IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-0323

Filed June 7, 2017

IN THE INTEREST OF C.C. and C.C.,

Minor Children,

K.C., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, William S. 

Owens, Associate Juvenile Judge.

A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s permanency review order and 

grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the district court. AFFIRMED.

Amanda M. Demichelis of Demichelis Law Firm, P.C., Chariton, for 

appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Monte M. McCoy of McCoy Legal Services, Centerville, for father.

Debra A. George of Griffing & George Law Firm P.L.C., Centerville, for 

minor children.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
2

DANILSON, Chief Judge.

A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s permanency review order and 

grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the district court. Finding no reason to disturb 

the court’s rulings, we affirm. 

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

The children at issue are Co.C., born in February 2008, and Cl.C., born in 

August 2003. This family came to the attention of the department of human 

services (DHS) when the district court provided a copy of the parents’ September 

2014 dissolution decree. The decree outlined the court’s concerns regarding 

domestic violence,

1

the parents’ use of methamphetamine, the adequacy of the

supervision of the children, and the well-being of the children while in the care of 

their parents. There was an existing protective order prohibiting the father from 

contacting the mother. The dissolution decree placed the children in the 

mother’s legal custody and physical care.2 A child-abuse assessment was 

subsequently conducted by DHS, and the family began participating voluntarily 

with services in late 2014.

On March 20, 2015, the children were removed from the mother’s physical 

care by ex parte order due to the mother’s arrest on felony drug and theft 

charges. A subsequent removal hearing placed the children in the father’s 

 

1 According to the dissolution decree, the father was convicted of assault against the 

mother in June 2014, and of third-degree burglary and possession of a firearm in August 

2014. A criminal no-contact order was set to expire in June 2019.

2 The decree states, in part:

The parties agree that joint legal custody is not appropriate in this case, 

and that one party or the other should be awarded sole legal custody and 

primary physical care of the children. Each party very much wants to be 

the parent awarded sole legal custody and primary physical care. 
3

temporary legal custody and care, and the parents were ordered to participate in 

random drug testing. The mother was ordered to obtain a substance-abuse 

assessment and comply with all recommendations for treatment.

On April 9, following an uncontested hearing, the children were 

adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA) pursuant to Iowa Code section 

232.2(6)(c)(2) and (n) (2015). The maternal grandparents’ motion to intervene 

was granted as they had provided substantial care for the children in the past.3 

Temporary legal custody and placement of the children remained with father. 

A May 28 dispositional order continued legal custody of the children with 

the father, with the goal that the children would return to the mother’s custody.4 

The family was receiving numerous services to address the substance-abuse 

and domestic-violence concerns, including Family Safety, Risk, and Permanency 

(FSRP) services; substance-abuse screening; domestic-violence services; and 

parent partners. The father had completed a parenting program (“24/7 dads”) 

and was participating in a batterers’ education program (BEP). The children 

were engaged in individual counseling to deal with their emotional issues arising 

from the parents’ discord and drug use. 

An August 2015 review hearing was held. An August DHS report to the 

court noted, in part: “This case may be safely closed when [the mother] 

successfully completes substance abuse treatment, follows all professional 

 

3 A case plan notes, “Although their mother had legal custody of [the children] per the 

divorce decree prior to DHS involvement, she allowed the boys to stay with their 

grandparents the majority of the time.” 

4 The mother appealed the adjudication and disposition but voluntarily dismissed that 

appeal. 
4

recommendations, and resolves her criminal charges. [The mother and father] 

need to continue to cooperate with DHS and FSRP services.” The juvenile 

court’s review order noted that the court had been informed the mother had been 

arrested recently, was in jail awaiting a hearing, and had a plea proceeding 

scheduled that might result in her being placed at a halfway house facility. 

The court also had before it the father’s motion for concurrent jurisdiction. 

With regard to that motion, the court concluded:

Although [the mother] has incurred additional criminal charges the 

department believes the permanency goal of returning the boys to 

her care and custody can still be achieved. The boys are indeed 

fortunate to have a father who is both capable and willing to serve 

as their primary care giver while [the mother] works toward 

regaining custody. If after a period of several more months it 

appears [the mother] will not be able to secure the boys’ return to 

her home, this court would likely then make more permanent orders 

regarding the boys’ placement with their father. However, until 

those decisions are made it would not be appropriate for this court 

to relinquish its authority to make a custody determination.

The juvenile court ruled the children were to remain in the father’s care.

Another review hearing was held on December 3, 2015, and the court

adopted the November case plan submitted by DHS. In the case plan it was 

noted that the mother needed to “continue to cooperate with DHS and FSRP 

providers”; the father had “successfully completed BEP, Children in the Middle, 

and attended Anger Management Counseling”; and the children were having 

supervised visits with their mother at the jail and semi-weekly visits with the 

maternal grandparents. The December review order noted the mother had 

“resolved her criminal charges and will be, or is in the half-way house.” The court 

ordered the children to remain with their father, found the children’s best interests 
5

would not be served by granting the district court concurrent jurisdiction, and 

ordered a further review hearing “in the next six months.”

A permanency hearing was scheduled for March 10, 2016.5 The March 

2016 case plan update submitted by DHS recommended the children remain in 

the father’s care and custody, concurrent jurisdiction be granted, and the 

permanency goal be changed to guardianship with other parent. It was also 

noted the mother had completed a substance-abuse evaluation but had just 

begun substance-abuse treatment; the mother had completed orientation into 

Family Treatment Court and was participating in substance-abuse meetings and 

seeing a counselor. It was recommended the mother successfully complete 

treatment and follow all professional recommendations and resolve her legal 

issues. 

Due to continuances, the permanency hearing was held over several days 

in April and June 2016. The mother sought additional time to seek reunification. 

She reported she was living with her parents and working at a jewelry store. 

DHS and the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) argued the children deserved 

permanency in the care of their father. 

The GAL strenuously objected to returning the children to the mother. In 

her permanency brief, the GAL wrote: 

1. Whether Mother’s substance abuse poses a risk to the children.

Mother testified on June 9, 2016, that at the time of her 

March 2015 arrest, that she was using methamphetamine daily at a 

rate of about half a gram per day. Mother further testified that she 

was in denial of her drug abuse, despite several positive drug

 

5 The code requires an initial permanency hearing within twelve months of removal. See

Iowa Code § 232.104(1)(a)(1). 
6

screens, until she was again arrested and jailed for a duration, on 

or about September 1, 2015.

Mother also testified on June 9, 2016 that she has been over 

280 days clean from substances, has completed treatment and is 

“recovered.” She testified that in the past she was unable to quit 

because she used due to withdrawal symptoms but that being

incarcerated kept her from using. She testified that she attends 

one meeting per week, but not always. Her mother testifies that 

she has often returned home late from the meeting, even close to 

midnight. Her testimony showed no knowledge of how to stay 

clean, what the 12 steps were, how to work the steps or the role of 

a sponsor in a recovering addict’s recovery. While there is, at time 

of conclusion of evidence, no information that Mother has used 

since her release from incarceration in late February 2016, there is 

also no indication that Mother has internalized any tools that would 

cause her to stay clean. Mother testified that she plans to stay 

clean by staying away from people with whom she used, although 

she testified that she lives in the same home, engages in the same

employment, and socially meets with people with whom she has 

used in their home. Relapse is a process, not necessarily an event.

Mother is in a precarious position with her recovery.

2. Whether Mother’s mental health poses a risk to the 

children.

Mother testified that she was a victim of domestic abuse.

Social Worker Weldon testified that in conversations with mother 

about the effects of domestic abuse, that she believed that Mother 

should seek counseling for the after effects. Mother admitted a

report on June 9, 2016, that was an evaluation for mental health 

therapy that stated that she was suffering from post-traumatic 

stress disorder due to the domestic violence, but that no therapy 

would be scheduled at this time. As with any evaluation for 

services, the report is consistent with the information provided by 

the subject and it appears that Mother is in denial about the effect 

of her mental health trauma upon her current mental health status, 

as Mother gives several inconsistent statements to the evaluator, 

including that she used methamphetamines only during her 

marriage and that Mother has court Monday “to determine whether 

her children are going to remain in the CINA system.” Evidence . . . 

that Mother had not moved past the emotional trauma or enmity

from the marriage was introduced several times including, Mother’s 

attempt to have admitted an unintelligible audio tape kept on a 

cellular phone what mother purported was domestic abuse and 

evidence that Mother had followed [the father] and [Cl.C.] with her

vehicle and sped away at a high rate of speed. Mother clearly 

shows enmity toward [the father] and has regularly put the children 

in the middle of that toxic relationship. While [the father] has in the 

past also put the children in the middle, he shows awareness of this 
7

and a recent reduction in this action. In finding for a change in 

permanency from Mother to Father’s custody, the Court in In re 

N.M. and M.M., noted “Rather than thinking first of the children’s 

need for a stable and secure home, [Mother] continues to use 

visitation as an opportunity to disrupt and undermine the children’s 

relationship with [Father] and [Father’s] family. [528 N.W.2d 94, 99 

(Iowa 1995).] Social Worker Weldon and FSRP Provider Gail both 

testified as to a recent event where [the mother] used visitation as 

an opportunity to question a child as to whether a step-sibling in

Father’s home was using drugs, and then to report that as a 

concern that came from the child to Social Worker Weldon. Such 

manipulation for legal advantage is confusing to the child, who is 

put in the middle, and undermines the child’s trust both in Father, 

the safety of their current home, and the juvenile court system. 

Mother’s desire to “get” [back at the father] is interfering with her 

ability to put the children first and shows that she is not ready to 

parent them full time.

3. Whether Mother’s criminal activity and/or incarceration 

poses a risk to children.

Mother was incarcerated from approximately September 1, 

2015 until February 24, 2016[,] and was incapable of providing care 

during that time. Mother was incarcerated for criminal activity, 

which, while it may be categorized under incarceration or under

[232.2(6)](c)(2), was a material factor in why Mother could not 

parent the children. Mother testified that she had sold drugs. 

Mother testified that [she] was convicted of drug charges and an 

offense related to untruthfulness. Mother testified that she was in 

denial of her criminal activity for many months. Mother testified that 

she was in denial of her substance abuse for many months. 

Mother testified that she was now “recovered.” Mother testified that 

she did not need mental health therapy, although she admitted to

Social Worker Weldon that she did. Mother is out late at night. 

Mother is driving erratically. There was a traffic stop of Mother 

during the time that she was actively using and engaging in criminal 

activity in which Mother was stopped in the wee hours of the night 

driving almost 100 miles per hour. Mother is prohibited from having 

weapons in the home. Mother has guns in the home. Mother is 

prohibited from having contact with offenders. Mother was written 

up in the halfway house for unauthorized contact. Mother owns 

property with [T.W.], a known drug user and violent partner with 

whom she and he had to be consequenced for communications in 

violation of their corrections agreement. Mother again, did not stop 

until it was brought to the court’s attention on April 14, 2016, when 

she was “caught.” After she had been consequenced, she resorted

to lying, using her mother’s name to send letters and photographs 

that Mother admitted she sent at [T.W.]’s request. Mother said she 

did not need verifiable employment for her corrections officer, and 
8

he testified she did. Mother is exhibiting some of the same

indications of lying and denial as when she was actively using and 

engaging in criminal activities. Whether this is mental health, or 

engaging in criminal activity or preparation to engage in criminal 

activity, Mother is engaged in the same deception and denial as

created adjudicatory harms. These children cannot be returned to 

her care now. 

4. Whether Mother is capable of exercising a reasonable 

degree of care.

Finally, Mother’s substance abuse, criminal activity, history 

of domestic abuse, history of poor relationship choices, and 

emotional issues due to those life choices led her to come to the 

conclusion that the children would be better off in her parents’ care 

much of the time. . . . The dental care which she provided those

children caused them unnecessary pain and refusing pain 

medication from the hospital for clearly rotten teeth. Their Father 

has now met their dental needs, as well as physical and mental 

health needs. Also, the record showed that the children’s grades 

have significantly improved since the children were placed with the 

Father. Neglect of the children’s health and educational needs 

meets the definitions of adjudicatory harm under [232.2(6)](c)(2).

While Mother states that she is free from substances, has 

ceased criminal activities, is not in an abusive relationship, does not 

need mental health therapy, and can have the children return to her 

care, the record does not so reflect. Mother is out late at night. 

Mother has a relationship with a new man with a history of use. 

Mother is not in recovery for her emotional trauma from the 

marriage. 

Time will tell if Mother continues in recovery. I hope she 

does. But taking a snapshot at June 9, 2016, the boys are not able 

to return home. Mother has not progressed beyond supervised 

visits. She only has three months of sobriety outside incarceration. 

She claims she is recovered. She continued to engage in 

manipulation and deception. She continues to have relationships 

with persons with whom she had toxic and criminal relationships. 

She stays out until midnight. She has not shown that she is

considering the children first and that she can meet their needs.

The GAL asserted additional time was not warranted.

On July 18, the juvenile court entered its permanency order noting, in part:

The professionals who have been involved with the family since 

September 2014 acknowledge that both parents have a strong

bond with the children, but there is a history of [the father] and [the 

mother] placing the children in the middle of their domestic discord. 

According to the testimony [the father] has taken steps to identify
9

when those situations begin to arise and is moderating his 

behavior. There continue to be concerns, however, with [the 

mother’s] ability to set aside her animus toward [the father] when

interacting with the boys. In fact, the FSRP providers testified their 

focus with [the mother] during visits is not in providing parenting 

instruction or protecting the boys’ physical safety, but rather to 

intercede if [the mother] begins inappropriate conversations with 

the boys. All of the professionals currently working with the family 

testified that while there are no risks to the boys’ physical safety 

there continue to be concerns regarding their mental and emotional 

safety. That being said, [the current DHS social worker and FSRP 

worker] both acknowledge that those issues could be resolved or at 

least diminished to a safer level with another six months of 

services.

The court allowed the mother “additional time to work toward reunification with 

the children,” and specifically adopted 

the steps sections and recommendations sections of the case plan

filed March 8, 2016[,] as the specific factors, conditions, or 

expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the 

determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s

home will no longer exist at the end of a six-month period. 

Specifically, [the mother] shall continue participation in any aftercare recommended as a result of her completed substance abuse

treatment, continue participation in FSRP services, continue 

participation in family therapy, refrain from adult conversation with 

and around the children, participate in individual therapy as

recommended, abstain from the use of illegal drugs and alcohol, 

and participate in random drug testing.

A permanency review hearing was set for October 2016. 

In the interim, the children’s relationship with the mother deteriorated. The 

children became reluctant to attend visits with their mother. The older child 

expressed frustration with and distrust of his mother. The mother sought 

permission from DHS to introduce the children to J.R., who the older child 

understood to be involved with the local drug culture. J.R. was arrested in 

September 2016. The car J.R. was driving on the date he was arrested 

belonged to the mother. Police learned from J.R. that the mother had spent the 
10

night at J.R.’s home the night before he was arrested.6 Searches of J.R.’s house 

and the car J.R. was driving turned up drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm. 

The mother claimed she did not know about J.R.’s involvement with drugs or 

weapons before his arrest, and she informed DHS and her children she was no 

longer involved with J.R. after his arrest. However, the older child reported 

seeing her with J.R. thereafter.

The permanency review hearing was held on October 13 and December 

1, 2016. On February 17, 2017, the juvenile court entered its order. We set forth 

some of the juvenile court’s findings:

9. None of the professionals working with the family see that 

there would be any risks to the boys’ physical safety were they 

returned to [the mother]’s home (though the fact that [she] was

spending time—including overnight—with [J.R.] and that he was 

found to have syringes, methamphetamine residue and a loaded 

handgun are certainly concerning); however, there continue to be 

concerns regarding the emotional well-being of the boys should 

they be returned [the mother].

10. As recently as early October [Cl.C.] refused to attend a 

visit with [the mother] because he felt she had lied to him about her 

relationship with [J.R.] [Co.C.] has expressed he will not attend a 

visit with his mother unless [Cl.C.] is also present because he does 

not feel “safe.” ([Co.C.] is unable to articulate what he means by 

“safe,” but is adamant in not attending visits without his brother). 

[The mother] has at times had difficulty dealing with the boys’ 

feelings regarding visits, but she did appropriately channel her 

disappointment over missing the visit in early October. This may 

reflect that [the mother] is beginning to make the sorts of changes 

the professionals believe [the father] has already achieved.

11. [The social worker] reports the boys are settled at their 

father’s home, enjoy living there, and are doing well. [Cl.C.] has 

certainly made it quite clear he has made a life for himself . . . with 

his father and has no desire to return to his mother’s home. 

Though he is five years [Cl.C.]’s junior, [Co.C.] also expresses that 

 

6 Even though one condition of her probation was to have the prior consent from her 

probation officer to sleep somewhere other than the home of her parents, the mother 

had not obtained the necessary permission.
11

he does not want to return to his mother’s home. The [GAL] is 

vigorous in her support of the boys remaining with their father.

. . . .

13. It cannot be disputed that [the mother] has engaged in, 

and continues to participate in services directed for her by the 

juvenile court; however, on balance considering the recent

circumstances surrounding [J.R.’s] arrest, [the mother]’s response 

to the arrest, her decision to continue her relationship with [J.R.], 

the obvious progress and stability the boys have achieved in their 

father’s home, the lack of any concerns with placement with their 

father, the boys’ desire to remain with their father, and the 

recommendation of the guardian ad litem the evidence fails to 

establish that it would . . . [sic][7]be appropriate to allow the children 

to return to the custody of their mother at this time pursuant to Iowa 

Code Section 232.104(2)(a).

The juvenile court concluded that in light of the “length of time the boys

have been removed, the possibility they would suffer emotional harm if returned 

to [the mother], and the boys’ credibly expressed preference that they want to 

remain with their father,” “the long-term needs of the boys will best be met by 

allowing them to remain with their father.” The court changed the permanency 

goal to “placement with other parent,” placed the children in the father’s legal 

custody, and granted concurrent jurisdiction to the district court.

The mother appeals.

II. Scope and Standard of Review.

We review permanency orders de novo. In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 90 

(Iowa Ct. App. 2005). We review both the facts and the law and adjudicate rights 

anew on the issues properly presented. In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa 

2003). We give weight to the juvenile court’s findings, but we are not bound by 

them. Id. Our primary concern is the children’s best interests. Id.

 

7 This sentence contained a double negative, which in light of the ruling indicates this 

typographical error. 
12

III. Discussion.

The mother argues the State has failed to meet its burden to show the 

permanency goal should be changed from reunification with the mother.8 She 

contends the children could be returned to her at the time of the permanency 

hearing and the risk of emotional harm was not a recognized adjudicatory harm. 

She maintains the children’s “[n]ot wanting to be removed from a current 

placement is not a valid argument” and the State failed to establish the children 

were in need of permanency. In response, the GAL and the State assert the 

State met its burden to transfer custody from one parent to the other under 

section 232.104(2)(d)(2). We agree. 

Section 232.104(2) states the juvenile court’s authority “[a]fter a 

permanency hearing” and allows these alternatives:

(a) Enter an order pursuant to section 232.102 to return the 

child to the child’s home.

(b) Enter an order pursuant to section 232.102 to continue 

placement of the child for an additional six months at which time the 

court shall hold a hearing to consider modification of its 

permanency order. An order entered under this paragraph shall 

enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral 

changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the 

need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer 

exist at the end of the additional six-month period.

(c) Direct the county attorney or the attorney for the child to 

institute proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship.

(d) Enter an order, pursuant to findings required by 

subsection 4, to do one of the following:

. . . .

(2) Transfer sole custody of the child from one parent to 

another parent.

 

8

Iowa Code section 232.104(1)(a), cited by the mother, sets the “time for the initial 

permanency hearing,” which is to be held “within twelve months of the date the child was 

removed from the home.” It is inapplicable to this case. 
13

Pursuant to its authority under section 232.104(2)(d), the juvenile court 

determined the custody of the children would be transferred to the father.

We must determine whether that transfer was proper pursuant to the 

additional requirements of the section: 

Prior to entering a permanency order pursuant to subsection 

2, paragraph “d”, convincing evidence must exist showing that all of 

the following apply:

(a) A termination of the parent-child relationship would not 

be in the best interest of the child.

(b) Services were offered to the child’s family to correct the 

situation which led to the child’s removal from the home.

(c) The child cannot be returned to the child’s home.

Iowa Code § 232.104(4).

“The State on a permanency hearing needs only show the children cannot 

be returned by convincing evidence, not by both clear and convincing evidence.”

In re A.D., 489 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Iowa Ct. App.1992). We bear in mind always that 

the children’s best interests are paramount. See Iowa Code § 232.1. 

Here, convincing evidence establishes—and all parties agree—that 

termination of the mother’s parental right would not be in the children’s best 

interests and that numerous and relevant services have been offered to this

family since 2014, yet the same concerns noted by the GAL and workers 

expressed at the initial permanency hearing remain. 

The mother did not acknowledge her active use of methamphetamine until 

her second arrest in September 2015. She failed to inform her workers of a June 

2016 drug screen that tested positive until forced to do so. While we 

acknowledge the screen was disposed of before the mother could have it 

independently checked, we are more concerned with the continuation of the 
14

mother’s mindset that undermines continued sobriety. The same concerns 

expressed by DHS and the GAL at the initial permanency hearing—that the 

mother had not been able to set aside her animus toward the father and put the 

children’s needs first, and had not “internalized any tools that would cause her to 

stay clean”—remained at the time of the permanency review hearing. The 

mother’s lack of candor and her association with and defense of J.R. a month 

before the permanency review hearing are particularly troubling. See In re A.B., 

815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012) (recognizing risk of unresolved drug 

dependency); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010) (“[W]e gain insight 

into the child’s prospects by reviewing evidence of the parent’s past 

performance—for it may be indicative of the parent’s future capabilities.” (citation 

omitted)). 

The mother contends there is no evidence to support the State’s assertion 

that the children “need permanency.” Chapter 232 itself declares children need 

permanency within a specified time frame. Section 232.104(1)(a) sets the time 

for the initial permanency hearing “within twelve months of the date the child was 

removed from the home.” Under section 232.104(2)(b), the court may continue 

placement “for an additional six months,” but to do so the court must “enumerate 

the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise 

the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the 

home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Thus, 

the legislature has determined children need permanency within eighteen 

months. Cf. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000) (stating in context of 

termination proceedings, “Iowa has built this patience into the statutory scheme 
15

of Iowa Code chapter 232”). While we acknowledge that the mother has made 

progress, at the time of the permanency review hearing the children had been 

out of their mother’s custody for more than nineteen months. The children were 

doing well in their father’s care and custody, and both informed the GAL they 

wished to stay with their father. 

The mother argues the children can be returned home at this time and the 

State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence any adjudicatory harm. 

She relies upon Iowa code section 232.102(5)(a), which states, in part, that 

custody should not be transferred unless there is clear and convincing evidence 

that: “(2) The child cannot be protected from some harm which would justify the 

adjudication of the child as a child in need of assistance and an adequate 

placement is available.” But we note the supreme court has recently illuminated 

the terms of “harm” and “harmful effects”: 

Although chapter 232 does not contain a definition of 

“harmful effects,” we have noted it “pertains to the physical, mental 

or social welfare of a child.” In re Wall, 295 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Iowa 

1980). Because of this broad definition, we have found such 

effects established when there was harm to a child’s physical, 

mental, or social well-being or such harm was imminently likely to 

occur. See In re B.B., 440 N.W.2d at 597–98 (finding the State 

proved the parents’ failure to exercise a reasonable degree of care 

when a child’s lack of attendance at school “adversely affected his 

educational, social, and emotional development”); In re J.S., 427 

N.W.2d 162, 165 (Iowa 1988) (finding harmful effects as a result of 

a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising 

children given that a child was playing outside on the street while 

the parents’ home was locked and a child was “very aggressive and 

uncontrollable”).

In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 41–42 (Iowa 2014). 

Here, the social worker testified the children would be at risk of emotional 

harm if returned to their mother. The children have been put into the middle of 
16

the parents’ conflict for many years, and the mother has not made much 

progress in recognizing its emotional impact on the children. Nor does she seem 

to recognize the impact her continued association with persons such as J.R. has

on the children. We acknowledge the mother has been the victim of abuse in the 

past, but her transgression into the use of illegal drugs, involvement with J.R.,

and lack of honesty on occasion have slowed her progress. The oldest child 

especially had lost trust in his mother. The mother’s claim that she could offer 

the children stability is not convincing where she testified she lived with her 

parents who were contemplating selling their house and leaving their business at 

which the mother was employed. Continued therapy between the children and 

the mother will help their relationship, but the time has come to change custody. 

We conclude the State has met its burden.

Moreover, in this case we also have the GAL’s objection to a return of the 

children to the parent. Section 232.104(7) states:

Subsequent to the entry of a permanency order pursuant to 

this section, the child shall not be returned to the care, custody, or 

control of the child’s parent or parents, over a formal objection filed 

by the child’s attorney or guardian ad litem, unless the court finds 

by a preponderance of the evidence, that returning the child to such 

custody would be in the best interest of the child.

The GAL objected to returning the children to the mother at the initial 

permanency hearing and continued to argue strenuously against returning the 

children to the mother at the permanency review. The juvenile court found that 

returning the children to the mother would not be in their best interest. We affirm 

the juvenile court’s rulings in their entirety. 

AFFIRMED.