U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

67–165 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

U.N. REFERENDUM FOR WESTERN SAHARA: 9

YEARS AND COUNTING

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 13, 2000

Serial No. 106–147

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

[VACANCY]

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

[VACANCY]

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

TOM SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director

CHARISSE GLASSMAN, Democratic Professional Staff Member

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member

COURTNEY ALEXANDER, Staff Associate
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

WITNESSES

The Honorable Allen Keiswetter, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................................ 2

APPENDIX

Member’s prepared statements:

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from California and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa ................................................. 12

The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from Pennsylvania ...................................................................................................................... 13

The Honorable George Radanovich, a Representative in Congress from California ..................................................................................................................... 15

Witness’ prepared statement:

Allen Keiswetter ...................................................................................................... 16

Additional Submissions:

Response by Mr. Keiswetter to additional question posed by Rep. Pitts ............ 21

(1)

U.N. REFERENDUM FOR WESTERN SAHARA: 9

YEARS AND COUNTING

Wednesday, September 13, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m. in room

2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Royce, Pitts

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will

come to order. Today, the Subcommittee will examine the troubled

peacekeeping operation in Western Sahara. This Subcommittee has

closely watched MINURSO.

Over the years, we have held several hearings focusing on it. Before that, Congress passed a resolution led by this Subcommittee

expressing support for former Secretary of State James Baker’s efforts as U.N. Special Envoy to move along the stalemated process.

A vote to determine whether resource-rich Western Sahara is to be

incorporated into Morocco or become an independent state was

originally set for January 1992. That was more than 8 years ago.

Now, 8 years and some $440 million later, MINURSO unfortunately is far from its goal. The U.N. itself is at a point of reaching

this conclusion. This May, in this report, Secretary General Kofi

Annan noted the prospects for holding a referendum were as distant as ever. In his latest report, the Secretary General observed

that the problems between the parties had deepened.

Special Envoy Baker has said recently that the referendum, in

his words, ‘‘is in big trouble.’’ His July meeting with the parties in

Geneva came to an abrupt end, with the Secretary General reporting that these talks had seen the parties move, in his words, ‘‘move

things backward.’’ It is discouraging that the Secretary General has

cited problems wholly distinct from the often-noted registration dispute, including the implementation of a code of conduct for the

planned referendum campaign. Annan has reported that the process has been impeded by ‘‘fundamental differences between the

parties over the interpretation of purposes.’’

It is clear to me that the U.S. and other countries have been unwilling to pressure Morocco enough to achieve the implementation

of a fair referendum. This suggests it is nearing time to shut down

MINURSO. It costs some $45 million to run, and the credibility of

U.N. peacekeeping is once again at stake. If peacekeeping is going
2

to be strengthened and win backing here, then we cannot afford to

support interminable missions with unachievable mandates.

The Administration testified to this Subcommittee that in the

face of no MINURSO progress, U.N. resources should not be used

for what then becomes a stop-gap measure. It expressed in no uncertain terms that time was running out. That was 2 years ago. If

MINURSO is terminated under these circumstances, the Administration has a responsibility to provide an honest accounting of

which party bears responsibility for its failure. That is a point I

made 2 years ago, and it is a point that still holds.

Sadly, many Sahrawis have put their faith in a process that appears to be a mirage. I wish it were different, and I should note

that Jim Baker has another meeting scheduled for later this month

at which he will try to pull a diplomatic rabbit out of a hat, but

short of that, I do not see why the U.S. should continue approving

U.N. resolutions extending MINURSO.

We will now hear from our witness, Allen L. Keiswetter, who was

appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State from the Bureau of

Near Eastern Affairs in July. He was previously the director of

Arabian Peninsula affairs. He holds the rank of minister counselor.

Ambassador Keiswetter joined the Foreign Service in 1967. He is

a graduate of Dartmouth College and holds advanced degrees from

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Harvard University. Ambassador, thank you for joining us today, and

if you would begin with your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce appears in the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF ALLEN L. KEISWETTER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr.KEISWETTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am

greatly honored to have this opportunity to appear before you regarding the Western Sahara. As you have noted, this is an issue

that expanded the past quarter-century and has constituted instability and a financial burden on the countries and peoples involved.

I would like to address first the U.S. interests and our role in the

Western Sahara; second, recent developments which you have already outlined; and, third, the prospects and U.S. policy.

A peaceful settlement would enhance the stability of the

Maghreb region, as well as the stability of the Mediterranean

Basin more generally. It offers the prospect of strengthening political, economic, and commercial cooperation for the betterment of all

concerned. Unresolved, this dispute constrains the opportunities of

the region and leaves several hundred thousand Sahrawis with a

bleak and uncertain future. If the situation deteriorates, a return

to violence would bring new suffering and hardship, threaten potential political and economic liberalizing trends in Algeria and Morocco, and pose serious risks for the stability of Maghreb, with serious implications for Southern Europe.

With these interests at stake, we continue to strongly support

the mediation efforts of the United Nations undertaken since the

late–1980’s. We remain committed to an early and durable, peaceful solution to this long-running conflict. This can happen only with

the full cooperation of all of the parties. These principles undergird
3

our support for the mission of the United Nations Secretary General’s personal envoy, former Secretary of State James Baker. We

believe the U.N. remains in the best position to bring about a solution to this case.

It was U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar who began implementation of the ‘‘cease-fire-and-referendum’’ framework solution agreed to by the parties. This plan laid out the mechanisms

for resolving whether the territory would become independent or a

province of Morocco based on a vote of the native population. In essence, it required the identification of eligible voters, the return of

refugees to the territory, and a vote under the auspices of the

United Nations.

Despite this framework agreement nearly a decade ago, there

has been only slow progress toward implementation. Serious political differences between the parties continued to block prospects for

an early vote on the future of the territory. By December 1999,

MINURSO had succeeded in completing the contentious Phase I of

the referendum process, the identification of potential voters. Indeed, an impressive total of more than 200,000 prospective voters

were processed in the course of this exercise, and about 90,000

were found eligible. However, the referendum remains pending because of disputes over the voting lists. The parties continue to disagree over the grounds for appeals by those persons not included

in the list of eligible voters.

As you have noted, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has said

that dispute over the appeals ‘‘allows the impossibility of holding

the referendum before the Year 2002 or even beyond.’’ The number

of appeals now total more than 130,000. The question is how to respect the rights of the voting applicants while avoiding a retreat

to use a long identification process.

Another obstacle in the resolution of this conflict has been the repatriation of refugees. The parties have not come to an agreement

regarding the draft refugee-repatriation protocol presented by the

U.N. High Commission on Refugees. So far, the parties have also

not agreed to implement proposed cross-border, confidence-building

measures that would improve the lot of the 120,000 or so refugees

that had been preregistered.

Despite these obstacles, the U.N. continues to facilitate talks. In

February of this year, U.N. Secretary General Annan asked his

personal envoy, James Baker, to consult with the parties to explore

ways to achieve an early, peaceful, and durable settlement. He recommended to the U.N. Security Council that it extend MINURSO’s

mandate until May 31st of this year to provide time to meet with

the parties. In an effort to either reconcile differences over the implementation of the settlement plan or find alternative approaches

to help solve the dispute over the Western Sahara, Mr. Baker visited Algeria, Morocco, the Western Sahara, and Tindouf, Algeria,

where he met with the POLISARIO leadership.

In May, Secretary General Annan invited Morocco and

POLISARIO, as well as observers from Algeria and Mauritania, to

talks in London presided by Mr. Baker. It was the parties’ first direct contact since 1997. The talks permitted a frank exchange of

views that were inconclusive.
4

In late May, the U.N. Security Council voted to extend the

MINURSO mandate until the 31st of July in an effort to provide

additional time to address the remaining issues. A second round of

talks was convened on June 28th in London. The parties were

asked to bring specific solutions to resolve all outstanding settlement plan issues or be prepared to consider and discuss other ways

to achieve ‘‘an early, durable, and agreed resolution of dispute.’’ Because of the lack of progress, Baker called on the parties to meet

again, emphasizing the need for flexibility on both sides, either toward moving forward with the U.N. settlement process or perhaps

through a solution that rested in between full independence and

full integration of the Western Sahara into Morocco.

In late-June, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to extend MINURSO’s mandate to October 31st, with the expectation

that the parties will meet again in direct talks under Baker’s auspices to resolve the multiple problems related to implementation of

the settlement plan and to try to agree upon a mutually acceptable,

political solution to the dispute. Those talks are slated for later this

month, perhaps in Berlin.

When the parties meet again, we hope they will make clear their

commitment to a process by which they will achieve a peaceful settlement. However, public statements by the parties to the dispute

in recent weeks have tended to narrow rather than broaden the opportunity for progress. Thus, in preparation for the forthcoming

meeting, we have encouraged the parties at the highest levels to

approach the next round with flexibility and a cooperative attitude.

Mr. Chairman, we are working hard to help bring about an early,

durable, and peaceful resolution to the conflict, one which is mutually agreed, takes into account the political rights and well-being

of all parties involved, and promotes the stability of the region. The

effort of former Secretary Baker has given us a chance to do this.

There are two possibilities on the table. First, the holding of a

referendum, provided the parties can agree to its technicalities, and

after nearly a decade, as you have said, that possibility still seems

years away. Second, finding a mutually acceptable, political solution. Mr. Baker is still in the process of exploring alternatives.

The United States opposes any solution being imposed on the

parties. That, in our view, will not work. The parties themselves

have to agree on the way ahead. We hope the steps will be taken

toward that end at the next meeting. The U.N. effort has the support of the U.S. and others in the international community, as experienced by the unanimously endorsed renewal of the mandate of

MINURSO by the UNSC. We continue to urge the parties to take

advantage of this important opportunity as their best chance to resolve this dispute.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we have encouraged the parties at high

levels to approach the Baker-led talks with flexibility and a cooperative attitude. We have sought to urge improvement of relations

between Algeria and Morocco, a key element to any durable

progress on the Western Sahara. We have continued our efforts to

deepen our ties to each of the parties through programs such as the

U.S.-North Africa Economic Partnership. Finally, we have continued to support MINURSO, which has served as a safety net for regional stability.
5

What I have described are elements of a U.S. policy of preventative diplomacy aimed at helping to resolve the long-standing conflict and thereby bringing greater peace and stability to the

Maghreb region and all of its people. I will be glad to take your

questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keiswetter appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Very good. Let me just say that we have witnessed

Moroccan authorities waging a media crackdown.

The government has sacked three managers of the state-run TV

channel and has banned editions of two newspapers for recording

interviews with the leader of the POLISARIO front. We have seen

the Moroccan delegation walk out, refusing to discuss the appeals

issues. We have seen 130,000 appeals being made, mostly from the

Moroccan side. After 198,000 people were interviewed for voting,

Morocco is refusing to allow the referendum to go ahead until the

appeals have been individually examined and, based upon the process that they are calling for, this will take at least 2 years.

So, it has been made clear to this Subcommittee that it has been

Morocco that has been the greatest impediment to the registration

process to begin with. We heard this from the witnesses at our last

hearing, the recent press accounts, from correspondence, from close

observers in the operation, including a number of U.S. military officers who served in MINURSO. Morocco is now flooding MINURSO

with voter-registration appeals, as I say, in what appears to be a

stalling tactic.

Do you agree, Ambassador, that Morocco bears the greatest responsibility for MINURSO’s current deadlock?

Mr. KEISWETTER. Mr. Chairman, our policy is not to take sides

with this dispute. In fact, our policy is to support the efforts of the

U.N. Secretary General and of Mr. Baker. In both of these cases

they have said that the lack of progress, the responsibility for the

lack of progress, lies on both sides, not just on one side, and I think

this is clear in the various reports that they have issued over the

past couple of years. So we have, in fact, been generous, we have

been supportive of the U.N.’s efforts, and we have urged all parties

to the dispute at high levels, in fact, to be flexible, to use imagination, and to cooperate on either of the approaches that former Secretary Baker has outlined. So that is my answer to you.

Mr. ROYCE. I think we have some responsibility to the parties in

the dispute who have invested a certain amount of faith in the

process and a certain amount of faith that we are going to make

an honest effort to not string them along but instead to see this

through to a conclusion. I had a couple of other questions I wanted

to ask you.

One is the Administration’s report to Congress on MINURSO. It

states that according to the UNHCR, the vast majority of refugees

say they fear for their safety should they return to Moroccan-controlled the Western Sahara. Are those concerns legitimate?

Mr. KEISWETTER. I think they are legitimate in the sense that

they feel them and that they accurately reflect the views that these

people express, in fact, to U.N. agencies. Since we have not unfortunately been able to even arrange some of the preliminary steps

that will lead toward this, such as family visits back and forth
6

across the berm, I think we have not yet had a chance, in fact, to

test whether there is justification. So the answer is these are the

fears accurately reported. Whether they are legitimate or not, I do

not know.

Mr. ROYCE. As I mentioned in my opening statement, it was 2

years ago when the Administration said that MINURSO’s time is

running out. Today, you have testified that after nearly a decade

the possibility of holding the referendum still seems years away, at

best, in your words. Is the Administration planning to end its support of MINURSO if Special Envoy Baker fails to make progress

or will it continue?

Mr. KEISWETTER. This is an excellent question. As you may

know, MINURSO’s mandate is renewed at very short intervals. It

renewed most recently at a 3-month interval; before that, for a 2-

month interval.

Mr. ROYCE. It expires in October.

Mr. KEISWETTER. Yes. So one of the reasons, in fact, for this is

for accountability in the sense that you have suggested, but I would

like to emphasize what MINURSO does in a broader sense.

I have described it in my testimony as a ‘‘safety net.’’ It does a

lot of things. First of all, it helps monitor and keep the cease-fire.

This has been very important at various times, particularly recently, when Algeria went through a period of crisis. It also is responsible, of course, for such efforts as coordinating demining.

Then, in addition to that, there are the duties that it has and responsibilities that it has for the process of identification and the

appeals, and it is proper for this process to go forward.

Mr. ROYCE. True, true, but the parties did not agree to a Cypruslike, peacekeeping agreement. They agreed to have an election, and

the United States signed on to the agreement under which there

was going to be an election. So now we are talking about the upside of the fact that this has evolved into a Cyprus-style peacekeeping agreement, and I am trying to ask, do we actually have a

commitment to move forward and push forward to have an honest

election?

Mr. KEISWETTER. The answer is Mr. Baker is doing his best to

try to resolve this problem, and he has asked the parties, in fact,

to consider two possibilities that I have outlined to you: either coming to grips with the problems with holding a referendum or, on

the other hand, considering other mutually acceptable, critical solutions.

Mr. ROYCE. I am going to turn now to Congressman Pitts, but

before I do, I would ask when this comes to an end. Is there ever

any intention of having accountability of saying what actually happened and what parties were holding up the process? Will there be,

after the fact, some accountability? I would just like to know that

for the record.

Mr. KEISWETTER. Mr. Baker has said that when the end comes,

that he would, in fact, name names and give accountability.

Mr. ROYCE. Right, and Mr. Baker is working for the United Nations at this time and doing a yeoman’s job on this, and I have met

with him. I appreciate all he is trying to do, but ultimately it becomes the responsibility of the Administration and of the Congress,

and at some point I think we have to come to grips with the reality
7

of what happened and why enough pressure was not brought to

bear on bringing about an agreement for an election. But with that

said, I am going to turn to Mr. Pitts of Pennsylvania, and I am

going to go make this vote. Thank you, Mr. Keiswetter.

Mr. KEISWETTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PITTS. (A Representative in Congress from Pennsylvania,

and Member of the Budget and Armed Services Committees) [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this

timely hearing on the Western Sahara and the final implementation of the settlement plan. I will submit my entire statement for

the record, but I would like to make a couple of comments.

I think it is vital at this time that all parties to the settlement

plan signed by the United States’ Special Envoy and former Secretary of State James Baker and the implementation. Despite the

International Court of Justice ruling in 1975 that Morocco had no

claim to the territory, Morocco continued to assert the Western Sahara as part of its country.

Tribal links do not establish sovereignty over a nation. That idea

was used by Saddam Hussein to justify his invasion and attempted

takeover of Kuwait. I visited some of the refugee camps in the Sahara Desert to talk to some of the people and the officials, and I

am a little concerned about what I hear now regarding abandoning

and disregarding the right of the people to vote for self-determination.

I would like to ask you if it is accurate that the U.S. Government, since 1975, on several occasions has made statements in support of the right of the people of the Western Sahara to self-determination, if this is accurate, please elaborate on how it is possible

for the current Administration, according to a number of reports,

to search for a resolution of the conflict which will completely deny

the right to self-determination, Mr. Keiswetter.

[Statement of Mr. Pitts appears in the appendix.]

Mr. KEISWETTER. Mr. Congressman, let me begin by saying that

the first part of your question, that the U.S., of course, had endorsed repeatedly the U.N. settlement plan, which includes identification of the voters, the appeals process, and then the actual referendum. That offer is still strongly supported by us and is still on

the table. But as the chairman noted a few minutes ago, the first

election referendum was to be held in January 1992. It is now more

than 8 years later, and it is still pending.

This is, in fact, one of the very strong reasons that has motivated

former Secretary Baker to ask the question of is there some other

way, and he has suggested that this, in fact, could be some option

that would be not full integration into Morocco and not full independence. He also said that it could be the alternative of, in fact,

somehow reaching a political arrangement that will allow the referendum to go ahead, and he is now in the process of exploring

these options.

So when the parties meet again, now later this month, both of

those topics are under discussion, and we would hope that there

could be progress made toward making a decision by the parties as

to how they want to go ahead.
8

Mr. PITTS. The other parts of the negotiated settlement plan;

does the State Department believe that the parties are still behold

to the other terms of the agreement?

Mr. KEISWETTER. In terms of repatriation and so on and so forth,

I think, as I have outlined in my testimony, there has not been a

great deal of progress on any of the fronts. For example, on refugees, some 120,000 have been preregistered, but on the other hand,

we still do not have agreement on confidence-building measures

that will allow families to visit across the berm.

Mr. PITTS. The group, MINURSO, I think that is an acronym

that stands for United Nations Mission for Referendum?

Mr. KEISWETTER. It is a French acronym.

Mr. PITTS. Does the State Department believe MINURSO should

continue to exist?

Mr. KEISWETTER. We have repeatedly endorsed and voted for the

continuation of MINURSO, and we have kept it under a very short

leash of 1-month periods, 2 months, and recently 3 months, so that

its performance can be evaluated. But that being said, it has several functions that we think are important to preserving stability.

First is sort of a safety net that it has provided in monitoring the

cease-fire and preserving the cease-fire during difficult times, for

example, when Algeria went through a period of crisis here recently. It also provides some breathing room for the new leadership

in both countries to modernize. It undertakes such programs as coordination of demining. All of this is in addition to the principal

jobs that I think you may be more familiar with that concern the

identification of voters and the appeals proposal. Frankly, if we go

forward with the referendum, it is vital to sorting out the details

of the referendum and to making it work.

Mr. PITTS. I understand that the POLISARIO did agree to the

confidence-building measures, that it was Morocco that has not

agreed to that. Is that your understanding?

Mr. KEISWETTER. If you have in mind here in particular the family visits, they were discussed at the last meeting of the technical

committee in Geneva in July, and I think it is fair to say that both

sides agreed in principle to the confidence-building measure of family visits. But since then, they have been unable to agree on the

language describing how this would work. So I think the answer

is both agreed in principle, but there are now disagreements about

the specific language that would make it work.

Mr. PITTS. Now, then, on the process of determining who are legitimate voters for the referendum, what is the status of that, and

who is agreeing, and who is disagreeing, and why are they agreeing?

Mr. KEISWETTER. The United Nations, MINURSO, has examined

more than 200,000, I believe the latest statistic that I saw was

something 244,000 individual cases. It has found about 90,000 to

be eligible voters. In addition to this now, there have been more

than 130,000 that have contested those decisions. Almost all of

these, not all, but almost all, are, in fact, people who were excluded

from the rolls and think they should be included in the rolls.

Now, part of the problem here is the circumstances in which this

occurs. The voting rolls are based on the Spanish census of 1974,

and so it is dated, and there have to be certain adjustments to it
9

to make it fair. It does not include, for example, Sahrawis that

were not residents in either area at the time. Now, I can only quote

the U.N. Secretary General on this issue, in which he said that

both of the parties see, in fact, the voter base as being important

to the outcome and in sort of getting out the vote. So there are, I

think, problems on both sides here.

Mr. PITTS. Have there not been about 130,000 appeals?

Mr. KEISWETTER. Yes. That is true. That is the figure, of 130,000.

That is the number of appeals.

Mr. PITTS. How many are from Morocco? What percentage?

Mr. KEISWETTER. A large percentage of them are, almost all, in

fact, because they are people who were Sahrawis but maybe residents in Morocco and other extenuating circumstances. One of the

biggest problems is the two-chiefs problem. To, in fact, be enrolled

and be declared eligible, there have to be two tribal chiefs who will

vouch for the voter. In many cases there is only one tribal chief.

So these are the problems that MINURSO faces.

Mr. PITTS. So of the 130,000, what, better than 98 percent are

from Morocco, and maybe 1 percent or less are from the

POLISARIO fields?

Mr. KEISWETTER. I do not think it is fair to say that they are exactly from Morocco. I do have some statistics here. This shows 75

percent, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. PITTS. Seventy-five percent?

Mr. KEISWETTER. I will be glad to provide this to you. It is from

the Secretary General’s report, which gives a full breakdown by location, and whether it is because of an exclusion or inclusion. I will

be glad to provide that.

[The submitted break down appears in the appendix.]

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. On a humanitarian note, when I was over

there, I visited victims of land mines. There are still millions of

land mines. There was a team, I believe, from Norway ready to remove land mines, and they were having a problem getting permission from the government of Morocco to go in and remove those

land mines. Has the State Department taken a position or advocated anything about removal of land mines?

Mr. KEISWETTER. We would encourage the effort. I do not know

anything specific about the case that you mentioned.

Mr. PITTS. But has the State Department urged the removal of

land mines?

Mr. KEISWETTER. Yes. We have encouraged all of these confidence-building and humanitarian measures. We think this is one

of the major justifications for MINURSO.

Mr. PITTS. The point is, there are innocent victims, children for

instance, I saw a little girl who had her leg blown off from a land

mine, that are being harmed just from the existence of these mines.

When you have got an international organization willing to go in

and remove wherever the impediment is, I think we ought to be advocating to try to remove those impediments and start removing

some of the land mines.

What about the return of POW’s from both sides? Are you familiar with the situation, and what has the State Department done to

try to get an exchange?
10

Mr. KEISWETTER. I am generally familiar with the situation. As

I understand it, at the moment there are only Moroccan POW’s

held by the POLISARIO, and now many of them have been held

for more than 25 years. We would hope that progress could be

made on this issue, as well as part of a confidence-building exercise

between the parties.

Mr. PITTS. Now, are they being held by the Sahrawis, or are they

not being permitted to return to Morocco by the Moroccan government? Do you know?

Mr. KEISWETTER. Mr. Congressman, I would like to get back to

you on the details of that, because while I have impressions, I

think it is important to be accurate.

Mr. PITTS. I visited with about 70 POW’s who were Moroccan,

some who have been there for 20 years, and was told that they

were free to return, that they had not received permission to return. Now, maybe that has occurred since then, but I think if we

can start exchanging, get the POW’s back, also, identify missing

persons, there are lists of many missing persons, exchange lists, removing land mines, do the humanitarian things, many of these

kinds of efforts toward a peaceful settlement would be very helpful.

The State Department has an opportunity, I think, and a responsibility to take a position and try to facilitate these matters.

Thank you. I do not have any more questions. I do not know if

the chair is coming back. He is not? So thank you very much, and

we will adjourn the hearing at this time.

Mr. KEISWETTER. It is a pleasure to talk with you.

[Whereupon, at 2:47 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
(11)

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 13, 2000
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