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DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: SUCCESSES,

CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 21, 2006

Serial No. 109–215

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

TED BRENNAN, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Democracy 

and Global Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................... 8

The Honorable Adolfo Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin 

America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development ..... 14

Christopher Sabatini, Ph.D., Senior Director of Policy, Council of the Americas/Americas Society ........................................................................................... 54

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Paula J. Dobriansky: Prepared statement ................................... 11

The Honorable Adolfo Franco: Prepared statement .............................................. 17

His Excellency Francisco Flores, former President of El Salvador: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 50

Christopher Sabatini, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................ 57

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 69

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DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: SUCCESSES, 

CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. 

The late Newsweek columnist, Meg Greenfield, once said that everyone is for democracy and principle. It is only in practice that the 

thing gives rise to stiff opposition. 

Democracy is, indeed, a widely-shared hope by people around the 

world, but its realization often faces enormous obstacles and continuing challenges. In today’s hearing, the Committee will explore 

the current fortunes of democracy in Latin America, examine some 

of the factors behind its successes and failures in an attempt to divine what the future might hold. 

By any measure, the spread of democracy in Latin America over 

decades has been quite remarkable. Twenty-five years ago, 16 of 

the 35 nations in our hemisphere were ruled by authoritarian leaders. Under these regimes, millions suffered significant oppression 

and widespread violations of human and civil rights, with little or 

no ability to influence the government that ruled over them. 

Throughout that time, the rights and freedoms that are the hallmarks of democracy were only a part of a distant dream of forlorn 

hope. 

Today, through the diligent efforts of visionary leaders in Latin 

America and their steadfast supporters in the United States and 

other democratic nations, worldwide democracy has now taken root 

in 34 of the 35 nations in our hemisphere. Although political freedom in many of these countries is often precarious, only the regime 

in Cuba continues to tightly shackle its people. 

The spread of freedom has had profound results for the lives of 

people in the region. In the countries once plagued by civil war and 

unrest, the advent of democracy has been accomplished and accompanied by a dramatic enhancement of security. Where juntas and 

violent coups once were the norm, free, fair and transparent elections have become common. 

This year, people in 14 countries will go to the polls to choose 

their leaders, both national and local. Following these elections, 

peaceful transfers of power within established constitutional frameworks will take place. Although some of our neighbors are still 

2

struggling to resolve lingering issues left over from the old regimes, 

millions throughout the hemisphere who were once excluded from 

the political process are now enjoying the basic human and civil 

rights that democracy guarantees. 

While we applaud the great strides that most of our neighbors 

have taken in developing and protecting their political freedoms, 

we must acknowledge that democratization is a long and difficult 

road. In Latin America, a region without a long history of democracy, armed insurgencies, drug trafficking, the presence of foreign 

terrorist organizations, poverty, corruption, weak political institutions and unwelcome interference from other countries threaten to 

destabilize societies and governments. 

It is not surprising that, given the high hopes of many for democracy and the persistence of economic, social and political problems, 

disillusionment has set in for many who expected quick and easy 

solutions to the enormous challenges they and their countrymen 

face. 

To bolster the young democracies, leaders throughout Latin 

America must focus not only on winning elections and writing Constitutions, they must also commit to building strong democratic institutions and practices within their governmental framework. 

Only strong democratic institutions can protect the rights and liberties of a nation and insulate them from being taken away by a 

simple change of government. 

It is in this area that the greatest problems lie. While some nations in the hemisphere have developed enduring democratic institutions, many others still struggle. Often, these are weak and unable to meet even the basic demands placed upon them, such as establishing and enforcing a fair tax code, instituting an effective judicial system, providing reliable police services and other needs 

which we in this country take for granted. 

Embracing democratic principles and building democratic institutions are the essential first steps in the establishment of political 

freedom. But the long-term sustainability of any democracy will depend on the ability of its elected leaders to fight the entrenched 

corruption, political favoritism and greed that all too often pervades the judiciary, police and other agencies of the government. 

There has been considerable progress in these areas in many 

countries, but much remains to be done, and some problems are 

starting or worsening. It is, in short, a testing time for democracy 

in Latin America. 

Promoting democracy throughout the world has long been a central element of U.S. foreign policy. Nowhere is this more important 

than in our own hemisphere, where the spread of political freedom 

has reinforced stability and enhanced human rights, allowed economies to expand and encouraged cooperation within and between 

countries on many subjects that once were the source of conflict. 

That progress is now threatened in many areas, and there have 

been a number of significant setbacks. 

We in this country have little choice but to assist those struggling to preserve their freedoms against the rising challenges. Selfinterest alone is a sufficient reason to do so, but an equally powerful motivation is fidelity to our ideals and our historic commitment 

to promoting liberty around the world. 

3

However, regardless of how great our desire to help, there are 

limits to what we can do. As Mohandas Gandhi once said, the spirit 

of democracy cannot be imposed from without, it must come from 

within. That is the test Latin America now faces. How deeply has 

democracy sunk its roots? How deeply will the people of the region 

go to defend their own freedom? 

I thank our distinguished panel of witnesses. I certainly look forward to our testimony. 

Now I turn to my friend and colleague, Mr. Lantos, for such remarks as he wishes to make. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

commend you for holding this hearing. 

Across Latin America, people at the bottom of the economic and 

social pyramid have begun to say, basta, enough, to decades of 

marginalization, discrimination, and exclusion from the limited economic growth of their respective countries. As a result, Latino voters have turned their rage on traditional political systems and traditional political parties. 

Let me be clear, Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to suggest that 

the people of Latin America have turned their backs on democracy. 

Quite the contrary. Their commitment to democracy is profound. 

According to the leading public opinion organization in the region, 

a majority of Latin Americans prefer democracy over any other 

form of government, and still more assert that they would never 

support the military government and believe that only through democracy will their countries prosper. 

The findings of the human rights group, Freedom House, as you 

have indicated, suggest that the governments across the region reflect the people’s preference for democracy. A quarter century ago, 

Freedom House ranked 16 Latin American countries as free. This 

year’s ranking shows that 22 are in that category. Freedom House 

concludes that, aside from Western Europe, the Western Hemisphere is the most democratic part of the entire globe. 

Although democracy has spread throughout Latin America, the 

prospects for consolidating democratic institutions and processes in 

a handful of these countries, like Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, are 

much less certain. And in one case, in Venezuela, democracy’s foundations have been systematically undermined by a demagogic leader bent on opposing democratic values and interests. 

Democracy in Venezuela today is a Potemkin village that seems 

convincing to some. The President, members of the National Assembly and other political leaders are elected through regularly 

scheduled ballots. The Supreme Court and the rest of the judiciary 

adjudicate matters before them, seemingly free from external interference. Opposition parties and the vocal press criticize the government, and the military yields to elected civilian authorities. 

But, to a discerning observer, the facade of democracy that Chavez has erected cannot hide the destruction he has wrought on 

democratic principles and fundamental freedoms in Venezuela. Let 

me cite just a few examples. 

Before the legislative elections at the end of last year, the vast 

majority of opposition candidates withdrew from the electoral contest. They rightfully feared that the balance of those who chose to 

vote against Chavez’s allies would have been made public. As a reVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:57 Nov 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\062106\28366.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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sult, candidates subservient to Chavez secured all 167 seats in the 

new National Assembly, just like the old Soviet elections. 

Chavez has been combing through the ranks of the civil service 

and firing anyone, from managers to janitors, whose name appears 

on a list of individuals who voted in a constitutionally authorized 

referendum to recall Chavez. This same list has reportedly been 

used to deny government contracts, applications for passports and 

ID cards, access to government-subsidized foodstuffs and medical 

attention. 

Two years ago, contrary to the requirements of the 1999 Constitution, Chavez and his allies in the National Assembly packed 

the supreme court with pro-government persons. This blatant use 

of traditional prerogatives was widely criticized around the globe, 

but that did not put a stop to Chavez’s power grab. 

Worldwide condemnation also failed to keep the Government of 

Chavez from enacting the so-called law of social responsibilities in 

radio and television, which, of course, is a device to restrict the 

freedom of media. 

Mr. Chairman, through these and other attacks on democracy, 

Chavez has created a one-party state in Venezuela. With his authoritarian regime consolidated, Chavez turned his attention and 

the country’s considerable oil wealth to increasing his stature at 

the expense of his Latin American neighbors and our own national 

interests. In Bolivia, Peru, Mexico and Nicaragua, Chavez openly 

campaigned for and financed candidates who he believes will join 

his alliance with Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. 

To Chavez, the Caracas-Havana axis is primarily intended to 

counter United States influence in the region to compromise our security interests, including ending terrorist financing and curbing 

narcotics trafficking. Chavez also is actively courting Iran and 

North Korea and expressed his willingness to wine and dine a delegation of Hamas terrorists. 

Mr. Chairman, the machinations of Chavez in the elections of 

other countries have not fooled the voters of at least two Latin 

American nations. These voters have been able to distinguish between genuine leaders and Chavez’s would-be acolytes. We must 

differentiate between demagogic leaders like Chavez and democratic leaders like Chile’s Michelle Bachelet, who just visited us 

last week, who promised to address the widespread poverty, rising 

income inequalities and rampant discrimination against the indigenous peoples or the communities of African decent. 

These leaders, many of whom are from the political left, cannot 

overcome the daunting challenges of their respective countries 

without outside assistance. 

Mr. Chairman, to ensure that the recently elected and soon-tobe elected Presidents of Latin America are not pressured into accepting the oil slick promises of dictators’ dollars, we must reengage with the region in three concrete ways: First, we must become more engaged in the region. We are now paying the price of 

a mindless pursuit of laissez-faire policies in Latin America. Most 

Latinos are fed up with free-trade agreements that primarily benefit giant corporate interests at the expense of struggling workers. 

They are fed up with forced privatization of utilities, which have 

often resulted in higher prices for inferior services; and they are 

5

fed up with politicians who are the ideologic descendents of the 

United Fruit Company. 

Latin America yearns for leaders like Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 

towering figures with vision, integrity and an understanding of the 

people’s needs; and they seek a new deal from us that restores cuts 

to basic health and education for the region’s poor, accepts that 

trade must be fair to workers and not just free for bosses of big 

business, and recognizes that the state has a legitimate role to play 

in the development of their countries. 

Second, our Government must show respect for all regional leaders, regardless of whether they are from the political right or left, 

as long as they defend human rights, strengthen the rule of law 

and promote democratic governments in their countries. We must 

demonstrate to these leaders and their people that we view them 

not as annoyances in our backyard but as neighbors who are as 

dedicated as we are to building a democratic and prosperous hemispheric community. 

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, as voters across the region continue to 

stream into polling booths, to choose between the policies of the 

past or a new paradigm for progress, our Nation also has a fundamental choice to make. We can defend or discredit that status quo, 

which is on its last breath in many countries, or assist the transitions to more just and more equitable societies. Our choice is clear. 

We should stand for change. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the remarks of our 

witnesses. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

It is the intention of the Chair to recognize Members for a 1-

minute brief opening statement, should they desire to make one, 

before we get to the witnesses. So I will call them in the order in 

which they appeared in the Committee room for today’s hearing. 

Mr. Burton of Indiana. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t have any opening comments other than to say I agree 

with almost everything that you and Mr. Lantos said, and I look 

forward to hearing from our witnesses. I have a number of questions for them which I think will illuminate the issue better than 

me making a speech right now. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Ms. Lee of California. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me just say it is obvious that there are points of disagreement regarding the United States’ interpretation of democracy and national sovereignty. History has shown that positive engagement is far more successful than isolation, and American intervention in the affairs of many sovereign nations has only hastened 

the deterioration of democracy in conflict-ridden countries. We cannot make the cry of undramatic and strategic locations after looking the other way in others. 

I do believe that there is much room for improvement in democracy, equal rights and access to the political system for the 

disenfranchised and the poor, including women, the indigenous 

people of many countries and Afro descendents in the hemisphere. 

6

But I also believe what we need to do today is hear from those testifying with regard to new, concrete and diplomatic suggestions and 

your analysis for finding that real, delicate balance of supporting 

the outcome of democratic fair and free elections, especially maybe 

when we don’t agree with the outcome of those elections. 

I think that is the critical question that we need to understand 

and answer, not only in the Western Hemisphere but throughout 

the world. 

Thank you, and I yield the balance of my time. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I congratulate you for scheduling this timely hearing on democracy in 

Latin America. 

This Committee has done due diligence in identifying threats and 

challenges to the consolidation of democratic institutions in the region. These range from corruption to narcoterrorism, to oppressors 

such as Fidel Castro and his proxies, who seek to foment instability 

and expand their revolutionary ideologies to other parts of the 

hemisphere. 

Freedom, democracy and free markets threaten their self-serving, 

repressive agenda, and they will use all of their available resources 

to undermine the young democracies in Latin America. Given this 

reality, it is necessary for the United States to implement our own 

multi-pronged strategy to counter these assaults and ensure that 

the forward momentum of translating elections into democratic 

governance continues unabated. 

I am extremely pleased to see three good friends with us today, 

Adolfo Franco, with whom I have worked on a number of issues, 

as well as Assistant Secretary of State Shannon. I look forward to 

their testimony. And I am so pleased to see the participation of 

Under Secretary Dobriansky—Paula to all of us—who is extremely 

welcome here, given her expertise on the overall approach to democracy promotion worldwide, programmatic objectives and application to the region that we are focusing on today; and I will have 

a series of questions for her and the other panelists. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Engel of New York. 

Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this very 

timely hearing on this day of democracy in Latin America. 

As Ranking Member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, 

this is certainly a topic of great interest to me. We are witnessing 

a historic period in which a staggering seven Latin America countries have elected new Presidents through democratic elections 

since November 2005, and six more Presidential elections are 

scheduled for the remainder of 2006. The outcome of these elections 

has and shall have real consequences for the state of democracy in 

the region, and I look forward to hearing your views on democratic 

developments in the Western Hemisphere—I say that to the 

panel—as well as their impact on United States relations and policy in the region. 

I am also particularly interested in the panel’s opinion of the 

proper U.S. role, as I am concerned that we support democratic 

forces in a way that is not counterproductive. I think we should 

support democracy, and I am disturbed about the subversion of deVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:57 Nov 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\062106\28366.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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mocracy in some quarters. But, whatever our concerns, I don’t 

think we should take sides in upcoming elections in other countries. I hope to hear your thoughts on how to maintain neutrality 

while at the same time protecting U.S. interests. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for convening the hearing. I 

look forward to hearing from all witnesses. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Boozman of Arkansas. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Meeks of New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, we cannot talk about Latin America without talking 

about the twin issues that link the two. The twin issues are democracy and poverty. Too often, poverty is democracy’s parasite. If, in 

fact, we are going to truly do something from the United States 

Government, as opposed to taking sides with this leader or that 

leader or accusing with this finger that this person is more democratic than others, we really need to look at what we can do to 

eradicate poverty in Latin America. We have not done that, really. 

That is the reason why, at times, you have a situation where 

some individuals are talking about Mr. Chavez one way and President Chavez some other way. The idea is to eradicate poverty, because, unless you do that, democracy will run into a problem. 

You have a whole host of individuals, particularly African 

Latinos throughout Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, who have 

never—who always have been on the bottom, no matter who the 

leader has been. 

Unless we talk and come together—and I do think there is a 

sense of hope with a number of the leaders and the people coming 

together, because they understand that the key to their having a 

better tomorrow is beginning to make sure that there is not a trickle-down but a trickle-up with the people on the bottom who have 

been stuck on the bottom of the river able to get release from that 

so that they can truly participate in the country and all that it has 

to offer. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Weller of Illinois. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me commend you and Mr. Lantos for conducting this 

hearing. I agree with much of the statements that the Ranking 

Members as well as the Chairman expressed. 

As we look forward to the testimony from our guests before us 

today—and I welcome them—I am particularly concerned about the 

current assault on democracy in Latin America. 

We have seen outside funding from foreign sources, funding, various organizations and street protests which were directly involved 

in the undermining of democratically elected governments in Bolivia and Ecuador. We have seen direct intervention by a foreign 

government from elsewhere in South America and the Peruvian 

elections as well as in Mexico. 

I want to focus on Nicaragua in my questions today. But, clearly, 

democracy is under assault in Latin America. I believe that this 

hearing is extremely important. I want to commend you, Mr. 

Chairman, for conducting this hearing today. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

8

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I appreciate your leadership, and I appreciate all that Ms. Dobriansky has done for the 

cause of freedom—Dr. Dobriansky has done for the cause of freedom throughout the world in her distinguished career. 

Let me note that one country hasn’t been mentioned that I believe needs to be mentioned, and that is that China is today playing what I consider to be a malevolent influence in Latin America, 

with alliances with Chavez, Castro, Panama, and this is doing the 

cause of democracy a great disservice and is a threat to the United 

States of America. We need to recognize that. 

We need to recognize, also, that the swing to the left, which is 

helped along by China in these countries, is not going to do anything to improve the lives of the people there because it will undermine their economic growth and their ability to work within the 

global system. 

With that said, I want to congratulate Constantine Menges for 

the record that he warned us that China was going to have a negative impact on freedom in Latin America. I am very happy we are 

paying attention to that threat today. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Tancredo of Colorado. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Dr. Paula Dobriansky graciously joins us this morning as our 

first witness. Dr. Dobriansky became Under Secretary of State for 

Democracy and Global Affairs in July 2005; and in this capacity 

she is responsible for a broad range of foreign policy issues, including democracy, human rights, labor and humanitarian relief matters. 

We also welcome Mr. Adolfo Franco to the Committee. He is Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Latin America and the 

Caribbean at the U.S. Agency for International Development, 

where he is responsible for the administration of U.S. economic and 

humanitarian assistance to the region. Prior to his appointment, 

Mr. Franco famously served as counsel to this Committee. 

Dr. Dobriansky, would you please proceed? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAULA J. DOBRIANSKY, 

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the 

Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss democratic 

development in Latin America. I will submit my full testimony for 

the record. 

Any assessment of the state of democracy in Latin America has 

to begin by recognizing the significant progress made by our neighbors in recent years. A region once marked by military governments and armed insurgencies has been transformed to one where 

democracy has become the rule, not the exception. 

The democratic consensus that unites our hemisphere is enshrined in a groundbreaking document, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which declares that ‘‘the peoples of the Americas 

have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.’’

9

United States policy has adapted to this revolutionary new consensus in our hemisphere by continuing to work with responsible 

leaders from across the political spectrum in a respectful and mutually beneficial way to make democracy a force for inclusion and 

empowerment. 

As Secretary Rice recently said, ‘‘We charge no ideological price 

for our partnership. We will work with all governments from the 

left, from the right, as long as they are committed in principle and 

practice to the core conditions of democracy, to govern justly, to advance economic freedom and to invest in their people.’’

U.S. policy offers a positive vision based on the benefits of representative democracy, free markets, economic integration and 

faith in the transformative power of freedom in individual lives. 

This is part of our broader goal and broader global effort as well. 

The U.S. has been a key supporter of the Community of Democracies, which has become an important venue for democracies, including smaller and developing nations, to share their experiences 

and develop best practices that can help build capacity. 

In April 2005, I accompanied Secretary Rice to Santiago, which 

played host to the CD Ministerial. Prior to that meeting, we organized a ‘‘Democracy Dialogue,’’ where some of our hemispheric 

partners, along with several African countries, produced a series of 

recommendations and best practices related to regional action to 

protect and promote democracy. 

Building on both the 2003 Dialogue and the Santiago CD Ministerial, we are working with the Organization of American States 

(OAS) and the African Union (AU) to establish a bridge between 

the democratic countries in the AU and the OAS to collaborate on 

institution building, to share best practices and to counter threats 

to democracy, among other goals. 

Still, while the region has come far, we all must understand the 

journey continues. As Secretary Rice has said, democratization is 

a process, not an event. So we do continue to confront many challenges in strengthening democracy in the region. 

The unprecedented political mobilizations we have witnessed of 

late have not always been accompanied by commensurate development of the liberal institutions that are at the core of successful 

democratic governance. Democratization has demonstrated pressures for positive change, and it is being channeled into institutions that aren’t always capable of delivering that change. Where 

the gap is largest, populations are most susceptible to the appeals 

of populists. 

In short, the task of strengthening institutions has become a key 

priority of governments throughout the region, so that democracy 

results in more social justice, more effective governance, more inclusion, greater development and greater stability. In short, that it 

transforms people’s lives for the better. 

To be an effective partner in the region, our policy seeks to highlight the link between democracy and development; and to do that 

we have based it on four key pillars: Strengthening democratic institutions, which includes targeting programs to marginalized peoples in Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, for example, to promote more inclusive democracy. 

10

In Nicaragua, we have trained over some 700 trainers who, in 

turn, trained electoral officials preparing for the November national elections. 

In Peru, our programs have strengthened local governments and 

regional governments and trained nearly 650 nongovernmental organizations, including women’s and indigenous organizations, on 

participation in local decision-making. 

In Haiti, we helped to bring about successful Presidential and 

parliamentary elections by working on strengthening political parties, reinforcing the Electoral Council, supporting electoral observers, training journalists and supporting civic education campaigns. 

Mr. Chairman, these are just a few of the ways that State Department funds are being used to help our neighbors strengthen 

those institutions without which democratic governance is impossible. 

The second pillar of our strategy is promoting prosperity. We are 

accomplishing this through a robust trade agenda and developing 

a basket of debt relief, poverty reduction, trade capacity building, 

competitiveness and private-public partner activities to complement free trade. 

President Bush has nearly doubled our annual foreign assistance 

to the region since 2001. 

Also, last year, we signed the Millennium Challenge Account compact with Honduras for some $215 million and one with Nicaragua for $175 million, both of which will improve rural road networks to help farmers transport their goods to market, as well as 

answer other rural development needs. We are now negotiating a 

compact with El Salvador, and we are devoting some $35 million 

to help Paraguay fight corruption and its business climate and 

move closer to qualifying for a compact of its own. 

Third, bolstering security. We are confronting non-traditional, 

multi-dimensional threats such as organized crime, terrorism, 

gangs, natural disasters and pandemics. By protecting the people 

of the Americas from those who operate outside the law, we 

strengthen democracy, promote social justice and make prosperity 

more likely. 

The fourth pillar of our policy is investing in people, because sustaining democratic development is not just about working to get 

the economies and politics of prosperity right. For citizens to realize their full potential and freedom requires deepening investments 

in health care and education. 

The President’s vision for this hemisphere is rooted in partnership. We will advance our common agenda as equals, with leaders 

who practice democracy, social justice and social inclusion. 

An important aspect of our democracy promotion strategy also 

calls for building strategic partnerships not only within the region, 

engaging regional partners such as Colombia, Mexico, Chile, but 

also with cooperative nations and organizations from outside hemisphere, like the European Union. We will also do this through the 

Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, we are at a key juncture in our relations with our hemisphere partners. Because, ultimately, if this 

great democratic transformation we are witnessing in the Americas 

11

is successful, we are able to show that democracy can provide solutions to issues of inequality, social exclusion and poverty, then it 

is only going to enhance our efforts to achieve democratization elsewhere in the world. 

Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer any questions that you and the Committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dobriansky follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAULA J. DOBRIANSKY, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I thank you for this opportunity to 

discuss democratic development in Latin America. I appreciate and value your and 

the Committee’s interest in this important issue. 

Any assessment of the state of democracy in Latin America has to begin by recognizing the significant progress made by our neighbors in recent years. A region once 

marked by military governments and armed insurgencies has been transformed to 

one where democracy has become the rule, not the exception. 

When the 34 democratic members of the Organization of American States gathered in Santo Domingo on June 4 for their annual General Assembly, there was only 

one empty seat at the table, a seat that will one day be filled by a representative 

of the free people of a democratic Cuba. 

The democratic consensus that unites our hemisphere is enshrined in a unique 

and groundbreaking document: The Inter-American Democratic Charter, which declares that ‘‘the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.’’ The Charter is much more than 

a grand statement, it provides a recipe for what are the essential elements of a 

democratic system, and emphasizes as well that ‘‘democracy is essential for the social, political, and economic development of the peoples of the Americas.’’

United States policy has adapted to this revolutionary new consensus in our hemisphere by continuing to work with responsible leaders from across the political spectrum in a respectful and mutually beneficial way to make democracy a force for inclusion and empowerment. 

As Secretary Rice recently said in remarks before the Council of the Americas, 

‘‘We charge no ideological price for our partnership. We will work with all governments from the left, from the right, as long as they are committed in principle and 

practice to the core conditions of democracy, to govern justly, to advance economic 

freedom and to invest in their people.’’

Indeed, to help sustain the region’s democratic transformation, U.S. policy offers 

a positive vision based on the benefits of representative democracy, free markets, 

economic integration, and faith in the transformative power of freedom in individual 

lives. 

This is part of our broader global effort, as well. The U.S. has been a key supporter of the Community of Democracies, which has become an important venue for 

democracies, including smaller and developing nations, to share their experiences 

and develop best practices that can help build capacity. In April 2005, I accompanied Secretary Rice to Santiago, which played host to the CD Ministerial, where 

Chilean leadership was critical to getting agreement on key issues, such as promoting a democracy practitioners database for the OAS. Prior to that, we organized 

what we called a ‘‘Democracy Dialogue,’’ where some of our hemispheric partners, 

such as Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Peru, 

along with seven African countries, produced a series of recommendations and best 

practices related to regional action to protect and promote democracy. 

Building on both the 2003 Dialogue and the Santiago CD Ministerial, we are 

working with the OAS and the African Union (AU), to establish a bridge between 

the democratic countries in the AU and the OAS to collaborate on institution building, to share best practices and to counter threats to democracy, among other goals. 

Still, while the region has come far, we all understand the journey continues. The 

fact is that the hard work of democracy is never done. As the Secretary has said, 

democratization is a process—not an event. 

And so we do continue to confront many challenges in consolidating and strengthening democracy in the region. Not surprisingly, the success of democracy in the 

Hemisphere has paradoxically helped define the biggest challenge it now faces in 

many countries. It has produced what President Bush has called a ‘‘revolution in 

expectations.’’

12

The unprecedented political mobilizations we have witnessed in the region have 

not always been accompanied by commensurate development of the liberal institutions that are at the core of successful democratic governance. Democratization has 

generated pressures for positive change, and it is being channeled into institutions 

that aren’t always capable of delivering that change. Where the gap is largest, populations are most susceptible to the siren songs of populists and the backward momentum they represent. 

In short, this task of strengthening institutions has become a key priority of governments throughout the region—so that democracy results in more social justice, 

more effective governance, more inclusion, greater development, and greater stability. It is an enormous task, but I can think of no more legitimate or worthy one 

in the region. Supporting our neighbors in this quest is among the highest priorities 

of our policy in the Western Hemisphere. 

Four Pillars 

To be an effective partner, our policy seeks to highlight the link between democracy and development, and to do that we have based it on four key pillars: strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, investing in people, and bolstering security. 

United States assistance programs to shore up democratic institutions in the 

Hemisphere range from legal code reform and judicial training to anti-corruption 

projects, conflict resolution, and support for free and fair elections. They are helping 

governments promote reforms that will enable elected officials to be more responsive 

to their constituents and give people a greater sense of direct participation in the 

political system. 

A key aspect in this area is helping to reach out to marginalized peoples to promote more inclusive democracy. In Bolivia, for example, U.S.-supported programs 

have trained over 300,000 indigenous, especially women and youth, on civic education and leadership and produced democracy-oriented radio programs in widely 

understood indigenous languages. In Ecuador, we have provided political leadership 

training to Afro-Ecuadorians to increase their participation in elections. Additionally, we have funded visits to the United States by several Afro-Brazilians to study 

the African-American experience and the importance of political participation in the 

democratic process. 

In Nicaragua, we have trained 686 trainers who in turn trained 17,140 electoral 

officials preparing for the November national elections; in Peru, our programs have 

strengthened 340 local governments and six regional governments, and trained 

nearly 650 nongovernmental organizations, including women’s and indigenous organizations, on participation in local decision-making. 

In Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, we’ve worked with our partners to improve the legal environment for anti-corruption reform and the administration of 

justice. We have procured and shipped thousands of democracy, human rights, and 

free enterprise books and pamphlets to support Cuba’s growing independent library 

network. 

In Haiti, perhaps our biggest challenge, we helped to bring about successful presidential and parliamentary elections by strengthening political parties; reinforcing 

the Electoral Council; supporting electoral observers; training journalists; and supporting civic education campaigns. 

Promoting economic prosperity is fundamental to our agenda because the inequality of income and wealth and social exclusion that characterize much of the region 

make it difficult for democracy to thrive. Sustainable economic growth and political 

stability are only possible if governments consciously provide access to the political 

system, economic opportunity, and social justice to all citizens, especially the poor 

and marginalized who possess tremendous talents and capabilities that are largely 

underutilized. 

President Bush has nearly doubled our annual foreign assistance to the region 

since 2001. Through the Millennium Challenge Account initiative, we are directing 

that new assistance to countries that have proven their commitment to democracy 

and ruling justly, but that need help in attacking poverty and sustaining economic 

growth. MCC assistance is a tangible demonstration of how we view the linkage between development and democracy. Last year, we signed a compact—a five-year 

commitment—with Honduras for $215 million and one with Nicaragua for $175 million, both of which will help improve rural road networks to help farmers transport 

their goods to market, as well as answer other rural development needs. We are 

now negotiating a compact with El Salvador and we are devoting $35 million to help 

Paraguay fight corruption, improve its business climate, and move closer to qualifying for a compact of its own. 

13

President Bush also believes that one of the surest ways to make opportunity real 

for all our citizens is by opening our doors to free and fair trade. Openness to other 

people and other ways of doing business has always been a path to development, 

while isolation means stagnation. Free Trade Agreements have also been critical 

tools to help leaders to improve and reform their economies. 

Thus, we will press forward with a robust trade agenda to prime the pump of 

prosperity. We have already signed, and the Congress approved, free trade agreements with Chile, Mexico, Canada, Central America, and the Dominican Republic. 

Most recently we signed new free trade agreements with Colombia and Peru, and 

we are still negotiating yet another with Panama. Our vision remains a free trade 

area of the Americas; the union of 800 million men and women from Northern Canada to Southern Chile, in the world’s largest free trade community. 

In addition, we have developed a ‘‘basket’’ of poverty reduction, trade capacity 

building, competitiveness, and private-public partner activities to complement free 

trade. Our new CAFTA–DR partners are benefiting from our trade capacity building 

assistance in labor and the environment. We will work with our neighbors to help 

enhance their energy security and to develop new sources of energy. We will continue to lead hemispheric efforts to catalyze private sector investment, reduce the 

cost of doing business, and expand access to micro-credit. 

We have also worked tirelessly to win debt relief agreements for the most disadvantaged countries in our hemisphere, and we are working with our partners to 

improve the effectiveness of the Inter-American Development Bank. President Bush 

is keenly interested in strengthening the bank’s role in private sector development—

especially of small businesses, which are the backbone of a healthy and growing 

economy. 

Democracy must also provide security, so citizens can exercise their basic rights. 

In recent years, the United States and our regional partners have fundamentally 

transformed the security agenda of the Americas and forged a consensus on the 

vital link between security and prosperity. Today’s challenge is confronting nontraditional, multidimensional threats such as organized crime, terrorism, gangs, 

natural disasters, and pandemics. By protecting the people of the Americas from 

those who operate outside the law, we strengthen democracy, promote social justice, 

and make prosperity more likely. 

Lastly, sustaining democratic development is not just about working to get the economics and politics of prosperity right. Democracies must respect human dignity, 

which will flourish when citizens have the power to make decisions concerning their 

own lives, and when they know that they have the opportunity to improve their way 

of life. For citizens to realize their full potential in freedom requires deepening investments in health care and education. Through our programs to fight HIV/AIDS, 

tuberculosis, and malaria, we are saving lives throughout the Hemisphere, particularly among the poorest. We are helping governments develop preparedness plans 

for natural disasters such as Avian Flu and hurricanes. Our Centers for Excellence 

in Education (CETTs) have already trained some 12,500 teachers and improved the 

literacy skills of over 450,000 students. 

Mr. Chairman, by targeting our efforts on these four pillars we seek to help countries live up to their democratic commitments and demonstrate to their citizens that 

government institutions can operate transparently and impartially, address the profound social issues that the Americas face today, and give people a voice in their 

national destiny. And through economic openness and opportunity, we can give people the belief and the hope that they can actually be agents of their own destiny 

and have some degree of control over their lives and the lives of their children. 

Strategic Partnerships 

The President’s vision for this Hemisphere is rooted in partnership. We will advance our common agenda, as equals, with leaders who practice democracy, social 

justice, and social inclusion. As Secretary Rice has said, ‘‘The United States has no 

desire to do things for our democratic partners; we want to do things with our democratic partners.’’

Indeed, an important aspect of our democracy promotion strategy calls for building strategic partnerships not only within the region—engaging regional partners 

like Canada, Colombia, Mexico and Chile—but also with cooperative nations and organizations from outside the Hemisphere, like the European Union, to ensure the 

greatest possible impact. 

We will also do this through our hemisphere’s premiere multilateral institutions: 

the Organization of American States—which is a principal vehicle in strengthening 

democracy through its members’ common allegiance to the Inter-American Democratic Charter—and, the Inter-American Development Bank. We are actively engaged with other parts of the inter-American system that work with governments, 

14

political parties, labor and business associations, and civil society organizations in 

order to develop the capacity to evolve, to change, and to become responsive to the 

demands that are being placed on them. 

The bottom line, Mr. Chairman, is that we recognize that we are at a key juncture 

in our relations with our hemispheric partners where no one can afford to sit on 

the sidelines, because ultimately if this great democratic transition and transformation we are witnessing in the Americas is successful, if we are able to show 

that democracy works, that it can provide solutions to issues of inequality, social 

exclusion, and poverty, then we have a chance to do so in the rest of the world. 

If we are not successful here—with our shared values and strong consensus about 

what actions democracies must take to create lasting development for their people—

it is going to be that much harder to achieve democratization elsewhere in the world 

where this common base of understanding and values does not exist. 

By making the blessings of freedom real in our hemisphere, we hope to set a shining example for the entire world. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be happy to answer any questions you and 

the Committee may have.

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Dobriansky. We appreciate your comments. We will have a lot of questions for you in a 

moment. 

Mr. Franco. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ADOLFO FRANCO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND 

THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. FRANCO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to voice the concerns 

of USAID throughout our development agenda for Latin America 

and the Caribbean and to continue to work on strengthening democratic institutions in the region. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I am submitting my full 

statement for the record. Secretary Dobriansky has outlined the 

Bush Administration’s policies very clearly. I would like to draw 

your attention to a couple of the hot spots in the region, as well 

as to what USAID is doing to address them. 

Last September, I testified before this Committee’s Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and expressed some of our 

concerns, discussed our successes in the region and some of the 

challenges that remain ahead. Since that time, we have had peaceful elections in a number of countries, including Colombia, Bolivia, 

Chile and Peru, and two rounds of elections in Haiti. 

Before this year is over, as Chairman Hyde noted, we will also 

witness Presidential elections in Ecuador, Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela. So we can really celebrate that democracy is 

taking hold in the Western Hemisphere when we compare where 

we were just 20 years ago. 

However, as has been noted in the opening statements, the successes that we have had are still being challenged. There is still 

much to be done. The United States Government believes that democracy continues to be threatened by corruption, poor working 

government institutions, weak rule of law, ineffective governance 

policies, rising crime and increasing gang violence. This is all being 

compounded with, as Mr. Meeks has noted, the endemic poverty 

and inequality that plagues the region. 

The fact is that the newly democratic or the democratic-elected 

governments throughout the region are still unable to meet citiVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:57 Nov 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\062106\28366.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
15

zens’ demands for services, economic opportunities and security. 

That is a fact. Our funded surveys on the regional attitudes have 

found that citizens in many countries, especially in the Andean Region, are deeply skeptical about their governments’ inability to deliver on basic services. This is in part due to high levels of past corruption, inequality and exclusion and, increasingly, because of 

crime. 

The most discredited institutions are also, unfortunately, the 

most important ones to democracy. These are political parties, legislators, the judiciary and law enforcement. 

President Bush’s commitment to the region is, however, as strong 

as ever. I would like to focus on two areas where the Administration of this President and Secretary Rice are working to reinforce 

and continue to strengthen and build democratic institutions, as 

noted by Secretary Dobriansky. 

I would like to focus on two areas where our USAID programs 

are increasingly being focused. They have to do with elections and 

crime. Without success in these areas, democracy in Latin America 

cannot continue to advance as we have seen it advance for the past 

two decades. 

We have noted a majority of the Western Hemisphere countries 

have elected civilian governments, peaceful Presidential transitions 

and relatively free and independent medium in all but one country 

in the region. Of course, that is Cuba, where we do not have a 

democratically elected government. 

In Haiti, the United States Government has been working to 

help the newly-elected Preval Administration succeed. In the 

months leading up to the Haitian elections, the USAID, in conjunction with the USAID Mission in Haiti, coordinated and provided 

$31 million for election support and provided assistance to a variety of political parties to ensure inclusion and debate and the participation of civil society organizations. Election activities included 

voter registration efforts, observation and monitoring to ensure 

good and fair elections in Haiti. 

In the current post-election environment, USAID continues to 

support the gains we have made and is working with the newlyelected Haitian parliament to strengthen international capacity 

and encourage democracy and now, increasingly, focus on municipalities and local organizations. 

USAID is also working to strengthen democracy in Nicaragua. 

The November 5 elections will be historic ones for the Nicaraguan 

people as it will elect a new President, Vice President, National Assembly, as well as delegates to the Central American Parliament. 

Democracy in Nicaragua has been under assault, Mr. Chairman, 

because of the country’s two main political parties. The Sandinistas 

and the Liberals maintain control of the legislature, judiciary and 

elections commission in an effort to try to manipulate the electoral 

policy. 

As Secretary Dobriansky has noted, our efforts are to ensure free 

and fair elections and work with whomever is elected. Our work in 

Nicaragua is focused on ensuring that the electoral policies that 

are in place in that country provide those free and fair elections for 

the people of that country. As a result, we are investing in election 

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date and civic education campaigns as well as coordination with 

other governments of the region. 

I would like to draw your attention to an issue that is rapidly 

growing in our region and could seriously undermine the democratic process of the last decade. I know, Chairman Burton, this is 

of great concern to you. That is the violence and crime, particularly 

of gangs, in the region. The issue of gangs, organized gangs, especially youth gangs is now a transnational issue affecting the United 

States. 

As sophisticated communications technology and have facilitated 

the expansion of gang activity across national borders throughout 

the United States, Central America and Mexico, the insecurity that 

is resulting from gang violence undermines the work of already 

fragile democracies and weakens the hemisphere’s governments. 

In addition, crime slows the wheels of economic growth. Corruption and weak rule of law contribute to high crime rates and have 

further reduced the annual growth by as much as 15 percent in the 

region attributable only to gang violence. Therefore, USAID and 

other government agencies are proactively addressing the issue. 

USAID is working in conjunction with the Department of State 

and the Department of Justice to coordinate an interagency strategy for combating youth gang in the hemisphere and create a holistic and balanced approach to the problem that has to do with prevention as well as law enforcement. 

A comprehensive gangs program is now being put together at 

USAID and the State Department to address the problem in El 

Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico to provide 

that combination of prevention, intervention and law enforcement 

approaches to combat the problem. 

I believe that we are uniquely positioned to address prevention 

and intervention aspects, and we are looking to by supporting policies in community-based programs that address the root causes of 

violence in gangs, which have to do with opportunities for young 

people, to give them an alternative to joining a gang. We are supporting community-based policing peripherals in El Salvador to create confidence in the marginalized populations in the police, and 

supporting an innovative community crime prevention program in 

Guatemala, which I would be happy to work on with the Committee. I pledge, Mr. Chairman, to redouble our efforts in this area. 

We are helping to strengthen the judicial systems and increase 

the effectiveness and the accountability of the police and improve 

community-based relations between the police and the communities 

they serve. 

Despite the rising threat of violence and the fragile state of democracy in the region, USAID remains committed to strengthening 

these democratic institutions in the hemisphere. We have increased 

our total assistance to the region over the last 6 years, and we are 

also pressing regional leaders to meet the needs of the people by, 

as President Bush said, ruling justly and ensuring human rights 

and being good stewards of the people’s faith and resources. Only 

then will democracy flourish in the region and our shared goals 

and vision be achieved. 

Secretary Rice reinforced this when she stated that democracy is 

fundamental to securing all of our national interests in Latin 

17

America, not just economic interest. USAID and our partners will 

continue to support stable democracies in all sections of the hemisphere and provide hope and opportunity to the people of the region, but we cannot do it alone. We need the international community, the OAS and the commitment of the regional leaders themselves. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome any questions 

you have for me. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Franco follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ADOLFO FRANCO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to have this opportunity 

to voice USAID’s concerns for Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) democratic 

progress and draw your attention to the successes, challenges and future of our region. In September of last year, I was able to speak before this very same committee 

on ‘‘Hot Spots’’ in Latin America and the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) democracy assistance programs. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you again today to update you on these critical issues. 

In May 2006, while speaking to Uruguay’s President Tabare Vazquez, President 

Bush reiterated the United States’ commitment to promoting justice and prosperity 

in Latin America. The strong economic, cultural, and geographic ties between the 

United States and the countries of the Western Hemisphere make their political and 

economic stability of vital interest to the United States and underscore why USAID 

remains committed to promoting strong and prosperous democracies in Latin America. As Secretary of State Rice has emphasized, democracy is fundamental to securing all of our national interests in Latin America. It is a vital precedent for generating broad-based, sustainable economic growth; improving livelihoods through investments in health and education; and preventing crime, terrorism, and conflict. 

Latin America’s democratic transition has strengthened public institutions and 

brought economic stability to what was once a war-torn and crisis-prone region. Now 

in a majority of Western Hemisphere countries there are elected civilian governments, peaceful presidential transitions, and relatively free and independent media; 

and all but one country in the region, Cuba, have democratically elected governments. Latin America is undergoing a wave of electoral cycles, and will witness over 

ten presidential elections this year alone. 

Nevertheless, USAID believes that democratic rule in Latin America is not yet 

consolidated and continues to be threatened by corruption, weak rule of law, ineffective governance, rising crime and gang violence, and endemic poverty and inequality. Democratically elected governments throughout the region are still unable to 

meet citizens’ demands for improved services, economic opportunities and security. 

USAID-funded surveys on regional attitudes toward democracy have found that 

citizens in many countries, especially the Andes, are deeply skeptical of their governments’ legitimacy, in part due to high levels of corruption and in part due to high 

levels of crime; and they are rightfully questioning their government’s inability to 

deliver on their demands. The most discredited institutions are also among the most 

important ones in a democracy—political parties, legislatures, judicial entities and 

law enforcement. Moreover, in some of the region’s most poverty-stricken countries, 

citizens seeking radical change are supporting populist leaders whose policies may 

threaten the democratic institutions and practices that took the region so long to 

attain. Already in several countries economic nationalism is hindering private investment and free markets, and more centralized power is threatening the continuation of representative democracy. 

Challenges to democracy come as no surprise given the vast levels of inequality 

and poverty in Latin America. The region is the most unequal in the world in terms 

of income disparity and is also one of the most impoverished, despite increases in 

per capita income over the last decade. According to a 2006 World Bank study, close 

to 25 percent of the population lives on less than two dollars a day. 

We at USAID believe that our work is critical to meeting the aforementioned challenges and consolidating democratic gains in the hemisphere. Some of the complex 

18

challenges ahead are surfacing in Bolivia, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru. 

Bolivia 

In Bolivia, Evo Morales and his Movement toward Socialism (MAS) party have 

continued to waver on economic policy, democracy, and counternarctoics. Morales 

and his MAS party not only won the presidency and a majority of seats in both 

houses of Congress, they also won a third of the state governorships (prefectures). 

Overall, the electoral process was a victory for democracy. However, preserving balanced power in a democratic system of government will be Bolivia’s greatest challenge. 

The new Bolivian government has, on several occasions, demonstrated inclinations to consolidate executive power and promote potentially anti-democratic reforms through the Constituent Assembly and other means. 

On May 1, President Morales moved to nationalize the nation’s natural resources, 

including its energy sector. In addition, there is serious concern about the executive 

branch meddling in judicial and electoral affairs. The upcoming Constituent Assembly, which is scheduled to begin in August of this year, will test the strength and 

robustness of the country’s democratic practices. 

USAID is focusing assistance to Bolivia on programs that strengthen vibrant and 

effective democracies, including the support of counterweights to one-party control 

such as judicial and media independence, a strong civil society, and educated local 

and state level leaders. In Bolivia, each of these groups contributes to the oversight 

of all democratic institutions, including the Constituent Assembly. USAID is also 

promoting good governance by helping newly elected state leaders to manage their 

budgets transparently, increase their accountability and engage their constituents 

effectively. This will help raise their national profiles and strengthen democratic institutions. 

Cuba 

President Bush, again on May 20, 2006, reaffirmed U.S. government support to 

the Cuban people to help promote a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. 

The Castro regime continues to deny Cuban citizens the most fundamental human 

rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom to organize independent 

labor unions and political parties, freedom of religion, and other freedoms contained 

in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. Amnesty International, in its 

May 2006 Annual Report, cites the Castro regime’s harassment and intimidation of 

Cuban human rights activists, especially through violent attacks by the government’s ‘‘rapid-response brigades,’’ in collusion with members of State security. Similarly, Freedom House lists Cuba among the eight most repressive regimes with failing scores in political rights and civil liberties. 

The USAID Cuba program works closely with the Department of State’s Cuba 

Transition Coordinator and the Bureau for Western Hemisphere Affairs to help 

strengthen Cuba’s independent civil society by increasing the flow of accurate information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to, from, and within Cuba. 

Since 1996, USAID has granted more than $48 million to U.S. universities and nongovernmental organizations to build solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists, 

give voice to Cuba’s independent journalists, defend the rights of Cuban workers, 

strengthen independent Cuban nongovernmental organizations, and help the Cuban 

people plan for a transition to democracy. 

Haiti 

Historically plagued by endemic poverty and political instability, Haiti is now at 

a crossroads. The installation of Rene Preval’s administration marks the resumption 

of constitutional governance in Haiti. After numerous obstacles and postponements, 

free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections took place on February 7, 

2006, with a high turnout. In May, Preval was sworn in as Haiti’s first democratically elected president since the ousting of former president Jean Bertrand Aristide 

in 2004, and on May 22 Preval nominated Jacques Edouard Alexis to be Haiti’s 

Prime Minister. Haiti’s newly-elected Parliament will also be convening for the first 

time since 2004. USAID worked closely with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti to coordinate $31 million in direct elections support, electoral administration, registration, observation and monitoring, as well as assistance to legitimate 

political parties and civil society organizations. 

USAID is committed to working with the new government of Haiti to help build 

a stable and well-governed state that is responsive to the needs of its people. Mindful of the need for economic development, USAID is supporting the provision of 

short-term emergency jobs while helping create the conditions for longer term 

growth and improved health and education services. USAID will work with the 

19

newly elected Haitian Parliament to strengthen institutional capacity and encourage 

participatory democracy as a counterbalance to centralized patronage politics. In the 

critical rule of law sector, USAID is working to reform the justice system and improve access to justice. 

Nicaragua 

Elections in Nicaragua will be held on November 5, 2006 for president, vice president, members of the National Assembly and delegates to the Central American 

Parliament. The country’s two main political parties, the Sandinistas and the Liberals, maintain control of the legislature, judiciary, and the Supreme Electoral 

Council (CSE), and continue to manipulate electoral processes. Daniel Ortega, 

Nicaragua’s former President and now both Presidential hopeful and Sandinista 

party leader, retains an anti-U.S. worldview and has worked to undermine the executive branch and democratic processes. Ortega also has made a deal with Venezuela 

for supplies of oil to Sandinista-controlled municipalities at preferential financing 

rates. Former President Arnoldo Alema ́n maintains control as the leader of the Liberal party. 

Considering the Sandinistas and Liberals control the CSE, there is a lack of public confidence in that institution’s handling of the electoral process and in whether 

or not presidential elections will be handled impartially. However, it is important 

to note that these concerns are not new. Based on a review of previous electoral assistance and international observation missions from Nicaragua’s 1990 elections onwards, it is clear that a lack of public confidence in the electoral framework, mistrust in political party processes, inaccurate voter registration lists, weak election 

monitoring, and limited organizational capacity are all recurring problems. 

USAID is working to address these challenges through a multifaceted approach. 

We coordinate with a variety of international donors and organizations—including 

the Government of Nicaragua, the Organization of American States (OAS), and local 

nongovernmental organizations—to support voter education activities, update voter 

registries, deliver voter identification cards, and provide mediation and citizen assistance centers, in addition to domestic and international election observers. Programs are designed to reduce the opportunities and incentives for electoral fraud, 

identify and address problems with electoral processes, and legitimize a peaceful 

transfer of power. 

USAID also continues to support anticorruption initiatives and justice sector reform in Nicaragua, efforts that will help strengthen democratic institutions and ensure that democratic principles prevail in the post-electoral environment. With 

USAID’s help, Nicaragua now has one of the best Criminal Procedure Codes in the 

region. USAID is also helping establish mediation centers nationwide to help alleviate congestion in the court system, improve access to justice, and enhance public 

confidence in the justice system. 

Venezuela 

President Hugo Chavez’s strident anti-American posture has left Venezuela bitterly divided. Moreover, increased control by the Venezuelan executive branch over 

the country’s five branches of government threatens the continuation of representative democracy. While Chavez’s supporters praise his expansion of social programs 

bolstered by oil revenue surplus, his opponents argue that his authoritarian tactics 

reflect those of communist Cuba. Presidential elections will take place in December 

2006, and opposition groups have not managed to unite behind a strong candidate. 

Meanwhile, the projection of Chavez’s interests and his brand of populism are undermining many of the region’s fragile democracies. 

USAID’s work in Venezuela is handled through our Office of Transition Initiatives. Our objectives are to provide assistance to maintain democratic stability and 

strengthen the country’s fragile democratic institutions by enhancing civil society 

dialogue, supporting constitutional processes, and strengthening democratic institutions. USAID supports existing civil society organizations that work on a variety of 

issues, including human rights, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and legislative and judicial system monitoring. Nongovernmental organizations are key institutions in a vibrant democratic society and are central to a healthy exchange of ideas. 

The institutional support provided will help these civil society groups play this essential role in Venezuela. 

USAID’s social impact programs demonstrate our government’s solidarity with the 

global fight against poverty and reinforce the favorable impression most Venezuelans have of the American people. Specifically, these projects support inner-city 

day-care centers; cancer hospices for children of low-income families; and centers for 

street children. 

20

USAID’s election-related activities in Venezuela include training candidates, campaign managers, and other political party workers on the mechanics of electoral 

campaigns. Training topics include helping candidate’s develop profiles and policy 

presentations; get-out-the-vote and day-of-the-vote activities; and understanding relevant electoral laws. USAID also works to strengthen political parties in message 

development, citizen responsiveness, and outreach. For example, prior to the 2004 

referendum and local elections, USAID worked with political parties to train partyaffiliated election observers from both sides in the rules and regulations associated 

with electoral events. During the elections of 2004, USAID also supported the institutionalization of a non-partisan, domestic electoral observation organization that is 

widely viewed as credible and non-partisan. 

Other Challenges for the Future 

In addition to the aforementioned, other areas of concern in the Hemisphere are 

Peru, Ecuador and gang violence in Central America. 

Peru 

On June 4, 2006 Peru elected Alan Garcia as president. President-elect Garcia 

bested the one time front runner and primary leader, Ollanta Humala. The elections 

in Peru were reported to be free and fair and almost no violence was reported. 

USAID supported Peru’s 2006 election cycle by encouraging broad debate on key 

reform issues, promoting access to candidate information and increasing transparency of the election process. Elections for regional, provincial and district officials 

will be held in November of this year. 

Ecuador 

Consolidating democracy continues to be a challenge in Ecuador, which has seen 

seven presidents over the last decade. Former President Lucio Gutierrez was ousted 

by the legislature in April 2005. This year, both the introduction of a new hydrocarbons law featuring high taxation rates and the expropriation of assets of the U.S. 

oil firm Occidental Petroleum, have created major uncertainties regarding the future of Ecuador’s key hydrocarbons sector. Weak institutions, the inability of Ecuadorians to arrive at a consensus on key reforms, and an unrepresentative government continue to be major threats to a stable democracy. This instability is exacerbated by pervasive and growing corruption. Presidential and legislative elections 

will be held in October 2006, and there currently is no clear frontrunner for president. These elections will provide a window of opportunity to shape future policies 

and reforms. 

USAID is intensifying efforts to work with civil society to promote democracy, advance political reforms, and provide election support to ensure vulnerable groups 

such as youth, women, indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorians can participate fully in the 

electoral process. The programs with civil society promote poverty reduction activities for micro and small enterprises, improve competitiveness, strengthen financial 

sector services, and support oversight of the government’s fiscal and tax management. 

Additionally, USAID support for democratic local governance and decentralization 

is having a positive impact on citizen trust in local government. Nationwide, citizen 

confidence in municipal governments increased from 46.7 percent to 51.4 percent 

from 2001 to 2004. In the 21 surveyed municipalities where USAID has been working, citizen satisfaction with their local governments improved, reaching 53 per cent 

satisfaction in 2004. The assistance USAID has provided to municipalities through 

its democracy and Northern and Southern border programs has been instrumental 

in strengthening Ecuadorians belief that democracy can indeed deliver concrete benefits. 

Crime and Gang Violence 

Finally, I would like to note USAID’s increasing engagement on the issue of gangs 

and crime in Central America and Mexico. When Central Americans are polled 

about their primary fears, personal security and neighborhood safety are the most 

common concerns, and gangs are often cited as the reason for high rates of crime 

and violence in their communities. USAID-funded public opinion surveys in Latin 

America reveal that victims of crime have less confidence in democratic institutions. 

In addition, in many countries, a high level of crime provides the strongest justification in people’s minds for a military coup. 

It is very clear that gang violence poses a direct threat to security, economic 

growth, and democratic institutions in Central America and Mexico, and it spills 

across borders to affect our own communities in the United States as well. Gang 

violence is now a transnational phenomenon and most analysts believe that communication between gang members in different countries is increasing. 

21

USAID efforts to reduce crime are closely linked to a need to strengthen and reform justice systems; increase the effectiveness and accountability of the police; and 

improve relations between police and the communities they serve. To this end, 

USAID supports a community-based policing program in El Salvador, an innovative 

community crime prevention program in Guatemala, and justice sector reform efforts throughout the region. 

USAID also completed a comprehensive assessment of gangs in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico. The report analyzes the root causes of 

gangs; examines the transnational and regional characteristics of the phenomenon; 

identifies best practices in the assessment countries and the United States; and recommends opportunities wherein the U.S. Government can best address the gang 

problem in the assessment countries from a policy and programmatic standpoint. 

The report shows that effectively halting the spread of gang violence in the long 

term will require a combination of prevention, intervention, and law enforcement 

approaches. To date, countries have largely responded by increasing investments in 

law enforcement, with much less attention to prevention and intervention. This imbalanced approach has not been successful as crime levels have not gone down. 

USAID, in collaboration with other federal Agencies and stakeholders, is uniquely 

positioned to address prevention and intervention aspects, and is currently looking 

to do so by supporting policies and community-based programs that address the root 

causes of youth gang proliferation in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. 

Conclusion 

USAID is promoting reforms that will help consolidate Latin America’s young democracies and bring about sustainable, broad-based economic growth. Given the 

trends and challenges in our hemisphere, USAID will strengthen its focus on rising 

crime and gang violence; poor governance and impunity at the highest levels; and 

poverty and inequality. USAID will help address the underlying causes of gang involvement via prevention and intervention activities. Additionally, USAID will 

strengthen government institutions by providing electoral assistance and implementing programs that focus on decentralization, good governance, justice sector reform, and anticorruption. We will also work with civil society to achieve improved 

civic responses for better governance, inclusion, transparency, and accountability for 

all people regardless of status. Finally, USAID will work to reduce poverty and inequality by promoting economic prosperity through job creation, employment expansion, and economic growth. 

Latin America’s challenges to securing democracy will not be met with short-term 

solutions. In fact, they will require a long-term, sustained, and collaborative effort 

on behalf of U.S. government agencies in collaboration with host-country governments. Fortunately, this work is already underway. Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay have agreements with the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and free trade 

agreements have been signed with Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and, most recently, Peru. By collaborating with host country governments and other U.S. government agencies, USAID is helping implement effective 

multisectoral measures that reduce corruption, strengthen public institutions and 

build local capacity. We can—and will—have an impact. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today. I welcome any questions that you may have.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Dr. Franco and Dr. Dobriansky; and, 

Under Secretary Shannon, it is nice having you with us today. I 

know you don’t have a statement, but we are always glad to see 

you. 

One of the things that has concerned me and other Members of 

the Committee is that we have put an awful lot of money into Colombia to fight the drug war and the crime problem down there. 

As a result, 40,000—an estimated 40,000 ex-combatants that were 

tied in with FARC and ELN have come out of the jungle; and yet, 

to my knowledge, only about 100 or less than 100 have been 

trained for other kinds of work. As a result, a lot of them are going 

back to the ELN and the FARC and getting back into the drug cultivation process and becoming part of the drug problem. 

Why is that? If we are putting billions of dollars in there to help 

President Uribe, why is it that we are not doing something to help 

these people be retained? 

22

Mr. FRANCO. Well, Mr. Chairman, working with you and Members of the Committee, we have pledged to, over a period of the 

next few years, to provide up to $48 million of the demobilization 

efforts. That part of the portion that corresponds to us, it is going 

to cost a lot more than $48 million. We estimate it is almost $190 

million initially, which the Colombians, by the way, will have the 

lion’s share of it. But the United States share of it, the $48 million, 

will address primarily the things you have described. 

That is what we call reintegration. After verification that people 

have actually reintegrated, been demobilized, we are working to 

provide that vocational training, those opportunities for people to 

become meaningful members of society again. 

So it is taking a little bit of time to work out these details, but 

we are working with the Congress. We had a lot of concerns, as you 

know, even about our own participation, some concerns by some 

Members of Congress about the whole demobilization effort, but I 

think we have surmounted that. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, the problem as I see it is that time is of the 

essence, these people coming out of there who were getting money 

from the drug cartel to do the dirty work and decided that they 

didn’t want to do it anymore, they wanted to fight the troops in the 

jungle and get killed and go through all the problems down there, 

they have come out and they are not getting any money or any 

training so that they can feed their families and live the kind of 

life that they would like to live. As a result, they are going right 

back to the same thing. 

So it seems to me that we have got to speed up the process if 

we are going to keep them on the right side of the law. 

Mr. FRANCO. I fully agree with that, Mr. Chairman. We have 

been providing the verification process. You know, the standards 

and the laws that have been passed in the appropriations bills are 

quite high. We have satisfied what is required to actually engage 

in demobilization. There were legal issues we have surmounted because we were talking about an organization that is on the terrorist list by the United States. So I can’t agree with you more. 

There were exhaustive consultations with Members of Congress on 

our demobilization plan and commitment to it, and I believe we are 

there. 

Mr. BURTON. Let us hope the process speeds up as quickly as 

possible. When I read about these guys going back into the jungle, 

I just think we are throwing money down a rat hole, but we have 

to keep them out of there, if possible, and encourage more to leave 

the cartels. 

Let me switch to a different subject. You know, this populism 

issue is becoming of great concern to me and a lot of my colleagues. 

In Venezuela, we see a populist President. At least that is what he 

calls himself. He has been, as we have been told, sending money 

and other commodities in to other countries to try to move toward 

populist or leftist candidates in the race for presidency in a whole 

host of these countries. What are we doing to deal with that? 

For instance, in Nicaragua, we have been told by some of the 

people that are in the political process down there that millions 

and millions of dollars are coming in through diplomatic channels 

23

to help the Sandinistas, the leftists down there. What are we doing 

to counter that, if anything, and what can be done? 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. First, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. 

Let me first, though, make a point about populism, a broad point. 

Populism in itself is really part of democracy. What we have witnessed in Venezuela is an elected official who is pursuing antidemocratic and undemocratic measures, as was summarized by 

Chairman Hyde and also, in particular, by Congressman Lantos. In 

terms of the steps that we are taking, for example, you pick Nicaragua. 

In Nicaragua, we have invested resources in ensuring that there 

will be free and fair elections that are held. The moneys that have 

been devoted, some $13 million through different accounts, is targeted toward the training of poll watchers, providing assistance to 

political parties, providing assistance for the establishment of electoral registries, specifically ensuring that there will be a level playing field. 

I hope my colleague, Assistant Secretary Shannon, will say something. Because he went down with Assistant Deputy Zoellick earlier this year to Nicaragua and really to convey that message very 

directly about the concern about resources that were coming in 

from the outside and also the kinds of steps that were taken internally in Nicaragua to prevent the incumbent government from 

holding free and fair elections. 

Would you like to add? 

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

In regard to Nicaragua, there is no doubt that there are countries in the region which would like to exercise influence within 

Nicaragua during this electoral period. 

I think what we have seen in the region, most recently in Peru, 

is that many electoral systems in many nations are resistant to 

that kind of influence. They recognize it for what it is, and they 

respond to it appropriately. 

What we have tried to do, as the Under Secretary noted, is focus 

on institutions to ensure that the vote is free and fair, but then 

also to highlight how our engagement with the country is with the 

country and with the state through the Millennium Challenge Account, through our free trade agreement with Central American 

countries and through the Dominican Republic through debt relief, 

through the HIPIC proposal, through the G–8 proposal, and also 

through the Inter-American Development Bank proposal, which we 

are working on now. 

In Nicaragua, we believe that we have put together a package of 

assistance of aid to Nicaragua which will highlight the linkage between democracy and development, which has been talked about 

here, and will make very clear that our interest and the interests 

of Nicaragua’s partners in the Organization of American States and 

outside of the region is in making sure that the Nicaraguan people 

have a free and fair choice and that the government that results 

from that free and fair choice has the resources necessary to begin 

to address the serious development and poverty issues that Nicaragua faces. 

24

More broadly, on populism, again, as the Under Secretary noted 

and as also was reflected in the comments of many Members here, 

one of the big challenges we are facing in the region is how democracy shows people it can deliver the goods and how democracy, 

through institutions, can channel all of the social conflict and confrontation that exists within many societies within Latin America. 

From our point of view, populism is the product of weak institutions; and what we need to be doing is working with countries that 

face democratic challenges and crises to strengthen their institutions, not only the formal institutions of government but also political parties and civil society and helping them build the civic traditions that will build linkages across societies. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. 

I will have a couple more questions later, but since we are under 

the 5-minute rule, we will go to the Ranking Member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask anybody who cares to answer—I want to pick up on something that 

Mr. Meeks said, because I think it is a very important statement 

about the poverty there. Given that approximately 41 percent of 

the region’s population still toils in grinding poverty, how do we 

justify having a third consecutive year of drastic cuts in the President’s Fiscal Year 2007 budget request for core development accounts for the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean? 

I know there has been an increase in MCA funding for a few 

countries, but MCA doesn’t help with basic health and education 

programs. So how can we believe that our Latin American partners 

are going to assume they are a priority with us, given the habit of 

shortchanging the foreign assistance directed toward the region 

and not really helping with the grinding poverty there? 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. Congressman, let me respond to that. 

I know when Secretary Rice was here before this Committee 

there was a direct discussion about this very issue. She mentioned 

very directly that there have been, admittedly, some very tough 

budget decisions that the Administration and Congress have had to 

deal with in this recent time. 

Having said that, she also, I think, made very specific mention 

of the premium that she has placed on transformation diplomacy 

and the need here in looking at our development assistance to look 

at those countries that are in greater need, not the ones that have 

middle-class income but those areas that are in greatest need. 

Thirdly, you mentioned it yourself, which is that we have—it is 

not a substitution for, but we have added into the Millennium 

Challenge Account, which, not only for the two countries or three 

that really have it but others that are in the region, I think it addresses this very issue of good governance, of also investing in people, trying to build from within those areas that have been neglected before. 

But, finally, let me just say that I also think what is important 

to note here is the overall trend to this region, as I cited in my remarks, in terms of overall foreign assistance. Because it is part of 

an overall package. There is development assistance, there is democratic assistance. Overall foreign assistance has increased from 

2001 to the present time. I believe it is from $862 million to reVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:57 Nov 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\062106\28366.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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quested $1.7 billion for this region. What does that take into account? That does take into account the priority we attach to that 

it is not only about democracy promotion, but it is, in fact, about 

development, and that these are interrelated and that there is a 

dire need to address those issues that have not been as well addressed in the past. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you something else, since you mentioned 

Secretary Rice. About 12 countries in Latin America have refused 

to sign so-called Article 98 Agreements. And those, as you know, 

make USG personnel immune from the ICC’s jurisdiction. So therefore under current legislation, much of the Western Hemisphere 

risks having its foreign assistance programs curtailed. Increasingly, 

a number of senior United States Government officials have spoken 

out on the damaging impact of ICC-related sanctions and one of 

them, of course, is our Secretary of State. 

In March 2006, Secretary Rice testified that such sanctions were 

basically, and I quote her, ‘‘the same thing as shooting ourselves 

in the foot.’’

As Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, I am concerned that 

these sanctions are very severely undermining our global interests 

and influence in the region and I would like to help address this 

serious problem. So my question is, given that regional governments clearly have no intent to modify their stance on the ICC, do 

you agree that we are cutting off our nose to spite our face? And 

at what point does the USG plan to abandon what I think, and I 

think what Secretary Rice thinks, is a failed policy? 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. Thank you, Congressman. The sanctions as are 

imposed as a result of the Article 98 matter does affect a portion 

of our assistance. That is the case. 

In particular, it imposes a constraint on assistance that is given 

directly to governments. But I would want to point out that where 

it does not affect our ESF funding and particularly as relevant to 

democracy promotion, it does not inhibit or curtail moneys that go 

to non-state actors or non-governmental organizations and civil society. And quite frankly, a substantial portion of our resources, in 

fact, are geared toward indigenous organizations, certainly civil society. We work through those grassroot sectors. 

So I would say that this is an issue that we are grappling with 

on the one hand because of the portion that is affected, but I would 

also submit that a significant portion is not due to the fact that 

moneys go to, as I said, civil society, non-state actors, all our HRDF 

accounts which in my line is not affected at all. This goes to bolstering human rights, all democracy efforts that are again targeted 

to civil society. 

You raise an issue that, as I said we have nevertheless for that 

portion that remains, we have been grappling with. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just share his concern about Article 98. I 

have met with a number of the Presidents of Central and South 

America and it is an issue that we ought to work on and might try 

to find a compromise. I will add my voice to his. 

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will address my 

first question to all the panelists. I will welcome your insight into 

26

our multilateral efforts to achieve the goals that were articulated 

both in 2001 in the Quebec Summit of Americas Plan of Action, 

and it was to strengthen representative democracy, promote good 

governance, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. And 

then again later in 2005 at the Community of Democracies Ministerial in Santiago, where Secretary Rice said we must use the power 

of our shared ideals to accelerate democracy’s movement to even 

more places around the globe. 

And then, for Under Secretary Dobriansky, do you agree that 

some of the countries in the former Soviet bloc can serve as catalysts and models for democratic transitions from oppressive totalitarian Communist rule, and can their experience provide guidance 

on the dynamics of the dissident movements on the internal opposition as well as the factors that affect the very difficult process of 

moving from a dictatorship to a democracy? And within that context, I ask that you elaborate on the work of the International Center for Democratic Transition in Hungary. This is an offspring of 

the Community of Democracies Santiago commitment and how this 

fits into our own strategy to precipitate a transition to a free democratic rule in my native homeland of Cuba. Thank you. 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. Let me address the second part of the question. 

I invite the Assistant Secretary to address the first part of your 

question. 

On the second part, with regard to the experience of those countries from Central and Eastern Europe, it was—and how it could 

be applied to the region and particularly to a number of countries. 

The meeting in Santiago, Chile, I think, underscored their interest 

in not only sharing their experience, but also the applicability of 

their experience. Hungary had formally announced on the occasion 

of the meeting in Santiago its creation of the International Center 

for Democratic Transitions, specifically for the purpose of trying to 

have the countries of Central Europe be able to apply their experiences to, say for example, Cuba. And in particular, the Center has 

come forward most recently with a number of initiatives, one of 

which is that they are gathering the experiences of the different 

countries of Central and Eastern Europe, putting together what 

they call their tool kit or tool box in the form of a report, which 

they are having translated into Spanish, so they can share it with 

the people of Cuba. 

Many of the countries of Central Europe believe that what they 

have gone through in terms of transitions, that there are lessons 

that could be learned, corners that could be cut, and experiences 

that could be well drawn upon. And we have welcomed the very aggressive involvement and activism of these countries in engaging 

not only in this case—I am citing one example in Cuba, but many 

of the countries have also applied their experience with regard to 

elections and the holding of elections, the development of civil societies as well. 

They have invited many NGOs into Central and Eastern Europe 

and vice-versa. We welcome that development and I think that the 

Community of Democracies has provided an important umbrella on 

which to really grow these opportunities. 

Mr. SHANNON. If I may add, part of our effort to implement the 

President’s policies in the region is done through multilateral instiVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:57 Nov 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\062106\28366.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
27

tutions and done also informally working through networks of partner countries. The kind of agenda that we have laid out in the 

hemisphere through the Summit of the Americas process, an agenda that is not only a U.S. agenda, but truly an American agenda, 

that is hemispheric and ambitious, can only be done through collaboration and cooperation. It requires countries to work together. 

And we have sought to use the summit process, the Organization 

of American States, Inter-American Development Bank, and the 

other institutions of the Inter-American system to develop that degree of cooperation and collaboration. So in that sense, we are looking for partners and we are looking for convergent voices as opposed to divergent voices in the region, and we have put a lot of 

resources against these kinds of activities. 

But also, it was mentioned earlier, the many elections that are 

taking place in the region. There are a lot of new political leadership emerging. There is a lot of important discussions and debates 

taking place at national levels throughout the hemisphere and we 

are seeing new governments emerge. And many of these new governments have not over time been participating in the summit 

process. And part of our goal is to draw them into the understandings that have been developed through the Summit of the 

Americas process and work with them to win their commitment to 

the agenda that democratic leaders have staked out in the hemisphere. 

And in this regard, our partnership cannot only be hemispheric; 

it has to be more broadly international. And the Under Secretary 

noted that we are working very hard in the European Union and 

elsewhere to identify those countries that have strategic interests 

in Latin America and convince them that they need to be participating; need to be participating on democratic issues and need to 

be participating on development issues. Because ultimately, for this 

region to be successful, it cannot be parochial. It has to open itself 

to the world. And we, along with our partners, are intent on doing 

that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know there is an expression: ‘‘I have seen the enemy, and it is us.’’

What I am listening to—let me just start with a statement. 

James Baldwin said, ‘‘Anyone who has ever struggled with poverty 

knows how extremely expensive it is to be poor.’’

Now, I am hearing democracy, democracy, democracy. The only 

way to bring this home is that for over 200 years there was a socalled democracy here in America. But to people who were enslaved 

or second-class citizens, African-Americans, democracy meant nothing to them because it did nothing to their everyday lives. And the 

reason why we are having problems in Latin America right now is 

because they have tried democracy, they have tried almost everything, but the people who have never seen anything, the light of 

day, are still suffering. 

And you can talk about democracy all you want. Until you decide 

that you are going to really make a difference in eradicating poverty in Latin America, and cutting a budget 3 consecutive years by 

substantial amounts—I listened to the answer—in countries where 

28

almost 50 percent of the people are in poverty—is not the way to 

get faith in our country. 

To talk about Venezuela, and I almost think this is a hearing to 

beat up on Venezuela. To talk about why we are worried with populism. Why is populism there? Because the people on the bottom 

are saying that we want at least somebody to talk about us. When 

you look at the rampant racial discrimination in many of these 

countries and yet we do nothing about it, we have to fight in trade 

agreements to get trade capacity money to help people build so that 

they can have a better tomorrow. We find resistance and give them 

as little as we possibly can, and they have to settle for that. 

No wonder. Why, even when I looked at this recent statistic of 

a survey that was done in Europe, of all places, saying that we are 

very close—you think about the threats to the world? They are 

looking at us in the same way they are looking at Iran, for God’s 

sake. We have got to wake up and understand it is about people. 

Many places I have gone, no American has been to in Latin 

America, in Colombia. No potable water. No roads. No sewage. 

What does democracy mean to them? That is why they came up 

with a poll saying they will take a dictator if it means that it will 

make a difference in their lives. 

We can’t just talk the talk and say there needs to be an election; 

that the elections are the be-all and end-all to everything. There 

were elections in Venezuela, I witnessed many of them, I wish people would, and out in my district, the way they did from Venezuela 

on both sides in the recall election. You were there, Mr. Franco. 

There was a coup attempt in Venezuela. The most undemocratic 

process there is. We did not say democracy must prevail. What we 

said was we accept this new government. And then we talk about 

democracy and then wonder why people laugh at us or don’t take 

us seriously when we tell them that this is the way to go. 

And then recently I have been traveling throughout the region. 

I have had some of the very leaders that have been elected—not 

the ones that are the populist leaders, the ones that we wanted—

who have said to me that they need a break from us because they 

are scared if they talk to certain people who they think are important in their strategic interest in their region, that they will be retaliated against by us. So they say maybe we want to do this because it is good for us, but we are afraid of you. 

That is no way to have a foreign policy. So then we have to 

fight—and I am for a lot of these free trade agreements, and Peru 

is coming up. And we talk about it—yet there is no real focus. Why 

are we talking about Haiti, the most failed state in the Western 

Hemisphere? That should be one of the very first things—if we 

want to have credibility, let’s talk about helping somebody. Because 

if we don’t, you are lending yourself to making sure that the Castros and the Hugo Chavezes of the world and the Moraleses of the 

world are successful. Because populism will continue to build because they are at least talking to the people who are voiceless. And 

no one, no one—you talk bad about Hugo Chavez. They say that 

before he was there they had the same problems. No one has 

talked to their problems and their issues. And until we start doing 

that, we as a country will be in trouble and our popularity will conVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:57 Nov 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\062106\28366.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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tinue to go down. Even in Latin America, look, down to 32 percent. 

And in Latin America, generally they loved Americans. 

We are in danger. We have got to get out of our own way and 

make sure that we change our priorities. And until we start focusing on eradicating poverty and so show that we care about people, 

we will never improve. And democracy that we want to see, the democracy that I believe in, the democracy that makes lives better, 

will never happen until we focus on those issues and stop reducing 

the budgets and cutting and fighting those things that will help 

those people that have been impoverished for so long a period of 

time. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. Would any of you like to 

respond? 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. If I may make a brief comment. Congressman, 

the issue of poverty and poverty eradication, I couldn’t agree with 

you more. It is a priority. It is essential. In fact, you have many 

disaffected populations, populations that have felt marginalized in 

and throughout Latin America. That is why we are seeing many of 

the changes, many of the shifts politically across the political spectrum that we are. 

I will also just add here that in a broader sense, I went to the 

world summit on a sustainable development meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa. At that meeting the topic of poverty eradication 

was front and center. All countries who gathered there agreed 

strongly and firmly that you have to have good governance as a 

basis and foundation to combat crime and corruption which tears 

at the very fiber of any society. But you also have to have resources 

to invest in your people, in their health and education. And it is 

true that you have to have governments that are accountable and 

that are addressing these issues. And, as we have seen in Latin 

America, there have been situations where that has not been happening. And that is why we are witnessing the kinds of uprisings, 

if you will, and outcries. 

Last point. I mentioned in my statement, and I wanted just to 

amplify this, I mentioned in my statement the fact that in 2003 we 

held a meeting bringing democratic countries of Latin America 

with democratic countries of Africa. And that meeting was very 

much geared to discussing how democracy can be advanced. Poverty was the number one issue in that meeting. We talked about 

strategies. When I say ‘‘we,’’ meaning we were the organizers, but 

the African and Latin countries talked about this. 

I was very struck you were today to have President Flores as 

part of the next panel. He gave a speech, and in that speech before 

this democracy dialogue, he stated to each and every country, he 

said, ‘‘You know what? Each and every one of us is wealthy because we have people. The wealth is in our own people. We have 

to as leaders give them a chance.’’ He got a standing ovation. 

The point here is governments do have to be accountable. They 

have to be accountable to their people. I couldn’t underscore more 

the importance of this issue. It is a key, key issue for us. It is also 

the core theme of—I mentioned the Community of Democracies. It 

is the core theme. The conference is being held in Africa. We are 

consumed with this issue about how to address that in a more effective way and working with our partners in the region. 

30

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Secretary. Let me before I yield to 

our—I am going to get him. Just a second—I just wanted to say 

happy birthday to Dana Rohrabacher, who is our next questioner. 

He is 29 today. 

Dr. Shannon, when you answer this question, I would like for to 

you add one caveat to it and that is, has poverty gone up or down 

since President Chavez has taken over in Venezuela? 

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you very much. 

Congressman Meeks, the point you make is right on target. Obviously, we have to show that democracy can deliver the goods. We 

have to show that democracy can address poverty, that it can address inequality, and that it can address social exclusion. If democracy can’t do that, then the people will walk away from it. 

At this point in time, the people in Latin America are committed 

to democracy in a pretty profound way and they are committed to 

it because of their own national histories and their own personal 

experiences. They recognize that democracy for them is about liberty. It is about civil liberties, about freedoms, about open societies, 

about being able to live their lives in the way they want to. The 

big problem they face is lack of economic opportunity and lack of 

the personal capacity, through education and health care and personal security, to take advantage of that opportunity. 

And what we are trying to focus on in our bilateral engagement 

in the region, in our foreign direct assistance programs, and in our 

multilateral engagement is to link political democracy and political 

citizenship with economic and social citizenship. And we are doing 

this through our resource flows. In fact, this Administration has 

doubled foreign direct assistance into Latin America and the Caribbean. And this is annually. So over time, 5 billion new dollars have 

been going into the region. 

Also through the Millennium Challenge Account we put 500 million new dollars on the move toward the region in Nicaragua, Honduras, Guyana, Paraguay and El Salvador. Now, this is not 

enough. But what we are trying to do is recognize that this money 

is catalytic and look for ways through our trade policies, through 

preferential access policies, through facilitating the movement of 

remittances to the region, to make sure that the total flows to the 

region are getting to the people who need them the most. 

But this is a dialogue that we continue to have in the region. It 

is a dialogue that originally both the United States and our partners in the region struggled with because we had different vocabularies. We would talk about democracy and trade and fighting corruption and rule of law. Our Latin American partners would talk 

about poverty, inequality, and social exclusion. It took both of us 

a while to realize that our Latin partners were talking about the 

problems they faced, we were talking about solutions as we saw 

them. But over time, I do believe that in our conversations we are 

linking up our understandings and our vocabulary and becoming 

better partners in this sense. 

But I recommend the speech that President Bush gave in November in Brazil, following the Mar del Plata Summit, in which he 

talked about the importance of social justice in the region and the 

revolution of expectations that has been created. And I also recommend the speech that Secretary Rice gave at the Council of the 

31

Americas in which she highlights the link between democracy and 

development. It is something that we are working on and we would 

be very happy to talk more with you and your staff and others of 

the panelists today—other representatives today about this issue. 

In regard to Venezuela, the figures fluctuate, obviously, depending on what statistics you are using. But it appears to us that one 

of the big challenges the Venezuelan Government has had is reducing poverty levels in Venezuela, even with the kinds of windfalls 

they have. There is my comment. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I 

would like to note that I believe it is not only my birthday, Mr. 

Chairman, but is the rumor true that it is your birthday as well 

today? 

Mr. BURTON. Yes, but I am only 28. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So congratulations, Mr. Chairman, for your 

birthday today. It was a very good day to have. This is the longest 

day of the year; shortest night of the year, I might also add. 

Mr. Meeks has stated his case very well. But let me note that 

I disagree with him. And I do so respectfully. I do not believe that 

I have met the enemy and it is us. There is an enemy—poverty and 

tyranny and injustice are enemies of the United States. It is not 

us that perpetuates these problems in those other countries of the 

world, the developing world. 

I believe the United States has played a positive role and I believe this Administration, as you have heard today, is committed 

to try to play a positive role. But we cannot do it for these other 

countries. The level of corruption that goes on in those other countries is to a large degree home-grown. And they are being—people 

there are being victimized by their own governments. And, yes, we 

can try to serve as an example, but our spending foreign aid budget 

has nothing to do with the poverty level in the countries that you 

are talking about. 

And I respect that you are concerned. You have a good heart for 

people. But I just disagree with that analysis that our spending on 

foreign aid has anything to do with the poverty level, for example, 

in Venezuela, where they have had ample money but ample corruption in their democratic leaders. And yes, the people have a right 

to be upset with democratic government. I know Ms. Dobriansky 

knows a lot about Venezuela. She has been there many times. 

Let me also note when it comes to ending poverty, the examples 

that we have seen in the world where people who lived in abject 

poverty in the worst possible conditions, that equal the conditions 

of those in poverty today in the Third World, who succeeded, and 

how did they succeed? People like in Malaysia, where we visited 

Malaysia together; how did they work their way out of abject poverty? It wasn’t by socialist liberal left swings in the government. 

They worked their way out by establishing a market economy and 

a niche in the world system. And basically, honest government, as 

they have in Singapore, where they established honest government 

to some degree—to a higher degree, which permitted economic 

progress. Without that, there would be no economic progress. Mr. 

Chavez will bring nothing but misery to his people. He will not 

bring higher standards of living. When you eliminate the balance 

32

of power, which Mr. Chavez is doing in Venezuela today, it will 

make matters worse, not better. 

Let me note there, Chavez himself orchestrated a military coup 

in which he did not succeed, but only his military coup. He was let 

go by the benevolence of those democratic leaders of Venezuela, 

who then he replaced. And believe me, if someone tries a military 

coup against him, they will not be released as quickly and let go. 

I want to focus on the issue that I find more disturbing, but I 

would agree, Mr. Meeks, that poverty—we are not going to have 

success in Latin America until we do see the poverty level diminish. Poverty is an enemy of freedom because it gives people faith 

in tyrants rather than faith in a democratic system and the rights 

that we all believe in. 

But let me add, one of the worst factors that I see is that we 

have the world’s worst human rights abuser now making a major 

entry into Latin America, as warned by Constantine Menges before 

he passed away. I see China buying port facilities in Panama, thus 

having a control somewhat, at least a major influence on that government and on the Panama Canal itself. We see China involved 

with oil deals, dealing with Mr. Chavez and Fidel Castro, another 

human rights abuser. And I would just like a comment from the 

panel on China’s role in Latin America today. 

Mr. SHANNON. I would be happy to respond. As you know, Deputy Secretary Zoellick has begun a series of senior dialogues with 

the Government of China about global issues. And one of the results that came out of that discussion was an agreement by both 

countries to begin consultations on specific geographic areas of interest to both countries, and two of those have taken place on Africa and on Latin America. 

I led the United States team to Beijing to do the talks with the 

Government of China regarding Latin America, and several things 

are worth noting. First, in the course of our conversations with the 

Chinese Government, we made very clear from our point of view, 

but also more broadly through the larger hemispheric commitment 

to democracy enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, 

the essential democratic nature of the hemisphere and the importance of those operating in the hemisphere to respect the democratic traditions and aspirations of the hemisphere. 

The Chinese Government in its explanation of its interests in the 

region—aside from its interests with Cuba, which is longstanding 

and is related to linkages between the Communist parties in both 

countries—has been focused in the region for two purposes. First, 

the diplomatic struggle with Taiwan. And, secondly, an interest in 

raw materials and energy, which is not specific to Latin America. 

We see it throughout the rest of the world where China is moving. 

The Chinese told us that their goal in Latin America is not political adventurism; that it is not about politics, but about feeding its 

people, providing its industries with raw materials and energy to 

drive its economy——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If I could interrupt one moment before you 

proceed, let me just note that they may be proceeding with those 

goals. In how they attain those goals, there is every example of outand-out bribery by the Chinese Government of Panamanian officials in the achievement of those port facilities on either side of the 

33

Panama Canal. Their goals may sound very understandable and 

benevolent in terms of the Chinese people; if they go about achieving those goals through bribery and what you call ‘‘political adventurism’’ and supporting dictators and folks like Chavez down in 

Latin America, yeah, they are trying to achieve that for their ends, 

but it is very detrimental to the cause of democracy and detrimental to our security interests, is it not? 

Mr. SHANNON. Obviously, we would not want to see any of the 

kind of activities that you just described. And in the course of our 

conversations, one of our purposes was to underscore not only the 

importance of respect for democratic principles and practices, but 

also to recognize that for the effective functioning of markets and 

the creation of prosperity, that all investors in the region need to 

be operating off established rules of behavior. But this of course is 

something that applies not just to the Chinese; it applies to many 

other investors who are interested in the region. 

What is important here, I think, is that as China increases its 

interest in the region for purposes of its economy and its people, 

we need to be talking to the Chinese. We need to be talking to the 

partners that the Chinese are working with. And we need to be 

making clear what our interests and goals are in this process. And 

we are doing that. 

Because it is evident also that as China engages in the region, 

it engages through a variety of mechanisms. It engages through its 

government in the Foreign Ministry. It engages through the Communist Party. It engages through its state-run institutions, whether it be the oil institutions or mines and minerals. And it engages 

through its armed forces and its relationships with armed forces in 

the region. 

And these are new engagements in the region for these institutions. And as these institutions engage, they will begin to develop 

their own contacts and their own ways of doing business. And we 

need to kind of be there watching it closely, in dialogue with them, 

and partners, so that we understand how this process is developing. And when we see things that we don’t like, that we need to 

speak out about it. And that is our intention. 

Mr. BURTON. Ms. McCollum. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to submit 

two articles, one from the New York Times and another one from 

the Washington Post, that I am just going to very briefly refer to 

and then ask a couple of questions. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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Ms. MCCOLLUM. In his column, Thomas Friedman on ‘‘Latin 

America’s Choices,’’ talks exactly about what you are talking about, 

Mr. Shannon. China, through its trade, is focusing on extracting resources, timber, soybeans, minerals, fish meal, to keep up with its 

factories and to feed its people. And there is nothing wrong with 

trade. 

It also in the article talks about another choice of a Latin American businessman who operates out of Montevideo where he currently has 550 Uruguayan programmers that are trained and directed by Indians to write codes in the running of computer systems for companies. Mr. Friedman’s column goes on to point out 

that he has postings for 500 more job openings, but no one trained 

to do them. 

In the Washington Post column, it talks about two views of the 

justice fueled by Bolivian land battle, and it points out how in Bolivia 80 percent of the population is rural and it lives in poverty, 

and it goes out to point out the land inequities that go back to the 

1970s and the great difficulty in trying to move from an agrarian 

society that can sustain itself. But at the same time, Mr. Friedman’s article points out how we need opportunities for education. 

We talked about the problem with drugs. We import illegally into 

our country the drugs, and if we cut off the supply in our country 

by working more with not only people who are substance abusers 

to get treatment, but also with a national initiative to really focus 

and stay focused on our children not to use drugs, we could make 

a difference on that, as well as our interference at times throughout history of picking winners and losers in countries and not allowing those individuals to do it themselves. 

And now I will segue into the discussion here. We heard on the 

Millennium Challenge process that was going through from the 

Catholic churches, from people who lived in the area, who said we 

pick winners and losers in the agrarian society by moving forward 

with roads that went to large haciendas in countries where they 

are still trying to undo some of the past mistakes of dictatorships 

in the seventies. And so I have some concerns about hanging all 

of our laurels just on that one hook, having heard from the population there. 

Without focusing on advancements of opportunities for clean 

water, for access to maternal health, tuberculosis, malaria and 

AIDS in conditions where people already live in extreme poverty, 

how can we know that those families don’t leave the children out 

in the field, so they are not going to school because dad has tuberculosis and there is the fear that mom might have AIDS, but the 


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test and the diagnosis has not happened? I would like to know exactly what we have done to increase opportunities through Peace 

Corps, maternal child health, AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and education. 

I know we are doing democracy and I know that this is not a bottomless pit for money here in the United States. I fully understand 

that. But parents remember who helped the child. Children remember who educated them. They don’t remember who got the 

Millennium Challenge grant. 

Mr. FRANCO. Thank you. Ms. McCollum, I think we have had 

these discussions before in our trips and so forth. Let me say I will 

get the full statistics for you to your office on these specific programs. I am a little more prepared for the democracy hearing. 

But these areas are areas that we have invested and continue to 

invest considerable amounts of about the $850 million that are 

channeled through the USAID. Secretary Dobriansky has mentioned there are different ‘‘spigots,’’ we call them, or different resources that are made available for Latin America as a whole. We 

work in all of these areas. We have very important HIV/AIDS programs. 

Let me talk about that, particularly in two focus countries which 

are Haiti and Guyana, where the prevalence rates are very, very 

high. We also have HIV/AIDS working with the business community in Mexico, Central America. We are expanding those this year. 

This year’s House appropriations bill called for a great expansion 

of these programs, particularly working with the AIDS responsibility project which links private and public sectors. I can tell you 

I am personally engaged in these issues and our Ambassadors in 

the region are keen on doing two things: Addressing HIV/AIDS 

issues in high prevalence countries and bringing those rates down, 

which we have, and keeping the pandemic in check in some Latin 

American countries in the Andean region and those countries 

where the rates are low. I would be happy to provide that. 

And you are absolutely right. These are programs that are tangible and people see the results. We have TB programs and malaria programs. The First Lady was at USAID 2 weeks ago and announced a major malaria initiative. Most malaria problems are in 

Africa, but we have malaria problems in our region, and they are 

being addressed as part of this initiative that the President and the 

First Lady herself announced 2 weeks ago. 

TB programs are very important, particularly in Sao Paolo in 

Brazil. It is a country where we have a relatively small program 

because of the ability of the Brazilian Government to leverage its 

own resources. The TB problem is prevalent in major cities in 

Latin America. We have TB programs. I will be happy to supply—

I visited the clinics myself. They are all in the marginalized populations, as you can imagine. 

Child maternal health care is at the core of our basic assistance 

programs in the poorest countries in the region. It has been a huge 

program in Bolivia, in Peru, in Haiti. In Haiti we reach about 

630,000 people every day on food and almost all child feeding and 

maternal health programs. But I would be happy to address these 

issues more fully for you. 

41

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. May I just add, we have some statistics. You 

asked about water and waste management. USAID had $67.6 million in water waste management. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I know the time is limited and you are going to 

get back. You can cite me what is in today’s budget, but I want to 

know what we have done over the past 6 years because funds have 

been shifted around. Thank you. 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. We would be glad to. These are very important 

issues and one which we have devoted resources to. 

Mr. BURTON. The gentlewoman’s time has expired, but if you 

could submit those for the record, we would be happy to get those 

to you, Ms. McCollum. 

Mr. Weller. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I welcome our distinguished panel before us. Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, Mr. 

Administrator, good to have you with us again, and be before us. 

As I said in my opening statement, I am concerned about what 

I see as an assault on democracy in Latin America. I am concerned 

about direct interference as well as intervention by outside governments in democratic elections that we have witnessed over the last 

several months. There is an estimated anywhere from $3–17 billion 

in Venezuela in oil money sloshing around Latin America, corrupting government officials, undermining democratic governments 

through the funding of street movements, and organizations bent 

on disrupting democratically-elected governments. 

We have seen direct support for candidates both financially as 

well as verbally. We have even seen, as we saw in the Peruvian 

elections, direct threats made to the people of the country if they 

elected someone other than Chavez’s choice. 

So, clearly, those are items of major concern to me as we talk 

about the future of democracy in Latin America. 

If we could focus on one of those countries and that is one of 

great interest for us in Central America, in the Nicaraguan elections that are coming. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of photos that I shared with 

the Committee staff and would ask if the first one of those could 

be put up on the screen. But on June 4th, there were over 10,000 

tons of Venezuelan-supplied fertilizer that was sent by President 

Chavez which rolled into the central Nicaraguan City of Matagalpa 

for distribution through Sandinista Party organizations at belowmarket prices. 

And this photo that I have with us right now is a photo that was 

a supplier obtained from La Prensa, a major daily newspaper in 

Managua. Sandinista sources say they have been promised up to 

20,000 tons of fertilizer through this election season by the Chavez 

Government, which would meet about one-third of the typical fertilizer needs of the entire country of Nicaragua. 

This is fertilizer that was sent directly from President Chavez’s 

Government to the Sandinista organizations. Recognizing the average per capita income in Nicaragua is only about $750 a person, 

and it is a small country, the introduction of one-third of the total 

amount of fertilizer typically used in 1 year to support political 

candidates of one party is certainly an item to question of whether 

42

or not there is direct intervention by the Chavez Government in 

Nicaragua. 

Also, I have a second photo I would like to share with the Committee as well. And that is on this particular photo, which was obtained from the news media in Nicaragua as well, but it is a photo 

of Sandinista Party Presidential candidate, Daniel Ortega, stepping 

off a helicopter. Of course, it is a shiny, brand-new helicopter. And 

I note that the President of Nicaragua has one helicopter available 

to him and the entire Nicaraguan Government, and that is a Russian helicopter that was left over from the Communist days in the 

1980s, but Daniel Ortega has three helicopters supplied to him by 

Chavez to assist him in his campaign. 

The caption by La Prensa, another major daily in Managua in 

March 1 of 2006 when this photo was published, shows Presidential candidate Daniel Ortega stepping off of the helicopter in 

the Bluefields area, which is on the Caribbean coast. And it asks 

the question in the caption, ‘‘With Oil Money,’’ and goes on to say 

the Secretary General of the FSLM, the acronym for the Sandinista, Daniel Ortega, was received yesterday afternoon at Bluefields Airport by several thousand Sandinista supporters. Ortega 

arrived at Bluefields, debuted the helicopter donated to the Sandinista by Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela. 

So clearly these are two examples of direct intervention. Now, my 

presumption would be those who would be friendly with Mr. Chavez would suggest well, the United States helps the Government of 

Nicaragua. What is the difference? 

The question I have for you, Mr. Franco, is since you administer 

the distribution of assistance and aid through USAID and I have 

been with you and various programs. I have seen the work that the 

USAID is doing in Honduras in helping to encourage farmers, who 

can move to crops that can be grown for export, raise themselves 

out of poverty. In Columbia to go change from being a cocalero to 

a cafetero and raise coffee for the export market. And I have seen 

the work that you are doing. 

The first question I have for you is, does USAID give financial 

assistance or fertilizer assistance or provide helicopters to political 

candidates and to political parties? What is the difference between 

the type of intervention we are seeing by the Chavez Government 

versus United States assistance programs? 

Mr. FRANCO. Well, Congressman Weller, let me say first of all, 

the United States does not support this way, in this fashion, any 

political party or any candidate in Nicaragua. What the United 

States Government does do, we are providing a total of $13 million 

to various agencies, of which about $10 million is being provided 

to USAID to ensure fair and free elections. That means voter registration, IDs, a campaign system that has a voter education component to it, get-out-the-vote campaign, audit of voter registries 

and eventually the quick counts that we all rely on. 

We work with the OAS. In Nicaragua we work with other international organizations. When we say the United States Government, we support the efforts of organizations that are experts in 

election processes. And that is how our investments are made. We 

do not support any political party, any political candidate. We do 

not provide goods or services to support anyone in particular. 

43

We are concerned in Nicaragua with something called the SEC, 

which is the Supreme Electoral Council in Nicaragua, that manages the electoral process in that country for the November elections; that that process be as agile, efficient, effective, and open 

and fair. I think we have a good track record in Nicaragua and 

throughout the hemisphere in terms of the investments we make 

through reputable international and organizations and non-governmental organizations and the OAS to ensure free and fair election. 

Mr. WELLER. If I could direct my question to Madam Secretary 

or the Assistant Secretary, Administrator Franco raised the Organization of American States and, of course, the Organization of 

American States in the past year has made some strong commitments on strengthening democracy. And the question has been 

raised, what is the view of the Organization of American States regarding the direct intervention that we have seen by one foreign 

government into the elections and the election process of another? 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. Well, I know that just in the recent OAS General Assembly meeting in the Dominican Republic, actually this 

issue was discussed rather directly. And there was a concern expressed that types of interventions of this nature are happening 

throughout the region. I think what was noteworthy about it, it 

wasn’t the issue of a viewpoint from the United States, but we 

have had many from in and throughout the region questioning and 

expressing concern about these kinds of developments, and calling 

for action. 

Mr. WELLER. Mr. Shannon? 

Mr. SHANNON. I would just like to note that the hemisphere has 

not seen this kind of direct intervention for specific candidates in 

quite a while. And it has created a degree of discomfort not just 

in Central America but elsewhere. It is worth noting in the aftermath the Peruvian election, officials of the Brazilian Government 

criticized Venezuela’s behavior in Peru and in harsh criticism of 

Alan Garcia and its open support for Ollanta Humala. And as the 

Under Secretary noted, Venezuela’s activities in the electoral fora 

were discussed quite vigorously at the OAS, not just in open sessions, but also in a closed leaders dialogue. 

And in this regard, I think people recognize what is going on. I 

think they understand that this is an effort to purchase influence 

and purchase a political place in a region. But this is the kind of 

terrain in which Democrats prosper. This is an electoral campaign. 

This is an opportunity for people to highlight what candidates 

stand for. And the kinds of direct linkages that are being established provide a huge opportunity for those who stand on the other 

side of the political divide from the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. And 

I believe they will take advantage of it quite successfully. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have been generous 

with the time, and I would ask those two photos be made a part 

of the record. 

Mr. BURTON. Without objection. We have some other documents 

that we would like to have in the record as well. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think our own experiences taught us that interference—well, I don’t want to use intervention—or influencing elections can backfire. I think we learned that when the United States 

Ambassador to Bolivia made a comment about Evo Morales. Do you 

remember that Tom? It did not work, did it? No. I’m sorry? 

Mr. SHANNON. Depends on your point of view. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Depends on your point of view, exactly. I think 

it is a legitimate issue. But I think for the United States to suggest 

that we haven’t either overtly or covertly supported or attempted 

to influence elections in the past is misleading. I was in Nicaragua 

in the last Presidential election and it appeared to me that the 

United States Embassy was very much involved in securing the defeat of Mr. Ortega. 

In fact, I was reminiscing about that experience yesterday with 

Secretary Zoellick and Congressman Dreier. We were both there. 

And I recounted how I insisted that Mr. Ortega be included in a 

meeting that we had, and I mentioned to Mr. Dreier that by the 

end of the meeting, I was convinced that Daniel Ortega was a free 

trade Republican. I don’t know whether it was an accurate assessment, but we both remembered that. 

So I am pleased to hear, though—and I mean we have had this 

history of dating back. In Guatemala in 1950, Asbenz, of course, 

was an icon, if you will, of the Caribbean region. And yet he did 

not suit our taste. So we saw that he was overthrown. We supported Somoza. We supported military dictatorships in Honduras, 

in Guatamala. And I think unfortunately, that historical legacy we 

are beginning to in the polling data in terms of how we are viewed 

reflects that. And I don’t want to make this about Hugo Chavez or 

Fidel Castro. I think there is a danger in doing this, because I 

think if we continue to look, to demonize, we are missing the larger 

picture. And I think we have to be concerned about the impact of 

consequences of our policies. And what are the best policies? We 

hear a lot about the fact that democracy is under stress, because 

it does not appear to be delivering the benefits. 

Let me just pose a question: Madam Secretary, you used the 

term, as did many of your colleagues, economic freedom. And I 

think we have got to be precise in terms of what we mean by economic freedom. I think there is an interpretation by some here in 

Washington that economic freedom means unfettered laissez-faire 

market dynamics. When history has established that particularly 

in developing countries, there is an appropriate role for the state 

to invest in infrastructure, whether it be health care, whether it be 

roads, whether it be education, whether it be, if you will, smoothing 

the rough edges of capitalism. We have seen that in Western Europe. We have seen that in our owner experience. I mean, thank 

God we had FDR here, you know, in 1932 after a 12-year laissezfaire capitalism brought this country into a Great Depression. 

What concerns me, and I agree with statements that have been 

made. You know, we can’t do it through foreign assistance. But I 

daresay that we can impact the domestic policies of nation states 

which for far too long have allowed economies to exist that only 

benefit a small minority of the people. And I think if we are going 

to have—if we are going to deliver on the promises of democracy, 

46

we have to use our leverage to ensure that these countries, that 

these nation states take into account that the benefits, if you will, 

of trade with the United States translates into investment so that 

the benefits of the additional growth are diffused throughout the 

society. And then I think we deal with the issue of those that feel 

frustrated because there has been no change. Comment, Tom? 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. If I might just comment on the front end because the term ‘‘economic freedom,’’ that is not meant to suggest 

a single approach. In fact, I think your comments really suggest 

the essence of very much of what we have been striving to do, and 

that is that you have to use all tools and instruments available to 

promote the opportunities for individuals in a society. 

And, for example, what came to my mind when you made the 

point was that you have many societies in which you have people 

who are trying to begin small businesses, medium-sized businesses. 

They are not able to even get loans, resources. Women in particular 

in many countries, whether it is in Latin America or other parts 

of the world, have not been able to achieve that. 

So——

Mr. DELAHUNT. If I can Madam Secretary, I could go further. 

Many of these people are illiterate. They don’t have the basics in 

terms of education and health care. And you know, many of these 

governments, one only has to look at the percentage of GDP that 

is generated from tax revenue, and it is half of what it is in most 

industrial countries. And yet we don’t insist in terms of our bilateral discussions on a variety of issues that that change. We ought 

to be using our leverage, is my point. 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. I would say that our message today is that that 

is a core part of our policy. The Millennium Challenge Account, by 

the way, that whole approach really strives to achieve that, to look 

at those programs and projects that will get to the source, that are 

not filtered through, that have not wasted or frittered away. That 

is very much our message today. 

Democracy does have to show results in this case and that is 

also, I think, very much our message that what we have seen in 

Latin America, that has not been happening because of the way in 

which policies have been implemented economically. This is not 

just about economic growth. It is about before—the point made 

about poverty eradication. It is about striving to pursue those strategies that will be the most effective. But I think the good news 

here is that you have countries that are democratic, that are interested in changing, and that are listening to their people. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Are you familiar with 

the work—any of you—I think I know the answer from the question from Adolfo, but the work of Fernando De Soto, the economist? 

Do you take him seriously and do you use his material? 

When he talks about what has to be done in terms of a democracy building effort, and the elimination—well, the minimization of 

poverty, as we will never eliminate poverty, what a strange concept. No matter what you do, we will always have somebody at the 

lower end and they will be identified as in poverty. We will never 

eliminate it as long as we are on the planet. 

47

But to minimize it, the task is, of course, overwhelming, and it 

is far greater than just as De Soto says, the imposition of democracy. Democracy can be imposed on a country. We have seen it. I 

mean, it happened in Russia and in other places. 

You don’t have a lot of economic growth, and of course, you don’t 

have an integrated system of judiciary, for instance, that will uphold, and also a tradition of the rule of law, so that contracts can 

be relied upon, contracts for land or anything else. 

It is a complex process that has to develop in order to achieve 

the goals of a democratic society, with a prospering economy, according to De Soto, and, of course, others. I certainly believe in 

what he is saying. 

The question is, what can we do about that? Especially, what can 

we do about that if one of the other aspects of that is an inhibiting 

factor in that particular, in the movement toward that goal, is endemic corruption in any particular country? I know we think of 

countries where certainly it is known that the corruption extends 

from the cop on the beat to the highest levels of government; it is 

endemic. 

It is part of what they are and who they are, whatever you want, 

for years. It is going to be for a long time, as long as that is the 

case, as long as you have this culture of corruption, that doesn’t 

seem to be endemic, then how do you achieve De Soto’s goals? How 

do you achieve your goals? Our goals are mutual goals of bringing 

this kind of economic prosperity to any country with that kind of 

problem? 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. I will make two comments, and then if you 

would like to comment, first just to say that, as part of the world 

summit on sustainable development efforts, we featured Hernando 

De Soto during our sessions. In fact, we addressed a wide variety 

of audiences, ranging from governmental leaders to NGOs, and we 

think that his message is an important one. It is an effective one, 

and it is a proven one. 

In terms of approaches, you mention the issue of crime and corruption which does tear at the very fiber of democratic societies. 

One of the areas that we have invested our resources in, in and 

throughout Latin America, in trying to combat this problem, is in 

the building of strong democratic institutions and especially in 

terms of also the judiciary. 

I think you find throughout Latin America that you have weak 

judiciaries, a weak rule of law, and this has been one of the areas 

that we have invested resources in. 

Mr. TANCREDO. How do you do it? How specifically do you create 

a strong judiciary in a country? Or, I should say, how do we do 

that? 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. I would say, first of all, it is through training. 

It is through also training of judges, training of lawyers. It is also 

by having exchanges whereby individuals who come from Latin 

America come, see other processes, whether be it in our own country. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Because if they go home, and they are threatened 

by the mob—I mean, all this is great stuff. But when you go back 

home and either your family is threatened by the cartels, or the 

money that is put in front of you is in such high stacks that it is 

48

hard to see over, does it really matter that you brought them in 

here and they looked at the way it happens in America? 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. Yes, I think it does. I remember the case of El 

Salvador. I remember when I served in the Human Rights Bureau 

of the State Department, and at the time, before he was running 

for President, Alfredo Cristiani came to the Bureau and made an 

appeal, tell us how we can do our job better in terms of providing 

for our judges. It is not only about the threats, but it is actually 

about the expertise. 

I wouldn’t exclude; it is one with the other. It is not a simple answer. I was only giving you one example of the types of programs 

that we do support in trying to have a strong framework, a framework of democratic institutions, because they do matter in terms 

of due process. 

It does matter. Community action. Let me give you a second example. In the case of Colombia, we have supported a program 

called the Culture of Lawfulness, which actually involves communities better understanding the role of law enforcement in their society, involving mothers, mayors, policemen, educators, lawyers. 

Actually, it has been rather successful, in terms of local communities, bringing down the rate of crime. 

So it is not just one program; it is a series of programs. I was 

only giving you one example of where we put our moneys in, but 

obviously, it is a problem that has to be addressed at multiple levels, not just only one level. 

Mr. FRANCO. Just very briefly, Mr. Tancredo, first of all, yes, I 

think we know and have a lot of respect for Herman De Soto. Of 

course, he started his work in Peru, in Lima, Instituto Libertad, 

and actually, over $150 million for his efforts, as you know. Now 

it is a global effort. 

His work is extremely important. Of course, it started with property rights. And it is the concept, in very succinct terms, is that 

you have to have a framework for economic growth that has not 

only a respect for law but an ability to get people to leverage resources through mortgages, credit and so forth. 

That is how we need to have these societies become more agile 

in terms of their administration of their property rights and attract 

investment and have people be able to leverage through credit and 

so forth. So the model, it has been a very good model, and, of 

course, it has evolved and expanded. Of course, his work is very 

important, and he is a very important partner. 

With respect to, when you say anti-corruption, it sounds like 

anti-motherhood. Of course, everybody is against corruption, except 

usually the people doing the corrupting. They are usually not in 

favor of anti-corruption. Most of those individuals, as you noted, 

are quite influential economically, or are part of a mob, or have a 

very vested interest. 

Just as Secretary Dobriansky said, we have tried our best beyond 

the Millenium Challenge Account at USAID and all the other programs to make investments where we see commitments by leaders, 

and it is hard. There isn’t a simple answer here. There is a lot of 

courage, particularly in leaders in Central America, and President 

Uribe and others have had the courage and have paid a price for 

49

this. So it is not an easy thing to do to be a champion for good governance. 

We have those leaders, and we have those commitments and our 

leaders are increasingly tied to those efforts in investing in those 

countries where there is a movement to address corruption. It is 

the number one indicator of the 14 indicators of the Millenium 

Challenge Account. Specifically, and very quickly with respect to 

how we go about changing these systems and how we make these 

reforms in judiciary possible is we have seen in the region, and 

that is why trade and other things are important, to make—attract 

investment, to make consumer confidence, to create confidence in 

society, we had to reform codes. We have to have an accusatory 

system rather than a traditional system. We have many Latin 

American countries, and we worked with bar associations. We have 

worked with judiciaries. We have had the supreme court of Panama meet with our Supreme Court. So it isn’t just an exchange of 

meetings. It is an exchange of technical, necessary changes 

throughout the region, and they are taking place. 

They are taking place, and that is creating a more transparent, 

open process that is yielding the ability for people; they are seeing 

that the results of the judiciary is actually working for them and 

also good ultimately for investment. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I don’t know if you want to give me the time to 

ask this question. 

Mr. BURTON. Sure, go ahead. 

Mr. TANCREDO. One question that the Committee wanted to put 

forward is our policy on the ICC and our demand for the Article 

98 Agreements have opened the door for China’s military assistance in places like Ecuador. Are we looking at Article 98 waivers 

down there? 

Mr. SHANNON. I can say that, as noted a little bit earlier, we are 

very concerned about the—our ability to use both ESF money and 

IMF money to do the kinds of transformational things that we need 

to do in the region, not only in terms of the armed services but also 

how we address the larger security agenda in the region, which 

goes beyond security assistance but also addresses natural disasters, environmental disasters and pandemics, and non-traditional 

actors like terrorists and drug traffickers. 

And, therefore, we are looking at the options available to us to 

see how we can make sure that ICC sanctions don’t interfere with 

our fundamental interests. 

So, as Secretary Rice noted, we are, indeed, considering these options at this point in time. 

Mr. TANCREDO. The options, one of them being a waiver? 

Mr. SHANNON. Correct. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Yes. Let me just follow up on that. There is a concern among a number of us about China’s influence in the region. 

If Article 98 is an impediment to us giving the military training 

that China will provide, we are concerned that their influence 

might be much more pervasive than even our State Department realizes. 

50

I really think there ought to be some middle ground on this Article 98. I understand the need for it, but I don’t want to see another 

major power start taking over in our backyard because of our reticence to solve this problem. 

Ms. DOBRIANSKY. Mr. Chairman, as we discussed earlier, when 

Congressman Engel was here, as I suggested, that is something we 

are looking at, some of the challenges, but also the areas that 

haven’t been affected by this. 

Mr. BURTON. I want to thank you very much for being here and 

thanks for your patience. It has been a long morning. 

Our next panel consists of Dr. Christopher Sabatini. He is a Senior Director for Policy at the Council of the Americas/Americas Society. He oversees the research and publishing programs. He has 

published numerous articles on Latin America dealing with democratization, security and defense, political parties and the effectiveness of international programs to support democratic development. 

He has also worked as director for Latin America and the Caribbean at the National Endowment For Democracy. 

I want to thank you for being here today, Dr. Sabatini. 

Unfortunately, His Excellency Francisco Flores, the former President of El Salvador, is unable to appear before the Committee this 

morning, but he submitted his testimony for the record, and welcomes the submission of questions in the record by our Members. 

We will do that. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Flores follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY FRANCISCO FLORES, FORMER PRESIDENT

OF EL SALVADOR

Mr. Chairman your questions on the current state of democracy in Latin America 

requires a methodology that will allow us to penetrate on the complexity of such 

a diverse region. I propose that we analyze the active agents of democracy, namely, 

political parties, and that we do so, on the basis of a concrete historical example. 

Since my country, El Salvador, successfully transited from a dictatorship to a democracy, I propose that we analyze this case prior to addressing general views on 

the region’s democratic future. 

THE CASE OF EL SALVADOR: FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY

A. Historical Background 

In 1972 the more radical sectors of the communist movement decided that conditions were ripe for an armed insurgency in El Salvador. These isolated groups were 

greatly stimulated by the Sandinista victory in 1979 in neighboring Nicaragua. A 

year later, under the direct command of the Castro regime, the approval of the Soviet Union, and the logistical compromise of the Sandinistas, the various guerrilla 

movements were integrated under a unified movement. The FMLN was officially 

born in Havana in 1980. 

The United State’s government decided to help the Central American nations stop 

the communist takeover of the region. El Salvador became from 1979 onwards the 

last armed scenario of the cold war. When the Berlin wall fell in November 1989, 

support for the guerrilla movement dwindled, thereby strengthening the argument 

of some of their leaders that the armed strategy had no future. The FMLN’s central 

command decided to accept the government offer to end the war through a negotiated peace. The Peace Treaty was signed in February 1992. 

El Salvador was destroyed by 13 years of armed conflict. In one of the greatest 

diasporas in modern history, one third of the population fled to neighboring countries. Every Salvadorean family had to mourn the loss or the separation from at 

least one of its members. Our streets were filled with beggars due to the brutal impoverishment of our campesino families. 

Power shortages were the norm, nurses and doctors pleaded that power lines be 

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way, the main artery that articulates the country from our borders with Guatemala 

to Nicaragua became in many stretches a dirt road. 

The state of siege suspended all personal rights from 6 pm to 6 am. Anybody in 

the streets could be shot without even an explanation. 

Faced with threat of a growing guerrilla movement, the Military Junta that governed since 1979, decided ‘‘to steal the promises of the left’’ and implement a socialist state. 

The destruction of the war was now compounded with a disastrous public policy. 

All properties greater than 240 hectares were forcefully expropriated. The banking 

system passed in its entirety to the government. Foreign commerce became a state 

monopoly through a law that forced all exports to be channeled through a government agency. 

This generated unprecedented corruption levels, a paralysis of the productive sector, and a bureaucratic mismanagement catastrophe in key institutions. 

In the middle of the war, a devastating earthquake destroyed the capital city. 

Our overpopulated country, totally dependent on its weak agricultural exports, 

overburdened by a disastrous public policy, in the midst of a severe armed conflict, 

seemed hopeless. 

And yet today, only fourteen years from the events I describe to you, El Salvador 

is a different country. It has slashed its poverty level by half, from 60% in 1992 to 

30% today. Extreme poverty has been brought down from an alarming 30% to a 

12%. Though any percentage in this category is inadmissible, El Salvador has 

achieved the highest poverty reduction rate in the continent. 

Twelve years ago, 25% of the population could neither read nor write. Today it 

is 13%. Infant mortality was 45 per a thousand births. Today it is 25. 

During our term in office, everyday we advanced one kilometer in connecting our 

most isolated rural communities, everyday we built three schools to educate our 

poorest children, everyday we built 106 new low income houses and every week we 

built a new health clinic. 

After having interest rates around 30%, we have today the lowest interest rates 

in the region, 6.8%. Our new monetary policy and strict fiscal discipline have earned 

us the coveted investment grade, shared in Latin America only by Mexico, Chile and 

El Salvador. 

Of all the Central American countries, El Salvador is the first to be ready to reap 

the benefits of the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the United States. 

Conditions in El Salvador have changed dramatically. Telephone lines have multiplied twelvefold. Vehicles have increased fourfold. Water supply and electricity are 

up 50% in the rural areas. It is now possible to acquire a low income house for $30 

a month. 

From a Socialist dictatorship, we now have a vibrant democracy, a free and independent press, a true separation of powers. 

What is El Salvador’s secret? What can explain this dramatic change in less than 

fifteen years? 

I am convinced that there are four essential elements. The first is a cultural 

change from the common ‘‘blame it on others’ to a conviction that a country must 

assume responsibility. The second is a long term vision structured on the principle 

of freedom; that is both economic and political freedom coupled with a strategy to 

fight poverty based on creating new opportunities. A vision with enough depth to 

tackle a country’s deepest problems, practical enough to be implemented in one and 

hopefully several government programs, and with sufficient appeal to gather the 

whole country around it can not be improvised. The third element is an effective 

leadership. 

This means a leadership that is the antithesis of populism. One that is willing 

to take the political costs of doing what his country needs and while doing it, still 

capable of winning elections. Fourth is a new political vehicle. 

It is this last element I will be emphasizing in my presentation today Mr. Chairman. I do so because the health of a democratic system is in the end, the health 

of its component parts, and so it has the greatest relevance for the issues you discuss today in this committee, and because without it none of the first three conditions would have been possible. 

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF EL SALVADOR

In our country, political parties had become so distorted that their objective was 

no longer the nation they were born to serve but their small interests. This created 

numerous distortions. Instead of selecting the best members of society for leadership 

positions they valued party loyalty and political clientele over anything else. As the 

most loyal party members are not likely to be the most competent, politics became 

52

synonymous with mediocrity, and a vicious cycle ensued as the more capable members of our society evaded political involvement. 

We had fallen into the most prevalent political disease of our region: populism. 

The common political approach was to consider popularity as the main objective of 

a president’s actions. These usually precluded initiatives that carried high political 

costs with two very dangerous consequences: either the urgently needed reforms 

were never undertaken, or so many concessions were made in the effort to appease 

criticism that the end result was a pale and superficial attempt that usually left 

things as they were. 

My conviction, supported by El Salvador’s record, is that a leader is elected to do 

what his country needs and his popularity must be subservient to this objective. In 

fact a leader’s political capital is valuable only if it is invested in improving the conditions of his country. If it is invested only in his image, it has no practical use for 

his countrymen. 

By the mid 1980’s this political behavior was such that the possibility of renewing 

our political leadership was precluded—over and over again, in every election, the 

same faces were up for the ballot. In this case national interests, however important 

they might be, are overcome by party interests because by taking away from voters 

the possibility to change their reality through votes, the electoral process becomes 

a meaningless formality. 

The distortion of this party loyalty in our public administration can’t be overstated. One of the most obvious is that the cabinet became a combination of friends 

and party members, thus eliminating the possibility of choosing capable leaders for 

strategic institutions. 

Prior to 1989, it was the norm to hire political activists as government employees 

in payment for participation during campaign efforts. This way a political clientele 

that could be mobilized during electoral periods was insured. 

A political culture was created that made of our institutions the spoils of political 

warfare. Decades of this behavior had allowed political parties to possess institutions as party territories. No election changed this as over the years so many instruments of control had been transferred into the party’s hands that a shadow government was effectively in place. 

This is a dangerous situation in any institution. In the case of the administration 

of justice the distortion is so grave that it can destroy a country. 

Through their past participation in the central government or their current influence in our national assembly, political parties had created such a strong legal 

shield over government employees that it was impossible to suspend, transfer or 

substitute any of the employees, however destructive their behavior. 

In many government agencies employees held allegiance to the political parties 

that protected them and not to the objectives of the newly elected administration. 

As the political activist could hide his transgressions behind his status of party 

member, the situation created a corruption incentive. 

These cadres of political activists constantly manipulated workers into enacting 

strikes to support their party’s political agenda. Workers always supported these 

measures because the law was so overprotective that a strike meant a paid vacation 

and a possibility of negotiating a salary raise to end the strike. 

The end result was that key government institutions had a highly incompetent 

management, shouldered a hugely overgrown bureaucracy, held a system of loyalties 

that fostered corruption and any effort to modernize them was effectively sabotaged 

through strikes and the support of political parties in congress. 

The lack of legitimacy of our traditional parties was to a great degree a cause for 

the armed conflict that began in 1979. As the possibility of resolving our social conflicts through our political system was not possible because of the lack of credibility 

of our traditional parties, those that proposed violence, insurrection and an anti-system perspective need only pinpoint the situation of our democratic system to justify 

their arguments. 

In El Salvador in 1979 all forms of radicalism, Marxism, guerrilla warfare, insurrection, military dictatorship, had a following since the population’s hope for change 

had been systematically frustrated by a political system that was hostage to decadent political parties. 

It was necessary to create a new political instrument. One that could serve as a 

vehicle for competent leaders to involve themselves in government without demanding any subservience to party interests; one that would not make of our institutions 

a prize for political activism; one that would have the national interest above all 

party considerations and would not allow populism to overshadow the serious restructuring that our country needed; one that would make out of constant renewal 

a strategy for political success. ARENA was born in 1980. 

53

Its essential characteristic became evident when the founder of the party, facing 

great possibilities of success in the 1989 presidential election stepped aside, and instead did the job of selecting the best candidate possible. 

President Cristiani was the first to further an economic model based on freedom, 

he negotiated The Peace Accord, effectively ending the war in 1992, and developed 

the first cohesive strategy to fight poverty. I can attest to this as I was a member 

of his team. 

Upon completing my term in office two years ago, our party won by a landslide 

the presidential election. In Latin America a fourth consecutive term won by the 

same party in free elections with the same core vision and implementing constant 

reform is to my knowledge a political phenomenon that has only happened in El Salvador. 

When my term was coming to a close, all the members that had accompanied me 

in the party’s directory were asked to resign. Every single political instrument that 

allowed me to continue exercising influence was willingly turned over to the new 

team. I did this out of a conviction that permanent renewal is El Salvador’s strategy 

for success. 

Every leadership in ARENA has been allowed to further his vision. The ARENA 

of President Cristiani limited in no way the administration of President Calderon. 

Neither was my vision constricted in any way by party considerations. This allowed 

the national interest to be at the core of my administration’s effort. 

To conclude this explanation of El Salvador’s successful transit from dictatorship 

to democracy, from poverty to sustained development, from war to peace, from isolation to international recognition allow me Mr. Chairman to restate that four essential conditions must be present: a national attitude that assumes responsibility and 

does not transfer a nation’s problems to external excuses, a long term vision based 

on the principles of freedom, competent leadership and a political vehicle that allows 

the national interest to be always above the party’s interest. 

CONCLUSION: GENERAL APPLICATIONS OF THE SALVADOREAN EXPERIENCE

In answering your broader question as to the health of democracy in Latin America, I believe that the historical experience of modern day El Salvador can provide 

valuable insights. I suggest the following ten:

1) The will to change has to come from within.

2) Healthy, competent leadership is of all political ingredients the scarcest and 

the most needed to change a Nation’s future.

3) Radicalism is present in all societies. It is the population’s deep frustration 

with a political system that constantly betrays their aspirations what creates a stimulus to the anti-system proposals, whether these are military 

coups or Marxist revolutions.

4) The temporary support for radical or violent political expressions in El Salvador during our crisis, were caused by our people’s realization of foul play 

during elections and never by a rejection to democracy as such.

5) When the smaller objectives of party politics take precedence, a political clientele can create such an overgrown, inoperative bureaucracy that the most 

essential government services as health, education, water supply can not be 

given to those that need them most.

6) Prolonged influence of party politics in public administration can produce 

a ‘shadow’ government; that is, a hidden authority that effectively controls 

institutions. When this happens in the judicial system a constant crisis ensues as the ‘shadow’ authority effectively sabotages any newly elected administration.

7) The tasks of changing an underdeveloped nation’s future are of such complexity that they require its most capable members to participate in the effort. Their involvement is not possible when party loyalty is grossly valued 

over competence, and particularly when political involvement is severely 

discredited.

8) The experience of El Salvador points to the fact that the differences in our 

region are not between large or small countries, rich or poor, highly educated or not, but between well managed countries and mismanaged ones 

. . . In the 1980’s El Salvador was seen as the poorest country in the region. Our experience was not that we had no resources but that they were 

gravely mismanaged. Priorities are much more important than resources.

54

9) Hope for the future is a crucial component of a country’s effort to surmount 

its obstacles. When political parties can’t offer a real leadership renewal 

this positive energy turns quickly into a pessimistic outlook.

10) A serious analysis of El Salvador’s political development is conclusive in 

signaling political parties as both the root of the crisis and the solution of 

the crisis.

Finally, Mr. Chairman I would conclude that El Salvador is proof that the opposite consequences happen when the political life is renewed by a new political party. 

A new political vehicle, or a profound renewal in a traditional party, can produce 

a sufficiently competent leadership to develop a long term vision, a capacity to assume the difficult reforms that all underdeveloped nations need, and produce volition towards renewal. 

I have become so convinced of these four essential elements in transforming a nation’s future that together with a team of competent professionals that accompanied 

me during my term in office, I founded the Instituto America Libre. Our institution 

does in situ research to identify sound, competent leadership, supports them in the 

development of a long term vision based on the principles of freedom, helps in designing new political vehicles and enables the transference of political abilities to 

win elections. Our objective is to see that other underdeveloped nations find prosperity within the values of democracy and are able to win the battle against poverty. 

I hope my remarks are of help to you Mr. Chairman in the task your committee 

has set for itself. Though it was not possible for me to attend your invitation I have 

considered it a great honor. My regards to you and the members of the committee.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Dr. Sabatini, for being here. We normally swear in our guest witnesses. So would you please stand so 

we can swear you in? 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. BURTON. You can proceed with your opening statement. We 

appreciate you being so patient. 

TESTIMONY OF CHRISTOPHER SABATINI, PH.D., SENIOR DIRECTOR OF POLICY, COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS/AMERICAS 

SOCIETY 

Mr. SABATINI. Thank you. It is a tough act to follow, obviously, 

but good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. 

I would like to I thank that you for this opportunity. I have a 

longer statement that I would like to have entered into the record. 

My name is Christopher Sabatini. As you mentioned I am the 

Senior Director of Policy at the Americas Society and Council of the 

Americas, a nonpartisan organization created over 40 years ago by 

David Rockefeller to promote better understanding and dialogue on 

issues of democracy, rule of law and development in the Western 

Hemisphere. 

The timing of this hearing is very important. Our analysis of the 

trends in the region lead me to these three conclusions, which I 

will elaborate on very briefly in my presentation. 

The first is, the countries that are examples of successfully consolidating democracies are ones that have linked their economies 

and fortunes to the global economy while building institutions and 

markets that meaningfully integrate their citizens into the political 

and economic life of their countries. 

Two, in many countries of the region, there was a process of social and political change under way due to the participation and inclusion of long marginalized populations, including the working 

poor, indigenous and Afro descendents. This can be an opportunity 

for extending democratic citizenship to populations long ago forgotten and left behind. 

55

This is not a question of left or right. It is not a question of demonizing those who come to power as a result of overcoming the 

legacy of repression and exclusion. 

Third, nevertheless, in many cases, these changes are testing political institutions and repolarizing politics. This requires the U.S. 

and others to reach out to these new political and civic actors while 

protecting and defending democratic fundamental institutions and 

rights. 

As has been mentioned, we are in the midst of an unprecedented 

electoral cycle in Latin America, and in the 14 months between November 2005 and December 2006, there will be 13 Presidential 

elections and at least nine congressional elections. Latin Americans 

from Mexico to Chile are exercising the most essential of basic 

democratic rights, the right to vote, at a time of growing worries 

on the part of citizens concerning their economic security, jobs and 

prosperity. These concerns, however, are not to be confused with 

rejection of democracy. 

As Congressman Lantos noted, democracy remains the preferred 

form of government throughout the hemisphere. According to regional public opinion surveys, the majority of citizens, 53 percent, 

still believe that democracy is preferable to any other form of government. Even in Cuba, the one non-elected democracy in the region, democracy activists last year registered over 3,000 examples 

of civic resistance to the Castro regime, a dramatic increase from 

a year ago and an even greater increase from 10 years ago. 

For all these citizens from the Rio Grande to the Tierra del 

Fuego, the democratic dream remains alive. But what is emerging 

is a regional patchwork quilt in terms of democratic organization. 

The variation in democratic stability hinges on two things. The 

first is the capacity of the political system to provide realistic, responsible options to voters that reflect popular demands, and the 

second is the capacity of the state and government to implement 

policies and deliver services, including justice. 

Sadly, in many countries, those characteristics are lacking. It is 

important to keep in mind that, irrespective of ideology, those 

countries that have succeeded in providing for their citizens and 

have developed a more stable democracy are those that have integrated effectively into the world economy. Let me talk first about 

the success stories. In countries like Chile, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay, institutions and policies are converging to secure more a stable democracy despite whatever partisan shifts may occur from 

election to election. 

To be sure, there are challenges in each country, most of them 

relate to the need to expand and improve delivery of social services 

and areas of basic and higher education, access to markets and the 

rule of law. 

In the case of Brazil and Mexico, governments also need to sustain efforts at institutional reform, to consolidate the economic 

gains made in recent years. 

A common thread runs through all of these countries, their integration into the global economy and the web of free trade agreements that binds them. 

In varying degrees, every one of these countries over the last decade has made a conscious decision to hitch its economy to the globVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:57 Nov 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\062106\28366.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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al market in ways that provide concrete political and economic benefits. To be sure, as Congressman Meeks said, trade alone is not 

sufficient for sustaining and strengthening democracy or reducing 

poverty. 

Open markets need to be tied to extensive, social and infrastructure programs to ensure that already divided societies and isolated 

sub-economies, many of which are not even tied to the market 

economies at a national level within these countries, do not become 

more divided and more isolated. For this reason, programs such as 

the Trade Capacity Act are very important in assuring that we provide a floor to integrate these economies within themselves and 

within the global economy. 

Yet, what closer integration in the global economy has done in 

all cases is provide a political and economic framework that has 

served as an anchor to ensure political consistency across administrations, provide a long-term perspective for investors and the government and help create stable jobs for citizens, which, according 

to regional surveys, today is the primary demand of citizens in 

Latin America. 

This contrasts with several of the countries in which historically 

weak institutions are straining to keep up with rising citizen discontent over poverty and inequality and the participation of a new 

generation of citizens. This includes previously repressed and excluded groups like indigenous, Afro-Latinos as well as a growing 

pool of informal sector workers that represent over 50 percent of 

the urban workforce in Latin America and thus over 50 percent of 

the electorate. 

These informal workers are on the margins of the economy and 

politics and have been shut out of formal jobs because of slower 

than expected growth and inflexible labor laws. They are often not 

organized politically, and they often enjoy limited rights and access 

to state benefits. These newcomers to democratic citizenship are arriving with new demands, new forms of political participation, but 

they are often confronting political systems that are not reforming 

or adapting, leaders that refuse to yield power to a new generation, 

parties that remain top-down, that are still top-down and undemocratic, and governments and states that have maintained the same 

personalized corrupt ways of doing business. As a result, party systems have fragmented and even collapsed leading to the profound 

change in the structure of politics. 

For this reason, this year, the year of elections in Latin America 

is particularly crucial. Unfortunately, these changes are often portrayed as left or right. They are not. Something far more important 

and historical is occurring, and it is necessary not to demonize the 

results. 

As I discussed in an op-ed that will come out tomorrow in the 

Financial Times, what is at work in countries like Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador, and even what we have seen in countries like Costa Rica and Colombia, there is a much more profound 

process of popular and structural change that goes far beyond traditional notions of ideology. 

In many cases, the exclusion of these groups and their lack of incorporation into the formal political system has made them a base 

for populous leaders who themselves defy left-right distinctions. 

57

These new groups, new leaders and new issues are emerging and 

coming to challenge historic ways of governing, express discontent 

and demand change. 

In my written testimony, I go through each of the individual 

countries. I will note a few particular examples. In Bolivia, while 

most of the attention is focused on the election of Evo Morales, attention hasn’t focused on the fact that with the elections of December 2005, it decimated the traditional electoral party system in Bolivia. 

The three parties that have dominated the party system in Bolivia have basically pretty much vanished and have been replaced 

by two parties, Evo Morales, a new coalition of opposition, and a 

raft of indigenous and ethnic groups. 

There is a similar situation, obviously, in Venezuela as well. Colombia, the political system and party system are undergoing extreme shifts of partisan realignment that, in many ways, it is not 

clear how they will shake out. One of the clear examples of this institutional weakness and political polarization has been the emergence and increasing frequency of popular protests and street 

coups. In a total of five cases, popular protest in Ecuador in 2000 

and 2005; Argentina in 2001; Bolivia in 2003; and Haiti in 2004, 

have forced Presidents to step down before the end of their mandates. 

And in one case, Venezuela in 2002, resulted in the temporary 

removal of the President. These indicate a troubling decay in the 

legitimacy of popular mandates and the collapse of institutions that 

should be able to mediate the differences that are emerging among 

citizens and among the old and new generations of the political 

class. 

There are other challenges as well: Growing concerns about the 

protection of civil and political rights; the erosion of international 

norms and standards in areas such as electoral transparency and 

support for civil society; the emergence of outsider candidates who 

are inexperienced and untested in democratic government policymaking; and last, the turning away from open markets and the 

risk of a return to economic isolation and the failed policies of the 

1960s and 1970s. 

In these times, the path to stable democracy requires reaching 

out to these new leaders, assisting them to construct the means 

and institutions to include these new participants in a political system and ensuring that the rights of the institutions fundamental 

to democracy are defended. 

Legitimate concerns about poverty should not justify the erosion 

of democratic institutions and rights. For their part, countries 

within and outside the region can and should work together to ensure that international norms that have evolved in recent years in 

human rights, electoral transparency and the right of civil society 

to cooperate internationally are respected and enforced. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sabatini follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER SABATINI, PH.D., SENIOR DIRECTOR OF

POLICY, COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS/AMERICAS SOCIETY

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. My name is Christopher Sabatini. I’m the senior director of the Americas Society and Council of the 

58

Americas, non-partisan organizations created over 40 years ago by David Rockefeller to promote better understanding and dialogue in the Western Hemisphere. 

The Americas Society, a registered non-profit under IRC regulations, and the Council of the Americas, a business organization representing over 175 companies invested in Latin America, are dedicated to the strengthening of open markets, democracy, rule of law, and economic development in the Americas. 

We are in the midst of an unprecedented historic electoral cycle in Latin America. 

In the 14 months between November of 2005 and December of 2006, there will be 

13 presidential elections and at least 9 congressional elections. Latin Americans 

from Mexico to Chile are exercising the most essential and basic of democratic 

rights: the right to vote. This comes at a time of growing worries on the part of citizens concerning their economic security, jobs, and prosperity. These concerns, however, are not to be confused with rejection of democracy. 

Citizens still support democracy in the region but, in many countries, institutions—both governmental and political—remain weak. While countries such as 

Chile and Mexico remain stable—in large part because of economic and political reforms and their integration into the global economy—in other countries institutions 

are being severely taxed by political change and polarization. This condition forces 

us to look beyond individual leaders and movements to find ways to strengthen institutions and reach out to new leaders. Such an effort should be guided by the idea 

of inclusion: extending a hand to elected governments, leaders and movements that 

want to address historical problems of poverty and inequality by better linking their 

countries to the modern global economy and elected governments and to their leaders who are trying to establish democratic means of including citizens and new entrants into politics. 

Democracy Is Still the Preferred Form of Government 

Despite what you may hear, democracy remains the preferred form of government 

throughout the hemisphere. According to regional public opinion surveys, the majority of citizens (53%) still believe that ‘‘democracy is preferable to any other form of 

government’’—an increase of 5% from 2001. 

Even in Cuba (the one non-electoral democracy in the region) democracy activists 

registered over 3,000 examples of civic resistance to the Castro regime last year. 

For all these citizens, from the Rio Grande to the Tierra del Fuego, the democratic 

dream remains alive. People still see democracy as the best means to address economic and political demands. Sixty six percent of citizens, according to the same 

survey, still believe that only with a democratic system can a country become developed. 

But what is emerging is a variegated region in terms of the levels of democratic 

institutionalization. If citizens believe in democracy, in many cases democracy is not 

delivering for them. The variation in democratic stability hinges on the capacity of 

the political system to provide realistic, responsible options to voters that reflect 

popular demands and the capacity of the state and government to implement policies and deliver services, including justice. 

Towards Consolidating Democracy 

In countries like Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay institutions and policies are 

converging to secure a more stable democracy, despite whatever partisan shifts may 

occur from election to election. To be sure, there are challenges in each country. 

Most of them relate to the need to expand and improve the delivery social services 

in areas of basic and higher education, access to markets, and the rule of law. In 

the case of Brazil and Mexico, governments are also need to sustain efforts at institutional reform in a number of areas to consolidate economic gains made in recent 

years. 

To this group, I would also add Colombia. While it, even more than the others, 

confronts serious challenges, Colombia has made great strides in the last four years. 

The challenges it faces are of a different type from the others, and involve securing 

peace and state authority throughout its territory, addressing grave concerns about 

impunity of combatants, confronting the erosion of the party system, and tackling 

a series of governmental and fiscal reforms. 

A common thread runs through all of these countries: their integration into the 

global economy and the web of free trade agreements that binds them to it. In varying degrees, every one of these countries over the last decade has made a conscious 

decision to hitch their economies to the global market in ways that have provided 

concrete economic and political benefits. 

To be sure, trade alone is not sufficient for sustaining and strengthening democracy or reducing poverty. Open markets need to be tied to extensive social and 

59

infrastructural programs to ensure that already divided societies and isolated subeconomies within the region do not become more divided and more isolated. 

Yet what closer integration into the global economy has done in all of these cases 

is to provide a political and economic framework. This integration has served as an 

anchor to ensure political consistency across administrations, provide a long-term 

perspective for investors and the government, and help create stable jobs for citizens—according to regional surveys, the greatest demand in Latin America today. 

Institutional Erosion and Backsliding 

This contrasts with several of the other countries in which historically weak institutions are straining to keep up with rising citizen discontent over poverty and inequality and the participation of a new generation of citizens (indigenous, AfroLatinos, and youth). To this I would add the growing pool of informal sector workers-laborers on the margins of the legal economy and politics who have been shut 

out of formal jobs because of slower than expected growth and inflexible labor laws. 

These new entrants into the political system are coming with new demands, new 

forms of political participation, but often they are confronting political systems that 

are not reforming or adapting: leaders that refuse to yield power to a new generation; parties that remain top-down and undemocratic; and governments and states 

that have maintained the same personalized, corrupt ways of doing business. As a 

result, when they failed (or even refused) to adapt, party systems have fragmented 

and even collapsed, leading to a profound change in the structure of politics. 

For this reason, this year, the year of the elections in Latin America, is particularly crucial. In the fourteen-month span beginning December 2005, there have been 

and will be presidential elections in: Honduras, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Haiti, 

Peru, Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Guyana. 

Many of these countries (such as Colombia, Peru and Mexico) are also having congressional elections, in addition to El Salvador and the Dominican Republic that 

only had congressional elections. 

All of this makes it an unprecedented election year for the region and one that 

could dramatically re-cast the political landscape in the hemisphere and with it policy towards and within the region on everything from trade, energy, human rights, 

economic reform, and regional diplomacy. Unfortunately, at a political level, these 

changes are often described in left-right terms. Depicting them so, however, obscures far more than it illuminates. 

On the one hand, there are the countries discussed earlier, Chile, Uruguay, 

Brazil, Costa Rica, and now (ostensibly with the election of Alan Garcia) Peru, with 

governments which, despite the leftist labels typically attached to them, are following the same core fiscal and trade policies as their supposedly more conservative 

colleagues in Colombia and Mexico. To be sure there are variations in emphasis, but 

the term leftist, as it has been traditionally used to describe leaders in the region, 

has lost its meaning. 

On the other hand, labeling the numerous new movements that have emerged in 

recent years simply as left underestimates their historical and sociological importance. What is at work in Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, and even in countries 

like Costa Rica and Colombia is a much more profound process of popular and structural change, that goes far beyond traditional notions of ideology. As I discuss in 

an op ed that will appear in the June 21, 2006 Financial Times, this change has 

altered political coalitions, and in many cases their exclusion and lack of incorporation into the formal political system has made them a base for populist leaders who 

themselves defy left right distinctions. 

These new groups, new leaders and new issues are emerging and are coming to 

challenge historic ways of governing, express discontent at the lack of accountability 

of officials, and to demand change by rejecting long-established parties.

• Bolivia: While much of the attention has focused on the election of indigenous 

leader of the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), President Evo Morales, 

who won 54% of the vote in first round December 2005 elections, at a more 

fundamental level, the election also marked the start of an untested new 

phase of electoral politics in Bolivia. The election ended the dominance of 

what used to be the traditional parties in Bolivia: the National Revolutionary 

Movement (MNR), the National Democratic Action (AND) and the Movement 

of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Two of the parties, the MIR and the AND, 

vanished entirely, while the MNR received only 6% of the vote. These have 

been replaced by the MAS, the party of President Morales, the party of his 

main challenger, PODEMOS, and a raft of local, regional and ethnic groups.

• Peru: In Peru, the congressional and presidential elections again demonstrated the ongoing fragility of the Peruvian party system. The second 

60

round of the presidential elections pitted the outsider and ultra-nationalist 

Ollanta Humala against Alan Garcia who had governed from 1985 to 1990. 

Humala—who promised to nationalize international investments in mining 

and questioned Peru’s proposed free trade pact with the U.S.—was able to tap 

widespread popular rejection of the ruling class in Peru and capitalize on the 

vacuum left by the collapse of the other political parties to come within 5 percentage points of beating Garcia. In the congress, Humala’s party, Union for 

Peru, won a plurality 45 seats in the 120-seat single chamber. In all, newly 

emerged parties and movements received over half the seats and well over 

50% of the vote in the congressional elections.

• Venezuela: In Venezuela, what was once thought to be the model two party 

system, with the Democratic Action (AD) and COPEI parties alternating 

power, has collapsed and given way to the arrival of the President Hugo 

Cha ́vez and the Fifth Republic Party (MVR). The collapse has left a political, 

democratic vacuum outside the government. For the December 2006 presidential elections the question will be on the electoral conditions and guarantees for a free and fair process and whether the opposition decides to remain 

in the game.

• Costa Rica: Even the stable two-party system in Latin America’s traditional 

island of democracy has undergone profound changes. The presidential elections on February 5th this year demonstrated that support for one-time dominant parties is disintegrating. One of the two parties that have historically 

dominated Costa Rican democratic politics virtually disappeared (the party of 

Social Christian Unity which received under 4% of the vote) and the victorious National Liberation party, led by President Oscar Arias Sanchez, won 

by a narrow margin to a newcomer, the Citizen Action party.

In all of these cases, much more is at work here than a left-right shift. What is 

occurring is profound political change in the hemisphere. Party systems are straining under the dual demands of popular dissatisfaction with the status quo and the 

emergence and growth of political participation in an environment in which representation has been typically skewed and often undemocratic. 

In the wake of this political reorientation what comes next and its implications 

for democracy is unclear. The arrival to power of once marginalized populations and 

the promise of stable democratic inclusion that they bring can represent an unprecedented opportunity for deeper and stronger democracy. What is coming to the fore 

is a new generation of citizens and leaders, many of whom until recently had been 

excluded from power and even society. Their lack of experience and untested status 

in politics is a natural outgrowth of the type of exclusion they have endured, and 

in some cases still endure. 

Nevertheless, growing popular discontent with the ability of democracy to deliver 

on people’s economic demands, the weakening of institutions and the rise of political 

polarization in the region have raised troubling signs in some countries of the region. Among them:

• growing concerns about the protection of political and civil rights;

• the increasing frequency of popular protests and ‘‘street coups’’ that in a total 

of five cases (Ecuador 2000 and 2005, Argentina in 2001, Bolivia in 2003 and 

Haiti in 2004) have forced presidents to step down before the end of their 

mandate and in one case (Venezuela 2002) resulted in the temporary removal 

of the president;

• the erosion of international norms and standards in areas such as elections, 

transparency and support for civil society;

• the emergence of outsider candidates who are inexperienced and untested in 

democratic government and policymaking; and

• the turning away from open markets and the risk of a return to economic isolation and the failed policies of the 1960s and 1970s.

Within this process, however, if the institutions of democracy (judicial systems, 

political parties and legislatures), political participation and a fair, accessible open 

market can be strengthened, this broader process of change can be an important 

step forward in improving the inclusiveness of democracy in the hemisphere. As I 

outline in the June 21 Financial Times op ed, one step governments can take to 

shore up democratic stability and the prospects for job growth and prosperity is 

tackling the issue of labor reform. The politics surrounding labor have always been 

explosive. But the growing social and political changes in the region offer a real opportunity for governments to profoundly recast politics and labor relations in the region away from the pull of populist promises and protest. 

61

Accomplishing all of these things requires ensuring that the rights and institutions fundamental to democracy are defended. For their part, countries within and 

outside the region can work together to ensure that international norms that have 

evolved in recent years in human rights, electoral transparency, and the right of 

civil society to cooperate internationally are respected and enforced. We need only 

look to the successful cases today, of Chile, Brazil and Mexico, to see that linking 

a country’s economy and politics to the global system, while providing the means 

to bring citizens into the modern economy, still provides the most effect means of 

accomplishing the dual goals of shoring up democratic institutions and providing a 

better life for citizens.

Mr. BURTON. I agree with much of the thesis that you espouse, 

that we need to try to work with these leaders even though they 

deviate from the political norm. 

The problem that I have is the influence that one populous regime might have on another because of the resources that they 

have and they can use in influencing another election. 

From your perspective, how do we deal with that? I mean, Congressman Weller talked about three helicopters going to Nicaragua 

from Venezuela in all probability; thousands of tons of fertilizer are 

being used to take over one-third of the normal amount that they 

would use for produce production; millions of dollars going in by 

trucks; and other paraphernalia that is used in the election. 

When we talked to the State Department a while ago, they were 

talking about, they said, well, we will try to make sure that is balanced out by poll watchers and that sort of thing, but that doesn’t 

cut the tremendous advantage that is given to one candidate over 

another with these resources coming from the outside. 

Add to that the fact that you have got a Communist leader like 

Fidel Castro working with Mr. Chavez, Mr. Morales, Mr. Ortega 

and others, and you have the potential for a real problem down the 

road. I mean, I was there when we had the wars in El Salvador 

and Nicaragua back in the early 1980s, mid-1980s, and I saw the 

bodies and the people that were forced out of their homes and the 

mass migration of people to the United States because of the loss 

of freedoms down there. We don’t want to see that happen again. 

So, from your perspective—and this is a long diatribe I am going 

into here—but from your perspective, I, along with Mr. Delahunt, 

have met with Mr. Chavez twice. I think Mr. Delahunt has met 

with him more than that, and we have talked to him. But, so far, 

the results have not been promising. 

From your perspective, how do we deal with this kind of a problem to make sure that democracy continues to flourish, and we 

don’t have populist or leftist or totalitarian regimes flourish and 

changing the whole landscape? 

Mr. SABATINI. There are two basic questions, which I would like 

to answer in that. The first is, I agree with you that some leaders 

simply cannot be dealt with or contained or maybe, perhaps, even 

negotiated with. This is an argument for always believing that negotiation and mediation can resolve all differences. Some leaders 

simply don’t want to cooperate. 

They would prefer to use their vitriol to build their own political 

base, and you simply can’t remain committed to working with them 

if they are not willing to commit to you. 

But it is an argument to work with their base, with other leaders, a second generation, leaders who may not have the same personalities of synchronicity of other leaders—but just the base. Let 

62

me cite one example. I talked about Afro-Latino populations. One 

of the things that could be done very cheaply—we talked about the 

USAID program that is providing scholarships for high school students to be able to come here to learn English. 

I remember speaking once to an Afro-Ecuadorian society leader 

and to an Ecuadorian of middle class descent. He studied in the 

United States. She did not. He knew English and the world of opportunity of being able to participate in the global economy was 

open to him. It was not open to her. 

Providing scholarships to these countries through a much more 

aggressive public diplomacy program could be a very cheap way to 

be able to introduce leaders and a base to the way we operate and 

our basic principle values. That can be expanded, and it is a very 

effective way. I am not arguing just to work with their leaders. 

The second issue is one of using patronage to start elections. I 

think, in that case, much more needs to be done to basically stiffen 

the back of individual organizations to be able to denounce that. 

Sure, there have been transgressions on both sides in the past. 

I certainly don’t dispute that. We have talked about them before, 

Congressman Delahunt, I know. But certainly, there are international norms that prevent that, and much more should be done 

with the OAS and with the European Union, perhaps actors that 

are less likely to rankle countries in the hemisphere to be able to 

try to control that, monitor and report on it. 

Right now, we have seen very good pictures of examples of fertilizer being spread around, of other things in the hemisphere. But 

certainly much more can be done to catalog and document those 

and raise the international forum, because it is a violation of international norms. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. How are you doing, Dr. Sabatini? It is good to see 

you. First of all, let me compliment you on your testimony. I was 

running in and out. From what I have heard in the other room, 

much of it I agree with. I have been a major proponent when we 

are looking at various free trade agreements and trying to insist 

that we put as much money in there as far as trade capacity built 

in. I was wondering if you could give us your opinion on whether 

or not you find that to be a useful expenditure of money and something that could help as far as when we do have trade agreements, 

bringing individuals who maybe are on the bottom, helping them 

to participate and be part of the democratic process and thereby 

helping stabilize the democracy in the end? That is my first question. 

Second question would be my concerns have also been, and just 

looking at how, just deal with one specific region, for example, Colombia, that we have talked about Plan Colombia, the money that 

we have been spending, a substantial amount. And I think there 

have been huge improvements. 

One of the constant complaints, though, that I am hearing is that 

when you go to the Pacific Coast where largely African Colombians 

are living and indigenous people, that they don’t see any effects of 

any of the money with reference to Plan Colombia, that there are 

more people from the FARC and the paramilitaries that are there, 

people being displaced from their land. 

63

So they don’t see any benefit in regards to Plan Colombia right 

now, that money. What, if anything, do you think that we could do 

to help that situation from what it currently is? 

Mr. SABATINI. Thank you. Let me answer your first question. Not 

only are our trade capacity programs useful; I think they are essential. What happened—and you hear people talk about today the 

Washington consensus, it refers of course to the package of fiscal 

and economic reforms that were often implemented in Latin America in the 1990s. 

Very few people want to stand up and defend them now. They 

criticize that it is creating inequality and poverty. Indeed, in many 

cases, they did. But what they also did was they did not create a 

market economy in these situations. They basically overlaid the decentralization and market reforms on to already skewed populations and already skewed income distributions and therefore 

worsened them. 

What we do not have in Latin America today are market economies, and the same goes for trade. If we tie these economies into 

the global marketplace and we do not address the existing and endemic disproportions in the economy and the distribution of wealth, 

it will only increase the distortions. I believe in free trade. I support free trade, but I believe in order to make it work, you need 

to be able to tie these sub-economies together more effectively, not 

just geographically but also in terms of population. 

If not, we face a huge distortion in terms of race, in terms of geographic distortion. We have seen it now, also in Mexico. The north 

is benefitting very effectively from NAFTA. The south is not. 

Mr. BURTON. If the gentleman would yield, how do you do that? 

Mr. SABATINI. Three particular ways: The first is infrastructure. 

Infrastructure in terms of development assistance has sort of gone 

out of fashion. It is unfortunate. Obviously, there are a lot of stories about the boondoggles, the dams and roads and so on. But 

travel around in rural Latin American areas. In some cases, Peru, 

where 40 percent of the population is not even engaged in the market economy; it is primarily a barter economy. How can you tie 

Peru into a global economy when most of the citizens don’t participate in a market economy? So infrastructure is a first; roads, wells, 

schools and the like. 

The second is a question of education, literacy, English. That also 

provides ties to providing more exchanges in scholarships so students can come up here, learn about the American people, To address the question, Mr. Delahunt and I believe Mr. Meeks, you 

mentioned of the declining support, popular support for the United 

States in terms of public opinion in Latin America. Let them find 

out how American people truly work and how we think. It can be 

a very cheap and effective way and also allow them to gain access 

to the global economy. 

The third area that I believe is essential is in terms of judiciaries, that also includes labor rights. CAFTA included very strong 

provisions for labor, but it also put a lot of onus on very ineffective 

and politicized judicial systems. We need to be able to provide both 

the national and international means to be able to defend those 

labor rights. One particular example that could be done is, in the 

Organization of American States and Commission for Human 

64

Rights, there are labor provisions. When cases cannot be resolved 

of labor rights violations in these countries, they need to be treated 

in international courts so that it takes them out of the hands of 

corrupted and politicized judiciaries, and they can be effectively defended and protected internationally where they need to be. 

Mr. MEEKS. Colombia. 

Mr. SABATINI. I think Plan Colombia has been fairly successful, 

in one case, in being able to rebuild the state in Colombia. We have 

seen a dramatic increase in the level of violence. The country has 

taken over—the government has been able to take back a number 

of roads in rural areas. It has been able to push back. It has been 

effective in demobilizing paramilitaries, although there are many 

questions about the impunity of those paramilitaries. 

I think, in that sense, it has been successful in pushing back. 

What it has not succeeded in is dramatically reducing narcotics 

production and dramatically producing the institutional infrastructure of a state so that it can make the next step. 

I believe that we are looking at a second generation of reforms 

that need to happen in Colombia and that need to happen if there 

is a second generation of Plan Colombia that will go much deeper 

in looking at issues of establishing justice, of establishing roads 

and establishing a much stronger economy that integrates people, 

including the several million displaced people from the combat back 

into the country. That needs to be very aggressively pursued. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, I think you have said it; you said it 

all in your description of the mistake of the Washington consensus 

and the overlay on to what was a skewed economic structure and 

system. The problem has been that it was—and this was the import, if you will, of the question that I posed to the earlier panel. 

Where we have failed is not insisting prior to entering into commercial/bilateral trade relationships that domestically these nations make the adjustments necessary so that infrastructure and 

health and education and other pressing issues that allow them to 

grow. That is where we have failed, not that we haven’t made an 

effort in terms of providing funding for judicial reform and all of 

the other things that we can address. But it isn’t just simply saying 

the market is going to handle it, because in these developing nations, there is no market. That is what the reality is. 

I just think that you said it so well. I also think, I mean, we hear 

a lot about President Chavez and President Morales and all of 

these concerns about populism. I think populism is the new term 

now. We kind of figured out that, if you are elected but we don’t 

like you, we call you a populist because we have to have some 

shorthand label to express our nervousness. 

I mean, all of these leaders have been elected because of a dissatisfaction with what the status quo was. That is what the reality 

is. 

I mean, in Venezuela, we have the Patria Por Todos. I think I 

am pronouncing it the right way. You have listed, I think very 

skillfully, where these traditional parties are just going, Mr. Chairman, they are just disappearing because they haven’t delivered. 

That is what the problem is. It isn’t necessarily—and others have 

said this—it isn’t our responsibility, necessarily. 

65

I am glad, as I said earlier and am going to repeat, the United 

States has not made an effort; we are talking about pictures of fertilizer machines, please. We have overthrown governments there. 

We have a historical legacy that we have to deal with. We wonder 

why they don’t trust us. I mean, starting in Guatemala, what is 

Guatemala today? There are a bunch of thugs down in Guatemala, 

but we don’t want to talk about them. We had to go and apologize 

to the Guatemalan people back in 1998 because they were implicated in a genocide that occurred there, and we are worried about 

fertilizer shipments. 

I think it is—I can’t agree with you more, Dr. Sabatini. We 

should be sitting down with every nation that has a democratic 

leader in this hemisphere and laying out some new rules about respect for sovereignty and non-interference. I don’t want to influence 

anyone else’s election. The only election that I am truly concerned 

about is the one coming this November that will bring back the 

Democrats into a majority, and with that, I yield back. 

Mr. BURTON. In your dreams. 

Mr. Meeks has one more question. 

Mr. MEEKS. Yes, I just want to ask a question, because you said 

you are for trade agreements, and obviously I voted for CAFTA and 

a few others, and therefore, I am also. But here is my question, because it seems easy to work out trade agreements with developed 

nations. You know, you don’t get into the headaches of, you know, 

when you talk about human rights and labor rights and all those 

kinds of things that developed. So we do these trade agreements. 

They are part of the global economy. 

But the ones who we need to engage more are the developing 

countries, so it almost, what comes first, the chicken or the egg? 

Do we engage with them, and then that encourages them? We are 

not going to engage with you? I just want to get your opinion on 

that. 

Mr. SABATINI. Let me, I will start off with that last comment. I 

think we need to engage. I think, in the region, we need to engage 

a process of inclusion rather than exclusion. What I mean by that 

is, we have got a network of trade agreements with different companies, and they have a network of trade agreements of Asian 

countries. The free trade of America’s promise that was outlined 

the Summit of the America’s is not going to happen any time soon, 

so we need to be able to understand the needs of these countries 

and try to understand, if you will, sort of north/south alliance, try 

to harmonize trade agreement they have with Asia, we have with 

Asia and we have with them, so that the sum is greater than the 

total of its parts. 

It will be much more difficult, because as you say the 

complementarity is not as clear there. But it also means, I think, 

rejiggering our entire development strategy and our entire dialogue 

with these countries to begin to address fundamental institutional 

pathologies that have really held these countries back. 

That goes beyond the Millennium Challenge Account, and it goes 

to the issue, Mr. Delahunt, that you mentioned, of trying to engage 

in a dialogue with these countries about their critical reforms in 

ways that is more than just funding but actually looks at issues of 

66

labor reform, looks at issues of judicial reform and tries to share 

that information. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just thank you for being here, but I would 

like to say one thing that you said that really stuck in my mind, 

in your statements and your answers to questions, and that is that, 

when we come up with these trade agreements, as part of the 

agreement, there ought to be serious consideration of the infrastructure and education of the populations in the areas, so that 

these people can become part of a global trade economy. 

So I think that is something that we ought to be talking about, 

and I will personally be talking to our trade Ambassadors when we 

talk about new trade agreements, because I hadn’t really thought 

about that. It sounds so simple, that you would put that first, you 

know. If we are going to have a free trade agreement, do you have 

the resources and the ability to make sure that everybody can become a part of it or as many as possible can become a part of it? 

It seems to me we have kind of put the cart before the horse. 

We come up with trade agreements without thinking about education, infrastructure and these other things. We will be talking 

about that, or I will be, to my friends. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. If the Chairman would yield to me. 

Mr. BURTON. Yes, Mr. Meeks and Mr. Delahunt and I will be 

working together on this. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is music to my ears. I think it is just absolutely critical. I think that the United States—this is an appropriate exercise of our influence to insist that those economies in 

those countries that don’t have the economic infrastructure to address the issues of inequality, who don’t collect taxes, by the way, 

from the oligarchs, like in Guatemala—I mean, it is just unbelievable. I would like to have a hearing on Guatemala, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, I will let you and Mr. Weller handle that one. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I think he might want to recuse himself. 

But, I mean, you have to have some revenue to support education 

and health and economic initiatives. I mean, I think today’s hearing was a very good hearing, and I will also just pick up on what 

said earlier, too. I think it was Chris Sabatini’s term about establishing norms in terms of elections and intervention—let us not use 

interference, but intervention. 

I think that is another area where you as Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere might want to invite participants from all countries to a day-long conference here in Washington about beginning a process to work out, you know, a modus 

vivendi, if you will, among democracies, so that there is no interference. 

But, Mr. Chairman, the United States has to be willing to abide 

by the rules. If we don’t like the results, then that is just the way 

it is in a world with healthy, viable democracies. We could continue 

to disagree with these democracies or particular issues. I mean, we 

turned—you know, the decision by both Mexico and Chile about not 

supporting the United States’ position in terms of the invasion of 

Iraq led to a real tension. That Chile trade agreement sat there for 

a considerable period of time. I don’t think that President Bush 

had a conversation with President Fox for an extended period of 

time. 

67

Now, that is not my position, but we have to understand that democracies are going to have disagreements on substantive issues. 

But if we want to have rules and everybody has got to play by the 

rules, then we can’t have an election in Nicaragua where fertilizer 

trucks show up and that the Governor of Florida puts an ad in a 

newspaper saying, ‘‘I endorse a candidate who opposes Daniel Ortega.’’ They are both wrong. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, we will try to work together on some of these 

issues. 

Thank you, very much, Dr. Sabatini. We appreciate your testimony. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:17 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RUSS CARNAHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Lantos, thank you for holding this hearing 

about democracy in Latin America. Throughout the world, grave issues face the 

international community, from AIDS and poverty in Africa to the threat of a nuclear 

North Korea. Over the next few decades the United States must travel a long and 

trying road in order to preserve peace and promote prosperity. For us to properly 

guide future foreign policy, I find it imperative that we examine our past successes, 

particularly one of the greatest geopolitical accomplishments of the past 50 years: 

the rise of democracy in Latin America. 

It is the unfortunate lesson of history that for most of the history of the Americas 

the democratic institutions established here in the United States have not spread 

to our friends south of our borders. For too long, civil strife and authoritarianism 

instead of peace and freedom have been the norm in Latin America. However, the 

last 25 years have seen significant changes in that pattern. Out of the 16 authoritarian regimes in Latin America that existed in 1981, only one, Cuba, remains 

today. 

Crucial to this shift from the rule of a few to the rule of the people has been our 

participation in bilateral and multilateral programs. Success in the region has not 

been achieved by unilateral force but through cooperation where all parties interested in the success of the Americas use each other’s knowledge and capabilities to 

reach a common goal. This truly is the basis of Franklin Roosevelt’s policy of being 

a ‘‘good neighbor.’’

As a good neighbor, we must seek to help our friends in Latin America who still 

face many challenges on their path to democracy. We should dedicate ourselves to 

assisting in the reduction of corruption and the protection of civil liberties. Hopefully by working together, we can replace the somewhat-shaky groundwork of democracy with a firm foundation of freedom. 

I would like to thank each of the witnesses for coming today, and I am eager to 

hear your testimony.

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