In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-17-00099-CR

JESSE LEE DIAMOND, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 354th District Court

Hunt County, Texas

Trial Court No. 29396

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

After Jesse Lee Diamond had been placed on one-year deferred adjudication community 

supervision for unauthorized discharge reckless endangerment,1the State moved to adjudicate 

Diamond’s guilt,2and the trial court adjudicated Diamond guilty and sentenced him to one year in 

county jail. 

Diamond appeals the trial court’s judgment of conviction, urging claims that the trial court 

erred in accepting his unknowing and involuntary pleas of true to the State’s alleged violations and 

that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings of true without considering 

Diamond’s erroneously accepted pleas. Because (1) the trial court did not err when it accepted 

Diamond’s pleas of true and (2) sufficient evidence supports the adjudication of Diamond’s guilt, 

we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

At the beginning of the hearing on the State’s amended motion to adjudicate Diamond’s 

guilt, defense counsel stated, “Your Honor, I’m looking at a copy of the amended motion to 

adjudicate community supervision . . . [and] [a]s to the -- each and every allegation, 1 through 7, 

Mr. Diamond pleads true but true with an explanation and/or we believe [he has an] excuse for the 

 

1See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.154 (West 2008). Diamond had been charged originally with the offense of 

intentional or knowing unauthorized discharge into or adjacent to a water way, but pled to the lesser-included offense 

of unauthorized discharge reckless endangerment. 

2

In its amended motion, the State alleged that Diamond violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision 

by: (1) failing to report to the community supervision department for the months of March, April, May, June, July, 

August, September, and October 2016; (2) failing to pay court costs in the amount $285.00, a fine in the amount of 

$600.00, and attorney fees in the amount of $2,280.00, at a combined monthly rate of $528.00; (3) failing to pay a 

community supervision fee of $60.00 per month for the months of March, April, May, June, July, August, September,

and October 2016; (4) failing to pay the Crime Stoppers’ fee, assessed in the amount of $50.00, within 180 days; 

(5) failing to reimburse the community supervision department $10.00 for the cost of urinalysis testing; (6) failing to 

report any changes in address, employment, or arrest; and (7) failing to appear in court on October 18, 2016. 
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allegations.” After calling Diamond to the stand, trial counsel asked Diamond if he was told he 

could have any witnesses to testify on his behalf at the hearing, to which Diamond responded 

affirmatively. Trial counsel then asked, “Now, you heard me tell the Judge that you were pleading 

true to each one of these but there were explanations and excuse -- or reasons that it happened or 

didn’t happen, correct?” Diamond responded, “Yes, sir.” Diamond then admitted that he failed 

to report to the community supervision office for the months of March, April, May, June, July, 

August, September, and October 2016. He followed his admission by explaining that his 

automobile was not working properly. When the State informed the trial court that it would like 

to call witnesses if he was going to give explanations, Diamond’s counsel assured the trial court, 

“He did plead true, Judge.” The trial court reiterated, “[H]e pled true,” and then asked Diamond 

if he was testifying as to the truth of the allegations or if he was “intending to testify as to the 

adjudication or as to punishment?” Diamond conceded that he was testifying as to punishment. 

The trial court responded, “Then based on the pleas of true by Mr. Diamond, we’ll find those true 

and we’ll proceed -- we’ll adjudicate him guilty and proceed with punishment at this point.” 

The State proceeded to call Mariah May, who was the community supervision officer who 

instigated the motion to adjudicate guilt. The State began, “And, you’ve understood he’s pled true 

to these allegations that you’ve alleged in this motion, correct?” To which May responded, “Yes.” 

May was asked why she did not believe Diamond was a good candidate for community 

supervision. She answered, “Frankly, Mr. Diamond is just not a good candidate for probation. He 

has made no contact to reach out to our department as to why he didn’t report.” May continued, 

“It appears that Mr. Diamond continues to be arrested for various reasons, although minor. I just 
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don’t believe that he is a very good candidate for probation.” At this point in the hearing, the 

procedural posture of the case became an issue:

[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I’m going to object. That’s not listed.

THE COURT: That one is not on this motion.

[Defense Counsel]: That’s not listed, Judge, so we would object to any 

testimony about that or that he was arrested.

[The State]: Well, Your Honor, we’re in the punishment phase.

THE COURT: We’re not in the punishment phase.

[The State]: I thought we were in the disposition phase because the --

THE COURT: I tried to go to the disposition --

[Defense Counsel]: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- phase and you interrupted me.

[Defense Counsel]: And said you wanted to put her on the stand.

[The State]: Your Honor, I believe what happened is he pled true, you found 

the -- he asked -- Mr. Wilkerson asked are we in the disposition phase, you said 

yes, so then I said I would like to go first for punishment because it’s the State’s 

motion.

THE COURT: And then I adjudicated him guilty, tried to proceed forward, 

and you interrupted and said, no, you wanted to not do it that way, you wanted to 

start back from the beginning so we were doing that.

[The State]: That’s fine. Okay.

After the State concluded its questioning of May, the trial court asked defense counsel if he would 

like to cross-examine May, to which counsel responded he did not. The trial court asked, “No 

further questions as to the -- whether or not I adjudicate Mr. Diamond guilty? That[’s] the question 
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right now. That’s where we’re at. Do you have anything else you’d like to present?” Diamond 

declined to do so. The trial court then stated, “Based on his pleas of true and the brief testimony 

by Ms. May, I will adjudicate him guilty of the offenses. We will proceed to punishment to 

determine what is appropriate.” The trial court continued hearing punishment evidence and, 

subsequently, sentenced Diamond to one year in county jail.

Diamond contends the trial court committed error when it accepted his pleas of true without 

establishing that the pleas were made freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. Diamond maintains the 

trial court “believe[d] [he] was not pleading true, but instead intended to present defenses to the 

allegations.” Diamond continues, “This would explain why there is no discussion regarding the 

consequences of a plea of true.” According to Diamond, when he stated that his plea of true would 

be accompanied by “legal excuses,” then “logic would dictate that [Diamond] did not understand 

that a plea of true would change the hearing into a unitary proceeding regarding punishment.” 

Diamond then claims that, without his pleas of true, the State failed to present sufficient evidence 

to support the trial court’s finding that Diamond violated the conditions of his community 

supervision. 

We review a decision to adjudicate guilt in the same manner as we review a decision to 

revoke community supervision—for abuse of discretion. Little v. State, 376 S.W.3d 217, 219 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2006)); see In re T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.); see Act of 

May 26, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1160, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2887, 2887, repealed by Act 

of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 770, § 3.01, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 2321, 2395 (eff. Jan. 1, 
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2017). In a revocation hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of the facts and determines the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to their testimony. T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d at 321. A 

trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision and to proceed to adjudication is examined

in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Id.

(1) The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Accepted Diamond’s Pleas of True

While the record reveals confusion on the part of all participants in the hearing on the 

State’s amended motion to adjudicate, Diamond has failed to provide us with any authority 

supporting his proposition that his request to present “excuses” somehow converted his pleas of 

true into pleas of not true, thereby potentially changing the procedural posture of the case. 

Likewise, Diamond has provided us no authority for his contention that a trial court is required to 

undertake an in-depth discussion about the consequences of a plea of true.3 Although the record 

reflects that Diamond pled true to the allegations contained in the State’s amended motion and that 

the trial court was well within its discretion to accept his pleas of true, we find it unnecessary to 

delve into a lengthy discussion of Diamond’s state of mind or the effect, if any, of the procedural 

 

3

Instead, Diamond contends, “Although no particular recitations are required to meet the due process requirements of 

a plea of ‘true’ at a revocation hearing, the record is devoid of indications that the plea was entered knowingly and 

voluntarily.” He continues, “Therefore, the plea of ‘true’ in this case, entered by Appellant’s trial counsel, does not 

meet the minimum due process requirements for a waiver of those rights.” 

The record does not support Diamond’s assertion that he did not intend to plead true. First, and as pointed 

out by Diamond, trial counsel stated that, as to “each and every allegation, 1 through 7, Mr. Diamond pleads true.” In 

addition to counsel’s statements, Diamond conceded that he was pleading true, but that he wanted to offer “excuses” 

for his failure to comply with the terms of his community supervision. Moreover, May testified that she understood 

that Diamond had pled true to the allegations against him. Contrary to Diamond’s contention that he unknowingly 

and involuntarily pled true to violating the terms of his community supervision, the record is clear that he admitted to 

the allegations against him and also sought to convince the trial court that his punishment should be reduced because 

he had “excuses” for the violations. 
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confusion that occurred during the hearing. This is so because, even if Diamond had entered a 

plea of not true, the trial court remained within its power to adjudicate Diamond’s guilt.

(2) Sufficient Evidence Supports the Adjudication of Diamond’s Guilt

The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated at 

least one of the terms and conditions of community supervision. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 

873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). If the State fails to meet its burden of proof, the trial court abuses its 

discretion in revoking community supervision. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1984). Proof by a preponderance of the evidence as to any one of the alleged violations 

of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to revoke 

community supervision. Marsh v. State, 343 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. 

ref’d) (citing Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)). Here, 

the State alleged, among other things, that Diamond failed to report to the community supervision 

office for the months of March, April, May, June, July, August, September, and October 2016. 

Diamond testified at the beginning of the hearing that he did not report during those months,

4

and 

his admission was corroborated by May’s testimony that “[Diamond] ha[d] made no contact to 

reach out to [her] department as to why he didn’t report.” Regardless of the procedural positioning 

of the case, based on (1) Diamond’s admissions that “each and every allegation, 1 through 7” were 

true, (2) Diamond’s testimony that he failed to report during the months alleged in the State’s 

amended motion, and (3) May’s corroboration that Diamond did not report to the department, there 

existed sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Diamond had violated the terms 

 

4Diamond also indicated that he was aware that he had a right to call witnesses on his behalf, which he did not do. 
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of his community supervision. Thus, the trial court did not err when it adjudicated Diamond guilty 

and sentenced him to one year in county jail.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: November 27, 2017

Date Decided: December 8, 2017

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