1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

CINDY HARRISON, as Legal 

Guardian of Robert Gene Wells,

 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 5:21-cv19-TKW-MJF 

TOMMY FORD, in his Official 

Capacity as SHERIFF of BAY COUNTY,

And RICK ANGLIN, in his Supervisory 

Capacity, 

Defendants. 

__________________________________/

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION

TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY 

AND EXPERT WITNESS FEES

Plaintiff, Cindy Harrison, as legal Guardian of Robert Gene Wells, and the 

undersigned counsel, respond to Defendants’ Motion for Attorney and Expert

Witness Fees [ECF No. 77] (the “Instant Motion”1

) as follows:

1

 On August 29, 2022, the Defendants filed the instant motion titled "Defendants' 

Motion for Attorney and Expert Witness Fees." [ECF No. 77]. On April 26, 2022, 

Defendants sent to the undersigned via email only a document titled “Defendants’ 

Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 

Defendants did not file, as a motion, their “Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 

11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”; instead, they filed it as an “Exhibit” to the 

instant motion. [ECF No. 76-1]. The instant motion (ECF No. 77) will be referred to 

as the “Instant Motion.” The document at ECF No. 76-1 will be referred to as the 

“April 26, 2022 Motion for Sanctions.”

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I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants' Instant Motion is, itself, frivolous. As explained below, it is not 

only procedurally defective but also makes several misleading arguments about the 

facts and laws pertinent to this action. 

By way of example, Defendants claim that the Instant Motion is “procedurally 

sufficient” [ECF No. 77, p. 12]. However, it is abundantly clear Defendants never 

served it before the date it was filed with this Court (August 29, 2022). Instead, 

Defendants emailed (not served, as required by Rules 5 and 11) a different paper 

they listed as an “Exhibit” to the Instant Motion [See ECF No. 76, the “April 26, 

2022 Motion for Sanctions”]. 

By way of another example, Defendants omit a text message agreement about 

the scope of their Rule 11 motion. In that conversation, which is explained more 

thoroughly below, Defendants agreed that Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint would 

no longer be the target of Defendants’ Rule 11 ambitions. However, even though 

Plaintiff stopped advocating for Count III and abandoned the claim, Defendants still 

included argument about Count III in their Instant Motion. 

Other examples of the wrongful nature of the Defendants’ Instant Motion are 

explained throughout this response. 

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II. BACKGROUND

1. On April 26, 2022, counsel for Defendants sent (via email only) a 

document titled “Defendants’ Motion For Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11” (referred 

to herein as the “April 26, 2022 Motion for Sanctions.”) [See ECF Nos. 76-1 and 

76-2].2 Assuming for the moment it was adequately served under Rule 5(a) (a false 

assumption), the 21-day safe harbor period would expire on May 17, 2021.3

 2. On May 12, 2022, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary 

Judgment. [ECF No. 52]. On that same day, they filed a Motion to Strike the 

Testimony of the Plaintiff's Expert (Ron McAndrew). [ECF No. 47].

 3. On May 16, 2022, within the 21-day safe harbor period, counsel for 

Plaintiff emailed counsel for Defendants (Jennifer Hawkins), informing her that 

Plaintiff would agree to stipulate the dismissal of Count III. See attached Exhibit A. 

 4. Not having heard back from Ms. Hawkins regarding the May 16, 2022 

email, on May 17, 2022 counsel for Plaintiff text messaged counsel for Defendant

restating the agreement to dismiss Count III. See attached Exhibit B. As reflected 

in the attached text message thread,

4 counsel for Defendants acknowledging the 

2 Plaintiff’s counsel never consented in writing to receipt of any motions for 

sanctions, attorneys' fees, or costs in this case. 

3 Twenty-one days after April 26, 2021 is May 17, 2021.

4 The messages include discussions about a case other than the instant one, so those 

parts of the thread have been redacted. Should the Court wish to see the entire thread 

without redactions, Plaintiff would ask permission to file it under seal. 

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agreement and stated that the April 26, 2022 Motion for Sanctions would “only apply 

to the remaining counts.” Those text messages read as follows: 

Marie Mattox: I have agreed within the safe harbor time to 

dismiss count 3. Not sure what I need to do other than that. I’ll file 

the notice of dismissal of that claim. 

Jennifer Hawkins: Yes. I agree you are dismissing count 3 within 

the safe harbor period. So my rule 11 will only apply to the 

remaining counts. Count 4 was dismissed by judge while ago. – so I 

don't think you need to do anything on that. Otherwise I think we are 

on the same page – I just am not drafting the dismissal for you. I am 

not objecting to your dismissal of count 3. So. I think we are on the 

same page? 

Marie Mattox: Yes and thank you. 

(emphasis supplied). Thus, as of May 17, 2022, it was clear to Plaintiff’s counsel 

that all counsel were “on the same page” and the April 26, 2022 Motion for Sanctions 

would “only apply to the remaining counts.”

 5. On June 13, 2022, in lieu of filing a dismissal, Plaintiff responded to 

Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion without addressing Count III, thereby 

abandoning it. [ECF No. 60]. The Court entered its Summary Judgment Order on 

August 22, 2022, noting it was apparent Plaintiff had abandoned the claim. [ECF 

Nos. 74, p.20]. 

 6. On August 29, 2022, the Defendants filed the Instant Motion. [ECF No. 

77]. Never before August 29th had the Instant Motion been seen or served on Plaintiff 

or his counsel. 

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III. SECTION 1988 LIABILITY

As an initial matter, section 1988 does not authorize a fee award against a 

party’s attorney. Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 761, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 

2461, 65 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1980) (“Neither § 1988 nor § 2000e–5(k) makes any 

mention of attorney liability for costs and fees. Roadway identifies nothing in the 

legislative records of those provisions that suggests that Congress meant to control 

the conduct of litigation. Without any evidence that Congress wished to alter the 

uniform structure established by the 1853 Act, we are reluctant to disrupt it.”, 

footnote omitted).

5

 Moreover, as explained below, to avoid a chilling effect on civil

rights litigation, section 1988 fees are rarely awarded to Defendants.

A. Section 1988 Awards To Defendants Are Rare Because 

It Undercuts The Efforts Of Congress To Promote The 

Vigorous Enforcement Of” Civil Rights Laws

Years ago, the Supreme Court established a double standard for attorney fee 

awards. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 413, 98 S.Ct. 698, 54 

L.Ed.2d (1978). On the one hand, prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights actions are to 

be awarded attorney fees in all but exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Newman v. 

5 Should fees or costs be entered against Cindy Harrison, Legal Guardian, and/or 

Robert Gene Wells, they reserve the right to show the Court their limited ability to 

pay in the bifurcated procedure. “The law in [the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Eleventh C]ircuit is clear that ability to pay should be considered in the award of 

attorney's fees under § 1988.” Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 528 (11th Cir. 

1998).

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Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402, 19 L.Ed.2d 1763, 1766 (1974)(class 

action brought under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 204(a), 48 U.S.C. § 

2000a–3(a)). Prevailing defendants, on the other hand, may be awarded attorney fees 

only when the plaintiff's claim is “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or ... 

plaintiff continued to litigate after it became so.” Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 

447 U.S. 752, 762, 65 L.Ed.2d 488, 498 (1980), quoting Christiansburg Garment 

Co. v. EEOC, supra, at 657. 

 In Christiansburg Garment Co., the Supreme Court examined fee awards 

against plaintiffs in Title VII actions and concluded that:

a district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing 

defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's action 

was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not 

brought in subjective bad faith.

434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700, 54 L.Ed.2d at 657. This standard was later held 

applicable to claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for attorneys' fees. Pasley v.

City of Jesup, Georgia, No. CIV.A. 283-176, 1984 WL 2573, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 

7, 1984), citations omitted. Therefore, defendants in a section 1983 action are only 

entitled to an award of attorneys' fees if, without regard to the existence of subjective 

bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, the action initiated was “frivolous, unreasonable, 

or without foundation.” Id. 

In applying these criteria, the Christiansburg Court admonished district courts 

to “resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by 

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concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have 

been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could 

discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be 

sure of ultimate success." 434 U.S. at 421–22, 54 L.Ed.2d at 657. Although 

acknowledging the need to deter meritless litigation, the Court nevertheless was 

concerned that assessing counsel fees against plaintiffs would "substantially add to 

the risks inherent in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to 

promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII." 434 U.S. at 422; 

54 L.Ed.2d at 657. Likewise, an award to Defendants pursuant to section 1988 would 

also undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of civil 

rights actions. 

B. Defendant Is Not The Prevailing Party To This 

Lawsuit 

Section 1988 is only available to a “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988; 

Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 742 F.2d 590, 591 (11th 

Cir.1984) ("Prevailing for purposes of § 1988 is exhibited by the fact that the litigant 

'has acquired the primary relief sought.' ") (quoting from Iranian Students 

Association v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 1979)).

6 Here, the Court 

6 Alternatively, if the Court does not deny Defendant’s Motion outright, the Motion 

is at best premature and improper at this stage, and the Court should deny the Motion 

without prejudice until the end of the case. See Lichtenstein v. Consolidated Serv. 

Group, Inc., 173 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that “[c]ourts should, and 

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declined to enter judgment on Counts V and VI of the Amended Complaint (claims 

for common law negligent training and negligence). [ECF No. 74, p. 25]. Should 

Plaintiff prevail on one or both of these state law counts, he will have “acquired the 

primary relief sought” and will be the prevailing party in this litigation.7

 

C. Plaintiff’s Claims Were Not “Frivolous, Unreasonable, 

Or Without Foundation”

 Section 1988 only permits an award against a plaintiff upon a finding that the 

action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. As explained below, they 

were not. 

1. Deliberate Indifference/Failure to Protect - 

Counts I and II

Plaintiff is indisputably a vulnerable person, being cognitively and physically 

disabled due to car accidents in 2015 and 2016. [Summary Judgment Order, ECF 

No. 74, p. 2]. He has low intellectual functioning, impaired speech patterns, and 

often do, defer consideration of certain sanctions motions until the end of [the 

litigation] to gain a full sense of the case and to avoid unnecessary delay of 

disposition of the case on the merits. This is a sensible practice where [as here] the 

thrust of the sanctions motion is that institution of the case itself was improper”); 

Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., No. 00 Civ. 1115(LAK), 

2000 WL 528633, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2000) (denying Rule 11 motion without 

prejudice “to renewal at conclusion of litigation”).

7 Moreover, when a plaintiff's civil rights lawsuit involves both frivolous and nonfrivolous claims, a court may grant reasonable fees to the defendant under § 1988, 

but only for costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the

frivolous claims. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 180 L. Ed. 2d 45 

(2011). Plaintiff reserves the right to maintain this argument in a second phase of the 

bifurcated procedure, should there be one. 

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memory difficulties. [Id.]. He also has difficulty walking and uses a walker to get 

around. [Id.]. Defendants had him in custody after he was arrested for nonviolent 

crimes, namely drug possession with the intent to sell and several misdemeanors. 

[Id. at 2]. 

Defendants housed Plaintiff with an inmate accused of child molestation, plus

another inmate “tied to a recent high-profile murder” – i.e., inmates Bell and McCoy. 

[Id. at 4]. According to another inmate, Bell and McCoy had previously “constantly 

picked on” Plaintiff. [Id. at p. 6, footnote 6]. After violating Plaintiff by shoving a

rubber glove placed on a broom into his buttocks, Bell and McCoy were criminally 

charged and pled no contest. [Id. at p. 6]. 

Plaintiff claimed that Defendants were deliberately indifferent and failed to 

protect Plaintiff because they housing him with inmates such as a child molester and 

another inmate “tied to a recent high-profile murder.” Bell and McCoy used a broom

they were given access to by Defendants and assaulted Plaintiff as he made his way 

to a nearby bathroom shower after soiling himself. Moreover, Bell and McCoy had 

previously “constantly picked on” Plaintiff – a particularized threat that was 

witnessed by another inmate. [Id. at p. 6, footnote 6]. Plaintiff’s pled that the 

situation predictably resulted in Plaintiff being sexually assaulted by an already 

accused molester and another inmate, untimely concluding in additional criminal 

charges for sexual battery against Bell and McCoy. 

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Although Plaintiff produced evidence that at least one person knew he was 

“constantly picked on” by Bell and McCoy, Plaintiff needed only show that prison 

officials were aware of a general risk to inmates in his situation. Beers-Capitol v. 

Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 2001), citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The Supreme Court in Farmer anticipated 

just such a scenario: 

[I]f an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a 

substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, welldocumented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the 

circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been 

exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known 

about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact 

to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk.

Id. at 842-43, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Similarly, 

Farmer made clear that a prison official defendant cannot escape liability by showing 

that he did not know that this particular inmate was in danger of attack: ‘it does not 

matter . . . whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal 

to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.’" Beers-Capitol at 

131, citing Farmer at 843, emphasis in original. 

Thus, under Farmer, Plaintiff did not need to show a particularized threat to 

himself. It is foreseeable that a disabled person, such as Plaintiff, would be assaulted 

by persons such McCoy and Bell. Plaintiff pled that that generalized risk is sufficient 

to establish a claim for deliberate indifference.

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 2. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Medical 

 Needs - Count III

Defendants claim they had to expend additional attorney’s and expert’s fees 

in obtaining the dismissal of Count III [ECF No. 77, p. 8]; that is highly misleading. 

Defendants never disclosed the text message agreement between counsel wherein 

the parties both agreed to the eventual dismissal of Count III and that the April 26, 

2022 Motion for Sanctions would “only apply to the remaining counts.” Instead, the 

Instant Motion makes it seem like Plaintiff's counsel simply agreed to dismiss Count 

III and never followed up, forcing Defendants to expend additional fees and costs. 

Quite the contrary, in lieu of filing the dismissal, Plaintiff's counsel simply 

abandoned Count III without further input or objection by Defendants. 

 However, even assuming Plaintiff’s abandonment of Count III was not 

tantamount to a “dismissal,” Defendants did not have to expend additional attorneys 

and expert fees in obtaining dismissal of Count III. On April 26, 2022, Defendants 

emailed their April 26, 2022 Motion for Sanctions. On May 12, 2022, Defendants

filed both their Summary Judgment Motion and a Motion to Strike the Testimony of 

Plaintiff's Expert. [ECF Nos. 47 and 52]. On May 17th, the agreement was reached 

amongst counsel to dismiss Count III. See attached Exhibit B. After this May 17th

agreement, Plaintiff responded to the May 12th Summary Judgment Motion 

abandoning Count III, and the Court dismissed it as abandoned. [ECF Nos. 60 and 

74]. Nevertheless, Defendants’ Instant Motion wrongfully states: “Thus, Count III 

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was dismissed by the Court, as Plaintiff waived any argument by not addressing it 

in the motion, however, that did not come without expense to Defendant Sheriff, by 

way of attorney’s fees and expert’s fees.” [ECF No. 77, p.8], emphasis supplied.

Defendants did not have to take any additional efforts to secure the dismissal 

of Count III after Plaintiff agreed to dismiss it on May 17th (which, by the way, was 

within the 21-day safe harbor period). Although Defendants filed a Reply to 

Plaintiff's Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, it does not 

appear to address Count III (Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs – 

Sheriff Ford). [ECF No. 64]. However, even assuming Defendants’ Reply did touch 

on Count III, it should have been limited to the issues raised in Plaintiff’s Summary 

Judgment Response (which abandoned the claim) because it was a Reply. Thus, it is 

not accurate that Defendants were forced to spend additional fees or costs to secure

the dismissal of Count III after Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to dismiss it on May 17th. 

Even less accurate is this statement by Defendant in its Instant Motion about 

the lack of a filed dismissal of Count III: “Unfortunately, no such motion was ever 

filed with the Court, leaving Defendant Sheriff in a position where Count III had to 

be addressed in the motion for summary judgment.” [ECF No. 77, p. 8]. Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on May 12, 2022 [ECF No. 52 ]. Plaintiff's 

counsel’s email agreeing to dismiss Count III was sent on May 16, 2022, and the 

text message understanding between counsel occurred on May 17, 2022. Even 

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assuming Plaintiff did not file a dismissal of Count III with the Court, Defendants 

had already filed their Summary Judgment Motion on May 12, 2022 --- thus, it is 

not at all accurate that not filing the dismissal left “Defendant Sheriff in a position 

where Count III had to be addressed in the motion for summary judgment.” That 

statement is also incorrect. 

 3. Plaintiff’s ADA Claim

Regarding Plaintiff's ADA claims, Plaintiff is indisputably disabled as 

defined by the ADA. As noted by the Court, prison officials must accommodate an 

inmate's disability in a "reasonable and effective" manner. [ECF No. 74, p. 24, citing 

Arce v. Louisiana, 226 F. Supp. 3d 643, 651 (E.D. La. 2016) (citing Wells v. Thaler, 

460 Fed. App’x. 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2012))]. Moreover, although the Court found that 

Plaintiff did not articulate what “program, service or activity” Plaintiff was denied, 

the Court also noted that it is "not clear" whether placement in a particular area of 

the jail is such a "program, service, or activity" as per the ADA. Id. at p.22 (“. . . 

even if placement within a particular area of a jail is a “program, service or activity” 

(and it is not clear that it is). . . “). Thus, it is reasonable that a jail’s “program, service 

or activity” includes the conditions where an inmate is housed, including utilization 

of the benefits of such housing like the bathroom and shower.

 Moreover, although the Court also concluded that there was no evidence from 

which a jury could find that Mr. Wells’ housing assignment was made with 

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deliberate indifference to his disabilities [ECF No. 74, p.22], the same arguments 

made surpa regarding deliberate indifference still apply. For example, the 

Defendants chose to house an accused child molester and another inmate "tied to a 

recent high-profile murder" together with a vulnerable, nonviolent, disabled inmate. 

Defendants left a broom beside the shower area in the same room with them. Another 

inmate saw that Bell and McCoy had previously "constantly picked on" Plaintiff – a 

particularized threat that Defendants' guards should have seen. Even assuming no 

particularized risk to Plaintiff, classifying disabled nonviolent offenders the same as 

violent child molesters are, at a minimum, deliberately reckless and indifferent. See

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), 

discussed supra. Thus, Plaintiff's claims were not at all without a reasonable basis. 

 D. Plaintiff's Expert Witness, Ron McAndrew

On May 12, 2022, Defendants filed their Motion to Strike Ron McAndrew as 

an expert. On May 26th, Plaintiff responded, stating he consented to the motion, and 

on the next day and in light of Plaintiff’s consent, the Court entered a one-page Order 

on the matter. [ECF Nos. 55 and 56]. 

Despite Plaintiff’s consent to the Motion to Strike, Defendants still complain. 

They now claim that Plaintiff “undermined the very purpose of Local Rule 7.1(B), 

which cost Defendants unnecessary time and expense in the preparation of their 

Daubert Motion.” [ECF No. 77, p. 10 – 11]. However, it is unclear how Defendants' 

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argument about Plaintiff's expert supports section 1988 sanctions against Plaintiff. 

If anything, the fact that Plaintiff’s expert “had given ‘his all-time worst deposition,’ 

claiming it to be due to old age” supports that Plaintiff brought her claim in good 

faith. It’s not Plaintiff's fault that Expert Witness McAndrew provided unexpected 

testimony. 

 Moreover, Defendants did not include any reference about Plaintiff's expert

in their April 26, 2022, Motion for Sanctions (the motion only filed as its “Exhibit 

1” to its Instant Motion at ECF No. 76-1). However, without even attempting to 

comply with Rule 11’s safe-harbor provision regarding Plaintiff’s expert, 

Defendants have included argument about Ron McAndrew as support for Rule 11 

sanctions.8

 That is patently improper and, itself, a violation by Defendants of Rule 

11’s requirement that it “must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be 

presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial 

is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within 

another time the court sets.” See Rule 11(c)(2). If Defendants believed this expert 

witness issue was a proper basis for Rule 11 sanctions, they should have properly 

followed the procedures required under Rule 11 for bringing it. See O'Boyle v. 

Sweetapple, No. 14-cv-81250-KAM, 2016 WL 9559919, at *2–3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 

8 See ECF No. 77, p. 12 – 13 (“With regard to the substance of the Motion, 

undersigned counsel references this Court to the above-referenced arguments, as set 

forth in the section regarding entitlement based upon 42 U.S.C. §1988.”)

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2016) (“If Mayor Morgan believed the amended complaint merited Rule 11 

sanctions, he should have served a new Rule 11 motion challenging that pleading to 

begin a new safe-harbor period.”).

 E. Defendants’ Failure to Offer to Settle 

Defendants tout that they never offered to settle this case [ECF No. 77, p. 11]; 

however, the applicable fact is that Plaintiff never unreasonably refused to settle this 

case. These facts support not awarding fees and costs against Plaintiff under section 

1988. Otherwise, Defendants hoping to recover their fees and costs would be 

discouraged from offering any settlements in section 1988 cases. 

When explaining the general factors that may be considered (including that 

regarding settlement), the Court in Sullivan cited two cases, one of which was 

E.E.O.C. v. Kimbrough Investment Co., 703 F.2d 98, 103 (5th Cir.1983). See 

Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas Cnty., 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985). In 

Kimbrough Investment Co., the court noted that “This trial was held only after the 

government's [plaintiff, the E.E.O.C.’s] attempts to settle the case failed.” 

Kimbrough Inv. Co., 703 F.2d at 103 . The court stated:

This trial was held only after the government's attempts to settle 

the case failed. The employer's own offer of settlement through 

adoption of an affirmative action plan, in the words of the district court, 

“suggested the need for some steps to correct racial imbalance in certain 

aspects of its work force.” The employer argues that the EEOC's case 

was brought vexatiously because it used flawed and misleading 

statistics in its trial exhibits. We recognize that the EEOC used 

statistical evidence that on its face in some measure lacked probative 

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value. But some testimony and some analysis of hiring practices was 

valid probative evidence. We cannot conclude the case was 

vexatious.

E.E.O.C. v. Kimbrough Inv. Co., 703 F.2d 98, 103 (5th Cir. 1983), emphasis 

supplied. Thus, it is obvious that the plaintiff’s attempts to settle in Kimbrough Inv. 

Co. were an argument against sanctions. 

In this case, Defendants admit they never offered anything to resolve this 

matter, even a nuisance value settlement. This is not the situation where a plaintiff 

refuses to settle, thus driving up the costs of litigation. Defendants have it backward, 

their refusal to settle is a factor weighing against the imposition of fees or costs

against Plaintiff. 

 F. Dismissal Prior to Trial 

Although Plaintiff’s federal claims have been dismissed, his state law claims 

are still alive. Thus, there has not been a dismissal prior to trial; the trial should now 

occur in the state court.9

 

IV . RULE 11

 Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is itself improper and unsupported 

9

 Moreover, the federal claims were dismissed at a late stage of these proceedings – 

if Plaintiff's case was genuinely frivolous, Defendants could have moved for 

summary judgment earlier in the case. See Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 

1187-88 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that defendant might have avoided much of the 

expense of defending the claims had it conducted this litigation differently because 

requesting a “prompt decision will likely avoid significant unnecessary discovery.”).

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by law or fact. It is contrary to the spirit and intent of Rule 11, which should not "be 

prepared to emphasize the merits of a party's position ... [or] to intimidate an 

adversary into withdrawing contentions that are fairly debatable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 

(Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendment). Moreover, in moving for sanctions 

under Rule 11, Defendants violated Rule 11 multiple times. 

 A. The Court Should Deny The Motion Because It Is 

 Procedurally Defective 

 

Rule 11’s procedural requirements and limitations are strictly construed.

Robinson v. Alutiq-Mele, LLC, 643 F.Supp.2d 1342, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2009) 

(“Because of the penal nature of Rule 11, the procedural requirements of Rule are 

strictly construed”); Chex Sys., Inc. v. DP Bureau, LLC, 2011 WL 5459683, at *3 

(M.D. Fla. 2011) (same). Accordingly, “[n]early every federal appellate court in the 

country has held that a Rule 11 motion can be granted only where the movant 

demonstrates strict compliance with the safe harbor provision.” Rocket Real Est., 

LLC v. Maestres, No. 15-62488-CIV, 2017 WL 4303783, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 

2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-62488-CIV, 2017 WL 4303784 

(S.D. Fla. May 18, 2017), aff'd, 749 F. App'x 952 (11th Cir. 2019).

 1. The Instant Motion Was Not Served 21 Days 

 Before It Was Filed

Rule 11 requires the movant to serve the motion on the nonmovant in 

accordance with Rule 5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Only after serving the motion and 

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affording the nonmovant twenty-one days to take remedial measures—the “safe 

harbor”—may the moving party file their motion with the Court. Id. Rule 5 does 

not explicitly authorize service by email, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b), and Defendants 

did not have an agreement in writing with Plaintiff to serve him with a motion for 

sanctions via email. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(F).10

 In a decision like the instant case, the Northern District of Texas recently held 

that a Rule 11 motion was invalid because it had only been emailed to counsel. Setliff

v. Zoccam Techs., Inc., No. 3:21-CV-2025-B, 2022 WL 1092962, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 

Apr. 12, 2022). The court held that, even though the defendants substantially 

complied with the Rule's requirements, this is insufficient because “[c]ompliance 

with the service requirement is a mandatory prerequisite to an award of sanctions.” 

Id. at *3. Moreover, those strict requirements cannot be waived. Id., citing In re Pratt, 

524 F.3d 580, 586–88 (5th Cir.2008). 

That strict compliance is required is also the law in this Circuit. Geico Gen.

Ins. Co. v. Hampel, No. 11-61620-CIV, 2012 WL 204284, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 

2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 11-61620-CIV, 2012 WL 204176 

10 If they did, it was Defendants’ obligation to produce it along with their Motion. 

Emergency Recovery, Inc. v. Hufnagle, No. 8:19-cv-329-T-24JSS, 2019 WL 

9089594 at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2019) (At all times, the burden of proof as to 

whether a party and/or his attorney have violated Rule 11 rests exclusively on the 

movant). Defendants never produced, nor can they produce, any written consent by 

Plaintiff or her counsel to service of any motion for sanctions solely via email. 

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(S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2012) (“Courts consistently have held that 

‘strict compliance with Rule 11 is mandatory.’” citing In re Pratt, 524 F.3d 580, 588

(5th Cir.2008)); See also Matter of Barnett, No. 18-30832-JPS, 2019 WL 329596, at 

*2 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Jan. 23, 2019) (citing In re Pratt for the same proposition); 

Miller v. RelationServe, Inc., 2006 WL 5849318, at *6 (S.D.Fla. Dec.1, 2006) (“[I]n 

this Circuit the procedural requirements of Rule 11 must ... be strictly construed.”). 

Notably, both the court in Setliff and the court in Hampel cited to the same 5th Circuit 

decisions in coming to their conclusions: In re Pratt, 524 F.3d 580, 586–88 (5th

Cir.2008). Thus, the analysis by the court in Setliff should be equally persuasive in

this Circuit because, in both Circuits, the procedural requirements of Rule 11 must

be strictly construed. 

 2. Defendants’ Instant Motion Is Materially 

 Different Than The One They Emailed

Rule 11 requires that “The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must 

not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged...contention...is withdrawn 

or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) 

(emphasis added). “Thus, the plain language of Rule 11 provides that the movant 

must file with the court after the expiration of the safe harbor period the motion that 

was served upon the adversary.” Hyman v. Borack & Assocs., P.A., No. 8:12-CV1088-T-23TGW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183566, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2012)

(emphasis supplied); see also Robinson v.Alutiiq-Mele, LLC, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 

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1351 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (denying Rule 11 motion where, inter alia, motion filed with 

court not the same motion that was served on non-moving party during safe harbor); 

In re Kirk-Murphy Holding, Inc., 313 B.R. 918, 921 (N.D. Fla. 2004) (interpreting 

bankruptcy rule 9011, which is identical to Rule 11)(“sanctions are to be initiated by 

motion, and served upon the offending party 21 days prior to filing the same 

sanctions motion with the court.”); Kearney Constr. Co. LLC v. Travelers Cas. & 

Sur. Co. of Am., No. 8:09-CV-1850-T-30TBM, 2016 WL 11448596, at *3 (M.D. 

Fla. Jan. 21, 2016) (FTBB's failure to serve a copy of the actual motion for sanctions 

upon Plaintiff at least twenty-one days prior to its filing with the court warrants 

denial of the instant motion under Rule 11.)

Here, Defendants never served (or emailed) a copy of the Instant Motion 

before filing it with this Court on August 29, 2022. The document that was served

on Plaintiff’s counsel, titled "Defendants' Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11, 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" (i.e., the April 26, 2022 Motion for Sanctions)

[ECF No. 76-1] is vastly different from the Instant Motion. Most of the April 26, 

2022 Motion for Sanctions appear to be boilerplate legal citations – some not even 

appropriate for the situation. [See ECF No. 76-1, p. 7 (Wherein Defendants 

mysteriously state: “To survive a motion to dismiss, a cause of action for deliberate 

indifference must adequately plead the existence of three components:. . . . 

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(emphasis supplied)]. The April 26, 2022 Motion for Sanctions itself even

recognizes the uncertainty in the applicable law, stating in its footnote 2: 

In Hoffer, footnote 2, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that a panel of 

the Court “recently suggested that the more than mere negligence 

standard in McElligott is more consistent with Farmer v. Brennan than 

the more than gross negligence standard in Townsend.” (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). However, the Court noted that the 

“competing articulations – ‘gross’ vs. ‘mere’ negligence – may well 

represent a distinction without a difference...” based on an 

interpretation by the Supreme Court. 

[EFC No. 76-1, p. 7]. 

On one of the rare occasions the analysis in the April 26, 2022 Motion for 

Sanctions attempts to reference the facts of this case, it appears that Defendants were 

challenging Count III of Plaintiff's complaint (which Plaintiff agreed to dismiss 

within the safe harbor period). [See ECF No. 76-1, p. 7 (“There is no record evidence 

of medical treatment being denied, rather this is a claim where Plaintiff is alleging 

failure to protect, thus, this claim cannot be sustained.”)]. Moreover, the Motion for 

Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11 only threatens “Plaintiff, Robert Gene Wells, and his 

counsel.” [ECF No. 76-1, p. 1, 9]. However, the Defendants’ current Motion is also 

aimed at Cindy Harrison –referring to Plaintiff as “she.” [ECF No. 77, p. 10]. In 

sum, the April 26, 2022 Motion for Sanctions is a hastily prepared document that 

would not support sanctions even if the Defendants had filed it instead of the Instant 

Motion. 

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As best, Defendant's April 26, 2022 Motion for Sanctions cannot be seen as 

anything other than a warning letter. Courts in the 11th Circuit, including the 

Northern District, make it clear that Rule 11 “warning letters” are insufficient. Miller 

v. RelationServe, Inc., No. 05-61944-CIV, 2006 WL 5849318, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 

1, 2006) (“Accordingly, it follows that in this Circuit the procedural requirements of 

Rule 11 must also be strictly construed. A strict construction of the Rule here 

requires that the Court follow what the Northern District found to be the conclusion 

of the "overwhelming majority of courts" that a warning letter is not the functional 

equivalent of serving a motion for sanctions.”); see also Kearney Constr. Co. LLC 

v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. 8:09-CV-1850-T-30TBM, 2016 WL 

11448596, at *3, footnote 1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2016) (“under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the 

Eleventh Circuit has squarely held that the standards applicable to an award of 

sanctions must be ‘strictly construed.’”).

 3. Failure to File Separate Motions

As noted by this Court in reference to the Instant Motion (which combines a 

request for fees and costs under section 1988 and a Rule 11 motion): “Arguably, the 

motions should have been filed as separate documents because Fed. R. Civ. P. 

11(c)(2) provides that “[a] motion for sanctions must be made separately from any 

other motion.” [ECF No. 80, footnote 1]. Noncompliance with that requirement has 

been described as a “fatal defect.” Id., citing, e.g., O’Boyle v. Sweetapple, 2016 WL 

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9559919, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2016) (denying Rule 11 motion as “procedurally 

defective” because it was combined with a motion seeking fees under §1988). But 

see Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 294 n.7 (6th Cir. 1997) (another 

case the Court referenced, reaching the opposite conclusion). 

Other courts in this Circuit have also held similarly to O’Boyle. For example, 

Batton v. Oak Inv. Grp. Corp., No. 2:18-CV-01361-JEO, 2018 WL 11395454, at *1 

(N.D. Ala. Aug. 29, 2018) (denying sanctions in part because “Plaintiff failed to 

follow the procedural requirements of Rule 11(c)(2)”); Barnes v. Gulfstream 

Aerospace Corp., 2012 WL 463743, at *1 (S.D. Ga 2012) (“not only is the separate 

motion requirement unambiguously demanded by Rule 11(c)(2), but also by the case 

law”).

Here, Defendants' Instant Motion exemplifies the wisdom behind having a 

party file a motion for fees and costs under section 1988 differently than Rule 11. 

Defendants, in their Instant Motion, are vague about who the target of their section 

1988 request is against – something they would not be able to do if the motions were 

separately filed. Moreover, if the motions were separate, it would further highlight 

the frivolity of the Rule 11 “portion” of the Instant Motion. That shallow argument, 

which amounts almost exclusively to a direction to “see above,” would not be 

possible had the two motions been separately filed. Thus, the better approach is that 

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reached by the Southern District in O’Boyle and the Defendants’ Instant Motion for 

Rule 11 sanctions should be summarily denied. 

 B. Defendants Did Not Carry Their Burden To Prove A 

 Violation Of Rule 11

As discussed supra, in a section 1983 action, defendants are only entitled to 

an award of attorneys' fees if, without regard to the existence of subjective bad faith 

on the part of the plaintiff, the action initiated was “frivolous, unreasonable, or 

without foundation.” Pasley v. City of Jesup, Georgia, No. CIV.A. 283-176, 1984 

WL 2573, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 1984). "Rule 11 is intended to deter claims with 

no factual or legal basis at all; creative claims, coupled even with ambiguous or 

inconsequential facts, may merit dismissal, but not punishment." Davis v. Carl, 9106 

F.2d 533, 538 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original). Thus, “[s]anctions [under Rule 

11] are warranted when a party exhibits a deliberate indifference to obvious facts, 

but not when the party's evidence to support a claim is merely weak.” Riccard v. 

Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). At all times, the burden of proof as to whether a party and/or 

his attorney have violated Rule 11 rests exclusively on the movant. Emergency 

Recovery, Inc. v. Hufnagle, No. 8:19-cv-329-T-24JSS, 2019 WL 9089594 at *1 

(M.D. Fla. June 12, 2019). 

Defendants fail to carry their burden to prove Plaintiff and counsel violated 

the standards governing Rule 11. Instead of attempting to address Rule 11's 

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requirements squarely, Defendants Instant Motion states: “With regard to the 

substance of the Motion, undersigned counsel references this Court to the abovereferenced arguments, as set forth in the section regarding entitlement based upon 

42 U.S.C. §1988.” [ECF No. 77, p. 13]. Defendants failed to prove that Plaintiff and 

his counsel showed "deliberate indifference to obvious facts" or that the claims have 

no factual or legal basis. Instead, their arguments (as outlined in the section 1988 

portion of the Instant Motion) argue that Plaintiff's claim is weak – something that 

cannot support sanctions per Rule 11. 

Notably, even the Defendants’ April 26, 2022 Motion for Sanctions 

recognizes the uncertainty in the applicable law. [EFC No. 76-1, fn. 2 (discussing in 

footnote 2 that “competing articulations – ‘gross’ vs. ‘mere’ negligence – may well 

represent a distinction without a difference...”). In another footnote, this time in 

the Instant Motion, Defendants note that "Bell constantly picked on Wells by 'joking 

around calling his name and getting him riled up'." [EFC No. 77, p. 6]. Thus, even 

the Defendants’ April 26, 2022 Motion for Sanctions and the Instant Motion show a 

genuine dispute as to the law and facts in this case.

 C. Plaintiff Is Entitled To Recover His Reasonable Attorney’s 

 Fees And Costs In Defending Defendants’ Baseless Motion

“Owing partly to the risk of misuse, Rule 11(c)(2) permits the award of 

expenses to the party prevailing on the sanctions motion[.]” Adhikari v. Daoud & 

Partners, Civil Action No. 09- cv-1237, 2017 WL 5904782 at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 

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30, 2017). “If the non-movant prevails, there is no requirement in the rule’s text or 

commentary that the movant’s conduct be found worthy of sanction.” Id. To award 

fees to the prevailing opponent, “[t]here should be something negative, then, in the 

losing party’s conduct, but it does not have to be so serious that sanctions are 

appropriate.” Id. at *8 (citing various cases where prevailing party fees were 

awarded to a Rule 11 opponent).

Thus, “in cases where the initial movant's Rule 11 motion is denied, a court 

may issue sanctions against the movant because ‘the filing of a motion for sanctions 

is itself subject to the requirements of the rule and can lead to sanctions.’ The 

nonmoving party need not file a cross-motion to receive fees as the court can award 

reasonable expenses to the prevailing party, including attorney's fees, incurred in 

presenting or opposing the motion.” E. Gluck Corp. v. Rothenhaus, 252 F.R.D. 175, 

179 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Specifically, Rule 11(c)(2) provides: “If warranted, the court 

may award to the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, 

incurred for the motion.” The 1993 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 further 

provide that a Rule 11 motion should not “be prepared to emphasize the merits of a 

party’s position ... [or] to intimidate an adversary into withdrawing contentions that 

are fairly debatable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 

Amendment). 

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Moreover, an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in having to 

defend against an unsupported or baseless Rule 11 motion can be issued without the 

court having to determine that the motion was itself frivolous. See Sarmiento v. 

Pena, No. 14-cv-66, 2016 WL 3964808 at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 25, 2016) (awarding 

fees under Rule 11(c)(2) and noting, “[t]he Court need not find that a defendant’s 

motion is frivolous to award reasonable award fees. As the Magistrate Judge found, 

there does not seem to be a good-faith basis supporting [the] motion. Therefore, [the 

opponent] should not have to bear the costs of responding.” (internal citation 

omitted)); Vanliner Ins. Co. v DerMargosian, No. 12-CV-5074-D, 2014 WL 

1632181 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2014) (“[A]lthough the [movant’s] amended 

motion need not have been frivolous to warrant a fee award under Rule 11(c)(2), the 

fact that it was frivolous informs the court’s finding that a fee award is warranted. 

[The opponent] should not have to bear the expense of paying its lawyers to respond 

to an amended sanctions motion that should never have been filed.” (footnote 

omitted)). 

Here, Defendants and their counsel have brought a reckless and ill-advised 

Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. Specifically, the Defendants and their counsel: 

a. Made claim for Rule 11 sanctions in the Instant Motion, 

despite the text messaged agreement between counsel that “rule 11 will 

only apply to the remaining counts”; 

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b. Failed to inform the Court of the text message arrangement 

between counsel on May 17, 2022, instead only referencing the “email 

correspondence” of May 16, 20222 [ECF No. 77, p. 3]; 

c. Failed to confer in good faith regarding any sort of 

problem Defendant may have had regarding Plaintiff's approach of 

simply abandoning Count III (instead of filing a notice of dismissal), 

instead seeking sanctions about it in the Instant Motion; 

d. Made the misleading statement in its Instant Motion that 

Defendants were forced to expend additional “attorney’s fees and 

expert’s fees” in obtaining the dismissal of Count III. Even assuming 

Plaintiff did not file a dismissal notice, Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment was filed before Plaintiff agreed to dismiss it, no 

“reply” regarding Count III was necessary, and the Court entered 

summary judgment against Plaintiff on that Count; 

e. Made the misleading statement in the Instant Motion that 

because no dismissal of Count III was filed, it left “Defendant Sheriff 

in a position where Count III had to be addressed in the motion for 

summary judgment.” Even assuming Plaintiff did not file a notice of 

dismissal of Count III, Defendants had already filed their Summary 

Judgment Motion as of the time Plaintiff agreed to dismiss Count III; 

f. Failed to adhere to Rule 11’s requirements that “the 

motion” be served 21 days before it is filed, instead emailing a different 

motion (the April 26, 2022 Rule 11 Motion) than the one it ultimately

filed (the Instant Motion);

11 

g. Claim that “Plaintiff was put on notice with the service of 

Defendants’ Rule 11 Motion on April 26, 2022,” when in reality 

Defendants’ Instant Motion is almost entirely different than the April 

22, 2022 Motion for Sanctions; 

11 Rule 11 states in part: “Since such a motion may be filed only if the offending 

paper is not withdrawn or corrected within 21 days after service of the motion, it is 

appropriate that the law firm ordinarily be viewed as jointly responsible under 

established principles of agency.” (emphasis supplied). 

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h. Seek wholly baseless section 1988 and Rule 11 sanctions 

regarding Plaintiff's Expert Witness, McAndrew, claiming that 

Plaintiff’s ultimate consent to McAndrew’s removal was somehow a 

violation of either section 1988 or Rule 11; 

i. Seek Rule 11 sanctions regarding Plaintiff's Expert 

Witness, McAndrew, when the issue was not even addressed in the 

April 26, 2022 Rule 11 Motion; 

j. References as an “Exhibit” to its Instant Motion a mostly 

boilerplate document (i.e., the April 26, 2022 Rule 11 Motion), with 

very little analysis and citing inapplicable law (such as that applicable 

to a motion to dismiss); and

k. Made frivolous arguments in the Instant Motion’s section 

1988 request for fees and costs, such as the notion that Defendants’ 

refusal to offer any settlement at all is a factor supporting somehow 

supporting Defendants’ position. 

Moreover, Defendants’ bad faith in filing its Instant Motion is exemplified by 

its Paragraphs 4 and 5. Therein, Defendants state: 

4. On April 26, 2022, Defendants served Plaintiff with a Motion 

for Sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P. [ECF No. 76-1] As 

of April 26, 2022, all discovery depositions were complete, and 

Plaintiff's motion to substitute expert and extend the discovery deadline 

was denied by this Court. [ECF No. 44]. By way of email 

correspondence, Plaintiff, by and through her undersigned counsel, 

agreed to stipulate to a dismissal of Count III, however, no such 

dismissal was ever filed with the Court. 

5. On May 12, 2022, Defendants filed a motion for summary 

judgment as to Counts I, III, V, VI, and VII. . . . 

[ECF No. 77, p. 3-4], emphasis supplied. The above is highly misleading because 

the email correspondence sent by the undersigned was on May 16, 2022 – not April 

26, 2022. See attached Exhibit A. That is a material fact, as shown by the 

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Defendants’ subsequent argument that: “Unfortunately, no such motion [i.e., a 

dismissal of Count III] was ever filed with the Court, leaving Defendant Sheriff in a 

position where Count III had to be addressed in the motion for summary judgment.” 

[ECF No. 77, p. 8]. Thus, Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Instant Motion are highly 

misleading, conveniently supporting the false narrative that Defendants were forced 

to file their summary judgment motion on Count III because Plaintiff did not file a 

dismissal of Count III (and instead abandoned the claim). 

Any one of the above acts by Defendants, standing alone, justifies sanctions 

against Defendants and their counsel pursuant to Rule 11(c)(2) (“If warranted, the 

court may award to the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's 

fees, incurred for the motion.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff is due his attorneys' fees 

incurred as the prevailing party in this Rule 11 dispute. See, e.g., Crawford v. Japan 

Airlines, No. 03-00451-LEK-KSC, 2013 WL 2420715 at *9 (D. Haw. May 31, 

2013) (awarding fees to Rule 11 opponent pursuant to Rule 11(c)(2) because 

“Plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 11 and ... the 

Plaintiff’s Motion is substantively without merit”).

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Instant Motion should be denied reading section 

1988. As to Rule 11, the Instant Motion is frivolous; it does not present grounds 

warranting the imposition of any sanctions against Plaintiff or his counsel pursuant 

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to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. It makes numerous misstatements, omits pertinent factual 

background, and fails in multiple respects to comply with Rule 11's strict procedures. 

Thus, Plaintiff requests that he be found the prevailing party and be awarded his 

reasonable attorney’s fees associated with defending Defendant’s baseless motion 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) against Defendants and their counsel. 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 7.1(F)

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(F), I hereby certify that the foregoing is 8,113 

words in length.

 Respectfully submitted,

 /s/ Marie A. Mattox

 Marie A. Mattox [FBN 0739685]

MARIE A. MATTOX, P. A.

 203 North Gadsden Street

Tallahassee, FL 32301

 Telephone: (850) 383-4800

 Facsimile: (850) 383-4801

 

 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been 

served on counsel of record by CM/ECF on this 26th day of September 2022.

 /s/ Marie A. Mattox 

Marie A. Mattox

Case 5:21-cv-00019-TKW-MJF Document 85 Filed 09/26/22 Page 33 of 33