[Cite as State v. Barnes, 2010-Ohio-987.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

AUGLAIZE COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2-09-23 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

 v. 

JASON BARNES, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Auglaize County Municipal Court 

Trial Court No. 09-TRD-01447 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: March 15, 2010 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Jason Barnesfor Appellant 

Edwin A. Pierce for Appellee 
Case No. 2-09-23 

-2-

SHAW, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jason L. Barnes, appeals the July 10, 2009 

judgment of the Auglaize County, Ohio Municipal Court, finding him guilty of 

speeding, eighty-four miles per hour in a sixty-five miles per hour zone, in 

violation of 4511.21(D)(2), and ordering him to pay a fine of $35.00, to pay court 

costs, and to be assessed two points on his driver’s license. 

{¶2} The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. On March 17, 2009, 

at approximately 2:52 p.m. Barnes was traveling on Interstate 75 in Auglaize 

County, Ohio, near the exit for U.S. Highway 33. At this time, Trooper Pilot 

Darwin Justice, Jr., of the Ohio State Highway Patrol (“OSHP”), Aviation 

Department, was performing speed enforcement in the area through the use of an 

OSHP airplane. 

{¶3} Trooper Pilot Justice noticed a white vehicle traveling in a marked 

one-mile section of the roadway between mile markers 108 and 109. This marked 

one-mile section was further divided into quarters, which were marked by white 

epoxy transfer mats. The pilot did not notice the white vehicle until it was 

approximately half-way into the first marked quarter. When the white vehicle 

entered the second marked quarter, the pilot began timing the vehicle until it 

entered the third marked quarter and then also timed the vehicle through the third 

and fourth marked quarters. Using the time-speed-distance math formula, the pilot 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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determined the speed of the white vehicle to be eighty-four miles per hour in both 

the second and third quarters of the mile and seventy-seven miles per hour in the 

fourth quarter. 

{¶4} Upon observing the white vehicle to be speeding, Trooper Pilot 

Justice called Trooper Michael Keaton, who was stationary in a marked patrol car 

on the berm of the roadway at mile marker 110, to prepare him to stop the white 

vehicle. Trooper Keaton exited his vehicle upon being informed by the pilot that 

the white car was coming towards him. Trooper Keaton, using hand signals, 

ordered the white vehicle to pull over, which it did. The pilot then told Trooper 

Keaton that he had stopped the correct vehicle and that the vehicle was traveling at 

eighty-four miles per hour at 2:52 p.m. At the time of the stop, Barnes was 

driving the white vehicle at issue. 

{¶5} Trooper Keaton issued a traffic citation to Barnes for speeding. This 

citation was filed in the Auglaize County Municipal Court on March 18, 2009, and 

Barnes, pro se, entered a written plea of not guilty that was filed on March 24, 

2009. A telephonic pre-trial was conducted on April 7, 2009,1

 and the matter was 

scheduled for a bench trial to commence on May 8, 2009. On May 8, 2009, a 

letter to the court from Barnes, dated May 1, 2009, was filed in the case. This 

 

1

 Barnes lives in the State of Kentucky. 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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letter requested the court’s assistance in obtaining certain items in discovery from 

the prosecution. That same date, the court conducted Barnes’ bench trial. 

{¶6} No oral motions were made to the court on the record prior to the 

commencement of the trial. The prosecution presented the testimony of Trooper 

Pilot Justice and Trooper Keaton and introduced one exhibit, the pilot’s aviation 

enforcement report that contained his notes about the vehicle speeds he checked 

on the day of Barnes’ citation. These witnesses were also subjected to crossexamination by Barnes. 

{¶7} At the conclusion of the State’s evidence, Barnes testified on his 

own behalf. During his testimony, Barnes testified that his employer uses a global 

positioning system (“GPS”) through his Verizon Wireless cellular phone, which 

provides his location and his speeds while traveling for his employer and alerts his 

employer if he drives in excess of the posted speed limit. Barnes introduced nine 

exhibits in support of this testimony. Specifically, Barnes testified that 

Defendant’s Exhibits 1-6 were documents downloaded from the internet from the 

GPS provider that reflect the speeds and path of travel for him from 2:46 p.m.-

2:54 p.m.,2

 on the day in question, which showed his rate of speed was not in 

excess of the posted speed limit as testified to by Trooper Pilot Justice. These 

documents show his speeds as follows: 2:46 p.m. – 57 mph; 2:48 p.m. – 50 mph; 

 

2

 The actual times on these documents are from 1:46 p.m.-1:54 p.m. However, Barnes testified, and the 

documents reflect, that these were times for the Central Time Zone, which is the time zone in which his 

employer operates. 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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2:50 p.m. – 44 mph; and 2:52 p.m. – 50 mph. The other three exhibits introduced 

by Barnes were internet downloads from Wikipedia that discussed some aspects of 

GPS. Barnes presented no other witnesses. 

{¶8} The court asked questions of Barnes regarding the GPS documents, 

some of which Barnes could not fully answer and some of which he had to 

speculate as to the answer. The court retained Barnes’ exhibits and told him that 

the court was desirous of knowing more about the program and was willing to 

conduct some research to determine whether he could consider Barnes’ exhibits. 

The prosecutor objected to the admission of these exhibits because Barnes did not 

present any evidence regarding the accuracy of the information, the 

equipment/program used to determine the speeds, the calibration of any equipment 

used to determine the speeds, and the scientific reliability of the 

equipment/program. 

{¶9} The court took the matter under advisement. On May 12, 2009, the 

court filed an entry allowing Barnes until May 26, 2009, to submit the manual for 

the GPS to help enable the court to interpret Barnes’ exhibits. On May 15, 2009, 

Barnes filed a motion to dismiss his case because the prosecutor failed to provide 

him with (1) a copy of the video from the ground trooper’s cruiser, which he 

maintained would show that there were other cars in the area that matched the 

description of his car and would provide the audio of the conversation between the 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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pilot and the ground patrol, and (2) the ground trooper’s notes/log that would show 

the tickets he gave to other motorists that day. This motion was overruled later 

that same day. 

{¶10} On July 10, 2009, the trial court rendered its decision in writing. In 

this entry, the court noted that it had permitted Barnes to submit further 

documentary evidence to explain the information contained in his exhibits but that 

Barnes did not do so, and the court noted that it was not able to obtain any other 

documentary evidence. Thus, the court found that Barnes had failed to support the 

technology upon which he was relying to refute that he was speeding.3

 The court 

then found Barnes guilty of speeding as charged in his citation. This appeal 

followed, and Barnes now asserts three assignments of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

TRIAL COURT ERRORED [sic] BY DENYING THE 

DEFENDANT THE PROMISED CHANCE TO GIVE 

CLOSING ARGUMENTS (SUMMATION), BUT ALLOWED 

ONLY THE PROSECUTION THE CHANCE TO GIVE 

THEIR CLOSING ARGUMENTS. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

TRIAL COURT ERRORED [sic] BY MAKING DECISION 

BASED ON EXPERIMENTS/OBSERVATIONS NOT 

 

3

 The record contains a compact disc, purportedly supplied by Barnes on an unknown date. On this disc are 

a letter to the court, with Barnes’ cellular phone account information, and the manual for the GPS. The 

court noted in a separate entry on July 17, 2009, that it received this information and considered it in 

reaching its decision. The court also noted that it contacted the GPS provider for additional information, as 

suggested in Barnes’ letter, but was unable to obtain any further information. 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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ENTERED INTO EVIDENCE BY EITHER PROSECUTION 

OR DEFENSE. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF 

THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶11} For ease of discussion, we elect to address these assignments of error 

out of the order in which they appear. 

Third Assignment of Error

{¶12} In his third assignment of error, Barnes maintains that his conviction 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Barnes asserts that 

the prosecution lacked evidence particular to his citation, having only put forth 

evidence regarding speeding citations in general. He further contends that it 

would have been quite easy for the pilot to have erred because the pilot was 

performing a number of tasks simultaneously. He also maintains that his GPS 

evidence was easy to understand, did not need an expert to explain it, and 

conclusively established he was not speeding. 

{¶13} An appellate court’s function when reviewing the weight of the 

evidence is to determine whether the greater amount of credible evidence supports 

the verdict. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, 1997-

Ohio-52. In reviewing whether the trial court’s judgment was against the weight 

of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and examines the 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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conflicting testimony. Id. In doing so, this Court must review the entire record, 

weigh the evidence and all of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of 

witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the 

factfinder “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice 

that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Andrews, 

3rd Dist. No. 1-05-70, 2006-Ohio-3764, citing State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio 

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717; Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 

541. Further, we must be mindful that the credibility to be afforded the testimony 

of the witnesses is to be determined by the trier of fact. State v. Dye, 82 Ohio St.3d 

323, 329, 695 N.E.2d 763, 1998-Ohio-234; State v. Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 

652 N.E.2d 1000, 1995-Ohio-235. 

{¶14} In order to prove the allegations contained in the citation, the State 

had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about March 17, 2009, Barnes 

operated a motor vehicle upon a freeway in Auglaize County, Ohio, “[a]t a speed 

exceeding sixty-five miles per hour[.]” See R.C. 4511.21(D)(2). As previously 

noted, in its case-in-chief, the State presented the testimony of Trooper Pilot 

Justice. He testified that he has been in the aviation department since April of 

2005. He then explained in detail how he detects the speed of vehicles from his 

aircraft through the use of two calibrated stop watches, a one-mile portion of the 

roadway that is marked by white epoxy mats by the Ohio Department of 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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Transportation through the use of survey equipment and is further divided into 

quarters by these same type of mats, and application of the time-speed-distance 

math formula. Once the pilot is able to ascertain the unlawful speed of a particular 

vehicle, he then contacts law enforcement on the ground to stop the vehicle. He 

observes the stopped vehicle to ensure that the ground unit has stopped the correct 

vehicle and then informs the ground unit of the speed of the vehicle and the time 

the speed was detected. The ground unit then issues the citation to the driver. 

{¶15} As for the calibration of his watches, Trooper Pilot Justice testified 

that on or about the fifteenth day of each month, his watches are timed for two 

minutes using an audible signal from Station WWB in Fort Collins, Colorado, that 

is in timing with the atomic clock at the Naval Observatory in Washington, D.C., 

which he stated is the most accurate time keeping device in the world. He then 

ensures that the two watches are within 1/10 of one second of each other. He also 

performs a comparison calibration check at the beginning and end of each 

enforcement day by timing his watches for a certain time frame, giving him a 

certain speed, and compares that to a comparison calibration chart to ensure that 

the elapsed time shown is the speed that it should be. 

{¶16} The pilot testified that in Barnes’ case, on the day in question, he 

first observed a white vehicle, later determined to be driven by Barnes, half-way 

through the first marked quarter-mile section. As this vehicle entered the second 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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quarter-mile section, meaning the moment the front bumper/grill portion of the 

white vehicle met the second white epoxy mat, he began timing the vehicle with 

his two stop watches. At the end of the second section, the pilot noted that 10.68 

seconds had elapsed, giving him a speed of eighty-four miles per hour. He also 

timed the vehicle through the third and fourth quarters, ascertaining the elapsed 

time at 10.66 seconds and 11.61 seconds, respectively, giving him speeds of 

eighty-four miles per hour for the third quarter and seventy-seven miles per hour 

for the fourth quarter. The pilot also testified that he visually observed that 

Barnes’ vehicle was traveling in excess of sixty-five miles per hour. He further 

testified that the traffic was light to moderate and that there were no other similar 

vehicles in the area, specifically no white vehicles with the exception of the OSHP 

cruisers that were assisting him. 

{¶17} Once Trooper Keaton stopped Barnes’ vehicle, Trooper Pilot Justice 

confirmed that this was the correct vehicle and supplied Trooper Keaton with the 

time of the violation and the speed. The pilot also wrote the elapsed times and 

speed determinations for each quarter, a description of the vehicle, the lane of 

travel of the vehicle, and the time of the violation on his aviation enforcement 

report, which was admitted as State’s Exhibit 1. This report also reflects that a 

comparison calibration check was performed at 8:00 a.m. and again at 3:30 p.m. 

on March 17, 2009. Trooper Pilot Justice also testified that he was positive that 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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the vehicle he determined was speeding was the vehicle stopped by Trooper 

Keaton, which was the vehicle driven by Barnes. 

{¶18} Trooper Keaton’s testimony corroborated the pilot’s testimony as to 

the communications between the two regarding the stop of Barnes. Trooper 

Keaton also identified Barnes as the driver of the white vehicle that Trooper Pilot 

Justice stated was traveling eighty-four miles per hour. Trooper Keaton further 

testified that the posted speed limit for that portion of the highway was sixty-five 

miles per hour and that the offense occurred in Auglaize County, Ohio. 

{¶19} To the contrary, Barnes testified that his speed was detected through 

his Verizon Wireless cellular phone. He testified that his employer utilizes a GPS 

program to detect the location and speed of its employees when traveling through 

their cellular phones and that this program actually sends alerts to his employer if 

one of its employees is speeding. As previously noted, he submitted downloaded 

documents regarding his speed and location when the troopers stopped him on 

March 17, 2009. These documents reflected a rate of speed of fifty miles per hour 

at the time the troopers purported that he was traveling at eighty-four miles per 

hour. However, Barnes did not have an independent recollection of his speed at 

that time. In addition, Barnes testified that the GPS provided the average of his 

speed over a two-minute time frame. In other words, the GPS did not give his 

specific speed at a specific time, but an average speed over two minutes. 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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{¶20} Further, Barnes presented no evidence from a person with personal 

knowledge regarding how the GPS calculates speed, whether there is any type of 

calibration of the equipment used to detect speed, whether the methods employed 

by his particular company to detect speed are scientifically reliable, or the 

accuracy of the GPS’ speed detection. To the contrary, Barnes only offered a 

download from Wikipedia about some aspects of GPS and his opinion that the 

company providing this service expended a substantial amount of money into 

research and development and that those controlling this program have “more 

training, more expertise than either of these two (2) officers have.” As for the 

compact disc submitted by Barnes after the conclusion of the trial to assist the 

court in interpreting his exhibits, the manual contained on the disc provides little 

to no helpful information in determining the method by which the speed 

calculations are made or the reliability thereof. 

{¶21} Given all of the evidence, we find that the credible evidence clearly 

supports the trial court’s judgment that Barnes was traveling in excess of sixty-five 

miles per hour on Interstate 75, a freeway, on March 17, 2009, in Auglaize 

County, Ohio. As such, we cannot find that the trial court, acting as the factfinder 

in this case, clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice 

that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Therefore, the third 

assignment of error is overruled. 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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Second Assignment of Error

{¶22} Barnes asserts in his second assignment of error that the trial court 

impermissibly considered evidence outside of what was presented at trial. More 

specifically, Barnes maintains that the following statement in the court’s judgment 

entry was an improper attempt to “fill the holes in the prosecution’s lack of 

evidence”: 

The Court finds that the speeds indicated by the GPS program 

do not even match what the testimony of the defendant would 

indicate as to his speed while on I 75. The defendant claimed 

that he was not speeding due to the fact that he was caught up 

with truck traffic on I 75 but it would be highly unusual for 

truck traffic in good weather to be traveling at speeds as slow as 

those indicated by the GPS system.

Barnes likens this statement to a juror who conducts an experiment to aid in the 

deliberation of a case. 

{¶23} Barnes is correct that factfinders are not permitted to consider 

outside influences, such as communications with others not serving in the same 

factfinder capacity and independent experiments, about the matter at trial. See 

State v. Kehn (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 11, 361 N.E.2d 1330; State v. Spencer (1997), 

118 Ohio App.3d 871, 873-874, 694 N.E.2d 161; State v. King (1983), 10 Ohio 

App.3d 161, 165, 460 N.E.2d 1383. However, not every such instance requires 

reversal, as the outside influence must have been prejudicial; i.e. materially 

affected a defendant’s substantial rights. King, supra. 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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{¶24} Here, the statement by the trial court did not reflect that the court 

had conducted any outside experiment or improperly considered evidence outside 

the record. Rather, the court was addressing Barnes testimony that he believed he 

was caught behind truck traffic, which could possibly explain why he was 

traveling at a speed of only fifty miles per hour on the interstate. The court did not 

indicate that this scenario was impossible but merely that it was highly unlikely 

given the weather conditions and the type of roadway. Thus, the court was not 

considering “outside evidence.” 

{¶25} Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the court was improperly 

considering outside evidence, a reversal of his conviction is not warranted. Given 

the testimony of the two troopers and the lack of any evidence as to the reliability 

of Barnes’ exhibits, the court’s consideration of the unlikelihood of truck travel at 

a low rate of speed for the interstate was harmless. Thus, the second assignment 

of error is overruled. 

First Assignment of Error

{¶26} In his first assignment of error, Barnes contends that his conviction 

should be reversed because the trial court failed to allow him to present a closing 

argument. The United States Supreme Court has held that a statute permitting a 

trial judge to deny a criminal defendant closing argument denies “the basic right of 

the accused to make his defense” in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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United States Constitution. Herring v. New York (1975), 422 U.S. 853, 859, 95 

S.Ct. 2550. Thus, a trial court is not permitted to totally deny a criminal defendant 

the opportunity to present a closing argument whether his trial is to a jury or to the 

bench. Id., see also, e.g., State v. McCausland, 124 Ohio St.3d 8, 918 N.E.2d 507, 

2009-Ohio-5933, at ¶ 6. However, the right to present a closing argument may be 

waived. Id. at ¶ 7, citing Yopps v. State (1962), 228 Md. 204, 207, 178 A.2d 879. 

Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court held that such a waiver need not be express, 

intentional, and voluntary. McCausland, 2009-Ohio-5933, ¶¶ 8-10. Rather, “[a] 

criminal defendant waives the Sixth Amendment right to present a closing 

argument when he or she neither requests a closing argument nor objects to its 

omission.” Id. at syllabus. 

{¶27} In the case sub judice, Barnes represented himself and testified on 

his own behalf. After the State cross-examined him, Barnes continued his 

testimony, in effect conducting a re-direct examination in narrative form. The 

court then began asking questions of Barnes concerning his GPS documents. 

After answering these questions of the court, the following discussion occurred: 

BARNES: Your honor will I have chance to address the court 

also as we get down, I mean aside from own testimony or, I do or 

[sic]? 

BECKETT [the prosecutor]: You have a chance to summarize 

in closing arguments. 

COURT: Mm huh. 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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BECKETT: But not through testimony. 

COURT: Do you have anything else that you want to testify 

here here [sic] to today? 

Barnes then proceeded to provide what can only be described as an argument. For 

instance, Barnes made statements to discredit the troopers’ testimony, commented 

on how the GPS was much more accurate than “the skeptical way” the troopers 

testified, discussed his pre-trial conversations with another prosecutor who he 

maintained only wanted to offer a plea rather than hearing Barnes’ evidence, 

commented on the prosecutor’s motives in this case, and then began to state what 

he might do if he were ever to be seated as a juror in the future. This last 

statement prompted the trial court to admonish Barnes about implying that he 

would act improperly if seated as a juror or refuse to sit on a jury because of his 

current case. 

{¶28} After this statement by Barnes, the trial court then asked the State: 

“Anything the state wants to present as to closing argument, well do you have 

rebuttal testimony?” The prosecutor then informed the court that she did not 

intend to present rebuttal testimony and proceeded with her closing argument. 

After the prosecutor’s summation, the court informed the parties that it would take 

the matter under advisement, discussed how it would have to research the issue 

concerning the GPS, and then told Barnes that it had been informed that he was 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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discussing his case on a local radio station and that this was “probably not 

appropriate.” The court specifically stated that it did not know what exactly the 

conversation was about or what Barnes’ impression of Auglaize County Municipal 

Court was but that fines ordered from citations were dispersed to many different 

agencies and that the court did not base its decisions on monetary gain to the 

county. The court then informed the parties that it would “probably be a couple of 

weeks” before a decision was rendered. At this point, Barnes stated: “I’m sorry I 

don’t mean to interrupt.” The court then stated that it needed to let some of the 

people in the courtroom leave and that it would let everyone know of its decision. 

Both the prosecutor and Barnes thanked the court and the matter was adjourned. 

{¶29} Barnes contends that his statement, “I’m sorry I don’t mean to 

interrupt[,]” was his attempt to request closing argument, having been informed by 

the prosecutor and the court that he would have the opportunity to address the 

court after his testimony. Thus, he maintains that he did not waive closing 

argument. We disagree with Barnes in two respects. 

{¶30} First, while Barnes did ask if he would be allowed to address the 

court after concluding his testimony, he did not subsequently request to be heard 

in summation. Instead, he proceeded to provide the court with his interpretation of 

the evidence presented by both the State and himself, to comment on the reliability 

of the evidence, and to challenge the motives of the State and its witnesses. As 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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previously noted, nothing in the “testimony” he provided after being asked if had 

any additional testimony could be described as evidence. To the contrary, it was 

an argument about the evidence that had been introduced for both parties. Thus, 

although Barnes was not specifically told at a certain point that he could be heard 

in summation, the trial court actually heard his summation of the evidence. 

Accordingly, he was not totally denied of the opportunity for final argument as 

Herring prohibits. 

{¶31} Second, Barnes’ attempt to interrupt the trial court as it informed the 

parties that it was taking the matter under advisement did not evidence his request 

to be heard in closing argument. Rather, he could have been attempting to 

interject in any number of ways. For instance, in his brief to this Court, Barnes 

asserts that during the trial, the court did not permit him to make a motion to 

dismiss his case or to address what he perceived to be discovery violations by the 

State.4

 Thus, he may have intended to move to dismiss the case, to discuss the 

evidence he sought from the State, or to otherwise address the motion he filed with 

the court the morning of his trial regarding discovery. This Court is not permitted 

to simply guess at what objections, requests, and/or statements Barnes may have 

 

4

 Barnes maintains that the State did not provide him with a copy of the video from Trooper Keaton’s 

cruiser. He asserts that this video shows that there was only one patrol car in the area, as opposed to cars, 

plural, as testified to by Trooper Pilot Justice. Thus, he maintains that what the pilot thought was an 

additional patrol car was most likely another white vehicle, which would have been the actual vehicle that 

was speeding rather than him. The record contains no cruiser video and the transcript of the trial in this 

matter does not reflect that a video was introduced. Moreover, Barnes has not shown that a video of the 

incident even exists. Therefore, this Court is unable to address this aspect of Barnes’ argument. 
Case No. 2-09-23 

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intended to make. Therefore, we do not find that this statement amounts to a 

request for closing argument or an objection to what he perceived was the trial 

court’s omission of his closing argument. By not stating anything specifically on 

the record, Barnes waived his right to closing argument. 

{¶32} In addition, there is no plain error in this case because, similar to 

McCausland, there is no indication that the outcome of this trial would have been 

different had a closing argument been made. See McCausland, 2009-Ohio-5933, 

at ¶ 15, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240, 2002-Ohio68; Crim.R.52(B). As previously noted, there were only three witnesses, the 

issues were simple, and the trial was brief. Accordingly, even applying a plainerror analysis, we would find nothing in the record to indicate that the outcome of 

Barnes’ bench trial would have been different had he presented a closing argument 

when prompted by the court rather than on his own accord. Thus, the first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶33} For all of these reasons, the judgment of the Municipal Court of 

Auglaize County, Ohio, is affirmed. 

 Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J., and ROGERS, J., concur. 

/jnc