No. 14224 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTAN 

1978 

THE STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

-vsELWOOD WILLIAM RYAN, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial 

District, 

Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana 

James D. Walen, argued, Deputy County Attorney, 

Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Berger, Anderson, Sinclair and Murphy, Billings, 

Montana 

Chris J. Nelson argued, Billings, Montana 

Submitted: December 11, 1978 

Decided: JAN 1 6 ;$73 
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

 his appeal is brought by the State of Montana from an 

order of the District Court, Thirteenth Judicial District, 

suppressing certain statements made by defendant Elwood Ryan 

during the execution of a search warrant at his home. The 

appeal is authorized by section 95-2403(2) (f), R.C.M. 1947, 

which permits the State to appeal from any court order in a 

criminal case which results in the suppression of a confession or admission. 

At approximately 10:OO a.m. on September 22, 1977, two 

detectives from the Yellowstone County sheriff's office and 

two sheriff's officers from Garfield County arrived at 

defendant's home in Jordan, Montana. The detectives were in 

plain clothes and drove an unmarked car while the Garfield 

County officers were in uniform and drove a sheriff's vehicle. 

When the officers arrived, defendant and his stepson were 

outside the house working on a vehicle parked in the yard. 

Detective Ellis presented defendant with a search warrant 

authorizing the officers to search his home for various 

firearms which defendant had earlier reported stolen and for 

which he had received insurance compensation. Upon reading 

a copy of the warrant defendant reportedly told the officers, 

"Well, you guys have got me anyway. I will just show you 

where the guns are at." 

~t the time the statement was made defendant had not 

been given a Miranda warning. Inside the house defendant 

requested the officers to wait while his wife got out of bed 

and dressed. When she had done so, he escorted them into 

his bedroom where he pointed to the closet saying "the guns 

are in there." At this point the officers had been at 
defendant's home approximately ten minutes and still had not 

informed defendant of his right to remain silent or to consult 

with an attorney. When the officers began checking the 

serial numbers on the various weapons they found in the 

closet, defendant told them that there was no sense in 

writing them down because he had altered them after turning 

in the burglary report. It was only after this statement by 

defendant that the officers placed defendant under arrest 

and informed him of his rights. 

At the suppression hearing held February 17, 1978, the 

District Court held that all the statements made by defendant 

prior to his arrest were inadmissible for failure to give 

the Miranda warning. 

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the statements 

made by defendant prior to his arrest were the product of 

custodial interrogation and therefore inadmissible for lack 

of a Miranda warning, 

The State argues that defendant's statements before 

arrest were completely voluntary and that until the time of 

his arrest, defendant had not been deprived of his freedom 

in any significant way. The State further argues that the 

officers had not initiated any sort of interrogation or 

focused their investigation on defendant. Under these 

circumstances, it contends, the Miranda requirement is not 

applicable. 

Defendant argues the District Court's suppression order 

should be affirmed because the presence of four armed 

officers with a search warrant deprived him of his freedom 

in a significant way and that he should have been informed 

of his rights to remain silent prior to making any statements. 
In Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 U.S. 478, 490-91, 

12 L Ed 2d 977, 986, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1765, the United States 

Supreme Court held that where the investigation of a crime 

has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is 

in custody, the police interrogate the suspect thereby 

eliciting incriminating statements , the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with counsel, 

and the police have not effectively warned the suspect of 

his right to remain silent, the suspect has then been denied 

his Sixth Amendment right to "the assistance of counsel" and 

therefore "no statement elicited by the police during the 

interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial." 

This rule was developed further in Miranda v. Arizona 

(1966), 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L Ed 

2d 694, 726, to require that when an individual is "taken 

into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the 

authorities in any significant way and is subjected to 

questioning," the authorities must employ procedural safeguards to "notify the person of his right of silence and to 

assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously 

honored . . . 11 11 . . . [Ulnless and until such warnings and 

waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no 

evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used 

against him." 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L Ed 2d 

at 726. 

The Escobedo and Miranda holdings both applied to 

interrogations which were conducted after the suspect had 

been taken to the police station. However, in 1969, the 

Supreme Court applied the Miranda rule to an interrogation 

conducted at a boarding house in the room of a suspect. 

Orozco v. Texas (1969), 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L Ed 
2d 311. In Orozco four officers entered the suspect's room 

at 4:00 a.m. and questioned him concerning a shooting, 

without arresting him or informing him of his rights. 

During the questioning, the suspect admitted that he had 

been at the restaurant where the shooting occurred and 

revealed the location of his pistol which was later shown to 

be the one used in the shooting. The Supreme Court dismissed the prosecution's argument that Miranda did not apply 

to those statements because they were made while the defendant was on his own bed and in familiar surroundings. 

Instead, the Court emphasized the words from Miranda which 

declare that the warnings are required when the person being 

questioned is "in custody at the station - or otherwise deprived -- of his freedom of - action - in w significant w~." 

394 U.S. at 327, 89 S.Ct. at 1097, 22 L Ed 2d at 315. 

(Emphasis in original.) 

In the present case defendant argues that the rationale 

of Orozco applies because four officers descended upon his 

premises at once and while not technically placing him under 

arrest, deprived him of his freedom of action in a significant way. The State focuses on the time, place, and circumstances of both the execution of the search and the making 

of the incriminating statements. In particular it points 

out that the officers arrived at defendant's home at 10:OO 

a.m., that defendant was not incommunicado and was in 

the presence and company of his wife and stepson, and that 

the officers did not actually interrogate defendant about an 

alleged crime but made their purpose known by serving a 

search warrant on him. 

Of particular significance to this set of facts is the 

lack of questioning by the officers. In Brewer v. Williams 
(1977), 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L Ed 2d 424, the 

Supreme Court held inadmissible the statements of a suspect 

who gave incriminating evidence even after he had been 

informed of his right to remain silent because, after his 

lawyer had refused to permit interrogation, he was questioned 

in the lawyer's absence. In Brewer, the defendant, while 

riding across Iowa with two detectives, was questioned once 

at the beginning of the trip. Sometime later in the journey 

he made the incriminating statements. 430 U.S. at 392-93, 

97 S.Ct. at 1236-37, 51 L Ed 2d at 432-33. Having once 

asserted his right to silence in the absence of his lawyer, 

the defendant could not again be questioned absent a strong 

showing of waiver. 430 U.S. at 404-06, 97 S.Ct. at 1242-43, 

51 L Ed 2d at 439-41. Thus, where questioning takes place 

in a custodial setting the dictates of Miranda must be 

carefully followed. 

In the same term as the Brewer decision, however, the 

Supreme Court considered the case of Oregon v. Mathiason 

(1977), 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L Ed 2d 714. In 

Mathiason it held that a parolee who voluntarily came to a 

police station was not subjected to custodial interrogation 

when he was questioned about a crime because he had been 

told that he was not under arrest when the questioning began 

and was free to leave a half hour later when the interview 

ended. 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714, 50 L Ed 2d at 719. 

The Court reasoned that a noncustodial situation is not 

"converted into one in which Miranda applies" simply because 

the questioning takes place in a "coercive environment": 

"Any interview of one suspected of a crime 

by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact 

that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause 
the suspect to be charged with a crime. But 

police officers are not required to administer 

Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to 

be imposed simply because the questioning takes 

place in the station house, or because the 

questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only 

where there has been such a restriction on a 

person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' 

It was that sort of coercive environment to 

which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, 

and to which it is limited." 429 U.S. at 495, 

97 S.Ct. at 714, 50 L Ed 2d at 719. 

Thus, Miranda applies to a questioning which takes 

place in a coercive environment in which the suspect's 

freedom of action has been significantly restricted. From 

the facts of the present case, defendant argues that his 

freedom had been so restricted by the presence of the officers. However, the other crucial element of the Escobedo, 

Miranda, Orozco, and Brewer cases is missing here--that is, 

the questioning by the officers. As was pointed out in 

Miranda, a confession which is truly voluntary is not foreclosed from evidence because made before the person confessing has been warned of his rights: 

"Any statement given freely and voluntarily 

without any compelling influences is, of 

course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an 

individual is in custody is not whether he 

is allowed to talk to the police without the 

benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether 

he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a 

police station and states that he wishes to 

confess to a crime, or a person who calls the 

police to offer a confession or any other 

statement he desires to make. Volunteered 

statements of any kind are not barred by the 

Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not 

affected by our holding today." 384 U.S. at 

478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L Ed 2d at 726. 

As applied to the facts of this case, the holdings of 

Escobedo, Miranda, Orozco, and Brewer do not require that 

the statements of defendant be excluded from the prosecution's evidence. Defendant was not questioned. He simply 
decided to admit that he still had the firearms. Where the 

entire situation was free from any coercion or deprivation 

of freedom of action by the law enforcement officers and the 

statements were not the result of interrogation, the requirements of Miranda were not applicable. Oregon v. Mathiason, 

429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714, 50 L Ed 2d at 719; Beckwith 

v. United States (1976), 425 U.S. 341, 347-48, 96 S.Ct. 

1612, 1616-17, 48 L Ed 2d 1, 8; United States v. Shelby (7th 

Cir. 1978), 573 F.2d 971, 975-76; United States v. Long 

Soldier (8th Cir, 1977), 562 F.2d 601, 603, n.1(2) ; Annot. 

31 A.L. R. 3d 565, 676-80 (1970). 

The holdings in State v. District Court of Eighth Jud. 

Dist. (1978), Mont . , 577 P.2d 849, 35 St.Rep. 

481, and State ex rel. Kotwicki v. District Court (1975), 

166 Mont. 335, 532 P.2d 694, are not directly in point with 

this case but lend considerable strength to the State's 

position. In those cases the statements or confessions made 

by the accused occurred while in custody. Due to the special circumstances in each, however, the confession was 

held admissible. In the first case the accused made a 

spontaneous confession after he had been informed of his 

rights, Though the accused was in a police vehicle at the 

time he made the confession, the police had not elicited a 

statement as in Brewer. 577 P.2d at 854, 35 St-Rep. at 487. 

In Kotwicki the defendant had not been informed of his 

rights to silence and an attorney, but this Court found the 

confession or admission appeared uncoerced and spontaneous. 

166 Mont. at 344, 532 P.2d at 698-99. In neither Kotwicki 

nor District Court of Eighth Jud. Dist. did this Court attempt to expand the scope or application of Miranda beyond 
the federal constitutional requirements established by the 

United States Supreme Court. 

The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the 

cause remanded for further proceedings. 

We Concur: 

'%&4AC&& 

Chief 'Justice