: E~~ring our New Ocean Frontier, OTA-342 (Washington, ~: U.S.

Governm ent printing Ofiice, July 1987), pp. 215-223, 233-236.

@Elliot, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. VLI~, 5, 13, ~4.

64pl_ WC de~si~ of m~w~l~er di~r~ or ]oc~]y concen~at~ in ]en~s--fo~d wi(.hin unconsolidated sands ~d gravels.
Chapter 5---The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 143

affect growth and reproduction of some pelagic

organisms. However, field studies of dredging and

disposal operations around the United States indicate few detectable physical impacts from water

column turbidity; any chemical releases (i.e., manganese, iron, ammonia, and phosphorus) are rapidly

diluted. Turbidity plumes typically dissipate within

several hours after dredging and/or disposal operations cease.

Benthic organisms in dredged areas around Antarctica will likely be destroyed by most types of

dredging equipment. In addition, at open-water

disposal sites, most benthic organisms that are

covered by more than a foot or so of dredged

material will be suffocated. At disposal sites in a few

tens of feet of water, such accumulations of dredged

material are usually resticted to bottom areas within

several hundred feet of the point from which the

dredged material is discharged into the water column. In deeper water, the bottom area covered by

dredged material will increase, but the thickness of

accumulating material will decrease.

Recolonization of dredging and disposal sites by

benthic organisms in temperate marine environments usually begins within a period of weeks after

cessation of the disposal operation; extensive recolonization can take from several months to a few

years in temperate climates. However, recolonization of Antarctic benthic environments may require

considerably more time due to the colder temperatures. 65

Development ofSuppotiFacil&”e@667 and

Transportation Systems68

The development of support facilities and transportation systems would lead to the destruction or

modification of Antarctic flora and fauna on a local

scale, similar to those described in the previous

section on mining activities. These types of activities will also compete with wildlife for ice-free

terrestrial environments.

Oil and/or minerals development in Antarctica

would involve constructing living quarters, oil

storage tanks, mineral processing units, power

generating stations, water and sewage treatment

plants, fuel storage facilities, buildings for storage of

equipment and supplies, etc. Developing and operating an average-sized mine or an oil field would

require a few hundred personnel and support staff

working at least 200 days per year over the life of the

activity. Construction activities would involve quarrying rock and/or dredging sand and gravel for

concrete and roads, modifying terrain, and installing

surface and subsurface drainage. Accidental spills of

fuel and other chemicals are also inevitable. Support

activities will also generate wastes in the form of

obsolete equipment, sewage and wastewater, biodegradable food, and other litter.

If oil or mineral resources in Antarctica are

eventually developed, the existing transportation

system (e.g., roads, air fields, docks and harbors,

etc. ) used to supply scientific research bases would

have to be expanded. Additional ships, roads,

railroads, vehicles, and/or pipelines would also be

required to remove any resources. For example, an

oil recovery operation for a 4-billion-barrel field

probably would require special storage facilities and

a few dozen specially built ships and docking

facilities to remove the oil during the summer

months. Some scientists also believe that oil discharges from routine tanker loading and from tanker

accidents could have significant cumulative impacts

on the Antarctic marine environment at a local and

perhaps regional level.

IMPACTS FROM MAN’S PAST

ACTIVITIES

Scientific Research Bases

During the 1800s and early 1900s, two dozen

exploratory expeditions from various countries visited Antarctica. Since the early 1900s, about 80

temporary and/or permanent research bases have

been established there. The first modern, internationally coordinated scientific effort to study the

region occurred during the 1957-58 International

Geophysical Year, during which 50 research stations

65zw&&, op. cit., foomote St P. 38

66 f7~io[, Op, Cl[,, foomote 6, pp. xvii, Vii-2 to 11. 19.20

b~z~~r~, ~. cit., footnote 8, pp. 28, 31-32.

6SRu~o~, op. cit., fcmt.note 7) P. 52.
144 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

were maintained by 12 countries,69 The 48 yearround and 19 summer research bases operated by

about 18 nations are shown in figure 5-6.70 Three

year-round bases are American.

Waste disposal practices in Antarctica during the

1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s were characterized by

a lack of state-of-the-art disposal alternatives (e.g.,

incinerators, sewage treatment plants, etc.) and by a

“frontier” attitude toward the environment. Since

the mid-1970s most countries have become more

aware of environmental impacts. With the exception

of the oil spill from the Bahia Paraiso sinking, most

impacts can be traced to accidental releases of small

amounts of oil and other chemicals, the construction

and operation of research bases and field camps, and

the disposal of wastes. Some environmental groups

contend that waste disposal practices (e.g., open

burning and landfilling) could be improved significantly with the use of different technologies. Such

technologies are often more costly.

Pollution in the immediate vicinity of most

year-round research bases has probably killed or

significantly impacted some or all benthic marine

organisms. For example, oil in the sediments of

Winter Quarters Bay, McMurdo Sound has largely

eliminated all benthic organisms. However, benthic

populations a few hundred meters beyond these

localities do not appear to have been significantly

impacted. 71 Considering Antarctica’s vast size,

the impacts generated by past scientific research

activities would be considered by most people to

be insignificant; some environmentalists, however, view them as more serious.

In recent years many countries have begun

cleaning up their research bases in Antarctica. For

example, in the 1986-87 season, the cargo ship M/V

Green Wave took 1,700 tons of waste back to the

United States for recycling and/or disposal. In 1988

Photo credit: Ann Hawthorne

Adelie penguins near McMurdo.

NSF outlined a $30 million, 4-year cleanup program

for American bases in Antarctica, and established an

Environmental Protection Agenda for all future

federally supported activities in Antarctica.72

Since the late 1950s, about two dozen coastal

bases have been abandoned or used only occasionally, often by expeditions from several different

countries. In many cases, equipment, buildings,

food, fuel drums, and much litter have been left

behind. Assuming responsibility for cleaning up

these abandoned bases could be difficult, especially

those bases used by more than one country .73

Touris m

7475767 7

Small air charters and expedition-type cruises on

ships carrying up to 150 tourists have become

increasingly popular over the last 25 years. Most

tourists visit the Antarctic Peninsula. There is a

100-bed guest house and a bank for visitors to

Chile’s Teniente Marsh research base on King

George Island off the Antarctic Peninsula. Over the

next few years it is anticipated that two to three

@~~ Intelligence Agency, op. cit., footnote 5, P. 40.

W3.R, Fletcher, ‘‘Antarctica: I%vironmcntal Prohxtion Issues, Congressional Research Sewicc RcporI for Congress, 89-272 ENR, Apr. 10, 1989,

p. 11.

TIRobi~~d, op. cit., footnote 46, pp. 937-944.

72Ntid Scl-F-tio~ Divisim of Pola pfo8r~s~ “U.S. Antarctic Program: Environmental Protection Agenda,” Aug. 31, 1988, p. 45.

73G=W== “1987-88 G~ Antarctic Expedition Report,’ Stichting Greenpeace Council, United Kingdom, p. 80.

74p.D. Hm, ~S~ Gm~ of -tic~fism,” Ocem, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 93-100.

~3N~@ ~iam F~~~ &#efy h Ati~ctica, NSF 88-78, 1988, pp. 9-1 m 9-10.

T6F.~ Au- AW~ti~ ~~Po~tics(B]~m~@on, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 277-283.

~Flc@h~, op. cit., footnote 70, P. 57.
.

Chapter 5-The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development . 145

Figure 5-6-Research Stations on Antarctica

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f,,,. ,, .../,, f ‘-l “< ,

b,!!, +,. ,7 IL’.., , Teniwa\e~,~yvajal

. F . : .! ,., ,$ “o., ,,

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,

A.. m’flv < ).,,.W5 , (New Zeat.ndl

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.,

(New Zeah-@ ‘Zealand Australla

SOURCE: U.S. Governrnent, 1989.
146 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

dozen tours-bringing about 3,500 people annually—

will visit Antarctica. Many tour groups are wellinformed and well-supervised; some are not.

Table 5-3 provides data on the approximate

number of person-days spent in Antarctica by

tourists and scientists. These figures indicate that

scientists and their support staff account for about 95

percent of the person-days logged in Antarctica. The

relative impact of tourist-related activities is probably much less than these figures indicate, since

land-based facilities are usually not required to

support tourist groups. In other words, the environmental impacts associated with normal tourist activities are at present minor compared to the impacts

generated by research activities. The recent sinking

of the Bahia Paraiso is an important exception to

this generalization. However, if tourism increases

and remains largely unregulated, the potential for

adverse impacts will increase.

Harvesting of Fish, Seals, and Whales

The most significant impacts to the marine

ecosystem of the Southern Ocean surrounding

Antarctica have been generated by overharvesting of fish, fur seals, and five species of

whales.

Antarctic Fishing

Major interest in Antarctic fishing developed

initially during the 1960s, and expanded significantly during the 1970s. For example, fish catches

increased from about 4,000 metric tons in the early

1970s to a peak of about 500,000 metric tons in the

1979-80 season, relative to almost 100 million

metric tons worldwide. The Antarctic cod was the

initial target of commercial fisheries in the early

1970s, but because of declining catches the focus

shifted to ice fish toward the end of the 1970s. Both

species are now depleted. Krill harvests increased

from about 2,000 metric tons in 1973 to about

446,000 metric tons in 1986.78

The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was

negotiated in response to heavy fishing, the consequent depletion of fish stocks in the 1970s, and

concerns about the possible development of a krill

fishery. It entered into force in 1982 and applies to

offshore areas within about 1,000 miles (1,600 km)

of Antarctica.79808182 The United States implemented this convention in 1984 through passage of

the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention Act (Public Law 98-623). The Convention

encourages the study, management, and conservation of the living resources within Antarctica’s

overall marine ecosystem, rather than focusing on

individual species of commercial importance.

Seal Harvesting

In the late 1700s and the early 1800s sealers from

the United States, Russia, and other European

countries began harvesting seals around the islands

in the Southern Ocean near Antarctica. Over 1

million seals were killed around South Georgia (in

the South Atlantic) alone between 1820 and 1822.83

Uncontrolled slaughter of fur seals for their thick fur

brought this species close to extinction by 1830. The

harvest of elephant seals for blubber oil began in the

early 1800s and continued until the 1960s. The four

species of seals (i.e., crabeater, Weddell, leopard,

and Ross) that only inhabit Antarctica have remained largely untouched by sealers due to their

inaccessibility or poor fur quality. w

After some limited harvesting of seals in 1964, the

then 14 parties to the Antarctic Treaty drew up the

Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic

Seals, which was signed in 1972 and entered into

TSK. Skmm and A.F. Ryan, “Antarctic Marine Living Resources, ” Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 59-63.

7%id., pp. 59-63.

%.J. Hofman, ‘‘Conservation of Marine Living Resources in Antarctica, unpublished paper for Seminar on the Polar Regions, Center for Oceans

Law and Policy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, March 1987, p. 14,

81J.N. Barnes, “The Emerging Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: An Attempt to Meet the New Realities of

Resource Exploitahon in the Southern Ocean, ’ J.I. Charney (d.), The New Natwnalism and the Use of Common Spaces: Issues in Marine Pollution

and Expbi@on of Antarctica (’htowa, New Jersey: Allenheld, Osmun publishers, 1982), pp. 239-286.

sZSiW@V ~im~ t.ccwimlu~ tie ~lnclpal fishing countries of the world including Japan with 13 percent of the world’s catch, tie Soviet

Union with 12 percent, China wifb 8 percent, and Chile and the United States with 6 percent each.

MH,J, Sutmn ~d p.K, p~k, ‘c~~ ad ~~ctlca” (~~), unit~ Nations EnVUOnment pro~~c, Nairobi, Kenya, August 1988, p. 20.

Wenmd Intelligence Agency, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 51.
Chapter 5-The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 147

Table 5-3-Presence of Scientists and Tourists on Antarctica

Approximate Duration of Percent

populations stay in days Person-days of total

Scientists and

support personnel

(UNEP):

Summer (@ 67 bases) . . . . . 3,500 120 420,000

Remaining 8 months

(@ 48 bases) . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000 240 240,000

(subtotal) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 660,000 95%

Tourists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,500 10 35,000 5 %

Total ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 695,000

SOURCE S.R Fletcher. “Antarctica. Environmental Proteetlon Issues.” Congressional Research Sewca Reoort for

Congress, 89-272 ENR, Apr. 10, 1989, p, 57.

force in 1978. The Convention totally protects the

fur, elephant, and Ross seals from exploitation;

prohibits the taking of seals that are in the water

(except in limited numbers for scientific purposes);

and sets annual quotas, seasons, and capture zones

for crabeaters, leopards, and Weddell seals.85 86 The

enforcement of the agreed-upon conservation measures depends entirely on the self-policing policies of

the signatory nations.

Whaling

Whaling around Antarctica began around the turn

of the century, From the late 1920s and early 1960s,

the world’s principal whaling grounds were located

in the Southern Ocean within about 600 to 1,200

miles of Antarctica. Particularly because of the

introduction of explosive harpoons, harpoon cannons, motorized catcher boats, and large factory

ships in the late 1920s, Antarctic whalers caused

critical declines in the populations of right, blue,

humpback, fin, and sei whales. Since the early 1960s

more than 1 million whales have been killed in

Antarctic waters.87 (See table 5-4.88)

Voluntary limits on whaling were established by

the International Convention for the Regulation of

Whaling during the 1930s.89 90 91 These limits had

little effect. In 1946 the International Whaling

Commission (IWC) was established to regulate the

whaling industry worldwide; its recommendations

did not carry much weight until the late 1960s. In

1986 the IWC instituted a temporary moratorium on

all commercial whaling; this moratorium is scheduled for review in the near future. As might be

expected, there are differing views within the IWC

about the exploitation of whales and how whaling

should be managed.92

Avoiding Sensitive Areas and Rehabilitating

Impacted Areas

Unique and/or especially sensitive areas should

be avoided, to the extent possible, in any future

Antarctic minerals exploration and development.

For example, highly stratified saline lakes found in

East Antarctica are especially susceptible to impacts

in the summer when streams flow along adjacent

ice-free valleys into them.93 The Treaty Parties have

set aside 28 Specially Protected Areas (SPAS) where

research, plant and animal collection, and vehicular

access are denied without entry permits. Due to their

importance for scientific research, 17 other sites

have been designated Sites of Special Scientific

Interest (SSSIs). These areas are off-limits to visitors

q~fi, op. cit., footnote 21, pp. 71-74.

~H&man, op. cit., footnote 80, p. 14.

N71bid., p. 14.

88D.C. Chapmsn, “Living Resources: Whales, ” Occanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Sumner 1988, pp. 64-70.

a%id., pp. 64-70.

%ntral lntel}igence Agency, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 52-53.

91J. G~lMd, 1‘me End of -g?’ New ScientMt, VO1. 120, No. 1636, CM. 29, 1988, pp 42A$7.

92Ho~m, op. Cit-, fOOmOte W! p. 14

~z~~rge, op. clt,, foomote 8, pp. 24-25.
148 . Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Table 5-4-Worldwide Populations of Whales Commonly Found

In the Southern Ocean

Average adult Population (in thousands)a

species size (in m) Original world Current world Antarctic

Southern Right . . . . . 12 100 3 3

Blue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 228 14 11

Humpback . . . . . . . . . 11 115 10 3

Fin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 120 100

Sei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 256 54 37

Sperm . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2,400 1,950 950

Minke . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 140 725 380

%11 eetimatos are highty epeculatwe.

SOURCE: Most data from the International Whaling Commission, OcwanUs, vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 1989, pp. 12-13.

Data on Antarctic stocks from P.G.H. Evans, The Natural HistcvY of Whales and Do4Mins (London:

Chnetopher Helm, 19S7), p. 343.

and access must conform to a management plan for

each SSSI. The locations of SPAS and SSSIs are

shown in figure 5-7.

Much can be done to clean up previously used

scientific research bases or resource development

sites in Antarctica by removing garbage, unused

fuel, chemicals, and other potentially toxic waste.

However, it is not possible or practical to accelerate

the natural recovery of impacted upland areas or

marine environments to their original conditions.

Future human activities should therefore be planned

and designed to minimize potential impacts in the

first place.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL

IMPACTS FROM

ANTARCTIC DEVELOPMENT9495

The larger the scale of mineral development in

Antarctica, the greater will be likely long-term

regional impacts on terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Some of these would undoubtedly take the

form of ill-defined sublethal and chronic effects on

the terrestrial and marine ecosystems from low

levels of contamination. Furthermore, the more

Antarctica is polluted by regional sources, the

less useful the continent becomes for evaluating

the effects of global pollution on the world's

oceans and atmosphere.% However, available

information suggests that resource development

in Antarctica, even if pursued on a large scale,

would probably not generate significant global

impacts to the world’s oceans and atmosphere

relative to other activities of man,97

Scientists would probably be especially concerned about the potential impacts of resource

development occurring within or near designated

research areas. As illustrated by the recent sinking of

the Bahia Paraiso, oil spills probably represent the

greatest risks to Antarctic research, especially biological and ecological research. The majority of

nonbiological research in Antarctica would probably not be directly impacted by development

activities; however, there would be indirect impacts

from added logistics activities, land-based construction, and possible disruptions caused by accidents.

Research Required to Better Predict

Impacts9899 100101102

Scientific exploration of Antarctica began in the

early 1800s with several biological investigations.

SWu.s. ~pmcnt of SW, OP. cit., fcmmote 42, pp. 6-26 to 6-28.

95zw.u&xgc, 0p. cit., foomotc 41, pp. 115-154.

%Ru~~, op. cit., footnote 7! PP. 34-35.

~zm~~, ~. cit., foomotc 8, PP. 33* ~~.

g~u~od, op. Cit., f~o~ 7, pp. 10, 36-3’7, 43. 53-55S 6’7.

‘WElllo~ op. cl[., f~mo~ 6, pp. xviii, VIII-1 to 4.

Iw.s. ~pmat of Stak, ~. cit., foomote 42, PP. 6-28 to 6-31.

IOIHoldga&, op. cit., fOOmO~ 91 PP. 3848.

l~y, op. cit., footnote 2, pp. 214-215.
.

Chapter S---The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development • 149

Photo credit: - Ted DeLaca, National Science Foundation

Palmer station, Anvers Island, off the Antarctic Peninsula.

Areas in the vicinity of Palmer station were impacted by the

Bahia Paraiso spill.

Geologic exploration of the continent began in the

late 1800s. Numerous scientific expeditions during

the 1900s continued to increase our knowledge

about the Antarctic environment. The establishment

of 50 bases by 12 countries during the International

Geophysical Year in 1957 and 1958 transformed

Antarctica into an international scientific laboratory.

Despite continuing research there are still

significant uncertainties about the environment

of Antarctica. As described in chapter 4, the

geologic data is meager for accurately estimating

Antarctica’s mineral potential. The response of the

continental ice sheet and surrounding seasonal sea

ice to changing climatic conditions is poorly understood. More quantitative data is required to better

understand the ocean circulation around Antarctica,

especially during the winter and in coastal waters.

Weather forecasting is still difficult. Floral and

faunal distributions on the ice-free coastal areas are

fairly well documented, although the ecosystem

relationships are not well understood. Baseline data

on the marine ecosystem are still incomplete,

including information on biomass distributions,

productivity, and food web relationships.

It is generally believed by both industry representatives and environmentalists that minimizing the

possible impacts of resource development activities

will be difficult without first collecting additional

environmental information on the topics listed in

table 5-5. Furthermore, a better understanding of

Antarctica’s environment, particularly the marine

ecosystem, is necessary in order to evaluate the

significance of impacts generated by development

activities relative to natural variability and other

independent trends, such as fishing. In fact, Article

4 of the Convention stipulates that no mineral

exploration or development will be allowed without

adequate information about the potential impacts

that such activities might generate.

The Federal Government has spent about $200

million over the past 15 years to evaluate potential

impacts of oil and gas development on the continental shelf of the United States. The environmental

research required before and during offshore petroleum development in Antarctica could cost as much

as a few hundred million dollars.103 An additional

$200 to $300 million could also be required for an

ice-strengthened research ship for marine research.

The research required to evaluate the impacts

associated with minerals development and other

land-based activities could be less costly than

marine research. As in other expensive, large-scale

scientific endeavors, the United States could seek to

defray some of these costs through an international

cooperative effort.

The Convention describes the general requirements and procedures for evaluating potential environmental impacts that will be associated with

exploration and development activities. However, it

is not clear in the Convention text whether the

research in table 5-5 would be conducted and paid

for by the Operator or by the Sponsor.

103R esearch in Antarctica might cmstmore or leas than this amount. On the one hand, research would probably not have to include the continem entire

coastline and continen MI shelf. On the other hand, research in Antarctica probably costs about two or three times more than comparable research on the

U.S. continental shelf due to the cxmtincnt’s remote location, greater logistical requirements, and adverse working conditions. Also, impact assessments

could be mme costly if the study areas are more variable or complex than assumed. Based on NSF’s funding figures for scientific research in Antarctica

(nottxl at the end of this chapter’s introduction), the international community has probably sp.msored several tens of millions of dollars of research on

tbe topics listed in table 5-5 over the last two decades.
150 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Figure 5-7-Specially Protected Areas and Sites of Special Scientific Interest on Antarctica

x

)

v“#

. .
Chapter 5-The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 151

Figure 5-7-Specially Protected Areas and Sites of Special Scientific Interest on

/ Inset B I

South Shetland King George

-w

Antarctica-Continued

Sites of Special Scientific Interest

Specially Protected Areas .

SOURCE: US. Government, 1989.
152 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Table 5-5-Basi c Research Required to Evaluate Chapter 4 contains a discussion of research

Possible Environmental Impacts Prior to

Resource Development

required to evaluate the mineral resources of Antarctica. Appendix A presents an oil development

Research and Information requirements scenario and discusses research needed on geologic

●

●

more detailed data on terrestrial, Iacustrine, and marine

ecosystems, especially those areas that are most likely to be

considered for resource development, and those areas that are

judged to be most sensitive to impacts

content and composition of hydrocarbons and other contaminants In Antarctic waters. sediment. and marine organisms

hazards, weather, and ice movement prior to the

development of petroleum resources in Antarctica.

Monitoring and environmental baseline studies

will become increasingly important if minerals

Research requiring extended time-series measurements activities commence in Antarctica. The United

(e.g., over a decade) States could be at a disadvantage in Minerals

● marine and terrestrial ecosystem dynamics in response to

pollution and other impacts from potential resource develop- Convention meetings if it does not devote more

ment attention to this type of work.

. fate of oil and its degradation in open and ice-filled seas around

Antarctica,, and under-shelf ice

. adverse short- and long-term effects (e.g., toxicity) of oil on

Antarctic phytoplankton, krill, seals, and benthic communities

SOURCE: OffkxI of TechnologyAs8e8snwnt, 1909.
P

Appendixes

Photo credit: U.S. Geological Survey
Appendix A

Development of an Antarctic Oil Field

INTRODUCTION

This appendix was prepared to illustrate the most likely

hypothetical scenario that would be employed if an

Antarctic oil field were developed under the terms of the

new Minerals Convention, It explores the technological

capabilities and economic incentives that would determine the viability of a hypothetical Antarctic oil field and

presents some possible approaches to development. If

commercial quantities of oil are discovered in Antarctica

in the future, companies experienced in developing

offshore fields in harsh, Arctic environments today

would, in some situations, have the capability and may

also have the incentive to develop an Antarctic field,

Whether they would have the capability depends on both

specific environmental conditions where the field is

located and the future status of needed technologies.

Whether companies would have the incentive depends on

profitability and risk-both financial and political.

The scenario presented in this appendix is based on

admittedly optimistic assumptions about several determining factors. Three are key to the discussion:

-first, that a world-class giant field is discovered;

—second, that the parties to the Minerals Convention

allow oil development in the area in which the field

is located and assure the developer of rights to

produce the field; and

—third, that the world price of oil is and remains high

enough to make Antarctic production economics

attractive,

Some of the needed technology for selected Antarctic oil

development has been built and is now successfully

employed in other areas; other technology must be

assumed to be available in the future as a consequence of

oil field ventures in other harsh environments. These

assumptions may or may not be realized in the future. If

any condition is not met, an Antarctic oil prospect would

probably not be developed. If the assumptions hold,

however, it is not unreasonable to project that over time,

the needed technology will be available and certain

prospects will be profitable to develop.

An Antarctic oil venture could not be undertaken

before the turn of the century. Substantial lead times will

be needed to do further scientific resource assessment

work, environmental baseline work, and surveys of

physical environmental constraints. Following this work,

substantial time must be devoted to reconnaissance

surveys. At the same time the regulatory system will

require preparation of exploration and development plans

and evaluation of environmental impacts. Finally, long

lead times will be needed to identify any oil field through

exploratory drilling, to delineate that field through

additional drilling, and to design and construct a production and transportation system. OTA concludes that the

minimum total time elapsed before any major Antarctic

field could be expected to produce oil would be 30 or

more years from today.

The technology needed for Antarctic oil development

in certain offshore regions is not substantially different

from that under development or available to major firms

for the Arctic and deep water temperate regions. For

Antarctic regions with more severe conditions, it is not

unreasonable to expect new technology to be available

over the next few decades. Much of the needed research

and development work is now underway. It is also

reasonable to expect that the world oil price will rise

sufficient y to make Antarctic oil production profitable in

the next three to five decades, even though the current

plentiful world supply may continue. Technology appears

to be one of the lesser important constraints to future

Antarctic petroleum development. Political, institutional,

and environmental constraints appear more significant.

The following sections discuss a purely hypothetical

development that might take place at a time at least 30

years in the future. Such a long range projection must

contain a large amount of uncertainty, but it is necessary

to look this far in the future in order to consider what

development might be like under the new Minerals

Convention. At the present state of knowledge and

institutional maturity it would be unreasonable to expect

commercial oil development to occur much sooner.

The following sections present:

. the design environment for Antarctic offshore oil

development

. a discussion about technologies that may be used for

Antarctic production; and

. a hypothetical scenario for Antarctic development.

THE DESIGN ENVIRONMENT FOR

ANTARCTIC OIL DEVELOPMENT

The discussion in chapter 4 shows that the greatest

potential for Antarctic oil development exists in one of the

offshore sedimentary basins, such as that in the Ross Sea,

that OTA selected for its hypothetical scenario. The

environmental conditions that determine the major design

criteria for development systems are quite severe in any

–155–
156 . Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Antarctic offshore region, and the Ross Sea is no

exception. The significant factors include:

glacier ice (the origin of icebergs);

sea ice (single-year ice 3 to 6 feet thick);

icebergs (some very large-to tens of miles square); 1

extreme cold (annual mean temperature 0oF along

coastline);

heavy seas (frequent, severe storms);

deep water (2,000 to 3,000 feet in Ross Sea);

long periods of winter darkness;

possible frozen gas hydrate present subsea;

deep water iceberg scour (up to 1,500 feet);

active faulting; and

sea-bottom permm.frost

While the available data are sufficient to make the

above list and identify the importance of these factors

overall, much more data will be needed to set design

criteria for any future oil production system. If oil

development is expected to take place in the next century,

it will also be necessary to spend considerable time and

effort collecting information and analyzing environmental design conditions. Some of these data requirements are shown in box A-1. One of the most important

areas where existing information is lacking is that of size

and frequency of icebergs. Icebergs could be a major

design constraint for specific production platforms. Other

information, such as of deep currents, sea ice anomalies,

etc., could also be potentially important but very few data

are available to make a judgment.

Based on current knowledge of the Antarctic environment, ice appears to be the most significant factor in the

above list both because very severe iceberg conditions

are known to exist in Antarctica and because offshore oil

operators have designed successful systems to operate

under conditions suggested by many of the other factors.

Ice is a significant design factor for any offshore system

because the structural loads imposed by moving ice can

be huge. Moving glaciers will not be resisted by any

normal structure—nor will very large icebergs. The larger

of the icebergs can also scour deep trenches in the seafloor

(as deep as 1,500 feet in some reports) and thus even

determine the depth to which pipelines must be buried.2

In the last 10 years two ships have been sunk by ice in the

Ross Sea.

The glacier ice that covers almost all of the Antarctic

continent with an average thickness of almost 2 miles also

extends offshore in many areas. The Ross Ice Shelf is

more than 200,000 square miles in size. OTA’s hypothetiBox A-1—Antarctic Environmental Information

Needs To Design Major Offshore Oil Production

Systems

Ocean Environment Knowledge of wind, waves, ocean

currents, and seafloor conditions

are needed to establish design

criteria.

Glacial Ice Physical properties of glacial ice

are needed to develop systems

that can operate on top, through,

and below the ice. This includes

such properties strength, temperature, plasticity, movement, etc.,

which can provide a basis for

establishing design criteria.

Sea Ice Thickness, coverage, strength and

other physical properties of the

ice are needed to develop design

criteria for fixed and moored platforms, ice breakers, and shuttle

tankers.

Icebergs Size, distribution, frequency, velocities, and scour depth of icebergs are needed to design offshore structures and pipelines.

Field Description A general knowledge of the probable location, size, depth, and

formation characteristics is needed

to define the most likely drilling

and production means that might

be used at specific reservoir 1ocations.

Note: The above data needs are general ad relate to eithtx tie possibility

of developtnmt in opm water w beneath the ice shelf.

SOURCE: OffI.ce of Technology Asseaarnent, 1989.

ca1 oil field is located in water seaward of the northern

edge of this shelf. Huge icebergs continually break off and

are discharged into the ocean from the many ice shelves

around the Antarctic coast.3

During the winter, the Southern Ocean surrounding

Antarctica freezes and more than doubles the apparent

size of the continent. This sea ice is generally annual ice

(i.e., it melts and refreezes each year) and has a thickness

of 3 to 6 feet. Such ice probably can be transited

year-round with icebreakers or icebreaking tankers or,

during the summer months, with only ice-reinforced

ships. Annual sea ice does not appear to be a formidable

problem, but more research is needed before reliable,

1A few l~rgs arc of czlormous si~ne recently released m the Ross Sea was about twice h size of the State of Rhode Mad.

2Deep Oil Technology, Inc., Technology and Cost~or O#More 011 Deveiopmeti m An/arctua, OTA umuactor report, Noveanba 1988.

3L.F, lv~w,‘f~~ctica+al~Cortdiwns and Peuoleum prospects,’ Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 78, No, 52, Dec. 29, 1980, pp. 212-220,
Appendix A-Development of an Antarctic Oil Field ● 157

year-round ice transit systems could be designed. For

example, some are concerned that if regular daily transits

are made by icebreaking tankers, large mounds of ice

rubble could build up and restrict normal passages.

Icebergs, on the other hand, appear to be formidable in

some regions.4 Antarctic icebergs can be very large

(several square miles is not unusual) and thick. It would

be impossible in some cases to design structures to

withstand their impact forces. However, there may be

some offshore regions where large icebergs are infrequent

or where they can be tracked and predicted. It is not

known whether iceberg-free regions would correspond to

the location of a commercial oil field. Since there is such

a vast territory to explore in Antarctica, it would make

sense to initiate exploration efforts in those regions where

production would be most feasible. However, until more

research on iceberg occurrence is done, it will not be

possible to design a specific oil production system for any

region in Antarctica.

Other severe environmental factors include stormy

seas, extreme wind chill factors, and very low temperatures. The greater depth of Antarctica’s continental shelf

(e.g., the seaward edge of the geologically interesting

Ross Sea shelf5 lies in about 2,600 feet of water) adds to

the technical complexity of offshore drilling and production. In combination with severe storms and problems

related to ice (such as quick moving pack ice and tabular

icebergs that have been observed grounded at depths of

more than 1,600 fee@), the difficulty of exploring for and

producing oil in some regions of Antarctica could be

formidable even compared to nearshore Arctic waters.

In general, the rigorous environment of Antarctica

is such that oil and gas production there (if, indeed,

exploitable quantities are discovered) is likely to be

more difficult than existing production anywhere else

in the world. Some of the biggest challenges to date for

the oil industry have been exploration for oil and gas

resources in the Canadian Arctic and in the Beaufort and

Bering Seas offshore Alaska. Antarctica is colder, more

stormy, and more isolated than these areas, and has a

continental shelf three to six times deeper than the global

mean.

7 But it is the iceberg problem that sets Antarctica

apart from most Arctic offshore regions. Each of these

environmental constraints adds to the difficulty of exploring for and producing oil in Antarctica.

For a future Antarctic development, structures could be

designed and built to withstand the cold temperatures and

to protect people from the worst effects of extreme cold;

however, careful designs would be required to keep

equipment running smoothly and people working efficiently. Offshore structures and ships would need to be

built to withstand hazards caused by a variety of ice forms.

These hazards include moving sea ice, pressure ridges,

icebergs, ice buildup on platforms and ships, permafrost,

and ice scour of the seabed. Innovative engineering

solutions to some Arctic problems could be a useful

guide. However, in areas such as the Beaufort Sea where

ice conditions are severe, industry has not yet discovered

fields that require production systems very far offshore,

into very deep water, or into the dynamic multiyear ice

zone. If such Arctic development does advance in the

future, it could offer useful engineering lessons for

Antarctica.

Antarctica is one of the most isolated places on Earth.

The Ross Sea in Antarctica is about 2,000 miles from New

Zealand. In contrast the remote Navarin Basin in the

Bering Sea off Alaska is about 600 miles from a potential

support base and itself poses extreme logistics problems

that would significantly affect the economics of oil

exploration and production there. Oil may be produced (if

discovered) in the Bering Sea but even here a large

amount would have to be recoverable to make operations

profitable. One characteristic of frontier areas like the

Navarin Basin and any area in Antarctica is that there is

little or no existing infrastructure. The only existing

infrasturcture in Antarctica supports the scientific program. This means that everything-men, equipment,

supplies, housing, entertainment, etc.—must be brought

from someplace else, and at considerable expense.

Conversely, produced oil must be transported long

distances to markets. Moreover, the currently feasible

options for transporting Antarctic oil (e.g., icebreaking

tankers) will be expensive and will require some technological development. It is worth noting that Alaska’s

North Slope oil is transported overland by an 800-mile

pipeline to an ice-free port to avoid the need for

icebreaking tankers.

An additional constraint in Antarctica is that about 98

percent of the land is buried beneath a thick continental

ice sheet. Not only does this preclude oil drilling with

today’s technology on all but the 2 percent of Antarctica

not covered by ice, but very few sites are available on

which advance support bases for offshore exploration

could be located. Ice-free areas may also be sites of

penguin rookeries, and an oil company that wished to

4H. Keys, “&ber$a ~f South Vlctona Lax@ kUIUCtiCii,’ ‘ New haland Anlarc(u Record, vol. 6, No. 2, 198S, pp. 1-7.

5j.c. BChCI@ (d.), “kbPemlcusn Rtmurces m -tica, ” Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Ankzrclica, U.S. Geological Suwey Cucular 909, 1983,

p. 22.

@mral lntelltgence Agency, Polar Regwns At&a$, 1978, p. 38.

7ftnd., p. 35.
158 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Photo credit: Bill Westermeyer

The Maumee, the oil tanker that resupplies McMurdo, after it hit an iceberg in 1976.

The iceberg put a 35-foot gash in the tanker’s bow, but no oil was spilled.

locate a support base at such a site could expect strong

opposition from environmental groups. Moreover, there

is no guarantee that a suitable location for a support base

will be found near an offshore oil prospect.

Even so, a supergiant oil field of high-grade producibility could be a powerful incentive for industry to invest

in Antarctica. The offshore petroleum industry is now

working in some harsh environments that also pose large

challenges to design engineers. Major exploration activities are currently underway in a number of hostile regions,

such as in the severe ice conditions of the Beaufort and

Chukchi Seas offshore Alaska and Canada, in iceberg

areas along Greenland and eastern Canada, and in the

North Sea, North Atlantic, and Norwegian Sea. The most

significant oil production experience in harsh environments to date is in the North Sea, but very deep water

production (2,000 feet) has begun in such areas as the Gulf

of Mexico and offshore Brazil; and, in a few years,

production will probably commence from fields offshore

Labrador.

In addition, recent leases were sold and plans are

underway to drill exploratory wells in the Chukchi Sea

north of Alaska, where thick, moving, multiyear sea ice is

prevalent. Some of these ice conditions maybe even more

severe than those in Antarctica, even though the depth of

water in the Chukchi Sea seldom exceeds 150 feet. Other

companies are accomplishing exploration drilling in the

North Atlantic west of the Shetland Islands in regions of

deep water and very rough seas. Still other companies are

planning exploration in areas of the Gulf of Mexico and

elsewhere where water depths are as great as 10,000 feet.8

One company is proceeding with development of an oil

field just 500 miles north of the Antarctic Peninsula, off

Argentina’s Tierra del Fuego.9 Another has begun engineering on the production facilities for the Hibemia oil

field in “Iceberg Alley’ on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. 10 Harsh environments requiring unique and costly

8Kq~, op. cit., fOOtXlO@ 4“

9+ 4Ffi[ ~ffiae Argentine Od Being Developed by To@l, ” Oceun Irtdwfry, vol. 23, No. 9, .%qxember 1988, pp. 115-116.

lo’’Mobd NMXMS FjrXIS Eligible To Bld on HkrIusi hj~t, ’ Od and Gas JotuMl, vol. 86, No, 52, Dec. 26, 1988, p. 28.
Appendix A---Development of an Antarctic Oil Field ● 159

Photo credit: Ann Hawthorne

The Maumeenear McMurdo in 1988 escorted by the Coast

Guard icebreaker, Polar Star. If oil is ever developed in

Antarctica, ice-strengthened or, more likely, icebreaking,

tankers will be needed.

technical approaches have not deterred petroleum exploration and development ventures.

OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGIES FOR

HARSH POLAR ENVIRONMENTS

Current offshore oil and gas operations and planned

systems for harsh environments around the world form

the basis of any projections of technologies that may be

used in future Antarctic petroleum development. Technologies employed by the offshore petroleum industry

have changed dramatically over the past 20 years

allowing exploration and production in environments that

were considered almost prohibitive two decades ago.

These technology changes can be expected to continue,

but the nature and extent of advances three to five decades

in the future are hard to predict, Industry has moved into

hostile environments in discrete incremental steps, progressively resolving the problems encountered, adapting

existing systems or techniques, and designing new ones

as needed. That technology base today is available for

adaptation to Antarctica by the major, experienced

operators in the same manner-in discrete, incremental

Steps.11

Offshore petroleum activities are commonly divided

into three phases: exploration, development, and production. Exploration includes geological and geophysical

surveys as well as exploratory drilling. In the Mineral

Convention’s terms, this includes both “prospecting”

and ‘‘exploration. Development begins after an oil

discovery is determined to be economic and includes

drilling of production wells and the design and construction of all platforms and facilities for producing the field.

Production begins with the flow of oil to the market and

continues until the field is depleted. In offshore hostile

regions, exploration has taken on the order of 10 years or

more, development work has taken about 10 years, and

production continues for 20 years or more. After initial

operations commence, some of these phases can be

accomplished concurrently.

Adequate exploration technology (both geophysical

survey ships and mobile exploratory drilling vessels) is

available today to work in many of the offshore Antarctic

regions, In fact, some seismic surveys have already been

done by the U.S. Geological Survey and several nations

working in Antarctica. Also, U.S.-based geophysical

survey firms have proposed, to a number of oil companies, to conduct further seismic operations in Antarctica.

These operations are conducted during the summer

months in ice-free waters. Scientific drilling operations

have also taken place at a number of sites surrounding

Antarctica the most notable of which were under the

auspices of the Deep Sea Drilling Program in the 1970s.

These and other scientific drilling operations were conducted during the summer months in ice-free waters.

None of this scientific drilling was to adequate depth or

at the proper locations to be considered part of an oil

exploration program.

A number of mobile drilling platforms operating in the

world today have the capability of drilling exploration

wells offshore Antarctica (such as in the Ross Sea) during

the summer months and in up to 50 percent ice coverage.

The most suitable drilling rig would probably be a

heavy-duty semi-submersible exploratory drilling vessel

similar to that used in the North Atlantic or the Bering Sea

offshore Alaska. Exploratory drilling could be accomplished over a number of summer seasons, much as is

done off Alaska and no major extension of existing

technology would be needed.

The present technology for production systems will

have to be developed further to make offshore Antarctic

oil production feasible. Systems are currently available in

areas of minimum ice encroachment. Where ice is present,

parts of deepwater systems would have to be combined

with systems designed for Arctic conditions. Such

combinations could include floating terminals and/or

subsea wells like those used in the North Sea; tanker

shuttle operations like those used in the Labrador Sea; and

ice-reinforced structures like those used in the Cook Inlet.

1 IU S, CmPS, Offim of Tw~Ology Assess~n~ 011 and Gas Technologies for [he Arc!~ and Dee~tier, OTA-O-270 OWshuWon, ~: U.S. cong~ss, ~ficc of

Tdnology Assessment, May 1985).
160 • Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Ongoing industry R&D programs could develop additional components needed for Antarctic production. For

example, considerable research is underway on remote

control systems for subsea wells. Two-phase pumping

systems are also being developed so that produced gas and

oil can be moved long distances before it is necessary to

provide a large separation facility. It is reasonable to

assume that many of these technologies will advance in

the next few decades and be available for any oil

production allowed in Antarctica.

A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO FOR

ANTARCTIC DEVELOPMENT

Technology Assumptions

OTA’s hypothetical scenario contains a number of

technology assumptions. It assumes that technology for

operating in ice-covered continental shelves will advance

on all fronts. This could bring the cost of oil extracted

from frontier areas down, closer to the cost of today’s

cheaper oil. For example, oil is profitably produced in

Prudhoe Bay on the North Slope of Alaska, moved to

Valdez by pipeline, shipped to the Panama Canal by

tanker, moved by pipeline across the Canal, and shipped

by tanker to the Gulf of Mexico. It seems reasonable that

30 years hence, technology will be readily available to

ship oil from offshore Antarctica to New Zealand or

Argentina by ice-strengthened or icebreaking tankers and

then to any location in the world in conventional tankers.

Developments in technology could also affect OTA’s

assumptions about Antarctic exploration and develop

ment. For example, 30 years hence, improved geophysical

techniques could significantly decrease the cost of finding

oil. This could result in lower delineation drilling costs,

because fewer wells will be needed to find and delineate

fields. Improved drilling techniques such as use of

down-hole motors and surface control and monitoring,

could lower drilling costs as well. Improvements in

production techniques such as use of multiphase pumps,

flexible pipelines, compliant platforms, ice-strengthened

platforms, etc., all tend to reduce the relative cost of harsh

environment field developments. Transportation technology could also reduce costs through use of improved

ice-operating tankers, deep-water pipeline systems, better

loading techniques, etc. Box A-2 summarizes key technological advancements beyond current technology that

OTA concludes are needed for developing an Antarctic

oilfield.

If the above technical developments occur, there

would seem to be no insurmountable technical barriers to oil exploration and development of Antarctica’s

Box A-2-Summary of Key Technology

Advancements Needed To Design Antarctic

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Offshore Oil Production Systems

High-capacity mooring systems to keep floating

drilling and production platforms on location during

heavy ice coverage.

Seafloor storage tanks for holding oil on the seafloor

in iceberg-infested waters.

Long-range subsea control systems that will allow

wells to be located long distances from production

facilities.

Two-phase flow pumps that will allow oil and gas to

be transferred long distances without separation.

Remote operated vehicles that will provide a means

of installing and servicing seafloor equipment in

deep water and Mow the ice shelf.

Mini-submarin es or remotely operated vehicles that

can provide direct access to seafloor equipment.

Icebreaking tankers for transporting oil year round

from Antarctica to an ice-free transfer terminal.

Flexible pipelines that can accommodate relative

movement between the seafloor and a floating

platform.

A means for keeping an access hole open through

glacier ice to allow wellheads to be located on the

seafloor or ground.

SOURCE: Offlcc of Technology Ascsmcnt, 1989.

offshore sedimentary basins. The relative technical

difficulty in developing oil in Antarctica today is probably

less than it was for developing fields in the Beaufort Sea

30 years ago. other fields (e.g., in the Chukchi Sea) will

probably be developed and be operating over the next 30

years, advancing the technology needed for Antarctica.

An Oil Consortium for Antarctica

Major international oil companies, in partnership with

each other and/or with state oil enterprises, would be the

likely “Operators” of any Antarctic oil exploration and

development if the Minerals Convention enters into

force. 12

A consortium of major oil companies and national oil

companies would be the most likely organizational

approach because of the finances that will be required and

because individual companies probably will be averse to

‘‘going it alone.” Most major, high-risk oil development

ventures, such as those in Arctic and deepwater offshore

areas, are undertaken by such consortia.

12J,N, (jmtl, The AR&UCtiC Ajkrals RquM: A Pelrokun Ituiwry Perspective, OTA wtIR’8ctoI EFL Novmk 1988.
Appendix A-Development of an Antarctic Oil Field ● 161

For the purposes of this scenario, OTA has assumed

that:

●

●

●

●

●

The consortium chooses the United States to be its

sponsor.

Seismic prospecting in the Ross Sea identifies

factors that suggest significant oil accumulations.

The same area also would be recognized as highly

prospective by other operators and that there would

be competing applications for the area of interest.

Subsequent to receiving an exploration permit for the

desired blocks, a wildcat well and follow-up delineation wells indicated the existence of an oil field

containing 4 billion barrels of recoverable oil with

very good reservoir and producing characteristics.

The field ultimately was developed to a peak

producing capacity of 700,000 barrels per day of

crude oil.

OTA chose the Ross Sea as a possible location for a

hypothetical oil field development because some evidence points to favorable conditions for oil accumulation

in the sedimentary rocks there and because reconnaissance seismic surveys have been conducted in some of the

prospective basins there. Based on preliminary evidence,

a number of geologists believe the Ross Sea to have the

best basins for petroleum formation of any of the

Antarctic prospects identified to date (see ch. 4).

The hypothetical consortium is assumed to be the

operating unit of the oil venture and to consist of four

major international oil companies headquartered in the

United States, The joint operation would cover activities

ranging from prospecting through exploration and development stages to the construction of a transportation

system. Consortium members each would provide managerial, professional, technical, and support personnel

required to staff the Antarctic operation,

If convinced that an initial investment in an Antarctic

venture could be justified, the consortium would appreach the appropriate agency of the U.S. Government

about prospecting (i.e., in the Ross Sea using seismic

survey techniques). Subsequent to supplying the appropriate agency with the information prescribed in Article

3713 of the Minerals Convention, the United States, as the

Sponsoring State, would notice the Commission of the

proposed prospecting plan. If the Commission did not

raise any objections, the survey would be conducted. The

details pertaining to a hypothetical reconnaissance seismic survey are shown in box A-3.

Assuming the results of the reconnaissance seismic

work indicated favorable areas, the most prospective

sector would be selected. The consortium would then

request its Sponsoring State to ask the Commission to

have the subject area identified for possible exploration

and development activities.

If the area identification request is approved, the

consortium would tender an application for an exploration

permit through its sponsor, to the Regulatory Committee

formed for the area. At this point the consortium could

also include a participation agreement with state oil

companies of several developing countries. Such an

approach may be desirable, given that a decision on an

application is to be based on a measure of wide

participation-especially if the area is of interest to a

number of competitors.

Under the terms of the Convention, the Regulatory

Committee will divide a given area into a grid pattern of

‘‘blocks, ’ that is, leasable tracts, and accept applications

for permits for Operators to work within those blocks. The

Committee would also put limits on the number of blocks

that would be allocated to any Operator and then resolve

competing applications for the same blocks. The method

of resolving competition for the same blocks is not spelled

out in the Convention but would be for the Regulatory

Committees to work out. (The “bonus bid” method

common to offshore lease sales in the United States could

be one option.)

Since the convention does not specify a method for

establishing the blocks, OTA has developed a method that

appears to be practical and within the intent of the

Convention terms. That method is described in box A-4.

A Hypothetical Exploration Program

Once blocks have been established and allocated,

exploration commences. Reconnaissance seismic surveys

indicate the areas of interest and reveal the most

promising. For the purposes of this example, OTA

assumes the most promising area to be the Terror Rift of

the Victoria Land Basin. This region has been identified

in a number of studies as having potential for hydrocarbon

accumulation. *4 Assuming the consortium is awarded an

exploration permit by the Regulatory Committee for three

blocks of 3,600 square miles each (see figure A-2), it

would then conduct a more detailed seismic survey of the

three-block area.

lss~h ~~~~ IXICIU&S identi!lcdon of the ~% tie mso~ subj~[ to prospecting, the prospxting methods and work program, and the monimring and prevenfioo

plactlm, an amesmem of ezlv uwnmemal impacts; and orgamzauonal and fmanclal qualifications.

14FoT C+le, ~ A.K. CoopeT, F.I. Davcy, ad K. Hinz, ‘‘Rms SCa_iOgy, HY~~ pokamal,” Odand Gas Jouf?ud, VO1. 86, No. 45, Nw, 7, 1988, pp. 54-58.
162 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Box A-3—A Hypothetical Reconnaissance Seismic Survey

Within the Ross Sea, three prospective structural basins are indicated that warrant investigation by seismic methods. These

basins and some of their physical characteristics are:

Basinal area with sediments Maximum indicated thickness Nautical Miles

Basin >16,000’ thick in square nautical miles thickness of sediments in feet Seismic Line

Victoria Land Basin . . . . . 8,650 nm2

46,000 (14,000 meters) 1,400

Central Trough . . . . . . . . . 2,500 nm220,000 (6,000 meters) 1,500

Eastern Basin . . . . . . . . . . 11,000 nm2

20,000 (6,000 meters) 2,700

Total = 5,600

Reconnaissance seismic surveying is conducted over the entirety of the Victoria Land Basin and the Central Trough. However,

in the Eastern Basin (45,000 square nautical miles total area) much of the basin has a comparatively thin sedimentary cover;

accordingly, only the deeper, potentially oil-bearing portions of the basin are investigated. All seismic surveying is carried out

in open water. The lines are shot over a 20-nautical-mile grid. A map showing the approximate positions of the seismic lines

is attached (figure A-l).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989.

Figure A-l—The Ross Sea, Antarctica: Reconnaissance Seismic Survey Lines

. 740S

~,-’- McMurdo Stn.

,’

Ross Ice Shelf

-.

The reconnaissance lines will be shot Reconnaissance seismic

over a 20 nautical-mile grid across Basin line males

indicated structural basins Victoria Land Basin 1,400 nm

#

Central Trough 1,500 nm

Seismic lines Eastern Basin 2,700 nm

Total 5,600 nm

SOURCE: J.N. Garrett, “The Antarctic Minerals Regime: A Petroleum Industry Perspective,” OTA contractor report, January 1989, Adapted from D.H. Elliot,

“Antarctica: Is There Any 011 and Natural Gas?” Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, p. 35.
Appendix A-Development of an Antarctic Oil Field ● 163

Box A-4-A Possible Approach To Delimiting

Blocks for Petroleum Operations in Antarctic

Walers

The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities does not specify the size of, or the

methods of determining, the blocks within which mineral

extractive activities may be undertaken in Antarctica.

Block size and designation in the Convention are not

specified. Reference to such blocks is made in Article 43

only to the extent that the Antarctic Mineral Resources

Commission will ‘‘adopt measures with respect to

maximum block sizes’ and that the relevant Regulatory

Committee will ‘‘make provision for a limit in appropriate circumstances on the number of blocks to be accorded

to any party. ”

A practical approach to the delimitation of blocks

pertinent to offshore petroleum operations is suggested

here. The blocks would be vastly larger than those

associated with the Gulf of Mexico or North Sea tracts

because they must be large enough to facilitate operational flexibility and maximize the chances of discovery

of billion-barrel plus oil fields. If the blocks are not very

large, the petroleum industry would be unwilling to

undertake Antarctic operations.

‘The plan subdivides areas into blocks, each of which

is 60 nautical miles on a side (i.e., each block side

corresponds to one degree of longitude as measured at the

equator). The dimensions of each block are:

Unit Area

Square nautical miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,600

Square statute miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,774

Square kilometers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,364

Acres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............3,055,259

Hectares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..........1,236,430

The blocks apply, in this example, to the Ross Sea;

wherever a block crosses a land/sea interface, only the

seaward block portion constitutes explodable/exploitable

acreage. The block grid system begins immediately north

of the Ross Ice Shelf. The block mumbering system starts

in the southwest, near McMurdo Station, with Blocks 1A,

IB, IC . . . progressing eastward; block grid numbers

increase progressively northward. See map in figure A-2.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989.

If results of the detailed seismic work indicate the

presence of many structural features, several would be

drilled and tested, These are known as wildcat wells. OTA

assumes the first four wildcat wells are either dry or did

not penetrate a commercial discovery but that the fifth

well indicates a significant oil discovery. This is a

generally optimistic assumption for exploration success

in a new frontier area, but it could be realistic if

substantial y more scientific assessment of resource

potential is accomplished.

Following intensive testing of the initial discovery

well, OTA assumes that 11 additional wells are drilled to

ascertain the extent of the discovery, the vertical height of

the oil column, and whether or not a primary gas cap is

present. Table A-1 illustrates the assumed field characteristics of this discovery.

The assumptions made here about wildcat well numbers, the extent of delineation drilling, and the size and

characteristics of the oil field are very optimistic, and

represent a “best case’ scenario. It is not necessarily the

most likely scenario, but it illustrates what a development

might look like, what technologies are needed, what it

might cost, and how long it would take to develop, By

making favorable assumptions, OTA has established a

baseline scenario that could be modified with a number of

less favorable assumptions.

A Hypothetical Development Program

OTA assumes that, on the completion of delineation

wells, the consortium, through the sponsoring state,

would apply to the Regulatory Committee for a develop

ment permit. This application would be accompanied by

an updated and more detailed description of the develop

ment plan, including the well spacing scheme, platform

and gathering facility design, drilling and platform

installation schedule, and the estimated field production

profile. It would detail the transportation methods and

would include a detailed, updated environmental impact

statement for the planned development. The Sponsor

would recertify the technical competence and the finanTable A-1-Characteristics of Hypothetical Discovery

Field Average net oil Recoverable

classification Field area oil reserves

Super-giant

field . . . . . . . 31,500 acres 200 feet 4 billion bbls.

NOTE: In the assumed discovery, no primary gas cap is penetrated, the oil

pool is determined to be undersaturated and the reservoir drive

mechanism is a partial water drive in conjunction with solution gas

expansion.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989
164 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treat-y for Antarctica

Figure A-2—A Hypothetical Plan for Dellmiting Blocks Dedicated to Offshore Petroleum Operation

. 740S

f

,C--.

-.

\

\

\

\

Edward Vll

Peninsula

I #

- --- - ~ :. a)

-- - /’

I

. \

-4’

Each square block measures Area dimensions of each block

60 nautical miles on each

side (i. e., each block side Unit Acres

corresponds to one degree of Square nautical miles 3.600

longitude at the equator) Acres 3,055,255

SOURCE: J.N. Garrett, “The Antarctic Minerals Regime: A Petroleum Industry Perspective,” OTA contractor report, January 1989. Adapted from D.H. Elliot,

“Antarctica: Is There Any Oil and Natural Gas?” Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, p. 35.

cial capability of the consortium to carry out the updated discovery would have been unclear when the initial plan

development plan. was drawn up,)

If the Regulatory Committee approved the updated In the OTA scenario, the approved development plan

development plan,15 a development permit would be provides for drilling 258 producing wells and 48 water

issued. (Note that the development plan that was submitinjectors from 6 production platforms. Peak production

ted as part of the original application for the exploration

capacity is 700,000 barrels of oil per day, and the expected

field life is in excess of 30 years, during which approxipermit would have been more general because the size and mately 4 billion barrels of oil would be produced (see box

producing characteristics of the anticipated oil field A-5).
Appendix A--4evelopment of an Antarctic Oil Field • 165

BOX A-5—Summary of Physical and Technical

Aspects of the Hypothetical Oil Field

The Oil Field

. Field dimensions: 10 miles long x 5 miles wide

. Reservoir depth: 8,900 feet to 9,300 feet subsea

• Average net oil sand thickness: 200 feet

. Crude oil gravity: 32 degrees American Petroleum

Institute

. Crude oil type: sweet

● Water depth: 2,500 feet

Recoverable Oil Reserves

. Reservoir volume: 6,300,000 acre feet

. Oil initially in place: 10 billion barrels

. Recoverable oil reserves: 4 billion barrels

Producing Characteristics

● Type of platform: floating drilling/production/

storage vessel; high-capacity mooring system; subsea wells with production risers to floating vessel

● Well spacing = 120 acres/well

. Total of 258 wells to drain the 31,500-acre field.

. Six platforms: 43 production wells and 8 water

injection wells each.

. Maximum producing rate: 700,000 barrels per day

. First production platform yield 125,000 barrels per

day for 8 years.

Transportation

. Icebreaking shuttle tankers to ice-flee terminal

Support

. All facilities on platform

. Crew/resupply with shuttle tankers

Development Schedule

. Commercial exploration: 2,000-2,010

. Initial discovery: 2,010-2,020

. Develop initial field: 2,020-2,030

. Start production: 2,030-2,040

Note: The production rate for this hypothetical field IS low compared with

other world class fields. A high production rate would improve

the resulting economics.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989.

Hypothetical Development Technologies

Three basic development systems could be used in this

scenario. The actual system used would depend mainly on

the prevailing ice conditions at the field site. System A

would be used if the field were located where only sea ice

is present and large icebergs are rare. System B would be

used in an area where large icebergs were more frequent,

thus requiring disconnection of the surface platform from

the wellheads. System C would be used on an ice shelf or

on the ice capon land. In general, then, *‘A’ would be an

appropriate system farthest out to sea (or where icebergs

are a rare occurrence), “B” closer to the shoreline (or

where large icebergs are more frequent), and “C’ on

permanent ice. The following briefly describes the

features of the three possible systems.

System A

This would incorporate large floating systems and be

used in deep water where very large icebergs were

extremely rare. It would have disconnect features that

would allow it to be located in areas where icebergs might

be unusual. Further, such systems could be designed to

withstand icebergs as large as 1 mile square and 300 feet

thick. A number of such systems have been tested or

proposed .

16171819 One is shown in figure A-3 .

System B

This approach incorporates substantial subsea systems,

including seafloor well heads with advanced control

systems and two phase pumps that allow oil to be

transferred long distances. The production and storage

system would be located remotely in a floating vessel, on

the seafloor, or on land. Figure A-4 shows a floating

vessel with emergency disconnect features.

Seafloor oil storage systems would allow fields to be

developed in regions where icebergs are abundant and

would make unnecessary the use of permanent surface

facilities above well heads, From storage, oil could be

transferred to surface facilities located up to several

hundred miles away in an iceberg-tie area. Access to

well heads could be achieved during ice-free months from

the surface above. Recent industry designs, proposals, and

R&D on components needed to develop this system

160,D. Wa@~ S.P. Kah, md J.J. Every, ‘Model Testing of a DecpwaLer SAL~*r SYSUXIL’ Bntuh hfariwne Technology, Offshore Twhnology Conference paper

5672, 1988, p. 505.

1’7R. Wl]mm Cw=m ~Wmb L~, “A Re~ew of & ~velpt of tie SWOpS Subma EOdUCtiOII SyStCIII, ’ ‘ Offshore Technology Conferencep~ 5724, 1988,

p. 373.

i8J.E, fi~md ~d T.L, Job,~M~~hmc~;s.H-pl~id 01~ CO.; and L.c. Kwok. /-k& ~fShOM COT; ‘‘A Summary of a Multi-Faceted phySiCd Model

Test Program of a Floating Drdhng and RaJuction Systerm” Offshore Tedmolo~ COrlf15t311CC PSPC? 5674, 1988, p. 523.

19R.J, AU4 ReaduIg and Bates Drilling CO., ‘‘Integratd Motion, Stabihty, and Mnable Load Des]gn of the Trendseuer Class .%nisubmcrsible Zane Barns,” OffahOre

kdmdog)’~mnce pSpCT %~, 1988, p. 87.
166 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Figure A-3-Antarctica Development System “A” (lceberg-Free Region)

Floating spar

for drilling, production Shuttle tanker

facilities & storage (dynamically positioned

(ice-strengthened hull) ice-strengthened hull)

High strength

mooring lines

or tubulars

(ice resistant)

\

Anchor

-:, --

‘“es / Subsea wells ~ 1111

SOURCE: Deep Oil Technology, Inc., “Technology and Coet for Offshore Oil Development in Antarctica,” OTA contractor report, November 1988.

Figure A-4-Antarctica Development System “B” (Iceberg Region)

}

5 to 50 miles

{

Drilling/workover vessel a

(Ice-strengthened hull)

Remote production/storage vesselb Shuttle tanker

(Ice-strengthened hull, (dynamically positioned

m ice-resistant mooring) . Ice-strengthened hull)

Multiwell seafloor

template and

two-phase flowpump

\

High-strength

Anchor

pile

/

~- - y-/— --< a --- y-.~- ---- 7 4+,-

‘ Vessel is on Iocation only during drilling operations

b Other storage options Include seafloor storage or land storage

SOURCE: Deep Oil Technology, Inc., “Technology and Cost for Offshore Oil Development in Antarctica,” OTA contractor report, November 1988.
Appendix A-Development of an Antarctic Oil Field 167

provide a basis for projecting the availability of this

technology. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 If gas/oil mixtures could

be pumped long distances and production complexes

could operate effectively on the seafloor, a total production system could be built. The general problem of

moving oil/gas mixtures long distances before processing

is one the industry has been working on for a long time.

System C

From the ice shelf or on glacier ice covering the land

mass (figure A-5), oil could be extracted through an open

hole filled with heated water or another nonfreezing

liquid. The well head would be located on the seafloor (or

land) and connect by risers to the surface facility. The

concept presumes that, where the ice is moving, the hole

could be advanced by continuously melting the ice

surrounding the risers to keep the surface facility positioned over the wellhead. The concept would use an

approach similar to deepwater floating production platforms that are operating in many locations today.

System A would use mostly existing technology;

system B would use existing technology and that currently under development. Its key components (subSea

wells, multiphase pumps, seafloor separators, and reliable

control systems and disconnect features) would be in use

elsewhere before the year 2020. System C is the most

speculative, but appears feasible and could be investigated more closely once the characteristics of thick ice are

better understood. Some R&D on this technology has

already been done.29

The transportation portion of each of the above systems

probably requires only a modification of existing technology or past designs. 3031 Oil could be moved by tanker

from Antarctica to ice-free land locations for shipment to

markets in the Northern Hemisphere, Distances to ice-tie

Photo Credit: Exxon

In 1969 the S.S. Manhatten tested the feasibility of

transporting oil by ice-strengthened tanker through the

Northwest Passage.

locations could range from 1,000 to 2,000 miles. Special

icebreaking or ice-strengthened tankers and icebreakers

would be used to transport oil to transfer terminals. From

here the oil could be shipped to any location in the world.

Pipelines could also be used to transfer oil from various

points within Antarctica to loading points only along very

selective routes. Hazards such as ice scouring and

permafrost would have to be taken into consideration. If

the hazards appeared substantial enough, new technologies might have to be developed.

An oil field in relatively deep, iceberg-free water, using

System A, appears at present the most likely type of

Antarctic oil field to be developed. Subsequent development, if any, might then move closer to the shoreline

where icebergs would be more of a problem. Later,

~. Darde ssxi A. hfailJe, Total<P; and P. Dursndo, Inst. Frsncais du Petrole, “Gne-Megawatt Subsea Matable EIxtric Ccnnector: Key to MuJuphase Pump ~ve

~bly—Now FMd Proven,” Offshore Tedtnology Conference paper %47, 1988, p. 263.

2tM.P. Amaudcau, Inst. Prancais du Peuole, “Developrrtent of a Two-phase Oil Pumping System for Evacuating Subsoa Production Without Processing Over a kng

Dstance: PoaeIdon project,” Gffshme Twhrmlogy Conference paper 5648, 1988, p. 271.

~H.A Herwig @ J.M. cattanach, Ferranti Subsea SYS@TIS I-d., ‘‘S~zatlon of North Sea Multiplexed Control Systems for Ilvm-Assisted Developments, ’

Offshore Technology Conference papcs 5670, 1988, p, 489.

23R.J. Empt.age, Cameron ISOXI W* L~, 1‘A Review of the Satellite Production System (SPS) Ness Development,” Gffshore Tdmology Conference papez 5723, 1988,

p. 367.

UK. HO@n& ABB.ALOITI A&anced SysLCms, and E. Nesse, StatoIl ~, ‘‘A New Approach to Subsea Intervention,’ Offshore Tedmology Confcrertcepsper 5728, 1988,

p. 407.

2S. .~s~ ~tim wl~out pla~m?” ~~~re /MoTora:wg T& OI/~, btanatimd ~lt]~ vol. 48, No. 12, Dcc=k 1988.

“’%pasadng Separat.km From the Platfornu” O@wre lncorporutmg The Ohm, International Edition, vol. 48, No. 12, tlecemtm 1988.

m, IM~tip~ ~ps fkhvCRd tO Researc h Particqxmts,” ~shore !ncorporohg the Ohan, htematiortd Edition, VOI. 48, No. 12, December 1988.

~K.J. Fardy, @l.f CMMdS R=OWXS Ltd., and S.P. Singeetharn, FMC Crop., PeBoleurrt Equipment Group, ‘ ‘Application of a Moddied SubSea Wellhead S@enr on

Mohkpaq, a Mobile Arctic Caisson Rig m the Canadian Beaufort Sea, Offshore Technology Conkrencepa per5790, 1988, p. 403.

%.C.Kuwinen, Polar Ice Conttg Office, University of Nebrssiu-Lincdn, ‘ ‘Ice Dnlhng Technology,’ paper presented at Polar Drilling Workshop, Byrd Polar Research

center, The Oluo State Univerwty, Columbus, OH, Nov. 6-9, 1988.

~S. G-~ D Sue-, , ‘Field ~d M*1 Tes~ for ~ct~tie Ixbr- Rmuti of the ARC(I ASCUC TticT, ’ ‘ k-ctic Oil Technology Conference, 1985.

3114~vel_ Of SIl IC~TankeJ Trartsporration System for North slope Alaskan Gss,’ ‘ LNG Conference, Ims Angelea, CA, 1986.
168 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Figure A-5-Antarctica Development System “C” (Ice Shelf or Ice Cap)

Drilling workover rig Mobile production

surface trees

\

facility

n Flexible / Pipeline loading

\

/

terminal -

r 1

—

Heated water

Multiwell template

Ice

SURCE: Deep Oil Technology, Inc., “Technology end Cost for Offshore Oil Development in Antarctica,” OTA contractor report, November 1988.

drilling on the ice shelf or ice itself could be tested. Some

experts, however, argue that a system mounted on the ice

shelf, System C, could be the easiest to develop; more

engineering studies are needed to verify this contention.

Though OTA’S most likely scenario presumes that oil

development would start from seaward locations and

move toward land, costs probably would change radically

as developments move landward. Since it is also much

more difficult to estimate costs for a hypothetical

development with technologies yet-to-be tested, OTA has

prepared cost estimates only for System A.

Obviously, accurate cost estimates for development of

an Antarctic oil field cannot be made at present. Nevertheless, a general look at Antarctic oil production costs cart

be instructive. The assumptions and resulting figures

based on the System A approach can be supported by

analogy to existing operations. Expert participants in an

OTA workshop on oil and gas development potential

considered the following cost estimates for System A

reasonable. Some even considered the following estimates too high compared to present, similar operations.

Experts consider the likely costs of production using

Systems B or C to be much higher, but this may not be the

case if more appropriate technologies are developed in the

future.

System A (figure A-3) would produce the hypothetical

4-billion-barrel field in the Ross Sea, as described. Such

an operation is comparable to the recently announced

plans of Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. for the Hibernia field on

the Grand Banks off Newfoundland. This harshenvironment field in iceberg-filled waters is planned to be

built over the next few years. A large concrete gravity

structure will hold the main production facilities. Three

ice-strengthened shuttle tankers will transport oil to shore.

Hypothetical Development Economics

OTA prepared a brief analysis of costs and profitability

of a System A operation using the above assumptions.

The estimated cost of exploration, development, and

transportation is given in table A-2. The analysis estimates the profitability of oil field development under

various economic scenarios that might prevail in the
AppendixA--4evelopment of an Antarctic Oil Field . 169

Table A-2--Cost Summary for Hypothetical

Development of a 4-Billion-Barrei Field-

(System A) (1886 Dollars)

Expenditures $Billions

NOTE: The above costs mchde delivery of produced oil to an cc-free

termmal m southern South Amerut. Added transportation costs to

a major refinery would be comparable to that for transport from the

Persmn Gulf to U.S. refineries<

SOURCE: Office of Technology heessment, 19S9.

future. The results and findings are illustrative rather than

definitive. Many unverifiable assumptions about the

presence of hydrocarbons and the cost of developing them

had to be made, A conventional discounted cash flow

model (employing a discount rate of 10 percent) was used

to measure the profitability of hypothetical projects that

might arise in Antarctica. It provides for an annual

accounting of exploration, development, and production

activities; and all associated expenditures, production

flows, revenues, and tax payments for each year of a

project’s life.

Each project evaluated consists of an individual oil

field. Project accounting allows for several dry holes prior

to the discovery of a substantial oil deposit, extends

throughout the field delineation, development and production stages, and ends when annual production has

fallen to the point where continued extraction is unprofitable for the Operator (the economic limit). At that point

the wells are plugged and the project is abandoned. The

length of the project (in years) can vary depending on the

size of the hypothetical deposit and the assumed level of

oil prices.

In order to evaluate the possible effect of field size on

economics, three hypothetical oil deposits were evaluated, containing 250, 1,000, and 4,000 million barrels of

recoverable oil reserves respectively. The delineation and

development programs reflect assumed individual physical characteristics of each field.

In addition to the above, model inputs include parameters that define the economic environment: world oil

price, the Operator’s discount rate (cost of capital), and

tax rules that might pertain to future income and

expenditures from Antarctic operations. The tax regime

used is similar to that for offshore oil operations in the

United States. The entire analysis uses constant 1988

dollars, so costs and oil prices are quoted in today’s

dollars, and the discount rate is measured in real terms.

Subsequent inflation would affect the nominal levels of

all these variables, but the net effects of these changes on

profitability would largely cancel out.

The results of this modeling exercise indicate that large

oil deposits (of world-class giant or larger size) could be

developed in Antarctica if oil prices rise to at least double

1988 prices. Figure A-6 illustrates these results by

plotting net present value (after tax) for the three field

sizes in the scenarios modeled. Only the 4-biliion-barrel

supergiant field is profitable with an oil price about

double the current price. The smaller fields require

three to eight times current prices.

The financial uncertainties are substantial. Will oil

prices rise high enough and remain high enough to permit

private operators to earn an adequate return on their

investments? Box A-6 discusses four important caveats

that could modify the results of this analysis,

Figure A-6--Oil Field Profitability

Net present value is plotted against a range of prices for three

hypothetical oil fields. An oil field can be developed profitably if its

net present value is greater than zero. Only the 4-billion-barrel

supergiant field is profitable with an oil price about double the

current price. Smaller fields would require much higher prices.

SOURCE J,L. Smith, “Profdabdlty of Antarct~ Oil Exploration and Development,” OTA contractor report, December 1988.
170 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Box A-6--Caveats

The following four caveats should be considered. They

have important implications regarding the likelihood of

petroleum development in Antarctica.

1. The presumed real discount rate in the analysis of 10

percent may be too low for companies contemplating

large investments in highly speculative and risky

projects. Although the 10 percent figure seems appropriate for investments being made in offshore petroleum provinces today, the hurdle rare for Antarctic

investments could be significantly higher. The impact

of higher discount rates would be to raise minimum

economic prices and minimum economic field sizes,

to lengthen the payback period, and to reduce the

probability of substantial investments.

2. The analysis excludes the cost of most geological and

seismic research that must be incurred prior to the

discovery of a significant oil field. It is understood that

the prospective profitability of ultimate discoveries

must offset these front-end costs before sizable

investments will be made in the Antarctic. Due to the

long lead times that separate these early exploration

costs from ultimate revenues, and the high carrying

costs associated with these capital expenditures, it is

safe to assume that the expectation of highly profitable

oil fields will be necessary to stimulate any exploration in the Antarctic.

3. All timing assumptions (see table 2) are highly

speculative, but very influential in the calculation of

the profitability of individual fields. The prospect of

lengthy certification or environmental permit procedures at each step will discourage private operators

from attempting the process at all. Since certification

and permitting procedures pertaining to Antarctica are

not yet in place, it is difficult to judge the reasonableness of the time lags assumed, However, actual time

lines could easily be longer.

4. The estimated cost of infrastucture in the model

assumes that a single field must bear the full cost of

gathering lines, transshipment terminals, and specially

equipped tankers. In reality, some of these costs could

be shared among several fields that might be discovered in the same area. Satellite fields, therefore, might

have a lower hurdle to clear if initial discoveries cause

the industry to put some common infrastructure in

place.

OTA’s analysis indicates that the potential of

Antarctic oil versus other alternatives cannot be

determined with current knowledge. Oil from Antarctica might be more or less expensive to develop than that

from the Chukchi Sea or tar sands, heavy oil or oil shale,

and other options. The costs to develop a particular

Antarctic field will of course depend on its size, quality,

and location. Some fields might be relatively inexpensive

to develop, whereas others may be prohibitively expensive; the same is true for the unconventional deposits

elsewhere in the world. Predictions of the costs to develop

alternatives have often errored on the low side, because

development costs themselves are tied to the price of oil

and because proponents have portrayed their proposals in

the best light.

In view of these arguments, what is the likely future for

Antarctic oil development? OTA’s best guess-and it is

only a guess-is that supergiant fields of 4 billion

barrels or more could be developed in Antarctica by

2020 or thereabouts if such fields exist and can be

found and if the constraints in the Minerals Convention can be overcome by a major international

Operator assisted by a supportive Sponsor.

SUMMARY

Commercial development of Antarctic oil reserves

could be feasible in the next century but only if several

optimistic assumptions prove out, These include technological advances; sustained, relatively high oil prices; and

a reduction in excess OPEC production capacity that

currently depresses the world oil market. It will also

require the presence and discovery of large oil deposits,

an expeditious process for resolving environmental and

operating policies, and sensible and measured taxation of

Antarctic oil revenues.

OTA concludes that if any one of these assumptions do

not hold, oil development in Antarctica will not occur.

Under the most favorable assumptions, commercial oil

development appears unlikely before three decades

hence. Early success in a concerted exploration campaign

could also be critical to viable, later development.
Appendix B

Metal Mining in Antarctica

INTRODUCTION

Commercial mining in Antarctica, if ever allowed,

would face not only the continent’s harsh climate and

remoteness, but also uncertainties about the geology,

environment technology, legal regime, and commodity

markets. The high costs of mining under these conditions

would limit commercial interest to ‘‘world class’ deposits containing large amounts of very high grade ore and

mineable with proven technologies. They would also

probably have to be in the more accessible and/or

hospitable areas of the continent.

The geology of Antarctica suggests that viable ore

bodies may exist, although none have been discovered so

far. So it will be some time before mining occurs, It

typically takes nearly a decade or longer to find, delineate,

and develop mineral deposits and meet permitting requirements. Even if exploration were to begin immediately, mining is unlikely before the next century. Given

economic and political constraints, production is not

expected to occur for at least two to three decades.

This appendix examines the technical and economic

considerations for future Antarctic mines. 1 It assumes that

the Convention will allow mining and that metals

commodity prices will remain within their historic ranges.

It also assumes that innovation in mining and processing

technologies will continue to be evolutionary, not revolutionary. The analysis begins with a review of mining

technologies now used in the Arctic, and then looks at the

possibility of adapting these to Antarctica.

THE ARCTIC

Mines have been operated in severe winter climates

near or north of the Arctic Circle for more than 30 years.

Copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, iron, coal, and other

minerals are currently produced in the northern regions of

North America, Greenland, Scandinavia, and the Soviet

Union (see table B-l).

The conditions at each site differ, but all Arctic mines

face low temperatures and high winds. Some mines must

also contend with ice conditions that make production and

transportation difficult. The weather can be so severe that

roads and ports become impassable and mines and

processing facilities are occasionally inoperable. Extended shut down periods (i.e., partial year operating

schedules) are common. None but the richest deposits are

economically attractive under these conditions. These

climatic conditions require special approaches to design,

operation, and maintenance in mining, processing, tailings disposal, and infrastructure support.

Mining

Open pit and underground mines, both of which exist

in the Arctic, use similar approaches to the problems of

cold, wind, and ice. For example, where the ground is

permafrost buildings and other surface facilities are

elevated or kept at subfreezing temperatures to prevent

melting the ice.

Technologies used at Arctic mines have evolved to

operate at -40” F and lower and in winds of 80 miles an

hour and more.2 Machinery is constructed of special steel

alloys and rubber compounds, and uses special lubricants

designed for cold weather use. Mobile equipment such as

drills, trucks, shovels, loaders, bulldozers, and scrapers,

are all furnished with heating systems and kept running

continuously to prevent freezing during the severe periods

of the winter. Equipment is shut down only for maintenance. Diesel fuel contains additives to permit continuous

flow at low temperatures and to prevent waxing in

engines. Hydraulic and electrical lines employ specially

designed tubing or coatings that maintain their flexibility

at low temperatures. Drilling, if necessary, is generally

done dry or with a brine solution. Explosives must be

designed to perform at low temperatures.

Underground Mines

Underground mining methods have been used in the

Arctic for the past 100 years. Finland, Norway, and

Sweden were the first to use these methods; Canada has

followed in the last 10 to 15 years. Notable examples of

underground mines are the Black Angel mine in Greenland and the Polaris (see box B-1 ), Lupin, and Nanisivik

mines in the Northwest Territories of Canada. 3

Underground mining methods generally are used for

deep ore bodies where the costs of overburden removal

would exceed those of developing and maintaining the

required below ground facilities. In the Arctic, an

additional consideration is that underground mines are for

the most part protected from the wind and blowing snow.

IW ~=logl~] fx~ tit tiwt Anwctlc msnersIs potentd were chscussed m ch. 4. The ~vlr onmental unpacts that could occur from nurung operatmts are discussed

m ch. 5. PohtIcal factors related to the adoption of the rmnerals convention, and the rights and assurances It affords to commercial operators and mves[ors, are chscussed us

ch 3.

2M@gW G~log]~] Gxssulmg, ‘ ‘Assessment of Mtnmg and Process Technology for Amarmc Mineral Development, ’ OTA contractor report, November 1988.

3COMINC0, 1 IpoIU1s we. ProductSon Success m the Rugged Arctic, ’ Mmmg i%gmeermg, October 1984, pp 1401-1406. J.K. Gowans, “Producing kid and Zinc

m Canada’s H@t Arctsc,” AIME Preprtnl 84-W (Ins Angeles, CA: March 1984).

-171-
172 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Table B=l-Arctic Nonfuel Mineral Facilities

Name Location Commodity Company Operation Latitude Status

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Wnes, PC-ADIT data system.

Drilling, blasting, loading, hauling, shaft or ramp haulage

to surface, and ventilation systems are usually all enclosed

and operate at temperatures from -20°F to near freezing.

Support facilities may also be located underground for

protection from the weather. Transportation permitting,

yealr-round operations are usually possible.

Permafrost in the Arctic can be up to 2,000 feet thick,

and ice layers can be found in the rock. However, miners

have developed techniques to cope with these problems.

Two examples of underground mining in which ice and

mixed ice-rock is encountered are the Nanisivik and

Polaris lead-zinc mines.4

Shaft sinking technology has improved such that it can

be performed in subfreezing conditions in the Arctic with

the same efficiency as elsewhere. However, special

approaches may be required where ground thawing is a

threat (see box B-l).

Open Pit Mines

There are few open pit mines in the Arctic. Examples

are Cyprus Anvil (Fare) in the Yukon, Aitik in Sweden,

and Red Dog (see box B-2), currently under development

in Alaska,5 Most open pit mines operate through the

severe winter conditions. A few operations, however, are

seasonal and may shut down for 3 to 4 months of the

winter. This is done more because of the workers’ limited

ability to function at the sustained low temperatures than

the equipments’ performance under these conditions.

Open pit mines are, by definition, exposed to the

weather, so they must contend with very low temperatures

in the Arctic. Of major importance is the ability of

‘%. Daytom ‘‘Bolidcn Takes a Qua-tying Corxcpt Underground at one of Europe’s Larger bad Mmcs,’ E&M./, February 1981, pp. 67-73. R. Fish, ‘The Place W&m

People Find Things- Nsnmvik Mines in Canada’s High Arctic,’ Ca&n Mmuig Journal, Septanbex 1978, pp. 344 Shaf

5J.C. HO@UIB, “Gakmizing he Anvil,” CanaduM Mining Journal, August 1986, pp. 17-18. L. Wln[e, “Copper from the Swdsh Arctic,” E&IUJ, February 19S4, pp.

29-33. H.M. ~egerich. “Pmgrcss Repot-I oaCOMINCO’s Red Dog Projec[ m Alaska, Second Largest Zmc Deposit Ever Dmcovcxed,’ Mining Engineenng, Decernlxr 1986,

pp. 1097-1101.
Appendix B-Metal Mining in Antarctica ● 173

Box B-1—Polaris: An Arctic Underground Mine1

The Polaris lead-zinc mine (75° N. latitude) is located on Little Cornwallis Island, Northwest Territories, Canada near the

settlement of Resolute Bay. It is owned and operated by Vancouver-based COMINCO, Ltd. and is the western world’s most

northerly base metal-mine.

had-zinc mineralization was discovered on Little Cornwallis Island in 1960. In 1972, following 10 years of exploration

and several years of core drilling, the sizable ore body was confirmed. The ore assays at 12 percent zinc and 3 percent lead

(compared with an average of 5.9 percent zinc and 2.4 percent lead at zinc mines worldwide).2 In 1979, after 5 years of engineering

and environmental feasibility studies, COMINCO announced it would proceed with development of the mine. Construction

began in 1980 and was completed by 1982 at a cost of about $125 million and roughly $35 million in working capital.3 It has

operated continuously and profitably since.

Temperature extremes range from a winter low of -58° F to a high of 59°F in August. Continuous darkness prevails from

November through February, and continuous daylight exists from April to August. Freeze-up begins in September. Offshore,

ice thickness increases from 1 foot in October to 7 feet in May. The permafrost extends to a depth of approximately 1,400 feet.

Only the top few inches thaw in the summer.

The major feature of mining at Polaris is the absolute necessity of preventing thawing. Because the entire ore body is located

in permafrost, the ore is porous and the voids contain ice. If allowed to thaw, the stability of the mine openings would severely

deteriorate. To ensure freezing conditions, four refrigeration units are used in the summer to cool the ventilation air. In the winter,

the natural -25°F ventilation compensates for the heat generated by the mining equipment. Inhibiting thawing also extends to

the backfilling operation. In many underground mines, the backfill material is mill tailings combined with cement, Mill tailings

would add too much heat to the Polaris mine, so shale mined at the surface is used instead. A small amount of fresh water is added

to this fill to freeze it in place for stability.

Polaris is located on the coast, so the need for roads was limited to those at the mine site. The mill was constructed on a

barge in southern Canada and towed to the mine site. At high tide, the barge was floated into a prepared lagoon and berthed. The

lagoon was then backilled. The 100 foot by 400 foot multilevel barge houses the concentrator, power generator, maintenance

shops, offices, assay lab, warehouse, and fuel oil storage.

The concentrates are stored in an unheated building with a capacity for 220,000 tons of concentrates. The shipping season

at Polaris is normally 6 weeks long, from mid-August to the end of September. During this period, the year’s production of

concentrates must be shipped out, and all supplies except perishable foods must be received. The concentrates are shipped

primarily to Europe for smelting and refining. Air service via Resolute Bay is available for personnel and food.

Mill tailings are disposed in Garron Lake. They are pumped 1.6 miles to the lake, where they are thickened and pumped

deep below the lake surface. Garron Lake provides an acceptable environment for depositing the tailings due to its meromictic

character (no vertical circulation of the water). Below 66 feet, there exists a zone with three times the salinity of seawater that

contains naturally occurring hydrogen sulfide. This precipitates any soluble heavy metals in the tailings slurry.

COMINCO has engineered a system which captures 93 percent of the energy value of the fuel oil burned to generate power.

Waste heat from the electric generator is used to dry the concentrates and provide space heating. The accommodations for the

200 workers are designed to provide as attractive an environment as possible. There are four living modules plus modules for

administration, dining, recreation, and service. The modules are positioned 5 feet off the ground to prevent thawing of permafrost.

The recreation facility includes numerous indoor sports facilities, including a swimming pool. The southern (non- Inuit) personnel

work continuously for 10 weeks and then have 2 or 3 weeks off. Most are flown to their homes in Montreal, Toronto, Edmonton,

Yellowknife, or elsewhere across Canada.

IT&cn ~fiIy hm 6‘ASSaSXIIa[ of Mining snd Precess Technology for Antucuc Mmerat Development, ’ November 1988, concr~c[m report prepared

for OTA by Msgcc Gccdo@cal Consuh.mg.

2An Appr~al ofhfmerab Avadabduyfor 34 Corrunodioes,Bulleun 692, Bureau of MURS, U.S. Departmen[ of tie ~L~lm (Wabgton, ~19g7).

3M~m J, & wit, ~lur~ ~~ M~g 01 An@rC[&a, ,$Cwtce and 7echAu10gy, &OfW??UCS df’OfIfICJ (0~0~: cl~ndon ~cs~. 1985)

personnel to function efficiently at the sustained low Dredging

temperatures that are encountered. Many operations, such Dredging is another mining technology used occasion- al drilling, loading explosives, and blasting must be allv in the Arctic. Alluvial deposits in shaIlow water are performed with personnel exposed to severe cold. Survey- dredged during the summer in Alaska and the Yukon. One

ing, sample handling, secondary blasting, and other large gold dredge operates off the coast of arctic Alaska

functions typically have to be performed outdoors. near Nome for about 5 months of the year,
174 . Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Photo erdt; GOAWCQ Lfd.

The Polaris Mine at 75” N. latitude in the Canadian Arctic.

Processing

After an ore is mined, various processing steps are used

to extract the valuable metals or minerals it contains.

Depending on the mineral, some combination of crushing,

grinding, beneficiation, smelting, refining, or hydrometallurgical processing are needed. Part of the processing is

normally done at the mine site, the remainder is done

elsewhere. The extent of mine-site processing depends on

the costs of transporting products and raw materials and

those of constructing and operating a processing facility.

For an easily processed ore, such as gold, all processing

may be performed at the mine site. Arctic gold mines

commonly have small furnaces and make gold bars. Base

metal mines in the Arctic, however, include only a mill

(crushing, grinding, classification, and concentration).

The concentrates are shipped elsewhere for smelting,

refining, or hydrometallurgical processing. This particular configuration is chosen because:

transporting ore that is of low value per ton to distant

mills is prohibitively expensive;

smelting economies-of-scale are such that few mines

are large enough to support a competitive smelter

transporting processing fuel oil, fluxes, and other

supplies to the mine site is costly and further strains

the already short shipping season; and

there are no proven hydrometallurgical processes for

nonferrous metals which are economically viable on

a small scale.

Common forms of beneficiation have been used in the

Arctic for copper, zinc, lead, and platinum group metals.6

The important feature in designing crushing circuits is to

keep ore from thawing and refreezing. For example, at the

Polaris mine, primary crushing takes place underground

at below freezing temperatures. Most Arctic grinding

circuits are located in a heated building. Flotation and

other concentration circuits are always located in heated

buildings.

Tailings Disposal and Water Treatment7

The selection of a disposal method for mill tailings is

a very site-specific decision. All Arctic mills have had to

meet stringent environmental limitations, and in the case

of newer operations ‘‘zero discharge’ is the goal. Red

Dog uses a tailings dam and discharged water is treated to

remove heavy metals. Mill tailings at the Polaris mine are

discharged into a lake where the high salinity coupled

with the naturally occurring hydrogen sulfide precipitates

the soluble heavy metals contained in the tailings pulp. At

Black Angel, where the tailings are discharged to the

bottom of a fjord, the original disposal system resulted in

lead contamination of the local marine life to the extent

that certain mussels were not suitable for consumption.

Black Angel has since adjusted its milling process to

reduce the heavy metal content (dissolution) of its mill

waste, and increased the thoroughness of its tailings

treatment operations. The technical aspects of land-based

tailings disposal can be resolved, as shown by the

methods used at Lupin and proposed for Red Dog.

However, because of the need for earthen darns and

additional water treatment capacity, disposal on land is

expected to become more expensive than ocean disposal.

Infrastructure Support

Mining requires a great deal of supporting infrastructure, including power, water, roads, and sometimes

railroad and shipping facilities. In addition, airfields and

personnel accommodations are required at remote mines.

Most of the mining camps developed in the Arctic of

Norway, Sweden, and Finland had some nearby manpower, roads, port facilities, and power available within

100 miles. Because North American Arctic mines are

more remote, more infrastructure had to be constructed

specifically for them. In general, governments have been

supportive of mine development in the far north, and have

at times assisted with infrastructure financing (e.g.,

Nanisivik in Canada).

Power at most Arctic mines is generated by diesel fuel.

This requires large amounts of fuel (on the order 4 million

dpla~m -p metals include phuinum, pdhdmrn, rhorhum. mtkuum, mdmrn, ~d OSmI~.

?Mw@ @-@K@ tid~, op. cl~.! ‘Oomae 2’

.
Appendix B--Metal Mining in Antarctica ● 175

Box B-2—Red Dog: An Arctic Open Pit Minel

The Red Dog deposit (68° N latitude) is located in northwest Alaska near the Kotzebue Sound and the Chukchi Sea. The

deposit contains 85 million tons of ore assaying 17.1 percent zinc, 5 percent lead, and 2.4 troy oz./ton silver. COMINCO, Ltd.

is developing the mine, which will be the world’s largest zinc producer when it starts production. The 6,000 short ton/day project

is being built at a cost of $300 million, plus an additional $175 million for a port and the access road from the port to the mine.2

Production is scheduled to begin in late 1989.

The operation will consist of an open pit mine, a mill, concentrate storage buildings, tailings disposal facilities, maintenance

shop, a power facility, road and port facilities, and accommodations and recreation facilities for 300 people.

The mine will be a conventional open pit mine with 10-cubic-yard loaders and 50-to 85-ton haul trucks. Due to the minimum

amount of waste which overlays the deposit, preproduction stripping is limited to several million tons; the life-of-mme strip ratio

should be very low (1.0 or less).3 A key element in the design of the pit is the placement of the waste rock. Weathering of the

deposit outcrop has caused heavy metals to enter Red Dog Creek. The mine plan calls for positioning the waste dumps to

minimize the potential for additional natural leaching of heavy metals from this weathered outcrop material, which will not be

processed initially.

The mill will incorporate the latest technology in order to minimize space requirements, maximize energy efficiency, and

improve recovery. The basic unit operations of the mill will be primary crushers; semi-autogenous (SAG), ball, and tower mills;

Maxwell and column flotation cells; and pressure filters. The SAG mills are used to eliminate fine crushing with its inherent

material-handling problems for wet or frozen ore. The concentrates will be filtered using pressure filters, thus making it

unnecessary to further dry the concentrates.

The mill tailings will be disposed behind a tailings dam constructed from material excavated from the mill site. The dam

will be raised in stages over the life of the mine. Excess water and run-off water will be treated for removal of heavy metals prior

to discharge to Red Dog Creek.

Power will be generated onsite, and the waste heat will be used to heat the process buildings, accommodation building, and

incoming water. Those surface facilities which do not house process equipment will be pre-engineered buildings erected on site.

The main mill facility and the accommodation building will be constructed of modules that have been preassembled in the United

States or Asia. These modules, weighing up to 1,500 tons will then be transported by barge to the Red Dog port and hauled to

the mine site.

The Red Dog mine is inland, so ground transportation has to be available. A 52-mile all-weather road (including 10 bridges)

from the port to the mine is being built at a cost of $2 million per mile. Concentrates out of, and supplies into, the mine will be

transported with 150-ton trucks.

The Red Dog shipping season is estimated to be 100 days. The port facilities are limited by shallow water. Self-unloading

barges will be required to transport the concentrates to offshore ships. The concentrates will be shipped to North America. Japan,

South Korea and Europe for smelting and refining.

IT&m primarily from ‘‘Aaseaamcmt of Mining and Process Technology for Antarctic Mineral Dovclopmcm, ’ November 1988, report prcpamd for OTA

by Mag= &Ob@Cid cimsuhmg.

2W~~d road ~c ~ ~

 f

usancd by the State of Alaska. COMINCO will pay a [olt fee of $17 per ton to tmmspon the concentrates

3S~iprauo,~~t~agc of w~~r~k -t-tbe rCXTWV~ for every ton of ore extractd Since waste rCXYIOVld is C08LlY, ~OW s~p ra~ios edUIKX he v~ablhtY

of mlncs.

gallons per year at Polaris) to be transported north. The supplies for the next 9 months are transported. The Red

fuel is brought by truck or ship. Fuel transport by ship is

seasonally limited at the coastal Polaris and Black Angel

mines and can require the use of ice breakers or reinforced

cargo vessels.

Road construction has been a major cost in some Arctic

areas. The Lupin mine in the Northwest Territories has a

winter road built on snow and lake ice. Supplies can move

along this road only during the winter months. This road

is 360 miles long, including 330 miles of ice roads across

frozen lakes. The road can be used for about 3 months of

the year, during which time essentially all fuel and

Dog mine in Alaska is presently under construction, and

a 52-mile access road to a port facility has been built

across permafrost at a cost of $2 million per mile.

Materials handling at the mine, mill, storage, and port

facilities is another important consideration in Arctic

mining operations. Special consideration during cold

weather is required to prevent inappropriate freezing of

ores, waste, tailings, slurry lines, conveyors, and concentrates.

Air transport is essential for rapid movement of

personnel and related perishable food and emergency
176 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

supplies. It is also essential during the construction phase

to reduce construction time and costs. Each site must have

a maintained airfield. Year-round operations must have an

airfield designed for severe weather conditions.

Building construction in the Arctic is most often

modular. Building and equipment modules are built in

more temperate regions and transported to the mine site

for final assembly. Module construction for infrastructure

was done at Polaris and Lupin and is underway for the Red

Dog mine in Alaska. In a unique design for Polaris, the

entire processing plant was built on a barge, towed to a

dredged basin at the site, and permanently moored in

place.8

Accommodations for personnel are required at the

remote Arctic mines. These quarters include recreational

and communications facilities for the workers. Waste heat

from the generator systems is used for surface facility and

plant heating in the Arctic.

Economics

The technology developed by the mining industry has

proved functional in severe Arctic conditions. The costs

associated with the special approaches to mining, processing, tailings disposal, and infrastructure support are

greater than in lower latitudes, but the mines have been

economic because of their higher grade ores. The ore at

Polaris averages 12 percent zinc, whereas ore grades at

zinc mines worldwide average 5.9 pecent.9 Coproduct

values may also be important. For example, the ore in the

Red Dog deposit not only assays 17.1 percent zinc, but

also contains 5 percent lead and 2.4 troy oz./ton silver.

Table B-2 shows the difference in ore grade and

operating costs for selected Arctic and southern mines.

For the mines listed in the table, the average operating

costs of both underground and open pit mines in the

Arctic are more than twice as high as comparable mines

further south. Ore grades are also significantly higher than

for southern mines. Arctic deposits typically contain in

situ ore valued at more than $200 per ton. 10 The risks

inherent in Arctic mining lead companies to require a

return on their Arctic investments of 20 percent or more,

compared with a 15 percent hurdle rate elsewhere.

Another consideration affecting the economics of

Arctic mines is the size of the deposits. Because of the

large capital costs involved, a deposit must be very large

and have suitable production to recover the investment.

For example, the Red Dog mine, with 85 million tons of

ore, will be the largest zinc mining operation in the world

when it reaches production. The capital cost is estimated

at $300 million not including the port and 52-mile access

road to the mine, which are being built by the State of

Alaska for $175 million. At full capacity, the mine is

designed to operate at a rate of 6,000 tons of ore per day.

Location is another economic consideration, particularly with regard to transportation infrastructure.

Occasionally, a deposit which may not be quite rich

enough or large enough to be developed independently

may, through fortuitous location, become more economically attractive by utilizing nearby infrastructure developed for another deposit. For example, the Lik deposit, 12

miles northwest of the Red Dog deposit may not have

been as economically attractive on its own as it is with the

nearby Red Dog deposit being developed. Thus far, the

Lik deposit has drilled reserves of approximately 24

million tons assaying 9 percent zinc, 3 percent lead, and

1.4 troy oz./ton silver.

ANTARCTICA

Environment

The Antarctic environment is perhaps the first factor

that would affect the viability of a mining venture.

Antarctica is the coldest, highest, windiest, and most

isolated continent on Earth. In addition, it has a cover of

ice that limits rock exposure to about 100,000 square

miles, or one-fiftieth of the total area of the continent. The

Antarctic Peninsula reaches within 500 miles of the tip of

South America, but in other sectors the closest land is

some 1,400 miles distant.11

The isolation and ice cover create an environment more

severe than that in the Arctic, and mines would need to be

designed to withstand low temperatures, high winds, and

harsh storms. The mean temperatures in the coastal areas

range from about +32°F (in the warm months) to 0°F to

-20°F (in the cold months). The interior, high polar

plateau, is much colder, with mean temperatures of about

-40°F in the warm months and as low as -90°F in the cold

months. The northwestern part of the Antarctic Peninsula

is milder because of its maritime climate; winter mean

temperatures are +15 “F, and winds over its central part are

— persistent but not fierce.

EJ.K. @win, 1l’IIK POIti proczsa Barge, ’ CIhf Bulktin, April 1983, pp. 93-97.

9An Appr&al qfMlnerals Av~”labillIY for 34 CO mmoditia, Bulletin 692, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Dep arunent of tie Intior (Washington, DC: 1987).

l% ~ltu ~“due (m=~ ~ $~on) ~Ul~ &e -uof me~l(s) CCMmiSItd in a ton of ore muhiplmd by Ihe price of tic McM(s). T’b.is value mmt ~ $Wlcid ~ cover

all the operating costs and deprcmated capllal wsts of reunwring the metal(s) and getting II to market.

1 ID,H Ellla, D*W, A Fr~ork jor Assessing Enwronmentai lmpacu of Possible An&rctac Mmural Development (lnst.itute of Polar Studies, The Ohio StaLC

Univaraity, 1987).
Appendix Metal Mining in Antarctica ● 177

Table B-2—Lead/Zinc Producer Comparisons

Estimated

Storms are frequent, even in the milder coastal areas.

Stormy conditions result from either surface flow of air

from the continental interior (katabatic winds that are

exceptionally violent in some coastal areas) or the passage

of low pressure systems. Depressions are generated

frequently in a circum-Antarctic belt between 70° and 60°

latitude South, and strong westerly winds occur on the

northern flank of this belt. Individual depressions may

form in less than a day and as many as six depressions in

various stages of growth and decay may occur at any one

time around the continent. These centers may follow one

another with greater frequency than is experienced in the

Northern Hemisphere belt of westerlies, and there is little

assurance of calm conditions between successive centers.

The southern parts of the depressions frequently penetrate

the coastal regions of Antarctica and bring strong winds,

blizzards, and heavy snowfall.

An Antarctic mine may have more difficulty accommodating the moving glacier ice than coping with the

weather. The ice sheet presents a formidable challenge to

designing a mining system. It forms a slow-moving

carapace whose thickness in places exceeds 13,000 feet. 12

The ice cover restricts rock exposures to coastal regions

and to the summits of isolated peaks (e.g., in the

Transantarctic and Ellsworth Mountains). At present no

system to mine through this ice is considered economically feasible, It will also be prudent to avoid building a

port and road system on moving ice. Resupply may also

be a serious problem in Antarctica-many thousands of

tons of fuel and other supplies must be brought to a

mining operation. Interior areas would be the most

difficult to resupply.

Logistical support for an Antarctic mine would be

hampered by the coastal ice shelves. Moreover, Antarctica is physically isolated by a pack ice belt that seasonally

extends 900 miles from the continent in some locations.

The minimum sea ice cover occurs in March, but by

September sea ice cover has grown to nearly 8 million

square miles. The sea ice consists of individual floes 30

to 300 feet across and up to 10 feet thick. In spring and

summer, however, the sea ice drifts northward and melts,

and open water is encountered along many coastal areas.

Mineralization

Moderate climate, accessibility, and available knowledge about mineral deposits suggest that the most

promising area for mining is the Antarctic Peninsula. The

Peninsula has received the most attention from geologists,

in part because theories point to possible deposits there

and because sampling is easier there than elsewhere.

Because parts of the Peninsula are accessible and more

moderate in climate, they may be promising enough for

initial minerals prospecting. 13

Mining

A mine in Antarctica’s interior (for instance on the

Dufek Massif) would face much greater isolation and

probably a harsher climate than is experienced at Arctic

mines. Such conditions would probably require substantial improvements in existing technologies, if not completely new technologies, and would likely require

extraordinarily high valued ore. In the coastal regions,

however—especially the Antarctic Peninsula—

environmental conditions are similar to those of existing

mining operations in the Arctic. An Antarctic mine in

12w 1= fIows out IoW~ tie co~t, UIW8ESgl~l~ uuo the ~IX txxmmmg par-r of the floating Ice shelves such as the ROSS Ice Shelf. The ice shelves me ~ soof the large tabular uxbergs.

130’TA w~hop (XI AII@UC kimitlg kchtloiogy d &UllOtItlCS, k. 13, 19~.
178 . Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

these areas would probably use similar technology and

operating techniques.

The Antarctic Continent offers some special conditions

not found in areas near mines of the Arctic. About 98

percent of the continent is covered by ice (which makes

it similar to northern Greenland), so mines must be

located in exposed or nearly exposed areas. Mine

construction would have to start in an exposed area but

may extend under ice cover. It would be impractical

initially to locate mine shafts on ice and to sink shafts and

declines through the ice to a deposit below. Shafts, ramp

declines, or other underground mine access points,

including ventilation raises, initially would have to be

located on solid ground. Similarly all plant sites and

support facilities would have to be located on the ground

or underground. A plan for dealing with ice and for siting

the surface plant and infrastructure must be addressed at

the time of mine design. Temporary buildings may be

located on ice, but if the ice is moving, even this is not

practical. Land areas suitable for mine locations will be

difficult to find. It will be necessary to drill and blast to

establish level surface areas for mine access and plant and

infrastructure construction in rugged areas such as the

Dufek Massif and the Copper Nunatak in the Antarctic

Peninsula. Alternatively, some of these facilities could be

located in underground excavations.

Underground Mining

The conditions for underground mining in Antarctica

may be similar to those in the Arctic. However, rock

temperatures and permafrost depths may differ. Nonetheless, several underground mining methods that have been

used in the Arctic might be applicable in Antarctica. For

example, a room and pillar method might be used for a flat

lying platinum deposit (a possibility in the Dufek igneous

complex).

Open Pit Mining

The open pit mining method may be suitable in selected

areas of Antarctica, the most likely being the northern

Antarctic Peninsula and the Dry Valleys near McMurdo

Station. It may be used in select areas where ice cover is

less than 500 to 600 feet thick. Mining an ore deposit

through thicker ice cannot be done by conventional

methods, and open pit mining of a deposit below the ice

is highly unlikely. There are no examples in the northern

latitudes of open pit mining through a glacier or ice field.

Ice accumulations have been mined in Canada in and

around open pit mines, but nothing comparable to mining

extensive ice areas. More research and investigation will

be needed before any system to undertake open pit mining

beneath the Antarctic ice cap can be contemplated.

However, it does appear possible to remove some ice over

an ore deposit by open pit mining methods.

Dredging

Dredging operations would be infeasible in much of

Antarctica because of ice conditions. Some areas, though,

have conditions suitable for at least seasonal dredging.

One such area is the northern part of the Antarctic

Peninsula. However, it is not certain what mineral

resources exist there.

Processing

Processing in Antarctica would probably face the same

problems and constraints as those encountered in the

Arctic. Most likely, milling would be performed at the

mine site, and the concentrates would be shipped to a

northern smelter or hydrometallurgy plant. Energy efficiency in the milling process would take on added

importance, because of costliness of bringing in fuel oil.

Solar energy may have application because of 24-hour

daylight in summer.

Tailings Disposal

Tailings from mill processing of ores would likely be

contained on land surface areas, but if land surface is in

short supply, tailings may be disposed on the ice. This

material would freeze and, assuming no thawing of the

ice, should present no future problem, Excess water could

be recycled from the tailings. This is only one of a variety

of possible methods for tailing disposal. All have some

drawbacks, either technical or economic, and the disposal

of tailings probably poses one of the most serious

environmental problems in a mining operation (see ch. 5).

Infrastructure Support

Constructing the infrastructure for Antarctic mining

would be more difficult and costly than in the Arctic given

the longer distances from major staging areas and the

moving ice. Transportation of fuel and concentrates as

well as personnel and supplies would be perhaps the most

difficult and costly task. New or modified transport

technologies may have to be developed. Mining and

processing initially may be seasonal operations for lack of

year-round infrastructure,

The transportation of fuel and concentrates for a base

metal operation would probably require ships. A port that

is at least seasonally ice-free would be needed,14 but port

facilities would be expensive and difficult to locate.

Arctic mining projects have used ice-reinforced ships and

barges as well as newly built, dedicated port facilities.

Ice-free periods are one to a few months’ duration so

14wa= ~tm may not be quid for I@ value, low volume products such IIS gold and phmnum These producta may posiubly bc shipped by air,
Appendix B--Metal Mining in Antarctica Ž 179

product stockpiles need to be built up for use during the

winter season, Port conditions in Antarctica may be

similar to those in the Arctic but with the added difficulty

of longer transits to a supply base, much stormier weather,

and locally higher occurrences of icebergs in the open

water.

Overland transportation of fuel, supplies, and product

would be one of the major costs of an inland mining

operation. A site at the Dufek Massif may require about

330 miles of ice ‘‘road’ across the Ronne Ice Shelf to the

site. Any discovery in Antarctica inland from the coast

would require the construction of an ice road for access,

except perhaps in the islands near the Northern Antarctic

Peninsula and the Northern Peninsula itself. Such construction and maintenance may well be a major and costly

task. Maintaining winter access along such a road may be

impossible where high winds and blowing snow could

make passage unsafe.

Fuel may be transported by pipeline, but with subfreezing temperatures prevailing, a pipeline would have to

be suspended and heated. Since a road would have to be

maintained for other supplies, a pipeline for fuel may not

be a justifiable added cost.

Air transportation would be required for personnel,

small supplies, and possibly product shipment in the case

of gold or platinum. Environmental conditions affecting

air service to Antarctic regions near the coast may be

similar to the Arctic, but inland, they may be much more

severe. Extreme cold temperatures, high winds, and

blowing snow in inland Antarctic regions could severely

restrict aircraft operations, and this could affect the ability

of a mine to operate year-round. Large, wheeled aircraft

have made numerous landings on unprepared blue-ice

patches in interior parts of the continent, suggesting that

use of such aircraft may be viable in some areas during the

austral summer.

Accommodations for personnel can be designed in a

manner similar to those in the Arctic examples cited and

should be satisfactory, but should be designed to withstand the high winds anticipated. If a year-round operation

is planned, crew transfers from the site by air during much

of the year will be needed. Air service in all conditions is

probably not possible. This means that an airfield must be

constructed that can function during almost all weather

conditions, a very difficult task in most areas of Antarctica.

Economics

Several studies and a number of speculations have

focused on the feasibility of mining platinum from the

Dufek Massif.15 The many technical problems encountered at this site in Antarctica’s interior appear insurmountable to some experts, The studies speculate that

mining may occur in this and other Antarctic sites if

agreements are reached to encourage such development

and if high-grade deposits are located. OTA finds that past

studies that concluded mining platinum from the Dufek

Massif was practical underestimated the costs and difficulties involved.16

OTA investigated the relative levels of difficulty of

mining in the Arctic and Antarctic. Mining in Antarctica

would not only be more expensive than that in the

Arctic, but the enhanced risks would require even

greater financial returns to the investors. Antarctic

mining might require an estimated 30 percent return,

compared with 20 percent in the Arctic, and 15

percent elsewhere. The in situ value of the Arctic Red

Dog and Polaris ores are $290 and $200 per ton,

respectively. 17 Deposits in Antarctica must have at least

this value for mining to be economic. OTA concludes that

to cover these costs, ore values would need to be about

$200 to $400 per ton for a commercial Antarctic

Peninsula mine, and about $300 to $600 per ton for a

Dufek Massif mine. These values (at today prices) mean

that a Peninsula gold deposit would need to contain an ore

with between 1/2 and 1 ounce of gold per ton and a Dufek

platinum deposit would need to contain the same grades

of platinum per ton. 18 Ores of these high grades are rare

and any lesser grade ores would probably not be

developed. Though this conclusion is highly speculative,

it appears reasonable given the limited state of current

knowledge.

SUMMARY

OTA has not developed a separate, complete scenario

for a hypothetical Antarctic mine because large numbers

of variables make any detailed technical or economic

approach impractical. Instead, the foregoing discussion

presents possible general approaches. It indicates that

certain high-grade mineral deposits could probably be

mined economically in Antarctica if they were located in

reasonably accessible areas. Mining on the coast or on the

Peninsula might be done with the technologies currently

used in the Arctic. Technology would not be a significant

)5s=, for ~xmple, M,J, & Wll, ~LMra~ ~ &jlnLng ,n AW~~Cf&~ .$clgme ~~ 7~c/uKJ/ogy, Ecomm~s ad pO/IrICS (Odord:Clmendon press, 1985), SIX also, me

I.nsutuw of Polar Stuches, A Framm ork for Assessing Environmental impacts of Pos@le A~arctic kfmeral Development, Otuo State Uruversity, 1977.

16Mag& Geological Consulting, op. cil., ftio~ 2.

17supra note IS

18A ~~of ~ppro~akly fm tm~ the grade of the example m tie de Wlt s[udy
180 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

deterrent to minerals development in these ice-free,

accessible locations with ‘‘Arctic-like’ environments.

Economics, however, could be a major deterrent. The

deposit would have to be of “world class” value to cover

the high costs of the facility and its infrastructure and the

large financial returns needed to compensate the investors

for the additional risks.

The situation is different for a mine in the Antarctic

interior (including the Dufek Massif). Here, the climate,

ice, and remoteness may require substantial improvements in existing technologies, if not completely new

technologies. Considering the other risks in developing an

Antarctic mine, mining firms and their financial backers

would be hesitant to adopt unconventional mining and

metallurgical processes. Initially only proven processes

are likely to be acceptable. Therefore, mining in Antarctica’s interior is not expected soon, if ever.

Most U.S. mining industry representatives have not

given much, if any, attention to Antarctic minerals. Those

that have paid some attention consider the political and

institutional risks to be the principal deterrent to future

Antarctic minerals development.19 They are pessimistic

about operating under the regulatory framework of the

Minerals Convention and the uncertainties of jurisdiction,

taxation, permitting procedures, environmental rules,

etc. 20 Further discussion of industry views on the

acceptability and workability of the Convention are

covered in chapter 3.

190TA W~kS@, ~. 13, 1988; Keith R. Km&dock, vice Prcslderu, American Mu@ CIXILPZZW, -n~c~ umcamm, Dec. 15, 1988,

~SiIII~ D. SmNM,S, GXUJUItant on Metal Markas, personal cmtumuuciuion, Apr. 13, 1989.
Appendix C

The Antarctic Treaty

Adopted at Washington 1 December 1959

The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium,

Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that

Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively

for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or

object of international discord;

Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international cooperation

in scientific investigation in Antarctica;

Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation

for the continuation and development of such cooperation

on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in

Antarctica as applied during the International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the

progress of all mankind;

Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of

Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the continuance

of international harmony in Antarctica will further the

purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the

United Nations;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.

There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a

military nature, such as the establishment of military

bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military

manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.

2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of

military personnel or equipment for scientific research or

for any other peaceful purpose.

Article 2

Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and

cooperation toward that end, as applied during the

International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to

the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article 3

1. In order to promote international cooperation in

scientific investigation in Antarctica, as provided for in

Article 2 of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties

agree that to the greatest extent feasible and practicable:

(a) information regarding plans for scientific programs

in Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations;

(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and stations;

(c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica

shall be exchanged and made freely available.

2. In implementing this Article, every encouragement

shall be given to the establishment of cooperative working

relations with those Specialized Agencies of the United

Nations and other international organizations having a

scientific or technical interest in Antarctica.

Article 4

1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be

interpreted as:

(a)

b )

(c)

a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial

sovereignty in Antarctica;

a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting

Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty

in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result

of its activities or those of its nationals in

Antarctica or otherwise;

prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as

regards its recognition or non-recognition of any

other State’s right of or claim or basis of claim to

territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.

2. No acts or activities taking place while the present

Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting,

supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in

Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing

claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be

asserted while the present Treaty is in force.

Article 5

1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the

disposal there of radioactive waste material shall be

prohibited.

2. In the event of the conclusion of international

agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive

waste material, to which all of the Contracting Parties

whose representatives are entitled to participate in the

meetings provided for under Article 9 are parties, the rules

established under such agreements shall apply in Antarctica.

-181-
182 . Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Article 6

The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the

area south of 60 degrees South Latitude, including all ice

shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice

or in any way affect the right, or the exercise of the rights,

of any State under international law with regard to the

high seas within that area.

Article 7

1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the

observance of the provisions of the present Treaty, each

Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to

participate in the meetings referred to in Article 9 of the

Treaty shall have the right to designate observers to carry

out any inspection provided for by the present Article.

Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties

which designate them. The names of observers shall be

communicated to every other Contracting Party having

the right to designate observers, and like notice shall be

given of the termination of their appointment.

2. Each observer designated in accordance with the

provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall have

complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas

of Antarctica.

3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations,

installations and equipment within those areas, and all

ships and aircraft at point of discharging or embarking

cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all

times to inspection by any observers designated in

accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time

over any or all areas of Antarctica by any of the

Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers.

5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the

present Treaty enters into force for it, inform the other

Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice

in advance, of

(a)

(b)

(c)

all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part

of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to

Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its

territory;

all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals;

and

any military personnel or equipment intended to be

introduced by it into Antarctica subject to the

conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of

the present Treaty.

Article 8

1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions

under the present Treaty, and without prejudice to the

respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to

jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers

designated under paragraph 1 of Article 7 and scientific

personnel exchanged under sub-paragraph l(b) of Article

3 of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying

any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction

of the Contracting Party of which they are nationals in

respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are

in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions.

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1

of this Article, and pending the adoption of measures in

pursuance of sub-paragraph l(e) of Article 9, the Contracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute with

regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall

immediately consult together with a view to reaching a

mutually acceptable solution.

Article 9

1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in

the preamble to the present Treaty shall meet at the City

of Canberra within two months after the date of entry into

force of the Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and

places, for the purpose of exchanging information,

consulting together on matters of common interest

pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their Governments, measures

in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the

Treaty, including measures regarding:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;

facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;

facilitation of international scientific cooperation

in Antarctica;

facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty;

questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in

Antarctica;

preservation and conservation of living resources in

Antarctica,

2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to

the present Treaty by accession under Article 13 shall be

entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the

meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article,

during such time as that Contracting Party demonstrates

its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of

a scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition.

3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article 7 of

the present Treaty shall be transmitted to the representatives of the Contracting Parties participating in the

meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article.

4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this

Article shall become effective when approved by all the
Appendix C—The Antarctic Treaty ● 183

Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled to

participate in the meetings held to consider those measures.

5. Any or all of the rights established in the present

Treaty may be exercised as from the date of entry into

force of the Treaty whether or not any measures facilitating the exercise of such rights have been proposed,

considered or approved as provided in this Article.

Article 10

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert

appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the

United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any

activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or

purposes of the present Treaty.

Article 11

1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the

Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or

application of the present Treaty, those Contracting

Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to

having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry,

mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or

other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall,

with the consent, in each case, of all parties to the dispute,

be referred to the International Court of Justice for

settlement; but failure to reach agreement on reference to

the International Court shall not absolve parties to the

dispute from the responsibility for continuing to seek to

resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to

in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 12

1. (a) The present Treaty maybe modified or amended

at any time by unanimous agreement of the Contracting

Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in

the meetings provided for under Article 9. Any such

modification or amendment shall enter into force when

the depositary Government has received notice from all

such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it.

(b) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter

enter into force as to any other Contracting Party when

notice of ratification by it has been received by the

depositary Government. Any such Contracting Party

from which no notice of ratification is received within a

period of two years from the date of entry into force of the

modification or amendment in accordance with the

provisions of sub-paragraph l(a) of this Article shall be

deemed to have withdrawn from the present Treaty on the

date of the expiration of such period.

2. (a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date

of entry into force of the present Treaty, any of the

Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to

participate in the meetings provided for under Article 9 so

requests by a communication addressed to the depositary

Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parties

shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation

of the Treaty.

(b) Any modification or amendment to the present

Treaty which is approved as such a Conference by a

majority of the Contracting Parties there represented,

including a majority of those whose representatives are

entitle to participate in the meetings provided for under

Article 9, shall be communicated by the depositary

Government to all the Contracting Parties immediately

after the termination of the Conference and shall enter into

force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of

the present Article.

(c) If any such modification or amendment has not

entered into force in accordance with the provisions of

sub-paragraph l(a) of this Article within a period of two

years after the date of its communication to all the

Contracting Parties, any Contracting Party may at any

time after the expiration of that period give notice to the

depositary Government of its withdrawal from the present

Treaty; and such withdrawal shall take effect two years

after the receipt of the notice by the depositary Government.

Article 13

1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by

the signatory States. It shall be open for accession by arty

State which is a Member of the United Nations, or by arty

other State which may be invited to accede to the Treaty

with the consent of all the Contracting Parties whose

representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings

provided for under Article 9 of the Treaty.

2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty

shall be effected by each State in accordance with its

constitutional processes.

3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of

accession shall be deposited with the Government of the

United States of America, hereby designated as the

depositary Government.

4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each deposit of any

instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of

entry into force of the Treaty and of any modification or

amendment thereto.

5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all

the signatory States, the present Treaty shall enter into

force for those States and for States which have deposited

instruments of accession. Thereafter the Treaty shall enter

into force for any acceding State upon the deposit of its

instrument of accession.
184 . Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the

depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Government of the United States of America, which shall

Charter of the United Nations. transmit duly certified copies thereof to the Governments

Article 14 of the signatory and acceding States.

The present Treaty, done in the English, French,

Russian and Spanish languages, each version being
Appendix D

The Convention on the Regulation of

Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to this Convention, hereinafter

referred to as the Parties,

Recalling the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty;

Convinced that the Antarctic Treaty system has proved

effective in promoting international harmony in furtherance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the

United Nations, in ensuring the absence of any measures

of a military nature and the protection of the Antarctic

environment and in promoting freedom of scientific

research in Antarctica

Reaffirming that it is in the interest of all mankind that

the Antarctic Treaty area shall continue forever to be used

exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become

the scene or object of international discord;

Noting the possibility that exploitable mineral resources may exist in Antarctica;

Bearing in mind the special legal and political status of

Antarctica and the special responsibility of the Antarctic

Treaty Consultative Parties to ensure that all activities in

Antarctica are consistent with the purposes and principles

of the Antarctic Treaty;

Bearing in mind also that a regime for Antarctic

mineral resources must be consistent with Article IV of

the Antarctic Treaty and in accordance therewith be

without prejudice and acceptable to those States which

assert rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in

Antarctica, and those States which neither recognize nor

assert such rights or claims, including those States which

assert a basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in

Antarctica;

Noting the unique ecological, scientific and wilderness

value of Antarctica and the importance of Antarctica to

the global environment;

Recognizing that Antarctic mineral resource activities

could adversely affect the Antarctic environment or

dependent or associated ecosystems;

Believing that the protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems must be

a basic consideration in decisions taken on possible

Antarctic mineral resource activities;

Concerned to ensure that Antarctic mineral resource

activities, should they occur, are compatible with scientific investigation in Antarctica and other legitimate uses

of Antarctica;

Believing that a regime governing Antarctic mineral

resource activities will further strengthen the Antarctic

Treaty system;

Convinced that participation in Antarctic mineral

resource activities should be open to all States which have

an interest in such activities and subscribe to a regime

governing them and that the special situation of develop

ing country Parties to the regime should be taken into

account;

Believing that the effective regulation of Antarctic

mineral resource activities is in the interest of the

international community as a whole;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

CHAPTER I: GENERAL

PROVISIONS

Article 1

Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

1 “Antarctic Treaty” means the Antarctic Treaty

done at Washington on 1 December 1959.

2 “Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties” means the

Contacting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty entitled to

appoint representatives to participate in the meetings

referred to in Article IX of that Treaty.

3 “Antarctic Treaty area” means the area to which the

provisions of the Antarctic Treaty apply in accordance

with Article VI of that Treaty.

4 “Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic

Seals” means the Convention done at London on 1 June

1972,

5 “Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic

Marine Living Resources means the Convention done at

Canberra on 20 May 1980.

6 “Mineral resources” means all non-living natural

non-renewable resources, including fossil fuels, metallic

and non-metallic minerals.

7 “Antarctic mineral resource activities” means

prospecting, exploration or development, but does not

include scientific research activities within the meaning

of Article III of the Antarctic Treaty.

8 “Prospecting” means activities, including logistic

support aimed at identifying areas of mineral resourc e

potential for possible exploration and development,

including geological, geochemical and geophysical investigations and field observations, the use of remote

sensing techniques and collection of surface, sea floor and

sub-ice samples. Such activities do not include dredging

-185-
186 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

and excavations, except for the purpose of obtaining

small-scale samples, or drilling, except shallow drilling

into rock and sediment to depths not exceeding 25 meters

or such other depth as the Commission may determine for

particular circumstances.

9 “Exploration” means activities, including logistic

support aimed at identifying and evaluating specific

mineral resource occurrences or deposits, including

exploratory drilling, dredging and other surface or subsurface excavations required to determine the nature and size

of mineral resource deposits and the feasibility of their

development but excluding pilot projects or commercial

production.

10 ‘Development’ means activities, including logistic

support which take place following exploration and are

aimed at or associated with exploitation of specific

mineral resource deposits, including pilot projects, processing, storage and transport activities.

1 i “Operator” means:

(a) a Party; or

(b) an agency or instrumentality of a Party; or

(c) a juridical person established under the law of a

Party; or

(d) a joint venture consisting exclusively of any

combination of any of the foregoing,

which is undertaking Antarctic mineral resource activities

and for which there is a Sponsoring State.

12 ‘Sponsoring State” means the Party with which an

Operator

being:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

has a substantial and genuine link, through

in the case of a Party, that Party;

in the case of an agency or instrumentality of a

Party, that Party;

in the case of a juridical person other than an

agency or instrumentality of a Party, the Party:

(i) under whose law that juridical person is

established and to whose law it is subject,

without prejudice to any other law which

might be applicable, and

(ii) in whose territory the management of that

juridical person is located, and

(iii) to whose effective control that juridical

person is subject;

in the case of a joint venture not constituting a

juridical person:

(i)

(ii)

where the managing member of the joint

venture is a Party or an agency or instrumentality of a Party, that Party; or

in any other case, where in relation to a

Party the managing member of the joint

venture satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (c) above, that Party.

13 “Managing member of the joint venture” means

that member which the participating members in the joint

venture have by agreement designated as having responsibility for central management of the joint venture,

including the functions of organizing and supervising the

activities to be undertaken, and controlling the financial

resources involved.

14 “Effective control” means the ability of the

Sponsoring State to ensure the availability of substantial

resources of the Operator for purposes connected with the

implementation of this Convention, through the location

of such resources in the territory of the Sponsoring State

or otherwise.

15 “Damage to the Antarctic environment or dependent or associated ecosystems’ means any impact on the

living or non-living components of that environment or

those ecosystems, including harm to atmospheric, marine

or terrestrial. life, beyond that which is negligible or

which has been assessed and judged to be acceptable

pursuant to this Convention.

16 “Commission” means the Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission established pursuant to Article 18.

17 “Regulatory Committee” means an Antarctic

Mineral Resources Regulatory Committee established

pursuant to Article 29.

18 “Advisory Committee” means the Scientific,

Technical and Environmental Advisory Committee established pursuant to Article 23.

19 “Special Meeting of Parties” means the Meeting

referred to in Article 28.

20 “Arbitral Tribunal” means an Arbitral Tribunal

constituted as provided for in the Annex, which forms an

integral part of this Convention.

Article 2

Objectives and General Principles

1 This Convention is an integral part of the Antarctic

Treaty system, comprising the Antarctic Treaty, the

measures in effect under that Treaty, and its associated

separate legal instruments, the prime purpose of which is

to ensure that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used

exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become

the scene or object of international discord. The Parties

provide through this Convention, the principles it establishes, the rules it prescribes, the institutions it creates and

the decisions adopted pursuant to it, a means for:

(a) assessing the possible impact on the environment of Antarctic mineral resource activities;

(b) determining whether Antarctic mineral resource

activities are acceptable;

(c) goveming the conduct of such Antarctic mineral

resource activities as may be found acceptable;
Appendix D-The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 187

and

(d) ensuring that any Antarctic mineral resource

activities are undertaken in strict conformity

with this Convention.

2 In implementing this Convention, the Parties shall

ensure that Antarctic mineral resource activities, should

they occur, take place in a manner consistent with all the

components of the Antarctic Treaty system and the

obligations flowing therefrom.

3 In relation to Antarctic mineral resource activities,

should they occur, the Parties acknowledge the special

responsibility of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties

for the protection of the environment and the need to:

(a) protect the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems;

(b) respect Antarctica’s significance for, and influence on, the global environment;

(c) respect other legitimate uses of Antarctica;

(d) respect Antarctica’s scientific value and aesthetic and wilderness qualities;

(e) ensure the safety of operations in Antarctica;

(f) promote opportunities for fair and effective

participation of all Parties; and

(g) take into account the interests of the international community as a whole.

Article 3

Prohibition of Antarctic Mineral Resource

Activities Outside this Convention

No Antarctic mineral resource activities shall be

conducted except in accordance with this Convention and

measures in effect pursuant to it and, in the case of

exploration or development, with a Management Scheme

approved pursuant to Article 48 or 54.

Article 4

Principles Concerning Judgments on Antarctic

Mineral Resource Activities

1 Decisions about Antarctic mineral resource activities shall be based upon information adequate to enable

informed judgments to be made about their possible

impacts and no such activities shall take place unless this

information is available for decisions relevant to those

activities.

2 No Antarctic mineral resource activity shall take

place until it is judged, based upon assessment of its

possible impacts on the Antarctic environment and on

dependent and on associated ecosystems, that the activity

in question would not cause:

(a) significant adverse effects on air and water

quality;

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

significant changes in atmospheric, terrestrial or

marine environments;

significant changes in the distribution, abundance or productivity of populations of species

of fauna or flora;

further jeopardy to endangered or threatened

species or populations of such species; or

degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of

special biological, scientific, historic, aesthetic

or wilderness significance.

3 No Antarctic mineral resource activity shall take

place until it is judged, based upon assessment of its

possible impacts, that the activity in question would not

cause significant adverse effects on global or regional

climate or weather patterns.

4 No Antarctic mineral resource activity shall take

place until it is judged that:

(a)

(b)

(c)

technology and procedures are available to

provide for safe operations and compliance with

paragraphs 2 and 3 above;

there exists the capacity to monitor key environmental parameters and ecosystem components

so as to identify any adverse effects of such

activity and to provide for the modification of

operating procedures as may be necessary in the

light of the results of monitoring or increased

knowledge of the Antarctic environment or

dependent or associated ecosystems; and

there exists the capacity to respond effectively

to accidents, particularly those with potential

environmental effects.

5 The judgments referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4

above shall take into account the cumulative impacts of

possible Antarctic mineral resource activities both by

themselves and in combination with other such activities

and other uses of Antarctica.

Article 5

Area of Application

1 This Convention shall, subject to paragraphs 2, 3

and 4 below, apply to the Antarctic Treaty area.

2 Without prejudice to the responsibilities of the

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties under the Antarctic

Treaty and measures pursuant to it, the Parties agree that

this Convention shall regulate Antarctic mineral resource

activities which take place on the continent of Antarctica

and all Antarctic islands, including all ice shelves, south

of 60° south latitude and in the seabed and subsoil of

adjacent offshore areas up to the deep sea bed,

3 For the purposes of this Convention ‘‘deep seabed”

means the seabed and subsoil beyond the geographic

20-604 0 - 89 – 5 : QL 3
188 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

extent of the continental shelf as the term continental shelf

is defined in accordance with international law.

4 Nothing in this Article shall be construed as limiting

the application of other Articles of this Convention in so

far as they relate to possible impacts outside the area

referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, including impacts

on dependent or on associated ecosystems.

Article 6

Cooperation and International Participation

In the implementation of this Convention cooperation

within its framework shall be promoted and encouragement given to international participation in Antarctic

mineral resource activities by interested Parties which are

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties and by other

interested Parties, in particular, developing countries in

either category. Such participation may be realized

through the Parties themselves and their Operators.

Article 7

Compliance with this Convention

1 Each Party shall take appropriate measures within

its competence to ensure compliance with this Convention and any measures in effect pursuant to it.

2 If a Party is prevented by the exercise of jurisdiction

by another Party from ensuring compliance in accordance

with paragraph 1 above, it shall not to the extent that it is

so prevented, bear responsibility for that failure to ensure

compliance.

3 If any jurisdictional dispute related to compliance

with this Convention or any measure in effect pursuant to

it arises between two or more Parties, the Parties

concerned shall immediately consult together with a view

to reaching a mutually acceptable solution.

4 Each Party shall notify the Executive Secretary, for

circulation to all other Parties, of the measures taken

pursuant to paragraph 1 above.

5 Each Party shall exert appropriate efforts, consistent

with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no

one engages in any Antarctic mineral resource activities

contrary to the objectives and principles of this Convention.

6 Each Party may, whenever it deems it necessary,

draw the attention of the Commission to any activity

which in its opinion affects the implementation of the

objectives and principles of this Convention.

7 The Commission shall draw the attention of all

Parties to any activity which, in the opinion of the

Commission, affects the implementation of the objectives

and principles of this Convention or the compliance by

any Party with its obligations under this Convention and

any measures in effect pursuant to it.

8 The Commission shall draw the attention of any

State which is not a Party to this Convention to any

activity undertaken by that State, its agencies or instrumentalities, natural or juridical persons, ships, aircraft or

other means of transportation which, in the opinion of the

Commission, affects the implementation of the objectives

and principles of this Convention. The Commission shall

inform all Parties accordingly.

9 Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of

Article 12(7) of this Convention or Article VIII of the

Antarctic Treaty.

Article 8

Response Action and Liability

1 An Operator undertaking any Antarctic mineral

resource activity shall take necessary and timely response

action, including prevention, containment, clean up and

removal measures, if the activity results in or threatens to

result in damage to the Antarctic environment or dependent or associated ecosystems. The Operator, through its

Sponsoring State, shall notify the Executive Secretary, for

circulation to the relevant institutions of this Convention

and to all Parties, of action taken pursuant to this

paragraph.

2An

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

3 (a)

Operator shall be strictly liable for:

damage to the Antarctic environment or dependent or associated ecosystems arising from

its Antarctic mineral resource activities, including payment in the event that there has been no

restoration to the status quo ante;

loss of or impairment to an established use, as

referred to in Article 15, or loss of or impairment to an established use of dependent or

associated ecosystems, arising directly out of

damage described in subparagraph (a) above;

loss of or damage to property of a third party or

loss of life or personal injury of a third party

arising directly out of damage described in

subparagraph (a) above; and

reimbursement of reasonable costs by whomsoever incurred relating to necessary response

action, including prevention, containment, clean

up and removal measures, and action taken to

restore the status quo ante where Antarctic

mineral resource activities undertaken by that

Operator result in or threaten to result in damage

to the Antarctic environment or dependent or

associated ecosystems.

Damage of the kind referred to in paragraph 2

above which would not have occurred or continued if the

Sponsoring State had carried out its obligations under this

Convention with respect to its Operator shall, in accordance with international law, entail liability of that
. —. 

Appendix D-The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 189

Sponsoring State. Such liability shall be limited to that

portion of liability not satisfied by the Operator or

otherwise,

(b) Nothing in subparagraph (a) above shall affect

the application of the rules of international law

applicable in the event that damage not referred

to in that subparagraph would not have occurred

or continued if the Sponsoring State had carried

out its obligations under this Convention with

respect to its Operator.

4 An Operator shall not be liable pursuant to

paragraph 2 above if it proves that the damage has been

caused directly by, and to the extent that it has been caused

directly by:

(a)

(b)

an event constituting in the circumstances of

Antarctica a natural disaster of an exceptional

character which could not reasonably have been

foreseen; or

armed conflict, should it occur notwithstanding

the Antarctic Treaty, or an act of terrorism

directed against the activities of the Operator,

against which no reasonable precautionary measures could have been effective.

5 Liability of an Operator for any loss of life, personal

injury or loss of or damage to property other than that

governed by this Article shall be regulated by applicable

law and procedures.

6 If an Operator proves that damage has been caused

totally or in part by an intentional or grossly negligent act

or omission of the party seeking redress, that Operator

may be relieved totally or in part from its obligation to pay

compensation in respect of the damage suffered by such

party.

7 (a) Further rules and procedures in respect of the

provisions on liability set out in this Article shall be

elaborated through a separate Protocol which shall be

adopted by consensus by the members of the Commission

and shall enter into force according to the procedure

provided for in Article 62 for the entry into force of this

Convention.

(b)

(c)

Such rules and procedures shall be designed to

enhance the protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems.

Such rules and procedures:

(i)

(ii)

may contain provisions for appropriate

limits on liability, where such limits can be

justified;

without prejudice to Article 57, shall

prescribe means and mechanisms such as

a claims tribunal or other form by which

claims against Operators pursuant to this

Article may be assessed and adjudicated;

(iii) shall ensure that a means is provided to

assist with immediate response- action, and

to satisfy liability under paragraph 2 above

in the event inter alia, that an Operator

liable is financially incapable of meeting

its obligation in full, that it exceeds any

relevant limits of liability, that there is a

defense to liability or that the loss or

damage is of undetermined origin. Unless

it is determined during the elaboration of

the Protocol that there are other effective

means of meeting these objectives, the

Protocol shall establish a Fund or Funds

and make provision in respect of such

Fund or Funds, inter alia, for the following:

—financing by Operators or on industry

wide bases;

--ensuring the permanent liquidity and

mandatory supplementation thereof in the

event of insufficiency;

-reimbursement of costs of response

action, by whomsoever incurred.

8 Nothing in paragraphs 4, 6 and 7 above or in the

Protocol adopted pursuant to paragraph 7 shall affect in

any way the provisions of paragraph 1 above.

9 No application for an exploration or development

permit shall be made until the Protocol provided for in

paragraph 7 above is in force for the Party lodging such

application.

10 Each Party, pending the entry into force for it of the

Protocol provided for in paragraph 7 above, shall ensure,

consistently with Article 7 and in accordance with its legal

system, that recourse is available in its national courts for

adjudicating liability claims pursuant to paragraphs 2, 4

and 6 above against Operators which are engaged in

prospecting. Such recourse shall include the adjudication

of claims against any Operator it has sponsored. Each

Party shall also ensure, in accordance with its legal

system, that the Commission has the right to appear as a

party in its national courts to pursue relevant liability

claims under paragraph 2(a) above.

11 Nothing in this Article or in the Protocol provided

for in paragraph 7 above shall be construed so as to:

(a)

(b)

preclude the application of existing rules on

liability, and the development in accordance

with international law of further such rules,

which may have application to either States or

Operators; or

affect the right of an Operator incurring liability

pursuant to this Article to seek redress from

another party which caused or contributed to the

damage in question.
190 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

12 When compensation has been paid other than under

this Convention liability under this Convention shall be

offset by the amount of such payment.

Article 9

Protection of Legal Positions under the Antarctic

Treaty

Nothing in this Convention and no acts or activities

taking place while this Convention is in force shall:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or

denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in the

Antarctic Treaty area or create any rights of

sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty area;

be interpreted as a renunciation or diminution

by any Party of, or as prejudicing, any right or

claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty

in Antarctica or to exercise coastal state jurisdiction under international law;

be interpreted as prejudicing the position of any

Party as regards its recognition or nonrecognition of any such right, claim or basis of

claim; or

affect the provision of Article IV(2) of the

Antarctic Treaty that no new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the

Antarctic Treaty is in force.

Article 10

Consistency with the Other Components of the

Antarctic Treaty System

1 Each Party shall ensure that Antarctic mineral

resource activities take place in a manner consistent with

the components of the Antarctic Treaty system, including

the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention for the Conservation

of Antarctic Seals and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the

measures in effect pursuant to those instruments.

2 The Commission shall consult and cooperate with

the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, the Contracting

Parties to the Convention for the Conservation of

Antarctic Seals, and the Commission for the Conservation

of Antarctic Marine Living Resources with a view to

ensuring the achievement of the objectives and principles

of this Convention and avoiding any interference with the

achievement of the objectives and principles of the

Antarctic Treaty, the Convention for the Conservation of

Antarctic Seals or the Convention on the Conservation of

Antarctic Marine Living Resources, or inconsistency

between the measures in effect pursuant to those instruments, and measures in effect pursuant to this Convention.

Article 11

Inspection under the Antarctic Treaty

All stations, installations and equipment, in the Antarctic Treaty area, relating to Antarctic mineral resource

activities, as well as ships and aircraft supporting such

activities at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or

personnel at such stations and installations, shall be open

at all times to inspection by observers designated under

Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty for the purposes of that

Treaty.

Article 12

Inspection under this Convention

1 In order to promote the objectives and principles and

to ensure the observance of this Convention and measures

in effect pursuant to it, all stations, installations and

equipment relating to Antarctic mineral resource activities in the area in which these activities are regulated by

this Convention, as well as ships and aircraft supporting

such activities at points of discharging or embarking

cargoes or personnel anywhere in that area shall be open

at all times to inspection by:

(a) observers designated by any member of the

Commission who shall be nationals of that

member; and

(b) observers designated by the Commission or

relevant Regulatory Committees.

2 Aerial inspection maybe carried out at any time over

the area in which Antarctic mineral resource activities are

regulated by this Convention.

3 The Commission shall maintain an up-to-date list of

observers designated pursuant to paragraph l(a) and (b)

above.

4 Reports from the observers shall be transmitted to

the Commission and to any Regulatory Committee

having competence in the area where the inspection has

been carried out.

5 Observers shall avoid interference with the safe and

normal operations of stations, installations and equipment

visited and shall respect measures adopted by the

Commission to protect confidentiality of data and information.

6 Inspections undertaken pursuant to paragraph l(a)

and (b) above shall be compatible and reinforce each other

and shall not impose an undue burden on the operation of

stations, installations and equipment visited,

7 In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions

under this Convention, and without prejudice to the

respective positions of the Parties relating to jurisdiction

over all other persons in the area in which Antarctic

mineral resource activities are regulated by this Conven-
Appendix D--The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities Ž 191

tion, observers designated under this Article shall be

subject only to the jurisdiction of the Party of which they

are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring

while they are in that area for the purpose of exercising

their functions.

8 No exploration or development shall take place in an

area identified pursuant to Article 41 until effective

provision has been made for inspection in that area.

Article 13

Protected Areas

1 Antarctic mineral resource activities shall be prohibited in any area designated as a Specially Protected Area

or a Site of Special Scientific Interest under Article IX (1 )

of the Antarctic Treaty. Such activities shall also be

prohibited in any other area designated as a protected area

in accordance with Article IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty,

except to the extent that the relevant measure provides

otherwise. Pending any designation becoming effective in

accordance with Article IX(4) of the Antarctic Treaty, no

Antarctic mineral resource activities shall take place in

any such area which would prejudice the purpose for

which it was designated.

2 The Commission shall also prohibit or restrict

Antarctic mineral resource activities in any area which,

for historic, ecological, environmental, scientific or other

reasons, it has designated as a protected area.

3 In exercising its powers under paragraph 2 above or

under Article 41 the Commission shall consider whether

to restrict or prohibit Antarctic mineral resource activities

in any area, in addition to those referred to in paragraph

1 above, protected or set aside pursuant to provisions of

other components of the Antarctic Treaty system, to

ensure the purposes for which they are designated.

4 In relation to any area in which Antarctic mineral

resource activities are prohibited or restricted in accordance with paragraph 1, 2 or 3 above, the Commission

shall consider whether, for the purposes of Article 4 (2) (e)

it would be prudent, additionally, to prohibit or restrict

Antarctic mineral resource activities in adjacent areas for

the purpose of creating a buffer zone.

5 The Commission shall give effect to Article 10(2) in

acting pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above.

6 The Commission shall, where appropriate, bring any

decisions it takes pursuant to this Article to the attention

of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Conservation of

Antarctic Seals, the Commission for the Conservation of

Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the Scientific

Committee on Antarctic Research.

Aticle 14

Non-Discrimination

In the implementation of this Convention there shall be

no discrimination against any Party or its Operators,

Article 15

Respect for Other Uses of Antarctica

1 Decisions about Antarctic mineral resource activities shall take into account the need to respect other

established uses of Antarctica, including:

(a) the operation of stations and their associated

installations, support facilities and equipment in

Antarctica;

(b) scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation therein;

(c) the conservation, including rational use, of Antarctic marine living resources;

(d) tourism;

(e) the preservation of historic monuments; and

(f) navigation and aviation,

that are consistent with the Antarctic Treaty system.

2 Antarctic mineral resource activities shall be conducted so as to respect any uses of Antarctica as referred

to in paragraph 1 above.

Article 16

Availability and Confidentiality of Data and

Information

Data and information obtained from Antarctic mineral

resource activities shall, to the greatest extent practicable

and feasible, be made freely available, provided that:

(a)

(b)

as regards data and information of commercial

value deriving from prospecting, they may be

retained by the Operator in accordance with

Article 37;

as regards data and information deriving from

exploration or development the Commission

shall adopt measures relating, as appropriate, to

their release and to ensure the confidentiality of

data and information of commercial value.

Article 17

Notifications and Provisional Exercise of

Functions of the Executive Secretary

1 Where in this Convention there is a reference to the

provision of information, a notification or a report to any

institution provided for in this Convention and that

institution has not been established, the information,

notification or report shall be provided to the Executive

Secretary who shall circulate it as required.
192 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treat-y for Antarctica

2 Where in this Convention a function is assigned to

the Executive Secretary and no Executive Secretary has

been appointed under Article 33, that function shall be

performed by the Depositary.

CHAPTER

Commission

II: INSTITUTIONS

Article 18

1 There is hereby established the Antarctic Mineral

Resources Commission.

2 Membership of the Commission shall be as follows:

(a) each Party which was an Antarctic Treaty

Consultative Party on the date when this Convention was opened for signature; and

(b) each other Party during such time as it is

actively engaged in substantial scientific, technical or environmental research in the area to

which this Convention applies directly relevant

to decisions about Antarctic mineral resource

activities, particularly the assessments and judgments called for in Article 4; and

(c) each other Party sponsoring Antarctic mineral

resource exploration or development during

such time as the relevant Management Scheme

is in force.

3 A Party seeking to participate in the work of the

Commission pursuant to subparagraph (b) or (c) above

shall notify the Depositary of the basis upon which it

seeks to become a member of the Commission. In the case

of a Party which is not an Antarctic Treaty Consultative

Party, such notification shall include a declaration of

intent to abide by recommendations pursuant to Article

IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. The Depositary shall

communicate to each member of the Commission such

notification and accompanying information.

4 The Commission shall consider the notification at

its next meeting. In the event that a Party referred to in

paragraph 2(b) above submitting a notification pursuant

to paragraph 3 above is an Antarctic Treaty Consultative

Party, it shall be deemed to have satisfied the requirements for Commission membership unless more than

one-third of the members of the Commission object at the

meeting at which such notification is considered. Any

other Party submitting a notification shall be deemed to

have satisfied the requirements for Commission membership if no member of the Commission objects at the

meeting at which such notification is considered.

5 Each member of the Commission shall be represented by one representative who maybe accompanied by

alternate representatives and advisers.

6 Observer status in the Commission shall be open to

any Party and to any Contracting Party to the Antarctic

Treaty which is not a Party to this Convention.

Aticle 19

Commission Meets

1 (a) The first meeting of the Commission, held for the

purpose of taking organizational, financial and other

decisions necessary for the effective functioning of this

Convention and Its institutions, shall be convened within

six months of the entry into force of this Convention.

(b) After the Commission has held the meeting or

meetings necessary to take the decisions referred to in subparagraph (a) above, the Commission shall not hold further meetings except

in accordance with paragraph 2 or 3 below.

2 Meetings of the Commission shall be held within

two months of:

(a) receipt of a notification pursuant to Article 39;

(b) a request by at least six members of the

Commission; or

(c) a request by a member of a Regulatory Committee in accordance with Article 49(l).

3 The Commission may establish a regular schedule

of meetings if it determines that it is necessary for the

effective functioning of this Convention.

4 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, its

meetings shall be convened by the Executive Secretary.

Article 20

Commission Procedure

1 The Commission shall elect from among its

members a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen, each of

whom shall be a representative of a different Party,

2 (a) Until such time as the Commission has

established a regular schedule of meetings in accordance

with Article 19(3), the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen

shall be elected to serve for a period of two years,

provided that if no meeting is held during that period they

meetingheld thereafter.

(b) When a regular schedule of meetings has been

established, the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen

shall be elected to serve for a period of two

years.

3 The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure.

Such rules may include provisions concerning the number

of terms of office which the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen

may serve and for the rotation of such offices.

4 The Commission may establish such subsidiary

bodies as are necessary for the performance of its
—.— ——

Appendix D--The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 193

functions.

5 The Commission may decide to establish a permanent headquarters which shall be in New Zealand.

6 The Commission shall have legal personality and

shall enjoy in the territory of each Party such legal

capacity as may be necessary to perform its functions and

achieve the objectives of this Convention.

7 The privileges and immunities to be enjoyed by the

Commission, the Secretariat and representatives attending meetings in the territory of a Party shall be determined

by agreement between the Commission and the Party

concerned.

Article 21

Functions of the Commission

1 Functions of the Commission shall be:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(9

(g)

to facilitate and promote the collection and

exchange of scientific, technical and other

information and research projects necessary to

predict, detect and assess the possible environmental impact of Antarctic mineral resource

activities, including the monitoring of key

environmental parameters and ecosystem components;

to designate areas in which Antarctic mineral

resource activities shall be prohibited or restricted in accordance with Article 13, and to

perform the related functions assigned to it in

that Article;

to adopt measures for the protection of the

Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems and for the promotion of safe

and effective exploration and development

techniques and, as it may deem appropriate, to

make available a handbook of such measures;

to determine, in accordance with Article 41,

whether or not to identify an area for possible

exploration and development, and to perform

the related functions assigned to it in Article 42;

to adopt measures relating to prospecting applicable to all relevant Operators:

(i) to determine for particular circumstances

maximum drilling depths in accordance

with article 1(8);

(ii) to restrict or prohibit prospecting consistently with Articles 13, 37 and 38;

to ensure the effective application of Articles

12(4), 37(7) and (8), 38(2) and 39(2), which

require the submission to the Commission of

information, notifications and reports;

to give advance public notice of matters upon

which it is requesting the advice of the Advisory

Committee;

(h) to adopt measures relating to the availability

and confidentiality of data and information,

including measures pursuant to Article 16;

(i) to elaborate the principle of non-discrimination

set forth in Article 14;

(j) to adopt measures with respect to maximum

block sizes;

(k) to perform the functions assigned to it in Article

29;

(1) to review action by Regulatory Committees in

accordance with Article 49;

(m) to adopt measures in accordance with Articles

(n)

(o)

(p)

(q)

(r)

(s)

(t)

(u)

(v)

6 and 41(l)(d) related to the promotion of

cooperation and to participation in Antarctic

mineral resource activities;

to adopt general measures pursuant to Article

51(6);

to take decisions on budgetary matters and

adopt financial regulations in accordance with

Article 35;

to adopt measures regarding fees payable in

connection with notifications submitted pursuant to Articles 37 and 39 and applications

lodged pursuant to Articles 44 and 53, the

purpose of which fees shall be to cover the

administrative costs of handling such notifications and applications;

to adopt measures regarding levies payable by

Operators engaged in exploration and development, the principal purpose of which levies

shall be to cover the costs of the institutions of

this Convention;

to determine in accordance with Article 35(7)

the disposition of revenues, if any, accruing to

the Commission which are surplus to the requirements for financing the budget pursuant to

Article 35;

to perform the functions assigned to it in Article

7(7) and (8);

to perform the functions relating to inspection

assigned to it in Article 12;

to consider monitoring reports received pursuant to Article 52;

to perform the functions relating to dispute

settlement assigned to it in Article 59; -

(w) to perform the functions relating to consultaa(X)

(y)

tion and cooperation assigned to it in Articles

10(2) and 34;

to keep under review the conduct of Antarctic

mineral resource activities with a view to

safeguarding the protection of the Antarctic

environment in the interest of all mankind; and

to perform such other functions as are provided

for elsewhere in this Convention.
194 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

2 In performing its functions the Commission shall

seek and take full account of the views of the Advisory

Committee provided in accordance with article 26.

3 Each measure adopted by the Commission shall

specify the date on which it comes into effect.

4 The Commission shall, subject to Article 16 and

measures in effect pursuant to it and paragraph l(h)

above, ensure that a publicly available record of its

meetings and decisions and of information, notifications

and reports submitted to it is maintained.

Article 22

Decision Making in the Commission

1 The Commission shall take decisions on matters of

substance by a three-quarters majority of the members

present and voting. When a question arises as to whether

a matter is one of substance or not, that matter shall be

treated as one of substance unless otherwise decided by a

three-quarters majority of the members present and

voting.

2 Notwithstanding paragraph 1 above, consensus

shall be required for the following:

(a) the adoption of the budget and decisions on

budgetary and related matters pursuant to Article 21 (1) (p), (q) and (r) and Article 35(l), (2),

(3), (4) and (5);

(b) decisions taken pursuant to Article 21 (1) (i)

(c) decisions taken pursuant to Article 41(2).

3 Decisions on matters of procedure shall be taken by

a simple majority of the members present and voting.

4 Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as

preventing the Commission, in taking decisions on

matters of substance, from endeavoring to reach a

consensus.

5 For the purposes of this Article, consensus means

the absence of a formal objection. If, with respect to any

decision covered by paragraph 2(c) above, the Chairman

of the Commission determines that there would be such

an objection he shall consult the members of the

Commission. If, as a result of these consultations, the

Chairman determines that an objection would remain, he

shall convene those members most directly interested for

the purpose of seeking to reconcile the differences and

producing a generally acceptable proposal.

Article 23

Advisory Committee

1 There is hereby established the Scientific, Technical

and Environmental Advisory Committee.

2 Membership of the Advisory Committee shall be

open to all Parties.

3 Each member of the Advisory Committee shall be

represented by one representative with suitable scientific,

technical or environmental competence who may be

accompanied by alternate representatives and by experts

and advisers.

4 Observer status in the Advisory Committee shall be

open to any Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty or

to the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic

Marine Living Resources which is not a Party to the

Convention.

Article 24

Advisory Committee Meetings

1 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, the

Advisory Committee shall be convened for its first

meeting within six months of the first meeting of the

Commission. It shall meet thereafter as necessary to fulfill

its functions on the basis of a schedule established by the

Commission.

2 Meetings of the Advisory Committee, in addition to

those scheduled pursuant to paragraph 1 above, shall be

convened at the request of at least six members of the

Commission or pursuant to Article 40(1).

3 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, the

meetings of the Advisory Committee shall be convened

by the Executive Secretary.

Article 25

Advisory Committee Procedure

1 The Advisory Committee shall elect from among its

members a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen, each of

whom shall be representative of a different Party.

2 (a) Until such time as the Commission has

established a schedule of meetings in accordance with

Article 24(l), the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen shall be

elected to serve for a period of two years, provided that if

no meeting is held during that period they shall continue

to seine until the conclusion of the first meeting held

thereafter,

(b) When a schedule of meetings has been established, the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen shall

be elected to serve for a period of two years.

3 The Advisory Committee shall give advance public

notice of its meetings and of matters to be considered at

each meeting so as to permit the receipt and consideration

of views on such matters from international organizations

having an interest in them. For this purpose the Advisory

Committee may, subject to review by the Commission,

establish procedures for the transmission of relevant

information to these organizations.

4 The Advisory Committee shall, by a two-thirds

majority of the members present and voting, adopt its
Appendix &--The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 195

rules of procedure. Such rules may include provisions

concerning the number of terms of office which the

Chairman and Vice-Chairmen may serve and for the

rotation of such offices. The rules of procedure and any

amendments thereto shall be subject to approval by the

Commission.

5 The Advisory Committee may establish such

subcommittees, subject to budgetary approval, as may be

necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 26

Functions of the Advisory Committee

1 The Advisory Committee shall advise the Commission and Regulatory Committees, as required by this

Convention, or as requested by them, on the scientific,

technical and environmental aspects of Antarctic mineral

resource activities. It shall provide a forum for consultation and cooperation concerning the collection, exchange

and evaluation of information related to the scientific,

technical and environmental aspects of Antarctic mineral

resource activities.

2 It shall provide advice to:

(a) the Commission relating to its functions under

Articles 21(1) (a) to (f), (u) and (x) and 35(7) (a)

(in matters relating to scientific research) as

well as on the implementation of Article 4; and

(b) Regulatory Committees with respect to:

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

the implementation of Article 4;

scientific, technical and environmental aspects of Articles 43(3) and (5), 45,47,51,

52 and 54;

data to be collected and reported in accordance with Articles 47 and 52; and

the scientific, technical and environmental

implications of reports and reported data

provided in accordance with Articles 47

and 52.

3 It shall provide advice to the Commission and to

Regulatory Committees on:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

criteria in respect of the judgments required

under Article 4(2) and (3) for the purposes of

Article 4(l);

types of data and information required to carry

out its functions, and how they should be

collected, reported and archived;

scientific research which would contribute to

the base of data and information required in

subparagraph (b) above;

effective procedures and systems for data and

information analysis, evaluation, presentation

and dissemination to facilitate the judgments

referred to in Article 4; and

(e) possibilities for scientific, technical and environmental cooperation amongst interested Parties

which are developing countries and other Parties.

4 The Advisory Committee, in providing advice on

decisions to be taken in accordance with Articles 41,43,

45 and 54 shall, in each case, undertake a comprehensive

environmental and technical assessment of the proposed

actions. Such assessments shall be based on all information, and any amplifications thereof, available to the

Advisory Committee, including the information provide

pursuant to Articles 39(2)(e), 44(2) (b)(iii) and 53(2)(b).

The assessments of the Advisory Committee shall, in each

case, address the nature and scope of the decisions to be

taken and shall include consideration, as appropriate, of,

inter alia:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

the adequacy of existing information to enable

informed judgments to be made;

the nature, extent, duration and intensity of

likely direct environmental impacts resulting

from the proposed activity;

possible indirect impacts;

means and alternatives by which such direct or

indirect impacts might be reduced, including

environmental consequences of the alternative

of not proceeding;

cumulative impacts of the proposed activity in

the light of existing or planned activities;

capacity to respond effectively to accidents with

potential environmental effects;

the environmental significance of unavoidable

impacts; and

the probabilities of accidents and their environmental consequences.

5 In preparing its advice the Advisory Committee may

seek information and advice from other scientists and

experts or scientific organizations as may be required on

an ad hoc basis.

6 The Advisory Committee shall, with a view to

promoting international participation in Antarctic mineral

resource activities as provided for in Article 6, provide

advice concerning the availability to interested developing country Parties and other Parties, of the information

referred to in paragraph 3 above, of training programs

related to scientific, technical and environmental matters

bearing on Antarctic mineral resource activities, and of

opportunities for cooperation among Parties in these

programs.

Article 27

Reporting by the Advisory Committee

The Advisory Committee shall present a report on each

of its meetings to the Commission and to any relevant
196 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Regulatory Committee. The report shall cover all matters

considered at the meeting and shall reflect the conclusions

reached and all the views expressed by members of the

Advisory Committee. The report shall be circulated by the

Executive Secretary to all Parties, and to observers

attending the meeting, and shall thereupon be made

publicly available.

Article 28

Special Meeting of Parties

1 A Special Meeting of Parties shall, as required, be

convened in accordance with Article 40(2) and shall have

the functions, in relation to the identification of an area for

possible exploration and development specified in Article 40(3).

2 Membership of a Special Meeting of Parties shall be

open to all Parties, each of which shall be represented by

one representative who may be accompanied by alternate

representatives and advisers.

3 Observer status at a Special Meeting of Parties shall

be open to any Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty

which is not a Party to this Convention.

4 Each Special Meeting of Parties shall elect from

among its members a Chairman and Vice-Chairman, each

of whom shall serve for the duration of that meeting. The

Chairman and Vice-Chairman shall not be representatives

of the same Party.

5 The Special Meeting of Parties shall, by a two-thirds

majority of the members present and voting, adopt its

rules of procedure. Until such time as this has been done

the Special Meeting of Parties shall apply provisional

rules of procedure drawn up by the Commission.

6 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, a Special

Meeting of Parties shall be convened by the Executive

Secretary and shall be held at the same venue as the

meeting of the Commission convened to consider the

identification of an area for possible exploration and

development.

Article 29

Regulatory Committees

1 An Antarctic Mineral Resources Regulatory Committee shall be established for each area identified by the

Commission pursuant to Article 41.

2 Subject to paragraph 6 below, each Regulatory

Committee shall consist of 10 members. Membership

shall be determined by the Commission in accordance

with this Article and, taking into account Article 9, shall

include:

(a) the member, if any, or if there are more than one,

those members of the Commission identified by

(b)

(c)

reference to Article 9(b) which assert rights or

claims in the identified area;

the two members of the Commission also

identified by reference to Article 9(b) which

assert a basis of claim in Antarctic

other members of the Commission determined

in accordance with this Article so that the

Regulatory Committee shall, subject to paragraph 6 below, consist, in total, of 10 members:

(i)

(ii)

3 Upon the identification of an area in accordance with

four members identified by reference to

Article 9(b) which assert rights or claims,

including the member or members, if any,

referred to in subparagraph (a) above; and

six members which do not assert rights or

claims as described in Article 9(b), including the two members referred to in subparagraph (b) above.

Article 41(2), the Chairman of the Commission shall, as

soon as possible and in any event within 90 days, make a

recommendation to the Commission concerning the

membership of the Regulatory Committee. To this end the

Chairman shall consult, as appropriate, with the Chairman

of the Advisory Committee and all members of the

Commission. Such recommendation shall comply with

the requirements of paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Article and

shall ensure:

(a)

(b)

(c)

4 (a)

the inclusion of members of the Commission

which, whether through prospecting, scientific

research or otherwise, have contributed substantial scientific, technical or environmental

information relevant to the identification of the

area by the Commission pursuant to Article 41;

adequate and equitable repmsentation of developing country members of the Commission,

having regard to the overall balance between

developed and developing country members of

the Commission, including at least three developing country members of the Commission;

that account is taken of the value of a rotation of

membership of Regulatory Committees as a

further means of ensuring equitable representation of members of the Commission.

When there are one or more members of the

Regulatory Committee referred to in paragraph 2(a)

above, the Chairman of the Commission shall make the

recommendation in respect of paragraph 2(c) (i) above

upon the nomination, if any, of such member or members

which shall take into account paragraph 3 above, in

particular subparagraph (b) of that paragraph.

(b) In making the recommendation in respect of

paragraph 2(c) (ii) above, the Chairman of the

Commission shall give full weight to the views
Appendix D--The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 197

(which shall take into account paragraph 3

above) which may be presented on behalf of

those members of the Commission which do not

assert rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica and, with reference to the

requirements of paragraph 3(b) above, to the

views which may be presented on behalf of the

developing countries among them.

5 The recommendation of the Chairman of the

Commission shall be deemed to have been approved by

the Commission if it does not decide otherwise at the same

meeting as the recommendation is submitted. In taking

any decision in accordance with this Article the Commission shall ensure that the requirements of paragraphs 2

and 3 above are complied with and that the nomination,

if any, referred to in paragraph 4(a) above is given effect.

6 (a) If a member of the Commission which has

sponsored prospecting in the identified area and submitted the notification pursuant to Article 39 upon which the

Commission based its identification of the area pursuant

to Article 41, is not a member of the Regulatory

Committee by virtue of paragraphs 2 and 3 above, that

member of the Commission shall be a member of the

Regulatory Committee until such time as an application

for an exploration permit is lodged pursuant to Article 44.

(b) If a Party lodging an application for an exploration permit pursuant to Article 44 is not a

member of the Regulatory Committee by virtue

of paragraphs 2 and 3 above, that Party shall be

a member of the Regulatory Committee for its

consideration of that application. Should such

application result in approval of a Management

Scheme pursuant to Article 48, the Party in

question shall remain a member of the Regulatory Committee during such time as that Management Scheme is in force with the right to

take part in decisions on matters affecting that

Management Scheme.

7 Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as

affecting Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.

Regulatory Committee Procedure

1 The first meeting of each Regulatory Committee

shall be convened by the Executive Secretary in accordance with Article 43 (1) Each Regulatory Committee

shall meet thereafter when and where necessary to fulfill

its functions.

2 Each member of a Regulatory Committee shall be

represented by one representative who may be accompanied by alternate representatives and advisers,

3 Each Regulatory Committee shall elect from among

its members a Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman shall not be representatives of

the same Party.

4 Any Party may attend meetings of a Regulatory

Committee as an observer.

5 Each Regulatory Committee shall adopt its rules of

procedure. Such rules may include provisions concerning

the period and number of terms of office which the

Chairman and Vice-Chairman may serve and for the

rotation of such offices.

Article 31

Functions of Regulatory Committees

1 The functions of each Regulatory Committee shall

be:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

to undertake the preparatory work provided for

in Article 43;

to consider applications for exploration and

development permits in accordance with Articles 45, 46 and 54;

to approve Management Schemes and issue

exploration and development permits in accordance with Articles 47,48 and 54;

to monitor exploration and development activities in accordance with Article 52;

to perform the functions assigned to it in Article

51;

to perform the functions relating to inspection

assigned to it in Article 12;

to perform the functions relating to dispute

settlement assigned to it in Article 47(r); and

to perform such other functions as are provided

for elsewhere in this Convention.

2 In performing its functions each Regulatory Committee shall seek and take full account of the views of the

Advisory Committee provided in accordance with Article

26.

3 Each Regulatory Committee shall, subject to Article

16 and measures in effect pursuant to it and Article 21 (1)

(h), ensure that a publicly available record of its decisions,

and of Management Schemes in force, is maintained.

Article 32

Decision Making in Regulatory Committees

1 Decisions by a Regulatory Committee pursuant to

Articles 48 and 54(5) shall be taken by a two-thirds

majority of the members present and voting, which

majority shall include a simple majority of those members

present and voting referred to in Article 29(2) (c) (i) and

also a simple majority of those members present and

voting referred to in Article 29(2) (c) (ii)
198 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

2 Decisions by a Regulatory Committee pursuant to

Article 43(3) and (5) shall be taken by a two-thirds

majority of the members present and voting, which

majority shall include at least half of those members

present and voting referred to in Article 29(2) (c) (i) and

also at least half of those members present and voting

referred to in Article 29(2) (c) (ii)

3 Decisions on all other matters of substance shall be

taken by a two-thirds majority of the members present and

voting. When a question arises as to whether a matter is

one of substance or not, that matter shall be treated as one

of substance unless otherwise decided by a two-thirds

majority of the members present and voting.

4 Decisions on matters of procedure shall be taken by

a simple majority of the members present and voting.

5 Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as

preventing a Regulatory Committee, in taking decisions

on matters of substance, from endeavoring to reach a

consensus.

Article 33

Secretariat

1 The Commission may establish a Secretariat to

serve the Commission, Regulatory Committees, the

Advisory Committee, the Special Meeting of Parties and

any subsidiary bodies established.

2 The Commission may appoint an Executive Secretary, who shall be the head of the Secretariat, according to

such procedures and on such terms and conditions as the

Commission may determine. The Executive Secretary

shall serve for a four year term and may be reappointed.

3 The Commission may, with due regard to the need

for efficiency and economy, authorize such staff establishment for the Secretariat as may be necessary. The

Executive Secretary shall appoint, direct and supervise

the staff according to such rules and procedures and on

such terms and conditions as the Commission may

determine.

4 The Secretariat shall perform the functions specified

in this Convention and, subject to the approved budget,

the tasks entrusted to it by the Commission, Regulatory

Committees, the Advisory Committee and the Special

Meeting of Parties.

Article 34

Cooperation with International Organizations

1 The Commission and, as appropriate, the Advisory

Committee shall cooperate with the Antarctic Treaty

Consultative Parties, the Contracting Parties to the

Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic seals, the

Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine

Living Resources, and the Scientific Committee on

Antarctic Research.

2 The Commission shall cooperate with the United

Nations, its relevant Specialized Agencies, and, as

appropriate, any international organization which may

have competence in respect of mineral resources in areas

adjacent to those covered by this Convention.

3 The Commission shall also, as appropriate, cooperate with the International Union for the Conservation of

Nature and Natural Resources, and with other relevant

international organizations, including non-governmental

organizations, having a scientific, technical or environmental interest in Antarctica.

4 The Commission may, as appropriate, accord

observer status in the Commission and in the Advisory

Committee to such relevant international organizations,

including non-governmental organizations, as might assist in the work of the institution in question. Observer

status at a Special Meeting of Parties shall be open to such

organizations as have been accorded observer status in the

Commission or the Advisory Committee.

5 The Commission may enter into agreements with

the organizations referred to in this Article.

Article 35

Financial Provisions

1 The Commission shall adopt a budget, on an annual

or other appropriate basis, for:

(a) its activities and the activities of Regulatory

Committees, the Advisory Committee, the Special Meeting of Parties, any subsidiary bodies

established and the Secretariat; and

(b) the progressive reimbursement of any contributions paid under paragraphs 5 and 6 below

whenever revenues under paragraph 4 below

exceed expenditure.

2 The first draft budget shall be submitted by the

Depositary at least 90 days before the first meeting of the

Commission. At that meeting the Commission shall adopt

its first budget and decide upon arrangements for the

preparation of subsequent budgets.

3 The Commission shall adopt financial regulations.

4 Subject to paragraph 5 below, the budget shall be

financed, inter alia, by:

(a) fees prescribed pursuant to Articles 21(l) (p) and

43 (2) (b)

(b) levies on Operators, subject to any measures

adopted by the Commission in accordance with

Article 21(1) (q), pursuant to Article 47(k) (i);

and
Appendix D--The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 199

(c) such other financial payments by Operators

pursuant to Article 47(k) (ii) as may be required

to be paid to the institutions of this Convention.

5 If the budget is not fully financed by revenues in

accordance with paragraph 4 above, and subject to

reimbursement in accordance with paragraph l(b) above,

the budget shall, to the extent of any shortfall and subject

to paragraph 6 below, be financed by contributions from

the members of the Commission. To this end, the

Commission shall adopt as soon as possible a method of

equitable sharing of contributions to the budget. The

budget shall, in the meantime, to the extent of any

shortfall, be financed by equal contributions from each

member of the Commission.

6 In adopting the method of contributions referred to

in paragraph 5 above the Commission shall consider the

extent to which members of and observers at institutions

of this Convention may be called upon to contribute to the

costs of those institutions.

7 The Commission, in determining the disposition of

revenues accruing to it, which are surplus to the requirements for financing the budget pursuant to this Article,

shall:

(a)

(b)

promote scientific research in Antarctica, particularly that related to the Antarctic environment

and Antarctic resources, and a wide spread of

participation in such research by all Parties, in

particular developing country Parties;

ensure that the interests of the members of

Regulatory Committees having the most direct

interest in the matter in relation to the areas in

question are respected in any disposition of that

surplus.

8 The finances of the Commission, Regulatory

Committees, the Advisory Committee, the Special Meeting of Parties, any subsidiary bodies established and the

Secretariat shall accord with the financial regulations

adopted by the Commission and shall be subject to an

annual audit by external auditors selected by the Commission.

9 Each member of the Commission, Regulatory

Committees, the Advisory Committee, the Special Meeting of Parties and any subsidiary bodies established, as

well as any observer at a meeting of any of the institutions

of this Convention, shall meet its own expenses arising

from attendance at meetings.

10 A member of the Commission that fails to pay its

contribution for two consecutive years shall not, during

the period of its continuing subsequent default, have the

right to participate in the taking of decisions in any of the

institutions of this Convention, If it continues to be in

default for a further two consecutive years, the Commission shall decide what further action should be taken,

which may include loss by that member of the right to

participate in meetings of the institutions of this Convention. Such member shall resume the full enjoyment of its

rights upon payment of the outstanding contributions.

11 Nothing in this Article shall be construed as

prejudicing the position of any member of a Regulatory

Committee on the outcome of consideration by the

Regulatory Committee of terms and conditions in a

Management Scheme pursuant to Article 47 (k) (ii)

Article 36

Official and Working Languages

The official and working languages of the Commission, Regulatory Committees, the Advisory Committee,

the Special Meeting of Parties and any meeting convened

under Article 64 shall be English, French, Russian and

Spanish.

CHAPTER III: PROSPECTING

Article 37

Prospecting

1 Prospecting shall not confer upon any Operator any

right to Antarctic mineral resources.

2 Prospecting shall at all times be conducted in

compliance with this Convention and with measures in

effect pursuant to this Convention, but shall not require

authorization by the institutions of this Convention.

3 (a) The Sponsoring State shall ensure that its

Operators undertaking prospecting maintain the necessary financial and technical means to comply with Article

8(1 ), and, to the extent that any such Operator fails to take

response action as required in Article 8(1), shall ensure

that this is undertaken.

(b) The Sponsoring State shall also ensure that its

Operators undertaking prospecting maintain

financial capacity, commensurate with the nature and level of the activity undertaken and the

risks involved, to comply with Article 8(2).

4 In cases where more than one Operator is engaged

in prospecting in the same general area, the Sponsoring

state or States shall ensure that those Operators conduct

their activities with due regard to each others’ rights.

5 Where an Operator wishes to conduct prospecting in

an area identified under Article 41 in which another

Operator has been authorized to undertake exploration Or

development the Sponsoring State shall ensure that such

prospecting is carried out subject to the rights of any

authorized Operator and any requirements to protect its

rights specified by the relevant Regulatory Committee.
200 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

6 Each Operator shall ensure upon cessation of

prospecting the removal of all installations and equipment

and site rehabilitation. On the request of the Sponsoring

State, the Commission may waive the obligation to

remove installations and equipment.

7 The Sponsoring State shall notify the Commission

at least nine months in advance of the commencement of

planned prospecting. The notification shall be accompanied by such fees as may be established by the Commission in accordance with Article 21(1) (p) and shall:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

identify, by reference to coordinates of latitude

and longitude or identifiable geographic features, the general area in which the prospecting

to take place;

broadly identify the mineral resource or resources which are to be the subject of the

prospecting;

describe the prospecting, including the methods

to be used, and the general program of work to

be undertaken and its expected duration;

provide an assessment of the possible environmental and other impacts of the prospecting,

taking into account possible cumulative impacts as referred to in Article 4(5);

describe the measures, including monitoring

programs, to be adopted to avoid harmful

environmental consequences or undue interference with other established uses of Antarctica,

and outline the measures to be put into effect in

the event of any accident and contingency plans

for evacuation in an emergency;

provide details on the Operator and certify that

it:

(i) has a substantial and genuine link with the

Sponsoring State as defined in Article

1(12); and

(ii) is financially and technically qualified to

carry out the proposed prospecting in

accordance with this Convention; and

(g) provide such further information as may be

required by measures adopted by the Commission.

8 The Sponsoring State shall subsequently provide to

the Commission:

(a) notification of any changes to the information

referred to in paragraph 7 above;

(b) notification of the cessation of prospecting,

including removal of any installations and

equipment as well as site rehabilitation; and

(c) a general annual report on the prospecting

undertaken by the Operator.

9 Notifications and reports submitted pursuant to this

Article shall be circulated by the Executive Secretary

without delay to all Parties and observers attending

Commission meetings.

10 Paragraphs 7,8 and 9 above shall not be interpreted

as requiring the disclosure of data and information of

commercial value.

11 The Sponsoring State shall ensure that basic data

and information of commercial value generated by

prospecting are maintained in archives and may at any

time release part of or all such data and information, on

conditions which it shall establish, for scientific or

environmental purposes.

12 The Sponsoring State shall ensure that basic data

and information, other than interpretative data, generated

by prospecting are made readily available when such data

and information are not or are no longer, of commercial

value and, in any event, no later than 10 years after the

year the data and information were collected, unless it

certifies to the Commission that the data and information

continue to have commercial value. It shall review at

regular intervals whether such data and information may

be released and shall report the results of such reviews to

the Commission.

13 The Commission may adopt measures consistent

with this Article relating to the release of data and

information of commercial value including requirements

for certifications, the frequency of reviews and maximum

time limits for extensions of the protection of such data

and information.

Artic1438

Consideration of Prospecting by the Commission

1 If a member of the Commission considers that a

notification submitted in accordance with Article 37(7) or

(8), or ongoing prospecting, causes concern as to consistency with this Convention or measures in effect pursuant

thereto, that member may request the Sponsoring State to

provide a clarification. If that member considers that an

adequate response is not forthcoming from the Sponsoring State within a reasonable time, the member may

request that the Commission be convened in accordance

with Article 19(2) (b) to consider the question and take

appropriate action.

2 If measures applicable to all relevant Operators are

adopted by the Commission following a request made in

accordance with paragraph 1 above, Sponsoring States

that have submitted notifications in accordance with

Article 37(7) or (8), and Sponsoring States whose

Operators are conducting prospecting, shall ensure that

the plans and activities of their Operators are modified to

the extent necessary to conform with those measures

within such time limit as the Commission may prescribe,

and shall notify the Commission accordingly,
Appendix D--The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 201

CHAPTER IV: EXPLORATION

Article 39

Requests for Identification of an Area for

Possible Exploration and Development

1 Any Party may submit to the Executive Secretary a

notification requesting that the Commission identify an

area for possible exploration and development of a

particular mineral resource or resources.

2 Any such notification shall be accompanied by such

fees as may be established by the Commission in

accordance with Article 21(1) (p) and shall contain:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

3 A

precise delineation, including coordinates, of

the area proposed for identification;

specification of the resource or resources for

which the area would be identified and any

relevant data and information, excluding data

and information of commercial value, concerning that resource or those resources, including

a geological description of the proposed area;

a detailed description of the physical and

environmental characteristics of the proposed

area;

a description of the likely scale of exploration

and development for the resource or resources

involved in the proposed area and of the

methods which could be employed in such

exploration and development;

a detailed assessment of the environmental and

other impacts of possible exploration and develop

ment for the resource or resources involved,

taking into account Articles 15 and 26(4); and

such other information as may be required

pursuant to measures adopted by the Commission.

notification under paragraph 1 above shall be

referred promptly by the Executive Secretary to all Parties

and shall be circulated to observers attending the meeting

of the Commission to be convened pursuant to Article

19(2) (a)

Article 40

Action by the Advisory Committee and Special

Meeting of Parties

1 The Advisory Committee shall meet as soon as

possible after the meeting of the Commission convened

pursuant to Article 19 (2) (a) has commenced. The

Advisory Committee shall provide advice to the Commission on the notification submitted pursuant to Article

39(1 ) The Commission may prescribe a time limit for the

provision of such advice.

2 A Special Meeting of Parties shall meet as soon as

possible after circulation of the report of the Advisory

Committee and in any event not later than two months

after that report has been circulated.

3 The Special Meeting of Parties shall consider

whether identification of an area by the Commission in

accordance with the request contained in the notification

would be consistent with this Convention, and shall report

thereon to the Commission as soon as possible and in any

event not later than 21 days from the commencement of

the meeting.

4 The report of the Special Meeting of Parties to the

Commission shall reflect the conclusions reached and all

the views expressed by Parties participating in the

meeting.

Article 41

Action by the Commission

1 The Commission shall, as soon as possible after

receipt of the report of the Special Meeting of Parties,

consider whether or not it will identify an area as

requested. Taking full account of the views and giving

special weight to the conclusions of the Special Meeting

of Parties, and taking full account of the views and the

conclusions of the Advisory Committee, the Commission

shall determine whether such identification would be

consistent with this Convention. For this purpose:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

the Commission shall ensure that an area to be

identified shall be such that, taking into account

all factors relevant to such identification, including the physical, geological, environmental

and other characteristics of such area, it forms

a coherent unit for the purposes of resource

management. The Commission shall thus consider whether an area to be identified should

include all or part of that which was requested

in the notification and, subject to the necessary

assessments having been made, adjacent areas

not covered by that notification;

the Commission shall consider whether there

are, within an area requested or to be identified,

any areas in which exploration and develop

ment are or should be prohibited or restricted in

accordance with Article 13;

the Commission shall specify the mineral resource or resources for which the area would be

identified;

the Commission shall give effect to Article 6, by

elaborating opportunities for joint ventures or

different forms of participation, up to a defined

level, including procedures for offering such

participation, in possible exploration and develop

ment, within the area, by interested Parties
202 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

(e)

(f)

which are Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties

and by other interested Parties, in particular,

developing countries in either category;

the Commission shall prescribe any additional

associated conditions necessary to ensure that

an area to be identified is consistent with other

provisions of this Convention and may prescribe general guidelines relating to the operational requirements for exploration and development in an area to be identified including

measures establishing maximum block sizes

and advice concerning related support activities; and

the Commission shall give effect to the requirement in Article 59 to establish additional procedures for the settlement of disputes.

2 After it has completed its consideration in accordance with paragraph 1 above, the Commission shall

identify an area for possible exploration and development

if there is a consensus of Commission members that such

identification is consistent with this Convention.

Article 42

Revision in the Scope of an Identified Area

1 If, after an area has been identified in accordance

with Article 41, a Party requests identification of an area,

all or part of which is contained within the boundaries of

the area already identified but In respect of a mineral

resource or resources different from any resource in

respect of which the area has already been identified, the

request shall be dealt within accordance with Articles 39,

40 and 41. Should the Commission identify an area in

respect of such different mineral resource or resources, it

shall have regard, in addition to the requirements of

Article 41(1) (a), to the desirability of specifying the

boundaries of the area in such away that it can be assigned

to the Regulatory Committee with competence for the

area already identified.

2 In the light of increased knowledge bearing on the

effective management of the area, and after seeking the

views of the Advisory Committee and the relevant

Regulatory Committee, the Commission may amend the

boundaries of any area it has identified. In making any

such amendment the Commission shall ensure that

authorized exploration and development in the area are

not adversely affected. Unless there are compelling

reasons for doing so, the Commission shall not amend the

boundaries of an area it has identified in such a way as to

involve a change in the composition of the relevant

Regulatory Committee.

Article 43

Preparatory Work by Regulatory Committees

1 As soon as possible after the identification of an area

pursuant to Article 41, the relevant Regulatory Committee established in accordance with Article 29 shall be

convened.

2 The Regulatory Committee shall:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

subject to any measures adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 21(1) (j) relating to

maximum block sizes, divide its area of competence into blocks in respect of which applications for exploration and development may be

submitted and make provision for a limit in

appropriate circumstances on the number of

blocks to be accorded to any Party;

subject to any measures adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 21(1) (p), establish fees

to be paid with any application for an exploration or development permit lodged pursuant to

Article 44 or 53;

establish periods within which applications for

exploration and development may be lodged, all

applications received within each such period

being considered as simultaneous;

establish procedures for the handling of applications; and

determine a method of resolving competing

applications which are not resolved in accordance with Article 45(4) (a), which method

shall, provided that all other requirements of

this Convention are satisfied and consistently

with measures adopted pursuant to Article41 ( 1 )

(d), include priority for the application with the

broadest participation among interested Parties

which are Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties

and other interested Parties, in particular, developing countries in either category.

3 The Regulatory Committee shall adopt guidelines

which are consistent with, and which taken together with,

the provisions of this Convention and measures of general

applicability adopted by the Commission, as well as

associated conditions and general guidelines adopted by

the Commission when identifying the area, shall, by

addressing the relevant items in Article 47, identify the

general requirements for exploration and development in

its area of competence.

4 Upon adoption of guidelines under paragraph 3

above the Executive Secretary shall, without delay,

inform all members of the Commission of the decisions

taken by the Regulatory Committee pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 above and shall make them publicly
Appendix &The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 203

available together with relevant measures, associated

conditions and general guidelines adopted by the Commission.

5 The Regulatory Committee may from time to time

revise guidelines adopted under paragraph 3 above, taking

into account any views of the Commission.

6 In performing its functions under paragraphs 3 and

5 above, the Regulatory Committee shall seek and take

full account of the views of the Advisory Committee

provided in accordance with Article 26.

Article 44

Application for an Exploration Permit

1 Following completion of the work undertaken

pursuant to Article 43, any Party, on behalf of an Operator

for which it is the Sponsoring State, may lodge with the

Regulatory Committee an application for an exploration

permit within the periods established by the Regulatory

Committee pursuant to Article 43 (2) (c).

2 An application shall be accompanied by the fees

established by the Regulatory Committee in accordance

with Article 43(2) (b) and shall contain:

(a)

(b)

detailed description of the Operator, including

its managerial structure, financial composition

and resources and technical expertise, and, in

the case of an Operator being a joint venture, the

inclusion of a detailed description of the degree

to which Parties are involved in the Operator

through, inter alia, juridical persons with which

Parties have substantial and genuine links, so

that each component of the joint venture can be

easily attributed to a Party or Parties for the

purposes of identifying the level of Antarctic

mineral resource activities thereof, which description of substantial and genuine links shall

include a description of equity sharing;

a detailed description of the proposed exploration activities and a description in as much

detail as possible of proposed development activities, including:

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

an identification of the mineral resource or

resourecs and the block to which the application applies;

a detailed explanation of how the proposed

activities conform with the general requirements referred to in Article 43(3);

a detailed assessment of the environmental

and other impacts of the proposed activities, taking into account Articles 15 and

26(4); and

a description of the capacity to respond

effectively to accidents, especially those

with potential environmental effects;

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

a certification by the Sponsoring State of the

capacity of the Operator to comply with the

general requirements referred to in Article

43(3);

a certification by the Sponsoring State of the

technical competence and financial capacity of

the Operator and that the Operator has a

substantial and genuine link with it as defined

in Article 1(12);

a description of the manner in which the

application complies with any measures adopted

by the Commission pursuant to Article 41(1)

(d); and

such further information as may be required by

the Regulatory Committee or in measures adopted

by the Commission.

Article 45

Examination of Applications

1 The Regulatory Committee shall meet as soon as

possible after an application has been lodged pursuant to

Article 44, for the purpose of elaborating a Management

Scheme. In performing this function it shall:

(a) determine whether the application contains

sufficient or adequate information pursuant to

Article 44 (2). To this end, it may at any time

seek further information from the Sponsoring

State consistent with Article 44(2);

(b) consider the exploration and development activities proposed in the application, and such

elaborations, revisions or additions as neces-

(i) to ensure their consistency with this Convention as well as measures in effect pursuant

thereto and the general requirements referred to in Article 43(3); and

(ii) to prescribe the specific terms and conditions of a Management Scheme in accordance with Article 47.

2 At any time during the process of consideration

described above, the Regulatory Committee may decline

the application if it considers that the activities proposed

therein cannot be elaborated, revised or adapted to ensure

consistency with this Convention as well as measures in

effect pursuant thereto and the general requirements

referred to in Article 43(3).

3 In performing its functions under this Article, the

Regulatory Committee shall seek and take full account of

the views of the Advisory Committee. To that end the

Regulatory Committee shall refer to the Advisory Committee all parts of the application which are necessary for

it to provide advice pursuant to Article 26, together with

any other relevant information.
204 ● Polar prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

4 If two or more applications meeting the requirements of

block:

(a)

(b)

Article 44(2) are lodged in respect of the same

the competing applicants shall be invited by the

Regulatory Committee to resolve the competition amongst themselves, by means of their own

choice within a prescribed period;

if the competition is not resolved pursuant to

subparagraph (a) above it shall be resolved by

the Regulatory Committee in accordance with

the method determined by it pursuant to Article

43(2) (e),

Article 46

Management Scheme

In performing its functions under Article 45, including

the preparation of a Management Scheme, and under

Article 54, the Regulatory Committee shall have recourse

to the Sponsoring State and the member or members, if

any, referred to in Article 29 (2) (a) and, as may be

required one or two additional members of the Regulatory Committee.

Article 47

Scope of the Management Scheme

The Management Scheme shall prescribe the specific

terms and conditions for exploration and development of

the mineral resource or resources concerned within the

relevant block. Such terms and conditions shall be

consistent with the general requirements referred to in

Article 43(3), and shall cover, inter alia:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

duration of exploration and development permits;

measures and procedures for the protection of

the Antarctic environment and dependent and

associated ecosystems, including methods, activities and undertakings by the Operator to

minimize environmental risks and damage;

provision for necessary and timely response

action, including prevention, containment and

clean up and removal measures, for restoration

to the status quo ante, and for contingency

plans, resources and equipment to enable such

action to be taken;

procedures for the implementation of different

stages of exploration and development;

performance requirements;

technical and safety specifications, including

standards and procedures to ensure safe operations;

monitoring and inspection;

liability;

(i) procedures for the development of mineral

deposits which extend outside the area covered

by a permit;

(j) resource conservation requirements;

(k) financial obligations of the Operator including:

(i) levies in accordance with measures adopted

pursuant to Article 21(1) (q)

(ii) payments in the nature of and similar to

taxes, royalties or payments in kind;

(1) financial guarantees and insurance;

(m) assignment and relinquishment;

(n)

(o)

(p)

(q)

(r)

(s)

suspension and modification of the Management Scheme, or cancellation of the Management Scheme, exploration or development permit, and the imposition of monetary penalties,

in accordance with Article 51;

procedures for agreed modifications;

enforcement of the Management Scheme;

applicable law to the extent necessary;

effective additional procedures for the settlement of disputes:

provisions to avoid and to resolve conflict with

other legitimate uses of Antarctica;

(t) data and information collection, reporting and

notification requirements;

(u) confidentiality; and

(v) removal of installations and equipment, as well

as site rehabilitation.

Article 48

Approval of the Management Scheme

A Management Scheme prepared in accordance with

Articles 45, 46 and 47 shall be subject to approval

pursuant to Article 32. Such approval shall constitute

authorization for the issue without delay of an exploration

permit by the Regulatory Committee. The exploration

permit shall accord exclusive rights to the Operator to

explore and, subject to Articles 53 and 54, to develop the

mineral resource or resources which are the subject of the

Management Scheme exclusively in accordance with the

terms and conditions of the Management Scheme,

Article 49

Review

1 Any member of the Commission, or any member of

a Regulatory Committee, may within one month of a

decision by that Regulatory Committee to approve a

Management Scheme or issue a development permit,

request that the Commission be convened in accordance

with Article 19(2) (b) or(c), as the case may be, to review

the decision of the Regulatory Committee for consistency

with the decision taken by the Commission to identify the

area pursuant to Article 41 and any measures in effect

relevant to that decision.
Appendix D--The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 205

2 The Commission shall complete its consideration

within three months of a request made pursuant to

paragraph 1 above, In performing its functions the

Commission shall not assume the functions of the

Regulatory Committee, nor shall substitute its discretion

for that of the Regulatory Committee.

3 Should the Commission determine that a decision to

approve a Management Scheme or issue a development

permit is inconsistent with the decision taken by the

Commission to identify the area pursuant to Article 41

and any measures in effect relevant to that Decision, it

may request that Regulatory Committee to reconsider its

decision.

Article 50

Rights of Authorized Operators

1 No Management Scheme shall be suspended or

modified and no Management Scheme, exploration or

development permit shall be canceled without the consent

of the Sponsoring State except pursuant to Article 51, or

Article 54 or the Management Scheme itself,

2 Each Operator authorized to conduct activities

pursuant to a Management Scheme shall exercise its

rights with due regard to the rights of other Operators

undertaking exploration or development in the same

identified area,

Article 51

Suspension, Modification or Cancellation of the

Management Scheme and Monetary Penalties

1 If a Regulatory Committee determines that exploration or development authorized pursuant to a Management Scheme has resulted or is about to result in impacts

on the Antarctic environment or dependent or associated

ecosystems beyond those judged acceptable pursuant to

this Convention, it shall suspend the relevant activities

and as soon as possible modify the Management Scheme

so as to avoid such impacts. If such impacts cannot be

avoided by the modification of the Management Scheme,

the Regulatory Committee shall suspend it, or cancel it

and the exploration or development permit.

2 In performing its functions under paragraph 1 above

a Regulatory Committee shall, unless emergency action

is required, seek and take into account the views of the

Advisory Committee.

3 If a Regulatory Committee determines that an

Operator has failed to comply with this Convention or

with measures in effect pursuant to it or a Management

Scheme applicable to that Operator, the Regulatory

Committee may do all or any of the following:

(a) modify the Management Scheme;

(b) suspend the Management Scheme;

(c) cancel the Management Scheme and the exploration or development permit; and

(d) impose a monetary penalty.

4 Sanctions determined pursuant to paragraph 3(a) to

(d) above shall be proportionate to the seriousness of the

failure to comply.

5 A Regulatory Committee shall cancel a Management Scheme and the exploration or development permit

if an Operator ceases to have a substantial and genuine

link with the Sponsoring State as defined in Article 1(12).

6 The Commission shall adopt general measures,

which may include mitigation, relating to action by

Regulatory Committees pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3

above and, as appropriate, to the consequences of such

action. No application pursuant to Article 44 may be

lodged until such measures have come into effect.

Article 52

Monitoring in Relation to Management Schemes

1 Each Regulatory Committee shall monitor the

compliance of Operators with Management Schemes

within its area of competence.

2 Each Regulatory Committee, taking into account the

advice of the Advisory Committee, shall monitor and

assess the effects on the Antarctic environment and on

dependent and on associated ecosystems of Antarctic

mineral resource activities within its area of competence,

particularly by reference to key environmental parameters

and ecosystem components.

3 Each Regulatory Committee shall, as appropriate,

inform the Commission and the Advisory Committee in

a timely fashion of monitoring under this Article.

CHAPTER V: DEVELOPMENT

Article 53

Application for a Development Permit

1 At any time during the period in which art approved

Management Scheme and exploration permit are in force

for an Operator, the Sponsoring State may, on behalf of

that Operator, lodge with the Regulatory Committee an

application for a development permit.

2 An application shall be accompanied by the fees

established by the Regulatory Committee in accordance

with Article 43(2) (b) and shall contain:

(a) an updated description of the planned development identifying any modifications proposed to

the approved Management Scheme and any

additional measures to be taken, consequent

upon such modifications, to ensure consistency
206 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

with this convention, including any measures in

effect pursuant thereto and the general requirements refereed to in Article 43(3);

a detailed assessment of the environmental and

other impacts of the planned development,

taking into account Articles 15 and 26(4);

a recertification by the Sponsoring State of the

technical competence and financial capacity of

the Operator and that the Operator has a

substantial and genuine link with it as defined

in Article 1(12);

a recertification by the Sponsoring State of the

capacity of the Operator to comply with the

general requirements referred to in Article

43(3);

updated information in relation to all other

matters specified in Article 44(2); and

such further information as may be required by

the Regulatory Committee or in measures adopted

by the Commission.

Article 54

Examination of Applications and Issue of

Development Permits

1 The Regulatory Committee shall meet as soon as

possible after an application has been lodged pursuant to

Article 530

2 The Regulatory Committee shall determine whether

the application contains sufficient or adequate information pursuant to Article 53 (2), In performing this function

it may at any time seek further information from the

Sponsoring State consistent with Article 53(2).

3 The Regulatory Committee shall consider whether:

(a)

(b)

the application reveals modifications to the

planned development previously envisaged;

the planned development would cause previously unforseen impacts on the Antarctic

environment or dependent or associated ecosystems, either as a result of any modifications

referred to in sub paragraph (a) above or in the

light of increased knowledge.

4 The Regulatory Committee shall consider any

modifications to the Management Scheme necessary in

the light of paragraph 3 above to ensure that the

development activities proposed would be undertaken

consistently with this Convention as well as measures in

effect pursuant thereto and the general requirements

referred to in Article 43(3). However, the financial

obligations specified in the approved Management

Scheme may not be revised without the consent of the

Sponsoring State, unless provided for in the Management

Scheme itself.

5 If the Regulatory Committee in accordance with

Article 32 approves modifications under paragraph 4

above, or if it does not consider that such modifications

are necessary, the Regulatory Committee shall issue

without delay a development permit.

6 In performing its functions under this Article, the

Regulatory Committee shall seek and take full account of

the views of the Advisory Committee. To that end the

Regulatory Committee shall refer to the Advisory Committee all parts of the application which are necessary for

it to provide advice pursuant to Article 26, together with

any other relevant information.

CHAPTER VI: DISPUTES

SETTLEMENT

Article 55

Disputes Between Two or More Parties

Articles 56, 57 and 58 apply to disputes between two

or more Parties.

Article 56

Choice of Procedure

1 Each Party, when signing, ratifying, accepting,

approving or acceding to this Convention, or at any time

thereafter, may choose, by written declaration, one or both

of the following means for the settlement of disputes

concerning the interpretation or application of this

Convention:

(a) the International Court of Justice;

(b) the Arbitral Tribunal.

2 A declaration made under paragraph 1 above shall

not affect the operation of Article 57(l), (3), (4) and (5).

3 A Party that has not made a declaration under

paragraph 1 above or in respect of which a declaration is

no longer in force shall be deemed to have accepted the

competence of the Arbitral Tribunal.

4 If the parties to a dispute have accepted the same

means for the settlement of a dispute, the dispute may be

submitted only to that procedure, unless the parties

otherwise agree.

5 If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same

means for the settlement of a dispute, or if they have both

accepted both means, the dispute may be submitted only

to the Arbitral Tribunal, unless the parties otherwise

agree.

6 A declaration made under paragraph 1 above shall

remain in force until it expires in accordance with its

terms or until 3 months after written notice of revocation

has been deposited with the Depositary.
.——

Appendix D---The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities Ž 207

7 A new declaration, a notice of revocation or the

expiry of a declaration shall not in any way affect

proceedings pending before the International Court of

Justice or the Arbitral Tribunal, unless the parties to the

dispute otherwise agree.

8 Declarations and notices referred to in this Article

shall be deposited with the Depositary who shall transmit

copies thereof to all Parties.

Article 57

Procedure for Dispute Settlement

1 If a dispute arises concerning the interpretation or

application of this Convention, the parties to the dispute

shall, at the request of any one of them, consult among

themselves as soon as possible with a view to having the

dispute resolved by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,

conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other

peaceful means of their choice.

2 If the parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have not agreed on

a means for resolving it within 12 months of the request

for consultation pursuant to paragraph 1 above, the

dispute shall be referred, at the request of any party to the

dispute, for settlement in accordance with the procedure

determined by the operation of Article 56(4) and (5).

3 If a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention relates to a measure in effect

pursuant to this Convention or a Management Scheme

and the parties to such a dispute:

(a)

(b)

have not agreed on a means for resolving the

dispute within 6 months of the request for

consultation pursuant to paragraph 1 above, the

dispute shall be referred, at the request of any

party to the dispute, for discussion in the

institution which adopted the instrument in

question;

have not agreed on a means for resolving the

dispute within 12 months of the request for

consultation pursuant to paragraph 1 above, the

dispute shall be referred for settlement at the

request of any party to the dispute, to the

Arbitral Tribunal.

4 The Arbitral Tribunal shall not be competent to

decide or otherwise rule upon any matter within the scope

of Article 9. In addition, nothing in this Convention shall

be interpreted as conferring competence or jurisdiction on

the Intemational Court of Justice or any other tribunal

established for the purpose of settling disputes between

Parties to decide or otherwise rule upon any matter within

the scope of Article 9.

5 The Arbitral Tribunal shall not be competent with

regard to the exercise by an institution of its discretionary

powers in accordance with this Convention; in no case

shall the Arbitral Tribunal substitute its discretion for that

of an institution. In addition, nothing in this Convention

shall be interpreted as conferring competence or jurisdiction on the International Court of Justice or any other

tribunal established for the purpose of settling disputes

between Parties with regard to the exercise by an

institution of its discretionary powers or to substitute its

discretion for that of an institution.

Article 58

Exclusion of Categories of Disputes

1 Any Party, when signing, ratifying, accepting,

approving or acceding to this Convention, or at any time

thereafter, may, by written declaration, exclude the

operation of Article 57(2) or (3) without its consent with

respect to a category or categories of disputes specified in

the declaration. Such declaration may not cover disputes

concerning the interpretation or application of:

(a) any provision of this Convention or of any

measure in effect pursuant to it relating to the

protection of the Antarctic environment or

dependent or associated ecosystems;

(b) Article 7(l);

(c) Article 8;

(d) Article 12;

(e) Article 14;

(f) Article 15; or

(g) Article 37.

2 Nothing in paragraph 1 above or in any declaration

made under it shall affect the operation of Article 57(l),

(4) and (5).

3 A declaration made under paragraph 1 above shall

remain in force until it expires in accordance with its

terms or until 3 months after written notice of revocation

has been deposited with the Depositary.

4 A new declaration, a notice of revocation or the

expiry of a declaration shall not in any way affect

proceedings pending before the International Court of

Justice or the Arbitral Tribunal, unless the parties to the

dispute otherwise agree.

5 Declarations and notices referred to in this Article

shall be deposited with the Depositary who shall transmit

copies thereof to all Parties.

6 A Party which, by declaration made under paragraph

1 above, has excluded a specific category or categories of

disputes from the operation of Article 57(2) or (3) without

its consent shall not be entitled to submit any dispute

falling within that category or those categories for

settlement pursuant to Article 57(2) or (3), as the case may

be, without the consent of the other party or parties to the

dispute.
208 . Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Article 59

Additional Dispute Settlement Procedures

1 The Commission, in conjunction with its responsibilities pursuant to Article 41(1), shall establish additional

procedures for third-party settlement, by the Arbitral

Tribunal or through other similar procedures, of disputes

which may arise if it is alleged that a violation of this

Convention has occurred by virtue of:

(a)

(b)

(c)

a decision to decline a Management Scheme;

a decision to decline the issue of a development

permit; or

a decision to suspend, modify or cancel a

Management Scheme or to impose monetary

penalties.

2 Such procedures shall:

(a) permit, as appropriate, Parties and Operators

under their sponsorship, but not both in respect

of any particular dispute, to initiate proceedings

against a Regulatory Committee;

(b) require disputes to which they relate to be

referred in the first instance to the relevant

Regulatory Committee for consideration;

(c) incorporate the rules in Article 57(4) and (5).

CHAPTER VII: FINAL CLAUSES

Article 60

Signature

This Convention shall be open for signature at Wellington from 25 November 1988 to 25 November 1989 by

States which participated in the final session of the Fourth

Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.

Article 61

Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession

1 This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by Signatory States.

2 After 25 November 1989 this Convention shall be

open for accession by any State which is a Contracting

Party to the Antarctic Treaty.

3 Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession shall be deposited with the Government of New

Zealand, hereby designated as the Depositary.

Article 62

Entry Into Force

1 This Convention shall enter into force on the

thirtieth day following the date of deposit of instruments

of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by 16

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties which participated

as such in the final session of the Fourth Special Antarctic

Treaty Consultative Meeting, provided that number

includes all the States necessary in order to establish all

of the institutions of the Convention in respect of every

area of Antarctica, including 5 developing countries and

11 developed countries.

2 For each State which, subsequent to the date of entry

into force of this Convention, deposits an instrument of

ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following

such deposit.

Article 63

Reservations, Declarations and Statements

1 Reservations to this Convention shall not be

permitted. This does not preclude a State, when signing,

ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, from making declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the

harmonization of its laws and regulations with this

Convention, provided that such declarations or statements

do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of

this Convention in its application to that State.

2 The provisions of this Article are without prejudice

to the right to make written declarations in accordance

with Article 58.

Article 64

Amendment

1 This Convention shall not be subject to amendment

until after the expiry of 10 years from the date of its entry

into force. Thereafter, any Party may, by written communication addressed to the Depositary, propose a specific

amendment to this Convention and request the convening

of a meeting to consider such proposed amendment.

2 The Depositary shall circulate such communication

to all Parties. If within 12 months of the date of circulation

of the communication at least one-third of the Parties

reply favorably to the request, the Depositary shall

convene the meeting.

3 The adoption of an amendment considered at such

a meeting shall require the affirmative votes of two-thirds

of the Parties present and voting, including the concurrent

votes of the members of the Commission attending the

meeting.

4 The adoption of any amendment relating to the

Special Meeting of Parties or to the Advisory Committee

shall require the affirmative votes of three-quarters of the

Parties present and voting, including the concurrent votes

of the members of the Commission attending the meeting.

5 An amendment shall enter into force for those

Parties having deposited instruments of ratification,

acceptance or approval thereof 30 days after the Deposi-
Appendix D-The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 209

tary has received such instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval from all the members of the Commission.

6 Such amendment shall thereafter enter into force for

any other Party 30 days after the Depositary has received

its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval

thereof.

7 An amendment that has entered into force pursuant

to this Article shall be without prejudice to the provisions

of any Management Scheme approved before the date on

which the amendment entered into force.

Article 65

Withdrawal

1 Any Party may withdraw from this Convention by

giving to the Depositary notice in writing of its intention

to withdraw, Withdrawal shall take effect two years after

the date of receipt of such notice by the Depositary.

2 Any Party which ceases to be a Contracting Party to

the Antarctic Treaty shall be deemed to have withdrawn

from this Convention on the date that it ceases to be a

Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty.

3 Where an amendment has entered into force

pursuant to Article 64(5), any Party from which no

instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the

amendment has been received by the Depositary within a

period of two years from the date of the entry into force

of the amendment shall be deemed to have withdrawn

from this Convention on the date of the expiration of a

further two year period.

4 Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 below, the rights and

obligations of any Operator pursuant to this Convention

shall cease at the time its Sponsoring State withdraws or

is deemed to have withdrawn from this Convention.

5 Such Sponsoring State shall ensure that the obligations of its Operators have been discharged no later than

the date on which its withdrawal takes effect.

6 Withdrawal from this Convention by any Party shall

not affect its financial or other obligations under this

Convention pending on the date withdrawal takes effect.

Any dispute settlement procedure in which that Party is

involved and which has been commenced prior to that

date shall continue to its conclusion unless agreed

otherwise by the parties to the dispute.

Article 66

Notifications by the Depositary

The Depositary shall notify all Contracting Parties to

the Antarctic Treaty of the following:

(a) signatures of this Convention and the deposit of

instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval

or accession;

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

the deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of any amendment adopted

pursuant to Article 64;

the date of entry into force of this Convention

and of any amendment thereto;

the deposit of declarations and notices pursuant

to Articles 56 and 58;

notifications pursuant to Article 18; and

the withdrawal of a Party pursuant to Article 65.

Article 67

Authentic Texts, Certified Copies And

Registration With the United Nations

1 This Convention of which the Chinese, English,

French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic

shall be deposited with the Government of New Zealand

which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to all

Signatory and Acceding States,

2 The Depositary shall also transmit duly certified

copies to all Signatory and Acceding States of the text of

this Convention in any additional language of a Signatory

or Acceding State which submits such text to the

Depositary.

3 This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United

Nations.

Done at Wellington this second day of June 1988.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized,

have signed this Convention.

ANNEX FOR AN ARBITRAL

TRIBUNAL

Article 1

The Arbitral Tribunal shall be constituted and shall

function in accordance with this Convention, including

this Annex.

Article 2

1 Each Party shall be entitled to designate up to three

Arbitrators, at least one of whom shall be designated

within three months of the entry into force of this

Convention for that Party. Each Arbitrator shall be

experienced in Antarctic affairs, with knowledge of

international law and enjoying the highest reputation for

fairness, competence and integrity. The names of the

persons so designated shall constitute the list of Arbitrators. Each Party shall at all times maintain the name of at

least one Arbitrator on the list.

2 Subject to paragraph 3 below, an Arbitrator

designated by a Party shall remain on the list for a period
210 . Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

of five years and shall be eligible for redesignation by that

Party for additional five year periods.

3 An Arbitrator may by notice given to the Party

which designated that person withdraw his name from the

list. If an Arbitrator dies or gives notice of withdrawal of

his name from the list or if a Party for any reason

withdraws from the list the name of an Arbitrator

designated by it, the Party which designated the Arbitrator

in question shall notify the Executive Secretary promptly.

An Arbitrator whose name is withdrawn from the list shall

continue to serve on any Arbitral Tribunal to which that

Arbitrator has been appointed until the completion of

proceedings before that Arbitral Tribunal.

4 The Executive Secretary shall ensure that an

up-to-date list is maintained of the Arbitrators designated

pursuant to this Article.

Article 3

1 The Arbitral Tribunal shall be composed of three

Arbitrators who shall be appointed as follows:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

The party to the dispute commencing the

proceedings shall appoint one Arbitrator, who

may be its national, from the list referred to in

Article 2 of this Annex. This appointment shall

be included in the notification referred to in

Article 4 of this Annex.

Within 40 days of the receipt of that notification, the other party to the dispute shall appoint

the second Arbitrator, who may be its national,

from the list referred to in Article 2 of this

Annex.

Within 60 days of the appointment of the second

Arbitrator, the parties to the dispute shall

appoint by agreement the third Arbitrator from

the list referrd to in Article 2 of this Annex. The

third Arbitrator shall not be either a national of,

or a person designated by, a party to the dispute,

or of the same nationality as either of the first

two Arbitrators. The third Arbitrator shall be the

Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal.

If the second Arbitrator has not been appointed

within the prescribed period, or if the parties to

the dispute have not reached agreement within

the prescribed period on the appointment of the

third Arbitrator, the Arbitrator or Arbitrators

shall be appointed, at the request of any party to

the dispute and within 30 days of the receipt of

such request, by the Resident of the International Court of Justice from the list referred to

in Article 2 of this Amex and subject to the

conditions prescribed in subparagraphs (b) and

(c) above. In performing the functions accorded

(e)

him in this subparagraph, the Resident of the

Court shall consult the parties to the dispute and

the Chairman of the Commission.

If the President of the International Court of

Justice is unable to perform the functions

accorded him in subparagraph (d) above or is a

national of a party to the dispute, the functions

shall be performed by the Vice-President of the

Court, except that if the Vice-President is

unable to perform the functions or is a national

of a party to the dispute the functions shall be

performed by the next most senior member of

the Court who is available and is not a national

of a party to the dispute.

2 Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed

for the initial appointment.

3 In disputes involving more than two Parties, those

Parties having the same interest shall appoint one

Arbitrator by agreement within the period specified in

paragraph l(b) above.

Article 4

The party to the dispute commencing proceedings shall

so notify the other party or parties to the dispute and the

Executive Secretary in writing. Such notification shall

include a statement of the claim and the grounds on which

it is based, The notification shall be transmitted by the

Executive Secretary to all Parties.

Article 5

1 Unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise,

arbitration shall take place at the headquarters of the

Commission, where the records of the Arbitral Tribunal

shall be kept. The Arbitral Tribunal shall adopt its own

rules of procedure. Such rules shall ensure that each party

to the dispute has a full opportunity to be heard and to

present its case and shall also ensure that the proceedings

are conducted expeditiously.

2 The Arbitral Tribunal may hear and decide counterclaims arising out of the dispute.

Article 6

1 The Arbitral Tribunal, where it considers that prima

facie it has jurisdiction under this Convention, may:

(a)

(b)

at the request of any party to a dispute, indicate

such provisional measures as it considers necessary to preserve the respective rights of the

parties to the dispute;

prescribe any provisional measures which it

considers appropriate under the circumstances

to prevent serious harm to the Antarctic environment or dependent or associated ecosystems,
.—.——-— ---

Appendix D-The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 211

2 The parties to a dispute shall comply promptly with

any provisional measures prescribed under paragraph l(b)

above pending an award under Article 9 of this Annex.

3 Notwithstanding Article 57(l), (2) and (3) of this

Convention, a party to any dispute that may arise falling

within the categories specified in Article 58(1) (a) to (g)

of this Convention may at any time, by notification to the

other party or parties to the dispute and to the Executive

Secretary in accordance with Article 4 of this Annex,

request that the Arbitral Tribunal be constituted as a

matter of exceptional urgency to indicate or prescribe

emergency provisional measures in accordance with this

Article. In such case, the Arbitral Tribunal shall be

constituted as soon as possible in accordance with Article

3 of this Annex, except that the time periods in Article

3(1) (b), (c) and (d) shall be reduced to 14 days in each

case. The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide upon the request

for emergency provisional measures within two months

of the appointment of its Chairman.

4 Following a decision by the Arbitral Tribunal upon

a request for emergency provisional measures in accordance with paragraph 3 above, settlement of the dispute

shall proceed in accordance with Articles 56 and 57 of this

Convention.

Article 7

Any Party which believes it has a legal interest, whether

general or individual, which maybe substantially affected

by the award of an Arbitral, Tribunal, may, unless the

Arbitral Tribunal decides otherwise, intervene in the

proceedings.

Article 8

The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the

Arbitral Tribunal and, in particular, in accordance with

their law and using all means at their disposal, shall

provide it with all relevant documents and information,

and enable it, when necessary, to call witnesses or experts

and receive their evidence.

Article 9

If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear

before the Arbitral Tribunal or fails to defend its case, any

other party to the dispute may request the Arbitral

Tribunal to continue the proceedings and make its award.

Article 10

1 The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide, on the basis of

this Convention and other rules of law not incompatible

with it, such disputes as are submitted to it.

2 The Arbitral Tribunal may decide, ex aequo et bono,

a dispute submitted to it, if the parties to the dispute so

agree.

Article 11

1 Before making its award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall

satisfy itself that it has competence in respect of the

dispute and that the claim or counterclaim is well founded

in fact and law.

2 The award shall be accompanied by a statement of

reasons for the decision and shall be communicated to the

Executive Secretary who shall transmit it to all Parties,

3 The award shall be final and binding on the parties

to the dispute and on any Party which intervened in the

proceedings and shall be complied with without delay.

The Arbitral Tribunal shall interpret the award at the

request of a party to the dispute or of any intervening

Party.

4 The award shall have no binding force except in

respect of that particular case.

5 Unless the Arbitral Tribunal decides otherwise, the

expenses of the Arbitral Tribunal, including the remuneration of the Arbitrators, shall be borne by the parties to the

dispute in equal shares.

Article 12

All decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal, including those

referred to in Articles 5, 6 and 11 of this Annex, shall be

made by a majority of the Arbitrators who may not abstain

from voting.
Appendix E

Selected Bibliography

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12,

13.

14.

15.

16.

Alexander, Uwis M., and Hanson, Lynne C. (eds.),

Antarctic Politics and Marine Resources: Critical

Choices for the 1980’s (Kingston, RI: Center for

Ocean Management Studies, 1985.)

Antarctica and Southern Ocean Coalition, “The

World Park Option for Antarctica, ” ASOC Paper

No. 4, ANT SCM/8, Apr. 21, 1986.

Auburn F. M., Antarctic L.uw and Politics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Ress, 1982).

Beck, P.J., “The United Nations and Antarctica,”

Polar Record 23(147), May 1986.

Beeby, Christopher, “A Negotiator’s View,” The

Antarctic: Preferred Futures, Corwtraints and Choices,

New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1983,

pp. 58-62.

Behrendt, John C. (cd.), Petroleum and Mineral

Resources of Antarctica, U.S. Geological Survey

tiCllh 99, 1983,

Beike, Dieter K., An Engineering Economic Evacuation of Mining in Antarctica: A Case Study of

Platinum, masters thesis, University of Texas at

Austin, May 1988.

Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Polar Regions Atlas, 1978.

Charney, Jonathan I., ‘‘Development of Antarcti%”

=marks, Proceedings of the American Society of

International Law, 1979, pp. 268-271; other remarks

by Richard B. Bilder, pp. 265-266; Giulio Pontecorvo, pp. 266-267; John Dugger, pp. 267-268; John

D. Negroponte, p. 271.

Charney, Jonathan 1. (ML), The New Nationalism and

The Use of Common Spaces: Issues in Marine

Pollution and Exploitation of Antarctica (New Jersey: Allenheld, Osmun Publishers, 1982).

Colson, David A., “The Antarctic Treaty System:

The Mineral Issue,’ Law and Policy in international

Business, vol. 12, 1980, pp. 841-902.

Cooper, Alan K., I)avey, Frederick J., and Hinz, Karl,

“Liquid Hydrocarbons Probable Under Ross Sea, ”

Oil and Gas Journal, Nov. 14, 1988, pp. 118-128.

Cooper, Alan K., Davey, Frederick J., and Hinz, Karl,

“Ross Sea-Geology, Hydrocarbon Potential, ” Oil

and Gas Journal, Nov. 7, 1988, pp. 54-58.

Craddock, Campbell (cd.), Antarctic Geoscience.

University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1982.

De Wit, Maarten J., Minerals and Mining in Antarctica: Science and Technology, Economics and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).

Ellioq David H., “Antarctica: Is There Any Oil and

Natural Gas?” OceanUs, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer

1988, pp. 32-38.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

Garret, John Norton, “The Economics of Antarctic

Oil,” hwis M. Alexander, Lynne Carter Hanson

(eds.), Antarctic Politics and Marine Resources:

Critical Choices for the 1980’s (Kingston, RI: Center

for Ocean Management Studies, 1985), pp. 185-190,

Group of Specialists on Antarctic Environmental

Implications of Possible Mineral Exploration and

Exploitation (AIMEE), report No. 2, The University

of Texas at Dallas, Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1982.

Holdgate, M. W., “Environmental Factors in the

Development of Antarctica,” Francisco Orrego Vicuna (cd.), Antarctic Resources Policy, 1983, pp.

77-101.

Joyner, Christopher, “Protection of the Antarctic

Environment: Rethinking the Problems and Prospects, ” Cornell ~nternational Luw Journal, vol. 19,

No. 2, Summer 1986, pp. 259-273.

Joyner, C. C., and Chopra, Sudhir K. (eds.), The

Antarctic Legal Regime (Boston, MA: Martinus

Nijhoff Publishers, 1988).

Kimball, he A., ‘‘Future Directions for the Management of Antarctic Science, ’ International Xnstitute

for Environment and Development, 1986.

Kimball, k A,, “The Antarctic Minerals Convention, ” Special Report, World Resources Institute,

July 1988,

Luard, Evan, “Who Owns the Antarctic?” Foreign

&airs, Summer 1984, pp. 1174-1193.

Mitchell, Barbar% “The Management of Antarctic

Mineral Resources, ’ International Institute for Environment and Development, 1982.

National Academy Press, Antarctic Treaty System:

An Assessment (Washington, DC: National Academy

Press, 1986).

National Science Foundation, The Role of the National Science Foundation in Polar Regions, a report

to the National Science Board, NSB-87-128, 1987.

Oliver, R. K., James, P. R., and Jago, J.B. (eds.),

Antarctic Earth Science (Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge, 1983).

Orrego Vicuna, Francisco (cd.), Antarctic Resources

Policy; Scientific, Legal and Political Issues (New

York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983),

Pontecorvo, Giulio, “The Economics of the Resources of Antarctica,” Jonathan 1. Chamey (cd.),

The New Nationalism and the Use of Common

Spaces: Issues in Marine Pollution and Exploitation

of Antarctica (New Jersey: Allenheld, Osmun Publishers, 1982), pp. 155-166.

Group of Specialists on the Environmental Impact

Assessment of Mineral Exploration/Exploitation in

-212–
Appendix Helected Bibliography ● 213

Antarctica, “A Prelimimuy Assessment of the Environmental Impact of Minelal ~@o~o@xploi~-

tion in Antarctica” (EAMREA), August 1977.

32. Quigg, Philip W., A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue

of Antarctica, A Twentieth Century Fund Report

(New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1983).

33. Roots, E. F., “Resource Development in Polar Regions: Comments on Technology,” Francisco Orrego Vicuna (cd.), Anlarctic Resources Policy, 1983,

pp. 297-315.

34, Rowley, Peter D., Williams, Paul L., and Pride,

Douglas E., “Metallic and Nonmetallic Mineral

Resources of Antarctica, ” The Geology of Antarctica, R.J. Tingey (cd.), Oxford University Press (in

press).

35, Shapley, Deborah, The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Age (Washington, DC: Resources

for the Future, 1985).

36. Splettstoesser, John F., “Antarctic Geology and

Mineral Resources, ” Geology Today, March/April

1985, pp. 41-45.

37. Splettstoesser, John F,, ‘‘Mining in Antarctic: Survey

of Mineral Resources and Possible Exploitation

Methods, ’ Third International Co@erence on Port

and Ocean Engineering Under Arctic Conditions,

Aug. 11-15, 1985, vol. II, pp. 1137-1155, University

of Alaska.

38. St, John, Bill, “Antarctica--Geoiogy and Hydrocarbon Potential, ” Future Petroleum Provinces of the

Worki, Michel T., Halbouty (cd.), AAPG Memoir 40,

1986, pp. 55-100.

39. Tingey, R.J. (cd.), The Geology of Antarctica. Oxford

University Press, in press.

40. United Nations: Question of Antarctica, Repofi of

the Secretary General, Dec. A/39/583 (Part I), 31

October 1984; (Rut II), vol. I, No. 29 October 1984;

(Part II) vol. II, No. 2 November 1984; (Part II), Vol.

III, No. 9 November 1984.

41. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Oil and Gw Technologies for the Arctic and Deepwater, OTA-O-270 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1985).

42, U.S. Department of State, Final Environmental

Impact Statement on the Negotiation of an international Regime for Antarctic Mineral Resources,

1982.

43. Vicuiia, Francisco (lnego, compiler, Antarctic Bibliography (University of Chile, Institute of International Studies, 1987).

44, Westerrneyer, William E., “Alternative Regimes for

Future Mineral Resource Development in Antarctica, ’ Ocean Management, vol. 8, 1982-83, pp.

197-232.

45. Westermeyer, William E., The Politics of Mineral

Resource Development in Antarctica: Alternative

Regimes for the Future (Boul&r, CO: Westview

Press, 1984).

46. Wright, N. A., and Williams, P. L., “Mineral Resources of Antarctica, U.S. Geological Survey

Circular 705, 1974, 29p.

47. Zurnberge, J.H, (cd.), Possible Environmental Eflects

of Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in Antarctica, SCAR, 1979.

48, Zumberge, James H., “Potential Mineral Resources

Availability and Possible Environmental Problems in

Antarctica, “ in Jonathan I. Charney (cd.), The New

Nationalism and the Use of Common Spaces, 1982,

pp. 115-154.
Appendix F

OTA Workshops Participants and Other Contributors

WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

Antarctic Oil and Gas Development Potential, Washington, D. C.,

Jan. 10,1989.

Participants critiqued OTA contractor reports on: a) technology and costs for offshore oil development in Antarctica,

b) estimating the profitability of Antarctic oil exploitation, and c) the potential for Antarctic oil in a world liquid fuels

context.

Don Anthony

Standard Oil Reduction Co.

Melvin Conant

Conant & Associates, Ltd.

Alan K. Cooper

U.S. Geologic Survey

John N. Garrett

Consultant

Edward E. Horton

Deep Oil Technology, Inc.

Virgil Keith

ECO. Inc.

Joe Riva

Congressional Research Service

Library of Congress

Marshall Rose

U.S. Department of the Interior

Jim Smith

Center for Public Policy

University of Houston

Michael E. Utt

Unocal Science and Technology

Irv Yancey

Mobil Research & Development Corp.

Bernard Lettau

National Science Foundation

The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, Washington, D. C.,

Dec. 15,1988.

Participants critiqued OTA contractor reports a) evaluating the Minerals Convention’s decisionmaking system, and

b) evaluating the Minerals Convention from the oil industry’s perspective. Participants also discussed the Antarctic and

Southern Ocean Coalition’s analysis of the Convention.

James Barnes

Environmental Policy Institute

Jonathan I. Charney

School of Law

Vanderbilt University

John Dugger

Office of International Affairs

U.S. Department of Energy

Robert Friedheim

School of International Relations

University of Southern California

John N. Garrett

Consultant, International Crude Oil Matters

Christopher Joyner

Department of Political Science

The George Washington University

Lee Kimball

World Resources Institute

Keith R. Knoblock

American Mining Congress

Thomas Laughlin

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

U.S. Department of Commerce

Bruce Manheim

Environmental Defense Fund

Bernard Oxman

School of Law

University of Miami

James Jackson

American Petroleum Institute

-214-
Appendix F--OTA Workshops Participants and Other Contributors ● 215

John B. Rigg

Territorial and International Affairs

U.S. Department of the Interior

Wes Scholz

Marine and Polar Minerals Division

Department of State

Antarctic Mining

R. Tucker Scully

Office of Marine Science and Polar Affairs

Department of State

Technology and Economics, Washington, D. C.,

Dec. 13,1988

Participants critiqued an OTA working paper on Antarctic mineral deposits and world markets and an OTA

contractor report on mining and process technology for Antarctic mineral development.

T S Ary Anton Inderbitzen

U.S. Bureau of Mines Division of Polar programs

National Science Foundation

Michael P. Foose

U.S. Geological Survey Maurice Magee

H.M. Giegerich

Magee Consulting

Anderson, Genssler & Schwab, Inc. Simon Strauss

Consultant on Metal

Tom Gunther

U.S. Bureau of Mines

Markets

Other Contributors

John Behrendt

United States Geological Survey

Fred Brownsworth

United States Geological Survey

Georges Chateau

Elf Aquitaine Petroleum

Waiter Cruickshank

Minerals Management Service

James Curlin

Office of Technology Assessment

Paul Derocher

United States Navy

David Drewry

British Antarctic Survey

Susan Fletcher

Congressional Research Service

Michel T. Halbouty

Michel T. Halbouty Energy Co.

Ann Parks Hawthorne

Photographer

Evelyn Hurwich

The Antarctica Project

Brad Laubach

Minerals Management Service

Roger Leick

Exxon Production Research Co.

John Keith

United States Geological Survey

Judy Kowalski

Office of Technology Assessment

D’Ann Lear

United States Geological Survey

Bruce Molnia

United States Geological Survey

Steve Plotkin

Office of Technology Assessment

Jenifer Robison

Office of Technology Assessment

Peter Rowley

United States Geological Survey

Robert Hofman

Marine Mammal Commission

Susan Sabella

Greenpeace
216 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Robert Stockman Edward Tennyson

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Minerals Management Service

Nick Sundt Peter Wadhams

Office of Technology Assessment Scott Polar Research Institute

Jack Talmadge Ed Wall

National Science Foundation Minerals Management Service
— — -

Appendix G

Glossary

Alkaline: A group of igneous rocks in which the alkalis

(Na2O and K2O) occur in high concentration relative

to silica (SiO2

).

Asthenosphere: The upper mantle. The layer or shell of

the Earth below the lithosphere (below about 100 km),

which is weak and in which isostatic adjustments can

take place, in which magmas may be generated, and in

which seismic waves are strongly attenuated.

Base metal: Any of the more common and more

chemically active metals, e.g., lead, copper, zinc.

Calc-alkaline: A group of igneous rocks in which silica

occurs in high concentrations relative to the alkalis.

Many of these rocks have the mineral quartz.

Ferrous metal: Iron and the metals commonly alloyed

with iron in steelmaking.

Gondwana: The hypothetical protocontinent of the

Southern Hemisphere, also called Gondwanaland. The

preponderance of modem evidence indicates that the

present continents are fragments which have been

separated from each other by some form of continental

displacement with the aid of seafloor spreading.

Granitic: A term used to describe light-colored, medium

to coarse grained crystalline rock containing more than

10 percent quartz and richer in alkalies relative to

calcium, iron, and magnesium.

Hydrothermal solutions: Hot saline solutions that pass

through fractures and pore spaces in rocks. Mineral

deposits can form as precipitates from hydrothermal

solutions.

Iron-formation: A sedimentary rock, typically thin

bedded or finely laminated, containing at least 15

percent iron and commonly but not necessarily containing layers of chert. Also called jaspilite or taconite.

Lithosphere: The crust of the Earth and upper mantle

having a total thickness of approximately 100 km.

Mafic: A term used to describe dark-colored igneous

rocks composed chiefly of ferromagnesian minerals.

Magmatic differentiation: The process whereby crystallization and separation of early formed minerals

leads to changes in bulk composition of the residual

magmatic liquids. Certain economically important ore

deposits may be formed by the process.

Orogen: An erogenic belt or linear region that has been

subjected to folding and other deformation during a

period of tectonic activity. These regions often become

mountain belts.

Placer: A surficial mineral deposit formed by mechanical

concentration (usually by water) of heavy mineral

particles from weathered debris.

Podiform: A term used to describe an orebody that has an

elongate, lenticular shape.

Porphyritic: A term used to describe an igneous rock in

which larger crystals are set in a finer groundmass

which may be crystalline, glassy or both.

Precious metals: A general term for gold, silver, or any

of the platinum-group metals,

Shield: A large area of exposed basement rocks in a

continental land mass surrounded by younger sedimentary rocks. The rocks of virtually all shield areas are

Precambrian in age.

Silicic: A general term used to describe an igneous rock

or magma in which silica constitutes at least two-thirds

of the rock and usually contains free silica in the form

of quartz, Granite is a typical silicic rock.

Stratiform: Having the form of a bed or layer consisting

of roughly parallel bands or sheets. Used to describe a

layered mineral deposit, such as chromite deposits

which can occur in layers up to several feet thick of

fairly uniform composition and extend over large

areas.

Stratigraphic trap: The sealing of a reservoir bed as a

result of lithologic changes, such as the gradation of

permeable sediments into impermeable sediments thus

forming a barrier that can trap migrating petroleum.

Structural trap: The containment of oil or gas within a

reservoir bed as a result of folding to produce a dome

or anticline or faulting to bring an impermeable bed

into contact with the reservoir bed creating a barrier to

migration.

Ultramafic: Very dark-colored igneous rock composed

chiefly of heavy minerals high in iron and magnesium.

-217-
Appendix H

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ATCP

ATS

BLM

BOM

CCAMLR

EEZ

ICSU

ICJ

IGY

IWC

MNAP

MMS

NAMRAP

NCP

NESDIS

—Antarctic Policy Group

—Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party

—Antarctic Treaty System

—Bureau of Land Management

—Bureau of Mines

-Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources

—Exclusive Economic Zone

—International Council of Scientific Unions

—International Court of Justice

—International Geophysical Year

—International Whaling Commission

—Managers of National Antarctic programs

—Minerals Management Service

—National Mineral Resources Assessment

Program

—Non-Consultative Party

—National Environmental Satellite Data and

Information Service

NOAA

NSC

NSF

ODP

OCS

OPEC

PGM

SCAR

SPA

SPR

SSS1

USAA

USGS

—National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

—National Security Council

—National Science Foundation

-Ocean Drilling program

-outer continental shelf

-Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

—Platinum Group Metals

—Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research

—Specially Protected Area

—Strategic Petroleum Reserve

—Site of Special Scientific Interest

—United States Antarctic Agency (possible

future agency)

—United States Geological Survey

-218 -
. — — .

Related OTA Report

● Marine Minerals: Exploring Our New Ocean Frontier.

OTA-O-342, 7/87; 356 pages. GPO stock #052-003-01072-l; $15.00,

NTIS order #PB 87-217 725/AS.

NOTE: Reports are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402-9325 (202-783-3238);

and the National ‘lkchnical Information Semice, 5285 Pon Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161-0001 (7034874650).