NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, 

Appellee, 

v.

JONATHAN JESSIE CORRALES, 

Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0456 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2011-156533-001 

The Honorable Pamela Hearn Svoboda, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Michael O’Toole 

Counsel for Appellee 

Droban & Company, PC, Anthem 

By Kerrie M. Droban 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. CORRALES 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Maurice Portley joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge : 

¶1 Jonathan Jessie Corrales appeals his convictions and 

sentences for armed robbery, theft, four counts of aggravated assault, 

attempted first-degree murder, two counts of misconduct with weapons, 

and discharge of a weapon from a vehicle. On appeal, Corrales argues: 1) 

the trial court erred in giving the jury a modified Willits1 instruction; 2) the 

prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; 

and 3) the trial court erred in denying Corrales’ motion for directed verdict 

on the charge of armed robbery. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 On October 28, 2011, Corrales entered a jewelry store and 

indicated he was interested in purchasing a necklace. Each piece of jewelry 

Corrales looked at was valued at several thousand dollars and displayed in 

a locked showcase. At Corrales’ request, the owner removed two chain 

necklaces for Corrales to handle. When Corrales requested to see a third 

necklace, the owner asked him to return those he already had in his 

possession. Instead of returning the items, Corrales turned to leave with 

the necklaces. After finding the store’s entry glass door locked, Corrales 

took out a gun and shot at the glass door so he could exit. 

¶3 Corrales fled the scene and was picked up outside the store 

by a man driving a black Monte Carlo with two red racing stripes on the 

front hood and an Arizona Cardinal’s football license plate. Phoenix police 

officer Jason Bloom (Officer Bloom) was on patrol that day, when he heard 

the police dispatcher send out a report of an armed robbery along with the 

description of the Monte Carlo identified as the getaway car. Shortly 

thereafter, Officer Bloom observed a black Monte Carlo with red racing 

 

1 See State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184 (1964). 

2 On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the verdict. State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 436, ¶ 12 (1998). 
STATE v. CORRALES 

Decision of the Court 

3 

stripes, and began following the car. Two other officers joined in the 

pursuit, activating their emergency lights and sirens. The Monte Carlo did 

not stop, but instead attempted to evade police and “continued to run.” 

During the pursuit, Corrales leaned out of the car and shot at the officers 

from the Monte Carlo passenger’s side window. One of Corrales’ shots 

struck Officer Bloom’s patrol vehicle, shattering the windshield and forcing 

him to leave the pursuit. The other officers continued the pursuit and 

Corrales fired additional shots. 

¶4 Corrales and another individual were later arrested and 

charged with several felonies arising from the armed robbery and police 

pursuit. At trial, Officer Bloom identified Corrales as the shooter. Officer 

Bloom also testified that after his initial suspect identification, he called the 

case agent Detective W. Bishel to provide a more affirmative identification, 

but neither Officer Bloom nor Detective Bishel prepared a supplemental 

report regarding this conversation. 

¶5 A jury convicted Corrales of all charges against him. The trial 

court sentenced him to eighteen years’ imprisonment with credit for 961 

days’ presentence incarceration on Counts one and two. Corrales was also 

sentence to twenty-eight years’ imprisonment on the remaining Counts, 

with this term to be served consecutive to Counts one and two. Corrales 

timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 

of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-

120.21.A.1 and 13-4031 and -4033.A (West 2015).3

DISCUSSION 

I. Modified Willits Instruction 

¶6 Corrales argues the trial court erred in failing to include 

certain standard language in its Willits instruction. At trial, the court 

provided the following instruction: 

If you find that the State has failed to preserve evidence 

whose contents or quality are important to the issues in this 

case, then you should weigh the explanation, if any given for 

the loss or unavailability of the evidence. If you find that such 

explanation is inadequate, then you may draw inference 

unfavorable to the State. 

 

3 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
STATE v. CORRALES 

Decision of the Court 

4 

Corrales claims that the trial court should have also included as part of the 

instruction the following: “an inference unfavorable to the State which, in 

and of itself may create reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.”

¶7 A defendant is entitled to a Willits instruction when the State 

fails to act reasonably in preserving any obviously material, exculpatory 

evidence, resulting in prejudice to the defendant. State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 

459, 464 (1984). Pre-trial disclosures by the State indicated that its witness, 

Officer Bloom, had not identified anyone when shown a photographic lineup that included a picture of Corrales. As previously stated, Officer Bloom 

identified Corrales as the shooter at trial. Officer Bloom also testified that 

he called Detective Bishel to provide a more affirmative identification after 

his initial identification, but no supplemental report was prepared before 

trial. Corrales argued that the in-trial identification by Officer Bloom was 

“trial by ambush.” 

¶8 The trial court determined: 1) no evidence was lost or 

destroyed, 2) the State did not act in bad faith, and 3) the officers did not 

violate police policies by failing to supplement Detective Bishel’s report. 

Moreover, Officer Bloom’s identification of Corrales was not exculpatory, 

but rather was inculpatory. Thus, a Willits instruction was not necessary 

using the standard set forth in Perez. 

¶9 However, the trial court did find that the State’s failure to 

disclose information about the testimony of one of its witnesses in advance 

of trial was sanctionable and determined that providing a modified Willits 

instruction was appropriate. Thus, the court excluded the standard Willits

language that Corrales argues should have been included. 

¶10 A trial court’s choice of sanction for late disclosure is 

discretionary. State v. Patterson, 230 Ariz. 270, 276, ¶ 24 (2012). We will not 

reverse absent a showing of prejudice. Id. Corrales has not explained how 

he was prejudiced by the excluded language and in review of the record on 

appeal, we find none. The trial court’s choice of sanction was therefore not 

an abuse of discretion. 

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

¶11 Corrales asserts the prosecutor’s comment in rebuttal closing 

that “I can guarantee you that if there was something nefarious going on 

with the State and the witnesses, you would have gotten an instruction 

regarding that,” resulted in a “watering down” of the trial court’s modified 

Willits instruction and amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. We 

disagree. 
STATE v. CORRALES 

Decision of the Court 

5 

¶12 In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct has 

occurred, the court considers whether the prosecutor calls attention to 

matters that should not be considered and the probability that the jury was 

improperly influenced by the comments. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 402, 

¶ 60 (2006). Prosecutorial misconduct constitutes reversible error when, in 

the context of all the evidence presented at trial, the misconduct was so 

“pronounced and persistent” it infected the trial with unfairness so 

profound any resulting conviction would be a denial of due process. State 

v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 335, ¶ 46 (2007); State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 

26 (1998). 

¶13 Corrales provides no explanation or evidence that suggests 

the prosecutor’s statements improperly swayed or misled the jury to a 

verdict otherwise unsupported by the record. Officer Bloom was not the 

only eyewitness to identify Corrales. Corrales’ DNA was found on the gun 

used in the commission of the crimes. His hand prints were found in the 

Monte Carlo. Given the totality of the evidence presented, the conduct in 

question would not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. See Newell, 212 

Ariz. at 403, ¶ 67. 

III. Armed Robbery Conviction 

¶14 Finally, Corrales argues the trial court erred in denying his 

request for a directed verdict on the charge of armed robbery. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 20. Specifically, he contends there was no evidence that he used 

force in taking of property from the jewelry store. We review claims of 

insufficient evidence de novo. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 595 (1993). 

¶15 In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, “the controlling 

question is solely whether the record contains ‘substantial evidence to 

warrant a conviction.’“ State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 14 (2011) (quoting 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20.a). Substantial evidence is “such proof that 

reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 562, ¶ 

16 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). “To set aside a jury verdict 

for insufficient evidence it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis 

whatever is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion reached by 

the jury.” State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316 (1987). 

¶16 A person commits robbery if “in the course of taking any 

property of another from his person or immediate presence and against his 

will, such person threatens or uses force against any person with intent 

either to coerce surrender of property or to prevent resistance to such 
STATE v. CORRALES 

Decision of the Court 

6 

person taking or retaining property.” A.R.S. § 13–1902.A (West 2015). 

Armed robbery occurs when a person uses or threatens to use a deadly 

weapon in the course of committing a robbery. A.R.S. § 13–1904.A.2 (West 

2015). 

¶17 Corrales argues he did not commit armed robbery by taking 

the necklaces because he did not draw his gun until after he had possession 

of the chains. Corrales contends that because he only used his gun to shoot 

out the store’s locked glass door and did not point the weapon at anyone, 

there was no contemporaneous use of threat or force in the taking of 

property and as such, he did not commit armed robbery. 

¶18 Under Arizona law, robbery is a “continuous offense,” which 

“includes any of the defendant’s acts beginning with the initiation and 

extending through the flight from a robbery.” A.R.S § 13–1901.2 (West 

2015). Corrales’ argument that he only used the gun to “shoot his way out 

of the store” is sufficient to suggest to a trier of fact that use of the weapon 

was to facilitate flight from the robbery. Accordingly, we hold that the trial 

court did not err by denying Corrales’ motion for judgment of acquittal on 

the charge of armed robbery. 

CONCLUSION 

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Corrales’ convictions 

and sentences.