[Cite as A.L.R.L. Family Trust v. Bowman, 2018-Ohio-2364.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ALRL FAMILY TRUST : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 : Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

HARRIS C. BOWMAN : Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 16-CVC-01-0068 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 18, 2018 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

RIC DANIELL SEAN A. MCCARTER 

1660 NW Profession Plaza #A 88 North 5th Street 

Columbus, OH 43220 Columbus, OH 43215 
Delaware County, Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 2 

Wise, Earle, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant, ALRL Family Trust, appeals the November 8, 2017 

decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio, granting summary 

judgment to Defendant-Appellee, Harris C. Bowman. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} In June 2015, appellant made an offer to purchase a residential home from 

appellee. The parties agreed to a purchase price and executed a purchase agreement 

on June 30, 2015. The agreement included an "as is" provision and a Residential 

Property Disclosure Form dated June 23, 2015. The form did not disclose any problems 

with the septic system. The sale was completed on August 14, 2015. 

{¶ 3} After the sale, the septic system failed. Appellant was forced to connect to 

the county sewer system, incurring expenses. 

{¶ 4} On January 22, 2016, appellant filed a complaint against appellee, claiming 

breach of the real estate contract and fraud relating to the septic system. Appellant also 

named Benchmark Labs, Inc. as a defendant. Benchmark conducted an inspection of 

the property including the septic system, and is not a party to this appeal. 

{¶ 5} Following some procedural issues, appellee filed a motion for summary 

judgment on August 31, 2017. Appellee argued the breach of contract claim could not 

exist because of the "as is" clause. As for the fraud claim, appellee argued he did not 

have any knowledge of the faulty septic system prior to entering into the purchase 

agreement. Appellee was made aware of the problems with the septic system after the 

purchase agreement was signed. In response, appellant argued appellee knew or had 

reason to believe the septic system was faulty prior to signing the purchase agreement, 
Delaware County, Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 3 

and he had a duty to disclose any subsequent information he received about the septic 

system. By judgment entry filed November 8, 2017, the trial court granted summary 

judgment to appellee. 

{¶ 6} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for 

consideration. Assignment of error is as follows: 

I 

{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (TRIAL COURT ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 

08, 2017)." 

I 

{¶ 8} In its sole assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment to appellee. We disagree. 

{¶ 9} Summary Judgment motions are to be resolved in light of the dictates of 

Civ.R. 56. Said rule was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. 

Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 448, 663 N.E.2d 639 (1996): 

Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be 

granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material 

fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds 

can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly 

in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party 

against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. State ex. rel. 
Delaware County, Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 4 

Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377, 1379, 

citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O3d 

466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274. 

{¶ 10} As an appellate court reviewing summary judgment motions, we must stand 

in the shoes of the trial court and review summary judgments on the same standard and 

evidence as the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506 

N.E.2d 212 (1987). 

{¶ 11} As explained by this court in Leech v. Schumaker, 5th Dist. Richland No. 

15CA56, 2015-Ohio-4444, ¶ 13: 

It is well established the party seeking summary judgment bears the 

burden of demonstrating that no issues of material fact exist for trial. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 

L.Ed.2d 265(1986). The standard for granting summary judgment is 

delineated in Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280 at 293: " * * * a party 

seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot 

prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis 

for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) 

of the nonmoving party's claims. The moving party cannot discharge its 

initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion the 

nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving 
Delaware County, Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 5 

party must be able to specifically point to some evidence of the type listed 

in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates the nonmoving party has 

no evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. If the moving party 

fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be 

denied. However, if the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the 

nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to 

set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the 

nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 

be entered against the nonmoving party." The record on summary 

judgment must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. 

Williams v. First United Church of Christ (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 150. 

{¶ 12} In its complaint filed January 22, 2016, appellant claimed appellee breached 

the real estate sales contract by "failing to disclose the broken condition of the sceptic 

(sic) sewer system and by stating that said system was not suffering from any material 

problems in the Residential Property Disclosure Form, Exhibit C." Appellant also claimed 

appellee committed fraud in misstating the disclosure form and withholding information 

he received about material defects with the septic system after the signing of the purchase 

agreement. 

{¶ 13} In his motion for summary judgment filed August 31, 2017, appellee argued 

no genuine issues of material fact existed as he did not have any knowledge of any 

problems with the septic system prior to entering into the "as is" purchase agreement, 
Delaware County, Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 6 

and he had no duty to disclose any problems he was made aware of afterwards. In 

support of his motion, appellee presented his affidavit wherein he averred to the following: 

10. I lived at my House for approximately 32 years. The last 10 years 

I reside (sic) there by myself. During the time that I reside (sic) at the House 

I never had a problem with the septic sewer system. 

11. The Residential Property Disclosure Form attached as Exhibit C 

to the Complaint and attached hereto as Exhibit 2 was completed and dated 

by me on June 23, 2015. The buyer acknowledged receipt of the Disclosure 

Form on June 30, 2015. On those dates I had no actual knowledge of a 

problem with the septic sewer system. 

12. After the House was in contract for sale, the buyer had the septic 

system inspected by Benchmark Labs on July 8, 2015, the report is 

attached as Exhibit F to the Complaint. In the report it states that the septic 

sewer system "has no apparent defects and is in acceptable operating 

condition." This conclusion was told to me by the inspector. The inspector 

did tell me that I should have a pumped (sic) out. 

13. I contacted Ericson Environmental Services ("Ericson") regarding 

a pump out of the system. Ericson came on July 15, 2015 to perform the 

pump out. As set forth on the estimate attached as exhibit D to the 

complaint and here as Exhibit 3, the Ericson person told me that he thought 

chemicals should be placed into the system to clean the leach field because 
Delaware County, Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 7 

the leach bed was poor, and that a new lid and outlet baffle was needed. I 

did not believe that such work was justified for this 60 year old system. 

14. The septic system existed at the House when I purchased it, and 

I believe it was about 60 years old at the time I sold it. After Ericson pumped 

the system, I told the Buyer that the septic system was 60 years old. I told 

the buyer that the system was failing. I told the buyer that instead of 

spending money on their plans to add a master bedroom on the House, that 

they should spend it on connecting the house to the county sewer which 

was located adjacent to the property. The buyer and her significant other 

and I discussed issues relating to connecting to the county sewer system. 

I am not sure what happened after the Buyer moved into the House, but 

when I lived in the House by myself I did not have any problems with the 

septic system. 

15. Until July 15, 2017, I never had the septic system serviced. I 

never had a problem with the septic system while I lived at the House. 

{¶ 14} In its memorandum contra filed September 28, 2017, appellant argued 

genuine issues of material fact did exist as appellee had a duty to disclose what he 

learned after having the septic system "inspected" by Ericson. Appellant alleged appellee 

knew the septic system was defective prior to signing the disclosure form. In support of 

its arguments, appellant presented appellee's deposition, as well as the affidavit of 

William Lutz, a beneficiary under the trust who authorized the purchase of the subject 

property. Mr. Lutz averred the following in pertinent part: 
Delaware County, Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 8 

As part of the offer and counteroffer was a "Residential Property 

Disclosure Form. I also personally reviewed this document. Said 

residential Property Disclosure Form, section B, states, in part, that there 

were no material problems with the septic system. 

The real estate was purchased by Plaintiff from Defendant Harris C. 

Bowman on August 14, 2015. I was present at the closing and am 

knowledgeable concerning the facts of the closing. 

On or about July 08, 2015, I caused Benchmark to inspect the septic 

system in place at the house. Benchmark performed the inspection but was 

unable to actually open and examine the interior of the septic system. 

Benchmark reported that the system was abnormally full. On July 15, 2015 

Defendant Harris C. Bowman caused the septic system to be inspected. 

The result of the inspection disclosed that the sceptic (sic) system was 

defective and that there was a material problem with the septic system. A 

copy of this report and estimate is attached to Defendant's deposition. I 

know these facts from personal knowledge due to the fact that I contacted 

Mr. Rick Bauman of Ericson Environmental Services, PO Box 266, 

Galloway, OH 43119 and he informed me that Defendant Bowman asked 

for an inspection of the septic system at 6396 Olentangy River Road, 

Delaware Ohio. Mr. Bauman did inspect the septic system and authored 

the estimate of repairs needed to such system. 
Delaware County, Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 9 

I further state that Defendant Bowman did not, at any time, disclose 

the existence of the estimate by Erickson (sic) to me or anyone concerned 

with the purchase on the buyer's side. 

* * * 

Defendant did not make any recommendation to me that any existing 

sewer line be hooked up to the house. To the contrary, Defendant informed 

me, on one occasion that occurred after July 15, 2015 but prior to closing, 

that the septic system at the house was old. I already knew this. Defendant 

did not tell me that he had the system examined by Erickson (sic). 

Defendant did not tell me that Erickson (sic) made recommendations to him 

for needed repairs. Defendant states in his deposition that "the system is 

failing. (Defendant Deposition, page 11), and that he "took that opportunity 

to also tell them about the problems that I had just discovered on the 15th 

of July...". (Defendant Deposition, page 12). It is my testimony that the 

Defendant did no such thing and made no such statements to me. 

Defendant did not tell me that he had the septic system examined. 

Defendant did not tell me that the system was failing. Defendant did not tell 

me that there were specific defects to the system discovered by Erickson 

(sic). Defendant did state to me, on one occasion prior to closing, that the 

system was old. If the Defendant had informed me that the septic system 

was failing I would have taken the obvious steps of either decreasing my 

offer to purchase or withdraw the offer. 
Delaware County, Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 10 

{¶ 15} In its November 8, 2017 judgment entry granting the motion for summary 

judgment, the trial court conducted a thorough analysis of the issues and concluded: 

"Because the Trust has not identified in the parties' contract any provision that Bowman 

has allegedly breached, and because that contract called for the Trust to buy the property 

'as is,' Bowman is entitled to summary judgment on the Trust's breach-of-contract claim." 

The trial court also concluded: 

 In short, on an issue on which the Trust would bear the burden of 

proof at trial - proving to the finder of fact that Bowman made a false 

statement about the condition of the septic system - the Trust has not 

presented any evidence undercutting Bowman's claim that his septicsystem answer on the property-disclosure form was true at the time he 

made it. Absent a false statement on that form, any fraudulentrepresentation claim raised by the Trust must fail. 

{¶ 16} We agree with the trial court's well-reasoned decision. The purchase 

agreement contained an "as is" clause. Short of a seller committing fraud, a buyer's claim 

for damages under a breach of contract claim is barred under an "as is" contract. Rodgers 

v. Sipes, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-11-19, 2012-Ohio-3070. A seller does not have any 

duty to disclose facts of a material nature under an "as is" contract. McNabb v. Hoeppner, 

5th Dist. Richland No. 10CA124, 2011-Ohio-3224; Williams v. Brown, 5th Dist. 

Muskingum Nos. CT2004-0048 and CT2004-0051, 2005-Ohio-5301. Appellant concedes 

in his appellate brief at 4 that appellee did not have a duty to update the property 
Delaware County, Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 11 

disclosure form. In addition, the property disclosure form contained a clause informing 

appellant that appellee "has no obligation to update this form." 

{¶ 17} Appellant alleges that appellee knew or had reason to believe the septic 

system was faulty before the purchase agreement was signed. In its appellate brief at 6, 

appellant admits it is "unable to prove that Bowman had actual knowledge of the septic 

system problems at the time the real estate purchase agreement was signed on June 30, 

2015." Appellant argues appellee knew the system was old. In his affidavit cited above, 

Mr. Lutz admitted "I already knew this." Appellee did not have the septic system inspected 

as argued by appellant. He had the septic tank pumped out at the recommendation of 

appellant's inspector, Benchmark. Bowman depo. at 8, 25. Benchmark reported the 

onsite sewage disposal system "has no apparent defects and is in acceptable operating 

condition." See Benchmark Inspection Report, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit E. 

{¶ 18} Upon review, we agree no genuine issues of material fact exist. The trial 

court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellee. 

{¶ 19} The sole assignment of error is denied. 

 
Delaware County, Case No. 17 CAE 12 0074 12 

{¶ 20} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio is 

hereby affirmed. 

By Wise, Earle, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Delaney, J. concur. 

 

 

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