United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

MILITARY 

PERSONNEL 

Reserve Components 

Need Guidance to 

Accurately and 

Consistently Account 

for Volunteers on 

Active Duty for 

Operational Support 

October 2006 

 

GAO-07-93 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

October 2006

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Reserve Components Need Guidance to 

Accurately and Consistently Account for 

Volunteers on Active Duty for Operational 

Support 

Highlights of GAO-07-93, a report to 

congressional committees 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

and Congress have expressed

concern with the frequency and

length of time that volunteer

reservists serve on active duty. In

fiscal year 2006, DOD nearly

doubled its fiscal year 2005 

estimate for the total maximum 

levels of reservists volunteering to 

be on active duty for operational 

support, as shown in the table. 

Congress required GAO to review

the reasons behind the increases 

and expressed an interest in

understanding which reservists

were being included or excluded

from these numbers. In this report, 

GAO (1) identified the factors that

led to the increase in DOD’s

requests for the maximum number 

of volunteer reserve personnel 

authorized to be on active duty for 

operational support since DOD’s 

initial request in fiscal year 2005

and (2) assessed the extent to

which the reserve components 

have consistently reported the 

number of reservists serving in an

operational support capacity since 

2005. In conducting this review, 

GAO analyzed agency documents 

and interviewed DOD officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD and

the reserve components develop 

guidance to clarify and consistently

define the categories of operational 

support that should be included in 

the reported amounts. In 

commenting on a draft of this

report, DOD concurred with the 

recommendation. 

DOD’s requested authorization levels for reserve personnel voluntarily on 

active duty for operational support grew substantially between fiscal years 

2005 and 2006 for two reasons. First, when developing its fiscal year 2005 

estimate, DOD used data reported annually that excluded some reservists 

serving in operational support capacities. Second, the definition of operational 

support was not included with the legislation and DOD did not distribute an 

official definition until 6 months after the fiscal year 2005 authorized levels

were in place. Based on the published definition and greater outreach to 

personnel responsible for monitoring the number of volunteers for this type of

active duty, most reserve components submitted higher estimates for 

maximum levels for fiscal year 2006. DOD submitted the same estimates in 

fiscal year 2007 as fiscal year 2006 because the number of volunteers did not 

change greatly. 

The reserve components have not been consistently identifying the number of 

reservists serving in an operational support capacity since this monthly 

reporting requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. The reserve 

components are inconsistently including certain categories of personnel in 

their reported numbers. For example, two of the six reserve components do 

not include personnel serving as voluntarily recalled retired reservists in their 

reported totals, even though this category is listed in DOD’s definition of 

operational support. In addition, only three of the six components include 

reservists serving on extended active duty missions in their reported numbers. 

GAO also found that the Navy Reserve erroneously submitted cumulative 

amounts instead of the highest amount of volunteer reservists each month for 

6 months, so that it appeared to exceed its maximum authorized level three

times. DOD is implementing a change to its Defense Manpower and Data 

Center to systematically generate the highest count of reservists each month, 

but the effectiveness of this change depends on whether the components 

update and align their policies and systems to provide these data. DOD is in 

the process of developing an instruction and only four of the reserve 

components have updated or have plans to update their guidance to clarify 

and consistently define what categories to include when accounting for these 

operational support reservists. Without updating and aligning their guidance, 

inconsistencies and errors in the reported numbers of operational support 

reservists may continue. 

Maximum Authorized Number of Active Duty Reserve Personnel for Operational Support from

Fiscal Years 2005 to 2006 

Maximum number of reservists 

authorized 

Fiscal year 

2005

Fiscal year 

2006 Difference

Percentage 

change 

Army Reserve 5,000 13,000 8,000 160%

Army National Guard 10,300 17,000 6,700 65%

Navy Reserve 6,200 6,200 0 0%

Marine Corps Reserve 2,500 3,000 500 20%

Air National Guard 10,100 16,000 5,900 58%

Air Force Reserve 3,600 14,000 10,400 289%

Total 37,700 69,200 31,500 84%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-93.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Derek Stewart 

at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 5

Conclusions 13

Recommendation for Executive Action 14 

Agency Comments 14 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 16 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 18 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 20 

Table 

Table 1: Maximum Authorized Number of Active Duty Reserve 

Personnel for Operational Support from Fiscal Years 2005 

to 2006 10 

Abbreviations 

DMDC Defense Manpower and Data Center

DOD Department of Defense 

FY fiscal year 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

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Page i GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

October 31, 2006 

The Honorable John C. Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Since the end of the Cold War, the reserve components1

 have become an 

integral part of military operations. As of May 2006, the Ready Reserve 

comprised roughly 44 percent of the total military force. The Department 

of Defense (DOD) has increasingly relied on both involuntarily mobilized 

and volunteer reservists since the first Gulf War, as well as in a series of 

military operations from 1994 through 2001 for contingencies in Haiti, 

Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Kosovo. Following the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, DOD has depended more heavily on the reserves for 

overseas operations and homeland missions. The department and 

Congress have expressed concern with the frequency and length of time 

that volunteer reservists are mobilized or voluntarily serve on active duty, 

which can lead to overuse of reservists and stress on the reserve force,

 1

 The Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Navy 

Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve comprise the DOD reserve components or

reserves. 

Page 1 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
impairing the availability and ability of reservists to respond quickly to 

contingency missions.2

Prior to October 2004, the extent to which reservists could volunteer to 

serve in military operations was restricted by legislation, which became 

known as the 180-day rule. The rule stated that DOD must count in its 

congressionally authorized, active duty, annual end strength levels any 

reservist serving in an active duty role and performing special work for 

longer than 180 days. As a result of the rule, DOD could use reservists to

perform mission-essential tasks for a limited period of time without 

considering them as a permanent addition to the force. DOD officials 

believed this rule limited volunteerism, service continuity, and their 

flexibility in using volunteer reservists in a variety of missions. To work 

around this rule, the services allowed reservists to volunteer multiple 

times in succession as long as each active duty service tour lasted fewer 

than 180 days. These actions resulted in volunteer reservists serving on 

active duty for extended periods of time without being accounted for 

under the active duty end strength numbers. 

Enacted in October 2004, the Ronald Reagan National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) included a mechanism to 

provide oversight over the number of reservists volunteering to be on 

active duty for operational support. The act eliminated the 180-day rule 

and created a requirement for Congress to annually authorize the 

maximum number of volunteer reserve personnel to be on active duty for

operational support purposes. The act did not define the term operational 

support, but provided for the Secretary of Defense to define operational 

support in a separately published regulation. The act also provided that a 

reservist on active or full-time National Guard duty for a period greater 

than 3 years or for a cumulative period of more than 3 years within the 

past 4 years was to be counted against the active duty end strength 

authorization. DOD then required the reserve components to report their 

 2

 GAO has also issued a number of reports and testimonies reviewing the increased use of 

reserve forces related to mobilization, availability, and readiness: Military Personnel:

DOD Needs to Address Long-Term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization

and Demobilization Issues, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Reserve 

Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and

Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004); Military Personnel: A 

Strategic Approach Is Needed to Address Long-Term Guard and Reserve Force 

Availability, GAO-05-285T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2005); and Reserve Forces: Army

National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to Be Reexamined, 

GAO-06-170T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
monthly highest numbers of these reservists in order to monitor that they 

did not exceed their maximum authorized levels. In the NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2006, most of the reserve components had significantly increased 

their estimates for the maximum number of reserves authorized to be on 

active duty for operational support. The total authorization level nearly 

doubled compared to the fiscal year 2005 authorization level. DOD’s fiscal 

year 2007 requested authorization for volunteer reservists remained 

consistent with the fiscal year 2006 maximum levels. 

Congress required that we review the reasons behind the increases from 

fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006, as well as the factors used to develop

the fiscal year 2007 levels.

3

 Congress also expressed an interest in 

understanding which reservists were being included or excluded from the 

number of reservists activated for operational support purposes. The 

objectives of this report are to (1) identify the factors that led to the 

increase in requests for the maximum number of volunteer reserve 

personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational support since 

fiscal year 2005 and (2) assess the extent to which the reserve components 

have consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an 

operational support capacity since 2005. 

To identify the factors that led to the increase in the number of authorized 

personnel, we reviewed policies, implementing guidance, and regulations, 

analyzed key legislation, and interviewed Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense Reserve Affairs and reserve component officials to gain an 

understanding of their roles and effectiveness in developing the 

authorization levels for reservists on active duty for operational support. 

To determine the reliability of the estimates for the maximum 

authorization levels for the reserve components, we gathered reserve 

component officials’ perspectives on their data systems in the collecting 

and reporting of reserve numbers to DOD. To determine the extent to 

which the reserve components have consistently reported the number of 

reservists serving in an operational support capacity, we obtained 

documentation and discussed with reserve officials the consistency in 

application of the guidelines, including information on the structure of 

reserve data systems and the process for collecting and recording the 

numbers of reservists. The components and DOD also provided the 

highest number of reservists each month as reported to DOD. We found 

inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the data, based in part on definitional 

 3

 H.R. Rep. No. 109-89, Title IV, at 310 (2005). 

Page 3 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
problems of categories of reservists to be included in reported numbers, 

generating data that we believe are not sufficiently reliable. As a result, we 

make a recommendation for executive action to improve the accuracy and 

consistency of information that is reported across the components. We 

conducted our review from June 2006 through September 2006, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The 

scope and methodology used in our review are described further in 

appendix I. 

DOD’s request for volunteer reserve personnel authorized to be on active 

duty for operational support grew between fiscal years 2005 and 2006 

primarily due to two key factors: data used by DOD to prepare its fiscal 

year 2005 estimate did not accurately reflect all the reservists voluntarily 

serving in operational support capacities and DOD had not defined what 

constituted operational support prior to submitting the fiscal year 2005 

estimate. According to DOD officials, when it developed its initial 

submission for maximum authorization levels, the department based its 

estimates on data reported annually by the reserve components for other 

purposes. The data excluded some reservists serving in operational 

support capacities. Once the numbers requested for fiscal year 2005 were 

approved by Congress and communicated throughout the reserve 

components, reserve officials with greater insight over the reservists 

serving in an operational support role realized that the estimates were too 

low and did not reflect the actual numbers of reservists serving in this 

capacity. Further complicating the issue, DOD’s definition of operational 

support was not agreed upon or distributed until April 26, 2005, 

approximately 6 months after the fiscal year 2005 authorized maximum 

levels were in place. Based on the published definition and greater 

outreach to gather appropriate data from the personnel responsible for 

monitoring the number of individuals who volunteered for this type of 

active duty, most reserve components revised the fiscal year 2005 numbers 

and submitted higher estimates for the maximum authorized levels for 

fiscal year 2006. DOD submitted the same maximum levels for fiscal year 

2007 as in fiscal year 2006 because there were no significant increases or 

decreases. 

Results in Brief 

The reserve components have not consistently or accurately identified the 

number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since this

monthly reporting requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. The 

reserve components are inconsistently including certain categories of 

personnel in their reported numbers, and components had different 

definitions of the personnel included within some reported categories. For 

Page 4 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
example, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard do not include 

personnel that are serving as voluntarily recalled retired reservists in their 

reported amounts, even though this category is listed in DOD’s definition 

of operational support. Army personnel stated that these reservists are 

included in their active duty end strength numbers. In addition, only three 

of the six reserve components include in their reported numbers reservists 

who are serving on extended active duty missions, and two of these 

components have different definitions of the personnel included in this 

category. We also found that instead of reporting the highest number of 

these reservists each month, the Navy Reserve submitted cumulative 

numbers of reservists for 6 months, which led to erroneously reporting 

that it exceeded its maximum authorized level three times. According to 

Navy officials, these errors were caused by lack of access to personnel 

data due to Hurricane Katrina, and the errors were ultimately corrected. 

To help address these inconsistencies and errors, DOD is implementing a 

change in its Defense Manpower and Data Center (DMDC) to enable DOD 

to systematically generate the number of each component’s operational 

support reservists. However, the effectiveness of this automated reporting 

change depends on the components, which are responsible for updating 

and aligning their policies and systems to provide accurate data to DMDC. 

DOD is still in the process of developing a draft instruction and only four 

of the reserve components have updated or have plans in place to update

their guidance to clarify and consistently define what categories of 

reservist to include when accounting for those performing operational 

support duties. Inconsistencies and errors in the reported numbers of 

operational support reservists may continue until DOD and the reserve 

components uniformly update their guidance to clarify and consistently 

define what categories of reservist to include in their reported numbers. 

Until this is accomplished, DOD and Congress do not have a clear picture 

of how many volunteer reservists are currently on active duty serving in an 

operational support capacity. We are recommending that DOD and the 

reserve components develop guidance that clarifies and defines the 

categories of operational support that should be included in the reported 

numbers so that accurate and consistent information is reported across 

the components. In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred 

with our recommendation. 

Although reserve personnel have been used for contingency and 

emergency operations through the involuntary “Presidential Reserve Call- Background 

Page 5 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
up” and “Partial Mobilization” authorities, a significant number of reserve 

personnel on active duty for these and other missions have been provided 

on a voluntary basis.4

 Agency officials stated that these volunteer 

reservists’ roles could include filling in for an existing active duty mission

temporarily (such as an infantryman or pilot), providing needed special

skills (civil affairs or engineer), or participating in training exercises that 

result in support to active duty missions. Legislation has evolved since 

1980 to provide DOD with more flexibility in managing these volunteer 

reservists. 

The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act5

 was passed in 1980 to 

amend Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The act required that Congress annually 

authorize total strength levels for each military service for active duty 

personnel, with some exceptions. The act also established the 180-day rule 

for reserve members serving on active duty for special work. Reserve 

members on active duty who performed special work for 180 days or 

fewer were excluded from being counted against active duty personnel 

end-strengths. 

Title 10 of the U.S. Code at Section 115, which governs personnel strengths 

for the military, gave authority to the Secretary of Defense to vary active 

duty and Selected Reserve end-strengths above the level authorized by 

Congress. Prior to October 2004, the Secretary of Defense could increase 

active duty end strength paid by active duty funds by up to 3 percent, 

increase the end strength for active duty and National Guard paid by 

reserve funds by up to 2 percent, and vary the end strength authorized for 

the Selected Reserve by up to 2 percent.6

On October 28, 2004, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 was enacted.7

 The act 

amended 10 U.S.C. § 115 by establishing an annual authorization 

requirement for the maximum number of reserve personnel authorized to 

be on active duty for operational support, thus creating a new accounting 

category. It also added a provision that allows the Secretary of Defense to 

 4

 Section 12301(d) of Title 10 of the United States Code authorizes the service secretaries to 

order a reservist to active duty with the consent of that member, as opposed to being called 

up or mobilized involuntarily in a time of war or other national emergency.

5

 Pub. L. No. 96-513, §102 (1980). 

6

 10 U.S.C. § 115(e) (2003). 

7

 Pub. L. No. 108-375. 

Page 6 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
increase the maximum strength authorized for certain reservists 

voluntarily on active duty to perform operational support by up to 10 

percent.8

DOD’s estimates for the maximum number of volunteer reservists 

authorized to be on active duty for operational support increased between 

fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 as a result of two key factors. First, 

DOD developed its fiscal year 2005 estimates using inaccurate data from a 

data source that could not distinguish volunteer reservists on active duty 

for missions that would be considered operational support from other 

reservists. Second, DOD did not formally define operational support prior 

to establishment of its fiscal year 2005 maximum authorized levels and did 

not release a definition of operational support until 6 months after the 

maximum authorized levels were passed under the NDAA. DOD increased 

its estimates for fiscal year 2006 after the reserve components reviewed 

historical numbers of these reservists based on the published operational 

support definition. For the fiscal year 2007 estimates, the reserve 

components submitted the same maximum levels as fiscal year 2006 

because there were no substantial increases or decreases in their 

numbers, according to DOD officials. 

One key factor that contributed to the increase in authorization levels 

requested for fiscal year 2006 was that DOD’s initial request for fiscal year 

2005 was not developed using data that accurately reflected the maximum 

number of reservists on voluntary active duty for operational support. In 

developing the estimate submitted for the fiscal year 2005 NDAA, DOD 

used data that was provided by the reserve components for other 

purposes. DOD derived its estimates from an annual data call where 

reserve components provide information about reservists’ activities 

throughout the year. These data identified reservists involved in such 

missions as domestic emergencies, counter-drug activities, major 

exercises, and mobilizations. According to a DOD official, they compiled 

the estimates from various categories that represented what they 

considered operational support. They automatically eliminated some 

categories from their count, such as some counter-drug activities and 

mobilizations, because they assumed that the reported data in these 

categories only included involuntary active duty reservists. DOD 

Authorization Levels 

Increased Due to 

Inaccurate Information 

and Lack of an Operational 

Support Definition 

DOD Based Its Initial 

Request on Data That Did 

Not Accurately Reflect the 

Number of Volunteer 

Reservists on Active Duty 

for Operational Support 

 8

 Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 416 (c)(4). 

Page 7 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
informally provided the estimates to the reserve components for their 

review, but had to submit the estimates before some reserve components 

could respond. 

After the authorized levels were approved by Congress in the fiscal year 

2005 NDAA and communicated throughout the reserve components, 

reserve officials with greater insight over the reservists serving in an 

operational support role realized that the estimates did not reflect the 

actual numbers of reservists serving in this capacity. Officials from the 

reserve components informed DOD that the maximum numbers requested 

were too low for force requirements. According to a DOD official, they 

scrutinized their initial data review and found that the information 

extracted from the data did not distinguish involuntarily activated 

reservists from voluntarily activated reservists. Once they realized that the 

data did not separate out voluntary and involuntary reservists, they 

recognized that some of the data from categories that had been excluded,

such as mobilizations, should not have been completely excluded since it 

contained some volunteers. DOD’s lack of formal coordination with the 

reserve components and its reliance upon existing data that did not 

specifically identify volunteer reservists on active duty for operational 

support contributed to DOD submitting a low estimate for fiscal year 2005. 

DOD Lacked a Definition 

of Operational Support 

Prior to its Fiscal Year 

2005 Estimate 

Another key factor that contributed to the increase in DOD’s fiscal year 

2006 estimate for the maximum number of reservists authorized was that 

DOD did not have a definition of operational support prior to its initial 

estimate for fiscal year 2005. When the fiscal year 2005 NDAA was enacted 

on October 28, 2004, the act did not provide a definition for operational 

support to apply to the maximum authorization levels, but instead required 

the Secretary of Defense to prescribe by regulation the meaning of the 

term operational support.9

After the fiscal year 2005 NDAA was enacted, DOD met with reserve 

component officials in response to their concerns about the low 

authorization levels and also to develop a definition for operational 

support. In collaboration with the components, DOD established a 

definition for operational support, and on April 26, 2005—approximately 

6 months after the fiscal year 2005 authorization levels for reserve 

personnel were made law—released the official definition with some 

 9

 Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 416(m). 

Page 8 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
accounting and reporting guidelines. DOD defined operational support as: 

active duty, other than mobilized active guard and reserve duty, 

voluntarily performed by reservists; full-time duty, other than mobilized 

active guard and reserve duty, voluntarily performed by National Guard 

members; and active duty for training performed at the request of an 

operational commander, or as the result of reimbursable funding. The 

definition of operational support included 

• active duty for special work,10

• active duty and active duty for training performed as the result of 

reimbursable funding, 

• funeral honors duty performed not in an inactive duty status, 

• voluntary active duty performed by recall reserve retirees not receiving

regular retired pay, and 

• active duty training performed as a result of a request of an operational 

commander to provide support. 

The guidelines created a requirement for components to report to DOD the 

highest number of operational support reservists each month. Once the 

definition for operational support was established, reserve component 

officials that had direct responsibility for monitoring reserve personnel 

end strength reviewed historical data from their internal systems on the 

number of volunteer reservists serving in the areas included under the 

definition. The components determined that the numbers that were in 

fiscal year 2005 NDAA did not accurately reflect the number of reservists 

performing operational support. Most of the reserve components then 

submitted higher estimates for the maximum authorized levels in the fiscal 

year 2006 NDAA. Table 1 shows that five out of six reserve components 

provided larger maximum levels for fiscal year 2006, and the total 

authorization level nearly doubled compared to the fiscal year 2005 

authorization level. 

 10 DOD previously defined active duty for special work as “a tour of active duty for reserve 

personnel authorized from military or reserve personnel appropriations for work on active 

component or reserve component programs. The purpose of active duty for special work is

to provide the necessary skilled manpower assets to support existing or emerging 

requirements.” Department of Defense Directive 1215.6, Uniform Reserve, Training and 

Retirement Categories, paragraph E 1.1.2 (Mar. 14, 1997). 

Page 9 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
Table 1: Maximum Authorized Number of Active Duty Reserve Personnel for 

Operational Support from Fiscal Years 2005 to 2006 

Maximum number of reservists 

authorized to be on active duty 

for operational support 

Fiscal 

year 

2005

Fiscal 

year 

2006 

Difference 

from 

fiscal year 

2005 to

fiscal year 

2006

Percentage

change from 

fiscal year 

2005 to

fiscal year 

2006

Army Reserve 5,000 13,000 8,000 160%

Army National Guard 10,300 17,000 6,700 65%

Navy Reserve 6,200 6,200 0 0%

Marine Corps Reserve 2,500 3,000 500 20%

Air National Guard 10,100 16,000 5,900 58%

Air Force Reserve 3,600 14,000 10,400 289%

Total 37,700 69,200 31,500 84%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

For its fiscal year 2007 estimates, DOD submitted a request for the same 

maximum levels as in fiscal year 2006. The reserve components reviewed 

their historical data as they did for the fiscal year 2006 estimates and 

updated them with data from fiscal year 2006. The reserve components 

found that there were no substantial increases or decreases in their fiscal

year 2006 numbers that required changes in their estimated maximum 

levels for fiscal year 2007. 

The reserve components have not been consistently identifying the 

number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since this

requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. In its April 2005 

memorandum that provided a definition for operational support, DOD 

directed the components to report the highest number of volunteer 

reservists serving in an operational support capacity each month so that 

DOD could monitor the amounts to ensure that components did not 

exceed the maximum levels authorized. On the basis of our analyses, we

found that the reserve components inconsistently include various 

categories of personnel in their reported numbers because the 

components have different interpretations about what is included under 

DOD’s operational support definition and how it applies to their existing 

categories. For example, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard 

do not include voluntary active duty performed by recalled retired 

reservists in their accounting amounts, even though this is one of the five 

categories listed under DOD’s definition of operational support. According 

Fiscal Year 2007 Estimates 

Match Fiscal Year 2006 

Maximum Levels 

Reserve Components Are 

Not Identifying Numbers 

of Active Duty Reservists 

for Operational Support 

Consistently across 

Components 

Page 10 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
to Army personnel, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard do not 

include these reservists because they consider them active duty and 

include them in their active duty end strength numbers. In addition, the 

reserve components are inconsistent on whether they include volunteer 

reservists serving on extended active duty in their reported operational 

support numbers. The definition of operational support provided by DOD 

does not specifically address extended active duty reservists. We found 

that three of the six reserve components—Navy Reserve, Air Force 

Reserve, and Army National Guard—include extended active duty 

reservists in their reported operational support numbers, although the 

Navy and Air Force define the length of service for extended active duty 

reservists differently. The Navy Reserve defines them as voluntary recall

reservists on 2 to 5 year tours. The Air Force considers them to be 

reservists volunteering to fill an existing, funded active duty position for 3 

years or less. The Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air National 

Guard do not include extended active duty reservists in their reported 

operational support numbers because they are currently being accounted 

for under active duty end-strengths. 

In addition to these inconsistencies, we also found that one component’s 

monthly reports of volunteer reservists serving on active duty for 

operational support have not provided DOD with an accurate accounting 

of the number of these individuals due to errors in the numbers reported. 

We found that in each month from January through June 2006, the Navy 

Reserve erroneously reported to DOD cumulative totals instead of the 

highest number of reservists in each month. A Navy Reserve official stated

that they did not have complete access to personnel data during these 

months because they had to relocate their personnel database after 

Hurricane Katrina. As a result, the Navy Reserve appeared to exceed its 

maximum authorized level for 3 months—in January, February, and June 

2006. The Navy Reserve did not discover this error until late July 2006, at

which time they retroactively corrected the erroneously reported amounts. 

To help address these inconsistencies and errors, the Defense Manpower 

and Data Center (DMDC) is in the process of implementing a system 

change that would allow DOD to have automated access to the number of 

volunteer operational support reservists. We reported in September 2006 

that DMDC can extract some reserve personnel data, such as a reservist’s 

number of deployments and citizenship, but it could not provide data 

Page 11 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
specifically on volunteer status from all six reserve components.11

According to a DMDC official, the proposed change would only provide 

information from systems already aligned with DMDC that can distinguish 

volunteer reservists for operational support. DMDC also does not have the 

authority to direct the services to correct data errors and inconsistencies. 

As of early October 2006, we found that each reserve component collected 

its operational support numbers from accounting systems that did not 

provide all this information to DMDC. For example, the Navy Reserve 

obtained its reported numbers from the Navy Reserve Order Writing 

System, which currently feeds into DMDC, but this system does not 

distinguish the highest amount of volunteer reservists each month. The 

Marine Corps Reserve’s systems can provide volunteer information to 

DMDC, but it reported end of the month numbers, not the highest number 

of reservists during the month. The Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and 

Air National Guard each pull key data from external databases managed 

by the Defense Finance and Accounting System, but the Army Reserve’s 

database did not provide the monthly highest number of volunteers. The 

Army National Guard compiles its number of volunteer reservists from its 

own systems and the Army Human Resource Command, which do not 

provide this information on volunteers. The DMDC official stated that the

effectiveness of the proposed change to automate reporting on volunteer 

operational support reservists still depends on the components, which are 

responsible for aligning their policies and systems to provide the 

appropriate information according to changes in data reporting 

requirements. As a result, we do not believe that this system change will 

provide DOD with accurate information about the peak monthly number 

of volunteer reservists serving in an operational support capacity, unless 

the components align their policies and systems to conform to reporting 

requirements. 

We found that DOD and the reserve components have not updated and

aligned their guidance to clearly and consistently articulate and define 

what categories of reservists to include in accounting for and reporting on

operational support levels. DOD released preliminary guidance in its April 

2005 memorandum that defined the five categories of reservists that 

comprise operational support; however, they have not yet updated their 

 11 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD and the Services Need to Take Additional Steps to 

Improve Mobilization Data for Reserve Components, GAO-06-1068 (Washington, D.C.:

Sept. 20, 2006). 

Page 12 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
instruction that governs the use of and accounting for reservists. DOD is in 

the process of developing an instruction on accounting and reporting 

procedures in the new DOD Instruction 1215.6, which it plans to officially 

release in late October 2006. Even though DOD has not released its 

updated instruction, the Army National Guard published updated guidance 

based on DOD’s April 2005 memorandum that provides examples of 

missions specific to the Army National Guard that are considered 

operational support. Another three components—the Army Reserve, Air 

Force Reserve, and Air National Guard—have plans in place to update 

their guidance to reflect operational support reporting requirements. The 

Department of the Army expects to release its updated guidance for the 

Army Reserve within the year. The Air Force Reserve plans to update its 

implementing regulations in March or April 2007 and, in the interim, has 

issued a policy memorandum that applies operational support 

requirements to its policies. The Air National Guard expects to update its

guidance in the near future, and has an interim policy that addresses 

operational support similar to the Air Force Reserve. The two remaining 

components—the Marine Corps Reserve and Navy Reserve—have not 

updated their existing guidance to incorporate operational support 

accounting and reporting and do not appear to have immediate plans to do

so until DOD releases new guidance. Until DOD and all of the reserve 

components update and uniformly align their implementing guidance,

inconsistencies and errors in the reporting of the number of operational 

support reservists may continue. As a result, DOD and the components 

cannot ensure that they will not exceed the maximum authorized levels, 

which may impair the ability of DOD and Congress to oversee the use of 

volunteer reservists serving on active duty in an operational support 

capacity. 

With DOD’s growing demand for reserve personnel to augment its active 

duty forces to accomplish its missions overseas and at home, stress on the 

reserve force is a significant issue. Reservists have been serving on 

increasingly longer and more frequent tours of duty. However, reserve 

personnel are a part-time force and DOD must take care in managing the 

frequency with which it uses the reserves to complete its missions. It is 

critical that DOD and Congress have oversight over DOD’s forces to 

ensure that its citizen-soldiers are not overextended. 

In eliminating the 180-day rule, Congress gave DOD flexibility in managing

its volunteer reservists to serve in a variety of missions, without limiting 

volunteerism and continuity of service. However, the reserve components 

continue to struggle with accurately and consistently identifying these 

Conclusions 

Page 13 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
reservists each month. Updated guidance that clearly articulates what 

should be included and excluded from this accounting would help the 

components eliminate the inconsistent interpretations that currently exist. 

Until DOD and all of the reserve components update their implementing 

guidance in a uniform manner, inconsistencies and errors in the reporting 

of the number may continue and DOD will be unable to ensure that 

reported numbers are accurate and that maximum levels are not being 

exceeded. Lack of an accurate accounting of the number of voluntary 

reserve personnel serving in an operational support capacity defeats the 

purpose for establishing the reporting requirement, which in turn hampers 

DOD’s ability to manage its forces and to minimize lengthy activations and 

stress on the reserve forces. This lack of visibility also limits Congress’s 

oversight over the use, availability, and readiness of the reserve force to 

ensure that its citizen-soldiers are not overextended. 

To ensure that the components can report accurate and consistent 

information about the number of reservists serving in an operational 

support capacity, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the reserve 

components to develop guidance to clarify and consistently define the 

categories of operational support that should be included in the reported 

numbers. 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) provided written 

comments on a draft of this report. The department concurred with the 

recommendation. DOD stated that it will develop guidance that 

specifically addresses what is to be included when accounting for 

operational support. The department’s comments are reprinted in their 

entirety in appendix II. In addition, the department provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking 

Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on Armed 

Services. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Commandant 

of the Marine Corps. We will also make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

Page 14 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Others making significant contributions to this 

report are included in appendix III. 

Derek B. Stewart 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 15 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the factors leading to the increase in the maximum number 

of reserve personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational 

support from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006, we reviewed and 

analyzed the authorization levels for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and the 

requested authorization levels for fiscal year 2007. We also obtained 

documentation of the highest number of reservists each month that is 

reported to DOD and analyzed figures to identify any trends or patterns of 

change. To determine what categories of reservists should be represented 

by the numbers of reservists serving on operational support, we obtained

documentation on the definition of operational support given to the 

components. We also interviewed DOD and reserve officials to gain an 

understanding of their roles and effectiveness in implementing Sections 

415 and 416 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal 

Year 2005. We interviewed officials from DOD Reserve Affairs, Army 

Reserve, Army National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, 

Navy Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve. To determine DOD’s authority 

and role in management of the reservists under the NDAA, we reviewed 

legislation and the history of relevant provisions of the law. To determine 

the reliability of the estimates for the maximum authorization levels for 

the reserve components, we gathered reserve component officials’ 

perspectives on their data systems in the collecting and reporting of 

reserve strength to DOD. 

To determine the extent to which the reserve components have 

consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an operational 

support capacity, we obtained DOD’s memorandums, implementing 

guidance, and regulations. We obtained documentation from DOD and 

reserve components to determine the categories included and excluded 

from operational support. We interviewed DOD officials to determine its 

definition for operational support, how DOD intended its implementing 

guidelines to be applied, and to determine its interpretation of relevant 

legislation. We also interviewed officials to determine the consistency in 

application of the guidelines. From our interviews, we obtained 

information on categories of reservists that were being excluded from 

operational support. We reviewed and analyzed legislation to determine 

what was required to be included in operational support. Officials also 

provided information on the structure of their data systems and the 

process for collecting and recording the numbers of reservists. The 

components and DOD also provided the highest number of reservists each 

month that was reported to DOD. Due to definitional problems of 

categories of reservists to be included in reported numbers, we found 

some inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the data, which produced data

that we believe are not sufficiently reliable. As a result, we make a 

Page 16 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

recommendation for executive action to improve the accuracy and 

consistency of reported monthly information. 

We conducted our review from June 2006 through September 2006, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 17 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 18 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 19 GAO-07-93 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 20 GAO-07-93 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Derek B. Stewart, (202) 512-5559 

In addition to the contact named above, Geraldine Beard, Renee Brown, 

Tracy Burney, Pawnee Davis, Laura Durland, Meredith Georges, George 

Poindexter, Terry Richardson, Gina Ruidera, and Karen Thornton made 

significant contributions to the report. 

 Increase in Authorized Volunteer Reservists

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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