Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future

in Space

November 1984

NTIS order #PB85-205391
Recommended Citation:

Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-STI-241, November 1984).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 84-601136

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

I am pleased to introduce the OTA assessment of Civilian Space Stations and the

U.S. Future in Space. This study was requested by the Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on Science and Technology,

and the request was endorsed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the

House Committee on the Budget.

The study was designed to cover not only the essential technical issues surrounding the selection and acquisition of infrastructure in space, but to enable Congress to

look beyond these matters to the larger context; the direction of our efforts. Given

the vast capability and promise available to the country and the world because of the

sophisticated space technology we now possess, equally sophisticated and thoughtful

decisions must be made about where the U.S. space program is going, and for what

purposes.

The Advisory Panel for this study played a role of unusual importance in helping

to generate a set of possible space goals and objectives that demonstrate the diverse

opportunities open to us at this time, and OTA thanks them for their productive commitment of time and energy. Their participation does not necessarily constitute consensus or endorsement of the content of the report, for which OTA bears sole responsibility.

It often happens that information generated during the course of an OTA study

can be used as legislation moves through Congress. A number of statements presented

in Senate and House hearings by OTA and a technical memorandum drawn from the

analysis have already contributed to the course of the debate. This report, the culmination of the OTA process, is now a resource for both Congress and the National Commission on Space, which Congress has created in order to give full and fundamental

review to the basic questions of charting our course. It is OTA’S hope that the publication of the study will also expand the circle of those who can effectively engage in

the debate and contribute to the decision process.

Director

. . .

Ill
Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Advisory Panel

Robert A. Charpie Chairman

President, Cabot Corp.

Harvey Brooks

Benjamin Peirce Professor of Technology and

Public Policy

Harvard University

Peter O. Crisp

President

Venrock, Inc.

Freeman Dyson

Professor

Institute for Advanced Studies

James B. Farley

Chairman of the Board

Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.

Charles E. Fraser

Chairman

Sea Pines Co.

Andrew J. Goodpaster

President

Institute for Defense Analyses

Charles Hitch

Professor

The Lawrence-Berkeley Laboratory

University of California, Berkeley

Bernard M. W. Knox

Director

Center for Hellenic Studies

Moya Lear

Chairman of the Board

Lear Avia Corp.

George E. Mueller, Jr. *

President and Chief Executive Officer

System Development Corp.

Carl Sagan

Director of the Laboratories for Planetary

Studies

Cornell University

Eugene Skolnikoff

Director

Center for International Studies

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

James Spilker

President

Stanford Telecommunications Inc.

Frank Stanton

President Emeritus

CBS Inc.

James A. Van Allen

Head, Physics and Astronomy Department

University of Iowa

OTA appreciates the valuable assistance and thoughtful comments provided by advisory panel members at many points during the assessment. OTA, however, accepts

sole responsibility for the views expressed in this report.

*Retired.

iv
OTA Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

William F. Mills* and Nancy Naismith, ** Science, Transportation, and Innovation Program Manager

Thomas F. Rogers, Project Director

Philip P. Chandler, Deputy Project Director

R. James Arenz, Senior Analyst

Randolph H. Ware, Congressional/ Fellow

Paula Walden, Research Assistant

Marsha Fenn, Administrative Assistant

R. Bryan Harrison, Office Automation Systems Analyst

Betty Jo Tatum, Secretary

Contractors

Lewis White Beck

Charles G. Bell

Hubert Bortzmeyer

Eva Brann

William Capron

Computer Sciences Corp.

William Schneider, Principal Iinvestigator

Arthur Danto

Leonard David

Eagle Engineering

Hubert Davis, Sr., Principal Iinvestigator

Marc Giget

Jerry Grey

JML, Inc.

John Logdson, Principal /investigator

Courtland Lewis

Charles Mathews

Peter Ognibene

Nicholas Rescher

Alex Roland

Satellite Systems Engineering

Wilbur Pritchard, Principal Iinvestigator

Kenneth Sayre

Science & Technology Consultants

Russell Drew, Principal Iinvestigator

Jerome Simonoff

Eugene Skolnikoff

Teledyne Brown Engineering

James E. Wilson

*Through September 1983.

* *After September 1983.
Contrib utors

James Arnold, University of California/

California Space Institute

James M. Beggs, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

William Bumgarner, Computer Sciences Corp.

Ashton Carter, Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

William F. Cockburn, Embassy of Canada

Anthony Cox, Embassy of the United

Kingdom

David Criswell, University of California/

California Space Institute

Troy Crites, Aerospace Corp.

Philip Culbertson, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Richard Dal Belle, Office of Technology

Assessment

Maxime Faget, Space Industries

James Fletcher, University of Pittsburgh (Member

of Technology Assessment Advisory

Council)

Robert F. Freitag, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Robert Frosch, General Motors Corp.

Karl Harr, Aerospace Industries Association

John Barrington, Communication Satellite

Corp.

Allen Hill, Boeing Aerospace Corp.

John Hedge, National Aeronautics and Space

Administrate ion

Saunders Kramer, U.S. Department of Energy

Louis Laidet, Embassy of France

Gordon Law, Office of Technology

Assessment

Robert Lottmann, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

John McElroy, National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration

Wilfred Mellors, European Space Agency,

Washington Office*

William Perry, Hambrecht & Quist (Member

of Technology Assessment Advisory

Council)

Irving Pikus, National Science Foundation

Udo Pollvogt, MBB/Erno

Luther Powell, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Ian Pryke, European Space Agency

Eberhardt Rechtin, Aerospace Corp.

James Rose, McDonnell Douglas

Joseph E. Rowe, Library of Congress

Hans Traumann, Embassy of the Federal

Republic of Germany

Ernesto Valierani, Aeritalia

Charles Vick, Consultant

David C. Wensley, McDonnell Douglas

Ray Williamson, Office of Technology

Assessment

Gordon Woodcock, Boeing Aerospace Corp.

* Retired

vi
Participants in U.S.S.R. Workshop, Dec. 13, 1982

Craig Covault

Aviation Week & Space Technology

Philip E. Culbertson

Associate Deputy Administrator

NASA Headquarters

Merton Davies

The Rand Corp.

Ed Ezell

National Museum of American History

Smithsonian Institution

John R. Hilliard

Air Force Systems Command Headquarters

Andrews Air Force Base

Nicholas Johnson

Principal Technologist

Teledyne Brown Engineering

Saunders Kramer

Consultant

Participants in Skylab Workshop, Jan. 25,

Leland Belew

Consultant

David Compton

Contractor

History Office

NASA/Johnson Space Center

John Disher

Consultant

Herbert Friedman

Chairman

Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics

and Resources

National Academy of Sciences

Owen Garriott

Astronaut

NASA/Johnson Space Center

Roger Hoffer

Professor

Department of Forestry and Natural Resources

Purdue University

Courtland Lewis

Biotechnology, Inc.

James E. Oberg

Consultant

Kenneth S. Pederson

Director

International Affairs Division

NASA Headquarters

Geoffrey Perry

Consultant

Paul Rambaut

NASA Headquarters

p. Diane Rausch

NASA Headquarters

Marcia Smith

Specialist in Aerospace and Energy Systems

Science Policy Research Division

Library of Congress

1983

Kenneth Kleinknecht

Manager

Procurement, Manufacturing and Tests for

Spacecraft Systems

Martin Marietta Corp.

Charles Mathews

Consultant

Edmond Reeves

Chief

Astrophysics Payload Branch

Spacelab Flight Division

NASA Headquarters

William Schneider

Vice President

Control Systems Activity

Computer Sciences Corp.

Robert Snyder

Chief, Separation Processes Branch

NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center

Jesco H. Von Puttkamer

Technical Engineer

Operations Management

NASA Headquarters

Vli
Participants in Low-Cost Alternatives to a

Jacques Collet

Head of Long-Term Program

European Space Agency

Paris Office

Wilbur Eskite

Deputy Chief

Systems Planning and Development

National Environmental Satellite, Data, and

Information Service

National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration

Edmund J. Habib

Vice President for Engineering

Satellite Systems Engineering

Tadahico Inada

Washington Representative for NASA

National Space Development Agency of Japan

Scientific Section

Embassy of Japan

Akihiko lwahashi

Representative

Science and Technology Agency

Government of Japan

Norbert Kiehne

DFVLR (Deutsche Forschungs- und Versuchsanstalt

fur Luft- und Raumfahrt e. V.)

Participants in Low-Cost Alternatives

to a Space Station Workshop, Apr. 27-28,

Hubert Bortzmeyer

Consultant

Joseph Carroll

California Space Institute

University of California, San Diego

Jacques Collet

Head of Long-Term Program

European Space Agency

Paris Office

David Criswell

California Space Institute

University of California, San Diego

Troy A. Crites

The Aerospace Corp.

Hubert P. Davis

Vice President

Eagle Engineering, Inc.

Space Station,

Kazuo Matsumoto

Representative

Apr. 4, 1983

National Space Development Agency of Japan

Wilfred Mellors

Head (currently retired)

European Space Agency

Robert Noblitt

Senior Systems Analyst

Teledyne Brown Engineering

Alain Perard

Long-Term Study Manager

CNES Paris

Udo Pollvogt

President

ERNO-USA, Inc.

Hans Traumann

Attache

Scientific and Technological Affairs

Embassy, Federal Republic of Germany

H. J. Weigand

Consultant

MBB, Space Division

1983

Russell C. Drew

President

Science and Technology Consultants

Jean-Pierre Fouquet

Scientific Attache for Space Affairs

Embassy of France

George F. Fraser

Chief Engineer, Advanced Engineering

Shuttle Orbiter Division

Rockwell International

Allen Hill

MESA Program Manager

Space Systems Division

Boeing Aerospace Corp.

Tadahico Inada

Washington Representative for NASA

National Space Development Agency of Japan

Scientific Section

Embassy of Japan

viii
William A. Johnston

Vice-President for Engineering

Fairchild Space Co.

Charles Mathews

Consultant

Rudy Meiner

European Space Agency

Paris Office

Wilfred Mellors

Head (currently retired)

European Space Agency

Washington Office

Robert Mory

European Space Agency

Paris Office

Udo Pollvogt

President

ERNO-USA, Inc.

Wilbur L. Pritchard

president

Satellite Systems Engineering

Anthony Sharpe

Manager of Space Station Program

Teledyne Brown Engineering

Thomas C. Taylor

President

Taylor & Associates, Inc.

Hans Traumann

Attache

Scientific and Technological Affairs

Embassy, Federal Republic of Germany

Participants in Unit Cost Workshop, Oct. 18-19, 1983

James Albus

Chief of Industrial Systems Division

National Bureau of Standards

William D. Bumgarner

Senior Member of the Executive Staff

Computer Sciences Corp.

Esker K. Davis

Pickering Research Corp.

Fred Esch

Executive Director

Spacecraft Technology

COMSAT Laboratory

James Graham

Senior Research Associate

John Deere & Co. Technical Center

Jack Barrington

Senior Vice President

Research and Development

COMSAT Laboratory

Walter Kapryan

Director and Senior Technical Advisor

Lockheed Corp.

William Perkins

Director

Strategic Business Management

Rockwell International

Donald K. Slay-ton

President

Space Services Inc.

William C. Schneider

Vice President

Control Systems Activity

Computer Sciences Corp.

Albert A. Sorenson

TRW

William C. Stone

Research Structural Engineer

National Bureau of Standards

David Wensley

Chief Program Engineer

Space Stations

McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co.

James E. Wilson

Consultant

Donald H. Novak

Project Manager

Computer Sciences Corp.

ix
Participants in Automation Workshop, Mar. 12, 1984

David Akin

Professor, Department of Aeronautics and

Astronautics

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

James Albus

Chief

Industrial Systems Division

National Bureau of Standards

Michael Arbib

Graduate Research Center

University of Massachusetts

Ruzena Bajcsy

Professor

Department of Computer and Information

Sciences

Moore School of Electrical Engineering

University of Pennsylvania

Michael Brady

Professor

Artificial Intelligence Laboratory

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Rodney Brooks

Professor

Department of Computer Sciences

Stanford University

Margaret Eastwood

Vice President of Engineering

GCA Corp.

Charles Fraser

Chairman

Sea Pines Co.

William isler

Program Manager

Systems Science Division

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Steven Jacobson

Professor

Department of Mechanical Engineering

University of Utah

Henry Lum

Acting Manager

Office of Computer Science and Electronics

NASA Headquarters

David Nitzan

Director

Robotics Department

SRI International

Marc Raibert

Professor

Department of Computer Science

Carnegie-Mellon University

Carl Ruoff

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Roger Schapell

Manager, Advanced Automation Technology

Denver Aerospace

Martin Marietta Corp.

Thomas Sheridan

Professor

Department of Mechanical Engineering

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Russell Taylor

Manager of Robot System Technology

T. j. Watson Research Center

IBM

James A. Van Allen

Chairman

Department of Physics

University of Iowa

x
Contents

Chapter

1. Executive Summary

2. Issues and Findings

3. Space lnfrastructure

4. A Buyer’s Guide to

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Space Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

5. Broadening the Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

6. Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Appendix Page

A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

F.

G

Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses

and Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ”

Concepts in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program . . . . . . . . 177

Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space

Infrastructure (Civilian “Space Stations”) Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Title II-National Commission on Space (Public Law 98-361) . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Glossary of Acronyms, Abbreviations and Terms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Chapter 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Contents

Page

Introduction: Relation of a “Space Station” (i.e., Space Infrastructure)

to the U.S. Future in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Rationale for Space infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Infrastructure Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Technology Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Procurement Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Funding Rate Options.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Need for Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Some Possible Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Infrastructure Required by the Proposed Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

cost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Shape of the Space Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., ., . . . . . . .

Private Sector . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. . $, . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New Role for NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES

Table No.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Comparison of Some Options for Low-Earth-Orbit

Operating Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Page

independently

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Space Infrastructure Platforms That Could Be Serviced by Shuttle

or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Some Illustrative Space Infrastructure Acquisitions Possible

at Various Annual Average Federal Funding Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Possible Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested

for Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Chapter 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION: RELATION OF A “SPACE STATION”

(I. E., SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE)

Atter the expenditure of some $200 billion

(1984$) since the launch of its first spacecraft in

early 1958, the United States has obtained the

scientific knowledge and developed the technoIogical capability and professional expertise to

succeed i n virtualIy any theoreticalIy possible civilian space venture that it may choose to undertake, But America’s second quarter-century of

space activities promises to differ markedIy from

the first, almost wholly exploratory, era. If space

is to be successfully developed in roughly the

same fashion as have other, more familiar naturalI resources and environments, the next stage

will be characterized by establishing and secu ring the capabilities to support routine, operational

activities there. I n this report, OTA refers to the

TO THE U.S. FUTURE IN SPACE

range of in-space facilities and services that would

support such activities as “infrastructure. ”

Important steps in the considered development

of space have already been taken. By any standard, the satellite communications industry is a

great success; its revenues have reached the multibillion-dollar per year level and are growing at

an annual rate of 15 percent. Massive Iaunch facilities, expendable launch vehicles, and the

space Shuttle now provide routine access to

much of near-Earth space; used in conjunction

with a global communications network and surface data processing facilities, they provide a sophisticated, though limited, range of services to

their users.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

A large, inhabited “space station” in low-Earth-orbit is one approach to the establishment of a long-term infrastructure

in space. The concept shown here (being visited by the space Shuttle) designed and built model used for

illustration throughout early 1984.

3
4 . Civilian space stations and the us. Future in Space

Another sign of strength is the maturity of the

U.S. aerospace industry. This sector is now beginning to position itself to provide space assets

and services independently, and now anticipates

conducting some in-space investigations and

commercial-industrial activities, privately financed, either on its own or in combination with

other business concerns. And other countries

now have capabilities to do many things in space—

capabilities that continue to grow rapidly.

For years, leaders of the U.S. civilian space

community have advanced the view that the next

major logical step in space should be the acquisition of specific, permanent in-space infrastructure: a civilian “space station. ”

In this context, Congress, in July of 1982, asked

OTA to undertake an assessment of “Civilian

Space Stations”; this report is the product of that

request. The OTA assessment was requested originally by the Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation, later (in October

1982) by the House Committee on Science and

Technology. The assessment was endorsed in

August 1982 by the House Committee on the

Budget and the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The various committee interests were stated

as follows:

● Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation: assess the need for a permanent orbiting facility; examine the major

technological alternatives and their related

costs and benefits; focus on the different

space station designs and orbits, the range

of feasible applications for the project, the

benefits and drawbacks of utilizing existing

concepts, the estimated costs for potential

missions and design options, and prospective private sector and international involvement.

Ž House Committee on Science and Technology: undertake an independent, rigorous,

balanced study of the need for a space sta-

●

●

tion; address “the hard questions”; not only

look at what a station can do that cannot be

done better some other way, but also evaluate alternatives to a space station. “In short,

the assessment should address and document the real forces driving us to build a

space station. ”

House Committee on the Budget: estimate

the effect of a space station’s cost on the

NASA budget and the overall Federal budget; and consider the roles of the Department

of Defense, the international community,

and the private sector in the development,

production, and operation of an inhabitable

space station.

Senate Committee on Appropriations: estimate the relative merits-of in-habitable and

u nonhabitable space platforms; estimate the

role automation/robotics can be expected to

play in the construction and eventual use of

space platforms; and estimate the costs associated with the range of design options.

This assessment has attempted to be responsive

to the entire range of congressional interest, with

the exception of the interest of the House Committee on the Budget in the role of the Department of Defense.

The report has examined the range of technology required of permanent space infrastructure

as well as the broader policy questions arising

from NASA’s proposal of a particular constellation of infrastructure elements. Overall, the considered development of space through the paced

acquisition of appropriate elements of space infrastructure is a key to maintaining America’s

leadership in space. However, because the Nation

does not have clearly formulated long-range goals

and objectives for its civilian space activities, proceeding to realize the present NASA “space station” concept is not likely to result in the facility

most appropriate for advancing U.S. interests into

the second quarter-century of the Space Age.

RATIONALE FOR SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

Several countries are competent in the conduct providing growing economic competition for the

of space investigations and the development and United States through development, acquisition,

use of space technology. These countries are now and operation of their own elements of infrastruc-
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 5

ture. The Soviet Union has made a commitment

to the permanent occupancy of space, has operated orbital stations with human work crews for

over a decade, and is showing interest in providing competitive space services. Thus, if the United

States is to continue as the leader in civilian space

activities, Congress must give serious thought to

the kind of space infrastructure to be developed,

the long-term goals that that infrastructure is to

serve, and the public-private and international arrangements that will take best advantage of it.

Future development of more sophisticated

space science and applications capabilities—e.g.,

staging of planetary exploration missions or assembly of large communications platforms—

wouId be markedly facilitated by the existence

of appropriate elements of space infrastructure.

It is assumed in this report that, whatever decisions are made regarding space infrastructure,

publicly supported space science and space applications will continue at roughly their present

level of appropriations (over $1 billion per year,

as measured in constant dollars).

Although the United States already has acquired some initial elements of space infrastructure, these are insufficient to undertake a number of desirable activities in an efficient and

effective manner. The acquisition of some additional permanent in-space infrastructure elements

WOU Id :

● allow sophisticated experiments in life and

materials sciences to be conducted;

● permit fuel to be stored and supplies to be

warehoused in low-Earth-orbit;

● initiate more efficient staging of voyages to

high orbits, the Moon, planets, and asteroids;

● allow the initial trial of new instruments, activities, and procedures; and

● allow the repair and maintenance of increasingly complex and specialized satellites and

common carrier platforms.

The ability to undertake these activities, all of

which would support space science and applications, constitutes a persuasive rationale for acquiring appropriate elements of permanent space infrastructure. At present, the more appropriate

would be those which allowed the satisfactory

conduct of: 1) life and materials sciences experiments, and 2) satellite servicing. However, by the

same token, sufficient resources to ensure that

these science and applications activities actually

are undertaken must be assured; otherwise, the

rationale for the infrastructure vanishes.

A persuasive case can also be made for seeing

that some of these permanent infrastructure elements allow an on-board human work force. This

case rests on the fact that automated facilities,

whether relatively autonomous or teleoperated,

capable of supporting all of the activities listed

above will not be available before 2000, even if

a large automation R&D program is begun immediately. (This does not argue against such an

R&D program. Indeed, there is good reason to

expect that sophisticated automation will be necessary for the future development of space as well

as for non-space-related Earth applications. It

might well be appropriate, therefore, to initiate

such a program now. Later, with the results of
6 ● Civilian space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

this program in hand, informed judgments could

be made about the most sophisticated mix of

human and machine workers.)

As the Shuttle development program comes to

a close, thousands of in-house engineers and

technical support staff and, in principle, as much

as $2 billion (1984$) per year in contract funds

under its present $7 billion (1984$) “budget envelope” will be freed up to be applied to one or

more new programs. If NASA is to maintain its

current size—a size that NASA leaders judge to

be acceptable to the general public–the combination of people and funds that could soon become available suggests, strongly, that any new

programs must include development and acquisition of a great deal of new technology, preferably related to having people in space; large numbers of technologists would be gainfully

employed both in NASA and in the space industry under contract to NASA.

In addition, many believe that NASA might not

long survive in its present form without a single,

large, “people-in-space” program upon which

a majority of its energies are focused. If a number of smaller programs were initiated instead,

each of them, it is thought, could be terminated
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 7

without widespread objections arising i n the political process.

Finally, NASA may have thought it prudent to

propose a ‘‘space station’ program rather than

some other large endeavor(s) (e. g., a return of

Americans to the Moon, or sending people on

an expedition to Mars, etc.), both because the

former had been carefully studied over the years,

representing, i n NASA’s view, a natural complement to the Shuttle, and because alternative large

programs seemed too grandiose, have not recently been discussed with the general public, and,

therefore, were less likely to enlist the required

support, both with in and without the administ ration.

All of these considerations, taken together, are

clear incentives for the space technology leaders, both Government and industry, to opt for a

combination of a Shuttle-like “methods and

means’ activity, rather than to accept the posi -

t ion of a much smaller Federal agency or to fight

for approval of one or more large, new space

“end” programs.

But while the case to be made for acquiring

some long-term, inhabitable infrastructure in lowEarth-orbit is persuasive, OTA concludes that there

is no compelling, objective, external case either

for obtaining all of the particular array of elements

that NASA now describes under the rubric of “The

Space Station, ” or for obtaining this or any other

array in the general manner that NASA is now expected to pursue, or for paying the particular public cost that NASA now estimates is required. As

the infrastructure would be of a broadly generalpurpose nature, to be used to support over 100

conceptual uses (few of which have been sharply

defined or have gained wide acceptance as important objectives of the space program), there is no

necessity for obtaining all of this particular array

soon.

INFRASTRUCTURE OPTIONS

The fact that the United

veloped a wide variety

means that it has genuine

States has already deof space capabi Iities

choices–both of what

infrastructure elements it places in orbit and of

how these elements are to be acquired and used.

It is around these choices that the difficuIt issues

lie; by andi large, the technology is either in hand

or can be readily developed.

Technology Options

It must be emphasized that the particular constellation of space infrastructure elements that

NASA currently aspires to develop, construct,

deploy, and operate is only one alternative in

a wide range of options. Simply put, there is no

such thing as “the space station. ” What is under

discussion is a variety of sets of infrastructure

elements, ranging from modest extensions of

current capabilities to more sophisticated, capable, and costly ensembles than NASA is now

suggesting.

As one way of presenting the variety of techno logy options available, OTA has prepared

 tables 1 and 2.}

There is one fundamental infrastructure option

that requires particular mention: should the elements be wholly automated or shou Id they house

‘] human crew? Conceptually, useful space infrastructure couId be designed either to include a

human work crew or to depend on sophisticated

machines unattended in space or operated via

communication links with the surface. Despite

the fact that the relative efficiency and/or effectiveness of these two quite different approaches

have been extensively debated for years, no general consensus has emerged. However, if sophisticated new space activities are to be supported

by in-space infra

1990s, there will

structure as soon as the early

have to be a human presence.
8 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in space

Table I.—Comparison of Some Options’ for Low-Earth-Orbit Independently Operating Infrastructure

, -. Free-flying NASA Infrastructure

Extended spacelab aspirations

Duration (developed Initial Mature,

Orbiter: as permanent operational fully

Phase II infrastructure) capability developed

Extended

Duration

Shuttle Orbiter:

Orbiter Phase I

Date available

(assuming start in 1985) Now

None

7

60

6

Can accept

Spacelab

10 days

Moderate

Modest

Some

Modest

No

No

Modest

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Modest

Modest

No

No

Modest

1988 1990 1990

0.5 2-3

20 6

100 100

(with Spacelab

habitat)

5 3

New technology Modest crew

1992 1996-2000

20

COSTb

(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) 0.2 8

Characteristics

Power to users (kW)

Pressurized volume (m3)

7

60

80

200

200

300

Nominal crew size

Miscellaneous

5

No new

technology

8

Orbital

maneuvering

vehicle plus

two free-flying

unpressurized

platforms

20

Reusable

orbital

transfer

vehicle plus

several more

platforms

-.

required; accommodations

modest

laboratory

space

Capabilities c

Time on Orbit 20 days 50 days Unlimited

(90 day

resupply)

Unlimited

(60-90 day

resupply)

Extensive

Modest

Moderate

Moderate

Modest

No

Modest

Modest

Modest

No

No

 Unlimited

(90 day

resupply)

Laboratories for:

Life sciences

Space science/applications

Materials science

Technology development

Observatories

Data/communication node

Servicing of satellites

Manufacturing facility (materials

processing)

Large structure assembly

Transportation node

Fuel and supply depot

Moderate

Modest

Some

Modest

Modest

No

Modest

No

Considerable

Modest

Moderate

Some

Modest

No

Modest

Modest

No

No

No

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Considerable

Considerable

Considerable

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

No

No

No

Moderate

Moderate

No

Extensive

Extensived

Considerable

Response to reasons advanced for

space infrastructure

Maintain U.S. space leadership and

technology capability

Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities

Enable long-term human presence

in space

Attention-getting heroic public

spectacle

Extended international cooperation

Promote U.S. commercialization of

space

Maintain vigorous NASA

engineering capability

Enhance national security, broadly

defined

Space travel for non-technicians

aLi~.ed ~ption~ are illustrative examples; the list is not exhaustive.

bcosts include design, development, and ~r~uction; launch and ~perational costs are not included, some costs are estimated by the office Of Technology Assess.

ment; others were provided to OTA.

cClearly judgmental.

dlnclud~ng launch to the Moon, Mars, and some asta:otis.

Modest Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

Moderate

Modest

No

No

Modest

Modest

Modest

Considerable

Modest

Moderate

Considerable

Modest

Modest

Modest

Considerable Extensive

Modest

Modest

Considerable

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Modest Modest Modest

Modest

Modest

Moderate

Considerable

Moderate

Considerable

No Extensive Extensive

No Unclear Unclear

Modest Considerable Considerable
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 9

Table 2.—Space Infrastructure Platformsa That Could Be Serviced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle

Unpressurized coorbiting platforms Pressurized platforms

(serviced by means of extravehicular activity) (serviced internally while docked)

Space European

Industries’ Modified

SPAS MESA LEAS ECRAFT EURECA Platform Spacelab

Date available

(now, or approximate, assuming

start in 1985)

Now 1986 Late 1980’s 1989

0.005

0.6

None

None

3,000 lb

Payload

10 days

No

Modest

Modest

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Unclear

No

No

No

Now 1987

0.2

2

None

None

2,000 lb

Payload

6 months

Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

No

No

Modest

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Costb

(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) 0.01 0.2 0.3 0.6

Characteristics

Power to users (kW)

Pressurized volume (f?)

Nominal crew size

0.1

None

None

6

None

None

20

2,500

1-3 only

when

docked

25,000 lb

Payload

6

3,000

3

20,000 lb

Payload

200 lb

Payload

20,000 lb

Payload

Miscellaneous

Capabilitiesc

Time on orbit

Laboratories for:

Life sciences

Space science/applications

Materials science

Technology development

Observatories

Data/communication node

Servicing of satellites

Manufacturing facility (materials

processing)

Large structure assembly

Transportation node (assembly,

checkout, and launch)

Fuel and supply depot

8 months Unlimited 3-6 months Unlimited

Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

No

No

Considerable

Modest

No

Moderate

Moderate

Modest

No

No

Extensive

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Modest

Moderate

No

No

Considerable

No

Modest

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No No No No

Response to reasons advanced for

space infrastructure

Maintain U.S. space leadership

and technology capability

Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities

Enable long-term human presence

in space

Attention-getting heroic public

spectacle

Extended international cooperation

Promote U.S. commercialization of

space

Maintain vigorous NASA

engineering capability

Enhance national security, broadly

defined

Space travel for non-technicians

No Modest Modest No

No

No

Modest

No

Modest

No

Modest

No

No No No No

No

Considerable

No

Considerable

Unclear

No

No

Modest

No No No No

No No No No

No No No No

aListed ~latforms are illustrative examples; the list k not exhaustive.

bcogtg include degi~n, development, and pr~uctlon; launch and operational costs are not included. SOme costs are estimated by the Office of Techno@y Assessment; others were provided to OTA.

cClearly judgmental.
10 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Procurement Options

Inasmuch as there is an affirmative answer

to the question of whether to acquire some longterm, in-space infrastructure, the decision of

how it is to be acquired must be faced. In many

respects, this second decision is just as important as the first. The mode of acquiring new,

long-term, in-space assets and services should

be influenced by a clear understanding of the

context in which space activities are expected

to be carried on. And the decision as to how to

acquire these assets and services will have a significant impact on future space activities.

There are four main factors that could heavily

influence procurement choices:

Several foreign countries are now capable

of producing and operating substantial elements of space infrastructure.

Using its own resources, the U.S. private sector is now capable of producing much of the

infrastructure currently envisioned and offering it for sale or lease to the Government

or the private sector.

NASA would prefer to acquire the infrastructure under its own aegis and in the same general way that it has acquired other large

space systems (except for Spacelab).

Other large and sophisticated civilian space

programs-can be easily imagined that would

require professional skills and funds of the

kind and magnitude now envisioned for a

“space station. ”

Congress and the President have approved

NASA’s request to initiate a “space station” program, and NASA appears to be moving to acquire

such infrastructure in much the same fashion that

it acquired the Shuttle:

●

●

●

A great deal of new technology would be developed, acquired, and used, essentially all

of which would be publicly funded.

NASA would arrive at and issue detailed engineering specifications for, and exercise

close management control over, the technology to be acquired.

This infrastructure would be procured by

NASA with Federal funds. The U.S. private

sector would not be prompted to use its own

●

resources to provide a substantial portion of

the infrastructure.

The international role would be limited.

NASA would not seek the kind of close collaboration that would result in shared authority, even if doing so might result in substantial capital cost reduction for the United

States.

A significantly different acquisition approach–

another option—would have the following

elements:

●

●

●

●

As much as is reasonably possible, already

developed, tested, and paid-for technology

would be used to achieve an adequate initial operating capability, with development

of new technology undertaken only where

demonstrably required to lower overall cost

of ownership.

NASA would prompt our private commercial-industrial-financial sectors to develop

and produce, with their own resources and

on a genuinely competitive basis, as many

of the Government-required civilian “space

stat ion’ assets and services as they can;

NASA would facilitate their efforts to do so;

and they could be offered to NASA on a sale,

lease or payment-for-service basis.

NASA, in obtaining the elements not provided by the private sector, would emphasize management methods specifically designed to take the best advantage of the now

quite sophisticated U.S. space industry.

NASA would negotiate collaborative agreements with other cooperating countries that

wouId see all partners share in the benefits

of such an initial operating capability at a reduced acquisition cost to the U.S. Government for its share.

This second approach would imply that NASA

would hand off much (perhaps most) of the more

mundane “space station” work by paying the private sector to do it, thereby conserving its skills

and resources so that they could be focused on

more challenging space goals and objectives, including development of the very advanced technology (e. g., bipropellant engines, a reusable orbital transfer vehicle, etc.) required to address

them—an activity which, for the most part, the

private sector cannot justify.
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 1 1

These two options are at opposite ends of a

spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of

long-term space infrastructure. In determining

which approaches from this spectrum are most

likely to influence the evolution of space activities in a desirable direction, Congress may wish

to consider the following questions:

● Should the Government be allocating its professional skills and experience to the development of (a) incremental or (b) fundamental advances in technology?

Which approach is most likely to stimulate

the “commercialization of space?”

What level of international collaboration is

really desirable?

What other large and important space ends

should be addressed in the next decade in

addition to the acquisition of in-space infrastructure methods and means?

Congress may also wish to keep in mind that

the choice of approach to infrastructure acquisition will also affect its eventual cost to the taxpayer. Beyond the observation that, in some general fashion, the cost will increase with the

capabiIity and sophistication of the infrastructure,

accurate cost estimates are very difficult to make.2

However, the following are important cost

factors:

1. the total capability acquired–which, as suggested by the examples listed in the tables

of infrastructure options, can encompass a

considerable range;

2. the extent to which already developed,

tested, and paid-for technology is used, v.

a focus on new technology with its higher

development cost and greater risk of cost

overruns;

3. the substitution, where feasible, of automated systems for the accomplishment of

tasks previously undertaken only by human

beings;

4. the manner by which the infrastructure is acquired–i.e., the extent to which NASA puts

the engineering challenge on the space industry by issuing performance specifications,

rather than continuing to issue detailed engi5.

6.

7.

8

9.

neeri ng specifications and managing the acquisition process in detail;

the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to persuade our private sector to develop infrastructure assets and services “on their own, ”

and to provide them to the Government at

purchase, lease, or payment-for-service

prices lower than those achievable by the

Government;

the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to effect

eventual private sector operation of the infrastructure and its related activities;

the extent to which large and rapid expansion of military space research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities increases costs in the civilian space

sector also;3

the extent to which any “Christmas-tree effect” takes place within NASA, whereby the

infrastructure acquisition management is

persuaded by the NASA Centers to allow the

cost of desirable but nonessential RDT&E

activities to be included in the acquisition

program; and

the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to arrive

at large-scale collaboration and related costsharing arrangements with other countries.

These points address only the initial capital cost

of this infrastructure—to this cost must be added

its ongoing operation and maintenance costs; the

cost of instruments and equipment needed for

scientific experimentation in association with its

use; and the interest cost of any money borrowed

to fund the acquisition program. And it must be

remembered, too, that the infrastructure will

eventually become obsolete or wear out.

It is clear that there are many opportunities to

reduce infrastructure net cost that could be

grasped by a vigorous, imaginative, and determined NASA management.4

These considerations suggest that, over the next

year or two, at least as much attention should be

given to identifying the best ways by which the

country should set about the permanent development of space as there is given to any technologi-

‘ClasSit’Ied m.lterldl M ,~~ not used I n prep.1 rl ng th IS report.

4Cost red u ct 10 n me,~su rw are d ISC u ssed I n .1 pp. D of t h I \ report
12 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

cal advances and operational capabilities that are

to be obtained.

Funding Rate Options

Another way of thinking about space infrastructure is to estimate how much of it could

be obtained if different annual funding rates

were established. Thus, to provide an independent basis of comparison with the civilian “space

station” program now apparently favored by

NASA, OTA has estimated what new space capabilities could be provided, by when, for various

annual average Government funding rates. No

changes to present NASA acquisition procedures

or NASA anticipated acquisition costs are assumed. Arbitrary annual average funding levels

of $0.1, $0.3, $1, and $3 billion per year (1984$)

were chosen to illustrate the number and kind

of space infrastructure elements that could be acquired over periods of 5, 10, or 15 years.

The results of these 12 funding scenarios are

given in table 3, which shows the funding rate,

number of years, total expenditure, and kinds of

infrastructure elements acquired. s The elements

are divided into those that can operate independently (e.g., the Shuttle Orbiter and a “space station” central base) and those that depend on being serviced or maintained from one of the

independent elements (i.e., by an orbital maneuvering vehicle, a local in-space transportation system operated from a “space station” central element, or directly by the Shuttle).

Table 3 lists the following (among other) elements of space infrastructure that could be acquired over various acquisition intervals:

1. At $0.1 billion per year: probably no “permanently manned” facility could be obsAdditional discussion of funding rate options can be found in

ch. 4 of this report.

Table 3.—Some Illustrative Space infrastructure Acquisitions Possibie at Various Annuai Average Federai

Funding Rates (all amounts in billions of 1984 dollars)

Space acquisition~

Dependent elements

Funding Number Total Unpres- Pressur- Space-based Beyond geostationary

rate of expenditures Independent infrastructure surized ized plat- transport

($&r)

orbit spacecraft

years ($) element+ platforms form# vehicles elements

0.1e 5 0.5 EDO If (20 days, 5 crew) 2 — — —

10 1 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 — — —

15 1.5 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 1 — —

0.3 5 1.5 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 1 — —

10 3 Free-flying Spaceiab modules’ 1 1 OMV —

(permanent, 3 crew)

15 4.5 2 free-flying Spacelab modules in both 2 1 OMV —

28 degree and polar orbits (3 crew each)

5 5 Space transportation center (4 crew) – — OMV; ROTV —

10 10 NASA initial operating capability 2 1 OMV; ROTV —

“space station”g (8 crew)

15 15 NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3 1 OMV;ROTV —

5 15 NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3 1 OMV; ROTV

10 NASA mature “space statlon”g (16 crew) 3

—

30 2 OMV;ROTV Lunar capable ROTV;

Shuttle-Derived Cargo Vehicle (SDV) staffed Lunar facility

15 45 NASA mature “space station”g 5 3 OMV; ROTV Lunar capable ROTV;

(18 crew, SDV) staffed Lunar facility;

Mars voyage

aTaEle8 1 and 2 pre~nt charactorlatlcs and capabllltles of Infrastructure element8 In detail.

b~tend~ Duratl~ Omltem (EOO) am limited In their etays on orbit; other Independent elements am IOnO-term.

cplatfms of the LEABECRA~/EURECA type.

dplatfoma of t~ m~lfl~ f~.flylm SWcela~pa~ lndugtrl~ty~ With theirown electricalpower and pressurization SY8WIIS.

eA~ * 1 b~~llonfyr, no Iong.tefm, staffed Infrastructure elements are -Ible.

f ~~ i ~=teti ~mtlon o~lter, phaae I) and t~ Spacelab modules have Ilmkd electrical Wwer (abut 7 k~.

bhe NASA “space etatlon” elements are expected to operate as transportation and aewiclng centera ae well as laboratories. They would have sufficient power for

exten81ve materlale processing. hA Slgniflcant pan of the cost of a human vieit to Mara couid b provided in thle ca~.
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 1 3

2

3

tained even by the year 2000. Further extension of capabilities of the Shuttle system and

unpressurized platform developments could

be obtained. The acquisitions could be: a development of the Extended Duration Orbiter

(EDO) Phase 1, for 20-day orbit stays, over

a 5-year period; or EDO Phase II, for 50-day

orbit stays, over 10 years or longer, plus two

or three free-flying unpressurized platforms

such as EURECA, LEASECRAFT, and/or the

Space Industries’ platform (assuming that the

Government would make an outright purchase of such platforms).

At $0.3 billion per year: within 5 years, the

acquisitions could be an EDO II plus several

(perhaps pressurized) platforms. Over 10

years, there could be acquired: 1) the first

permanently orbiting, Spacelab-derived habitable modules in 28.5° LEO that could support three people; 2) an orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV) (enabling servicing of

nearby satellites); and 3) a few free-flying

platforms. in 15 years, there could be obtained either: 1) two free-flying Spacelabs,

one in polar orbit, one at 28.5° LEO; or 2)

much more capable permanent infrastructure at 28.5° than that which could be acquired in 10 years.

For $1 billion per year: within 5 years, there

could be acquired: 1 ) a permanent LEO facility operating as a transportation node; 2)

an OMV; and 3) a reusable orbit transfer vehicle capable of transporting spacecraft to

and from higher, including geostationary, orbit. In 10 years the initial operating capability (IOC) infrastructure now favored by

NASA could be acquired. In 15 years, nearly

4.

all of the infrastructure now seriously considered by NASA could be acquired.

At $3 billion per year (assuming that only

funds, not technology or other factors,

would be the pacing program factor):

NASA’s fully developed “space station”

could become available in somewhat more

than 5 years. In 10 years, this infrastructure

plus a geostationary platform, plus a Shuttlederived cargo vehicle for lower cost fuel and

cargo transfer to LEO, plus a lunar facility

ready for occupancy and continuing operation would become possible. In 15 years,

NASA’s complete infrastructure aspirations

and a lunar settlement could be in hand and,

perhaps also, plans for seeing a human crew

travel to the vicinity of Mars and back could

be well advanced.

These projections are for infrastructure acquisition only; operational costs are not included.

Also, there is a basic difference between the costs

associated with Shuttle-type vehicles and permanently orbiting facilities. The use of an EDO to

conduct extended science or development activities with a crew would involve launch costs each

time it went into orbit; use of a permanent facility would require resupply several times per year,

but the cost for each flight could be shared with

other payloads. For example, if 12 dedicated 30-

day EDO flights were conducted per year, about

$1 billion (1984$) in annual transportation costs

would be involved; in comparison, the cost of

4 partial-load Shuttle launches per year to resupply a permanent facility would total $100 million

to $400 million (1 984$).

NEED FOR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

In view of the variety of possible ensembles of which identifiable, serious users have “hard” reinfrastructure, the different methods of acquiring quirements might well be acquired within the next

them, and the range of funding rates at which decade. In the meantime, the most effective way

they could be acquired, how are the choices to to determine our direction in space would be a

be made? In general, these choices should not be national discussion of, and eventual agreement

made without prior agreement on the future direc- on, a set of long-range goals which the United

tion of the civilian space activities of the United States expects its civilian space activities to

States; however, the infrastructure elements for address.
14 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in space

B Photo credit” Aeronautics and Space Administration

One alternative to the development of new technology is to use the space Shuttle for many advanced operations in

low-Earth-orbit. Shown here: (A) servicing satellite in April 1984; (B) assembly of a large structure in orbit—

here simulated in water; and (C) a deployable antenna.
Ch. I—Executive Summary • 15

Today, unfortunately, there is general agreement neither on such a set of long-range goals

nor on a set of specific objectives which, as they

are addressed, would serve as milestones of progress toward those goals. If future civilian spacerelated goals and objectives are to be effective

i n providing direction to U.S. space efforts, they

should be such as to command widespread attention; have inherent humanitarian and scientific interest; foster development of new technology; have relevance to global issues; prompt

international cooperation; and involve major participation of our private sector.

Such a set of goals and objectives would allow

a clear determination of the basic characteristics

of the infrastructure elements actually needed,

and of the means and rate whereby these elements should be acquired. In the absence of such

goals and objectives, and with the great uncertainties in the estimate of any infrastructure cost to

the public, OTA concludes that it is impossible to

judge, objectively, whether or not most of the infrastructure elements proposed to date—and, in

particular, many of the set currently proposed by

NASA—are truly appropriate and worth their substantial cost.

SOME POSSIBLE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

I n order to prompt the formulation and subsequent discussion of future space goals and objectives, OTA has prepared a list of possible longrange goals and a set of nearer-term objectives

designed to address those goals. Although OTA

does not recommend either this particular set of

goals or its supporting family of objectives, they

are intended to exemplify the kind of goals and

objectives around which consensus might well

be formed so as to provide sensible guidance for

the Nation’s future space activities. The Advisory

Panel of this assessment has taken an unusually

active role in helping to formulate these goals and

objectives. It is the panel’s judgment that the

goals and objectives proposed for discussion are

reasonable and important.

The national goals proposed for discussion are

as follows:

●

●

●

●

●

●

to increase the efficiency of space activities

and reduce their net cost to the general

public;

to involve the public directly in space activities, both on Earth and in space;

to derive scientific, economic, social, and

political benefits;

to increase international cooperation and

collaboration in and regarding space;

to study and explore the Earth, the solar system, and the greater physical universe; and

to spread life, in a responsible fashion,

throughout the solar system.

OTA has also formulated, as milestones to mark

progress toward these goals, the following family

of 10 objectives. Table 4 relates these objectives

to the six goals. Some of the objectives are readily

achievable; others may not be, but still represent

legitimate targets.6 They are not rank-ordered.

1. A space-related, global system/service

2

3.

4.

could be established to provide timely and

useful information regarding potentially

hazardous natural circumstances found in

the Earth’s space and atmosphere, and at

and below its surface.

A transportation service could be established to and from the Earth’s Moon, and

a modest human presence established

there, for scientific and other cultural and

economic purposes.

Space probes could be used to obtain the

information and experience specifically required to plan for further exploration of the

planet Mars and some asteroids.

Medical studies of direct interest to the general public, including study of the human

aging process, could be conducted through

scientific experiments that compare physiological, emotional, and social experience

in the absence of gravity with experience

gained in the conduct of related surface

stud ies.

‘A full dl~cussion of the objectik es appear~ [n ch, 6 of this report.
16 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Table 4.—Possible Goals and Objectives

Goals

Increase Derive

space activities’ Involve the scientific, Increase Study and Bring life

efficiency; general Derive political, inter- explore the to the

reduce their public economic and social national physical physical

net cost directly benefits benefits cooperation universe universe

Objectives:

N

P

P

P

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Establish a global information system/

service re natural hazards

Establish lower cost reusable

transportation service to the Moon and

establish human presence there

Use space probes to obtain information

re Mars and some asteroids prior to

early human exploration

Conduct medical research of direct

interest to the general public

Bring at least hundreds of the general

public per year into space for short

visits

Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting, common-user system/sewice

Make essentially all data generated by

civilian satellites and spacecraft

directly available to the general public

Exploit radio/optical free space

electromagnetic propagation for longdistance energy distribution

Reduce the unit cost of space transportation and space activities

Increase space-related private sector

sale&

N N N Y Y Y N

N

Y

P

Y

Y

Y

P

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

P

Y

P

P

Y

Y

N N Y P Y N N

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

aThlg w~ld advance the proapects of successfully addressing aii other “9~is.”

Y: Yes; N: No; P: Perhaps; depends on how carried out.

At least hundreds of members of the general public per year, from the United States

and abroad, could be selected on an equitable basis and brought into space for short

visits there.

A direct audio broadcasting, common-user

system/service could be established that

would be available to all of the countries

of the world on an economical and equitable basis.

In general, all of the nonclassified and nonprivate communications from, and nonproprietary data generated by, all Government-supported spacecraft and satellites

could be made widely available to the general public and our educational institutions

in near-real-time and at modest cost.

Radio and optical free-space electromagnetic propagation techniques could be exploited in an attempt to allow reliable and

economic long-distance transmission of

large amounts of electrical energy, both

into space for use there, and from space,

lunar, and remote Earth locations for distribution throughout the world.

The unit cost of space transportation, for

people and equipment, between the

Earth’s surface and low-, geosynchronous-,

and lunar-Earth orbit could be sharply

reduced.

Space-related commercial-industrial sales

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

in our private sector could be stimulated

to increase at a rate comparable to that of

other high-technology sectors, and our

public expenditures on civilian space assets

and activities could reflect this revenue

growth.

Congress and the President have now agreed on

legislation that will establish a National Commission on Space. This commission will be well-positioned to initiate and sponsor a national debate

on the future direction of U.S. space activities. The

goals and objectives suggested here may provide

a substantial starting point for further discussion.
Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 1 7

INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED BY THE PROPOSED GOALS

AND OBJECTIVES

Technology

Some of these objectives, if they are to be

achieved, will require certain elements of inspace infrastructure; others, depending on how

they would be carried out, may or may not require such elements; still others will require none.

The manner in which the United States obtains

any of this infrastructure should reflect, as much

as possible, our already great investment in space

technology and operations; whenever reasonably

possible, it should be obtained at the lowest capital, and operations and maintenance, cost to the

public purse.

If the Government’s large capital costs for development and production are to be minimized

and the private sector strengthened, then serious

consideration might well be given to encouraging the private sector to provide infrastructure elements that meet Government performance specifications, rather than detailed engineering specifications. These elements could be provided to

others as well as to the Government through sale,

long-term leases, or on the basis of charges for

actual service use.

The main elements of longer term space infrastructure called for in pursuing the family of 10

objectives are:’

a.

b.

c.

an LEO capability to assemble and check

out the large and sophisticated satellites and

space structures needed to provide both the

hazard-prevention and the direct audio

broadcast global system/service [objectives

(1) and (6)];

an LEO human residential and working

space to be used for medical research [objective (4)], and possibly for space visits [objective (5)];

a transport staging facility to support efficient travel to geostationary orbit, the

Moon, and beyond, using reusable orbital

transfer vehicles or other vehicles. [this

7N0 additional space infrastructure elements are needed to

achieve objective (7).

would address objectives (1), (2), (3), (6), (9),

and possibly (8)]; and

d. a storage facility in LEO would allow use of

full Shuttle loads, helping objective (9), and

staffed LEO laboratory facilities could promote (1 O).

Of course, if such infrastructure elements were

available for the specific purposes that justify their

acquisition, they could be used for additional purposes also.

Note that, in essence, provision of the infrastructure needed to pursue two of the larger-scale

objectives [(2) and (4)] could accommodate most

of the needs of all of the other eight. In what follows, therefore, the cost of this infrastructure is

included under these two objectives.

And note that no Government development of

free-flying platform infrastructure elements is

called for; these elements (e.g., MESA, SPAS,

EURECA, LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries platform, etc.) could and probably would be designed, developed, and installed by our private

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Free-flying platforms such as the one depicted in this

artist’s concept offer one option for relatively low-cost

space infrastructure elements.
18 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

sector, and/or other countries, and offered to the

civilian space community—both Government

and private interests—under appropriate sale or

lease arrangements, where they could be used

for remote sensing, the conduct of scientific research, or the production of various materials

under microgravity conditions.

Finally, note that very large amounts of very

costly electrical power in LEO (with an initial capital cost of as much as $10,000 per watt) are not

called for; some 20 kilowatts would appear to be

sufficient. Larger amounts appear to be needed

only for any eventual commercial-industriaI materials processing, and could then be provided

and financed by the private sector in anticipation

that such processing will prove to be profitable.

cost

Attaining all of the proposed objectives would,

overall, cost a great deal of money. In the accompanying table S, rough estimates are made for the

cost of each of them, and the length of time over

which each would be pursued to completion. It

is a fundamental assumption that maximum use

will be made of: 1 ) already developed and paidfor technology, 2) the most truly competitive procurement methods, and 3) the most modern and

least burdensome acquisition strategies and procedures.

A first rough estimate of the total cost8 of attaining all 10 of the proposed objectives is no less

BApp. F of this report discusses costs in detail.

Table 5.—Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion

Total costa Duration

Objectives (billions, 1984 dollars) (years)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Establish a global information system/service

re natural hazards

Establish lower cost reusable transportation

service to the Moon and establish human

presence ther#

Use space probes to obtain information re

Mars and some asteroids prior to early human

exploration

Conduct medical research of direct interest to

the general public

Bring at least hundreds of the general

public per year into space for short visitsg

Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,

common-user system/service

Make essentially all data generated by

civilian satellites and spacecraft directly

available to the general public

Exploit radio/optical free-space electromagnetic propagation for long-distance

energy distribution

Reduce the unit cost of space transportation

and space activitiesg

’

h

Increase space-related private sector salesh

2

20

2

6

0.5

2

0

0.5

5

0.5

10

15, 25

15

5, 25

5, 25

10

25

10

15

25

-$401

acO~t~ are for @VelOprnent and acqulsltlorr. o~ratlona and maintenance costs are nOt included, excePt for some iaunch and

Oparationa costs noted for objectives 2, 3, and 4.

b15 ~eam t. eatabliah t~ settlement, and 3 visits/year at $0.1 billion each (pius tMSiC Shuttle launch costs) over the followin9

c~~~~~maverage, one pro~ eveV 3 yeara and S0.4 billion each.

d~ billion over 5 Yearn t. establish a iife sciences laboratory in LEO, and $0.2 billionhear thereafter to oPerate it. This

laboratory could also be used for materials science and other research.

e5 years t. establish a LEO “ldgts-habitat,)’ and its continuin9 use thereafter.

f $OU billion/year in addition to DOD expenditures.

g~.3 billion~ear for a l~year t~hnolqy development efforf to reduce space transportation Unit COStS.

%his would also help efforts directed toward the other objectives. i The actual cost couid ~ as high as $80 billion (1984 dollars), if costs exceed initial pr~ictions by WO/O
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 1 9

than $4o billion and perhaps considerably more

(as much as $60 billion [1 984$]) over the next 25

years. Table 5 itemizes the estimated costs for all

the objectives. Given that these estimates are

made at an early stage, there cannot be great confidence in their detailed accuracy, but such accuracy is unnecessary for the illustrative purposes

being served here.

If work were to commence on all of them now,

the bulk of the cost would occur over the next

15 years.

Space transportation costs are not included in

these estimates, except for an additional $0.1 billion (1984$) or so for each flight from lowEarth-orbit to lunar orbit. Rather, it is assumed

that some 10 Shuttle surface-LEO flights per year

at an average cost of about $0.1 billion (1 984$)

each by early in the next decade would be budgeted for all Government-sponsored civilian R&D

purposes, including those considered here.

Financing

There are many matters that must be given

carefuI consideration before a national commitment to undertake such large, lengthy, and costly

public activities could be made. Certainly among

the most important are the sources and magnitude of funds that can be reasonably expected

to be available.

If the funding previously spent on Shuttle development (approximately $2 billion per year) is

continued but reallocated towards the initial objectives, and if the NASA appropriation (approximately $7 billion per year) is augmented by a

real growth of 1 percent per year, and if truly collaborative cost-sharing international agreements

could be reached whereby other friendly countries would contribute, say, an additional amount

equal to one-third of this subtotal, we could look

forward to approximately the following amounts

being available for the initial 10 objectives:

Reprogramming of the Shuttle

development effort fund level

of $2 billion per year for 25

years – $ 50 billion

1 percent per year “real

growth” over 25 years applied

to these objectives – $ 25 billion

Cost-sharing by other countries – $ 25 billion

Total – $100 billion

Amounts spent for related space research, development, test, and evaluation by the U.S. private

sector would be added to this total.

As these figures are considered, it should be

kept in mind that space is a high-technology domain. Increasing private sector interest in exploiting the economic potential of space invites comparison of growth rates in other high-technology

sectors. If private sector space-related sales continue at a rate of 10 percent per year (a conservative estimate for high-technology sectors), the

tax revenues derived therefrom would, over the

next quarter-century, be quite substantial. And

to the extent that public funding of Government

space activities is understood as “offset” by these

tax revenues (as they sometimes are in the aeronautics area) the net cost to the public for such

space activities would be substantially reduced. g

Clearly, under such circumstances, funding limitations would not prevent the United States from

undertaking an ambitious publicly supported civilian space program throughout the next quarter of a century.

9App. F of this report discusses these prospects at length.

SHAPE OF THE SPACE FUTURE

There are important changes under way in how rity considerations are already the subject of

space activities are carried on. The number of im- widespread debate. If the United States is to

portant players is increasing as space expertise maintain its leadership role in civilian space activand experience spreads, economic considera- ities, it must be prepared to make fundamental

tions are becoming more important, and secu- shifts i n policy and practice.
20 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Photo credit: Aeronautics and Space Administration

Communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit (such as Webster Vl, shown here)

can provide continuous coverage of large of the Earth’s surface for relay of radio,

television, and telephone signals.

International ‘

International space activities will continue to

expand, both in numbers of countries involved

and in absolute magnitude of their capabilities.

There is every reason to expect that the spacefaring nations of the world will find it in their interest to participate in the considered development

of near-Earth space, and perhaps all countries

would like to engage in civilian space activities

to some extent. The OTA report on International

Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space

Activities10 

addresses a wide range of issues arising in this area, and appendix C of this report discusses the variety of ways in which the United

 and Competition in Civilian Space

Activities, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 

 in press.

States and other friendly countries might, in concert, develop, operate, and use long-term in-orbit

infrastructure.

Private Sector

To date, private sector interest in space has

been confined primarily to the successful satellite communications business and the support of

Government activities. However, there is tangible evidence that a number of private concerns

will soon begin to offer assets and services on a

fee-for-service or lease basis, both to the Government and to other private interests. The projected

needs of space science and space applications,

for example, constitute a ready market for providers of various future infrastructure system/

services.
Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 21

New Role for NASA

In view of the significant changes in the way

that space activities will be carried on in the future, NASA may well have to make certain fundamental shifts of attitude and operation. I n the

past, it has been NASA’s responsibility to meet

any given national space objective by itself; in

the future, it should be NASA’s responsibility to

see that the objective is met. That is, NASA should

now aspire to the much broader role of seeing

that others in our private sector and throughout

the world do much more of what it does today.

In the simplest of terms: if NASA is to rise successfully to the challenges now emerging in the

national and international space arena, it should

place relatively less emphasis on accomplishing

by itself those things that our private sector or

other friendly nations can satisfactorily do, either

alone or with NASA assistance. It can succeed

in this only by continuing to cooperate with both,

and by broadening this cooperation so as to

prompt and assist both to extend their space-related capacities, confidence, and commitment.

And it could emphasize such cooperation in the

acquisition of in-space infrastructure—i. e., a

“space station .“

Released from its present relatively near-term

focus, NASA could concentrate more of its own

professional activities on the most important and

exciting of everything else in and concerning

space, the things that no one else can or will do:

the very best of space-related science; the cutting

edge of space-related technology development;

the boldest of space-related explorations and developments.

Finally, NASA and other space-related offices

i n the executive branch shouId see that their activities continue to be conducted, and the results

thereof continue to be used, not only to increase

knowledge and to address important social and

political goals, but now also to enable our private space sector to increase its non-Government

sales—the sales that generate the taxes that help

to pay for Government space activities.

38-798 0 - 84 - 3 : QL 3
Chapter 2

ISSUES AND FINDINGS
Contents

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NASA’s Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

National Commission on Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Civilian “Space Stations” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Case for infrastructure in Low-Earth-Orbit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Concerns About Low-Earth-Orbit Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Cost of Low-Earth-Orbit Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Our Future in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Long-Term Space Goals and Objectives

Long-Term Space Strategies . . . . . . . . . .

Cost Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Space Cooperation . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Space as an Arena of Peaceful Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NASA’s Changing Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Non-Government Policy Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Possible Legislative Initiatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Strategies for Acquiring Any New In-Space Civilian Infrastructure . . . . . . . . .

Civilian Space Policies, Goals, Objectives, and Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Creation of Space Policy Study Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

25

25

28

30

31

31

32

33

33

35

35

37

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

43

45

46
Chapter 2

ISSUES AND FINDINGS

GENERAL

NASA’s Circumstance s

A general and most important conclusion of

this assessment, one that touches on all its other

findings, is that any serious discussion of the

Nation’s future civilian space aspirations and

activities, both publicly funded and privately

sponsored, must be carried on with a full appreciation of the present and near-term circumstances of the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA).

Since soon after NASA’s inception, its space

programs have had two major components: 1)

a core of continuing space science and space exploration activities, later joined by space applications activities, and the development of that

technology specifically required to conduct

them; and 2) singular major technological forays, centering on people in space. It is worth

noting that while the core science and exploration activities were mandated in NASA’s founding

charter, the National Aeronautics and Space Act

of 1958, as amended, the succession of big programs seems to continue as a matter of tradition–

with the explicit approval of the President and

Congress.

Such major undertakings as Mercury, Gemini,

Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle take years, even a

decade, to complete, involve a large fraction of

NASA’s engineering staff, and cost billions or tens

of billions of dollars. Because the magnitude of

NASA’s commitment to these undertakings is so

complete, other, smaller programs—including the

core science and exploration activities—are always at some risk of seeing part of their funding

delayed or transferred to cover overruns in the

big programs. A small percentage overrun in a

major program component can represent the

whole of a smaller, but perhaps equally important science or application program.

For the most part, it is this spectacular kind

of activity that takes most of NASA’s attention

and resources, is of most interest to the general

public, here and abroad, and serves the important national objective of projecting the civilian technological prowess of the United States

on the world stage.

From the viewpoint of the technologists who

make up most of the continuing leadership of the

U.S. publicly funded space effort, these major

NASA programs serve several important objectives:

●

●

●

●

●

●

they keep NASA in the public eye in a particularly gratifying fashion;

they attract the services and loyalty of outstanding space engineers both within NASA

and the closely related sections of the U.S.

private space industry;

they allow the development of a great deal

of new technology otherwise difficult to

justify on a piecemeal basis–technology that

allows further space advances subsequently;

they are more difficult to interrupt or cancel

than smaller and/or less generally appreciated space activities;

once approved, they require relatively little

further engagement by engineers in “political justification” activities for some time; and

they provide perhaps the most visible and

apparently effective civilian response to the

widely publicized in-space activities of Soviet cosmonauts.

And to date, it is this kind of activity that has

obtained the most attention, and approval, of the

president and Congress. But these large programs

also have another, rather troubling set of characteristics. Because they are primarily technological in nature, they are inherently difficult to explain satisfactorily to those who are not

professionals or not particularly interested. They

are initiated by Government technologists and

their supporters who are convinced of their value,

rather than being initiated in response to large

segments of the general public’s specifically calling on NASA to provide them. ’ Perhaps most im-

‘The implication here is not that there is no public support for

the civilian space program in general or the big technological spec2 5
26 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Dramatic manned space missions such as the Apollo 11 lunar landing have generated public support for NASA,

portant, the completion of any one of the large,

high-technology, “manned” programs faces

NASA’s management either with making a fundamental move toward a more equal distribution of agency funds among all its R&D programs, or with creating and securing support for

another program of the same general character and size.

Thus, the first successful flight of a Shuttle orbiter in early 1981 found the NASA management

 in particular, but that this support might be broadened if

wide public discussion were encouraged. One need only compare

the extent to which the public, to date, interests itself in space issues

with the extent to which it interests itself in education, health services delivery, housing, defense, transportation, etc.

confronting this problem again. Within a relatively few years thereafter, either another large

new program would have to begin, or a number

of relatively small existing programs would have

to be considerably enlarged (or new ones initiated)—or else as many as one-quarter of NASA’s

professional staff and approximately $2 billion per

year would be lost.

Without an internal or external mandate to

achieve a more nearly equal distribution of funds

among all its R&D programs, NASA leaders opted

to pursue another large, high-technology,

“manned” program. The particular program

chosen has been the subject of study and discussion within the civilian space community for

decades: “the space station” program. After
Ch. 2—issues and Findings ● 2 7

detailed engineering study, the public acquisition

of in-space infrastructure under this program

would proceed for several years at an average

rate of some $2 billion per year. It would involve

the development of high technology, much of

which would address the problems attendant on

seeing people reside and work in space in a permanent fashion under safe and sanitary conditions. Its buildup could be phased to match the

reduction in the Shuttle development program

so that, overall, NASA’s present and anticipated

“budget envelope” could be maintained, and the

Shuttle program’s professional skill mix could be

satisfactorily reassigned.

Given, first, its institutional end of maintaining its current size and, second, its choice of a

space infrastructure program as means to attain

that end, NASA has been somewhat reluctant

to consider new modes of acquiring the infrastructure envisioned. For example, NASA could

choose to employ a great deal of already developed, space-qualified, and already paid-for technology. It could prompt the U.S. private space

industry to come forward with proposals to provide major infrastructure elements to NASA in an

economical fashion, elements that the private

sector, using its own resources (including private

funds), would design to the Government’s performance specifications (rather than to detailed

design specifications under contract). lt could

seek international collaborative arrangements

under which foreign partners would bear a substantial fraction of the present $8 billion estimate,2

thereby significantly reducing the cost to U.S. taxpayers. However, with the two givens, these new

approaches could result in an insufficient program base to maintain the agency’s present size

and, perhaps, even its present character as an independent, civilian, national resource.

In view of NASA’s internal circumstances and

the many other external desiderata which its resources could alternatively address, the question

arises: is a “space station” program the best way

for NASA to spend the foreseeably available $2

billion per year3 to serve the needs of the Nation—and the world? The President and Congress

have just approved a “space station” program

in principle, and allocated $150 million to commence engineering studies—studies now expected to take 2 years. Decisions as to the character, magnitude, and pace of this program

would be made after the completion of these

studies, and any others that Congress might

request.

If: 1) NASA’S basic decision not to move

toward a more nearly equal distribution of funds

among all its R&D programs remains unchanged,

2) its overall aspirations for its “space station”

program are not realized, and 3) no adequate

substitutes appear and are approved within the

next 2 years, then the basic character of the

present U.S. publicly funded civilian space prozlt is imw~ant to appreciate that this $8 billion figure covers only

the initial capital outlay, not the continuing operations and maintenance costs or subsequent capital outlays to acquire additional

capabilities.

JThe $2 billion per Year figure is predicated upon two Projections: that NASA’s overall budget will remain level in constant

(1984$) dollars at somewhat over $7 billion per year, and that the

roughly $2 billion per year currently spent for Shuttle development

will be made available for space infrastructure acquisition.
28 Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

gram itself could be placed in question. If

NASA’s professionals were convinced that they

could not see a reasonable future for the exercise of the skills they so successfully displayed in

the Shuttle program, they would soon begin to

explore employment alternatives—and the more

accomplished, more imaginative, and more independent employees, which any outstanding R&D

organization simply must retain, would be the

ones most likely to do so. One of the clear alternatives would be to work on what now appears

to be another rapidly growing high-technology

space program area—that of the space elements

of the new military Strategic Defense Initiative

(SDI), a program now headed by a former associate administrator of NASA who was responsible for the Shuttle development program.

If large numbers of professionals left NASA, and

if their leaving the civilian space R&D area were

accompanied by similar departures from that part

of the private space industry long associated with

NASA, an already significant and increasing imbalance between our military and civilian publicly funded space programs would be magnified.

A vigorous, independent NASA has served the

Nation well; any trend toward reducing it to mere

adjunct status cannot be viewed, in the overall

national security context, without concern.

Thus, the NASA management may have “bet

the company” on the successful outcome of a

campaign to obtain approval for one more large,

new, high-technology, publicly funded civilian

space program. Unfortunately, even if approval

is received, such a program could foreclose, perhaps for 5 to 10 years, the possibility of NASA’s

undertaking other, more desirable options or its

effecting any fundamental changes either in its

major program mix or in the way it acquires

space technology. Yet, in OTA’S judgment, serious consideration must be given, now, to preserving these options and making these changes,

if NASA is to maintain U.S. space leadership.

For fundamental shifts in other national and international circumstances that will importantly

affect the conduct of future space activities are

already under way.

Just as unfortunately, because the Shuttle development program is expected to be essentially

complete within 2 years, any moves to effect large

and desirable changes in the NASA program mix

and/or acquisition processes and/or international

collaboration policies must also be made within

that time. Making such moves effectively would

call for a high degree of institutional imagination

and political statesmanship by both branches,

and NASA particularly.

Whatever else the executive branch and Congress decide to do at this decision point, they

should resolve that they will not be required to

face such circumstances again. The publicly

funded civilian space program of the United

States is too important, and the scientists and

technologists heading the program too competent and responsible, to continue to be treated

with the form of “benign neglect” that has been

the rule since

grand Apollo

Transitions

fundamental,

the successful completion of the

program.

Transitions

are under way. And they are so

and moving so rapidly, that we
Ch. 2—Issues and Findings ● 2 9

should not be surprised to see them have significant, although presently unpredictable in

detail, impacts on any “space station” program,

even in the next few years. The key institutional

question is this: will U.S. leaders see to it that

NASA meets these transitions head-on and

moves out smartly to “lead the parade” by orchestrating the growing and increasingly varied

foreign and domestic space interests?

For nearly a quarter of a century, the United

States and the Soviet Union were the only major players in the civilian space arena.4 Except for

satellite communications, all of the U.S. civilian

space activities were formally conceived, funded,

and managed by the Federal Government, primarily NASA.

Similarly, during this interval, NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA), and the National Weather Service decided, with regard to the weather and climate

area, what space-related scientific, technologydevelopment, and infrastructure-acquisition programs should be conducted; developed their

characteristics in some detail; mounted almost

always successful campaigns with the President

and Congress to receive direction, legal permission, and Federal funds for their conduct; and

then conducted them using large numbers of inhouse scientists and engineers and contracting

with their counterparts in universities and the

space industry.

NASA has frequently been willing to consider

international cooperation in science with other

countries, and has reached cooperative agreements with many countries—agreements that saw

other countries spend significant amounts of

money to support their space professionals and

to provide them with equipment in order to effect such cooperation. But there has yet to be any

major cooperative agreement reached that would

see truly significant equipment jointly designed

and produced by the United States and one or

more other countries that would result either in

4Since the adoption of the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space

Act, the United States has maintained identifiably separate civilian

and military space programs, though there has always been cooperation between the two. The extent to which one can make a similar distinction with respect to Soviet space activities remains a vexing

question.

important technology sharing, in U.S. program

risk sharing, or in large savings to the public

purses The Department of Defense (DOD) often

does so within NATO and elsewhere, as do major aerospace companies in order to reduce their

own financial, technological, and market risk exposure in large complex programs. NASA officials

are making overtures to other countries regarding their participation in any “space station” program, but it remains to be seen whether these

overtures will result in the kind of collaboration

that would realize major cost savings to the

United States.

With a single recent exception,b there has been

no important instance in which our private sector has set out to develop major items of spacerelated technology of acknowledged central importance to NASA programs on its own, using its

own resources—including financing—to do so.

All such critical elements are still procured by the

Government, with Government funds and some

considerable Government oversight in the process.

However, over the past few years, international

civilian space circumstances, the circumstances

of our own space-related private sector, and the

attitude of our Government toward the civilian

space area have begun to undergo fundamental

shifts-shifts that, in the next few years, cannot

but have great impact on what our publicly

funded civilian space program does and how it

does it.

As a result of the sustained and generous assistance of the United States, and by working in close

concert with NASA and the U.S. space industry

over the past few years, several other countries

have conceived of, developed, produced, installed, and used substantial space and spacerelated equipment. Such equipment, some of it

designed primarily for scientific research, some

!$Spacelab is the exception that proves the rule. NOAA, on the

other hand, is moving to obtain further contributions of spacerelated technology through the Economic Summit process, and is

pursuing the development of international polar-orbiting meteorological satellites; both of these initiatives could result in important

cost savings to the U.S. public program.

6The exception is the agreement, on an ‘upper stage, between

NASA and the Orbital Science Corp. of Vienna, VA. McDonnell

Douglas upgraded the Delta and developed the Payload Assist

Module (PAM) using its own funds, and other private groups are

now developing expendable boosters of various kinds.
30 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

primarily for commercial applications, is of a sophistication that often matches that of U.S. equipment, and of a sales magnitude that, in some instances, now clearly offers serious competition

to the generally acknowledged preeminence of

the United States (cf. Spacelab; Ariane; the Canadian Remote Manipulator System; DBS spacecraft; etc.).7 These countries now have sufficient

confidence in their own skills and experience to

encourage them to ask for a much closer kind

of cooperation with the United States. It will not

be long before they can and probably will insist

on it, for they will have the ability and the motivation to “go it alone” if they cannot see that their

basic interests would be adequately served by the

kind of cooperation extended to them by the

United States.

Similarly, one of NASA’s outstanding successes

(shared with DOD) has been that of shepherding

the aircraft, electronics, chemical, and other hightechnology areas of our private sector into the

civilian space business. This is now a very sophisticated and confident part of our overall national

commercial-industrial capability. But significant

segments of the private space sector are increasingly restless with the prospect of having to produce high-technology space items under what

they perceive to be the no-longer-necessary, and

wasteful, “close control” of NASA managers.8

Also, the past few years have seen a growing

number of entrepreneurs beginning to enter the

civilian space area. These “newcomers” are not

limited to those who would use the assets and

services that NASA expects to acquire; some

would provide such assets and services to both

the Government and others in the private sector on what they believe to be inviting financial

terms. Both the President and Congress are clearly determined to see that the private sector plays

a much more prominent role in the civilian space

area generally, that it is encouraged to make major investments therein, and that the country

7For a thorough discussion of this issue, see the OTA report /international Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, in press,

6At least some in the private sector believe that they can do as

good work on space hardware generally as they do on commercial air transportation and communications satellites, and they are

willing to assume the financial responsibility of doing so and to risk

grave financial penalties if they fail.

finally begin to reap the large and direct economic benefits so long hoped for by civilian space

leaders.

Finally, the great, persistent, and projected deficits in our Federal budget now require Congress

to take an even more careful look at deferrable

expenditures, especially “new starts. ” Indeed,

the central issue of the President’s request for

congressional approval of the first phase of a

“space station” program is that of its capital cost,

even though NASA now estimates the size of the

initial portion of the program (in constant 1984

dollars) to be less than one-half that of the Shuttle program, and not much more than 10 percent

of the Apollo program, and its acquisition schedule would seemingly not require NASA’s budget

to be increased over today’s amount.g

These new national and international circumstances have begun to command the attention

of the executive branch, and important first

steps toward addressing them have been taken.

However, although many of the leaders of the

U.S. publicly funded space program are convinced of the importance of these circumstances, few of them have the professional and

business experience required to ensure an effective response. Furthermore, it appears that

most of those beneath the top management levels as yet have little enthusiasm for making indicated changes. And, indeed, it is not clear that

leaders of the executive branch have thought

out, clearly, just how far they are willing to see

innovative arrangements arrived at that would

carry NASA and NOAA into much closer collaboration with other countries and with our

own private sector.

National Commission on Space

In July 1984, Congress enacted, and the President signed into Iaw,lo the National Aeronautics

and Space Act of 1985. Title II of this Act estabgHowever, consider the following: “In recent decades the average overrun on major programs, in constant dollars and constant

quantities, has been slightly over 50 percent. The average schedule

milestone has been missed by a third of the time initially projected.

The average time to develop new systems has, until recently, been

increasing at the rate of 3 months per year . . . each year. ” Norman R. Augustine, “The Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech

Management,” Aerospace America, March 1984, p. 5.

lopublic Law 98-36I.
Ch. 2—Issues and Findings Ž 31

Iished a National Commission on Space. The deliberations of the National Commission can be

expected to have a fundamental impact on the

entire civilian space future, including the future

course of any civilian “space station” program.

This conclusion is based on the assumption that

the Commission will provide an appropriate mix

of prestige, broad concern for the national interest, technical expertise, and diverse outlook.

There are great opportunities now perceptible

in the civilian space area, but the rapidly changing circumstances that make their achievement

possible have raised difficult issues and created

institutional inconsistencies. If the new opportunities are to be realized, these issues must be

faced and the inconsistencies resolved. OTA has

earlier expressed the view that many of these

issues and inconsistencies cannot now be dealt

with adequately by the annual authorization

process and that, therefore, some more fundamental mechanism, such as a Presidential Commission, should be created. The newly authorized

Commission is the first opportunity in a generation for Congress—and the Nation—to set a truly

fresh course in space. It is critically important to

the Nation generally, and to a successful U.S.

future in civilian space activities specifically, that

the Commission be successful.

NASA now plans to spend the next 2 years

making studies of a fairly specific low-Earth-orbit

(LEO) infrastructure complex that it would acquire, operate, and use in a manner similar to

the Shuttle. This plan was set in motion some

years ago. Over the next year and a half, the

deliberations and eventual findings of the National Commission could offer NASA, and

others seriously interested in the space future,

the opportunity to develop new program options, and to compare these new options, new

methods, and new attitudes with the civilian

“space station” program as currently defined.

Afresh, basic and uninhibited review of policy

issues might well result in a fundamental change

of NASA views on the following matters:

●

●

●

●

the appropriate character of the “space station” program;

the character and mix of its various large,

long-range programs;

the ways in which it might orchestrate the civilian space interests of all friendly countries;

and

the ways in which it could act to prompt

greatly increased private sector investment in

space.

CIVILIAN “SPACE STATIONS”

The Case for Infrastructure in

Low-Earth-Orbit

on balance, a persuasive case can be made

for acquiring some long-term infrastructure in

near-Earth space, some of which would allow

a human work force to be retained there for extended periods.11 This case rests primarily on

tangible rather than intangible considerations.

The persuasive tangible reasons are that the

United States would then be able to explore the

possibility of more efficient transport staging beI I [t is of course assumed that the character and location of the

infrastructure elements would be chosen to meet the specific, important expressed needs of those expected to use the services that

these elements would be expected to provide—i.e., not chosen by

the technologists who would design, produce, and install them.

tween LEO and geostationary orbit (GEO), the

Moon, and beyond; to commence certain important life science12 and materials science experiments early in the next decade, the conduct of

which would otherwise border on the impossible; to warehouse space assets and consumables,

so as to improve the efficiency of very costly

surface-LEO transportation; to aspire to much

more ambitious and dependable servicing of ever

larger and more sophisticated, and therefore

more costly and complex, space assets, thereby containing their total life-cycle costs and increasing their effectiveness; and to undertake new

12Life ~ience r-arch could include studies of long-term response

to in-space conditions (in preparation for possible staffed expeditions to the Moon, Mars, or the asteroids) as well as studies relevant to the general human population on Earth.
32 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

and innovative space activities with confident

freedom.

These reasons reflect not only the many years

of conceptual studies of infrastructure arrays that

could support space activities but, as well, a general consensus as to the value of space infrastructure elements gained with actual experience in

Skylab, the Shuttle Orbiter, the Soviet Salyut,

Soyuz, and Progress, the Tracking and Data Relay

Satellite System (TDRSS), Spacelab, the Manned

Maneuvering Unit (MMU), the West German

SPAS platform, the Canadian Remote Manipulator System (RMS), etc.

Indeed, it seems likely that, in retrospect-some

two decades hence—at Ieast a large portion, perhaps all, of the space infrastructure capabilities

now advanced by NASA as necessary will be seen

to have been so. But this eventuality gives no

guidance as to how and when the various elements should be acquired.

Another reason advanced is that, eventually,

there may be important economic payoffs from

materials processing in space that would require

the use of space infrastructure. What is now required is a great deal of imaginative and sound

in-space basic and applied research in the materials science area.

The intangible reasons for acquiring such infrastructure—reasons of maintaining space leadership generally, of creating further heroic role

models, of exhibiting our capacity for hightechnology development, of enhancing national

security, of maintaining a strong NASA, etc.—

are much less compelling. “Space buffs” and perhaps some in the private sector (those who have

called for a long-term Government commitment

to provide R&D facilities in space before they

would consider investing there themselves) argue

that general-purpose space infrastructure (i.e., a

“space station”) would address such great and

intangible purposes. But there is no evidence that

large segments of the general public agree with

this assessment, and they have not been offered

the opportunity to express their views on other

major space ventures that might more forcefully

address such intangibles. A number of alternative intangible goals have already been put forth;

undoubtedly, more will be articulated in the

future.

The Concerns About Low-Earth-Orbit

Infrastructure

But while the case to be made for acquiring

some long-term, habitable, LEO infrastructure is

persuasive, there is no compelling, objective, external case either for obtaining all of the particular array of elements that NASA now describes under the rubric of “the space station,”

or for obtaining this or any other array in the

general manner that NASA is now expected to

pursue, nor for paying the particular public cost

that it now estimates is required to do so.13 (The

important internal case for proceeding with a

large, early “space station” program is discussed

above.) As the infrastructure would be of a very

general-purpose nature, to be used to support

myriads of conceptual uses, few of which have

been sharply defined or have gained wide acceptance as important objectives of our publicly

funded space program, there is no necessity for

obtaining all of it soon. And, under these circumstances its value to the space program is quite

difficult to estimate objectively.

Three groups are particularly concerned about

a nearly $10 billion (1984$) commitment to a

“space station” program:

●

●

those, particularly space scientists, who fear

that such a relatively large commitment

would represent a hazard to their own space

interests;

those space professionals who would prefer

NASA to take a more measured, evolving,

learn-as-we-go approach; and

13Some contend that the substantial and growing U.S.S.R. space

infrastructure (including Salyut, Soyuz, Progress, and Cosmos 1443-

class modules) constitutes a valid, and important, justification for

the United States to mount a comparable, if not more capable, program. This report does not address this contention. However, even

if keeping up with the Soviets or beating them at their own game

were to become the motivation for a major civilian space infrastructure acquisition program, it does not follow that such a program

would resemble that which NASA has described. Indeed, it might

be quite different. See the OTA Technical Memorandum, Sa/yut:

Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space, OTATM-STI-14, December 1983.
Ch. 2—Issues and Findings ● 3 3

● those particularly concerned with the commencement of any new and costly Federal

initiative who are sensitive to its impact on

the Federal budget even if it falls within

NASA’s present, and hoped-for, “budget

envelope” of some $7 billion per year.

Of course, if the projected capital cost were

well less than the near $10 billion (1 984$) now

estimated for the initial operating capability (IOC)

(i.e., the initial phase of the infrastructure acquisition program that NASA has in mind; the full

cost of the program would approximate $20 billion [1984$] by the year 2000), the concerns of

these groups would be significantly lessened.

The Cost of Low-Earth-Orbit

Infrastructure

The eventual cost of any in-space infrastructure

depends on the chosen size, capability, degree

of new technology involved, and method of acquisition. It is not now possible to make another

estimate of the IOC cost that is significantly different from that made by NASA for what it describes as “the space station” in which one would

have greater confidence. There simply are too

many large potential “cost drivers, ” the significance of which cannot be judged under today’s

rapidly changing circumstances.

All of the experience with the acquisition,

over a relatively long time, of large amounts of

space technology, much of it to be newly developed, suggests that the $8 billion (1984$) figure will eventually be seen to have been a floor,

not a ceiling, on cost. In spite of, or rather because of, this experience, NASA is determined

that it will not be repeated.14

There are several options available relating to

acquisition practices, international collaboration,

and the more imaginative use of the U.S. private

sector that, if effectively grasped, could reduce

the cost impact on the Federal budget. Acquisition of in-space infrastructure is inherently different from the acquisition of a Shuttle or a commitment to develop and deploy those resources

required to send a person on a safe round-trip

to the Moon. To use NASA’s own earlier, corlasee Augustine, op. Cit.

rect, and quite illuminating expression, space infrastructure can be bought “by the yard.”15

One thing is clear: NASA, if it wished, or were

persuaded, could opt for obtaining now a

“core” fraction of the total infrastructure capability that it believes that the country will need

over the long term—a core fraction that would

allow many useful scientific studies to be made

and infrastructure support operations to be explored and evaluated, at a net U.S. capital cost

of one-quarter to one-third of the $8 billion that

it now seeks. To this core fraction other elements could be added incrementally as experience is gained in its use and as requirements become sufficiently persuasive.

The technological and programmatic options

exist for doing so. There is clearly a great variety

of U. S., other Government, and private in-space

infrastructure (some already in hand, some in development, some that is receiving detailed study)

from which selections could be made to provide

various kinds and amounts of in-space assets and

support services—assets and services that would

be expected to allow some new activities to be

undertaken, and to increase the efficiency and

effectiveness of others.

Properly encouraged by NASA, private sector

firms are almost certain to come forward in the

next few years with proposals that would provide

some of the desired infrastructure elements and/

or support services now thought to require Government development and acquisition. Some

such developments are already under way.16

Alternatives

Some large sophisticated civilian space ventures such as the Space Telescope are pushing

at the frontiers of technology. This is not (or, at

least, need not be) the case for in-space infrastructure. Indeed, there is little doubt that, with approls’’Space stations are the kind of development that you can buy

by the yard.” James Beggs, NASA Administrator; Committee Report of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space (Senator Gorton, Chairman) of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Mar. 8, 9, and

15, 1983, p. 51.

IGTheSe developments are discussed in some detail in ch. 3 of

this report.
34 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

priate congressional approval and funding, the

Nation could see the capabilities described by

NASA in place and operating satisfactorily well

before the middle of the next decade. Because,

in OTA’S view, technology development for

space infrastructure envisioned in the near-term

should present no significant problem, it has not

been given central attention in this assessment.

However, some general observations on technology matters may be useful here.

• Three basic kinds of in-space infrastructure

elements are worthy of separate, but related,

attention:

1. one or more relatively large central complexes, with work crews as required–

complexes where the bulk of the relatively

innovative work could be carried on;

2. normally unattended “free-flying” platforms, nearby or remote from such complexes, where various equipment could

carry on activities precluded by the orbital locations, micro-gravitational circumstances, or effluents associated with a central complex; and

3 .transportation between the surface and

such a complex, and between the complex and the platforms, and between the

complex and much higher orbits or even

out to solar system distances.

● OTA is not persuaded that all of the particular capabilities now being emphasized by

NASA, when measured against alternatives,

are the ones that have the greatest value to

the Nation’s publicly funded civilian space

program. NASA’s present selection of the initial set of infrastructure elements and their

location in space would provide many of the

desired support capabilities. But they would

not serve the interests of those attempting

to service remote-sensing platforms of importance to weather and climate from low, nearpolar orbits, or from geostationary orbits, nor

the interests of those in the private sector

whose communications, and perhaps navigation/position-fixing, satellites are located

in much higher, including geostationary, orbits, nor the interests of those who would

like to see less costly transportation provided

between the Earth and GEO, and the Moon,

Mars, and asteroids.

● Providing safe, sanitary, and suitable in-

●

●

frastructure elements ‘for long stays by

human crews will be costly. But however

much some may be interested in exploiting

unattended sophisticated machinery in LEO,

the state of the art is not yet capable of providing the wide range of functions and confidence that human workers can provide until well after the early 1990s. However, given

the substantial emphasis that, to date, NASA

has placed on human work crews in space,

it would be the prudent course, now, to raise

the level of support for the development of

in-space automation and remote operation

from Earth. Emphasis on R&D for spacerelated automation and remote operation

could also be expected to have a salutary influence on automation R&D for applications

here on Earth, U.S. industrial competitiveness, and its introduction into commercialindustrial activities.

There are two quite different reasons that can

be advanced for the development of new

technology to be employed in space infrastructure. One reason is to provide capabilities there that present technology cannot;

the other is to reduce the life-cycle costs of

its ownership—i.e., to reduce O&M costs

and extend its useful lifetime. Both are

laudable objectives. But they must be

balanced against the simple fact that “there

is no such thing as enough money,” and any

decision to provide anything more (or less)

than the vitally needed capabilities, and to

do so at an earlier than necessary date, and

any decision to try to predict the far future

so as to provide for all possible uses of such

capabilities, will simply result in at least the

unwarranted, and perhaps wasteful, use of

funds. OTA is not convinced that a good

enough balance has been struck between

the competing demands for funds for infrastructure and funds for other space activities.

Diligent and imaginative exploitation of the

Shuttle fleet, along with use of free-flying

platforms and local in-space transportation

systems for individuals (all already under

way), could provide much useful information and experience that would be of great

value in making later decisions about the

characteristics and operational employment
Ch. 2—issues and Findings • 35

of long-term in-space infrastructure. Over

time, this broadening experience will increase the confidence with which eventual

infrastructure selection decisions are made.

● Significant extensions of the time that an Orbiter could remain usefully on-orbit (to, say,

double or triple today’s 7 to 10 days) would

provide many of the capabilities desired for

work crews in permanent infrastructure, and

provide them sooner and at relatively modest cost, thereby relaxing the cost and schedule requirements associated with the latter.

● Space lab’s operational characteristics also

could be amplified at relatively modest cost,

with the same helpful consequences.

● Private sector development of large in-space

electrical power supplies, occasionally attended platforms, and other infrastructure

elements could be successfully completed

before the end of the decade. If done with

imagination and economy they could offer

attractive alternatives to Government development and acquisition of these capabilities.

OUR FUTURE IN SPACE

Long-Term Space Goals and

Objectives

The United States can now make major strides

in the civilian space area, but it is not adequately

prepared to do so.

We need to “re-visit” the substance of the

1958 Space Act, reaffirm those of its policy principles that are judged to be still valid, add others

as appropriate, and lay out a set of new goals

that are responsive to contemporary and foreseeable circumstances, interests and values. An

initial family of end objectives also should be

identified that would address those goals over

the next years and decades.

U.S. civilian space activities should be designed

to protect, ease, challenge, and improve the human condition, In addressing its long-term goals,

the Nation should strive to move its space interests and activities closer to the mainstream of

public interests and concerns, maintain space

leadership, enhance national security, and position its civilian space activities to respond to finding the unexpected in the cosmos.

For the purpose of prompting public discussion,

OTA has developed an initial set of such goals,

and a family of initial objectives to address these

goals. Chapter 6 of the assessment treats these

in some detail. The objectives are suggested for

consideration as additions to, not substitutes for,

the continuing “core” programs of space science

and exploration, space applications, and the development of the technology needed to conduct

all three. The family was generated to encourage

much greater and more direct involvement of interested segments of the general public in civilian space activities, and to strive for economic,

political, and cultural ends in addition to the scientific, exploration, and technology-development

ends of today. And the family contains some elements that are simply “bold. ”

The national goals OTA proposes for discussion

are:

●

●

●

●

●

●

to increase the efficiency of space activities

and reduce their net cost to the general

public;

to involve the general public directly in space

activities, both on Earth and in space;

to derive scientific, economic, social, and

political benefits;

to increase international cooperation and

collaboration in and for space;

to study and explore the Earth, the solar system, and the greater physical universe; and

to spread life, in a responsible fashion,

throughout the solar system.

Brief descriptions of the national objectives suggested to prompt public discussion follow; they

are

●

not rank-ordered.

A space-related, global system/service could

be established to provide timely and useful

information regarding all potentially hazardous natural circumstances found in the
36 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Earth’s space and atmosphere, as well as at

and below its surface.

A transportation service could be established

to and from the Earth’s Moon, and a modest human presence established there, for

scientific and other cultural and economic

purposes.

Space probes could be used to obtain the

information and experience specifically required to plan for further exploration of the

planet Mars and some asteroids.

Medical studies of direct interest to the general public, including study of the human

aging process, could be conducted through

scientific experiments that compare physiological, emotional, and social experience in

the absence of gravity with experience

gained in the conduct of related surface

studies.

At least hundreds of members of the general

public per year, from the United States and

abroad, could be selected on an equitable

basis and brought into space for short visits

there.

A direct audio broadcasting, common-user

system/service could be established that

would be available to all of the countries of

the world on an economical and equitable

basis.

In general, all of the nonclassified and nonprivate communications from, and nonproprietary data generated by, all Governmentsupported spacecraft and satellites could be

made widely available to the general public and our educational institutions in nearreal-time and at modest cost.

Radio and optical free-space electromagnetic

propagation techniques could be exploited

in an attempt to allow reliable and economic

long-distance transmission of large amounts

of electrical energy, both into space for use

there, and from space, lunar and remote

Earth locations for distribution throughout

the world.

The unit cost of space transportation, for

people and equipment, between the Earth’s

surface and low-, geosynchronous-, and

lunar-Earth orbit could be sharply reduced.

Space-related commercial-industrial sales in

our private sector could be stimulated to increase at a rate comparable to that of other

high-technology sectors, and our public expenditures on civilian space assets and activities could reflect this revenue growth.

Under present circumstances, the infrastructure

that NASA would acquire in its “space station”

program is best described as general-purpose,

i.e., designed to support well over 100 in-space

activities. As a consequence, it must contain a

large number of sophisticated and costly elements, and there is considerable difficulty in setting objective acquisition priorities among them

and acquisition schedules for all of them.

Were a specific family of space end objectives

established, it would then be much less difficult to establish which are the more important

in-space support assets and services that are required, and the time by which they would need

to become available.

A rough estimate of the cost of meeting this

family of objectives over the next quarter of a century amounts to some $40 billion to $60 billion.

To put this cost into perspective, it should be

noted that:

●

●

●

●

completion of the Shuttle development program would reduce NASA expenditures by

$2 billion per year, or $50 billion over this

interval;

if the 1 percent per year “real-growth” principle is accepted and is extended indefinitely, another $25 billion would thereby be

provided;

collaboration with other countries could provide the equivalent of perhaps another $25

billion; and

the private sector should be able to reduce

costs and make direct space R&D investments that, together, could amount to the

equivalent of billions of dollars.

Clearly, under such circumstances, funding

limitations would not prevent the United States

from undertaking an ambitious publicly supported civilian space program throughout the

next quarter of a century.
Ch. 2—issues and Findings “ 37

Long-Term Space Strategies

If Congress and the President together reestablish a formal set of basic civilian space

goals, they—and the general public—could turn

their attention to identifying a family of specific

objectives to address them. Then, on a year-toyear basis, as these plans were completed to the

satisfaction of both branches, Congress could

decide which one(s), if any, to pursue as technological, financial, political, and other circumstances suggest and allow.

In the case of each objective, detailed program

plans could be laid out for attaining it. Such plans

could:

identify required technological developments and space infrastructure support capabilities;

identify operational and/or political concerns;

reflect circumstances in the civilian space

area generally, both here and abroad;

estimate the schedules and costs to accomplish each;

judge who would be expected to be the major participants in their conduct;

judge what the most likely end results of their

successful completion would be;

identify who would benefit from their successful completion, and what sources of

funds should be looked to to meet both initial capital costs and any ongoing O&M costs;

and

suggest who would have the responsibility

for any long-term ownership, operation,

maintenance, and use of assets produced in

the program.

Every 5 years or so, a review of the progress

of programs addressing the initial list of objectives could be conducted as at the outset, and

a new family established. In this fashion, Congress

would always have before it well-thought-out civilian space activity and investment options—options to which a great deal of professional study

and general discussion had already been given

before any decisions to proceed were required.

In this general fashion the two vital questions

of “can we do it?” and “should we do it?” would

be separated, and the latter could be taken up

by our political process in a more paced, thoughtful, and confident manner.

It is helpful to remember that broad, public,

national debates on other important and complex issues–on housing policy, for instance, and

defense policy–take place regularly. While it is

true that, historically, there has been little or no

national debate on civilian space issues, that is

because the Nation’s space capabilities are only

now coming of age—in the sense that after 25

years real options, worthy of discussion, finally

exist.

Cost Reduction

However else the publicly funded space activities of the United States might be described,

they certainly would have to be characterized

as being very, very costly. Today, the kind and

number of space activities is no longer hindered

by ignorance of the physical characteristics of

the Earth’s space domain, by concern about the

reliable in-space lifetime of well engineered and

tested equipment, or by fear that men and women going into and remaining in space for as long

as weeks at a time would be harmed. The unit

cost of these activities is the greatest inhibition

to our development and use of space. If these

costs were lowered by 10 to 100 times, many

individuals and organizations would be attracted to doing things in and concerning space

that today are not seriously considered or even

thought of.

Consequently, if space is ever to be widely

used, a fundamental thrust must be to reduce

these unit costs sharply and across the board—

and particularly the cost of space transportation.

The Shuttle is an outstanding technological and

operational success, but achieving the objective

of a much lower dollar per pound cost for passenger and cargo transportation between the

Earth’s surface and LEO, GEO, and beyond still

remains to be accomplished.

Some elements of space infrastructure now

under consideration by NASA for the first (IOC)

and second (full-capability) phases of its “space

station” program could improve the efficiency

38-798 0 - 84 - 4 : QL 3
38 Ž Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

of Shuttle use and offer the promise of lowering

the unit cost of LEO/G EO/Lunar trips, and these

elements should be singled out for early and specific attention. But cost reduction is such a fundamental matter that it should receive major support by NASA, and by the Department of

Transportation, and by our private sector generally, and this support should call out for technological, operational, and institutional innovation,

and the objective, tough-minded, pursuit of any

such innovations that show significant promise.

There are many opportunities open to NASA

for reducing unit costs in its own acquisition processes, and these are spoken to in some detail in

appendix D.

The Private Sector

Both the President and Congress have expressed their determination to see the private

sector play a much more prominent role in our

civilian space area, and NASA and NOAA must

pay this determination particular heed. But it

is OTA’S view that, as yet, this serious matter

is not receiving all the attention within the executive branch that it warrants, except perhaps

at the highest levels. ” This lack of attention

seems to result from the fact that most of the

space engineers and scientists in the Government

simply do not have the professional and business

experience required to work closely and imaginatively with the private sector. Perhaps even

more important, their long-term experience within the Government “space club” has not provided them with the perspective to appreciate

how important it is to the future of the publicly

funded space program that the private sector

assume this more prominent role.

In general, most NASA and NOAA scientists

and engineers can appreciate that successful private sector investment in the civilian space area

(as well as any other area, for that matter) will

result in increased employment opportunities, the

production of needed and desired capital goods

and commercial services, the strengthening of our

economy generally and our international trade

‘The July 20, 1984, issuance by the White House of a “National

Policy on the Commercial Use of Space” fact sheet is an encouraging development.

position particularly, etc., and do express the general sense that these are laudable national objectives. Yet almost all are still more interested in

addressing their own internal science and engineering agendas.

There is another aspect of the successful interjection of large-scale private sector activity into

the civilian space area that is perhaps most important to the long-term prospects of the publicly

funded portion of these activities: they could increase the tax base and increase tax revenues.

Today, U.S. private sector space sales amount

to some $2 billion per year, are increasing at an

average annual rate of some 15 percent per year,

compounded, and are probably generating a total

of some $1⁄2 billion in taxes of all kinds. It appears

to be a reasonable conclusion that such an average annual rate of increase could well be maintained for at least the next decade or two.

Such a rate of commercial and industrial spacerelated sales- and tax-revenue increase could figure most importantly in the future of the publicly

funded civilian space program. Already, today,

while the Federal outlays for this program cost

some $7 billion per year, private sector space

sales return some $1/2 billion annually in the form

of taxes. Were the 15 percent per year, compounded, rate to continue throughout the end

of this century (and setting aside consideration

of any negative impact that this growth could

have on other segments of our economy), the resulting tax revenues could approach half of our

public cost for supporting a civilian space program of today’s magnitude. indeed, in 20 years

these growing tax revenues could equal the cost

of such a public program. And, by then, private

sector space-related R&D activities also could be

funded at a level of billions of dollars per year.

The funds now being spent on NASA and NOAA

programs are “discretionary” not “entitlement”

funds. At some time in the future, our national

financial circumstances could prompt serious

questions to be raised about the continuance of

such large, deferrable, expenditures. Of course,

there are arguments that can be, have been, and

would be advanced for not reducing the present

level of such public expenditures, but these levels

have been sharply curtailed in the past. To the
Ch. 2—issues and Findings “ 39

extent that objective evidence of the direct importance of the R&D and other activities of NASA

and NOAA to this kind of economic growth is

in hand, it is an argument for the continuation

of these activities.

OTA concludes that two important, perhaps

the most important, activities that NASA could

undertake today, and for the indefinite future,

would be to reduce the unit cost to the private

sector of their conducting activities in space, and

to be of assistance to them in their making productive investments in space.

Developing methods of truly useful and acceptable assistance could well be a thorny matter,

inasmuch as in many commercial-industrialfinancial areas there is a somewhat adversarial

relationship between the Government and the

private sector. And for some time the Government will continue to be the largest purchaser

of any private sector space goods and services.

Consequently, just as in, say, the supercomputer

and nuclear energy areas, the space area will

have to see the appropriate roles of the Government and the private sector sorted out to ensure

that the interests and responsibilities of each are

clear, so as to best serve both—and the Nation.

Finally, it can be anticipated that the private

sector’s particular concern for cost reduction will

eventually result in lowered costs in public space

activities also.

International Space Cooperation

For most of the space age, there has been considerable cooperation in space activities between the United States (by NASA, NOAA and

DOD) and several other friendly countries—effective and useful cooperation. The changing

circumstances of the civilian space area call for

a reappraisal of the kind and magnitude of

cooperation that now should be sought.

The OTA report International/ Cooperation

and Competition in Civilian Space Activities,

studies this area in some considerable detail;

here we will confine our conclusions to two:

1. The European Space Agency (ESA), several

of its major member countries, Japan, and

Canada have evidenced interest in working

closely with the United States on a “space

station” program. Now may be the time to

inquire as to whether our best interests, and

the interests of at least some of these countries, would be best served by moving

beyond yesterday’s and today’s kind of

cooperation, and to attempt more direct collaboration or even joint venturing with them

on any such program.

As yet, NASA appears to be giving insufficient thought to establishing the kind of multi-national, interleaved, development and

production program of the type often entered into by the Department of Defense in

NATO and elsewhere, and by some of our

large private sector organizations and their

analogs in other countries.

In the DOD case, considerations of military security, the additional complexity of

working on programs involving other countries, the hazards of undue technology transfer, and eventual commercial “spinoffs,”

have oftentimes been resolved, to mutual

advantage, in favor of sharing costs and important professional skills. There may be, indeed, similar, legitimate concerns about

technology transfer arising in any future international civilian infrastructure development program. However, the technology developed in such a civilian program would,

in the main, be general-purpose, and the

cost-sharing incentives would remain.

The general economic circumstances of

many of these countries are basically sound;

they desire to work with us on civilian space

matters in general, and any “space station”

program in particular; they have exhibited

technological prowess in Spacelab, the Canadian Remote Manipulator System, Ariane,

and various communications satellites provided to INTELSAT. They were willing to

trust the good offices of the United States

and NASA in going ahead with the $1 billion European Spacelab program–a program that could be rendered valueless at any

time that the United States were to withdraw

the opportunity of their employing it with

the Shuttle.

Given all of these circumstances, it is not

beyond imagination that a major international collaborative civilian “space station” pro-
40 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

gram could be negotiated that, among its

other virtues, could lighten the total burden

on our public purse perhaps by as much as

$2 billion to $3 billion. This is not the approach to dealing with other countries on

any “space station” program that is now being taken by NASA. The present approach

is one of asking other countries to add funds

to the United States’ estimated and anticipated $8 billion commitment. The alternative approach has not been debated in the

United States outside of NASA.

The alternative approach is being explored

by NOAA: NOAA is soliciting important

cost-sharing, perhaps as much as one-half,

on the part of other countries who share the

U.S. interest in maintaining, and improving,

weather-related space sensing systems. This

alternative approach to working on a “space

station” program with other countries is

worthy of careful consideration by Congress.

For no reasonable way of reducing the Federal debt burden by billions of dollars should

be passed by unless Congress convinces

itself that it is not in the Nation’s interest to

do SO.

2. Except, perhaps, for the smallest and poorest

countries, all of the countries in the world

must have at least some interest in space:

the devices and people that orbit above

them, the activities that go on there, and

how they all could affect their own interests.

But only about one-tenth of the world’s

countries play an active role in space today.

Here is an extraordinary opportunity for

the United States!

Our determination to exhibit “space leadership” need not and probably should not

be confined to dealing with the richest and/

or most technologically advanced countries.

We could broaden our approach to “international cooperation” by taking as an explicit goal the incorporation of the space interests and activities of any other country in the

world into our program, if that country

would be at all inclined to participate in

space ventures along with us, Of course,

such an initiative would require hard work,

patience, imagination, and generosity on the

part of the United States. But these characteristics are not usually in short supply in the

United States generally, and certainly not

among the professionals in NASA and the

Department of State. Indeed, it was the combination of just these national characteristics in the U.S. approach to working with a

few countries in the past that enabled them

to begin to work in space.

Recall that INTELSAT now has over 100

member countries, joined in a common interest to see space used to improve communications. The United States could now

begin to use any in-space infrastructure program to start orchestrating the interests of all

of the countries in the world that would be

willing to work with us in reasonable ways

to see space developed and used for any and

all peacefu I purposes “for the benefit of all

man kind.”

Space as an Arena of

Peaceful Cooperation

Even now, when discourse between the United

States and the Soviet Union is modest in the extreme, and the practical possibilities of effecting

cooperative space-related activities between the

superpowers are severely limited,18 many cannot

but hope that the two countries will find ways

to initiate important cooperative civilian space

endeavors in the future.

To date, most visions of such cooperation form

around scientific activities. They are important,

and they should continue to be given serious and

thoughtful attention.

Together, the United States and the Soviet

Union have some 600 million people and a gross

national product of some $5 trillion between

them, and both have global interests and power.

Therefore, possible joint cooperative space

activities need not be confined to science; indeed, a broad range of space-related activity

IBU,S..U.S,S.R. Coowration in space-related activities has not entirely vanished. The SARSAT search-and-rescue program, a joint

U.S.-Canadian-French undertaking, continues to interoperate successfully with the parallel Soviet COSPAS system. Both the United

States and the Soviet Union are members of INMARSAT, the

maritime equivalent of INTELSAT, and both are cooperating, along

with Europe and Japan, in the International Halley Watch program.
Ch. 2—Issues and Findings . 41

Photo Aeronaut/es and Space Administration

NASA has had agreements with more than 100 countries for cooperation in space activities. The pinnacle of international

cooperation in space to date was the Test Project in 1975 (shown here), in which a U.S. Apollo

spacecraft docked with a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft for several days of joint manned operations. However, no international

cooperative agreement (including has yet involved significant sharing of technology or saving of costs.

areas might well be explored, imaginatively and

determinedly.

OTA plans to report on some of the issues in

this area in the fall of 1984.

NASA’S Changing Role

Until a few years ago, and except for the satellite communications area, NASA has, since its inception, organized, staffed, and managed itself

to see that it, and its contractors, did essentially

all that was done in the civilian space area.

Throughout most of this time, and probably

without conscious reflection on NASA’s part, or

the part of anyone else, it has simply been assumed that once our country decided that something was to be done in or for civilian space,

NASA was to do it. That is, the responsibility for

seeing that something got done in the civilian

space area was equated with NASA’s doing it

itself.
42 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

But the changing circumstances of the past few

years now clearly suggest a fundamental reappraisal of NASA’s responsibilities and role in the

development and further study, exploration, and

use of space.

Although this study of civilian “space stations”

and the U.S. “future in space” has brought these

changing circumstances into clear, at times painfully clear, focus, it has not attempted to search

out what NASA’s new role should be in detail.

It is to be noted, however, that the Nation’s interests now are becoming much broader than

those of NASA and, indeed, in some instances,

may lead to conflicts with what NASA may perceive to be its own interests.

NASA could and, in OTA’S view, might well

now give increased attention to making some

fundamental shifts of attitude and operation.

In the past, it has been NASA’S responsibility

to meet any given national space objective; in

the future, it could be NASA’s responsibility to

see that the objective is met. That is, NASA could

now aspire to the much broader role of encouraging others in the private sector and throughout the world to do much more of what it does

today.

If NASA is to rise successfully to the challenges

now emerging in the national and international

space arena, it must place relatively less emphasis on accomplishing by itself those things that

our private sector or other friendly nations can

satisfactorily do, either alone or with NASA assistance. it can succeed in this only by continuing

to cooperate with both, and by broadening this

cooperation so as to prompt and assist both to

extend their space-related capacities, confidence,

and commitment. And it could emphasize such

cooperation in the acquisition of in-space infrastructure, i.e., a “space station. ”

Released from its relatively near-term focus,

NASA could concentrate more of its own professional activities on the most important and exciting of questions regarding space, the things that

no one else can or will do: the very best of spacerelated science; the cutting edge of space-related

technology development; the boldest of spacerelated explorations and developments.

Finally, NASA could see that its activities continue to be conducted, and the results continue

to be used, not only to increase knowledge and

to address important social and political goals,

but also to enable our private space sector to increase its non-Government sales—the sales that

generate the taxes that help to pay for NASA’s

activities.

Non-Government Policy Studies

It is inherently difficult for the Government

to make some kinds of policy studies and, indeed, it is potentially hazardous to have all such

studies made by the Government in areas of important national concern.

Particularly in areas where Federal programs

take a long time to develop and carry out (say,

a decade: cf. Apollo, Shuttle, Landsat, “space

station”) vested interests are naturally created

within the Government and closely related sections of the private aerospace industry. Later

these interests can present serious problems

of resource re-allocation on the program’s approaching completion unless new avenues for

their employment have been carefully explored

and publicly agreed on beforehand.

Our free, and increasingly educated, mobile,

diverse, rich society is bound to generate ideas,

desires, value judgments, and activities about

which the Government simply has difficulty in

keeping well informed, particularly if the ideas

are quite different from those with which the

Government has been dealing for some time and

are generated and pursued by persons and organizations that are “new to the scene. ”

Civilian space activities continue to be of importance to the United States in many intangible ways, and they are now beginning to be

appreciated as offering tangible and growing private sector economic prospects as well. “Space

commercialization” has become a popular topic.

But in the absence of a “bottom line” and competitive economic forces, the Government has

a more difficult time than does our private sector in sharply reducing unit costs. And Government offices only rarely, by themselves, originate
Ch. 2—issues and Findings ● 4 3

large innovative and challenging programs and

carry them out to satisfactory completion.

In the area of the physical sciences, for instance, U.S. leaders can look to several policy

study centers for independent guidance on issues

of broad national concern, In the space area,

however, there are only a few dedicated individuals who can provide similar guidance.

In view of the increasing importance of civilian space activities to the American public generally, it might well be desirable to establish one

or more independent space policy centers whose

professional staff would not be required to respond to the contemporary institutional concerns of the space community. Such centers

would control their research agendas and

allocate resources as they believed best, rather

than simply responding to directives. An example of this type would be a university-based institute with several funding sources. The continuing study efforts of such centers could

provide the American public a better opportunity to consider, and to help initiate, space activities that would address important cultural, economic, social, and political ends.

POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

In the context of the circumstances and issues

discussed in this assessment and the conclusions

reached therein, Congress could now give consideration to taking a number of initiatives.

Some of these suggested initiatives are directly

related to “the civilian space stations” area;

others are related to broader areas that are of general importance to “our future in space. ”

Strategies for Acquiring Any New

In-Space Civilian Infrastructure

The response of Congress to the President’s formal request for the commencement of a “space

station” program should take account of the general circumstances discussed in this study and the

existence of options beyond those proposed by

NASA. Given these general circumstances and

the variety of options, Congress could adopt one

of four positions:

1. decide that it is premature and/or inadvisable

to set out, soon, to obtain any large amount

of new long-term in-space infrastructure, and

refuse to accede to an executive branch request to do so a year or two hence; or

2. at least by implication simply agree, in principle, to provide the kind and number of inspace assets and services that NASA judges

to be necessary and, accepting its $8 billion

cost and 7 to 8-year schedule estimate as

working numbers, be prepared to approve

3.

a year or two hence the acquisition of the

general kind of infrastructure elements that

NASA is now focusing on; or

specifically identify any major space services

to be provided, ask NASA to present various

estimates of costs, schedules, and procurement strategies that would be involved in

providing them and, subsequently, select

from these estimates the elements and strategies to be approved; or

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Free-flying platforms such as the one depicted in this

artist’s concept offer one option for relatively low-cost

space infrastructure elements.
44 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

4. for the acquisition of any in-space infrastructure, simply approve an average annual expenditure rate for its acquisition and allow

NASA to select the elements, acquisition

schedules, and procurement strategies in the

light of NASA’s judgment regarding their relative cost and value.

Congress need not imagine that it is required

to commit itself to accepting any of these positions at this time, inasmuch as the President’s

fiscal year 1985 request was restricted to the first

year of a 2-year study activity that would cost a

relatively modest amount (some 5 percent of the

projected total acquisition cost) for such a major implied space activity. But there is a sufficiently persuasive case for our obtaining some

additional space infrastructure so that thoughtful

and comprehensive study of what it should be

and how it should be obtained is now warranted.

Therefore (setting aside the very important matter of our Federal budget’s present and projected

circumstances and the implications thereof for

any deferrable “new starts”) Congress could use

the next year and a half to become better informed about the options available to it and the

implications of selecting particular ones from

among them. And it could task the executive

branch to make additional, broader, studies than

it now has in mind—studies that could assist Congress in arriving at its crucial judgments a year

or so hence.

The House Committee on Science and Technology has taken an important step in the direction of raising such broader issues in requesting

a study by NASA that will look into “space station” program management and procurement

matters. 19 A report of this study, to be provided

by NASA to the committee by December 15,

1984, is expected to speak to both “ . . . [the]

Space Station development management plan

and procurement strategies with a description of

the alternatives available and the basis for the

[NASA] choices taken.”

Similarly, Congress could request the executive

branch to inform it regarding:20

●

●

●

Igsee Committee report of Mar. 21, 1984.

qt shou Id be noted that this assessment makes the assumption

that NASA’s overall funding level will remain relatively constant

as it has in recent years.

The priorities it places on the various services and assets that it sees as generally desirable. That is, if Congress were to allocate

more or less than the $2 billion per year now

being discussed for the acquisition of IOC

elements of space infrastructure, what are

the most important services to be made available and elements to be selected?

The ways that are available to keep the U.S.

public cost to a minimum, and the bases for

the executive branch’s pursuit or rejection

of them. That is, there are two important opportunities for reducing the public cost of

any space infrastructure, but it is not clear

that NASA—with its institutional interest in

retaining present personnel force and appropriation levels—has incentives to pursue

either with sufficient imagination and vigor.

These opportunities are:

1, Other countries could collaborate closely

with the United States so as to produce

any agreed infrastructure in a fashion that

would see their financial contributions reduce the demands on our public purse to

well below the $8 billion figure, rather

than simply producing additional, perhaps

essentially duplicative, infrastructure elements at no savings to the United States.

2. Our private sector could be encouraged

to use its own resources to develop, produce, and install as much of any agreed

infrastructure as would meet the Government’s performance specifications at a

cost lower than the Government’s present

procurement practices allow, rather than

have Government funds used to purchase

all of it and Government personnel used

to manage the process in detail.

Other important space initiatives that NASA

could undertake. That is, if Congress were

to decide that the acquisition of any infrastructure should proceed at an average

annual public expenditure rate appreciably

less than $2 billion per year, what other important programs could be mounted with the

remaining professional staff and the difference in dollars?21

*1 Ibid.
Ch. 2—issues and Findings Ž 45

● Conceptual programs of cooperation with

the Soviet Union in civilian space activities.

That is, while a case can be made for mounting large and continuing, technologically

challenging, U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative civilian space programs, essentially nothing of

this nature is now being seriously considered

because of the low state of political accommodation. In anticipation that today’s tensions may abate someday, it is important that

conceptual programs now be identified and

described that would: 1 ) be of little inherent

political sensitivity, 2) offer little prospect of

significant technology transfer, 3) allow for

important involvement of other space-experienced countries as well, and 4) offer the

promise of important cost savings to any

country that, otherwise, would pursue any

of them alone. The conduct of some such

programs could well require some related

elements of in-space infrastructure.

These broader studies would be carried on

at the same time, and for a small fraction of

the cost of, the “space-station” engineering

studies that NASA is now beginning to conduct, and the conclusions of their satisfactory completion would clearly be of importance to Congress 1 1⁄2 years hence.

Civilian Space Policies, Goals,

Objectives, and Strategies

Except for a few changes in the basic space law,

Congress has been satisfied to deal with evolving circumstances through specific year-to-year

changes in NASA’s authorization bills. But these

circumstances are now so greatly changed, and

our space assets and experience are now so great,

that it has become clear that Congress could reassess our civilian space laws’ goals, objectives,

institutions, policies, and plans with great profit.

For instance, Congress and the general public

should not find themselves in the position of having to decide on large, complex, and very costly

items of space infrastructure such as a “space station” without having a much clearer understanding of what these items will all be used for over

the long term, and without being confident that

their character, the uses to which they will be put,

how they are to be acquired, owned, operated,

and paid for, have all been carefully considered

and conclusions reached that most would accept

as reflecting our broadest national interests—not

primarily the interests of the space community.

Congress is now moving to effect some important changes in space law and policy. Legislation

has already been enacted in 1984 by Congress

and accepted by the President that makes an important change in the Space Act.22 The act now

declares “ . . . that [NASA should] seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the

fullest commercial use of space.”

Although a sufficient, and sufficiently broad,

base of thought, analysis, and discussion of fundamental considerations is not yet in hand to

allow Congress to proceed to make other fundamental changes in our national civilian space posture with great confidence, the National Commission on Space authorized for in Title I I of this

year’s legislation,23 and its subsequent activities,

couId go far toward calling widespread attention

to our civilian space problems and opportunities.

The Commission is expected to give the first

broad consideration to our national space interests in a generation—consideration that would

encompass interests in addition to those of science and technology that receive by far most of

the attention today. It is the kind of consideration that would guard against our continuing to

be caught up in either fascination with or the details of exotic space technology, and would focus

instead on sensible and generally acceptable

methods whereby we can proceed with the development of space, meet human needs in so doing, and fashion new ways of paying for it as we

go. And it could identify new policies, goals, objectives, and strategies, and structural changes

that, put in place, would increase the likelihood

that the great promises of the next quarter-century of the space age would, in fact, be realized.

All of those within and without the Government who are truly and seriously interested in

furthering our prospects in space should be prepared to assist this Commission.

zzpublic Law 98-361.

ZJlbid.
46 ● Civilian ssace Stationss snd the U.S. Future in Spac e

The Creation of Space Policy

Study Centers

The number of professionals engaged in space

policy analysis is extremely small. The President’s

science advisor spoke to this lack of independent expertise in testifying before a House subcommittee in February 1984.

And in March the House Committee on Science and Technology24 spoke to “ . . . the changing character of national and international space

activity [that] translates into issues and policy considerations of increasing breadth and complexity, ” and went on to say that “[d]uring the next

Wjee committee KpOrt Of Mar. 21 f 1984.

year the Committee intends to look in greater

depth at the elements and character of the current institutional apparatus for setting space policy [and] examining the process by which decisions and policies are reached on civil space

issues. ”

In these circumstances, Congress could consider prompting the establishment of one or more

modestly sized, policy-related, study centers outside of the Government. Provided with sufficiently broad charters, and funded in such a fashion

as to assure both independence in, and long-term

support of, truly challenging studies, professionals

would be attracted to conduct the kinds of broad

inquiry and analysis that the civilian space area

now so badly needs.
Chapter 3

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Considerations For Any Space Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Orbits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Low-Earth-Orbit Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Space Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NASA’s Approach to Space Infrastructure . . . . . . .

“Mission Analysis Studies” Summary . . . . . . . . .

Infrastructure Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reactions of National Research Council Boards . .

Alternative Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . .

Uninhabitable Platforms . . . . . . . . .

Habitable Infrastructure . . . . . . . . .

Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) .

Spacelab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Shuttle

Shuttle

Figure No.

as Permanent

External Tank

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7,

8.

9.

10.

11.

Orbital Inclinations

Diagram of Shuttle

Infrastructure

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Mission Profile . . . . . . . . . .

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A Possible Configuration for NASA’s Initial Operational Capability . . . ‘ . .

Space Station Involving a Solar Power Array, Habitat Module,

Logistics Module, Two Laboratory Modules, and Satellite

Servicing Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

An Artist’s Conception of a LEASECRAFT Enroute to Orbital Altitude

With Payload Attached . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A Free-Flying Permanent Industrial Space Facility. . . . . . . . .

Major Spacelab Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Shuttle-Spacelab Flight Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

An Artist’s Conception of a Free-Flying Pressurized Module

an Attached Resource Module (second phase of Columbus

External Tank Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Possible Uses of External Tank ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Concept of Infrastructure Utilizing Four External Tanks . . . .

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Chapter 3

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

SUMMARY

Since 1957 various spacefaring nations have

launched hundreds of spacecraft, many of which

remain today in Earth orbit or on itineraries within

the solar system or beyond. Many of these spacecraft, and some of those to be launched in the

future including any “space station” elements

and associated launch and transportation systems, are elements of space infrastructure, enabling humans at the surface and in space to carry

out activities outside of Earth’s atmosphere. This

chapter begins with a discussion of the space

environment, orbits, and the technical aspects of

space infrastructure. NASA’s specific aspirations

for a “space station” and the functions that NASA

expects it to provide are listed in detail. The projected uses of such a facility are summarized,

taken from the response of a number of major

aerospace contractors to NASA’s Mission Analysis Studies. The reaction of the National Research Council’s Space Science Board and the

Space Applications Board to NASA’s “space station” aspirations are then discussed. The remainder of chapter 3 lists and describes alternatives to NASA’s aspirations for space infrastructure,

including a number of currently existing platforms

and other infrastructure elements, and some that

are under development or in the planning stage. 1

A “USA Salyut” concept is presented as an option that could provide in-space infrastructure

that is roughly comparable to the Soviet Union’s

current Salyut 7.

‘Among the sources for the material presented in this chapter

are background repcrts prepared for OTA by Dr. Jerry Grey,

aerospace consultant (on space systems and transportation) and

by Teledyne-Brown Engineering on alternatives to wholly new technology in-space infrastructure. Additional material on existing or

proposed space platforms and spacecraft was furnished by individual aerospace companies. Also available were results of an OTA

workshop on lower cost alternatives to a space station; workshop

participants included aerospace industry and international representatives.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is currently pursuing a wide

variety of civilian space activities. The argument

is being forcefully advanced that additional inspace infrastructure would permit scientific, technology-development and commercial activities

to be performed more easily or economically

than at present, and might allow new types of

activities in space. Plans for a civilian “space station, ” i.e., space infrastructure, were included

in the ambitious U.S. publicly supported space

effort which commenced immediately after the

launch of the first Sputnik over a quarter century

ago. NASA undertook preliminary designs for

such “space stations” in the early sixties.2 In the

early seventies, astronauts were successfully supported for long durations aboard Skylab, the first

U.S. space laboratory. Now, at the beginning of

the second-quarter century of the space age, U.S.

space infrastructure that would support long-duration human activities in space is again under

consideration.

‘The first realistic design initiative for a space station appears to

have been taken prior to the NASA efforts by the Lockheed Corp.

Missiles and Space Division in the late 1950s (S. B. Kramer and R.

A. Byers, “Assembly of a Multi-Manned Satellite, ” LMSD Report

No. 48347, December 1958).

49
50 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

CONSIDERATIONS FOR ANY SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

The space environment is quite different from

that on and near the Earth’s surface. There are

a number of orbital, environmental, and technical factors that must be considered to ensure safe

and successful operations in space.

Orbits

Infrastructure elements could be located in

one, or several, of a wide range of orbits. Most

communications satellites and some meteorological and Earth observation satellites utilize locations in geostationary orbits, 35,800 km above

the Equator, as fixed vantage points from which

to transmit and receive signals or to observe the

Earth’s surface and its atmosphere. It has been

frequently suggested that on-orbit servicing of

geostationary satellites, their orbital transfer propulsion systems, and inter-orbit transportation

vehicles, could be done more efficiently from infrastructure located in low-Earth-orbit (LEO) with

a low inclination relative to the Equator. An orbital inclination of 28.5° (see fig. 1) would be reasonable for this infrastructure, because launches

over the Atlantic Ocean from Cape Canaveral

into orbits of this inclination consume the least

energy.

These two functions–servicing geostationary

satellites and launching into the lowest energy

orbit from Cape Canaveral—are reasonably compatible, because the additional energy needed

per unit mass at great altitudes to transfer a

payload into geostationary orbit from 28.5° is

relatively small.

However, full repetitive coverage of the Earth

for low-altitude meteorological and other Earthviewing satellites requires near-polar orbits (such

as the near-900 inclination illustrated in fig. 1).

Such satellites are therefore launched from the

Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, which

offers a safe launch trajectory to the south, over

the Pacific Ocean. A Sun-synchronous near-polar

orbit that follows the dawn-dusk line is possible;

it avoids Earth shadowing of solar-powered or

solar-viewing instruments, but does not accommodate Earth-viewing instruments that require illumination of the Earth’s surface by the Sun.

b

Figure 1

Representative Uses

● Earth observation

Near-polar (land, ocean, atmosphere)

orbit

I

Materials

processing

Life sciences

Astrophysics/solar

When repetitive but not full coverage of the

Earth is essential, a lower inclination can be used;

an orbit inclination of 57o is favored because it

is the maximum practical inclination obtainable

with a Cape Canaveral launch. It may be desirable to use infrastructure elements in several orbital planes, or perhaps to develop and employ

a reusable orbital transfer vehicle (ROTV) for

transportation between orbits having various inclinations, although this would be expensive.

Orbital altitudes are also related to several physical characteristics of space. One of these is the

“solar wind,” a radiation flux of high-energy particles from the Sun, that can present a threat to

human beings and equipment. However, the region from 200 to 600 km in altitude (LEO) is

shielded by the Earth’s magnetosphere and the

radiation there is almost negligible compared with

the radiation in and beyond the Van Allen belts,

which extend to 50,000 km in altitude. The magnetic field is less effective in shielding against ra-
Ch. 3—Space /infrastructure . 51

Photo credit: Nat/ona/ Aeronautics and Space Administration

Diagram showing Earth’s magnetosphere and other near-Earth phenomena.

diation approaching the Earth near its magnetic

poles, including that associated with solar flares.

Thus, high-altitude orbits and near-polar orbits

are much less hospitable than low-Earth-orbits of

low inclination.

Orbit altitude also affects the amount of global

Earth coverage available to viewing instruments.

If a sensor is required to provide daily global coverage, for example, the physical limitations on

the angular swath width impose a minimum satellite altitude much higher than 500 km.

Aerodynamic drag becomes an important consideration for lower altitude orbits. Aerodynamic

drag decreases for higher orbits; at 400 km, the

drag is two orders of magnitude less than at 200

km. The minimum economical, long-term altitude for large semipermanent infrastructure elements that would be serviced using the Shuttle

ordinarily would be above 300 km, and it will

likely be below 600 km because of the rapid decrease in Shuttle payload capacity with greater

altitude.

Since locations in LEO are above most of the

atmosphere, astronomical observations of all sorts

are favored there. As well, one revolution around

the Earth in a typical circular LEO takes 90 minutes, allowing vast areas of Earth’s surface to be

observed in continuous succession and on a frequently repeated basis. However, higher orbits

provide a broader field of view for remote sensing of Earth.

Another consideration is the energy that must

be expended to take material to a sufficient altitude to obtain a relatively low drag, long-life orbit. To reach LEO requires more than half of the

energy required either to reach geostationary orbit or to escape the Earth’s gravitational field

altogether. This is the physical basis for some of

the projected cost savings of a permanently orbiting infrastructure base: large launch costs would

be paid only once when infrastructure components are carried into orbit and left there, avoiding additional, repetitive, launch costs for heavy

equipment that would be frequently used in

space. Of course, resupply launches would still

be needed and would offset some of this cost saving.3

Low-Earth-Orbit Environment

Four characteristics of the LEO physical environment are of particular interest: microgravity,

high vacuum, periodic high-intensity sunlight,

and the combination of solar exposure and shadowing that makes thermal control possible. For

any infrastructure elements located beyond the

Van Allen belts, a fifth environmental parameter

is high-energy radiation,

3

The number of resupply launches required would depend on

the types and levels of activities carried out, the presence or absense

of people, etc.
52 Ž Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Above the minimum practical orbital altitude

of a permanent space facility, the presence of

microgravity and vacuum are essentially independent of orbital inclination and altitude. In particular, the exploitation of microgravity or near

“weightIessness, ” which occurs when gravitational and orbital acceleration counteract one

another, shows promise for the processing of materials under such unique conditions. Energy generation depends on radiation from the Sun, and

thermal control depends on radiating waste heat

out into deep space. For most orbits, the Sun is

eclipsed nearly half of the time by the Earth, but

this effect can be tolerated if energy storage systems are used; batteries charged from solar photovoltaic arrays can be used to supply electric

power during times that sunlight is blocked by

the Earth.

Of course, for many human beings, simply being in orbit, and being able to view the Earth and

heavens from this perspective, are the outstanding characteristics of space.

Technical Considerations

The design of infrastructure components and

systems will depend heavily on a number of

technical considerations. While a considerable

amount of workable “space station” technology

exists, as demonstrated by the success of Skylab,

SPAS, MESA, and the Shuttle itself, the development of new technology may be desirable to obtain a long, and particularly useful and efficient

lifetime for space infrastructure.

Data Management.–Space infrastructure elements would use an extensive data handling network both on-board and on the ground. The network would serve orbiting elements including the

Shuttle, communication, navigation and remote

sensing satellites, orbital transfer vehicles, crew

members on spacewalks, tended free flyers, and

support staff and scientific researchers on Earth.

Cost, program control, and reliability prompt consideration of a wide variety of hardware and software technologies just now coming into being.

For example, faster processors, laser disk storage,

and flat display terminals will provide large increases in capacity at lower unit cost and weight.

Communications.—A number of communication links would be desirable using frequencies

throughout the electromagnetic spectrum and encompassing a wide variety of distances, information content, and line-of-sight propagation directions. Space communications must be designed

to avoid interference with established groundbased systems and to take privacy, cost, capacity, and reliability into account. Another consideration is the location of communications and

data processing nodes. The various space infrastructure elements could require a large number

of antennas and lenses (the Shuttle has 23) that,

altogether, would cover a wide field of view.

Phased-array antennas, whose radiation patterns

can be “pointed” electronically rather than mechanically, could be widely used.

Systems for locating and tracking natural and

manmade debris, loose tools, and approaching

spacecraft is also necessary. System concepts for

this purpose include radar with beacons or passive reflectors, radio transponders, interferometry,

the Global Positioning System, ground-based radar, or Iidar (laser radar),

Although space communications can rely initially on current technology, millimeter and optical wavelengths may be desirable for use in

space. The development of systems in these parts

of the spectrum would offer significant technological challenge.

Electromagnetic Interference (EMl).–This is

a significant problem that can occur in space, particularly when high-power microwave sources

and sensitive detectors are involved. It is difficult

to protect some electronic circuits from this “pickup” problem. In some cases EM I could force the

use of a constellation of individual platforms separated rather widely from each other rather than

a single large structure.

Attitude Control and Stabilization .–Although

space infrastructure elements do not have to contend with gravity, wind, earthquakes, precipitation, and other problems encountered on Earth,

they must deal with quite different problems such

as the absence of both a “firm footing” and the

‘‘stiffening” influence of gravity. Of particular

concern is the control and stabilization of large,
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure • 53

flexible, evolving, structural assemblies and modules. Elaborate control systems for each module

(sensors, actuators, computers, , . .) that are coordinated by a single “supervisory” controller

may have to be employed.

Power.–Solar photovoltaic power generators

with nickel-cadmium battery storage are commonly used in space. Systems employing them

today cost at least several thousands of dollars

per watt and have useful lifetimes of 10 years or

less in orbit. One alternative is a nuclear power

reactor, perhaps of the type now being explored

in the Space Power Advanced Reactor program,

but development time and hazards to human beings (and perhaps cost) may well preclude the

use of nuclear reactors for inhabited infrastructure in the near future.

Significant cost reduction in photovoltaic arrays

has been achieved using optical focusing devices

that concentrate sunlight on the photocells, but

considerable effort would be needed to develop

and demonstrate practical arrays of this type for

use in space. Coupled with this technique could

be the use of more efficient solar cells, such as

gallium-arsenide, in place of silicon cells. Efforts

to increase the lifetime and reduce the mass of

batteries could also lead to cost reduction. One

promising replacement for present nickel-cadmium devices is the nickel-hydrogen battery.

Another, at an earlier stage of development, is

the regenerative fuel cell/electrolysis method, in

which a fuel cell produces electricity and water

when in the Earth’s shadow and splits water into

hydrogen and oxygen when in sunlight.

Thermal Energy Management.–For infrastructure composed of connected modules, it may not

be practical to use individual thermal control systems for each module. Although individual systems would offer maximum flexibility, such an

approach would prevent heat thrown off from

one module from being used by another, and

each module’s radiator, which is by far the biggest and most exposed component of the thermal system, would impose its own orientation

and location constraints on the overall structure.

Hence, a centralized, automated system may be

needed both to minimize total mass and to optimize radiator orientation (i.e., edge to Sun).

38-798 0 - 84 - 5 : QL 3

However, such a system would require both a

large, massive single radiator and considerable

transfer of energy among the various modules via

a heat-transport medium. Therefore, the tradeoffs between centralized and modular thermal rejection systems need to be examined in detail.

The centralized system might utilize a gimbaled

radiator maintained in an edge-to-Sun orientation, not only maximizing heat dissipation and

thereby requiring perhaps a 60-percent smaller

area than a fixed radiator, but also minimizing

solar-wind degradation of its thermal coating.

A conventional separate-tube radiator, similar

to that used in the Shuttle, would be extremely

complex and massive because of the need for

redundant piping, valving, and other plumbing

components. For a typical 100-kW heat rejection

system, a Shuttle-type radiator would require

almost 6,000 meters (almost 4 miles) of tubing

in over 1,500 individual pumped fluid tubes,

more than 50 fluid manifolds, and more than 75

isolation valves, fluid swivels or flexible line

segments. Hence, a heat pipe radiator may be

a better choice. Heat pipes transfer heat by boiling a fluid such as ammonia at one end of a

sealed tube and condensing it at the other. The

liquid is then returned to the hot end by capillary

(surface-tension) forces in a specially designed

wick which forms part of the tube. The heat pipe

has no moving parts, and each pipe is self-contained. Single pipes have demonstrated heat rejection rates up to 2 kW; hence, as few as 50

could handle 100 kW of power in space, While

the technology is relatively well known, considerable development is called for to evolve a practical, reliable, long-life, heat pipe radiator at this

power level.

Another technological challenge would be an

inter-module system that transfers thermal energy

to a radiator. Shuttle-type pumped-loop systems

using Freon 21 would consume large amounts

of power (up to 5 kW for a 100-kW system), and

would also require the development of large,

costly, space-rated pumps and their attendant repair and maintenance. A two-phase heat transport system using the same principle as the heat

pipe would consume only about one-tenth as

much power. Hence, it may be worth the cost

of its development.
54 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

The use of passive cryogenic coolers for electrooptical detectors will present a difficult technical challenge. Active cryogenic systems are probably not satisfactory for long-term operation. Passive coolers require exposure to dark space and

an environment that is free from effluents that

would condense on the cooler’s cold patch.

Propulsion.— Infrastructure elements require

propulsion systems for attitude control, orbit

change, station-keeping, and acceleration control. Propulsion systems currently use storable liquid mono- and bi-propellant pressure-fed thrusters. Near-future plans include cryogenic oxygen/

hydrogen propulsion systems. Longer term prospects are electromagnetic thrusters including ion

rocket (ions can be accelerated to much higher

exhaust velocities than those provided by chemical rockets) and mass drivers (“buckets” of heavy

materials can be accelerated, very rapidly by electrical motors rather than by conventional chemical combustion).

A principal challenge will be the creation of a

storage and transfer system for handling liquid

fuels in space. Specific needs are leak-proof fluid

couplings and leak-detection techniques, fluidquantity gauges that operate with acceptable accuracy in microgravity where conventional liquidIevel sensors are not suitable, reusable, low-mass,

nontoxic, long-life insulation for cryogenic storage and transport, and the liquefaction and refrigeration systems needed for long-term cryogenic

storage. Improvements in cryogenic refueling

procedures now used on the surface for Shuttle

operations would be necessary—preferably procedures that would use automation—to obviate

the need for a large technical staff that would be

very expensive to accommodate in space.

Life Support Systems.–Some of the materials

necessary for the support of humans in space

would be supplied from Earth, others would be

recovered in orbit from metabolic byproducts.

With the exception of food, recovery technology

demonstrated since 1967 can provide for oxygen,

carbon dioxide scrubbing, and water for both

drinking and washing. Such a “partially closed”

system accommodating an eight-person crew,

each drinking about 3.5 kg of water and using

about a liter of wash water per day, would have

to be resupplied every 90 days and would have

a 30-day contingency supply. Compared with the

Shuttle system, which does not use recovery,

almost 7,OOO kg per resupply launch could be

saved. If reclaimed water were also used for

showers, and for washing utensils and clothes,

thereby replacing “wet wipes,” disposable clothes,

and disposable food service utensils, another

5,000 kg could be saved for each launch. Therefore, the development cost of such a system

could be offset by associated transportation savings of over $100 million per year.

Food supply technology will also require some

development, including improvements in packaging, preservation, bulk storage, reconstitution,

and on-board preparation. Proper sanitation to

reduce the incidence of debilitating illness in the

completely closed environment of a “space station” will require waste disposal, contamination

containment, disease-prevention measures, and

heakh-maintenance facilities unique to microgravity environments to be developed and used.

Some of this technology has already been developed for the long-duration Skylab project, but improvements are needed. Particular attention

should be given to the proper design of residential, exercise, and recreational facilities if people

are to remain in orbit for periods of much longer

than several weeks.

Space Transportation

Vehicles will be needed for transportation between Earth and LEO, between various LEO orbits, between LEO and higher, including geostationary, orbits, and beyond to the Moon and

perhaps to other planets and some asteroids. In

the near future, supply for a “space station” from

Earth would rely primarily on the present Shuttle and possibly its derivatives. Local checkout

and maintenance services requiring people working directly in space could be conducted by

tethered or free-flying spacesuited astronauts,

sometimes augmented by the existing manned

maneuvering units (MMUs). Servicing of more

distant spacecraft could be accomplished with a

planned orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV), possibly in combination with either the Shuttle or a

planned space-based ROTV, or by an ROTV (or
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure • 55

the Shuttle) carrying an astronaut equipped with

an MMU.

Launching spacecraft into higher orbits or on

Earth-escape trajectories requires the use of an

upper stage rocket, which could be automatic,

teleoperated, or used with a crew, plus kick

stages or planetary landing stages, depending on

the project. ROTVS, either teleoperated or employing crews, could be used to service satellites

in orbits of significantly different altitude and

somewhat different inclination.

Shuttle.-The Shuttle (fig. 2) meets most of the

current needs for transportation between the

Figure 2.—Diagram of

Earth’s surface and LEO at any Inclination. The

Shuttle can deliver 30,000 kg to a 200-km (120-

mile) orbit inclined at 28.5° to the Equator. Any

increase in orbit altitude or change from this orbit inclination reduces the payload capacity.

However, most payloads are volume-limited by

the cargo bay’s 18-meter length and 4.6-meter

diameter rather than weight-limited. By the early

1990s, the earliest date considered practical for

obtaining a “space station,” NASA projects a total

of some 24 to 30 Shuttle flights per year, and

some 50 per year by the year 2000. The Shuttle’s cargo bay could be used to carry infrastructure- elements

Shuttle Mission Profile

.

SOLID ROCKET

BOOSTER RECOVERED

A

APPROACH AND

LANDING
56l Civilian Space Statlons and the U.S. Future in Space

its crew of up to seven persons could be used

to assist with any assembly and checkout. The

Shuttle could also resupply expendable, ferry

personnel, and serve for emergency rescue.

Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU).–The

MMU is a backpack equipped with a computeroperated propulsion system that permits an astronaut to “free fly, ” thereby projecting his senses,

his strength and dexterity, and his judgment beyond the confines of the Shuttle or other habitable infrastructure out to a few hundred meters.

It is a general-purpose device that can be used

for inspection, servicing and deployment or retrieval of equipment, for construction and assembly operations, for crew rescue, for emergency

repairs, etc. A Shuttle-based MMU was successfully demonstrated on two flights in early 1984.

Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV).-Local

transportation in LEO would be provided by the

OMV. It would be operated remotely from the

Shuttle, other space infrastructure, or possibly

from Earth. It would be designed to have a sixdegree of freedom propulsion system that would

allow satellite or platform servicing operations at

distances well beyond the MMU’S few-hundredmeter limit. One version of the OMV would be

able to make altitude changes of 1,000 km or

more above its initial LEO and orbit plane changes

of up to 8°, depending on payload weight.

Basic OMV equipment includes propulsion

units and propellent tanks; television cameras and

lights for inspection and operator guidance; communications; control systems for remote operations; electric power; thermal control; and various

manipulators and docking attachments. Current

NASA plans are to have such a new-technology

vehicle developed and operating in time to be

useful in the deployment and assembly of a

“space station.”

Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV)-Up to November 1982, all payloads launched into space

were carried there by ELVS. There are now three

basic U.S. families of ELVS: the Delta, Atlas-Centaur, and Titan III. The European Space Agency

has its Ariane family of boosters, Japan has its

N-2 (derived from the U.S. Delta) and is developing others, the People’s Republic of China has

launched a geostationary satellite using its FB-3

“Long March” rocket, and the Soviet Union is

offering to make its Proton launcher commercially available. In addition, several private corporations in the United States and Germany have announced plans to develop ELVS. Many of these

vehicles and possibly others may be available

commercially throughout the next decade. However, it is not likely that they will be suitable for

launching spacecraft that carry people, although

they could launch supply spacecraft as the Soviet Proton boosts the Progress into orbit.

Expendable launch vehicles that can launch to

high orbits, or to Earth-escape trajectories, use

either their own upper stages or uniquely compatible orbital transfer vehicles (OTVS). The payload itself carries the “kick stage” or other propulsion needed to move from high, inclined,

elliptical orbits to geostationary orbits.

Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle (ROTV).-A

reusable, high-performance, liquid propellant

“space tug” could provide transportation between LEO and geostationary and lunar orbits,

or between Earth orbits of various inclination and

altitude. Reusability and space-basing give promise of economic benefit for the use of an ROTV

in launching and servicing communications and

other satellites that utilize the geostationary orbit. An ROTV could be piloted by a crew or remotely operated.

Development of an “Advanced Space Engine”

suitable to power an ROTV has yet to be started.

Space-basing implies reusability, of course, as

well as flexibility of thrust and duration of rocket

burn, and the ability to refuel and perform maintenance in space. Thus, space-basing requires

some form of orbital logistics system, including

tanks, pumps, controls, and other equipment for

refueling, people or teleoperator devices to check

out the ROTV, refurbish it as needed, and reset

its operating systems for each new trip, and perhaps crew quarters.

Space-basing also requires docking, servicing,

and storage facilities in space to make ROTV operation possible. Moreover, as fuel for the ROTV

must always be brought from the surface to LEO,

alternative ways of transporting it are under consideration. More efficient delivery systems than

the Shuttle, such as a Shuttle-derived tanker vehi-
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure • 57
58 Ž Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

cle, are being looked at. Scavenging left-over fuel

from the Shuttle external tank is being given consideration. Considerable development time and

expense would be involved in any of these efforts.

A prospect which offers an opportunity for considerable propellant savings is to dissipate the

ROTV’S excess kinetic energy, on return from

high altitudes to LEO, by allowing it to dip into

the upper reaches of the Earth’s atmosphere, a

maneuver called “aerobraking.” The return flight

would consist of a brief de-orbit burn that would

place the ROTV into an elliptical transfer orbit

that intersects the top of the atmosphere. If the

ROTV could dissipate enough energy to decrease

its velocity by 2,400 meters per second, it would

have just enough energy left to raise it to a “space

station’s” (typical) 300-km orbit. There, it could

deliver its return payload (if any) and refuel for

its next trip. This aerobraking concept promises

a saving of over half of the propellant needed

(compared to an all-propulsive ROTV) for a return trip with payload from geostationary Earth

orbit.

NASA’S APPROACH TO SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

“Mission Analysis Studies” Summary

In 1982, as part of NASA’s planning to acquire

long-term inhabited infrastructure, i.e., a civilian

“space station, ” the agency authorized “mission

analysis studies” in the United States, and reached

an agreement with foreign countries for parallel

studies, of the desires or needs for, and characteristics of, such infrastructure. The results of

these studies appear in appendix A.

The “mission analysis studies” started with the

supposition that the United States would build

a civilian “space station, ” and did not require the

potential user to address either justification of the

basic “space station” concept or its funding. The

studies were simply to identify uses that either

would require or would materially benefit from

the availability of a “space station” and to suggest some of its fundamental characteristics.

Of the several hundred potential activities in

science, commercialization, and technology development identified by the U.S. companies (primarily aerospace) conducting the studies, the

selection was narrowed by NASA to a set of about

100 time-phased missions for the first 10 years

of “station” operation, 70 percent of which could

be accomplished from a central base facility located in a 28,5° inclination in LEO. Free-flying

platforms, either co-orbiting or in polar orbit,

could accommodate most of the others.

The contractors viewed activities such as equipment servicing, research (especially in the life

sciences and materials processing), and assembly

and modification of large space systems as areas

in which presence of a human crew would be

particularly beneficial. They recommended architectural concepts involving several types of modules for the initial central complex: a command/

habitability module with accommodations for a

crew of four; an electrical power system providing about 25 kW to the users; logistics modules

for periodic resupply; airlocks, docking ports, and

pallets to enable mounting of equipment and laboratory modules. Subsequent development and

growth of the facility over a 10-year period and

incorporation of an ROTV and several free-flying

platforms were anticipated.

Estimation of acquisition costs ranged from approximately $4 billion to $5 billion (1984$) for

the initial facility, to about $12 billion for an

evolved complex envisioned as being completed

6 to 8 years after the system first became operational. Other than the performance and social

benefits of such a “space station,” they estimated

that economic benefits from servicing satellites

in orbit, transfer of satellites to higher orbits by

an ROTV, and human-tended long-term research

activities would be considerable. The increased

ability to launch planetary probes, establish a

lunar settlement, and undertake human explora-
Ch. 3—Space /infrastructure • 59

tion of Mars was considered of great significance

in terms of long-range goals.

The foreign mission analysis studies paralleled

those of the U.S. contractors and defined a similar set of space activities appropriate for infrastructure use. All participating agencies from Europe,

Canada, and Japan expressed great interest in taking part both in providing elements of space infrastructure and in actively participating as partners in its use. Many of them look upon it as

fundamental to their future role in space and

therefore want long-term understandings and

agreements with the United States on participation.

NASA assembled the United States and foreign

mission analysis reports and held a workshop in

May 1983 to synthesize the results. The workshop

established a minimum time-phased “mission

set” (for the initial decade of use) of 107 specific

space activities, plus four generic commercialindustrial service activities (e. g., satellite servicing). Of the total set, 48 were categorized under

science and applications, 28 under commercial,

and 31 under technology-development.

In parallel with the contractor studies, NASA

hired two consulting firms to communicate with

a variety of non-aerospace companies to identify and encourage interest in the use of in-space

facilities for commercial purposes. The consultants discussed prospects with approximately sO

companies, and more than 30 expressed active

interest in using a “space station” if it were available. Most of the companies moving toward

agreements with NASA to become active in space

are well-known U.S. industrial firms (one with an

announced agreement is the 3M Co.), but several are from the small business sector or Europe.

Interest is concentrated on the possible production of particular chemicals, metals, glass, communications, and crystals. Among the half dozen

companies now actively investigating the possi80X D.-NASA's Current Aspirations

$ 8 .

, ,

. .
60 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

bility of sponsoring space experiments, most are

more interested in crew-tended operations rather

than automated procedures. Further details of the

consulting firms’ studies are discussed in the final

section of appendix A.

Infrastructure Functions

The NASA planning process has depended

heavily on the “Mission Analysis Studies” of U.S.

and foreign aerospace contractors and foreign

space agencies. From the views assembled therein, functions were identified for any space infrastructure (“space station”) that could provide

efficient and effective assets and services to support the projected space activities.

NASA’s aspirations for a “space station” were

most recently presented to the Senate Committee on Appropriations in March 1984. The infrastructure envisioned in their plans would provide the following:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

an on-orbit laboratory supporting research

on a wide range of life, materials, and other

science topics, and the development of new

technology (e.g., studies of biology, cosmic

rays, processing methods for pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, testing of space

materials, and advanced communications

technology);

permanent observatories for astronomy and

Earth remote sensing (e.g., a solar optical telescope to examine the surface of the Sun,

a starlab to study the structure of galaxies,

and Iidar equipment to probe the atmosphere);

a facility for microgravity materials processing and manufacture of products (e.g., pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, glasses, and

metals);

servicing of satellites and platforms (e.g., the

maintenance or replacement of components, replenishment of consumables, and

exchange of equipment);

a transportation hub to assemble, check out,

6.

7.

8.

and launch vehicles (e.g., those carrying

communications satellites) to geostationary

or other high orbits, and as automated interplanetary probes (e.g., a Mars orbiter or

an asteroid rendezvous vehicle;

an assembly facility for large space structures

(e.g., antennas for advanced satellite communications systems);

a storage depot for spare parts, fuel, and supplies for use as needed by satellites, platforms, vehicles, and people; and

a staging base for more ambitious future

projects-and travel (e.g., a lunar settlement

or a human voyage to Mars).

Questions such as the following must be asked

relative to the corresponding functions listed

above:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

How much of an investment do these (and

other) capabilities warrant?

Is use of a “space station” the optimum way

to accomplish these missions?

When will the need for a microgravity production facility be demonstrated, and how

much of its cost should its users pay for?

What kinds of satellites will be repaired,

why, and who will bear the cost?

When will the transportation hub be ready

and why is it needed then?

What is the purpose of the assembly facility

for the large space structures–and of the

large space structures themselves?

What is the justification for a storage depot

in space?

When will a staging base be required for a

lunar settlement or a manned Mars expedition?

And, underlying all of these specific questions

is the hazard that too great a commitment to the

acquisition of in-space infrastructure, and the resulting long-term operations and management expenditures, might preempt the adequate support

of other important civilian space activities.
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 67

REACTIONS OF NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL BOARDS

Other science and engineering organizations

have participated in the study of space infrastructure acquisition. NASA invited the National Research Council (NRC) to review its possible utilization for space science and applications. (The

NRC is a private organization of distinguished

scientists and engineers operating within the charter of the National Academy of Sciences to act

as an advisor to the U.S. Government (and others)

on science and technology issues. It works

through its committees, boards, and institutes,

two of which, the Space Science Board (SSB) and

the Space Applications Board (SAB), studied these

issues in workshops during the summer of 1982.)

The Space Science Board concluded that almost all of the space science research projects

forecast for the next 20 years (a forecast made

without giving great attention to the possible use

of sophisticated in-space infrastructure) could be

carried out without the use of a “space station”

as then characterized by NASA. These projects

could be carried out by using Shuttle/Spacelab,

satellites, interplanetary probes launched with expendable launch vehicles, or contemplated upper stages compatible with the Shuttle. The SSB

stated it was not opposed to a “space station, ”

that a decision on it should be made for reasons

beyond science uses, and that some science interests would make use of it if it were available.

But the SSB expressed concern that any delays

in launching science payloads that might be imposed as a consequence of waiting for completion of any “space station” could harm science

programs unnecessarily, as the SSB believes happened during the development of the Shuttle

(when several programs used up funds for employee salaries and other program costs during

such delays),

The Space Applications Board expressed guarded

support for use of a “space station .“ It indicated

interest in applications made possible, or made

more efficient, through use of appropriate infrastructure, such as servicing of free-flying platforms, launching of geostationary satellites, repairing LEO satellites, and serving as a materials

processing laboratory. Communications experimentation, especially for large antennas, was

another likely use in their estimation. The presence of a human crew was deemed desirable,

particularly for materials science experiments and

for modification and repair of instruments. The

SAB also concluded that a platform in near-polar

orbit would be an important infrastructure component, to be used for Earth remote sensing of

resources, Earth environmental studies, and

ocean observations. The capability of the platform to merge and process a variety of data prior

to transmission to the ground would be an advantage compared to independent, unprocessed

transmissions from individual satellites. The SAB

cautioned that sufficient resources must be made

available to develop instruments and payloads for

use on any “space station. ”

Another body examining the role of expanded

space infrastructure was the NASA Solar System

Exploration Committee (SSEC). The SSEC is a

group of the Nation’s outstanding planetary scientists directly advising NASA on planetary research.

The SSEC, which spent 2 years defining a new

U.S. planetary space strategy, looked at the

usefulness of any new infrastructure for planetary

exploration. It concluded that, in the near term,

the facility could be used beneficially as an

assembly and launch base for deep space probes

with potentially important advantages for planetary spacecraft requiring large internal propulsion

systems. In the longer term, this could greatly facilitate the return of samples from Mars by providing a fully loaded booster such as a Centaur

rocket. A “space station” could also serve as a

holding facility for returned samples to alleviate

concerns of their possible contamination of the

Earth.

In January 1984, NASA created a 15-member

advisory panel of academic space scientists that,

over a 2-year interval, is expected to give NASA

advice on suitable research projects for long-term,

habitable, space infrastructure.

Of related interest to NASA programs, the NRC’s

Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB)

conducted a workshop during 1983 on NASA’s
62 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Space Research and Technology Program. While

not directly addressing “space station” issues,

their report noted the high payoff uses of space

in the communications and meteorology fields,

the present speculative nature of manufacturing

in space, the high cost of space transportation

and systems as an inhibiting factor in the commercial use of space, and that, in the face of

foreign competition, the United States should

continue to explore and stimulate potential uses

of space.

The ASEB urged NASA to provide access to

space for experimental purposes as a natural extension of national aerospace facilities on the

Earth’s surface. Overall, the report recommended

that NASA devote a significant portion of its efforts to develop technology that would reduce

the cost of spacecraft subsystems, payloads, transportation, and operations.

ALTERNATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE

Because of the large public costs associated

with the NASA plans for acquiring in-space infrastructure, and considering the view of the

Space Science Board (and others) regarding the

NASA plans, it is important to explore alternative approaches for providing the desired capabilities of such infrastructure. OTA has identified

several alternatives that could provide various capabilities, at various times, and at various initial

costs to the Government. These alternatives include system components that currently exist or

are currently under development. OTA has also

considered a gradual approach to infrastructure

acquisition with various average annual funding

rates; lower cost alternatives could be used as

early steps in an evolutionary development leading to increasingly sophisticated and capable arrays of infrastructure. Each of these approaches

has different implications for initial Government

cost, life-cycle costs, pace of commercial development, and the pace for carrying out human

activities in space.

Uninhabitable Platforms

Regardless of the outcome of the debate over

the need for infrastructure that includes and/or

supports a long-term human presence in space,

there is a significant community of users who

would benefit from having uninhabited space facilities and services available to them. A number

of so-called free-flying automated platform alternatives now exist, are in development, or have

been conceived, that could take advantage of the

Shuttle or expendable vehicles for launch and

service.

The Shuttle can be used to launch to, and return equipment or other materials from, LEO. This

ability allows for the use of space platforms offering electric power, heat rejection, communications, attitude control, and other services to a

number of users. Some time after insertion into

orbit (typically several months to a year), the Shuttle or an ROTV would rendezvous with such a

platform, and servicing intervals for platformmounted instruments would be coordinated with

the rendezvous schedule, keeping costs in mind.

Payloads could be exchanged, attitude control,

fuel and other expendable replenished, batteries

charged, or the platforms could be returned to

an LEO base or to Earth. Platforms could avoid

contamination and stability problems associated

with inhabited infrastructure. The cost of the

common platform facilities could be amortized

over a long lifetime and a large number of activities.

Fairchild LEASECRAFT.-The Fairchild LEASECRAFT (fig. 4) is designed to support equipment

that can be exchanged on orbit. This design approach anticipates that the costs (special equipment, crew training, etc.) and risks associated

with performing maintenance and payload modifications and substitutions on orbit are outweighed

by the saving in transportation cost and improvement in spacecraft utilization, which avoids frequent launch and return of the platform.
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 63

Figure 4.—An Artist’s Conception of a LEASECRAFT Enroute to Orbital Altitude With Payload Attached

LEASECRAFT was inspired by the Multimission

Modular Spacecraft (MMS) system on which the

Landsat D and Solar Maximum Mission spacecraft

are based. It can provide up to 6 kW of power

and other services to user payloads, and is intended to serve LEO space projects that include

data acquisition/transmission and materials processing.

Data acquisition activities generally require fine

pointing and high data rates but relatively modest power levels. Materials processing projects,

on the other hand, require high power but low

data rates and relatively coarse pointing. The

LEASECRAFT could be converted from one configuration to the other on orbit from the Shuttle

or from other inhabited infrastructure.

The LEASECRAFT design includes a centrally

mounted propulsion module that contains 2,700

kg of hydrazine for transfer from the standard

Shuttle orbit of about 300 km to an operating

altitude of 480 km. Later it can be returned to

the Shuttle orbit for rendezvous. The total weight

of the LEASECRAFT bus is expected to be 6,400

kg (including the initial charge of propellant).

The power and other services provided by the

LEASECRAFT are dependent on the number and

type of its modules. Details of how module and

payload changes will be handled will depend on

lessons learned from the Solar Max repair. Possibilities include the manipulation of tools by the

Remote Manipulator System (RMS), spacewalking outside the Shuttle cargo bay by payload

specialists, and retrieval of the LEASECRAFT by

the RMS to a position in the cargo bay where

payload specialists would perform the work

needed.

An automated electrophoresis payload being

developed by McDonnell Douglas is frequently

mentioned in conjunction with the LEASECRAFT.

It will consist of an electrophoretic processing fa-
64 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

cility and a separate supply module having a combined weight of some 10,000 kg. The processing unit will use 3.5 kW of power and will require

an acceleration environment of less than 0.1 percent of gravity on Earth.

Another prospective payload for the LEASECRAFT system is NASA’s Advanced X-Ray Astronomy Facility (AXAF). AXAF is a 9,000-kg telescope

that will operate in a 500-km orbit, require 1.2

kW of power, and periodic change of imaging

and spectrographic instruments.

The LEASECRAFT’s ability to accommodate

specific payloads is very similar to that of the high

power version of EURECA (see below), with one

important exception: the higher data handling

ability of LEASECRAFT would allow it to accommodate most science and applications instruments. It would not accommodate some instrument projects that are very large, or those that

require human involvement.

The initial LEASECRAFT reportedly will cost at

least $150 million (1984$) apiece to purchase.

Users may also purchase partial services of

LEASECRAFT or lease an entire platform from

Fairchild for $20 million to $40 million (1984$)

per year. Transportation costs will include initial

launch of the LEASECRAFT and its payload and

other payloads that, subsequently, are taken to

it for exchange.

Boeing MESA.–The Modular Experimental

Platform for Science and Applications (MESA) is

a low-cost satellite system designed by Boeing for

launch on the Ariane. The MESA design follows

from Boeing small spacecraft designs and production of the last decade. This includes three spacecraft known as S-3 for the Department of Defense, two Applications Explorer Modules (AEMs)

for NASA, and the Viking Spacecraft being produced today for the Swedish Space Corp.

The MESA program utilizes existing hardware

and previous experience to achieve a low-cost

platform for modest payloads that do not require

recovery, and for special cases that do require

recovery.

An interesting feature of the MESA system in

its Viking configuration is that it duplicates the

Ariane structural interface on its top side, which

enables it to share a launch by fitting between

the Ariane and the primary payload. This use of

residual launch capacity can reduce the cost of

transportation to orbit.

The total mass of the MESA/Viking platform is

some 500 kg. The design of the platform provides

for attitude control and propulsion. Once the Viking separates from the main satellite after launch,

the propulsion unit can boost the Viking into its

operational orbit. The spacecraft is spin stabilized

at 3 rpm, and Earth/Sun sensors and magnetic

torquers are elements of the attitude control system. A combination of solar arrays and a battery

provide 60 W of average power with a peak power of 120 W.

Limited changes can be made in solar array size

and power output. The overall diameter of the

MESA with payload cannot exceed the 2.95-meter internal diameter of the Ariane’s payload compartment. The central core of the platform is designed to accommodate both platform (420 kg)

and payload weights (0o kg for the design reference) and up to nearly 2,OOO kg of host satellite

weight during Ariane launch. The available volume for the payload is 1.6 cubic meters (m J).

Should the solid-propellant rocket motor not be

required, an additional internal volume of approximately 0.6 m3 would be available for payload use.

MESA is limited in its applicability because of

its small size, limited resources, the use of spin

stabilization, and the intention to have the payload integrated within the structure. This makes

it best suited to small, scanning or nonviewing,

dedicated activities. While suited for some space

plasma physics or cosmic ray investigations, the

spin stabilization is not appropriate for microgravity activities. MESA will accommodate only a

small fraction of the science and applications

projects identified in NASA’s Mission Analysis

Studies.

MESA is reported to cost $10 million (1984$).

Transportation charges on the Ariane are uncertain since it can share a launch with another payload. If it is carried in the Shuttle, it should qualify

for the minimum charge of $12.5 million (1984$).
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 6 5

Photo ” Boeing Aerospace 

The Boeing MESA spacecraft undergoing ground processing.
66 Ž Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Shuttle Payload Support Structure (SPSS).–

An example of a structure supporting payloads

that remain attached within the Shuttle cargo bay

is the SPSS that has been developed for NASA.

Teledyne Brown expects to commercialize SPSS

during 1985. It will provide a mount, electrical

power, data handling, and environmental control for payloads weighing up to 1,400 kg.

Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF).–A

platform housing 57 experiments, many of them

seeking to record how manmade materials hold

up in the LEO environment, was released from

the Shuttle in April 1984. The 10,000 kg-satellite,

called the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF),

will be retrieved by the Shuttle in 1985. The LDEF,

basically a free-flying support structure for scientific experiments, cost $14 million (1 984$), not

including launch and retrieval.

Pleiades Concept.–A concept to expand the

use of platforms for space science research has

been proposed by students in a 1983 systems engineering course at Stanford University. In this

concept (called “pleiades”), a platform located

in the Shuttle cargo bay would provide data processing and other support for several co-orbiting

free flyers equipped for long-term astrophysics

research. Periodic servicing would be feasible

from the Shuttle. If developed, it might become

a permanent space infrastructure element.

Space Industries’ Platform.-A free-flying permanent industrial space facility (lSF), designed primarily for materials processing, has been proposed by a new commercial space company,

Space Industries, Inc. (fig. 5). An automated platform suited for production purposes, it could be

placed in LEO by the Shuttle and serviced several times a year by it and/or any eventual longterm space infrastructure. The ISF would include

a pressurized volume where equipment could be

serviced by a crew during resupply periods; the

facility, however, would provide no life support

functions when occupied other than a suitable

atmosphere compatible with the Shuttle or ROTV,

to which it is expected to be attached during

these periods.

Assuming successful financing, the facility could

be placed in operation in the late 1980s. No cost

figures have been made public, but some industry sources estimate that it would cost some hundreds of millions of dollars to develop and construct.

MBB SPAS.–The concept of a Shuttle-tended

platform was tested, to a limited degree, with the

Space Pallet Satellite (SPAS) payloads during two

Shuttle flights. SPAS was developed at the initiative of the German company Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB). Its structure is constructed out

of graphite epoxy tubes to form a modular truss

bridge that spans the Shuttle cargo bay in width

and fits that length dimension for which a minimum launch charge is made by NASA. The structure provides mounting points for subsystem and

experiment hardware and includes a grapple fixture for handling by the Remote Manipulator System, i.e., the Shuttle arm. The SPAS is designed

to operate in either a Shuttle-attached mode or

as a free-flying platform, and it was released during the seventh Shuttle flight to operate in the latter mode for about 10 hours before retrieval. In

that operation it provided the first opportunity

to demonstrate the Shuttle’s ability both to deploy and retrieve a satellite. The SPAS payload

remained in the cargo bay during the 10th Shuttle flight, where it successfully handled equipment for several commercial users.

Having only battery power and compressed gas

thrusters, the initial SPAS is designed for shortIifetime projects (7 to 15 days), but subsequent

versions could undoubtedly extend the lifetime

by incorporating solar photovoltaic arrays and

propellant-type thrusters, and maybe even a kick

motor to achieve a wider range of orbits and/or

to be able to return to a Shuttle-compatible orbit for rendezvous. In its present form, SPAS will

only accommodate relatively small, low-power

instruments used for short periods of time.

The basic SPAS platforms costs less than $1 million (1984$); subsystem equipment required by

specific payloads is not included. SPAS is designed to qualify for the minimum Shuttle launch

charge of $12.5 million (1984$) but, with a large

payload, it may exceed this qualification.

EURECA.–The European Space Agency (ESA)

is developing a small unmanned platform carrier

that would be released from the Shuttle and retrieved after free flights in space of 6 to 9 months.
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 6 7

Figure 5.—A Free-Flying Permanent Industrial Space Facility

Initial Operating Configuration

‘-- -

Four ISF Module Configuration

. .

---

Two ISF Module Configuration

ISF Docked to NASA’’ Space Station’

Ch. 3—Space /infrastructure Ž 69

Shuttle. The ability to fly from the Shuttle to a

useful orbit and back for rendezvous with the

Shuttle is typical of most space platform concepts.

The EURECA will have a payload capacity of

about 1,100 kg with the combined carrier and

payload weighing approximately 3,500 kg. The

total length of the carrier/platform, plus its

payloads, in the Shuttle’s cargo bay will be 2.3

meters, with an option for a shorter length of 1.6

meters if desired.

Energy for EURECA will be provided by deployable and retractable solar arrays that will initially

deliver 5.4 kW of power at 28 volts. Of this output, 1 kW will be available to the payload on a

continuous basis, while much of the balance will

be required to charge the batteries that supply

power when sunlight is not available.4 The power

supply for EURECA and its payload will be cooled

using a fluid loop connected to a radiator.

EURECA payload and housekeeping data will

be relayed to Europe via circuits employing the

L-Sat communications satellite as a test. The

telemetry system will normally use ground stations in Europe, but it will also be compatible with

the Shuttle. The maximum data rate that can be

processed on the ground by the proposed system is 2.5 kbps, although the on board system will

be capable of transmitting up to 1 Mbps.

Size, mass, capacity, and data handling ability

are the most stringent EURECA design constraints.

If the data rate is restricted to 2.5 kbps, only film

cameras can be accommodated. But if the full

1 Mbps data rate can be utilized, many science

and applications instruments can be accommodated. However, large, high power, or high data

rate payloads, such as telescopes, radars, Iidars,

multispectral scanners, or a combination of these

or other instrument payloads cannot be accommodated. Increasing the available power level

alone does not significantly improve the ability

to accommodate such payloads, since science

and applications instruments that require high

power (e.g., remote sensing radars) also tend to

have high data rate requirements (tens to hundreds of Mbps).

4More power would be available for payload use if it proves possible to operate the platform in a Sun-synchronous dawn-dusk orbit where it does not enter the Earth’s shadow.

The cost of EURECA has not been clearly stated,

although ESA has referred to a program cost of

$170 million (1984$) that appears to include some

payload costs.

Plans are also being developed for EURECA 11,

an advanced version having increased power and

payload capacity. The new design will allow

space-basing and equipment exchange on-orbit,

using the Shuttle or a yet-to-be-developed Ariane

automatic docking system.

SOLARIS.-This French concept includes preliminary designs for an automated platform. It

would be unmanned, located in LEO, and would

use furnaces, a robot manipulator arm, solar

power, and other subsystems. Ariane 4 would

launch a transfer and supply stage, and a ballistic

reentry capsule will bring processed materials

back to Earth.

The first generation facility would have the following major elements:

● The Orbital Service Module (OSM), which

is a user-shared platform with docking ports

for payloads and transport vehicles.

● An in-orbit Transport Modular Vehicle (TMV)

for resupply, transport, and servicing of

space payloads.

● A Data Relay Satellite Communications

System for control and high data rate transmissions.

. The Ariane 4 launcher.

The intent is to fly the OSM in a circular “Sunsynchronous” orbit following a path over the twilight line, thus avoiding the Earth’s shadow and

thereby achieving a relatively high 10 kW of continuous power output for its users. Activities such

as materials processing, microwave Earth observation, and assembly and check-out of large vehicles in orbit are envisioned. The orbit altitude

could be adjusted from 600 to 1,000 km. Two

docking ports would be available for TMV berthing, with five ports for payloads. Data transmission rates would not exceed 400 Mbps. The entire OSM weight would be 4,500 kg (excluding

propellant).

The function of the TMV is to provide transportation service between the Ariane delivery orbit

and the OSM, and to permit the return of a lim38-798 0 - 84 - 6 : QL 3
70 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

ited amount of equipment and products to Earth.

The TMV will consist of an expendable module

with propulsion, attitude and trajectory control,

and the ability to rendezvous and dock.

The TMV can be used in either one-way or

round-trip service. For one-way service the payload would be attached directly to the TMV module, and both would be placed inside the fairing

of the Ariane 4 for launch. A 5,000-kg payload

could be accommodated in this manner.

Round-trip service requires the use of a reentry vehicle similar to the Apollo reentry module.

The TMV module is attached to the reentry body

for launch in a manner similar to the arrangement

for a one-way payload, and the two are separated

during reentry. About 2,500 kg and 15 m3 of payload could be accommodated within the reentry vehicle; it could touch down on either land

or water and is designed for reuse.

The first generation SOLARIS concept is functionally similar to the science and applications

space platform studied by NASA, except that

SOLARIS specifies a dawn-dusk Sun-synchronous

orbit. This orbit restricts its usefulness for many

Earth-viewing projects that require lighting from

the Sun. However, radars, Iidars, and some microwave instruments can “see” in the dark and

would not be affected, while solar-viewing instruments wouId gain the advantage of continuous visibility of the Sun. The ability of SOLARIS

to support large, multiple instrument facilities

should allow for accommodation of most of the

solar physics payloads. However, a continuous

full Sun orbit would be a problem for many celestial-viewing instruments that depend on Earth

shadow to eliminate scattered light from the Sun.

All automated life science activities and all

materials processing, except for those requiring

human presence, could be accommodated.

The orbit of SOLARIS is not suited to launch,

retrieval, or servicing of low inclination satellites

(including geostationary satellites), since a large

orbit plane change is required. And, since most

Sun-synchronous satellites are not in dawn-dusk

orbits, a “latitude drift” would be required to

service them. Some studies consider satellite

assembly and service to be a major role for a

“space station”; SOLARIS would be able to accommodate only a small fraction of this market.

Costs of the evolutionary SOLARIS program

have not been defined, but they likely would be

several billions of dollars (1984$) if the entire concept is developed.

Habitable Infrastructure

Although uninhabited platforms can be used

to support many experiments and commercial

processes that do not require human presence,

and some activities require a stability that would

be difficult to achieve if humans were present,

other activities require or can be greatly aided

by human presence. These include life science

studies of humans in space, which are necessary

to prepare for long duration human travel in

space, and interactive experimentation in materials processing (e.g., pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, crystals), which is required in order to

explore the commercial potential of materials

processing.

A number of infrastructure elements other than

the proposed NASA “space station” are available

that can support humans in space.

Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO).–A major

constraint on the duration of the on-orbit time

for the Shuttle is the availability of electrical

power. The current Shuttle power system uses

three fuel cell powerplants fed by cryogenically

stored hydrogen and oxygen, and delivers 21 kW

on a continuous basis, of which 14 kW is allocated to the Shuttle itself and 7 kW is available

for payloads. The fuel cells are fed from tank sets

(one hydrogen and one oxygen tank in each set)

located under the floor lining in the Shuttle cargo

bay. Three tank sets are considered standard

equipment. Two additional sets (for a total of five)

can be installed with no volume penalty to payloads, but with a combined weight penalty (fully

fueled) of 1,500 kg. The full complement of five

tanks will provide a stay time of 8 days if the full

7-kW payload allocation is drawn upon continuously. Where little payload power is drawn, as

might be the case for satellite repair or remote
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 71

sensing activities, the stay time could be as much

as 12 days.

One obvious approach to extending the stay

time is to add more tank sets. One such concept

results in a stay time of 15 to 22 days, again

depending on power consumption, by loading

a four-tank-set carrier into the cargo bay. Such

a carrier would shorten the usable length of the

cargo bay by some 2 meters out of 18, and result in a 3,700-kg decrease in payload capacity.

Extension of this approach to even longer durations has a practical limit because of the volume

and weight capacity lost, and the limited storage

lifetime of cryogens.

A 20-day stay time with 7 kW of power consumed by the payload, or up to 26 days if less

power is consumed, can be achieved by using

a solar array in conjunction with the five standard cryogenic tank sets. In one concept, the solar

array would deliver 18 kW in sunlight, and the

fuel cells would deliver 3 kW makeup power for

a total 21 kW. During orbital eclipse of the solar

array, the fuel cells would supply the full 21 kw.

The RMS could deploy the array underneath the

Shuttle, to avoid interference with the power system heat radiator and the field of view from the

cargo bay. A previously proposed Power Extension Package (PEP) was identical in concept but

was sized to provide 15 kw, instead of the normal 7 kw to payloads. The payload weight penalty for these concepts, including tank sets, is estimated at 2,300 to 2,700 kg. The cost to modify

one Shuttle was estimated to be $100 million to

$200 million (1984$). Spacelab would have been

the principal beneficiary of the PEP, but the

planned flights of Spacelab were judged to be not

frequent enough to justify the expenditure.

To achieve stay times well beyond 20 days requires some radical changes in the power system,

but the Shuttle could be designed for essentially

limitless duration as far as power is concerned.

Batteries would be used for power during Shuttle eclipse, and operation of the existing fuel cells

would be limited to launch, reentry, or emergencies. The fuel cell reactants would be stored at

ambient temperature and high pressure, thereby

eliminating the storage lifetime constraint associated with cryogens. A 48-kW solar array would

be required to provide power to recharge the batteries in sunlight; this power would be in addition

to the basic 21 kW needed for Shuttle and payload power. The weight penalty for such a power

subsystem is estimated to be about 3,200 kg.

Modifications are required in other areas as

well. Flash evaporators that are currently used

to supplement radiator heat rejection require

large amounts of water in some attitudes, and to

minimize reliance on them it would be necessary to increase the capacity of the radiators. With

regard to habitability, water tanks must be added

to compensate for water that is no longer generated by fuel cells and a regenerative CO2 system

would be required. Furthermore, for 15- to 30-

day durations, the Shuttle habitable volume is

only adequate to marginal for a crew of four. A

reconfiguration of the mid-deck, recommended

for 30- to 60-day durations on orbit, includes

moving the airlock to the cargo bay. A Spacelab

module would also be added to provide such

crew amenities as a shower and an exercise and

off-duty area as well as increased work area.

Among the activities which an EDO would be

expected to support is satellite servicing. The

Shuttle can reach a wide range of orbit inclinations and LEO altitudes, and the cargo bay, with

its RMS and space for supplies and other support

equipment, seems well suited for this type of activity. The technical feasibility of repairing satellites from the Shuttle was demonstrated on the

Solar Maximum Mission Satellite in April 1984.

With the Shuttle launch charges alone projected

to be as much as $100 million for a dedicated

flight before the end of the decade, the prospect

of sharing a launch for this purpose along with

other payloads and/or activities is a significant factor in the economic viability of such an operation.

In theory, with on-orbit infrastructure serving

as an operations and distribution center, a Shuttle destined for it could carry not only supplies

and equipment for the operation at hand but

could be loaded with payloads and supplies to

be left in space. Subsequent transfers to freeflyers, for instance, could then be accomplished

with a lighter, more energy-efficient proximityoperations vehicle in contrast to the relatively

massive Shuttle. The premise is that the saving
72 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

to be realized by utilizing the launch capacity of

the Shuttle more effectively would, over time,

more than offset the cost of the on-orbit infrastructure specifically designed to handle equipment and supplies. It is not clear to what extent

the on-orbit infrastructure operations costs (both

on-orbit and ground-support) are included in

analyses of such operations. It is also not clear

how total costs (facilities and operations) would

be allocated among all users of a shared “space

station” to establish the economic viability of any

particular activity such as satellite repair and

servicing.

Finally, an EDO could function as an observatory and a laboratory. There are adequate accommodations in the aft flight deck to control and

monitor an observing payload such as one containing a large telescope. The Shuttle has no provision for laboratory operations beyond the accommodations available in the mid-deck lockers

and, on some early flights, the main galley area.

However, a Spacelab module, discussed in the

following section, could be added to provide a

shirt-sleeve working environment in the cargo

bay. One drawback is that Spacelab consumes

nearly half of the available 7 kW of payload power. Thus, electrical power for experiments would

require careful management, and a more capable power system would be desirable for an EDO.

An EDO is estimated to cost about $2 billion

(1984$) for the basic Shuttle, $300 million (1984$)

for an upgraded habitation module similar to

Spacelab, and $200 million (1984$) for the PEP.

The full Shuttle launch cost would be incurred

for each flight.

Spacelab.–The Shuttle carried Spacelab into

orbit for its maiden flight in November 1983.

Spacelab is a set of hardware that converts the

cargo bay into a general-purpose laboratory for

conducting science, applications, and technology investigations. It was financed and built

jointly by ESA in close cooperation with NASA,

providing a convenient means for working with

a collection of experiments in a shirt-sleeve LEO

laboratory environment. It augments the Shuttle

services for powering, pointing, cooling, and controlling experiment hardware and for data handling and transmission to Earth.

Spaceiab is composed of two primary building

blocks: modules and pallets. The module is a canIike pressure vessel approximately 4 meters in

diameter that provides a shirt-sleeve working

environment for the crew and rack accommodations for experiment hardware. The module consists of two end cones and one or two center sections (each 2.7 meters long). It may be used in

either its long form (7.0 meters) or short form (4.3

meters) and may be flown alone or in combination with one or more pallets. The pallets are Ushaped structures 3 meters long that span the cargo bay and provide mounting for instruments that

are to be exposed to the space environment. pallets may be flown individually or tied together

in trains. For pallet-only projects, the computers

and other subsystem elements normally carried

in the module are housed in an “igloo” that can

be attached to the forward pallet, The Spacelab

hardware set also includes an Instrument Pointing Subsystem (IPS) capable of high-accuracy

pointing for clusters of small instruments or a

large telescope.

While both pallets and modules can be considered for use as independent space infrastructure,

in its present form Spacelab is totally dependent

on the Shuttle for its resources. Specifically, the

Shuttle provides 7 to 12 kW of electrical power,

8 to 12 kW of cooling, data handling and data

communication at rates of up to 50 megabits per

second. Further, the Shuttle provides oxygen replenishment, and serves as both a crew residence

and a safe haven under emergency conditions.

Spacelab depends on these resources to provide

a safe, stable laboratory environment.

Several stages in the evolution of the SpaceIab module beyond the current generation have

been studied, moving from complete dependence on, and attachment to, outside support elements, to relatively independent operation as a

free-flyer that is resupplied every 6 months or so

by the Shuttle or an OMV.

Spacelab With an EDO.–One version of the

Spacelab that would be carried by an EDO utilizing a PEP, was studied by ESA in collaboration

with NASA, The electrical and heat rejection sys-
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 73

Figure 6.— Major Spacelab Elements

MODULE

terns would be modified to handle increased

power, and the command and data management

system wouId be modernized. Since two SpaceIab modules are now owned by NASA, additional

costs would involve only the modifications and

launch costs.

Spacelab as an Attached Module.–Another

version would see the Spacelab used as a laboratory component of a “space station.” The module

would be lengthened to provide a greater shirtsleeve volume for more experiments and people,

but in this case other connected infrastructure

elements would replace the Shuttle as a support

system. Either an existing NASA Spacelab module

could be used for this purpose, or an additional

module could be provided at a cost of $300 million (1984$).

Spacelab as a Free-Flyer.–A third version is

that of Spacelab as an inhabited free-flyer. This

would require the development of a dedicated

service module that would provide the types of

resources currently provided by the Shuttle.

For attitude control, there are a number of possible candidate systems which could be adopted.

In Europe, for example, there is the ESA Modular

Attitude Control (MAC) system, which is designed

for general satellite application. This subsystem

is in prototype form, and hardware tests are u rider

way at present. Electrical power and cooling provisions would be required, as part of the dedicated services module, in the form of solar arrays, batteries, and a heat radiator with a cooling

fluid loop. It is possible that the increased-capacity (12 kW) solar arrays under development by

ESA, together with the ESA radiator, would be

suitable. Command and data handling could be

satisfied by commercial computer technology.

Oxygen supply for the free-flying Spacelab could

be handled by using the nitrogen tanks that are

already available in Spacelab. However, for long

durations on orbit, additional provision for oxygen supply would be necessary, which might

possibly take the form of a water electrolysis system (as yet undeveloped). For crew habitation,

the developed Spacelab free-flying module would
74 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure 7.–Shuttle-Spacelab Flight Profile

I LANDING /7 ~

REMOVE

RIMENT DATA

<.! L-, ,,, V,L, . , L, ,

Y

;“ SPACELAB SPACE FLIGHT

nnel-n, kl A -?-, nh , m EXPERIMENT

L INTEGRATION TAPE, FILM, SAMPLES, E

USER COMMUNITY

L EXPERIMENTER

TC

need to be based on a two-segment-long module

as a minimum (7.0 meters), or preferably a threesegment-long module (1 O meters), in order to

provide the necessary volume for sleeping, food

preparation and consumption, waste disposal, exercise and recreational equipment, and commodity stowage. Crew-supported experiment and laboratory activities could be accommodated in a

Spacelab-derived two-segment module, connected to the habitation moduIe by an airlock;

it would contain the necessary laboratory equipment and Spacelab-derived racks. The use of two

modules connected via an airlock would provide

the basis for a necessary safe haven in the event

of a major failure in, or of, either module.

The use of two Spacelab-derived modules,

combined with the associated dedicated service

module, could provide long-duration infrastructure for human and automatic operations in

space. An intermediate step in this direction

would be the development of a two-segment

Spacelab-derived module, coupled with a dedicated service module. The cost of such a development (designed for Shuttle resupply every 90

days) could be some $400 million (1984$). The

two-module development costs would be considerably greater than for a one-moduIe configuration, perhaps approaching $800 million (1984$).

To put the size of a Spacelab-derived free-flyer

into perspective, it is interesting to compare the

facilities described above to the Skylab facility

which was orbited 10 years ago. A three-segment

Spacelab module has roughly the same external

dimensions as the Apollo Command and Serv-
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 7 5

ice Module’s propulsion/resource system plus

reentry vehicle, that part of the Apollo transportation system that rendezvoused with Skylab. The

Skylab Orbital Workshop (OWS) provided primary habitation and work space 6.7 meters in diameter by 8.2 meters long or about 280 m

3 of

volume. Thus, the volumes enclosed by the twoand three-segment-long modules contain 25 and

40 percent, respectively, of the habitable volume

of the OWS, and together would total just 70 percent of the OWS volume. In addition to the OWS,

some Skylab control and utility functions were

housed in the airlock module and the Multiple

Docking Adapter. Because of the dimensions of

the Shuttle cargo bay, a number of Shuttle

Launches would be required to build up a SpaceIab-based infrastructure on a scale equal to

Skylab.

The free-flying Spacelab could accommodate

any payload currently envisaged for the Space lab

module on the Shuttle. Some life science facility

concepts now being studied use a dedicated

Spacelab module as their basic structure. All life

sciences studies could probably be performed;

high-temperature furnaces for material processing may require higher power and cooling that

could, if necessary, be provided by additional

power modules. Commercial production facilities

are not yet clearly defined, but if such production proves to be desirable, additional power and

Spacelab modules could be added, if necessary,

to accommodate it. A small fraction of the Earth

or celestial-viewing instruments could utilize the

scientific airlock or window of Spacelab, but this

is a cumbersome way to handle such instruments.

The only advantage of the Spacelab window or

scientific airlock over a permanent external mounting position is easier access to the instrument,

while the disadvantages include limited space,

restricted field of view, and the necessity to handle the instrument whenever it is installed. However, viewing instruments could be installed and

operated on one or more co-orbiting platforms.

Spacelab could serve as an operations control

center for other space activities. Properly equipped,

it could accommodate 100 percent of this function, although, depending on the number of

activities conducted, more than one Spacelab

module might be needed. The characteristics of,

and the problems associated with, exchanging

equipment in the Spacelab module indicate that

its best use might be as a dedicated life and/or

materials science laboratory, or as an in-space

control center.

The idea of developing and using. existing

Spacelab hardware for long duration human

activities in space remains attractive in view of

the maturity of the system building blocks. Limitations of the free-flying Spacelab concept, however, may be significant. As an example, it would

be difficult to develop an efficient closed-loop life

support system.

Spacelab as free-flyer, including a utilities

module based on EURECA, has been estimated

to cost $1 billion (1984$). Transportation costs

would include an initial full Shuttle launch and

subsequent supply and transport services via the

Shuttle. An automatic docking service could be

developed for resupply by expendable launch

vehicles, but the cost of such a development is

uncertain.

Columbus.–The Germans and Italians have

proposed to ESA that the Columbus project, using

Spacelab modules as components of a more extensive infrastructure, should become the ESA

contribution to the U.S. “space station” program.

The plan, including three steps or phases, begins with a Spacelab module attached to a U.S.

“space station, ” providing laboratory workspace

and deriving life support, power, attitude control, and other services from the parent “station. ”

A second step (fig. 8) is an independent free-flying

Spacelab with power, attitude control, and modest life support supplied by a service module fashioned after the EURECA platform. It would require direct resupply by the Shuttle or an OMV,

provide laboratory workspace, and allow tending

by a crew for up to 8 hours at a time. A third step

would add another Spacelab one-segment moduIe, with propulsion, to be used as a crew transport and servicing vehicle which might also be

able to accommodate a small crew for short periods at the laboratory. By servicing the free-flyer,

it would enable the Columbus module to operate autonomously for a few months at a time. This

last phase is projected in Columbus program literature for possible implementation near the end
76 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure 8.—An Artist’s Conception of a Free-Flying Pressurized Module With

an Attached Resource Module (second phase of Columbus concept)
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 7 7

of this century. Cost estimates for a Columbus

project are not yet available.

NASA Minimum Cost “Space Station. ”-A

study regarding a “space station” that would minimize costs by using Spacelab modules was performed at the NASA Marshall Space Center and

was reported in 1982. It would provide sound

and useful infrastructure, but would be of relatively modest dimensions in comparison with

NASA’s present aspirations. It would include a

habitat module, a separate safe haven for emergencies, and a support systems module. It would

be launched by the Shuttle and would have 1 kw

of power and a scientific workspace. Later,

another support system module and a docking

adaptor would be attached, providing for the

long-term support of three persons, an experiment module, pressurized and unpressurized experiment ports, gyroscopic attitude control, communications and data handling, and 6 kw of

nominal user power. According to the NASA

study, the cost of this facility would be $2 billion

to $2.5 billion (1984$), assuming the use of an

existing Spacelab module already in the inventory.

Shuttle as permanent Infrastructure. -In the

discussion of the EDO, it was shown how relatively modest changes to the existing Shuttle vehicle could result in 20- to 25-day on-orbit stay

times while more extensive modifications could

make 30- to 60-day stay times attainable. A concept has been proposed by one Mission Analysis Study contractor group that would have major Shuttle and its external tank assemblies carried

into orbit together to form permanent infrastructure. The basic Shuttle would be stretched to add

30 feet to the cargo bay and would be utilized

without the wings, tail, and thermal protection

subsystem. The main engines and the OMS engines

would remain in place. The crew compartment

would be stripped to make room for a control

module. A command module would be located

in the cargo bay. Major external tank modifications would include a power module with solar

arrays which would mount on the nose, and a

wraparound radiator for thermal control.

The Shuttle and its external tank also would use

the Shuttle solid rocket boosters for launching as

is the case for the conventional Shuttle. Upon its

reaching orbit, the solar arrays would be deployed, the cargo bay doors would be opened,

and the command module would be rotated into

an upright position, thereby freeing the cargo bay

for use in servicing and staging operations. A

subsequent Shuttle launch could deliver a habitability module, logistics module, and crew.

The use of a basic Shuttle in this fashion would

allow the very rapid acquisition of infrastructure

able to serve as a habitable “space station” for

a relatively low development cost.

Shuttle External Tank (ET) .-Application of the

ET as an infrastructure element is intriguing because of its large size, because it achieves a nearorbital velocity during normal Shuttle launch

operations, and because it “comes free of extra

cost” to orbit. As a result, several aerospace companies have studied the ET for possible use on

orbit.

The ET has an interior pressurized volume of

some 2,OOO m

3 in the form of two separate

tanks—one for hydrogen, the other for oxygen.

In present Shuttle launch operations, the ET

separates from the Shuttle and reenters the atmosphere after main engine cutoff. On average, at

separation from the Shuttle, the ET still contains

about 4,500 kg of liquid O2 and H2

. The challenge is to identify practical methods of salvaging the tank and scavenging these residual propellants.

The ET in orbit, initially viewed as a construction shed and distribution center, might serve as

a mounting structure for telescopes, large antennas, large solar power collectors, and experiment

pallets, or it could be used as a component of

inhabited infrastructure, in which case it would

need windows and entry hatches. The most obvious use for the ET is for on-orbit fuel storage.

This requires the least on-orbit modification,

but assumes that the techniques and equipment

needed to scavenge leftover fuel from the Shuttle and to store it for long periods in space are
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 7 9

The addition of a free-flyi~g’SPAS platform, at a ctwt of $(h~ b@i~n {1,~$) would increase the

science/applications uses by three. Other platforms suc!h a~ k4ESAj lXA3ECRAFf or EURECA could also

be added. For example, the use of three EURECAS, wh[dhcould be purchased at a cost of $0.6 billion

(1984$) or leased annually at a fraction of this cost, would increase science/applications uses by lo.

(In addition, while the system as described here would rtot serve as an assembly/launch platform, 9

out of 10 projected solar system probes could be designed ~ be launched with upper stages from the

Shuttle.) “,,

. , , ,

in summav, a “USA Salyut” that approximates the, S@i~ SaIyut 7 could be assembled using e=ntially existing or currently underdevelopment technol~g Iie;;,Spacelab modths and a service module

composed of EURECA or LEASECRAFT-type power ad at!t\t@&”ccmttol% With the added cost of several free-flying platforms, it could support most of the ‘Wiend@~~d applications experiments and about

one-third of the commercial and technology developwnt-adities’ now described by NASA as requiring long-term space infrastructure. Anwhg the sciene~ a@@@ it cdt)ld not support are what NASA

describes as the Latge Deployable Reflector, Mars %~@h:@!tum,I!atth Wiences Research Platform,

and Experimental Geosynchronous Communications l%t@i!ti. Operationally, the size, power, and port

capabilities of the infrastructure would mean the pace@ rg#@%h And ckwelopment work would necessarily be less than half as rapid as with the NASA”pro#m@~@ swce infr=tructure. [f sta~ed in 1985,

it could be operational by about 1990 # a -t of rw~ly, $2 biilion (1984$).

. .

Of course, any design aimed speclft~liy t@yard CjJr#@-~&@Ie@ivalence with the Salyut 7 may

miss the mark by the time it becomes op@fitiondlfiwati~ %wiet space infrastr~cture could be quite

different by 1990. However, the general”-c~mparkon of Capability and cost is illuminating. .4 .

. . ,

.,

‘Described in detail in the OTA Technical Mernorarrdum Sa/yut-Sot4tH StepS 7%ard Awrwnmt Human Presence in Space, December 1993.

developed. Use as an uninhabited warehouse or

unpressurized, sheltered workshop in space only

requires that the tank be purged of residual fuel,

since several access openings (larger than 1 meter diameter) already exist.

A concept to use ETs as components of habitable infrastructure has been developed by the

Hughes Aircraft Co. In this concept, four ETs

would be taken separately into orbit and then

joined to form the spokes of a large wheel-like

structure. Solar panels would be mounted on a

rim connected to the outer ends of the ET spokes,

providing 150 kW of power. The wheel would

rotate, and a “despun“ module at the hub of the

wheel would provide zero gravity workspace.

The basic feasibility of this “dual-spin” system has

been demonstrated on a much smaller scale in

over 100 successful communications satellites

built by Hughes. Modules attached to the outer

ends of the ETs, carried into space as aft cargo

carriers, would be available for habitation and

pressurized workspace. Rotation of the wheel

would provide artificial gravity in the spinning

part of the facility and gyroscopic action for attitude control.

This innovative concept has several obvious advantages. There is no doubt that many human

activities, such as eating, drinking, food preparation, showering, and dealing with human waste,

would be much easier to carry on in the artificial gravity environment provided by this system.

And possible health problems associated with

long-term living in microgravity, such as decalcification of bones and atrophy of muscle and connective tissue, could be avoided. In general, the

presence of spin and a choice of gravity regimes,

ranging from microgravity to artificial gravity

simulating what we are used to on Earth, shouId

prove to be useful in solving a number of human,

scientific, and engineering problems.
80 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure 9.— External Tank Structure

INTE

L H2
Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 81

Figure IO.— Possible Uses of External Tank

PROPELLANT SCAVENGING ET AS A HANGAR

\ ’

’

ET AS A STRONG BACK

.

ET WITH ACC HABITAT
82 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure 11 .—Concept of Infrastructure Utilizing Four External Tanks
Chapter 4

A BUYER’S GUIDE TO

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... .

Procurement Options .. ... ... ...... .. ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A Catalog of Space Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cost Drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

People and Automation in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Alternative Funding Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conclusions . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . $ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES

Table No.

6.

7.

8.

Comparison of Some Options for Low-Earth-Orbit Independently

Operating Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Space Infrastructure Platforms That Could Be Serviced by Shuttle or

an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Some Illustrative Space Infrastructure Acquisitions Possible at Various

Annual Average Federal Funding Rates... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

85

85

87

91

92

94

97

Page

88

89

97
Chapter 4

A BUYER’S GUIDE TO SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

SUMMARY

If the United States decides to acquire a substantial amount of long-term space infrastructure,

there are various ways to proceed that should be

carefully considered, including the degree to

which new technology would be used, whether

NASA should set design or performance specifications, and the roles of the private sector and

international partners. The costs and capabilities

of a number of possible infrastructure options are

compared in a table format. The cost drivers associated with the listed options and OTA’s approach to cost estimation are discussed. The next

section examines a number of tradeoffs that

should be considered regarding the use of automation and people in a “space station. ” Buyers

may reasonably decide to acquire space infrastructure using an average annual funding rate

rather than a “lump sum” approach. Possible infrastructure that could be obtained using average annual funding rates of $0.1, $0.3, $1, and

$3 billion (1 984$) are presented. The functions

that NASA intends to provide in a “space station”

are listed, and alternative infrastructures that

could provide those functions are indicated. ’

1 In addition to the two OTA workshops mentioned specifically

in the following text, sources of information for ch. 4 include the

same references noted in ch. 3 for possible infrastructure elements

and their estimated acquisition costs.

PROCUREMENT OPTIONS

If there is an affirmative answer to the questions of whether to acquire long-term in-space

infrastructure (and, if so, how much, of what

kind, and when), there yet remains the decision

of how it is to be acquired. In many respects, this

second decision is just as important as the first.

The mode of acquiring new, long-term, in-space

assets and services should be influenced by a

clear understanding of the contemporary context

in which space activities are carried on. And the

decision as to how to acquire these assets and

services will have a significant impact on the

future of space activities.

The pioneering, generous, and effective efforts

of the U.S. Government, and of NASA in particular, have resulted in the spread of civilian space

capabilities and expertise throughout much of the

world, to the point where they are now essentially beyond the power of the United States to

control even if it is of a mind to do so. Many of

the nations of Europe, and Japan, Canada, India,

BraziI, and the People’s Republic of China as well,

are increasingly positioning themselves to pursue their own interests in space, independent of

what the United States might desire. Other countries’ evident success with Spacelab, with Ariane

and its launch complex, and in the field of satellite communications has given them great confidence in their abilities to work in full collaboration with the United States on major space programs

and, before long, to undertake such programs

without the United States, should they then deem

that to be appropriate.

The U.S. private space industry is also fully capable of developing all or most of the ensemble

of low-Earth-orbit (LEO) infrastructure elements

needed to provide a more-than-adequate initial

operating capability (IOC) of the type now being studied by NASA. With the important exception of satellite communications, our industry in

the past has undertaken work exclusively under

contract to the Government. However, the past

several years has seen the beginning of important space activities undertaken wholly on private initiative.

Some of these private sector activities and some

of those undertaken by other countries will be

38-798 0 - 84 - 7 : QL 3

85
86 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

in direct competition with what many in NASA

now perceive to be their own important institutional interests.

With the completion of the Shuttle development program now in sight, the United States

faces a major decision as to whether–and, if so,

how–to redeploy a large fraction of NASA’s

resources. Under present circumstances, NASA,

as in the past, would prefer to undertake another

large technological program, similar to the Shuttle, to serve as the major agency focus, rather

than to spread its efforts over a number of activities that could be more demanding and more

useful. Of the various candidate activities, NASA

has chosen to concentrate on the acquisition of

a great deal of long-term, habitable LEO infrastructure.

Congress and the President have approved

NASA’s request to initiate a “space station” program, and NASA appears to be moving to acquire

such infrastructure in much the same fashion that

it acquired the Shuttle:

●

●

●

●

A

A great deal of new technology would be developed, acquired, and used, essentially all

of which would be publicly funded.

NASA would arrive at and issue detailed

engineering specifications for, and exercise

close management control over, the technology to be acquired.

This infrastructure would be procured by

NASA with Federal funds. The U.S. private

sector would not be prompted to use its own

resources to provide a substantial portion of

the infrastructure.

The international role would be limited.

NASA would not seek the kind of close collaboration that would result in shared authority, even if it might provide substantial capital cost reduction for the United States.

significantly different acquisition approach

would- have the following elements:

● As far as is reasonably possible, already developed, tested, and paid-for technology

would be used to achieve an adequate IOC,

with development of new technology under-

●

●

●

taken only where demonstrably required to

lower overall cost of ownership.

NASA would prompt our private commercial-industrial-financial sectors to develop

and produce, with their own resources and

on a genuinely competitive basis, as many

of the Government-required civilian “space

station’ assets and services as they can;

NASA would facilitate their efforts to do so;

and they could be offered to NASA on a sale,

lease, or payment-for-service-provided basis.

NASA, in obtaining the elements not provided by the private sector, would emphasize management methods specifically designed to take the best advantage of the now

quite sophisticated U.S. space industry (see

app. D, “Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on

Cost Containment of Civilian Space infrastructure [Civilian “Space Station”] Elements).

NASA would negotiate collaborative agreements with other cooperating countries that

would see all partners share in the benefits

of such an IOC at a reduced acquisition cost

to the U.S. Government for its share.

This second approach would imply that NASA

would hand off much (perhaps most) of the more

mundane “space station” work by paying the private sector to do it, thereby conserving its skills

and resources so that they could be focused on

more challenging space goals and objectives, including the development of the very advanced

technology (e.g., bipropellant engines, a reusable

orbital transfer vehicle, . . .) required, an activity which, for the most part, the private sector

cannot justify.

These two options are at opposite ends of a

spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of

long-term space infrastructure. in determining

which approaches from this spectrum are most

likely to influence the evolution of space activities in a desirable direction, Congress may wish

to consider the following questions:

● Should the Government be allocating its professional skills and experience to the development of: 1 ) incremental or 2) fundamental advances in technology?
Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space infrastructure ● 8 7

● Which approach is most likely to stimulate • What other large and important space ends

the “commercialization of space”? should be addressed in the next decade or

● What level of international collaboration is two in addition to the acquisition of in-space

really desirable? infrastructure methods and means?

A CATALOG OF SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

The fact that the United States has already developed a wide variety of space capabilities

means that it has genuine choices—both of what

infrastructure elements it places in orbit and of

how these elements are to be acquired and used.

It is around these choices that the difficult issues

lie; by and large, the technology is either in hand

or can be readily developed.

It must be emphasized that the particular

constellation of space infrastructure elements

which NASA currently aspires to develop, construct, deploy, and operate is only one alternative in a wide range of options. Simply put, there

is no such thing as “the space station. ” What is

under discussion is a variety of sets of infrastructure elements, ranging from modest extensions

of current capabilities to vastly more sophisticated, capable, and costly ensembles than NASA

is now suggesting.

As one way of presenting the variety of technology options available, OTA has prepared

tables 6 and 7.2

 tables were prepared in response to the congressional

committees which requested this assessment, 3 discusses infrastructure options in detail.

Photo credit: Natlonal Aeronautics and Space Administration

One option for modestly increased length of stay in

space is a Shuttle Orbiter modified for extended

flight—the Extended Duration Orbiter, or EDO. Such

a configuration might involve large solar panels for

extended electrical power, as shown here.
88 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Table 6.—Comparison of Some Optionsa for "Low Earth” Orbit Independently Operating Infrastructure

Free-flying NASA infrastructure

Extended Extended spacelab aspirations

Duration Duration (developed Initial Mature,

Shuttle Orbiter: Orbiter: as permanent operational fully

Orbiter Phase I Phase II infrastructure) capability developed

Date available

(assuming start in 1985) Now 1988 1990 1990 1992 1996-2000

Costb

(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) None 0.2 0.5 2-3 8 20

Characteristics

Power to users (kW)

Pressurized volume (m3)

7

60

20 6

100

(with spacelab

habitat)

5 3

New technology Modest crew

required; accommodations

modest

laboratory

space

60

200

200

300

Nominal crew size

Miscellaneous

6

Can accept

Spacelab

5

No new

technology

8

Orbital

maneuvering

vehicle plus

two free-flying

unpressurized

platforms

20

Reusable

orbital

transfer

vehicle plus

several more

platforms

Capabilities c

Time on Orbit 10 days 20 days 50 days Unlimited

(60-90 day

resupply)

Extensive

Modest

Moderate

Moderate

Modest

No

Modest

Modest

Modest

No

No

Unlimited

(90 day

resupply)

Unlimited

(90 day

resupply)

Laboratories for:

Life sciences

Space science/applications

Materials science

Technology development

Observatories

Data/communication node

Servicing of satellites

Manufacturing facility (materials

processing)

Large structure assembly

Transportation node

Fuel and supply depot

Moderate

Modest

Some

Modest

No

No

Modest

No

Moderate

Modest

Some

Modest

Modest

No

Modest

No

Considerable

Modest

Moderate

Some

Modest

No

Modest

Modest

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Considerable

Considerable

Considerable

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

No

No

No

Extensive

Extensive

Considerable

No

No

No

No

No

No

Moderate

Moderate

No

Response to reasons advanced for

space infrastructure

Maintain U.S. space leadership and

technology capability

Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities

Enable long-term human presence

in space

Attention-getting heroic public

spectacle

Extended international cooperation

Promote U.S. commercialization of

space

Maintain vigorous NASA

engineering capability

Enhance national security, broadly

defined

Space travel for non-technicians

No Modest Modest Modest

Modest

Considerable

Modest

Moderate

Considerable

Modest

Modest

Modest

Considerable Extensive

Modest

Modest

Considerable

Extensive

Extensive

Extensive

No

No

Modest

Modest

No Modest Modest Modest Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

Moderate

Modest

Moderate

Considerable

Moderate

Considerable

No No No Extensive Extensive

No No No Unclear Unclear

Modest Modest Modest Considerable Considerable

aLiated options are illustrative examples; the list la not exhaustive.

bco~ts include de@~n, development, and pr~uct’on; launch and operational costs are not included. Some costs are estimated by the Office of Technology Assessment; others were provided to OTA.

cClearly judgmental.

dlncluding launch to the Moon, Mars, and aome esteroids.

Examples of habitable infrastructure are shown listed, followed by one version of Space lab dein table 1. First, the present Shuttle Orbiter and veloped into a free-flying inhabited facility.

its possible modifications for somewhat extended Finally, the present NASA-envisioned space sta-

(but not permanent) stays on orbit (i.e., a so- tion” concept is given, including both the IOC

called Extended Duration Orbiter—EDO) are version with an estimated completion in 1992,
Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure ● 8 9

Table 7.—Space Infrastructure Platformsa That Could Be Semiced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle

Unpressurized coorbiting platforms Pressurized platforms

(serviced by means of extravehicular activity) (serviced internally while docked)

Space European

Industries’ Modified

SPAS MESA LEASECRAFT EURECA Platform Spacelab

Date available

(now, or approximate, assuming

start in 1985)

cod ’

(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars)

Characteristics

Power to users (kW)

Pressurized volume (ft3)

Nominal crew size

Miscellaneous

Capabilities c

Time on orbit

Laboratories for:

Life sciences

Space science/applications

Materials science

Technology development

Observatories

Data/communication node

Servicing of satellites

Manufacturing facility (materials

processing)

Large structure assembly

Transportation node (assembly,

checkout, and launch)

Fuel and supply depot

Response to reasons advanced for

space infrastructure

Maintain U.S. space leadership

and technology capability

Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities

Enable long-term human presence

in space

Attention-getting heroic public

spectacle

Extended international cooperation

Promote U.S. commercialization of

space

Maintain vigorous NASA

engineering capability

Enhance national security, broadly

defined

Space travel for non-technicians

Now

0.005

0.6

None

None

3,000 lb

Payload

10 days

No

Modest

Modest

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Unclear

No

No

No

Now

0.01

0.1

None

None

200 lb

Payload

8 months

No

Modest

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Modest

No

No

No

1986

0.2

6

None

None

20,000 lb

Payload

Unlimited

Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

No

No

Considerable

No

No

No

Modest

Modest

No

No

No

Considerable

No

No

No

1987

0.2

2

None

None

2,000 lb

Payload

6 months

Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

No

No

Modest

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Late 1980’s

0.3

20

2,500

1-3 only

when

docked

25,000 lb

Payload

3-6 months

Modest

No

Moderate

Moderate

Modest

No

No

Extensive

No

No

No

Modest

Modest

No

No

No

Considerable

No

No

No

1989

0.6

6

3,000

3

20,000 lb

Payload

Unlimited

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Modest

Moderate

No

No

Considerable

No

No

No

No

Modest

No

No

Unclear

No

No

No

No

aLi~t~ ~latformg are illustrative examples; the list Is not ‘Xhaustlve.

btists include ~esian, ~evelopment, and ~r~uction; launch a~ o~ratl~nal costs are not included. Some costs are estimated by the office of Technology As~ssment; others were ~rovlded to OTA.

cClearly judgmental.

and a mature, fully developed facility (1996- ●

2000).

The parameters for each option that may be

used for rough comparative purposes are:

. Approximate date of availability—assuming

that an acquisition (in contrast to a study)

“go-ahead” were included in the fiscal year

1987 budget.

Cost (in fiscal year 1984 dollars)–to produce

the capabilities shown. The estimates are

based on sources such as industry reviews,

company publications and meeting presentations, aerospace periodicals, and NASA information releases. Inasmuch as some options utilize existing hardware, the costs do

not reflect similar proportions of development and production efforts for the various

options.
90 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

●

●

●

Characteristics–several design parameters

and sizing factors that provide the bases for

infrastructure capabilities.

Capabilities—the types of functional activities that the listed infrastructure could support, and the degree to which these activities might be accomplished.

Responsiveness of a given infrastructure-to

the various reasons put forward for having

a civi I ian n “space station, ” including any

long-term presence of human beings in

space .

If great and long-range space activities (for instance, the establishment of a lunar human settlement or the return of materials from the asteroids

or Mars) come under consideration, they wouId

appear to be achievable using a sophisticated

reusable orbit transfer vehicle (ROTV) coupled

with on-orbit assembly, check-out, launch, and

recovery. The one option listed in table I that

could provide these capabilities is the NASA fully

developed infrastructure.

Examples of uninhabitable “free-flying’ space

platforms are shown in table 2. These platforms,

or others, could be used in conjunction with, and

serviced by, any of the options listed in table 1.

In this way, additional capabilities could be added

to the infrastructures given in table 1, SPAS and

MESA are currently existing commercial platforms

that were financecj and developed by the private

sector. LEAS ECRAFT is also a private venture now

under development.

Some cautions should be noted in the interpretation of this information. General descriptions

of the various options are given, an estimates

of their capabilities. These capabilities can be expected to change in some cases. Most of the capabilities have been described by qualitative adjectives. Quantitative estimates are rounded off

to one figure. In the fifth section of the tables,

“Response to the Reasons Advanced for Space

Infrastructure, ” the comparisons clearly must be

qualitative and judgmental in nature and are presented simply to bring these factors to the attention of the reader. For instance, as a particular

item the Spacelab option of table 2 is only one

of several that have been put forward; one by

European Space Agency (ESA) countries could

definitely augment international cooperation if

it were implemented.
Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure ● 9 1

COST DRIVERS

Beyond the observation that, in some general

fashion, the cost will increase with the capability and sophistication of the infrastructure acquired, it is difficult to estimate the eventual cost

of this capability to the Government. At least all

of the following factors could have an important

influence on this cost:

1. the total capability acquired–which, as suggested by the examples listed in the tables

of infrastructure options, can encompass a

considerable range;

2. the extent to which already developed,

tested, and paid-for technology is used, v.

a focus on new technology with its higher

development cost and greater risk of cost

overruns;

3. the substitution, where feasible, of automated systems for the accomplishment of

tasks previously undertaken only by human

beings;

4. the manner by which the infrastructure is acquired, i.e., the extent to which NASA puts

the engineering challenge on the space industry by issuing performance specifications,

rather than continuing to issue detailed engineering specifications and managing the acquisition process in detail;

5. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to persuade our private sector to develop infrastructure assets and services “on their own, ”

and to provide them to the Government at

purchase, lease, or service-payment prices

lower than those achievable by the Government;

6. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to effect

eventual private sector operation of the infrastructure and its related activities;

7. the extent to which large and rapid expansion of military space research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities increases costs in the civilian space

sector also;3

8. the extent to which any “Christmas-tree effect” takes place within NASA, whereby the

infrastructure acquisition management is

persuaded by the NASA Centers to allow the

cost of desirable but nonessential RDT&E

activities to be included in the acquisition;

and

9. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to arrive

at large-scale collaboration and related costsharing arrangements with other countries.

These points address only the initial capital cost

of this infrastructure—to this cost must be added

its ongoing operation and maintenance costs; the

cost of instruments, furnaces, etc., needed for

scientific experimentation in association with its

use; and the interest cost of any money borrowed

to fund the acquisition program. And it must be

remembered, too, that the infrastructure will

eventually become obsolete or wear out.

It is clear that there are many opportunities to

reduce infrastructure net cost that could be

grasped by a vigorous, imaginative, and determined NASA management.4

These considerations suggest that, over the next

year or two, at least as much attention should be

given to identifying the best ways by which the

country should set about the permanent development of space as there is given to any technological advances and operational capabilities that

are to be obtained.

3Classified material was not used in preparing this report.

4Cost reduction measures are discussed i n app, D of this report.
structure issues is that of the proper mix of so- 1. phisticated people and sophisticated machines

(automation) to be employed in work activities

in spaces

Sln arriving at judgments on various “man/machine” issues OTA,

in close concert with senior congressional staff members, designed

and convened a workshop which brought together many of the

Nation’s experts in “smart machine” development from the Government, industry, and academic communities with OTA and congressional staff professionals. 2.

If specifically designed to do so, any civilian “space station” program could effectively serve as a high-visibility focus for promoting research and development in all

disciplines in the field of automation. important advances in terrestrial applications

of automation could be expected to follow

from a vigorous space automation program.

However, there is a firm consensus among
Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space /infrastructure . 93

3.

4.

scientists and engineers in the various automation disciplines that current automated

equipment could not accomplish many of

the functions envisioned by NASA for an

early 1990s “space station. ” This situation

results, in part, because NASA has invested

relatively few resources to develop automated capabilities specifically for generalpurpose infrastructure-support (in contrast

with special-purpose scientific) space activities. In addition, the academic and industrial advanced automation research community numbers only a few hundred.

Therefore, if the kind of overall operational

“space station” now envisioned by NASA

is to be functioning by the early 1990s, it

will have to include people. Conversely, if

it is to be wholly or mostly automated, it

could not become operational until 5 to 10

years thereafter, even with a major automation R&D effort. However, if any of the

aspirations of those now conducting research and development in the space materials processing area are realized, and one or

more processes are found suitable for longterm production, then elements of the infrastructure that would be devoted to such production, such as platforms co-orbiting near

any central complex, could be singled out

for early, specific, sophisticated-machine

R&D focus.

Conceptually, space infrastructure could be

designed either to include a human work

crew or to depend on unattended sophisticated machines. Despite the fact that the

relative efficiency and/or effectiveness of

these two quite different approaches have

been extensively debated for years, no consensus has emerged. This absence of consensus results from a number of factors: the

state-of-the-art for sophisticated machines;

the amount of experience we have had to

date in the actual conduct of space support

operations is quite small; and, in such operations, NASA has placed more emphasis on

human beings than on machines;

5.

6.

For the foreseeable future, therefore,

only a general continuum of conclusions

can be outlined:

machines generally will be unable to anticipate and deal with genuinely unknown

circumstances and surprises;

people will need the assistance of machines to gain speed, strength, and memory; to improve their sensory capabilities

and their mobility; and to provide them

with artificial senses via radar, Iidar, radiation detection, etc.;

machines employed for ongoing R&D and

commercial-industrial operations will require human oversight and assistance; and

machines, maintained by people or not,

as circumstances suggest,” should do all

hazardous and very-long-term repetitive

work.

In the matter of relative cost of automated

and space facilities including people, the

expense of developing and providing safe,

sanitary, and suitable living and working facilities for human beings has to be weighed

against the costs of providing analogous

automated capabilities. The former will certainly be relatively expensive; the latter may

well cost more than some advocates imagine, especially if as much capability is expected of the machines as of a professional

human work crew. With respect to doing

useful work in space, human beings represent in-hand technology. Cost alone does

not provide sufficient ground for choosing

between automated and manned facilities.

However, there are three reasons advanced

for having men and women in space, only

one of which is to do useful work. The

other reasons are: to serve as subjects for

scientific study and to engage in any other

kind of human activity. With respect to the

second and third reasons, the question of

humans or machines does not even arise.

Only the purpose of doing useful work has

been extensively studied and, as indicated

in the preceding points, no clear and gen- , “ ,
94 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

eral present advantage for having people or physiology, psychology, and social behavsophisticated machines there has emerged. ior, must be acquired. If, similarly, the NaIf the Nation decides, as a matter of policy, tion decides, as a matter of policy, to enable

to have some of its people remain away from people to pursue in space a variety of culEarth for long periods, then staffed space fa- tural activities other than work then, again,

cilities, allowing for the study of human only their presence there will suffice.

ALTERNATIVE FUNDING RATES

Chapters 5 and 6 discuss a space infrastructure

acquisition program that would involve an initial decision on the purposes of, and the objectives to be achieved in, the civilian space area,

followed by the design of that infrastructure with

appropriate functional capabilities to support the

attainment of these objectives. An estimate of the

cost and schedule associated with the attainment

of these objectives, along with the acquisition of

such infrastructure, is also presented.

An alternative approach could simply establish

annual expenditure levels for in-space infrastructure acquisition. Thus, to provide an independent basis of comparison with the civilian “space

station” program now favored by NASA, OTA has

estimated what new space capabilities could be

acquired, by when, if various annual average

Government funding rates were established to do

so. No changes to present NASA acquisition procedures or NASA anticipated acquisition costs are

assumed. Arbitrary annual average funding levels

of $0,1, $0.3, $1, and $3 billion per year (1984$)

were chosen to illustrate the number and kind

of space infrastructure elements that could be acquired over periods of 5, 10, or 15 years.

The results of these 12 funding scenarios are

given in table 8, which shows the funding rate,

number of years, total expenditure, and kinds of

infrastructure elements acquired. The elements

are divided into those that can operate independently (e. g., the Shuttle Orbiter and a “space station” central base) and those that depend on being serviced or maintained from one of the

independent elements (i.e., by an orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV), a local in-space transportation system operated from a “space station”

control element, or directly by the Shuttle).

Table 8 lists the following (among other) elements of space infrastructure that could be acquired over various acquisition intervals:

●

●

●

For $0.1 billion per year: probably no “permanently manned” facility could be obtained even by the year 2000. Further extension of capabilities of the Shuttle system and

unpressurized platform developments could

be obtained. The acquisitions could be: a development of the EDO Phase 1, for 20-day

orbit stays, over a 5-year period; or EDO

Phase 11, for 50-day orbit stays, over 10 years

or longer, plus two or three free-flying unpressurized platforms such as EURECA,

LEASECRAFT, and/or the Space Industries’

platform (assuming that the Government

would make an outright purchase of such

platforms).

At $0.3 billion per year: within 5 years, the

acquisitions could be an EDO I I plus several

(perhaps pressurized) platforms. Over 10

years, there could be acquired: 1) the first

permanently orbiting, Spacelab-derived habitable modules in 28.5° orbit that could support three people, 2) an OMV (enabling servicing of nearby satellites), and 3) a few freeflying platforms. In 15 years, there could be

obtained either: 1 ) two free-flying Spacelabs,

one in polar orbit, one at 28.5°, or 2) much

more capable permanent infrastructure at

28.5° than that which could be acquired in

10 years.

For $1 billion per year: within 5 years, there

could be acquired: 1) a permanent LEO

facility operating as a transportation node

(obtained as a new design by NASA), 2) an

OMV, 3) an ROTV capable of transporting

spacecraft to and from geostationary and
Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure ● 9 5

e-Earth that are the

chemical
96 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Table 8.—Some Illustrative Space Infrastructure Acquisitions Possible at Various Annual Average Federal

Funding Rates (all amounts in billions of 1984 dollars)

Space acquisitions a

Dependent elements

Number Unpres- Pressur- Space-based Beyond geostationary

Funding of Total Independent infrastructure surized ized plat- transport orbit spacecraft

rate years expenditures elements bplatforms form# vehicles elements

O.1e5

10

15

0.5

1

1.5

EDO If (20 days, 5 crew) 2

EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3

EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3

— —

—

—

—

—

1

1

1

—

—

0.3 5

10

1.5

3

EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3

Free-flying Spacelab modules’ 1

(permanent, 3 crew)

2 free-flying Spacelab modules in both 2

28 degree and polar orbits (3 crew each

—

OMV

—

—

15 4.5 1 OMV

5

10

5

10

Space transportation center (4 crew) —

NASA initial operating capability 2

“space station”g (8 crew)

NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3

OMV; ROTV

OMV; ROTV

—

1

—

—

15 15 OMV;ROTV

OMV; ROTV

OMV:ROTV

1

1

2

—

15

30

NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3

NASA mature “space station”g (16 crew) 3

Shuttle-Derived Cargo Vehicle (SDV)

NASA mature “space station”g 5

(18 crew, SDV)

5

10

—

Lunar capable ROTV;

staffed Lunar facility

Lunar capable ROTV;

staffed Lunar facility;

Mars voyageh

15 45 3 OMV: ROTV

aTables 1 and 2 p~e~erlt characteristics and capabilities of infrastructure elements In detail.

b=tended D“ratlon Orbitem (EDO) are IImited In their stays on orbit; other independent elements are lonO-term.

cplatforms of the LEASECRAFT /EURECA tYPe

dplatfoma of t~ m~ifi~ free.flylng spa~elab~pa~e lndu~trles type with their Own electrical power and pressurization SyStemS.

eAt $fJ 1 billion&r, no long.te~, staffed infrastructure ebments are Wssible.

f Em i (~tend~ Duration o~lter, phaae 1) and the spacelab modules have limited eleCtriCa~ pOWer (about 7 kw).

gThe NASA “’space station” elements are expected to operate as transpodatlon and servicing centers as well as laboratories. They would have sufficient power for

hextensive materials procesalng.

A slgnlflcant part of the cost of a human visit to Mars could be provided in this case.

other higher orbits, and 4) the capability to

support the kind of vehicles that could be

developed later to travel to and from the

Moon. In 10 years, the IOC infrastructure

now favored by NASA could be acquired.

In 15 years, nearly all of the infrastructure

now seriously considered by NASA could be

acquired.

At $3 billion per year (assuming that only

funds, not technology or other factors, would

be the pacing program factor): NASA’s fully

developed “space station” could become

available in somewhat more than 5 years. In

10 years, this infrastructure plus a geostationary platform, plus a Shuttle-derived cargo

vehicle (SDV) for lower cost transfer of fuel

and cargo to LEO, plus a lunar facility ready

for occupancy and continuing operation

would become possible. In 15 years, NASA’s

complete infrastructure aspirations and a

lunar settlement could be in hand and, perhaps also, plans for seeing a human crew

travel to the vicinity of Mars and back could

be well advanced.

These projections are for infrastructure acquisition only; operational costs are not included.

In general, more extensive infrastructure would

require larger operational costs. Also, there is a

basic difference between the costs associated

with using Shuttle-type vehicles and permanently

orbiting facilities. The use of an EDO to conduct

extended science or development activities with

a crew would involve launch costs each time it

went into orbit; use of a permanent facility would

require resupply loads several times per year, but

the cost of each flight could be shared with other

payloads. For example, if 12 dedicated 30-day

EDO flights were conducted per year about $1

billion (1984$) in annual transportation costs

would be involved; in comparison, cost of four

partial-load Shuttle launches per year to resupply a permanent facility would total $100 million

to $400 million (1984$), depending on the weight

of supplies carried in each flight.
Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space /infrastructure . 97

CONCLUSIONS

The general conclusion of a great deal of study

by the civilian space community (Government,

industry, and university) is that some additional

long-term in-space LEO infrastructure could be

used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness

of a number of present and anticipated space

activities. However, our space experience to

date, and science, engineering, and space operations considerations alone, are not now sufficient, by themselves, to determine the character and amount of the in-space infrastructure

to be acquired soon. And in the absence of any

objective external demand for its prompt acquisition, these considerations cannot determine

the rate at which it should be acquired.

There are a wide variety of infrastructure options that could be chosen from to provide various kinds and amounts of in-space support assets

and services. Some infrastructure options currently exist, others could be developed using current technology, and some would require new

technology. The cost to the Government of acquiring this infrastructure could be reduced, substantially, if our private sector were to offer to provide lower unit cost portions thereof, and other

portions were provided by other countries in collaborative programs within the United States.

it is clear that a number of important support

assets and services could be provided with infrastructure other than that defined as “The NASA

Space Station.” Therefore, in considering how

much of what kind of in-space infrastructure

should be provided by when, reasonable ways

for Congress to proceed might be:

● to select those specific support assets and

services that they judge to be important, ask

NASA to price them, and specify a date by

which they should become available; or

● to set an annual average funding rate for the

acquisition of in-space infrastructure, and

allow NASA to select the assets and services

to be provided and the dates of their acquisition.

And Congress could decide to what extent

NASA should emphasize the acquisition of any

infrastructure by our private sector and by other

countries in order either to relieve the burden

on the Government’s budget generally, or to increase the amount, or hasten the time, by which

space infrastructure would be acquired and/or

other space activities were conducted.6

Using the first approach, Congress initially

might select functions similar to those provided

by the Soviet Salyut 7 (operational since 1982).

Such a semi-permanent LEO laboratory could be

developed using Spacelab-like modules connected to a power and support module patterned

after current platform designs. It would support

several crewmembers and one-third of the science,

commercial, and technology development activities that NASA now suggests would be handled

by their IOC. NASA’s estimate is some $2 billion

(1984$) for such a development.

Or, in another example, the conduct of ROTV

operations might be selected as one of the main

support functions to be supplied by space infrastructure. This would allow servicing and other

activities in virtually all orbits, including polar,

geostationary, and even lunar. In addition, such

infrastructure would support the continued exploration of the solar system, which is one of

NASA’s most important “char ters.” The cost for

an ROTV and its associated LEO infrastructure has

been estimated at $3 billion to $4 billion (1984$).

Of course, another example of the first approach would have Congress simply select the

IOC assets and services identified by NASA and

the aerospace industry that are estimated to cost

$8 billion (1984$) (plus the cost of NASA staff);

or even to spur the infrastructure acquisition

process beyond NASA’s present aspirations, and

begin to move people beyond LEO.

Congress could consider alternative ways of

providing those assets and services in varying

degrees. For instance:

● an on-orbit laboratory supporting research

on a wide range of life, materials, and other

science topics, and new technology devel-

‘A conceptual possibility would be for NASA to provide a core

facility to which private industry could attach docking and fuel storage equipment for commercial ROTV operations.
98 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

●

●

●

●

●

opments (Shuttle, EDO, Spacelab, Columbus, NASA minimum cost “space station,”

Space Industries platform);

permanent observatories for astronomy, and

Earth remote sensing (Shuttle, EDO, SpaceIab, Space Industries, SPAS, MESA, EURECA,

Landsat, LEASECRAFT, Space Telescope,

IRAS, 0S0 satellites, Solar Max, and other

existing or planned observatories);

a facility for microgravity materials processing including the manufacturing of such

products as pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, glasses, and metals (Shuttle, EDO,

Spacelab, LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries

platform, SPAS, Columbus, EURECA, MESA);

servicing of satellites and platforms, including the maintenance or replacement of components, replenishment of consumables, and

exchange of equipment (Shuttle, EDO, ELVs,

as well as OMVs and ROTVs operated from

the Shuttle);

a transportation node to assemble, check

out, and launch vehicles to geosynchronous

and other high orbits, and on interplanetary

trips {Shuttle, EDO, Columbus, NASA minimum-cost “space station”);

an assembly facility for large space structures

such as antennas for advanced satellite communications systems (Shuttle, EDO, Columbus, NASA minimum-cost “space station”);

●

●

a storage depot for spare parts, fuel, and supplies for use as needed by satellites, platforms, vehicles, and people (ETs, Columbus,

LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries platform,

NASA minimum-cost “space station”); and

a staging base for later, more ambitious

exploration and travel (Columbus, NASA

minimum-cost “space station”).

If Congress were to select an average annual

funding rate, some examples of the approximate

kind and amount of infrastructure that could be

obtained over a period of some 10 years (in 1984

dollars) are, for instance:

$0.1 billion per year: an EDO (20-day stay

on-orbit) plus some free-flying platforms; or

$0.3 billion per year: an EDO (50-day stay

on-orbit), plus free-flying, pressurized infrastructure supporting several crewmembers,

plus some free-flying platforms; or

$1 billion per year: most of the NASA IOC

plus an ROTV; or

$3 billion per year: all of the NASA IOC, plus

its extensions, plus an ROTV, plus a Shuttlederived cargo vehicle, plus

platform, plus an operating

program.

a “geostationary

lunar settlement
Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure ● 9 9

B Photo credit Natlonal Aeronautics and Space Administration

One alternative to the development of new technology is to use the Space Shuttle for many advanced operations in

low-Earth-orbit. Shown here are: (A) satellite servicing satellite in April 1984; (B) assembly of a large structure in orbit—

here simulated in water; and (C) a deployable antenna.
Chapter 5

BROADENING THE DEBATE
Contents

Space Infrastructure

Need for Goals and

Page

as Methods and Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Objectives .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

The Policy Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Today’s Too Narrow Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Recent Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

President Reagan’s Call for a “Space Station” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Steps Toward Broader Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Chapter 5

BROADENING THE DEBATE

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE AS METHODS AND MEANS

Even the most informed ardent supporters of

a U.S. civilian “space station” program agree that

any such facility would be a means to various

ends, rather than an end in itself. The ends proposed may be grouped into four categories: industrial (e.g., manufacturing materials); commercial (e.g., servicing satellites); scientific (e. g.,

conducting experiments in the life sciences); and

national security (e. g., maintaining a permanent

U.S. manned presence). These ends, despite their

diversity, have in common a presumption that

space activities will in future become more routine and more clearly operational, less experimental, and less tentative. This presumption in

turn derives from an important change in the way

that we are now beginning to view space.

Twenty-five years into the Space Age, we are

in a position to view near-Earth space much as

we would a vast tract of undeveloped raw land

on the Earth’s surface:

● We have identified at least some of the desirable locations (particular orbits).

. We have established an initial legal framework for their beneficial occupancy (the Outer Space Treaty).

● We have reliable transportation for people

and machinery to and from these remote

areas, from selected locations on the Earth’s

surface (via the Shuttle).

Ž We can maintain reliable communications

with these remote areas (via NASA’s satellite communications system).

These capabilities are prompting us to undertake

the considered development of near-Earth space—

with, therefore, the long-term implications for use

and support of any assets and people placed

there.

indeed, the terms “space station” or “space

transportation node” are most accurately understood as identifying elements of long-term, perhaps permanent, space infrastructure, concentrated initially, for the most part, in low-Earth

orbits. These elements would provide in-space

structure, electrical power, thermal control, warehousing, stability (as to location, attitude, and

temperature), communications, fuel, associated

docking and air lock capabilities, local transportation, LEO-GEO transportation, and, if staffed by

men and women, life support and residential and

working space, Because it is expected to be sophisticated, and useful for periods of several decades, this space infrastructure could provide a

new and qualitatively different regime of space

assets, allow the provision of new space services,

and support the conduct of space activities in a

new and presumably more efficient and effective

manner.

Four major decisions have marked the U.S. civilian space program: the establishment of NASA

in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of

1958, the initiation of the Apollo program in

1961, the establishment of COMSAT in the Comsat Act of 1962, and the initiation of the Shuttle

program in 1972. But, despite the growing importance of the Nation’s publicly supported space

activities, the pattern of decision making over the

past 20 years has seldom proceeded in the light

of broad public discussion. Until very recently,

the discussion of whether to undertake a “space

station” program and, if so, what elements it

should contain, had also been confined principally to engineers and scientists within NASA, and

within NASA-supported university programs and

aerospace contracting firms. Consideration of the

views and interests of these communities has, to

a very great extent, determined the kind of “space

station” program now suggested by NASA.

As NASA’s Shuttle development program comes

to a close, thousands of its in-house engineers

and technical support staff and, in principle, as

much as $2 billion per year in contract funds,

u rider its present “budget envelope, ” would be

freed up to be applied to one or more new programs. Given the agency’s natural desire not only

to maintain its current size (a size NASA leaders

judge to have the support of the general public),

103
104 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

but to grow at 1 percent per year1–a desire supported by the Reagan Administration–this combination of people and funds that could soon become available suggests, strongly, that any new

programs must include the development and acquisition of a great deal of new technology,

preferably related to having people in space; large

numbers of technologists would be gainfully

employed both in NASA and in the space industry under contract to NASA. NASA’s plans could

well have been further influenced by the fundamental political belief that the agency might

not long survive in its present form without a

single, large, “people-in-space” program upon

which a majority of its energies are focused. If

a number of smaller programs were initiated instead, each of them, it is thought, could be terminated without widespread objections arising

in the political process. Finally, NASA may have

thought it prudent to propose a “space station”

program rather than some other large endeavor(s)

(e.g., a return of Americans to the Moon, sending people on an expedition to Mars, etc.) both

because the former had been carefully studied

over the years, representing, in NASA’s view, a

natural complement to the Shuttle, and because

alternative large programs seemed too grandiose,

have not recently been discussed with the general public, and, therefore, were less likely to

enlist the required support, both within and without the administration.

Once the decision had been made to begin defining a “space station” program to be proposed

for congressional approval, NASA began canvassing possible user communities to learn what characteristics they would like it to incorporate in

order to meet their needs. This process would

I NASA management has a strong commitment to its own institutional future. NASA Headquarters material, NASA HQ MF 83-

2275(1 ), prepared for a presentation to its internal Policy Review

Committee in mid-1983, and subsequently presented to a Board

of the National Research Council, lists eight “Agency Goals. ” The

first goal is: “Provide for our people a creative environment and

the best of facilities, support services, and management support

so they can perform with excellence NASA research, development,

mission, and operational responsibilities. ”

The second goal speaks to the space transportation system (the

Shuttle), and the third to the establishment of a permanent manned

presence in space.

App. B shows that, in previous years, this commitment has also

been strong.

ensure that the actual infrastructure, when built,

served as many constituencies as possible, and

also might moderate potential opposition from

groups who might view any large project as a

threat to the budgets of their relatively smaller

activities.

The groups canvassed included the various

NASA Centers, the National Research Council

(the Space Science Board and the Space Applications Board), the space industry, various potential foreign providers and users of space technology (the European Space Agency, Canada, and

Japan), and, in general, any groups that had

worked on previous “space station” studies. The

essential form of NASA’s questions to these various groups was: if there were a permanent and

permanently staffed “space station, ” what activities might it reasonably support, how would

these activities influence its design, and of what

value would those support activities be? Eight aerospace groups, placed under contract to NASA

in the fall of 1982, undertook parallel “mission

analysis studies”2

in order to determine a set of

activities for the first 10 years of the “space station’s” operation, the fundamental characteristics suitable for accomplishing these activities,

and the presumed value to be associated with

obtaining and using them. These contractor groups

soon formed similar judgments regarding the

amount of money that (NASA hoped) would be

made available, a desirable acquisition schedule,

and NASA’s preferences on such matters as the

employment of people in space and the use of

new v. already space-qualified technology. Also,

using standard industry cost estimating practices,

they suggested the likely acquisition costs of the

infrastructure elements to the Government,

The process by which users were canvassed

was essentially open-ended: no potential use that

either required or would materially benefit from

a “permanently manned space station” was rejected out of hand. Given NASA’s internal circumstances, this open-ended character was certainly unexceptionable: the more—and the more

varied—the identified uses, the more capable, sophisticated, and large the supporting infrastruc2

The resu Its of these studies are summarized in app. A.
Ch. 5—Broadening the Debate ● 105

ture would have to be. The greater the resulting

capability and sophistication, the more engineers

would be required to design, develop, and produce it–and the greater its cost. Increased costs,

in turn, wouId imply more Government contracting—and understandably generate greater interest in and support for the program by the space

industry.

In general, the greater the number of potential users and potential suppliers, the greater the

influence that could be brought to bear on Government decision makers to approve any “space

station” program. In any event, essentially all important space industry groups were represented

in the eight aerospace groups of companies, and

the number of potential uses recommended for

inclusion totaled well over 100.

If there were any important potential uses left

out of account, either because the supporting

technology would be too costly or could not be

obtained in time, or because NASA judged their

discussion to be inappropriate for the time being, they could still be provided for later, not in

the initial operational capability (IOC) “station,”

but in the subsequent full capability “space station” program, which could continue to the end

of this century.

it is important to appreciate that the form in

which NASA put its original questions to the eight

aerospace groups largely determined the approach

taken to potential acquisition of a civilian “space

station.” And this approach, in turn, largely determined the result—a “Christmas-tree” proposal in

which there was something for all identifiable poNEED FOR GOALS

This entire panoply of relatively narrowly

focused and nearer term ends provide, in OTA’s

judgment, insufficient justification for a major,

new U.S. civilian space effort. Moreover, there

is general agreement neither on a set of longrange goals which the U.S. civilian space program

now is expected to achieve nor on a set of specific objectives which, as they are addressed,

would serve as milestones of progress toward

those goals. And without such a set of goals and

objectives the Nation cannot make a clear detertential users, with little attempt either to weigh

the seriousness of their intentions to use the facility, or to gauge their willingness to see funds

that they would employ otherwise used instead

to develop it. A different, and perhaps more

appropriate question, wouId have been: in view

of the maturing capabilities and increasing numbers of the spacefaring nations of the world,3 what

elements of long-term, in-orbit infrastructure

would be appropriate to facilitate the considered

development of near-Earth space? This question

would not have required initial assumptions that

the facilities would be permanent and permanently manned, that the size of the eventual program would have to be geared to maintaining

NASA’s size and form, and that all possible users

should be accommodated.

But even with the large number of uses that

were identified, little doubt remains that the

kind of “space station” which NASA prefers

cannot now be fully justified on scientific, economic, or military grounds,4 or combinations

thereof. Rather, a decision to approve it will

rest, finally, on a political judgment that will reflect many intangible factors as well.

31deally, one should add: “ and in wew of the goals and objectives of our civilian space program. ” However, as argued

throughout thts report, there is no publicly accepted agenda of such

goals and objectives,

‘It must also be noted that, since the cancellation of the Manned

Orbiting Laboratory Program in 1968, the U.S. military has been

consistent in its public position that there is no military requirement for a “manned space station. ” This position IS still publicly

malntal ned and remains i n force, even in the context of the President’s call, in March 1983, for development of advanced ballistic

missile defense systems that could see large amounts of very sophisticated and costly military technology deployed in space.

AND OBJECTIVES

mination of the basic characteristics of the infrastructure elements actually needed, of their

acquisition schedule and cost, or of the means

whereby they should be acquired.

If future U.S. space-related goals and objectives

are to be effective in providing direction to future

U.S. space efforts, they should be such as to command widespread attention; have great inherent

humanitarian and scientific interest; foster the development of new technology; have relevance
106 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

to global issues; prompt international cooperation; and involve major participation of our private sector so as to advance our economic

prospects.

THE POLICY BACKGROUND

The overall end of U.S. space activities was first

stated as a preamble to the National Aeronautics

and Space (NAS) Act of 1958, as amended (sec.

102 (a)): “The congress hereby declares that it

is the policy of the United States that activities

in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes

for the benefit of all mankind.” Six policy principles, forming the core of the NAS Act, give substance to that overall end. These six have provided the framework in accordance with which

the civilian space program has evolved to the

present day. These principles may be stated as

follows:

●

●

●

●

●

●

that U.S. preeminence in space science, exploration and applications be maintained;

that economic, political, and social benefits

be derived;

that knowledge be increased;

that civilian and military activities be separated (though they are to be coordinated and

are not to duplicate one another unnecessarily);

that NASA, the civilian agency, be limited

largely to research; and

that international cooperation be fostered.

Thus, the NAS Act articulated the policy principles for overall guidance of the U.S. civilian

space program, but the act alone has not provided (and cannot be expected to provide) the

particular goals for civilian space activities. Lacking such guidance, the space program has instead

been directed by political and budgetary pressures not always relevant to a logically ordered

exploration, development, and use of space. At

the same time, none of the policymaking bodies

successively established in the executive branch

nor any of the committees of Congress have been

able to ensure that a long-range plan of particular policies and programs would be pursued. s

5

For a fu II discussion of these policy principles and their implications, see Civilian Space Policy and Applications, OTA-STI-17 7

(Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

June 1982).

Over the years, a number of specific goals and

objectives have been proposed. Significantly,

however, none of them has arisen as a result of

widespread public discussion. With the maturity

of U.S. space capabilities (and the capabilities of

several other countries and our own private sector as well) on the one hand and the straitened

financial circumstances of the Government on

the other, this situation is in need of fundamental change. That is, if the United States is to maintain a strong commitment to a continuing civilian space program, then an informed national

agreement on the goals and objectives of such

a program is most important.

At the beginning of the Nixon Administration,

the Apollo program was rapidly coming to a successful close, but no clear definition of a postApollo space program had emerged. Early planning efforts had failed to yield a consensus, and

space program budgets had decreased dramatically, presenting the new administration with

growing unemployment in the aerospace industry as well as a major technological agency that

did not have clear signals regarding its future. In

order to address these problems, the Presidential Space Task Group (STG) was established

under the chairmanship of the Vice President.

The STG review was the first comprehensive interagency planning effort that was carried out

with respect to the civilian space program.

In its final report,6 the STG recommended commitment to a balanced publicly funded program

that included science, applications, and technology-development objectives, but no immediate

commitment to expeditions to the planets. They

suggested no change in the institutional structure

nor an operations role for NASA, but did emphasize the desirability of expanding international

cooperation. The major technological development that the STG suggested was the reusable

—-.. — b

The Post-Apo/lo Space Program: Directions for the Future, Space

Task Group Report to the President, September 1969.
Ch. 5—Broadening the Debate ● 107

space Shuttle system that couId support an eventual “space station. ” The clear priority was for

Shuttle development first, with a “space station”

as a potential future development. Support for

exploratory expeditions to the planets was retained as a long-range option for the Government’s civilian space program, with a “manned

Mars mission before the end of this century as

a first target. ”

In 1976, almost two decades after the adoption of the NAS Act, NASA issued its own “Outlook for Space” report. This document addressed

the cultural goal of better scientific understanding of the physical universe and the social/economic goal of further exploration and exploitation of the solar system, The report suggests four

goals reflective of basic human physical needs:

1. improving food production and distribution;

2. developing new energy sources;

3. meeting new challenges to the environment;

and

4. predicting and dealing with natural and manmade disasters.

In October 1978, President Carter released a

space policy statement that summarized the important aspects of an administration review of

space policy and provided guidance regarding

the President’s view of national objectives in the

publicly supported civilian space program over

the next several years. This statement reaffirmed

endorsement of a balanced space program and

committed the administration to the continued

development of the space Shuttle system and its

use during the coming decade. However, the

statement made no new program commitments

and specifically rejected any major new technological development. No goals were set to provide a focus for the program and the general philosophy was best characterized by the statement

that “activities will be pursued in space when it

appears that national objectives can most efficiently be met through space activities. ” Overall, the policy statement left many questions unanswered. It made several statements about what

the United States would not do in space, but remained very general regarding the nature of what

it would do. In addition, it became clear that fiscal

constraints were likely to continue, and, as a consequence, commitments to specific multiyear

Government programs would be made only with

great care. This announcement was received with

some dismay by the congressional leaders involved with the space program and by the aerospace community. This concern spawned a number of hearings and proposed legislative approaches

to a more vigorous space policy for the United

States, and led to the request for the OTA assessment of Civilian Space Policy and Applications.

Then on July 4, 1982, President Reagan announced the issuance of his National Space Policy Statement “. . . to provide a general direction

for our future [space] efforts . . .,” asserting that //

. . . our goals for space are ambitious, yet

achievable. ” This statement “. . . establishes the

basic goals of United States policy which are to:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

strengthen the security of the United States;

maintain U.S. space leadership;

obtain economic and scientific benefits

through the exploitation of space;

expand U.S. private sector investment and

involvement in civil space and space-related

activities;

promote international cooperative activities

in the national interest; and

cooperate with other nations in maintaining

the freedom of space for activities which en:

hance the security and welfare of man kind.”

On June 27, 1983, the Science Advisor to the

President “. . . challenged] the aerospace community to do some bold thinking about the future

[concerning space],” and went on to observe that //

. . . the real issue is how we can fashion a space

program that addresses today’s national aspirations and needs . . . and . . . re-ignite[s] the spirit

of adventure that captured America in the past

. . . . “ He questioned “. . . why don’t we let the

American people share the grand vision of the

future of space?”

But the articulated goals, particularly in the absence of specific objectives designed to address

them, fall well short of what the United States,

today, might expect of its publicly supported civilian space activities.

They do not speak at all of such fundamental

matters as having human beings in space; of hav-
108 “ Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

ing the general public directly involved in space- pendence of the Western European countries and

related matters; or of ameliorating the great in- Canada, Japan, Brazil, the People’s Republic of

hibition that the present cost of space assets and China, india, and others, as well as the large and

activities has on the development and use of constantly expanding U.S.S.R, space program

space. And there is little in these words to sug- that, in its nonmilitary aspects, commands the atgest the imaginative, the exciting, the challenging tention and respect of our civilian space Ieaders.7

or the adventurous or, to use the Science Advisor’s word: the “bold. ” 7See Salyut—Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence

Finally, behind all of this there are the growin Space—A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-STI-14 (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Deceming accomplishments, competence, and inde - ber 1983).

TODAY’S TOO NARROW DEBATE

As the important matter of defining and articulating such national goals and objectives is addressed, it should not be taken as implied here

that such definition and articulation are not now

going on. What should be understood is that, for

all practical purposes (including that of obtaining any civilian “space station”), this activity is

being conducted by space-related scientists, engineers, and program managers—almost all within

the Government, within university offices supported by the Government, or within the Government-supported aerospace industry, At best,

then, the goals and objectives that would be expected to result from this kind of consideration

might, understandably, represent viewpoints that

are narrow relative to the wide spectrum of our

national interests and opportunities in the civilian space area today. It is likely that an expression of goals, and especially specific objectives,

arrived at in this fashion will reflect, perhaps unduly, the interests of their originators. And finally,

the U.S. political system oftentimes places as

RECENT

Recently, there have been a number of calls

to formulate a set of broadly based, contemporary national goals and objectives in the civilian

space area.

For instance, Simon Ramo observes in his new

book What’s Wrong With Our Technological Society and How to Fix /t (pp. 175-1 76):

After twenty-five years it is still true of the entire commercial use of space in the united States

much weight on the process by which a national

decision is reached as on the substance of this

decision; therefore, the better course for the Government in the longer run is to encourage as

many of our citizens who are interested in space

to participate in the pre-decision debate.

It was quite appropriate that, for most of the

past quarter of a century, our national space goals

and objectives primarily reflected those of the science and technology communities alone. These

communities have done their work well. Consequently, our space activities now can, and should,

be broadened to reflect both the maturity of our

space knowledge and skills, and the general public’s broader interests and concerns.

The matter of describing a new and clarified

set of long-term civilian space goals, and laying

out specific civilian space activity objectives, is

made more urgent by the recent increase of military interest in space—an increase that may well

soon accelerate.

PROPOSALS

that the government and the private sector have

not yet worked out their best permanent roles.

Less forgivable is something else. With space so

clearly an arena of powerful economic and [national] security interest for the nation, we have

been approaching plans and policies about

space for well over a decade on an intermittent,

t-top-and-jump short-range political basis. NASA

has many hopes and plans, of course, but the

nation does not have a plan for the next two decades. A real plan would describe both goals and
Ch. 5—Broadening the Debate • 109

anticipated budgets. It would have recognition,

acceptance, and stature with all the power centers influencing advances and applications in

space, namely, the government’s Executive

Branch, Congress, industry, and the scientific

and technological fraternity. A real plan would

be one to which all these forces were committed

long-term, in the same way that at the start of

the 1960s we were committed to landing a man

on the moon before the end of the decade. . . .

[And while] the possibilities of space warfare

[and] economic constraints [must be considered]

none of these factors should prevent the United

States from having sound long-range space goals

as a guide to the government’s budgeting process. . . . Less-than-adequate attention has been

given to setting priorities and long-range goals

and allocating missions to each sector.

in a recent report prepared by the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications and transmitted to the Committee on Science and Technology of the U.S. House of Representatives,

Representative Ronnie Flippo, then Chairman of

the Subcommittee, stated that: “. . . there is a

lack of long-range goals for our space program.”8

The report noted that 7 years earlier it had also

addressed “Future Space Programs” and then

emphasized that NASA should “. . . focus on an

over-arching concept [that] should represent one

or more mind-expanding endeavors which challenge the imagination and capability of the country [the] key element of [which] should be sub-

~Future Space Programs: 1981, Subcommittee on Space Science

and Applications, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.

House of Representatives, May 1982, p. 1.

stantial return on past and current investments

in space through clear . . . benefits to the society

on earth in the form of greatly expanded services and direct contributions to solution of earthbound problems. ”9

The “NASA Advisory Council Study of the Mission of NASA” (released on Oct. 12, 1983) suggests activities that, in some cases, could be considered goals or objectives: explore the solar

system, pursue scientific research in space, exploit space for public and commercial purposes,

and expand human presence in space. And

NASA awarded a near $1 million contract to a

private organization (Ecosystems) to provide it

with suggestions on “. . . long-term research

goals and the technology it should work on to

meet those goals. ”

The President’s Private-Sector Survey on Cost

Control, in commenting on the “. . . Federal

expenditure on R&D [of] about $48 billion a year

. . . faults the major science agencies for failing

to have clearly defined goals and plans for meeting them. ”10 And an editorial in the Christian

Science Monitor pointedly observes that “. . . it

is most important that the U.S. develop a consensus on manned-space-flight goals. None now

exists . . . Until consensus exists no specific space

station concept can be usefully approved.’” 11

9

1 bid., p. 3.

l~sclence, No. 222, NO V. 25, 1983, p. 903.

I I The Chrjgjan Science Monitor, Dec. 12, 1983, p. 23.

PRESIDENT REAGAN’S CALL FOR A “SPACE STATION”

In 1984, the future of the Nation’s activities in

space was placed squarely on the congressional

agenda. In his State of the Union Address, President Reagan spoke at considerable length about

the space area and what he judges should be the

Nation’s aspirations in regard to it. And he devoted his radio address during the same week to

space. He directed NASA to commence the development of permanent, low-Earth-orbit infrastructure that would support human beings in

space, and to obtain it within the next decade.

And he asked Congress to authorize and appropriate Federal funds to begin studies of this proposed infrastructure.

Of particular relevance here is the president’s

assertion that: “[one of] our great goal[s] is to build

on America’s pioneer spirit and develop our next

frontier . . . : space.”; “America has always been

greatest when we dared to be great. . . . We can

follow our dreams to distant stars.” And in developing the infrastructure (i. e., a civilian “space station”) he called for international participation so
110 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

as to: “. . . expand freedom for all who share our In effect, the President’s speeches have now

goals. ” prompted, and indeed his specific request for FedIn his radio talk, he spoke to the: “. . . challenge eral law and funds for a major new initiative in the

[of] reaching for exciting goals in space , . . ,“ while publicly funded civilian space program essentially

requires, the conduct of a national debate over the explaining that, as well, “Our space goals will chart next year or two regarding our national interests, a path of progress toward creating a better life for goals and objectives in the civilian space area. all people” [and he emphasized that]: “a , . . space

station [should be seen as] a stepping stone for [addressing] further goals.” Emphasis added.

STEPS TOWARD BROADER PARTICIPATION

Interestingly enough, the circumstances discussed above have resulted in only one important change to the basic 1958 Act—the explicit

emphasis on space commercialization that was

added this summer. Indeed, it was only in the

fall of 1983 that Congress began to hold hearings

that might lay a basis for such changes. Scores

of billions of public dollars have been appropriated to pay for our public civilian space program

since we reached the Moon, and almost surely

scores of billions more will be appropriated during the next few decades, but, to date, without

the kind of thoughtful and fundamental reappraisal of our contemporary national interests and

activities in space that many are coming to believe

the issues now demand. Our publicly supported

civiIian space area has seemed to suffer from a

form of benign neglect.

However, the debate is quickening. Congress

has taken an extraordinary step regarding the articulation of national goals and objectives in the

civilian space area. In passing the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1985, Congress, among

other things, found and declared that “. . . the

identification of long-range goals and policy options for the United States civilian space program

through a high-level, representational public

forum will assist the President and the Congress

in formulating future policies for the . . . program . . . “; and they called for the establishment

of a “National Commission on Space” that will

assist the United States “ . . . to define the longrange needs of the Nation that may be fulfilled

through the peaceful uses of outer space “12

With the President’s signature to Public Law 98-

361, there has been put into motion the first formal and fundamental reexamination of the Nation’s civilian space aspirations, objectives and

institutions since the passage of the NAS Act in

1958.

From the outset of this assessment, the need

for identifying a far-sighted set of generally acceptable civilian space goals and objectives that reflect today’s circumstances has been apparent.

Most notably, the assessment’s Advisory Panel

has strongly urged that an initial set of such goals

and objectives be identified and proposed for

broad study and discussion so as to lay a more

rational basis for the consideration of any large

and costly space civilian “space station. ”

In response to that call, and with the intention

of providing a sound and useful starting point for

a national debate on the scope and direction of

the Nation’s space activities, the next chapter of

this report provides an ensemble of interrelated

goals and objectives for consideration by Congress and the American public.

IZpubllc Law 98-36I, Title Ii.
Chapter 6

TOWARD A GOAL-ORIENTED

CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM
Contents

Possible Civilian Space Goals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Possible Civilian Space Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Indicated infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cost and Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Final Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES

Page

113

113

122

124

126

128

Table No. Page

9. Possible Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

10. Cost and Schedule to satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion . . . . . . . 125
Chapter 6

TOWARD A GOAL-ORIENTED

CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM

POSSIBLE CIVILIAN SPACE GOALS

If the civilian space activities of the United

States are to maintain widespread and enthusiastic public support, they should aspire to protect, ease, challenge, and/or improve the human

condition. Such aspirations can and should be

articulated in the form of long-range goals that

would guide the conduct of the Nation’s space

activities in general and a decision regarding possible acquisition of any “space station” in particular.

In order to prompt the formulation and subsequent discussion of future space goals and objectives, OTA has prepared a list of possible longrange goals and a set of nearer term objectives

designed to address those goals. Although OTA

does not recommend either this particular set of

goals or its supporting family of objectives, they

are intended to exemplify the kind of goals and

objectives around which consensus might well

be formed so as to provide sensible guidance for

the Nation’s future space activities. The Advisory

Panel for this assessment has taken an unusually

active role in helping to formulate these goals and

objectives. It is the Panel’s judgment that the

goals and objectives proposed for discussion are

reasonable and important.

The set of possible goals follows. (They should

be read with reference to the six basic principles

spoken to in the 1958 Space Act and discussed

in the previous chapter. ) Some of these can be

defined in fairly specific terms, but others–no less

POSSIBLE CIVILIAN

In order to illustrate how the six basic civilian

space goals suggested in the previous section

could be addressed, this section identifies 10 specific objectives that the United States (in coopsignificant—can be stated only in a more general

and open-ended way:

●

●

●

●

Ž

●

to increase the efficiency of space activities

and reduce their net cost to the general

public;

to involve the general public directly in space

activities, both on Earth and in space;

to derive scientific, economic, social, and

political benefits;

to increase international cooperation and

collaboration in and re space;

to study and to explore the Earth, the solar

system, and the greater physical universe;

and

to spread life, in a responsible fashion,

throughout the solar system. ’

These goals (some new, some already wellaccepted) have been chosen so as to move U.S.

space interests and activities closer to the mainstream of public interest and concern, while at

the same time maintaining space leadership,

enhancing national security, and developing new

capabilities to respond to finding the unexpected

in the cosmos.

I Undertaking this goal responsibly would entail preserving the

pristine environments of other worlds for future study and appreciation. For example, there are bodies such as Europa and Titan, which

have not yet been explored, where life may already exist. And there

remains some residual controversy even about the possibility of

microbes on Mars.

SPACE OBJECTIVES

eration with other countries, in most cases) could

attain within the second quarter-century of the

space age. The particular objectives suggested

here for further study and discussion are chosen

113
114 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

to have a great impact and, taken as a group, to

respond to a broad spectrum of public, private,

professional, and international interests.

Of course, discussion of any of these conceptual objectives should actually be undertaken

only with surface-based alternative and complementary activities clearly in mind. Some elements

of a few are already under way in a modest fashion, but not in the sharply focused fashion suggested here. Some may turn out not to be feasible for technological, economic, or other reasons,

Some could be attained in a very short time, but

others will take many years. Some respond to objective needs, some respond to conceptual opportunities. Broad consensus on some should be

rather easily reached, but others can be expected

to provoke serious argument and perhaps even

disagreement. They range in cost from near-zero

to tens of billions of dollars. Some are chosen particularly because, in addition to the importance

of their being achieved, they also invite the active and important partnership of other countries

and the U.S. private sector.

These objectives are proposed under the assumption that the U.S. Government would still be

expected to carry on, as today, a “core” spacerelated basic research program at the level of at

least $1 billion annually (in constant dollars). Pure

scientific research should continue to encompass

such diverse space-related areas as astronomy,

cosmology, life sciences, materials sciences, geodesy, magnetism, relativity, plasma physics, meteorology, atmospheric composition and dynamics, and programs of preparing for human Iunar,

asteroid, and planetary exploration and settlement. The basic research program would be expected to continue solar system exploration generally, including the planets, their moons, the

Sun, comets and asteroids, and to improve the

methods and means of transporting equipment

and people in space. And it would be expected

to develop, deploy, and use those “cutting edge”

space technologies—large and sophisticated telescopes and interferometers that span the electromagnetic spectrum, microgravity furnaces, sophisticated and powerful Earth-oriented remote

sensors, sophisticated space probes, etc.—that are

required to make early and fundamental advances

in these fields in a highly productive fashion.

The results of these basic research activities, of

course, will be many and varied. In both the

shorter and longer term they can have important

public policy implications and, in general, they

can eventually influence the cultural, economic,

and national security interests of the country in

many, and oftentimes unexpected, ways. As the

roles and capabilities expected of our in-space

infrastructure for the next two or three decades

are considered, basic research activities should

receive a high priority.2 Continuing success in

fundamental space research may be expected to

facilitate the accomplishment of the objectives

proposed here.

The titles of the 10 civilian space objectives follow. They are not rank-ordered:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

90

10.

Global Disaster Avoidance and Minimization.

Human Presence and Activities on the

Moon.

Exploration of Mars and Some Asteroids.

Medical Research of Direct Interest to the

General Public.

People, Drawn From the General Public,

in Space.

Modernizing and Expanding International

Short-Wave Broadcasting.

Providing Space Data Directly to the General Public.

Using Space and Space Technology for the

Transmission of Electrical Energy.

Reducing the Cost of Space Operations, Especially Transportation.

lncreasing Commercial-Industrial Space

Sales.

The eventual acceptance of any or all of these

objectives (along with their related costs) as actual national objectives would leave the priority

among them, and the rate of public expenditure

in addressing them, completely open. Each and

all would be undertaken, if at all, only as the

funds become available to do so.

Table 9 relates these 10 specific objectives to

the broader goals.

A brief elaboration of each of the 10 follows.

‘See the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Public Law

98-361 ).
Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 115

Table 9.—Possible Goals and Objectives

Goals

Increase Derive

space activities’ Involve the scientific, Increase Study and Bring life

efficiency; general Derive political, inter- explore the to the

reduce their public economic and social national physical physical

net cost directly benefits benefits cooperation universe universe

Objectives:

1.-

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Establish a global information system/

service re natural hazards

Establish lower cost reusable

transportation service to the Moon and

establish human presence there

Use space probes to obtain information

re Mars and some asteroids prior to

early human exploration

Conduct medical research of direct

interest to the general public

Bring at least hundreds of the general

public per year into space for short

visits

Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting, common-user system/service

Make essentially all data generated by

civilian satellites and spacecraft

directly available to the general public

Exploit radio/optical free space

electromagnetic propagation for longdistance energy distribution

Reduce the unit cost of space transportation and space activitiesa

Increase space-related private sector

N

Y

N

P

P

P

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N N N Y Y Y N

N

N

N

Y

P

Y

Y

Y

P

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

P

Y

P

P

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

N N Y P Y N N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

sale#

aThls ~~u~d advance the proSpeC& of successfully addressing all other ‘Qoals.”

Y: Yes; N: No; P: Perhaps; depends on how carded out.

1. Global Disaster Avoidance and Minimization.—ln cooperation with the other countries of

the world, our Government and our scientific and

enginering communities could be set to the task

of beginning to provide a global, space-related,

Earth-monitoring system/service which would

provide fundamental information to the world’s

political leaders, organizations, and institutions

to assist them in dealing, satisfactorily, with

macroscopic “life-and-death” problems in such

areas as weather, climate, air and water purity,

food production, seismology, and resource conservation. It would be designed to complement

related surface-based system/services, taking specific advantage of the in-situ measurement and

monitoring perspectives that only appropriate

sensors located in space could offer. Attention

could be concentrated on earthquakes, tsunamis,

ozonosphere perturbations, severe storms, environmental pollution, the carbon dioxide “greenhouse” effect, volcanic effluvia, etc. Well before

the year 2000 this operational global system/service could be in place, monitoring and studying

the Earth’s space and atmosphere, and surface

and subsurface, for characteristics and changes

relevant to such problems, and supplying both

immediate and longer term “warning” information promptly, directly, and in a form useful

to nontechnicians.

These are problems that have inherent multinational elements of potentially grave hazard. And

this type of space-related system/service could be

developed, installed, and used in such a fashion

as to obviate the serious concerns raised by some

countries over what they consider to be undue

surveillance of a military-political nature, or the

kind of monitoring that could provide an undue

economic advantage to some countries. The

original elements of this system/service could be

continually improved on as new scientific knowledge is obtained, new space-related measurement techniques are perfected, and experience

is gained in the reliability, utility, and cost of

space-related services in comparison with analogous services that could be provided at the sur-

Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 117

face. It could, of course, draw heavily on any

“global habitability” scientific studies. And it

could provide information that would be usefuI

in furthering study of “nuclear winter. ”

2. Human Presence and Activities on the Moon.

–Our Government and our scientific and engineering communities in government, universities,

and the private sector, could be given the task

of establishing a modest, permanent, habitable

facility on our Earth’s Moon. Such a facility would

allow physical, chemical, geological, and cosmological studies to begin there in earnest–with the

entire activity involving as many countries as possible. The U.S. private sector in concert with the

Government could also be challenged to provide

facilities and services there that would open up

the Moon to travel, recreation, sports and other

cultural, commercial, and industrial pursuits.

Three important elements of this program could

be: 1 ) the development of a relatively low-cost,

human transportation system/service between

low-Earth-orbit and the Moon [see objective (9)];

2) consideration of producing oxygen on the

Moon from lunar materials as a source of rocket

oxidant for return trips and for life support (i. e.,

using solar energy to release oxygen from Moon

rocks); and 3) a search for abundant supplies of

water/ice in the cold-traps at the lunar poles.

A primary cost-driver for human settlement on

the Moon, and other celestial objects, will be the

reliability and efficiency of the technology which

would enable such settlements to provide livable

atmospheres, grow their own food, and build effective and durable habitats using local materials.

3. Obtaining Information Required for Eventual

Human Exploration of Mars and Some Asteroids.

—The Soviet Union has stated that it expects to

explore, and have some of its people establish

a presence on, the planet Mars. The United States

could also aspire to do so when the technology

is in hand to allow it to be done at relatively low

cost, when adequate Mars-related data and information are also in hand, and when our experience in settling on the Moon gives us the confidence that we can do so successfully and efficiently [see objective (2)]. Early programs to develop and use lower cost transportation, housing, and people-related services in establishing

low-Earth-orbit and lunar residential and work

places could all keep analogous Mars objectives

specifically in mind. Over the next 10 to 20 years,

crewless space probes, with characteristics specifically reflective of our intention to have some

of our men and women visit the surface of Mars

early in the next century, could be sent there.

Specific plans could see a human exploration program commence on the satisfactory completion

of our initial settlement on the Moon, provided

the cost of doing so is then seen to be acceptable.

Of course, the space probes could, as well,

search for information of importance to a better

understanding of our own terrestrial circumstances and processes. And consideration could

be given to exploring a few of the asteroids as

wel I.

4. Medical Research of Direct Interest to the

General Public.– For over 20 years, the space programs of both the United States and the Soviet

Union have been concerned with the ability of

men and women to survive and function well in

space. Space provides a special environment,

marked particularly by the near absence of gravity, within which several diseases and related

human physiological processes might now begin

to be profitably investigated. Important topics

relevant not only to future space dwellers, but

also to the Earth population as well, could include

research on hypertension, osteoporosis (a disorder involving loss of bone mass highly prevalent

in older women), osteoarthritis (which affects

over 16 million Americans), weight control, energy metabolism, digestive function, and body

fluid balance.

To elaborate on one such opportunity: experimental evidence, gathered from both animals

and humans in space and in certain Earth-based

simulations of some of the conditions of space

flight, suggests that there may bean analogy between some of the physiological changes that occur in the absence of gravity and those changes

which take place during the normal aging process. For example, as cosmonauts and astronauts

adapt to longer duration living in essentiaJJy

weightless conditions in space, they experience

atrophied muscles, brittle bones, and decreased

cardiovascular and respiratory capacity, i.e.,

38-798 0 - 84 - 9 : QL. 3
118 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

physiological conditions similar to those which

accompany senescence. Further experimental

studies in research programs carried on at the

Earth’s surface and on the Shuttle-Spacelab may

confirm that, inasmuch as the human aging process evolved under conditions of constant gravity here on Earth, removal of this force over long

periods of time in space results in changes in the

aging process and its rate—changes that could be

studied in weightlessness with an explicit intention of relating any findings to the general population. Given the importance of scientific studies

of aging to all of the world’s people as individuals,

and the effects of an aging population on many

economic, social, and political institutions, if surface and Shuttle-Spacelab “space station” studies

are encouraging, the United States could inaugurate a major international research program

in the fields of gerontology and geriatrics that

would encompass related experimentation both

in space and on the Earth’s surface.

5. People, Drawn From the General public, in

Space.—The Government is now moving to expand human use of the Shuttle to include a very

few nontechnician “communicators” per year on

Earth-space flights. Within the next decade, we

could have space “Lodge/Habitats” established

in low-Earth-orbit, with the Shuttle being used to

see hundreds of persons per year, the great majority of whom would be representative of various

professional and cultural sectors and the general

public (i.e., nonastronauts and nonspace technician workers) drawn from the United States and

rest of the entire world’s population, being transported there to spend a short time in space. The

entire activity could be operated as a sound,

albeit innovative, commercial enterprise carried

on in cooperation with the U.S. Government;

there should be little or no net out-of-pocket cost

to the Government as a consequence of this cooperation. The enterprise could be conducted so

as not to favor the rich—all of our citizens should

have some opportunity to visit there. And such

“Lodge/Habitats,” and the activities that they,

and the Shuttle, could allow to commence in

space, could be used to help the world celebrate

the next “Millennium” in an extraordinary fashion.

Only when a large number of our citizens, representative of a broad cross-section of our society,

begin to experience the “space adventure” directly, will the space domain and space activities gradually begin to move into the mainstream

of our national interests and concerns.

~his objective and objective (7) have in common the aim of making the space domain, and

space science and technology, much more accessible to the general public.]

6. Modernizing and Expanding International

Short-Wave Broadcasting.–Hundreds of millions

of people, world-wide, regularly listen to speech

and music programs broadcast via shortwave by

more than 100 countries. Because of the inherent

characteristics of the ionosphere which influence

the way by which the broadcast signals are propagated, this service is limited at best and oftentimes is of poor quality, reliability, and coverage.

Also, shortwave broadcasting has become a matter of growing international political contention

because of its dominance by the major countries

and the growing interference to reception caused

by increasing use of the sharply limited useful

radio-wave spectrum by very powerful surface

transmitters. A cooperative U.S. Governmentprivate sector initiative could lead an international

effort to establish a global system, employing sophisticated and powerful direct broadcast satellites, that could replace most of today’s individual country shortwave stations well within a

decade. Developed as an international commonuser system, use of its services could allow broadcasters throughout the world, regardless of their

size, location, or political persuasion, to reach

audiences in other countries clearly and reliably,

and at relatively modest cost. Such a service

could go far toward meeting a standard of nationto-nation broadcasting equitability simply not

physically possible under today’s surface-based

shortwave broadcasting circumstances. Briefly,

it would be a more efficient, effective, and fair

way of accomplishing the kind of shortwave

broadcasting now done from the Earth’s surface.

And, as well, the prospect of wholly new kinds

of international programming and international

marketing services could be opened.

7. Providing Space Data Directly to the General

Public.—’’The wholesale introduction of computers into [the home and especially] into class-
Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 119

rooms since 1980 amounts to a quiet revolution

that will help meet the demands of scientific and

technological change as well as economic computation in world markets.” 3 Nearly 80 percent

of our junior and senior high schools now have

computers and it is expected that the number in

our public schools will reach 600,000 by next

year. A computer network now interconnects 200

university sites, and the number of terminals is

expected to reach 150,000 soon.

A high school teacher in the United Kingdom

has attained international attention by having his

students ‘‘tune in” to signals from Soviet spacecraft and deduce information about the crafts’

characteristics and activities. The cultural, social,

and economic implications of having a large and

growing segment of our population using increasingly sophisticated computers in their homes,

businesses, grade and high schools, universities,

etc., promise to be enormous. Many of these individuals and organizations could now be supplied, in near-real-time and at modest cost, with

the nonclassified and nonproprietary data generated by payloads of public satellites and spacecraft generally, by designing them to allow direct

readout of the space signals transmitted from

them and/or by providing the data promptly and

generally from central collection points. For instance, a recent Shuttle/Spacelab flight resulted

in the generation of 20 million video frames, 900

frames of film, and 2 trillion bits of data. Hundreds of thousands of people have already taken

the opportunity simply to listen in, passively, to

surface-space voice communications—and made

modest payments to do so. Making data available

on the atmosphere, surface and subsurface characteristics of the bodies in our solar system, including the planet Earth, and spacecraft operating data as well—all directly, while they were

being generated–could allow and prompt a

much greater direct public involvement, both

here and abroad, in the publicly supported U.S.

civilian space program. As well, it could increase,

by orders of magnitude, today’s study and appreciation of these space data, spacecraft technology, and space activities generally, especially

by our younger people. In time, the market could

well prompt the creation of “service-added” or-

‘Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 6, 1984.

ganizations that could prepare various educational packages with a wide variety of users in mind:

students of various ages and interests and many

of the general public with home TV receivers,

video recorders, and computers.

8. Using Space and Space Technology for the

Transmission of Electrical Energy. -In effect, any

radio communication involves the transmission

of energy through the Earth’s atmosphere and/or

space—albeit at miniscule power levels. A few

years ago, tens of thousands of watts of continuous microwave power were transmitted in free

space with very high efficiency and reliability, and

multi hundred million dollars per year Defense

programs are now anticipated that would see at

least 10 megawatts transmitted through the atmosphere and/or space via collimated and directed

microwave and optical electromagnetic beams.

Use of such methods and means might allow

electricity to be distributed usefully across space.

Energy sources could be located in geostationary

orbit and/or on the lunar surface and the energy

transmitted to the Earth’s surface. Or energy

could be supplied from the Earth’s surface, as

needed, to geosynchronous orbit and to a million miles or more beyond, at any desired power

level. Given that the cost of electricity is very

much higher in orbit (where it is provided by solar

cell/battery combinations) than at the Earth’s surface, the latter might be able to be done competitively at an earlier date.

The ready availability of such electrical energy

in space could allow a complete rethinking of the

design and use of space assets and activities in

such space-related areas as communications, navigation, position-fixing, remote sensing, and even

transportation. This is because systems designers

could anticipate having tens of megawatts (or

more) of electrical power available in space,

whereas they now have only kilowatts and still

only tens of kilowatts by the middle of the next

decade, and system operators would have to pay

only for the amounts of power that the systems

would actually consume, just as at the surface.

In addition, many areas of the world have enormous renewable energy potentials (especially

hydro, but solar as well when the conversion

process becomes economically attractive), but

they are located too far from other areas which
120 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

need such energy. A reliable, cost-competitive

and efficient solution to the very long-distance

(several thousands of miles, and intercontinental)

transmission problem could allow surface-generated (N. B., in this case not in-space generated,

as in the Solar Power Satellite concept) electricity to be distributed via space. Most importantly,

electricity generated by renewable sources could

be treated as an exportable commodity, and international and intercontinental distribution and

load-shedding could become a global possibility—to great economic, social, and political advantage.

And, of course, when such technology is reliably and economically in hand, it could be used

to supply electrical “fuel” to spacecraft on voyages to and from the Moon, and farther.

9. Reducing the Cost of Space Transportation.

—Whatever other measures are used to characterize civilian space activities, that of the enormous cost of in-orbit assets and activities is certain to be listed. The primary “cost-driver” is that

of space transportation for people and physical

assets. For the predictable future, it will cost well

over $1 ,000/lb (1984$) to place human and equipment payloads into 200-mile high-Earth orbit, in

an era when, near the Earth’s surface, they can

be transported by aircraft over 10 times the distance at one-thousandth of this cost. Such a great

cost differential continues to be one of the greatest inhibitions, perhaps the greatest inhibition, to

our investment in, and use of, our Earth’s space.

We could now begin to look well beyond the

Shuttle, and the specific technologies, fuels,

payloads, and operations basic to its design and

use. We could mount large-scale, advanced technology development programs that would address promising methods and means of providing reliable space transportation at much lower

unit cost, giving full consideration to the future

circumstance of the much greater space traffic

volumes that such lower costs could engender.

An initial objective could be to reduce the cost

per pound for transport between the Earth’s surface and low-Earth-orbit by an order of magnitude.

10. Increasing Commercial-industrial Space

Sales.–The United States has spent well over

$200 billion (1984$-adjusted) to learn how to enter space, to survive and function in it, and to

use it. In doing so, the Nation has accrued an

enormous reserve of space knowledge, assets,

and experience, and created a sophisticated

high-technology space industry administered and

managed by Government and non-Government

professionals in essential harmony with many

other professionals in our university community.

With one important exception, the entire civilian space effort has continued to be supported

from the public purse. The time has now been

reached when our private sector—commercialindustrial-financial—could begin to assume an increasing responsibility for the conduct of our civilian space activities. The one exception, the private satellite communications business, has already

reached sales of some $2 billion per year and

continues to grow at an average 15 percent per

year rate, compounded. Government organizations, policies, activities, and leadership could

now be structured not only to see that the growth

in this one economically successful space field

is maintained, but that other space fields (navigation, position-fixing, tourism, remote sensing, and

materials processing) are likewise explicitly encouraged to grow and prosper. The President has

announced a space strategy “to encourage American industry to move quickly and decisively intc

space. Obstacles to private sector space activities will be removed, and we’ll take appropriate

steps to spur private enterprise in space, ” And

the Space Act has now been changed so as to

require NASA to “seek and encourage . . . the

fullest commercial use of space.” New businesses, increased employment, increased sales

here and abroad, the introduction of new and

useful public and private services, and larger Federal, State, and local tax revenues all lie in prospect, once the present private sector learns how

to moderate its dependence on the Government’s largess and its slow-paced, structured way

of doing business, and new private, competitive,

entrepreneurial activities are formed and grow.

One of the most important civilian space objec-
Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 121

tives now could be that of seeing that procurement of more and more of our space assets, and

the conduct of more and more of our space activities, become commercialized, so that: 1 ) the net

burden of space activities on the public purse is

sharply reduced, and 2) the Government can apply

its resources to the achievement of objectives that

either are not appropriate to the private sector

or lie beyond its capabilities.

As these economic benefits grow, they could

be looked at as offsetting, at least to some extent,

the cost of our publicly supported space program.

Social benefits also must be kept in mind, since

a fundamental purpose of government is that of

meeting important public needs that the private

sector inherently cannot.

Of course, a number of other objectives could

also be entertained. These could include: increased emphasis on a solar system exploration

program, augmenting the expected wide-ranging

core solar system exploration program mentioned

earlier; a global person-to-person satellite communications system/service; an in-space “sophisticated-machine” experimental and demonstration program; etc. It is clear that when truly

imaginative minds become impressed with the

broad dimensions of the space domain–not only

its physical magnitude and character but the opportunity for innovative uses–there is little apparent limit to the number and kinds of concepts

for exploring and using it for earthly benefit.

Underlying a decision to pursue any or all of

these objectives would be a concern for the basic

welfare of our own and indeed all of the world’s

people; a challenge to international cooperation

in large, exciting, and peaceful activities; a challenge to the basic innovativeness and cost consciousness of our private sector; a commitment

to the permanent human investiture and considered development of both our Earth’s space and

our Moon; and a general sense of “spirit-lifting.”
122 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

After careful study, and the weighing of costs and reflective of enlightened U.S. leadership in the

alternatives, it seems reasonable to observe that thoughtful, bold, imaginative, and purposeful deany decision to pursue them could be taken as velopment and use of space.

INDICATED INFRASTRUCTURE

Some of these objectives, if they are to be fore . . . and use much common or hand-meachieved, would require certain elements of in- down technology, as much as possible rather

space infrastructure; others, depending on how than build custom hardware. . . .“4

they would be carried out, may or may not require such elements; still others would require

none. The manner in which the United States obtains any of this infrastructure should reflect, to

the maximum, our already great investment in

space technology and operations; whenever reasonably possible, it should be obtained at the

lowest capital, and operations and maintenance,

cost to the public purse. It would embrace the

If the Government’s large capital costs for development and production are to be minimized

and the private sector strengthened, then serious

consideration should be given to encouraging the

private sector to provide infrastructure elements,

through sales, long-term leases, or on the basis

of charges for actual service use, that meet Government performance specifications.

views of NASA’s chief scientist: “[n assembling

the necessary hardware, the watchword is ‘inheritance’ . . . projects and spacecraft are to 4

Dr. Frank McDonald, quoted in Christian Monitor,

make maximum use of what has been done be- Dec. 28, 1983, p. 14.
Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 123

Obtaining space infrastructure in this fashion

is not only a reasonable and effective use of U.S.

space assets, but it could reduce the difficulty of

obtaining public funds for the scientists, engineers, managers, and equipment needed to pursue more, and more important, space ends.

The main elements of longer term space infrastructure called for in pursuing the 10 objectives

are:5

● an LEO capability to assemble and check out

the large and sophisticated satellites and

space structures needed to provide both the

hazard-prevention and the direct audio

broadcast global system/service [objectives

(1) and (6)];

JNo additional space infrastructure elements are needed to

achieve objective (7).

●

●

●

an LEO human residential and working

space to be used for medical research [objective (4)];

a transport staging facility to support efficient

travel to geostationary orbit, the Moon, and

beyond, using reusable orbital transfer vehicles or other vehicles. This would address

objectives (1), (2), (3), (6), (9), and possibly

(8); and

a storage facility in LEO would allow use of

full Shuttle loads, helping objective (9), and

staffed LEO laboratory facilities could promote objective (1 O).

Of course, if such infrastructure elements were

available for the specific purposes that justify their

acquisition, they could be used for additional purposes also.

Note that, in essence, provision of the infrastructure needed to pursue two of the larger scale
124 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

objectives [(2) and (4)] could accommodate most

of the needs of all of the other eight. In what follows, therefore, the cost of this infrastructure is

included under these two objectives.

And note that no Government development of

free-flying platform infrastructure elements is

called for; they (e.g., MESA, SPAS, LEASECRAFT,

EURECA, and the Space Industries platform)

could and probably would be designed, developed and installed by our private sector, and/or

other countries, and offered to the civilian space

community—both Government and private interests—under appropriate sale or lease arrangeCOST AND

Attaining all of these 10 suggested conceptual

objectives would cost money—overall, a great

deal of money. In table 10, rough estimates are

made for the cost of each of them, and the length

of time over which each would be pursued. in

all cases the cost estimates are rounded off to one

figure. And, again, the maximum use of: 1) already developed and paid-for space technology,

2) the most truly competitive procurement methods, and 3) the most modern and least burdensome acquisition strategies and procedures, are

all fundamental assumptions.

OTA’s first rough estimate of the total cost of

attaining all 10 of the objectives is some $40 billion (1 984$) over the next 25 years. But, seemingly in the nature of things, long-term high

technology development programs such as these

invariably encounter unforeseen difficulties and

experience the pressure of unexpected external

events. Indeed, the total cost should be understood to be no less than $40 billion (1 984$), and

perhaps considerably more–as much as, say, $60

billion (1984$ ).6 Given the early period at which

these estimates are made, there cannot be great

b“ln recent decades the average overrun on major programs, in

constant dollars and constant quantities, has been slightly over 50

percent. The average schedule milestone has been missed by a third

of the time initially projected. The average time to develop new

systems has, until recently been increasing at the rate of three

months per year . , each year. ” Norman R. Augustine, “The

Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech Management, ” Aerospace America, March 1984, p. 5.

ments, where they could be used for the conduct

of scientific research or the production of various

materials under microgravity conditions.

Finally, note that large amounts of very costly

electrical power (with initial capital costs as high

as $10,000 per watt) are not called for in LEO;

some 20 kilowatts would appear to be sufficient.

Larger amounts appear to be needed only for any

eventual commercial-industrial materials processing, and could then be provided and financed

by the private sector in anticipation that such

processing will prove to be profitable.

SCHEDULE

confidence in their detailed accuracy. But such

accuracy is not needed for the illustrative purposes for which they were developed.

if work were to commence on all of them now,

the bulk of the cost would occur over the next

15 years.

Space transportation costs are not included in

these estimates, except for an additional $0.1 billion (1984$) or so for each LEO-lunar orbit flight.

Rather, it is assumed that some 10 Shuttle surfaceLEO flights per year, at an average cost of about

$0.1 billion (1984$) each, would be budgeted for

all Government-sponsored civilian research and

development purposes, including those considered here.

Clearly, these costs are great in total sum, especially in the face of other important calls upon

Federal tax revenues during an area of multi hundred billion dollar annual deficits in the Federal

budget.

While the total cost of our publicly funded civilian space program will reflect the magnitude

and character of the objectives addressed in the

program, and these will, in turn, reflect political

decisions, the unit costs to acquire and operate

the technology will reflect engineering and management decisions.

Beyond the observation that, in some general

fashion, the cost will increase with the magnitude,
Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 125

Table 10.—Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion

Total cost a Duration

Objectives (billions, 1984 dollars) (years)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Establish a global information system/service

re natural hazards

Establish lower cost reusable transportation

service to the Moon and establish human

presence thereb

Use space probes to obtain information re

Mars and some asteroids prior to early human

exploration

Conduct medical research of direct interest to

the general publicd

Bring at least hundreds of the general

public per year into space for short visitse

Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,

common-user system/service

Make essentially all data generated by

civilian satellites and spacecraft directly

available to the general public

Exploit radio/optical free-space electromagnetic propagation for Iong-distance

energy distribution+

Reduce the unit cost of space transportation

and space activitiesh

Increase space-related private sector salesh

2

20

2

6

0.5

2

0

0.5

5

0.5

- $40i

10

15, 25

15

5, 25

5, 25

10

25

10

15

25

ab~t~ are for deve[~pment and acqu~sltlon, o~ratfons and maintenance costs are not Included, excePt for some launch and

operations costs noted for objectives 2, 3, and 4.

b15 years t. establish the settlement, and 3 vlsits&ear at $0.1 billlon each (PIUS basic Shuttle launch costs) over the following

c&{~~r&erage, one pro~ evev 3 years and S0.4 billion each.

d$2 billion over 5 years t. establish a life sciences laboratory in LEO, and $0.2 billionlyear thereafter to oPerate it. This

laborato~ could also be used for materials science and other research.

e5 years t. establish a LEO “lodge-habitat, ” and its continuing use thereafter.

f w ~ bllllon~ear In addition to DOD expenditures.

9w:3 bllllon/year for a 15.year technology development effort to reduce space transportation Urlit COSk3.

%hls would also help efforts directed toward the other objectives.

i The actual cost could ~ as high as ~ billion (1984 dollars), if costs exceed Mtial Predictions @ ~0/0

generality, and sophistication of the space capability acquired, it is difficult–indeed, it is impossible, at this time—to estimate the eventual cost

to the Government of addressing these objectives

and obtaining the required infrastructure. A number of the significant infrastructure “cost-drivers”

are presented in chapter 4. Suffice it to say here

that there are a number of factors that could influence the net cost to the taxpayer for acquiring space infrastructure, and many opportunities

to minimize this net cost that could be grasped

by vigorous and imaginative NASA management.

Appendix D speaks to the matter of cost containment.

To this point, only the initial capital cost of LEO

infrastructure has been considered. To this cost

must be added its ongoing operation and maintenance (O&M) costs (and the O&M costs of lunar

infrastructure also); the cost of instruments, furnaces, etc., needed for scientific experimentation

in association with its use; and the interest cost

of any money borrowed to fund the acquisition

program. 7 We must remember, too, that infrastructure eventually becomes obsolete or wears

out, and, since its support services will come to

be depended on, this implies that some form of

amortization and replacement will be called for.

A consequence of the successful attainment of

any or all of these unit cost reduction objectives—and reduction in the unit cost of space

7Any such cost is not allocated (if indeed it were possible to allocate it) on a program-by-program basis. But, in the overall, the more

than $100 billion per year now required to be paid on the Federal

debt is a cost of Government that must be considered by Congress,

at least implicitly, in all of its authorization and appropriation

actions—in the space area as for all others.
126 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

transportation generally—would be to attract and more of its research, development, test, and

more private interest to space activities. NASA, evaluation funds, to the development of truly

in turn, would then be able to apply more scien - “cutting edge” technology in support of its

tific, engineering, and management attention, science, exploration, and other activities.

CONCLUSIONS

To create a truly modern civilian space program, the United States now might well move to

adopt up-to-date, long-term goals in the civilian

space area, and to initiate work on a first family

of specific space objectives to address over the

next 20 to 25 years, If such goals and objectives

were set, the Nation would have a clearer picture of the kind of space infrastructure required

to meet the objectives, as well as the cost and

schedule under which this infrastructure could

be obtained.

The United States would also be able to treat

its publicly supported civilian space program

more explicitly as a direct investment of great potential economic importance, in addition to the

other benefits that it provides. This might in turn

ensure that the program’s public costs would be

prudently contained, that its economic benefits

would be substantially and objectively enlarged,

and that it would serve the broadest public interest.

Finally, if an early, paced transfer of management attention, commitment, and resources takes

place away from further major development and/

or production of Shuttle capability, and if there

is a vigorous and innovative pursuit of Government cost sharing with other countries and our

own private sector, then the 10 objectives outlined here–or others analogous to them–could

be aggressively pursued, and probably attained

relatively soon, within the appropriations now expected to be received by NASA. And the attainment of these objectives would entail the acquisition of much of the in-space infrastructure that

NASA now aspires to acquire. Also, if there is a

continuing increase in extra-NASA payments for

use of Shuttle services, and if the private spacerelated sector succeeds in continuing to grow at

anything like its present rate, thereby generating

rapidly increasing tax revenues, these important

“offsetting” incomes could be taken into consideration by Congress when passing on NASA appropriations.

Indeed, a reasonable extrapolation from present funding circumstances would suggest that, by

the end of this century, our publicly supported

space program could be much larger than it is

today.

It must be emphasized that whether or not, as

a matter of public policy, our tax-supported civilian space program should be allowed to grow

to the magnitudes discussed here as possible is

not an issue addressed in this report. Rather, it

is important to appreciate that, under certain conditions, expenditures for this program could be

considered to be offset to a large extent by revenues, thus giving Congress more flexibility in setting expenditure levels than it has today. An important element of public debate about our space

future, therefore, should be about the allocation

of public, economically related investments

therein—for we need no longer consider our public space expenditures as consumption expenditures that underwrite the salaries of astronomers,

the technologies required for exploring the solar

system, and the intangibles of “space leadership. ”

The promising prospects now in view indicate

what agenda items should be emphasized in public policy considerations of our long-term civilian space interests. For if, over the next quartercentury, we modernize our civilian space goals

and lay out a family of objectives for our civilian

space activities much broader than those usually

discussed; if we determine to focus our Government and private sector skills on building, together, a great commercial-i ndustrial-financial private
Ch. 6— Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 127 .———— .——— -

sector space business in the face of growing in- we can move civiIian space activities into the

ternational competition; if we administer and mainstream of America ’s- indeed, the world's—

manage our space activities with vigor, imagina- interests, reap great political, sociaI, and economic

tion, and statesmanship; and if we take the lead benefits, and very soon begin to have our men

in orchestrating the space interests and activities and women strike out across the solar system.

of all of the friendly countries of the world; then

Phofo credif /Vaflona/ Aeronauf/cs and Space Adm/n/straf/on

Space technology has opened up the entire to observation and scientific research. Satellite (I a joint project

of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, produced dramatic revelations about the characteristics

of other stars in our galaxy.
128 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

FINAL OBSERVATIONS

Congress and the United States will soon have

an unprecedented opportunity to rethink its basic

views and interests in the civilian space area

through the creation, and subsequent endeavors,

of a “National Commission on Space. ” Public

Law 98-361 mandates that such an extraordinary

Commission be formed.

In preparation for doing so, a few observations

should be made about a truly fundamental concern held by many regarding our publicly supported civilian space program–a concern that,

for the most part, goes unvoiced by professionals

associated with this program, but which should

be dealt with in any fundamental reexamination

of it. In so doing, we should keep in mind that

the essential magnitude and character of this program was set a generation ago in response to the

major national security concern raised by the

launch of Sputnik by the U. S. S. R., and subsequent international events and our perceptions

thereof. Thus, the basic nature was set in another

era to serve the needs of that era and, fundamentally, has changed little, even though those needs

have long since been met.

This concern may perhaps best be expressed

in question form: How can the U.S. people and

Government justify, today, continuing to make

such truly great and continuing public expenditures on space related matters perceived by most

of our general public as (however at times interesting, and even exciting) lying well outside of

the mainstream of their personal interests and

concerns, particularly now that our military space

program serves to offset most perceived U.S.S.R.

space-related military “threats,” and during an

extended period of unusual national financial

stringency?

As Congress begins to ponder this question, it

might start by reflecting on an observation made

recently by Freeman Dyson: “ . . . if I look at, say,

Senate hearings and Congressional Committees,

they tend to pay too much attention to scientists.

They’re always talking very much in quantitative

terms and technical details when the problems

really aren’t there. They very seldom ask, ‘Well,

what’s all this good for?’ “ (Emphasis in the

original .)8

In response to this question, many might be

willing, in principle, to give the Government the

“benefit of the doubt” when its leaders point out

(as they have nearly every year for the past dozen,

at least), that eventually such R&D expenditures

will return economic benefits many times over.

While there is a general consensus that, in macroeconomic terms, economic “spinoff” to the private sector has been significant, outside of the

satellite communications area it has not been possible to identify with objective confidence, to

date, that such great economic returns have been

obtained (though there are grounds for hope that

eventually satellite navigation and materials processing in space may also provide significant economic benefits).9 And, of course, the same prospect for economic return could be advanced also

about many other economically related R&D

areas, high technology and not, in which Government expenditures are either essentially zero

or only a very small fraction of today’s annual

$7 billion public civilian space expenditures. So

there is understandable reserve and questioning

about such a response. For most of us, $7 billion

per year is a great deal of money.

Well beyond these kinds of considerations is

the ethical concern of whether or not scientists,

engineers, and managers should be paid so very

well by the public to spend additional large sums

of public funds each year to do such things as

take photographs of distant planets. Many take

the view that, with the immediate, continuing,

and enormous problems faced by hundreds of

millions of people throughout the world, with

millions of U.S. (tax-paying) families having to live

on a truly modest income or, indeed, having to

deal with the lack of employment, with interest

eThe Washington Post, Apr. 9, 1984, P. B-1 1.

9However difficult it may be to quantify the benefits of space R&D,

one can say with confidence that the use of weather satellites has

saved thousands of lives. In addition, the use of surveillance satellites has resulted in savings to the Government that are on the order of tens to hundreds of billions of dollars.
Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 129

payments on our Federal debt now costing us

over $100 billion per year, supporting space research and exploration of this great magnitude

just doesn’t seem to be a sensitive and equitable

use of public funds or even, to some, a particularly decent human avocation.

The more general pro forma response to this

concern, at least in part, is that: “ . . . life is unfair. ” Life is unfair. But most of us would probably agree that we all do have some obligation,

when reasonably possible, to attempt to redress

some of these sobering societal imbalances and

that, at the very least, those who are generously

supported by the public to engage in civilian

space activities should share widely in the discharge of this obligation.

Another general pro forma response is that

most grave and widespread human problems

seemingly cannot be addressed by space-related

activities, any more than they can be by a ballet

production or a walk in a park.

In this assessment the more direct and useful

response is that some of our civilian space program objectives can be purposely selected to see

that space is used, specifically, to make progress

toward important agreed-on societal ends. The

suggested family of 10 conceptual objectives has

been crafted so as to see that some of them speak

directly to a few of the most fundamental human

concerns that space and space technology can

indeed be used to “get at”: better protection from

natural disasters, better communications among

the world’s governments and peoples in our nuclear weapons age, and greater understanding of

physical conditions that affect all of us as we grow

older. They are of such a basic nature as to be

of potential value to “all mankind. ”

And, as well, a basic theme suggested here is

that the publicly supported civilian space program now could be organized and conducted to

a considerable extent as a public investment program in basic science and high technology, and

that its leaders now could be charged, explicitly,

with overseeing all of our public space activities

with a fundamental view in mind: that these activities lead, in both the shorter and longer run, to

the creation of wholly new commercial-industrialfinancial ventures, and to truly large-scale, rapid,

objectively measurable, national economic growth

—with all that this implies for the delivery of new,

useful, public and private goods and services, increased employment, increased deficit-offsetting

tax revenues, and a more competitive international trading position.

And another basic theme is that the U.S. Government could now endeavor to orchestrate the

interests and capabilities, however diverse and/or

small, of all of the friendly peoples of the world

in cooperative civilian space activities.

If the United States does all of these things, and

does them in a truly efficient and productive manner, then we would see space being used, where

space can sensibly be used, both to protect and

to ease the human condition.

With the creation of such major space-related

programs to address such basic human concerns,

and appreciating that most of us the world over,

much of the time, “do not live by bread alone,”

we can in more reasonable conscience also continue to undertake—and even perhaps enlarge

upon—space-related activities that, as well, challenge the human condition: we can strike out

from the Earth for the Moon, 10 for the planets and

asteroids, and indeed fix our eyes on ‘‘distant

stars.

But only if we pay our ethical dues to our fellow

countrymen and women and to “all mankind”-

and only if we meet our financial obligations as

we go.

10An OTA Working paper giving the thoughts of six philosophers

on “The Philosophical Implications of Establishing Permanent

Human Presence in Space” is available from the OTA Science,

Transportation, and Innovation Program office.
POSTSCRIPT

This postscript gives the sense of a meeting of members of the Advisory

Panel held in November 1983 at the Aspen Institute’s Wye Plantation. The document was prepared by E. B. Skolinoff, and carefully reviewed by the participants. Certain exceptions expressed by participants are noted within the text.

The preparation of such a document by an OTA Advisory Panel iS an unusual act ion; Advisory Pane Is are seIected to represent a wide cross cross-section

of informed opinion, and serve only to give guidance and review to an OTA

assessment. In this case, however, the people I i steal below chose to go beyond

the traditional role, and express their own views directly. Panel members have

also been given the opportunity to fulIy review and comment on the fulItext

of the report itself.
REPORT OF THE SECOND ADVISORY PANEL MEETING

Held at Aspen-Wye Plantation in November 1983

by

Professor E.B. Skolnikoff

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Participating Panel Members*

Robert A. Charpie, Chairman

Harvey Brooks

Peter O. Crisp

Freeman Dyson

James B. Farley

Charles E. Fraser

Andrew j. Goodpaster

Charles Hitch

Bernard M. W. Knox

George E. Mueller, Jr.

Carl Sagan

Eugene Skolnikoff

James Spilker

The panel was asked to consider the proposal

for a manned civilian space station in the light

of the development of the Nation’s space activities generally, and of possible future civilian activities and goals in space. The panel approached

this task first as a broad enquiry into future objectives in space and how the proposed space

station relates to those objectives. The results of

that enquiry made it inappropriate for us to er-tgage in a more detailed evaluation of the current

space station proposal.

As background for our conclusions, we need

to note that the panel believes U.S. civilian space

activities are and should be of high value to the

Nation domestically and internationally. The

country has a variety of motivations behind its

space commitments—-political, psychological,

scientific, technological, economic—all of which

have validity and importance. In particular, in

looking to the future, the panel believes it essential that the program should come to represent

again the sense of exploration and adventure, the

energizer of both technological and institutional

innovation, the source of outward-looking na-

*The participants are [n general agreement with this summ~rv

ot cone [us ions, although some members may not necessarl Iy cn -

dorw all the details or the phrasing of certain statements.

tional pride that captured our imagination, and

that of others, in its first two decades. Those characteristics can be achieved in different ways, not

necessarily correlated to the magnitude of the

space budget. We also believe there should be

ways that the program can be used more effectively as an instrument for peace and cooperation

in a world in which the environment of space is

threatening to become one more arena for military competition.

Our conclusions are as follows.

I. Current Space Station Proposal*

The panel has major reservations about the current NASA concept for a permanent manned

space station and recommends against commitment to such a project at this time. We are quite

certain that a space station of some kind will

eventually be needed. However, the objectives

underlying the current concept seem diffuse and

imprecise. Approval of the proposal now would

tend to lock the Nation’s civilian space efforts into

a large, expensive program that would likely preempt alternative possibilities and programs.

The panel was most concerned about the absence of studies that evidence a larger vision of

space objectives and opportunities, against which

this, or any future space station proposal, could

be evaluated (see 11). A space station should not

bean end in itself, but rather a step toward other

goals. Those other goals, which need to be carefully developed and publicly debated, should

provide a necessary framework for evaluating the

role and usefulness of any proposed design for

a space station.

The panel recognizes that not all possible activities and payoffs can be anticipated, and that

*George E, Mueller dlsa~rees w Ith thl~ conclusion, which he

regards a$ not ~ onstru[ t iie with resi)ect to direct Ion tor NASA, and

Su[)ptjn i~ [’ of unnecessary study. t+ e does a~ree w Ith the need to

make the i[)acc itatlon a step to a lon~-ra n~e goa 1, and would sup

[mrt ,i\kl n~ NASA to de~lgn a t,Ic I lit} to ~upport such a program

133
134 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

unexpected opportunities emerge in the course

of developing a new capability. And the panel

accepts the validity of the desire to take advantage of the capabilities offered by the Shuttle. But

some of the immediate functions envisioned for

the proposed space station (exploring near-Earth

applications, for example) can be evaluated without much, or any new infrastructure in space, in

fact, by imaginative uses of the Shuttle; and a

more fully thought-out station keyed to longerrange objectives would be more likely to stimulate innovation and imagination.

Moreover, the station as envisioned would appear to have little payoff either for development

of new technology (see III), or for the politicalpsychological benefits at home and abroad we

have already indicated should be given substantial weight (see also Xl).

The development of a habitable space station

to gain expertise of people in space is an important argument, but also one with little present

basis for evaluation. We have seen no analysis

of the differential costs of a manned v. an unmanned facility, nor an analysis of the opportunity costs of that differential. It is important that

it be understood that the panel does not argue

against man-in-space per se (the Shuttle may provide a good portion of that experience), but rather

that a better rationale than has been provided us

is required for a goal worthy of attainment.

Il. Analysis Capability

The lack of studies analyzing long-term space

goals and opportunities was striking to the panel.

There were not even studies available that laid

out possible alternatives to the current proposal.

Without these, the panel felt it was not possible

to sensibly evaluate the scale, nature, cost or purpose of a manned civilian space station. An initial “goals” paper prepared by OTA staff represented a start toward the kind of studies that are

needed.

The panel believes this situation is deeper in

its significance than simply whether adequate

studies had been conducted before the space station proposal was put forward. NASA has been

positively discouraged by successive administrations from engaging in or sponsoring much forward thinking, presumably to discourage the

emergence of costly ideas or prevent the appearance of lobbying. One result is that apparently

little capability exists within NASA, and essentially

none outside, able to carry out on a continuing

basis the kind of informed, analytical, critical

studies that any major program area ought to

have. The need is acute.

We have considered various options for creating such a locus for the professional study of

public policy questions relating to the civilian

space program and wouId make several observations. Clearly, NASA should have a larger internal capability for long-term analysis, but that

alone would not be adequate for obtaining objective outside views or for establishing public

credibility. The Administrator of NASA could, and

we believe should, serve as a sponsor of such

studies, perhaps working through a broadly based

advisory committee to enhance objectivity and

credibility. We recommend that early consideration be given to a long-term program of support

of studies in the private sector (analytical organizations, commerce, industry and universities)

that would build a community of knowledgeable

analysts of the Nation’s space activities, analogous to that which has been developed in other

areas such as energy and the environment.

Such a program of studies also implies a more

open planning process and the concomitant continuous rethinking of NASA objectives that go

with that openness. This process can provide an

opportunity for more extensive engagement of

the private sector (see Vi), an objective we

believe should be high on NASA’s agenda, and

can engage the interest of constituencies not

already deeply involved in the space area.

Ill. R&D

A major factor in evaluating a proposal for the

next step in the space program should be the contribution that objective will make to the development of new technology. The panel does not

believe the civilian space station as proposed is

likely to have as significant a technology-forcing

effect as should be required from a program that

would be the centerpiece of the space agency’s

activities for close to a decade.
Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting ● 135

———

In fact, the situation is more serious, for advanced technological development has been

severely cut back in the space program since the

early days of the Shuttle program. Key technologies that wouId be necessary for later missions,

such as advanced space propuIsion systems or

machine intelligence and robotics, have not been

adequately (or at all) supported because of fundding limitations. Even technologies to fully exploit

current space applications have been relatively

neglected. The current proposaI for a civiIian

space station would generate little such technology development and, more than likely, would

prevent funds being available for such programs.

Yet, those technologies represent what should be

major payoffs of space activities and the central

features of future space activities

Accordingly, we recommend that NASA engage in the conscious development of seminal.11

technologies that are Iikely to form the bui!ding

blocks for future space goals. This should be carried out in close cooperation with industry, rather

than wholly in-house, with the Government stimuIating private-sector ventures and financing

where possible. The model of the highly successful relations between the National Advisory Com -

mittee for Aeronautics (NACA) and industry for

aeronautical technology could well be followed

by NASA for space technology development.

IV. Immediate Alternatives to a

Space Station

In recommencing deferral of the proposed

NASA civilian space station commitment, we do

believe other steps should be taken. Two of high

priority are given above: begin analyses of possible long-term space goals, and design a program

of technology development. In addition, some

of the stated purposes of the proposed space station could be explored with the existing Shuttles.

In particular, the possibilities and viability of manufacturing in space, repair of low-Earth-orbit

space satellites, and much scientific research can

and should proceed with present capabilities and,

if indicated, their modest improvements. Such

programs can provide necessary information to

judge more definitively what the real needs are

to carry out those functions on a continuing basis.

It makes little sense to make major commitments

to an expensive large-scale facility if already existing capabilities remain underexploited because

of shortage of funds,

I n any programs undertaken in the near term,

however, it is important that they not be allowed

to develop a Iife of their own that prevents more

desirable aIternatives, or interteres with other

ongoing programs of great importance, such as

those i n space science.

V. Long-Term Mission Possibilities

The p,inei di~c us~ed w)m~~ ~x)s>i ble Iong-term

a c- t i v i t i es t h (~ t < (~t i \ti (c( ! s o m e ot t h [’ ( r i t ~~ r i a Ji { I

believed to 1)~’ im~mrt,lnt: lik.~1) to L t)mrm,]n({

~vi(iwpr(~ad altent i( )n, i n ho r(’ r) t S( i (’ n t i ti( I n t e r c’~t,

technolc)g~ t’(lr( I ng r[> I LIL d n( (‘ to XI o I ){1 I i $~ L] t’~,

\u b~td nt i,i I sixn Iti( .l n[{~ to h t] r II.~ n ~)! ( }t>l[’m 5, $11 lta hi I it y for i rlt~’ rn ,lt i u n d I C-[XJI N I r ,tt i f) n ( >~’<’ V I I i ,1 nd

~)rikate-$c~( t~jr [J,irt i{ i~~<itit)n [~[t~ X), L1’~ I Ilcl\ ~’ tlcll

rx[~rn i ned t h[’~~’ i n d(4{l i I, not f 1( ~ Lt [’ ,](ji [x-{ltt’ ,) n}

~Jc] rtlcu Iclr c hoi~ v T h~~>/ ,] r{) \Ll ~}qt~~t I () 11 \ 01” 1 I) L’

kind~ ()( ~\MC [’ ;(~’i li L$ t> l~t~li(i (.) ~h(~u I(I l~t$ ,] n,i -

ly7ed dnd stu(ji[(l il} (J(~tc]il.

(In<’ c-{]tegor) (Jt ~x~ssii)l~~ gtMl\ L\oLl I{i ini (Jl\ (J

programs (let i~n(~d spvc iticci I 1)’ to cc)rlt ri but(’

knowledge ~]bout ~jres(nt or futur<) pl,~nc’t,ir> ,{nd

human issuc~s. For cx,~m}]l(~, ~)rogram< [{e>ign~[l

to Iearfl mor[) dbout the global ‘‘~rw>r~hou:)~)’

effect that cou Id resu It from dcc u m u I<it i rl~ C a rkndioxide in the atmosphere th rou~ll, ,Inl{)ng

ot h(’ r~, intensive examination ot t h e at m osp h [: w

ot VP n us, which has experienced its own m~~s$ive

C02 ‘‘green house.” Another such goal WOUIC{ be

the study of the effects of Iarge-sc.]le fire, ~olcanic

act ion and d u st storms t h rough ta rgeted stud i es

of the Martian en~i ronment, which is rite ~vith

such events.

More directly Earth-oriented, ,1 [)oi~ible organizi ng focus of an i m portal nt se~ment of’ space

activities cou Id be the detaileci nlon it(~ri ng of the

habitability of our planet on the surface and in

the atmosphere. The substantial hazards anci possible catastrophes lying ahead —COl and other

gas accumulation, ozone depletion, soil depletion, deforestation, desertitication, agriculture dis-

[>.]se \(LJ Iner,]bi I ity, among others—make a major

ciedicatecl program of global monitoring potentially of crucial importance for the future.
136 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

A different kind of goal in space would be to

contribute directly to more generaI research objectives in the life, material, or other sciences. For

example, some of the effects of zero gravity on

the body appear to be similar to the effects of

aging. Are there important contributions that can

be made through space research programs on

aging, an increasingly important social goal for

an expanding global population? Many other

such complementary research targets could undoubtedly be developed and evaluated.

And, of course, there is a long list of possible

scientific goals in space that can be considered:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

unmanned rendezvous missions to an asteroid or comet to provide early solar system

history;

Mars exploration, with unmanned roving

vehicles;

landing on the Saturn moon Titan, which has

a nitrogen atmosphere, complex organic matter and strong evidence of a liquid ethane/

methane ocean;

solar spacecraft able to penetrate some distance into the Sun while sending back information; and

Venus probes.

Longer-term:

6. landing on asteroids, planets or comets with

return of sample material;

7. probes beyond solar system;

8. manned lunar station;

9. manned asteroid station; and

10. manned missions to Mars.

Note, incidentally, that the current space station proposal would not necessarily be the preferred next step for most of these goals.

V1. Private-Sector Involvement

The panel is strongly of the belief that the private sector can be more effectively and extensively engaged in the Nation’s space activities

than it has been to date. For the most part, current involvement has been restricted to a select

group of NASA contractors or subcontractors.

There is need for involvement of a much broader

industrial constituency to elicit new ideas for

space applications and techniques. Not only is

it desirable to engage the innovative and entrepreneurial character of American high-technology industry, but also to attempt to bring down

unit costs of space assets and activities over time,

and to involve consumer-oriented industries in

space applications that may be marketable.

To engage the private sector effectively to

achieve these objectives poses several requirements. Consultation with industry should start

with a broad dialogue on a wide range of possible space goals and mission opportunities, not

with the detailed design of an already-determined

space station.

A second requirement is to develop a clarity

of commitment to activities that signals long-term

interest. Such commitment is necessary to encourage industry to invest its resources of manpower and money in the development of technology potentially useful for those activities. Such

a clarity of commitment should be the outcome

of the joint studies and consultation referred to

above,

A third, with regard to space applications, is

to use either public corporations (perhaps of the

Comsat type) or other institutional innovations

to take over commercial development and exploitation of space technology. NASA is not well

suited to the design and marketing of commercial/industrial systems or services—that is not its

purpose—and simply attempting to hand over an

existing developmental system, such as Landsat,

to the private sector for operation is unlikely to

be viable.

It is also possible that the present structure of

NASA is not well suited to prompt a major increase in private-sector space activities because

of the present large commitment to in-house laboratories (see IX) and present technology procurement practices. We cannot make a definitive

judgment on that, but recommend an objective

evaluation by NASA and by Congress.

VIl. International Cooperation

International cooperation has been a goal of

the U.S. space program from the beginning, but

the panel believes much more could be done.

Cooperation is particularly attractive for future

activities for several reasons: technical competence is more widely distributed throughout the

world than in the past, resource limitations are
Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting ● 137

more of a constraint on all countries, and many

space activities are relevant to all people, not just

Americans.

It is possible that the costs of space activities

could be reduced by genuine joint programs that

enlisted not only the funds, but also the talents

of other nations. Examples, such as Spacelab,

already exist. But for more extensive cooperation,

there must be a commitment for joint planning

at a very early stage, and reasonable guarantees

of program continuation once a commitment has

been made. Past history of American project cancellations in midstream do not contribute to confidence in the United States as a reliable partner.

Near-Earth space applications are of obvious

interest to other countries from a commercial

perspective, but programs for monitoring the

changes in habitability of our planet would provide other common motivations. And, planetary

probes that would potentially provide information relevant to this planet’s concerns—for example, those goals mentioned earlier of improving

understanding of the CO2 greenhouse effect by

studies of Venus, or gaining knowledge of the effects of fire, volcanoes and dust from study of the

Martian environment—would also provide common foci of interest with other countries.

In fact, the potential benefits for all from space

activities should provide a high incentive target

for cooperation even if the other possible benefits

of resource and talent sharing are less clearly relevant. There are also, of course, difficulties inherent in international cooperation, difficulties that

stem primarily from problems of meshing of

disparate bureaucracies and political systems.

There is also the problem that the structure and

incentives in NASA, and more broadly in the

budgetary and decision process in the U.S. Government, do not lead naturally to seeking international cooperation. This, too, is an issue we

believe deserves separate attention by NASA and

by Congress.

It should be noted that there seems to be considerable interest within Western industrial countries in cooperating on the proposed civilian

space station; European countries, Canada, and

Japan are waiting for the United States to decide

what it intends to do. Cooperation, to be really

meaningful, must involve joint planning and

study of alternatives before selection is made. We

recommend a more open set of discussions that

ask what we and other interested countries

should be doing together.

Any military overtones to NASA projects (see

Vlll) will likely have a negative effect on possibilities for international cooperation. Though it

may be possible in practice to separate the military from the civilian interests in specific missions,

it is a problem that we cannot afford to ignore.

There are also potential political benefits to be

gained over time through intimate and extensive

cooperation with others. Cooperation with Eastern bloc countries, and especially the Soviet

Union, will not remove the sources of conflict,

but may be used as an instrument to ameliorate

those conflicts and offer alternatives.

Vlll. Effect of Military Programs

and Interests’

The panel is very concerned about the effects

on the civilian space program of a major new and

enlarged focus on military uses of space. Though

there might be some budgetary competition, the

primary problem would be the competition for

scarce technical manpower and industrial resources. The most qualified personnel would

likely be attracted to the rapidly expanding and

technologically exciting defense sector, and

NASA itself might see some of its best people

leaving.

In addition, such a large-scale military commitment would likely serve to give a military image

to our space activities abroad, where the distinction between civilian and military interests may

not be clear.

International cooperation in the civilian program may also be harder to achieve because of

increased concern in the United States over apparent loss of technology assumed to be critical

for national security. Controls over information

could well be sufficiently onerous as to rule out

some forms of otherwise desirable cooperation.

*To avoid the appearance of possible conflict of interest, members of the panel with past and present involvement in military space

activities did not participate in the formulation of this section of

the report.
138 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

IX. NASA Operations and Organization

The panel did not make any formal evaluation

of NASA’s structure and performance, but a few

observations based on the experience of panel

members and the issues at stake are in order,

some already mentioned.

As has been noted, NASA is not well positioned

for much more extensive cooperation with the

private sector, or with other countries. The specific reasons are different in each case, but the

underlying factors in NASA appear to be: the

pride in past successes achieved by “going it

alone”; the perception of private-sector activities

as competitive with, not complementary to, its

interests; the lack of desire among most scientists and engineers to devote themselves to the

administrative orchestration of multicultural,

multi-political projects; and the large fixed facilities of NASA that inhibit flexibility. All of these

discourage assignment of major responsibilities

outside the organization.

This structure also serves to maintain high fixed

overhead costs in NASA, again discouraging exploration with industry of ways of bringing unit

costs down. It is not clear what cost reductions

would be possible, but it would be difficult to

evaluate the possibilities given the present

structure.

To some extent, the existing structure may also

discourage the development of alternative goal

concepts, and generally inhibit imagination, since

changes in programs may have negative effects

on the present organization.

These observations may be exaggerated, or

should perhaps be balanced by other important

attributes. We urge attention to the issue,

however.

X. International Economic

Competition

International competition in provision of civilian space services has already emerged, primarily with European countries, and is likely to grow

in the future as Japan becomes more heavily

engaged. To some extent, that competition has

been encouraged by U.S. policies that have not

provided adequate guarantees for the future,

such as launch services, or have not been adequately consumer-oriented in systems design and

development (for example Landsat). However,

competition is inevitable, quite apart from U.S.

policies, for advanced industrial nations with

high-quality technological capabilities are likely

to enter any market with economic potential.

Men and women in orbit, utilizing sophisticated

and costly space assets, may be an important capability for U.S. commercial exploitation of the

economic potential for near-Earth orbits, but we

consider that case as not having been demonstrated as yet. In fact, commitment to such a capability could delay exploitation, by preempting

funding and personnel that might better explore

possibilities with industry through use of the present Shuttle capability or its modest extensions.

It could, in fact, be a massive commitment to the

wrong kind of station, even for economic purposes.

There is another aspect of the economic value

of space activities—the spinoff of new technology to the commercial sector. In this respect, as

we noted before, the proposed space station

would likely hold relatively little interest as a

means of developing new technology—especially

in comparison with other feasible goals.

Xl. Geopolitical Competition

The Soviet Union has been conducting a vigorous manned space station program which, notwithstanding some serious mishaps, is apparently

on track. Beyond the continuing exhibition of

space prowess, presumably of important political value to them, the uses to which their capabilities are intended to be put are not clear–

perhaps this is similar to the American situation—

though Soviet Union scientists have often indicated that the long-range goals for their space

program include manned bases on the Moon or

Mars. Regardless of later goals, they have certainly been gaining useful information about people in a space environment (which they share

quite extensively with the United States).

There is a natural reaction in such circumstances that leads to programs undertaken to

“match” the achievements of the Russians, or to

be concerned about the information or experience they have obtained that is not immediately
Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting ● 139

available to us. But, for the United States to

undertake a large-scale program not necessary,

or ill-suited, to our needs is more likely to handicap us in the future in geopolitical competition

with the Soviet Union. Especially is this so in this

case in which the civilian space station goal is

not likely to command dramatic attention or to

lead to important new technology.

Civilian space activities are, in fact, an important arena for international political competition.

The panel’s plea is for the United States to aim

for a goal worthy of attainment from this perspective, as well as from others. The international political effects of visible, dramatic nonmilitary accomplishments are important in presenting an

image of a dynamic Nation able to preserve its

vitality in an open, democratic form of government. Many throughout the world find hope and

encouragement in that demonstration; it is important to us as well as to them.

We note again that competition in civilian

space accomplishments need not rule out the

possibility of some cooperation as well, even with

our primary competitor. The more important the

subject, the greater would be the political significance of cooperation.

We close with reiteration of the panel’s conviction of the importance of the civilian an space

program to the country, and the significance of

the next major steps in space that the Nation

undertakes, Our ideas, our imagination, and our

critical analytical abiIities need to be engaged i n

laying out the alternatives before us just as our

institutions, public and private, need to be appropriately engaged in implementing the decisions

finally made. In the long run, a sustained and effective civilian space program wilt depend on

building a lasting political consensus,a consensus based on informed public debate and understanding of the significant objectives that can be

served by civiIian space activities.
APPENDIXES
Appendix A

RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL NASA STUDIES ON SPACE

STATION USES AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Early in 1982, NASA established working groups to

prepare for and coordinate a planning program to acquire a long-term in-space inhabited infrastructure,

i.e,, a civilian “space station. ” A Space Station Steering Committee at NASA headquarters led a twopronged effort. A Technology Steering Committee had

the task of assessing the current state of technology

and planning any needed development activities for

the program. At the same time, a Space Station Task

Force became the principal planning group to consider types of activities (user needs/desires) to be carried out with any new long-term infrastructure, system physical characteristics, concept development,

and management organization.

To support the Task Force as well as help clarify

various issues involved, NASA authorized a series of

parallel investigations of the potential desires for, and

characteristics of, such infrastructure. These studies

(costing more than $6 million altogether) were made

by eight U.S. aerospace companies (with their associated subcontractors). In addition, the European

Space Agency, Canada, and Japan funded essentially

parallel user studies of their own. Related investigations of possible nonaerospace industry interest in

space use were made by two consulting firms.

Major Findings of the U.S. Aerospace

Industry “Mission Analysis Studies”

In anticipation that the United States could decide

to build a publicly funded, habitable, permanent civilian “space station”, NASA asked eight aerospace

industry contractor groups to perform independent

“mission analysis” studies to indicate what it could

be used for (the desires and/or needs), what capabilities it should have to meet them (its attributes), what

its fundamental characteristics and components might

be like (its architecture), and what costs and benefits

to the Nation might be expected of such a space program conducted over the remainder of the 20th century. Emphasis was to be on the user communities,

national conceptual uses, and general architectures,

not specific configurations.

in essence, they were asked to answer the questions

“If the United States were to acquire an initial civilI The Department of Defense also participated with NASA in these studies,

and paid 5 percent of their cost. For the most part, the studies related to

national security are classified, and no further reference will be made to them

here.

ian “space station “ complex in low-Earth-orbit (LEO)

in the 1990’s, who could use it, how could they use

it, what attributes, capabilities, and types of components should it therefore have, what would it cost,

when could it become available, and what benefits

could its use provide?”

The contractor groups (in each case a prime contractor, usually with several subcontractors) communicated with the individuals, organizations, and insti -

tutions that might be expected to make use of such

in-space infrastructure to ascertain the important present and potential desires and/or needs for it, with emphasis on those uses that would require or materially

benefit from it. They then analyzed these various uses

as a sequenced set of activities, so as to identify and

characterize infrastructure attributes and capabilities

that would be necessary in order to meet them. Sufficient study of major components and architectural options was made to provide reasonable indications of

how adequate infrastructure could be provided.

They next provided programmatic and scheduling

plans in order to predict when various portions of the

program could become operational. Finally, costs of

establishing the overall space infrastructure were estimated and the economic benefits projected that they

foresaw through its use. The companies drew conclusions and made recommendations regarding further

developments.

The eight prime contractors performing these studies

were Boeing Aerospace Co., General Dynamics Corp.

(Convair Division), Grumman Aerospace Corp., Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Martin Marietta Corp.,

McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co., Rockwell International, and TRW. About 20 other high-technology

companies were involved as subcontractors. The final

reports were submitted on April 22, 1983. Their results

have been published in a series of volumes entitled

“Space Station Needs, Attributes, and Architectural

Options.”

The major findings of these contractor studies are

outlined below.

Users and Uses

(Mission Requirements)

The aerospace contractors actively sought out the

interests of potential users of LEO infrastructure in order to project what kind and extent of activities its support assets and services should provide. Users were

141
142 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

categorized under the three broad areas of science

and applications, commercialization, and technology

development.

The fields of astrophysics and solar physics, life

sciences, environmental sciences and Earth observation, materials processing, and communications sciences all offered examples of possible uses of an initial complex. Over the longer term, it could be used

as a base for launching lunar, asteroid and interplanetary research spacecraft. Advantages of having a

human crew were seen in instrument and equipment

servicing (predominantly for Earth observation, plasma

physics and astrophysics) and human involvement in

research (predominantly in materials processing, life

sciences and solar physics). Research in most life

sciences, and some materials and astro/solar physics

was deemed impractical without direct human participation; one contractor concluded that 41 of 75

science activities would benefit from a human presence. The servicing of equipment would produce the

side benefit of seeing instrument assets in space accumulated. Long-term operations would be especially

important to some research.

The permanent infrastructure would include “freeflying” tended platforms to ensure isolation (where

needed) from the possible dynamic disturbance or

contamination of various kinds that might be present

in an inhabited location.

Commercial possibilities were suggested for remote

Earth sensing in the fields of petroleum and mineral

prospecting, and agricultural forecasts; for materials

processing; for on-orbit satellite launching of meteorological, navigation, and communications satellites to

higher, even to geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), and

for satellite servicing (although CEO servicing would

not be possible using the initial infrastructure now envisioned by NASA).

Almost all Earth resources observation from space

currently employs satellites without a crew and their

use will continue; however, the contractors found advantages in using people to select surface locations

to be studied, instruments, and observational parameters. Having space infrastructure also would enable

concurrent multidisciplinary observations, and the

crew would add the flexibility to modify the instruments during long-term observation periods.

The economical processing of some materials under

conditions of near-zero gravity is one of the more intriguing possibilities for eventual commercial exploitation, with such materials as pharmaceuticals, alloys,

semiconductors, and optical fibers as products. (Market demand for each of these products is seen by some

of the more optimistic contractor groups as having the

potential to grow to the multibillion-dollar-per-year

level by the year 2000 if they could be made available at acceptable prices).

McDonnell Douglas Corp. has already pioneered

in exploring the use of the electrophoresis process to

produce pharmaceutical materials aboard the Shuttle. Electrophoresis is a separation process in which

electrically charged particles suspended in a solution

migrate through the fluid in the presence of an applied electrical field. If the particles are of microscopic

or larger size, a common process limitation is a sedimentation of the particles under gravitational conditions. The effective absence of gravitational attraction

when conducted in orbit around the Earth permits the

process of separation and purification of such materials as proteins and pharmaceuticals to proceed at

rates 500 to 1,000 times faster than on the surface of

the Earth.

Several other companies are giving serious consideration to studying and manufacturing materials in

space. However, the contractor groups agreed that the

concept-to-market process generally takes many years,

that a space research laboratory is required, that for

at least some of the studies professionals in situ and

continuous operations are very important desiderata,

and that for most production processes, very large

amounts of electrical power (in present space terms)

would be essential.

Satellite communications is already a 20-year-old,

highly successful, world-wide commercial space enterprise. It is seen as a business that should continue to

expand rapidly. The required technology should move

in the direction of large, dynamically controlled, multiantenna subsystems, on-board switching, and high r.f.

power, for which a “space station” may well be seen

by some as essential (or at least desirable) for efficient

structural assembly and deployment, testing and

check-out, lower-cost transportation to geostationary

orbit—and eventually, perhaps, the servicing of GEO

satellites.

Satellite servicing is seen as enabling resupply and

repair of co-orbiting space vehicles, and those in other

orbits, such as polar or geostationary. In the latter case,

a Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle (ROTV) would be

needed to deploy or retrieve the spacecraft, as (according to several contractors) extensive servicing

would usually by done in, or in the vicinity of, a central “space station” complex.

LEO infrastructure is seen by the contractor groups

as enabling space technology development on all

fronts–developments of interest to materials processing, communications, flight controls, fluidics, large

space structures, on-orbit assembly and test, robotics,
App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 143

etc. All of these would benefit because of the sophistication of the support equipment that could be provided them, the longer time available for work in orbit than is provided by the Shuttle, and the extensive

crew involvement needed, at least for the foreseeable

future, for construction, calibration, and test.

Phased Activities (Mission Sets)

The contractor groups assembled sets of activities

and operations responding to needs and desires expressed by potential users in order to estimate the

assets and services required to support them for varying stay times in space. The preferred orbits were seen

to be a low-Earth-orbit whose plane would be at 28.50

inclination to the Equator (typical of launches from

Kennedy Space Center, FL), a 57° inclination (possible from KSC with a more northerly insertion direction) and a polar orbit (available with launch from

Vandenberg AFB, CA). In some cases, staging to

geostationary orbit or to escape velocity (for lunar,

asteroid and/or planetary flights) would be necessary.

Most of the studies identified several hundred possible uses and desires, a number well in excess of what

might be accommodated during the 1990s. When examined in the context of realistic technical progress,

the likelihood that such uses/desires would actually

develop, and the benefits made available through such

use, etc., the vast majority of those potential uses

could be supported with infrastructure located in the

low inclination orbit of 28.5°. This is exemplified by

a typical distribution of activities shown in table A-1

as recommended by one of the contractor groups. The

activities in this baseline set are noted as being best

accommodated either by attaching them to a central,

inhabited infrastructure complex, or locating them on

free-flying platforms that would be tended only intermittently by crew members.

Inasmuch as some 70 percent or more of the potential needs/desires could be accomplished in the

28.5° orbit, it was the unanimous recommendation

of all the contractor groups that any initial inhabited

infrastructure be located in this orbital plane. Freeflying platforms, either co-orbiting or in polar orbit,

could accommodate most of the remaining missions.

One example of the number of inhabited infrastructure-attached payload elements at any time (socalled station occupancy) is shown in figure A-1, in

which the initial operational capability was assumed

to occur during 1990. The projected activities are seen

to reach a high number quite early in the development cycle.

Functional Capabilities

NASA has recently indicated that it expects proposed new space infrastructure to provide the set of

functions described in chapter 2. One contractor’s

visualization of these functions is given in figure A-2,

while table A-2 illustrates the corresponding attributes

required for space infrastructure designed to accomplish the functions. Translated into physical quantities,

the requirements for power, pressurized volume, crew

size and Shuttle launches are typified by figure A-3.

The initial power needs for the central space complex

of the infrastructure are modest, about 25 kW, but as

Table A-1 .—One Contractor Group’s Mission Set

Attached to central

infrastructure complex

in LEO Free-f I yers

Inclination plane Inclination plane (LEO)

28.5” Polar 28.5° 57” Polar GEO Escape

Science and applicatlons:

Astrophysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Earth and planetary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Environmental observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Life sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Materials processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Commercial:

Earth and ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Materials processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Industrial services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Technology development: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Operations: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

Total mission set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

6 3 1 1

3 1 7 12

4 1 7 4 3

1 2 1

5

1

1

2

7 9 12 14 12 12

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the General Dynamics Corp
144 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure A-l .—One Contractor’s Time-Phased Set of

Activities Involving Work Crews

30

20

10

0

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year

Conclusion: 28.5-deg station captures approximately 92°/0 of

activities involving crews.

SOURCE Based on Informatlon contained in the study led by General

Dynamics Corp

the experiment load increases so does the power requirement. If materials processing in space takes place

on a commercial scale now visualized by some, the

power demands could then become quite large. It is

likely that, eventually, much of the materials processing production would be carried out on platforms with

their own solar array power supplies; they would coorbit with the central complex.

In the view of most contractor groups, an initial

operational crew would consist of some three persons,

with the crew size growing to as many as 8 to 10 in

the mid 1990s. Corresponding pressurized volume for

the crew and some operations might grow from about

200 m3 to 600 m3

.

Five or six Shuttle flights would be required to establish the IOC infrastructure suggested in the studies.

Figure A-2. —A Representative Set of Functional Capabilities

SOURCE Based on in the study led by Grumman Aerospace 
App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 145

Table A.2.—One Contractor’s Estimate of Required

Infrastructure Attributes

Accommodates activities with work crews:

. Micro-gravity

— Life sciences

— Materials processing

— Technology development

● Outward looking

— Astrophysics

● Earth pointing

— Earth exploration

— Environmental observation

Supports free-flyer activities:

● LEO/H EO satellites/platforms

— Emplacement

— Service

— Retrieval

● GEO satellites/platforms

— Emplacement

— Service

● Planetary satellites

— Boost

Provides resources:

● Work crew time

● Power

● Data processing

● Command and control

● Thermal control

● Stable platform

● Pressurized volume

● Exterior mounting

Provides functions:

● Assembly and construction

● Checkout

● Service

● Reconfiguration

● Maintenance and repair

● Transportation

● Storage

SOURCE: Based on Information contained In the study led by the General

Dynamics Corp

Contractors estimated that civilian projects would require six or seven flights per year (fig. A-3). While three

or four supply visits per year by the Shuttle would be

needed for ongoing operations and maintenance

(O&M), these could be partial-load deliveries combined with other loads.

Infrastructure Elements

(Architecture)

It is at the implementation stage that the contractor

groups’ reports suggest quite different approaches to

providing those in-space infrastructure elements

needed to meet the user needs/desires. One conceptual array of components is illustrated in figure A-4.

The central complex would be in communication with

other elements including free flyers, free-flying platforms, a reusable orbital transfer vehicle, the Shuttle

Orbiter, and ground stations via the Tracking and Data

Relay Satellite communications system.

The components suggested by one of the contractor groups for the first central complex are indicated

in figure A-5. A central command/habitability module

provides overall infrastructure command and control,

data handling, communications, and accommodations for a crew of four. (Several of the contractor

groups’ studies suggest three crew members at the

outset.) Directly attached is the energy module where

solar cell arrays and batteries provide electrical power

and its conditioning and storage. (In this illustration,

the energy module is pressurized; some studies suggest that it be mounted externally.) The third, logistics,

module stores and makes available consumables and

equipment delivered by the Shuttle. With only these

three infrastructure elements, a crew could live in orbit satisfactorily for extended periods but would be

able to accomplish relatively little scientific or other

activity beyond those experiments that could be accommodated in the available internal space.

Additional elements shown in figure A-5 are the

airlocks to permit people to move in and out of the

habitability module and to conduct activities in space

(so-called extravehicular activity (EVA)), an astronomy

service pallet to enable mounting of scientific observatory equipment, and a payload service pallet to permit servicing of satellites and such auxiliary vehicles

as an orbital maneuvering vehicle. The final unit suggested for the IOC is a materials processing laboratory.

The continuous power suggested would approach

25 kW (roughly corresponding with the initial level

shown in figure A-3). Inasmuch as the crew accommodations might require about half of this amount,

the power available to users would allow for materials

processing experiments but not for some kinds of

ongoing production.

Other contractor groups would arrange the infrastructure elements differently, with a possible command module separate from an habitability module,

or an operations module combining energy generation and conditioning with a command and control

center and EVA facilities. Some designs would incorporate tunnels or passageways to connect different

modules.

Ten or more subsystems have been suggested to

enable the infrastructure elements to remain in orbit

and function satisfactorily. These are itemized in the

organizational diagram shown in figure A-6.

In accordance with the NASA study directions to

the contractor groups to envision the use of new technology where it would be beneficial, various new

materials and theoretical designs for the subsystems

have been suggested. An example of one contractor

group’s technology recommendations is given in table

A-3; while most items are considered to be currently

available in a useful form, advanced technology would

be required to achieve the improved capability and/or
146 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure A-3.— One Contractor’s Estimate of Resources and Services

90 95 00

Year

I

200

n 1 1 1 I 1 i I I I

“ 1990 1995 2000

Year

8

6

4

I J

o

I I I 1 1 I I I I I

95 00

Year

Shuttle flights

14

12

10

8

6

4

SOURCE Based on !nformatlon contained In the study led by the General Dynamics Corp

reduced weight and Iifecycle costs that it recommends. Some contractors identified standardization

as contributing to cost containment; where no advance in technology appeared necessary, they suggested use of standard available equipment if practical, with space qualification as necessary.

Evolution of the Initial Capability

All of the contractor groups provided plans for evolution from the initial operational capability (IOC) to

expanded infrastructure expected to become available

by the end of the century. One example of infrastructure located in the 28.50 orbit is shown in figures A-7

(IOC) and A-8 (Evolved). The crew would increase

from three to nine, the power would triple, the number of pressurized core modules would increase from

one to five, and the servicing facility would quadruple in size. A similar evolutionary plan including

tended co-orbiting and polar platforms and an ROTV

is shown in figure A-9. A possible co-orbiting industrial platform is illustrated in figure A-1 O, and an initial tended polar platform could appear as shown in

figure A-1 1. Core module commonality was suggested

by essentially all contractor groups in order to promote production cost economy.

Role of a Human Crew

All contractor groups emphasize the importance of

having a human crew. All consider that “sophisticated

machines” (robotics, artificial intelligence, etc. ) will

not be able to provide the desired capabilities that

could be provided by a human crew through the early

1990s. The benefits of having a human crew are summarized by one contractor group in table A-4.
App. A —Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 147

Figure A-4. —infrastructure/’’Space Station”

Costs and Benefits

The cost estimates of design, development, test and

evaluation, and production, of a “space station” complex have been made by each contractor group according to parametric models following a “Work

Breakdown Structure” developed by the joint Industry Government Space System Cost Analysis Group.

Since detailed designs were not part of the study,

predominantly weight-based parameter estimates

were used to arrive at a rough order-of-magnitude estimate for the costs of designing, building and deploying a complex.

Inasmuch as individual contractor groups proposed

different combinations of modules and systems, considerable care is necessary in making comparisons of

costs among them. It will suffice here to note that a

“core” IOC space station in a 28.50 inclination orbit

(i.e., command/habitation capability for a crew of

three or four, power unit, and resupply logistics

modules) was estimated to cost $3.3 billion to $4 billion (1 984 dollars). With appropriate attached pallets

and modules to provide further observation, experi -

ment, and servicing capability, the cost would be $4.5

billion to $6 billion. With a crew of eight or nine, 6 0

kW of power to users, two or three laboratory modules

and expanded servicing facilities, plus two tended

platforms–one co-orbiting and one in polar orbit–

the estimated acquisition cost would be $7.5 billion

to $9 billion. This latter infrastructure array corresponds to the IOC suggested by the NASA Space Station Task Force (SSTF) in June 1983.

The above figures include those Shuttle launches required to place the elements in orbit, but generally

do not include NASA support and program management expenses; OTA estimates that these latter costs

would be another $1 billion to $2 billion if acquired

by NASA in its usual fashion.

An additional ROTV capability cost has been estimated at $2 billion to $3 billion, including both the

LEO basing facility and the operating vehicle. If a new

fuel tanker vehicle were to be developed, it could cost

approximately $1 billion.

The programmatic approach assumed by a number

of contractor groups is that of the use of “protoflight”

construction. One group compared the new method

38-798 - 84 - 11 : 3
148 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure A-5.—One Contractor’s Suggested IOC Central Complex Architecture

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by Rockwell International.

Figure A-6.—A Suggested Central Complex Subsystem Organization

● Power

gen

● Power ● Water

dist reclamation

● Waste mgmt

● Clothing

● EVA

● IVA

● Radiator ● Storage ● Engines ● Data bus

● Transport ● Handling ● Processors

● Interfaces

● Controls/

displays

● Storage

● FLT

software

● Transmitter ● Attitude

● Antenna reference

determination

● Detection/ ● Momentum ranging storage

● Navgation

● Orbit

maintenance

● Structures ● Health maintenance

● Mechanisms ● Habitability &

● Materials crew support

SOURCE Based on information contained in the study led by Rockwell International
App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 149

Table A-3.—One Contractor’s Suggested List of Subsystem Enabling Technology

Subsystem characteristics —

EPS . . . . . . . . . . . . ●

●

●

DMS . . . . . . . . . . . •●

●

●

COMM & TRKNG •●

●

●

EC/LSS . . . . . . . . . ●

GN&C . . . . . . . . . . ●

●

●

Solar array

NiH, batteries

180V dist.

Ada computer language

Fibre optics

Advanced main memory with b/u

battery

Bubble auxiliary memory

S, Ku band subsystems Dish, omni-antennas

TDRS

Simultaneous operation

closed loop

Attitude control

Velocity control

Stabilization

Sensors

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

a technology and techniques adequate

 required for technology

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Enabling technology

Thin cell and higher efficiency

Cell manufacturing processes

Battery development

High voltage component development

Meeting existing Ada schedulea

Low loss couplersa

Develop higher densities

Space qualifications and higher densities

Modulations/cod ing/bandw idtha

Design/develop for application

Acquisition/tracking/data ratea

Radio frequency interference protection

Existing hardware with modifications

Existing hardware with modifications

Existing hardware with modifications

Existing hardware with modifications

Existing hardware with modifications

Key

 Power Subsystem

 Management Subsystem

 —Communication

TRKNG—Tracking

EC/LSS—Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem

GN&C–Guidance, Navigation, and Control

TDRS—Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

SOURCE Based on contained the study led by the Grumann Aerospace Corp

Figure A-7.—One Contractor’s Suggested IOC Central Complex

SOURCE Based on Information contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace Corp
150 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure A-8. —The Same Contractor’s

Added facilities

● Solar array

Suggested Evolved Central Complex

— Assembly/storage

NADIR

SOURCE Based on contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace 

. Typical missions

— Astronomy

— Life science

— R&D

— Satellite & industrial

platform service

— Payload assembly

— Earth observation

Figure A“9.—One Contractor’s Suggested Evolution Plan; LEO, 28.5°

Key

TMS—Teleoperataor maneuvering system ISTO—lnitial solar terrestrial observatory

MMU—Manned maneuvering unit ASTO—Advanced solar terrestrial observatory

RMS– Remote manipulator system ASO—Advanced solar observatory

OTV—Orbital transfer vehicle LSS — Large space structure

SOURCE Based on contained in the study led by Marietta 
App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements • 151

Figure A-10. —One Contractor’s Suggested Free-Flying Industrial Platform

SOURCE Based on contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace 

Figure A-11 .–One Contractor’s Suggested Tended Polar Platform (IOC)

.

SOURCE Based on contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace Corp
152 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Table A4.—One Contractor’s Summary of Benefits of infrastructure Work Crew Presence

Function Benefit Related issues

Maintenance and repair. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ●

●

Real-time mission involvement. . . . . . . . ●

●

Lab operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ●

●

Construction, assembly, test checkout,

modification of large systems . . . . . . ●

●

●

●

Reduced equipment cost ●

Enhanced availability and life

Reacting to unexpected or transient “

events

Discovery, insight, and

understanding

Difficult or impossible to automatea •

Research progress not paced by

Shuttle reflight schedule ●

Difficult or impossible to automatea 

●

Simplify designs compared to ●

complex deployment ●

Stiffen structures

Final test and correction in space

Realizing cost savings potentials

Designing activity and

instruments to take advantage

Lab equipment at “space

station”

Crew skills

Role of EVA

Design to realize benefits

Low-thrust transfer to final

destination

%VIthin the predictable future.

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study lad by the Boeing Aerospace Co.

with that used in the Skylab project. In contrast to the

multiple qualification test, backup, and flight articles

used then, they assume that the first production unit

will be a flight article. Furthermore, they judge that

the large size of modules permitted by the space transportation system (STS) would promote economy of

scale. Finally, they judge that autonomous operation

of the infrastructure would allow significant reduction

in ground support compared to that of Skylab. These

factors lead them to conclude that a “space station”

could be acquired for significantly less cost per pound

than was Skylab. Although it is unclear which precise

spacecraft elements are included, their estimate was

$77,000/kg ($35,000/lb) for Skylab (1984), while they

projected $44,()()0/kg ($20,000/lb) for a “space station.” Their estimate of the cost of the Spacelab is

$220,000/kg ($100,0O0/lb), although this is higher than

that of European sources. (Of course, a “space station” could be many times larger and heavier than

either Skylab or Spacelab.) They estimate that it required 10 percent of the acquisition costs per year for

Skylab O&M, and estimate that a life-cycle-cost designed “space station” would require about 3 percent

per year to operate.

Estimates for operation and maintenance costs of

all the aerospace contractor groups fall within the

range from $150 million to $600 million per year

(1984); about $400 million per year represents a mean

value of these costs for a “space station” accommodating 8 to 10 crew members.

All contractor groups foresee that in-space infrastructure could provide operational performance,

sociopolitical, and economic benefits. The first two

are essentially qualitative in nature: appropriate activities would enable scientific and commercial communities to expand and improve their activities in space.

Some of the technology advances would be expected

to “spin off” to other areas.

Further, they expect that the performance benefits

would accrue from an improved ability to perform inspace tasks, resulting in both an increase of quantity

and improved quality of output. A number of these

are listed in table A-5. In the research and technology areas, the cost of development programs could

be reduced by large factors–some project it to be as

much as 50 percent. Free-flying platforms could enable and promote many commercial projects. A base

for maintenance and repair of in-space equipment on

Table A.5.—One Contractor’s Summary

of Performance Benefits

All mission operatlons:

● Decoupled from Shuttle launch schedule, payload

priorities, and ground delays

Space based ROTV:

• 10,000 kg + useful payload into GEO

● On-demand capability

On-orblt assembly:

Ž Work crew can inspect, work around, and

complement robotics and automation

● Shuttle size limits surmounted

On-orbit technology and R&D:

● Work crew can calibrate, operate, and modify

● True space environment

● Interaction of multiple disciplines and capabilities in

a novel environment will produce synergistic

advances

● Shorter development programs

Sclentific observations:

● Short lived experiments extended

● Work crew can monitor, intervene, replenish, and

update

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the Grumman

Aerospace Corp.
App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 153

an as-needed basis, and scheduled activities such as

resupply and/or removal of manufactured products,

would be provided. The useful life of observation

modules would similarly be enhanced by replenishment of consumables, change of experimental equipment items and their unscheduled repair.

As scientific knowledge is gained there is greater potential to enhance the quality of life. Basic research

results provide some of the background to applied research, where economic and social benefits prospects

become more visible. Improved space-based ocean,

weather, and atmospheric research eventually could

assist in our ability to locate and manage Earth resources, and monitor and control the physical environment. New pharmaceuticals as well as semiconductors and metal products could become available

through space research and processing. Other social

benefits envisioned by one of the contractors are indicated in table A-6.

“Space station’ ’-related economic benefits are

hoped for in at least three ways: research, development, and production activities generally; satellite

servicing; and orbital transfer vehicle operations. The

contractor groups judge that the greatest benefits

should flow from the latter.

Research and development cost reduction through

use of infrastructure support is the most difficult to estimate, but most of the contractor groups concluded

it could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars per

year. One example is that of a lengthy science research project such as that involving the Shuttle Infrared Celestial Telescope Facility that anticipates

some 250 days of use in space. If done in a series of

30-day extended-duration orbiter (EDO) trips, the

associated operating expense is estimated to be about

$3.6 million/day, while if accomplished in a continuous interval in a laboratory there, the cost is expected

to decrease sharply, to $0.4 million/day. Materials

science experiments done in space using a 30-day

EDO might cost $2.9 million per experiment, comTable A-6.—Some Social Benefits Suggested

by One Contractor

. High-technology—a national goal

● Focus for engineering/science education

● Lunar and beyond exploration

• International cooperation

● Unique, sophisticated development facility

• New communication services

● New commercial products and industries — medical,

semiconductor

● New therapeutic, diagnostic techniques

● Enhanced national security

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the Grumman

Aerosp~e Corp.

pared with an estimated $0.6 million per experiment

if done in a long-term laboratory there. One estimate

of the cost of pharmaceutical production, where a

large portion of the expense is in the materials, is that

of some $33 million/kg ($15 million/lb) if done in an

EDO, compared to $18 million/kg ($8 million/lb) if

done at a “space station.” These kinds of cost benefits

could be expected to continue throughout the complete “space station” life of some two decades and,

if realized, could be a significant factor in encouraging the commercialization of space.

Were a Shuttle used to service an LEO satellite, the

price per flight would approach some $20 million,

which is comparable to the value of the servicing for

many such satellites. Using permanent space infrastructure services offers the possibility, in principle, of

reducing this operational cost by perhaps one half.

Benefits expected of an ROTV are related primarily

to its being based in space and its reusability. One of

the study contractor groups estimated that a fully

amortized ROTV service could be provided at a total

cost of about $60 million for a 4,500 kg (10,000-lb)

payload delivered from LEO to GEO. In contrast, a

large expendable upper stage costs some $100 million or more, delivered with its payload to LEO. Thus,

net economic benefit for the ROTV would be some

$4o million to $5o million per flight, and 20 launches

per year could provide a total savings of $1 billion/year.

Figure A-1 2 illustrates the judgment of one contractor group regarding the various kinds of benefits expected of the use of a “space station.”

Regardless of when a positive economic payoff

might commence—always assuming that it does—a

“space station” could be a powerful capability multiplier. Of course, one of the most important benefits

would arise from the conduct of activities which

would be impossible to conduct without it, and activities that we cannot conceive of now.

Conclusions

The aerospace contractor groups that studied potential needs and desires for new infrastructure identified hundreds of activities in the areas of space

science and applications, commercialization, and

technology development that could be carried out utilizing long lifetime infrastructure with accommodation

for a crew to live and work in space. The vast majority

are activities that are possible only with a crew supported by the infrastructure, or ones that would be

enhanced by their presence: they would maximize

R&D performance, especially in the life and materials

sciences, and contribute to economic benefits. No

single activity, or even a few, would be sufficient to

justify its establishment, but the large total number
154 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure A-12.–One Contractor’s Summary of Infrastructure (“Space Station”) Payoffs

Provides significant economic

Equivalent to two additional Orbiters benefit as launch and utilities facility

7

6

5

B$ 4 . +

3

2

1

Extended time on orbit

STS sortie

Free-flyer spacecraft

Spa

stati

o 5 10 20

Time, years

Projected benefits exceed cost

$

Cumulative

cost

Cumulative

benefits

 years

SOURCE Based on Information contained the study led by Martin Marietta Corp

contributing in all functional areas, in the judgment

of the contractor groups, provide reasons to acquire

an extensive permanently inhabited space infrastructure.

All study participants see significant benefits—including such intangibles as national prestige, leadership in space, and economic, performance, and social

benefits connected with scientific research, commercialization, and new technology. Reflecting the broad

range of advantages projected, contractors differed as

to which aspect would be most significant. Planetary

probes, a Lunar settlement, and human exploration

of Mars are considered of great significance in terms

of longer range goals.

It was the unanimous recommendation that the first

infrastructure units should be placed in a 28.50 inclination low-Earth-orbit. All were envisioned as new technology designs and were projected as allowing evolutionary growth with increased size and capability

phased in over an initial assembly period of about 5

years. The smallest unit with adequate volume to

house a crew of three for extended stays and with minProvides long-term capability for

imum experimental and research facilities would consist of a command/habitat module connected to a

solar-array energy module, plus two logistics modules

(for resupply by Shuttle flight). They estimated such

an initial unit’s acquisition cost to be from $3.3 billion to $4 billion (1984). A later complex accommodating eight crew members, 60 kW of power to

users, two laboratory modules, several external payload attachment points and satellite service pallets,

and two tended platforms (co-orbiting and polar) were

estimated to cost $7.5 billion to $9 billion. An ROTV

capability could cost as much as $3 billion more. And

further expansion of “space station” components and

capabilities were contemplated into the 21st century.

These contractor costs accumulate to $10 billion to

$12 billion for the development of the contractorsuggested evolved complex over an approximately 9-

year period to the mid-1990s; NASA support and program integration expense could be another $2 billion

to $3 billion. The contractor “evolved” system is

roughly comparable to the summer 1983 NASA IOC
App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 155

but with the addition of full ROTV capability. (Further

additions that enter, generally, in NASA’s future plans

to the year 2000 would add another $6 billion.)

The contractors point out that, although quite large,

these expenditures may be compared with the approximately $60 billion (1 984) invested in the Apollo program and the estimated equivalent $56 billion spent

for the Salyut-Soyuz project (reported by Interavia for

February 1982), each over a somewhat comparable

period of time. While the study contractor groups concluded that these estimated costs could be contained

within a NASA budget projection that maintained

today’s level of appropriation over a 10-year period,

they recognize that some cost-offsetting economic return on this public investment is necessary.

While the prospects for cost containment and other

intangible benefits are considered to be promising,

two operational factors are pointed out as the main

sources of large, quantifiable economic benefits. One

is the use of an LEO-based ROTV system to transport

equipments between LEO and higher orbits, including

GEO. The other relates to the fact that appropriate infrastructure would result in maximizing the STS load

factor for each flight. The contractors project a reduction in costs for these activities of up to $10 billion

over the system lifetime. Income could result from increased commercial space development fostered by

the lower cost of space activities and faster conduct

of research activities generally.

A final comparison may be made regarding other

long-duration “space stations” of the past and present:

Skylab and Salyut. As orbiting spacecraft accommodating crews, at first glance they appear to be fundamentally similar. But, while all three could function

as space test and laboratory facilities, the contractors

note that the proposed “space station” is the only one

providing for satellite servicing. And neither Skylab nor

Salyut offered the assembly and transport harbor envisioned for a new “space station. ”

Major Findings of “Mission Analysis

Studies” of Other Countries

Related studies were also requested of potential

foreign participants in any “space station” program.

In terms similar to the eight U.S. aerospace contractor group studies, the European Space Agency (ESA),

the National Research Council of Canada, and a Japanese Space Station Task Team (representing numerous organizations in Japan interested in aerospace

activities) prepared studies. In addition, individual

companies or groups of companies from these regions

presented reports of elements or subsystems of special

interest to them. Among these were Dornier of Germany, Aerospatiale of France, Spar Aerospace of Canada, and a group of European companies consisting

of AEG, British Aerospace, Fokker, and CIR.

European Space Agency

The member nations of the European Space Agency

(ESA) authorized a study team which was directed by

MBB/ERNO and included Aeritalia, Matra, British

Aerospace, Dornier System, SABCA, BTM, and KAMPSAX. It examined European interest in providing elements and the likely consequences of utilizing a

“space station” having crew capabilities.

Especially emphasized was ESA’s desire to participate actively in the program, both in the design and

construction of components (e.g., logistics modules,

free-flying platforms, laboratory modules, and equipment and servicing pallets) and in the later operations

(e.g., access on a continuing basis for experiments,

identification of payloads and operational requirements, and provision of crew members).

The study assessed participation as offering potential benefits to European nations in scientific, technological, industrial, economic, operational, and political areas. European contributions were seen as based

upon their own set of potential user interests, on systems with clean interfaces with other infrastructure

components, and on the utilization of developed European technologies (specifically Spacelab). Perhaps ESA

could provide “dedicated modules” with preferential

conditions for European users to compensate for European investment. Participation would be particularly

cost effective to ESA if all of the infrastructure were

available to it without a major program on their part

to obtain it, so that it would be complementary with

rather than competitive with European unmanned

systems.

The study team identified about 130 activities that,

conceptually, European countries desire to carry out

in space. Similar to the projections of the U.S. contractor groups, they included materials processing, life

sciences and bioprocessing studies, space science and

applications, and technology development. An innovative use was that of entertainment, such as filming

of space movies and creation of new artistic forms in

space.

ESA recognized the possibility of free-flyers as a supplement to a “space station” for Earth observation and

space science, but noted the advantages (over an expendable booster) of the Shuttle and additional inorbit infrastructure; this combination would involve

less costly hardware, provide return transportation as

needed, and obviate the necessity of bringing a complete spacecraft back to the surface for servicing.
156 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

The need or benefit from human involvement in

about 70 percent of the proposed activities was

stressed. Among these were life sciences experiments

and the servicing of satellites such as the EURECA

vehicles that are under design in Europe. Power needs

identified for users were in the range of 20 to 30 kW.

Canada

The National Research Council of Canada expressed

a high degree of interest. The Canadian report identified about 37 potential uses and desires, largely in

the areas of remote sensing and technology development. Most could be carried out at an orbit inclination of 28.5° with 5 kW of power. Many uses would

benefit from having a human crew, and a Canadian

astronaut as a payload specialist was proposed.

Continued development of the SPAR Remote Manipulator System is anticipated along with new work

on associated construction and servicing subsystems.

Also, Canada would develop a space vision system

to facilitate ranging and docking, and consideration

is being given to advanced remote sensing subsystems.

In a separate report, Spar Aerospace Limited outlined its capabilities in high-power solar arrays and indicated interest in building one of a modular type;

various concepts were given but no cost estimates.

Japan

The Japanese Space Station Task Team reported

long-term, across-the-board interest. While few specifics regarding individual experiments were given,

they anticipated uses for astronomy, life sciences,

materials processing, technology development, Earth

observation, space energy research, and large communications satellite assembly. The majority of these

would require or benefit from human presence, with

long time on orbit and human judgment and/or operating capability as important factors. They anticipate

that space activities would involve two general phases—

one up to the middle 1990s to develop methods to

be capitalized on thereafter.

The Japanese would be interested in developing

almost any or all elements of the space infrastructure,

from attached modules to the ROTV. They suggest

starting with simple standard modules and enlarging

the capabilities for various additional needs.

Individual Foreign Company Interests

Extensive studies were made by several European

companies or industrial groups to augment the reports

discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. A

submission of Spar Aerospace Limited has already

been discussed in the section on Canada; others are

presented here.

DORNIER

Dornier of Germany investigated several conceptual infrastructure elements for ESA which have an obvious relation to a potential later participation of Europe in a U.S. program. The conceptual elements

analyses included:

1.

2.

3.

‘requirements and technology aspects for space

pointing systems;

designs and capabilities of heat pipe radiators;

and

life sciences experiments and development of life

support systems.

AEROSPATIALE

Aerospatiale of France studied the following areas:

1.

2.

3.

General infrastructure concepts, along with their

evaluation of the eight U.S. contractor group architectural designs. The contractor group studies

were noted as having numerous advantageous

design features, but in each case several difficulties are foreseen.

Concepts for a Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle were studied with special consideration of its

fuel storage arrangements.

Designs of a Teleoperator Maneuvering System

were-studied. It would incorporate solar arrays

to provide electrical power.

AEG, BRITISH AEROSPACE, FOKKER, CIR

This group of European companies analyzed power

sources employing solar energy arrays, comparing

planar and concentrator designs and various supporting structure arrangements. A flexible-blanket, retractable, fold-out array was favored for further study. This

approach also lends itself to stepwise growth to power

levels as great as 250 kW.

MBB/ERNO, AERITALIA, BRITISH AEROSPACE,

DORNIER SYSTEM, SABCA, BTM, KAMPSAX

MBB/ERNO, the leader of this group of companies,

was also the principal contractor for the general ESA

“space station” study. Thus, much duplication occurs

in this report of the summary appearing earlier in this

chapter.

Considerable emphasis was put upon the possibility of the Spacelab and EURECA spacecraft being used

as infrastructure elements.

Modifications of Spacelab could provide combined

habitation/laboratory functions in conjunction with an

EDO vehicle. A crew of three could be accommo-
App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 157

dated, but this would result in a decrease in laboratory space compared to the present Spacelab design.

EURECA would first be used as a Shuttle-tended unpressurized free-flying platform. Later development of

a resource/service module incorporating solar electrical power, environmental control, and life support

systems would enable an increased capability in association with the developed Spacelab and the EURECA

platform. Ultimately these elements could, with others,

become components of a larger, more permanent

space infrastructure.

Also, a Spacelab with its own solar array could be

a free-flying experiment module which could be

tended by a crew that would visit for a few hours at

a time.

They also indicated a European consortium was prepared to develop and produce an ROTV and its

hangar facility, a Teleoperator Maneuvering System

(labeled by Matra as a Teleoperated Service Vehicle),

and the satellite service and assembly infrastructure

segments.

No specific estimated costs were given. However,

six items (a free-flying, tended, experiment module,

a logistics module, a free-flying platform, an unpressurized logistics resupply carrier, a teleoperator maneuvering system, and a thermal control technology

development program) could be achieved over a 1s

year period at funding levels aggregating about $1.6

billion (1984). While direct comparison with estimates

made by U.S. aerospace companies is difficult because of numerous design and capability differences,

this cost could be lower than, but of the same order

of magnitude as, the estimate for a corresponding set

of modules by the American contractors.

The study observed that pressurized modules would

sometimes be needed for experimental reasons even

if human habitation were not a consideration, and this

would affect not only the design but also the operation of such modules.

The study team recommended that development

should proceed in phases with the initial phase using

proven existing elements. Automated processes should

be preferred for routine work, but cost effectiveness

must always be considered, inasmuch as automation

can be costly.

This study, representing companies from many

European countries, was oriented to identifying potentially produceable infrastructure elements, not

overall concepts. This emphasized Europe’s intention

to play an active role in development and operation,

not simply provide hardware. The candidate elements

would satisfy their user needs and have clean interfaces with the other elements of space infrastructure.

This would not only put Europe in a position to operate their facilities, but also enable them to be offered

to the United States, thus allowing a sharing of resources and reducing the financial involvement of participating nations,

Summary

The universal attitude of all non-United States organizations is one of enthusiasm to participate in a space

infrastructure program, not just to develop and build

elements of it, but to be active as partners in the operation and use of its facilities, especially the elements

that they would produce. Many of them look upon

it as fundamental to their future role in space and

therefore want long-term understandings or agreements with the United States. The characteristic note

is one of desired international cooperation in which

there is true participation throughout rather than

simply shared eventual utilization.

NASA Synthesis of the “Mission

Analysis Studies”

NASA assembled the United States and foreign mission analysis reports relating to a civilian “space station” and held a workshop during May 1983, to synthesize the results. Of the hundreds of projects and

experiments proposed by potential users, the workshop of the Requirements Working Group and the

SSTF Concept Development Group established a minimum time-phased “mission set” (for the decade from

1991 to 2000) of 107 specific space activities, plus four

generic industrial service activities (e.g., satellite

servicing).

Of the 107, 48 were categorized under science and

applications, 28 under commercial, and 31 under

technology development. The four additional commercial opportunity activities would be continuously

available as needed for industrial servicing.

The NASA working groups judged the list of activities to be realistic in terms of maturity of experimental

and program planning, scientific need, and progress

of technology development. The programs identified

for the first 3 years were particularly well validated

in their view. At the end of the workshop, their recommendations of the minimum capabilities required

at IOC were as follows:

1. Space station central complex at 28.50:

● 55 kW of average electrical power to users;

● Two 60 m3 laboratory modules (for materials

processing in space and life sciences);

● 5 person crew (4 for payload operations);

● 300 MBPS data rate; and

• 4 to 6 payload attachment mounts,
158 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

2. Polar platform (unpressurized):

● 12.5 kW of average power;

● 300 MBPS data rate; and

• 4 payload attachment mounts.

Nonaerospace Industry Interest

in Space Use

NASA contracted with the Booz-Allen & Hamilton

and Coopers and Lybrand consultant firms to communicate with a variety of nonaerospace companies

to ascertain (and at the same time stimulate) interest

in the use of space facilities for commercial purposes.

Up to March 1984, they discussed prospects with upwards of so companies of which more than 30 expressed active interest. To most of these firms the concept of doing business in space is utterly foreign; a

great deal of exploring with them is necessary to surface possibilities of products or services that might be

compatible with their commercial activities and offer

promising opportunity of eventual financial success.

Booz-Allen & Hamilton reported to a conference in

mid-1 983 that most of the companies moving toward

negotiation of Joint Endeavor Agreements with NASA

are well-known U.S. industrial firms (one with an announced agreement is the 3M Corp.) but several are

from the small business sector or Europe. Interest is

concentrated in such fields as chemicals, metals,

glasses, communications, and crystals. Another type

of enterprise being actively pursued is a fee-for-service

laboratory in space. Among the half-dozen companies

actively investigating space experiments, most are interested in crew-tended operations rather than remote

or automated procedures.

Since the administration’s authorization of a “space

station” program, interest among several companies

has become more firm, according to those involved

in the study; the 3M Corp. has recently announced

a Memorandum of Understanding with NASA to begin

space experiments on inorganic chemical materials

and on thin films. An executive with one company

with experience in aerospace has indicated that the

Government’s funding toward eventual acquisition of

permanently inhabited space infrastructure is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to convince industries that the United States is serious about space

commercialization. He considers that, in addition, a

long-term commitment to supporting the commercialization effort is what will suffice to bring the private

sector into full participation.

Some industry observers point out that the oftenmentioned example of how communications satellites

became a commercial success is not necessarily relevant to today’s efforts at space commercialization in

other areas. First, there was already a clear market for

the improved communications services which a private organization was created to provide, something

which is not clearly evident today is such areas as

materials processing in space or remote sensing. Second, the enabling legislation to move it forward to

reality was motivated by the need to create an international system, while today’s commercialization

issues concern primarily U.S. domestic businesses.

The barriers that Booz-Allen & Hamilton found to

wider interest in commercial space enterprises were

technical, economic, and government-related. First,

technical knowledge of the space environment by

many industries is very scanty, while in general there

are too few answers as yet to the behavior of many

kinds of materials in space. Second, economic risks

associated with timing and cost of space experiments

are looked at by private enterprise from the standpoint

of the expected long payback period (1 O or more

years). Third, the maze of government bureaucracy

to be faced to obtain approval on such things as Joint

Endeavor Agreements is deterring some, especially

small companies, from entering into space business.

Booz-Allen & Hamilton is recommending establishment of some form of permanent intermediary to assist

nonaerospace companies in contacts with NASA and

other Government agencies.
Appendix B

THE EVOLUTION OF CIVILIAN IN-SPACE

INFRASTRUCTURE, I. E., “SPACE STATION,”

CONCEPTS IN THE UNITED STATES*

Introduction

Almost from the first time humans thought about

leaving the surface of this planet, one theme has been

the creation of some form of human outpost in space.

In fiction, and during this century in increasingly specific engineering detail, the “space station” concept

has been extensively discussed. In one of the two major space-faring nations, the Soviet Union, a fairly

rudimentary but still very capable “space station” program, centered on the Salyut spacecraft, has been ongoing since 1971. In the other space power, the

United States, the development of some kind of permanent presence i n space to support space activities

i n an efficient and effective manner, is now u rider

way.

This appendix reviews those past occasions, with

particular attention to the rationales offered at various

times for space infrastructure development and to the

differing concepts which have been proposed. History can cast a useful perspective on current policy

alternatives, which, after all, reflect the continuation

of a long-running debate over the justification for infrastructure of various characteristics, size, and cost.

By sketching the earlier points in the history of the U.S.

space program at which a “space station” has come

under serious consideration as a major project, only

to be rejected in favor of some other alternative, it may

be possible to identify what is now different, and what

is not, that might now lead to a more favorable evaluation of various proposals.

Earliest Space Infrastructure

(i e., .. “Space Station” Concepts)t

The first proposals for “space stations” conceptually

akin to modern schemes appeared in the late nineteenth century. Konstantin E. Tsiolkovsky’s Dreams of

Earth and Sky and the Effects of Universal Gravity

(1895) and Kurd Lasswitz’s On Two Planets (1897) set

*This paper was prepared for OTA by John Logsdon, based In part on

orlglnal material by Alex Roland,

I Much of this section IS based on papers by Frederick 1. Ordway, I I 1, ‘‘The

History, Evolutlon, and Benefits of the Space StatIon Concept, ” presented

to the XIII International Congress of the History of Sctence, August 1971;

and Leonard David, “Space StatIons of the Imaglnatlon, ” A/AA Studenf)ourna/ VOI 20, No, 4, winter 1982/1 983.

the tone by picturing “space stations” as stepping

stones for trips by people to the planets, especially

Mars. Like these earliest contributions, succeeding

proposals included fiction and nonfiction, humanism

and science, practicality and fancy. They were sparked

by an unbridled enthusiasm for spaceflight and a firm

belief that exploration of the planets was human destiny. Most were informed enough to realize that direct ascent from Earth to interplanetary space was not

technical y attractive. “Space stations” were way stations, logistics depots on the way to the planets.

Tsiolkovsky in 1923 wrote of a station placed “at

a distance of 2,000 to 3,000 versts (a Russian unit of

distance equal to 0.6629 mile) from the Earth, as (an

artificial) Moon. Little by little appear colonies with

supplements, materials, machines, and structures

brought from Earth.” In his 1923 book, The Rocket

Into Interplanetary Space, space pioneer Herman

Oberth first described an orbiting manned satellite as

a “space station, ” and proposed that it could be used

as an Earth observation site, world communications

link, weather satellite, or orbital refueling station for

outward-bound space vehicles.

The early proposals resulted in more words than

hardware. The only group of “space station” advocates to make progress toward realizing their dreams

were the members of the German Rocket Society,

among whom the “space station” concept became

common currency. 2 But even they could only muddle along on rocket research with the limited private

funds at their disposal until military support prompted

by the approach of World War II brought on the financing necessary for research and development that

would lead to spaceflight. Wernher von Braun and

his associates built the v-2 rocket for the Wehrmacht

in order, they said later, to achieve their real goal—

the development of spaceflight. Whatever their motives, after the war they brought to the United States

the most advanced rocket technology in the world and

schemes for “space station” and interplanetary flight

that had been sparked and nurtured by the romantic

enthusiasm of the first half of the 20th century.

‘Barton C. Hacker, “And Rest As On a Natural Station: From Space Statton to Orbital Operations In Space-Travel Thought, 1985-1951 ,“ unpublished

paper, NASA History C)tlce ArchIves (hereafter NHOA), Washington, DC,

p 9.

159
160 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

In the United States in the years immediately following World War II, both scientists and military leaders recognized that the ability to launch payloads into

orbit would have important implications for their particular fields of activity. In considering the various uses

to which space might be put, several lines of development emerged. First, to the concept of “space stations” with human crews as stepping stones to the

planets was added the less dramatic but more realizable concept of relatively small Earth satellites, not

to send men to other celestial bodies but to perform

practical, Earth-oriented tasks in orbit: communication, scientific research, reconnaissance, etc. j

Second, further consideration led some to conclude

that bases in orbit were “not necessary for most activities envisioned there: rendezvous of the rockets and

satellites themselves is sufficient to most purposes. ”4

But this perspective and its appearance in the literature

did nothing to deter a third line of development: the

elaboration of earlier concepts of “space stations, ”

perpetuated in this era most spectacularly by Wernher

von Braun’s concept of a toroidal “space station. ”

Von Braun’s ideas received wide publicity in a Collier’s magazine special titled “Man Will Conquer

Space Soon.” Von Braun claimed that “scientists and

engineers now know how to build a station in space

that would circle the Earth, 1,075 miles up . . . .If we

do it, we can not only preserve the peace but we can

take a long step toward uniting mankind.”

Von Braun’s plan called for a triple-decked, 25-ftwide, wheel-shaped station in polar orbit which would

be a “superb observation post” and from which “a

trip to the Moon itself will be just a step.” The main

element of space infrastructure would be accompanied by another: a free-flying observatory that would

be tended by a crew.

Von Braun noted that the station would not be alone

in space; “there will nearly always be one or two

rocket ships unloading supplies near to the station. ”

“Space taxis” or “shuttle-craft,” as von Braun described them, would ferry both people and materials

from the rocket ships to the station itself.

Von Braun noted a number of uses for a “space

stat ion”:

● “a springboard for exploration of the solar

system”;

‘R. Carglll Hall, “Early US. Satellite Proposals,” Tec/rno/ogy and Cu/fure,

vol. 4, 1963, pp. 41 O-434; and Arthur Clarke, “Extraterrestrial Relays: Can

Rocket Stations Give Worldwide Coverage?” W/re/ess Wodd, October 1945,

pp 305-308.

4Harry E. Ross, “Orbital Bases, ” )ourna/ of fhe British /rrferp/anetary Society,

vol. 9, 1949, pp. 1 -19; Kenneth W. Gatland, “Rockets in Circular Orbit, ”

)ourna/ of the British Interplanetary Society, vol. 9, 1949, pp. 52-59.

‘Wernher von Braun, “Crossing the Last Frontier, ” Co//ier’s, Mar, 22, 1952,

pp. 25-29, 72-74.

● “a watchdog of the peace”;

● a meteorological observation post;

● a navigation aid for ships and airplanes; and

● “a terribly effective atomic bomb carrier. ”

This detailed description was only one of the many

concepts developed in the years after World War II

but prior to the 1957 launch of Sputnik and the formal beginning of the Space Age.6 Even before the

United States had an official civilian space program,

most of the possible uses of a “space station” had

been identified by visionaries who dreamed of space

travel,7

The Response to Sputnik, 1957-618

Sputnik changed the context for U.S. space activities. In spite of President Eisenhower’s attempts to

avoid it, a space race with the Russians was on. All

kinds of proposals that would have been laughed from

the stage in earlier years were put forward in deadly

earnest. Many at home and abroad perceived the

United States as having fallen behind the Soviet Union

at least in this sophisticated technology, and nothing

but a crash program would do.

Having people in space is the most complicated and

the most dramatic of space activities, and it quickly

became the focus of the competition. News that the

Soviets were considering a “space station” of the von

Braun variety fanned the enthusiasm in the United

States for a like undertaking and underlined the military overtones of the space race.9 As one observer put

it, “the rapid and timely completion of the Military

Space Station will do much to bring about space

supremacy (italics added) for America and lay the

scientific foundation for the aerospace power of the

future.”

10

But this was not to be. In spite of all that the military had done to pioneer research in spaceflight, President Eisenhower opted for a civilian space agency, the

bThe detailed description in the von Braun article should not be confused

with a detailed design. For two early detailed designs, see: 1 ) “Assembly of

a Multl-Manned Satellite, ” Lockheed Missile and Space Division, LMSD

48347, Dec. 18, 1958 (available in the archives of the National Air and Space

Museum of the Smithsonian Institution); and 2) “A Modular Concept for a

Multi-Manned Space Station, “ in the IAS Proceedings of the Manned Space

Stat/on Symposium, Apr. 20-22, 1960, pp. 37-72.

7See, for example, the IAS report, op. cit.

8Thls history is recounted in John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the

Moon Project Apollo and the Nat/onal Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,

197o), ch, 2; and W. David Compton and Charles D. Benson, Living and

Working in Space: The History o{ Skylab (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1983), SP-4208, ch. 1.

9“Soviet Scientist Sees Need for Manned Station in Space, ” AerO/spdCe

Engineering, vol. 17, September 1958, p, 27.

iOLowell B. Smith, “The Military Test Space Stat Ion,” Aero/SpdceEfWKW-

/ng, vol. 19, May 1960, p. 19.
App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States . 161

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), and entrusted it with a manned mission. And

that mission would be a modest one, at least at the

start. Project Mercury would demonstrate that a person could fly in space; until then there would be no

talk of “space stations” and manned flight to the

Moon and planets.11

However, as the new space agency began operations, NASA leadership set the development of a longrange plan for the agency’s first decade as a high-priority task. A “space station” was a leading candidate

for a post-Mercury goal. The House Space Committee in early 1959 concluded that stations were the logical follow-on to Mercury, and von Braun (then still

working for the Army) presented a similar view i n his

briefings to NASA, At this time, the German rocket

team had developed an elaborate scheme, called Project Horizon, for Army utilization of space, including

miIitary outposts on the Iunar surface.

In the first half of 1959, NASA created a Research

Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight, chaired

by Harry Goett. At the first meeting of this committee

members placed a “space station” ahead of a lunar

expedition in a list of logical post-Mercury steps. In

subsequent meetings, the debate centered on the

question of whether a “space station’s” value for

scientific research, especially in the biomedical area,

outweighed the excitement of a lunar landing goal.

While some members of the committee argued that

“the ultimate objective of space exploration is

manned travel to and from other planets, ” the representative of one center argued for an interim step,

since “in true spaceflight man and the vehicle are going to be subjected to the space environment for extended periods of time and there will undoubtedly be

space rendezvous requirements. All of these aspects

need extensive study . . . the best means would be

with a true orbiting space laboratory that is manned

and that can have a crew and equipment change. ” 12

Ultimately, the Goett committee recommended that

a lunar landing be established as NASA’s long-range

goal, on the grounds that it was a true “end-objective”

requiring no justification in terms of some larger goals

to which it contributed.

These recommendations were not immediately accepted. For example, at an August 1960 industry briefing on NASA’s future plans, George Low presented

a scheme in which a manned lunar landing and creation of a “space station” were given equal treatment

I I Loyal s Swenson, jr., james M, G rlmwood, and Charles C. Alexander,

This I\’eM Ocean A H/sfory of’ Prqect Mercury, NASA SP-420T (Washington, DC National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon, 1966).

I ~Bruce Lofi I n, as quoted I n the MI n utes of the Research steering Committee on Manned Fllght, meeting of May 25-26, 1959 (NHOA)

as long-range goals of the NASA program; Low told

the conference that “in this decade, therefore, our

present planning calls for the development and demonstration of an advanced manned spacecraft with sufficient flexibility to be capable of both circumlunar

flight and useful Earth orbital missions. In the long

range, this spacecraft should lead toward a permanent

manned “space station. ”13 Low also announced the

name of the advanced spacecraft program, then aimed

both at the Moon and at “space stations”; it was to

be called “Project Apollo.”

The Apollo Anomaly

Once again, however, external events intervened

to upset the orderly course of events envisioned by

those planning the country’s future in space. President

Kennedy came into office in 1961 committed to reassert America’s vitality and resolve in the war of nerves

with the Soviet Union. When, in April 1961, the Russians tested the United States once again by launching the first man into space, Kennedy ended his early

indecisiveness on the space program and in 1961

committed the country to the race to the Moon. This

decision, the most momentous in the history of the

American space program, was made for reasons of

prestige and politics. 14 It determined the future of

NASA and its programs more thoroughly than any

other decision before or since. That influence operated on two levels.

First, and perhaps most importantly in the long run,

the style and public perception of the Apollo commitment made it something of a model for all future space

proposals. President Kennedy made the decision

quickly but not precipitously. He consulted his staff

and NASA and chose the Moon landing as the most

dramatic and most feasible of the suggestions for

demonstrating U.S. ability to best the Soviet Union in

high-technology competition. He presented the idea

in a speech before an unusual joint session of Congress, in which the new President outlined his plans

for fulfilling his campaign promises of getting the

United States moving again.

“Now is the time,” said Kennedy, “to take longer

strides—time for a great new American enterprise—

time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in

space achievement, which in many ways may hold

the key to our future on Earth. ”15 In a moving and uncompromising challenge, the President called on Con1

‘George Low, “Manned Space Fllght, ” an NASA, NASA -lrrdustry Program

P/.]ns Conference, July 1960, p. 80, (NHOA).

‘“ Logsdon, op. cit., chs. 3-5, recounts the history of the declslon to begin

the Apollo program and analyzes the motives which led to that declslon

“lbld , p. 128
162 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

gress and the public to commit itself to a $25-billion16

undertaking in space for largely intangible goals of

prestige and competition. Congress and the public

agreed, launching NASA on its most famous and formative enterprise and creating an indelible image of

how to launch a major project in space. Only slowly,

if at all, would NASA administrators and other space

advocates come to realize that the Apollo commitment was a political anomaly defying duplication.

The Apollo decision also ensured that in accomplishing the lunar landing objective the United States

would develop a large, but specialized, space capability, and that manned spaceflight would come to

dominate all other kinds for at least a decade. And

it ensured, especially after it was complemented by

the lunar-orbital rendezvous decision, that the “space

station” concept would recede into the background

for the duration of the race to the Moon. The Moon

mission would proceed on its journey directly from

Earth orbit–simply because that was the quickest way

to go (though not necessarily the best for long-term

development) and the Saturn V launch vehicle (originally designed for other purposes) would permit it.

In this hothouse atmosphere, Project Mercury and

Project Gemini became demonstration programs for

Apollo. Many of the tasks that had to be accomplished

in order for Apollo to succeed were also on the agenda

for “space station” research. Mercury, for example,

demonstrated that a person could survive the weightlessness and radiation of space. Gemini demonstrated

that rendezvous, docking, and extravehicular activity were feasible. The last of these was always more

important to “space station” plans than to Apollo.

Both projects demonstrated, at least to some, that a

human being was a crucial component of the spacecraft’s capability, performing such functions as

piloting, observing, and photographing; and piloting

especially was contrasted with the comparatively

primitive, ground-controlled capsules of the Russians

in which the cosmonaut was simply a passenger. ’

Notwithstanding these positive steps on the road to

a total manned spaceflight capability, Apollo was to

prove a programmatic deadend for NASA. Many in

NASA understood all along that the lunar rendezvous

approach to accomplishing the objective was a technical anomaly and they never gave up their notion

of a more logical approach to human exploitation of

space, i.e., a “space station. ” For this reason, while

Apollo was at the center of public attention during the

lbThen_some $6CI bi I I ton today.

I TSwenson, et al., Op. cit.; Baflon C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, on

the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini, NASA SP-4203 (WashI ngton, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1977).

1960s, studies of “space station” concepts proceeded

throughout the decade.

“Space Station” Plans During

the 1960s

During the 1960s, “space station” studies were conducted both within NASA and by the various aerospace contractors (particularly those without a major

role in Apollo). They resulted in examination of a wide

variety of concepts, ranging from inflatable balloonIike structures, through the use of refurbished rocket

stages, to very large stations requiring the use of Saturn

V boosters to put them in orbit. Three NASA field centers—the Manned Spacecraft Center in Texas, the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, and the Langley

Research Center in Virginia—managed these in-house

and contractor studies, and they were coordinated by

the Advanced Missions Office of the Office of Manned

Space Flight at NASA headquarters in Washington.18

While the manned flight centers at Houston and

Huntsville were focusing almost their total energies

on getting Apollo started in the early 1960s,’9 the

Langley Research Center was giving substantial attention to the theoretical and engineering aspects of

“space station” design. These efforts dated from at

least mid-1959, and by 1962 enough work had been

done to form the basis for a “space station” symposium.20 Langley researchers noted that “a large manned

orbiting ‘space station’ may have many uses or objectives.” Among these objectives they listed:

1. learning to live in space;

● artificial-gravity experiments,

. zero-gravity experiments, and

• systems research and development,

2. applications research;

● communications experiments,

● earth observations,

3. launch platform experiments; and

4. scientific research.

With respect to launch platform experiments, Langley

suggested that:

. . . the “space station” with its crew of trained astronauts and technicians should be a suitable facility for

Iestudles durln~ the 1960s at the Langley Research Center, the Manned

Spacecraft Center, and the Marshall Space Flight Center are summarized In

Langley Research Center, Compilation of Papers Presented at the Space Station Technology Symposium, Feb. 11-13, 1969 (N HOA).

!sEven So, both Houston and Huntsville had “space station’ study effofls

under way; in particular, Houston was studying a large (24-

person) “space station” to be launched by a Saturn V. The studies directed

by Langley have been chosen for review because they were more fully developed than those directed by the two other centers.

~t}The early Langley studies are summarized in Langley Research Center,

A Reporl on the Research and Technological Problems of Manned Rotating

Spacecraft, NASA Technical Note D-1 504, August 1962 (NHOA).
App. B—The Evolution of Civilian /n-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States • 163

learning some of the fundamental operations necessary for launching space missions from orbit. The new

technologies required for rendezvous, assembly orbital countdown, replacement of defective parts, and

orbital launch can be determined. 21

Among various “space station” studies carried out

by Langley contractors during the first half of the

1960s, perhaps the most detailed was that of a

Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) conducted by Douglas Aircraft from 1963 to 1966. Douglas had had some prior interest in “space stations”;

in 1960 it had built a full-scale mockup of a fourperson astronomical space observatory as the central

theme of an “ideal home exhibition” held in London.

This station was to be constructed inside the fuel tank

of a second-stage booster, a Douglas idea which ultimately found use in the Skylab program over a decade later.22

In this study, a baseline technical concept for an

MORL was established first, then the “utilization potential” of such a station was examined—i,e., design

preceded requirements. When the original design was

compared to various requirements, it was inadequate,

and a larger station in a different orbit evolved as the

final result of the study effort. The study found that

the highest utilization potential came from “key engineering and scientific research studies augmented by

specific experiments directed toward potential Earthcentered applications. ” As the study proceeded, the

MORL got steadily more sophisticated and bigger, as

there were no criteria established to limit the addition

of new experimental requirements.

The MORL requirements study examined:

● Earth-centered applications;

● national defense;

● support of future space flights; and,

● the space sciences.

From this analysis, the study predicted the need for

“hundreds of thousands of man-hours” in orbit to

carry out all useful applications; this implied a longrange requirement for “near-permanent operations

and support of probably several space stations. ” The

study also noted, foreshadowing a future issue, that

“the limiting factor on the number of such stations,

and the crew size of each station, appears to be the

cost of logistic support. ” The final MORL concept, although basically a zero-gravity station, had an onboard centrifuge for reentry simulation, testing of phys-

.

“ I hld

)iGeorg(, v But Ier, ‘‘space sti3t10n5, 1959 To?” in B. J, Bluth and S R.

\Ic \eal L,Iprf~te on SpJCe, vol 1 (Granada Hills, CA National Behavior Sys-

[t’m\, 1981 J, p 8

ical condition, and physical therapy if zero-gravity

conditions were debilitating for the crew. 23

By early 1963, NASA Associate Administrator and

General Manager Robert Sea mans called for study of

an Earth Orbiting Laboratory (EOL) from “an overall

NASA point of view.” Such study was needed, said

Seamans, since an EOL had been studied and discussed “by several government agencies and contractors” 24 and because NASA and DOD “are now

supporting a number of additional advanced studies. ”

Seamans’ reference to DOD was significant: NASA

and DOD were locked in a controversy over control

of post-ApoIlo manned flight efforts. NASA’s management, anticipated Seamans, would “be faced with the

decision to initiate hardware development” in 1964.

Seamans ordered an agency-wide, 4 to 6 week highpriority study which would examine EOL proposals

in terms of, among other factors:

1. Defense Department interest,

2. international factors, and

3. other government agency interest. 25

Throughout this study and other attempts to define

a “space station” program in the 1963-66 period,

there was a continuing tension between those designing the station itself (primarily associated with the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), its field centers

and associate contractors) and those interested in the

experiments and other uses of such a faciIity (primarily the Office of Space Science and Applications and

the Office of Advanced Research and Technology

(OART)). For example, one OART staffer complained

in 1963 that “the fact that OMSF is supplying funds

for MORL , . . does not change the fact that in doing

so they are in a supporting role to the experimental

purpose of the MORL. That experimental purpose

should carry a heavy stick in the determination of how

the research program will be accomplished. ”26

Later in 1963, the Director of OART asked field center assistance in defining “more clearly the potential

usefulness of such a laboratory as a platform for scientific and technological research in space. ” He noted

~JDouglas MISS I Ie and Space Systems Diwslon, Douglas Aircraft CO., ‘‘ Report on the Development of the Manned Orbkal Research Laboratory (MORL)

System Utilization Potential, ” Repon SM-48822, January 1966.

ZdThough It IS not discussed in detal I In this report, durl ng this period the

Department of Defense was exploring the potential of manned flight for national security missions. Some of this study effort was conducted jointly with

NASA, but most was not; one focus of the effort was the military potential

of a “space station. ” In 1963, the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory

(MOL) program was approved as an initial step in examining the ways In

wh Ich human crews cou [d be used to enhance national security operations

In orbit The MOL wa5 canceled In 1969

J~Memoran~u m from NASA Associate Adml nlstrator, “Space Task Team

for ,Manned Earth Orbltlng Laboratory Study,” Mar. 28, 1963 (NHOA).

“Memorandum from Chtet, Manned Systems Integration, to Director, Ottlce of Ad\anced Research and Technology, “ SEB for the Manned Orbttal

Research Laboratory, May 16, 1963 (N HOA).

38-798 0 - 84 - 12 : QL 3
164 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

that “a view has prevailed to date, based primarily on

intuitive judgment [emphasis added here], that this research function (exclusive of biotechnology and human factors research) constitutes one of the more important long-range justifications” for a “space station.”

It was essential, he argued, to make “a correct decision as to whether and why a MORL project should

be undertaken.”27

By 1964, the definition of uses for a “space station”

had broadened enough to lead the Director of the

OMSF Advanced Manned Mission Office to suggest

that it was “both timely and necessary to pursue

. . . broadly beneficial uses of “space stations” with

the departments and agencies that will capitalize and

exploit these broader uses” and that an interagency

“applications working group” be established for this

purpose. Such interagency involvement, he noted,

“can result in a higher level of knowledgeable support to NASA for implementation of a national multipurpose ‘space station’ program.”28

Beginnings of Post-Apollo Planning2g

Under pressure from the White House and Congress, NASA began looking beyond the Apollo project in 1964 and 1965. In 1964, an in-house examination of NASA’s future options had recommended that

NASA defer “large new missions for further study and

analysis. “3° However, there was concern within NASA

about maintaining an adequate workload for both

NASA centers and NASA contractors, as the development phase of Apollo neared completion, and an evolutionary approach from Apollo to more advanced activities appeared more likely to meet this need, given

the low probability of a major new start on post-Apollo

programs.

The nature of NASA’s long-range planning during

this period turned on the style and personality of the

Administrator, James E. Webb. A lawyer and businessman who had served President Harry Truman as Director of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and as Under

~’Memorandum from Director, Office of Advanced Research and Technology, “Request for Assistance in Defining the Scientific and Technological

Research Potential of a Manned Orbital Laboratory, ” Oct. 31, 1963, NHOA,

This IS not a reference to the Air Force’s MOL Program.

ZaMemorandum from Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program, ‘‘1 ncreased Participation of Potential User Agencies in Development of Broadly

Beneficial Utiiizatlons of Manned Orbiting Space Station, ” July 15, 1964

(N HOA),

~gSee Arnold Levine, Managing NASA In the Apo1/o Era, NASA Sp-4012

(Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1983),

chapters 2 and 9 and James Webb’s foreword, for a full account of postApollo planning.

~OThe rep~ was called “Summary Report, Future Programs Task Group, ”

and was printed in U ,S, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space

Sciences, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1966, 89th Congress,

1st sess,, 1965, pt. 3, pp. 1027-1102.

Secretary of State, Webb combined an ebullient and

dynamic personality with a keen political sense and

long familiarity with the ways of Washington. He

believed in long-range planning, but he eschewed

long-range plans, which he felt excessively tied the

hands of the Administrator. He wanted to be prepared

for the future, but he did not want to commit himself

or NASA prematurely to another project as large as

Apollo.

Webb adopted two approaches to post-Apollo planning. First he characterized and rationalized Apollo

as the development of a capability in space, not an

end in itself. Once the Moon landing was accomplished, NASA would be able to convert the resources

and experience of the Apollo program to other purposes through a program called Apollo Applications.

Second, he used his fine political sense to ensure that

NASA adjusted its ambitions in space to suit the climate of opinion in Washington and throughout the

Nation. As the war in Vietnam and the domestic unrest

of the late 1960s compounded NASA’s problems in

getting congressional attention and appropriations,

NASA gradually modified its internal plans and proposals. The agency took more clearly the line that

Webb stressed throughout his tenure: NASA must

have a balanced program in which manned spaceflight played a role along with space science, applications, and aeronautical research.

NASA spoke more often in the mid-to-late 1960s of

practical, Earth-oriented space activities, which would

exploit the gains already made and provide taxpayers

with tangible returns on their investment in space,

And, increasingly, NASA came to look on the “space

station” as the logical next step that would at once

exploit the Apollo team and its achievements and still

respond to political pressure for a measured and pragmatic space program .31

The public debate in the late 1960s on the future

of the space program introduced many of the concepts about the “space station” that still surround this

proposal–some inherited from the Apollo experience,

others developed to address the criticisms of that program. First, NASA sought, in conjunction with its plans

for a “space station,” to define an undertaking large

enough to focus the agency’s future activities, as Apol10 had focused them in the 1960s. Occasionally, it was

suggested that a manned Mars mission would provide

the ideal focus,32 but the “space station” could per-

~1 see, for example, Webb’s testimony i n U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, National Space Goals for the PostApol/o Period, Hearings, 89th Cong,, 1st sess., Aug. 23-25, 1965.

JzWebb for example, stressed the importantance of focus in a letter to

President Johnson, Feb. 16, 1965, published in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal

Year )966, op. cit., p, 1028,
App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States Ž 165

form the same function, even while providing a logical

step toward Mars. The “space station” had the added

advantage of seeming more practical and Earthoriented. Second, NASA stressed the flexibility of the

“space station” concept and a station’s ability to perform a variety of functions ranging from Earth-oriented

applications and scientific research to staging platforms for manned missions to the planets. George E.

Mueller, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Manned

Flight, emphasized the economic benefits of “space

stations” i n such areas as applications, weather, communications, research, and national security. 33

NASA advocacy of “space stations” also argued that

the country should see that the Apollo team and hardware were held together and exploited, should maintain manned spaceflight in addition to unmanned missions, and should sustain the Nation’s preeminence

in space in flight operations, science, and technology

lest the Soviets win the long-term space race by default. 34 Occasionally, NASA invoked national security

as a rationale for the “space station, ” but in the 1960s,

at least, this brought the agency into apparent conflict with the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory,

a conflict Webb tried to avoid, at least in public. 35

The theme that NASA employed most relentlessly

was that the “space station” was the logical next step

in the development of America’s capability in space.

George Mueller was especially emphatic. Speaking of

practical applications, he testified:

The major steps that are involved . . . are, first of

all, the development of an orbital “space station, ” and

along with that is a need for a logistics system to provide support for an orbital “space station. ” That combination then leads to the development of what might

be called an application center, and if you will, that

is probably going to turn out to be a relatively large

orbital station which will have in it the sensors that

are required .36

Continuing this hypothetical progression of Earthoriented, practical “space stations, ” Mueller added

that,

. . . having utilized this orbital station for a number

of years, there is another major step forward in going

to a research complex which might be the large orbiting research laboratory and coming from that research complex, then, would come the second generation of application centers, and here they would

JJM~eller’s testimony IS in U.S Congress, Senate COminlttee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, National Space Goals for the Post-Apollo Per/od,

Op Clt , p. 103

MU s congress, senate Corn mlttee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,

Ndtlonil Spdcc God/s for the Post-Apollo Pe[@d, op. Cit., p, 338,

)~webb told congress the h40L ‘‘represents an added nationa I space ca -

pa bill(y rather than a competitive one. ” Ibid , p, 341. See also the testimony

ot Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Englneerlng, esp p. 336

l~Th IS and the foIIoWI ng two q uotatlons are from Ibid , pp. 49, 62, and 64

be more specialized and there would be more of

them.

This envisaged a time well into the future where

man is really operating on a continuing basis in

space . . . . Mueller also proposed that:

we can go in the direction of exploiting our

Iunar capability as it developed in the basic Apollo

program and will be developed further if the Apollo

Applications Program is carried out. Or we can go in

the direction of increased emphasis on Earth orbit applications . . . . We can go from Apollo applications

through the development of an orbital “space station, ” and then on to the near planet flyby systems

and follow a logical path which then goes to planetary

exploration.

For all the purposes a “space station” might serve,

from the purely practical to the widely visionary, it

was always cast in this period as the logical next step

in developing space capability. NASA instituted an

Apollo Applications Program, but this was an interim

move towards what the agency really sought: a major political commitment to make the next step another large one.

In 1967 and 1968 this campaign suffered major reversals which had permanent impact on the course

of events. The Apollo 204 fire in January 1967, which

killed three astronauts during preflight testing at Cape

Kennedy, set the Apollo landing back a number of

months, and cast the first serious doubt on NASA’s

ability to meet its Apollo goal. The accident also

focused congressional attention on NASA and consumed some of the agency’s political credit on the

Hill. Perhaps more damaging in the long run was the

resignation of James Webb in the closing weeks of the

1968 presidential election campaign. Leaving the

agency without the major commitment to a post-Apol10 program he had sought, Webb took with him an

irreplaceable sense of political pragmatism that the

agency would sorely miss.

As the first successful lunar landing mission approached, in the fall of 1968 NASA requested $60 million to initiate a “space station” effort. This request

was denied. NASA approached the beginning of 1969

in some disarray:

• James Webb had resigned in the Fall of 1968, and

the Acting Administrator, Thomas Paine, was new

to the agency.

● Richard Nixon had been elected President, and

his position on space policy was far from clear.

● NASA had settled on the “space station” as its

post-Apollo program objective, but to date had

had no success in getting Presidential or congressional support for such an initiative.

NASA took bold action in the early months of 1969

to attempt to change this situation.
166 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Post-Apollo Planning Under

Thomas Paine

A research engineer before joining NASA as Deputy Administrator in January 1968, Thomas O. Paine

became Acting Administrator following Webb’s resignation in October. Nominated NASA Administrator

by President Nixon in March 1969, Paine was confirmed by the Senate the same month, beginning the

shortest term—less than 20 months—of any NASA

head.

Paine was a swashbuckler,37 an out-and-out space

enthusiast, critical of the caution and circumspection

of his predecessor and determined to inaugurate the

second decade of space with a major, national, Apollo-like commitment. As he wrote to the President’s

science advisor after being confirmed as NASA Administrator:

We have been frustrated too long by a negativism

that says hold back, be cautious, take no risks, do less

than you are capable of doing. I submit that no perceptive student of the history of social progress doubts

that we will establish a large laboratory in Earth orbit, that we will provide a practical system for the frequent transfer of men and supplies to and from such

a laboratory, that we will continue to send men to

the Moon, and that eventually we will send men to

the planets. If this is true, now is the time to say

so . . . .We in NASA are fully conscious of practical

limitations . . . .In the light of these considerations,

we can be sensible and moderate about our requests

for resources—but we must know where we are

going. 38

Initial Proposals

This philosophy led Paine, at the start of the Nixon

administration, to take steps unusually bold for an acting agency head. In February 1969, Paine appealed

directly to the President in support of the manned

space flight program. He argued that “positive and

timely action must be taken by your Administration

now to prevent the Nation’s programs in manned

space flight from slowing to a halt in 1972” and suggested that:

the nation should . . . focus our manned space

flight” program for the next decade on the development and operation of a permanent “space station”-a National Research Center in Earth orbit—

accessible at reasonable cost to experts in many disciplines who can conduct investigations and opera

J7Homer Newe[ [, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years Of space science

NASA SP-421 1 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Adminlstratlon, 1980), p. 288.

‘Quoted {n Levine, op. cit., pp. 258-259.

tions in space which cannot be effectively carried out

on Earth.

Paine told the President that he had “a unique opportunity for leadership that will clearly identify your

administration with the establishment of the Nation’s

major goals in space flight for the next decade” and

that “the case that a ‘space station’ should be a major future U.S. goal is now strong enough to justify at

least a general statement on your part that this will

be one of our goals.”39

Paine asked for a March 31 presidential decision on

future manned space flight issues. He did this even

though he knew that, on February 13, the President

had established an ad hoc blue-ribbon Space Task

Group (STG) and had asked that group for “definitive

recommendations on the direction which the U.S.

space program should take in the post-Apollo period,”

with a September 1 reporting date.40 By asking the

President to decide on the future of manned space

flight in advance of the planning process which was

being established for precisely that purpose, Paine was

trying to use the success of the Apollo 8 circumlunar

mission and the desire on the part of any new administration to take some early and popular initiatives as

counters to a process which he was not sure would

be favorable to NASA.

In preparing for Space Task Group consideration of

the Paine initiative, the positions of the various participants on a large “space station, ” and the factors

influencing their positions, became evident.

The BOB objective was to “head off any play by

NASA to get a budget amendment now” since “this

is bad budget strategy, probably unworkable as far as

Congress was concerned, and impossible to obtain

without committing the President to support the longrange objectives. ”41

The President’s Science Adviser, Lee DuBridge,

asked the Space Science and Technology Panel42 to

assist him in evaluating the Paine initiative. The Panel

met with NASA officials, and advised Dr. DuBridge

that there was “no great urgency” related to the issues

Paine had raised and, “from a programmatic standpoint, the arguments in favor of early action appear

very weak. ”43

JgMemorandum from Thomas Paine to the President, ‘‘Problems and Opportunities in Manned Space Flight,” Feb. 26, 1969.

@The STG was chaired by Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew and had as members NASA, the president’s Science Adviser, and the Department of Defense,

The Bureau of the Budget, Department of State, and Atomic Energy Commission had observer status.

41 Brlefi ng Memorandum prepared by the Bureau of the Budget, Econom -

ICS, Science, and Technology Division, “President’s Task Group on

Space Meeting No, 1,“ Mar. 6, 1969.

41A subgroup of the president’s Science Advisory Committee (F’’MC).

4Jlbld
App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States ● 167

The “space station” did gain some support from the

Department of State, which saw:

. . . a close relationship between our space program

and foreign policy objectives. Thus, an ongoing, challenging and successful space program is important

from the viewpoint of these objectives–particularly

one designed and funded to afford increasing opportunities for international cooperation.

The State Department believed that there were “greater international values i n a “space station” and reusable logistics vehicle than in . . . lunar exploration, ”

and that:

our choices should not be unduly influenced

by our estimate of Soviet choices, nor do we need

to prejudice deliberate consideration of our space

goals in order to preempt Soviet activities. Our capability is now well understood both by the Soviets and

by most other countries. Foreign countries will focus

less on the competition between ourselves and the

Soviets than on the relevance of space activities to

their own interests and needs.44

The Department of Defense (DOD) position was

that DOD “does not have or anticipate projects which

require a “space station” as defined by NASA. DOD

has great interest in the development of a lower cost

transportation system suitable for their uses as well as

for NASA’ S.”45

The report of the STG staff directors was a rejection

of that part of the Paine initiative which asked for early

“space station” commitment:

The majority of the Committee members . . . did

not support the request for additional FY70 funding

to enable more rapid progress toward the launch of

a “space station” in the mid-1970s. This view does

not represent an unfavorable judgment on the question of adopting the “space station” as a major new

goal of our space program, but rather results from a

desire not to imply prejudgment of the eventual resuIt of the STG review. The case for urgency was unconvincing, and it appears that no important options

would be foreclosed by deferring action .46

This attempt by NASA to get early commitment to

a “space station” has been reviewed in some detail

because its resolution foreshadowed much of what

happened in the following 1 1⁄2 years as NASA struggled to gain support for a “space station” development as its major post-Apollo program objective,

Throughout the STG review and the White House

consideration of the STG report, NASA argued that

the “space station, ” and not the space shuttle concept, which was evolving from its origin solely as the

“R F Packard, “Department of State observations, ” draft, Mar. 13, 1969,

45MI Iton Rosen (NASA staffer for STG), ‘‘Memorandum for the Record, ”

Mar 13, 1969 (N HOA).

46, Report O( the space Task Group Staff DI rector’s Committee on NASA’S

Request for Amendments to the NASA fiscal year 1970 Budget,” Mar. 14,

1969, p 4

station’s logistic vehicle, should be the Agency’s toppriority program, In the summer of 1969, NASA let

two Phase B study contracts for “space station” design, and in its 1970 congressional testimony the station was presented as the centerpiece of the agency’s

programs,

Throughout 1970, NASA continued technical studies and user-oriented activities to promote the station

concept. However, by the middle of that year, it was

clear that in the eyes of the space subgovernment outside of NASA, the shuttle program was a more attractive investment than was the station, and by the end

of the year, the station had been dropped back to conceptual study status. NASA had built up a great deal

of momentum behind the “space station” concept

through the 1960s, but when it came time for the

country to decide, through the policymaking process,

whether the station was a “good buy, ” the response

was negative. The reasons for this negative assessment

were already clear for NASA to see by March 1969,

but it took over a year for NASA’s leadership to recognize the situation and to steer the Agency away

from the station and behind the shuttle.

Detailed Station Planning

After conducting preliminary Phase A studies, primarily in-house, during 1967 and 1968, NASA was

prepared in early 1969 to involve the aerospace industry in defining the program through two Phase B

studies. NASA’s hopes were that these program definition studies would provide the technical basis for

a start on “space station” development within a year

or two. These studies were initiated in September

1969, and extended over most of the next 2 years. But

events at the policy level made it increasingly unlikely

that the “space station” program would ever proceed

beyond the Phase B stage, at least in the 1970s.

The handwriting was already on the wall by the time

the “Paine initiative” was rejected in March 1969, but

during the rest of 1969 and 1970 it became much

clearer. Finally, NASA could no longer avoid reality,

and by late 1970 the space Shuttle, not the station,

was identified as the agency’s top priority. Just as the

Apollo Applications Program had been a “better buy”

for the country in the mid-1960s, so the Shuttle was

perceived by policy makers in the early 1970s, But the

failure of the “space station” program to gain approval

was not because of a lack of effort; the Phase B study

process was the focus for that effort.

DEFINING THE PREFERRED CONCEPT

AND ITS RATIONALE

One problem, perhaps the key one, was that NASA

found it quite difficult to tell both prospective contrac-
168 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

tors and the political leadership what kind of station,

for what purposes, it wanted to develop. This was so

even though NASA had been studying “space station”

concepts throughout the 1960s. The basic requirements which had emerged from the study effort were:

1.

2.

3.

qualification of people and systems for long-duration Earth orbit flight;

demonstration of man’s ability and functional

usefulness in performing engineering and scientific experiments; and,

periodic rotation of the crews and resupply of the

“space station. ”

The average crew size for this station was planned to

be six to nine persons, with a 2-year orbital lifetime

design goal.47 An Apollo command and service module launched by a Saturn 1B booster was to be the logistics vehicle for the station; the station itself was to

be launched on a Saturn V booster.

When Thomas Paine was exposed in January 1969

to this staff thinking, he found it too modest. His center directors agreed. For example, Wernher von Braun

told Paine that:

NASA should now tell the contractors what we want

in the long run, what we foresee as the ultimate—the

long range–the dream–station program. NASA

should spell out the sciences, technology, applications, missions and research desired. Then NASA

should define a 1975 station as a core facility in orbit

from which the ultimate “space campus” or “space

base” can grow in an efficient orderly evolution

through 1985.

MSC Director Robert Gilruth told Paine:

We should now be looking at a step more comparable in challenge to that of Apollo after Mercury. The

“space station” size should be modular and based

on our Saturn V lift capability into 200-mile orbit.

Three launches would give us one million pounds in

orbit, including spent stages. That is the number we

should be planning for the core size.48

Out of this lack of consensus within NASA came a

rapid change from the January concept of a “space

station.” In February, Aviation Week reported that “all

previous concepts have been retired from active competition in favor of a large station,” with the focus on

“a 100-man Earth-orbiting station with a multiplicity

of capabilities” and the “launch of the first module

of the large “space station, ” with perhaps as many

as 12 men, by 1975. ” Top NASA officials were reported to have rejected earlier “space station” plans

as “too conservative. ”49

4%Vllllam Normyle, “Alternatives Open on Post-Apollo, ” Awatiorr Week

and Space Techncdogy, Jan, 13, 1969, p. 16.

‘+BThomas palne’s notes from meeting on space stations, jan. 27, 1969

(N HOA).

~yWI Illam Normyle, “NASA Alms at 100-Man Station, ” Aviation Week and

Spdce Technology, Feb. 24, 1969, p, 16.

NASA issued a Statement of Work for the Phase B

Space Station Program Definition on April 19. Prospective contractors were ready; they had been following

the rapidly expanding character of the program closely

and were “already forming teams in anticipation” of

the Phase B competition. so

The Work Statement described the “space station”

as “a centralized and general purpose laboratory in

Earth orbit for the conduct and support of scientific

and technological experiments, for beneficial applications, and for the further development of space exploration capability” and noted that the work requested would include “the Space Base but will focus

on the mid-l970s Space Station as the initial but evolutionary step toward the Space Base. ” The objectives

of the “space station” program were stated as:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Conduct beneficial space applications programs,

scientific investigation and technological engineering experiments.

Demonstrate the practicality of establishing, operating, and maintaining long-duration manned orbital stations.

Utilize Earth-orbital manned flights for test and

development of equipment and operational techniques applicable to lunar and planetary exploration.

Extend technology and develop space systems

and subsystems required to increase useful life by

at least several orders of magnitude.

Develop new operational techniques and equipment which can demonstrate substantial reductions in unit operating costs.

Extend the present knowledge of the long-term

biomedical and behavioral characteristics of man

in space.

The initial “space station” was to have a crew of

12, and would normally operate in a zero gravity

mode, but during the early weeks of its operation there

would be an assessment of the effects of artificial gravity; a counterweight would be tethered to the station

and the configuration spun to provide the gravitational

effect, The station was to be 33 ft in diameter and was

normally to operate in a 270-nautical mile, 55° orbit,

but also be capable of operating in polar and slightly

retrograde orbits, 51

Shortly after the original proposals in response to

the statement of work were received by NASA, a new

requirement was added to the Phase B effort. Not only

was the “space station” to be designed so that it could

be the core around which a space base could be de50Wllllam Normyle, “Large StatIon May Emerge as ‘Unwritten’ U.S. Goal,”

Aviat/on Week and Space Technology, Mar, 10, 1969, p. 104.

51 NASA , ,Statement of Work, Space station Program Definition (Phase B), ”

Apr. 14, 1969,
App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States . 169

veloped; the station module would also be the core

of a spacecraft designed for a manned trip to Mars.

This requirement came out of the policy debates described in the section in this report, “NASA’s PostApollo Ambitions Dashed,” and was a reflection of

the high hopes for all of NASA’s future manned programs which were pervasive in the immediate aftermath of the first lunar landing.

PHASE B STUDIES

Three aerospace firms, North American Rockwell,

McDonnell Douglas, and Grumman Aircraft, submitted proposals to NASA in response to the Phase

B Statement of Work, and on July 22, 1969, NASA

awarded Phase B contracts of $2.9 million each to

North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas.

The studies were to run for 11 months beginning in

September; MSC would manage the North American

Rockwell effort, and MSFC, the McDonnell Douglas

study.

A continuing problem during the course of the

Phase B studies was the difficulty of integrating station design and the candidate experiments for the station. These studies were compiled into a thick document known universally as the “Blue Book. ” One

participant in the study later noted that “the candidate experiments compiled in the NASA Blue Book

are too costly to be considered as a whole, are somewhat duplicated . . . , have not been verified as the

true experiment goals . . , .“52

The Phase B studies were extended for 6 months

on June 30, 1970; by this time, the planning date for

the first station launch had slipped to 1977. The cost

of the program was now estimated at $8 billion to $15

billion, including both development costs and 10 years

of on-orbit operations; this estimate did not include

the cost of a space Shuttle program. It was reported

that “an overriding desire on the part of the United

States to internationalize the 12-man “space station”

. . . has eliminated any possibility of Department of

Defense participation in the program.”53

In addition to the technical design activities, NASA

was undertaking a Phase B effort to define experiment

modules to be added to the core station and planning

a year-long study to involve potential users, both domestic and international, in the program as it was developing. A user’s symposium to kick off this effort was

scheduled for September 1970, and both study contractors were building full-scale mockups of the 33-ft

“Jack C. Heberllg, “The Management Approach to the NASA Space Station Deflnltlon Studies of the Manned Spacecraft Center, ” NASA Technical

Memorandum X-58090, June 1972, p. 30,

$~space Business Dady, July 27, 1970.

station. However, beneath this growing momentum

was an uncertain base of political support.

On July 29, 1970, Charles Mathews, NASA’s Deputy Associate Administrator of Manned Space Flight,

ordered MSC and MSFC to terminate the continuing

Phase B activity and to redefine the effort in a fundamental way. On the basis of congressional action,

NASA leadership had become convinced that the Saturn V program, which had been in terminal condition for almost 2 years, was finally dead, i.e., there

would be no booster capable of launching a 33-ft station. The only launch vehicle available for use in putting the “space station “ into orbit would now be the

space Shuttle, with its planned 15-ft by 60-ft payload

bay. What had started out as the supply vehicle for

the station was to be its key to survival.

It took some doing to skew the study effort toward

components with diameters able to fit into the Shuttle payload bay; one study contractor commented that

“people who were eager to fly in a 33-ft station found

the prospect of long stays in the 14-ft station not very

attractive. ” But NASA did issue Phase B extension

contracts for a modular “space station” study effort

to extend through most of 1971, and North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas went to work

on the new concept.

By the time the studies were begun, however, the

likelihood that they would lead to an early commitment to station development was already vanishingly

small. NASA had suffered a number of defeats in late

1969 and through 1970 in its attempts to get an ambitious post-Apollo program approved, and by the

summer of 1970 it was becoming quite clear to NASA

leaders that only one big program had any chance of

presidential and congressional approval, and that it

was not the “space station” program. From its start

as the “advanced logistics system” for the station and

space base, the space Shuttle had garnered the interest of the Air Force and many within NASA, and in

the summer of 1970 the agency leadership grudgingly

decided to make the Shuttle its top-priority program.

Thomas Paine had announced his resignation in mid1970, and the station thus lost a supporter at the top;

this may have made the shift to the Shuttle easier.

Station studies continued through 1970, 1971, and

1972, with the final in-house studies focused on a

single research applications module (RAM) to be carried into orbit by a Shuttle.54 This was all that remained

of what, only a few years earlier, had been plans for

truly large facilities in Earth orbit. As a final indication

of this reality, on November 29, 1972, the Space Sta-

~qThls u Itlmately became the basis for the Spacelab developed by the European Space Agency,
170 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

tion Task Force was abolished, then immediately reincarnated as the Sortie Lab Task Force. NASA was able

to gain approval for Shuttle development in early

1972, and that task occupied the agency’s energies

throughout the decade. Until the Shuttle was ready,

the dream of permanent human facilities in space

would have to wait. However, preserving a large payload bay as an essential element of the Shuttle, NASA

was able to maintain the possibility of returning to the

station concept, thereby keeping its dream alive.

NASA’s Post-Apollo Ambitions

Dashed55

While the “space station” Phase B effort was proceeding apace at the technical planning level, at the

policy level NASA from 1969 through the end of 1971

was trying to get White House (particularly) and congressional support for an increasingly less ambitious

post-Apollo program. The initial forum for this attempt

was the Space Task Group. After its early rejection of

NASA’s “space station “ initiative, the STG turned to

the task of preparing recommendations on future

space policy and programs for President Nixon.

The image of the Apollo commitment as a model

for future space goals colored STG discussions from

the start. At an early STG meeting, NASA’s Administrator, Thomas Paine, argued the need for a “new banner to be hoisted” around which competent and motivated engineers, scientists, and managers could rally,

as they had around the Apollo goal. Vice President

Agnew, reacting to Paine’s point, raised for the first

time in the STG context the question which would influence much of the group’s debates: Where was the

Apollo of the 1970s? Could it be, asked Agnew, that

the United States should undertake a manned mission

to Mars?

When Agnew first read the staff proposals for STG

consideration, he reportedly was disappointed because none contained the strong and dramatic theme

he thought was required for the national space effort.

On July 16, 1969, as he joined thousands at Kennedy

Space Center to watch the liftoff of the Apollo 11 mission, Agnew “went public. ” In interviews at the

launch site Agnew said that it was his “individual feeling that we should articulate a simple, ambitious, optimistic goal of a manned flight to Mars by the end

of this century. ” After liftoff, Agnew told the launch

team that he “bit the bullet . . . today as far as Mars

is concerned. ”

Agnew’s statement at Cape Kennedy was not a

spontaneous reaction to the excitement of the occa55Th is account is acJapted from John M. Logsdon, ‘‘The Policy Process and

Large-Scale Space Efforts,” Space Humanization Series, vol. 1, 1979, pp.

65-80.

sion; it had been planned in advance. It reflected

Agnew’s willingness to lend support to an ambitious

and bold space program, if only NASA would propose

it. This willingness matched the predispositions of

NASA administrator, Paine, himself disappointed at the

lack of excitement and purpose he was getting from the

organization’s planning machinery. Spurred on by

Agnew’s private and public support, Paine decided

that NASA should also “bite the bullet” and move aggressively to identify an early manned Mars mission

as the central focus for its future plans. In order to do

this, he ordered NASA planners explicitly to incorporate a manned Mars mission during the 1980s into

NASA’s overall plans. This was the source of the early

modification to the Phase B study requirements described previously.

There were several reasons for switching to the Mars

emphasis as a central theme in NASA planning. Perhaps most influential was the early STG rejection of

a “space station” commitment based on the “logical

next step rationale. ” By justifying a “space station”

as a necessary precursor to manned Mars missions i n

the 1980s, NASA hoped to provide a convincing rationale for the station’s urgency. Not only “space stations” but the newly proposed space Shuttle, the development of nuclear rocket engines, and the

retention of the large Saturn V as a booster were required if an early manned Mars landing were to be

approved as a national goal.

Between March and August 1969, as the Apollo program and other ongoing NASA missions achieved

spectacular successes and public interest in space was

at a peak, as the Vice President continued to ask for

an “Apollo for the seventies, ” as NASA’s manned

flight organization coalesced behind an aggressive

plan of new activities for the next decade, Paine

became more and more bullish about the need for

bold new initiatives as a way of keeping the Nation’s

civilian space program vigorous and his agency’s

momentum large. As Apollo came to an end, NASA

plans had gotten increasingly ambitious.

Now, by asking for “commitment in principle” to

the most ambitious plan his advisers had conceived,

Paine presented a challenge to the other STG members and to others interested in the future of the space

program. He told the Nation that NASA was ready to

begin a program that would send people to Mars at

the earliest feasible time, and he asked the Nation’s

leadership whether they were willing to support such

a bold enterprise. The answer was not long in coming, and it was a resounding “No.”

The results of NASA’s attempt to mobilize support

behind the Mars objective, were, from the agency’s

perspective, little short of disastrous. What NASA discovered was just how limited the support for major

new space initiatives was. The final STG report, sub-
App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States ● 171

mitted to the President i n mid-September, did suggest

that “the United States accept the long range option

or goal of manned planetary exploration with a

manned Mars mission before the end of this century

as the first target. ” This goal, said the report, would

act as “a shaping function for the post-Apollo pro -

gram. ” Beyond its general statements, the report recommended no commitment to any particuIar program

option or even any specific project on a particular

timetable.

Even this “muted Martian manifesto” had no standing with the White House. Although the STG finished

its work with its submission to the President, more

then 6 months passed before Nixon made any formal

reaction to the Group’s recommendation, and that reaction was noncommittal. In the interim the processes

of public policymaking operated on the space program to shape it to the short- and longer-term requirements of what the White House perceived as the

budgetary and political interests of the Nation. When

NASA tried to use the STG report as the basis for justifying its 1971 budget request, it found that the report’s

recommendations carried little weight either in the Bureau of the Budget or, particularly, the White House.

While the President personally apparently remained

a space buff, his advisers were quite skeptical of the

political payoffs from major new activities in space;

their reading of public opinion was that American

society had little interest in future space spectaculars.

This skepticism, combined with stringent budgetary

constraints, resulted in a budget for NASA in fiscal

1971 that was far below NASA’s most pessimistic expectations. NASA, still not reconciled to the notion

that space had little political support, “fought a retreating action through the entire budget process, ” being

“beaten back but fighting lustily at every turn of the

road, ” according to Administrator Paine.

It was in this context that, during the first half of

1970, it became clear to NASA leadership that NAS A

would not get approval to develop simultaneously

both a “space station” and the space Shuttle. In a

March 1970 statement, President Nixon provided only

a very guarded endorsement of future space activities, and what priority was granted he gave to the

space Shuttle. During the 1970 debate over NASA’s

budget, Congress expressed a high degree of skepticism about ambitious new goals in space. The linkages

among the Shuttle program, development of a “space

stat ion,” and a manned Mars expedition came under

particular attack, and threatening but unsuccessful attempts to delete funds for station and Shuttle studies

were made in both the House and the Senate.

As the preceding section described, at the technical level NASA was still acting in mid-1970 as if “space

station” approval were possible. However, NASA’s

policy leadership grudgingly read the handwriting

(which was in capital letters) on the wall, and in putting together the next agency budget request in September 1970 decided to make the Shuttle the top-priority NASA program for the 1970s and to give up

attempts to gain approval to develop a “space station”

until after the Shuttle program was well under way.

It took another 1 1⁄2 years of conflict-filled negotiations

with the White House and Congress before NASA was

able to gain their endorsements of the space Shuttle

in 1972.

Using the budget process, the political leadership

of the country had applied its concept of national interest and national priorities to the space program;

through that process, the technological aspirations of

NASA were put under firm though perhaps too shortterm political control. What happened to NASA’s

“space station” plans is best viewed, not in terms of

NASA “winning” or “losing,” but in terms of what

happens when an agency’s aspirations are significantly

at variance with what political leaders judge to be both

in the long-term interests of the Nation and politically

feasible. This experience might be quite relevant to

current attempts by NASA to gain support for the kind

of “space station” program that it desires.

Skylab: An Interim “Space Station”56

The only remainder of the Apollo Applications Program, begun with high hopes in 1966, Skylab was a

S-IVB third stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle, outfitted as a workshop to be visited by three successive

crews after being launched into low Earth orbit. The

mission could hardly have gotten off to a worse start.

During launch of the Skylab workshop in May 1973,

the meteor/thermal control shade tore loose from the

spacecraft and seriously damaged a solar cell panel

needed to produce power on the vehicle. The first

crew to visit Skylab managed to jury-rig a parasol to

replace the shade and to salvage the one solar panel

that was not lost in launch. This proved enough to save

the mission and to allow virtually the full run of experiments that had been planned for the three crews

that visited the laboratory in 1973 and 1974, turning

potential disaster into another virtuoso display of

NASA resourcefulness and skill.

Skylab provided grist for everyone’s mill. “Space station” advocates praised the demonstration of man’s

long-term survivability in space–84 days for the third

~~F~r a tull account of the Skylab project, see W. David Compton and

Charles D Benson, LI\ Ing and Work/rig In Space. the H/story of Space/ab

NASA SP-4208 (Washington, DC National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon, 1983).
172 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

crew—and the rich variety of scientific and applications tasks of which he had proved himself capable–

ranging from Earth observation and photography to

manning the solar telescope, conducting physiological

experiments, and even carrying on space processing.

Especially did they fasten on the role of human beings as the flexible, opportunistic component in the

“space station” that had saved the mission with emergency repairs no machine could have made. Without

people, claimed the advocates, Skylab would have

failed. 57

Without people, claimed the critics, Skylab would

not have been necessary. Many who questioned the

wisdom of manned space flight, especially scientists,

even while they conceded the impressiveness of the

Apollo achievement and appreciated how their own

programs had ridden on its coattails, came to wonder if the whole undertaking involving people was

worth the candle. With money drying up and many

scientific missions promised for the final flights of

Apollo being canceled with those flights, the relative

economy and efficiency of unmanned, automated

missions looked more attractive in contrast. 58

Whatever the eventual evaluation of Skylab, it was

interpreted by NASA’s manned space flight managers

as legitimizing renewed study of the “space station”

concept. Those studies, carried out during the 1974-

80 period, have laid the base for current discussions

of whether it is finally time to move ahead with the

acquisition of in-space infrastructure, of what character and magnitude, to be obtained by when, and to

be operated, used, and paid for by whom.

Recent In-Space Infrastructure

(i.e. “Space Station”) Studies

In addition to the impetus to reexamine the “space

station” concept which came from the success of the

Skylab project, other influences in the same direction

included the need to begin to identify potential “postShuttle” programs and new requirements for using

men and women in space operations emerging from

a number of study efforts being carried out by NASA

in the 1974-75 time frame.

In order to build a plausible rationale for once again

proposing a “space station” as an element of NASA’s

program, it would be necessary to identify some highpriority activities which could not be accomplished

using the space Shuttle, with its 7 to 20 day orbital

staytime, its Spacelab facility for manned experimental

Szsee, for example, John H. Disher, “Next Steps in Space Transportation,

Astronaut/es and Aeronautics, January 1978, p. 26,

JBNewell, op. cit., pp. 290-295.

activities, and its significant capability for lifting large

and/or heavy cargoes to low Earth orbit (LEO). Studies

which established requirements for large structures in

both LEO and geosynchronous orbit–structures

which could only be constructed in space—seemed

to provide the needed rationale, and space construction became a major theme in space infrastructure

studies during the 1975-80 period.

The first NASA foray into a new station study effort

was a 1975 study of a “Manned orbital Systems Concept” (MOSC) carried out by McDonnell Douglas Astronautics under the technical direction of the Marshall Space Flight Center. This study “examined the

requirements for . . . a cost-effective orbital facility

concept capable of supporting extended manned

operations in Earth orbit beyond those visualized for

the 7-to 30-day Shuttle/Spacelab system.” Study guidelines included use of available hardware developed

for the Skylab, Spacelab, and Shuttle programs, “insofar as practical, ” and an initial operational capability (IOC) in late 1984.

The context for the MOSC study included a growing concern about the Earth’s resource limitations,

population growth, and environmental stresses, driven

by the widely publicized “limits to growth” debate

of the early 1970s. The study noted that “the planning and development of future space programs cannot be done in isolation from the many critical problems facing the peoples of the world during the

coming decades” and that “there will continue to be

many conflicting and competing demands for resources in the years ahead.” This context skewed the

emphasis in establishing activities to be conducted

with the support of in-space infrastructure to “the research and applications areas that are directly related

to current world needs. ”

Though oriented more directly than past station concepts to high-priority global problems, the MOSC

study still emphasized the “science and applications

research facility” rationale; although such activities as

assembly of large structures and operating space manufacturing facilities were examined during the study,

the emphasis was on a facility which would “enable

the scientific community to pursue programs directly

related to the improvement of life on Earth.” The final

MOSC configuration called for a four-man modularized facility; the manned module would be based on

the Spacelab design, and Spacelab pallets would also

be used to support unpressurized payloads. Total program costs for development and operation of the initial MOSC facility were estimated to be $1.2 billion.59

SgMcDonnell Douglas Astronautics, Manned Orbita/ ~YskmJ ConcePts

Study, Book l-Executive Summary, Sept. 30, 1975, pp. iii, 1-2, 30, 36.
App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States ● 173

Rather than attempt to gain approval to take the

MOSC effort to a Phase B stage, in the Fall of 1975

NASA decided to conduct further studies in which the

emphasis was shifted from research in orbit to space

construction. In explaining its study plans, NASA

noted:

Earlier “space station” studies emphasized the

“Laboratory in Orbit” concept. Emphasis is now being placed on a Space Station as an “Operational

Base” which not only involves a laboratory but also

such uses as: (a) an assembly, maintenance, and logistics base for conducting manned operations involving antennas, mirrors, solar collectors, transmitters;

(b) for conducting launch and retrieval operations for

orbit-to-orbit and Earth-departure vehicles which may

require assembly or propellant transfer in orbit; (c)

for conducting retrieval, maintenance and redeployment operations for automated satellites; (d) for managing clusters of spacecraft and space systems as a

central base for support for common services . . . .

Orbital location studies will emphasize the possible exploitation of geosynchronous orbit, as well as

low inclination and polar low Earth orbit . . . . Current planning is directed toward a “space station”

new start in fiscal year 1979.60

There were a number of reasons for NASA’s switch

i n emphasis in “space station” justification. There was

no evidence that the scientific community was any

more supportive of a manned orbital laboratory concept in 1975 than it had been in 1970; prior attempts

to justify a “space station” by its use as a space-based

R&D facility had not been successful. More positively,

the mid-70s saw a number of studies of the potentials

of space operations for addressing problems on Earth.

The most broadly conceived of these studies was

undertaken by a NASA study group which was asked

in 1974 by NASA Administrator James Fletcher (who

had become Administrator in April 1971) to provide

an Outlook for Space—”to identify and examine the

various possibilities for the civiI space program over

the next twenty-five years. ” The study group concluded that:

. . . the great challenges facing the physical needs of

humanity are principally the results of the continuing struggle to improve the quality of life. Particularly

critical is the need to improve food production and

distribution, to develop new energy sources, to meet

new challenges to the environment, and to predict

and deal with natural and manmade disasters. In each

of these areas, we found that significant contributions

can be made by a carefully developed space program.

The NASA report recognized that “future space programs must provide a service to the public.” In responding to the Outlook for Space report, James Flet-

‘>W S Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NAS A

4u(horIzatIon /or FY 1977, Hearings, p. 1046

cher set as a primary NASA goal, “accelerating the

development of economic and efficient space services for society, ” such as “resources management,

environmental understanding, and commercial returns from the unique contributions of space. ”61

The Outlook for Space report was not directly or

strongly supportive of the need for a “space station. ”

It did conclude, however, that:

Most of these activities might well be supported by

the Shuttle system, together with associate space laboratories and free-flyers, There are more far-reaching

objectives, however, which will require human activities in space transcending those supportable by current Shuttle flight plans, such as the construction of

satellite power stations or the establishment of a permanent lunar base. It is difficult at this time to assert

that either of these activities, or others like them—

space manufacturing, space colonies—will be undertaken within the next 25 years. Nevertheless, as we

looked at the future of space, particularly at those

more creative programs directed toward major exploitation of the opportunities which space provides, we

inevitably found man to be an integral part of the system. If the United States is to be in a position to take

advantage of these potential benefits then it would

seem necessary that we develop the capability to

operate for extended periods of time. The space facility would be constantly available, although crews

would, of course, be periodically exchanged.

The creation of such a permanent space facility

seemed to us to be the most useful way to continue

the advancement of manned-flight technology. With

the Shuttle system giving us comparatively low-cost

access to space on the one hand, and the economies

which could be realized from the use of the permanent space facility on the other hand, the construction of a permanent “space station” appears to be

the next logical step for the manned flight program—

not as an objective in itself, but rather for its technological support of a number of other objectives which

can benefit from our growing knowledge of how humans can work in space and to provide a foundation

for the future.62

Once again, NASA saw the justification for a “space

station” primarily as “the next logical step” in exploiting people’s ability to work in space.

In addition to the Outlook for Space study, in the

mid-1970s a number of even more visionary efforts

were identifying challenging future space goals. One

notion which received wide public attention, but had

a relatively modest influence on NASA’s internal planning activities, was the proposal by Princeton Professor

Gerard O’Neill that, primarily in response to the

Earth’s resource limitations, work begin on develop-

~1 outlook {of sPaCe. A synopsIs (Wash I ngton, DC: National Aeronautics

and Space Adm I n Istratton, January 1976), pp. iv, v, 5-7

~~lbld,, pp 55-56
174 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

ing very large human habitats in space—space colonies. 63

A concept which was quite attractive to NASA’s

engineers was developed by Peter Glaser of Arthur

D. Little, Inc.; this was the proposal that large solar

arrays in geosynchronous orbit could provide a large

source of continuous energy on Earth. The solar power

satellite (SPS) idea was given a great deal of technical

attention by NASA during 1975 and 1976, until NASA

was forced by the Office of Management and Budget

to turn over lead responsibility for SPS to the Energy

Research and Development Administration (soon to

become part of the Department of Energy).

Developing an SPS would require extensive use of

on-orbit work crews in order to assemble and test very

large structures in space. Similar construction requirements were derived from less grand schemes involving large antennas in space for communications use

and scientific investigations.

By the end of 1975, NASA had developed an argument that space construction might be a major requirement of its programs during the 1980s, and

wanted to explore the role of in-space infrastructure

utilizing work crews in carrying out these construction efforts. In December 1975, the agency issued a

request for proposals for a “Space Station Systems

Analysis Study” (SSSAS); the study effort was to be

focused around the use of a “space station” to “serve

a wide range of operational base and space laboratory activities, ” such as using the station “as a test facility and construction base to support manufacturing, fabrication and assembly of various sizes of space

structures, ”64

One finding of the system analysis studies was that

scientific efforts could “go along for the ride” on

‘‘space stations” capable of supporting construction,

materials processing, and power generation objectives. An aerospace publication reported that:

The space base concept is one whose time seems

to be coming rather quickly. Until recently, “space

stations” have been thought of mainly as . . . ‘the

traditional laboratory in the sky. ’ Some observers were

surprised when construction, materials processing and

power were given roughly equal status with science . . . . Now, the balance has shifted further

to . . . space construction work as the ‘prime focus’

of the studies.65

When NASA began this study effort in late 1975,

its hope had been to use the Phase A study results as

6JGerard K. 0’ Nelll, ‘‘The Colonizationof SpaCe, ’ phY51c5 Today, September 1974,

b4NASA Press Release, “NASA Seeks Proposals for Space Station Studies, ”

Dec. 11, 1975.

‘

>

’’ Operational Base Concepts Gain In Space Station Studies, ” Aerospace

Dally, Sept. 13, 1976, p. 54.

the basis for a Phase B “space station” “new start”

in fiscal 1979—i.e., sometime after October 1978.

However, NASA was unable to get the approval of

the Office of Management and Budget to proceed on

a schedule which would have made such a new start

possible. Recognizing that NASA was not going to be

able to start on a major “space station” effort anytime

soon, by the spring of 1977 NASA officials were suggesting that “the (Shuttle) orbiter is a significant ‘space

station’ in itself, ” and were looking toward ways to

enhance Shuttle capability to perform many of the

missions that the SSSAS studies had assigned to a

“space station. ”66

Rather than being the year in which significant momentum behind a “space station” program was developed, 1978 turned out to be a year in which there

was essentially no “space station” activity per se. The

system analysis studies had identified, as important

steps in extending the capabilities of the space Shuttle, the development of an in-orbit power supply and

of Shuttle-tended unmanned orbital platforms for various science and applications payloads. Both Johnson

Space Center (JSC) and Marshall Space Flight Center

(MSFC) were studying orbital power supplies during

1978; the Johnson Space Center concept was called

a power extension platform, while Marshall Space

Flight Center was examining a 25-kW power platform.

Marshall also initiated studies of an unmanned

Science and Applications Space Platform (SASP), and

most of the MSFC study activities during the 1978-80

period were devoted to these two program concepts.

(During 1980 and 1981, MSFC contracted with

McDonnell Douglas to study an evolutionary program

through which an unmanned platform such as the one

defined in the SASP study could grow into a manned

platform, i.e., a “space station, ” perhaps along the

lines that McDonnell Douglas had earlier defined in

the 1975 Manned Orbital Systems Concept study.)

While Marshall’s emphasis was on an evolutionary

approach to space platforms, by early 1979 the leadership of JSC had decided that the Center’s efforts should

refocus on a major “space station” effort. Aviation

Week reported JSC was “concerned about this lack

of continuing assessment for permanently manned

U.S. facilities” and was “mindful of the growing Soviet capability in this area. 67’ Another factor influencing JSC thinking was “a need for a real goal to maintain the dedication of present participants in the space

program and the interest and enthusiasm of young

people in space technology in order to motivate their

pursuing engineering and science careers.”68

6bAvja(jon week and Space Technology, Mar. 16, 1979, P. 49.

b71bld.

MNASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Space @erations Center: A

Concept Analysis, Nov. 29, 1979, pp. 1-1, 1-2.
App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States • 175

Based on these considerations, during 1979 JSC conducted an in-house study of a concept identified as

a Space Operations Center (SOC). This study was

based on two assumptions: “that the next 10 to 20

years will include requirements for large, complex

space systems” and “that geosynchronous orbit is

clearly a primary operational area in space in the coming decades. ” If these assumptions were valid, JSC

argued, then “the space construction and servicing

of these future systems wiI I be more effective with a

permanent, manned operations center in space. ”

The primary objectives of the SOC were identified

as:

●

●

●

construction, checkout, and transfer to operational orbit of large, complex space systems;

on-orbit assembly, launch, recovery, and servicing of manned and unmanned spacecraft; and,

further development of the capability for permanent manned operations in space wiith reduced

dependence on Earth for control and resupply.

The SOC study noted that this list of objectives:

. . . noticeably does not include onboard science and

applications objectives, although the free-flying satellites which would be serviced would include mostly

those of this genre. The primary implication of this

mission is that experiment and applications requirements will not be design drivers; the SOC will be “optimized” to support the operational functions of these

objectives. However, experiments or applications

which can tolerate the operational parameters of the

SOC can be operated onboard, or an entire dedicated

module could be attached to an available berthing

port.

The study developed a concept of a self-contained,

continuously occupied orbital facility built from several Shuttle-launched modules. The initial SOC crew

would be 4 to 8 people. In addition to a core facility,

the full-capability SOC would require a construction

facility and flight support facility. The costs of this fully

capable SOC were estimated at $2,7 billion, with the

total facility in place 9 to 10 years after program initiation. b9

The Johnson Space Center briefed interested parties on SOC at the end of November 1979, in anticipation of initiating a contractor study of the concept during 1980. One account of this briefing suggested that

“the ‘space station’ may be ready for a comeback.”7

°

The following year would see a new administration

take office and a new NASA Administrator appointed.

The concept of in-space infrastructure would be

looked at afresh.

●

W hj., pp 1.8, 1-13, 1- 1‘3, 1 ’24

7“Da\ Id Doollng, “Space StatIon May Be Ready for a Comeback, ” HurIf~-

~ i//c TIrrw$, Dec 9, 1979, p 4

Conclusions

It should be evident that there is no obvious cutoff

point for an account of the development of the “space

station” concept. Today’s planning and proposals are

a continuation of an evolution which has roots in the

earliest years of this century and which has proceeded

i n sporadic bursts of intensity over the past quartercentury. It is possible, however, to reflect on past experience in the context of the current situation. Such

reflection reveals two levels of concrete justification

which have been offered i n support of in-space infrastructure—i. e., “space station, ” acquisition.

One set of justifications ties the need for a permanent human presence in orbit to a particular image

of the future objectives of the civiIian space program.

According to this line of reasoning, a “space station”

can

1.

2.

3.

In

be seen as:

a necessary way station in preparing for people

exploring the solar system; or

an extremely valuable “national laboratory in orbit” for carrying out many of the research and

development activities related to a balanced and

diverse civilian space program with both scientific and application objectives; or

a centralized operations base from which the

routine exploitation of, particularly the commercial exploitation of, both LEO and geosynchronous orbits can most effectively proceed.

all of these justifications, in-space infrastructure

is explicitly a means to achieving or faciIitating a particular set of space policy objectives, and a decision

to develop it would be tied to the more fundamental

decision that those objectives were of sufficient

priority to justify the investments required to achieve

them, including the necessary infrastructure itself. Historically, what has happened at past occasions for

decision on the course of the American space program

is that other goals than those which would have required a “space station” were given preference:

1.

2.

In 1961, President Kennedy sought a dramatic

space achievement in which the United States

could best the Soviet Union. The choice of a lunar-landing objective and of the lunar-orbital rendezvous approach to achieving it as the response

to Kennedy’s need meant bypassing the development of Earth-orbital capabilities including

“space stations. ”

In 1969-71, President Nixon sought to reduce the

priority and budget allocation of the space program after Apollo while still developing some

new technology, maintaining a manned space

flight element, and creating more balance among

various program objectives. Within the scope of

what he was wiIling to approve, there was insuf-
176 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

ficient activity to justify developing a major orbital laboratory, and the space Shuttle was selected as an alternative (and in NASA’s mind, an

interim) step until the level of space activity

would become high enough to require such a facility.

From the perspective of overall policy objectives,

then, the fact that a “space station” has been rejected

as a part of the space program in the past can be interpreted primarily as a function of the particular stage

i n the program’s evolution at the time that its acquisition was proposed. Such rejections are best understood as national leaders saying “not yet” or “not

under the current conditions, ” rather than an outright

“no.” The issue then becomes whether the overall

character and desired objectives of the Nation’s space

program for the rest of this century are now of a scope

to justify acquiring in-space infrastructure as a means

to achieve them.

Related to this point is an observation which springs

clearly from this historical record: that the concept

“space station” can be used to describe very different

hardware configurations and technical capabilities,

ranging from the von Braun toroidal concept of the

1950s, through the 50 to 100 person space base proposed by NASA in 1969 and the “construction shack”

concept of the mid-197os, to recent proposals for a

small and evolutionary station based on an unmanned

platform. Historically, then, the term “space station”

is extremely elastic, and an informed evaluation of a

particular proposal must ask “what kind of ‘space station, ’ for what purposes, at what cost?” In this sense,

the past history of the proposal is not particularly relevant to the current situation.

At another level of justification, the need for a permanent human outpost in orbit has been consistently

seen by those with a broad perspective on future

space activities as a necessary step in development

of a capability to explore and exploit outer space, if

that exploration and exploitation is to be pursued aggressively. Thomas Paine made this argument to

Richard Nixon in 1969:

We believe strongly that the justification for proceeding now with this major project as a national goal

does not, and should not be made to depend on the

specific contributions that can be foreseen today in

particular scientific fields like astronomy or high energy physics, in particular economic applications,

such as Earth resource surveys, or in specific defense

needs. Rather, the justification for the “space station”

is that it is clearly the next major evolutionary step

in man’s experimentation, conquest, and use of

space.71

Current NASA Administrator James Beggs has made

much the same point, saying that “a ‘space station’

is the logical next step in the history of our manned

space systems. It will build on the achievements of

the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle programs. ”72

This argument decouples station justification from

any particular set of missions and suggests that a

“space station “ is a valuable, logical, and/or necessary step in developing the capability to pursue any

future objectives in space. The underlying assumption

is that the United States will want to pursue an active

space program and that a “space station” is required

to do so. This line of argument is frequently combined

with assertions of the need for leadership or preeminence in space as a source of national pride and prestige and as a counter to the military and/or economic

threats coming from other spacefaring nations.

This theme has consistently been put forth over the

past two decades by advocates of a “space station.”

In the past, it seems as if they were “ahead of the

curve’ ’—i.e.,., that in objective terms the U.S. space

program had not yet developed to a point where the

argument that a permanent manned outpost was indeed the logical next step in an aggressive space enterprise was plausible to those outside the space community.

The same argument is being put forth today; the

question is whether it is any more plausible in 1984,

as the U.S. space programs enters its second quartercentury, than it has been previously. Given the capability for easy access to orbit provided by the space

Shuttle, it may be that having the ability to stay in orbit for extended periods for experiments or operations

is now in fact a “next logical step.” Or it may be that

the program has not yet evolved, and is not evolving

toward the kind of active future, in which the creation of permanent human presence in orbit is justified.

This historical review suggests that space advocates

will continue to press their vision of the way to go

about opening the space frontier and that a “space

station” will continue to be an integral part of that vision. It is up to others in leadership positions to decide

whether the vision of space held by those who are

the heirs of Tsiolkovsky, Oberth, von Braun, and many

others who have worked on the space program in this

country is one which the United States will now

embrace.

T\ Memorandum from Thomas Paine to the President, Feb. 24, 1969.

72 James M. Beggs, “Securing Our Leadership in Space,” Astronautics and

Aeronautics, September 1982,
Appendix C

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A

CIVILIAN “SPACE STATION” PROGRAM*

Introduction

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,

as amended, includes the following passage: “The aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall

be conducted so as to contribute to . . . the following [objective]: . . . Cooperation by the United States

with other nations and groups of nations in work done

pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application

of the results thereof . . . .’1 As a result of this provision, NASA has a long tradition of cooperation with

other countries in space activities.

In accordance with this tradition, there have been

extensive discussions over the past 2 years between

NASA and other friendly countries regarding a possible international in-space infrastructure acquisition

program. Then, in January of 1984, President Reagan

in his State of the Union Address called for a U.S.

“space station” with international participation. These

circumstances indicate the importance of a full consideration of various international options for development, acquisition, operation, and use of future longterm, in-orbit infrastructure. The aim of this appendix is to contribute to this consideration.

Why International Involvement?

THE MOTIVES FOR COOPERATION

Countries engage in international cooperation in scientific and technical undertakings for a variety of

reasons. In order to assess the potential advantages

and disadvantages of international involvement by

another country in a U.S. “space station” program (or

even the advantages of fully internationalizing the program) it is first of all necessary to understand the

reasons which lead nations to engage in international

technical cooperation in general. These motivations

can then be discussed as they apply to the specific

situation of space infrastructure development, operation, and/or use in order to provide a framework for

examining various degrees and forms of potential international involvement, from no involvement at all

up to and including a space infrastructure enterprise

which is fully multinational from the start.

● Paper prepared for OTA by Hubert Bortzmeyer, with revision by John

Logsdon.

I National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, As Amended, Section

102(b)(7).

There are both symbolic and utilitarian payoffs

which lead a country to engage in international involvement in its technical activities through formal cooperative agreements. Among the national objectives

served by such involvement are:2

1. Symbolic Objectives

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

political and policy influence–a country may

engage in international cooperation in order

to influence political attitudes and policy outcomes in cooperating countries, in particular

so that those attitudes and outcomes are compatible with its own national objectives.

policy legitimization–a country may invite

others to cooperate with it in order to enlist

their support for a particular course of action

that the country intends to pursue; broadening the base of involvement in a particular

undertaking may increase its legitimacy both

at home and abroad.

policy commitment–a country may allow

others to participate in one of its undertakings as a means of gaining their commitment

to support some of its other policies.

leadership–a country may invite others to

join it in a common undertaking because it

believes that such an intimate partnership will

allow it to demonstrate clearly to others a

leadership position.

cooperation to encourage cooperation—a

country may initiate or enter into a specific

cooperative undertaking in order to demonstrate its commitment to the general principle of international cooperation as a desirable

course of action.

2. Utilitarian Objectives

a.

b.

division of labor and sharing of costs–a country may invite others to join in an undertaking it wishes to pursue in order to achieve a

necessary or desirable sharing of the burdens,

particularly the cost, of that undertaking.

access to foreign resources—a country may

open one of its undertakings to foreign participation in order to engage or have access to

‘This statement of objectwes IS adapted from Stephen M. Shaffer and Lisa

Robock Shaffer, The Politics of International Cooperation: A Comparison of

U.S. Experience in Space and in Security (Graduate School of International

Relations, University of Denver, 1980).

177
178 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

unique or superior resources, both physical

and human, available only in other countries.

c. economic influences-a country may invite

others to participate in an undertaking in order to increase the likelihood that they will

then purchase the products or services of that

undertaking, rather than those of potential

competitors.

This breakdown of the objectives of cooperation basically reflects the perspective of a country seeking to

involve others in its activities; however, it also can be

used to identify the reasons why others would agree

to cooperate with that country. In general, one would

expect those responding to a cooperative initiative to

give highest priority to utilitarian benefits, but the symbolic payoffs from international cooperation can accrue, though not evenly, to all partners.

The United States has made international cooperation in science and technology—in space as in numerous other sectors-a major element of its foreign policy; most observers agree that the overall benefits of

such cooperation in both symbolic and utilitarian

terms have been substantial, and that the negative impacts have been comparatively insignificant.3 Unless

it begins a technical undertaking for motivations which

are overwhelmingly nationalistic in character (e.g.,

Project Apollo or the Supersonic Transport) the United

States has welcomed the participation of its closest

allies. As international involvement in the “space station” program is assessed, this “bias” toward cooperation will be maintained.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE:

THE RECORD TO DATE

In the 25 years that the United States has had a Government-funded civilian space program, international

cooperation has been one of its major themes; as mentioned above, it was an explicit objective of the NAS

Act. Armed with this legislative mandate, with Presidential and congressional support for a U.S. civilian

space program which emphasized openness and scientific objectives, and with already existing patterns

of cooperation in space science, NASA has since its

inception conducted an active program of international partnership.

In space, perhaps more than in most areas of international science, it has been the policies and initiatives of the Government, rather than those of the scientific and technical community, which have

established the U.S. attitude toward cooperative

undertakings. 4 Although NASA’s international programs have involved the Soviet Union, Canada, Japan, and various developing countries, NASA’s primary cooperative partner to date has been Europe—

both individual European countries and the various

European space organizations which have existed

over the past two decades.

International cooperation in civilian space activity

is thus a longstanding tradition, especially in the field

of space science, but also to some extent in space applications and space technology programs. As the general space policies of potential international partners

in a space infrastructure acquisition program are reviewed, many examples of cooperative ventures can

be brought to light. These range in scope from modest participation in minor projects to intense involvement in major undertakings on the basis of full partnership, An extreme example of the latter is the setting

up of an intergovernmental consortium to carry out

comprehensive programs in a particular technical

field—telecommunications.

On the other hand, there are few examples of substantial involvement of foreign partners in programs

which could be characterized as the main thrust of

the national space policy of a given country, whether

it be the United States, the U. S. S. R., or any other

space-capable state. As a matter of fact, the only instance so far of such an arrangement is the involvement, since the early 1970s, of Europe and Canada

in the development of the American Space Transportation System (STS).

But even that example is not really valid, since the

hardware developments assigned to Europe (Spacelab)

and Canada (the Remote Manipulator System, RMS),

although producing valuable complements, involve

a rather minor share of the total costs involved, on

the order of 10 percent. Furthermore, what is really

central in the STS is the American-built Shuttle. The

other two items are accessory to it: the RMS could

easily have been replaced with some U.S.-designed

equivalent, and, if Spacelab did not exist, the STS

JThe Nat tonal Academy of Sciences has recently undertaken a review of

sclentlflc and technolog~al cooperation among the OECD countries which 4Another area where Government I nttlatlves were crucial I n establlshi ng

reaches this conclusion. patterns of international cooperation was nuclear energy.
App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 179

would still be able to carry out 90 percent of its intended activities. s

An invitation for international participation in a U.S.

“space station” program might well have the result,

as did the U.S. offer to participate in STS development,

that foreign participation would be somewhat marginal in terms of both the scope and the nature of its share

in the workload. A different outcome, however, is also

possible, resulting in what was described above as a

rather unusual circumstance: major foreign involvement in what will be the brunt of the U.S. effort in

space over the next decade or more. Since the early

seventies, space technology has been disseminating

and/or maturing throughout the world, bringing certain countries almost to par with the United States in

aspects of space technology relevant to a such an

undertaking, and thus broadening the technical base

for significant cooperation.

In order to understand which of these outcomes is

likely and/or preferable, it is first necessary to detail

the objectives which would lead both the United

States and other countries to collaborate on a space

infrastructure undertaking. As NASA’s current Director of International Affairs has observed: “International

space cooperation is not a charitable enterprise; countries cooperate because they judge it in their interest

to do so. ”

6

U.S. OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS RELATED

TO INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S. SPACE

INFRASTRUCTURE ACQUISITION PROGRAM

In the first year of its existence, NASA formulated

a set of policy guidelines for international cooperation in space. Those guidelines have survived periodic

reexamination and remain in force today. They reflect

“conservative values7

” with respect to the conditions

under which cooperation is desirable.

sThe U.S. policy, as became clear I n 1972, was to ensure that foreign contributors to the STS should not have responsibility for any element which

was essential to the success of the system. The only civillan space programs

to which Europe has contributed or is contributing essential parts are the

International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUVE) and the Spxe Telescope (ST). There

IS a strong push within NASA to Iim it the foreign role in any ‘‘space station’

program to non-essential elements, but this push is being countered by an

Increasingly strong insistence, from the major ESA contributors at least, that

potential partners be allowed to develop some of the key infrastructure elements, Of course, there is a natural resistance within U.S. industry to seeing

foreign organizations provide what it could produce: witness, for instance,

the Industrial opposition to the Canadian development of the RMS. It should

be noted, however, that NATO partners are frequently gwen responsibility

for developing essential components of defense systems, with consequent

strerigthenlng of the alliance.

6Kenneth S. Pedersen, “International Aspects of Commercial Space Activities, ” speech to Princeton Conference on Space Manufacturing, May 1983.

7Arnold Frutkin, /nternationa/ Cooperation in Space (Prentice-Hall, 1965),

p. 32.

The essential features of NASA guidelines are:

cooperation is to be on a project-by-project basis,

not on a program or other open-ended arrangement;

each project must be of mutual interest and have

clear scientific value;

technical agreement is necessary before political

commitment;

each side bears full financial responsibility for its

share of the project;

each side must have the technical and managerial

capabilities to carry out its share of the project;

NASA does not provide substantial technical assistance to its partners, and little or no U.S. technology is transferred; and

scientific results are made publicly available.8

These guidelines have occasionally been bent, as

in the case of the 1975 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Apollo-Soyuz

Program. In general, however, they have provided an

effective framework within which NASA has pursued

a mixed set of objectives, including:

● Scientific/Technical

Increasing the number of qualified people

working on problems of space research and

space technology by broadening the base of

involvement in space activities;

Shaping the development of the space programs in other countries by offering attractive

opportunities to join with the United States i n

“doing things our way”; and

Channeling the funds and technical capabilities dedicated to space in other countries

away from activities which are competitive or

not compatible with U.S. interests, but involving them in a program dominated by and largely defined by the United States.

● Economic

– NASA estimates that it has achieved over $2

billion in cost savings and effective contributions from its cooperative programs over the

past 25 years; cost-sharing has been an influential, though not top-priority, element of NASA’s

cooperative programs.

– Involving other countries in expanded space

activities may create new markets for U.S. aerospace products.

● Political

— NASA’s international cooperative programs

have been designed to present a positive image of the United States to our cooperating

partners; in particular, the contrast between

8Shatier and Shaffer, op. CIt,, p. 18

38-798 0 - 84 - 13 , QL 3
180 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

U.S. openness and Soviet secrecy with respect

to space has been exploited by the United

States.

— International cooperation in space has been

undertaken by the United States in order to

advance other U.S. foreign policy objectives.

While the priority given to these various objectives

has varied over time and mission opportunity, at the

core has been a policy that permitted this country’s

closest allies to become involved in the U.S. space

effort. Indeed, some have criticized NASA for making possible such participation, at minimal cost, in an

effort paid for almost entirely by U.S. taxpayers; “benefit, know-how and opportunity were shared to an extent which was totally unprecedented where an advanced technology was involved . . . .“9 Since the

start of its civilian space program, the United States

has used international cooperation in space as a

means of creating a sense of togetherness and common achievement among, particularly, the industrial

democracies which are this country’s most significant

partners in maintaining world order.

The benefits to the United States of international

space cooperation do not come without costs, of

course. Among the potential negative impacts of involving others in the U.S. space program are:

1. increased technical risk and management complexity;

2. Significant O Ut-flOWS of sensitive or valuable U.S. .

3.

4.

technology, employment opportunities, and/or

hard currency, as the United States purchases

space-related goods or services from other

countries;

in particular, the development, through their involvement in U.S. space activities, of effective

competitors to U.S. firms in commercial space efforts; and

possible disputes among the United States and

its cooperating partners-which, if not resolved,

could lead to broader foreign policy conflicts.

To date, NASA has managed its affairs so as to have

minimized these potential negative impacts. For instance, many of the cooperative programs involved

NASA’s launching of foreign satellites, in which the

technical risk to NASA was virtually non-existent and

which often led to foreign purchase of additional

launches.

gArnold Frutkin, “U.S. Policy: a Drama in N Acts,” Spectrum, September

1983, p. 74.

FOREIGN OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS

RELATED TO INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S.

“SPACE STATION” PROGRAM

Success in cooperative undertakings requires that

each side perceives the cooperation as being beneficial to itself; such undertakings are even more likely

to be successful if there is at least some commonality

of objectives. All partners must believe that cooperation is a useful means for advancing some of their national objectives without undue costs related to others.

It is somewhat more difficult to generalize with respect

to the motivations which might lead specific countries

or groupings of countries to decide to join the United

States in development, operation, and/or use of space

infrastructure, but the following seems most germane:

● Scientific/Technical

In most areas of space technology, the United

States is still a leader. Other countries may

hope that close partnership with the United

States will give them increased access to these

technologies and help upgrade their own technical capabilities.

The “space station” contains elements of

space infrastructure which, used in connection

with the space transportation system, will

“modernize” space operations; other countries may decide they must be part of the most

advanced way of operating in space,

● Economic

— If the commercial potential of many areas of

space activity is as large as some forecast, use

of in-space infrastructure will be an essential

or at least extremely useful means for achieving that potential. Other countries wanting to

participate in the commercial exploitation of

space may view sharing the costs of a “space

station” program as the best way to be major

partners in such commercial exploitation.

— Cooperation with the United States may be the

only way that other countries can afford to develop capabilities in particular areas of space

technology. Division of labor and costs is a

necessary approach for those without the resources to develop a total system of space infrastructure on their own. While the United

States could probably afford to develop it on

its own, as could the ESA countries in collaboration with Japan,10 probably no other counIOAS noted later in this appemfix, there is a considerable difference between the amount of taxpayers’ money the United States on the one hand

and Europe and Japan on the other are prepared to spend on space. But

there is little doubt that Europe alone cou/d make a comparable investment

if the political will existed.
App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 181

try or region except the Soviet Union and its

allies could make a comparable investment in

space.

— Other countries may anticipate that such a program will provide marketing opportunities for

their industries and want to participate in the

program in order to maximize those opportunities.

. Political

— Participation in the “space station,” like participation in the space transportation system,

may provide other countries a way of sharing

in the political and prestige benefits of manned

space flight activities without bearing the total

cost of manned systems.

— The United States is the military and economic

leader of the non-Communist world; cooperation with the United States in such an effort

may provide a way for other countries to maintain or increase their commitment to a political

and military alliance with the United States.

THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL

“SPACE STATION” PROGRAM

Some have suggested that any major new undertaking in space be from the start “truly” international—

i.e., designed, funded, and managed by an international consortium or an equivalent organization .11 Although the current momentum behind “space station” plans is leading away from this option, it is worth

identifying it here and assessing it later as a possible

way of approaching its development or operation.

Such an approach would, of course, be the ultimate

in the way of internationalizing a program; in this

mode of cooperation, the United States would merely

be a shareholder among many others within a consortium of participants. There are precedents in this

respect; an instance which comes readily to mind is

that of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT).

In 1962, the U.S. Congress passed the Communications Satellite Act, creating the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and charging it with developing a global system for international satellite

communications. The United States could not achieve

such an ambitious goal without the active participation of other nations; therefore negotiations were

started which led (after substantial conflict) in 1964

to an “interim agreement” under which a global network was successfully established. In 1969, a Plenipotentiary Conference was convened, with 67

1 I See, for example, RcJ&rt Salkeld, “Toward Men Permanently in Space, ’

Astronautics and Aeronautics, October 1979.

member countries in attendance: it resulted in a

Definitive Agreement which entered into force in 1973

and made INTELSAT a working international organization, with a present membership of more than 100

countries.

The U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries never

joined INTELSAT, both because it was initiated by the

United States and actually run by Americans during

the first years of its existence and because they would

have had very little influence on the organization

under the weighted system of voting which was

employed.

The International Maritime Satellite Organization

(lNMARSAT) has a number of features that are distinctly different from those of INTELSAT. It provides

global coverage, whereas INTELSAT does not. Another

difference is that among its member states, INMARSAT

counts the Soviet Union (with a 14 percent ownership share, second only to the United States’ 23 percent) and several other socialist countries.

INMARSAT’S statute obliges it to provide free access

to members and nonmembers.

INMARSAT was created pursuant to the initiative of

a United Nations agency, the Inter-governmental

Maritime Consultative Organization, which, from

1973 to 1976, convened a series of international conferences to establish a global maritime satellite communications system. In 1979, the INMARSAT Convention and Operating Agreement entered into force, and

operations started early in 1982. With the exception

of the above-mentioned differences, INTELSAT and

INMARSAT are similar in structure.

Could a similar international organization be

created, in order to develop, operate, and use in-space

infrastructure? In principle there is no obstacle to this,

although the parallel with INTELSAT can be very misleading. In particular, it is not clear that the provision

of orbital infrastructure to accomplish a variety of objectives could ever be the kind of profitable enterprise

that space-based communications has been. Communications is a well-established business, yielding a return on investment of about 14 percent within

INTELSAT. Also, the capability upon which INTELSAT

was originally based (communications satellites and

launch capabilities) had been developed by the

United States at its own expense.

There are no such credible economic prospects for

space infrastructure, which would have many different

uses, some for pure government-funded research,

others in the nature of a public service, and still others

for commercial applications. Also, in a satellite communications system, there lies more cash-flow in the

procurement of the ground segment than in the

building of the satellites. This has made it possible for
182 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

American firms to be the exclusive manufacturers of

INTELSAT satellites for years without stirring too much

resentment within the international consortium,

because other member countries have found adequate compensation in the manufacturing of ground

stations for themselves and for sale abroad.

Also, Europe, with its Ariane series of boosters, is

now competing for INTELSAT launch contracts. In addition, some form of international cooperation was absolutely essential, almost by definition, for an international communications network to be feasible. No

such cooperative imperative is attached to space infrastructure.

A more adequate precedent for an international

“space station” enterprise might be that of an international organization created to conduct a number

of jointly coordinated space programs for the benefit

of its member states. Such a “limited partnership” may

be a realistic approach to space infrastructure development and/or operation. To a large extent, the European Space Agency (ESA) does provide such a parallel. 12 Since its inception, ESA has performed very

successfully in spite of the difficulties associated with

almost all international organizations.13 In ESA’s case,

the two major problem areas have been, and still are:

1 ) the time and burdensome negotiations required to

settle differences about general policies to follow and

what programs to support; 2) the framing of an “industrial policy” designed to improve the worldwide

competitiveness of European industry while ensuring

a “fair return” to individual members states (the “return” is the value of the contracts let by ESA to any

member state, and it is “fair” when proportionate to

that member’s financial contribution to the agency’s

budget).

The Convention governing ESA provides some clues

as to how these difficulties are dealt with in the long

run:

1. The formal structure of ESA is designed to accommodate laborious negotiations and compromises.

The legislative power, so to speak, rests with a

Council where all states are represented; the

Council meets regularly, usually for 2-day sessions.14 There is also an Executive responsible for

day-to-day operations and long-range planning.

I ZESA is described i n more detail below.

IJI ndeed, if one takes a long view of past European coopf?ration, saY, over

100 years, ESA’S record is strikingly good. Although its operations have been

on a much smaller scale than have those of NASA, ESA’S record of technical

successes is perhaps as good as that of any other organization.

141n general, exh Member State has one vote in the Council. However,

a Member State does not have the right to vote on matters concerning an

optional program in which it does not take part. Except where the ESA Convention provides otherwise, decisions of the Council are taken by a simple

majority of Member States represented and voting.

2. ESA’s overall activity is subdivided into two categories:

mandatory activities, which include chiefly

scientific programs and basic organizational

expenditures; mandatory contributions are

based on each state’s GNP;

optional activities, which are specific programs

like Ariane, Spacelab, Marecs, and so on; contributions to these programs are negotiated

between the participants at the inception of

the program.

This system provides ESA with a considerable flexibility: although unanimous consent of all Member

States is needed formally to permit ESA to undertake

an optional program, a vote in favor of the program

does not carry any obligation to participate. Member

States may decide, after a program has been

authorized, whether—and, if so, to what extent—they

wiII participate. Thus, Member states can adjust their

financial effort to the degree of interest they see in a

program and/or to the “return” their industry will obtain from it (one of the solutions to the irksome “fair

return” problem). Also, member states can support

another partner’s favorite project by a token participation which can be traded against others, resulting

i n “package deals” which settle seemingly unreconcilable differences.

A further degree of flexibility is provided by the fact

that the agency is not obligated to manage all of its

programs through its own staff. ESA can delegate to

a national agency the responsibilities for a program’s

management, if this appears to be preferable from a

political, economic, or technical point of view (CNES,

the French space agency, is thus entrusted with technical management of the Ariane development

program).

3. ESA early recognized that a multinational agency

is better off letting contracts to multinational industrial firms rather than attempting to balance

contracts among national companies according

to its “fair return” principle. This balancing act

is often performed better and more quickly inside multinational consortia of European aerospace and electronics firms, the creation of which

ESA has encouraged.

As a last parallel which might be drawn from ESA,

it should be noted that this agency’s role is generally

limited to development and demonstration of space

systems. Utilization, in the sense of operational or

commercial exploitation, is usually entrusted to other

intergovernmental organization, like EUTELSAT for regional European communications or EUMETSAT for

meteorological satellites. Commercial operation can

even be entrusted to private multinational corporations like ARIANESPACE, which has been established
App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 183

to produce, market, launch, and finance Ariane

launch vehicles. This arrangement could be paralleled

in an international “space station” program: different

international entities, with possibly different membership and operating procedures, could take care of its

development and operation.

As far as development and operation are concerned,

one might question whether the creation of international entities in charge of these activities would entail creation of new technical agencies duplicating the

know-how and resources of existing space agencies,

most notably NASA. Clearly, this would not be an advisable course. However, the international body in

charge of the program could confine itself to overall

management, and rely on existing agencies in the participating countries for technical management, supervision, and day-to-day activity, a procedure similar to

that sometimes followed by ESA. Given that the

United States would undoubtedly be the largest shareholder in such a joint venture, it should be possible

to have the leading role assigned to NASA and/or the

U.S. private sector in this context. Other major agencies like ESA (Europe), NASDA (Japan), CNES (France),

or DFVLR (West Germany) would as a matter of

course have to be entrusted with tasks commensurate

with their country’s or region’s financial commitment.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. DECISION TO

“GO IT ALONE” WITH RESPECT TO THE

“SPACE STATION”15

Of course, there is the possibility that no other country will reach agreement with the United States to cooperate in the acquisition and use of in-space infrastructure. In this unlikely situation, the United States

would “go it alone. ” Would such a step deal a fatal

blow to all future prospects of international cooperation in space? There seems to be no reason to fear

such a drastic outcome: what would probably happen is merely an extension into the future of the present situation, characterized by a large amount of duplication, with most countries striving to acquire more

or less the same capabilities so as to be able to compete, especially where commercial applications are

concerned.

The same countries, however, are now willing to

participate in quite a large number of cooperative

.

I SThe circumstances adduced at the beginning of this appendix provide

reason to believe that a U .S, -only program is the least I ikely alternative, However, since no final Congressional decision on international participation in

any U.S. “space station” program has been made—and since the Congress

may wish to reconsider this matter de rrovo-the U.S.-only option IS Included

here

schemes, not only in the field of space science (reputedly free of competition), but also in general public

service types of applications (e.g., meteorology or

search-and-rescue), and even in commercial applications (e.g., communication via INTELSAT, INMARSAT,

or INTERSPUTNIK). Cooperation, in other words,

seems to be a widely recognized way of performing

space activities, provided a certain amount of autonomous assets have been secured to safeguard national

independence and ability to compete, so that if this

U.S. offer to cooperate is not taken up on a program

as central even as the “space station, ” this situation

is unlikely to be reversed,

That such duplication does not make optimal use

of the global resources of the international community is obvious, but by no means new. If one accepts

it, the next question, from a U.S. perspective, is

whether other spacefaring countries, not being involved in the U.S. program, would thus be motivated

to challenge U.S. supremacy in space and to compete

commercially with it even more effectively and better than they do now. In other words, what are the

implications if other countries strive to acquire more

or less the same capabilities as the United States is

seeking by developing space infrastructure, but on

their own and not in partnership with the United

States?

It should be noted first that acquisition of similar capabilities does not necessarily require development

of similar technology. The capability to launch satellites, for instance, can be provided by a very sophisticated reusable craft like the Shuttle, or by less inexpensive expendable rockets. Similarly, it could turn

out that most or all functions of space infrastructure

that utilize a human crew could eventually be performed by one or several automated systems. This certainly seems to be true whenever a single specific activity is under examination: materials processing in

space, for instance, could perhaps be adequately performed in an operational production mode by an unmanned platform along the lines of the French

SOLARIS concept.

Therefore, when specific activities are considered

in isolation, there appear to be ways for other countries to remain competitive in space applications without joining a U.S. “space station” program. However,

when looked at from a global perspective, a comprehensive space program is more than the sum of a few

specific application projects. U.S. development of

long-term space infrastructure would mark the inception of a new way of performing activities in space;

the hoped-for result would be enhanced flexibility and

economies of operation in many areas of space science and applications, whether already recognized

or presently unforeseen.
184. Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Any country wishing to gain access to this new way

of doing business in space would have to acquire an

extensive set of technologies and systems:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Orbital communication relays. (The United States

is developing such relays in the form of the Tracking and Data Relay Satellites; similarly, ESA’s LSAT will have orbital capabilities and will be used

in this role for the control of EURECA).

In-orbit servicing (and probably retrieval) systems.

(The United States has flown a short-range system

of that kind, the manned maneuvering unit

(MMU), which enables people to tend satellites

in the vicinity of the Shuttle, To go further along

this line, NASA will have to develop the so-called

Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV)).

The capability of returning space hardware from

orbit to the surface of the Earth via unmanned

vehicles. (This is a capability which the United

States has bypassed through development of the

Shuttle) and/or;

Ultimately, man-rated launch and reentry vehicles (unless automated systems or systems remotely controlled from the ground suffice. to perform all the space tasks for which the need for

human beings is currently foreseen–a possibility which is debatable at best).

Even if one takes into account that such capabilities

need not rest on facilities identical (in terms of size,

sophistication, etc.) to those deployed by the United

States, the cost of their creation is nevertheless likely

to be several times higher than the cost of creating

and maintaining independent “traditional” satellite

building and launching capabilities.

Consider, for instance, the total development and

flight testing cost of Ariane 1: roughly $1 billion (1984).

The corresponding cost for the Shuttle exceeds $10

billion. The Shuttle’s payload capability is much

greater than that of Ariane 1, especially in LEO. But

the important point is that Ariane suffices to endow

European countries with the capability to launch all

the applications satellites they need, and even further,

to market launch services abroad, competing commercially with NASA and the U.S. private sector in

that field. (One might state more accurately that the

real competition will come from the Ariane 2, 3 and

4 versions, which together will cost about an additional $400 million beyond the initial development expenditures: the argument, however, still holds true.)

Suppose now that Europe decides to acquire a

manned flight capability of its own. A typical way to

do that (as explored in ESA’s “long-term preparatory

program”) would be to develop an even larger version of Ariane, with a LEO capability around one-half

that of the Shuttle: under the name Ariane S, various

preliminary designs for such a vehicle have been publicized. These designs are compatible with a winged

reentry vehicle, looking somewhat like a down-scaled

Shuttle, which under the name HERMES has also been

through early design stages in France. Both craft could

operate automatically but could also transport people.

No cost estimates have been officially quoted yet,

but independent experts, by extrapolating from other

European and U.S. program costs, predict $2 billion

to $4 billion as the price for acquiring such a minimal

capability. This is much less than what it took to develop the Shuttle, but 2 to 3 times what it cost to

develop Ariane. Of course, in order to exploit such

a staffed flight capability properly, if it is not to remain

only a prestige enterprise, all space activities must be

adapted to the “new way of doing business in space.”

Today’s European satellites, for instance, do not lend

themselves to servicing in orbit; all sorts of new techniques would have to be adopted for that purpose,

such as modules easy to plug out or in; built-in, readily

accessible and readable check-out circuits; safety devices destined to protect the astronauts’ lives, and so

on.

In turn, even if this proves to be economical in the

long run, it would call for increased investment at the

start. Added to the higher operating costs of manned

space flight, the overall consequence of all these considerations amounts to this: in order to acquire the

capabilities which go with the new way of conducting space activities, medium space powers like Europe or Japan would probably have to multiply their

space budgets by at least 2 to 3 times. However, the

ratio of civilian space expenditures to gross national

product (GNP) in Europe and Japan is much smaller

than the corresponding ratio in the United States—

i.e., roughly 4 times less. There is therefore room for

expansion, but such a major shifting of gears would

require a reassessment of national priorities in all the

countries involved, and there is no sign that such a

reassessment is imminent.

A last question to address is whether another alternative is open to these countries: again assuming that

the United States goes ahead alone with the development of a “space station” and all the attendant new

technologies, must countries wishing to enter into or

stay in the space business of necessity develop similar

capabilities? In other words, could “doing business

in the old way” be competitive when faced with the

“new way, ” just as expendable launch vehicles from

Europe, Japan, and the United States seem to be managing to stay in competition with a very new and different craft, the Shuttle?

Two factors will have a deciding influence on this

question:
App. C—International /evolvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 185

1. Economics

— The relative importance of captive markets;

— charges applied to users: the very sophistication of new systems may, at least in the initial

phase, lead to high operational costs; this argument is further complicated by the fact that

user’s charges do not necessarily reflect actual

costs. If the United States decided to go ahead

for reasons of its own, not all of which were

economic ones, it probably would not fully

amortize costs through user’s charges; other

suppliers of space services might do the same,

to facilitate export sales, for instance;

— the fact that the key area of commercial competition in space utilizes the geostationary orbit, whereas the “space station” and its related

new capabilities will at the start focus on LEO

activities, and will extend their sphere of

operations to geostationary orbit much later;

meanwhile, business can go on as usual in that

orbit.

2. Political and Technical Trends

— One of the major impacts of “space station”

technology will be in the field of construction

and assembly of large structures or platforms

in orbit. Presently, however, there seems to

be a trend in favor of small or medium-sized

satellites which fit the needs of one given

country or group of countries eager to possess

its own independent system. Small to medium-sized satellites would probably also appeal

to commercial operators (in the United States

and elsewhere) who might find it of advantage

to own a system built along their specifications

rather than to lease a segment of a larger

system.

— However, even small/medium satellites might

benefit from new methods of operating in

space. The capability to check a satellite in

low orbit before transferring it to its final orbit to start operation there, or the capability

to repair it when it fails, may be a significant

commercial advantage which no prospective

customer is likely to overlook. However, the

economic attractiveness of satellite servicing

is still a very controversial matter; lb anyway,

from a strictly financial point of view, a customer could be presented with the same advantages by an adequate system of warranty.

But the psychological appeal would clearly be

in favor of the servicing capability.

lbThe reluctance of those concerned to meet the relatively low costs of

retrieving and refurbishing WESTSTAR 6 and PALAPA B-2 indicate that inorbit retrieval ad repair are not yet economically attractive.

At the present stage, it would seem that neither economic factors nor political and technical trends yield

a clear answer to the question of whether there is an

alternative way open to countries unable or unwilling to acquire in-space infrastructure. This is a major

reason to believe that the U.S. offer to cooperate with

other countries will be accepted by other spacefaring nations, at least to the minimum extent necessary

to see what happens. Whether such minimal participation is in the U.S. interest will be discussed later in

this paper. But the conclusion of the reasoning and

analysis just presented is inescapable—as the United

States begins a space infrastructure program, others will

want to be part of it, provided the cost (in all senses

of the term) is not too great.

Possible Modes of International

Involvement in a U.S. “Space

Station” Program

There is a wide variety of possible forms that international cooperation in a space infrastructure program

might take. This section describes two general categories of involvement, each with several variations:

1. international cooperation during “space station”

development, then separate deployment of

operational systems; and

2. international cooperation throughout the deployment, operation, and use of the “space station .“

JOINT DEVELOPMENT, SEPARATE DEPLOYMENT

If the United States and/or its potential international

partners believe that free and open competition in utilizing space is preferable (or unavoidable), and if these

countries nevertheless want to save on development

costs and prevent all-out duplication of efforts, then

this option will be attractive. joint development of a

total system or a piece of hardware, followed by separate or independent deployment, operation, exploitation and/or sale is a commonplace arrangement in,

among others, aerospace programs. Many military and

civilian aircraft have been or are being born that way,

at least in Europe. The United States seems to favor

separate development followed by licensing

agreements, but there are examples to the contrary

(e.g., the joint development of the CFM 56 jet engine

by General Electric and the French SNECMA).

Among the reasons that other countries might want

to commit only to joint development, reserving the

right of separate deployment of constituent elements,

are:

1. Going along to see what happens. This would

typically be the attitude of countries or agencies

feeling rather skeptical about the benefits to be
186 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

2.

3.

derived from use of in-space infrastructure, but

which deem it necessary to be at least symbolically present in the game, just in case it turns out

that their skepticism was ill-founded. Such partners may not be of the most active sort, but they

also will not be troublesome, since the very

reason of their being present is “to follow the

leader.” Presumably they would not be interested

enough in the joint undertaking to fund cost increases if the program should meet with difficulties, and would therefore attempt to settle for a

fixed amount rather than a fixed percentage type

of participation.

Going along to acquire some of the know-how

and of the technologies to be derived from the

program. This would be the attitude of countries

or agencies with a positive attitude towards new

systems, but which are not in a hurry to deploy

and use them, so that they only want to acquire

knowledge to be implemented in a much later

perspective. Along with other, more “political”

motivations, this seems to be what prompted Europe to join the post-Apollo program. There was

also a more immediate industrial motivation; Europe hoped to sell to NASA more units of the hardware developed by European firms, and NASA

has indeed purchased a second Spacelab flight

unit in Europe. This type of motivation is apt to

create problems, insofar as it raises the issue of

technology transfer or dissemination.

Going along in order to & able to deploy a separate system at about the time that the primary

partner deploys its own. This is a sign of real interest to the program, insofar as it means that all

parties truly believe in it. However, it might well

generate more problems than would the preceding ones. It is indeed unlikely that all parties concerned will aim, through their joint development

efforts, towards development of strictly identical

infrastructure elements. As a consequence, a

number of compromises would have to be accepted by all (or some of) the participants to reconciIe differing specifications. Any given participant will tend to specify the work assigned to it

so that it serves directly (or with the smallest

possible amount of modification or adaptation)

its own national interests. However, the end

product of the same work, if the joint endeavor

is to make any sense, must also be readily adaptable to what other participants plan to construct.

In a rather grossly exaggerated way, this is a situation akin to ESA and NASA trying to agree on a

definition of Spacelab which would enable it to

be launched either by the Shuttle or by Ariane.

Such compromises are by no means impossible, but

must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to make

sure that the overall cost of the compromise design

and of its adaptations to specific needs does not exceed the added costs of separate developments. Furthermore, such a compromise design is inevitably difficult to agree on, for all parties tend to believe that

it is to them that will fall the largest amount of modifications to be made later to adapt the common development of their specific needs. These, however, are

problems inherent in all cooperative development

programs, and past experience, notably in the field

of aeronautics and armaments, proves that they can

be settled whenever a strong sense of common purpose prevails.

While, for one or more of the reasons sketched

above, joint development without a commitment to

joint operation or utilization may be attractive to a potential cooperating partner, it would appear that the

United States might prefer a more comprehensive

cooperative approach, as described below. However,

there may be reasons for the United States to avoid

commitment to international involvement beyond the

development stage. Among such possible motivations

are:

1.

2.

3

In

A feeling that national security applications in

space might evolve in such a way that the United

States would prefer to deploy its own infrastructure so that it could control access to it; this is

not necessarily a problem since provisions for

such restriction could be part of an international

agreement.

A similar argument could be made if, particularly,

materials processing activities appear quite promising commercially and U.S. firms prefer a U. S.-

only “industrial park” in space.

The United States may prefer a safety valve freeing it from the need to continue a joint effort if

there is a likelihood that the cooperative experience during the development phase is not satisfactory on technical, economic, and/or political

grounds.

addition to all of the above, dissatisfaction with

joint development programs sometimes crops up, not

from problems directly related to the development

phase of the undertaking, but from an apparent or real

lack of benefits deriving from the joint effort once it

has carried through. This leads one to examine what

benefits can be expected, and what sort of framework

is needed to ensure that they can be reaped.

1. Each party deploys and uses for its own purposes

one or several units of the jointly developed hardware. (Construction would presumably be shared

among industrial firms which built the proto-
App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program . 187

2.

A

types.) This approach is feasible if integrated

systems have in fact been jointly developed; however, as stated earlier, this may not necessarily

be the usual case, as agencies and administrations

involved wiII tend to prefer clear-cut interfaces

rather than closely integrated systems.

Assuming then that each participant has developed a self-contained system (e.g., the United

States develops a core element and country X a

teleoperator maneuvering system (TMS) compatible both with the U.S. element and country X’s

own spacecraft and launch vehicles), several options are possible:

— Participants in joint development efforts make

no provisions for the post-development phase,

and leave it to evolving circumstances and

economics to ensure a successful career for the

developed items. (For example, if the U.S. elements are sound ones, country X will purchase

one or more, and vice versa, provided no legal

obstacles or perceived national security concerns regarding these sales arise).

— Make it an obligation for all par-ties to purchase

(and agree to sell) one or several units of the

hardware developed by each. 17

— And, of course, all possible intermediate arrangements between these two extremes. (To

use a simplified example: the United States

could be obligated to use country X’s teleoperator maneuvering system, not by purchasing

it but by offering as a compensation a given

amount of “utilization time” on elements of

its infrastructure; reciprocally, country X’s obligations would be to provide and maintain a

given number of these TMS vehicles.)

“closed-end” international partnership appears

to make the most sense if the infrastructure is a“ necessary, but not sufficient, part of the capabilities required for effective and efficient operations in space.

All partners will want to ensure that whatever is developed will be compatible with their longer range,

but separate, plans for space. However, this kind of

limited international involvement is less likely in most

situations to be attractive either to the United States

or to its potential partners than more substantial involvement in the operation and utilization phases as

well as the development phase. The following section

examines such an approach.

I @ch an expl~it obligation WOUld circumvent the possible unwillingness

of one party to purchase elements from another. From the European point

of view, U.S. unwillingness to purchase additional Spacelab modules has

been something of a problem.

JOINT DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION AND USE

The essential features of this option are:

— operation and maintenance costs of the infrastructure, as well as development costs, would

be shared;

— ownership of most or all of its elements would

stay most probably with the United States; however, all participants’ rights of access and use for

common and/or national purposes, including

mutual commercial competition, would be guaranteed by an adequate legal framework.

Implementation of this approach is essentially a

three-step process, where each step has to be considered separately before an overall conclusion is

made:

1. Joint Development

Most considerations just set forth in the section

above are applicable here. In a way, however,

there are fewer problems; the ultimate purpose

of joint development being the deployment of

elements to be used jointly, there is less need for

involved legal rules concerning mutual purchasing obligation, second source development, and

so on. Nor does one have to be concerned about

compatibility of certain sub-elements with individual countries’ nationally developed launch

vehicles and the like. (Unless of course some participants wish to be able to break the partnership

and go their own ways, but this would not be set

as a primary objective of the arrangement.)

Needless to say, though, “rules of the game”

are still indispensable, especially in three areas:

Settling the ownership of technology acquired

while carrying out the joint development, and

transfer of technology, where required, for accomplishing the work;

Assuming a dominant position of the United

States in the undertaking, how much potential leverage will be left to its partners in order

to give them a feeling of being able to protect

their rights?

Conversely, one has to retain for the United

States the possibility to work out substitute arrangements, in the event that one or another

of the partners defaults, so as to ensure the

ultimate integrity of the program,

2. Joint Operation

jointly developed infrastructure can be used

jointly while being operated by a single country—presumably the United States. joint operation would, however, lend a more international

flavor and help international participants to feel

more secure by giving them added leverage—
188 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

3.

with, of course, potential problems for the United

States.

International involvement in operating the infrastructure could range from very little (opening

a few positions to foreign nationals on the ground

control team and possibly in the orbital crew, as

a token gesture) to full-fledged internationalization of both ground team and crew. The latter

would imply including citizens of other countries

in various key positions in numbers proportionate

with the overall level of participation of their

country in the program.

The latter case, even if likely to create problems for the United States by the leverage and

the visibility it gives to its partners, might, however, also pave the way towards solution of one

issue raised by this approach—the question of

“equitable costs.” Assuming that the United

States develops, say, 95 percent of a “space station” system, and that country X develops and

builds 5 percent of it, it seems fair to reserve 5

percent of the station’s effective working time for

country X’s purposes. If, however, the United

States is alone in bearing all the maintenance and

operating costs, X cannot enjoy its 5 percent

“space station time” free of charge. Some equitable reimbursement scheme has to be devised

for maintenance and operating costs incurred by

the United States—a scheme that would resolve

attendant problems of fair and accurate accounting, opening U.S. accounts to X’s comptrollers,

devising rules for taking into account all the fringe

benefits built in the system (like the replenishment of propellant tanks with unused fuel from

the Shuttle, and so on). However, if country X

actually carries out 5 percent of the maintenance

and operations in kind, it may be possible to end

up with an almost no-exchange-of-funds

situation.

Joint Utilization

The problem here is that there will be not only

utilization in common for common purposes, but

also an individual participant’s use of the infrastructure for its own benefit, including commercially competitive types of usages.

International partners will want to be provided

with adequate safeguards to protect their legitimate rights. This, in turn, raises the question of

what are “legitimate rights.” An effort should be

made to define this concept as precisely as possible. Listed below are what appear to be major

issues involved:

— Is thereto be unrestricted use of a given fraction of the “space station’s” effective work

time, for the user’s own benefit, for whatever

purposes, provided it complies with international law and a preset series of explicit rules?

These rules must not be open to unilateral interpretation. Sensitive aspects, such as safety

and national security requirements, must be

exhaustively and accurately dealt with in advance, so as not to allow, later on, the impression of arbitrarily imposed requirements.

This right-to-use may not necessarily be free

of charge, but if a price has to be charged for

it, it must be equitable (no preference with respect to the U.S. Government or private users,

no hidden overheads, etc.). As stated above,

the ideal situation would probably be one

where very little or no exchange of funds occurs. The setting of utilization priorities is

equally important in this connection; the present NASA-DOD arrangement for giving absolute priority to national security payloads in

Shuttle manifesting would not be likely to generate much international enthusiasm if it were

paralleled.

Cancellation clauses must be very explicit and

provide for adequate prior warning and compensation; unilateral recanting should not be

allowed. Needless to say, the purpose of such

clauses would not be limited to protection of

U.S. partners; the latter would have to consent

as a counterpart to a perdurable involvement

system, in order to allow not only for the infrastructure’s initial deployment, but also for

the continuous evolution and growth which

is going to be one of its main features.

There seems to be no reason why all the abovementioned issues could not be settled in the terms of

a cooperative agreement among the United States and

its partners. Legal terms, however, would probably not

be sufficient to enable all parties to the undertaking

to feel safe and secure: safeguards embedded in the

very fabric of the joint effort, providing mutual leverage and affording room for the inevitable compromises, may have to be accepted.

On the surface at least, such a situation might appear unbalanced in the eyes of the U.S. public and

Government: the United States will probably be carrying most of the burden of the joint undertaking, and

would seem required to provide to others guarantees

and safeguards and to accept dependence on them

in excess of what would be commensurate with its

partners’ share of the burden. To most of these partners, however, being involved substantially in a U.S.

“space station” program would mean forfeiting their

ability to develop not only a similar, but even a re-
App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 189

duced, capacity of their own, at least in the near term.

Therefore, they will be staking the whole of their initial asset commitment in the joint venture, whereas

the United States would always be in a position, with

some added funds and efforts, to make up for the failure of one of its partners to keep the deal—a recourse

that, under the circumstances, would be more costly

to the partners.

From the U.S. point of view, of course, accepting

international participants in its “space station” program makes sense only if this apparent–and, to some

extent, real—imbalance does not jeopardize fundamental national interests. The more guarantees and

safeguards the United States can afford to offer to its

potential partners, the more those countries are likely

to participate substantially and to pay accordingly.

This working out of mutual stakes in a common undertaking is likely to be a delicate and complicated

process,

Potential International Partners

Now that potential modes of cooperation have been

discussed, the potential partners for the United States

in a “space station” effort will be described in some

detail.

Advances in space technology over the last decade

throughout the world provide many prospective candidates for bilateral or multilateral cooperation on a

space station project. One should, however, keep in

mind that taking a meaningful share in a program of

such scope, cost and technical sophistication, will be

no trivial undertaking for most of these candidates.

What is meant by “meaningful share” depends, of

course, very much upon the circumstances. In a bilateral arrangement between the United States and

another country, the latter’s supplying less than 1 percent of the infrastructure’s value in hardware or commonplace electronic components can hardly be

termed meaningful. On the other hand, in the case

of a broad multilateral organization comprising many

countries, large and small, with shares ranging from

a fraction of 1 percent to several 10s of percent, a participation similar in level and kind to what has just

been described might well be meaningful to the participating country.

Another factor to be taken into account when considering joint ventures in advanced technological developments is, obviously, the relative level of industrial development of the participating countries.

Countries with more or less comparable industrial

backgrounds, similar technical outlook and mutually

compatible management practices will find it easier

to pool their resources.

This description of potential international partners

will focus first and foremost on those industrialized

countries which at present are displaying a certain

amount of interest, or at any rate curiosity, toward

“space stations.” This list includes Europe–as a whole

through the European Space Agency and as exemplified by countries like France, the Federal Republic of

Germany and Italy–and Japan and Canada.

Among the industrialized countries, the Soviet

Union also deserves some mention, though hardly as

a likely participant in a U.S.-sponsored program. Rather, as a major space power already engaged in its own

program of developing, emplacing, and using in-space

infrastructure, the Soviet Union is a potential competitor to the United States in offering opportunities for

international involvement in such activity.

Among the developing countries, some have acquired enough space technology capability to design

and build indigenous satellites and launch vehicles

(China, India), and others have ambitious plans to do

so in the future (Brazil). These and others deserve

some attention, especially as possible participants in

a broad multilateral effort.

EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY

Although joint European endeavors in space date

back to the early 1960s, the present European Space

Agency (ESA) was founded in May 1975. ESA was the

successor to two earlier organizations, the European

Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the

European Space Research Organization (ESRO). It is

of interest to recall briefly the history of these organizations, insofar as it sheds some light on U. S.-

European relationships in space endeavors as well as

on how international space organizations perform.

In 1960-1961 a number of European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and

the United Kingdom) became aware of the political

and scientific benefits to be drawn from space activities (awareness of potential economic benefits

emerged some years later). They understood also that

a pooling of their resources and efforts was necessary

to compete with the United States and the U.S.S.R.

i n at least certain key areas—leaving out the development of staffed capabilities in which the superpowers

were competing strongly for what appeared to be essentially national prestige reasons. These countries

also recognized the importance of a comprehensive

program including satellite as well as launch vehicle

development.

ESRO was created to deal with satellite development, and it did so successfully. From 1967 to 1975,

ESRO launched (with U.S.-built rockets) nine satellites,
190 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

conducted a large number of experiments in space,

engaged in successful cooperative projects with

NASA, and managed to have its mandate enlarged to

encompass applications satellites. The organization

built up a competent and well-organized executive

and technical staff which ran three technical field

centers and a network of tracking stations.

ELDO, meanwhile, kept running into trouble, although it had only one project to deal with, the development of Europa, a medium-size rocket, roughly

equivalent to the U.S.-built Atlas-Agena. Poor management structure was the main source of trouble;

ELDO had almost no authority of its own, but acted

as a sort of coordinating agency for separate national

projects (a British first stage, a French second stage,

a German third stage, Italian payload fairings, etc.).

Additional problems arose from the fact that system

and subsystem development had to proceed in parallel. The first stage was virtually completely developed at the start of the program and suffered only one

minor failure in nine flights. Each of the remaining

stages experienced failures on its first operational flight

as an element of the complete vehicle: as a result,

there was a string of six failures in which, in turn, each

major element became successful.

The program was further marred by a formidable

escalation of costs, and, when its eleventh test flight

ended in failure at the end of 1971, it was finally canceled after $700 million had been spent.

At about the same time, the United States had stimulated ELDO, ESRO, and their member states to consider whether Europe should build a major segment

of NASA’s proposed space transportation system (STS),

then referred to as the “post-Apollo program.” By

1972, agreement seemed to be within reach; the task

allocated to Europe was development of a “space

tug,” an advanced rocket-stage to be used to transfer

payloads from the Shuttle’s low orbit to higher ones,

including the commercially essential geostationary orbit, The tug appeared to be a good candidate for cooperation, insofar as it was indeed an important segment

of the STS—almost a key one—and because in developing it, Europe could draw from its unhappy but extensive experience in rocketry. Furthermore, it would

enable Europeans to keep working and making progress in what they felt was an essential area–i.e.,

launch vehicle development.

In mid-1 972, however, the United States decided

to withdraw the space tug proposal, “partly because

the entire post-Apollo program was being scaled back,

because of doubts about European technical capabilities, and also because the Air Force thought the military potential of the tug was too great to permit dependence on outside sources.”18-19

Also, during the same period, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) were negotiating with

the United States for the launching of their jointly built

Symphonic telecommunications satellite, which the

cancellation of the Europa project left without a

launch vehicle. The United States agreed initially to

launch Symphonic, but required that the satellite be

declared experimental rather than operational. The

United States thus complied with its policy of assisting

with launchings provided they were for peaceful purposes and in compliance with “relevant international

arrangements.” This was a reference to the INTELSAT

Agreement which required signatories to avoid “significant economic harm” to the organization caused

by regional competition, To France especially, and

perhaps to a lesser degree to the FRG, these conditions were construed as an attempt by the United

States (and other INTELSAT partners who shared in

this position) to keep them out of the expanding satellite telecommunications business.

These events acted as catalysts in the setting up (in

1973) of the principles which were to govern the future ESA as well as in the drafting of its program. Based

on unsatisfactory European experience in obtaining

U.S. launch assurances, the French found excellent

grounds for advocating development of an autonomous European launch capability, and succeeded in

obtaining from its partners a 40-percent participation

in the previously French-only program to develop the

Ariane launcher. The FRG, though disappointed by

the withdrawal of the tug proposal, nevertheless

sought out European participation in the U.S. space

transportation system through development of a “sortie laboratory,” later named Spacelab.

The United Kingdom agreed to go along with a

“package deal” which was worked out in July 1973,

whereby France funded 60 percent of Ariane, the FRG

about the same percentage of Spacelab, and the U.K.

56 percent of a European maritime communications

satellite, later called MARECS. Each of the three countries also agreed to take a minor share of the two

others’ favorite projects. With this “package deal” accepted, the creation of ESA could proceed, and the

agency began operation in May 1975. The stated objectives of the ESA include:

IKivilian Space Policy and Applications (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment OTA-STI-1 77, 1982), p. 363.

19A more detailed discussion of European involvement in NASA’S pOstApollo efforts is provided below.
App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program • 191

— developing and implementing a long-term space

policy;

— carrying out space activities;

— coordinating the European space program and

the space programs of its member states; and

— developing and implementing an industrial policy appropriate for its programs.

The agency, in addition to carrying out major but

optional projects such as Ariane and Spacelab, carries out a space science program planned on a 5-year

basis. This science program and ESA’s operating budget call for mandatory financial contributions from its

member states. Table C-1 lists the current distribution

of such contributions for the ESA science program. I n

constant-dollar terms, the ESA budget for mandatory

programs has remained virtually constant since the organization’s inception.

ESA runs a comprehensive set of space programs.

1.

2.

Communications Satellites-a broad and vigorous

program, with several satellites in orbit (OTS, an

experimental spacecraft, and MARECS, leased to

INMARSAT to provide operational maritime communications); with more to be launched (ECS-1

and -2, for the purpose of setting up a regional

satcom system); and with a large communications

satellite (L-SAT) under development. The first LSAT payload includes four different experiments,

one of which is to test direct-to-the-home TV

broadcasting.

Remote Sensing–as a contribution to a global

program set up under the auspices of the World

Meteorological Organization, ESA launched two

METEOSAT geostationary weather satellites similar to the U.S. GMS. The second of these satellites was carried in orbit by ESA’s own launcher

(Ariane), and ESA’s member states have agreed

to keep the METEOSAT system in operational

condition for at least 10 years (by replacing the

satellites when they fail in orbit). The Agency also

Table C-1 .—ESA Science Budget

Percent contribution to ESA’s

Member States science program

Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.49

Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.51

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.40

Federal Republic

of Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . 25.57

Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.54

Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.46

Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.00

Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.04

Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.25

Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.99

United Kingdom. . . . . . . . . . 13.75

3.

4.

has under development an advanced coastal and

oceanic monitoring satellite (ERS-1) equipped

with a radar and other microwave instruments.

Other remote-sensing activities are also underway

(data reception and dissemination, Spacelabborne high-resolution camera).

Space Sciences-ESA has pursued ESRO’s tradition of ambitious scientific satellite projects. Four

of these are presently operating successfully while

several more are in the development phase. Most

notable is GIOITO, a spacecraft to fly by Halley’s

Comet in 1986. Science also is an area where

cooperation with NASA has been and is extensive; ESA is contributing several major subsystems

on the Space Telescope. The two agencies also

had a joint program called the International Solar

Power Mission (ISPM). This was a rather sophisticated plan to send two spacecraft (one U.S.-built

and the other European-built) over the two poles

of the Sun. In 1981, because of budget cutbacks,

NASA chose to withdraw its spacecraft from this

enterprise, creating frustrations and resentment

not only within the scientific community but also

within political circles in Europe. The ISPM has

gone ahead but now includes only a European

spacecraft launched by NASA. The impact of this

withdrawal is discussed later in this appendix.

Launch Vehicles–this is an area where the dual

nature of ESA’s policy is best shown. On one

hand, the Agency actively pursues its Ariane

autonomous launcher program, aimed in part at

competing commercially with U.S. launch vehicles; on the other hand, it is locked in, through

the Spacelab program, to the use of the U.S. Shuttle. Concerning Ariane, in spite of two setbacks

(failure of one development flight out of four and

of the first operational flight attempted late in

1982), there were (as of July 1984) 7 successful

launches out of 9 attempts, and it is definitely a

technical success. The more powerful Ariane 2,

3, and 4 versions have already been approved

and funded by ESA. Commercial success also is

expected during the next several years as a result of several external factors: delays in the Shuttle development schedule, high cost of U.S. expendable vehicles such as Delta or Atlas-Centaur

(resulting, in turn, from low production volume),

and an insufficient number of Shuttle flights. A

private corporation (Arianespace) has been established to finance and market Ariane through active salesmanship and promotion.

Spacelab was successfully launched aboard the

Shuttle in November 1983. Slippages in the

launch schedule, cost overruns, and technical interface problems—which each party tended to at-
192 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

tribute to the other—have at times caused a certain amount of strain between NASA and ESA,

but probably nothing more than is to be expected

in such an ambitious cooperative effort.zo T h e

question remains, however, of the scope which

will be given to Spacelab’s utilization, and of who

is willing to pay for the exploitation of its capabilities. How this question is resolved will have

an influence on European attitudes toward participation in a U.S. “space station” program.

5. Future Plans–These are still in the process of being drawn up, but it is worthwhile to point out

that ESA has allocated funds not only to evaluate

those options which are natural follow-ons of present programs (like an advanced heavy version

of Ariane beyond the planned version 4) but also

to study explicitly the prospects of “transatlantic” cooperation. Within the next 2 years, ESA

must decide which of the major options identified

by its long-term space transportation plan to

follow: cooperation with the United States in developing space infrastructure, and/or pursuing

European-only development of modern capabilities for space operations. The timing of U.S. and

ESA decisions on future programs is now compatible, but will not remain so indefinitely.

ESA also has an active program of basic research

in materials processing, one of the most promising

candidates for widescale applications aboard a “space

station.” This research program is carried out at present on a variety of vehicles, among which Spacelab

is prominent. ESA’s Council has already approved and

funded the development of another in-space infrastructure element for this purpose; a space “platform,”

it is named EURECA (European Retrievable Carrier).

EURECA is designed to carry experiments that require longer times on orbit than are available on the

Shuttle. It will include materials processing facilities

(furnaces and the like), and will be launched and retrieved by the Shuttle. Its design will provide enough

maneuvering and power supply capability to sustain

a prolonged (i.e., 6 months) orbital life of its own.

These features give to EURECA all the appearances

of a “free-flyer” which could be tended by other,

future infrastructure elements and actually make it

look like a first step toward ESA participation in a

“space station.”

All of the above points clearly toward an ESA willingness to consider seriously the possibility of a European participation in a space infrastructure program.

ZOMany modifications had to be made to Spacelab as a result of changes

in the Shuttle interface. This situation was somewhat reminiscent of the operations of ELDO, for it arose, and inevitably so, from the parallel development

of a system and one of its major subsystems.

Past history, however, also points strongly toward a

European tendency to balance its commitments carefully between the acquisition of autonomous capabilities (as exemplified by Ariane) and the involvement

with U.S. projects (e.g., Spacelab).

To sum up, it appears that, notwithstanding its policy of retaining capabilities of its own, especially in

those areas where commercial competition may take

place, ESA is a likely candidate for a substantial cooperative effort with NASA because:

a. ESA and its individual member-states have a

b.

c.

d.

In

longstanding tradition of cooperation with

NASA.

Although much smaller, total European space expenditures are commensurate with NASA’s

(about one fourth). Given that the consolidated

gross national product (GNP) of ESA’s memberstates is somewhat larger than the GNP of the

United States, there seems to be room for a substantial increase in these expenditures. However,

present trends do not seem to point in that

direction.

The ESA Executive (headquarters and technical

centers) is driven by internal motivations which

are somewhat similar to NASA’s, and ESA is striving to define and get authorization for an ambitious long-range program which would give size,

focus and purpose to its activity.

Most member-states of ESA are at least willing

to take a look at a possible U.S. offer to cooperate on a “space station,” and generally believe

that the very scope of such a program makes it

necessary to approach it jointly in order to

achieve a meaningful level of participation.

spite of what has just been said, some major

member-states of the European Space Agency do not

want at the present juncture to preclude bilateral cooperation with the United States (if they deem it worthwhile and no satisfactory joint European arrangement with the United States can be devised.) These

countries appear at present to be France, the FRG, and

Italy, which together account for over so percent of

ESA’s resources. In any case, even though these countries would be likely to end up participating in a U.S.

space infrastructure program through ESA if such a

program is instituted, they will assess their interests

and decide upon their course irrespective of the joint

European assessment, and it is therefore worthwhile

to take a closer look at each one.

FRANCE

France has always aimed at being the “third space

power” after the United States and the Soviet Union,

and has indeed managed to build up the largest and
App. C—international lnvolvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 193

most comprehensive space program in Europe and the

third-largest in the world. Budgetary appropriations

are an indication of this; in 1983 (approximate figures)

France’s space expenses will be $545 million (as compared with the FRG’s $325 million, or Japan’s $450

million). French ambitions date back to the de Gaulle

era, and it was as early as 1966 that France orbited

its first satellite with a French-built rocket, a few days

before its second satellite was launched by NASA.

Since then, the French program has substantially

shifted its emphasis away from national prestige towards economic competitiveness, especially for export purposes.

Therefore, while maintaining a fair-sized space science program, CNES (the French space agency) has

been active mostly in launch vehicle development

(Ariane, under ESA’s supervision), communication satellites construction (participation in joint European

programs; national TELECOM 1 satellites to be launched in 1984; a bilateral program with the FRG to

launch direct TV broadcasting satellites in 1985), land

remote-sensing systems (the first satellite of which,

named SPOT 1, is to be launched in 1986 and will

incorporate two high-resolution instruments and

stereoscopic imaging capability), and a variety of other

programs.

French industry, meanwhile, does not content itself

with implementing national programs and its share of

European ones, but also strives very hard to compete

for space-related export sales. Ariane launch services

have been sold to several organizations or countries–

including private firms in the United States—and communications satellites to ARABSAT (a consortium of

Arab countries).

CNES also runs a research program to evaluate materials processing applications, and has laid out plans

and preliminary designs for a specialized automated

“manufacturing-in-space system” named SOLARIS.

This concept features a platform (without crew facilities) equipped with furnaces, adequate power supply,

and other ancillary subsystems including a robot manipulator arm; a transfer and raw material supply stage

to be launched by Ariane 4; and a ballistic reentry capsule to bring processed items back to Earth. An effort

to promote interest in this concept among other ESA

member-states has not met with success up to now,

perhaps because it was felt to be premature.

In sum, France’s space policy places a strong emphasis on “autonomy” (on a European level at least,

if not in the strictly national sense). This is due in part

to a frame of mind inherited from the de Gaulle era,

but now even more so to economic considerations;

commercial competition requires that a country be

able to play its own hand independently. Furthermore,

France and the FRG are now discussing plans for a

military reconnaissance satellite: this makes autonomy

all the more important to French decision makers.

Hence the staunch support (and high financial contribution) given to the Ariane program, and the carefully balanced bilateral cooperation with many different countries: the United States, the FRG, Sweden,

and the U.S.S.R. particularly. In ESA’s policymaking

bodies, France has been and will probably remain in

the future one of the staunchest advocates of the dual

approach of balancing cooperation with the United

States with an equally strong commitment to autonomous capabilities.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Just like France and other members of ESA, the FRG

conducts the largest share of its space efforts through

that agency’s joint programs. In particular, the FRG

government strongly supported the Spacelab program

at its inception in the early 1970s, and since then has

provided more than 50 percent of its funding. The FRG

also provides the largest single contribution to ESA’s

remote-sensing programs (METEOSAT, ERS), and land

communications programs (OTS, ETS). More recently,

when trying to shape ESA’s future programs, the FRG

has acted as a promoter of the EURECA project described earlier, while France was promoting Ariane 4.

The FRG, however, is also engaged in a number of

bilateral cooperative undertakings. Along with France,

the FRG is developing TV-SAT, a direct television

broadcasting satellite: experience thus gained will

enable its electronics and aerospace firms to compete

for export sales in what is expected to become one

of the fastest growing markets, that of DBS (direct

broadcasting satellites). Another important area of

bilateral endeavor is space science, not only with the

United States (several FRG scientific satellites have

been launched by the United States), but also with

France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Strong emphasis on materials science and processing is a characteristic feature of the FRG’s space program. This includes suborbital flights on sounding

rockets, which provide a few minutes of “near zero

gravity”; small payload packages to be carried by the

Shuttle (referred to by NASA as “Getaway Specials”)

and of course utilization of Spacelab. The FRG has

conducted major experiments on the first Spacelab

mission in 1983 (which was a joint U.S.-European

flight). It has also purchased and will manage a wholly

FRG Spacelab mission called D-1, to be flown in October 1985.

The FRG materials processing program is not purely

scientific in orientation. It aims at involving the industrial sector early in exploring potential applications of
194 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

space-processed metals, composite metals, crystals,

and chemicals. This close association of government

support with industry’s initiative seems to work well,

all the more so because the FRG’s major aerospace

and electronics firms play a much larger role in initiating and funding research and development efforts

than do their counterparts in other European

countries.

Generally speaking, this fits in well with what appears to be the overall goal of the FRG’s space policy: to encourage its national aerospace industry, to

promote scientific and industrial/technological research, and to rely on ESA’S programs to stay in the

applications business. The keyword seems to be

“competition through technological capability” rather

than “competition through nationally proven systems.” (This latter could well be the French motto.)

All this supports the views expressed in many quarters that among ESA’s member-states the FRG is the

most “transatlantic-rein ded,” and that its attitude

towards cooperative ventures with the United States

is likely to be more positive than that of the French.

There is no doubt that in ESA’s councils, and even

more freely so when drafting its national program, the

FRG would consider very seriously a possible invitation from the United States to participate in “space

station” development. Also, the FRG has been less

outspoken than France in its reactions to the frustrations which have resulted from some of the past U. S.-

Europe joint ventures. But the frustrations were there

all the same, and like most of its European partners,

the FRG will weigh closely the pros and cons of the

possible modes of cooperation.

ITALY

With a 1983 budget for space activities in the range

of$150 million, of which slightly more than one-half

makes up its contribution to ESA programs, Italy is

clearly demonstrating a willingness to implement a

space policy of its own. The framing of such a policy

seems to be hindered by lack of central coordination

among the several interested government agencies:

Defense, Communications, and the National Research

Council (CNR). The last, however, seems to be in the

process of taking the lead.

In 1979, CNR managed to secure government approval for an overall plan calling for a sharp increase

in funding; this has been partly implemented. Most

of the increase is to fund national programs, especially

in the field of communications satellites: a system

named ITALSAT is being considered, as well as a direct broadcasting TV system. Meanwhile, Italy has

strongly supported ESA’s experimental L-SAT program

and has taken a leading position in advanced communications technology (20-30 gigahertz) through the

SIRIO-2 meteorological data dissemination satellite,

which was destroyed in 1982 when the first Ariane

operational flight failed to achieve orbit.

Besides its marked interest in communications-related space activities, Italy has undertaken several

bilateral cooperative ventures with NASA, particularly

in areas not covered by European programs. In the

past, these have included an imaginative concept

called San Marco, involving several launchings of

small scientific satellites by U.S.-made SCOUT rockets

from an off-shore platform located on the equator off

the coast of Kenya. More recently, Italy started developing IRIS, a small booster stage for Shuttle payloads.

Remote sensing is another theme for U.S.-Italian cooperation, if only because Italy runs the main European

Landsat data receiving station located at Fucino near

Rome.

The latest scheme considered for a joint U.S.-Italian

venture is worth mentioning because of its obvious

relation to in-space activities. It is the so called

“tethered satellite” concept, in which a scientific satellite is to be attached by a long umbilical cord to the

Shuttle or another infrastructure element in orbit. Italy

now has a Memorandum of Understanding with

NASA regarding this matter, and joint studies are

under way to develop the concept, Perhaps because

of this, Italy up to now has been one of the most eager

of ESA’s member-states to participate in informal discussions on U.S.-European cooperation in a “space

station” development program.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

Although the United Kingdom initially showed little inclination to share in NASA’s “space station”

aspirations, this situation has changed over the past

year, with U.K. interest coming to focus on platforms.

Great Britain is, after France and the FRG, the third

largest contributor to ESA’s budget, but the lion’s share

of its attention over the past several years has been

given to satellite communications, within ESA as well

as nationally. As it happens, a “space station” has

been thought, until recently, to be of relatively little

value to satellite communications (except in the very

long term). Britain’s developing interest in long-term

in-orbit infrastructure, coupled with its intention of

maintaining its vigorous space science program (pursued both through ESA and bilaterally with NASA) and

its rapidly growing interest in remote sensing, may signal a move toward a more comprehensive and diversified space program.
App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program . 195

OTHER ESA MEMBER-STATES

This paper has dwelt at some length on those members of ESA which deem it preferable to participate

directly, as well as through ESA, in talks with NASA

on “space station” matters, This does by no means

imply a lack of interest on other member countries’

parts. However, it does make it more difficult to assess

their positions with respect to possible U.S. overtures

since those positions are not debated publicly.21 One

fact remains, however: all ESA’s members have entrusted to the Agency a long-term program planning

mandate, and have provided funds therefore. And this

mandate explicitly encompasses consideration of

“transatlantic” cooperation on a space station.

CANADA

There is a General Agreement on Cooperation between Canada and ESA, which makes Canadian participation in an ESA contribution to a space infrastructure program at least a possibility. Its longstanding

tradition of bilateral cooperation with the United

States, however, prompts Canada, through its National

Research Council, to evaluate its interest in a “space

station” independently.

Canada’s expenditures in space in 1983 were about

$100 million. Apart from a pioneering effort to operate

domestic satellite communications systems (the ANIK

spacecraft family built by Hughes) and a number of

joint scientific projects with the United States, Canada’s major bilateral program with NASA is the development of the remote manipulator arm for the

Shuttle. In return for a NASA commitment to purchase

additional arms from Toronto-based Spar Aerospace

Ltd., Canada has funded the $100 million development of the first flight unit, which has been successfully tested on Shuttle flights. Manipulator systems

could be important features of space infrastructure and

thus are candidates for Canadian contribution.

JAPAN

With the exception of bilateral cooperation with the

United States, Japan has, to date, carried the burden

of its space activities alone.22 Fairly constant in the last

few years, Japan’s space expenditures per annum

amount to approximately $45O million, a budget nearly one half the size of the European Space Agency’s.

ZIThe ~sitlon of the smaller states In ESA is somewhat simi far to that of

those in the European Economic Community. At the Economic Summit, the

big four European nations attend in their own right; the remaining six are

represented by the President of the Commission.

Zz)apan may nw be expanding its sphere of space cooperation. it has recently opened a liaison office in Paris, for example.

Space development in Japan is executed under the

leadership of the Space Activities Commission (SAC),

an advisory organ to the Prime Minister. The main executive agency is the National Space Development

Agency (NASDA), established in 1969 to undertake

the development of applications satellites and related

launch vehicles, and to conduct launching and tracking operations. Another agency, the Institute of Space

and Astronautical Science (ISAS), is in charge of scientific space programs carried out on balloons, sounding

rockets, and satellites. ISAS builds its own family of

launch vehicles and runs its own launch center at Kagoshima, independently of NASDA’s launch facilities

which are located at Tanegashima.

Japan is the only country where large-scale space

science and space applications programs are carried

out by two completely separate entities, reporting to

different departments of government; while ISAS is an

“independent national institute” under the Ministry

of Education, NASDA reports to the Prime Minister’s

Office through the Science and Technology Agency.

But NASDA also carries out programs on behalf of,

and draws funds from, other ministries: Transport

(meteorology), Posts and Telecommunications,

From 1970 to 1981, Japan successfully launched 21

satellites, developed two families of launch vehicles,

undertook the development of several more satellites

and of a third type of launcher, and readied a number

of experiments to be carried by the Shuttle and

Spacelab. For the time being, this effort has been

directed exclusively towards meeting domestic needs

(communications, remote sensing) and the acquisition

of technology and expertise through a wide range of

scientific and experimental programs. Consequently,

there has been, to date, little effort by Japan to compete with other space powers in offering commercial

services abroad. (An exception is the sale of ground

stations for setting up communications networks or

remote-sensing data reception; in these areas, Japanese industry has captured a good share of the world

market.)

Until very recently, Japan has cooperated closely

with NASA as well as with U.S. industry. In the field

of space science, there have been a number of scientific exchanges, and this will continue as Japan plans

to use flight opportunities on the Shuttle and Spacelab.

Many of Japan’s applications satellites, whether experimental or operational, have been developed within the framework of joint ventures among Japanese

and U.S. companies. As far as launch vehicles are concerned, the “Mu” series of small launchers has been

an indigenous development from the start, but the

larger “N” family to be used to launch applications

satellites has relied on technology transfers from the

United States.

38-798 0 - 84 - 14 : QL 3
196 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

The first stage of the “N1” version is in effect a ThorDelta first stage built under license, and the third stage

is a U.S. (Thiokol) production. The improved “N2”

version goes even further in this direction, as it also

includes a U.S. (Aerojet) second stage. All told, Japanese industry builds barely more than half of the “N2”

vehicle. It should be pointed out that the U. S.-Japanese Agreement on Space Activities (signed in 1969)

imposes restrictions on the use of these U.S. technologies and hardware by curbing transfer to third parties.

The new launcher design, named Hi-A (roughly

equivalent to ESA’s Ariane 1 ) will alter this situation

significantly, for the second stage (which will burn advanced liquid hydrogen/oxygen propellants) and the

third stage, as well as the guidance system, will be of

indigenous design and manufacture. When the H1 -A

becomes operational, Japan will be only one step

removed from an autonomous launch capability,

namely the development of a new first stage (for which

preliminary designs have already been proposed).

In addition to the obvious desire to increase Japanese industry’s share of the construction of space

hardware, this trend towards autonomy could be

based on two grounds. First, there may be dissatisfaction with U.S.-supplied hardware; indeed, in 1979 and

1980 two costly launch failures were traced to probable malfunction of U.S.-supplied subsystems, and in

the aftermath of these events it was decided to accelerate indigenous development.23 Second, an autonomous launch capability clearly would enable Japan

to offer full-scale commercial services in space applacations. 24

Another aspect of Japan’s space policy is that little

has been done to diversify its sources for technology

procurement and partnerships beyond the United

States. Regular consultations are held, for instance,

with ESA, but amount to little beyond some coordination or satellite tracking stations. France was approached in the early 1970s and at several points later

on for possible cooperation on liquid hydrogen-fueled

rocket engines, but to no avail; the parties did not

reach even a conceptual definition of a cooperative

venture.

zqhe japane5e reaction to the recent failure of transponders on their direct broadcast satdlite suggests that the drive toward self-sufficiency will prob

ably be further intensified.

q has ~n ~nt~ out that Japan’s launch capabilities are severely limited

by agreements with the fishing industry, whereby the Tanegashima launch

center can be used only four months per year. But this restriction clearly

would not be sufficient to deter Japan frcwr its traditional policy of entering

the world market after a technology has been mastered and tried out on domestic markets.

In May 1984, Japan announced a plan for its participation in the U.S. “space station” program. The

plan calls for Japan’s development of an experimental

module to carry out life science and materials science

experiments, to be performed by one Japanese worker. The module will be connected with the U.S. infrastructure. It will include a manipulator arm, experimental devices for studies related to pharmaceuticals,

crystals, compound materials, and a self-sufficiency

food system. The development expenses to be paid

by Japan are estimated to be 200-300 billion yen [$0.9-

1.4 billion (1984)].

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Some developing countries can operate in space on

their own, as is exemplified by India and the People’s

Republic of China. Both countries have launched several satellites using indigenous launchers. Both countries are engaged in efforts to use existing systems to

acquire expertise in important applications areas like

meteorology, remote sensing, communications, and

educational broadcasting. Details of programs and

technology are not always very well known outside

of these countries; most Western observers who have

visited space facilities in India and China have been

impressed by their potential, if not always by their

present condition. In both countries, an adequate substratum of advanced industries is missing—especially

in the areas of electronic components, high-grade materials, and chemicals—and strains are caused by conflicting priorities and by lack of foreign exchange.

Shortages of trained technicians add further difficulties, but the foundation has been laid for further activities in space.

Other developing countries are striving to reach the

stage already attained by China and India. A few years

ago, it seemed that Brazil was on the verge of getting

a comprehensive program started, including its own

satellites and launchers, developed in part indigenously and in part with foreign help. (France and the

FRG had actually almost concluded agreements with

Brazil to that effect.) Political developments, growing

economic difficulties, and diplomatic pressures from

some countries that were, perhaps, wary of Brazil’s

access to missile technology have lowered these prospects considerably. Although Brazil has not managed

to become a builder of space systems, it is an active

user of existing systems (INTELSAT for communications, LANDSAT for remote sensing), and still plans

to operate a satellite communications system of its

own, which would be procured abroad.

Utilization of space technology, in contrast to its development, is almost worldwide. In particular, more

than 100 participating countries are members in
App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 197

INTELSAT, and each of them operates at least one

ground station. In addition, there are more than half

a dozen LANDSAT and/or SPOT remote-sensing data

reception stations i n existence or u rider construction

throughout the so-called Third World .25

Are there potential partners in a joint “space station” venture to be found among these countries, especially among those which have some sort of aerospace industry of their own? There is no basic reason

why the answer should be no, but it must be pointed

out that:

— to some of these countries, cooperation with the

United States would pose a tricky, if not insurmountable, political challenge, unless the mode

of cooperation approached a “genuinely international” one;

— financial participation of these countries could

probably not exceed a very small percentage of

the total cost; and

— such a program exceeds by far the ambitions that

these countries set at present for their endeavors

in space, and going along with it in an international context would not satisfy the fundamental

craving for autonomy and self-assertion which

often, to some extent, underlies their space

policies.

Concerning the second point, it might be argued

that a large number of small percentages can amount

to a sizable sum. To give one example: 82 out of 102

signatures of INTELSAT own each less than 1 percent

of the shares, but their combined participation

amounts to more than 20 percent. As to the third

point, a genuinely international structure could be

acceptable to countries who see space activities as a

means of self-assertion; for, even if the system were

built and operated by industrialized countries, it

would at least be jointly owned/managed by all. These

considerations all point to the same conclusions: a significant level of participation by developing countries

is unlikely to occur, except possibly within some

broad international framework and unless aggressively

pursued by the United States.

THE SOVIET UNION

Under present and foreseeable political circumstances, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to participate in in a space venture initiated and led by the

United States. Even the prospects of its participating

in a genuinely international system seem very remote.

One need only remember that the Soviet Union, and

the other Eastern-bloc countries, have never joined

25Each of these stations usually serves several Countria.

the INTELSAT organization. These countries decided

instead to create their own international satellite communications system, named INTERSPUTNIK; since the

two systems have to be linked somehow, there are

INTELSAT ground stations in the U. S. S. R., Cuba, and

Romania, but these countries are users of and not parties to INTELSAT. It is true that the Soviet Union is

party to several international satellite systems, notably

INMARSAT (which is, roughly speaking, to maritime

communications, what INTELSAT is to ground communications) and SARSAT-CORPAS (an experimental

satellite assisted search and rescue system). But these

were created in a context where the United States did

not play a dominant role.

However, it is not possible to discuss international

prospects for international involvement in a “space

station” without mentioning the Soviet Union, for that

country does operate its own in-space infrastructure:

Sal yut-Soyuz-Progress .26 Furthermore, the Soviet

Union has provided opportunities to several other

countries to have one or more of their citizens visit

this infrastructure.

The Soviets have never concealed their ultimate intention to have some of their people in space

operating permanent facilities there, and Salyut is

clearly a major step towards that goal. The pace of

its future evolution is, however, open to conjecture.

The Salyut-Soyuz-Progress infrastructure, as developed

to date, does not exhibit all the features to which

NASA aspires for U.S. in-space infrastructure.

For instance, the Salyut’s crew can perform work

only inside the station, or, when spacewalking, only

very close to it, by remaining tethered. The Soviets

apparently have no such thing as manned maneuvering units, teleoperated maneuvering systems, and the

like. As a result, the crew cannot tend other spacecraft which might co-orbit or rendezvous with their

complex, in order to maintain, service, or repair them.

This reflects adversely on all material processing research: Salyut, because of perturbations caused by

NThe name SALYUT designates a series of manned Ohitd laboratories,

launched and operated one at a time since 1971. The system presently active, SALYU1 7, is likely to stay several years in orbit, as did its predecessor

SALYUT 6, both because of design improvements and because a fair amount

of in-orbit maintenance can now be carried out by visiting crews. The spacecraft, weighing about 40,000 Ibs, is launched unmanned, and later on rendezvous with SOYUZ capsules carrying a crew of 2 or 3. SALYUT 6 and 7 have

also been visited by larger (30,000 Ibs) unmanned craft. The usual pattern

of activity is to send abroad first a “semi-permanent” crew of two for a duration now exceeding 6 months. While this crew stays on board, visiting crews

of three join them (usually for a week). These visits alternate with unmanned

resupply trips by PROGRESS. To date, the station has been left unoccupied

for some time after the semipermanent crew has accomplished its long-duration stay, after which the cycle starts again. For a more complete discussion, see the OTA Technical Memorandum Sa/yut: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space, December 1982.
198 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

crew members’ movements and the lack of a free-flying platform in its vicinity, does not provide the very

low level of residual “gravity” necessary for the implementation of finely tuned experiments.

In spite of this, and other present limitations, the Salyut has been used extensively for military and civilian activities. In the latter case, where some results

are known, cosmonauts have performed useful work

in life sciences, Earth observation, astronomy, materials processing, and technology development. Furthermore, SaIyut has enabled the Soviet Union to gain

the prestige associated with having some of its people in orbit.

Cooperation with the Soviet Union in space is a

complex matter.27 Planning is difficult when future

plans are, by definition, to be kept secret. Communication with authoritative Soviet representatives tends

to be scant, slow, and often “beside the point.” Standards, methods and even terminology are very different

from those in use outside the Soviet Union. Consequently, project managers and teams from these countries who have been involved in bilateral programs

with the U.S.S.R. have usually experienced great difficulties in keeping cost and schedule under control.

However, Soviet teams have proven their ability to

be flexible and imaginative when they feel the need

for it. For example, West German scientists whose instruments are to be flown on the upcoming Soviet

VEGA mission to Halley’s Comet have found the cooperative arrangements quite satisfactory.

Whatever the difficulties inherent in international

cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in space activities, there

are countries which have no other choice, and there

are countries which find advantage in balancing cooperation with the United States with joint ventures with

the Soviet Union. It seems unlikely, however, that

these latter countries would go so far as to bypass cooperation with the United States on a “space station”

by exclusive recourse to analogous Soviet flight opportunities.

Factors Influencing Assessment

of International Involvement in

U.S. “Space Station” Program

PAST EXPERIENCE

Both the United States and its potential partners will

have a substantial historical record in mind when it

comes time to decide whether, and how, to proceed

in a cooperative “space station” endeavor.

The debate over European participation in NASA’s

post-Apollo program is by far the most important past

experience, since it was the only time that the United

States invited its major allies–Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan—to participate in an effort which was

at the core of NASA’s plans for the future. While there

had been significant scientific cooperation prior to

1969, particularly with Europe, there was a deliberate

decision as NASA’s post-Apollo efforts were being

planned in 1969 and 1970 to make international involvement in those efforts, particularly of U.S. allies,

a major theme.

Armed with what he thought was a mandate from

President Richard Nixon to seek such involvement,

NASA Administrator Thomas Paine toured Europe and

the Far East inviting other countries to consider

substantial involvement in the emerging U.S. postApollo plans, which at the time included a “space station,” Shuttle, reusable orbital transfer vehicle (“space

tug”), and, ultimately, having people visit Mars. European nations, through ELDO and ESRO, were particularly responsive to Paine’s initiative, and began to

study in some detail various forms of participation; neither Japan nor Australia made an active response to

the U.S. initiative.

A primary NASA objective in initiating the

post-Apollo dialogue was “to stimulate Europeans to

rethink their present limited space objectives, to help

them avoid wasting resources on obsolescent developments, and eventually to establish more considerable prospects for future international collaboration

on major space projects. ”28 In particular, NASA was

eager to steer Europe away from developing an autonomous launch capability. Plans for an expendable

European launcher were the “obsolescent developments” to which Paine was referring.

At the time NASA was offering to involve other

countries in an ambitious post-Apollo enterprise; it did

not have White House or congressional approval for

the programs it was promoting overseas. Indeed, one

tactic NASA may have been using to gain program approval at home was to point out the problems involved

in withdrawing from incipient agreements with Europe to cooperate in those programs. Potential U.S.

partners were aware of the NASA approach; in September 1970, for example, “American space officials

were asked for assurance that, if West European nations scrapped their space programs in favor of a joint

effort with the United States, the latter would not, in

an economy move, back down. ”29

ZTU ,s, /u .s, s, R. Coowation in space will be examined by OTA in detail

in a technical memorandum to be published late In 1984.

ZBLetter from Thomas Paine, NASA Administrator, to the President, NOV.

7, 1969.

ZqNew York Times, Sept. 24, 1970, P. 64.
App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 199

By 1971, only the Shuttle and orbital transfer vehicle remained as part of NASA’s post-Apollo plans; the

“space station” had been shelved for the indefinite

future. NASA was suggesting to Europe that its participation involve developing some portion of the airframe of the Shuttle orbiter and total responsibility for

developing the space tug. However, others within the

Executive Branch were skeptical that Europe had the

technical capability to develop the tug on its own, and

were concerned that the United States might, in the

process of assisting Europe in the tug development,

transfer sensitive and/or economically valuable U.S.

technology.

Throughout 1970 and 1971, negotiations on European involvement in post-Apollo development efforts

were Iinked to a European request for U.S. assurance

that it would launch European communication satellites. The United States had for some time resisted providing such assurances on terms acceptable to Europe because of its own economic interests, both

INTELSAT and in U.S. industry’s domination of the

market for communications satellites, but i n September 1971 a compromise on the issue acceptable to

both sides was reached and this obstacle to the postApollo negotiations was removed.

President Nixon approved development of the Shuttle on January 5, 1972. Shortly afterwards, a joint

NASA/European “experts group” met and reported

that “NASA . . . continued to encourage European

participation in development and use of the postApollo program. . . . NASA’s expectation [was] that

European participation in development of the Shuttle would be within the context of a broader program

which included multilateral European responsibility

for development of a major element such as reusable

space tugs . . , or Shuttle-borne orbital laboratories . . , .“3

°

The suggestion that there was an alternative to European development of the space tug had emerged within the United States during 1971; the so-called “sortie can” laboratory (also called a research and

applications module) was seen as clearly within European capabilities, offering no risks of unwanted technology transfer, having no military implications, and

providing clean technical and managerial interfaces

with development of the Shuttle orbiter itself. On the

other hand, two factors militated against Europe’s developing the tug: 1 ) recognition that the Shuttle and

its associated orbital transfer vehicle would be used

by the United States for military, as well as civilian,

purposes, and 2) NASA’s concern over housing the

JONASA press Release, Feb. 11, 1972.

tug, with its planned cryogenic fuel, in the Shuttle

payload bay.

In June 1972, the United States withdrew (without

warning) the option of Europe’s participation being

development of the tug, and told Europe that the only

choice left for substantial participation was development of the sortie laboratory. Europe was also excluded from direct involvement in developing any element of the Shuttle orbiter itself. This decision came

as a blow to Europe, which had already spent substantial sums both on tug development and, particularly

in the United Kingdom and Italy, on orbiter design

work in collaboration with U.S. industry. In terms of

stimulus to European technical and industrial capability and eventual sales potential, Europe viewed the

sortie laboratory as a distinctly less desirable option.

Nevertheless, Europe (and in particular the FRG)

found the opportunity to become involved with the

U.S. mainstream program for the 1970s attractive

enough that it continued negotiations in a situation

where the United States was clearly playing a dominant role. After a further year of negotiations, in mid1973 Europe agreed to proceed with development of

the sortie laboratory (by now named Spacelab) as part

of a “package deal” which also included development

of a French launcher (which became the Ariane project) and of an experimental maritime communications

satellite and which called for the creation of a single

European Space Agency to carry out these projects.

It was the difference in cost between the expensive

tug development program and the less expensive (at

the time) Spacelab program which freed up the funding needed to initiate joint European support of

Ariane.

The Memorandum of Understanding which governed NASA/European cooperation on Spacelab was

signed in September 1973.31 At the time of the U. S.-

European agreement on Spacelab development, it was

anticipated that the facility would be used extensively

in conjunction with the Shuttle and that the United

States would buy several Spacelabs beyond the one

engineering model and one flight model which Europe agreed to develop and build at its own cost and

then to deliver to NASA. This has not yet happened.

31 The Mou b~ween NASA and E’jA was a subo~l “ate document ~hlch

drew its authority from the Intergowxnmental Agreement between the United

States on the one hand and each of the individual governments of the ESRO

Member States on the other. This Agreement was thus binding on the whole

of the U.S. Government not just on NASA. Although ratified by the parliaments of several ESRO countries, it was not submitted to the U.S. Senate

for ratification. As a consequence, its status was that of an “International

Executive Agreement” and, as such, subordinate to U.S. domestic law. This

point, which the ESRO states did not appreciate at the time, became important in 1979 in connection with a U.S. Air Force plan (later cancelled) to

develop a system similar to Spacelab.
200 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

The costs of both Shuttle and Spacelab utilization have

escalated to the point where extensive utilization of

the full Spacelab capabilities is questionable, and the

United States has bought only the minimum single additional Spacelab to which it was committed.

The Europeans knew that, under the circumstances,

they would have to accept the status of a junior partner. Now that they have demonstrated their competence, they will look to agreements on a much more

equitable basis as Europe considers cooperation with

the United States in “space station” development. For

example, the current head of CNES has questioned

whether Spacelab has “fulfilled German expectations”

(the FRG was the major European advocate of the program) and has suggested that “there is some question

as to whether Spacelab . . . is really appreciated by

the U.S. . . . In any event, Europe does not really feel

at home in Spacelab, whose operation is now out of

European hands.”32

European acceptance of what some now perceive

to be unfavorable terms in the Spacelab agreement

stemmed in large part from lack of confidence in European capabilities and from a belief that only through

cooperation with the United States could those capabilities be improved. Now, having brought both

Spacelab and Ariane to success, Europe has much

more confidence in its ability to chart its own future

in space and it is likely to be a more demanding participant in negotiations with the United States over

cooperative ventures.

European confidence in the United States as a cooperative partner was shaken in the spring of 1981 when

the United States announced, without prior consultation with its European partners, that it was canceling

a U.S. spacecraft which was part of a two-spacecraft

International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM).33 This withdrawal caused vigorous protests from not only European space officials but also representatives of foreign

ministries.34 There is general agreement that the ISPM

affair was not handled well by the United States.35 Although both the United States and Europe have managed to put ISPM in perspective, European officials

are not beyond using U.S. remorse over the incident

‘

zHerbert Curien, “The Pride of France: a National Commitment, ” Spectrum, September 1983, p. 75.

JJlndeed, European confidence had been shaken earlier when the United

States cancel led its share in the AEROSAT program, In this instance, the U.S.

withdrawal was total, and the program was stopped.

3zFor a runn i ng account of the International Solar Polar Mission COfItrOVerSy,

see articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mar, 2, Mar. 30, Aug.

3, Sept. 28, and Dec. 28, 1981.

JSlt is ~rhaps ~rth noting that the situation was aggravated because NASA

was not permitted to consult or even warn ESA of the impending cancellation until the President’s budget had been delivered to the Congress.

as a bargaining chip in U.S.-European negotiations on

future collaboration. For a time, though, it seemed as

if “aberrations such as the unilateral pullout by the

United States” from the ISPM could “set back progress for years.”36 It is perhaps an indication of the

basically favorable climate for U.S.-European collaboration in space activities that the ISPM incident and

the Spacelab experience are viewed as lessons of what

is to be avoided in future negotiations rather than

reasons for not cooperating in the future.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

Military and national intelligence space activities

provide the United States and its allies with major national security advantages, and all indications point

towards reliance on them in the future. A major program like the “space station” is therefore bound to

have national security implications. If a decision is

made to develop a single set of infrastructure elements

to satisfy all interests, civilian and military, then the

prospect of international involvement in such a program raises critical questions. This is all the more true

since new security implications may emerge as the

program matures. If the future unveils unforeseen potentialities, international participation in the program

may inhibit, perhaps even prevent. the United States

from taking full advantage of them.

To an extent, major international involvement will

obviously restrict U.S. freedom of choice in the future:

it would be more difficult, for instance, for the United

States to preserve the option of integrating all its efforts in space (military as well as civilian) and having

a single Government agency responsible for them

(though the U.S. Army and its Corps of Engineers may

exemplify a possible approach). Such a drastic step

has been debated and rejected in the past, but, in principle, it remains an option which international participation might foreclose. Conversely, any form of

U.S. military activity would raise major problems for

ESA as a partner, since the ESA charter precludes any

involvement in military projectso

37

A more likely future, however, is that any national

security uses would rely on elements operationally

separate from the civilian one, but built with similar

or identical technology and perhaps making joint use

of basic utilities. Dependence of any military segment(s) on parts and/or subsystems procured from foreign sources could ensue, This is a situation which will

36Noel Hinners, “Space Science and Humanistic Concerns,” in Jerry Grey

and Lawrence Levy, eds., Global Implications of Space Activities (American

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1982), p. 43.

‘Three of ESA’S members (Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland) are neutral

countries.
App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 201

never please the military (which, like France, prefers

“autonomy”), but which can probably be met with

adequate licensing arrangements (e.g., those under

which the A V-8 Harrier aircraft was produced). For

instance, if the U.S. military were to envision using

elements of any civilian space infrastructure under

such circumstances, a foreign supplier could be required to entrust a U.S. official agency with all drawings and documents needed to transfer the manufacturing of the item under consideration to a U.S.

supplier if such a course eventually proved to be necessary. An intergovernmental arrangement would specify those situations where the U.S. agency is authorized to implement the transfer to a national supplier,

so as to protect the foreign firm’s commercial interests in all other cases.

Such a device works best when the back-up supplier in the U.S. is pre-identified, so that a minimum

amount of transfer of know-how, consistent with the

preservation of the foreign source’s interests, can be

carried out in advance, thus shortening the inevitable lead time inherent in a manufacturing restart. Of

course, there is always the possibility that the U.S. military could procure systems directly from non-U. S.

suppliers; this has happened for a few military systems

in the past.

Another security-related consequence of international participation could be that foreign participants

would be exposed to the operating characteristics of

the technology used by U.S. national security agencies. This could involve those parts or subsystems provided by foreign sources, and can be assessed only

on a case-by-case basis. But the matter could extend

beyond foreign-supplied hardware, since foreign participants will of necessity have access to a certain level

of technological detail, especially those interfacing

with what they supply. This, however, is not necessarily critical: in a similar instance, the Shuttle, although it can be used to carry on U.S. national security activities, is itself not a classified item. However,

many aspects of Shuttle operations, such as access to

the Orbiter itself, are carried out under strict security,

and the military has developed separate control facilities for its use of the Shuttle.

Similarly, as the presumed leader in a space infrastructure program, the United States is bound to be

i n a dominant position regarding transfer of sensitive

technology and industrial information. As was the case

with Spacelab, all data and drawings pertaining to any

foreign contribution would have to be made available

to the United States in order to allow operation, maintenance, and repairs to be carried out. The United

States, on the other hand, would have to provide only

essential interface data to its partners. Such considerations, therefore, should not discourage the United

States from seeking foreign participation, if it so

desires.

Perhaps more important to national security considerations are the restrictions which might be imposed on certain national security uses of internationally developed infrastructure. While some, perhaps

many, potential international partners might not oppose so-called “peaceful” military applications (e.g.,

military R&D, or activities in support areas such as

communications, navigation, surveillance), some of

them are unlikely to agree to the installation of any

“battle station” on an element derived from a development program to which they are party. There is

clearly no way to bypass such an issue: it would of

necessity have to be settled beforehand, as explicitly

as possible, in the agreement instituting the international program.

A last issue relating to national security considerations is that of the transfer of technology from the

United States to foreign participants, or vice versa.

There are generally two ways in which such technology

1.

2.

transfers occur: “

In the course of an international development

program, a certain amount of know-how is inevitably transferred among the parties to the project.

This is more in the nature of general knowledge

(management, organizational methodology and

procedures) than of specific technological skills.

The character of technical interaction between

NASA and ESA in conjunction with Spacelab,

even though it includes some technical assistance

provided by NASA, is evidence of this.

If a foreign participant in charge of a given subsystem were to appear unable; at a late stage of

the program, to produce a product conforming

to required performance standards, it then would

become necessary to assist the concerned party

in meeting the specifications, a process which

might involve the transfer of valuable and sensitive know-how. This can only be assessed on a

case-by-case basis, but a number of safeguards

can be built into the program at the start. These

would include careful selection of subsystems entrusted to foreign participants and provision for

midcourse assessment of performance. Of

course, the reverse possibility now exists as well:

that the United States could gain access to valuable technological know-how from other

countries.

POTENTIAL PRIVATE-SECTOR INVOLVEMENT

In principle, private business and international

cooperation are perfectly compatible; successful
202 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

“multinationals” are proof of this. It is true that until

recently there were no multinational firms involved

in space developments (unless INTELSAT is seen as

a business). Actually, space activities in practically all

countries constitute an area where governmental setting of policy, financing, and implementation of programs are the rule, although the private sector can be

expected to play an increasingly important role in future space activities.

There is a clear trend towards increased private-sector involvement in those applications of space expected to generate profit, and the matter of “space

commercialization” is now being actively debated in

the United States. In Europe, precedents have been

set with firms like ARIANESPACE (for the sale of launch

services) and SPOT-IMAGE (for the commercial exploitation of the French SPOT Earth-resources-sensing

satellite). In Japan, space programs rely on close government-industry interaction.

Hence, if it appears that activities conducted using

space infrastructure can be economically profitable,

the fact that it was developed internationally should

not present an insurmountable obstacle to private-sector involvement in its use. However, all other things

being equal, it is likely that U.S. industry would prefer to deal with infrastructure owned and operated by

U.S. interests, Government or private.

THE ECONOMICS OF COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS

The greater the prospects of commercial use of

space infrastructure, the better the prospects for returns from investments made to develop it. The economic prospects can only gain from its large and wideencompassing utilization. Such utilization, including

foreign users, may exist even if the United States develops all or nearly all of the infrastructure. Many

foreign customers would be attracted to any opportunities provided by its use. The extent of commercialization would then depend mainly on the conditions set by the owner(s) and operator(s): first and

foremost, pricing policy, but also any commercial restrictions (e.g., will the infrastructure be made available to foreign firms competing directly with U.S. firms

in a given field of application?) and technical factors

(e.g., such stringent safety requirements that disclosure

of proprietary knowledge would have to be made by

the user). However, NASA’s experience with accommodating commercial interests (including R&D efforts)

on the Shuttle, through such mechanisms as Joint Endeavor Agreements and trips purchased in whole or

in part by commercial interests under proprietary conditions, provides precedents which suggest that even

U.S.-only elements could accommodate non-U.S.

commercial users successfully.

It appears likely that international involvement in

space infrastructure development, operation, and

ownership would enhance the prospects for an economically efficient and broadly based utilization program. Common interest in its future capabilities and

use will stimulate creativity and innovation among a

much wider international community of potential users, including non-profit-seeking ones (governmental

agencies, research institutions and the like). Also, any

competition from the Soviet Union will be lessened

if spacefaring countries feel secure in their participation in a U.S./international complex.

THE TECHNICAL ADEQUACY OF POTENTIAL

FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

What components of space infrastructure would

each of the potential partners reviewed earlier be most

likely to contribute by virtue of the current tendencies of its own programs, of the existence of technological domains where its industry is known to excel,

or of other factors? Answers to this question are important. For if any foreign partners enter such a cooperative effort, the United States must ensure that their

technical contributions are feasible, compatible, and

complementary. Or, from another perspective: to

what extent would the desired infrastructure have to

be modified in order to accommodate contributions

by a given set of participants?

It is impossible now to suggest more than a few generalities, inasmuch as NASA has not yet specified what

the overall performance specifications are going to be.

Too, the level of technical sophistication for a given

subsystem cannot yet be articulated. As just one example, consider electric power conditioning and distribution. On all spacecraft developed until now, electric power is distributed at low voltage, and all

spacefaring countries possess the relevant technology.

Many experts, however, judge that, for long-term inspace infrastructure, this technology should be supplanted by an alternative, high-voltage technology. In

anticipation of just such a development, ESA and

NASA have been discussing for some time the generation of a set of standards to be employed in spacecraft high-voltage power systems; but the matter is still

outstanding,

Lastly, potential participants may wish to make their

contribution, not in the areas where their industry is

best endowed with existing capabilities, but rather in

areas where they want it to acquire new capabilities.

Nothing should prevent them from doing so if they

are ready to commit themselves to meet the costs of

such new and (to them) risky developments. This matter could become “sticky,” however, if they were to

wish to make a “key” contribution in such an area,
App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 203

Thus, no useful projection of task allocation can be

made now. Perhaps the division of work will have to

be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, before the program actually starts, but after its shape and definition

have been outlined in more detail. Some countries are

already suggesting ways in which they might prefer

to contribute, and it would be wise for the United

States to give careful consideration to including prospective partners in the infrastructure design phase in

some sensible fashion.

Assessment: Pros and Cons

of International Involvement

A “U.S. ONLY” PROGRAM

At first glance, since almost certainly the United

States is likely to bear the largest part of the financial

burden of a “space station” development program,

and since international cooperation is fraught with

many well-known difficulties, it would seem that there

would be much merit in the prospect of an independent, strictly U. S., undertaking. In addition, many of

the reasons which have led the United States to consider a “space station” program in the first place—

national pride and a sense of accomplishment, national prestige, national security, or supporting U.S. firms

in commercial space activities—might best be served

by a program carried out under exclusive U.S. control.

Similarly, it could be argued that potential international partners might find it to their advantage to be

left to their own devices in planning and implementing their respective space programs, rather than having to weigh the pros and cons of associating themselves with what will in essence be an American

program, unlikely to be perfectly suited to their goals

and/or technical and financial resources and likely to

limit their ability to pursue independent actions.

The arguments in favor of a strictly national U.S. program can be summarized as follows:

1, There is no substantial reason why the United

States would not be able to go it alone: the country has all the technical and industrial resources

necessary.

2. Generating and maintaining international inter38

est in a “space station” program and enlisting

participants is in itself a difficult process, leading

to many concessions on the part of the United

States and other participating countries, the return from which could be rather disappointing.

Participation of Europe in major U.S. space

undertakings, such as the Space Transportation

System or the Space Telescope, seems always to

stay in the 10 to 15 percent range, which is consistent with European space budgets. Even if one

798 0 - 84 - ] 5 , QL 3

3.

4.

other major partner, say Japan, joins the “space

station” program at a similar level, this still leaves

the U.S. to bear 60 to 70 percent of the expense.

International cooperative programs, especially

where advanced technology is concerned, have

the reputation of being beleaguered by complex

diplomatic and managerial interfaces, as well as

by difficult compromises needed to tailor the

overall undertaking to each participant’s particular requirements.

Past experience points to the fact that the U.S.

civilian space pro-gram is difficult enough to coordinate with the U.S. national security program on

a purely national basis. This could be even more

difficult in the case of an international “space station” program.

These considerations must however be carefully

weighed against a number of arguments in favor of

international involvement:

As stated repeatedly, international cooperation

is a long-standing tradition in civilian space programs, and pursuing it has had a very positive political impact. Traditional partners of the United

States in the industrialized world consistently list

cooperation with this country among the objectives of their space policy statements; for example, the head of the French space program, who

also chairs the ESA Council and the European Science Foundation, has recently noted that “cooperation with the United States is of fundamental

importance. ”38 The United States has given a

strong impression already that it anticipates significant international utilization of a “space station” and that, in order to assure such utilization,

it wilI be receptive to foreign participation i n the

development phase of the program. A decision

to forego such participation would certainly have

major (though probably not yet very major) political costs.

2. As discussed earlier, if the United States chooses

to go ahead alone with its space infrastructure acquisition program, several countries or groups of

countries among the industrialized Western-type

democracies are likely to follow suit, even if on

a smaller scale and after some time. Such duplication of efforts might well result in a net loss to

the Western world. The very cost of these investments is bound to generate an extremely harsh

level of competition for their commercial utilization, to the point where it may not be economically sound any more and the benefits of space

~acurlen, op. Cit., P. 76
204 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

commercialization could be lost or significantly

delayed.

3. Even if the prospects that Europe and Japan may

associate in a joint “space station” program without the United States seem remote, there is no

doubt that this possibility becomes more likely

if the United States chooses to go it alone. As

argued earlier, there are virtually no circumstances in which Europe or Japan would

refuse a U.S. offer of involvement in the “space

station, ” and thus it is up to the United States to

decide whether to make that offer.

As argued earlier and briefly again above, a likely

impact of U.S. decision to proceed alone would be

the eventual development by other space-oriented

countries of capabilities which will be, at least in part,

similar to those offered by a U.S. “space station.” This

could result in increased downstream economic competition between the United States and other industrial countries in commercial exploitation of space. By

involving potential competitors in the U.S. ‘program,

this situation might be avoided or minimized. There

is a certain parallel with the situation regarding European involvement in U.S. post-Apollo activities. By

withdrawing the offer of European development of a

space tug (with an estimated cost to Europe of $500

million—$1 billion) and substituting the Spacelab (then

estimated to cost $100 million-$200 million), the

United States made possible a European financial

commitment to develop its own launcher, which is

now competing with the Shuttle for launch contracts.

The United States needs to evaluate carefully whether

it wants to create a similar situation as its “space station” program begins.

As mentioned earlier in this paper, from the U.S.

perspective international involvement is an option, not

a requirement. However, not only are there strong

reasons for the United States to pursue this option,

but, at least from NASA’s perspective, internationalizing the “space station” program to some meaningful

degree eventually may bean important means of gathering political support in this country for the size

and kind of program that it wishes to have. If the nationalistic objectives which might be served by NASA’s

present “space station” program aspirations are not

sufficient to gain White House and congressional support of a “go it alone” approach, then an approach

mixing nationalistic and cooperative elements seems

essential to mobilize political support for it.

AN INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM

This approach to space infrastructure development,

operation, and use would be preferred by the United

States and/or other space-capable countries only if it

was the best available means of maximizing all of the

national objectives which have led to beginning the

program in the first place. As mentioned earlier, the

INTELSAT and INMARSAT analogy is rather misleading here. The objectives of those systems are inherently international in character and could not be successfully pursued without broad international

participation, while space infrastructure can be developed and operated as a purely national enterprise.

Even the parallel to ESA is somewhat artificial: European countries created ESA because such a joint endeavor was the only way that they could marshal the

resources required to carry out a comprehensive

space program, albeit on a regional rather than a national basis. The United States, should it chose to do

so, has the resources required for unilateral “space

station” development.

A decision to create an international acquisition arrangement is highly unlikely, given the specific character of the support mobilized behind the “space station” concept in the United States, Europe and Japan

to date. One fundamental motivation which could

lead to such a decision–that it was the only way to

mobilize the needed financial or technical resources—is missing, and there seems to be no other

compelling reason, from a U.S. perspective, to pursue this option. Only if it were seen by the United

States and, to a lesser degree, other spacefaring states

as a particularly attractive way of symbolizing their

commitment to broadly based international cooperation would a “fully international” option be preferred; no such vision has been persuasively advanced.

Making international operational arrangements

once the infrastructure is acquired appears a somewhat more realistic prospect, though still unlikely to

be preferred by its developers. The United States (and

its partners) could recoup at least some costs of the

acquisition by selling shares in it, and this form of

broadened international involvement may be an attractive way of giving newly industrializing and developing countries a useful sense of involvement on

the space frontier. Broader international involvement

could also be accomplished by internationalizing (to

some extent) the operating crew—or by leasing facilities to the rest of the world.

A U.S. PROGRAM WITH INTERNATIONAL

INVOLVEMENT

Since the United States has given strong indication

that it will open its space infrastructure program to

foreign participation, it is useful to estimate what form

of involvement is most likely to be successful, where

success is defined as a mixture of costs and benefits
App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 205

which is acceptable to all involved. Reaching an agreement is likely to involve difficult bargaining and significant compromise at the political, managerial, and

technical levels. This process is already beginning, and

both the United States and its potential partners (particularly Europe) are approaching the issue in a rather

different manner than was the case during the 1969-73

negotiations over post-Apollo participation.

Those objectives which are likely to be of most interest to the United States perhaps would be best

served by a cooperative approach which would commit the United States and its partners to share important parts of the overall acquisition program, to remain

involved beyond its acquisition (i. e., during its operational phase as well), and to seek broadly based infrastructure utilization once established: that is, overall

joint acquisition, operation, and use. Certainly the

United States would prefer to be the world leader in

space development and use over the next few decades. A U.S.-led, freely arrived at, major in-space infrastructure collaboration program–one involving

many, perhaps all, countries, especially the major

spacefaring ones—would go a long way toward

achieving this goal.

But it seems as if the objectives, primarily utilitarian,

which would motivate other countries to join in such

a U.S. program would be best served if they could do

so with minimal loss of their future freedom of action—i.e., participation in the acquisition, including

development, phase only, with no a priori commitment to system utilization or to sharing in overall

system management.

Potential U.S. partners are, of course, fully aware

that a U.S. offer to share in the acquisition of in-space

infrastructure is fundamentally political in character,

and that decisions on issues such as cost-sharing and

division of labor are as much political as technical or

economic. However, as the earlier review of the space

programs of potential partners has suggested, Europe

(both ESA and individual countries) Canada and Japan will bring some very real assets to the negotiating process. The outcome of that process is certainly

not going to reflect U.S. interests alone. Indeed, Europe, Canada and Japan may consider their participation in the operation of the infrastructure and their

guaranteed access to it as preconditions to their contributing to its development.
Appendix D

SYNOPSIS OF THE OTA WORKSHOP ON

COST CONTAINMENT OF CIVILIAN

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE (CIVILIAN

“SPACE STATION”) ELEMENTS1

PREFACE

This appendix summarizes information presented at

an OTA workshop on cost containment and cost minimization in NASA’s projected civilian “space station”

program. This program is expected to result in the

Government’s acquisition of elements of an overall

in-space infrastructure support system. The 2-day

workshop was held on October 18 and 19, 1983, and

was attended by more than a dozen senior professional representatives from (non-NASA) high-technology Government organizations, Government-related

aerospace industry organizations, and non-space industry organizations. Most of those attending were

either former senior NASA professionals or had

worked often on large NASA contracts. The views of

invitees unable to attend are also contained in this appendix. A Glossary of Terms appears at the end of the

document.

The workshop discussions were limited to a NASA

program that would develop infrastructure elements

without significant participation by foreign governments or the private sector in either funding or overall management. Such involvement would bring with

it additional considerations that would have to be addressed early in the planning stages of the project in

order to avoid serious, cost-increasing program

changes.

Moreover, the workshop discussions assumed that

NASA staffing for the project would remain at the minimum levels required to obtain the infrastructure at

the earliest date and in the most cost-effective manner.

Workshop participants did not attempt to quantify,

in either absolute or percentage terms, the estimates

of possible cost reductions expected to result from

using the management and technical approaches suggested here.

The first section summarizes the results of the 2 days

of discussion; it is divided into the two areas on which

the discussion centered: management considerations

1 Workshop conducted for OTA by Computer Sciences Corp.

206

and technical considerations. A synthesis of the discussions in these two areas is presented in the next two

sections. The last section is a set of tentative

conclusions for the consideration of NASA and

Congress.

Summary

Recent history indicates that only about one-third

of the cost of acquiring a space system is directly

related to hardware. Management, engineering, integration, test, software, documentation, and other acquisition support activities use up the remaining twothirds. Although many ways that promise to cut costs

in a civilian space infrastructure (“space station”) program were discussed at the workshop, program philosophy and management were emphasized.

Some of the cost issues have already been recognized by NASA and may indeed be incorporated into

NASA’s current cost-control activities. These issues are

nonetheless included here in order to bolster the argument that NASA will have to change the way it acquires high-technology space assets if acquisition unit

costs are to be sharply reduced.

The major cost issues are summarized below:

COST-CONTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS

New technology: In general, the cost of in-space

infrastructure elements is directly related to the

amount of new-technology research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) invested in

the program. To minimize cost, NASA should

adopt an approach that would minimize the

amount of new technology necessary to meet

performance objectives. Because NASA Centers

have their own continuing agendas and tend to

incorporate their own RDT&E interests into large,

popular, long-term development programs, the

extent of involvement of the Centers in the management of large space programs affects the cost

of those programs.

Sufficient management authority: NASA’s current plan to designate a separate Associate Ad-
App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements . 207

●

ministrator for the program is both necessary and

appropriate. The structure, responsibilities, and

authorities of the management organization reporting to this Associate Administrator are also

vital for controlling costs.

Careful definition: An extensive definition phase

(e.g., the present NASA Phase A/B) could help

minimize costs by determining precisely what capabilities are required to meet specific objectives;

technology development should be limited to

those requirements.

These issues, discussed in terms of management and

technical considerations, are summarized below.

●

MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Centralized management: A centralized, highlevel NASA organization to manage development

and procurement could lower cost by reducing

layers of management, minimizing the number

of organizational and design interfaces, and coordinating parallel development efforts. It could

also simplify coordination of technical and management efforts.

System engineering and integration: Strong system engineering and system integration efforts

(see Glossary) both by contractors and by NASA

could reduce the number of technical interfaces,

allow most design conflicts to be resolved inhouse, and help ensure that the overall system

is engineered for optimal performance.

Bounded program: Defining a bound, or end

point, to the initial acquisition, including development, activities could contain costs by eliminating the possibility of prolonged RDT&E so as

to reach an early initial operational capability

(lOC).

Separation of NASA’s general RDT&E costs from

infrastructure acquisition costs: The initial development should be based as much as possible

on available technology. And only those RDT&E

costs that directly contribute to development

should be charged to this program.

Development of new cost models: Current cost

models will not provide accurate estimates of the

funding needs of the future civilian “space station” program. These models were developed for

efforts that had requirements fundamentally different from the needs of the proposed “space station. ”

TECHNICAL AND PROCUREMENT

CONSIDERATIONS

Current technology: Based on the requirements

defined to date for an operational civilian “space

●

●

station, ” extensive technological development

does not appear to be necessary to obtain its necessary elements. Elements based on current technology would be less expensive to produce, with

some exceptions would appear to have reasonable long-term operation and maintenance costs,

would permit later improvements, would not require as extensive a management effort, and

would cost the taxpayer less,

Performance objectives requirements: The

strong Phase A/B effort that NASA currently performs is required. However, if NASA develops

detailed design specifications and procures hardware on the basis of their use, contractors’ initiatives to meet or better schedules and costs

would be inhibited. Performance objectives (with

specified minimums) based wherever possible on

current technology would allow contractors to

meet the program requirements in the most costeffective and timely manner.

Contract incentives: By specifying performance

objectives that could be met with minimal advances in technology, NASA would encourage

contractors to propose the most efficient cost and

schedule approaches. Incentive contracts that

both reward and penalize would help to ensure

that these objectives are met.

Design issues: Adopting standards, defining and

maintaining simple” interfaces, replicating ‘basic

elements, and specifying common hardware

would simplify design and development, reduce

change-migration across the interfaces, and reduce the impact of nonrecurring costs.

Management Considerations

Both the management philosophy and practice

under which any space program is conducted are usually dominant factors in determining the cost of the

various program elements. Sound management practices must include cost avoidance, cost minimization,

and cost containment. The following management

practices should keep space system acquisition costs

low:

centralize the development program management organization and have it report directly to

the NASA Associate Administrator;

use proven industry contractors for acquiring the

major program elements;

set specific endpoints for the initial development

phase; and

develop and implement management practices

that emphasize, and wherever possible reward,

cost reduction and cost containment.
208 Ž Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT

A centralized organization to manage the acquisition program could reduce costs by concentrating the

control and integration of all technical, cost, and

scheduling activities. Clear lines of responsibility; centralized direction; strong control over budgets, funds,

and technical decisions; and control over such factors as interface and communality would be enhanced

under such an approach. Splitting program management among different NASA centers, as has sometimes

been the practice in the past, could make it difficult

to develop a fully integrated “space station.” However, the centers should be used, as necessary, to provide specific expertise or technical support.

The management organization, which would be responsible for contracting for the various program elements, should be given a large measure of authority.

The organization could be located at a Center in order to have access to technical and administrative support. Such an organization must have an experienced

technical arm; to achieve that, expert personnel from

NASA Centers could be assigned to the program management office.

This centralized approach would enable a program

manager to more easily assess risks and make costreducing decisions, primarily because he or she would

be freed from conflicting pressures from other parts

of the organization. (This reasoning supports the argument that individual NASA Centers should not be given management control over elements of the program,) Under this approach the central program

management team would have the best chance to

evaluate costs, scheduling, and performance objectively, and to produce balanced emphases and

decisions.

When a Center does manage the development of

technology or hardware for the program, it should be

on a subcontract basis from the program management

office. It should have a specific development time and

cost. Inasmuch as current technology would be used

wherever feasible, long-term RDT&E programs at the

NASA Centers would not burden the acquisition program with their associated costs and management demands. While new-technology RDT&E is an important

continuing function of the NASA Centers, it should

be funded separately unless it uniquely meets the performance or cost objectives of the space infrastructure program.

SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND INTEGRATION

In any complex system, each component or subsystem should be designed with the objective of

enhancing the performance of the entire system. Thus,

compromises must be made among the various subsystems so that the complete system—not just each

component of it—performs as well as the technological state-of-the-art and the funds available for its acquisition will allow. This activity is known as system

engineering. System integration is the term used to describe activities aimed at ensuring that the individual

subsystems work together to create a well-functioning

whole. Both of these concepts involve much more

than just technical performance. In the case of NASAprocured systems, acquisition costs and operating and

maintenance costs also should be important considerations. Usefulness to system users, such as simplicity

of access, is another, and long life and easy evolution

to the next step may be others. More detailed factors

might include ease of flight preparation, in-orbit maintenance, and updating, for example.

Many past system engineering and integration efforts at NASA have emphasized the technical or mission performance. Certain changes that have occurred

during the past 25 years of space effort should now

allow NASA to broaden its view of system engineering and integration.

Until very recently, the civilian space program has

been (it had to be) characterized as a very high-technology program that has had to bootstrap itself: that

is, the technology often had to be developed during

the same time interval that it would have to be incorporated into the spaceflight hardware. Thus, NASA’s

responsibility was not only to manage the aerospace

contractors that build the mission hardware but also

to establish both internal and external RDT&E capabilities to carry out the necessary parallel technology development. In discharging these dual roles, NASA, of

necessity, has been intimately involved in design and

development of the systems it was procuring. Indeed,

doing so was the only practical way by which NASA

could effectively communicate its requirements to its

contractors. As a consequence of these circumstances,

NASA has tended to concentrate on the hardware design and performance aspects of system engineering

and integration— sometimes at the expense of cost

containment.

Two factors present today should allow NASA to

broaden its emphasis from hardware design considerations of system engineering and integration to

other, equally important matters: 1 ) the relatively advanced state of the technology—especialIy that available for this program—and 2) the evolving sophistication of U.S. industrial capability. After 25 years of

space technology development and operational experience in its use, essentially all of the technology

is in hand to build a sophisticated, long-life, reasonably priced civilian “space station” for operation in

LEO. Also, the aerospace industry has changed significantly. Part of NASA’s original charter was to fos-
App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements . 209

ter and enhance the space technology know-how of

U.S. industry. To a considerable extent, NASA has

achieved this objective: many senior personnel in industry have devoted their entire careers to space-related activities, and many have come to the industry

from NASA–in various fashions NASA gave many of

these and other individuals their professional “start.”

Because of these factors, several cost-reduction possibilities now exist. Inasmuch as space systems should

be built using current technology unless new technology would lower life-cycle costs, in many cases NASA

should be able to specify the use of already existing

hardware. Using this technology, together with current industry sophistication, should enable NASA to

transfer more of the system engineering and integration associated with hardware design to industry, freeing NASA system engineers to concentrate on cost

minimization and avoidance, operability, and other

important matters. Of course, NASA must continue

to ensure that all of the space infrastructure elements

work together efficiently; that the major interfaces are

defined, controlled, and integrated; and that the end

use objectives are met. A NASA centralized project

management organization would be responsible for

these efforts. In particular, the organization could ensure that appropriate tradeoffs are made that result in

reduced development and O&M costs.

BOUNDED ACQUISITION PROGRAM

NASA’s present emphasis on the “evolutionary

character” of the “space station” program, while embodying many good programmatic features, gives rise

to a very real concern —that is, the pace at which initial elements of the integrated system become available for early operational use. Program delays often

are associated with over-sophistication built in during the definition phase or with unrealistically stringent

specifications. In addition, many engineers and scientists have a tendency to keep improving the design

at all levels—improvements which also can result in

delays in advancing to operational status.

This concern could be allayed by the very practical

approach of establishing a program consisting of a

bounded acquisition phase, including development,

for the procurement, launch, in-orbit assembly, and

acceptance of the infrastructure elements defined as

providing initial IOC. The centralized program management office would carry out this phase. All other

related or supporting activities would have separate

budgets and would be subcontracted to other NASA

offices after negotiation of performance specifications,

costs, and schedules. Even the bounded program

should have identified elements that could be eliminated or moved off-line in event of cost, schedule, or

performance problems in order to meet the IOC date.

This approach provides considerable flexibility should

unforeseen program difficulties occur—as they almost

always do.

The program’s initial operational phase would be

initiated on the IOC date, but the operational planning would be begun earlier by a parallel program organization. A well-thought-out transition plan to move

from the acquisition to the operational phase should

be developed as a part of Phase A/B and acted upon

throughout the acquisition phase so that effective and

comprehensive operating procedures exist at the outset of operations. Thus, the program organization

needed to conduct the operational phase should be

established by NASA during Phase B. This organization would work with the acquisition program office

and with other operations organizations within NASA.

In particular, it would become familiar with the operations of the Shuttle, Spacelab and other space infrastructure elements in order to gain experience in their

use.

The two program organizations–acquisition and

operations—should work together to obtain low lifecycle costs. Cost estimates should be keyed first to the

two program phases and then to schedules, in order

to foster sound decisionmaking regarding the program’s ongoing budget. During the operations phase,

the overall concept of a civilian “space station” should

be reviewed periodically, in close concert with the private sector, to determine whether the Government

should continue, expand, or reduce operations based

on considerations of life-cycle costs and national

benefits.

COST AWARENESS AND CONTROL

Establishing and maintaining cost awareness among

aerospace engineering personnel in both Government

and industry should be a major part of any program

activity and should begin at the definition phase. At

that phase, it is important that the definition be complete within the scope of the bounded program. This

activity should include an estimate of costs of all elements of the work to be done. System designers

should participate in this process and be responsible

for any budget alterations assigned to them. Contractor costs and schedules must be realistic and contractors should be made aware of the need to estimate

them accurately.

Cost awareness can be promoted through motivational programs. One useful approach involves contract incentive fees for cost, schedule, and performance. However, when this arrangement is used, the

contractor must not be overly constrained in his

problem-solving efforts. The incentive contract is a
210 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

motivational technique that could be used effectively

at all levels of the organization. It could be augmented

at the lower levels by direct awards for cost-saving suggestions, underbudget performance, rapid problemsolving, and similar efforts that reduce the costs of a

particular facet of the program.

Key to any effective cost control activity are accurate

cost estimates. Estimates that are too low break down

the cost control process. Estimates that are too high

create a “vacuum” that will surely be filled. Moreover,

cost models based on previous programs will not give

satisfactory results for this program because those

models use weight, volume, safety, and complexity

factors that are significantly different. A quantitative

analysis is needed to correct existing cost models. In

the meantime, bottom-to-top estimates may prove instructive, particularly when applied to already existing

technology or subsystems.

Life-cycle costing may dictate design decisions that

are more costly initially but that provide savings over

the long term. Program operating environments must

also be considered for their effects on costs: designing for a fail-operational, as compared to a fail-safe,

working environment is costly. The concept of acceptable risk, particularly human risk, as it affects costs

should be analyzed anew, because the in-orbit “space

station” operating environment is inherently much

more tolerant of operating difficulties than has been

the case in previous space programs. The ability to

repair equipment and rescue personnel also should

be taken into account.

Finally, to be effective, cost estimates, whether derived from cost models or otherwise, must assume a

reasonably small development effort for solving unexpected problems. Additional funds should be set aside

to handle such problems, but access to this money

should be very carefully controlled.

Technical and Procurement

Considerations

The kind of technology to be used, and the division

of tasks between private contractors and NASA Centers during the acquisition process must be considered

in order to achieve the lowest unit cost. The following factors should also be kept clearly in mind:

● The United States, the European Space Agency

countries, Canada and other countries have already invested enormous amounts of money and

effort to develop, test, and use sophisticated

space technology.

. The aerospace industry has “come of age, ” and

now can be expected to exercise ingenuity in

containing costs and meeting performance and

time schedules without the detailed NASA management oversight required in the past.

Conflicts of interest often exist between RDT&Eoriented NASA Centers and the system acquisition management office responsible for overall capability optimization, cost containment, and

meeting of schedules.

USE OF CURRENT TECHNOLOGY

Together with various ground and space transportation infrastructure, appropriate in-space infrastructure should provide NASA and other users with costeffective capabilities to pursue many important spacerelated objectives. It is quite appropriate that NASA

consider the program in this larger context while making plans for its development. And, the character and

magnitude of the NASA Centers’ involvement in this

planning activity must bean important part of this consideration.

The various NASA Centers are developing preliminary concepts for individual infrastructure elements

and associated subsystems. These design concepts are

technologically sophisticated and are being developed

on an individual subsystem basis. It appears that these

subsystems are to be packaged in modules that are

as independent as possible from each other, and that

the infrastructure central complex will bean aggregate

of these modules.

Proceeding with the acquisition of such individual

subsystems in this fashion could be evidence of inadequate system engineering capability, or inadequate

management strength, or both. Both are needed to

enforce those top-down tradeoffs and compromises

necessary to ensure that the overall system—and not

just the individual subsystems or modules—functions

as well as possible, Experience has shown that early

hesitation regarding system engineering can often result in increasing difficulty later in the enforcement

of such compromises; measures taken to integrate subsystems that, by then, do not inherently fit together

can be a very costly experience.

It appears that NASA may now be planning to

employ a substantial amount of new and sophisticated

technology in the program, and to have a parallel program for the development of this technology. it is very

important that NASA first analyze, based on performance requirements and cost reduction/avoidance objectives alone, whether developing this new technology is necessary. In particular, it should seek sound

professional advice from outside NASA in order to balance any internal tendency to favor new technology

development. It must be repeated that, for the most

part, a functional “space station” could be built using

current technology. It could be cost effective in ad-
App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements ● 211

dressing important, long-term, civilian space program

goals and objectives. And it should be designed so that

it could be modified during its operating life as new,

more cost-effective, technologies are developed “offline.”

INCENTIVE CONTRACTING VIA

PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS

To date, most NASA spaceflight activities have involved planning for and procuring hardware that has

been at the leading edge of the technology. Accordingly, because it has had to issue detailed engineering specifications to contractors, NASA has been

heavily involved in the technical aspects of such procurements. It is NASA’s present intention to issue engineering specifications for procurement after the

detailed definition is determined in a combined Phase

A/B study. This process would tend to over-constrain

potential private-sector contractors: the detailed design, budget, schedule, and expected performance

would be predetermined. However, design changes

are usually necessary to resolve unanticipated problems that occur as the design is developed. The need

for such changes in turn may adversely affect the

budget, schedule, and performance. Design changes

have been the chief reason that spaceflight hardware

has been so costly.

However, if the overall infrastructure was engineered first as a whole, then NASA could procure it

on the basis of performance specifications rather than

detailed engineering specifications. A detailed Phase

A/B preparation would still be required, but its purpose should be to determine the performance objectives and minimum requirements of the overall infrastructure, and then of the specific elements,

ensuring that all specifications are necessary and

achievable. Such an approach provides contractors

with incentives for achieving the performance objectives within cost and on schedule.

Specifying the desired performance, and providing

contract incentives for achieving performance and for

bettering costs and schedules, could minimize unit

costs, Further, with negative incentives—i.e., penalties

for failure to meet the costs and schedules–agreedto unit costs could also be minimized. NASA should

carefully define an acceptable incentive fee structure

that relates to a predetermined level of risk acceptance for the program. Contractors would be responsible for any trade-offs to meet the performance specified. NASA’s system engineering and integration role

would be to define the areas where the elements meet

and to ensure that the elements do in fact work together. This procedure is used by COMSAT to procure hardware for satellite communication systems

from the aerospace industry, and has been highly successful and cost effective.

DESIGN ISSUES

For-profit companies understand the importance of

good design practices in minimizing the cost of manufactured products. These practices include using

standard components or subsystems when appropriate, minimizing and simplifying interfaces, and

replicating basic elements as often as possible. It is expected that space hardware contractors will use such

design practices if NASA encourages them to do so.

As noted earlier, however, NASA seemingly now

plans to procure the infrastructure elements by means

of detailed engineering specifications. Such a plan

could prevent contractors, when the seemingly inevitable design changes crop up, from calling on the most

cost-effective design options to remedy the problem.

Moreover, detailed design specifications are rarely

developed with overall cost effectiveness in mind.

Reflecting their past experience, NASA Centers often

emphasize technical excellence and complete elimination of risks, even when the safety of people is not

a concern, almost regardless of the costs.

But if performance specifications were written to require minimal use of new technology, design practices would not be an issue. Contractors could do

what they do best—design cost-effective equipment

that meets the Government’s specified performance

needs.

Acceptable risks should be assessed during NASA’s

Phase A/B definition to determine where performance

specifications and, ultimately, design specifications

could be relaxed to contain and minimize costs.

Conclusions

The primary conclusions of the OTA workshop

follow.

CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

Effective and efficient management of the proposed

program could be achieved by establishing an organization with a single point of authority and control

at a high level within NASA. To ensure complete integration of all management interfaces, this organization should control all prime contractors directly and

involve only those Centers necessary for the technical execution of the program. This central NASA management organization should be responsible for establishing performance specifications and for defining and

managing interfaces between major elements. The

prime contractors for these major elements should be
212 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

fully responsible for the system engineering and integration of their respective elements.

MINIMIZATION OF THE USE OF

NEW TECHNOLOGY

It is almost axiomatic that cost and risk will be minimized if the IOC infrastructure is built using proven,

state-of-the-art technology to the extent feasible. Space

technology has now developed to the point that future

RDT&E and associated facilities should be funded

separately from this program; they should not be dependent on justification by any one large space program for their inauguration or continuation. RDT&E

performed at NASA Centers should be funded solely

on the basis of need to support long-range space

science, applications, or technology development.

NASA should seek outside advice as to what new technology is needed in order to offset any possible inhouse bias in favor of costly, and perhaps unnecessary, development.

PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS AND

INCENTIVE CONTRACTS

Significant cost savings could be realized if NASA

were to procure major elements of the “space station”

based on performance specifications, rather than on

detailed design specifications, Contracting should include incentives and penalties based on performance

objectives so that the contractors would be prompted

to apply initiative and ingenuity in minimizing costs

while meeting schedules and performance.

CONTRACTOR SYSTEM ENGINEERING

AND INTEGRATION

If infrastructure elements were procured on the basis

of incentive contracts defined by performance speci-”

fications, design details would be the responsibility of

the contractors, not NASA. By implication, contractors for major infrastructure elements would also perform the system engineering and integration for their

elements. The centralized NASA program office would

be responsible for defining, controlling, and integrating the interfaces.

FINITE, BOUNDED ACQUISITION PROGRAM

Costs could be contained if the program were

planned as a finite, bounded acquisition program specifically designed to achieve an early IOC. The acquisition phase would include the procurement, launches,

on-orbit construction, and acceptance testing of the

flight systems. The later, separately managed, operations phase would then be initiated and reviewed periodically. The effect would be to bound all acquisition

costs, including development costs, and to provide a

fixed framework for operations planning,

RISK MANAGEMENT

With the program based, insofar as possible, upon

proven current technology, operational risk could be

examined rationally as a cost factor. Alternative approaches to quantifying risk acceptance should be explored; complete risk avoidance at any cost is not

always required and is very costly.

Glossary of Terms

Available technology-space technology, including

hardware, software, techniques, and capabilities

that need no further development for inclusion as

part of the infrastructure (“space station”).

Bounded program–Predetermined end point of any

research, development, test and evaluation

(RDT&E) program, in terms of time and costs based

on realistically achievable objectives.

Cost models–Formal methodologies for estimating

the cost of planned future spacecraft subsystems/systems based on extrapolations of the cost

of previously developed similar subsystems/systems, with appropriate weighting factors for differences in weight, volume, safety, complexity, past

and/or anticipated cost increases, etc.

Components–The lowest level of decomposition of

the parts that comprise a subsystem.

Configuration control–Formally established project

control procedures for proposing and approving

changes to a developing system by assessing the

effects of possible changes on the other components/subsystems within the system, on the system

performance, and on the interfaces with other

systems.

Current technology-(See available technology.)

Design specifications- Detailed engineering specifications for the procurement and manufacture of elements of the infrastructure,

Definition phase–The initial phase of any proposed

NASA high-technology development and/or acquisition program. (NASA proposes to spend more effort than usual on the definition phase of a space

infrastructure—civilian “space station’ ’—program,

corresponding to its more conventional Phases A

and B so as to permit better estimates of infrastructure use, technology, and costs to be made, thereby

enabling NASA to go directly into Phase C contracting following procurement funding approval.)

Elements–The highest level of decomposition of the

modules, free flyers, platforms, and transportation

vehicles that comprise any infrastructure.
App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements ● 213

Engineering specifications–( See design specifications.)

Incentive contracts-Contracts that reward the contractor for meeting or bettering performance,

schedule and/or cost estimates while complying

with all minimum specifications. Penalties are imposed for not meeting schedules, costs, or specifications.

Infrastructure-The totality of surface and in-space

components, subsystems, modules, elements, and,

perhaps, in-space human crew that are to be used

to support various space activities efficiently and

effectively. (See “Space Station.”)

Interfaces-The point or points at which adjacent subsystems, systems, modules, or elements of any infrastructure come together in a structural, mechanical, electrical, or functional sense.

Life cycle cost–Total cost from start of concept

through development, production, deployment,

and operation throughout the useful life of the infrastructure. Includes all maintenance, operational,

and peripheral costs.

New technology—Technology that either is nonexistent and must be developed or does not exist in

fully usable form, and which must at least be

changed and perhaps be developed further before

it becomes “avail able.” This implies that additional

costs must be incurred to bring the technology to

a useful stage.

Open-ended program–A program without a defined

end point in time and/or cost and which, in many

cases, tends to be self-perpetuating.

Performance requirements-Quantitatively stated

functional requirements; they must precede engineering or design specifications.

Phases A, B, C, D–Fundamental elements of NASA’s

usual approach to the development and acquisition of large, high-technology systems:

Phase A–Study of conceptual design options and

alternatives for accomplishing the desired objectives.

Phase B—Trade-offs to select one or more generally acceptable approaches as most cost effective.

Usually provides first-order cost estimates based on

past experience with analogous systems.

Phase C–Detailed design, which begins to provide

information for a more accurate bottom-to-top cost

estimate.

Phase D–Actual system development. Usually

done on a cost basis, with an incentive fee; rarely

procured at a fixed price. There is continuous management by NASA and, at times, negotiation regarding performance, costs and/or schedules.

(In phases A and B, suggestions regarding appropriate technologies are usually heavily influenced

by NASA.)

RDT&E– Research, development, test, and evaluation

(or engineering.)

Space Station–Infrastructure elements located in the

Earth’s space, perhaps containing a human crew,

used to support space activities efficiently and effectively. (See “Infrastructure.”)

System engineering-System design methodology that

adjusts components and subsystems in order to

achieve the best possible performance from the system as a whole in addressing specified objectives;

system initial and life cycle cost is usually an important consideration; acquisition time can also be

an important consideration.

System integration-The engineering necessary to ensure that all of the individual subsystems interface

properly so that the complete system performs as

it should.

Test bed (RDT&E)–A facility for simulating the environment and/or external interfaces so that systems

and subsystems can be tested realistically.
Appendix E

TITLE II—NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SPACE

(PUBLIC LAW 98-361)

Purpose

Sec. 201. It is the purpose of this title to establish

a National Commission on Space that will assist the

United States–

(1) to define the long-range needs of the Nation that

may be fulfilled through the peaceful uses of outer

space;

(2) to maintain the Nation’s preeminence in space

science, technology, and applications;

(3) to promote the peaceful exploration and utilization of the space environment; and

(4) to articulate goals and develop options for the

future direction of the Nation’s civilian space program.

Findings

Sec. 202. The Congress finds and declares that–

(1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the lead civilian space agency, as established in

the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as

amended, has conducted a space program that has

been an unparalleled success, providing significant

economic, social, scientific, and national security

benefits, and helping to maintain international stability

and good will;

(2) the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,

as amended (42 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.), has provided

the policy framework for achieving this success, and

continues to be a sound statutory basis for national

efforts in space;

(3) the United States is entering a new era of international competition and cooperation in space, and

therefore this Nation must strengthen the commitment

of its public and private technical, financial, and institutional resources, so that the United States will not

lose its leadership position during this decade;

(4) while there continues to be a crucial Government role in space science, advanced research and

development, provision of public goods and services

and coordination of national and international efforts,

advances in applications of space technology have

raised many issues regarding public and private sector roles and relationships in technology development,

applications, and marketing;

(s) the private sector will continue to evolve as a

major participant in the utilization of the space environment;

(6) the Nation is committed to a permanently

manned space station in low Earth orbit, and future

national efforts in space will benefit from the presence

of such a station;

(7) the separation of the civilian and military space

programs is essential to ensure the continued health

and vitality of both; and

(8) the identification of long range goals and policy

options for the United States civilian space program

through a high level, representational public forum

will assist the President and Congress in formulating

future policies for the United States civilian space

program.

National Commission on Space

Sec. 203. (a)(l) The President shall within ninety

days of the enactmert of this Act establish a National

Commission on Space (hereinafter in this title referred

to as the “Commission”), which shall be composed

of 15 members appointed by the President. The members appointed under this subsection shall be selected

from among individuals from Federal, State, and local

governments, industry, business, labor, academia, and

the general population who, by reason of their background, education, training, or experience, possess

expertise in scientific and technological pursuits, as

well as the use and implications of the use of such

pursuits. Of the fifteen members appointed, not more

than three members may be employees of the Federal Government. The President shall designate one of

the members of the Comission appointed under this

subsection to serve as Chairman, and one of the members to serve as Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairman

shall perform the functions of the Chairman in the

Chairman’s absence.

(2) Members appointed by the President under paragraph (1) of this subsection may be paid at a rate not

to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of

basic pay in effect under section 5332 of title 5, United

States Code, for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule

for each day, including traveltime, during which such

members are engaged in the actual performance of

the duties of the Commission. While away from their

homes or regular places of business, such members

may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem

in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons

214
App. E—Tit/e I/-National Commission on Space Public Law 96-361 • 215

employed intermittently in the Government service

are allowed under section 5703 of title 5, United States

Code. Individuals who are not officers or employees

of the United States and who are members of the

Commission shall not be considered officers or

employees of the United States by reason of receiving payments under this paragraph.

(b)(l) The President shall appoint one individual

from each of the following Federal departments and

agencies to serve as ex officio, advisory, non-voting

members of the Commission (if such department or

agency does not already have a member appointed

to the Commission pursuant to subsection (a)(l):

(A) National Aeronautics and Space Administration,

(B) Department of State.

(C) Department of Defense.

(D) Department of Transportation.

(E) Department of Commerce.

(F) Department of Agriculture.

(G) Department of the interior.

(H) National Science Foundation.

(1) Office of Science and Technology Policy.

(2) The President of the Senate shall appoint two advisory members of the Commission from among the

Members of the Senate and the Speaker of the House

of Representatives shall appoint two advisory members of the Commission from among the Members of

the House of Representatives. Such members shall not

participate, except in an advisory capacity, in the formulation of the findings and recommendations of the

Commission.

(3) Members of the Commission appointed under

this subsection shall not be entitled to receive compensation for service relating to the performance of

the duties of the Commission, but shall be entitled to

reimbursement for travel expenses incurred while in

the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.

(c) The Commission shall appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as it deems advisable. The

Chairman of the Commission shall be responsible

for –

(1) the assignment of duties and responsibilities

among such personnel and their continuing supervision; and

(2) the use and expenditures of funds available to

the Commission. In carrying out the provisions of this

subsection, the Chairman shall act in accordance with

the general policies of the Commission.

(d) To the extent permitted by law, the Commission

may secure directly from any executive department,

agency, or independent instrumentality of the Federal

Government any information it deems necessary to

carry out its functions under this Act. Each such department, agency, and instrumentality shall cooperate with the Commission and, to the extent permitted

by law and upon request of the Chairman of the Commission, furnish such information to the Commission.

(e) The Commission may hold hearings, receive

public comment and testimony, initiate surveys, and

undertake other appropriate activities to gather the information necessary to carry out its activities under

section 204 of this title.

(f) The Commission shall cease to exist sixty days

after it has submitted the plan required by section

204(c) of this title.

Functions of the Commission

Sec. 204. (a) The Commission shall study existing

and proposed space activities and formulate an agenda for the United States civilian space program. The

Commission shall identify long range goals, opportunities, and policy options for United States civilian

space activity for the next twenty years. In carrying

out this responsibility, the Commission shall take into

consideration—

(1) the commitment by the Nation to a permanently

manned space station in low Earth orbit;

(2) present and future scientific, economic, social,

environmental, and foreign policy needs of the United

States, and methods by which space science, technology, and applications initiatives might address those

needs;

(3) the adequacy of the Nation’s public and private

capability in fulfilling the needs identified in paragraph

(2);

(4) how a cooperative interchange between Federal

agencies on research and technology development

programs can benefit the civilian space program;

(5) opportunities for, and constraints on, the use of

outer space toward the achievement of Federal program objectives or national needs;

(6) current and emerging issues and concerns that

may arise through the utilization of space research,

technology development, and applications;

(7) the Commission shall analyze the findings of the

reviews specified in paragraphs (1) through (6) of this

subsection, and develop options and recommendations for a long range national civilian space policy

plan.

(b) Options and recommendations submitted in ac

-

cordance with subsection (a)(7) of this section shall

include, to the extent appropriate, an estimate of costs

and time schedules, institutional requirements, and

statutory modifications necessary for implementation

of such options and recommendations.
216 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

(c) Within twelve months after the date of the estab- House of Representatives, a long range plan for United

Iishment of the Commission, the Commission shall States civilian space activity incorporating the results

submit to the President and to the Committee on Com- of the studies conducted under this section, together

merce, Science and Transportation of the Senate and with recommendations for such legislation as the

the Committee on Science and Technology of the Commission determines to be appropriate.
Appendix F

FINANCING CONSIDERATIONS AND

FEDERAL BUDGET IMPACTS

With respect to the conceptual objectives proposed

for discussion in chapter 6 of this report, it is important to ask not only the question of “what would their

attainment cost?,” but the next most important questions as well: “who would pay these costs?” and

“under what circumstances?” This appendix addresses these questions, and then turns to an examination of how novel answers thereto could affect the

Federal space budget.

Financing Considerations

International Considerations

Note that what is being discussed here are not

NASA1 goals and objectives, but national goals and

objectives and, at least for the most part, goals and

objectives for the benefit of all mankind. Therefore,

for instance, when other countries can reasonably be

expected to have an active interest in cooperating with

the United States as parties in multinational activities,

this also should be taken into explicit consideration

when considering their cost to us.

John Logsdon has recently observed that: “There

is now the possibility of a global division of labor and

cost in space science [and exploration] . . .“.2 Officials of the European Space Agency (ESA), for instance,

are reported to be of the view that ESA: “ . . . anticipates contributing . . . perhaps up to 30 percent of the

estimated cost [of any] space station . . .“.3 And OTA

has been told, informally, by a well-informed foreign

official that, if Japan and Canada also were to be included in a full partnership arrangement, “in the limit”

this fraction could be appreciably larger. And recently

fractions of 35 to 40 percent overall have been publicized. 4 (This 35 to 40 percent, i.e., some $3 billion

[1984$] apparently is now seen by NASA as in addition to the $8 billion [1 984$] now estimated by NASA

as the cost of the IOC infrastructure to the United

States.)

Simply for purposes of illustration, an assumption

of one-third foreign government cost-sharing is taken

here as a reasonable expectation regarding at least obI Other Government agencies, primarily the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admtnlstration (NOAA), have Important space interests and respons} bllitles as well.

‘Science, Jan. 6, 1984, p. 11 et. seq.; see esp. p. 13.

3Science, Dec. 9, 1983, pp. 1099-1100.

4Nature, Mar. 15, 1984, p. 216.

jectives (1), (2), (3), and (4). A further assumption is

made: that the U.S. Government will view its civilian

space leadership role as one of orchestrating the interests, abilities, and activities of any and all of those

countries of the world who wish to participate in space

research, exploration and development, and that it

will play this role in the vigorous, sensitive and innovative fashion that competitive space circumstances

and the high political and financial stakes require.

Indeed, if the United States does not lead the world

in this fashion, there is growing indication that, perhaps sooner than we imagine (especially with the successful Spacelab experience behind them), several

European countries themselves would be prepared to

“go it alone.” And the U. S. S. R., as well, may be beginning to exhibit an “outreach” toward cooperation

with countries outside of the Communist bloc.

The Solar System Exploration Committee of NASA’s

senior Advisory Committee has taken specific and positive recognition of this opportunity in its recent report: Planetary Exploration through Year 2000.5 Under

the general heading of “International Cooperation, ”

the Committee observes that: “In the 1960s and

1970s, planetary science was clearly dominated by the

United States, with major contributions by the U.S.S.R.

The trend in recent years has been an increase, relative to the United States and the U. S. S. R,, in the capability and interest of other nations to participate in

planetary science and exploration missions. This increasing interest has occurred against a backdrop of

budgetary constraints in all nations, together with increasing sophistication and cost of planetary missions.

Combined, these factors suggest that more planetary

science can be accomplished in a given period if interested nations coordinate their planning and, occasionally, undertake joint missions.”

But no allowance is made in the NASA budget projections–projections that average some $400 million/

year (1 983$) throughout the rest of this centuryG

–for

the important financial contributions that other countries could be expected to make to space science and

exploration programs.

One very long-term, very successful example of multinational cooperation in the space field was developed under the enlightened leadership, and with the

important assistance of, the United States: the lnterS1 983, see esp. pp. 25-26.

%ee NASA’s report, p. 27.

217
218 . CiviIian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

national Telecommunications Satellite Organization

(I NTELSAT). Some 20 years ago, the only countries involved in civilian satellite communications were the

United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Today, INTELSAT counts 109 countries as members;

the countries conduct a useful, profitable, and rapidly

growing space-related business–long-haul trunk communications—which grossed some $400 million in

1983, and in which the required U.S. investment share

is now down to less than 25 percent. (The business

is now so profitable that, last year, potential competitors came forward.) And INTELSAT has been

joined by INMARSAT in the maritime communications

area; INMARSAT counts even the U.S.S.R. among its

members. ’

Finally, the President has taken steps to see that the

matter of international cooperation—indeed, perhaps

international collaboration—in the civilian space area

will receive direct and important attention by the executive branch. In his radio address during the week

of his 1984 State of the Union message, the President

observed that: “international cooperation . . . has

long been a guiding principle of the United States

space program [and that] just as our friends were asked

to join us in the Shuttle program, our friends and allies

will be invited to join with us in the space station project.” In response to this Presidential directive, NASA’s

Administrator has recently visited several other countries to explore the matter of their working on any

“space station” program with the United States.

Private-Sector Considerations

Also, when our private sector can reasonably be expected to assume the cost (in anticipation of commercial-industrial sales and profits), or at least an important fraction thereof, this should be taken into

consideration. This should be the case for at least objectives (2), (5), (6), (7), and (10) (see ch. 6).

For much of 1983, and still continuing, NASA has

had a task force studying what it might do to speed

and enlarge the “commercialization” of space. And

the Department of Transportation (DOT) has recently

been charged by the President with assisting an expendable launch services industry.

Now the President has given a powerful general

thrust to the matter of much greater economic participation by our private sector in space-related activities, In his 1984 State of the Union address he expressed himself of the judgment that: “ . . . space

holds enormous promise for commerce today,” and

7

For a thorough discussion of the satellite communications area, see the

OTA report International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities (now in press).

was quite specific in justifying his decision to start

work on the development of space infrastructure in

terms of its eventually allowing for “ . . . living and

working in space for . . . economic . . . gains. ” In his

later radio address he stated that he expects: “ . . . a

space station will open up new opportunities for expanding human commerce . . . .“

The legislative branch too, perhaps smarting because of the seemingly endless Landsat commercialization difficulties, and responding to the continuing

hesitancy within NASA concerning their space applications responsibilities, has moved to strengthen the

law quite specifically regarding “space commercialization.” NASA’S fiscal year 1985 authorization bill,

which became Public Law 98-361 with the President’s

signature on July 16, 1984, makes a basic change in

the “National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.”

It amends section 102 of the act by including a new

paragraph (c) as follows: “The Congress declares that

the general welfare of the United States requires that

[NASA] seek and encourage, to the maximum extent

possible, the fullest commercial use of space.” This

is strong, unambiguous and “revolutionary” language

for our publicly funded civilian space program’s

“char ter.”

It would seem reasonable, therefore, to imagine that

the kind of private sector participation suggested here

in addressing certain of the 10 conceptual objectives

will, in fact, be realized.

International Plus Private-Sector

Cost Sharing Considerations

Thus, when the financial support of both other

countries and our own private sector are taken into

consideration, the net U.S. public cost of meeting

these 10 conceptual objectives is estimated to be some

$25 billion to $40 billion (1984$), i.e., some 70 percent of their estimated $40 billion to $60 billion total

cost. 8 (See table F-l). The average net public cost for

the first 5 years considered here would be some $2.0

billion/year (1984$); during the last 5 of the 25 years

the average net public cost could decrease to about

one-half this rate. (See table F-2.)

These expenditure rates suggest that, with the completion of the initial modest Moon settlement, the projected NASA budget could allow a major program of

human exploration of Mars (and of one or more asteroids) to begin in earnest.

‘Norman R. Augustine, “The Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech

Management,” Aerospace America, March 1984,
App. F—Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts ● 219

Table F-l .—USA Net Public Cost (billions of 1984 dollars)

Total Other Private USA net

cost countries sector public cost

1. Establish a global information system/service

regarding natural hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Establish lower cost reusable transportation service

with the Moon, and establish human presence there . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Use space probes to obtain information regarding Mars

and some asteroids prior to early human exploration . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. Conduct medical research of direct interest

to the general public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5. Bring at least hundreds of the general public

into space for short visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6. Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,

common-user system/service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7. Make essentially all data generated by civilian satellites

and spacecraft directly available to the general public . . . . . . . . . . .

8. Exploit radio/optical free-space electromagnetic propagation

for long distance energy distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9. Reduce the unit cost of space transportation

and space activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10. Increase space-related private salesa 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 0.7 0 1

20 7 1 13

2

6

0.3 0 2

2 0 4

0.5 0 0.4 0.1

2 0.2

0

0 2

0 0 0

0.5 0 0 0.5

0

0

0

0.5

5

0

= 26C

5

0.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . = 40b

=10 = 4

aThi~ would advance the pr~~pect~ of successfully a& JresSing all goals and all other objectives.

bThe actual total cost including a ~percent incre=e could be $60 billion; the same inCreaSe could affect all other cost ‘Stimates’

cwith a 50.percent cost increase, this cost could be $40 billion

NOTE: Some rows do not sum due to rounding.

Table F-2.—First Rough Estimate of the Total Cost/Year and the Net Public Cost/Year

(in billions, 1984 dollars) for the First 5 Years, of Attaining the 10 Conceptual Objectives

Total cost (and the Total Net public cost Net public

years) to attain each cost/year, (and the years) to attain cost/year,

“objective first 5 years each objective first 5 years

1. 2 (lo) 0.20 1 (lo) 0.10

2. 20 (15) 1.33 13 (15) 0.87

3. 2 (15) 0.13 2 (15) 0.13

4. 6 ( 5) 0.40 4 ( 5) 0.28

0.5 ( 5) 0.10 0.1 ( 5) 0.02

6 2 (lo) 0.20 0.2 (lo) 0.02

7. 0 (25) 0.00 0.0 (25) 0.00

8. 0.5 (lo) 0.05 0.5 (lo) 0.05

9. 5 (15) 0.33 5 (15) 0.33

10. 0.5 (25) 0.02 0 (25) 0.00

=40 = 3 =26 ==2

Economic-Growth Considerations civilian space area to date, and considering only expenditures from now on.

To date, except for the satellite communications

area, the United States’ publicly supported civilian

space program has been essentially one of basic research, exploration, and development of technology

required to support both. Economic returns have been

expected to result from general “spin off” to the private sector from these otherwise-directed R&D activities. The general sense is that to some important extent that has apparently happened, even though the

PROJECTED GROWTH IN PRIVATE SECTOR

SALES AND RELATED TAX REVENUES

Beyond the cost-offsetting financial participation of

other cooperating countries and our own private sector, it is important to obtain some useful sense of the

present, and future, marginal net cost to the U.S. general public of its civilian space activities—i e., setting

aside further consideration of the over $200 billion

(1984 adjusted) “sunk cost” of our investments in the

38-798 0 - 84 - 16 : QL 3
220 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

evidence on the macroeconomic level is admittedly

difficult to come by.

Let us start, therefore, probably conservatively but

objectively and reasonably quantitatively, by noting

that the present (1 983 year-end) U.S. commercial-industrial space-related annual sales of capital equipment (essentially all in the satellite communications

business, for satellites, their launching, and their associated ground equipments) are some $1.6 billion/

years If satellite insurance sales, operations and maintenance (O&M) charges related to surface equipments,

end-to-end circuit lease charges and lease charges for

in-space microwave transponders (there are now

some 400 in orbit which are owned by U.S. companies) are added, total U.S. private-sector space-related

sales are now probably $2 billion to $3 billion per

year.

This sales figure, at least in the satellite communications long-haul circuit leasing area where records

have been kept since the outset of private sector operations (see INTELSAT’s annual reports) is a consequence of an average annual growth rate of some 15

percent/year, compounded, for nearly the past 20

years. 10

If it is assumed that the total of all Federal, State,

and local tax rates on these sales averages 20 to 30

percent, 11 then, roughly, $0. 5 billion/year in Government tax revenues are now being derived from these

sales. Thus, while the gross civilian space-related Government expenditures are some $7 billion/year today,

in fact the net Government expenditures could be

considered to be significantly Iess—i.e,, effectively

some $6.5 billion/year (or some 7 percent) less.

Now, assume for the purpose of illustration that the

total sales generated in the satellite communications

area, enlarged in time by space-related navigation,

position fixing, remote sensing, materials processing,

tourism, private launch and transportation services,

space platform leasing, etc., continues to grow at the

current rate, i.e., some 15 percent/year, compounded–a doubling about every 5 years. The projection for this rate of growth has been made by NASA

and others and may prove to be conservative. The

gThis figure was provided to OTA by Janet Martinusen ot the Aerospace

Industries Association of America, Inc.)

IOln what follows, note that no attention is given either to the influence

of inflation or to any decrease in nonspace-related sales as a consequence

of the growth of space-related sales; i.e., this discussion must be considered—

particularly by economists–as illustrative and qualitative, not methodologically exhaustive and quantitative.

llfconomjc RepOr-f of the President, transmitted to the Congress, February

1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984); Study of

1982 Effective Tax Rates of Selected Large U.S. Corporations, prepared by

the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1983).

most recent projection, by Jerry Grey12 is that: “Satellite communications demand is still growing rapidly

at between 20 and 30 percent per year and is projected to continue at this rate to the end of the century, despite potential inroads by optical fibre cables.

projections for turn-of-the-century annual volume

(spacecraft, launch and integration services, and communications services themselves) range from $30 billion to$100 billion.” A 15 percent/year, compounded,

sales growth throughout 1984-2000 on a 1983 base

of $2 billion would produce sales of some $20 billion

in 2000; on a $3 billion base, some $3o billion.

Of course, the rate of 15 percent/year, compounded, may prove to be optimistic. If, instead, a

10 percent figure is used, the year 2000 sales projection would exceed $10 billion on a present $2 billion

base, and $15 billion on a present $3 billion base.

Further, assume either that Government civilian

space-related expenditures remain at about $7.o billion (1983) per year or that they grow, in real terms,

at 1 percent per year, compounded, as is NASA’s desire and this administration’s expressed intention.

(No attention is given here as yet to the reimbursements made to the Government for the provision of

space-related Government services—now almost

wholly the reimbursement for the provision of Shuttle flights.)

Under such circumstances and with such assumptions, over time, the effective net Government cost

of supporting the civilian space program (in billions

of 1983 dollars) could be considered as decreasing rapidly. (See tables F-3 and F-4.)

Under either assumption regarding future NASA appropriations, and a projected 15 percent/year tax revenue increase, the “break-even” point would be

reached in some 20 years; i.e., in one generation the

effective net public investment required to underwrite

our entire Government civilian space program—either

a program of today’s magnitude or, by then, some 20

percent larger–would be reduced to zero. Even with

the lower 10 percent/year tax revenue growth projection, the effective net public cost would then be a

great deal less than today’s. And, over the next 20

years, a total of tens of billions of dollars (1 984) in tax

revenues would have been generated.

This is such an important observation and prospect

that it bears further elaboration. For the prospect that

such extraordinary private-sector space-related sales

and tax revenue projections might well be attained

suggests that the Government could commit itself to

promoting, vigorously and innovatively, the growth

!Z’’lnvesting In Space . . . ,“ Aerospace America, April 1984, p. 90.
App. F—Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts • 221

Table F-3.—Growth in Tax Revenues From Private Sector Space. Related Sales,

and Their Influence on the Net Cost of the Federal Civilian Space Program

(billions of 1983 dollars per year– assuming a 15°/0 sales growth rate)

Government space expenditure net cost

Tax revenues A constant $7 billion/ $7 billion (1983) increasing

Years growth @ 150A/year year (1983) at 1‘\Olyear

O (1983) 0.5 6.5 6.5

5 (1988) 1,0 6.0 6.4

10 (1993) 2.0 5.0 5.7

15 (1998) 4.1 4.0

20 (2003) 8.2 (1.2) 0.3

25 (2008) 16.0 (9.5) (7.5)

Table F-4.—Growth in Tax Revenues From Private Sector Space-Related Sales,

and Their Influence on the Net Cost of the Government Civilian Space Program

(billions of 1983 dollars per year–assuming a 10% sales growth rate)

Government space expenditure net cost

Tax revenues A constant $7 billion/ $7 billion (1983) increasing

Years growth @ 10%/year year (1983) at 1‘/Olyear

O (1983) 0.5 6.5 6.5

5 (1988) 0.8 6.2 6.5

10 (1993) 1.3 5.7 6.4

15(1 998) 2.1 4.9 6.0

20 (2003) 3.4 3.6 5.1

25 (2008) 5.4 1.6 3.6

of commercial and industrial space-related sales. That

is, the Federal Government, working in close concert

with the private sector, would work to see, over time,

a great increase in such high-technology sales, thereby

generating proportionally much greater tax revenues

which could be looked upon as “offsets” to the public R&D expenditures on space. Also, if successful,

such an initiative would result in an effective transfer

of much of the responsibility for the health and growth

of space-related economic activities from the public

to the private sector.

The President has just taken particular note of this

possibility: the July 20, 1984, White House “Fact

Sheet” entitled “National Policy on the Commercial

Use of Space” states that “In partnership with industry and academia, Government will expand basic research and development which may have implications

for investors aiming to develop commercial space

products and services.”

Of course, private-sector gross revenues also can be

expected to support space-related commercial-industrial R&D. Again, assuming that sales grow at the average annual rate of 10 to 15 percent, compounded, and

assuming as well that about 5 percent of these sales

is spent by the private sector on space-related R&D

(probably a conservative assumption; C. Paul Christensen recently observed that: “ . . . a successful hightechnology company normally must spend 5 to 10

percent of its gross sales on R&D’’13) then, 20 years

from now, a private-sector R&D investment rate of

some $1 billion to $2 billion (1 984) per year would

have been reached.

The total Government investment (again, assuming

that NASA appropriations increase at 1 percent “real

growth” per year, compounded) plus the commercialindustrial investment in space-related R&D would be

expected to increase substantially overtime. (See table

F-5, which assumes a 15 percent projected growth rate

for the private sector.) By the end of the next quarter

of a century, the country’s overall space-related R&D

activities could reach a level that would be nearly

twice the size of today’s Government program and

that, by then, would be increasing at some 5 percent/year, compounded.

These are extraordinary projections, and they could

well turn out to be conservative ones.

To put such numbers into a space R&D and exploration perspective, note that a U.S. public expenditure

of an average of some $1 billion/year over, say, 15

I Jsclence, Apr. 13, 1984, P. 117
222 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Table F-5.—Growth in Yeariy U.S. Space investment,

Federal (increasing at 1°/0 annually) Pius Private

(increasing at 150/0 annually)

Investment (billions of 1983 dollars per Year)

Years Government Private Total

O (1983) 7.0 0.1 7.1

5 (1988) 7.4 0.3 7.7

10 (1993) 7.7 0.5 8.2

15 (1998) 8.1 1.0 9.1

20 (2003) 8.5 2.0 11.0

25 i2008) 9.0 4.1 13.0

to 20 years could allow us, along with other cooperating countries, to place a modest settlement on the

Moon. In similar fashion, an additional some $2 billion/year, over 20 to 30 years, could allow a first

human landing on the planet Mars. And each of these

sums would include paying for that kind and amount

of LEO infrastructure specifically required to assure

the efficient operational conduct of these ventures,

HISTORICAL BASES FOR A PROJECTION OF

SALES GROWTH IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

While, of course, no brief can be held with complete confidence, either for the absolute rates of increase of space-related sales, or for such a long-term

continuation thereof as is outlined here—and other

countries have also already clearly perceived the great

longer-term economic prospects in the space area14

–

it must be remembered that the U.S. investment in

the publicly supported civilian space area has provided an enormous base of assets, understanding and

experience for so doing; that the active interest of our

private commercial-industrial sector in investing in

space assets and activities, already non-trivial, is

quickening; and that we have other high-technology

growth “stories” as useful references: air transportation, computers, radio, television, medical technology, communications, etc.

For instance, President Karl G, Harr of the Aerospace Industries Association observed, in his report

of December 1983, that “ . . . there has been a considerable acceleration in the building of commercial

communications satellites . , . that’s just the beginning

of an indicated boom; worldwide projections show

enormous increases in demand for satellite communications services between now and the end of the

century.” And Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth

Dole is recently quoted as saying, with reference to

14See the OTA rew~ on /nternatjona/ Cooperation and Competition in

Civilian Space Activities, 1984.

that Department’s new responsibilities for the commercialization of expendable launch vehicles: “ . . .

this involves ‘a whole new industry’ with growth prospects estimated at up to $10 billion over the next decade. ”15

A recently published OTA report, International

Competition in Electronics, notes that: “Sales of the

more than 6,000 electronics manufacturers in the

United States exceeded $125 billion in 1982 and are

growing rapidly . . . the growth rate over the past decade reached nearly 15 percent [per year, compounded].” 16-17

As one general example: Forbes magazine has

recently 18 surveyed the sales growth of 25 leading

companies in the electronics area, comparing the

average of such sales for the most recent 5 years with

the average of the preceding 5 years. The annual

sales growth of the top one-half of the companies averaged 23 percent, compounded.

The early days of commercial radio provide another

example of how the growth rate of a newly introduced

service supported by new technology can attain phenomenal values. “[In] the spring of 1922 . . . the sale

of radio sets, parts, and accessories amounted to more

than $60 million annually. By the end of 1929, sales

had climbed to a remarkable $843 million.”19 This is

an annual growth rate of greater than 40 percent/year,

compounded. More recently, lasers and their applications have become at least as big a high-technology

business as has satellite communications, “In the past

2 decades . . . the market for laser-related systems that

solve practical problems has grown to over $3 billion

per year , . . “2°

As an individual company example, over the past

7 years the International Business Machines Corp.

(IBM) has seen its sales grow at an average annual rate

of 14 percent, compounded, and its top financial officer was quoted late last year as venturing the prediction that “ . . . sales growth in the next several years

will surpass the 14 percent rate . . . “;21 in fact, sales

grew 17 percent in 1983.22 Seven years ago IBM’s sales

J~Aerospace Daily, Jan. 19, 1984, pp. 97-98.

lcNovember 1983, p. 108.

17N4B. Neither this figure, nor any that follow which reference sales growth

in either absolute numbers or annual rates, have been adjusted to reflect

the unusually high inflation rates that held during the late 1970s and early

1980s. Consequently, they are inherently “optimistic” if taken as an augury

of future sales growth. But, at the same time, this was an epoch during which

business expansion was abnormally repressed by the same inflationa~ pressures—pressures that, one hopes, will not soon be repeated.

Iajan. 2, 1984, p. 176.

IsSteven L. ~1 Sesto, “Technology and Social Change, ” in Technological

Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 24, pp. 183-196; see esp. p. 183.

Zoscience, Apr. 13, 1984, P. 117.

I} Wa// Street Journal, Dec. 9, 1983, P. 5.

llwall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1984, p. 2.
App. F—Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts ● 223

were some $15 billion; today they are some $40 billion, and 3 years from now could approximate $55

billion. It is clear that the absolute size of sales is not

necessarily an impediment to further sales growth

when desired new assets and services are being introduced and adopted—not even at the $30 billion to

$50 billion/year level.

Other, more recent, high-technology commercialindustrial examples abound. Over approximately the

past decade (ending in 1982) the average annual compound growth rate in sales (taken from Moody’s or

individual company reports) for the Communications

Satellite Cooperation was 15 percent; for INTELSAT

and Texas Instruments: 16 percent; for Hewlett-Packard: 23 percent; and for MCI: 68 percent.

Thus, it does seem reasonable to expect that, with

energetic and innovative consideration explicitly given

to cooperative Government-private sector promotion

of United States commercial-industrial space investments and initiatives—initiatives directed both to

opening up new uses related to space and to reducing the unit cost of producing space assets and conducting space operations–the next quarter of a century could see truly important, perhaps outstanding,

growth in our civilian space-related sales, with all that

this should imply for employment, tax revenues, international trade, etc. As the earlier referenced OTA

report succinctly states: “ . . . the United States needs

to search for new engines of growth to drive the economy into the 21st century . . . “23 and “ . . . special

stress should be laid on . . . R&D and technology plus

measures aimed at stimulating investment in new and

innovative firms . . . “

24 And, as a recent Washington

Post article emphasized: “America’s strength in exporting is not in standardized, commodity products,

but in high-technology specialized products that draw

on the huge pool of American know-how and expertise;] specialized, higher technology products . . . are

America’s bread and butter.” 25-26

LEGAL AND EXPERIENTIAL BASES FOR

FEDERAL/PRIVATE-SECTOR COOPERATION IN

ECONOMICALLY DIRECTED R&D

It is important to note that there is some precedent

in Federal law for exploring Government-private sector initiatives in stimulating sales in a high-technology

13/nternatjona/ com~titfon in Electronics, p. 466.

Z41bld., p. 502.

~sjan, 8, 1984, P, G l/G8

26 Notably, in the private commercial-industrial world, the sPace area is

not yet even considered to be important in terms of “high technology”-

see U.S. News and World Report, Jan. 16, 1984, p. 38 where, in de fintng

“High Technology: What Is It?,” space assets and activities go unmentioned.

domain such as space. The “Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980”27 states: “(a) Policy.

It is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to ensure the full use of the result of the Nation’s Federal investment in research and development. To this end, the Federal Government shall strive

. . . to transfer federally . . . originated technology . . . to the private sector. ” Also, for instance, the

Department of Defense (DOD), using the 1982 authority incorporated into formal law by inclusion of appropriate language in Title 10 of the United States Code,

Section 22394, employs very long-term contracting for

utility services in its “Venture Capital Energy Procurement Program by the Military Services. ”28 DOD uses

this program to excite the private sector to develop

and use new technology to provide DOD with energy

services at lower cost than otherwise; this approach

is now being replicated by certain States and municipalities.

And the features of the “Small Business Innovation

Development Act of 1982,”29 which was enacted to

(among other things) “ . . . utilize Federal research

and development as a base for technological innovation [so as] to contribute to the growth and strength

of the Nation’s economy, ” also could be utilized by

NASA, NOAA, DOT and other space-related executive branch offices. This act requires that as much as

1 1/4 percent of the “annual extramural” R&D appropriations of most major Federal agencies be spent with

smaller and, presumably, more aggressive, more entrepreneurial, business organizations.

Perhaps, say, a small fraction of 1 percent of the total

annual NASA and Commerce/NOAA/DOT appropriations could be spent directly and specifically to prompt

activities that offer reasonable promise of furthering

the growth of space-related sales in our private sector. In close concert with our private space-related

business sector, the Government, in order to realize

a more effective linkage of its R&D to the private marketplace, could use these funds to help “focus” the

scientific, exploration, and technological results of the

other 99.5 percent on the task of increasing business

sales.

Such a requirement would be somewhat analogous

to that holding for the nine national laboratories that

operate under the aegis of the Department of Energy.

Under the terms of the Stevenson-Wydler Act (sec.

11 (b)) these laboratories are obligated to spend not

less than 1/2 percent of their funds on activities that

ITpub[lc Law 96-480, Sec. 11. Utilization of Federal Technology, Oct. 21,

1980.

Zasee an article by this title in the 10th Energy Technology Conference Report, p. 230 et seq.

‘

qPublic Law 97-219.
224 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

would see the technology that they develop, using

Federal funds, “transferred” to our private sector. The

potential power of such an approach is a matter of

public record. One of these laboratories, Sandia,

spends more than 1 percent of its budget in this fashion, and has had a long list of successful transfers. 30

In one area alone, that of clean-room technology used

by hospitals and electronics companies, Sandia estimates that sales have now reached $200-million/year

by 70 companies. Much as in the case of satellite communications and NASA (but scaled down by just an

order of magnitude), the total tax revenues provided

by such sales, probably some $50 million, is some 8

percent of Sandia’s $7oO million annual budget.

In an article entitled “The Making of a Conservative Science Policy,” Wil Lepkowski observes that:

. . . from 1982 onward [the present] Administration . . . drew back from its original insistence that the

government had no business developing new technologies for the private sector. ” He suggests that: “In

fact, there is nothing wrong with the government’s developing ideas, concepts, and hardware for the private sector to exploit for the good of the public.” And

he concludes: “What the administration will notice

in 1984, and try to stimulate, is evidence from research

agencies that their programs are contributing to the

economy, innovation, and productivity. We can expect to see growing evidence of the major contribution of the conservative revolution: closer and closer

integration of economics with science and technology. After many decades, policymakers are doing a better job of bringing the two together. That, by itself,

is an achievement.”31 The President’s 1984 State of

the Union address and his subsequent radio address

both bear out Lepkowski’s expectation in the civilian

space area,

The Congressional Research Service recently observed that: “ . . . many analysts believe that Federal

policy to harmonize governmental and private sector support of private science and technology probably could be improved significantly without [an excessive] degree of government-private sector

collusion . . . “

32 And it prepared a report for the use

of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the United States Senate that notes that:33

“With increasing [prospects] of space commercialization . . . the Government may have to provide fundjOTechno/ogy Transfer at Sandia National Laboratories: First Annual Report, SAND83-0345, March 1983.

31 Technology Review, January 1984, p. 39 et SW.

j?jee the CRS Review, January 1984, p. 14.

3Wongressional Research Service, “Policy and Legal Issues Involved in the

Commercialization of Space” published as a Committee Print (No. 98-102),

Sept. 23, 1983, pp. 17-18.

ing if the private-sector [at the outset] is unwilling or

unable to fund the R&D [and it] may be necessary to

increase support for initial R&D funded by the Government if commercial activity is deemed important.”

The report raises serious questions as to “. . . the effectiveness of [the] mechanisms [now used by NASA]

for promoting [space] commercialization,” But the

heretofore-mentioned example of Sandia and, for instance, the pressure for AT&T’s Bell Labs, with its $2

billion/year budget, to become consumer- and marketoriented, 34 suggests that the executive branch, and

especially NASA and Commerce/NOAA/DOT, if properly prompted by the President and Congress and led

by imaginative, experienced, and tough-minded leaders, could make the required transition. For instance,

NASA’s recent request for proposals for a Shuttle marketing support contract is an important step in that

direction.35 So is Executive Order #12465 (February

24, 1984), designating the Department of Transportation as the lead agency “for encouraging and facilitating commercial ELV activities by the United States

private sector.”

THE SPACE-RELATED PRIVATE SECTOR GROWS UP

Slowly, the private sector is learning more about

space, more about the prospects of doing business

there, and more about how to deal with the Government in so doing.

For instance, NASA and the 3M Co., St. Paul, MN,

signed a memorandum of understanding earlier this

year that will enable the company to fly aboard the

Shuttle several experiments related to the growth of

organic crystals and the development of thin films.

NASA has signed one major joint endeavor agreement

with McDonnell Douglas and Johnson & Johnson for

the production of pharmaceuticals in space, and currently is in discussions with approximately 20 companies contemplating future space endeavors.

Other firms have been involved in discussing a wide

range of experimental activities such as electroplating

enhancement, improvement in catalytic materials, formation of glass alloys, research in long-term blood

storage, development of remote-sensing techniques,

development of smaller space vehicles and components of a “space station,” etc. The firms include: Fairchild, Micro-Gravity Research Associates, John Deere,

Space Industries Inc., DuPont, Honeywell, A.D. Little, Orbital Sciences Corp., American Science and

Technology Corp., Ball Aerospace, C2Spaceline,

Sparx, Spaceco Ltd., and Astrotech.

Jtsee /formation Technology Research and Development, OTA, in Press.

MNASA tndust~ Briefing for STS Marketing, May 1, 1%4.
App. F—Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts ● 225

Of greatest importance in considering the matter of

the Government’s working to promote growing private-sector sales i n the civilian space-related area are,

of course, the views and policies of the leaders of both

the legislative branch and the executive branch, particularly the President himself. President Reagan has

made his views and desires clearly known. In his radio

address of January 28, 1984, he stated: “We expect

space-related investments to grow quickly in future

years . . . .NASA, along with other departments and

agencies, will . . . promote private investment

. . . we’re going to bring into play . . . the vitality of

our free enterprise system. ”

So, whatever views the administration has in regard

to close cooperation between the Government and

the U.S. private sector in general, and however much

attention such cooperation receives in other areas, it

is now clearly, indeed forcefully, on record as supporting it between civilian space-related offices such

as NASA and the commercial-i ndustrial-financial institutions that can be expected to profit from such cooperation. To repeat: “ . . . NASA . . . will promote

private investment , . . ,“

And, of course, to the extent that the private sector

provides space assets and operational services that

technology, the marketplace, and its growing freeenterprise capabilities allow, and conducts RDT&E activities at the multibillion-dollar/year level, NASA

would be able to concentrate on the more basic research, the more demanding space exploration, and

the more exotic “cutting edge” technology required

to support both.36 First hints of the potential of such

a private sector move are beginning to appear: Rockwell International is studying the commercial construction, launch, and maintenance of a private-sector

in-orbit “electric utility, ” costing more than a billion

dollars, that would be prepared to offer electrical power as a service to a host of space operations; J’ Space

Industries is readying itself to develop, produce, and

deploy a sophisticated space platform by 1988; the

Astrotech Corp. is holding discussions about their purchasing a Shuttle Orbiter at a price of some $2 billion

(1984); etc.

Impacts on the Federal (NASA)

Space Budget

What can be concluded from simply studying and

projecting the Federal civilian space program budget

itself?

jbsee the article by George Mueller in Aerospace America, January 1984,

p. 84 et seq.

ITsee the International Section of Renewable Energy News, December

1983.

As an initial reference point, the NASA fiscal year

1984 budget authorized by Congress is adopted. It is

usually presented in the general form of table F-6. (The

data source is the Congressional Record. In all that

follows, rounding can influence the last figure in sums.

All other Government civilian space expenditures are

small relative to NASA’s, and their inclusion would

unnecessarily complicate this discussion.) Inasmuch

as only the space R&D elements of this budget are of

concern here, this table presents just these.

Table F-6 shows that $2 billion will be spent on Shuttle production (Space Transportation Capabilities Development) in fiscal year 1984. The Shuttle production and development program is nearly complete;

when it ends, there will be about $2 billion that is

unspoken for in the NASA budget, if current funding

levels continue.

Two other financial matters must be taken into consideration: the reimbursement to the Government for

Shuttle transportation services when the Shuttle is used

by the private sector and other countries; and the 1

percent/year real growth in funds that would be made

available to NASA if the present administration’s expressed budget views in this regard for future fiscal

years are accepted by Congress and continue indefinitely.

That the payments for use of Shuttle launch services are already reimbursing the Government for 4

percent of the publicly funded civilian space program,

and that these payments are now expected to grow

to truly important dimensions soon (perhaps 14 percent by 1989), should be appreciated by all with a serious interest in the cost of this program. The NASA AdTable F-6.—NASA Overall Authorization for

Fiscal Year 1984 (billions of dollars)

A. R&D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.88

B. Construction and facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.13

C. Program management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.24

D. Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . =$7.30

The R&D element (A, above) consists of external

contract funds for:

1. Space transportation capabilities

development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.01

2. Space transportation operations . . . . . . . . 1.55

3. Physics and astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.56

4. Planetary exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.22

5. Life sciences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.06

6. Space applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.31

7. Technology utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.01

8. Aeronautical research and technology . . . 0.32

9. Space research and technology. . . . . . . . . 0.14

10. Tracking and data acquisition . . . . . . . . . . 0.70

=$5.90
226 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

ministrator has reported at a press briefing36 that the

reimbursements—primarily for Shuttle flight services—approached $300 million in fiscal year 1984, and

that he expects that they will approximate some $7OO

million in fiscal year 1985. Further, he stated that: “1

still anticipate reaching the break-even point in 1988

or 1989. ”

Thus (even without considering the cost-offsetting

importance of tax revenues generated by private-sector space business) the net cost to the public of our

publicly funded civilian space program even now is

significantly less than the gross cost because of this

Shuttle cost reimbursement: it is $6.6 billion net out

of $6.9 billion gross. Next year the expected reimbursement income would more than offset a 4 percent inflation rate. (Considering the tax revenues as

an additional effective “offset” would reduce the $6.6

billion to $6.1 billion. That is, the net cost could be

considered to be some 11 percent less than the gross

cost, and falling.)

And, finally, NASA now has some reason to expect

that funds for its program would increase by 1 percent/year plus any inflationary increase. If inflation

compensation plus 1 percent real growth becomes

emplaced in NASA’s annual appropriations, it would

have important influence on the pace at which spacerelated objectives, such as those suggested here, could

be pursued. A 1 percent “real growth” on a base of

$7 billion/year would provide a total addition of some

$10 billion by the end of this century, and a total approaching $25 billion in the next 25 years—i.e., an

average of some $1 billion per year (1984$) over this

latter interval.

Under the assumptions made here, three conclusions may be reached concerning cost and financing

considerations:

1. In the absence of any private-sector or othercountry financial participation-i .e., under circumstances whereby the full cost of addressing

the ten conceptual objectives would be defrayed

by U.S. public funds, and assuming that the funds

continuing to become available year-to-year

would be in the same amount as those now available under NASA’s “budget envelope,” then,

starting 2-3 years hence, the essential completion

of Shuttle-related development could provide

some $2 billion (1984) /year—i,e., some $50 billion (1984$) over the next quarter of a century,

2. If, to this RDT&E “wedge” is added the anticipated 1 percent/year “real growth” in appropriations, in addition to an indexing of appropriations

to neutralize the influence of inflation, the next

3.

4.

25 years could see a total of some $25 billion

(1984$) added to the $50 billion made available

through the Shuttle RDT&E completion—i.e., a

total of some $75 billion (1984$). Thus, just these

two measures alone would suffice to see (from

the financial viewpoint alone) that the ten conceptual objectives could be satisfactorily addressed within the next quarter of a century.

If the two preceding assumptions are retained,

and if, in addition, the full cost were to be shared

by other countries and our private sector, in the

fashions and to the degrees outlined earlier, this

measure (again, speaking just of financial, not political or technological circumstances) would allow the ten conceptual objectives to be attained

in, say, 20 years since this would allow some $15

billion (1984$) of public funds to be used to accelerate the schedule. Alternatively, the 1 percent

per year “real growth” and/or the “base” figure

of $2 billion could be reduced.

Whether or not such public and other funds are

indeed made available could be influenced, positively and importantly, by two other circumstances:

● If the incorne from other countries and the private sector for the use of the Shuttle increases

as is now hoped/expected, then, in a half-dozen

years or so, this would amount to NASA appropriations being, in effect, “offset” by as much

as some $2 billion (1984$) per year;

. If our private space-related sector could be stimulated to maintain its present rate of sales

growth, it could begin to make significant additional space R&D investments itself—investments that could grow to billions of dollars/year

in the next two decades or so; and

. If the tax revenues “thrown off” by our private

sector’s commercial-industrial sales continue to

increase in the future as they have in the past,

i.e., if a 10 to 15 percent per year, compounded,

growth rate were to continue over the next quarter of a century, they could, at least to some extent, be looked upon also as an important “offset” to the gross public cost of our publicly

supported space program, inasmuch as they

would amount to scores of billions of dollars

(1984$).

Clearly, under such generaI circumstances as these,

funding limitations would not prevent the United

States from undertaking an ambitious publicly supported civilian space program throughout the next

quarter century.

aaThe Washinflon Post, Feb. 6, 1984, page A-9.
Appendix G

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS

AND TERMS

Glossary of Acronyms and

Abbreviations

ACC – Aft Cargo Carrier

AEM – Applications Explorer Module

ASO – Advanced Solar Observatory

ASTO – Advanced Solar Terrestrial Observatory

ASEB – Aeronautics and Space Engineering

Board (of the NRC)

AXAF – Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility

B — Billion

BOB – Bureau of the Budget

CDG – Concept Development Group

CNES – Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales

(France)

CNR – National Research Council (Italy)

COM – Center of Mass

COM M — Communications

COMSAT – Communications Satellite Corporation

DBS – Direct Broadcast Satellite

DDT&E – Design, Development, Test, and

Evaluation

DMS – Data Management Subsystem

DOC – Department of Commerce

DOD – Department of Defense

DOT – Department of Transportation

ECLSS – Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem

EDO – Extended Duration Orbiter

ELV – Expendable Launch Vehicle

EOL – Earth-Orbiting Laboratory

EOS – Electrophoresis Operations in Space

EPS – Electrical Power Subsystem

ESA – European Space Agency

ET — External Tank

EUMETSAT – European Meteorological Satellite

Organization

EURECA – European Retrievable Carrier

EUTELSAT – European Telecommunications Satellite Organization

EVA – Extravehicular Activity (“walking in

Space”)

FF — Free Flyer

g – Gravity

GEO – Geostationary Earth Orbit (sometimes, less precisely, geosynchronous)

GN&C – Guidance, Navigation, and Control

GPS – Global Positioning [Space] System

(see NAVSTAR)

HEO – High Earth Orbit

IMS – Information Management Subsystem

INMARSAT – International! Maritime Satellite CorINTELSAT

IOC

ISAS

ISF

ISTO

IVA

JEA

JSC

Kbps

KSC

kg

kW

LDEF

LDR

LEO

LIDAR

LSS

M

MAC

MAS

MBB

Mbps

M DA

MESA

MMS

M M U

MOL

MORL

MOSC

poration

— International Telecommunication

Satellite Corporation

— Initial Operational Capability

— Institute of Space and Astronautical

Science (Japan)

— Industrial Space Facility

— Initial Solar Terrestrial Observatory

— Intravehicular Activity

– Joint Endeavor Agreement

– Johnson Space Center

— Kilobits per second (of data

handling)

— Kennedy Space Center

— kilogram (2.2 pounds)

– kilowatt

— Long Duration Exposure Facility

— Large Deployable Reflector

— Low-Earth-Orbit (usually 200-600

km)

— Light Detection and Ranging

– Large Space System

— Million

— meter (3.3 feet)

— Modular Attitude Control

— Mission Analysis Study

— Messerschmitt-Boelkow-BIohm

— Megabits per second (of data

handling)

— Multiple Docking Adaptor

— Modular Experimental Platform for

Science and Applications

— Multimission Modular Spacecraft

— Manned Maneuvering Unit

— Manned Orbiting Laboratory

— Manned Orbital Research Laboratory

— Manned Orbital Systems Concept

227
228 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

MPS

MSC

MSFC

NAC

NAE

NAS

NASA

NASDA

NAVSTAR

NOAA

NRC

O&M

OART

OAST

OMB

OMS

OMSF

OMV

OSM

OTA

OTV

OWS

PEP

P/L

POV

R&D

RCS

RD&P

RDT&E

r.f.

RMS

ROTV

RWG

SAB

SDV

SOC

— Materials Processing in Space

— Manned Spacecraft Center

— Marshall Space Flight Center

— NASA Advisory Council

— National Academy of Engineering

— National Academy of Sciences

— National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

— National Space Development

Agency (Japan)

— DOD Satellite Navigation System

(see GPS)

— National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (within DOC)

— National Research Council (of the

NAS-NAE)

— Operations and Maintenance

— Office of Advanced Research and

Technology (within NASA)

— Office of Aeronautics and Space

Technology (within NASA)

— Office of Management and Budget

— Orbital Maneuvering System

— Office of Manned Space Flight

(within NASA)

— Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (formerly designated TMS)

— Orbital Service Module

— Office of Technology Assessment

— orbital Transfer Vehicle

— Orbital Workshop

— Power Extension Package

— Payload

— proximity Operation Vehicle

— Research and Development

— Reaction Control System

— Research, Development, and Production

— Research, Development, Test, and

Evaluation (or Engineering)

— Radio Frequency

— Remote Manipulator System

— Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle

— Requirements Working Group

— Space Applications Board (of the

NRC)

— Shuttle Developed Vehicle

– Space Operations Center

SOLARIS – European Space Platform Concept

SPAS – Space Pallet Satellite

SPS – Solar Power Satellite

SPSS – Shuttle Payload Support Structure

SS – Space Station

SSB – Space Science Board (of the NRC)

SSEC

SSSAS

SSTF

STG

STS

TDRS

TDRSS

TMS

TMV

TRKNG

TRS

TSV

TUSK

VAFB

WBS

— Solar System Exploration Committee

— Space Station Systems Analysis

Study

— Space Station Task Force (within

NASA)

— Space Task Group (of the National

Security Council)

– Space Transportation System

– Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

– Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

System

— Teleoperator Maneuvering System

(former designation for OMV)

— Transport Modular Vehicle

— Tracking

— Teleoperator Retrieval System

— Teleoperator Service System

— Tethered Upper Stage Knob

— Vandenberg Air Force Base

— Work Breakdown Structure

Glossary of Terms

Base–the central or core set of interrelated, and perhaps interconnected, 28.5° LEO infrastructure

(“space station”) modules including facilities for

power, docking, control, and human habitation.

Cargo bay–the Space Shuttle’s central fuselage section (openable to space) in which cargo, equipment, and experiment modules are carried.

Core–(see base.)

Cosmos 1443-a Soviet resupply vehicle for Salyut orbiting spacecraft.

Element–any module, platform, free flyer, or vehicle which is an integral part of the in-space infrastructure, and dependent on one or more other element(s) for its long-term operation.

Free flyer–an unattached or free-flying uninhabitable

satellite (usually dedicated to one purpose or activity) which is serviced by or otherwise dependent

on other infrastructure elements.

Geostationary satellite–a geosynchronous satellite

whose circular orbit lies in the plane of the Earth’s

equator and which thus remains fixed relative to

the Earth; by extension, a satellite whose position

remains approximately fixed relative to the Earth;

its altitude is necessarily approximately 35,000 km

above the Earth’s surface.

Geosynchronous satellite–an Earth satellite whose

period of revolution is equal to the period of rotation of the Earth about its axis.

Infrastructure-a generic term referring to all the elements constituting an interdependent space sup-
Glossary of Acronyms, Abbreviations and Terms Ž 229

port system, consisting of surface and in-space

elements.

Leasecraft-proposed commercial, long-term, unpressurized platform that could be used for Earth observation, materials processing in space, etc.

Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO)–an orbit around the Earth at

altitudes usually ranging from 200 to 600 km and

located at any of various inclinations to the Equator.

Megabit-a data communications rate of 1 million bits

(or units) per second.

Module—an element of the infrastructure base or core

which provides a unique function for infrastructure

operations.

Orbiter–the Shuttle vehicle of the NASA Space Transportation System.

Orbit transfer–change of orbit, usually to one of significantly different altititude or inclination.

order of Magnitude–factor of 10.

Pallet–an open structure attached to an element of

infrastructure that provides mounting for equipment, vehicles, or experiments.

Platform–an orbiting multi-use structure capable of

supplying limited utilities to changeable payloads

and dependent on other infrastructure elements;

usually uninhabitable except, perhaps for some, for

servicing.

Polar orbit–an orbit whose plane intersects the

Earth’s axis of rotation.

Salyut–a Soviet inhabited “space station” in LEO, the

first model of which was launched in 1971.

Satellite–a body that revolves around another body

of preponderant mass and that has a motion primarily and permanently determined by the gravitational forces of attraction between them; generally

applied here to an object revolving about the Earth.

Shuttle-the reusable passenger- and cargo-carrying

surface-LEO vehicle of the NASA Space Transportation System; sometimes referred to as the Space

Shuttle Orbiter.

Skylab–an independent orbiting laboratory composed principally of hardware remaining from the

Apollo program; inhabited by crews of astronauts

during 1973-1974.

Spacelab–a laboratory module, designed and produced by ESA, carried into and out of orbit in the

Shuttle cargo bay and supported by the Shuttle

power and life support systems.

Space probe–a spacecraft designed to travel out of

the gravitational field of the Earth to explore other

parts of the solar system.

Space station–a totality of habitable and uninhabitable Earth-orbiting interdependent infrastructure

elements constituting a long term in-space support

system.

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)–a

communications system used to relay data directly

between orbiting vehicles and a single U.S. ground

station at White Sands, NM.
Index
Index

broadening the debate, 103-110

need for goals and objectives, 105

policy background, 106

President Reagan’s call for a “space station, ” 109

recent proposals, 10 8

space infrastructure as methods and means, 103

steps toward broader participation, 110

buyer’s guide to space infrastructure, 85

alternative funding rates, 94

catalog of space infrastructure, 87

cost drivers, 91

people and automation in space, 92

procurement

Congress:

House:

Committee

Committee

109

Senate:

Committee

Committee

tion, 4

options, 85

on the Budget, 4

on Science and Technology, 4, 44, 46,

on Appropriations, 4, 60

on Commerce, Science, and TransportaEuropean Space Agency (ESA), 39, 56, 66, 155, 189

evolution of civilian in-space infrastructure, 159-176

Apollo anomaly, 161

beginnings of post-Apollo planning, 164

earliest space infrastructure, 159

NASA’s post-Apollo ambitions dashed, 170

post-Apollo planning under Thomas Paine, 166

recent in-space infrastructure, 172

response to Sputnik, 1957-61

Skylab: an interim “Space Station, ” 171

“Space Station” plans: during the 1960s, 162

financing considerations and Federal budget impacts,

217-226

infrastructure options, 7

funding rate options, 12

procurement options, 10

technology options, 7

comparison of options, 8

space infrastructure platforms, 9

infrastructure required, 17

cost, 18

financing, 19

technology, 17

INTELSAT, 39, 40

internationaI involvement i n a civiIian ‘‘space station’

program, 177-205

assessment: pros and cons, 203-205

factors influencing assessment of international involvement, 198-203

possible modes of international involvement, 185-189

potential international partners, 189

Why international involvement?, 177-185

issues and findings, 25-46

civilian “space station s,” 31-35

alternatives, 33

concerns about LEO infrastructure, 32

cost of LEO infrastructure, 33

infrastructure in LEO, 31

general, 25-31

NASA’s circumstances, 25-28

transitions, 28

possible legislative initiatives, 43-46

civilian space policies, goals, objectives, and

strategies, 45

creation of space policy study centers, 46

strategies for acquiring any new in-space civilian infrastructure, 43

U.S. future in space, 35-43

arena of peaceful cooperation, 40

cost reduction, 37

international space cooperation, 39

long-term space goals and objectives, 35

long-term space strategies, 37

NASA’s changing role, 41

non-Government policy studies

private sector, 38

legislation:

Comsat Act of 1962, 103

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 25, 35,

103, 106, 110

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1985, 30, 45

National Academy of Sciences, 61

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),

4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 21, 25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 38,

39, 42, 43, 49, 58-60, 103-104

Solar System Exploration Committee, 61

National Commission on Space, 16, 30, 31, 214

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA), 29, 30, 38, 39, 40

National Research Council, 49, 61

NATO, 29, 39

National Weather Service, 29

need for goals and objectives, 13

Nixon administration, 106

OTA workshop on cost containment of civilian space

infrastructure, synopsis of, 206-213

People’s Republic of China, 56, 85

possible goals and objectives, 15

Presidential Space Task Group, 106

Ramo, Simon, 108

rational for space infrastructure, 4-7

Reagan, President Ronald, 107, 109

relation of a “space station” to the U.S. future in space,

3

Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting, held at

Aspen-Wye Plantation, November 1983, 133-139

analysis capability, 134

233
234 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

current space station proposal, 133

effect of military programs and interests, 137

geopolitical competition, 138

immediate alternatives to a space station, 135

international cooperation, 136

international economic competition, 138

long-term mission possibilities, 135

NASA operations and organization, 138

private-sector involvement, 136

R&D, 134

results of principal NASA studies on space station uses

and functional requirements, 141-158

major findings of the U.S. aerospace industry “Mission Analysis Studies, ” 141

AEG, British Aerospace, Fokker, CIR, 156

Aerospatiale, 156

Canada, 156

costs and benefits, 147

Dornier, 156

European Space Agency, 155

evolution of the initial capability, 146

functional capabilities, 143

individual foreign company interests, 156

infrastructure elements, 145

Japan, 156

phased activities (mission sets), 143

role of a human crew, 146

users and uses, 141

NASA synthesis of the “Mission Analysis Studies, ” 157

nonaerospace industry interest in Space use, 158

shape of the space future, 19

international, 20

new role for NASA, 21

private sector, 20

space infrastructure, 49-82

alternative infrastructure, 62-82

habitable infrastructure, 70

Columbus, 75

Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO), 70

Spacelab, 72-75

uninhabitable platforms, 62

Boeing MESA, 64

EURECA, 66

Fairchild LEASECRAFT, 62

Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), 66

MBB SPAS, 66

Pleiades Concept, 66

Shuttle Payload Support Structure (SPSS), 66

SOLARIS, 69

Space Industries Platform, 66

shuttle as permanent infrastructure, 77

considerations for any space infrastructure, 50-58

LEO environment, 51

orbits, 50

space transportation, 54

expendable launch vehicle (ELV), 56

manned maneuvering unit (MMU), 56

orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV), 56

reusable orbital transfer vehicle (ROTV), 56

shuttle, 55

technical considerations, 52

attitude control and stabilization, 52

data management, 52

electromagnetic interference (EM I), 52

life support systems, 54

power, 53

propulsion, 54

thermal energy management, 53

NASA’s approach to space infrastructure, 58-60

infrastructure functions, 60

mission analysis studies, 58

National Research Council, 61

Title n-National Commission on Space (P. L. 98-361),

214-216

toward a goal-oriented civilian space program, 113

cost and schedule, 124

indicated infrastructure, 122

possible goals, 113

possible objectives, 113

global disaster avoidance, 115

human presence and activities on the Moon, 117

increasing commercial-industrial space sales, 120

medical research of direct interest to the general

public, 117

modernizing and expanding international short-wave

broadcasting, 118

obtaining information required for eventual human

exploration of Mars and some asteroids, 117

people drawn from the general public, in space,

118

providing space data directly to the general public,

118

reducing the cost of space transportation, 120

using space and space technology for the transmission of electrical energy, 119

U.S. Department of Defense, 4, 29, 30, 39

U.S. Department of Transportation, 38

U. S. S. R., 5, 45

U.s . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1984 0 - 38-798 : QL 3