NO. 4-01-0196

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

DONALD PENN and NORMA PENN,			)	Appeal from

	Plaintiffs-Appellants,		)	Circuit Court of

	v.			     		)	McLean County

BECKY GERIG; HUNDMAN REALTY, INC.; and	)	No. 00L92

THOMAS MALONEY, d/b/a COLDWELL BANKER	)	

HEART OF AMERICA REALTY,          		)	

	Defendants,				)	Honorable

	and						)    John P. Freese,

ROGER A. HEERDT and DENISE HEERDT,      )    Elizabeth A. Robb,

	Defendants-Appellees.         )    Judges Presiding.

_______________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

	After discovering certain defects in their recently purchased home, plaintiff home buyers filed a cause of action

against defendant home sellers.  Count III of plaintiffs' com

plaint alleged noncompliance with the Residential Real Property

Disclosure Act (Act) (765 ILCS 77/1 through 99 (West 1996)) and count X alleged common-law fraud.  The trial court dismissed

count III with prejudice, due to the running of the one-year

statute of limitations.  765 ILCS 77/60 (West 1996).  On plain

tiffs' motion, the trial court also dismissed count X without

prejudice.  The trial court then granted defendants' motion for

sanctions and ordered plaintiffs to reimburse defendants $4,330

for attorney fees.  Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's order

dismissing count III with prejudice and the order granting

defendants' motion for sanctions.  We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

	In the fall of 1997, defendants, Roger and Denise Heerdt, listed their Bloomington, Illinois, home for sale with a local realtor.  On September 8, 1997, defendants completed a

residential real property disclosure report in accordance with

the Act.  765 ILCS 77/35 (West 1996).  Defendants disclosed they were aware of "material defects in the basement or foundation

(including cracks or bulges)."  Defendants further explained

their answer in the appropriate blank on the disclosure form and

stated:  "crack in foundation on south side of house" and "small

settling cracks on walls throughout."  

	Around October 17, 1997, plaintiffs, Donald and Norma

Penn, entered into negotiations with defendants for the purchase

of defendants' home.  On October 18, 1997, plaintiffs signed a

purchase agreement and they also signed the disclosure report, in

which defendants disclosed the fore mentioned defects.  On Novem

ber 28, 1997, defendants delivered possession of the residence to

plaintiffs.  The instrument of conveyance of the residential real

property was recorded on December 4, 1997.  

	On May 16, 2000, plaintiffs filed a nine-count com

plaint against five parties:  Becky Gerig, Hundman Realty, Inc.,

Thomas Maloney (doing business as Coldwell Banker Heart of

America Realty), Roger A. Heerdt, and Denise Heerdt.  This appeal

involves only those counts of the complaint directed toward the

Heerdts.  In count III, plaintiffs alleged defendants violated

the Act because they "falsely and intentionally filled out the

[r]esidential [r]eal [p]roperty [r]eport in an incorrect manner

so as to deceive and mislead the [plaintiffs] and others as to

the true condition of the home."  Plaintiffs complained of

undisclosed defects in the home's sewer system, roof, and founda tion, which cost them $17,900 to correct.  

	On June 12, 2000, defendants filed a motion to dismiss

count III, alleging it was barred by the applicable one-year

statute of limitations.  765 ILCS 77/60 (West 1996).  Defendants

argued the complaint was filed nearly 2 1/2 years after the

accrual of the cause of action as set forth in the Act.  Defen

dants also argue they disclosed all known defects in the disclo

sure report prior to plaintiffs' purchase of the home, so even if

the discovery rule applied to the Act, it would not toll the

running of the limitations period in this case.  On June 16, the

trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to file count X

against defendants, alleging common-law fraud.  On August 9,

2000, a hearing was held on defendants' motion to dismiss count

III.  The trial court granted the motion and dismissed count III

with prejudice due to the expiration of the statute of limita

tions.  

	On August 21, 2000, defendants filed a motion to

dismiss count X.  On November 16, 2000, plaintiffs filed a motion

for voluntary dismissal of count III.  On November 22, 2000, the

trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss count X and,

noting its earlier dismissal of count III with prejudice, denied

plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal of count III.  On

December 11, the trial court entered an order dismissing, without

prejudice, all other counts of plaintiffs' complaint (against

other defendants) and withdrawing all pending discovery requests.

	On December 21, 2000, plaintiffs filed a notice of

appeal of the trial court's order dismissing count III with

prejudice.  On January 8, 2001, defendants filed a motion for sanctions against plaintiffs and their attorney, Jack Vieley.  On

February 2, 2001, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plain

tiffs' appeal, which was granted by this court on February 16,

2001.  The trial court heard defendants' motion for sanctions on

February 28, 2001, and took the matter under advisement.  On

March 6, 2001, the trial court entered an order granting defen

dants' motion for sanctions, and on March 7, 2001, plaintiffs

filed a notice of appeal.  On March 20, 2001, the mandate from

this court dismissing plaintiffs' December 21, 2000, appeal (Penn v. Gerig, No. 4-00-1081 (February 16, 2001) (unpublished order of dismissal)) was filed with the circuit clerk of McLean County. 

On March 21, 2001, plaintiffs filed a second-amended notice of

appeal.  We note defendants have filed with this court a motion

for sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 375 (155 Ill. 2d R.

375(b)), which we will consider as part of this case.  

II. ANALYSIS

	On review we consider three issues:  (1) whether the

discovery rule should be applied to the Residential Real Property

Disclosure Act to toll the running of the one-year statute of

limitations period until a time the plaintiffs knew or reasonably

should have known of their injury; (2) whether the trial court

erred in granting defendants' motion for sanctions; and (3)

whether this court should grant defendants' motion for sanctions

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 375 (155 Ill. 2d R. 375(b)).

A. Statute of Limitations

	Whether the discovery rule is applicable to the Act is

an issue of first impression in Illinois.  The limitations period

set forth in the Act states:  "No action for violation of this Act may be commenced later than one year from the earlier of the

date of possession, date of occupancy, or date of recording of an

instrument of conveyance of the residential real property."  765

ILCS 77/60 (West 1996).  The primary rule of statutory construc

tion is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the

statute.  If the statutory language is clear, the language should

be given effect without further aids of construction.  Miller v. Bizzell, 311 Ill. App. 3d 971, 974, 726 N.E.2d 175, 177 (2000).  

	The discovery rule has been applied in many situations

to alleviate the sometimes "harsh results" of a literal applica

tion of statutes of limitation.  In effect, the discovery rule

delays the commencement of the relevant statute of limitations

until the plaintiff "'knows or reasonably should know that he has

been injured and that his injury was wrongfully caused.'" 

Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors Adjustment Co., 166 Ill. 2d 72, 77, 651 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (1995), quoting Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Leydig, Voit & Mayer, 158 Ill. 2d 240, 249, 633 N.E.2d 627, 630- 31 (1994).  The discovery rule will not be applied given a

contrary indication of legislative intent.  Hermitage, 166 Ill. 2d at 78, 651 N.E.2d at 1135.

	In this case, the legislature has spoken in clear and

unambiguous terms.  Only three very specific events will trigger

the running of the one-year statute of limitations for causes of

action brought under the Act:  the date of possession, the date

of occupancy, or the date of the recording of an instrument of

conveyance.  765 ILCS 77/60 (West 1996).  None of these events

are related to the discovery of potential defects in the home.  In fact, we conclude the clear and unambiguous language chosen by the legislature contravenes the application of the discovery rule

to the limitations period of the Act.  First, the legislature

chose a very short, one-year statute of limitations.  This

period, albeit short, gives the home buyer some protections not

previously enjoyed under the somewhat harsh, common-law doctrine

of caveat emptor, while protecting sellers against potential unlimited liability under the Act if a buyer discovers a defect

many years after the purchase of a home.  The application of the

discovery rule would render meaningless the legislature's choice

of the three specific triggering events as well as the short,

one-year limitations period.  

	If we examine the statute further, we also find the

legislature not only chose three specific triggering events, it

specifies the limitations period will begin "from the earlier of the date of possession, date of occupancy, or date of record

ing***."  (Emphasis added.)  765 ILCS 77/60 (West 1996).  According

to this clear and unambiguous language, the limitations period

may begin to run even before the home buyer occupies a residen tial property and has the chance to discover undisclosed defects

in the home.  For example, if a home buyer delays occupancy of a residence for whatever reason, but the deed is recorded prior to

occupancy, the statute of limitations begins to run when the deed

is recorded.  Because the legislature has chosen three specific

triggers that provide a bright-line test for determining the

exact date of the beginning of the limitations period and because these triggers have nothing to do with the home buyer's actual

discovery of defects in the home, we find the application of the

discovery rule to the Act would be contrary to legislative intent.

	The running of the short, one-year limitations period

of the Act does not, however, leave a home buyer without a remedy

if she feels she has been deceived by a home seller who has

fraudulently concealed latent defects.  Section 45 of the Act

states:  "[t]This Act is not intended to limit or modify any obliga

tion to disclose created by any other statute or that may exist

in common law in order to avoid fraud, misrepresentation, or

deceit in the transaction."  765 ILCS 77/45 (West 1996).  There

fore, because an aggrieved home buyer has remedies available in

addition to those created by the Act, a strict application of the

one-year limitations period set forth in the Act does not lead to

the "harsh results" that initially prompted courts to create the

discovery rule and prompted the legislature to codify the discov

ery rule in certain statutory causes of action. 

	Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's December 11,

2000, order dismissing with prejudice count III of plaintiffs'

complaint.

B. Rule 137 Sanctions

	To fully understand the issues as they relate to the

trial court's order granting defendants' motion for sanctions and

defendants' motion for sanctions on appeal, we provide the

following time line of the somewhat confusing procedural facts in

this case:

	June 12, 2000:  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss

count III of plaintiffs' complaint, alleging the suit was time-

barred due to the expiration of the statute of limitations.  In

this motion, defendants also alleged they were entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R.

137) and Bizzell, 311 Ill. App. 3d, at 974-75, 726 N.E.2d at 177- 78.  

	August 9, 2000:  After a hearing on defendant's motion

to dismiss, Judge Freese entered an order dismissing count III of

plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice "as a result of the expira

tion of statute of limitations."  Judge Freese also granted

plaintiffs' motion for leave to file count X against defendants,

alleging common-law fraud.  Plaintiffs filed count X on this day,

and, without leave of court, requested $300,000 punitive damages. 

The trial court did not make a ruling as to defendants' request

for attorney fees and, according to defendants, the trial court

never heard any argument pertaining to "sanctions" at this

hearing. 

	August 21, 2000:  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss

count X of plaintiffs' complaint, in which they again request the

trial court grant them "costs and attorney's fees."  

	November 22, 2000:  After a hearing on defendants'

motion to dismiss count X, Judge Freese entered an order granting

defendants' motion.  The trial court granted plaintiffs leave to

replead count X within 35 days.  Again, presumably because the

trial court granted plaintiffs leave to replead count X and the

litigation remained ongoing, the court did not yet consider or

rule on the issue of attorney fees or sanctions.

	November 16, 2000:  Plaintiffs filed a motion to

voluntarily dismiss count III of their complaint.

	December 11, 2000:  Judge Freese denied plaintiffs'

request to voluntarily dismiss count III of their complaint because the court had previously dismissed count III with preju dice.  The trial court granted leave for plaintiffs to file an amended complaint on or before December 27, 2000.  Again, the

trial court did not enter a ruling as to attorney fees, nor is

there any evidence the issue was discussed before Judge Freese.

	December 21, 2000:  Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal

of the trial court's dismissal of count III with prejudice due to

the running of the statute of limitations,; docketed No. 4-00-

1081.  

	January 8, 2001:  Defendants filed a motion for sanc

tions, citing numerous instances of alleged sanctionable conduct

by plaintiffs and their attorney, Jack Vieley.  Defendants again

cite Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) and Bizzell, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 974-75, 726 N.E.2d at 177-78, in support of their

argument and request sanctions of $7,465 for reasonable attorney

fees.  This motion was assigned to Judge G. Michael Prall.

	January 10, 2001:  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss

plaintiffs' appeal in No. 4-00-1081, alleging the appeal was

premature because the trial court never addressed the issue of

Rule 137 sanctions.  Defendants also alleged plaintiffs failed to

file a docketing statement pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 312

(155 Ill. 2d R. 312). 

	January 29, 2001:  Plaintiffs filed a motion for

substitution of judge on defendants' motion for sanctions,

requesting the reassignment of Judge Freese to hear the motion

because he had ruled on all previous material issues in the case. 

Because Judge Freese was no longer presiding over civil cases in

McLean County in January 2001, the case was finally assigned to Judge Elizabeth Robb.  

	February 16, 2001:  This court granted defendants'

motion to dismiss plaintiffs' December 21, 2000, appeal.  Penn v. Gerig, No. 4-00-1081 (February 16, 2001) (unpublished order of dismissal).

	February 28, 2001:  Hearing on defendants' motion for

sanctions is held and Judge Robb takes the case under advisement. 

	March 6, 2001:  Judge Robb entered an order granting

defendants' motion for sanctions.

	March 7, 2001:  Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of

appeal herein of Judge Robb's order granting defendants' motion

for sanctions and also of the December 11, 2000, order dismissing

count III with prejudice, docketed No. 4-01-0196.  

	March 20, 2001:  Mandate from this court in No. 4-00-

1081 dismissing plaintiffs' December 21, 2000, appeal is filed

with the circuit clerk of McLean County.

	On appeal, plaintiffs first argue Judge Robb was

without authority to enter an order as to sanctions because Judge

Freese previously "had failed to allow the [defendants'] three

previous written requests for sanctions and awarded no sanc

tions."  Plaintiffs contend Judge Freese's "refusal" to grant

sanctions became the law of the case for all subsequent stages of

the suit.  We disagree.

	The law-of-the-case doctrine provides "where an issue

has been litigated and decided, a court's unreversed decision on

a question of law or fact settles that question for all subse

quent stages of the suit."  Norton v. City of Chicago, 293 Ill. App. 3d 620, 624, 690 N.E.2d 119, 123 (1997).  Our review of the record shows the trial court never entered an order granting or

denying Rule 137 sanctions or fees at any stage of the proceed

ings prior to Judge Robb's March 6, 2001, order.  Further, the

record fails to show the issue was even discussed prior to the February 28, 2001, hearing on defendants' motion for sanctions. 

The issue was never litigated or ruled upon and a final and

appealable order was never entered pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).  Therefore, plaintiffs' argument

is without merit.

	Plaintiffs next contend even if defendants' final

request for sanctions is not barred by the law-of-the-case

doctrine, Judge Robb's March 6, 2001, order granting defendants'

motion for sanctions "was void as a matter of law for lack of

jurisdiction" because the mandate dismissing plaintiffs' appeal

was not filed in the circuit court until March 20, 2001.  We

again disagree.

	According to Supreme Court Rules 301 and 304(a) (155

Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 304(a)), appeals may ordinarily be taken only

from final orders that dispose of every "claim" raised in an

action.  John. G. Phillips & Associates v. Brown, 197 Ill. 2d 337, 339, 757 N.E.2d 875, 877 (2001), citing Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465, 563 N.E.2d 459, 463 (1990).  The Illinois Supreme Court has held motions for sanc

tions under Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) are

"claims" in the cause of action with which they are connected and

they "'shall be considered a claim within the same civil action.'"  (Emphasis added.)"   (Emphasis omitted.)*(empha  John G. Phillips, 197 Ill. 2d at 339-40, 757 N.E.2d at 877, quoting 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.  The supreme court has also found the circuit court has jurisdic

tion to act on a timely filed motion for Rule 137 sanctions even if such motion is filed after a notice of appeal.  John. G. Phillips, 197 Ill. 2d at 340, 757 N.E.2d at 878.  Filing of a timely motion for Rule 137 sanctions renders the prior notice of

appeal ineffective as premature.  Cashmore v. Builders Square, Inc., 207 Ill. App. 3d 267, 273-74, 565 N.E.2d 703, 707 (1990); see Niccum v. Botti, Marinaccio, DeSalvo & Tameling, Ltd., 182 Ill. 2d 6, 8, 694 N.E.2d 562, 564 (1998).

	In applying these rules to the present case, it is

apparent the circuit court never lost jurisdiction over defen

dants' timely filed motion for sanctions even though it was filed

after plaintiffs' notice of appeal.  Therefore, Judge Robb had

jurisdiction to consider and rule upon defendants' motion for

sanctions prior to both this court's February 16, 2001, dismissal

of the appeal and the March 20, 2001, filing of the mandate in

the McLean County circuit clerk's office.  

	Having disposed of these ancillary matters, we now

reach the merits of this issue:  whether the trial court abused

its discretion in granting defendants' motion for sanctions.  In

her order, Judge Robb made the following pertinent findings:  (1)

defendants were entitled to recover their attorney fees pursuant

to Supreme Court Rule 137 and Bizzell, 311 Ill. App. at 974-75, 726 N.E.2d at 177-78; (2) the filing of count III was not "well

grounded in fact and was not warranted by existing law or a good-

faith argument for the extension, modification[,] or reversal of

existing law" and, therefore, defendants were entitled to recover

attorney fees incurred in defense of count III; (3) defendants were also entitled to recover attorney fees incurred in defense

of count X because plaintiffs sought to recover compensatory and

punitive damages, a request that was stricken on December 11,

2000, because punitive damages are not allowed in cases where a

complaint is based, even in part, on a theory of negligence; (4)

the actions of plaintiffs in filing count III and in seeking

punitive damages without leave of court in count X "appear to be

for purposes of harassment or to needlessly increase the cost of

litigation [for] [d]efendants."

	In Bizzell, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 976, 726 N.E.2d at 179, this court found an award of attorney fees pursuant to the Act is

within the discretion of the trial court and in determining

whether to award attorney fees, the trial court should consider

factors consistent with Rule 137.  We stated: 

		"Under Rule 137, sanctions may be

granted (1) if either party files a pleading or motion that to the best of the attorney's

'knowledge, information, and belief' is not

'well grounded in fact' and is not 'warranted

by existing law or a good-faith argument for

the extension, modification, or reversal of

existing law,' or (2) if the pleading or

motion is interposed to 'harass or to cause

unnecessary delay or needless increase in the

cost of litigation***.'"  (Emphasis in origi

nal.)  Bizzell, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 976, 726 N.E.2d at 179, quoting 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.

	The "additional factors" consistent with Rule 137 the trial court must consider include the following:  (1) the degree

of bad faith by the opposing party; (2) whether an award of fees

could deter others from acting under similar circumstances; and

(3) the relative merits of the parties' positions.  Bizzell, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 976-77, 726 N.E.2d at 179, citing Haskell v. Blumthal, 204 Ill. App. 3d 596, 6012-031, 561 N.E.2d 1315, 1318 (1990).

	Our review of Judge Robb's order granting sanctions

shows she correctly noted the law and applied the relevant

factors in determining whether to award sanctions.  While we do

not necessarily agree with the trial court that plaintiffs'

argument regarding the issue of whether the discovery rule

applies to extend the one-year statute of limitations in the Act

was not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for

the extension of existing law, we do agree that for plaintiffs to

argue for the application of the discovery rule in this case was entirely contradicted by the facts.  

	Most, if not all, of the "defects" plaintiffs listed in

their complaint related to "structural defects" caused by the

home's alleged "moving" and "settling."  Defendants disclosed material defects in the basement or foundation and provided the

following written explanation:  "crack in foundation on south

side of house" and "small settling cracks on walls throughout." 

We need not cite legal authority to recognize these defects are

indicative of a house that is "moving" and "settling."  

	The disclosure statement was signed by plaintiffs on

October 18, 1997.  Therefore, even if we were to find the discov ery rule applied to the Act, plaintiffs had sufficient notice on this date that structural problems existed in this home and

perhaps a closer examination was necessary.  See Regas v. Associ ated Radiologists, Ltd., 230 Ill. App. 3d 959, 964, 595 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (1992) (purchaser of property cannot "'shut his eyes

to available information and then charge that he has been de

ceived.'  [Citations.]").  The discovery rule is of no help to

plaintiffs under the facts of this case because, due to defen

dants' disclosure of known structural defects, plaintiffs were

aware of such defects prior to the statutory triggering of the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Act.  The

earliest triggering date of the one-year statute of limitations

under the Act was November 28, 1997, the date plaintiffs received

possession of the premises, and presumably the date of occupancy

(the record or plaintiffs' brief does not dictate otherwise). 

Thus, the Act provided plaintiffs with a longer period in which

to file a claim than would the application of the discovery rule. 

	Plaintiffs also contend they may not be sanctioned for

their inclusion of a prayer for punitive damages in count X,

because punitive damages are allowed in cases involving common-

law fraud.  In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite Home Savings & Loan Ass'n of Joliet v. Schneider, 108 Ill. 2d 277, 284, 483 N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (1985), which states punitive damages

are proper in a fraud action "'where the false representations

are wantonly and designedly made.'  [Citations.]"  The complaint at

issue in Home Savings alleged counts of fraud and negligent misrepresentation in the sale of property and the Supreme Court

of Illinois found the issue of punitive damages was properly

before the jury.  However, the court reversed the award of punitive damages based on a faulty jury instruction.  Home Savings, 108 Ill. 2d at 285-86, 483 N.E.2d at 1228-29.

	Plaintiffs overlook the fact Home Savings was decided prior to the effective date of section 2-604.1 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, which, as of November 25, 1986, requires a party

to file a pretrial motion and seek leave of court to include a

prayer for relief seeking punitive damages in all actions "based

on negligence."  735 ILCS 5/2-604.1 (West 1996).  Section 2-604.1

has been interpreted by this court, in a case in which Jack

Vieley was the attorney for the appellant, as applying to an

entire action and thereby prohibiting a prayer for punitive damages in any complaint, based even in part, on a theory of negligence.  McCann v. Presswood, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1071-72, 721 N.E.2d 811, 814 (1999).     	

	The first two counts of plaintiffs' complaint in the

present case are allegations of negligent misrepresentation. 

Therefore, in keeping with the well-known principle that punitive

damages are disfavored by Illinois courts (McCann, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1071, 721 N.E.2d at 814), section 2-604.1 of the Code

requiring a party to seek leave of court prior to adding a prayer

for punitive damages, and our decision in McCann, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded sanc

tions based, in part, on plaintiffs' conduct in seeking $300,000

in punitive damages in count X of their complaint.

III. Rule 375 Sanctions

	On appeal, defendants have filed a motion for sanctions

pursuant Supreme Court Rule 375 (155 Ill. 2d R. 375(b)), and

request that this court order plaintiffs to pay defendants' reasonable costs associated with defending the appeal, including

reasonable attorney fees.  Defendants briefly cite the facts and

the reasoning leading to the trial court's order granting sanc

tions against plaintiffs and they also allege two further in

stances of plaintiffs' misconduct and disregard for court rules:  

(1) plaintiffs' failure to file a timely docketing statement as

required by Supreme Court Rule 312 (155 Ill. 2d R. 312); and (2)

plaintiffs' providing a statement of facts in their appellate

brief which is "argumentative" and "inaccurate," which necessi

tated preparation of another statement of facts in defendants'

brief.  Based on plaintiffs' conduct and failure at every stage

of the proceedings below, defendants argue their bringing of the

lawsuit was "without any basis and in bad faith" and the appeal

is a "needless extension of a baseless lawsuit."  This appeal,

defendants contend, shows "Vieley and [p]laintiffs have remained

stubbornly litigious and caused defendants unnecessary expense." 

We agree.  

	Supreme Court Rule 375 states if an appeal is frivo

lous, not taken in good faith, or taken for a improper purpose

such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless

increase in the costs of litigation, an appropriate sanction may

be imposed upon any party or the attorney of the party.  Rule 375

also states an appeal will be deemed frivolous "where it is not

reasonably well grounded in fact and not warranted by existing

law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or

reversal of existing law."  155 Ill. 2d R. 375(b).  Finally, the

rule states an appeal "will be deemed to have been taken *** for

an improper purpose where the primary purpose of the appeal or other action is to delay, harass, or cause needless expense." 

155 Ill. 2d R. 375(b).  In determining whether an appeal is

frivolous, we use an objective standard:  the appeal is frivolous

"if it would not have been brought in good faith by a reasonable,

prudent attorney."  Dreisilker Electric Motors, Inc. v. Rainbow Electric Co., 203 Ill. App. 3d 304, 312, 562 N.E.2d 970, 974 (1990).

	As to plaintiffs' appeal of the trial court's dismissal

of count III with prejudice due to the running of the statute of

limitations, we agree with defendants and find the appeal is

frivolous.  As we discussed earlier, the legal issue of whether

the discovery rule is applicable to the Act is weak, but it is

not entirely without merit.  However, no factual basis warranted

the application of the discovery rule in this case even if we were to find it applied to the Act.  Defendants disclosed the existence of structural defects and plaintiffs were aware of such

defects prior to the statutory triggering of the limitations period.  Count III of plaintiffs' complaint was not reasonably

well grounded in fact, nor is plaintiffs' appeal of the trial

court's dismissal of count III.  Therefore, we find a reasonable,

prudent attorney acting in good faith would not have sought to

extend the lawsuit by pursuing this issue on appeal.

	We also find plaintiffs' appeal of the trial court's

order granting defendants' motion for sanctions to be frivolous. 

The trial court's order was based predominantly on the fact that

count III was not well grounded in fact and the prayer for

punitive damages in count X was filed without leave of court.  We

have discussed both of these issues at length and have determined plaintiffs' arguments are without merit.  Although a party need

not be correct in his view of the law (Shea, Rogal & Associates, Ltd. v. Leslie Volkswagen, Inc., 250 Ill. App. 3d 149, 154, 621 N.E.2d 77, 80 (1993)), plaintiffs' arguments on appeal are not

objectively reasonable given the lack of a factual basis for

count III of the lawsuit and Jack Vieley's involvement in and

presumed knowledge of a fFourth dDistrict case that was entirely

dispositive of the punitive damages issue at the trial level and

on appeal.  

	Accordingly, we grant defendants' motion for sanctions

and direct defendants to file a statement of reasonable expenses

and attorney fees incurred as a result of this appeal within 14

days.  Plaintiffs and their attorneys shall then have seven days

to file a response.  This court will then file a supplemental

opinion determining the amount of the sanctions.

	III. CONCLUSION

	We affirm the trial court's judgment.  

	Affirmed.

	McCULLOUGH, P.J., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.