United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-30577

____________

In the Matter of the Complaint of Ingram Barge 

Company, L.L.C., as owner and operator of Barge IB976, doing business as 

Ingram Barge Company, for Exoneration from or Limitation 

of Liability

Ingram Barge Company, L.L.C., as owner and operator 

of Barge IB976, doing business as Ingram Barge 

Company; American Longshore Mutual Association, 

Limited; T.T. Barge Cleaning Mile 183, L.L.C.; T.T. Barge 

Services Mile 237, L.L.C., 

Petitioners—Appellees,

versus

Gregory Ratcliff, 

Claimant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:20-CV-313

______________________________

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 19, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

Before Duncan and Wilson, Circuit Judges, and Schroeder, District 

Judge.*

Per Curiam:†

Gregory Ratcliff worked as a barge cleaner for T.T. Barge Services,

which provides barge cleaning services to Ingram Barge Company. Ratcliff 

asserted negligence claims against Ingram after Ratcliff was injured by caustic 

soda that he was cleaning up on Ingram Barge 976, which was moored to one 

of T.T.’s work barges at the time of his injury. 

After Ingram filed a district court complaint to limit liability, Ratcliff 

counterclaimed and asserted claims of negligence against Ingram. T.T. also 

filed a claim for contribution and indemnity against Ingram. T.T. and Ingram 

each moved for summary judgment regarding Ratcliff’s claims. 

The district court granted summary judgment (1) as to Ratcliff’s lack 

of seaman status under the Jones Act and (2) as to all of Ratcliff’s negligence 

claims against Ingram. The district court then dismissed the case with 

prejudice. Ratcliff challenges the district court’s orders granting summary 

judgment. We affirm.

I. 

T.T. provides barge services in and alongside the Mississippi River. 

Ratcliff worked as a barge cleaner at T.T.’s Mile 183 facility, which includes 

shoreside offices and parking. The facility also includes two work barges1 that 

float in the river: the Cleaning Barge and the Repair Barge. T.T.’s work 

_____________________

* United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by 

designation.

† This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

1 Both of T.T.’s work barges are made up of three smaller barges.

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barges are decommissioned barges moored to land by steel cables attached to 

sunken concrete blocks. Though decommissioned, T.T. work barges can still 

move on water, although they are only moved for repairs or to accommodate 

dredging. Readying the T.T. work barges for movement requires a crane to 

remove a metal walkway, calls for utility lines to be disconnected, and 

involves a days-long process that can take more than a week. Like many other 

barges, T.T.’s work barges cannot propel themselves. A T.T. work barge was 

once struck by a passing vessel. 

Multiple customers, including Ingram, bring their barges to T.T.’s 

facilities for cleaning or repair services. Customers park their barges 

alongside T.T.’s work barges and moor their barges to T.T.’s work barges. 

During cleaning or repair, customer barges remain moored and stationary 

while T.T.’s barge cleaners and repairmen board and work on the customer 

barges. The barge cleaners and repairmen are assigned to work on different

customer barges from various customers each day. T.T.’s barge cleaners and 

repairmen do not leave T.T.’s facility on the customer barges. However, 

even though company policy forbids it and T.T. denies that it occurs, Ratcliff 

alleges that sometimes T.T.’s barge cleaners and repairmen ride customer 

barges about 200–360 feet between the work barges (presumably to avoid a 

longer walk over land). 

Ratcliff was injured by caustic soda burns while cleaning Ingram Barge 

976. Ingram hired T.T. to clean the caustic soda out of the barge. The caustic 

soda was frozen and extended along the walls and the ceiling. Ratcliff and his 

team were aware they would be cleaning caustic soda. Ratcliff’s foreman 

informed Ratcliff that the caustic soda was frozen in Ingram Barge 976 while 

explaining morning assignments before he entered the barge. Upon entering 

the barge, Ratcliff saw that the frozen caustic soda extended to the ceiling but 

alleged that he was surprised to see it on the ceiling. Ratcliff’s foreman and 

work team also noticed the frozen caustic soda on the ceiling. Ratcliff’s 

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foreman began spraying the caustic soda on the ceiling and warned Ratcliff to 

back away. About an hour-and-a-half after Ratcliff entered the barge and saw 

the caustic soda on the ceiling, Ratcliff was burned on one of his arms and 

one of his legs by drops of caustic soda that had thawed and dripped down. 

However, Ratcliff continued working after pausing to change into a new 

“slicker suit” after the drops of caustic soda that injured him had burned his 

original suit. Later, Ratcliff slipped and fell in a pool of caustic soda and 

suffered more extensive and severe burns. Ratcliff alleges the caustic soda 

pool that more severely injured him was created by the frozen caustic soda 

on the ceiling thawing, dripping down, and pooling. At the time of his injury, 

Ratcliff alleges he was new to cleaning caustic soda and was unfamiliar with 

the proper personal protective equipment for cleaning caustic soda. 

Ratcliff originally filed a state court petition against Ingram and T.T. 

(among others) alleging that he was a Jones Act seaman. Ingram then filed a 

complaint in the Middle District of Louisiana to limit liability regarding 

Ratcliff’s state court claims. The district court enjoined prosecution of the 

state court claims. 

Before the district court, Ratcliff answered and counterclaimed, 

asserting claims of negligence against Ingram. Among claims by other parties, 

T.T. filed a claim for contribution and indemnity against Ingram under 

general maritime law, including a claim for contribution should Ratcliff 

qualify as a Jones Act seaman. 

T.T. moved for summary judgment as to Ratcliff’s lack of seaman 

status. Ingram separately moved for summary judgment as to all of Ratcliff’s 

negligence claims against Ingram. The district court granted both motions for 

summary judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice. Ratcliff appealed.

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II.

Ratcliff raises three issues on appeal. He argues that the district court 

erred (A) in finding the T.T. Cleaning Barge lacked vessel status under the 

Jones Act at summary judgment, (B) in granting summary judgment as to

Ratcliff’s lack of seaman status under the Jones Act, and (C) in granting 

summary judgment as to all of Ratcliff’s negligence claims against Ingram. 

Reviewing these arguments in turn, we determine that the district court 

committed no error. 

A. 

Ratcliff first argues that the district court erred in finding that T.T.’s

Cleaning Barge lacked vessel status when it granted summary judgment as to 

Ratcliff’s lack of seaman status under the Jones Act. We disagree. 

Grants of summary judgment are reviewed de novo, including as to 

Jones Act and Longshore Act claims. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of 

Tex., L.L.C., 997 F.3d 564, 568 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc). The de novo

standard of review applies here.

Ratcliff contests vessel and seaman status here because they affect

whether the Jones Act applies and consequently which remedies, if any, he

may seek. The remedies available under the Jones Act and the Longshore and 

Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (the “Longshore Act”) are “mutually 

exclusive” of one another. Id. at 569. If a worker qualifies as a Jones Act 

seaman, the worker may sue his employer for Jones Act negligence, the 

owner of a vessel he works on for unseaworthiness, and a third party for 

general maritime law negligence. See id. at 568–69; Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 

335 F.3d 376, 386–87 (5th Cir. 2003). However, if the worker fails to qualify 

as a Jones Act “seaman” and is instead classified as a longshoreman under 

the Longshore Act, no negligence claims are available against the 

longshoreman’s employer and he may sue a third-party vessel under a 

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restrictive theory of negligence that only provides three specific duties of 

care.2 Becker, 335 F.3d at 386–87; see Kirksey v. Tonghai Mar., 535 F.3d 388, 

391 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 

156, 171–79 (1981) (explaining that the Longshore Act permits a restrictive 

theory of negligence against a third-party vessel).

“The Jones Act does not define the term ‘vessel’, and this Court has 

repeatedly held that the term is incapable of precise definition.” Ducote v. V. 

Keeler & Co., 953 F.2d 1000, 1002 (5th Cir. 1992). Instead, the Rules of 

Construction Act explains that the term “‘vessel’ includes every description 

of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as 

a means of transportation on water.” 1 U.S.C. § 3. But the Supreme Court 

rejects an “anything that floats” approach to defining the term. Lozman v. 

City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 126 (2013). 

The Supreme Court has explained that “a ‘vessel’ is any watercraft 

practically capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary 

purpose or state of transit at a particular moment.” Stewart v. Dutra Constr. 

Co., 543 U.S. 481, 497 (2005). But the Court later clarified that a watercraft 

does not fall within the definition of vessel “unless a reasonable observer, 

looking to the [watercraft]’s physical characteristics and activities, would 

consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over 

water.” Lozman, 568 U.S. at 121. And a watercraft is not a vessel “if it has 

been permanently moored or otherwise rendered practically incapable of 

transportation or movement.” Stewart, 543 U.S. at 494.

T.T. and Ingram argue that T.T.’s barges, including T.T.’s Cleaning 

Barge, are merely work platforms essentially functioning as docks that are 

_____________________

2 And a longshoreman may “sue nonvessel third parties under general maritime 

law tort principles.” Becker, 335 F.3d at 387.

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permanently moored and connected by steel cables to sunken concrete blocks 

called “deadmen.” T.T. and Ingram point out that T.T.’s barges are rarely 

moved and can only be moved after an intensive, days-long process that can 

take over a week to ready the work barges for movement. And the barges are 

only moved to make repairs or accommodate dredging operations. T.T. and 

Ingram also point out that T.T.’s barges are not intended or allowed to be 

moved under T.T.’s regular U.S. Coast Guard plan.3

On the other hand, Ratcliff argues that T.T.’s Cleaning Barge is a 

barge that can and does move on water. Ratcliff admits that T.T.’s work 

barges are decommissioned barges that only move periodically. But Ratcliff 

contends that means T.T.’s barges are only temporarily moored. Based on 

the T.T. barges’ physical characteristics and activities, Ratcliff argues that 

T.T.’s work barges satisfy Lozman’s test for vessel status because a 

reasonable observer would consider T.T.’s work barges designed to a 

practical degree for carrying people or things over water. 

T.T. and Ingram cite older case law to suggest that the purpose of 

T.T.’s Cleaning Barge should be considered here. Ducrepont v. Baton Rouge 

Marine Enters., 877 F.2d 393, 395 (5th Cir. 1989); Daniel v. Ergon, Inc., 892 

F.2d 403, 407–08 (5th Cir. 1990). Ducrepont and Ergon applied the Bernard

factors, the first of which considers whether “the structures involved were 

constructed and used primarily as work platforms.” Bernard v. Binnings 

Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 824, 831 (5th Cir. 1984). Ducrepont affirmed summary 

judgment and determined that a floating barge used primarily as a work 

platform for cleaning and repairing barges was not a vessel despite not being 

_____________________

3 T.T. also argues its barges lack any means of self-propulsion. While that physical 

characteristic may be relevant, it “is not dispositive.” Lozman, 568 U.S. at 122. And as 

Ratcliff points out, it is undisputed that Ingram Barge 976 is a vessel although it lacks any 

means of self-propulsion. 

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constructed as a work platform. 877 F.2d at 395. Ergon similarly determined 

that a floating barge cleaning and stripping platform moored to the shore by 

wires was not a vessel for Jones Act purposes as a matter of law and stated 

that the magistrate judge had erred in failing to grant summary judgment. 892 

F.2d at 407–09. Ergon also determined that the barges used primarily as work 

platforms in Ergon and Ducrepont were indistinguishable despite minor 

differences like whether the barges were subject to Coast Guard inspection 

or whether the barges had been tugged to different locations. Id. at 407–08. 

Ratcliff cites subsequent case law that focuses on a watercraft’s

moving capabilities. See Ducote, 953 F.2d at 1002–04. In Ducote, we reversed 

summary judgment because a jury could find that a movable spud barge 

subject to “planned extensive movement” was a Jones Act vessel despite it 

being moored at the time of a crane operator’s accident and having not been 

moved any considerable distance during the course of the project during

which the crane operator was injured. Id. at 1004.

We decline to ultimately determine vessel status here based on 

Ducrepont, Ergon, or Ducote because all those cases predate both Lozman’s 

reasonable observer test and Stewart. Stewart suggests that the primary 

purpose analysis used in Ducrepont and Ergon is no longer dispositive. See 

Stewart, 543 U.S. at 497 (explaining that “a ‘vessel’ is any watercraft 

practically capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose

or state of transit at a particular moment”) (emphasis added). Moreover, 

Ducote distinguishes itself on the facts from cases like the instant case where 

“barges rendered immobile for extended periods of time and used as 

construction platforms or dry docks are not vessels” because the spud barge 

in Ducote “was moved at least a short distance every day.” Ducote, 953 F.2d 

at 1004 n.18.

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We instead focus our analysis on Lozman and Stewart. In Lozman, the 

Supreme Court clarified Stewart and explained that “the statutory definition

[of vessel] may (or may not) apply—not that it automatically must apply—

where a structure has some other primary purpose, where it is stationary at 

relevant times, and where it is attached—but not permanently attached—to 

land.” Lozman, 568 U.S. at 124. In clarifying Stewart, Lozman further 

explains that the “basic difference” between a vessel’s purpose and a 

nonvessel’s purpose is whether the watercraft in question “was regularly, but 

not primarily, used (and designed in part to be used) to transport workers and 

equipment over water.” Id. at 125. Lozman explains that the dredge in Stewart

was a vessel because it was regularly used to transport dredging personnel 

and equipment over water despite being used primarily for dredging; but that 

the wharfboat in Evansville, which was primarily used for cargo transfer while 

being attached to or floating near a dock, was not a vessel because it was not 

regularly used for, or designed to any practical degree to be used for,

transportation despite being annually towed away in the winter to avoid ice. 

Id. at 124–25 (comparing Stewart, 543 U.S. at 493–95, with Evansville & 

Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19, 46 (1926)).

Here, applying Lozman to the summary judgment record viewed in 

the light most favorable to Ratcliff, T.T.’s Cleaning Barge is not regularly 

used to transport workers or equipment over water. Instead, T.T.’s Cleaning 

Barge is semi-permanently and indefinitely attached to land by steel cables, 

except for rare moves during repairs or to accommodate nearby dredging 

operations. See Stewart, 543 U.S. at 494 (explaining that a “floating casino 

was no longer a vessel where it ‘was moored to the shore in a semi-permanent 

or indefinite manner’” (quoting Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusement 

Corp., 52 F.3d 560, 570 (5th Cir. 1995))). Preparing to move T.T.’s Cleaning 

Barge can take over a week and requires removing a metal walkway and 

disconnecting utility lines. And T.T.’s Cleaning Barge is stationary at all 

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relevant times when Ratcliff and other barge cleaners work on it. Therefore, 

a reasonable observer would not consider T.T.’s Cleaning Barge designed to 

a practical degree for carrying people or things over water. 

Additionally, Ratcliff argues that T.T. applies the incorrect standard 

of review because whether T.T.’s barges qualify as vessels is a fact question 

left to the jury and not subject to garden-variety summary judgment review. 

However, both cases that Ratcliff cites for this proposition further explain 

that summary judgment may be appropriate when deciding whether a 

watercraft is a vessel under the Jones Act “where the facts and the law will 

reasonably support only one conclusion.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 

347, 373 (1995); see Ducote, 953 F.2d at 1002–03 (“[S]ummary judgment may 

be appropriate when there is no evidence from which reasonable persons 

might draw conflicting inferences on any of the elements of the seaman 

test.”). The uncontroverted facts and law here only support the conclusion 

that T.T.’s Cleaning Barge does not qualify as a vessel under the Jones Act.

Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that T.T.’s Cleaning Barge 

lacked vessel status at summary judgment.4

B.

Ratcliff next argues that the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment as to Ratcliff’s lack of seaman status under the Jones Act. We 

disagree.

To qualify as a Jones Act seaman, a plaintiff must satisfy two

requirements. First, “an employee’s duties must ‘contribut[e] to the function

of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.’” Chandris, 515 U.S. at

_____________________

4 This determination comports with a district court decision granting summary 

judgment after finding T.T.’s work barges are not vessels under the Jones Act. See Young 

v. T.T. Barge Servs. Mile 237, LLC, 290 F. Supp. 3d 562, 567 (E.D. La. 2017). 

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368 (quoting McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355, (1991)

(emphasis added). Second, that employee “must have a connection to a 

vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is 

substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Chandris explained:

The fundamental purpose of this substantial connection 

requirement is to give full effect to the remedial scheme created 

by Congress and to separate the sea-based maritime employees 

who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based 

workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection to a 

vessel in navigation, and therefore whose employment does not

regularly expose them to the perils of the sea. 

Id. Sitting en banc, the court provided three factors to be considered in

determining whether the “substantial connection” requirement is met:

(1) Does the worker owe his allegiance to the vessel, rather than 

simply to a shoreside employer?

(2) Is the work sea based or involve seagoing activity?

(3) (a) Is the worker’s assignment to a vessel limited to 

performance of a discrete task after which the worker’s 

connection to the vessel ends, or (b) Does the worker’s 

assignment include sailing with the vessel from port to port or 

location to location?

Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 574.

Because T.T.’s Cleaning Barge does not qualify as a vessel, the rest of 

the analysis as to Ratcliff’s seaman status under the Jones Act focuses on

Ratcliff’s connection to Ingram’s barges (including Ingram Barge 976), 

which the parties do not dispute are Jones Act vessels. Applying the Chandris

requirements and Sanchez factors, Ratcliff lacks a substantial connection to 

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Ingram’s barges. Therefore, Ratcliff does not qualify as a seaman under the 

Jones Act.

First, Ratcliff argues that he satisfies Chandris’s “very broad” 

threshold function requirement that he “contribute to the function of the 

vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.” See Chandris, 515 U.S. at

368, 377. Second, Ratcliff argues that he satisfies Chandris’s duration prong 

of the substantial connection requirement that is generally met if a worker 

spends a minimum of 30 percent of his time aboard a vessel. See Chandris, 

515 U.S. at 371. Third, however, even assuming these are met, Ratcliff fails 

to satisfy Chandris’s nature prong of the substantial connection requirement 

based on the three Sanchez factors. 

The first Sanchez factor asks: “[d]oes the worker owe his allegiance to 

the vessel, rather than simply to a shoreside employer?” Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 

574. Ingram argues that Ratcliff owed his allegiance to a shoreside employer 

because he reported to work and received assignments from T.T.’s shoreside 

offices, not Ingram’s fleet. Ratcliff argues that he owed allegiance collectively 

to both Ingram and T.T. Here, Ratcliff owed allegiance to his shoreside 

employer, T.T., for which he directly worked—not one of T.T.’s multiple 

customers for which he may have been assigned to clean one of their barges 

on any given day. Therefore, the first Sanchez factor weighs against Ratcliff 

satisfying Chandris’s substantial connection requirement.

The second Sanchez factor also does not weigh in favor of Ratcliff 

satisfying Chandris’s substantial connection requirement. It asks: “[i]s the 

work sea-based or involve seagoing activity?” Id. Ratcliff argues that his work 

on Ingram’s barges was seagoing and he was exposed to the perils of the sea 

because (a) Ingram’s barges were directly in the Mississippi River and at risk 

of collision with mid-river watercraft that had previously struck T.T.’s 

cleaning barge, (b) Ratcliff had previously slept at T.T.’s facility, and 

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(c) Ratcliff had previously rode Ingram’s barges about 200 feet between 

T.T.’s Repair Barge and Cleaning Barge despite T.T. company policy against 

such rides. Denying the rides happened, T.T. argues that any such rides on 

Ingram’s barges violated T.T. company policy and were taken merely as 

passengers to avoid walking on land from one tier of the facility to another. 

Ingram argues Ratcliff’s work cannot be seagoing because Ratcliff has 

admitted that (1) Ingram’s barges were always moored during Ratcliff’s 

cleaning duties, including during the time of the accident; and (2) Ratcliff had 

no duties with respect to any moving barges or vessels. 

Here, Ingram’s arguments show that Ratcliff’s barge cleaning work 

was not sea-based and did not involve seagoing activity. And Ratcliff’s 

arguments can be distinguished. That a T.T. work barge was once struck does 

not make Ratcliff’s cleaning work aboard nearby Ingram barges any more 

“seagoing” than an object can become “seagoing” just because a nearby dry

dock has been struck. And Ratcliff only claims that he slept at T.T.’s facility, 

not aboard Ingram’s barges. Only the alleged 200-foot customer barge rides 

against company policy suggest any sea-based work or seagoing activity—and 

those hardly subject Ratcliff to the perils of the sea. Even viewing that fact in 

the light most favorable to Ratcliff at summary judgment, the second Sanchez

factor is neutral at best and cannot help Ratcliff satisfy Chandris’s substantial 

connection requirement.

The third Sanchez factor asks: “(a) [i]s the worker’s assignment to a 

vessel limited to performance of a discrete task after which the worker’s 

connection to the vessel ends, or (b) [d]oes the worker’s assignment include 

sailing with the vessel from port to port or location to location?” Id. Here, as 

Ingram points out, Ratcliff admits that his discrete task ends when he is 

finished cleaning Ingram’s barges—in Ratcliff’s own words, he is then “done 

with it.” And any 200-foot barge rides cannot constitute sailing from port to 

port. Ratcliff provides little resistance against Ingram’s and T.T.’s 

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arguments regarding this third factor. Therefore, the third Sanchez factor

weighs against Ratcliff satisfying Chandris’s substantial connection

requirement.

Based on the summary judgment evidence viewed in the light most 

favorable to Ratcliff, the Sanchez factors weigh against Ratcliff satisfying 

Chandris’s substantial connection requirement at least regarding the nature 

of that connection. Therefore, Ratcliff does not qualify as a Jones Act 

seaman. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary 

judgment as to the lack of Ratcliff’s seaman status under the Jones Act.

C. 

Ratcliff argues that, even if the Longshore Act applies, the district 

court erred in granting summary judgment and finding that Ingram owed no 

duty under the Longshore Act. We disagree. 

Section 905(b) of the Longshore Act applies here. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). 

Under § 905(b), vessel owners “owe three narrow duties to longshoremen: 

(1) a turnover duty, (2) a duty to exercise reasonable care in the areas of the 

ship under the active control of the vessel, and (3) a duty to intervene.” 

Kirksey, 535 F.3d at 391. Only the turnover duty is at issue in this case: 

The turnover duty encompasses two distinct-but-related 

obligations. First, the vessel owner “owes a duty to exercise 

ordinary care under the circumstances to turn over the ship and 

its equipment in such condition that an expert stevedore can 

carry on stevedoring operations with reasonable safety.” 

[Kirksey, 535 F.3d at 392.] And second, the vessel owner “owes 

a duty to warn the stevedore of latent or hidden dangers which 

are known to the vessel owner or should have been known to 

it.” Id. However, a vessel owner need not warn of “dangers 

which are either: (1) open and obvious or (2) dangers a 

reasonably competent stevedore should anticipate 

encountering.” Id.

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Manson Gulf, L.L.C. v. Mod. Am. Recycling Serv., Inc., 878 F.3d 130, 134 (5th 

Cir. 2017).

While the district court addressed the turnover duty to warn as to the 

frozen caustic soda generally, Ratcliff now emphasizesthat the frozen caustic 

soda on the ceiling of the barge created a hidden or latent danger. Though

Ingram warned T.T. about “2 inches per tank” of caustic soda buildup, 

Ratcliff alleges the warning did not extend to frozen caustic soda on the 

ceiling. Here, like Manson Gulf, claimant’s “turnover-duty claim hinges on 

whether the [danger] was hidden or was instead (1) open and obvious or (2) 

a danger ‘a reasonably competent stevedore’should have anticipated.” Id. at 

135 (citation omitted).

But here, unlike Manson Gulf, no summary judgment evidence viewed

in the light most favorable to Ratcliff can show that the danger of frozen 

caustic soda on the ceiling was not open and obvious. Ratcliff himself5

confirmed that he saw caustic soda on the ceiling of the barge and dripping 

down as he entered the barge. According to Ratcliff’s own testimony, he first 

saw the caustic soda on the ceiling an hour-and-a-half before he was initially 

injured on his arm and leg by falling drops of caustic soda.6 Ratcliff’s foreman 

and work team also saw the caustic soda on the ceiling and dripping down. 

Ratcliff’s foreman warned Ratcliff and his work team to stand back as he 

sprayed the frozen caustic soda to clean it off the ceiling. All these facts

contrast with the obscured platform hole in Manson Gulf that played “tricks 

_____________________

5 Ratcliff’s own testimony is prioritized here because “an open-and-obvious 

inquiry should take place from the perspective of the injured longshoreman.” Manson Gulf, 

878 F.3d at 136 n.2.

6 Ratcliff alleges that caustic soda lacks color and odor, at least in some form. But 

Ratcliff nevertheless testified that he could see the frozen or dry caustic soda buildup on 

the ceiling of the barge as it thawed and dripped down. 

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on your eyes” and others did not see until the Manson Gulf claimant fell 

through the hole. Id. at 136. Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact exists 

as to the openness of and obviousness of the caustic soda on the ceiling that 

dripped down.

7

Ratcliff’s surprise upon finding the danger of caustic soda on the 

ceiling of the barge cannot change the fact that Ratcliff and others found the

danger open and obvious.

8 Ratcliff’s surprise might factor into the analysis of 

whether the caustic soda on the ceiling was a danger a reasonably competent 

stevedore should have anticipated encountering. But we need not proceed 

with that analysis given that the danger here is open and obvious. See id. at 

134 (explaining that “a vessel owner need not warn of dangers which are 

either: (1) open and obvious or (2) dangers a reasonably competent stevedore 

should anticipate encountering”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations 

omitted).

That Ratcliff was new to and unfamiliar with cleaning caustic soda and 

was not provided the proper personal protective equipment lacks relevance

_____________________

7 Moreover, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the openness and 

obviousness of the pool of caustic soda on the floor. By Ratcliff’s own account of the facts,

he saw the caustic soda dripping down and had already been injured by the falling drops of 

caustic soda, which caused him to change his slicker suit. Therefore, the pool of caustic 

soda on the floor, which Ratcliff alleges was created by the frozen caustic soda thawing and 

dripping down, would have been open and obvious to Ratcliff. 

8 Other evidence refutes Ratcliff’s alleged element of surprise. Ingram points to 

evidence suggesting that T.T.received pictures of the barge’s condition before work began,

a T.T. representative performed a check of the barge before cleaning began, and that T.T.

determined a “Butterworth” spray of the ceiling was necessary before entering the barge.

However, Ratcliff’s testimony that he was surprised would at least create a factual dispute

as to whether it would have been surprising. Nevertheless, this factual dispute as to surprise 

does not inform the open and obvious inquiry here—in other words, even if Ratcliff was 

surprised to see the caustic soda on the ceiling as he entered the barge, such surprise does 

not preclude the danger from being open and obvious. 

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No. 22-30577

17

as to whether the frozen caustic soda on the ceiling was open and obvious. 

Those facts would be relevant if we analyzed the need to warn under the 

“reasonably competent stevedore” standard or if Ratcliff could assert 

negligence claims against T.T., his employer. But those facts lack relevance

to the openness and obviousness inquiry here as it relates to whether to 

impose the narrow turnover duty to warn of hidden or latent dangers against 

Ingram.

At oral argument, Ratcliff clarified his argument to explain that 

Ingram breached its turnover duty to warn the moment Ratcliff stepped foot 

inside the barge and before Ratcliff was injured. But Ratcliff’s temporal 

distinction is unpersuasive. The danger of caustic soda on the ceiling 

remained open and obvious. 

The openness and obviousness of the caustic soda on the ceiling 

negated the turnover duty to warn. Accordingly, Ingram owed Ratcliff no 

turnover duty to warn of the caustic soda on the ceiling. See Kirksey, 535 F.3d 

at 397 (determining a “vessel had no turnover duty to warn against the defect 

or to correct the unsafe condition” because it was open and obvious); Hess v. 

Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1036 (5th Cir. 1977)

(discerning “no basis for imposing a duty of care on the defendants” where 

the danger “was well known to all concerned”).

Ratcliff fails to show that the alleged high degree of danger changes

the analysis here. Ratcliff presents his argument regarding the high degree of 

danger in the context of the West exception. The West exception may excuse 

a vessel owner from a duty to protect an independent contractor “from risks 

that were inherent in the carrying out of the contract.” Hill v. Texaco, Inc., 

674 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118, 

123 (1959)). Ratcliff attempts to distinguish cases where the West exception 

applies by arguing the danger is far more dangerous here. By arguing the West

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18

exception does not apply to the frozen caustic soda on the ceiling, Ratcliff 

essentially asks to limit the application of the West exception when a danger’s 

quantity, condition, or location is unexpected. But we need not determine 

whether the West exception applies, or whether it should be limited, because 

Ingram owes Ratcliff no duty to warn in the first place given the openness and 

obviousness of the danger.

9

Ratcliff also assertsthat Ingram breached its duty to warn of hidden or 

latent dangers by violating industry standards in a way that caused or 

contributed to Ratcliff’s injuries. Ratcliff alleges that industry standards 

obligated Ingram to send a representative to check the barge and conduct a 

job safety analysis so that it could properly warn Ratcliff of hidden or latent 

dangers. However, as already determined, Ingram owed Ratcliff no turnover 

duty to warn of hidden or latent dangers based on the openness and 

obviousness of the danger here. Therefore, these allegations cannot raise a 

genuine issue of material fact.

Lastly, Ratcliff argues that Ingram breached its distinct-but-related

obligation to furnish a reasonably safe ship under the turnover duty by failing 

to provide a first aid kit on its barge. Ratcliff alleges that Ingram had a duty to 

provide the first aid kit because it was an industry standard. The district court 

did not analyze Ingram’s separate turnover duty “to exercise ordinary care 

under the circumstances to turn over the ship and its equipment in such 

_____________________

9 At oral argument, Ratcliff further contended that the “distinction between 

knowledge of a condition and knowledge of the dangerousness of that condition” prevented 

the danger of caustic soda on the ceiling from being open and obvious. See Randolph v. 

Laeisz, 896 F.2d 964, 971 (5th Cir. 1990). But Randolph applied that distinction while 

analyzing a vessel owner’s duty to intervene, not a vessel owner’sturnover duty. Id. Ratcliff 

fails to cite any authority for imposing a turnover duty on a vessel owner based on a high 

degree of danger regardless of the openness and obviousness of that danger, and we decline 

to create any such authority.

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condition that an expert stevedore can carry on stevedoring operations with 

reasonable safety,” Manson Gulf, 878 F.3d at 134 (citation omitted), in its 

order granting summary judgment as to Ingram. But that makes no difference 

here. This Circuit has already determined that the openness and obviousness 

of a danger may also negate the turnover duty to furnish a reasonably safe 

ship. Kirksey, 535 F.3d at 397. Moreover, Ratcliff points to no summary 

judgment evidence of any industry standard relating to first aid kits.

10

Therefore, even if some factual dispute exists as to whether the lack of a first 

aid kit contributed to Ratcliff’s injury, no genuine issue of material fact arises 

because Ratcliff cannot connect any such failure to Ingram’s turnover duty 

to furnish a reasonably safe ship based on the summary judgment evidence.

III.

For the reasons set forth above, Ratcliff’s argumentsfail. Accordingly, 

the district court’s orders granting summary judgment are

AFFIRMED.

_____________________

10 Instead, as Ingram points out, evidence shows that T.T. inspected Ingram Barge 

976 upon arrival and before beginning any work on it and concluded that no conditions 

existed that would prevent the cleanup work from safely occurring. And T.T. Barge’s 

corporate representative further testified that T.T. Barge has no criticism of Ingram—or 

the condition of its barge—related to Ratcliff’s alleged injuries. 

Case: 22-30577 Document: 00516900931 Page: 19 Date Filed: 09/19/2023