In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-1608

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

AARON WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 08 CR 77711—David H. Coar, Judge.

____________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 7, 2010—DECIDED OCTOBER 25, 2010

____________

Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. In July 2008, Chicago police officers

pulled over a Suburban at the request of another Chicago

police officer, who was a member of a Drug Enforcement

Administration (“DEA”) task force. A subsequent

warrantless search of the vehicle, in which defendantappellant Aaron Williams was a passenger, revealed a

brick of cocaine. The district court denied Williams’s

motion to suppress the drug evidence on the grounds that

the DEA task force had probable cause for the search,
2 No. 10-1608

which could be imputed to the officers under the collective

knowledge doctrine. Williams entered a guilty plea to one

count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams

or more of a substance containing cocaine, 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), in which he preserved his right to challenge

the suppression ruling. The district court sentenced

Williams to 60 months of imprisonment. Williams appeals

the denial of his motion to suppress.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Background

In the summer of 2008, the Drug Enforcement

Administration (“DEA”) was investigating an alleged

drug-trafficking organization. In connection with that

investigation, a DEA-led task force used court-authorized

wiretaps to intercept phone calls made and received by

individuals suspected to be involved in the drug-trafficking ring. On July 15, 2008, the DEA intercepted a series of

calls between Bernardo Solano, Filiberto Hinojosa, and

Leobardo Barmbila that led them to believe that a drug

transaction was going to occur at a suspected stash house

located in the 2700 block of North Monitor Avenue in

Chicago, Illinois. During one of those calls, Hinojosa

informed Solano that “the car parts” had arrived at the

“shop.” Agents conducted surveillance on the Monitor

residence, and stopped an individual later identified as

Solano after seeing him leave the house. Solano admitted

that he had purchased two kilograms of cocaine at the

Monitor residence. From photographs provided by DEA

agents, Solano identified Hinojosa as the person from
No. 10-1608 3

whom he had purchased the cocaine, and Barmbila as the

person who he believed had supplied the cocaine.

The following day, the DEA intercepted additional phone

calls between Hinojosa and Barmbila, in which they

discussed meeting the “black guy” at the “shop on Monitor” later that day. Based on those calls, DEA agents

decided to conduct surveillance on the Monitor residence

at the anticipated time of the transaction, and to put

officers from the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) on

standby to assist.

Chicago police officer Daniel Gutierrez, a member of the

task force, was responsible for coordinating the DEA’s

efforts with the CPD. Prior to the anticipated transaction,

Gutierrez met with a number of Chicago police officers,

including officer Joseph Simon, and told them that a

person would be coming to the Monitor residence to

purchase narcotics. Gutierrez had not heard the intercepted phone calls himself, but he was in contact with the

agents who had monitored the calls. Gutierrez requested

that the officers position themselves in the area. He told

them that he would provide them with information about

the suspect vehicle, and that they should stop the vehicle

after developing their own probable cause to do so.

Members of the task force conducting surveillance on the

Monitor residence saw Williams and another individual,

Ennis Howard, arrive in a Chevy Suburban at approximately 11:30 A.M. Howard and Williams parked the

Suburban in an alley behind the Monitor residence and

entered the backyard. Williams was carrying a brown

shoebox. Approximately fifteen minutes later, agents saw
4 No. 10-1608

Howard and Williams leave the backyard carrying the

brown shoebox, get in the Suburban, and drive away.

Gutierrez, who was conducting surveillance near the

Monitor residence, saw the Suburban drive away from the

Monitor residence and turn onto Diversey Avenue.

Gutierrez called Simon, gave him a description of the

vehicle and the license plate, and informed him that the

vehicle was heading eastbound on Diversey.

Simon and his partner began following the Suburban and

eventually stopped the vehicle. Simon instructed Howard

and Williams to exit the vehicle. A pat-down search

revealed two bags of marijuana in Williams’s pocket. A

subsequent search of the Suburban by other officers who

arrived on the scene led to the discovery of a brown

shoebox in the back seat of the Suburban containing a brick

of what was later confirmed to be a kilogram of cocaine.

Williams was charged in an indictment with one count of

possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of

a substance containing cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

On March 31, 2009, Williams filed a motion to suppress the

evidence seized by police following the July 16, 2008 traffic

stop. At a hearing on the motion, Simon testified that, after

following the Suburban for a period of time without

observing any traffic violations, he pulled alongside the

vehicle. Simon testified that he could see that the

passenger-side occupant was not wearing a seat belt, and

that he stopped the Suburban based on that violation.

While Illinois law requires drivers and (most) passengers

of motor vehicles to wear seatbelts, 625 ILCS 5/12-603.1(a),

a police officer “may not search or inspect a motor vehicle,
No. 10-1608 5

its contents, the driver or a passenger solely because of” a

driver or passenger’s failure to wear a seat belt, id. at

§ 603.1(f); see also 725 ILCS 5/108-1(3). Simon testified that,

at the time of the stop, he was aware that the seat belt

violation would not justify a search of the vehicle or its

occupants. According to Simon, when he approached the

vehicle, he saw “crumbs” of marijuana on the center

console and two cigar-like objects in the open ashtray.

Based on what he believed to be marijuana in plain view,

Simon ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle.

Williams also testified at the suppression hearing. He

acknowledged that there were two unsmoked marijuana

cigars in the ashtray, but stated that he had closed the

ashtray when the vehicle was pulled over. He also testified

that there were no “crumbs” or any other marijuana on the

center console.

The district court concluded that Simon’s testimony was

not credible. In reaching that conclusion, the district court

relied on Simon’s manner of testifying, as well as on

Simon’s professed strategy for effecting the desired search,

which the court concluded made “little sense.” According

to Simon, he decided to pull the Suburban over for a

violation he knew did not provide him with the probable

cause he needed to search the vehicle. Then, if Simon is

believed, he fortuitously saw marijuana in plain view

because—contrary to Williams’s testimony—Howard and

Williams, knowing they had a kilogram of cocaine in the

back seat, left the ashtray containing marijuana open for

two approaching officers to see. Finding Simon not to be

credible, the district court determined that the search of the
6 No. 10-1608

We note that while “the provider and driver of the car” has “a 1

reasonable expectation of privacy in it[,] . . . a mere passenger”

does not. United States v. Price, 54 F.3d 342, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1995).

We have found nothing in the record to suggest that Williams—the passenger—owned the Suburban in which he and

Howard were stopped. However, the government has not

argued that Williams lacks standing to challenge the search of

the vehicle. See id.; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (illegal

search of vehicle does not infringe passengers’ Fourth Amendment rights, and passengers lack standing to challenge the

(continued...)

Suburban was not supported by the seat belt violation the

officers testified that they observed, or the marijuana the

officers testified they observed in plain view in the Suburban. The district court nevertheless denied Williams’s

motion to suppress, concluding that the DEA’s wiretap

investigation and surveillance evidence gave the CPD

officers probable cause to search the Suburban under the

collective knowledge doctrine.

On December 4, 2009, Williams entered into a conditional

guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his

motion to suppress. On March 2, 2010, the district court

sentenced Williams to 60 months of imprisonment. This

appeal followed.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Williams challenges the denial of his motion

to suppress the evidence found during the warrantless

search of the vehicle. In reviewing a district court’s denial 1
No. 10-1608 7

(...continued) 1

search). Therefore, the argument is waived and we need not

consider it. Price, 54 F.3d at 346 (the principle of “standing” is

“rooted in the substantive law of the Fourth Amendment and

not Article III,” and consequently can be waived).

of a motion to suppress evidence, we review conclusions of

law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. United

States v. Booker, 612 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2010). Probable

cause determinations are mixed questions of law and fact

that we review de novo. Id. 

Warrantless searches are considered per se unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment unless one of a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions applies.

Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009).

One such exception to the warrant requirement is the

automobile exception, which allows law enforcement to

conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or

evidence of a crime. See United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d

515, 521 (7th Cir. 2009); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,

153-56 (1925). When probable cause exists to search a

vehicle, law enforcement agents are permitted to search all

parts of the vehicle in which contraband or evidence could

be concealed, including closed compartments, containers,

packages, and trunks. United States v. Scott, 516 F.3d 587,

589 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24

(1982).

Here, our inquiry is two-fold. First, we must decide

whether the DEA task force had enough information to
8 No. 10-1608

support a finding of probable cause to search the vehicle.

Second, if so, we must determine whether that information

can be imputed to the officers who conducted the stop and

search under the collective knowledge doctrine.

A. Probable Cause

Probable cause to search exists where, based on the

known facts and circumstances, a reasonably prudent

person would believe that contraband or evidence of a

crime will be found in the place to be searched. See

Zahursky, 580 F.3d at 521; Scott, 516 F.3d at 589. Here, the

question is whether there was “a fair probability” that

contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the

Suburban; absolute certainty of such a discovery is not

required. Zahursky, 580 F.3d at 521. The determination

whether suspicious circumstances rise to the level of

probable cause is a common-sense judgment, and officers

are entitled to draw reasonable inferences based on their

training and experience in making that determination.

United States v. Reed, 443 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2006).

We conclude that the facts known to the DEA task force

supported a search of the vehicle. On July 16, 2008, agents

intercepted calls between Hinojosa and Barmbila discussing a meeting with “the black guy” at “the shop” on

Monitor. Agents then observed Howard and Williams

arrive at the Monitor residence, enter the backyard carrying a shoebox, and exit shortly thereafter carrying the same

shoebox. The day before, agents had intercepted calls

between Hinojosa and Barmbila, and between Hinojosa

and Solano, during which they arranged a meeting at “the
No. 10-1608 9

shop.” Later on July 15th, agents had observed Solano

leaving the Monitor residence carrying a package, which

Solano subsequently admitted contained two kilograms of

cocaine that he had purchased from Hinojosa and Barmbila

at the Monitor residence. Taken as a whole, these facts

justified the agents’ belief that Howard and Williams

purchased drugs at the Monitor residence, and that a

search of the Suburban would uncover those drugs.

Williams argues that agents could not reasonably have

believed that he and Howard went to the Monitor residence to buy drugs because the calls intercepted on July

16th did not discuss any particular drug, weight, or dollar

amount—even in code. According to Williams, the calls

suggest only that a meeting was to take place, not necessarily a drug transaction. As we have said before, “a finding

of probable cause does not require evidence sufficient to

support a conviction, nor even evidence demonstrating

that it is more likely than not that the suspect committed a

crime.” United States v. Funches, 327 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.

2003). All that is required is a fair probability of discovering contraband. Here, the totality of the facts and circumstances—that Williams and Howard met Hinojosa and

Barmbila (suspected drug dealers) at the Monitor residence

(a suspected stash house), where agents knew Hinojosa

and Barmbila had carried out a drug transaction as recently

as the day before, and that Williams and Howard left that

meeting carrying a shoebox (in which they could conceal

drugs)—were sufficient to create probable cause even

absent such details in the calls themselves. Moreover, that

Williams and Howard’s conduct on July 16th “taken in

isolation, . . . might be innocently explained away” does
10 No. 10-1608

not preclude a finding of probable cause. United States v.

Scott, 19 F.3d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1994) (“it is of no moment

that most of [defendant’s] conduct . . . may have been

unrelated to drug activity” where the officers, “view[ing]

[the] conduct as a whole” and in light of their training and

experience, concluded that defendant was engaged in drug

trafficking). Here, the facts and circumstances surrounding

the meeting were sufficient to justify the officers’ belief,

based on their experience in policing narcotics transactions,

that a drug transaction had occurred.

B. Collective Knowledge Doctrine

Having determined that the DEA task force had probable

cause to search the vehicle, we consider whether the

information known to the task force can be imputed to

Simon under the collective knowledge doctrine. The

collective knowledge doctrine permits an officer to stop,

search, or arrest a suspect at the direction of another officer

or police agency, even if the officer himself does not have

firsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the necessary

level of suspicion to permit the given action. See United

States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985). There is no

Fourth Amendment violation if the knowledge of the

officer directing the stop, search, or arrest—or the collective knowledge of the agency for which he works—is

sufficient to constitute probable cause. United States v.

Harris, 585 F.3d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 2009). In order for the

collective knowledge doctrine to apply, (1) the officer

taking the action must act in objective reliance on the

information received, (2) the officer providing the informa-
No. 10-1608 11

tion—or the agency for which he works—must have facts

supporting the level of suspicion required, and (3) the stop

must be no more intrusive than would have been permissible for the officer requesting it. United States v. Nafzger,

974 F.2d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 1992).

We have applied the collective knowledge doctrine

where, as is the case here, DEA agents asked local law

enforcement officers to stop a specifically-identified

vehicle, and the local officers had no knowledge of the facts

underlying the DEA’s probable cause. For example, in

United States v. Rodriguez, 831 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir. 1987),

the DEA requested that Illinois State Police make a

“routine traffic stop” of an individual the DEA believed

was involved in drug-trafficking activities for the purpose

of identifying the driver. The officer who made the stop

knew nothing about the factual basis for the DEA’s suspicion, other than that the DEA was coordinating a large

investigation with local agencies. Id. at 165-66. Based on

the facts of that case, which involved an admittedly

“skeletal” request for assistance, we concluded that the

“state trooper was . . . acting as an extension or agent of the

DEA agent and she could act on the DEA agent’s suspicions.” Id. In United States v. Celio, 945 F.2d 180, 183

(7th Cir. 1991), Illinois State Police stopped and searched

a vehicle at the request of the DEA, based solely “on the

bald assertion by the federal agents that they suspected

drug trafficking.” As in Rodriguez, “the automobile to be

stopped with its occupant was pointed out specifically by

the requesting officer, and the [detaining] officer knew the

requesting officer was coordinating a large investigation

with local agencies.” Id. at 184 (quoting Rodriguez, 831 F.2d
12 No. 10-1608

at 166). We concluded that the search was supported by

probable cause because the DEA’s collective knowledge

could be imputed to the officers under the collective

knowledge doctrine. Id.

The facts here are analogous to those at issue in Rodriguez

and Celio. Gutierrez specifically identified the Suburban

and its occupants for Simon, who was aware of the ongoing DEA investigation. In fact, Simon knew more about the

underlying facts than did the local officers in Rodriguez and

Celio, as he knew that the vehicle was leaving a suspected

drug transaction.

Williams attempts to distance his case from Rodriguez

and Celio based on Gutierrez’s instruction that Simon

develop his own probable cause to stop and search the

Suburban. According to Williams, that statement precluded Simon from relying on the DEA’s knowledge, and

therefore Simon could not have been acting in objective

reliance on the information he received from Gutierrez, as

is required for the application of the collective knowledge

doctrine. We disagree with Williams’s characterization of

the instruction. Gutierrez did not forbid Simon from

relying on the information collected by the DEA task force.

Rather, Gutierrez sought to conceal the existence of the

DEA investigation and wire taps from Williams and

Howard. That effort has no impact on the fact that the

DEA agents had probable cause, on which Simon was

entitled to rely.

Other appeals courts similarly have concluded that the

application of the collective knowledge doctrine is unaffected by an officer’s use of a cover story to disguise a stop
No. 10-1608 13

as a mere traffic stop. See United States v. Chavez, 534 F.3d

1338, 1341-42 (10th Cir. 2008) (where officer stopped

suspect at DEA’s request, the fact that the officer pretended

that the stop was for a failure to turn on headlights in order

to conceal a confidential informant’s identity and protect

the integrity of the DEA investigation did not preclude the

application of the collective knowledge doctrine);

United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1038 (9th Cir. 2007)

(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“disguising the stop as a ‘traffic

stop’ was a valid law enforcement tactic calculated to

ensure an officer’s safety . . . [and] did not change the

nature of the stop,” or the fact that the stop was made at

the direction of an officer who had probable cause, such

that the collective knowledge doctrine applies). Moreover,

the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have considered instructions

like the one Gutierrez gave Simon, and concluded that such

an instruction does not bar the application of the collective

knowledge doctrine.

In United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753 (5th Cir.

1999), a DEA agent instructed the local police dispatcher to

issue a radio bulletin stating that a DEA agent needed

assistance in stopping a van suspected to be transporting

drugs or weapons, and that the officers should form their

own reasonable suspicion before stopping the van. Id.

at 757. The DEA agent asked local authorities to make the

stop to avoid revealing the existence of the DEA investigation. Id. at 757 n.1. The dispatcher issued the bulletin, but

did not include the instruction that officers form their own

reasonable suspicion. Id. at 757. After hearing the bulletin,

a police officer and SWAT team stopped the van. 199 F.3d

at 757. The Fifth Circuit held that the stop was constitu-
14 No. 10-1608

tional because the DEA agent’s knowledge could be

imputed to the officers under the collective knowledge

doctrine. Id. at 759-60. The court noted that the dispatcher’s

“failure to relate [the agent’s] instruction that the [local

police] officers form their own reasonable suspicion before

stopping the van” was “irrelevant.” Id. at 760 n.6. The court

found the defendants’ argument to the contrary to be

“immaterial . . . because under the ‘collective knowledge’

doctrine, the [local] officers did not need to form their own

suspicion.” Id. As Williams points out, the message about

developing independent suspicion was not relayed to the

detaining officers in Ibarra-Sanchez, while Gutierrez’s

instruction was communicated to Simon here. But the Fifth

Circuit’s description of the dispatcher’s failure to pass on

the instruction as “irrelevant,” and its characterization of

the defendants’ argument that the failure somehow was

relevant as “immaterial,” indicate that the court would

have concluded that the collective knowledge doctrine

applied regardless of whether the instruction was included

in the bulletin. Id.

Chavez is even more factually analogous to the instant

case. There, the requesting DEA agent instructed the state

police officer tasked with stopping a vehicle suspected to

be transporting cocaine to develop his own probable cause

for stopping the vehicle. 534 F.3d at 1341. The Tenth Circuit

found that the stop was proper under the collective

knowledge doctrine because the DEA agent who requested

the stop had probable cause. Id. at 1348. The court apparently found the instruction that the officer develop his own

probable cause to be of no consequence to the collective

knowledge inquiry, as it did not address the instruction,
No. 10-1608 15

except to note that the officer’s use of a cover story to

conceal the reason for the stop “was a valid law enforcement tactic.” Id. (quoting Ramirez, 473 F.3d at 1038

(Kozinski, J., concurring)).

Williams also contends that the collective knowledge

doctrine does not apply because Simon testified that he did

not rely on the information he received from Gutierrez to

justify the search. But Simon’s subjective reasons for

making the stop and initiating the search are irrelevant, as

“[s]ubjective intentions play no role in the ordinary,

probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (case law “foreclose[s]

any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of

traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the

individual officers involved”); see also Florida v. Royer, 460

U.S. 491, 507 (1983) (the fact that officers acted on one

rationale in conducting a search does “not foreclose the

[government] from justifying [the search] by proving

probable cause”). Therefore, Simon’s motivations for the

stop and search do not affect the collective knowledge

doctrine analysis.

Our decision is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s

opinion in Ramirez. In Ramirez, a police sergeant requested

that a uniformed officer make a “traffic stop” of a car

suspected to have been involved in a drug transaction. 473

F.3d at 1029. A uniformed officer made the requested

traffic stop when he observed the car straddling two lanes.

Id. The defendants argued that the stop was invalid

because lane-straddling is not illegal. Id. at 1030. Based on

Whren, the Ninth Circuit concluded that neither the fact
16 No. 10-1608

that the officer “was directed to make a traffic stop,” nor

the fact that he may not have had “valid grounds to make

the traffic stop because of lane-straddling,” was relevant

because the officer had probable cause based on the

collective knowledge doctrine. Id. at 1030.

Williams maintains that even if the collective knowledge

doctrine applies, only Gutierrez’s knowledge—and not that

of the entire DEA task force—can be imputed to Simon.

Williams asserts two arguments in support of that position.

First, he contends that the knowledge gleaned from the

wiretaps cannot be imputed to Simon because Gutierrez

did not listen to the wiretap conversations. Second, he

argues that the knowledge of the DEA agents (i.e., the

substance of the wire tap conversations) cannot be imputed

to Gutierrez because he worked for a different agency, the

CPD. We address each argument in turn.

As noted above, Gutierrez was a member of the DEA-led

task force. He testified that, prior to briefing Simon and the

other CPD officers, he became aware that calls had been

intercepted indicating that there was going to be a narcotics sale at the Monitor residence. Gutierrez was in radio

contact with members of the surveillance team who

informed him that they had observed Howard and Williams enter and leave the Monitor residence carrying the

shoebox. Therefore, based on communications with other

task force members, Gutierrez had indirect knowledge of

the facts supporting probable cause.

We previously have held that whether the requesting

officer had direct knowledge of the facts supporting his

suspicion is “inconsequential” where the agents in posses-
No. 10-1608 17

sion of the knowledge and the requesting agents are “part

of a coordinated investigation” and are in communication.

Nafzger, 974 F.2d at 914. The knowledge of a team of

officers “work[ing] together closely in monitoring [a] drug

transaction as it unfold[s] . . . ‘may be mutually imputed’ ”

even the absence of “ ’express testimony that the specific or

detailed information creating the justification for the stop

was conveyed.’ ” United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 766

(7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nafzger, 974 F.2d at 911). Therefore,

knowledge of the information contained in the intercepted

phone calls can be imputed to Gutierrez based on his role

in the task force’s investigation.

Williams’s second objection also fails to carry the

day, although we recognize that the language of some of

our precedents may be misleading. We have said that

knowledge may be imputed to an officer “so long as the

knowledge of the officer directing the [challenged action],

or the collective knowledge of the agency he works for, is

sufficient to constitute probable cause.” United States v.

Valencia, 913 F.2d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).

That language was designed to recognize that the knowledge of other officers may be imputed to the requesting

officer, so long as the officers are in close communication

with one another. Here, Gutierrez was assigned to the DEA

task force and worked closely with DEA agents on the

drug trafficking investigation. That he carried a badge

issued by the CPD, not the DEA, does not preclude the

application of the collective knowledge doctrine. Therefore,

the district court correctly imputed the DEA task force’s

knowledge to Gutierrez and Simon.
18 No. 10-1608

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

judgment.

10-25-10