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VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 23-AP-340

109 State Street

Montpelier VT 05609-0801

802-828-4774

www.vermontjudiciary.org

ENTRY ORDER

NOVEMBER TERM, 2023

State of Vermont v. William Farnsworth* } APPEALED FROM:

}

}

Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,

Criminal Division

} CASE NO. 23-CR-08640

Trial Judge: A. Gregory Rainville

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Defendant William Farnsworth appeals from the superior court’s denial of his request to 

modify his conditions of release to remove Condition 4, requiring supervision by a court-approved 

responsible adult. He requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s decision and hold either that 

the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to lift the condition or that the condition violates the 

Vermont Constitution. Because we find that the trial court’s decision was supported by the 

proceedings, and because defendant did not raise his constitutional argument below, we affirm. 

The State’s probable cause affidavit alleges the following. On September 2, 2023, police 

responded to a domestic disturbance call at the alleged victim’s residence, where defendant had 

recently been staying. The alleged victim told police that after a verbal dispute, defendant pinned 

her against a cabinet, squeezed her neck causing her vision to go blurry, and then punched her after 

she attempted to fight back. She also informed police that her two juvenile children, including her 

and defendant’s nineteen-month-old child, were present in the house during the incident but were in 

a different room. Defendant denied the allegations, but told the officer that he would not leave 

willingly and intimated that he had previously fought with police officers. 

Defendant was arrested and charged with one count of aggravated domestic assault in 

violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1043(a)(1). At defendant’s September 5, 2023, arraignment, the court set 

several conditions of release, including restrictions on contact with the alleged victim, a twenty-fourhour curfew, and supervision by a court-approved responsible adult. Defendant remains 

incarcerated because he has been unable to identify a responsible adult to supervise his release.

At the time of his arrest, defendant was also on parole for an unrelated offense. Defendant’s 

criminal record shows that he has previously been convicted of two felonies and fifteen 

misdemeanors, and that he has two failures to appear and four convictions for violations of court 

orders or conditions. As a result of the arrest, defendant was detained for an alleged parole 

violation. At the parole violation hearing on October 17, 2023, the parole board determined that 
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defendant would be released, pending a second hearing on November 1, 2023, which was later 

continued to December. The board imposed its own conditions on his release, including a twentyfour-hour curfew, release to an approved residence, and placement on GPS and SCRAM electronic 

monitoring devices. However, the parole board’s conditions did not include a requirement for 

supervision by a court-approved responsible adult. 

On October 18, 2023, defendant motioned the trial court to amend the conditions of release 

to remove the responsible adult condition. At the motion hearing held on October 20, 2023, 

defendant averred that he had a time-sensitive residence available through Pathways Vermont, that 

he would be subject to GPS and SCRAM alcohol monitoring under the parole board’s order, and 

that he had retained a case manager at Therapeutic Works, Inc. to provide additional support. 

Because of the additional supervision provided by Therapeutic Works and the GPS and SCRAM 

monitoring, defendant argued that the responsible adult condition was no longer the least restrictive 

condition of release required by 13 V.S.A. § 7554(a)(2). 

In an initial oral ruling, the court denied defendant’s request to modify the conditions of 

release. The court reasoned that because of defendant’s long history of “violent behavior and 

violations of probation and court orders,” the responsible adult condition remained necessary. 

Defendant immediately appealed the denial to this Court. 

The trial court then issued a written order on October 23, 2023, reiterating the denial of the 

motion and providing further rationale. The court concluded that defendant was a risk of flight 

because of his “lengthy criminal record, with several failures to appear and multiple violations of 

court orders.” It also found that defendant was a danger to the community because “[h]e has 

accumulated approximately eight convictions for assaultive crimes, including several felony and over 

a dozen misdemeanor convictions.” Because of defendant’s “demonstrated penchant for refusing to 

comply with conditions and for engaging in violent behavior,” the court reasoned that the 

responsible adult condition remained the “least restrictive means to mitigate the risk of flight and 

reasonably ensure the protection of the public.” Defendant then filed a second notice of appeal on 

October 27, 2023, requesting that we consider both the oral and written decisions on the motion. 

We granted defendant’s request and consolidated the two appeals. 

In his appeal of the trial court’s order, defendant makes two arguments. First, he contends 

that the imposition of a responsible adult condition on a defendant who has no suitable third party 

to fill the role amounts to an unconstitutional preventative detention. He further argues that he has 

been denied the rights available to those held without bail, including the right to a weight-of-theevidence hearing. Second, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 

requested amendment when he had put forth a well-developed, less restrictive alternative release 

plan. 

As a preliminary matter, we decline to address defendant’s first argument because it was not 

properly preserved before the trial court. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must raise the 

issue with “specificity and clarity in a manner which gives the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on

it.” State v. Ben-Mont Corp., 163 Vt. 53, 61 (1994). “Failure to preserve issues below results in 

waiver, even of constitutional issues.” Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2010 VT 98, ¶ 28, 189 Vt. 

518. Defense counsel here conceded during argument that he did not directly raise the 

constitutional argument before the trial court, and the transcript confirms that there was no mention 

of the argument that the responsible adult condition violated the Vermont Constitution. The closest 
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defendant came to making this argument was counsel’s statement that “we don’t have a responsible 

adult to put forward today, and I’m not sure that we will be able to locate one.” But this statement 

by itself did not raise the constitutional issue with “specificity and clarity” such that the trial court 

had “a fair opportunity to rule on it.” Ben-Mont Corp., 163 Vt. at 61. Therefore, we decline to 

address this issue. 

Second, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 

amendment to the conditions of release. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding bail 

and conditions of release for abuse of discretion. State v. Hance, 2006 VT 97, ¶ 6, 180 Vt. 357. We 

will affirm an order denying amendment of conditions of release “if it is supported by the 

proceedings below.” 13 V.S.A. § 7556(b); see State v. Bailey, 2017 VT 18, ¶ 6, 204 Vt. 294. 

Vermont’s bail statutes create a “starting presumption . . . [of] pretrial release on personal 

recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond.” State v. Pratt, 2017 VT 9, ¶ 10, 204 Vt. 282; see 

13 V.S.A. § 7554(a). However, where a court finds that these conditions will not “reasonably 

mitigate the risk of flight,” it may impose the “least restrictive” condition or set of conditions that 

will reasonably achieve this goal. Id. § 7554(a)(1). In determining which conditions of release to 

impose, the court must consider the following factors:

the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; the weight of 

the evidence against the accused; the accused’s employment; financial 

resources, including the accused’s ability to post bail; the accused’s 

character and mental condition; the accused’s length of residence in 

the community; and the accused’s record of appearance at court 

proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at 

court proceedings. 

Id. § 7554(b)(1). If the court further determines that the conditions imposed to mitigate the risk of 

flight will “not reasonably protect the public,” it may additionally impose the “least restrictive”

condition or conditions that will reasonably achieve that goal. Id. § 7554(a)(2). In making this 

determination, the court must take into account the same factors as listed above, as well as the 

defendant’s family ties and record of convictions. Id. at § 7554(b)(2). The court may also consider 

the defendant’s recent history of violence or threats of violence. Id. 

We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the responsible 

adult condition remained the least restrictive condition to reasonably mitigate the risk of flight and 

protect the public. The court determined that defendant was a risk of flight, that the conditions 

imposed under 13 V.S.A. § 7554(a)(1) were insufficient to reasonably ensure protection of the 

public, and that the responsible adult condition was the least restrictive condition that would 

reasonably ensure protection of the public. In determining that defendant was a risk of flight, the 

trial court noted defendant’s extensive criminal record, his failures to appear, his violations of court 

orders, his violations of probation, and the crime that he was charged with. And in determining that 

defendant posed a danger to the public, the court considered his prior convictions, including 

multiple violent offenses, his parole violations, and the alleged victim’s expressed fear of retribution. 

Defendant does not identify additional factors that the court failed to consider. 

The trial court also considered and rejected the alternative plan offered by defendant. The 

court found that GPS and SCRAM monitoring did not provide a sufficient substitute for monitoring 
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by a responsible adult. In making this determination, the court referenced a previous decision of 

this court in which we suggested that electronic monitoring provides less protection for the public 

than direct supervision. See State v. Labrecque, 2022 VT 6, ¶ 24, 216 Vt. 589. The court also noted 

that defendant’s past violations have often involved the abuse of alcohol and concluded that,

because alcohol is ubiquitous, there was a significant risk to the public absent direct supervision. We

agree that direct supervision provides a somewhat greater level of security under these 

circumstances. And given the standard of review, we will not disturb the court’s conclusion that this 

level of supervision remains the least restrictive means that will reasonably ensure protection of the 

public. 

The trial court’s findings were supported by the record and based on the statutory factors, 

and its conclusion was adequately supported by the proceedings below. It considered and rejected 

the alternative plan offered by defendant, finding that defendant’s plan offered less protection to the 

public and that the original conditions of release remained the least restrictive means that would 

reasonably ensure protection of the public. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in 

denying defendant’s request for relief. 

Affirmed.

FOR THE COURT:

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice