NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

AARON B., Appellant,

v.

ASHLEY H., A.B., A.B., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0147 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS519298

The Honorable Lindsey G. Coates, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant

Ashley Higbee, Chandler

Appellee

FILED 9-29-2020
AARON B. v. ASHLEY H.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge David D. Weinzweig

joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

Aaron B. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to Au.B. and Al.B. (collectively, the 

“Children”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ashley H. (“Mother”) and Father’s relationship began in 2010

and ended in 2013. They never married and characterized their relationship

as “on and off.” Their two children were born in 2011 and 2013, 

respectively. Mother is now married to Joel H. (“Stepfather”).

Between 2015 and 2017, Mother, Stepfather and the Children

moved back and forth between California and New Mexico. Before leaving 

California initially, Mother and Father entered into a stipulated agreement

(“Agreement”) establishing a parenting schedule and awarding each parent

“joint legal custody.”1 A separate order required Father to pay child 

support, which, the parties maintain, was amended through “a side 

agreement.” Regardless, Father was inconsistent in paying child support

and has not done so since September 2018.

Between 2014 and 2017, Father regularly went long periods of 

time without seeing or contacting the Children. In 2015, Father moved to 

Arizona. Approximately two years later, Mother, Stepfather and the 

Children also moved to Arizona. Despite the Children’s increased 

proximity to Father, his interactions with them remained inconsistent.

Between May 2017 and April 2018, Father did not have any contact with the 

Children, which Father contends was due to his work schedule. In 2018, 

while Father was unemployed because of a work injury, he had occasional 

1 Although the Agreement only pertained to the oldest child, the parties 

believed it applied to both children and treated it as such.
AARON B. v. ASHLEY H.

Decision of the Court

3

weekend visits with the Children. Mother relayed her concern that one 

child, in particular, demonstrated negative and defiant behavior following 

visits with Father, as well as her concern for the Children’s safety following 

a seizure Father suffered during a weekend visit in 2018. Father’s last 

contact with the Children was in January 2019.

In June 2019, Mother petitioned for termination of Father’s 

parent-child relationship. The juvenile court conferred with the California 

courts from which custody and support orders had previously been issued, 

and jointly determined that Arizona had jurisdiction to proceed under the 

Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act.

2 See A.R.S. 

§§ 25-1001 to -1067. Following an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court 

terminated Father’s parental rights based on abandonment, also finding 

termination was in the Children’s best interests. Father timely appealed. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona 

Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1), and Arizona 

Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103(A).

DISCUSSION

We review a severance ruling for an abuse of discretion, 

accepting the juvenile court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, 

Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004), and 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to affirming the court’s ruling, 

Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008). 

Because the juvenile court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, 

observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed 

facts,” we will affirm an order terminating parental rights if reasonable 

evidence supports the order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 

86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (quoting Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 

Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004)).

2 The juvenile court had jurisdiction to grant the severance as: (1) Arizona 

was the home state of the Children, (2) the Los Angeles superior court and 

the Victorville superior court agreed to relinquish jurisdiction, and (3) the 

juvenile court found that the Children, Mother and Father no longer resided 

in California. See, e.g., Angel B. v. Vanessa J., 234 Ariz. 69, 74, ¶ 16 (App. 

2014).
AARON B. v. ASHLEY H.

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I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding that Father 

Abandoned the Children

“To justify termination of a parent-child relationship, the 

[juvenile] court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of 

the statutory grounds set out in [A.R.S. §] 8-533,” and find, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, “that termination is in the best interest[s] of 

the child[ren].” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 

(2000); accord Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 66(C). Abandonment, as defined in 

§ 8-531(1), is one statutory ground for termination: 

[T]he failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to 

maintain regular contact with the child, including providing 

normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial finding 

that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and 

communicate with the child. Failure to maintain a normal 

parental relationship with the child without just cause for a 

period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of 

abandonment.

Abandonment is measured by a parent’s conduct, not by that parent’s

subjective intent. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 18. Accordingly, it is the 

parent’s “burden to act,” id. at 251, ¶ 25, and where the parent fails to 

provide reasonable support, maintain regular contact with the child, 

provide normal supervision, or makes only minimal efforts to communicate 

with the child, the court may find that the parent has abandoned the child, 

Kenneth B. v. Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, 37, ¶ 18 (App. 2010).

Although a parent “may not restrict the other parent from 

interacting with their child and then petition to terminate the latter’s rights 

for abandonment,” Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 297, ¶ 21 (App. 

2013), where circumstances prevent a parent from exercising traditional

methods of bonding with the child, the parent “must act persistently to 

establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his 

legal rights to the extent necessary,” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 22. 

Relying upon Calvin B., Father contends he made more than 

minimal efforts to support and maintain contact with the Children and that 

Mother prevented him from interacting with the Children. In Calvin B., this 

Court observed that, despite attempts by mother to prevent father from

interacting with his children, the father “vigorously asserted his legal rights 

to see his son.” 232 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 29 (quoting Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, 

¶ 22). There, the father actively sought more involvement in his child’s life 
AARON B. v. ASHLEY H.

Decision of the Court

5

than the mother would allow; for example, he petitioned for joint custody, 

obtained an order establishing a fixed amount of parenting time, and 

despite legal and social interference by the mother, he managed up to ten 

visits with his child a year. Id. at 297, ¶¶ 22-25. 

Here, however, unlike Calvin B., Father had joint legal 

custody and an Agreement establishing a parenting schedule. 

Nevertheless, Father went substantial periods of time without contacting

the Children and did not adhere to the terms of the Agreement, nor take 

responsibility as joint legal custodian of the Children. Father was 

inconsistent in financially supporting the Children and has not done so 

since 2018. And, while the record demonstrates that Mother occasionally 

did not respond to Father’s messages seeking information about the 

Children, Mother’s actions do not rise to the level of interference required 

to establish a defense to abandonment. Father had an obligation to act and 

a duty to vigorously pursue a relationship with his Children, which he did 

not do.

Because reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding that Father abandoned the Children, on this record, the court did 

not err. 

II. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding that 

Terminating Father’s Parental Rights Was in the Children’s Best Interests 

The juvenile court must also find, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that terminating the parent-child relationship is in the children’s 

best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 

(2005). In conducting the best interests inquiry, the juvenile court must find 

that the children would either “benefit from a severance or be harmed by 

the continuation of the relationship.” In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. 

JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). 

Father contends the Children would not be harmed by a 

continuation of the parent-child relationship because the Children “would 

remain with Mother and Stepfather and their needs would continue to be 

met.” However, where severance of the parent-child relationship will 

benefit children, the best interests determination may also be satisfied. Id.

at 369, ¶ 17. 

Here, the juvenile court found that termination was in the 

Children’s best interests, in part, because Stepfather “fulfills the role of 

father figure for the [C]hildren;” is “emotionally bonded to the [C]hildren 

and committed to meeting their needs;” “the [C]hildren refer to Stepfather 
AARON B. v. ASHLEY H.

Decision of the Court

6

as their father;” and Stepfather “plans to adopt the children.” See Demetrius 

L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (2016) (“When a . . . child’s needs [are 

being met] and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally 

possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of parental 

rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.”); see also 

Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 (App. 1998) (a 

court “may properly consider in favor of severance” factors that include 

“the immediate availability of an adoptive placement” and “whether an 

existing placement is meeting the needs of the child”). 

Because reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding that the Children’s needs are being met in Mother and Stepfather’s 

care, and that the Children are prospectively adoptable by Stepfather, the 

court did not err in concluding that termination was in the Children’s best 

interests. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. As the prevailing party 

on appeal, Mother may recover her costs upon compliance with Arizona 

Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.