The Court pre viously g rante d defe ndant Gross’s motion for summar y judgme nt as 1 to a ll o the r c ounts a g a ins t hi m and re qu e ste d a dd iti on a l brie fi ngon “ the iss ue s r e latin g to available reme dies for wrong ful fore closure a nd on when one become s a bona f ide purc haser

for va lue ” to a ssi st i n r e so lut ion of his mot ion

a s to Count O ne . Se e Or de r at 1, Dk t. N o. 37 (Jul y 23, 2009). UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

__________________________________________ ) MA RY RI CH ARDS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Ci vi l A cti on No. 08 -00 07 (P L F) ) OPTI ON ONE MORTGAGE CORP., e t al

. , ) ) De fe nd ants . ) __________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON AND ORDER C urr en t l y p en d i n g b ef

o re th e C o urt ar e d ef

en d an tOp t i o nOn e M o rt gage Corporation’s (“ Option One”) motion for summary judgme nt and def

endant Alvin E. Gr oss J r.’s mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt a s to Count O ne . Af te r c are fu l c on sid e ratio n o f t he pa rt ie s’ 1 paper s, the rele vant statutes and c ase la w, and the or al ar g uments prese nted to the Court on Au gu s t2 4 , 2 0 0 9 , th e C o urt s t at es th e f o l l o wi n g: “Rule 56 conta ins ‘no express or implied require ment’ that the movant ‘suppor t its mot ion with affidavits or other simil ar materials neg ating the opponent’s c laim.’” Monca da v. Peters, 579 F . Supp. 2d 46, 50 (D.D.C. 2008) (quotingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)) ; see a lso F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(a) , (b). As a result, when the nonmoving pa rty (her e, Ms. Richards) be ars the ultimate bur den of pr oof at trial on a dispositi ve issue or issues, the2

moving pa

rties (he re, O ption One and Mr. G ross) may car ry their initial burden on summary judgme nt by

doing no mor e than “ pointing out to the district court . . . that ther e is an a bsence of evidenc e to support the nonmoving party ’s ca se.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 325; see 10A W R I GHT , M I LL ER & K ANE , F ED ER A L P R AC TI C E AND P ROCE D U RE : C I V I L 3D, § 2727 at 474 (1998); 11 M O O RE ’ S F ED ER A L P RACTI CE § 56.13[1] at 56-138 (3d e d. 2002). In this case, Option One a nd Mr. Gross attempted to do so in part by pointing out the abse nce of evidenc e in support of pla int if f’ s a sse rt ion s ( 1) that sh e wa s p re pa re d to te nd e r t

he amou nt o f t he mor tg a g e loa n to Option One prior to f

orec losure but that Option One r efuse d to acc ept the tende r, and ( 2) that Mr. Gross wa s on notice of the a lleg ed wr ong fulness of the f orec losure. Once the moving pa

rties make out a

case that would entitle them “to judg ment as a matter of law if unc ontroverte d at trial,” the Court will gra nt summary

judgme nt unless the opposing pa

rty offe rs some compe tent evidenc e showingthat there is a g enuine issue a s to a materia l fac t. W R I GHT , M I LL ER & K ANE , § 2727 at 486. “In this way the burde n of produc ing evidenc e is shifted to the par ty opposing the motion.” I d. at 486-88. To mee t this burden, plaintiff produc ed evide nce in the f orm of an a ffidavit fr om Keny a Ray mond, plaintiff’s ca

reg iver a nd “attorne y

in fac t,” which sug g ests that on the day of the for eclosure sale Ms. Ray mond

and a re pr e se ntativ e fr om C ountr y wi de B ank

(“ Countr y wi de ” ), F ra

nc isc o E nr iqu e s, a tte mpt e d to pay the full amount of the mortg ag e loan owe d by plaintiff to Option One in orde r to stop the fore closure sa le. See Plaintiff’s Me morandum in Opposition to Defenda nt Option One’s Motion fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt ( “ Op p. ” ), Ex. M , A ff ida vit of Ke nya D. Ray mon d ¶ ¶ 1 1- 16 . Wh ile thi s evidenc e is, at best, thin, and is contra dicted by other re cord e vidence , and while Ms. Ray mondShe has bee n found to have committed a fra ud on the cour

t by making aff

irmative 2 misrepre sentations to the court in a r elated pr ocee ding be fore J udg e Judi th Retchin of the Sup e ri or Court of the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia . Se e De fe nd ant, Al vin E. Gr os s, Jr.’ s Re ply

to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Mot ion to Dismi ss or, in the Alternative Motion for Summary J udg ment, Ex . J (“Super ior Court Dec ision”) at 4.

Even thoug h the statements fr om Ms. Ray mond rely

on hear say

statements made 3 by Mr. Enriques — the alleg ed re prese ntative from Country wide who pa

rticipated in the phone call — at summary

judgme nt, “a nonmovant is not requir ed . . . to produc e evide nce in a for m that w ou ld b e a dmi ssi ble a t tr ia l, [b ut] the e vid e nc e sti ll mus t be c a pa ble of be ingc onve rt e d into admissible evidence .” Wilburn v. Robins on, 480 F.3d 1140, 1143 n.2 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Gleklen v. De mocratic Cong. Campa ign Comm., Inc., 199 F .3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . T he he ars ay state me nts of

Mr . E nr iqu e s ma

y be c onve rt e d into a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e if

he is c a lle d to te sti fy

a t tr ia l, t he re fo re the Court

may c on sid e r t

he m at th is point. 3 has ser ious credibility

problems, on a motion for summary judgme nt, the Court may not make 2

cre dibilit y

deter minations and must not resolve disputes betwee n conflictingevidenc e. See Cz ekalski v. Peters, 475 F .3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Take n in a light most favor able to the 3

no nmo vin g pa

rt y , M s. Ray

mon d’ s a ff

ida vit su g g e sts that sh e wa s r e a dy , w ill ing , a nd a ble to te nd e r t he fu ll amou

nt o f t he mor tg a g e loa n b a lanc e and

that O pti on

On e re fu se d to a c c e pt t

his tender prior to fore closure. In addition, Ms. Ray

mond testified at her

deposition that she spoke on the phone wi th b oth Mr . E nr iqu e s an d M

r. Gros s immediately

afte r the for eclosure sale. See Opp., Ex. D, Deposition of Kenya D. Ray mond at 139-41. In conjunction with Mr. Gross’s a dmission t hat plaintiff told him that she had secur ed a c ommitm ent for a reve rse mortg ag e fr om Country wide and that she be lieved that the f orec losure wa s wrong ful, see Plaintiff Richa rds’ Supplemental Memorandum r e: B FP and Wrong ful For eclosure , Ex . A, Deposition of Alvin E. Gross, Jr. at 51, 56, the deposition testimony from Ms. Ray

mond sugg ests that Mr. Gross may have be en on notice — suff

icient to meet the standa

rds of inquiry

notice, see Clay

Properties, Inc. v.4

Was hin g ton

Pos t, 6 04 A. 2d

89 0, 89 5 ( D. C. 1 99 2) — th a t pl a int if f’ s atte mpt

to t e nd e r f

ull pay ment was re fused by

Option One prior to f

orec losure, that the f

orec losure wa s wrong ful, and the re fo re that he mig ht n ot b e a ble to a c qu ir e le g a l ti tle up on se ttl e me nt. In light of the fore g oing, the Court is hesitant at this poi nt to gr ant summary judgme nt for either

Option One or Mr . Gross. As re prese nted by counsel, ne ither par

ty has deposed Mr . Enriques, a lthough plaintiff’ s counsel re prese nted that Mr. Enrique s may be ca lled to t e sti fy a t tr ia l. An e xplanatio n f ro m Mr . E nr iqu e s a

bo ut t he natur e of

the a lle g e d p ho ne c a lls on September 6, 2007, a s well as the status of pla intiff’s alleg ed re verse mortg ag e loan f rom Country wide would assist the Court g reatly in resolving the pendingmotions. I n light of the fore g oing, it is here by

ORDERED that on or be fore September 14, 2009, the parties sha ll notify the Court whether

any party intends to take the de position of Mr. Enriques, and, if so, sha ll file a transcr ipt of that deposition with the Court on or before October 14, 2009. SO ORDERED. _/s/________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: August 28, 2009