NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

YVONNE ELIZABETH FORBES, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D18-952 

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed May 8, 2019. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier 

County; Frederick R. Hardt, Judge.

Yvonne Elizabeth Forbes, pro se. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee.

LaROSE, Chief Judge.

Yvonne Elizabeth Forbes appeals the denial of her motion for 

postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. 

App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A); 9.141(b)(3); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(k). We affirm. See City of 

Clearwater v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas Cty., 905 So. 2d 1051, 1057 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) 

("[T]he 'tipsy coachman' doctrine . . . allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court 

decision that 'reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons' so long as 'there is any 
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basis which would support the judgment in the record.' " (quoting Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. 

Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999))). 

Background

In April 2010, a jury convicted Ms. Forbes of a scheme to defraud and the 

use of a public record to commit a felony. The trial court imposed a lengthy prison 

sentence. We affirmed her direct appeal without opinion; the mandate issued in 

December 2011. See Forbes v. State, 75 So. 3d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (table 

decision).

Thereafter, in April 2012, Ms. Forbes filed a rule 3.850 motion for 

postconviction relief. After summarily denying several claims, the postconviction court 

conducted a November 2014 evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims. Following 

the hearing, the postconviction court denied the remaining claims. We affirmed the 

nonsummary rule 3.850 order on appeal. See Forbes v. State, 193 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2016) (table decision).

The subject matter of the claims and the postconviction court's disposition 

of Ms. Forbes' April 2012 rule 3.850 motion are not pertinent to this appeal. What is 

relevant is her assertion that, at the November 2014 evidentiary hearing, she learned for 

the first time that her trial counsel failed to convey a purported probationary sentence 

offered by the State. Based upon her filing of another rule 3.850 motion in August 2015, 

the postconviction court granted Ms. Forbes a January 2017 evidentiary hearing on this 

newly discovered evidence claim. The postconviction court later denied relief. 

Analysis

Ms. Forbes argues that the postconviction court erroneously denied her 

motion. She maintains that "trial counsel never conveyed a plea offer of probation . . . 
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the only plea conveyed . . . [wa]s a plea offer of 20 year[s'] prison." She contends that 

the records attached to the order before us "do not refute [her] claim that the plea offer 

of probation was not conveyed to her by her trial counsel."1

Ms. Forbes' newly discovered evidence claim was filed timely based upon 

her professed November 2014 discovery of the uncommunicated probationary plea 

offer. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1); see, e.g., Blake v. State, 152 So. 3d 66, 68 (Fla. 

2d DCA 2014) (declaring that "[a] claim of newly discovered evidence can be an 

exception to the two-year time limitation in rule 3.850(b)"); Clark v. State, 236 So. 3d 

481, 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (holding that defense counsel's knowledge of a proposed 

plea deal could not be imputed to defendant for purposes of the newly discovered fact 

exception to the two-year limit, and that therefore plea offer could constitute newly 

discovered evidence allowing defendant to proceed on rule 3.850 motion alleging 

counsel had provided ineffective assistance in not conveying the plea offer to 

defendant). Further, a newly discovered evidence claim may be an exception to the 

general prohibition on successive rule 3.850 motions. See White v. State, 664 So. 2d 

242, 244 (Fla. 1995) (holding that a defendant may file successive postconviction relief 

motions based on newly discovered evidence). No procedural hurdles prevented the 

postconviction court from considering the merits of Ms. Forbes' newly discovered 

evidence claim.

1

In her brief, Ms. Forbes ventures a variety of new and ancillary arguments 

and factual assertions that were neither contained within her rule 3.850 motion nor were 

they developed or supported at the evidentiary hearing. We decline to consider them. 

See Smith v. State, 213 So. 3d 722, 740 (Fla. 2017) (citing Doyle v. State, 526 So. 2d 

909, 911 (Fla. 1988), for the finding that a claim was "procedurally barred because it 

was not presented to the trial court in the defendant's rule 3.850 motion and could not 

be raised for the first time on appeal"); Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784, 788 (Fla. 

1992) ("[The] claim that this reason is not supported by the record was not raised below 

and therefore has been waived.").
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Following an evidentiary hearing, we review the denial of a motion for 

postconviction relief to determine whether competent, substantial evidence supports the 

postconviction court's findings of fact. Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1262 (Fla. 

2016). "Competent, substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence." 

R.F. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 770 So. 2d 1189, 1192 (Fla. 2000); see also 

Savage v. State, 120 So. 3d 619, 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (noting that "competent" 

refers to admissibility, while "substantial" requires that there be some material or 

relevant evidence having definite probative value (citing Dunn v. State, 454 So. 2d 641, 

649 n.11 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (Cowart, J., concurring specially)). We defer to the 

postconviction court's factual findings. See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033-

34 (Fla. 1999). 

As long as the trial court's findings are supported by 

competent substantial evidence, "this Court will not 

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions 

of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as 

the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court." 

Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 

1074, 1075 (Fla. 1984)). However, we review conclusions of law de novo. See 

Schofield v. State, 67 So. 3d 1066, 1072 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ("[T]his court reviews the 

postconviction court's application of the facts to the law de novo."). 

To analyze the postconviction court's order, we identify the elements 

undergirding Ms. Forbes' claim. In doing so, we will show that the postconviction court 

properly denied relief, but unnecessarily concluded that the State made a plea offer. 

"A trial counsel's failure to convey a plea offer can constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel." Gallant v. State, 898 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) 

(citing Whitten v. State, 841 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)); see also Taylor v. 
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State, 248 So. 3d 280, 281 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) ("The failure to convey a favorable plea 

offer to a defendant in a criminal case can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." 

(citing Clark, 236 So. 3d at 483)). To succeed, the postconviction movant must 

establish that: (1) she would have accepted the offer had counsel advised her correctly; 

(2) the prosecutor would not have withdrawn the offer; (3) the trial court would have 

accepted the offer; and (4) the conviction or sentence or both would have been less 

severe than the judgment and sentence that were imposed. Alcorn v. State, 121 So. 3d 

419, 430 (Fla. 2013). 

The Alcorn elements are conjunctive; the movant must prove each to be 

entitled to postconviction relief. The Alcorn elements also unfold chronologically, 

meaning that the elements develop temporally with the requisite first development being 

either that a favorable plea offer was extended to a criminal defendant but the 

acceptance was not communicated to the State before it expired; or, that the State's 

plea offer was simply never communicated by trial counsel to the postconviction movant 

before the State withdrew the offer. This second scenario, seemingly, is what Ms. 

Forbes alleged happened to her. 

Critically, what remains implicit but unsaid in Alcorn is that the favorable 

plea offer must actually exist. A postconviction court cannot analyze such a claim under 

Alcorn without first finding that the State extended an offer. Cf. Timothee v. State, 721 

So. 2d 776, 777 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("[A] plea agreement is a contract requiring a 

meeting of the minds. When it appears any party is mistaken, confused, or 

misunderstands essential terms of the agreement, there can be no meeting of the 

minds." (citation omitted)). 
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The postconviction court avoided the issue, finding that "[t]he record is 

clear that, if there was a [probationary] offer it was revoked at trial call." But the 

postconviction court need not have determined whether a probationary plea offer was 

revoked if there was never an offer on the table. 

The evidence adduced at the January 2017 evidentiary hearing 

established that the State extended no probationary offer to Ms. Forbes. Consequently, 

the record does not support the postconviction court's finding that an offer may have 

been made. 

Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he discussed a 

potential probationary plea offer with the assigned assistant state attorney (ASA). 

Unfortunately, the State never offered such a deal because the parties could not agree 

on the amount of restitution, a critical demand from the State. 

In fact, trial counsel's testimony reveals that he spoke with Ms. Forbes on 

several occasions about an offer, including making an extended probationary term with 

agreed-upon restitution. Trial counsel even enlisted Ms. Forbes's sister to speak with 

her about the benefits of such an offer. However, the discussions between trial counsel 

and Ms. Forbes never progressed beyond general talk that she should make such an 

offer because Ms. Forbes "never agreed to a restitution amount" and she "did not want 

to be adjudicated because she did not want to lose her real estate license." Trial 

counsel's testimony was consistent with that of the two ASA's who handled the case; 

one testified that they did not recall extending a probationary offer, and the other 

affirming that his recollection "was that the Defendant was not willing to accept any plea 

offer." 
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Ms. Forbes and her sister both testified that trial counsel never advised of 

a probationary plea offer. This is not necessarily inconsistent with trial counsel's 

testimony. Nonetheless, the postconviction court chose, as it may, to credit trial 

counsel's and the ASAs' testimony over that of Ms. Forbes and her sister. See Green v. 

State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1101 (Fla. 2008) ("We generally defer to the trial judge 

regarding these [witness] credibility determinations."); Shere v. State, 742 So. 2d 215, 

218 n.8 (Fla. 1999) (stating that the role of the trial judge in a postconviction motion 

evidentiary hearing is to make credibility determinations and findings of fact). 

Conclusion

The record reflects that the State never extended a probationary plea offer 

to Ms. Forbes. Cf. Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906-07 (Fla. 2002) ("The key to 

the application of [the tipsy coachman] doctrine of appellate efficiency is that there must 

have been support for the alternative theory or principle of law in the record before the 

trial court."). Consequently, it goes without saying, counsel cannot be deficient for 

failing to communicate a nonexistent offer. 

Affirmed.

MORRIS, J., Concurs. 

ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, J., Concurs in result only.