[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11740

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHN IFEOLUWA ONIMOLE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00492-WMR-CCB-8

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11740

Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

John Onimole appeals his 36-month sentence for money 

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2. He argues that 

the district court erred in (1) calculating his guideline range by 

considering other relevant conduct for which he was not convicted 

and which was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) ordering 

restitution for losses caused by the overall conspiracy instead of 

those caused solely by his conduct; and (3) denying a reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility. After review, we affirm. 

I . Background

In 2020, a federal grand jury issued a 21-count superseding 

indictment charging Onimole, among other codefendants, with 

one count of conspiracy and one count of money laundering 

(Counts 1 and 19). According to the indictment, Onimole, 

Ahamefule Aso Odus (“Aso”), Chukwukadibia Ikechukwu 

Nnadozie (“Chuka”), and Uchechi Chidimma Odus (“Uche”), 

conspired to knowingly engage in a business e-mail compromise 

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23-11740 Opinion of the Court 3

(“BEC”) scheme1 and a “romance scam” scheme2 between 

approximately February 2017 and September 2018. According to 

the indictment, the co-conspirators set up numerous personal and 

business bank accounts for sham companies for the purposes of 

receiving the ill-gotten gains from the schemes. Once the stolen 

funds were received, the conspirators then quickly dispersed the 

money through wire transfers to other accounts or by making 

check or cash withdrawals in an attempt to conceal the source of 

the funds. Count 19 charged Onimole, Aso, and Uche with money 

laundering based on one of the BEC schemes. 

Onimole entered an open plea of guilty to the money 

laundering charge (Count 19). At the change-of-plea hearing, the 

government set forth the factual basis for the charge. The 

government explained that Count 19 incorporated by reference the 

factual allegations of Count 1 (the conspiracy count). Specifically, 

1 In a BEC, an e-mail message which appears legitimate—but in fact is not—is 

sent to a business and fools an unwitting employee to interact with the 

message, which then deploys malware into the employee’s computer system. 

From there, the malware collects secured information and monitors 

correspondence to determine when a financial transaction is scheduled to take 

place. When one is scheduled between legitimate parties, the illegitimate 

third party that has been monitoring the company through the malware then 

sends a “spoofed” e-mail that again appears legitimate and changes the wiring 

instructions thereby sending the money into a bank account controlled by the 

conspirators. 

2 In a romance scam, the conspirators have fake profiles on dating websites 

and engage with users of the site and cultivate a romantic relationship only to 

then trick the victim into sending the conspirator money under false pretenses. 

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“[t]he defendants named in the first superseding indictment,” 

including Onimole, “were all residents of the metro Atlanta area 

and they served as money launderers for other conspirators 

throughout the country and throughout the world who conducted 

[BEC] schemes, romance fraud schemes, and targeted companies 

and individuals across the United States.” The defendants set up 

numerous bank accounts, including ones for sham companies that 

they registered with the State of Georgia for the purpose of 

receiving the stolen funds. Once the funds were received, they 

quickly disbursed the funds into other accounts through wire 

transfers or by making check or cash withdrawals. 

On July 26, 2018, as a result of a BEC, company BCL wired 

$46,450.85 to a bank account controlled by defendants. At the 

direction of defendant Aso, another co-conspirator used the stolen 

funds to purchase cashier’s checks payable to others, including 

Onimole. Onimole then cashed the $22,230 check. 

Onimole agreed with the government’s summary of the 

facts. However, he clarified, upon further questioning, that he did 

not know that the source of the money was fraudulent, and he only 

learned about that after the fact. His counsel then explained that 

Onimole’s plea was not based on actual knowledge but on 

deliberate ignorance—meaning that he understood the 

circumstances were highly suspicious and logically indicated the 

funds were “from an inappropriate source,” but he actively 

disregarded the circumstances because his co-conspirators gave 

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him money for cashing the check.3 The government asserted that 

it believed it could prove actual knowledge at trial, but agreed that 

Onimole could alternatively be convicted on a deliberate ignorance 

theory. The court then asked Onimole whether he “suspect[ed] 

that the money was not legitimate, that it was from some illegal or 

criminal purpose,” and he stated “Yes, your honor. I had a feeling. 

I did have a feeling. I mean, I was told it wasn’t. But I just had a 

strong feeling and I still do.” The court further clarified, asking 

whether Onimole knew “when [he] got involved in it and started 

preparations to receive the money and to withdraw the money and 

convert it to cashier’s checks and to otherwise disburse it, did [he] 

know then that that money came from criminal activity?” 

Onimole stated “[a]t that point, yes, sir.” 

The district court then found that there was a factual basis 

for the plea, noting that based on the government’s proffer it 

believed the government could prove actual knowledge, but 

alternatively, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Onimole 

deliberately ignorant. Accordingly, it accepted his plea. 

Following Onimole’s plea, the United States Probation 

Office prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”). The PSI 

indicated that Onimole’s involvement in the underlying conspiracy 

consisted of opening bank accounts used to receive funds obtained 

from BEC schemes and withdrawing those funds. Onimole was 

linked to a SunTrust bank account, two Bank of America accounts, 

and a sham company called “Branagh, Inc.” The PSI also indicated 

3 Onimole received $1,000 for his services. 

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that Onimole was held accountable for an intended loss of 

approximately $1,267,996.06 based on his participation in several 

BEC schemes in addition to the one involving BCL that served as 

the basis for Count 19, and it detailed his connection with those 

schemes. Onimole objected to this information, arguing that he 

did not plead guilty to Count 1 and he was not liable for any losses 

stemming from Count 1. The probation officer maintained that 

even though Onimole did not plead guilty to Count 1, the other 

schemes were properly included and considered as relevant 

conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. 

The probation officer determined that Onimole’s base 

offense level was 22 pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.1(a)(2) and 2B1.1 

because Onimole was responsible for an intended loss amount that 

was more than $550,000 but less than $1,500,000. After accounting 

for specific offense enhancements and a three-point reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility, Onimole’s resulting total offense level 

was 20. An offense level of 20 and a criminal history score of I 

resulted in a guidelines range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment. 

Onimole objected, arguing that he should be responsible for 

only the value of the laundered funds he pleaded guilty to in Count 

19, which would result in a total offense level of 11 and a lower 

guidelines range. In light of Onimole’s objections to the inclusion 

of relevant conduct, the government objected to the three-point 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 

Prior to sentencing, Onimole filed a sentencing

memorandum, asserting that he should receive a three-point

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reduction for his acceptance of responsibility because he pleaded

guilty to Count 19. He then reiterated his argument that he should 

only be held responsible for the specific conduct underlying Count 

19, which would result in a significantly lower offense level and 

guidelines range of zero to six months’ imprisonment. He also filed 

a motion in limine to exclude “irrelevant, inadmissible evidence and 

issues at his sentencing,” seeking exclusion of any evidence at 

sentencing that did not specifically relate to Count 19. 

At sentencing, the district court stated that it was not going 

to “grant . . . or consider” the motion in limine because such a 

motion is designed to prevent evidence from being introduced—

typically when juries are involved. But, in this instance, the court 

needed to know about what Onimole did not want the court to 

consider in order to resolve the objections to the PSI and determine 

whether the objected-to conduct was relevant or not. Onimole 

argued that there was “an enormous difference between a 

conspiracy and a substantive count.” He argued that he would 

have denied the conspiracy allegations at trial because he was not 

involved in managing or controlling the bank accounts, his

codefendants had access to his personal information, and his

codefendants exploited him to engage in activities without his 

knowledge. Thus, he maintained that the conduct underlying the 

money laundering count to which he pleaded guilty was “totally 

disassociated from all the other allegations . . . about him being 

involved in other [BEC schemes,” and that only the conduct related 

to the substantive money laundering count should be considered. 

The court noted that the sentencing guidelines direct the district 

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-11740

court to consider all relevant conduct, and asked Onimole whether 

he had any authority to support his position. Onimole admitted 

that he did not have any additional authority other than what he 

presented in his motion in limine. 

The government argued that, under the guidelines and this 

Court’s precedent, the district court should consider all relevant 

conduct, which includes uncharged conduct. The court overruled 

Onimole’s objection and allowed the government to present 

evidence on relevant conduct related to other BEC schemes and 

money laundering activities that involved Onimole. 

The government then called Special Agent Joshua Barnes 

who testified at length to Onimole’s involvement in the BEC 

schemes. Generally, his testimony established that Onimole 

registered the fictious company Branagh, Inc. in his name, with the 

State of Georgia in June 2018.4 Onimole also opened several 

business bank accounts for the company, but none of the accounts 

had any transactions consistent with business activities. In addition 

to the conduct to which Onimole pleaded guilty in Count 19

involving company BCL, the investigation connected him with 

other BEC schemes involving companies AMM, HZOH, STC, 

GWL, Orahealth, and ZTB. 

For instance, the agent testified that, as a result of a BEC 

scheme, company A.M.M. wired $54,918.67 to a SunTrust Bank 

4 Branagh was administratively dissolved by the Secretary of State in August 

2019. 

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account controlled by a co-conspirator. After the money was 

received, two cashier’s checks totaling $52,000 were issued—one 

of which was for $30,000 payable to Onimole. The same day the 

check issued, Onimole’s driver’s license was used to cash the check, 

and his personal identifying information was listed on the bank’s 

currency transaction report (“CTR”).5 Onimole listed his 

occupation on the report as “retail sales.” 

This pattern continued with the other BEC schemes. For 

example, the agent testified that, after the funds from HZOH, STC, 

and ZTB were wired from the respective companies into a

co-conspirator’s account, a portion of those funds would then be 

directly issued to Onimole via a cashier’s check or directly 

transferred into his personal bank account.6 As for the Orahealth 

and GWL scheme, the funds were transferred to a bank account in 

the name of Onimole’s sham company Branagh, Inc., and Onimole 

was a signer on the account.7 

5 Banks are required to complete a CTR for any transaction involving cash 

over $10,000. 

6 A wire transfer of close to $72,000 of the stolen ZTB funds was attempted 

from one co-conspirator’s account to Onimole’s personal Wells Fargo 

account, but the wire was returned as a “beneficiary name mismatch” because 

the recipient of the money was listed as “Branagh, Inc.,” and that name did 

not match the name on the designated account. Once the funds were returned 

to the original co-conspirator’s account, they were ultimately withdrawn by 

other co-conspirators. 

7 On the same day as GWL’s wire, some of the stolen GWL funds were then 

used to purchase three airline tickets to California, one of which was in 

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Following the agent’s testimony and additional argument 

from the parties, the district court concluded that the government 

had met its burden to establish the existence of the conspiracy by a 

preponderance of the evidence and that the other schemes were

relevant conduct. Accordingly, the district court determined that 

the intended loss amount of $1,267.966.068 was the correct amount 

even though all of that money did not necessarily “flow[]” to 

Onimole. 

The district court then sustained the government’s 

objection to the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, noting 

that the court “spent most of the day talking about whether the 

defendant did the things the Government says he did and which he 

says he did not,” which was not consistent with an acceptance of 

responsibility reduction. Nevertheless, the court noted that it 

would keep Onimole’s position in mind when considering whether 

to depart or vary downward. Thus, the revised total offense level 

of 23 and a criminal history category of one resulted in an advisory 

guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. 

Following arguments from the parties as to the appropriate 

sentence and consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the 

district court varied downward and sentenced Onimole to a belowguidelines sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 

Onimole’s name. Onimole was then listed on a CTR from a bank branch in 

California withdrawing $15,000 of the stolen funds. 

8 The actual loss amount was $1,117,966.06. 

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3 years’ supervised release. The district court also imposed 

restitution in the amount of $1,117,966.06, jointly and severally, 

with Onimole’s co-conspirators. Finally, the district court ordered 

forfeiture of $550,000—the minimum amount of funds laundered. 

This appeal followed. 

II. Discussion

Onimole argues that the district court erred in (1) calculating 

his base offense level by considering other relevant conduct for 

which he was not convicted and which was not proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt; (2) ordering restitution for losses caused by the 

overall conspiracy instead of those caused solely by his conduct; 

and (3) denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. We 

address each argument in turn.

A. Calculation of the base offense level

Onimole argues that the district court erred in increasing his 

base offense level based on the total intended loss value of the 

laundered funds from the BEC schemes ($1,267,966.06), and that 

the court should have limited the value to the actual loss involved 

in the substantive money laundering offense to which he pleaded 

guilty ($22,230). 

“We review a district court’s interpretation of the 

Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and the determination of the 

amount of loss involved in the offense for clear error.” United States 

v. Stein, 846 F.3d 1135, 1151 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). 

“We review only for clear error the application of the relevant 

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conduct guideline in § 1B1.3 to the facts of the case.” United States 

v. Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Section 2S1.1 of the Guidelines establishes the base offense 

level for money laundering offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1. It 

provides, as relevant here, that the base offense level is “8 plus the 

number of offense levels from the table in § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property 

Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to the value of the 

laundered funds, otherwise.” Id. § 2S1.1(a)(2). Under the relevant 

table, if the value of the loss attributable to the defendant is more 

than $550,000 but less than $1,500,000, the base offense level is 

increased by 14 points. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). 

We have held that “[w]hen calculating a defendant’s 

sentencing range under the Guidelines, the sentencing court must 

consider all ‘relevant conduct’ as defined in [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.3.” 

United States v. Siegelman, 786 F.3d 1322, 1332 (11th Cir. 2015); 

United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2014) (“In 

addition, proper calculation of the guidelines requires 

consideration of all relevant conduct, not merely charged 

conduct.” (quotations omitted)). Section 1B1.3 of the guidelines, 

defines relevant conduct as “all acts and omissions committed, 

aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or 

willfully caused by the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). 

“When an offense involves ‘jointly undertaken criminal activity,’ 

[whether or not charged as a conspiracy,]relevant conduct includes 

‘all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in 

furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.’” United 

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States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)). “[R]elevant conduct is broadly defined 

to include both uncharged and acquitted conduct that is proven at 

sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Siegelman, 786 

F.3d at 1332. “Accordingly, under § 1B1.3(a), when a defendant is 

acting in concert with others, the appropriate conduct to consider 

for sentencing purposes is far broader than the conduct that drove 

the original conviction.” Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1297. 

We have held that, even absent a conspiracy charge, the 

district court may hold all participants responsible for the losses 

caused by the jointly undertaken scheme when the defendant’s 

actions suggested that he was actively involved in the criminal 

scheme and that he agreed to jointly undertake in the scheme. See 

United States v. Whitman, 887 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2018). 

When the defendant challenges the loss amount calculation, “the 

government bears the burden of supporting it with reliable and 

specific evidence.” See United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298, 1318 

(11th Cir. 2015). 

Here, as discussed above, the government presented 

extensive evidence at the sentencing hearing that directly linked 

Onimole to several other BEC money laundering schemes in 

addition to the one that served as the basis for Count 19. This 

evidence included that after the stolen funds were wired from the 

respective companies into a co-conspirator’s account, a portion of 

those funds would then be directly issued to Onimole via a 

cashier’s check, directly transferred into his personal bank account, 

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or were otherwise connected with his company Branagh, Inc. 

Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the district court to 

conclude that Onimole agreed to participate in a jointly undertaken 

criminal scheme.9 See Whitman, 887 F.3d at 1248–49. Based on this 

evidence, the district court did not clearly err in considering the 

other BEC schemes as relevant conduct and in concluding that 

Onimole was responsible for the losses caused by the jointly 

undertaken schemes. Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. As a result, the 

district court properly determined Onimole’s base offense level. 

U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.1(a)(2), 2B1.1(b)(1)(H).

9 Onimole argues that relevant conduct must be proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt and cannot be based on judicial factfinding, citing Alleyne v. United States, 

570 U.S. 99 (2013). This argument is foreclosed by our binding precedent. See 

United States v. Charles, 757 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2014) (rejecting an 

identical Alleyne-based challenge and holding that “a district court may 

continue to make guidelines calculations based upon judicial fact findings and 

may enhance a sentence—so long as its findings do not increase the statutory 

maximum or minimum authorized by facts determined in a guilty plea or jury 

verdict”); United States v. Campbell, 765 F.3d 1291, 1301 n.10 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(rejecting argument “that all sentencing enhancements are elements . . . that 

a jury must decide” and reaffirming holding in Charles). Although Onimole 

contends that our precedent is inconsistent with Alleyne and other related 

Supreme Court decisions, under the prior-panel-precedent rule, “a prior 

panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is 

overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or 

by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th 

Cir. 2008).

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B. Calculation of the restitution amount

Onimole argues that, even if he is accountable for the total 

intended loss for purposes of his base offense level, the district 

court erred in imposing the total actual loss—$1,117,966.06, jointly 

and severally—as the restitution amount because a defendant is 

responsible “only for the loss caused by the specific conduct” that 

is the basis of his conviction, citing Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 

411, 413 (1990).10 

“We review de novo the legality of an order of restitution, 

but review for abuse of discretion the determination of the 

restitution value of lost or destroyed property. We review for clear 

error factual findings underlying a restitution order.” United States 

v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations 

omitted) (internal citations omitted).

The district court, in imposing a sentence, must order 

restitution in accordance with the Mandatory Victim Restitution 

Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. “The method for calculating 

actual loss, as opposed to intended loss, under the Sentencing 

Guidelines is largely the same as the method for establishing actual 

loss to identifiable victims under the MVRA. Stein, 846 F.3d at 1153

10 To the extent that Onimole asserts that his financial situation should have 

been accounted for when the court ordered restitution or forfeiture, that 

argument is without merit. See United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th 

Cir. 2000) (“The district court is not required, nor does it have the discretion, 

to consider the offender’s ability to pay when ordering restitution under the 

[Mandatory Victim Restitution Act].”).

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(quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[i]n most cases, the amount 

of actual loss under the guidelines will be the same as the 

restitution figure.” Id.

The Supreme Court in Hughey v. United States held that 

restitution could be authorized under the Victim and Witness 

Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA) “only for the loss caused by the 

specific conduct that [was] the basis of the offense of conviction.”

495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990). However, Onimole’s reliance on Hughey 

is misplaced. As we have previously explained, post-Hughey,

Congress’s enactment of “the MVRA all but eviscerated Hughey

with respect to crimes involving schemes.” United States v. 

Edwards, 728 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States 

v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th Cir. 2004)). Congress greatly 

expanded the definition of “victim” under the MVRA, and we have 

held “that by defining ‘victim’ expansively in scheme-based crimes, 

Congress partially overrul[ed] Hughey’s restrictive interpretation of 

the VWPA and expand[ed] district courts’ authority to grant 

restitution.” Id. at 1293 (quoting Dickerson, 370 F.3d at 1338). Thus,

while “[a]n award of restitution must be based on the amount of 

loss actually caused by the defendant’s conduct,” United States v. 

Foster, 878 F.3d 1297, 1307 (11th Cir. 2018),“[c]ourts have agreed 

that, in light of the expanded statutory language, restitution orders 

for conduct closely related to the offense of conviction are 

appropriate under [the MVRA], in addition to the specific conduct 

for which the defendant was convicted.” United States v. Brown, 665 

F.3d 1239, 1252 (11th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Valladares, 

544 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding a restitution award 

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that included losses from uncharged conduct and holding that “the 

district court was permitted to consider the losses [to the victim] 

incurred from [the uncharged] scheme” because the uncharged 

scheme “could be considered relevant conduct”).

Accordingly, as discussed above, because the other BEC 

schemes were properly considered relevant conduct, the district 

court did not err in including the actual losses from those related 

BEC schemes in the restitution award.11 Brown, 665 F.3d at 1252; 

Valladares, 544 F.3d at 1269.

C. Reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility

Onimole argues that the district court erred in denying him 

a two-point reduction under the guidelines for acceptance of 

responsibility, which he maintains he should have received because 

he pleaded guilty to Count 19. 

A defendant is entitled to a two-point reduction of his 

offense level if he clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility 

for his offense. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Importantly, “[a] defendant 

who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment [for 

acceptance of responsibility] as a matter of right.” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. 

(n.3). Rather, to determine whether the reduction applies, the 

district court must consider, among other factors, the timeliness of 

11 Onimole argues that the district court failed to connect him to the total 

actual loss of $1,117,966.06. We disagree. As discussed previously, there was 

a preponderance of the evidence linking Onimole to the BEC schemes that 

made up the actual loss amount involving victims BCL, STC, HZOH, GWL, 

Orahealth, ZTB, and AMM. 

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the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and whether he 

truthfully admitted that he engaged in the conduct comprising the 

offenses of conviction and “any additional relevant conduct for 

which he is accountable under § 1B1.3.” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. (n.1(A), 

(H)). “[A] defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively 

admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction” in order 

to receive a reduction—in other words, the defendant can remain 

silent. Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. (n.1(A)). However, “[a] defendant who 

falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the 

court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with 

acceptance of responsibility . . . .” Id.; see also United States v. 

Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1022–23 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Although a 

guilty plea can constitute significant evidence of acceptance of 

responsibility, it may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant 

inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility.”).

“In reviewing a district court’s refusal to grant a reduction 

under § 3E1.1, [we] review[] its interpretation of the Guidelines de 

novo. We review the factual findings upon which the denial of the 

acceptance reduction is based for clear error.” United States v. 

Roosevelt Coats, 8 F.4th 1228, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotations 

omitted) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he determination of 

whether a defendant has adequately manifested acceptance of 

responsibility is a flexible, fact sensitive inquiry” to which we give 

“great deference.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Thus, we will not set 

aside a district court’s determination that a defendant is not entitled 

to a § 3E1.1 adjustment unless the facts in the record clearly 

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establish that the defendant has accepted responsibility.” Moriarty, 

429 F.3d at 1022–23.

Here, the district court did not clearly err in determining 

that Onimole had not clearly demonstrated acceptance of 

responsibility. Although he pleaded guilty to Count 19, he, at the 

very least, frivolously contested relevant conduct, which is 

inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 

cmt. (n.1(A)). And we have upheld the denial of acceptance of 

responsibility under similar circumstances. See United States v. 

Tejas, 868 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (upholding denial of 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility where defendant “went 

beyond mere silence” and affirmatively denied relevant conduct); 

United States v. Sammour, 816 F.3d 1328, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016) 

(upholding denial of reduction for acceptance of responsibility 

where defendant “downplay[ed] his culpability at the sentencing” 

and “frivolously contested relevant conduct” (alterations 

adopted)). In light of the record before us, we cannot say that “the 

record clearly establish[es] that [Onimole] has accepted 

responsibility.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1022–23. Accordingly, he is 

not entitled to relief. Id.; Tejas, 868 F.3d at 1248.

III. Conclusion

For the above reasons, we affirm Onimole’s conviction and 

sentence. 

AFFIRMED.

 

USCA11 Case: 23-11740 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 03/22/2024 Page: 19 of 19