SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0382-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

IBRAHIM SULAIMANI,

a/k/a SIR WILLIAM JACKSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Argued October 7, 2020 – Decided July 27, 2021

Before Judges Fuentes and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Docket No. 88-11-1273.

Kevin Walker, First Assistant Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Kevin Walker, of counsel and on 

the briefs).

Jeffrey C. McElwee, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the 

cause for respondent (Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Jeffrey C. McElwee, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0382-18

On March 3, 1988, fifteen-year-old defendant Ibrahim Sulaimani, a/k/a 

Sir William Jackson, was charged in the Chancery Division, Family Part with 

committing the following acts of delinquency that, if committed by an adult, 

would constitute murder, N.J.S.A, 2C:11-3, first degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 

2C:15-l; second degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, 

N.J.S.A, 2C:39-4(a), third degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-5(b), fourth degree unlawful possession of a weapon (nunchaku sticks), 

N.J.S.A. 2C: 39-5(d),1 and second degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(b)(1).

On September 30, 1988, a Family Part judge conducted a hearing and 

granted the State's motion to transfer these juvenile delinquency charges to the 

Law Division, Criminal Part, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.2

 This allowed the 

State to prosecute defendant as an adult and, if convicted, sentence him to a term 

of imprisonment within the range permitted under Title 2C, notwithstanding his 

minority. On November 4, 1988, a Mercer County grand jury returned an 

indictment against defendant charging him with the same criminal offenses he 

1 Effective January 13, 2008, the Legislature made unlawful possession of a 

handgun a second degree offense. 

2 As our Supreme Court recently noted in State in Interest of N.H., "[o]ver the 

years, the Legislature has revised the waiver statute on a number of occasions."

226 N.J. 242, 249 (2016). 
3 A-0382-18

faced in the Family Part, and added two counts of felony murder, N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-3a(1); N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6.

Defendant pled not guilty and was tried before a jury over a period of ten 

consecutive days, commencing on April 24, 1990. The jury found defendant 

guilty of two counts of felony murder, first degree robbery, second degree 

burglary, and all of the weapons-related offenses, and acquitted him of 

purposeful, knowing murder. Defendant was eighteen years old at the time he 

appeared before the trial judge for sentencing on August 10, 1990. The trial 

judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of life imprisonment, with thirty 

years of parole ineligibility. 

On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. 

State v. Jackson, No. A-676-90 (App. Div. Sept. 22, 1994), certif. denied, 140 

N.J. 329 (1995). We incorporate by reference the underlying facts and evidence 

that led to defendant's conviction, as described in detail in the opinion of this 

court. Id., slip op. at 3 to 8. 

On January 21, 1996, a Criminal Part judge, with no previous involvement 

with the case, denied defendant's first post-conviction relief (PCR) petition. In 

response to defendant's appeal, this court affirmed the PCR judge's order. State 

v. Muhammad, No. A-505-96 (App, Div. Jan. 21, 1999). Defendant filed a 
4 A-0382-18

second PCR petition, which was heard and denied by a different Criminal Part 

judge on August 14, 2008 and affirmed by this court on direct appeal. State v. 

Sulaimani, No. A-0591-08 (App. Div. July 15, 2009). 

On November 1, 2017, defendant represented by counsel, filed a motion 

to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(5). The matter first 

came for oral argument before Judge Robert C. Billmeier on February 16, 2018. 

As framed by Judge Billmeier, defendant "claims his sentence must be vacated 

because it is not in accordance" with the United States Supreme Court's holdings 

in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), and Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), as well as our Supreme Court's holding in State 

v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017). Defendant had not yet completed serving the 

thirty-year minimum term of imprisonment at the time defendant's counsel 

argued the motion before Judge Billmeier:

He was [fifteen] years old at the time. . . . [T]wo juries, 

separately, have determined that the adult co-defendant 

was the actual shooter. Mr. Sulaimani was actually 

acquitted of the knowing and purposeful [murder]. 

That's another Miller factor. His involvement in this 

tragic incident rests on the theory of felony murder, as 

opposed to Mr. Sulaimani actually committing the fatal 

act.

He was very young at the time, very impetuous at the 

time. He obviously fell under the sway of an older codefendant who influenced him. There . . . was a certain 
5 A-0382-18

element of dysfunction, unfortunately, in the home. 

And he was the byproduct of that dysfunction. 

The judge noted that the Supreme Court's holding in Montgomery v. 

Louisiana made clear that by "[a]llowing [juvenile] offenders to be considered 

for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient 

immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a 

disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment." 136 S. Ct. at 

736. In response, defense counsel argued that despite defendant's exemplary 

disciplinary record as an inmate, the likelihood that he would be paroled after 

completing the minimum thirty-year term remained uncertain.

The prosecutor argued that based on our Supreme Court's holding in 

Zuber, the court must first apply the Miller factors3 to determine whether a 

3 The United States Supreme Court in Miller held that a judge should consider 

the following five factors before sentencing a juvenile to a mandatory life 

sentence without parole: (1) the juvenile's chronological age; "hallmark 

features" such as "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 

consequences;" (2) the juvenile's family and home environment, especially if it 

is dysfunctional and prevents the child from extricating him or herself; (3) the 

circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of the juvenile's 

participation, and whether there were familial or peer pressures that affected the 

child; (4) whether the juvenile could have been charged and convicted of a lesser 

offense if not for the incompetent nature associated with youth, such as an 

inability to interact with law enforcement agents, prosecutors, ability to 

meaningfully participate in plea agreement negotiations and/or an incapacity to 
6 A-0382-18

thirty-year minimum term with the real possibility of parole thereafter is the 

functional equivalent of a life sentence. In a prescient statement, the prosecutor 

then argued that if defendant "were to be paroled just a few short days from now, 

he would have a substantial portion of his life on the outside." At the conclusion 

of the February 16, 2018 oral argument session, Judge Billmeier informed the 

attorneys he would issue a written decision.

As the prosecutor anticipated, on or about April 12, 2018, the Parole 

Board granted defendant's parole application effective May 24, 2018. The 

fifteen-year-old boy who was detained and remanded to a juvenile detention 

center by a Family Part judge emerged from an adult prison facility thirty years 

later as a forty-five-year-old man. In support of his motion, defendant submitted 

a supplemental brief arguing that requiring him to remain under the supervision 

of a parole officer for life directly impacted his liberty interest and cast the same 

unconstitutional shadow our Supreme Court just found unacceptable in State in 

Interest of C.K., 233 N.J. 44 (2018).

assist defense counsel; and (5) mandatory punishment that disregards the 

possibility of rehabilitation, even when the circumstances strongly suggest it.

567 U.S. at 477 (citations omitted).
7 A-0382-18

In C.K., our Supreme Court held that the registration and community 

notification provisions of Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11; N.J.S.A. 2C:7-

2(g), imposed these obligations for life on juveniles adjudicated delinquent for 

committing certain sexual offenses. Under these circumstances, the lifetime 

requirements imposed on juveniles in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) violated the 

substantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey 

Constitution. Id. at 48.

Writing for a unanimous Court in C.K., Justice Albin definitively stated:

[N]o juvenile adjudicated delinquent will be released 

from his registration and notification requirements 

unless a Superior Court judge is persuaded that he has 

been offense-free and does not likely pose a societal 

risk after a fifteen-year look-back period.

Defendant may apply for termination from the Megan's 

Law requirements fifteen years from the date of his 

juvenile adjudication, and be relieved of those 

requirements provided he meets the standards set forth 

in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).

[Id. at 48-49.]

In light of the Court's holding in C.K., Judge Billmeier summoned the 

attorneys for a second round of oral argument held on July 13, 2018. In the 

course of his interactions with the attorneys, Judge Billmeier noted a particular 
8 A-0382-18

feature of the Court's ruling in C.K. that defense counsel had not directly 

addressed:

[T]he Supreme Court said . . . that [a] juvenile had to 

be on supervision for [fifteen] years before he can 

petition the Court to be released. Your client, as I 

understand the regulations of parole, seven years after 

his release from this past May, can petition the Parole 

Board to be released from any parole requirements. 

And, in fact, for good cause, and given his track record, 

he may not even have to spend seven years on parole.

[(Emphasis added).]

At the conclusion of the second oral argument, Judge Billmeier once again 

apprised the attorneys that he would communicate his decision in a written 

opinion. In an order dated August 9, 2018, supported by a well-reasoned 

memorandum of opinion, Judge Billmeier denied defendant's motion to correct 

his alleged illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).

 Judge Billmeier began his analysis by noting that defendant's argument 

is rooted in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller

and Montgomery, and our Supreme Court's decision in Zuber. Defendant argued 

that when these decisions are considered together, the central thesis of these 

cases renders his original life sentence with a thirty-year period of parole 

ineligibility "retroactively illegal and require[s] that he be resentenced." In his 

memorandum of opinion, Judge Billmeier acknowledged that although 
9 A-0382-18

defendant had been released from prison "he is subject to numerous parole 

conditions, including an inability to vote, restrictions on his ability to change 

addresses and travel, and the requirement to report to a parole officer as 

directed." He also recognized that if defendant had been sentenced after a proper 

consideration of the five Miller factors, "he would have been sentenced to thirty 

years' imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier, rather than life 

imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier."4

The Supreme Court revisited its holding in Miller four years later in 

Montgomery, a case in which the defendant was seventeen years old when he 

was sentenced to a term of life without parole for killing a deputy sheriff's 

officer in 1963. 136 S. Ct. at 725-26. The Court explained that Miller

"announced a substantive rule of constitutional law" that applies retroactively.

Id. at 734. It also explained that the retroactive application of Miller

does not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone 

convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender 

received mandatory life without parole. A State may 

remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile 

4 The Supreme Court in Miller held that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a 

sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for 

juvenile offenders." 567 U.S. at 479. However, the Court left the door ajar for 

imposition of a life sentence in a case in which a juvenile is convicted of 

homicide. In such cases, the judge must "take into account how children are 

different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing 

them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 480. 
10 A-0382-18

homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather 

than by resentencing them. Allowing those offenders 

to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose 

crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who 

have since matured—will not be forced to serve a 

disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment.

[Id. at 736 (internal citation omitted).]

Judge Billmeier also relied on our Supreme Court's analysis in Zuber, 

where the Court outlined the five Miller factors and characterized them as 

"particularly instructive for judges sentencing juvenile offenders." 227 N.J. at 

445.5

 After carefully analyzing the trilogy of cases discussed here, Judge 

Billmeier concluded that the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Miller

was not relevant here because defendant "was not subject to a sentencing scheme 

mandating life without parole." 

Against this backdrop, defendant appeals raising the following arguments:

5 The two defendants in Zuber committed serious, violent crimes before they 

reached the age of majority. The trial court sentenced one of the defendants to 

an aggregate term of 110 years' imprisonment. If left undisturbed, he would 

have been approximately seventy-two years old by that time he was eligible for 

parole. The trial court sentenced the other defendant to a term of seventy-five 

years. If left undisturbed, he would have been eighty-five years old by that time 

he was eligible for parole. 227 N.J. at 428-29. 
11 A-0382-18

POINT I

THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IN THIS CASE IS 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL 

COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE "MITIGATING 

QUALITIES OF [DEFENDANT'S] YOUTH," AS 

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF C.K. REQUIRES.

(A) The Miller/Zuber Jurisprudence

(B) C.K.: extending the Miller/Zuber

Jurisprudence.

We reject these arguments and affirm substantially for the reasons 

expressed by Judge Billmeier in his well-reasoned memorandum of opinion. 

Defendant's challenge to the validity of Judge Billmeier's analysis and ultimate 

outcome lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.