United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

June 1996 PRECISION-GUIDED

MUNITIONS

Acquisition Plans for

the Joint Air-to-Surface

Standoff Missile

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-144

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260439 

June 28, 1996

Congressional Committees

The Air Force and Navy are developing the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff

Missile (JASSM) to attack, at nearly any time, high-value, well-defended

targets while allowing the launch aircraft to stay outside the range of

enemy defenses. We reviewed the JASSM acquisition plan under our basic

legislative responsibilities because (1) the program has congressional

interest, (2) it is a major acquisition program, and (3) we wanted to

determine how the Air Force plans to overcome the difficulties in meeting

stringent requirements similar to those of the canceled Tri-Service

Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM). This report, which contains a matter for

congressional consideration, is addressed to you because your committees

have jurisdiction over this area.

This report discusses (1) the Air Force’s plan to use a new acquisition

process that balances capability and affordability requirements for

acquiring JASSM, (2) schedule and cost risks because of the immaturity of

essential technology and the complexity of integrating JASSM with multiple

aircraft, (3) the Air Force’s plan to acquire 35 pilot production missiles

early in development that may not be needed, and (4) the need to

strengthen the Navy’s commitment to the program.

Background In 1986, the Air Force began developing TSSAM to provide a low observable

conventional cruise missile. Key characteristics included long-range,

autonomous guidance, automatic target recognition, and precision

accuracy with a warhead able to destroy a well-protected structure. After

the TSSAM procurement unit cost increased from an estimated $728,000 in

1986 to $2,062,000 in 1994 (then-year dollars), the Department of Defense

(DOD) terminated the program.

Following a comprehensive reassessment of force requirements, the Air

Force and Navy agreed they urgently needed an affordable missile with

most of TSSAM’s characteristics. They proposed a joint program that would

build upon the lessons learned from TSSAM and more recent programs that

use new acquisition approaches. On September 20, 1995, the Principal

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology

approved the initiation of the JASSM program, under Air Force leadership. It

is to be developed, produced, and initially deployed over the next 5 years.

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The Air Force’s April 1996 schedule for JASSM development and early

production calls for

• a 24-month competitive program definition and risk reduction phase

beginning in June 1996 (milestone I);

• a 32-month engineering and manufacturing development phase beginning

in June 1998 (milestone II);

• production of 75 low-rate initial production missiles beginning in

January 2000;

• production of 90 full-rate production missiles beginning in April 2001

(milestone III); and

• initial JASSM deployment in June 2001.

Figure 1 shows the Air Force’s schedule for JASSM development, missile

deliveries, and testing.

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Figure 1: JASSM Schedule

Event

Development


Pre-engineering & 


 manufacturing development


Engineering & 


 manufacturing development


Critical design review

Missile Deliveries


15 test missiles


22 test missiles


35 pilot production


1st capability


Low-rate initial production


Full-rate production


Testing


Contractor development 


 test & evaluation


Combined development 


 test/operational test


Initial operational 


 test & evaluation

1996

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

(15)

(22)

(35)

(75)

(90)

(9)

(14)

(4)

a

b

Fiscal year

aA critical design review is conducted to determine that the detailed design satisfies performance

and engineering required of the development specification.

bFirst capability is the first attainment of the minimum capability to effectively employ a weapon of

approved specific characteristics and which is manned or operated by an adequately trained,

equipped, and supported military unit or force.

The estimated development cost for the JASSM program is $675 million

(fiscal year 1995 dollars). The Air Force plans to buy about 2,400 missiles

at an average unit procurement price of $400,000 to $700,000 (fiscal year

1995 dollars). Based on these unit prices, we estimate the procurement

cost for 2,400 Air Force missiles is $960 million to $1.68 billion, and the

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total estimated acquisition cost (development and procurement) is 

$1.64 billion to $2.36 billion.1

 The Congress appropriated $25 million to

start the JASSM program in fiscal year 1996, and the President’s fiscal year

1997 budget includes $198.6 million for the program.

Results in Brief The central theme of the JASSM program is to use acquisition reforms and

commercial practices to obtain the best value for the government by

meeting the users’ requirements for a long-range standoff weapon at an

affordable cost. We agree with this theme. However, we are concerned

that procurement reforms will not be sufficient to overcome the technical

challenges of producing a viable and affordable system in the desired time

frames. The program plan calls for developing and initially deploying the

Air Force’s most capable precision-guided munition in 5 years for no more

than $700,000 a missile. It seems optimistic when compared to the cost

experience for other less-capable precision-guided munitions in DOD’s

inventory or development. During the 24-month competition, the Air Force

intends to use its new management strategies to address these schedule

and cost risks before advancing into the final development, testing, and

initial production phases. Considering today’s less threatening security

environment and the capabilities of other missile systems in DOD’s

inventory, more time, if needed, may be available to minimize these risks

before low-rate initial production.

Compared to past programs with similar goals, the JASSM acquisition plan

contains schedule and cost risk. Specifically, the plan does not appear to

allow enough time to develop and test the complex technology needed for

autonomous guidance and automatic target recognition, and then integrate

the missile into the aircraft planned to carry it. Even though attempts were

made throughout an 8-year period, to integrate TSSAM with these same

aircraft, not one aircraft was certified to carry the missile during that

period.

The Air Force’s plan to manufacture 35 pilot production missiles early in

development increases schedule risk and results in buying developmental

missiles for about $25 million that are not needed to support the planned

test program.

Even though JASSM is a joint Air Force-Navy program, the Navy’s

commitment to the program is uncertain. JASSM is to be designed for use at

1

These cost estimates do not include the costs for Navy missiles because the Navy has not yet

established its procurement plans for JASSM.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-144 Precision-Guided Munitions
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sea, but no Navy funds are committed to its development, no requirement

exists to integrate the missile with the Navy’s F/A-18 aircraft during

development, and no Navy missiles are included in the planned production

quantity. In March 1996, the Chief of Naval Operations committed to

providing funds for F/A-18 integration, but this is not expected to occur

during JASSM development.

New Acquisition

Process Being Used

The JASSM Single Acquisition Management Plan has an overriding theme of

affordability. To provide the required capability at an affordable cost, the

Air Force plans to use a series of new acquisition processes and encourage

industry to use commercial practices to lower the missile’s price and

speed its deployment.

To accomplish these challenging goals, the Air Force intends to establish a

unique partnership with industry. In contrast to its past practice, the Air

Force intends to minimize (1) the requirements to use military

specifications and standards and (2) government oversight. The JASSM

request for proposal, for example, is significantly shorter than for TSSAM

and other past missile acquisition programs, focuses on the desired

capability, and does not tell industry how to develop the missile. The Air

Force intends to offer industry the maximum possible flexibility to apply

commercial practices and innovation. During the 24-month competitive

phase, JASSM program office personnel plan to join with contractor

personnel to form problem-solving teams and help facilitate the

development of the proposed missile design.

The JASSM contractors are expected to modify an existing missile design,

use available off-the-shelf technology, and use a variety of commercial

business and technical practices. The use of commercial practices has

been stressed to all potential JASSM developers. These initiatives are

intended to lower development, production, and operational support

costs, as well as reduce the time needed to develop and produce the

system. The principal focus of the 24-month competition, for example, is

to eliminate unnecessary cost and allow the contractors to trade off

performance and other requirements. JASSM cost is as important as

technical performance and schedule. Another innovation is that the

contractor is expected to provide a lifetime, total system warranty for each

missile.

A similar approach using reforms and commercial practices is being used

in a pilot program to acquire the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).

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Under this pilot program, the Air Force is developing a guidance system

and steerable tail kit to significantly improve the accuracy of 1,000- and

2,000-pound general purpose bombs that are currently in its inventory. The

JDAM program office is projecting at least a 50-percent reduction in the

baseline average unit procurement price, which includes the cost of a full

system warranty.

Essential Technology

May Not Be Ready

Although the Air Force plans to rely upon existing missile designs and

off-the-shelf technology to speed JASSM development, essential guidance

and automatic target recognition technologies are not mature. The 

2 to 3 years available before JASSM flight testing may not be sufficient time

to fully develop, integrate, and test these complex subsystems. Because

these technologies are essential to meeting the program’s requirements,

their successful development is one of the pacing items of the program.

Reliable Guidance Systems JASSM is expected to use an inertial navigation system integrated with a

global positioning system receiver to navigate from its launch point to the

target area. This navigation system is expected to be low-cost, reliable, and

accurate to about 13 meters. Global positioning system receivers,

however, are vulnerable to both intentional and unintentional interference,

including jamming. Recent studies by DOD and the Air Force describe how

properly placed jammers can cause an unprotected global positioning

system-aided weapon to entirely miss its target. One problem facing the

engineering community is defining the potential jamming threat so that a

cost-effective countermeasure can be developed.

Although the Air Force is evaluating electronic and other countermeasures

to develop an antijam capability, it appears a combination of techniques

may be needed to ensure reliable and accurate missile guidance. Specially

designed antennas and more rapid connection with global positioning

system satellites are among the techniques being considered. The Defense

Science Board recommended that DOD develop more accurate inertial

navigation systems that do not rely on a global positioning system as

much. The high cost of potential antijam devices or more accurate

navigational systems has limited their use in precision-guided munitions.

An Air Force laboratory is conducting a program to develop and test a

global positioning system antijam system suitable for precision-guided

munitions such as JDAM. Development of the antijam system began in 1995,

and it is scheduled to be tested in fiscal year 1998. Assuming the threat

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uncertainties are resolved and the antijam system’s cost is acceptable, it

could initially be added to JDAM. It may also be adaptable to JASSM and

other precision-guided munitions. With this schedule, however, this

system may not be available in time to meet JASSM’s June 1998 critical

design freeze when the missile design is to be finalized.

Automatic Target

Recognition

JASSM requires an automatic target recognition system for a true

fire-and-forget2

 precision attack capability under adverse weather

conditions. Other programs, such as the Tomahawk, are trying to develop

this technology, but no precision-guided munition available today has that

capability. Although navigating to the target using a global positioning

system-aided preprogrammed flight plan is a well-understood technology,

reliably finding the target, and specifically, the desired aim-point without

the aid of a pilot remains an unfilled DOD requirement. Precision accuracy

in smoke, fog, and adverse weather conditions is a critical aspect of this

technology that remains to be demonstrated in an operational system.

Affordability and reliability are also important issues.

The three basic sensor technologies that have been evaluated in laboratory

studies are imaging infrared, laser radar, and synthetic aperture radar. All

three appear suitable for JASSM, with laser and synthetic aperture radar

technologies offering better adverse weather performance and easier, less

costly mission planning. None of them, however, are mature enough to

incorporate into an existing design today. All would require, in the opinion

of Wright Laboratory engineers, intensive development in an actual

weapon system program like JASSM to become a fully operational system

ready for production. Wright Laboratory and JASSM program engineers

estimated 2 to 3 years would be needed to develop, integrate, and flight

test this technology. With a June 1998 design freeze, this does not appear

to support the JASSM development schedule.

According to JASSM program office officials, synthetic aperture radar

technology could not be available in time for JASSM, and the availability of

laser radar technology is questionable. They said an imaging infrared radar

could be ready and is a likely candidate for JASSM. Based on our analyses of

other programs, including TSSAM, developing imaging infrared technology

and its associated mission planning elements in 2 years will be difficult. In

an autonomous guidance system using an imaging infrared sensor, the

system tries to match the sensor-detected image to a computer image of

2

Fire and forget is a term applied to a weapon system that does not require operator assistance to

guide it once it is fired.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-144 Precision-Guided Munitions
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the target obtained earlier. Because the system relies on light intensity

variation, the time of day, time of year, and atmospheric conditions are

important and sometimes difficult to manage. Extensive laboratory testing

by the Air Force has shown that such systems are error prone and

unreliable. Also, the key problems of mission planning have not yet been

satisfactorily resolved.

Aircraft Integration

Approach Adds Cost

and Schedule Risk

JASSM is to ultimately be carried by a variety of Air Force and Navy aircraft,

including F-16, F-15, and F/A-18 fighters and B-52H, B-1B, and B-2

bombers. Because these aircraft have different structural and electrical

systems, JASSM must be designed to be compatible with all of them. For

example, the missile can weigh no more than 2,250 pounds based on a F-16

and F/A-18 carriage limitation. The missile can be no longer than 

168 inches for it to fit on the B-1B’s internal launcher. It must also be

compatible with different electrical circuits and software systems

applicable to the various aircraft launch platforms.

Integrating a missile with multiple aircraft is a complex task and has taken

other programs years of wind tunnel testing, fit checks, electrical and

software analyses, and extensive flight testing. Numerous changes, for

example, were made to TSSAM to accommodate the idiosyncracies of the

same aircraft that are planned to carry JASSM. Attempts to integrate TSSAM

with these same aircraft occurred over 8 years, yet not one aircraft was

certified to carry the missile during that period. Availability of suitable test

aircraft and stable electrical and software configurations were among the

problems slowing the integration of TSSAM. The JASSM program office

identified these same problems as potential risk areas.

To speed JASSM’s development, the Air Force has decided to initially

integrate the missile only with F-16 and B-52H aircraft. Later, as funds are

available, separate programs are to complete integration with the

remaining aircraft. While the program manager expects this plan to reduce

the complexity of the integration task during JASSM development, we

believe it adds technical risk and undisclosed future costs. Technical risk

remains because compatibility evaluations are not sufficient to identify all

potential integration issues. Also, the costs of integrating JASSM on several

other aircraft (i.e., F-15, F/A-18, B-1B, and B-2) are not included in the

$675-million development cost estimate. Moreover, as currently planned,

postponing these difficult tasks until after the government and contractor

development team is dispersed risks losing essential experience and

expertise.

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Some Developmental

Missiles May Not Be

Needed

The Air Force plans to buy 72 JASSMs during development and 75 during

low-rate initial production. Of the 72 developmental missiles, 37 are to

support the development test program, including initial operational test

and evaluation, and 35 are to be pilot production missiles to demonstrate

that the contractor can repeatedly produce quality missiles for no more

than an average unit price of $700,000 (fiscal year 1995 dollars). If the Air

Force revised its JASSM acquisition schedule and used the low-rate initial

production missiles for proving the production process and for initial

operational test and evaluation, it could reduce the number of

developmental missiles and save about $25 million.

The Air Force plans to begin manufacturing the 35 pilot production

missiles in November 1998, or soon after the start of the 32-month

development and testing phase. Conducting pilot production early in the

development phase, however, increases schedule risk and may result in

manufacturing missiles requiring design and production process changes

after production begins. A similar pilot production program was used for

the Advanced Cruise Missile program, and none of those missiles were

similar enough to the final configuration that they could be updated and

deployed at a reasonable cost. In the case of the Advanced Cruise Missile

program, as the flight test program identified design and manufacturing

deficiencies, many changes were made to the missile’s guidance set,

sensor, actuators, and other subsystems; the program’s schedule slipped;

and projected costs increased.

According to DOD Regulation 5000.2, low-rate initial production is the

minimum quantity necessary to (1) provide production-configured or

representative articles for operational tests, (2) establish an initial

production base for the system, and (3) permit an orderly increase in the

production rate for the system sufficient to lead to full-rate production

upon successful completion of operational testing. The regulation,

therefore, contemplates that low-rate initial production missiles can be

used for proving the production process and for initial operational test and

evaluation. As now planned, however, 9 of the 37 developmental missiles

will be used for initial operational test and evaluation and the 75 low-rate

initial production missiles will be delivered only after this testing is

completed. The 35 pilot production missiles, after proving the production

line, will be used for additional testing, if needed, and to establish an early

operational capability.

If the JASSM acquisition plan is revised to eliminate the 35 pilot production

missiles, the Air Force could reduce some of the overlap between

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development and production, as well as the associated cost and schedule

risk. Also, using low-rate initial production missiles would reduce the

number of development test missiles required. Each of the early missiles is

expected to cost approximately $700,000; eliminating the 35 pilot

production missiles would reduce development cost by about $25 million.

JASSM Unit Price

Goal Is Optimistic

To ensure that JASSM is affordable, the Air Force established an average

unit procurement price goal ranging from $400,000 to $700,000 (fiscal year

1995 dollars). The $400,000 price is the program objective, while the

$700,000 price is the threshold beyond which the Air Force would

reevaluate continuing the program. We support the Air Force’s objective to

acquire an affordable and capable replacement for TSSAM. However, we are

concerned that the JASSM price is optimistic and could lead to acquisition

problems as the program proceeds.

As a critical parameter for the JASSM program, the average unit

procurement price is firm and not expected to increase. In fact, the

program manager has challenged interested contractors to achieve the

$400,000 objective price, if possible. The Air Force believes the price

objective is achievable if (1) JASSM is derived from an existing missile in a

competitive environment and (2) the Air Force and contractor are able to

realize savings by implementing acquisition reforms and using best

commercial practices. The program office prepared a cost estimate that

supports the $700,000 threshold price, and the Office of the Secretary of

Defense is reviewing the estimate.

Attaining a price within the $400,000 to $700,000 range will be the focus of

the 24-month competition when the contractors are to trade off

performance and other requirements to obtain the most cost-effective

system possible. A similar process was used in the JDAM program, a

guidance and steerable tail kit for general purpose bombs. The JDAM

program office expects to reduce the average unit procurement price by at

least 50 percent.

Price goals were also proposed for other missile programs. For many of

them, however, the average production unit price grew as the program

matured. For example, the production unit price for TSSAM increased from

an estimated $728,0003

 to about $2.1 million (then-year dollars). Although

TSSAM’s production price grew more than other programs, many of those

we examined experienced cost growth.

3

The production unit cost goal was $405,000 (fiscal year 1984 dollars) when proposed.

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Our comparison of the estimated unit prices for several missiles in DOD’s

inventory and development disclosed that JASSM is expected to cost less

yet provide significantly greater capability. Several precision-guided

munitions in inventory and development cost more than the $700,000

average procurement price established for the JASSM program. Yet, none of

these missiles have the automatic target recognition capability required for

JASSM, which is expected to contribute significantly to the system’s cost.

Missile systems that most closely approximate the capability expected of

JASSM, such as the Navy’s Tomahawk and the Standoff Land Attack

Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) missiles, cost significantly more.

Others, such as the Air Force’s AGM-130 and AGM-142, do not have the

range, accuracy, or carrier flexibility required for JASSM, yet they cost

about the same as the JASSM threshold price or more. Also, none of these

missiles has the lifetime, full service warranty planned for JASSM.

Containing cost growth on other missile programs has led to some of the

following acquisition problems:

• reduced performance and system capability,

• postponement of key capabilities until a later production block or

modification program,

• reduced procurement quantities and higher unit price, and

• initiation of other programs to meet unfilled requirements.

In time, cumulative efforts to reduce costs led to contractor, user, and

congressional dissatisfaction. Some programs were cut back significantly,

while others were terminated. The TSSAM program, for example, was

terminated after nearly 8 years and $4.4 billion were invested, because of

significant development difficulties and growth in its expected unit cost.

Based on this extensive history of overrunning initial cost estimates, it is

incumbent for DOD to watch this program closely.

Navy Commitment Is

Uncertain

Although JASSM is a joint Air Force and Navy program, the Navy has not

provided development funding and, until March 1996, did not require

carrier operability. Also, integration with the F/A-18 is not planned during

the development program. Further, none of the 2,400 missiles planned for

procurement are intended for Navy use. This brings the Navy commitment

into question.

For JASSM to be carried on, stored within, and launched from an aircraft

carrier or other ship, it must meet Navy environmental and supportability

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-144 Precision-Guided Munitions
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requirements. These requirements are significantly more demanding than

those for a land-based missile system. They must be designed into the

missile system. Adding them later, according to the program office, would

require a basic redesign of the system and a production block change.

Until recently, these characteristics were optional, but, after a March 1996

meeting between DOD, service, and contractor personnel, carrier

operability became a firm requirement and is to be designed into JASSM.

Integrating JASSM with the F/A-18 is not scheduled during the development

program. This integration issue was debated by the Air Force and Navy

during the formation of the JASSM acquisition plan. The issues appear to be

funding, availability of test aircraft, and increased complexity of the

development program. In March 1996, the Chief of Naval Operations

committed to providing funds for F/A-18 integration, but this is not

expected to occur during JASSM development.

Rapid Deployment

May Not Be So Urgent

To meet the Air Force’s urgent need for JASSM, the program’s development

and initial production is scheduled to achieve an initial deployment of the

weapon system in late 2001, or about 5 years after the start of the program.

While no other missile in DOD’s inventory provides all the capabilities

planned for JASSM, several in inventory or development offer significant

capability, particularly for the Navy. Accordingly, the services may have

more time, if necessary, to develop and test JASSM without excessive

schedule risk.

The JASSM Mission Need Statement identifies an urgent need for a new

missile, because current air-launched standoff weapons are very limited in

number and do not provide the required capability. The Operational

Requirements Document states that JASSM should provide the following

required capabilities:

• long standoff range,

• autonomous guidance,

• precision accuracy,

• automatic target recognition,

• ability to destroy fixed hard and soft targets,4

• carriage by the primary fighter and bomber aircraft, and

• survivability.

4

Fixed hard targets include bridges, port facilities, hardened aircraft shelters, underground command

posts, and bunkers; fixed soft targets include factories and manufacturing sites, general purpose

buildings, roads, and rail yards.

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According to Air Force officials at the Air Combat Command, JASSM is

urgently needed because (1) the Command expected to have TSSAM in the

year 2000; (2) until JASSM is deployed, Air Force bombers and fighters will

have only a limited number of long-range missiles; and (3) available

weapons are unable to destroy enemy command and control operations

and integrated air defenses with acceptable attrition rates. Until this need

is met, Command officials believe less cost-effective and less-capable

alternatives will have to be used, resulting in potentially higher attrition

rates for both the weapons and launch platforms.

Although no existing weapon has all the characteristics planned for JASSM,

several precision-guided munitions in the inventory or development have

some of them. For example, the SLAM-ER5

 will provide much of the range

planned for JASSM. SLAM-ER does not have an automatic target recognition

capability, but can achieve precision accuracy with pilot assistance. The

Tomahawk missile, widely used during Desert Storm, can be launched

hundreds of miles from a target to attack a specific building. The Navy has

several thousand Tomahawk missiles in its inventory, and an improved

version is being developed. Table 1 shows the characteristics and

quantities of precision-guided munitions in inventory and development.6

5

The SLAM-ER is an upgrade and retrofit to the baseline SLAM. It will maintain baseline SLAM

capability while improving performance in the areas of launch and control, aircraft survivability,

immunity to countermeasures and probability of kill against hardened targets. SLAM-ER is also

expected to provide improved range, hard target penetration and user interfaces for both mission

planning and aircraft integration.

6

For further information on these and other precision-guided munitions, see Weapons Acquisition:

Precision-Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production, and Development (GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 23,

1995).

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Table 1: Precision-Guided Munition Characteristics and Quantities

Characteristics

Missile system Range Guidance Warhead type Carrier Quantity

Inventory systems

AGM-130 over 15 nm Television and

infrared with

man-in-loopa

2000-pound

general purpose

F-15E , F-111 602

AGM-142 (Have Nap) over 15 nm Television and

infrared with

man-in-loop

750-pound

blast/fragmentation

or penetrator

B-52H about 130

AGM-86C (CALCM) over 350 nm Autonomous Blast/

fragmentation

B-52H over 200

AGM-84E (SLAM) over 60 nm GPS/INS plus IIR

with man-in-loop

Blast/

fragmentation

F/A-18 767

Tomahawk C/D over 350 nm Autonomous Unitary or

submunition

Ships, submarines 3,405

Developmental systems

JASSM over 60 nm Autonomous Blast/

fragmentation and

penetrator

F-16, 

B-52H

2,400

AGM-154 (JSOW) over 15 nm GPS/INS with

man-in-loop

Blast/

fragmentation, or

penetrator

F/A-18,

AV-8B,

P3, S3

23,800

SLAM-ER over 60 nm GPS/INS plus IIR

with man-in-loop

Blast/

fragmentation

F/A-18 700b

Legend

nm = nautical miles

GPS/INS = global positioning system/inertial navigation system

IIR = imaging infrared

aDOD uses the term “man-in-the-loop” when the operator can manually guide the munition to the

target.

bThe Navy plans to upgrade and retrofit 700 of the 767 baseline SLAMs to the SLAM-ER

configuration.

In addition to developing JASSM, the Air Force and Navy are buying and/or

modifying additional precision-guided munitions. For example, the Navy

plans to modify 700 SLAMs to the SLAM-ER version, which is planned to have

greater standoff range, lethality, and accuracy than SLAM. About 1,000

Harpoon missiles could also be upgraded to SLAM-ER missiles if they are

needed. The Air Force has increased its procurement of AGM-142 and

AGM-130 missiles and is modifying 200 nuclear Air-Launched Cruise

Missiles to the conventional configuration.

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Although none of these weapons have all the characteristics planned for

JASSM, the precision-guided munitions in the inventory and those planned

to be added to the inventory in the next few years provide a strong

capability for U.S. forces. Since several of these weapons were not

available previously, this capability will be more effective than that used

during the successful air campaign of Desert Storm.

Recommendations The difficulties of developing critical technologies and the potential of

cost growth, as well as our view that this missile is not urgently needed,

are real concerns. To minimize them, we believe that the progress of this

program should be managed by accomplishment of significant events and

not just to meet a tight time schedule. Therefore, we recommend that the

Secretary of Defense ensure that (1) required autonomous guidance and

automatic target recognition technologies are mature before finalizing the

JASSM design, (2) the Air Force does not acquire the 35 pilot production

missiles early in development without a demonstrated need for additional

test missiles, (3) missiles used during planned initial operational test and

evaluation are production-representative missiles, and (4) the Navy

participates fully in the program so the final JASSM design meets both Air

Force and Navy requirements.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with three of the four

recommendations. It agreed to ensure that essential technology is mature

before finalizing the JASSM design, production-representative missiles are

used for initial operational test and evaluation, and the Navy participates

fully in the program so that the JASSM design meets the needs of both

services.

DOD did not agree with our recommendation that the Air Force not acquire

the 35 pilot production missiles early in the development phase without a

demonstrated need for more test missiles. DOD stated that the Air Force’s

plans to use these missiles for maturing the production process, for certain

tests, for flight test spares, and for an early deployment option were

justified.

Although we agree the pilot production missiles can serve all of these

purposes, without a sense of urgency for fielding this weapon, we are not

convinced that spending about $25 million for these missiles so early in

the program is necessary. Early pilot production increases the risk of

manufacturing missiles that require significant changes to make them

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-144 Precision-Guided Munitions
B-260439 

deployable. We further believe DOD would be better served if low-rate

initial production missiles were used instead. Low-rate initial production

missiles can serve all of the purposes identified by the Air Force for the 35

pilot production missiles, and they can be deployed.

The DOD response is included in appendix I.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

Because the Air Force’s plan to manufacture 35 pilot production missiles

early in development increases schedule risk and results in buying

developmental missiles that are not needed to support the planned test

program, the Congress may wish to consider not providing the estimated

$25 million for the 35 pilot production missiles.

Scope and

Methodology

We reviewed Air Force and Navy requirements documents that are the

basis for the JASSM program. We then reviewed the JASSM acquisition plans

to determine if the program will fulfill the requirement. We reviewed

historical cost data on existing missile systems to determine how planned

acquisition costs compared to actual production costs.

We identified Air Force and Navy precision-guided munitions that are in

production or about to go into production to determine what interim

capability will be available until JASSM becomes operational.

We discussed precision-guided munition technology with research

engineers to find out what capabilities are available now and what is still

in development. We interviewed Air Force and Navy personnel concerning

requirements and acquisition. We visited or spoke with personnel at the

following locations:

• JASSM Program Office, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;

• Air Force Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;

• Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia;

• Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;

• Wright Laboratories, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; and

• Wright Laboratories, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

We conducted our review between January 1995 and March 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-144 Precision-Guided Munitions
B-260439 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Air

Force, and the Navy; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and

other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon

request.

Please contact Thomas J. Schulz, Associate Director, Defense Acquisitions

Issues at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning

this report. Major contributors to this report were Raymond Dunham,

Matthew R. Mongin, and Gerald W. Wood.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-144 Precision-Guided Munitions
B-260439 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-144 Precision-Guided Munitions
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-144 Precision-Guided Munitions
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-144 Precision-Guided Munitions
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 15.

Now on p. 15.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-144 Precision-Guided Munitions
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 15.

Now on p. 15.

(707107) Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-144 Precision-Guided Munitions
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