United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

June 1996 DEFENSE

AMMUNITION

Significant Problems

Left Unattended Will

Get Worse

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-129

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260167 

June 21, 1996

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness

The Honorable Duncan Hunter

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Procurement

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

In March 1995, you asked us to review the status of the Department of Defense’s ammunition

stockpile and production facilities available to support the military’s ammunition requirements.

This report addresses your concerns about the ammunition stockpile, including conventional

ammunition, explosives, and missiles. Our review focused on the amount of ammunition excess

to established requirements and problems with the ammunition stockpile management, which

threaten readiness. We issued a separate report addressing your concerns about the production

facilities available to support the military’s ammunition requirements (Ammunition Industrial

Base: Information on DOD’s Assessment of Requirements, GAO/NSIAD-96-133, May 31, 1996).

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and each of the military

services; the Commanding General, Army Materiel Command; the Commanding General, Army

Industrial Operations Command; and other interested parties. We will also make copies

available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staffs have any questions concerning this

report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

The military services have over 5 million tons of conventional ammunition,

explosives, and missiles (hereafter referred to as ammunition) valued at

about $80 billion as of September 30, 1994. This ammunition, if loaded

onto railroad cars, would stretch over 800 miles—the distance from

Washington, D.C., to Orlando, Florida. Because of concerns about the

condition and readiness of this ammunition, the Chairmen, Subcommittee

on Military Readiness and Subcommittee on Military Procurement, House

Committee on National Security, asked GAO to determine (1) whether the

ammunition stockpile meets wartime and peacetime requirements and

(2) what problems the Army single manager has in managing much of the

military services’ ammunition stockpile.

Background Under the national military strategy, the military services are required to

maintain enough ammunition for two nearly simultaneous major regional

conflicts and for peacetime needs, such as training. The Defense Planning

Guidance lays out general guidelines for the services to determine how

much ammunition they need to conduct operations under the strategy.

Ammunition that exceeds these requirements is to be shared among the

services or disposed of through sale to other nations, recycling, or

destruction. In 1977, the Army assumed single manager responsibility for

storing, managing, inspecting, testing, and disposing of most of the

services’ ammunition. In this role, as of September 30, 1995, the single

manager was responsible for managing 3 million tons of ammunition

owned by the services. The individual services also manage additional

stocks of ammunition in their own facilities.

Results in Brief The services have to do a better job of managing their ammunition needs.

As of September 30, 1994, the total stockpile of usable and unusable

ammunition was worth about $80 billion. GAO estimates that about

$31 billion of this total ammunition stockpile was excess. This excess

amount includes about $22 billion worth of ammunition that was still

usable.

This situation has occurred primarily as a result of the collapse of the

Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the change in the primary threat to the

United States. As a consequence, the services’ ammunition requirements

were drastically reduced, and more of the ammunition stockpile became

excess. The Army’s war reserve requirements, for example, were reduced

by 74 percent.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Executive Summary

Of the various types of ammunition in the stockpile, GAO found that almost

half have amounts that exceed the services’ needs in varying quantities.

For some types of ammunition, the services have over 50 times their stated

needs. While there are shortages of some specific ammunition types,

overall the services generally have enough ammunition to meet their

wartime and peacetime requirements.

Increases in the single manager’s ammunition stockpile due to the return

of massive amounts of ammunition from Europe and Operation Desert

Storm, combined with a decrease in the single manager’s budget,

workforce, and storage space, have created a situation that could, if

allowed to continue, degrade the forces’ readiness to meet wartime and

peacetime needs. The single manager’s ability to manage ammunition has

been severely taxed. As a result, ammunition inspections and tests have

fallen so far behind that the single manager cannot ensure the usability

and readiness of the ammunition stockpile. Moreover, the single manager

does not know how much of the ammunition is excess to stated

requirements, in part, because the single manager does not know the

services’ requirements or what ammunition they also own and store in

their own facilities. In addition, the services have not identified what

ammunition the single manager stores for them is required and what is

above stated requirements. Because the services’ total ammunition needs

and the extent of ammunition above stated requirements are both

unknown, ammunition that exceeds one service’s needs is not always used

to fill another service’s requirements, and services have bought

ammunition that could have been redistributed from other services’ excess

ammunition.

Finally, the single manager faces two problems in disposing of the

increasing amount of excess ammunition. First, the single manager must

continue to store excess ammunition until the services identify and

relinquish ownership of it. Currently, the services have no incentives to

identify their excess ammunition, in part, because the single manager is

responsible for and pays for its care; that is, storage, inventories,

surveillance, and disposal. Second, although the Congress has recently

provided more funds for ammunition disposal, the single manager cannot

meet existing demands for disposal. As a result, the stockpile continues to

grow.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Executive Summary

Principal Findings

Much of the Ammunition Is

Excess or Old

When the Cold War ended, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) ammunition

requirements decreased substantially. Army war reserve requirements

alone decreased from 2.5 million tons to 650,000 tons. When GAO compared

the amount of usable ammunition on hand to each service’s requirements

to support two major regional conflicts and training and testing needs for

7 years (6 years of testing for the Army), it found that almost 50 percent of

the different types of ammunition include amounts that exceed the

services’ needs. For example, the Air Force and the Army have enough

.30-caliber carbine ball ammunition to meet their stated requirements 

58 and 517 times, respectively.

Of the $80 billion in usable and unusable ammunition, GAO estimates the

total value of excess ammunition to be about $31 billion. This includes

about $22 billion of usable ammunition that exceeded stated needs and

about $9.4 billion in unusable assets excess to stated needs. In addition,

over $2.9 billion of excess assets that were on the single manager’s

inventory records did not appear on the services’ inventory records. Also,

over $2 billion in ammunition was identified for disposal.

Moreover, the services spent about $125 million for ammunition in fiscal

years 1993 and 1994 that exceeded their fiscal year 1995 stated

requirements. In addition, ammunition is being stored and managed for

weapon systems that either have been purged or are no longer in the

active inventory. For example, the Marine Corps had about 3 million

.50-caliber cartridges for the M85 machine gun, even though the Marine

Corps has removed the M85 gun from its inventory and no other weapon

system uses this type of .50-caliber ammunition.

The age of over half of the ammunition stockpile managed by the single

manager is not in the single manager’s database. Of the ammunition for

which the age is known, almost 25 percent is over 25 years old. Even when

this old ammunition is usable, it is not always easily accessible in storage

facilities, and commanders prefer not to use it. During Operation Desert

Storm, battlefield commanders opted to use more modern ammunition.

Moreover, commanders want to train with ammunition they will use on

the battlefield, not the “old stuff.” As a result, old ammunition continues to

age and takes up storage space.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Executive Summary

Of the services’ 2,781 types of ammunition, 752 types have shortages when

compared to the services’ requirements databases. However, the services

generally believe that the ammunition shortages are manageable because

they have substitute items and procurements planned to fill these

shortages.

Stockpile Management

Problems Threaten

Readiness, and Planned

Improvements Have Been

Delayed

Much of the huge amount of ammunition returned after Operation Desert

Storm and from bases closed in Europe came to the single manager’s

depots in small, broken lots. Also, the single manager’s budget and

workforce have been greatly reduced. These factors have combined to

make management of the stockpile difficult. A 1993 Joint Ordnance

Commanders Group’s report noted major deficiencies in the maintenance

of the ammunition managed and maintained by the single manager that

could affect readiness. The single manager’s main concern has been the

receipt of ammunition and quick delivery to customers at the expense of

efficient storage, disposal, inspection, and maintenance. Many problems

affect the ammunition stockpile. For example:

• The condition of some ammunition is unknown because of delays in

inspections and testing, which are important to ensure that war reserve

items are usable, properly classified as to condition, and safe. In addition,

the single manager’s database shows ammunition as usable, even though

defect codes show it is overdue for inspection. Although the single

manager’s database shows that only about 6,600 lots were past due for

inspection, other records the single manager considers more accurate

show that about 68,000 lots—10 times as many—were actually past due for

inspection. Also, 25 percent of the war reserve items were overdue for

tests. Both these backlogs are expected to double over the next 

3 to 5 years.

• About 29 percent of the services’ top priority wartime ammunition items,

such as motors for the MK66 2.75-inch rocket, could not be issued as of

March 1995 because they needed to be repaired or inspected or could not

be fixed. Eighteen percent of the top priority items needed repairs costing

an estimated $99 million.

The single manager has made little progress in implementing its 1994

Integrated Ammunition Stockpile Management Plan, which is intended to

streamline the stockpile. Part of the problem is that the services have not

yet identified which of their ammunition is required and which is excess to

stated requirements. Without this information, the single manager cannot

give priority to the storage and care of required ammunition to ensure

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Executive Summary

readiness. In addition, ammunition that exceeds one service’s needs is not

always used to fill another service’s requirements, and a service may make

unnecessary purchases of ammunition that is excess in another service.

GAO’s analysis of requirements and ammunition on hand identified

opportunities for cross-sharing among the services. GAO found that (1) the

services spent about $185 million for ammunition items during fiscal years

1993-95, even though amounts in excess of stated requirements were

available in another service; (2) $1.2 billion in ammunition in excess of

stated requirements could be shared among the services to alleviate

shortages; and (3) $19 million in costs could also be avoided if usable

ammunition in excess of stated requirements was shared with a service

that planned maintenance on the same type of ammunition.

In addition, the single manager historically has not received the funding

requested or needed to manage the stockpile adequately and to dispose of

excess ammunition, in part, because of competition with other Army

funding needs. In recognition of this problem, the Congress statutorily

established a funding minimum for the care and maintenance of

ammunition in 1995. In addition, the conferees on the DOD appropriations

act directed that a minimum for fiscal year 1996 be expended for the same

purpose. This has helped, and in fiscal year 1995, the single manager was

able to do a complete ammunition inventory to restore the accuracy of

ammunition inventory records.

Options for Handling

Ammunition Storage and

Disposal Problems

GAO believes that the single manager will face difficulties for years in

managing the ammunition stockpile. The single manager has tremendous

backlogs of ammunition to dispose of, and these backlogs will increase for

the foreseeable future, especially if the services begin to identify

ammunition that is excess to requirements. One problem is that the

services are not inclined to declare ammunition excess as they do not have

to pay the single manager to store it. Also, once ammunition is declared

excess, the owning service is not reimbursed for its cost if another service

wants it. An option for persuading the services to relinquish ownership of

excess, old, and obsolete ammunition, as pointed out in the Joint

Ordnance Commanders Group’s 1993 report, would be for the single

manager to charge the services a storage fee. The report also suggested

that additional storage space could be made available if excess

ammunition were used in training, included in foreign military sales or

grant aid programs, or was destroyed. In addition, as GAO recommended in

1979,1

 the single manager could own, manage, and control the ammunition

1

Centralized Ammunition Management—A Goal Not Yet Achieved (LCD-80-1, Nov. 26, 1979).

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Executive Summary

stockpile and thus know what ammunition is excess to stated

requirements and distribute it to other services that need the ammunition

or dispose of it, if unneeded.

Disposing of excess ammunition is a time-consuming, expensive process.

For example, at the installation with the largest disposal capacity, 

1,300 tons of ammunition were destroyed at a cost of about $1 million

during 1 week GAO visited. With over 375,000 tons of ammunition awaiting

disposal at the end of fiscal year 1995 and additional ammunition

identified for disposal each year, it will take years to dispose of the

ammunition. And because of the expense associated with disposing of this

much ammunition, finding the funds to facilitate disposal is difficult. One

option would be to require the services to include the cost to dispose of

ammunition being replaced in budgets for new ammunition. While this

option would not eliminate the significant quantities of ammunition that

already exist, it would focus earlier attention on the ammunition disposal

problem, provide additional funds for disposal, and over time significantly

reduce the quantities awaiting disposal.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

To impress upon the services the need to address the problem of excess

ammunition, the Congress may wish to consider requiring the Secretary of

Defense to report annually the amount of ammunition on hand and the

amount that exceeds established requirements. This report could also cite

progress made in addressing specific ammunition stockpile management

problems, including identifying ammunition in excess of established

requirements, cross-sharing of ammunition in excess of established

requirements among services that have shortages, inspecting and testing

ammunition, and disposing of excess ammunition that it no longer makes

sense to retain. With this information, the Congress could make more

informed annual budget decisions related to the ammunition stockpile.

Recommendation To facilitate implementation of the single manager’s plan for storing,

maintaining, and disposing of ammunition, GAO recommends that the

Secretary of Defense develop incentives to encourage the military services

to categorize their ammunition as required or as excess to established

requirements, to update this information annually, and to relinquish

control of their excess ammunition to the Army single manager for

distribution to other services that have shortages of ammunition or for

disposal when it no longer makes sense to retain it. Possible changes in

ammunition management, among others, include (1) requiring the services

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Executive Summary

to pay the single manager a fee for storing their ammunition;

(2) authorizing the single manager to own, manage, and control the

stockpile and/or be aware of the services’ total requirements and

ammunition in their own storage facilities, so the manager can identify

ammunition excess to requirements and coordinate redistribution of it to

services that need the ammunition or dispose of it when appropriate; and

(3) including the services’ cost to dispose of excess ammunition in their

budgets for new ammunition.

Agency Comments DOD partially concurred with the findings in this report and the matter for

congressional consideration. DOD disagreed with the recommendation and

the options for handling ammunition storage and disposal problems.

DOD stated that it took exception to the criteria that GAO used in

determining excess inventory and that GAO infers that stocks above

established requirements are excess and should therefore be disposed of.

GAO agrees that not all the ammunition in excess of stated requirements

should be disposed of, and this report does not state that all excess

ammunition should be disposed of. However, GAO believes that the usable

assets in excess of stated requirements (about $22 billion) should be made

available for cross-sharing with other services to avoid one service

purchasing assets that another service has in excess of its requirements. In

addition, GAO believes there are many items being stored that will never be

used and should be identified for disposal. Other items may not need to

have dollars expended on them to convert them from unusable to usable

ammunition. Without some sort of prioritization or identification of

ammunition required to meet wartime and peacetime requirements, only

the $2 billion of ammunition identified for disposal would be treated

differently by the single manager.

DOD stated that it recognizes that improvements to ammunition

management are needed. It stated that its Integrated Ammunition

Stockpile Management Plan has resulted in significant progress in many

areas, such as demilitarization. GAO agrees that the 1994 management plan

is a step in the right direction but is concerned about the plan receiving

the services’ full support in such areas as identifying required and

nonrequired ammunition, which is a critical component of the plan.

DOD partially concurred with the matter for congressional consideration.

DOD said it already provides the Congress with ammunition inventory data

in the Supply System Inventory Report and demilitarization information in

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Executive Summary

the procurement budget justifications. GAO is aware of this report and the

information contained in it. However, as currently prepared, the Supply

System Inventory Report does not provide any information on the amount

of ammunition that exceeds established requirements or stockpile

management problems.

DOD disagreed with the recommendation and options given for potential

changes in ammunition management. DOD stated that it considers the

present arrangement for managing much of the services stockpile to be

satisfactory. GAO does not agree that the present arrangement for

managing the stockpile is working well and believes that existing DOD

practices will not solve the problems. GAO continues to believe its

recommendation is valid.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

14

Military Services Determine Ammunition Requirements 14

The Army Manages the Wholesale Stockpile of Conventional

Ammunition for All the Services

15

Changing World Conditions Have Affected the Ammunition

Stockpile

17

Joint Service-Sponsored Study Addressed Stockpile Operations 18

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 18

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21

Chapter 2 

Much of the Services’

Ammunition Is Excess

to Requirements and

Is Aging

22

War Reserve Requirements Have Been Significantly Reduced 23

Almost 50 Percent of the Types of Ammunition Have Quantities

Exceeding Requirements

24

Service Inventories Contain Many Old and Aging Ammunition

Items

28

Management Practices Perpetuate the Buildup of Excess and

Aging Ammunition

30

Despite Some Shortages of Ammunition, Services’ Managers

Generally Believe They Can Meet Requirements

35

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 42

Chapter 3 

Problems With

Ammunition Stockpile

Management Threaten

Readiness, and the

Single Manager’s Plan

for Improvement Has

Been Delayed

44

Condition of the Stockpile Is Significantly Impaired 45

Despite 1994 Plan for Improvements, Little Progress Has Been

Made

60

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 65

Chapter 4 

Conclusions and

Recommendation

66

Matter for Congressional Consideration 67

Recommendation 67

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 68

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Contents

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 70

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 92

Tables Table 1.1: Stockpile Management Functions 17

Table 2.1: Excess Serviceable Ammunition Owned by the

Services

25

Table 2.2: Serviceable Ammunition That Exceeds Requirements

Multiple Times

26

Table 2.3: Excess Unserviceable Ammunition Owned by the

Services

27

Table 2.4: Age of Ammunition in the Wholesale Stockpile 29

Table 2.5: Army Items Purchased That Were Excess to

Requirements

33

Table 2.6: Navy Items Purchased That Were Excess to

Requirements

34

Table 2.7: DOD Ammunition Purchases That Could Have Been

Filled With Existing Inventory

38

Table 2.8: Selected Ammunition Shortages and Offsetting Excess

Ammunition Among the Services

40

Table 2.9: Costs of Planned Ammunition Maintenance That Could

Be Avoided by Using Excess Ammunition

40

Figures Figure 1.1: Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Sites 16

Figure 2.1: Reduction in Army War Reserve Requirement 24

Figure 2.2: Ammunition Dating From the 1940s 29

Figure 3.1: Condition of Items in the Wholesale Ammunition

Stockpile

46

Figure 3.2: Increase in Periodic Inspection Backlog 48

Figure 3.3: Current and Projected Backlogs of Tests for

Large-Caliber War Reserve Ammunition in the Wholesale

Stockpile

50

Figure 3.4: Maverick Missiles Stored Outside 52

Figure 3.5: Old Propelling Charge for 155-millimeter Gun 53

Figure 3.6: Nike Hercules Rocket Motors With No Requirement 54

Figure 3.7: Navy MK25 Mines Manufactured in 1954 55

Figure 3.8: Example of Wasted Space With Fragmented Lot 56

Figure 3.9: Ammunition Disposal Operations 57

Figure 3.10: Increase in Ammunition Disposal Backlog 59

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Contents

Abbreviations

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

HARM High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile

IG Inspector General

O&M operation and maintenance

RDAISA Research Development Acquisition Information System

Agency

WARS Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The four military services stockpile in their retail and wholesale

inventories conventional ammunition, explosives, and missiles (hereafter

referred to as ammunition) valued at about $80 billion as of September 30,

1994. About $58 billion of this ammunition is classified as usable or

serviceable.1

 Serviceable ammunition valued at about $34 billion is owned,

stored, and managed by the services (retail stocks). The remaining

serviceable ammunition, valued at $24 billion, is owned by the services but

stored under Army management to ensure that a sufficient supply is

available to meet needs for peacetime training and for war (wholesale

stocks). Including the retail stocks, the amount of ammunition stored is

over 5 million tons, which if loaded into railway cars would stretch over

800 miles, about the distance from Washington, D.C., to Orlando, Florida.

Under current guidance, the services must maintain enough ammunition

to support forces fighting in two nearly simultaneous major regional

conflicts. This requirement represents a change in national strategy

dictated by international developments and a major reduction in U.S.

forces. A 1993 study directed by the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group2

found that the changes had seriously affected stockpile operations and

readiness.

Military Services

Determine

Ammunition

Requirements

Each service determines the types and quantities of ammunition it needs

to meet requirements for war reserves and training. The requirements are

based on the national military strategy, which requires the services to be

capable of fighting two major regional conflicts. The Defense Planning

Guidance gives general direction to the services and planning factors for

the conduct of military operations under the strategy. Each service is to

use the Department of Defense’s (DOD) capabilities-based munitions

requirements process to establish its munitions requirements. Under this

intricate process, the services determine their requirements based on the

operational objectives of the combatant commander in chiefs against

potential threats. The requirements determination process also considers

the services’ logistics capabilities and the need for sufficient ammunition

to remain after an operation or conflict for future contingencies. Each

service must maintain enough ammunition to meet all those requirements.

The services assess the combination of inventories at both wholesale and

retail levels and in the procurement pipeline to determine whether they

1

Ammunition is coded so that its physical condition can be identified and reported. It is coded into

three categories: serviceable or ready for issue, unserviceable or not suitable for issue or use, and

suspended or not suitable for issue or use pending final classification.

2

The Group includes flag-rank officers from each military service and is chaired by the Commander,

Industrial Operations Command, formerly called the U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical

Command.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

have sufficient ammunition to meet requirements for combat, strategic

readiness, residual readiness, training, and testing.

The Army Manages

the Wholesale

Stockpile of

Conventional

Ammunition for All

the Services

In 1977, the Army became the single manager for conventional

ammunition, assuming responsibility for the storage, management, and

disposal of wholesale inventories of ammunition and explosives for all the

services. As of September 30, 1995, this stockpile consisted of 3 million

tons of ammunition stored at nine depots, two plants, and one arsenal (see

fig. 1.1), comprising in all 37.8 million square feet of storage space.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.1: Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Sites

Sierra

Crane

Tooele

Pine Bluff

Anniston

Blue Grass

Red River

Letterkenney

Hawthorne

McAlester

Seneca

Savanna

The services own 80 percent3 of the total tonnage of ammunition stored by

the single manager. The Army owns the largest amount, 43 percent,

followed by the Air Force with 17 percent, the Navy with 13 percent, and

the Marine Corps with 7 percent.

3

The remaining 20 percent of the wholesale stockpile is ammunition designated for disposal

(12 percent) and industrial and interservice support agreement stocks (8 percent).

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

As the manager of the wholesale ammunition stockpile, the Army

undertakes all the management functions—distribution, storage,

inventorying, surveillance, maintenance, and disposal (see table 1.1). The

Army’s effectiveness in performing these functions determines the

stockpile’s readiness.

Table 1.1: Stockpile Management

Functions Category Description

Distribution Expeditious receipt and issue of items.

Storage Safe and secure storage of items; quick response to

customer requests; efficient use of storage space.

Inventorying Checking of stock location, quantity, and condition

against master records to provide inventory accuracy and

quick response.

Surveillance Determination of the condition and serviceability of

stockpiled items through inspections and testing.

Maintenance Repair of defective stockpile items to restore to usable

state.

Disposal Demilitarization and disposal of excess, obsolete, and

unsafe items from active inventory through destruction or

recovery of resources for other uses.

Changing World

Conditions Have

Affected the

Ammunition Stockpile

During the 1980s, ammunition storage was generally stable. In 1985, with

55 to 60 percent of the storage space occupied, the stockpile held about

2 million tons of ammunition. Most of the stockpile consisted of large lots,

which optimized space and facilitated economical surveillance and

inventories. However, in 1990 and 1991, world politics changed

significantly as the Soviet Union collapsed. As a result of this event and

other worldwide changes, the United States shifted from preparing for a

global war to preparing for regional conflicts and crises, and a general

reshaping of military resources and budgets began. First, four major Army

storage installations were closed or realigned,4

 which reduced the

ammunition stockpile’s storage capacity from 36 million to 30 million

square feet. Second, because of overall reductions in the budget, the single

manager decided to significantly decrease its inventorying of the

wholesale stockpile. Third, massive amounts of ammunition were returned

from overseas: (1) prepositioned ammunition from Europe, as U.S. forces

stationed there were withdrawn and (2) stock from Operation Desert

Storm, of which only 10 percent was used during the war. The continental

U.S. stockpile installations received twice as much stock—1 million

4

The four major Army storage installations that were closed or realigned were Fort Wingate Depot

Activity, New Mexico; Navajo Depot Activity, Arizona; Pueblo Depot Activity, Colorado; and Umatilla

Army Depot Activity, Oregon.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

tons—as they had shipped out. This ammunition arrived in small,

broken-up lots, which required more storage space and inventory work.

The stockpile has also been affected by (1) increases in retail stock stored

within its facilities, which increased the cost of storage installation

operations and reduced storage space and (2) lower usage rates, as

customer demand declined.

Joint

Service-Sponsored

Study Addressed

Stockpile Operations

In 1993, the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group, concerned that the

wholesale conventional ammunition stockpile’s readiness and quality had

been degraded, initiated a comprehensive study to assess the wholesale

ammunition stockpile. The resulting report,5

 issued in October 1993,

identified several conditions adversely affecting the readiness and

reliability of the ammunition stored in the stockpile. The report identified

problems in all the major functions that related to stockpile operations

and management. Some degraded functional areas, such as inventory and

surveillance, directly affect the readiness and reliability of the stockpile;

others, such as receipts, issues, and storage of ammunition, affect the

efficiency and effectiveness of operations. The report predicted that

conditions would worsen over the next 4 years because of continued

funding problems and identified several initiatives to effect improvements

to the readiness and operations of the stockpile.

The report’s findings led to a charter for an ammunition functional area

analysis and the development of the Integrated Ammunition Stockpile

Management Plan to address funding and storage management concerns.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Concerned about the condition and readiness of the wholesale

ammunition stockpile, given changes in world and stockpile conditions,

the Chairmen, Subcommittee on Military Readiness and Subcommittee on

Military Procurement, House Committee on National Security, asked us to

determine (1) the availability of ammunition to meet wartime and

peacetime requirements and (2) what problems the Army single manager

has in managing the military services’ wholesale ammunition stockpile.

To determine whether DOD has sufficient ammunition to meet demands for

training and war reserves, we compared serviceable ammunition, from

both wholesale and retail inventories, on hand for each service as of

September 30, 1994, with the amount needed to meet requirements for

5

Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program (WASP) Review and Assessment, October 1993.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

wartime and peacetime operations. In making this determination, we used

the automated data systems that each service maintains for its ammunition

items. Specifically, the requirements were obtained from the Army

Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System (WARS),6

 Navy Non-Nuclear

Ordnance Requirements System, Air Force Theater Allocation Buy/Budget

System, and the Marine Corps Ammunition Requirements Management

System. We did not independently verify the military’s method of

determining ammunition requirements.

To determine whether the services have excess amounts of ammunition,

we analyzed computerized files of the services’ inventories as of

September 30, 1994 (the end of the fiscal year). First, we compared the

total on-hand serviceable inventory, item by item, to that needed to satisfy

wartime requirements, testing and training requirements for 7 years 

(6 years of testing for the Army), and other requirements. We used testing

and training requirements for 7 years (1) to be conservative in calculating

on-hand quantities exceeding requirements, (2) because DOD’s retention

policy authorizes this level of supply to meet Defense Planning Guidance,

and (3) because 7 years coincides with the future years’ planning of the

services. As requested by the Army, we used operational project,

wholesale, and basic load requirements in addition to 6 years of testing

requirements and 7 years of training. Second, we determined the amount

of unserviceable ammunition by type of ammunition for which there was

excess serviceable inventory. Third, we compared the single manager’s

inventory database showing ammunition stored for the services with the

services’ databases that we had used in our comparison. We then

determined the amount of additional ammunition excess to requirements

that was not on the services’ records. Finally, we identified the amount of

ammunition DOD has designated for disposal. To determine the services’

rationale for excesses, we selected and discussed with item managers 

145 types of ammunition (126 randomly selected and 19 judgmentally

selected because they had large quantities of excess items) for which

on-hand quantities exceeded service-determined requirements.

6

We based our analyses on ammunition requirements contained in the WARS database. Although Army

representatives suggested in March 1996 that we use the Army’s Research Development Acquisition

Information System Agency (RDAISA) database for greater accuracy, we determined that this

alternative database does not contain requirements for all Army ammunition items but requirements

for ammunition items for which procurement actions are in process or planned. We further determined

that the RDAISA database was not any more complete than the WARS database. For example,

46 percent of the types of ammunition for which the WARS database showed a requirement did not

have a requirement in the RDAISA database. Therefore, we did not recalculate our detailed analysis of

ammunition requirements and the amount of ammunition excess to requirements based on the

RDAISA database.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Introduction

To determine whether the services have shortages of ammunition, we

compared the same universe to the amount needed to meet wartime

requirements plus that needed for 1 year of training and testing. We used

only 1 year of training and testing requirements to be conservative in

calculating ammunition shortages. To determine the services’ rationale for

types of ammunition with shortages, we selected and discussed with item

managers 154 types of ammunition (152 randomly selected and 

2 judgmentally selected because they represented large dollar values) for

which on-hand quantities were less than service-determined requirements.

Additionally, we selected and discussed with service officials the 

42 highest unit cost items (representing $32 billion of the $60 billion

shortage) to determine the rationale for shortages.

We used the Standard Depot System database for our analyses of the

wholesale stockpile. This database includes information from 11 of the 

12 storage installations (Pine Bluff Arsenal is not included in the system).

We used data as of March 1995 for old ammunition in the wholesale

stockpile, serviceability of ammunition in the stockpile as classified by

condition codes, and backlogs of periodic inspections and data as of

September 1995 on the net storage space of installations. We also used

data from an Army disposal study dated September 1995 on items

designated for disposal and estimates of disposals anticipated in the

future.

In relation to the management of the stockpile, we interviewed

ammunition management officials and reviewed policies, procedures, and

documents related to the management of conventional ammunition at the

following sites:

• Headquarters locations

• Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, Washington, D.C.

• Technical commands

• U.S. Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia

• U.S. Industrial Operations Command, Rock Island, Illinois

• U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School, Savanna, Illinois

• Inventory commands

• Air Force Air Logistics Center, Ogden, Utah

• Naval Ordnance Center, Indian Head, Maryland

• Marine Corps Systems Command, Clarendon, Virginia

• Storage installations

• Hawthorne Army Depot, Hawthorne, Nevada

• Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania

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Introduction

• Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas

• Sierra Army Depot, Herlong, California

• McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, Oklahoma

• Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Crane, Indiana

We did this review from April 1994 to April 1996 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD expressed concern about the requirements database we used,

particularly for the Army. We used the WARS database, which was the most

complete automated database we found for the Army. At our exit

conference, Army officials suggested that we use the Army’s RDAISA

database for greater accuracy. However, we determined that this database

does not contain requirements for all Army ammunition items; it only

contains requirements for ammunition items for which procurement

actions are in process or planned. We remain unconvinced that the Army

has a more complete automated database that we could have used. Also,

DOD notes in its comments on this report that it started using a

capabilities-based munitions requirements process beginning with the

fiscal year 1996 budget. Our requirements data were the latest available as

of September 1994, which was after the beginning of the development of

the fiscal year 1996 budget and included capabilities-based principles.

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The services have to do a better job of managing their ammunition needs.

As of September 30, 1994, the total stockpile of usable and unusable

ammunition was worth about $80 billion. We estimate that about

$31 billion of this total ammunition stockpile was excess.1

 This excess

amount includes about $22 billion worth of ammunition that was still

usable.

This situation has occurred primarily as a result of the collapse of the

Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the change in the primary threat to the

United States. As a consequence, the services’ ammunition requirements

were drastically reduced, and more of the ammunition stockpile became

excess. The Army’s war reserve requirements, for example, were reduced

by 74 percent.

Of the various types of ammunition in the stockpile, we found that almost

half have amounts that exceed the services’ needs in varying quantities.

For some types of ammunition, the services have over 50 times their stated

needs. While there are shortages of some specific ammunition types,

overall, the services generally have enough ammunition to meet their

wartime and peacetime requirements.

DOD management practices perpetuate the buildup of excess and aging

ammunition, even though the ammunition stockpile is supposed to

comprise only ammunition and explosives essential for peacetime and

wartime needs. In many instances, the services keep it available just in

case they or other organizations, such as state agencies or foreign allies,

have a need for it. However, DOD often does not determine what would be

a reasonable amount to keep to meet these needs. For all these reasons,

storage facilities are reaching capacity levels, and the excess ammunition

is stressing the ability of installation personnel to manage required

ammunition since all ammunition not identified for disposal, including the

$31 billion excess mentioned above and $2.9 billion in excess that appears

on the single manager’s inventory records but not the services’ inventory

records, receives the same amount of single manager attention (see ch. 3

for a discussion of stockpile management). Moreover, in fiscal years 1993

and 1994, the services spent about $125 million for ammunition that

exceeded fiscal year 1995 stated requirements. No service purchased

1

We define excess as ammunition quantities above the military services’ stated war reserve and

peacetime requirements. DOD’s definition of excess ammunition differs from our definition. DOD does

not define ammunition as excess until the quantity of an item exceeds all authorized retention levels

(such as economic and contingency retention levels) and the item is processed for reutilization or

disposal.

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ammunition items in fiscal year 1995 for which it had quantities on hand in

excess of stated requirements at the end of fiscal year 1994.

In addition to its ammunition in excess of stated requirements, DOD has

shortages of some types of ammunition. However, the services generally

believe that these shortages are manageable because they have substitute

items and planned procurements to make up for shortages.

We believe that the shortages of some items could be satisfied by better

sharing of amounts in excess of stated requirements among the services.

While the Army has shared some excess ammunition among the other

services, the single manager is unaware of all ammunition in excess of

stated requirements because the services have not identified which of their

ammunition is required and which is not required. Without this

information, the single manager cannot adequately identify and coordinate

redistribution of excess ammunition. During our review, we identified

$1.2 billion of items in excess of stated requirements that could be shared

to meet service shortages of required ammunition, reduce potential future

procurements, and avoid maintenance.

War Reserve

Requirements Have

Been Significantly

Reduced

Because the threat the United States faces has changed from a global war

to a much smaller one involving two major regional conflicts, all the

services’ war requirements have been reduced. Army war reserve

requirements in total tonnage declined 74 percent—from 2.5 million tons

in fiscal year 1992 to 650,000 tons in fiscal year 1994 (see fig. 2.1). For

example, the requirement for multiple launch rocket system pods

decreased by 82 percent. Likewise, the requirement for the 155-millimeter

dual purpose improved conventional munitions decreased by 61 percent.

The reduced threat has led to reduced requirements, and reduced

requirements have contributed significantly to large quantities of various

ammunition types becoming excess to the services’ stated needs.

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Figure 2.1: Reduction in Army War

Reserve Requirement (tonnage in

millions)

1992 1994

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

Fiscal year

Tonnage

Source: Conventional Ammunition Functional Area Analysis.

Almost 50 Percent of

the Types of

Ammunition Have

Quantities Exceeding

Requirements

All the services have serviceable ammunition in the stockpile that exceeds

their needs as defined in the Defense Planning Guidance; that is, to

support U.S. forces during two nearly simultaneous major regional

conflicts, for training and testing during peacetime, and for other needs. In

total, about 50 percent of the ammunition types in the services’ inventories

include quantities exceeding requirements. The 50 percent includes

ammunition types in their inventories for which the services have no

stated requirements.

Although ammunition managers agreed that some items were excess, they

believed that ammunition should be kept for other uses, such as training

and foreign military sales. However, they have set no limits on how much

should be kept for other purposes. The retention of excess ammunition

adds unnecessarily to workload and costs and requires the use of

increasingly valuable storage space.

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Excess Serviceable

Ammunition

The services own and store in the wholesale and retail stockpiles excess

ammunition valued at about $22 billion, or 40 percent of the value of the

total serviceable stockpile (see table 2.1). To determine the adequacy of

the stockpile, we compared the amount of serviceable ammunition on

hand in both wholesale and retail level storage facilities as of

September 30, 1994, to the services’ stated requirements. At that time, the

services owned and stored 2,781 different types of serviceable

conventional ammunition worth $58 billion. Before considering stocks

excess, we accounted for the quantity of ammunition needed for two

major regional conflicts and for 7 years of training and testing (6 years of

testing for the Army). For all services, we allowed 1-1/2 times the stated

requirements before determining excess quantities.

Table 2.1: Excess Serviceable

Ammunition Owned by the Services Dollars in billions

Service

Value of

serviceable

ammunition

Value of excess

serviceable

ammunition

Excess as

percentage

of total

serviceable

ammunition

Army $26.4 $15.0 57

Navya 14.9 3.8 26

Marine Corps 5.4 2.1 39

Air Force 7.0 .7 10

Subtotal $53.7 $21.6 40

Excluded Navy itemsa 4.5

Total $58.2

aWe excluded items valued at $4.5 billion with a requirement of zero because the Navy could not

identify components versus end items for several types of ammunition.

Of the excess ammunition owned by the services, 30 percent exceeded

requirements by 1-1/2 to more than 30 times. For another 18 percent, the

services did not identify a requirement. The total value of these items is

$21.6 billion. (See table 2.2.)

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Table 2.2: Serviceable Ammunition

That Exceeds Requirements Multiple

Times (as of Sept. 30, 1994) 

Dollars in billions

Number of times type of

ammunition exceeds

requirementa

Number of

ammunition

types

Percentage

of total

ammunition

types

Value of

excess

items

More than 30 121 4.3 $3.7

15.01 to 30.0 83 3.0 0.3

1.51 to 15.0 637 22.9 14.6

Subtotal 841 30.2 18.6

No requirement 500 18.0 3.0

Total 1,341 48.2 $21.6

aAmounts exceeding 1 indicate that more than enough ammunition is on hand to meet the

wartime and peacetime requirements through fiscal year 2001.

One example of excess ammunition types is the .30-caliber carbine ball

cartridge. The Air Force has enough of this type of ammunition to meet its

stated requirement 58 times, and the Army has 517 times the amount

needed. Similarly, the Navy has 276 times the amount of the .50-caliber ball

cartridges needed, and the Marine Corps has 92 times the number of

offensive hand grenades needed to meet its requirements.

Also, as table 2.2 shows, 500 types of ammunition worth $3 billion have no

stated requirements. For example, the Air Force has no requirement in its

database for its 4.8 million of 20-millimeter cartridges worth over

$21 million. According to Air Force officials, this ammunition is needed for

the M39 gun and the F-5 aircraft and can be used in the M61 gun, when

separated. In addition, the Marine Corps does not show a requirement in

its database for its 4,307 105-millimeter cartridges valued at over

$2.5 million and 2.9 million .50-caliber cartridges valued at about

$2.7 million. Marine Corps officials stated that they do not need these

types of ammunition. The other services similarly have ammunition on

hand for which there is no stated requirement. Although Air Force officials

said that they have specific uses for the ammunition, they nevertheless do

not show that they need it by including it in their requirements database.

Additional Excess

Inventory

We calculated the total amount of excess ammunition—serviceable and

unserviceable—at about $31 billion. In addition to the $22 billion of

serviceable ammunition in excess of stated needs, we calculated that as of

September 30, 1994, DOD had about $9.4 billion in unserviceable assets that

exceeded stated needs (see table 2.3), for a total excess of $31 billion, or

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about 39 percent of the $80 billion ammunition stockpile. In addition, there

was over $2.9 billion of excess assets on the single manager’s inventory

records that did not appear on the services’ inventory records, and over

$2 billion of ammunition that was identified for disposal.2

Table 2.3: Excess Unserviceable

Ammunition Owned by the Services Dollars in billions

Service

Value of

unserviceable

ammunition

Value of

excess

unserviceable

ammunitiona

Excess as

percentage of

total

unserviceable

ammunitiona

Army $8.6 $5.5 64

Navyb 6.7 3.4 51

Marine Corps 1.5 .4 27

Air Force .9 .1 11

Subtotal $17.7 $ 9.4 53

Excluded Navy itemsb 3.8

Total $21.5

aThis represents only unserviceable ammunition by type of ammunition for which there was

excess serviceable inventory.

bWe excluded items valued at over $3.8 billion with a requirement equal to zero because the Navy

cannot identify components versus end items for several types of ammunition.

Without some identification of ammunition not needed to meet wartime

and peacetime requirements or some other prioritization, all ammunition

other than that identified for disposal receives the same level of attention

by the single manager. As discussed in chapter 3, the large amount of

ammunition being stored by the single manager is stressing the ability of

installation personnel to manage required ammunition.

Item Managers’ Views on

Excess Ammunition

We queried ammunition item managers about the reasons that DOD had

excess ammunition for 145 selected (126 randomly and 19 judgmentally)

types of ammunition. These managers agreed that they had excess items

for 59 (41 percent) of the 145 types we selected. They disagreed that the

rest were excess for varying reasons. All cited training as a reason for

keeping excess ammunition. However, we had already computed training

and testing needs in our analysis, and the ammunition they cited as needed

for training was excess to stated requirements. Other reasons cited for

2

We were only able to determine a dollar value for 43 percent of the ammunition identified for disposal

as of September 30, 1994, and this amounted to $2.1 billion.

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keeping the ammunition were for foreign military sales, research and

development, trade purposes, military competitions, and ceremonies, such

as military funerals. However, the services had not determined what would

be a reasonable amount to meet these needs; rather, they seemed to keep

all of any item they thought might be needed.

Service Inventories

Contain Many Old and

Aging Ammunition

Items

Historically, the age of ammunition in the stockpile has been a concern

and the object of study since before fiscal year 1979. In fiscal year 1979,

the single manager initiated a purification program to eliminate old,

obsolete, or otherwise unneeded ammunition items. This particular effort

built on the results of past studies. In September 1985, the single manager

issued an ammunition stockpile rotation study that assessed the

effectiveness of stockpile rotation policies and regulations. This study

analyzed ammunition stocks in the United States and Europe and found

that 30 percent of the Army’s stocks in the United States and 26 percent of

the overseas stocks were 20 years old or older.

Little change, if any, has occurred since 1985. Despite an awareness of age

and the need to rotate ammunition stocks, we found that as of March 1995,

a considerable portion of the wholesale ammunition stockpile was over 

25 years old. The age of over 56 percent of the lots in the wholesale

ammunition stockpile is unknown because the date of manufacture is

either not recorded in the database or recorded incorrectly. Of the

remaining 44 percent, 14 percent was over 30 years old, 34 percent was

over 20 years old, and more than 55 percent was over 10 years old. 

Table 2.4 shows the ages of the ammunition lots3

 in the wholesale

stockpile.

3

Ammunition is manufactured and controlled by lots. An ammunition lot identifies specific

characteristics associated with a certain quantity of ammunition (e.g., complete rounds, components,

propellants) that is manufactured or assembled by one producer under uniform conditions and is

expected to function in a uniform manner. Beginning around the mid-1970s, the month and year of

manufacture were incorporated among the characteristics of each ammunition lot number.

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Table 2.4: Age of Ammunition in the

Wholesale Stockpile (as of Mar. 1995) 

Age in years

Number of

lots

Percentage of

totala

0 to 5 40,688 26

5.01 - 10 30,150 19

10.01 - 15 18,474 12

15.01 - 20 14,986 9

20.01 - 25 15,130 10

25.01 - 30 16,587 10

30+ 22,453 14

Total 158,468 100

aDoes not include 202,691 lots for which the age was unknown or incorrectly entered into the

database.

We observed ammunition dating to the 1940s (see fig. 2.2). Service officials

generally said that unless ammunition has a shelf life, its age does not alter

its serviceability. They noted that if ammunition is stored properly, it is as

good as the day it was manufactured.

Figure 2.2: Ammunition Dating From

the 1940s

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While old ammunition may still be serviceable, it is less likely to be used if

a new item is available. The 1985 rotation study noted that soldiers in the

field demanded the newest and best lots of ammunition available, thus

older lots remained in storage. More recently, during Operation Desert

Storm, battlefield commanders opted to use newer, more modern items.

Ammunition that was shipped to Southwest Asia for Operation Desert

Storm, partly from Europe, but was not used now occupies over 2 million

square feet of space in the U.S. depot system, awaiting potential use and

continuing to age. Also, according to single manager officials,

commanders insist on training the way they are expected to fight a war.

Consequently, they also do not want to train with the “old stuff.” Rather,

they want to use the more modern and the most current ammunition, if

available.

Management

Practices Perpetuate

the Buildup of Excess

and Aging

Ammunition

The Joint Ordnance Commanders Group’s 1993 study and resulting report

on the wholesale stockpile found that the excess ammunition in the

stockpile contributes to the stockpile’s annual operational costs. The

report suggested that the services reduce the amount of excess

ammunition stored. The report also suggested that training, foreign

military sales, grant aid programs, and destruction are among the ways of

eliminating excess. However, the services have made little progress in

eliminating excess and aging ammunition because they are reluctant to

classify ammunition as excess; have no incentive to declare ammunition

excess, since the Army pays for its storage; are storing ammunition for

weapon systems no longer in their inventories; and have purchased

ammunition that, according to their records, was not needed to meet

required levels. In addition, the services keep ammunition over and above

requirements, or in “long supply,” to meet various retention needs.

Moreover, single manager personnel do not always issue the older stock,

leaving it to continue to age.

Services Are Reluctant to

Classify Ammunition as

Excess

According to the 1993 report on the wholesale stockpile, the services have

known for some time that they have excess quantities of ammunition

items. We were told that the services do not like to declare ammunition

excess because they then lose ownership of stocks. Also, if items in long

supply are transferred to another service, the transferring service is

reimbursed for the items. However, if an item is identified as excess and

then given to another service, the issuing service is not paid for the item.

Also, theater commanders may exercise their judgment to retain

ammunition items even if requirements no longer exist. Air Force

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inventory control point officials agreed in October 1994 that they could no

longer provide effective and efficient management of vast quantities of

older, obsolete weapon systems. They listed 138 potential items for

disposal because they had no operational requirement, were no longer

reliable, were environmentally unacceptable, or their shelf life had

expired. Although headquarters officials approved some of these items for

disposal, they directed that others be retained until suitable substitutes

became available or more data were provided about the items.

Services Have No

Incentives to Reduce

Excess Ammunition

Currently, the services have no incentive to reduce excess ammunition in

the wholesale stockpile because the single manager is responsible for its

care; that is, storage, inventories, surveillance, and disposal of the

ammunition. The 1993 report on the wholesale stockpile notes that an

incentive for inducing the services to reduce excess ammunition would be

to charge a storage fee or charge each service for the cost to maintain its

stock in the wholesale system. However, single manager officials we

talked to did not support charging the services a storage fee. In their

opinion, the real issue is the need for the services to identify nonrequired

items and turn them over to the single manager for disposal or identify

them for possible redistribution where they exceed stated requirements.

However, the services have only partially provided this information.

Services Store Ammunition

for Weapon Systems No

Longer in Their Inventories

Ammunition is being stored and managed for weapon systems that either

have been purged or are no longer in the active inventory. Although we did

not determine the total amount of ammunition stored for weapon systems

no longer in the inventory, we found specific examples of such

ammunition.

The M60A2 tank and the M42 self-propelled gun are obsolete weapon

systems to the Army. However, the Army continues to store 147,300

152-millimeter cartridges valued at $43.6 million for the M60A2 tank and

269,000 40-millimeter cartridges valued at $2.5 million for the M42

self-propelled gun. Although Army officials acknowledged that the

152-millimeter cartridges were at one time used for the M60A2 tank, in

commenting on this report, DOD said the Army is maintaining these

152-millimeter cartridges for the M551 Sheridan tank. However, DOD noted

that there will be a reevaluation of the need to retain these cartridges.

Also, the Army is storing 97 million rounds of various small arms

ammunition valued at $146 million for weapons no longer in the Army’s

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inventory. According to Army officials, this ammunition cannot be used

for other weapons currently in the inventory.

The Air Force continues to store motors for the Nike Hercules rocket.

According to the Air Force’s database, there is no requirement for these

rocket motors, and the Air Force owns only 39 of them. However, the

Standard Depot System database, which accounts for wholesale

ammunition assets, shows that the Air Force owns 469 of the Nike rocket

motors—430 more than the Air Force’s system shows. The Navy continues

to store in the wholesale inventory about 4,000 16-inch projectiles for its

battleships, which are no longer in the active fleet. These projectiles are in

the single manager’s wholesale inventory database as belonging to the

Navy. However, they are not in the inventory database used by the Navy.

Also, the Navy stores 3-inch, .50-caliber ammunition and MK25 mines in

the wholesale system. At one depot we visited, we were told it had little or

no issues of the 3-inch, .50-caliber ammunition in 15 years, and according

to an official at another installation, there had been no activity at all for

the MK25 mines in over 10 years. Like the 16-inch projectiles, over 5,000

MK25 mines in the single manager’s wholesale inventory listed as

belonging to the Navy are not in the Navy’s inventory database.

The Marine Corps continues to store about 3 million .50-caliber cartridges

for the M85 machine gun, even though the Marine Corps has removed the

M85 gun from its inventory and no other weapon system uses this type of

.50-caliber ammunition. Likewise, the Marine Corps continues to store

over 4,000 105-millimeter projectiles that were used for the M60A1 tank.

The M60A1 tank, however, is also no longer in the Marine Corps’

inventory. In commenting on this report, DOD noted phasing out of the

M60A1 tanks from the Marine Corps’ inventory began in 1991 and was

completed in 1994. DOD stated that the purging of ammunition for the M85

and M68 weapons began in October 1991 and is scheduled for completion

in fiscal year 1997.

Services Have Bought

Ammunition When

Existing Inventory Was

Sufficient

We compared the services’ ammunition purchases during fiscal years 1993

through 1995 to ammunition items in excess quantities as of September 30,

1994. For fiscal years 1993 and 1994, we found that the Army and the Navy

bought 17 types of ammunition at a cost of about $124.4 million and

$0.3 million, respectively, that according to their records they did not need

to meet stated requirements. We did not find that similar purchases were

made for fiscal year 1995.

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As can be seen in table 2.5, in fiscal year 1993, the Army purchased six

types of ammunition at a cost of over $114 million. According to Army

records, all of these items were excess to their fiscal year 1995 stated

requirements, and after deducting the quantities purchased in fiscal years

1993 and 1994, inventory quantities remaining still exceeded

service-defined requirements. For example, the Army bought 118,893

155-mm projectiles (D864) at a cost of $78.9 million. After deducting this

quantity from the excess quantity as of September 30, 1994, 86,307 of these

projectiles remained in inventory.

Table 2.5: Army Items Purchased That Were Excess to Requirements

Fiscal year

Item Description

1993

quantity 1993 cost

1994

quantity 1994 cost

Excess

quantity on

9/30/94

Excess quantity

remaining after

deducting

purchasesa

D513 155-mm projectile 40,903 $9,999,965 119,200 78,297

D532 155-mm propelling

charge 49,104 $27,508,061 616,500 567,396

D864 155-mm projectile 118,893 78,946,141 205,200 86,307

M995 Demolition charge 1,751 96,393 580 24,865 2,362 31

M997 Demolition charge 341 9,265 487 10,319 940 112

ML05 High explosive cutter 4,380 888,658 10,580 6,200

ML10 Demolition charge 4,578 79,978 6,083 1,505

ML11 Demolition charge 3,893 68,984 7,494 3,601

ML18 Demolition charge 439 11,976 6,136 5,697

ML19 Demolition charge 4,968 139,005 6,874 1,906

N523 Percussion primer 1,714,432 6,651,966 2,780,000 1,065,568

Total cost $114,100,484 $10,335,092

aThis is the excess quantity remaining after subtracting the 1993 and 1994 purchases from the

excess on hand on September 30, 1994.

An Army official told us that these purchases may have been made

because (1) the Congress directed the purchase, (2) it was more

economical to purchase a large quantity rather than a small quantity to

meet the requirement, or (3) the requirements decreased after the item

was placed in the budget request cycle. Another Army official commented

that the purchases could have been made before the requirements

changed.4

4

In commenting on this report, DOD expressed concern with the data in table 2.4. However, we could

not address its concerns because the data provided by DOD was not compatible.

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to Requirements and Is Aging

Smaller, but similar purchases were made by the Navy (see table 2.6). In

fiscal years 1993 and 1994, the Navy bought six types of ammunition at a

cost of $320,000. According to Navy records, all of these items were excess

to their fiscal year 1995 stated requirements and after deducting the

quantities purchased in fiscal years 1993 and 1994, inventory quantities

remaining still exceeded service-defined requirements.

Table 2.6: Navy Items Purchased That Were Excess to Requirements

Fiscal year

Item Description

1993

quantity 1993 cost

1994

quantity 1994 cost

Excess

quantity on

9/30/94

Excess quantity

remaining after

deducting

purchasesa

A064 5.56-mm cartridge 6,400 $2,816 179,200 $62,720 1,588,906 1,403,306

A071 5.56-mm cartridge 30,240 7,862 13,440 2,957 32,198,092 32,154,412

B634 60-mm cartridge 2,724 203,864 10,854 8,130

G811 Practice hand grenade 4,950 24,849 11,394 6,444

G878 Hand grenade fuze 2,520 4,284 3,240 4,504 265,038 259,278

M458 Detonating cord 152,000 6,080 164,700 12,700

Total cost $224,906 $95,030

aThis is the excess quantity remaining after subtracting the 1993 and 1994 purchases from the

excess on hand on September 30, 1994.

Assuming ammunition requirements are accurate and in accordance with

Defense Planning Guidance, we believe the readiness posture of the Army

and the Navy could have been enhanced if fiscal year 1993 and 1994

procurements had been focused on items with shortages rather than on

items that either met and/or exceeded requirements.

Practices for Rotating

Stock Lead to Aging and

Obsolescence of

Ammunition

It is the single manager’s policy for installations to first issue ammunition

from small lots and use older stocks for training. However, this policy is

not always followed. All the installations we visited noted that, as a

practical matter, this policy is often too difficult to follow. Not all items in

a storage facility are easily accessible, and if the facility is at or near

capacity, single manager personnel have little choice but to issue the more

accessible stock to maximize efficiency and to ensure that the customer’s

required delivery date is met.

We agree that additional work would be required to consistently issue

first-in stock and that this could increase labor costs and delay deliveries.

We recognize, however, that the longer first-in stock remains in storage

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facilities, the older it becomes and the more likely it is to become obsolete

and destined for destruction. As we noted previously, over 55 percent of

ammunition in the wholesale system for which the age of the ammunition

is recorded is over 10 years old.

Despite Some

Shortages of

Ammunition, Services’

Managers Generally

Believe They Can

Meet Requirements

As of September 30, 1994, the services had shortages of items in 752

ammunition types valued at about $60 billion. According to the Deputy

Chief of Staff for Ammunition, U.S. Army Materiel Command, however,

“sufficient munitions are currently in the stockpile to support any

projected military operation.” Inventory control point officials from all the

services agree that they have no major problems with shortages because

they consider inventory quantities sufficient, they have substitutable items,

and/or they have plans to purchase the items. During our review, Marine

Corps officials stated that the Marine Corps did not have enough

ammunition to support requirements. However, in commenting on this

report, DOD said a Marine Corps ammunition study conducted after our

review was completed validated a lower level of war reserve requirements

than was previously identified. Therefore, DOD commented that all the

services have sufficient ammunition to support their requirements,

although the mix of ammunition is not optimum.

Shortages Thirty percent of the items with shortages were on hand in quantities

ranging from over 50 percent of the requirement to almost the entire

requirement; 41 percent were on hand in quantities ranging from 1 percent

to 50 percent of the requirement; and 29 percent had none on hand to meet

the requirement. Some of the items are expensive, which accounts for the

large amount of money ($60 billion) needed to eliminate these shortages.

Also, we used service-defined requirements in our analysis, and these

requirements did not always take into account the availability of substitute

items and the planned phaseout of ammunition. In six classified

DOD/Inspector General (IG) reports issued from June 1994 through

June 1995 on quantitative requirements for antiarmor munitions, DOD/IG

concluded that the services had overstated requirements by $15.5 billion.

Forty-two of the items identified as in a shortage condition in our analysis

accounted for over 50 percent ($32 billion) of the total dollar value of the

shortages. Fifteen items have a unit cost that exceeds $1 million, which

accounts for over $18 billion in shortages. Stated requirements for many of

these items may not reflect the true need for the item. For example,

according to the Navy’s database, the Navy has a shortage of 

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to Requirements and Is Aging

1,587 AIM-54C Phoenix missiles, but the Navy does not consider the

missile to be in a shortage status. In fact, after considering several other

substitute items, the Navy’s inventory has about 191 percent of the

requirement for the Phoenix. The replacement cost of each missile would

be over $2 million; the shortage amount accounts for over $3.2 billion of

the total shortage.

Similarly, the Air Force is short about 18,000 AGM-88B High-Speed

Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM), which account for over $6 billion of the

shortage amount. However, according to Air Force officials, HARMs are no

longer being procured and their database only shows a lesser shortage

amount. Likewise, the Army is short 616 Army Tactical Missile System

(ATACMS), which accounts for over $390 million, but according to Army

officials, the ATACMS is not recognized as being in a shortage position.

Various versions of the Patriot missile are also shown in the database as

being in short supply. The value of these missiles is about $760 million.

According to an Army official, no procurements had been requested since

about 1993, and there had been no procurements since about 1993 or 1994.

A more sophisticated version of the Patriot missile will be the next missile

purchased for the inventory. The official commented that the requirement

in the database may be the number that was needed at an earlier date.

Service officials generally disagreed with the service-defined requirements,

which when compared to ammunition on hand indicated that 42 high

dollar value items were actually in a shortage position. To the contrary, we

were told that inventories are generally sufficient to meet requirements,

particularly when quantities of substitute items are considered. With

budget constraints, the services do not have the money to purchase some

items in a shortage position. And with the exception of the Marine Corps,

service officials generally believed that they had sufficient quantities of

substitute ammunition and that future procurements would be adequate to

meet wartime and peacetime requirements under the Defense Planning

Guidance. Army officials noted, however, that in the future they anticipate

problems in filling training requirements.

We randomly selected 152 ammunition items showing shortages. Managers

said that 67 of the items had shortages, and they planned future purchases

for some of these items. However, despite the records, which showed that

these items lacked sufficient quantities to meet established requirements,

the item managers contended that most of the items (85) were not

considered to have shortages because of available substitutes and planned

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buys. Our sample showed a serious shortage of top-priority items for the

Marine Corps but no major problem for the other services.

The Marine Corps asserted that it had an insufficient amount of some

ammunition to support two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.

According to the Marine Corps’ program manager for ammunition, the

Marine Corps “is prepared and capable of executing one MRC [major

regional conflict] and doing significantly more than that . . . [but] does not

have the ammunition to support [two MRCs].” The program manager

noted that the Marine Corps is short of ammunition valued at about 

$1.5 billion, including $500 million in ammunition for current training

needs. We were told that shortages are mainly long-range artillery and war

reserve items such as .50-caliber SLAP 4 and 1-linked cartridges,

9-millimeter ball cartridges, and 7.62-millimeter ball linked cartridges.

DOD’s comments on this report noted that a Marine Corps ammunition

study conducted after this review was completed has validated a lower

level of war reserve requirements than was previously identified.

Therefore, DOD said all services, including the Marine Corps, have

sufficient ammunition to support their requirements.

More Cross-Sharing of

Excess Ammunition Can

Be Done

Although the Army has shared some excess ammunition across the

services, we found that (1) purchases of about $185 million in fiscal years

1993 and 1995 could have been avoided if ammunition in excess of stated

requirements had been shared among the services, (2) $1.2 billion in

ammunition in excess of stated requirements could be shared to alleviate

shortages, and (3) $19 million in costs could be avoided by providing

ammunition in excess of stated requirements in good condition to services

that planned maintenance for the same ammunition. The Senate

Committee on Appropriations has also recognized the need for the

services to be more aggressive in sharing excess ammunition. For fiscal

year 1995, on the basis of our identification of potential ammunition

budget reductions,5

 it directed the Army to transfer at least 17,000 excess

M203A1 155-millimeter red bag charges, at no cost, to the Marine Corps

and denied the Marine Corps $12 million for new charges.

Ammunition officials stated that one reason that more ammunition in

excess of stated requirements has not been shared is that the single

manager does not know the other services’ requirements or the total

holdings of ammunition. Even if the single manager did have this

5

1995 Defense Budget: Potential Reductions and Rescissions in RDT&E and Procurement Programs

(GAO/NSIAD-94-255BR, Sept. 8, 1994), p. 91.

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to Requirements and Is Aging

knowledge, it is not authorized to redistribute ammunition. It, therefore,

cannot initiate the distribution of ammunition in excess of stated

requirements and purge the wholesale system of unnecessary items for

which there is no reason to retain.

Cross-Sharing to Avoid

Unnecessary Purchases

Cross-sharing of existing ammunition that exceeds one or more service’s

stated requirements can preclude unnecessary purchases and redirect

resources to fill or partially fill shortages. During fiscal years 1993 through

1995, the military services purchased $184.5 million of ammunition items

that were not needed to meet stated requirements (see table 2.7). The

ammunition purchased, according to service-defined requirements and

inventory records, was already available or partially available in DOD

inventories in quantities that exceeded fiscal year 1995 service

requirements. For example, in fiscal year 1995, the most current year after

the September 30, 1994, excess analysis, the military services bought 

18 types of ammunition at a total cost of $102.2 million. However, enough

of the same types of ammunition were already in the inventory system to

completely satisfy or partially satisfy 58 percent, or $59.4 million, of the

total fiscal year 1995 purchase quantity. Similar conditions existed in fiscal

years 1993 and 1994.

Table 2.7: DOD Ammunition Purchases That Could Have Been Filled With Existing Inventory (fiscal years 1993-95)

Fiscal year

Ammunition cost and avoidance 1993 1994 1995 Total

Purchase cost $131,039,722 $48,529,950 $102,200,702 $281,770,374

Purchase cost totally avoided 100,306,079 17,520,692 38,634,122 156,460,893

Purchase cost partially avoided 2,191,111 5,108,352 20,757,027 28,056,490

Total cost avoided $102,497,190 $22,629,044 $59,391,149 $184,517,383

Percent of purchase cost avoided for these specific item

types 78.2 46.6 58.1 65.5

Examples of excess ammunition that could have filled services’ shortages

include the Marine Corps’ 22 million 5.56-millimeter tracer rounds. As of

September 30, 1994, the Marine Corps had a quantity of this ammunition

sufficient to meet the quantities bought by the Air Force, the Army, and

the Navy and still had about 12 million rounds more than needed.

Redistribution of the Marine Corps’ assets in these instances could have

saved and/or redistributed over $5 million spent by the other services for

the same ammunition. In another example, the Army had over 1.9 million

25-millimeter APDS-T cartridges, which exceeded its stated requirements.

The Navy bought this same item in fiscal years 1993 and 1995 at a cost of

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to Requirements and Is Aging

over $5 million, and the Marine Corps bought the item in fiscal years 1994

and 1995 at a cost of over $6 million. Redistribution of these assets could

have saved or redirected over $11 million for ammunition with shortages

or for other purposes, and the Army would still have had 1.4 million

rounds more than its stated requirement. We believe that centralized

oversight and management of DOD ammunition requirements and assets

would enable better use of ammunition through redistribution and free up

funds to purchase items determined to have shortages.

Cross-Sharing to Reduce

Shortages

We identified $1.2 billion of ammunition in excess of stated requirements

that could be shared among the services to meet service shortages. Some

cross-sharing of ammunition has been done. For example, in fiscal year

1993, the Army transferred over 1.8 million excess .50-caliber blank linked

cartridges and 61,500 60-millimeter cartridges to the Navy and the Marine

Corps, respectively. And in fiscal year 1994, the Army again transferred

additional excess ammunition—about 3,800 .45-caliber blank cartridges

and about 68,000 .50-caliber blank cartridges to the Navy, about 484,000

5.56-millimeter dummy cartridges and about 118,000 7.62-millimeter

dummy cartridges to the Marine Corps, and 347,000 5.56-millimeter

dummy cartridges and 16.5 million 5.56-millimeter cartridges to the Air

Force. While this is a step in the right direction, the services must make a

concerted effort to identify ammunition in excess of requirements that can

be shared to reduce shortages.

DOD directives currently require each service to report to the single

manager its total assets against requirements to help identify excesses and

corresponding needs among the services. However, the single manager has

not regularly received this data from all the services. Despite the Army’s

transfers of excess ammunition, our analysis of ammunition requirements

and assets showed 139 instances where excess on-hand quantities of

$1.2 billion could be shared among the services to meet shortages. For

example, 30 ammunition items with shortages in the Navy could be

partially or totally filled by excess quantities in the Army, the Air Force,

and the Marine Corps; shortfalls of 8 items in the Army could be relieved

by excess items from the Marine Corps; and 15 Air Force items with

shortages could be partially or wholly filled by excess items from the

Army. As shown in table 2.8, for some ammunition types, two of the four

services have excess quantities that could be shared to fill a deficit in

another service, and even when shortages are relieved by excess

ammunition, excess quantities still remain.

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Table 2.8: Selected Ammunition Shortages and Offsetting Excess Ammunition Among the Services

Item Description Army Air Force Navy Marine Corps

Quantity

remaining after

cross-sharing

B506 Cartridge, 40-mm, red smoke 745,200 (9,387) (32,780) 21,079 724,112

G900 Hand grenade, incendiary (17,300) 0 43,232 19,992 45,924

G937 Hand/rifle grenade 0 (124) 22,138 91,067 113,081

A130 Cartridge, 7.62-mm ball 12,427,900 0 (3,273,179) 7,990,929 17,145,650

B508 Cartridge, 40-mm, green smoke 766,700 0 (5,977) 73,764 834,487

L323 Signal smoke, red, hand held 13,300 0 (4,684) 74,496 83,112

L324 Signal smoke, green, hand held 5,900 0 (9,904) 44,630 40,626

M028 Demolition kit, Bangalore

torpedo 10,100 0 (942) 19,369 28,527

N464 Fuze, proximity 2,149,500 (33,043) 0 556,131 2,672,588

ML14 Demolition charge, linear shaped 6,919 9,833 (9,091) 0 7,661

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate shortages.

Cross-Sharing to Avoid

Maintenance

In addition to filling some of the services’ shortages, the cross-sharing of

excess ammunition during fiscal years 1996 through 2000 could result in

the avoidance of more than $19 million in planned maintenance costs (see

table 2.9). For example, about $11.5 million in planned maintenance could

be avoided by sharing a portion of the 839,694 excess 155-millimeter

projectiles with services that plan maintenance on 370,000 projectiles. In

addition, the $3.4 million cost to repair 40-millimeter cartridges could be

avoided because, in this case, the Air Force has more than 1 million excess

cartridges that could partially fill the Army’s requirement to repair

1.7 million rounds of this item.

Table 2.9: Costs of Planned

Ammunition Maintenance That Could

Be Avoided by Using Excess

Ammunition (fiscal years 1996-2000) Item Description

Ammunition

requiring

maintenance

Excess

quantity on

hand

Maintenance

cost avoided

A063 5.56-mm cartridge 288,096 22,301,824 $86,429

A071 5.56-mm cartridge 1,505,991 32,198,092 240,959

B542 40-mm cartridge 252,638 727,687 568,435

B546 40-mm cartridge 2,129,544 1,048,969 3,352,085

D502 155-mm projectile 9,000 23,078 1,305,000

D563 155-mm projectile 370,000 839,694 11,484,000

N285 Fuze 245,010 3,773,600 2,290,844

Total $19,327,752

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to Requirements and Is Aging

Single Manager Does Not Have

Information or Authority to

Direct Cross-Sharing

In 1979,6 we recommended that the Secretary of Defense assign

responsibility to the single manager for operating a single national

inventory control point to provide DOD-wide integrated inventory

management, designate the single manager as owner of the ammunition in

the wholesale inventory, and require the single manager to apply the

principles of vertical stock management for inventory. DOD disagreed with

these recommendations, stating that the single manager organization’s

objective would be to permit the cross-sharing of stocks between services

and to avoid procurements by one service for needs that could be satisfied

with another service’s excess ammunition. DOD stated that the single

manager would be provided information on location and condition of

retail stocks and service stratification of stocks. This information would

allow the single manager to perform, with service approval, cross-sharing

to gain efficiencies in procurement, inventory, and transportation

management. However, we found that the single manager does not have

information on location and condition of retail stocks or information on

service stratification of stocks.

Concerning our 1979 recommendation that the single manager be the

owner of the ammunition in the wholesale inventory, DOD disagreed. DOD

said the services have an obligation to control the assets they acquire

through congressional appropriations and the custodial responsibility of

the single manager does not conflict with cross-sharing economies of

common items or inhibit effective depot-level management.

In our 1979 report, we noted that several problems with the existing

organization of the single manager preclude achieving further centralized

ammunition management. The single manager organization lacks visibility

over the services’ retail stocks, has limited communication channels, and

must compete for resources with other Army programs. It is principally

staffed by Army personnel and is viewed by the other services as

parochial. In addition, the single manager is unable to fully implement the

concept within the single manager’s own service—the Army.

As we noted in our 1979 report, the services are reluctant to give the single

manager the degree of control the manager needs to provide efficient and

economic inventory management in peacetime and the intensive inventory

management needed during war.

Ammunition at U.S. storage and production facilities is designated

wholesale and the remainder retail. The services retain total responsibility

6

Centralized Ammunition Management—A Goal Not Yet Achieved (LCD-80-01, Nov. 26, 1979).

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to Requirements and Is Aging

for the retail inventory. In our 1979 report, we noted that single manager

officials claim they could achieve more savings if they had retail asset

visibility for all services through transportation savings and matching long

supply and excess ammunition items against projected procurements. The

wholesale and retail designations, coupled with the services’

responsibilities, preclude the single manager from managing a substantial

segment of the inventory.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD partially concurred with our findings. DOD agreed that there were

excesses, but took exception to the criteria that we used in determining

excess inventory. It said we inferred that stocks above established

requirements were excess and should therefore be disposed of. Our report

states that DOD has about $22 billion of serviceable ammunition that

exceeds established needs and about $31 billion in excess serviceable and

unserviceable ammunition.

We agree that not all the ammunition in excess of stated requirements

should be disposed of and do not state that it should be. However, we

believe that the assets in excess of stated requirements should be made

available for cross-sharing to avoid one service purchasing assets that

another service has in excess of its wartime and peacetime requirements.

In addition, we believe there are many items being stored that will never

be used and should be identified for disposal. Furthermore, items in

excess of stated needs that should be retained should be identified as not

required, but to be retained for potential future use. This could greatly

help the single manager to better apply limited resources to storing and

maintaining ammunition.

DOD agreed that cross-sharing of ammunition at the wholesale level would

allow for better use of ammunition through redistribution. DOD stated the

planned Joint Defense Total Asset Visibility Program will provide all the

services the capability to review all assets and will further expand

cross-sharing of assets at the wholesale level. DOD did not agree with our

analysis of ammunition requirements and assets that showed excess

on-hand quantities of $1.2 billion that could be shared among the services

to meet shortages. DOD provided information for the Army that showed

stockage retention levels rather than excesses for most of these items. DOD

makes available for cross-sharing ammunition it considers excess;

however, it does not consider stocks in its retention categories as available

for cross-sharing. We believe all assets in excess of requirements,

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including retention stocks (such as economic retention levels) should be

considered for cross-sharing, which may avoid a future procurement.

Army data from its September 30, 1994, asset stratification of conventional

ammunition, which excludes missiles, shows total assets of $18.7 billion

and an authorized acquisition objective of $13.3 billion. It shows various

retention levels totaling $4.4 billion, or 23.7 percent, and a potential excess

of about $1 billion, or 5 percent. Using the stratification data for

cross-sharing would only make the $1 billion of potential excess available

while the $4.4 billion in various retention levels would not be identified for

cross-sharing. We believe the economic retention amounts of over

$1 billion should be made available for cross-sharing to avoid purchases by

another service and other retention stocks should be considered for

cross-sharing.

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Problems With Ammunition Stockpile

Management Threaten Readiness, and the

Single Manager’s Plan for Improvement Has

Been Delayed

Increases in the wholesale ammunition stockpile due to returns of massive

amounts of munitions from Europe and Operation Desert Storm,

combined with a decrease in the wholesale stockpile’s workforce, have

created a situation that could, if allowed to continue, degrade the forces’

readiness to meet wartime and peacetime needs. Because the Army has

placed a lower priority on funding ammunition functions, management of

the stockpile has become a difficult task, and managers have had to

concentrate on the receipt and delivery of ammunition to the detriment of

their inspections, tests, maintenance, storage, and disposal. During the

summer of 1993, the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group’s study team

assessed the management of the stockpile and found major deficiencies in

stockpile management. The team predicted that unless something was

done about the deficiencies, conditions would worsen. Our review

confirmed that the stockpile’s condition and readiness have indeed been

degraded. We found that

• ammunition was reported as serviceable when it might not be because the

single manager’s method of recording the condition of stock was

misleading;

• the condition of ammunition was often unknown because required

inspections and testing had not been done;

• top-priority ammunition was not serviceable because repairs had not been

done;

• ammunition was inefficiently stored, taxing facilities where space is at a

premium; and

• the ammunition designated for disposal is accumulating faster than it can

be eliminated.

In 1994, the single manager developed the Integrated Ammunition

Stockpile Management Plan to improve the poor condition of the

wholesale ammunition stockpile. However, the single manager has made

little progress toward improving the stockpile’s operations and readiness.

Two factors beyond the single manager’s control hinder the success of

implementing the plan: (1) the services’ lack of incentives to identify

required and nonrequired items in the stockpile and (2) the uncertainty of

sustained funding for the care, maintenance, and disposal of ammunition.

None of the services, including the Army, have provided a list of required

and nonrequired ammunition, and although funding increased in fiscal

years 1995 and 1996, the sustainment of increases to carry out the plan to

completion is not ensured.

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Management Threaten Readiness, and the

Single Manager’s Plan for Improvement Has

Been Delayed

Condition of the

Stockpile Is

Significantly Impaired

Because of the vast influx of ammunition from overseas in recent years

and decreases in storage space, funding, and staff, the ability of the single

manager to manage the stockpile has been taxed. As discussed in 

chapter 2, much of this ammunition is excess, old, and deteriorating but

has not been removed from the inventory and is taking up valuable space.

The single manager has concentrated on receiving and issuing ammunition

and because of resource constraints has neglected the surveillance,

maintenance, and disposal of ammunition. As a result, the condition of the

stockpile is unknown. This situation degrades the overall readiness of the

ammunition stockpile and could, if allowed to continue, degrade the

forces’ readiness.

Army’s Method of

Classifying Ammunition as

Serviceable Leads to

Uncertainty

As of March 1995, 59 percent of the ammunition tonnage and 223,293 of

the services’ ammunition lots were classified as serviceable; the remaining

41 percent of the tonnage was unavailable for issue because it was

unserviceable, suspended, or designated for disposal. Because of the lack

of identification of required and nonrequired items, we could not

determine serviceability statistics for required stocks. Of the services’

top-priority items (which make up 25 percent of the stockpile’s tonnage),

about 71 percent were classified as serviceable, but 29 percent were

termed unusable because they needed repair, could not be fixed, needed

inspection, or were suspended from issue (see fig. 3.1). For example,

motors for the MK66 2.75-inch rocket could not be issued as of March 1995

because 100 percent of them needed inspection.

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Management Threaten Readiness, and the

Single Manager’s Plan for Improvement Has

Been Delayed

Figure 3.1: Condition of Items in the Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile

59.3%

17.1% 7.8%

2.9%

12.9%

Total stockpile

70.9%

17.9%

9.2%

2.0%

Top priority items

Serviceable Requires repair Suspended Beyond repair Disposal stocks

2.0%

Source: GAO analysis of the wholesale ammunition stockpile Standard Depot System database

as of March 1995.

The condition of ammunition lots is identified by codes signifying that the

ammunition is serviceable, unserviceable, or suspended. Lots in all

conditions may also have defect codes indicating, for example, rust, paint

needed, replacement of unserviceable components required, or

nonhazardous/unserviceable/nonreparable. Of the lots classified as

serviceable, 24 percent had at least one defect, and 1,752 lots (about

1 percent) were identified as nonhazardous/unserviceable/nonreparable.

Of the services’ top-priority serviceable items, 19 percent had at least one

defect. When the lots with defect codes are deducted from the serviceable

tonnage, the portion of the stockpile classified as serviceable without

defect is about 46 percent, and the portion of top-priority items classified

as serviceable is about 58 percent.

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Management Threaten Readiness, and the

Single Manager’s Plan for Improvement Has

Been Delayed

One defect code indicates that an ammunition lot is overdue for periodic

inspection by at least 6 months. Before 1990, overdue inspections were

clearly indicated by changing the lot’s condition code, but the other

services objected to this procedure, and the Army dropped it. Now, the

condition code remains unchanged, and the defect code is added.

According to one official, under this system, the lot’s condition does not

look as bad as it really is, since the condition code is not changed.

Even though the defect code is indicated on ammunition lots, inventory

records that item managers routinely use do not include defect codes. Item

managers must look up the lot number in an ammunition lot report to

determine whether it has a defect. Because of personnel shortages, only a

small percentage of overdue inspection codes is entered into the inventory

database. Although stockpile officials’ statistics show that about 68,000

lots were past due for periodic inspections as of June 30, 1995, our

analysis of stockpile data shows that only 6,609 lots had been coded as

past due. Therefore, lots that appear to item managers as available for

issue may, in fact, not be available. This situation creates a false

impression of readiness, and issuance of ammunition could be delayed as

a result.

Condition of Ammunition

Is Suspect Because of

Delays in Inspections and

Tests

To ensure that requisitions can be speedily filled with usable ammunition,

especially in wartime, the single manager must continually check the

condition of ammunition items to ensure that they are ready for use and

safely stored. Each stockpile installation is supposed to inspect

ammunition periodically to ensure that items are serviceable, properly

classified as to condition, and safe. Based on the expected rate of

deterioration, ammunition is to be inspected every 2 to 10 years. For

example, Army guidelines specify that blasting caps should be inspected

every 2 years and small arms ammunition every 5 years. In addition,

regular tests are to be done to ammunition, not only to ensure that all

items are safe and reliable but also to identify those of marginal reliability

or capacity and those for maintenance or disposal. However, inspections

and ammunition tests have fallen so far behind in recent years due to

personnel and funding cuts that the condition of many items, including the

services’ top-priority items, is no longer known, with the result that

stockpile readiness may be impaired.

Inspection Backlogs Are

Growing

According to stockpile officials, a backlog of inspections has existed since

the 1980s, when the lack of personnel precluded periodic inspections of

unserviceable ammunition. However, the backlog has more than doubled

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since fiscal year 1989 (see fig. 3.2), largely because of the influx of material

from Europe and Operation Desert Storm and the loss of inspection

personnel. In fiscal year 1994, stockpile managers suspended periodic

inspections for all but fast-moving items, and in fiscal year 1995, they

concentrated instead on reducing the backlog of lots that were in an

unknown condition. By fiscal year 2001, periodic inspections of more than

139,000 lots could be backlogged.

Figure 3.2: Increase in Periodic Inspection Backlog

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

Fiscal year

Number of lots

Source: U. S. Army Industrial Operations Command.

Our analysis shows that the services’ priority items had not been treated

any differently from lesser priority items when periodic inspections were

done. As of March 1995, the periodic inspections of 15 percent (4,444) of

the services’ top-priority lots were past due, meaning the serviceability,

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condition, and safety of these priority items were questionable. This

number is likely to be larger because the date for the next inspection for

22 percent (8,396) of these lots was not in the inspection database.

Periodic inspections of top-priority items are important because these are

the items the services need to be available (without defect) and ready for

war.

Test Program Is Behind

Schedule

Because inspections cannot detect all deterioration of ammunition, lot

samples are regularly taken for test-firing or examination at test facilities

or laboratories. This effort includes several testing programs, including

programs for small-caliber and large-caliber ammunition.1

 According to

stockpile officials, of all the testing programs, only the large-caliber

program is backlogged. Stockpile management has concentrated its

limited testing funds on such programs as small arms at the expense of the

large-caliber program, which is a much more costly effort. The

large-caliber program covers 129 items having a 5-year test cycle, 85 of

which are war reserve stock; the remaining 44 are classed as substitutes

and do not have a war requirement. As of September 1995, testing for

25 percent of the war reserve items and 59 percent of the substitutes was

overdue. Officials predicted that, by fiscal year 1998, these backlogs could

increase to 55 percent for war reserve items and to 84 percent for the

substitutes. (See fig. 3.3.)

1

For testing purposes, large-caliber items comprise all ammunition in sizes ranging from 40 millimeters

to 8 inches.

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Figure 3.3: Current and Projected

Backlogs of Tests for Large-Caliber

War Reserve Ammunition in the

Wholesale Stockpile

24.7%

75.3%

Fiscal year 1995

55.3%

44.7%

Fiscal year 1998

Total past due test

Total with current test

Source: U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command.

Uncertainty of Extent of

Unserviceable Critical

Items Threatens Readiness

In the 1993 report on the wholesale stockpile, the single manager stated

that 27 percent of the services’ critical items for war, including the M830

120-millimeter cartridge and the M864 155-millimeter projectile, were

unserviceable; that is, the items needed maintenance before they could be

used, were missing components, or were earmarked for reclamation. As of

March 1995, 18 percent of the services’ top-priority ammunition for war

and training needed repair, and 2 percent was beyond repair. Because of

the backlog in inspections and tests of ammunition, however, the full

extent of unserviceable items in the stockpile today is uncertain. As long

as managers lack accurate information on the condition of stored items,

effective planning and performance of maintenance are problematic. More

important, the failure to maintain ammunition in good condition could

affect the services’ ability to meet wartime requirements.

Repairs and maintenance of ammunition in storage are important not only

to sustain readiness but also to save funds, since an unserviceable item

can be repaired, on average, for 10 to 12 percent of the cost of a new item.

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The single manager estimates that the average cost to repair a ton of

ammunition is $800. Using that estimate, about $99 million would be

needed to repair the 18 percent of top-priority ammunition currently

known to need repair. The estimated cost to purchase new items could be

as much as $826 million.

Inefficient Use of Storage

Space Impedes Efficiency

of Stockpile Operations

Several factors contribute to the inefficient use of storage space. These

factors include the loss of storage space due to downsizing, the addition of

ammunition from Europe and Operation Desert Storm, the retention of

ammunition that is unusable or awaiting disposal, and the proliferation of

fragmented (broken up) lots of ammunition. As a result of these factors,

some usable ammunition is stored outside when it should be stored inside.

Since 1988, the storage space for ammunition has been drastically

reduced. Storage space was reduced by 6 million gross square feet when

four installations were closed based on the recommendations of the 1988

Base Realignment and Closure Commission. As of September 1995, over 

80 percent of the stockpile installations’ net storage space2

 of 26.1 million

square feet3

 was full, and that space will be reduced by about 16 percent

when the Sierra, Seneca, and Savanna storage areas are closed, as

recommended by the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

In addition to dealing with less space, storage facilities had to

accommodate a vast amount of ammunition returned from abroad after

Operation Desert Storm and from bases closing in Europe. Ammunition

storage space will soon become even more cramped as ammunition use

declines through force reductions and the stockpile receives another

113,000 tons of ammunition from Europe in fiscal year 1996.

Due to the inefficient storage of ammunition, some serviceable items that

should be stored inside were stored outside, while material with less

demanding storage requirements occupied high-explosive storage areas.

For example, serviceable high-explosive items were stored outside, while

inert material was stored in about 600,000 square feet of structures

designed to house high-explosive and small arms items. Also, serviceable

Maverick, Patriot, and Hawk missiles, which should be stored inside, were

2

To determine an installation’s net storage space, the single manager reduces its total storage space by

the amount of unusable space and aisle space it contains, and then subtracts 10 percent from that

difference to account for losses due to multiple lots and other abnormalities.

3

Our analysis did not include Pine Bluff Arsenal because it is not included in the Standard Depot

System database.

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stored outside at one depot. (Fig. 3.4 shows Maverick missiles stored

outside.)

Figure 3.4: Maverick Missiles Stored

Outside

Among the serviceable ammunition stored at installations were items that

were beyond repair and designated for disposal and occupying

considerable space. As of September 1995, 12 percent, or 3.2 million

square feet, of the stockpile’s storage capacity was occupied by stocks

designated as beyond repair or for disposal. For example, about 300,000

tons of items designated for disposal were stored inside at an annual cost

of about $8 million and occupied nearly 2.8 million square feet.

Aggregated, these stocks would fill at least two storage installations that

could be used to store serviceable stocks. We found the following

examples of individual types of ammunition with questionable needs.

In one case, 251,000 propelling charges (for 155-millimeter guns) that had

been condemned but not designated for disposal were taking up 36,031

square feet (see fig. 3.5).

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Figure 3.5: Old Propelling Charge for

155-millimeter Gun

Note: Propelling charge should be all white.

In another case, 715 unserviceable Nike Hercules rocket motors with no

requirements occupied 31,212 square feet. One depot was storing 458 of

these items, some of which were manufactured in 1959. According to an

official there, these rocket motors occupied 16 to 20 storage sites at that

depot (see fig. 3.6).

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Figure 3.6: Nike Hercules Rocket

Motors With No Requirement

Two types of 3-inch, 50-caliber gun ammunition occupied about 15,000

square feet, even though the Navy no longer has any weapon in active

inventory that uses this ammunition. According to an official at one

installation, this ammunition has had few or no issues in 15 years.

In yet another case, 5,382 Navy MK25 mines that appeared in the Army’s

wholesale inventory database as belonging to the Navy did not appear in

the Navy’s inventory database, and was occupying 49,552 square feet.

About 2,200 (40 percent) of these mines had been suspended because their

condition was unknown. We noted that some of these mines at one

installation were manufactured in 1954, and at another installation, none

of these mines had moved in over 10 years (see fig. 3.7).

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Figure 3.7: Navy MK25 Mines

Manufactured in 1954

The proliferation of small, fragmented lots of ammunition also impedes

the efficient management and use of ammunition storage space. According

to the 1993 report on the wholesale stockpile, about 32,000 fragmented

lots were stored largely because of base closures and the return of

ammunition from Europe and Operation Desert Storm. Installations were

forced to store the returned ammunition without knowing whether

additional quantities of the same lots would be received. These lots were

often stored in more than one location. To optimize storage space and

reduce inventories and surveillance, ammunition from the same lot in the

same condition should be located in one storage structure when possible.

If personnel have to fill requisitions from several locations, response time

is delayed and issue costs increase.

Our analysis shows that since October 1993, the number of fragmented

lots in the stockpile has increased 14 percent. These lots—some of which

were stored in more than three structures—occupy 24 percent (5.9 million

square feet) of the total storage space (see fig. 3.8). Fragmented lots can

be reduced by selecting them first when filling requisitions, either by using

an automated lot selection process or a manual selection process.

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Figure 3.8: Example of Wasted Space

With Fragmented Lot

Items Marked for Disposal

Accumulate Faster Than

They Can Be Eliminated

As storage space has been significantly reduced and ammunition has been

added, the disposal of excess, obsolete, and unusable ammunition has

become crucial. (See fig. 3.9 for ammunition disposal operations.)

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Figure 3.9: Ammunition Disposal

Operations

Truck carrying Ammunition (Navy bombs) to Disposal Site

Blast on Destruction of Navy Bombs

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Air Force Bombs Awaiting Destruction

Blast on Destruction of Air Force Bombs

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As of September 1995, nearly 375,000 tons of ammunition items designated

for disposal remained stored in the stockpile. According to single manager

officials, the ammunition designated for disposal has increased and is

likely to increase further. Also, in recent years, the identification of

ammunition for disposal has greatly exceeded the amount disposed of.

Ammunition designated for disposal from fiscal years 1986 through 1995

amounted to 681,000 tons, while the amount eliminated was 390,000 tons

(see fig. 3.10).

Figure 3.10: Increase in Ammunition Disposal Backlog

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

Fiscal year

Tonnage

Designated Eliminated Cumulative backlog

Source: U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command.

Storage installations and contractors execute the ammunition disposal

program. Before an item is earmarked for disposal, other options—sales,

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transfers, and reuse—are explored. According to single manager officials,

foreign military sales have not proved a successful means of disposing of

excess ammunition because foreign countries buy new, rather than

obsolete, items if they have the means to do so. Currently, the primary

means of disposing of ammunition is by open burning or detonation.

Greater emphasis, however, is being placed on the resource recovery and

recycling method of ammunition disposal, even though this will increase

costs.

Despite 1994 Plan for

Improvements, Little

Progress Has Been

Made

In 1994, the single manager developed the Integrated Ammunition

Stockpile Management Plan to improve the poor conditions found in the

wholesale ammunition stockpile. The plan proposes specific actions to

achieve, by 2001,4

 a smaller, safer ammunition stockpile by changing

operations and optimizing space with fewer installations and staff.

However, except in its inventorying of ammunition, the single manager has

not substantially improved the operations and readiness of the wholesale

ammunition stockpile. The single manager cannot ensure success in

implementing the plan and managing the stockpile until the Army and

other services identify their ammunition as required and nonrequired, but

the services have no incentives to do so. Successful implementation of the

plan also is dependent on sufficient funding being provided for the care,

maintenance, and disposal of stockpile items. The Congress established a

minimum funding level in fiscal year 1995, and the conferees on the DOD

appropriations act established a funding minimum for fiscal year 1996 for

the care and maintenance of ammunition. Also, the House Committee on

Appropriations, in its report on DOD’s fiscal year 1995 appropriations, said

it expects DOD to fund disposal activities at a level that will decrease the

disposal backlog to a sustainable level of about 100,000 tons early in the

next century.

The Single Manager Has

Begun to Implement Parts

of the Stockpile Plan

The single manager has greatly improved its inventory records, a critical

function previously identified as seriously degraded. In 1995, the single

manager inventoried the entire wholesale stockpile at a cost of

$14 million. This inventory restored the stock records’ accuracy of item

locations and quantities. It also introduced major changes in the inventory

process to focus on the accuracy of quantities within storage sites. It did

not, however, assess condition. Once a site is physically inventoried, it is

sealed and no longer subject to a yearly inventory unless activity affects its

4

Although fiscal year 2001 is the goal for implementing the plan, the single manager also set a goal of

reducing the disposal stockpile to 100,000 tons by fiscal year 2004.

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stock balance. To ensure that stock balances are correct, 10 percent of all

sealed locations will be sampled annually. This new process is intended to

reduce the inventory workload, freeing staff for other duties.

The single manager has also taken steps to improve the stockpile’s

operations, as planned. For example, it has consolidated some small,

fragmented lots of material and redistributed them within warehouses and

has removed some items from inappropriate storage. Storage installations

in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 freed about 800,000 square feet of space. In

addition, the single manager has adopted a priority system to ensure that

required war reserve and training items receive maintenance first.

Quarterly reviews will focus on the most urgent maintenance needs.

The Services Have Not Yet

Identified Required and

Nonrequired Ammunition

At all six storage installations we visited, officials either were unaware of

any progress made or had not detected any change in operations resulting

from the single manager’s “tiering” concept, which relies on each service’s

categorization of its ammunition as required and nonrequired. The

problem is that neither the Army nor the other services have identified

stock in those categories. The single manager’s three-tier concept is

designed to ensure that the more critical ammunition is stored in depots

capable of providing the quickest response to mobilization. Four tier I

depots would contain mostly required items needed in the first 30 days of

mobilization, items needed for training, and items needed beyond 30 days

to augment tier II and III depots’ war reserve stocks. Tier I depots would

receive all support necessary for storage, surveillance, inventories,

maintenance, and disposal. Tier II depots would normally store war

reserves needed more than 30 days after mobilization, production offset

items, and some nonrequired stocks awaiting disposal. Tier III depots

would be caretakers for items awaiting disposal or relocation.

The single manager has not aggressively pursued the services’ efforts to

identify stock as required and nonrequired, and the single manager does

not know the priority the services place on each type of ammunition. As a

result, surveillance,5

 maintenance, storage, and inventories may not be

focused on priority stock to ensure it is ready for shipment when needed,

and scarce resources may be spent on items with low or no priority.

During our review, we found that the Army had not fully complied with the

single manager’s plan to identify ammunition, and the other services may

not fully understand the stockpile’s definition of required and nonrequired

5

The serviceability of ammunition is determined through surveillance inspections and tests by

sampling ammunition lots.

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ammunition. Some attempts were made to generate the necessary data,

but the services did not provide sufficient detail.

• In 1993, the Air Force classified serviceable high-priority items as tier I,

unserviceable items as tier III, and all others as tier II, but it did not know

whether the items in tiers I and II were required and the items in tier III

were nonrequired. Officials said that the single manager did not ask for the

information by required and nonrequired categories.

• In 1994, the Navy provided tonnage data to the single manager by types of

ammunition, which in a general sense categorizes items into tiers. Navy

officials could not recall being requested to categorize ammunition as

required or nonrequired, and they noted that the wholesale stockpile

manages only 13 percent of the Navy’s ammunition inventory. Most of the

Navy assets are stored aboard ships and at naval weapon stations, which

they consider to be tier I and II locations.

• Marine Corps officials said they had not been required by the single

manager to categorize items as required or nonrequired.

During our review, we found that for inspection purposes, the Army had

assigned a priority to each type of ammunition that can be used to identify

required and nonrequired ammunition. The priorities range from

ammunition needed for training and war reserve to ammunition for which

there is no formal requirement. The single manager requested that the

other services concur with these priority definitions. The Marine Corps

responded; however, the Navy and the Air Force have not responded to

this request, and the single manager cannot require the services to provide

this information.

The Single Manager May

Not Have Sufficient Funds

to Carry Out the Plan

The single manager is concerned that it will not consistently have

sufficient funds through 2001 to implement its $2.7 billion plan to restore

the stockpile to a usable condition and dispose of unneeded ammunition.

The single manager uses operation and maintenance (O&M) funds for

receipts and issuance, inventories, and surveillance of ammunition and

procurement appropriations for disposal of excess, obsolete, and unsafe

ammunition.6

The O&M funding allocated by the Army for inventories, storage, and

surveillance has historically been less than needed by the single manager

and has not yet been provided to implement the single manager’s plan.

Therefore, the single manager has made little progress in correcting

6

The services provide funds for maintenance and repairs on items they own.

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stockpile problems. Moreover, the progress made in correcting inventory

records in 1995 may be jeopardized because funding allocated by the Army

is insufficient to maintain the accuracy of the records.

According to the single manager, to successfully carry out its plan and

restore stockpile readiness, it must have consistent full funding over

several years for stockpile activities. The plan was based on near-term

funding levels, beginning in fiscal year 1996, and it projected full

implementation by fiscal year 2001. However, actual funding for fiscal

years 1996 and 1997 was less than required, which, according to the single

manager, postponed implementation of the plan by 2 years—from 2001 to

2003. Moreover, because of limited staff at stockpile installations, large

funding levels in any given year will not enable the single manager to catch

up—a lost year will add an additional year to fully implement the plan.

For fiscal year 1995, the Congress statutorily required that a minimum of

$388.6 million of the Army’s 1995 O&M account be spent specifically for the

safety and security, receipt and issue, efficient storage and inventory,

surveillance, and other activities associated with conventional

ammunition.7

 For fiscal year 1996, the conferees on the DOD appropriations

act directed that a minimum of $300.9 million be spent for the same

purpose. According to single manager officials, setting a minimum is a

good approach because funding levels are consistent and better planning

and management decisions can be made. The House Committee on

Appropriations report on the 1995 DOD appropriations stated that it

expects the Army to fully fund ammunition activities in future budget

submissions. It also commended DOD for increasing its budget for disposal

activities to $95 million for fiscal year 1995, and it recommended funding

of $110 million and stated the expectation that DOD would continue this

level of funding in future budgets.

In its 1994 plan to improve stockpile management, the single manager set a

goal to reduce the 423,000 tons of ammunition awaiting disposal to 100,000

by fiscal year 2004. The three interrelated factors to accomplish this goal

are anticipated disposal quantities between fiscal years 1996 and 2004, the

actual disposal funding, and the average cost to destroy a ton of

ammunition. In March 1996, the Army estimated that 685,900 tons—more

than triple the 1994 single manager’s estimate of 225,000 tons—will be

generated between fiscal years 1996 and 2004. This estimate does not

7

The Chemical and Biological Defense Command split from the U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and

Chemical Command/Industrial Operations Command in fiscal year 1995, taking $59.8 million of this

amount, leaving $328.8 million for the stockpile. In total, $396.95 million was obligated for this activity

in fiscal year 1995.

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include 98,834 tons (85,733 tons of industrial stocks and 13,101 tons of

tactical missile and large rocket motor assets) that will be generated

which have other sources of disposal funding. If the single manager

receives $100 million a year through fiscal year 2004 for disposal, and the

disposal cost per ton is no more than $909 a ton, the single manager will

meet its goal of eliminating the 100,000-ton backlog. The single manager

recognizes that it will be difficult to meet this goal because it relies on a

significant level of funding and the cost to dispose of ammunition may

increase. Therefore, the goal will not be met if the single manager does not

receive $100 million a year or if the disposal cost per ton increases. For

example, if the average cost per ton is $1,100, the disposal backlog will be

over 239,000 tons at the end of fiscal year 2004. Likewise, if the cost is

$1,300 a ton, the backlog will be over 365,000 tons. The disposal stockpile

most likely will grow even more as ammunition quantities excess to

service requirements are identified (see ch. 2).

Moreover, the single manager is concerned that the disposal program will

suffer from funding cuts, personnel shortages, and low priority. If the past

is any indication, the single manager may be correct. During fiscal years

1986-94, funding for disposal totaled $266 million, considerably less than

the $695 million the single manager estimated was needed to operate at

maximum capacity.

The disposal of obsolete and deteriorated ammunition is a time-consuming

and expensive process. At the installation with the largest disposal

capacity, 1,300 tons of ammunition were destroyed at a cost of about

$1 million during 1 week we visited. Additionally, the lack of Army funding

has affected the single manager’s ability to operate disposal facilities at

full capacity. Although the estimated disposal capacity is over 100,000 tons

of ammunition per year, the single manager has not been able to fully fund

this function. Prior to 1995, the greatest amount disposed of was 61,500

tons in 1992; only 11,700 tons were disposed of in 1990. For example, one

installation that can process 27,800 tons of ammunition annually had been

allocated only 19,200 tons for disposal in fiscal year 1995. Another

installation with a capacity to dispose of about 35,900 tons had been

allocated only about 3,800 tons in fiscal year 1994.

The single manager plans to gradually decrease its reliance on open

burning/detonation of ammunition because environmental regulations

have made these methods difficult and undesirable. Currently, however,

open burning/detonation is the only cost-effective method of disposal for

some items, such as cluster bombs and large rocket motors. Nonetheless,

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the single manager plans to increase disposal through resource recovery

and recycling methods. These methods are more costly—over $2,000 per

ton or over twice as much as for open burning/open detonation. Should

the cost per ton to dispose of ammunition approach this higher level, the

backlog would increase significantly.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD concurred that problems with the ammunition stockpile management

threaten readiness. DOD noted that funding levels in fiscal years 1993 and

1994 were so low as to force concentration on shipments and receipts at

depots. DOD said that during this period surveillance, stockpile reliability

testing, and priority maintenance projects were severely limited. DOD

agreed that defect codes had not been entered for all items with overdue

inspections but said inspections are performed prior to issuance of any

item. DOD also said that during the first quarter of fiscal year 1996,

significant progress was made toward prioritizing ammunition items and

identifying those that satisfy power projection and training requirements.

Based on the new priorities, periodic inspection backlogs were adjusted

and reduced from approximately 60,000 lots to approximately 30,000 lots

with the identification of the required part of the stockpile. We strongly

support identifying what is needed for power projection and training and

concentrating limited resources on these ammunition items. We believe

that DOD’s observation that periodic inspection needs were reduced from

60,000 to 30,000 lots and is indicative of potential reductions that can be

made in the care and maintenance functions of the single manager.

DOD partially concurred that the single manager’s plan for improvement

has been delayed. DOD said that while funding has been problematic, DOD

does not believe that the implementation of the improvements in

ammunition management will be delayed. DOD said the overall goal of the

Integrated Ammunition Stockpile Management Plan is to accomplish

(1) depot tiering by 2001 and (2) the other changes in stockpile

management as soon as possible. With the closure of three depots, DOD

expects to accomplish the tiering goal on schedule. DOD notes that the two

major requirements to implement the management plan are adequate

funding and segregation of the stockpile. We agree that these are

important. We are particularly concerned that the identification of

required ammunition, such as for power projection and training, be done

as quickly as possible so that the single manager can better use limited

resources. We are also particularly concerned that unless funding levels

and ammunition disposal are closely monitored, the single managers will

not meet its 2004 disposal goal.

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Conclusions and Recommendation

Unquestionably, the single manager faces difficulties in resolving problems

that developed with the wholesale stockpile as the Cold War ended. These

difficulties stem from DOD’s downsizing of its force and facilities in

response to the much reduced threat. Reductions in ammunition storage

space and the workforce, coupled with the return of massive amounts of

ammunition from closed bases in Europe and from Operation Desert

Storm, have degraded the single manager’s ability to manage the stockpile.

In addition, this ammunition was returned in small, broken lots that were

stored haphazardly as they came from overseas.

Partly as a result of this situation, half of the ammunition types in the

stockpile contain items in excess of stated requirements, which we

estimated to be valued at about $31 billion. This $31 billion of usable and

unusable ammunition, as well as $2.9 billion of excess ammunition that

was on the single manager’s inventory records but not the services’

inventory records, was being treated by the single manager as necessary to

meet requirements. Because the single manager has concentrated on

responding to requests for usable ammunition, inspections and tests of

ammunition have been delayed. The single manager does not know how

much ammunition in excess of stated requirements is in the stockpile and

is therefore unaware of what ammunition could be shared among the

services to alleviate shortages and what unusable ammunition does not

need attention beyond that for safety reasons. In addition, there are

tremendous backlogs of ammunition to dispose of. For the foreseeable

future, this disposable ammunition will increase and take up limited

storage space.

These problems are not insurmountable, but they will take time to

overcome. The Integrated Ammunition Stockpile Management Plan is a

step in the right direction. In addition, the minimum levels set for the care

and maintenance of ammunition established by the Congress for fiscal

year 1995 and the House Committee on Appropriations for fiscal year 1996

have helped the single manager in meeting its responsibilities.

The single manager’s success in implementing the management plan is

limited by the services’ lack of incentives to identify excess ammunition.

The services are not inclined to determine which of their ammunition is

required and declare the remainder excess because once ammunition is

declared excess, a service is not reimbursed for its cost if another service

wants it. Also, the services have no incentive to mark ammunition for

disposal because they do not have to pay the single manager to store it. As

the Joint Commanders Ordnance Group’s 1993 report points out, the single

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Chapter 4 

Conclusions and Recommendation

manager could charge the services a storage fee as an incentive for the

services to relinquish ownership of excess, old, and obsolete ammunition.

The report also suggested that additional storage space could be made

available if excess ammunition was used in training, included in foreign

military sales or grant aid programs, or destroyed. In addition, as we

recommended in 1979, the single manager could own, manage, and control

the entire ammunition stockpile. If this was the case, the manager would

have visibility over ammunition in excess of established requirements and

could distribute it to other services that need it or, if unneeded, dispose of

it when there was no longer a reason to retain it.

Another troublesome problem is the disposal of excess ammunition,

which is a time-consuming, expensive process. For example, at the

installation with the largest disposal capacity, 1,300 tons of ammunition

were destroyed at a cost of about $1 million during 1 week we visited.

With over 375,000 tons of ammunition awaiting disposal at the end of fiscal

year 1995 and additional ammunition identified for disposal each year, it

will take years to dispose of the ammunition. And because of the expense

associated with disposing of this much ammunition, finding the funds to

facilitate disposal is difficult. One option would be to require the services

to include the cost to dispose of ammunition being replaced in budgets for

new ammunition. While this option would not eliminate the significant

quantities of ammunition already awaiting disposal, it would focus earlier

attention on the ammunition disposal problem, provide additional funds

for disposal, and over time significantly reduce the quantities for disposal.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

To impress upon the services the need to address the problem of excess

ammunition, the Congress may wish to consider requiring the Secretary of

Defense to report annually the amount of ammunition on hand and the

amount that exceeds established requirements. This report could also cite

progress made in addressing specific ammunition stockpile management

problems, including identifying ammunition in excess of established

requirements, cross-sharing of ammunition in excess of established

requirements among services that have shortages, inspecting and testing

ammunition, and disposing of excess ammunition when it no longer makes

sense to retain it. With this information, the Congress could make more

informed annual budget decisions related to the ammunition stockpile.

Recommendation To facilitate implementation of the single manager’s plan for storing,

maintaining, and disposing of ammunition, we recommend that the

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Conclusions and Recommendation

Secretary of Defense develop incentives to encourage the military services

to categorize their ammunition as required or as excess to stated

requirements, to update this information annually, and to relinquish

control of their excess ammunition to the Army single manager for

distribution to other services that have shortages of ammunition or for

disposal when it no longer makes sense to retain it. Possible changes in

ammunition management, include requiring the services to pay the single

manager a fee for storing their ammunition; using excess ammunition in

training; authorizing the single manager to own, manage, and control the

wholesale stockpile and/or have visibility of the services’ retail stocks and

total requirements so the manager can identify ammunition excess to

stated requirements and coordinate redistribution of it to services that

need the ammunition or dispose of it; and requiring the services to include

the cost to dispose of excess ammunition in their budgets for new

ammunition.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD partially concurred with the matter for congressional consideration.

DOD said it already provides the Congress with ammunition inventory data

in the Supply System Inventory Report and demilitarization information in

the procurement budget justifications. We are aware of this report and the

information contained in it. However, as currently prepared, the inventory

report does not provide any information on the amount of ammunition

that exceeds established requirements. Also, information on stockpile

management problems and progress in solving these problems is not

provided.

DOD disagreed with the recommendation and options given for potential

changes in ammunition management. DOD stated that it considers the

present arrangement for managing much of the services’ stockpile to be

satisfactory. DOD stated it believes stockpile stratification and

cross-sharing could be enhanced but does not consider incentives to be

necessary to encourage compliance by the military services. Problems

with cross-sharing among the services noted in our 1979 report continue.

In addition, due to large quantities of ammunition in storage and a reduced

work force to manage this ammunition, problems with ammunition

management threaten readiness. Therefore, we do not believe that existing

DOD practices will solve the serious problems. The Integrated Stockpile

Management Plan is a step in the right direction, yet all the services still

have not identified required and nonrequired ammunition as called for in

the 1994 plan. This is a very important part of this plan’s implementation.

DOD disagreed with the options to require a storage charge or increase the

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Chapter 4 

Conclusions and Recommendation

single manager’s responsibilities. We agree other options are possible;

those in our report are some potential options. However, we do not agree

the present arrangement for managing the stockpile is working well and

believe that existing DOD practices will not solve the problems. We are not

advocating erosion of the centralized management of ammunition but are

providing options to further strengthen ammunition management and

provide incentives to the services to help the single manager operate more

effectively. We continue to believe our recommendation is valid.

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See pp. 8 and 42.

See comment 1.

Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 2.

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 2 and 14-21.

See p. 21.

See p. 21.

Page 73 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4 and 22-30.

Page 74 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

See pp. 8 and 42.

See comment 3.

Page 75 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 4.

Page 76 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 30-35.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Page 77 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 31.

See p. 33.

See comment 7.

Page 78 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 32.

Page 79 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 80 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5, 23,

and 35-42.

See p. 35.

See pp. 42-43.

Page 81 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Page 82 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5 and 44-60.

Page 83 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 84 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5-6, 44, 

and 60-65.

Page 85 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 65.

Page 86 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6-7 and 

66-67.

See pp. 9 and 68-69.

Page 87 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7 and 67.

See pp. 8-9 and 68.

Page 88 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7-8 and

67-68.

See pp. 9 and 68-69.

Page 89 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

GAO Comments 1. The draft report we sent to the agency for comments concentrated on

the $22 billion in serviceable ammunition that was excess to stated

requirements. However, when DOD responded to this report and dealt with

excess ammunition, it addressed the total ammunition

stockpile—serviceable and unserviceable ammunition. Since the single

manager treats both serviceable and unserviceable ammunition the same if

it has not been declared excess by the services, we expanded our

discussion of excesses to cover the entire ammunition stockpile. This

increased the amount in excess of stated requirements to about $31 billion

for usable and unusable ammunition. In addition, $2.9 billion in excess

ammunition is on the single manager’s inventory records but not the

services’ records. Also, over $2 billion of items are awaiting disposal.

2. The Department of Defense (DOD) stated that it had trouble identifying

the sources of data we used. Our sources were discussed with DOD, and

they are identified in our scope and methodology section in chapter 1. The

computerized database we used to compare assets on hand to

requirements was created using DOD-supplied data, and our sources have

been provided to DOD. Other sources of data, such as DOD’s report on the

Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program, are identified throughout our

report.

3. DOD discussed the need to retain three types of munitions—16-inch gun

ammunition; 3-inch, .50-caliber gun ammunition; and the MK25 mines. DOD

stated that two of these items have been retained for “mothballed” ships

that have been kept as mobilization assets. DOD agreed that the MK25

mines are excess. We believe that ammunition retained for mothballed

ships needs to be identified as such to the single manager so that it can

best use its scarce resources. As discussed in responding to agency

comments in chapter 2 of this report, we do not advocate disposing of

excess ammunition for which there is a potential future need.

4. DOD stated that 40-millimeter ammunition for the M42 self-propelled gun

has been declared excess for several years, with a quantity of 17,000

remaining to be supplied to Turkey. Although declaring ammunition as

potentially excess initiates an inventory reduction of unneeded

ammunition, a declaration “for several years” does not rid it from the

inventory system. As of September 30, 1994, the Army’s inventory records

showed that it still owned 269,000 40-millimeter cartridges. These

cartridges at that time had not been transferred to the disposal account.

Page 90 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

5. DOD stated that the services have active annual processes for identifying

excess, screening excess with other services’ and foreign military

customers, and for transferring any remaining excess to the resource

recovery disposal account. We agree that DOD has a process for identifying

and sharing excess with others. However, we believe this DOD process

needs to be improved. For example, the identification of an excess asset

for cross-sharing among the services is not done until a service removes all

retention category holds on the asset. Therefore, for example, if one

service has more of an asset than its wartime and peacetime requirements

and decides that it might sometime in the future buy this asset, the service

places the excess in an economic retention category. This asset then does

not appear as excess, and another service could buy the item. DOD has over

$1 billion in assets in this economic retention category, which we believe

should be made available to other services for potential cross-sharing to

prevent another service from buying these same items.

6. DOD stated that the age of an ammunition item is not necessarily related

to its combat usefulness. DOD also stated that depots normally ship the

older lots first. However, in our visits to ammunition depots, we were told

that the older lots are not shipped first unless it is cost-effective to do so.

Furthermore, we noted many ammunition items dating from the 1940s to

the 1960s. Also, as found by the single manager’s stock rotation study in

1985, soldiers in the field demanded the newest and best lots of

ammunition available. We agree that just because ammunition is old does

not mean it is unusable. However, we question whether much of the

ammunition dating from the 1940s, for example, will ever be used.

7. We annotated our report to note that the Marine Corps’ hand grenades

referred to as being in excess are offensive hand grenades.

Page 91 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon A. Cekala

Joan B. Hawkins

Nancy L. Ragsdale

Norfolk Field Office Dudley C. Roache, Jr.

Bradley D. Simpson

Sandra D. Epps

Linda H. Koetter

Jeffrey C. McDowell

Patricia W. Lentini

Dallas Field Office Calvin E. Phillips

Donald R. McCuistion

(703064) Page 92 GAO/NSIAD-96-129 Defense Ammunition
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