IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

No. 84368 

LE 

OCI 11 2022 

BF:nwN 

CL 'UPREMe COURT 

DEPUTY í. RK 

LUXX LIGHTING, INC., 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 

CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE 

NADIA KRALL, DISTRICT JUDGE, 

Respondents, 

and 

FOHSE, INC., 

Real Party in Interest. 

F 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

This original petition for a writ of prohibition challenges a 

district court order denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Having 

considered the petition, answer, and reply, we conclude that our 

intervention is not warranted at this time. 

Because a writ petition seeks extraordinary relief, the 

consideration of the petition is within our sole discretion. Okada v. Eighth 

Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 6, 8, 408 P.3d 566, 569 (2018). When there 

is no "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," 

NRS 34.170, a writ of prohibition may be available to "arrest[ the 

proceedings of any tribunal . . . exercising judicial functions, when such 

proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal," 

NRS 34.320; Daane v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 654, 655, 261 

P.3d 1086, 1087 (2011.). 

As a general rule, we will not entertain a writ petition that 

challenges a district court order denying a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. Chur v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev. 68, 70, 458 P.3d 

2.i_ -5206Z 

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336, 339 (2020). And we are not convinced that this petition implicates any 

exception to that general rule. See id. (reviewing such orders only where 

"(1) no factual dispute exists and the district court is obligated to [grant the 

motion] pursuant to clear authority under a statute or rule; or (2) an 

important issue of law needs clarification and considerations of sound 

judicial economy and administration militate in favor of granting the 

petition"). First, petitioner has not demonstrated that the district court was 

obligated to grant the motion under clear legal authority. Petitioner moved 

for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction over petitioner. A defendant may use a motion for judgment on 

the pleadings "to raise various rule 12(b) defenses regarding procedural 

defects." Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1993). 

But this is limited to "only certain procedural defenses after the close of the 

pleadings, as authorized by Rule 12(h)(2) and (3)." Mussat v. Enclarity, Inc., 

362 F. Supp. 3d 468, 472 (N.D. Ill. 2019); see 5C Charles A. Wright and 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 (3d ed. 2018). 

Because NRCP 12(h)(2) and (3) do not include the defense of a lack of 

personal jurisdiction, a motion for judgment on the pleadings cannot be 

used to assert that defense. See Mussat, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 472 (concluding 

that "the only 12(b) defenses that may properly be brought after the close of 

pleadings in a 12(c) motion" include a failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, failure to join a necessary party, and lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction); 5C Wright & Miller, supra, § 1367 (explaining "that 

r`Federal cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 

strong persuasive authority, because the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 

are based in large part upon their federal counterparts." McClendon v. 

Collins, 132 Nev. 327, 330, 372 P.3d 492, 494 (2016) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). 

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C.J. 

arraguirre 

Herndon 

Sr.J. 

the defenses of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

failure to join a party under Rule 19 without whom the action cannot 

proceed, and failure to state a legal defense to a claim may be raised on a 

motion for judgment on the pleadings"). Second, because petitioner can 

move for an evidentiary hearing on personal jurisdiction or challenge it at 

trial (provided it has not been waived), considerations of sound judicial 

economy and administration do not militate in favor of granting the 

petition.2 See Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 693-94, 

857 P.2d 740, 744-45 (1993) (discussing the different manners a defendant 

may challenge personal jurisdiction before and at trial). For these reasons, 

we 

ORDER the petition DENIED.3

2The parties dispute whether petitioner waived personal jurisdiction, 

see Superpurnper, Inc. v. Leonard, Tr. for Bankr. Est. of Morabito, 137 Nev., 

Adv. Op. 43, 495 P.3d 101, 106 (2021) (holding that personal jurisdiction is 

an affirmative defense which is waived if not raised in the responsive 

pleading), but we do not reach this issue because the district court order 

does not explicitly address it. See 9352 Cranesbill Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

136 Nev. 76, 82, 459 P.3d 227, 232 (2020) (providing that "this court will not 

address issues that the district court did not directly resolve"). 

3The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

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p)) PAM 

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cc: Hon. Nadia Kra11, District Judge 

Snell & Wilmer, LLP/Las Vegas 

Lamkin IP Defense 

Simons Hall Johnston PC/Reno 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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