NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 11a0119n.06 No. 09-4471 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT LAURA J. ASBURY,

P laintif f-App ellant, ON AP P EA L F RO M THE v. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE NORT HERN LIN DATU CC I TEO DO SIO; DI STR IC T OF OHI O ROBERT B ICKETT ; DAV ID HORNER; STE VEN STAHL ; BRUCE ALEXANDER; DELMAR COLEMAN, in their indivi dual and of fi cial capacities; SUMMIT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON P LEAS, JUVENILE DIVISIO N,

De fend ant s- App e lle e s. ________________________________________/ BEF OR E: SUH RH EIN RI CH , C OLE a nd C OOK , C ir c uitJudg e s. SUHRHEINRICH, Circu it Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant L aura Asbury alleg es that the district court er

red in gr anting Def

endants-A

ppellees summar

y judgme nt on her c laims that she was te rm inate d in re ta liatio n for the e xer c ise of he r F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts . A sb ur y fa ils to d e mon str a te that her a ssociation or her

speec h wer e constitutionally pr o te c te d a n d , c o nsequently , she ca

nnot make out a prima fa cie c ase f

or re taliation. We AF F IRM.

I. BACK GR OUND A. F acts L aura Asbury was an employ ee of Ohio’s S ummit County J uvenile C ourt (“SCJ C”) betwe en 2000 and 2007. During her tenure with SCJ C, A sbury serve d as a pa

rt-time Dete ntion Center Group-2-

Counselor and then, fo l l o wi n g a 2003 promotion, as a f ull-time Detention Off

icer . Asbury ’s Detention Of

fice r duties included supe rvising juve niles housed in the Dete ntion Center and transportingjuveniles to court hea ring s and medica l appointments. L ong -standing SCJ C policy prohibits contact betwe en De tention Office rs and r elea sed juvenile s. I n 2006, J udg e L inda Tucc i Teodosio, the Administrator of SCJ C, became conc erne d over
s t a f f c o n t a c tw i t h r e l e a s e d

i n d i v i d u a l s an d r e i n f o r c e d t h e n o - c o n t a c tp o l i c y. D e s p i t e t h i s p o l i c y, A s b u r y m a i n t a i n e d

c o n t a c tw i t h j u v e n i l e s f

o l l o w i n g t h e i rr e l e a s e f

r o m t h e D e t e n t i o nC e n t e r . In addition to violating the no-c ontact poli cy , Asbury acc umulated a leng thy

disciplinary

rec ord during he r t e nure a t SCJC, i nc lud ingre pe a te d v e rb a l and wr itt e n d isc ipl ina

ry no tic e s and tw o s us pe ns ion s. I n 2 00 7, SCJC sc he du le d a dis c ipl ina

ry c on fe re nc e wi th A sb ur

y to ad dr e ss he r co nta c t w ith
a re lease d y outh. The outcome of this conferen ce wa s a letter , dated Ma rch 2, 2007, e x plaining SCJ C’s conce rns that Asbury was unable to exercise appr opriate bounda ries with y outh under he r
su pe rv isi on . T he le tte r w arn e d A sb ur y that fur th er b e havio r i na pp ro pr iate to h e r p os iti on a s a De te nti on Of fi c e r w ou ld r e su lt i n h e r t e rm inatio n. On Ma rc h 1 1, 20 07 , jus t da

y s a ft e r r e c e ivi ngthi s letter, Asbury had a confr ontation w ith he r supervisor. On Marc h 12, 2007, a Detention C en t er juvenile filed a

g rieva nce, alleg ing Asbury

reve aled the juve nile’s conf idential medical infor

mation to another D etention Center r esident. An i n t er n al investig ation of these inc idents resulted in SCJ C scheduling a disciplinary confe renc e with Asbury

on Marc h 19, 2007. Following this confer ence , J udg e Te odosio reviewe d the investig ative re p o rt reg ardingAsbury ’s final two disciplinary incidents and Asbur

y ’s entire dis c ipl ina ry re c or d. Judg e Te od os io de c ide d to ter min a te As bury , c iti ngthe mos t r e c e nt i nc ide nts
as we ll as her longdisciplinary history

.Counts four a nd five pre sented in Asbury ’s amende d complaint alleg ed re taliation for 1 e xer c isi nghe r “ ri g ht t o f re e sp e e c h” and

“ ri g ht t o free ass oc iatio n, ” re sp e c tiv e ly , b ut d id n ot t ie specific co n d u ct to either c ount. For e ase of ref ere nce, w e desig nate Asbur y ’s fre edom of association count a s including h er association with re lease d juveniles and he r fr eedom of speec h count as includingher spe ech w ith relea sed juveniles, her advice to a detention ce nter re sident reg ardingleg al re prese ntation, and her three “p rotests.” B eca

use the a naly tical fra mework is the same for fre edom of a ssociation and fr eedom of speec h claims, the distinction does not impact our re su lt. -3- I n April 2007, SCJ C notified Asbury of her termination via letter, which stated that Asbur y ’s final two disciplinary

incidents, confr onting a

supervisor a

n d d i s cl o s i ng medical infor mation of a resident, we re sig n i fica

nt violations of SC J C policy . I t went on to summarize her e x tensive disciplinary

rec ord and her rec eipt of the Marc h 2 letter, wa rning her of

termination. The ter

mination letter c oncluded by

saying that her re cent a ctions left SCJ C with no choice but to terminate he r.

B. Pr ocedural History I n Aug ust 2008, Asbury

filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, alleg ing wrongful ter mination

a g a ins t Jud ge T eod os io, fi ve SCJC em plo y e e s, and

the Sum mit

County Court of Com mon Ple a s. Her complaint set forth thirtee n counts. The two c ounts at issue here alleg ed ret al i at i on for exercising her F irst A mendment rig hts. One count alleg ed a fre edom of assoc iation violation based 1 on Asbury ’s int er ac t ion with relea sed juveniles. The other c ount alleg ed fr eedom of speec h violations based on Asbury ’s spee ch with re lease d juveniles, her a dvice to a Det enti on Center juvenile reg arding the j uvenile’s right to an attorney , and her communications to SCJ C supervisors over the potential perf

ormanc e proble ms of other employ ees ( Asbury terms these c ommunications her “ protests”). T he “pr otests” in turn focuse d on: (1) improper admission procedur es by another SCJC em plo y ee, ( 2) g a mbl ingby

a te a c he r at th e De te nti on

Ce nte r, and

(3 ) a n e mpl oy e e wh os e person smelled of

alcohol.-4-

I nAp ri l 2 0 0 9 , t h e p ar t i es s t i p u l at edt o t h e di s m i s s al o f th re e S C J C em p l o y ee s , l ea v i n g J u d ge T eo d o s i o , two other SCJ C employ ees, a nd the county

court a s defe ndants (her einaf ter “ Court Def endants” ). In Aug ust 2009, the Cou rt De fenda nts filed for summary

judgme nt. Two months later, the district court g rante d them summary judgme nt on eac h of the thirtee n counts. Asbury

a pp e a ls the dis tr ic t court ’s ru lin g on ly wi th re sp e c t to the tw o Fi rs t Ame ndme nt r e ta liatio n c ounts
. II. AN AL YSI S A. Standard of

Review The Six th Circuit reviews de novo a g rant of summar y judgme nt. W

im bu sh v . W

y e th , 619 F.3d 632, 636 ( 6th Cir. 2010). Summ ary judgme nt is appropriate wher e ther e is no g enuine issue

a s to any mate ri a l f

a c t and the mov ant i s e nti tle d to j ud gment as a matte r o f l aw. F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (a ); In t ’l Da i ry Foods Ass’n v . Boggs , 622 F.3d 628, 635 ( 6th Cir. 2010). A court must view a motion for summary

judgme nt in the lig ht most favorable to the non-moving party
. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 5 7 4 , 587 (1986). “ The c entra l issue is ‘whether the evidenc e pre sents a suff

icient disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so onesided that one pa

rty must prevail as a

m at t er of law.’” Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n , 622 F.3d at 635 (q u o t i n g Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986))

. B. Su bst ant ive St anda r ds “A g overnme nt employ ee doe s not r elinquish a ll First Amendment rig hts otherwise e njoy ed by citizens just by

rea son of his or her

employ ment.” Ci ty o

f S a n D ie go v. Roe , 5 4 3 U. S . 77, 80 (2004). How ever , the state’s inter ests “as a n employ er i n regulating the speec h of its employ ees ‘diffe r sig nificantly

from those it possesses in conne ction wit h re gu l ati on of the spee ch of the
c it iz e n r y in g ener al.’” Con nic k

v . M y e rs , 4 6 1 U. S
. 1 3 8 , 1 4 0 (1 9 8 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Picke ring v. Bd. of-5-

Educ. , 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). As a result, a gover nmental employ er may impose restra ints on an employ ee’ s speec h that would be unconstit utional if applied to the public g ener ally

. City of San Diego , 543 U.S. at 80. To succe ssfully make out a prima fac ie case for reta liation, “the employ ee
mus t de mon str a te that: (1 ) he e ng a g e d in c on sti tut ion a lly pr ote c te d s pe e c h o r c on du c t; ( 2) an a dv e rs e
a c tio n w a s ta

ke n a g a ins t hi m th a t w ou ld d e te r a pe rs on of or din ary fi rmne ss from con ti nu ingto eng ag e in that conduc t; a n d (3 ) t here is a ca usal conne ction betwee n elements one and two . . . .” Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 470 F.3d 250, 255 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (citing Thaddeus-X v. Blatter , 1 75 F .3 d 3 78 , 3 94 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) ( e n b anc )) . T his same fr a me wo rk a lso a pp lie s to F ir st Amendment freedom of association cla ims. Ak e rs v . M c Gi nn is , 352 F.3d 1030, 1036 (6th Cir. 2003) (c itatio ns omi tte d) (r e a so nin g that the “ e xten siv e ly de ve lop e d” ana ly tic a l too ls fo r speech cla ims apply to other F irst Amendment re taliation claims). De mon str a tin g c on sti tut ion a lly pr ote c te d sp e e c h re qu ir e s the pla int if f t o ma ke tw o thre sh old showing s: f

ir s t, th a t t h e s p e e c h inv o lv e s a

matt e r o f p u b li c c o n c e r

nan d s e c o n d , th a t t

h e s p e e ch
occur red outside the duties of

his or her e mploy

ment. Hughes v. Region VII Area Agenc y on Aging , 54 2 F .3 d 1 69 , 1 80 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) ; Miller v. City of Canton , 319 F. App’ x 411, 416 (6th Cir. 2009). Matters of public c oncer

n relate to political, social, or other conce rns of the c ommunity

. Connick , 461 U.S. at 146. As a result they are distinguishable f rom internal of

fice politics where a

n individual speaks a s an employ ee a

bout matters of only

persona l interest. Ak

e rs , 352 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Jack son v. Leighton , 168 F .3 d 903 , 909 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) ). We d e te rm ine wh e the r s pe e c h invo lve s a matter of public c oncer

n by looking “to the content, form, and context of t he st atements in l ight of the rec ord as a

whole.” Id

. at 1 0 3 8 (q u o t i n g Jack son , 1 68 F .3 d at 91 0) ; see also Connick, 4 61 U. S.-6-

a t 14 7- 48 . Wh e the r a

pu bli c e mploy ee’s sp eech or a sso c iatio n is a matte r o f p ub lic c on c e rn is a question we re view de novo. Hughes, 542 F.3d at 180. I f the plaintiff me ets the two threshol d s h o wing s, the court then ba lance s the individual’s int e re st i n ma

kin g the sp e e c h a g a ins t th e g ov e rnme nt’ s inte re st i n r e str ic tin g the sp e e c h in wh a t is kn o w n a s the P i cke ring balanc ing te st. Id . ( ide nti fy ingthe te st t

he Sup re me Court

se ts f or th i n Picke ring , 391 U.S. at 568). Picke ring b a l an c i n g i s e s s e n t i a l l y a f o r m o f i n t e r m e d i a t e s c r

u t i n y. Ak e rs , 3 5 2 F. 3 d

at 1 0 3 7 (c i t i n g Mo ntgom e ry v . Ca rr , 101 F.3d 1117, 1129 n.7 ( 6th Cir. 1996)). Private spee ch that does not touch on m atters of public conce rn imposes no specia l burden of justification on the g overnme nt employ er; it nee d o nly satisfy rational ba sis review. Id . (citing W ate rs v . Ch ur c hil l , 5 11 U. S. 6 61 , 6 71 (1 99 4) ); United St ates v. N at’l Treasury Emps. Union , 513 U. S
. 4 5 4 , 4 6 6 (1 9 9 5 ) ( ci t i n g Connick , 461 U.S. at 148-49). C. P roce dural Chal lenge Asbury argues that the Court De fenda nts did not pr ovide suffic ient ref ere nces to the r ecor d in sup po rt

o f t h e i r m o t i o nf o r s u m m ar y j u d g m e n tan d

t h a t , a s a r e s u l t , t h e m o t i o ni s p r o c e d u r a lly defe ctive. I t is incumbent on the par ty seekingsummary

judgme nt to demonstrate the a bsence of a materia l issue of fac t. Am . Civ il Libe rti es Uni on of Oh io F ou nd ., In c . v . D e W

e ese , --- F.3d -

--- , 2011 WL 309657, at *3 (6th Cir. 2011). “[A] party seekingsummary

judgme nt alway s bear s the initial responsibility

of informingthe district court of the basis for its motion, and identify ing those portions of the plea dings, de positions, answers t o interrog atories, and admissions on file, toge ther with the aff idavits, if any , which it believes d em o n s t ra t e the abse nce of a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t.” Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (inter nal quotation marks omi tted). The movant need only demonstrate a

n absenc e of a g enuine issue of m ater ial fac t with reg ard to a ny one ele ment-7-

of the plaintiff’ s prima fa cie c ase. See Ce lotex , 4 77 U. S. at 32 2- 23 (c on c lud ingthat “ a c omp le te failure of proof conce rning an essential element of the nonm oving pa rty ’s ca se nec essar ily

rende rs all other fa cts immaterial”)

. I n their motion for summary judgme nt, the Court D efe ndants challeng ed the first and third elements of A sbury ’s re taliation c laims. Wit h respe ct to the association and spe ech c laims based on her c ontact with re lease d juveniles, the Court Defe ndants first disputed that Asbury ’s contac t cause d her te rmination. I n support, they cited the Marc h 2, 2007 letter that g ave he r a w ritten war ning f or this behavior, but did not terminate he r. Second, the Court Defe ndants disputed that her a ssociation

an d s p ee ch wi t h r e l ea s edj u v en i l es wa s co n s t i tu t i o n al l y p ro t ec t ed

. I ns u

p p o rt , t h ey

ci t edt o J u d ge Teodosio’s deposition and the Marc h 2, 2007 letter to establish the exist ence and purpose of the nocontac t policy . The Court De fenda nts also pointed out that this Court pr eviously held in Ak e rs that simil ar a ssociation betwee n detention cente r staff and individuals re lease d from the detention ce nter d id n o t to u c h o n matt e r s o f p u b li c conce rn. Se eAk

e rs , 352 F.3d 1038- 39 (conc luding that the association wa s a “pur ely private matter” and that the policy preve nting a ssociation easily satisfied rational ba sis review)

. The Court De fenda

nts also challeng ed the c ausation and public nature of the speec h. As for Asbury ’s “protests,” the Court Def endants c ited Connick

for the pr oposition t hat such ty pes of intra

office criticism do not amount to a matter of public conce rn worthy of constitutional protection. See Connick , 461 U.S. at 149. The Court Def endants disputed that her

speec h cause d her te rmination,
c iti ngAs bury ’s ow n d e po sit ion te sti m o ny

to s ho w t hat A sb ur y he rs e lf kn e w o f n o c a

us a l r e latio ns hip betwee n he r

“ p r o te s ts ” an d

h e r f ir in g . A d d it io n a ll y , th e Co u rt D e f e n d an ts p o in te d

to A s b u r y ’s
e xten siv e his tor

y of dis c ipl ina

ry a c tio n, be g inn ing in 20 02 and c on tin uin g un til he r t e rm inatio n in-8-

2007, and re fer ence d J udg e Te odosio’s deposition, Asbury ’s deposition, and SCJ C documentation reg ardingdisciplinary

action take n ag ainst Asbury

. Clearly , the Court Def

endants satisfied the require ments f o r s u mm a r y ju d g me nt b y

informing the district court throug h citations to the pleading s and deposition testimony that t here was no g enuine issue of

materia l f

act as to whether Asbury was terminated in r etaliation for e x erc ising he r First Amendme nt rig hts. Their motion for summary judgme nt was proc edura lly sufficie nt. On appe al, Asbury

also argues t hat t he Court Def endants proc edura lly

err ed by raising new
ar g u m e n t s i nt h e i r

r e p l y b r i e f

t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt
. T h i s ar g u m e n t i s l i k e w i s e w i t h o u tm e r i t
. A s b u r y, in her re sponse to the motion for summary judgme nt, cr i t i cized the Court Def endants for insufficiently

supporting the ir motion for summary judgme nt. Whil e Asbury initially claimed the Court De fe nd ants fa ile d to a dd res s the e sse nti a l e le me nts of he r r e ta liatio n c la im, sh e we nt o n to argue that they

had not demonstrate d why her a ssociation and spee ch cla ims were not a matter of public conce rn and that they had not show n that her speec h and association wer e not the cause of her termination. I n their reply brief, the Court D efe ndants responde d to this criticism by fu rt h er explaining the arg

uments prese ntedi nt h ei r m o t i o n : ch al l en gi n g th at As b u ry ’s as s o ci at i o nan d s p ee ch wi th r e le a se d juve nil e s w e re c on sti tut ionall y pr ote c te d, re futin g any

c a us a l li nk be tw e e n th is association and spe ech and Asbury ’s termination, conte sting that he r other spe ech w as a matter of public conce rn, and disputing any causa l link between this speec h and her termination. Th e Court De fe nd ants ’ re ply br ie f doe s noth ing mor e tha n re ply to the a lle g a tio ns ma de in Asbury ’s re sponse and e laborate on the arguments made in their orig inal motion. Se e Sc ott sd aleIn s. Co. v . F low e rs , 51 3 F .3 d 54 6, 55 3 (6 th Cir . 2 00 8) (e xpla ini ngthat “ re ply br ie fs re ply to a rgume nts
ma de in t he re spon se br ie f” (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s and c itatio n o mitte d) ); see also Vaughn v.As noted ea rlier, the ba sis for Asbury ’s fre edom of a s sociation, her c ontact with re lease d 2 juv e nil e s, a lso inc lud e s a fr e e do m of

sp e e c h c la im.

-9- Cannon U.S.A., Inc. , No
. 9 0 -2 0 3 8 , 1 9 9 1 W L1 7 7 9 7 0 , at * 4 (6 t h C i r. S ep t
. 1 2 , 1 9 9 1 ) (p erm i t t i n g a
m o v an t ’ s r e p l y t o e l a

b o r a t e a n d m a k e “ e v e nc l e ar e r ” ana r g u m e n to r i g i n a l l y s u

p p o rt e d b y o n l y a limit ed discussion). Asbury ’s contention re g ardingthe contents of the Court Def endants’ r eply

brief is without m erit. D. Sub stantive Challenge Asbury also claims the district cour t improperly

g rante d summary judgme nt beca use g enuine iss u e s o f mate r ia l f

a c t r e ma in w it

h r e g ar d to w h e th e r h e r a s s o c iati o n an d s peec h wer e constitutionally

protec ted and whe ther ther e wa s a ca usal link to her termination. 1. F r e e dom of A sso c iat ion Cl aim 2 Asbury claims that her a ssociation and spee ch with re lease d juveniles are a matter of societa l
conce rn bec ause she encour ag ed and suppor ted the juveniles in an effor t to help them become a

nd
rema in law-a

biding a nd productive me mbers of soc iety . I n Ak e rs , we ex plained that contact betwe en staff a nd former

residents of a

corr ectional f

acility , while driven by

understanda

ble and eve n la ud a ble mot ivatio ns , is a

“ pure ly pr ivate matte r[] o f l itt le or no c on c e rn

to t he c omm un ity a s a whole.” Ak

e rs , 3 52 F .3 d at 10 38 . A c c ording ly , p e r t his Cou rt ’s c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d p re c e de nt, As bury ’s a sso c iatio n a

nd sp e e c h wi th the re le a se d juve nil e s is a pr iva te matte r t

hat do e s n ot r ise to the level of

a matter of public conc ern a

nd is not constitut ionally

protec ted. As a non-public matter, SCJ C ne ed only satisfy rational ba sis review to justify its no-contact po lic y . T he po lic y

is d e sig ne d f

or the pr ote c tio n o f bot h S CJC an d D e te nti on Ce nte r j uv e nil e s: i t pr ote c ts a g a ins t c on fl ic ts o f i nte re st a nd pr e ve nts any

a pp e ara nc e o f i m p r o pr ie ty . T he SCJC ce rt a inl yA s b u r y’ s a m e n d e d

c o mp l a i n td o e s n o ti n c l u d e an y r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s s p e e c h

. A c c o r d i n g l y, 3 the motion for summary judgme nt is silent on the issue. Asbury ref ere nces this spee ch, albe it in a cursor y manner , in both her r esponse br ief opposing summary judgme nt and her

opening brief be fore thi s Co ur t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt

a dd re sse d th is s pe e c h in

its op ini on , an d s o, we sh a ll a lso c on sid e r i t here

. -10- has a le g itimate interest in these g oals and the no-conta ct policy is a rational means for advanc ing this int ere st. As such, the policy withsta n ds a fr eedom of association and f

ree dom of speec h challeng e. 2 . Fre ed o m of

S p ee ch Cl a i ms a. Right to an Attor ney Asbury maintains t h at s h e “d i d the rig ht thing” by telling a juvenile she ha d a rig ht to an attorney
. Asbury ’s deposition testimony indicates that when a Detention C enter juvenile re turned 3 from cour

t, the y oung woman wa s visibly ups et an d cl ai m ed that she wa s to be sent to the Depa rtment o f

Y o u th Se r v ic e s ( “ D Y S” )

. A s b u r

y in qu ir e d w h e th e r th e juv e n il e h a d

ana tt o r ney prese nt with her at court. When the juvenile stated that no attorney was pre sent, Asbury

advised he r to write the pre siding judicial off icial and r equest a

n attorney befor e her

transfe r to DYS. As bury ne ve r expl a ins why thi s adv ic e c on sti tut e d a matte r of pu bli c c on c e rn . I n a

ny e ve nt, this advice did not touch on a matter of public conce rn. By her ow n admission, all Asbury did was provide private advice with the aim of helpingthis juvenile chang e the outcome of a pr ocee ding; he r sp e e c h d oe s n ot r e fl e c t any ty pe of a tte mpt to n oti fy the pu bli c a bo ut a pr ob le m w iththe ju ven ile justice sy stem.I n her deposition testimony , Asbury explains that during her e mploy ment at the De tention 4 Center she kept a notebook to doc ument occur renc es she c onsidered “ suspect.” A t the time of her deposition, Asbury

could not locate the notebook. H oweve r, she pr ovided ty ped summaries purportedly

based on the contents of he r notebook. He r deposition testimony included these ty

ped notes as exhibits

. -11-

b. “ P r ot e st s” i. Adm ission P roce dures On appe al, Asbury

maintains that her “ protests .
. . conce rn t he community .” With respect to her “ protest” ove r De t en t i o n Center a dmission procedure s, Asbury ’s deposition testimony indicates t h at s h e co m plained at lea st in part to expl ain her Marc h 11, 2007 confr ontation with a supervisor f

or which she subsequently rec eived discipline. Asbury ’s “protest” was not to ensure the airingof a public c oncer

n, but rather

to provide her s ide of the story befor e her

supervisor lea

rned of this incident of insubordination. Asbury has fa iled to establish that this speech wa s a matter of public conce rn. ii. Gam blin g Act ivity As bury ’s “pr ote st” ov e r a lle g e d g a mbl inga c tiv ity by a te a c he r at th e De te nti on

Ce nte r i s likewise tied to her own misconduct. Thi s t ea ch er h ad previously notified SCJ C supervisors of As bury ’s ina

pp ro pr iate c on du c t in

his c la ssr oo m, whic h r e su lte d in dis c ipl ina

ry a c tio n a gain st Asbury . Asbury ’s own notes descr ibing the circ umstances surrounding this “prote st” confir m the 4 self-se rving and retributive nature of her speec h; he r documentation stated that the alleg ed g ambling

a c tiv ity me ri te d d isc ipl ine fo r the te a c he r. I t did not e xpla in h owthe a lle g e d c on du c t w a s o f p ub lic
c on c e rn . In s ho rt , th is “prote st” wa s a lso e xclu siv e ly se lf -s e rv ingand

wa s n ot a

matte r o f p ub lic
conce rn.-12- iii . A lc oho l U se Finally , reg ardingthe “pr otest” over the employ ee whose pe r s o n s me ll e d o f a lc o h o l, A s b u

r y ’s
ow n d e po sit ion te sti mony ind ic a te s tha t she ne ve r ac tua lly pr ote ste d a co- e mpl oy e e ’s us e of a lc oh ol. I ns te a d, sh e me re ly

inq uir e d a bo ut how t o m ak e aco mp l ai n twi t h o u tfo rm al l y fi l i n g o n e. Du ri n g a
su bs e qu e nt d isc ipl ina

ry c on fe re nc e ov e r h e r o wn c on du c t, As bury ult imate ly ra ise d this iss ue bu t, other than na

ming the individual, did not provide a ny other details (e.g . date, time, etc .) about the alleg ed inci d en t
. T h e context and form of this speec h indicate that, r ather than trying to r aise a

n iss ue of pu bli c c on c e rn , A sb ur

y a g a in s ou g ht t o d e fl e c t atte nti on fro m he r o wn

mis c on du c t. Fur thermore , Asbury ’s s t at em en t was not that an e mploy ee w as drinking on the job, which mig ht rise to the leve l of a public c oncer n, but rather

that h i s b re ath, clothing , sweat, or skin smelled of alcohol. Cf. Ohse v . Hughes , 816 F.2d 1144, 1151 (7th Cir. 1987) (determining that speakingout about the drinkingof alc ohol by g overnme nt employ ees dur ing busine ss hours, in addition to other conduct, c onstitut ed spee ch of a public conce rn), vacate d on other grounds 485 U.S. 902 (1988). I n short, none of A sbury ’s “pr otests” wer e dire cted at informing the public about improper
c on du c t at th e De te nti on Ce nte r. I nd e e d, the “ pr ote sts ” we re alw ay s p re c ipi tate d b y so me disciplinary

action for Asbury ’s own misconduct. More over, the form of he r “pr otes ts , ” c o mp la ining to individual members of the Detention Center, further confirms that these “prote sts” were n ot matters of public c oncer

n. I n Connick , the Supreme Court re asoned that a questionnaire distributed to o the r s ta ff

me mbe rs wa s n ot a

n atte mpt “ to i nf or m th e pu bli c ” no r wa s it

an atte mpt

“ to b ri ngto light actual or potential wrong doing or brea ch of public trust.” 461 U.S. at 148. Asbury did even less than the employ ee in Connick , protesting to one or two people within the Dete ntion Center. The content, conte x t, and form of her “ protests,” thus, do l ittle to support her c ontention that she spoke-13-

of a matter of public c oncer n. We think the warningin Connick is apposite here : “To pre sume that all matters which tr anspire w ithin a gove rnment off ice a re o f public conc ern w ould mean that virtually ever y rema rk—and cer

tainly ever

y criticism direc ted at a public of ficial—would plant the seed of a constitutional case .” Id at 149. We will not consti tutionaliz e Asbury ’s self- serving criticisms. Fur thermore , beca

use neither he r a sso c iatio n n or

he r s pe e c h is c on sti tut ion a lly pr ote c te d, sh e c ann ot m a ke ou t a pr ima fa c ie c a se for r etaliation and we need not r eac h the other e lements of her claim. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt.