NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 12a0475n.06
No. 10-4618
UNI TED STATES COURT OF A PPEAL S FOR THE SI XTH CI RCUI T

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. ROBERT E. JONES, Def endant- Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FR OM T HE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT CO U RT F O R THE NORTHERN DI STRI CT OF OH I O

BEFORE: BOGG S, COOK, and WHI TE, Circuit Jud ges. HELE NE N. WHITE , Circuit Jud g e . Def endant- Appellant Robert E. J ones pleade d g uilty

to one count of being a felon-in- possession of a firea rm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g )(1) and was
sentenc ed to a term of forty -two months of imprisonment, followed b y t h re e y ea rs of supervised rele ase. J ones appea ls the district c ourt’s denial of his motion to s uppress e vidence on the g round that the police unlawfully stopped and sear ched the vehicle in which he was a passeng er. Although the police initially had rea sonable suspicion to make the traff ic stop, the g rounds for that suspicion

ce as ed to exis t befor e the police approa ched the vehicle. Be cause the continued detention of t h e vehicle and subsequent sear ch wer e there fore unlawful, we reve rse the district court’s judgme nt and

rema nd the ca se for

further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

-1-I

.

On Fe bruar

y 27, 2009, J ones rode as a passeng er in a vehicle trave ling on Superior Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio. Whil e driving in the opposite direc tion from J ones, Offic er Rich J ackson (“O ffice r J ackson” ) and his partne r observe d that the vehicle in which J ones was riding did not have a vis ible license plate on the re ar bumpe r, which O ffice r Jackson believed w as a violation of state law. Offic er J ackson thus stop ped the vehicle. As Offic er J ackson approa ched the vehicle, he noticed that there was a temporar y plate att ache d to the vehicle’ s rea r window. Be cause fog obscure d the plate, Offic er J ackson could not make out the numbers until he was 6 to 12 inches awa y from the vehicle and shined his flashlig ht on the plate. Although the initial basi s fo r t h e s t o p no longe r exis ted, Offi c e r Ja c k son continued the stop beca use he believed that the license plate’s display in the rea r window was illega l. When the dri v er could not produce his license, Offic er J ackson place d the driver in the rear of his patrol car while he attempted to asce rtain t he driver’s identit y . Once Offic er J ackson discovere d the driver had a suspended license, he place d the driver under arr est and order ed J ones and another passeng er o u t o f the vehicle. Offic er J ackson then sear ched the vehicle and found a firea rm underne ath the passeng er’ s seat. Upon questioning from Offic er J ackson, Jones admitted that he owne d the fire arm. The g overnme nt indicted J o n es fo r being a felon-in- possession of a firea rm on Marc h 10,
2009. J ones moved to suppress, inter alia , the firea rm on g rounds not rele vant here

. I n the motion,
J ones descr ibed the vehicle as not having any license tag s. The mag istrate judge held a hear ing on J ones’s motion on Fe bruar y 24, 2010. During the hear ing, counsel for J ones dis co v ered that the vehicle in fac t had a temporar y tag that was display ed in the rea r window and thus claimed that the traff ic stop was illega l. The mag istrate judge reque sted supplemental briefing on whether Ohio law

-2-require s that a temporar y license plate be visible to the office r prior to a traff i c s t o p an d wh ether d i s p l ay of a temporar

y license plate in the rea r window is proper . Both parties submitt ed supplemental briefing and the mag istrate judge held another suppression hear ing on M a r c h 1 6 , 2 0 1 0. The mag istrate judge then issued a repor t that rec ommended the motion b e d en i ed and informed
J ones that he had fourtee n day s to file objections. Four teen day s later, on April 21, 2010, the district

court a dopted the mag istrate judg e’s r eport.
I n its opinion, the district court stated that J ones had not filed any objections to the mag istrate jud ge’ s re p o rt

. Howeve r, when J ones’s counsel filed late objections on May 5, 2010, counsel indicated that J ones had previously filed objections pro se. The district court docket does not contain

a rec ord of these objections. On May 13, 2010, J ones filed a motion seeking new counsel, asser ting ineffe ctive assistance of counsel, based, in part, on his attorney ’s failure to file timely objections to the mag istrate judge ’s repor t. The court appointed new counsel on May 17, 2010, who filed a second motion to s uppress on July 11, 2010. I t is unclear w hether this mot ion was denie d or withdraw n. On J uly 16, 2010, J ones pled g uilty pursuant to a p l ea agr eement. Under that ag ree ment, J ones re serve d the rig ht to appeal the district c ourt’s denia l of his motion t o suppress. I I

. We must first addre ss whether the absenc e of rec ord obj ections to the mag istrate judge ’s
repor t prec ludes our revie w of J ones’s appea l. Ordinar ily a party that fails to f ile objections to the
mag istrate judge ’s repor

t waives the rig ht to appellate revie w. United States v. Taylor , 281 F. App’x 467, 469 (6th Cir. 2008). Howeve r, “beca use t he rule is a nonjurisdi ctional waiver provisi on, t he
Court of Appea ls may excuse the defa ult in the interests of justice.” Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); see also Carlson v. Horn , 899 F.2d 1221, *1 ( 6th Cir. 1990).

-3-I n this case , J ones m ay have submit ted t imely objections to the m ag istrate judge’ s repor t. Be cause the rec ord is unclea r on this matter and the g overnme nt asser ted in the plea ag ree ment that
J ones could rese rve appea l of this issue despite the lack of objections on rec ord, we will revie w the

case on the merits.
I I I

. A. We reviewa district cour t’s fac tual finding s on a motion to suppress for c lear err or and its leg al conclusions de novo. United States v. Adams , 583 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2009). Be cause the district court denied J o n es ’s motion to suppress, we consider “all evidenc e in the light most favor able to the United States.” United States v. Torres-Ramos , 536 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 2008).
B. The magistra te j udg e found that Ohio law is not settled on what constitutes proper di splay of temporar

y license plates and beca use “ther e is exis ting Ohio case law supporting Offic er J ackson’ s belief at the time he stopped the vehicle and approa ched the driver that the temporar y tag

was improperly display ed, Offic er J ackson had probable cause that the display in this situation violated the law.” I n the alterna tive, the mag istra te judge conclude d that “af ter [Officer ] J ackson was able to re ad the lice nse tag , he had an objectively rea sonable belief that the driver had violated the law and c ould lawfully

approa ch the dr iver a

nd ask the drive r questions.”
J ones contends that althoug h Offic er Jackson initially had re asonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, tha t suspicion was eliminated once Offic er J ackson vie wed the te mporary license pla te in the rea r window. There fore , arg ues J ones, the continued detention of the vehicle exceede d the scope of the orig inal purpose of the stop and thus violated his Fourth Ame ndment rig hts.

-4-A police office r may conduct a brief investiga tor y s t o p , al so known as a Terry stop, of a

person if the office r has a rea sonable suspicion, supported by specific articula ble fac ts, that criminal 1
acti v i t y h as o ccurred or is about to occur . United States v. Atchley , 474 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007). Be sides being justified at its inception, a Terry stop “must be rea sonably rela ted in scope to the circ umstances which justified the” initial interfe renc e. United States v. Blair , 524 F.3d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 1 9 -2 0 (1968))

. An office r may not continue to detain a motorist once the purpose of the traff ic stop is complete unless something that occu rr ed during the stop cause d the office r to have independe nt rea sonable, articula ble suspicion of criminal activity

. United States v. Hill , 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Erwin , 155
F. 3 d 8 1 8 , 8 2 2 (6th Cir. 1998) ( en banc ), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 1123 (1999))

. I n order to have

rea sonable suspicion for a stop based on a traff ic violation, “a police office r must know or rea sonably believe that the driver of the car is doing something that repr esents a violation of the law.” Hughes , 606 F.3d at 316. When evalua ting the validity of a Terry stop, court s co n s i der the totality of the circ umstances. United States v. Smith , 594 F.3d 530, 537 (6th C i r. 2 0 1 0 ). “[ I ]f either the initial traff ic stop or the scope and duration of the stop was unlawful, the evidenc e and statements obtained from that illega lity must be excluded as ‘fr uit of the poisonous tre e.’” United States v. Gross , 550 F.3d 578, 583 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (citing W ong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). Offic er J ackson initially stopped J ones beca use he could not see a front or rea r license plate

Although the mag istrate judge used the probable cause standard, we note that the corr ect standard 1 for ongoing

crimes is the lowe r re asonable suspicion sta ndard. United States v. Hughes , 606 F.3d 311, 316 n.8 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Simpson , 520 F.3d 531, 541 (6th Cir. 2008) (“a seizure for an ong oing violation of any crime – no matter how minor – is g overne d by the standard of rea sonable suspi cion, not probable cause ,” even t houg h the probable cause standard applies to completed misdemea

nors)). -5-on the vehicle in w hich J ones was a passeng er. As Offic er J ackson approa ched the car on foot, he

saw the temporar

y plate proper ly aff

ix ed flush to the rea

r window. At this point, the purpose of the stop was complete. Howeve r, Offic er J ackson continued approa ching the vehicle, and when he was 6 to12 inches from the vehicle’s rear window and shi ned his flashlig ht on the plate, he could read the plat e’ s letters and numbers. After rea ding the temporar y plate, Offic er J ackson resumed his 2
approa ch due to his belief that the law require d a license plate to be illumi nated, on the rea r bumper, and visible from the police vehicle a s it is drivi ng down the stree t. Even thoug h this belief has no support in Ohio law, the stop will still be upheld if the license plate display was in fac t unlawful for

a differ ent rea son or if another violation justified the stop. During the motion-to-suppress hear ing, Offic er J ackson testified t h at he had no other rea sonable suspicion that J ones or the vehicle was
eng ag ed in criminal activity

. There fore , the stop will be valid only if the license plate display in fac t violated R.C. 4503.21. When constru i n g Ohio law, we must apply it acc ording to controlling decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman , 197 F.3d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir. 1999).

O f f ic e r Ja c kson’s testimony was partially inconsistent. During the first motion-to-su p p r e s s h e a r in g , 2 Offic er J ackson testified that the plate was “cle ar” from three fee t awa y . During the second motionto-suppress h ea ri n g, Of

fice r J ackson testified that only the outline of the temporar y tag was clea

r from three fee t. He also tes tified that he was not shining a flashlig ht on the plate from three fee t awa y . During the second hear ing, the mag istrate judge asked questions to clar ify Offic er J ackson’ s t es t i m o n y reg arding the distance from which he could rea d the temporar y plate. Offic er J ackson responde d that he could n o t rea d the temporar y plate until he was 6-12 inches from it; howeve r, shortly befor e that testimony , he testified that he could rea d the plate from three fee t awa y . Despite these inconsistencies, this court g ives g rea t defe renc e to finding s o f fa ct t h at “ar e based on deter mi n ati ons reg arding the cre dibilit y of witnesses.” Anderson , 470 U.S. at 575. For a finding based on cre dibilit y deter

minations to be clea

rly err oneous, the story , if not contra dicted by extrinsi c evidenc e, must be “so internally inconsistent or implausible on its fac e that a rea sonable fac tfinder would not cre dit it.” Id. Be cause a rea sonable fac tfinder could cre dit Offic er J ackson’ s testimony , we a cce pt the district court’s fa ctual finding s. -6-Be cause t h e Supreme Court of Ohio has not addre ssed what constitutes “plain view” under R.C.

4503.21, we may look to “the decisional law o f t h e s t at e's lower courts, other fede ral courts construing state law, restate ments of law, law revie w commentar ies, and other jurisdictions on the ‘majority ’ rule” to asce rtain how it would decide the issue. Id

. (citing Grantham & Ma n n v. Am. Safety P r o d

s
. , 8 31 F.2d 596, 608 (6th Cir. 1987)). Although decisions of Ohio’s appellate courts do not bind this court, we should not disreg ard them unless “convinc ed by other persua sive data that [t he Supreme Court of Ohio] would decide otherwise.” Id. (citing Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch , 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967)).
I n finding that Offic er J ackson had probable cause to continue the stop, the mag istrate judge stated that “[i] t is not clea r from exis ting Ohio case law whether an unillumi nated temporar y tag in the rea r window of a car whose letters and numbers can be rea d only from a distance of a foot or less and with the aid of a flashlig ht is i n ‘pl ain view’ under [Ohio Revised Code §] 4503.21.” The rele vant portion of R.C. 4503.21 states:
No person to whom a temporar y license placa

rd or windshield sticker has been issued for the use of a motor vehicle unde r sec tion 4503.182 of the R evised Code, and no opera tor of that motor vehicle, sha ll fail to display the tempora

ry license placa

rd in plain view from the rea

r of the vehicl e ei t h er in the rea r window or on an external rea r surfa ce of the motor vehicle, o r fa i l t o display the windshield sticker in plain view on the rea

r window of the motor vehicle. No temporar y license placa

rd or windshield sticker shall be c overe d by any materia l that obstructs its vis ibilit y . R.C. § 4503.21(a). 3 Contrary to the mag istrate judge ’s finding , at the time of the stop it was clea r from exis ting Ohio case law that an unobstructed and unillumi nated temporar y license plate aff

ix ed to a vehicle’ s

The applicable City of Cleveland ordinanc e is virtually identical to R.C. § 4503.21. For purposes 3 of this appea l, it is unnece ssary to analy ze eac h law sepa

rate ly

. -7-rea

r window that was both visible and leg ible from the rea r o f t h e vehicle did not violate R.C.
4503.21. I n addition, the Ohio Court of Appeals has squarely h el d t h at a properly aff ix ed li cense plate that is only obscure d by fog does not violate R.C. 4503.21 if the office r can rea d the plate. See Ohio v. Cooke , No. 98-L -160, 1999 WL 778378, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1999) (unpublished opinion). Alt h o u g h the g overnme nt maintains that the license plate here should have been illum i n at ed to be in compliance with R.C. 4503.21, the l aw does not impose such a require ment. See Ohio v. B a u mgartner , No. L -98-1282, 1999 WL 375519, at *1 (Ohio C t.App. J une 11, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (R.C. 4503.21 does not make a motorist “re sponsible to light the are a wher e [a temporar

y ] tag is display ed so it will not b e o b s t ru ct ed from view during the dark hours of the night a nd ear ly morning .”)
T h e mag istrate judge cited, inter alia , Ohio v. Keathley , 562 N.E.2d 932 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988), to support its finding that Offic er J ackson could still detain J ones afte r he viewed the temporar y plate. I n Keathley , an office r stopped a v eh i cle beca use dirt cover ed the reg istration sticker and the office r could not deter mine if the sticker was valid. Id. at 933. Although the office r could view the valid sticker as he approa ched the vehicle, he still detained the driver and eventua lly cited him for a suspended license. Id

. T h e Keathley court aff irmed the lower court’s denial of defe ndant’s motion to suppress on the g round that the office r had probable cause to continue the stop bec a u s e th e p late violated Troy Ordinanc es Section 335.10, which specifie d that “a license plate shall

not be cover ed, obscure d or conce aled by any part or acc essory of the v ehicle, or by any fore ign substance o r materia l, and shall be reada ble i n its entirety from left to rig ht.” Id; see al so Ohio v. T erry, 719 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio C t. App. 1998) (tempora ry tag partially taped to rea r window such that some of the numbers wer e conce aled was not in compliance with R.C. 4503.21); Ohio v. Colton,

-8-No. 20760, 2005 WL 2077785 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug

. 19 , 2 005) (tempora ry tag at bottom of rea

r window that was not visible from the rea r of the vehicle violated R.C. 4503.21.) (unpublished opinion); Ohio v. Hanna, No. WM-99-016, 2000 WL 262356 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2000) (license plate on front dashboar d of vehicle that could not be rea d by the office r as he passed by violated R.C. 4503.21) (unpublished opinion). The mag istrate judge also cited this court’s decision in United States v. Elmore , 304 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 2002), for the proposit ion t h at “e v en if Offic er J ackson lacked reasona ble s uspicion that

a traff ic violation was being committed after he approa ched the car on foot and discovere d and rea d the temporar

y license plate, he could lawfully approa ch the driver and ask him qu es tions.” I n Elmore , the office r stopped a vehicle beca use it did not have a visible license plate, but upon “ver y close inspection” the officer could “disce rn—and with some difficulty , rea d—throug h the car ’s heavily tinted rea

r window a temporar

y license tag

. ” Id

. The Elmore court stated that Ohio law require s that temporar

y plates display ed in the rea r window be clea

rly visible and not obstructed by tinted windows. Id. Additionally , in dicta the Court stated that the off icer :

was not prohibited by the Four th Amendment from conducting a sear ch of the car once the initial purpose for pulling over the car , in this case to verify that the car had license tag s, had been fulfilled.... [T] his circ uit ha s repe atedly held that ‘[o] nce the purpose of the traff

ic stop is completed, a motorist cannot be further detained unless something t h at o cc u rred during the stop cause d the office r to have a rea sonable, articula ble suspicion that criminal activity was afoot’.... Her e the purpose of the stop plainly had not been completed, since the Offic er had rea son to believe that the display of the tempora

ry tag was in violation of the law. Id. at 561 n.1 (interna l citations omit ted).
I n addition, the g overnme nt cites Ohio v. Lavalette , No. WD-02-025, 2003 WL 1904394 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2003) (unpublished opinion), a case wher e an office r stopped a vehicle

-9-beca

use rust initially obstructed his vi ew of the license plate but the off icer was ultimately able to

rea d the plate as he approa ched the vehicle. Id

. at * 1

. T h e Lavalette court found the stop lawful partially beca use the rust on de fenda

nt’s plate violated R.C. 4503.21. Id. The case s relied on by the mag istrate judge and the g overnme nt make clea r that R.C. 4503.21 holds drivers responsible for proper ly aff ix ing their l i cense plates and keeping them fre e from obstructions, such as rust or tinted cover s. Howeve r, R.C. 4503.21 does not mandate the impossibl e 4
and force drivers to be responsible for elements outside of t h eir control, such as a poorly lit street or fog

. Cooke , 1999 WL 778378, at *4. I t is not difficult t o see tha t such an interpr etation would make a driver’ s compliance with R.C. 4503.21 depende nt upon the particula r street he or she is on

or the time of day he or she is driving

. We have y et t o fi n d a single Ohio case that supports that interpre tation of R.C.4503.21.
I n th e a lt erna tive, the mag istrate judge found that even if Offic er J ackson mistakenly beli e v e d that the temporar

y plate on J ones’s vehicle violated R.C. 4503.21, “he had an objectively rea sonable b el ief that the driver violated the law and could lawfully approa ch the driver and ask the driv er questions.” We disag ree . This court has not y et answe red whether an office r’s objectively rea sonable mistake of law

can e stablish reasona

ble suspicion for a sear ch or seizure. We need not here beca use we find that

A more rec ent Ohio Court of Appea ls case , not cited by the district court or g overnme nt, is simil ar 4 to Lavalette and Keathley

. I n Ohio v. Phillips , No. 22918, 2009 WL 2106294, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. J uly 17, 2009) (unpublished opinion ), an office r stopped a vehicle for an obstructed temporar y license plate wher e he could not r ead its plate due to a tinted lice nse plate cover that was smudge d with dirt and salt. Upon approa ching the vehicle on foot, the office r was able to rea d the plate. Id. The court held that the office r had rea sonable suspicion to continue the stop afte r rea ding the plate beca use the tinted license plate cover smudge d with dirt and salt obstructed the license plate in violation of R.C. 4503.21. -10-the office r’s belief that the license plate display in this case violated R.C. 4503.21 was not

objectively

rea sonable. Offic er J ackson conce ded that he was able to r ead the temporar y plate in its entirety befor e interac ting with the driver. Howeve r, Offic er J ackson continued the stop beca use of his belief that the license plate had to be on the rea r bumper, illumi nated, and rea dable from his car as he drove down t he st ree t. This belief finds no support under Oh i o ca s e l aw o r i n the s tatute i tself. Offic er J ackson also believed that a rea r window display of a temporar y license plate was improper. Ag ain, there is no basis for this belief as it direc tl y co n t radicts the lang uag e of R.C. 4503.21. See R.C. 4503.21(a) (“no opera tor of that motor vehicle, shall fail to display the temporar y license placa

rd in plain view from the rea

r of the ve hicle either in t he rear window or on an e x terna l rea r surface of the motor vehicle” ) (empha sis added)

. Fur ther, Ohio case law expli ci t l y co n t radic ts Offic er J ackson’ s belief that fog is a n obstruction within the meaning of the statute. See Cooke , 1999 WL 778378, at *4. For these rea sons, Offic er J ackson’ s belief that the manner of display ing the license plate at issue violated R.C. 4503.21 was not objec tively rea sonable.
I n sum, R.C. 4503.21 require s that a temporary plate be disp l ay ed “in pl ain vi ew from the

rea r of the vehicle either in the rea r window or on an external rea r surfa ce of the motor vehicle” and

not be “cove red by any materia l that obstructs its visibil ity .” The display in this case satisfied those require ments. I f not for the fac t that Offic er J ackson conducte d the stop on a dark, winter night in

5

The two most rec ent Ohio Court of Appea ls decisions addre ssing the lawfulne ss of a traff ic stop 5 based on simil ar fac ts support this court’s conclusion that Ohio court s wo uld find that Offic er J ackson lacke d rea sonable suspicion to detain appellant once he rea d the temporar y plate. I n Ohio v. L opez , No. 93197, 2010 WL 2202890 (Ohio C t. App. J une 3, 2010) (unpublis hed opini on), t he court found an office r lacke d rea sonable suspicion to continue the stop of a vehicle based on a lack of license plates once the office r was able to see a temporar y plate aff ix ed flush to the rea

r window. Although the office r could see the plate upon exit ing his car , the office r said the plate was not leg ible -11-an are a that was poorl y illumi nated, he likely would have had no difficulty rea ding the plate. As

Offic er J ack s o n d i d n ot obtain independe nt rea sonable suspicion that the vehicle was eng ag ed in criminal activity afte r rea ding the plate, and Offic er J ackson’ s belief that the tempor a r y plate violated Ohio law was not objectively re as o n ab le, the continued detention of the vehicle and subsequent

sear ch we re unla

wful. Acc ording ly , the firearm that Offic er J ackson found while conduc ting the 6
unlawf u l s ea rch should have been suppressed. United States v. See , 574 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2009) (c iting W

ong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963))

. I V.
Fo r t he fore g oing rea sons, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of J ones’s motion to
suppress, VACATE J ones’s conviction, and REMAND the case for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

beca use the rea

r win d o w wa s angled, causing a g lare

. Id. at *1. The Lopez court found the temporar y plate in compliance with R.C. 4503.21 beca use i t was a ffixed flush to the rear window and not obstructed in a

ny way . Id. at *4. I n Lakewood v. Shelton , No. 95746, 2011 WL 3860510, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2011) (unpublished opinion), the court compar ed Lopez and Phillips and found “[the] case to be simil ar to Lopez and distinguishable from Phillip s . ” I n Shelton , the office r st opped a vehicle whose l icense plat e was illegible beca use i t was covere d with snow. Id. at *1. Upon approa ching the car , the office r could rea d the pl at e b u t could not rec all whether he brushed the snow off or if it fell off. Id. The court held that the stop was unlawful beca use there was no rea son to detain defe ndant af ter the of fice r could re ad the lice nse plate. Id. at *4. Under Ohio law, once a police of fice r no long er ha s rea sonable suspicion that a ve hicle does not 6 have the proper

tag s, the police c an explain the rea son for the initial stop to the driver but ca nnot ask for the driver ’s license or otherw ise furthe r deta in the vehicle. Ohio v. Chatton , 463 N.E.2d 1237, 1240-41 (Ohio 1984)

. -12-