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ELEONES BUENO v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(AC 38662)

Prescott, Mullins and Beach, Js.

Argued March 21—officially released June 13, 2017

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Sferrazza, J.)

Vishal K. Garg, for the appellant (petitioner).

Nancy L. Walker, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Stephen J. Sedensky III,

state’s attorney, and Randall Blowers, former special

deputy assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee

(respondent).
Opinion

BEACH, J. The petitioner, Eleones Bueno, appeals

following the denial of his petition for certification to

appeal from the judgment denying his petition for a

writ of habeas corpus. The dispositive issue is whether

the habeas court abused its discretion in so doing. We

conclude that it did not and, accordingly, dismiss the

appeal.

The petitioner is a citizen of the Dominican Republic

who was admitted as a lawful permanent resident of the

United States in 1992. On April 11, 2012, the petitioner

appeared before the trial court to enter into a plea

agreement concerning two separate criminal matters.

At that time, he was represented by Attorney Robert

Koetsch. The petitioner first pleaded guilty, in docket

number CR-11-0141887-S, to one count of larceny in the

fifth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-125a.

The petitioner then pleaded guilty, in docket number

CR-11-0141917-S, to one count of larceny in the second

degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–123 (a)

(3). In its canvass of the petitioner, the court inquired

as to whether the petitioner had ‘‘had enough time to

talk with’’ Koetsch and whether he was ‘‘satisfied with

his legal advice’’; the petitionerresponded affirmatively.

The court further advised the petitioner as follows: ‘‘If

you’re not a citizen of the United States, do you understand the conviction for these offenses might have a

consequence of deportation, exclusion from admission

or denial of naturalization, pursuant to federal immigration law?’’ The petitioner answered, ‘‘Yes, sir.’’ The court

then found the pleas to be knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily made with the assistance of competent

counsel. In accordance with the terms of the plea

agreement, the court sentenced the petitioner to a total

effective sentence of eighteen months incarceration and

three years of probation.

Eleven months later, the petitioner again appeared

before the trial court.1 At that time, he pleaded guilty,

in docket number CR-13-0415495-S, to one count of

escape in the first degree in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-169, stemming from his failure to return to a ‘‘transitional supervision community release’’ facility. In canvassing the petitioner, the court informed the petitioner

that, as a result of his plea, he ‘‘could be deported,

excluded from the [United States], or denied naturalization.’’ In response, the petitioner stated, ‘‘I understand.’’

The court sentenced the petitioner to a term of one

year incarceration, execution suspended after six

months, with one day of conditional discharge.

While the petitioner was incarcerated, the United

States Department of Homeland Security commenced

a removal proceeding against him. Its notice to appear

articulated two distinct grounds for removal. First, it

charged the petitioner with violating ‘‘[§] 237 (a) (2)
(A) (iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . as

amended, in that, at any time after admission, you have

been convicted of an aggravated felony . . . relating

to a theft offense . . . or burglary offense for which

the term of imprisonment [of] at least [one] year was

imposed.’’ Second, the notice charged the petitioner

with violating ‘‘[§] 237 (a) (2) (A) (ii) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act, as amended, in that, at any time

after admission, you have been convicted of two crimes

involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single

scheme of criminal misconduct.’’ Following a hearing,

the United States Immigration Court on February 20,

2014, issued an oral decision in which it found both

grounds proven and ordered the petitioner to be

removed to the Dominican Republic. The petitioner

filed an appeal from that decision, which the Board of

Immigration Appeals dismissed on June 9, 2014. In its

written decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals

expressly indicated that the removal order was predicated solely on the petitioner’s convictions for larceny

in the second degree and larceny in the fifth degree

in violation of Connecticut law.2 The petitioner was

removed to the Dominican Republic in August, 2014.

Approximately three months after the immigration

court issued its removal order, the petitioner filed an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior

Court. The operative pleading, the petitioner’s April 30,

2015 amended petition, contains two intertwined claims

regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty

plea in docket number CR–11–0141917-S, to one count

of larceny in the second degree.3 Specifically, the petitioner alleged that (1) his guilty plea ‘‘was not made

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because [he]

did not know or understand [its] immigration consequences’’ in violation of his right to due process, and

(2) Koetsch rendered ineffective assistance of counsel

by failing to properly research and advise him of those

consequences.4

The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction,

thereafter moved to dismiss the petition on mootness

grounds, alleging that, in light of the petitioner’s other

unchallenged convictions that would prevent the petitioner’s reentry into the United States, the habeas court

could provide him no practical relief. Prior to the commencement of trial on September 18, 2015, the court

discussed that motion with the parties. At that time,

the court deferred consideration of the matter due to

the representation of the petitioner’s habeas counsel

that a witness who was ‘‘necessary for the motion to

dismiss’’ had not yet arrived. A two day trial followed,

at which the court heard testimony from four individuals—the petitioner, Koetsch, Warren Murray, a prosecutor for the state, and Justin Conlon, an immigration

attorney.

The petitioner testified via videoconference with the
aid of an interpreter. In his testimony, the petitioner

stated that Koetsch ‘‘never spoke about immigration

consequences’’ of his pleas with him. The petitioner

testified that, at the time that he entered his pleas, he

did not know that deportation would result from his

guilty pleas. He further testified that, if he had been

so advised, he ‘‘would have never [pleaded] guilty to

the crimes.’’

Koetsch offered contrasting testimony. He stated

unequivocally that he apprised the petitioner that ‘‘[h]e

will be deported’’ as a result of his guilty pleas. In a

colloquy with the petitioner’s habeas counsel, Koetsch

elaborated on his conversation with the petitioner

regarding the immigration consequences of a guilty

plea:

‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: . . . I see you told him

he will be deported?

‘‘[Koetsch]: Yes. Then we did have a conversation

regarding that and . . . he told me that he had a conversation with his father, after I had met with him at

the correctional facility, and [the petitioner] told me he

didn’t care if he got deported and that he would just

come back in the country anyway.

‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Did you give him any

advice as to whether he would be able to come back

in the country?

‘‘[Koetsch]: I told him once he’s deported he’s not

going to be able to come back in. I don’t know how he

intended to come back in. I don’t get involved in how

they come back in the country.’’

Conlon testified on the petitioner’s behalf as to the

immigration consequences of the petitioner’s larceny

pleas, as well as his March 14, 2013 plea of guilty to

escape in the first degree. Conlon opined that the latter

conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony or

a crime involving moral turpitude under federal immigration law. Conlon also acknowledged that the immigration court had found that the petitioner’s convictions

of larceny in the second degree and larceny in the fifth

degree constituted crimes involving moral turpitude.

In addition, Conlon provided testimony regarding the

petitioner’s guilty plea to a crime involving the assault

of a public safety officer a decade earlier in Florida

(Florida plea).5 Conlon noted that the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that,

under Connecticut law, a conviction of assaulting a

public safety officer for which a defendant was sentenced to at least one year imprisonment constituted

an aggravated felony under federal immigration law.

See Canada v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 560, 564–73 (2d Cir.

2006). Although he was not familiar with such an

offense under Florida law, Conlon opined that a felony

conviction of assaulting a public safety officer likely

would have adverse immigration consequences for a
defendant, provided that it was accompanied by ‘‘a one

year sentence or more . . . .’’

Days after the habeas trial concluded, the court

issued its memorandum of decision.In that decision,the

court first granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss,

finding that the matter was moot in light of the Florida

plea. In so doing, the court acknowledged that ‘‘[n]o

transcript [or] court record of the Florida proceeding

was introduced before this court. Neither party

requested that the court take judicial notice of the laws

of Florida concerning deferred adjudications nor supplied reference to specific statutes governing that procedure. However, the petitioner testified at the habeas

hearing, and, on cross-examination, he recalled that he

entered a guilty plea in the Florida case. Also, his criminal history in 2013 disclosed a 2002 Florida felony

record for the offense in question.’’6 Accordingly, the

court found that, ‘‘[a]lthough the evidentiary record is

scant, the petitioner’s admission to pleading guilty in

Florida, in conjunction with his recorded criminal history corroborating the same, persuade this court that,

for purposes of immigration law, the petitioner would

be regarded as having been convicted of an aggravated

felony. This conviction forms an absolute bar to his

reentry into the United States.’’

The court continued: ‘‘Usually, this conclusion would

terminate the court’s adjudicative process. However, it

is possible that an appellate tribunal would disagree

with this court’s determination of a lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, either because of an insufficiency

of evidence regarding the Florida disposition or because

a legal conclusion that bar to reentry does not moot this

habeas case. Therefore, the court will, as an alternative,

also address the merits of the petitioner’s claims.’’ The

court noted that ‘‘[b]oth the petitioner’s due process

violation and ineffective assistance claims hinge on

proof that the petitioner was unaware that his guilty

plea to larceny second degree would automatically compel his deportation by the federal authorities when he

decided to plead guilty to that charge . . . .’’ The court

then expressly credited Koetsch’s testimony that he

advised the petitioner that he definitely would be

deported as a result of his guilty plea to the charge of

larceny in the second degree. The court discredited the

petitioner’s testimony to the contrary, finding that ‘‘the

petitioner was prudently and adequately advised that

deportation was certain to follow his conviction.’’ The

court further found that ‘‘the [petitioner] decided to

accept the plea offer because the agreement significantly reduced his possible prison sentence, he was

likely to be convicted of deportable offenses in any

event, and because of his misplaced reliance on his

father’s advice as to the ease with which he could return

to the United States legally or otherwise.’’ For those

reasons, the court concluded, ‘‘the amended petition

is dismissed, or, alternatively, denied.’’ The petitioner
subsequently filed a petition for certification to appeal

to this court, which the habeas court denied, and this

appeal followed.

‘‘When the habeas court denies certification to

appeal, a petitioner faces a formidable challenge, as we

will not consider the merits of a habeas appeal unless

the petitioner establishes that the denial of certification

to appeal amounts to an abuse of discretion.’’ Jefferson

v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn. App. 767,

772, 73 A.3d 840, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 929, 78 A.3d

856 (2013). To prevail, the petitioner must demonstrate

‘‘that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason;

that a court could resolve the issues [in a different

manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.’’ (Emphasis altered;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Warden,

230 Conn. 608, 616, 646 A.2d 126 (1994).

At the outset, we note that two distinct issues are

presented in this appeal. The first concerns the question

of mootness; the second involves the merits of the petitioner’s due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To demonstrate that the court abused its

discretion in denying certification to appeal, the petitioner must establish that both issues satisfy the standard enunciated in Simms v. Warden, supra, 230

Conn. 616.

I

We first considerthe mootness question, which implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. See

Council v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 477,

486–87, 944 A.2d 340 (2008). ‘‘It is a well-settled general

rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an

essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the

province of appellate courts to decide moot questions,

disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from

the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . When . . . events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical

relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has

become moot.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, 254 Conn. 214,

225–26, 756 A.2d 1264 (2000). Ourreview of the question

of mootness is plenary. Council v. Commissioner of

Correction, supra, 487.

The present case involves a petitioner who has been

removed from this country by federal decree following

proceedings before the immigration court. In recent

years, our courts have considered the mootness question in this context. The seminal decision is State v.

Aquino, 279 Conn. 293, 901 A.2d 1194 (2006), in which a

defendant, who had been residing illegally in the United

States, appealed from the trial court’s denial of his

motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Id., 294. In that motion,

the defendant claimed that his plea ‘‘was not knowingly
and voluntarily’’ made because counsel never advised

him of the ‘‘certainty of deportation as the result of the

plea.’’ Id. The trial court denied that motion and, while

an appeal was pending, the defendant was deported.

Id., 297. Our Supreme Court thereafter determined that

the defendant’s appeal was moot, stating: ‘‘The defendant did not produce any evidence at the hearing on

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea—indeed, he did

not even claim—that he would be deported solely as

the result of his guilty plea. . . . There is no evidence

in the record as to the reason for his deportation. If it

was not the result of his guilty plea alone, then this

court can grant no practical relief . . . .’’ Id., 298. Our

appellate courts have adhered to that precedent on

numerous occasions. See, e.g., Quiroga v. Commissioner of Correction, 149 Conn. App. 168, 174, 87 A.3d

1171 (observing that ‘‘Aquino requires proof that the

larceny plea was the exclusive basis of the petitioner’s

deportation, rather than a primary or likely one’’), cert.

denied, 311 Conn. 950, 91 A.3d 462 (2014); State v.

Chavarro, 130 Conn. App. 12, 17–18, 21 A.3d 541 (2011)

(appeal moot because defendant failed to establish that

his deportation was result of guilty plea alone).

The record reflects, and the respondent does not

dispute, that the petitioner’s removal was based solely

on his guilty plea to larceny in the second degree, as

the immigration court found that conviction to be both

an aggravated felony under federal immigration law

and one of two crimes involving moral turpitude. See

footnote 2 of this opinion. Accordingly, the ‘‘narrow

inquiry before us is whetherthere is evidence to suggest

that, in the absence of the [larcency in the second

degree] conviction underlying the present habeas petition, the petitioner would be allowed to reenter this

country or become a citizen.’’ St. Juste v. Commissioner of Correction, 155 Conn. App. 164, 175, 109 A.3d

523, cert. granted, 316 Conn. 901, 111 A.3d 470 (2015);

see also State v. Aquino, supra, 279 Conn. 298–99 n.3

(noting that ‘‘there is no evidence to suggest that, in

the absence of the guilty plea, the defendant would be

allowed to reenter this country or become a citizen’’).

In the present case, the court’s mootness determination was predicated on its conclusion that the Florida

plea constituted an aggravated felony under federal

immigration law that was ‘‘an absolute bar to [the petitioner’s] reentry into the United States.’’ Both at trial

and on appeal, the petitioner has challenged that determination.7 Fortwo reasons, we conclude that the court’s

determination is untenable. First, the record does not

disclose the precise crime to which the petitioner

pleaded guilty under Florida law. As the Second Circuit

has noted with respect to aggravated felonies under

federal immigration law, ‘‘[t]o determine whether an

offense is a crime of violence . . . we must look to

the elements and the nature of the offense of conviction,

rather than to the particular facts relating to [the] peti-
tioner’s crime.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Canada v. Gonzales, supra, 448 F.3d 565. The paucity

of evidence regarding the Florida plea precluded such

review in the present case, as the record before the

habeas court did not disclose the specific offense to

which the petitioner pleaded guilty under Florida law.

Second, although the petitioner acknowledges that a

plea to a crime involving the assault of a public safety

officer may give rise to adverse immigration consequences, he maintains that it does so only in instances

in which a defendant receives a sentence of at least one

year.8 The Immigration and Nationality Act enumerates

dozens of aggravated felonies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)

(43) (2012). Among those is ‘‘a crime of violence . . .

for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year

. . . .’’ 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (2012). In Canada v.

Gonzales, supra, 448 F.3d 573, the Second Circuit held

that a ‘‘conviction for assaulting a peace officer, in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-167c (a) (1), constitutes

a ‘crime of violence’ . . . thus permitting removal of

[the] [p]etitioner as an aggravated felon . . . .’’ In that

case, the petitioner was ‘‘sentenced to a total of four

years’ imprisonment . . . .’’ Id., 563.

In his appellate brief, the respondent avers ‘‘that the

offense of battery of a public safety officer meets the

definition of a crime of violence.’’9

It nonetheless

remains that the habeas court was presented with no

evidence that the petitioner received a ‘‘term of imprisonment [of] at least one year’’ in connection with the

Florida plea, as federal law requires. See, e.g., United

States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 286 Fed. Appx. 672, 673

(11th Cir. 2008)(noting that although defendant’s ‘‘prior

conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer

constituted a ‘crime of violence’ under [federal law]

. . . it did not meet the requirements of an ‘aggravated

felony’ because he was sentenced to less than one year

of imprisonment’’). The only evidence regarding the

terms of the Florida plea came during the petitioner’s

testimony, in which he acknowledged that he performed community service after pleading guilty to the

unspecified criminal offense, but ‘‘was never imprisoned.’’ The record, therefore, lacks evidence on which

the court could conclude that the petitioner’s plea to the

unspecified Florida offense constituted an aggravated

felony under federal immigration law that permanently

barred his reentry into the United States. See Placide

v. Commissioner of Correction, 167 Conn. App. 497,

501 n.1, 143 A.3d 1174 (considering additional conviction that did not serve as basis of petitioner’s deportation and concluding that ‘‘we are not convinced that the

petitioner’s other conviction . . . would bar reentry as

a crime of moral turpitude’’), cert. denied, 323 Conn.

922, 150 A.3d 1150 (2016). Accordingly, the court

improperly determined that the petition was moot as

a result of the Florida plea.
II

That determination does not end our inquiry, as the

petitioner also must demonstrate that the merits of his

due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims

are debatable among jurists ofreason, could be resolved

in a different manner, or are adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further. Simms v. Warden,

supra, 230 Conn. 616. In resolving those claims, the

court expressly credited the testimony of Koetsch and

discredited the petitioner’s testimony as to whether the

petitioner was advised that deportation would result

from his guilty plea. As our Supreme Court recently

observed, an appellate court ‘‘does not . . . evaluate

the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, [it] must

defer to the [trier of fact’s] assessment of the credibility

of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of

their conduct, demeanor and attitude. . . . The habeas

judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to

their testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 631,

643–44, 153 A.3d 1264 (2017); see also Eastwood v.

Commissioner of Correction, 114 Conn. App. 471, 484,

969 A.2d 860 (appellate court does not second-guess

findings of habeas court related to credibility of witnesses), cert. denied, 292 Conn. 918, 973 A.2d 1275

(2009). This court, therefore, cannot disturb those

determinations.

In light of its assessment of the relative credibility

of the testimony offered at trial by the petitioner and

Koetsch, as well as the admonition on immigration consequences provided to the petitioner by the trial judge

during the plea canvass, the habeas court found that

‘‘the petitioner was prudently and adequately advised

that deportation was certain to follow his conviction’’

and that ‘‘the petitioner decided to accept the plea offer

because the agreement significantly reduced his possible prison sentence, he was likely to be convicted of

deportable offenses in any event, and because of his

misplaced reliance on his father’s advice as to the ease

with which he could return to the United States legally

or otherwise.’’ Those findings are substantiated by the

evidentiary record before us. We therefore conclude

that the petitioner cannot demonstrate that his due

process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims

are debatable among jurists ofreason, could be resolved

in a different manner, or are adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further. Simms v. Warden,

supra, 230 Conn. 616. Accordingly, the court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal.

The appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The petitioner was represented by Attorney Matthew Ramia at that proceeding.
2 Both the decision of the United States Immigration Court and the subsequent decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals reflect that the basis

of the removal order was the immigration court’s findings that (1) the

petitioner’s conviction for larceny in the second degree constituted an aggravated felony under federal immigration law, and (2) his convictions for

larceny in the second degree and larceny in the fifth degree both constituted

‘‘crimes involving moral turpitude’’ thereunder.

3 As the petitioner reiterated in his appellate brief, he ‘‘is only challenging’’

his conviction for larceny in the second degree in this habeas action.

4 The petition also alleged that Koetsch rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to ‘‘make [his] immigration status . . . part of the plea bargaining

process . . . .’’ At trial, Koetsch testified that, in negotiating the petitioner’s

pleas, he asked the state to consider a ‘‘lesser larceny’’ charge that would

minimize the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. His attempt was

unsuccessful. Prosecutor Warren Murray, who handled the petitioner’s larceny pleas on behalf of the state, corroborated that testimony by providing

a detailed explanation as to why the state would not entertain such a request.

Even if the petitioner had offered to serve a greater total effective sentence,

Murray testified that he ‘‘would have wanted a robbery. It was a crime of

violence . . . where a citizen was struck and I would probably want some

type of conviction . . . I think society should know that he was engaged

in some type of behavior which was rather serious.’’

In that respect, we note that the long form information in CR-11-0141917-

S was admitted into evidence at the habeas trial. Count one alleged that

the petitioner committed robbery in the third degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-136 (a) and stated in relevant part that ‘‘at the City of Danbury

. . . at approximately 8:15pm, on or about the 22nd day of July 2011, [the

petitioner] did commit a robbery where in the course of committing a

larceny, he used or threatened the immediate use of physical force upon

another person for the purpose of overcoming resistance to the taking of

the property, to wit: he and/or another demanded money from [the victim]

and when refused he did strike [the victim] and took his wallet and cellular

phone . . . .’’ Count two of the information alleged that the petitioner committed larceny in the second degree, while the third and final count alleged

assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1).

That count alleged in relevant part that the petitioner ‘‘with the intent to

cause physical injury to another person [caused] such injury to another

person, to wit: he did strike [the victim] in the head causing pain and/or

swelling . . . .’’ At the plea hearing, the trial court remarked to the petitioner: ‘‘Sir, I understand you’re disappointed that you’re not receiving a

completely suspended sentence, but I want to tell you your attorney fought

very hard for you and, in fact, the state is giving you consideration in the

sense that the plea agreement, as I understand it, does not require a plea

to the robbery charge, which would require you to serve 85 percent.’’ In

this appeal, the petitioner has not raised any claim regarding Koetsch’s

alleged failure to make his immigration status part of the plea bargaining

process.

5

In his testimony at the habeas trial, the petitioner acknowledged that,

in 1999, he was arrested in Florida and charged with an unspecified offense

pertaining to the assault of a public safety officer. The petitioner further

testified that he ‘‘pled guilty’’ to that charge, for which he was ordered to

perform community service and ‘‘was never imprisoned.’’

6 The transcript of the petitioner’s March 14, 2013 plea hearing on the

charge of escape in the first degree was admitted into evidence at the habeas

trial. At the outset of that proceeding, a bail commissioner reviewed the

petitioner’s criminal history, stating in relevant part: ‘‘His most recent [conviction] was . . . April of 2012, for larceny second from a person. . . .

Also April of 2012 . . . a larceny five . . . . He has a Florida record dated

back to 2002, which was a felony.’’ The record before us contains no further

documentation of that unspecified offense.

7 As the petitioner’s counsel argued at the habeas trial, ‘‘there’s no reason

for this court to find that [the Florida plea] would be an aggravated felony

that would prevent the petitioner’s reentry or that [it] was an alternative

basis for deportation.’’

8 The respondent contends that this distinct claim was not presented to

the habeas court and, thus, is unpreserved. In response, the petitioner, citing

Michael T. v. Commissioner of Correction, 319 Conn. 623, 635 n.7, 126 A.3d

558 (2015), argues that his claim is ‘‘subsumed within or intertwined with

arguments related to the legal claim raised at trial.’’

We note that the respondent made no reference whatsoever to the Florida
plea in either his August 21, 2015 motion to dismiss or his accompanying

memorandum of law in support thereof. Rather, those pleadings focused

entirely on the petitioner’s larceny and escape pleas in Connecticut. The

respondent first mentioned the Florida plea during his cross-examination

of Conlon, the final witness at the September 18, 2015 proceeding. At that

time, the respondent informed the court that he had ‘‘a reasonable basis to

believe that the petitioner has been convicted of battery against a police

officer, a public safety officer in the state of Florida in 2002 or 2003.’’

9 Apart from being a crime of violence pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)

(43) (F), the respondent has not identified any other basis on which the

Florida plea could constitute an aggravated felony under federal law.