TURKEY'S STRATEGIC POSITION AT THE CROSSROADS OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Stephen J. Blank

Stephen C. Pelletiere

William T. Johnsen

December 3, 1993
*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this publication are invited and may

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed to the authors via commercial telephone (717)

245-4085 or DSN 242-4085.
FOREWORD

By virtue of its strategic location at the intersection of

Europe and Asia, Turkey plays a pivotal role in the post-cold war

system of states. It lies, one could say, at the epicenter of a

series of conflicts, real and potential, in both continents. It

also has enjoyed noticeable growth in both economic prosperity

and democracy since 1980. And because Turkey has been, and

remains, a faithful U.S. ally, Washington has called upon it to

play a role in the Balkans, Near East, and former Soviet empire

commensurate with its new-found political and economic

development.

This report analyzes the implications of Turkey's policies

and the reactions of Turkey's neighbors in three discrete

chapters. The authors focus their conclusions and options for

U.S. policymakers on the effect of Turkish policies in Europe,

the Middle East, and the former Soviet republics. The final

chapter summarizes their conclusions with respect to the three

regions and provides policy options for continuing U.S.-Turkish

relations that are so important in the search for peace and

stability in these regions. The authors and the Strategic Studies

Institute welcome readers' comments and will continue to assess

developments in this vital area of Western and U.S. concern.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
SUMMARY

Turkey sits astride Europe, particularly the Balkans, the

Middle East, and the former Soviet empire now known as the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In addition, since 1980

Turkey has compiled an enviable record of economic growth and

democratization in politics. For these reasons U.S. policymakers

have assumed that Turkey, a steadfast U.S. ally, is especially

well-poised to play a role as an anchor in the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), as a positive pole of attraction for

the Middle East and southern republics of the ex-USSR in

Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and as a block against a

resurgence of Russian power and/or Iranian fundamentalism.

This analysis of Turkey's policies and current geostrategic

or geopolitical role in these regions is contained in three

independent chapters that consider the extent to which Turkey can

play those roles expected by its leaders and elites and by U.S.

policymakers, as well. In his analysis, Lieutenant Colonel

William T. Johnsen observes that Turkey's role in Europe has both

magnified and declined since the fall of the Soviet empire. On

the one hand, its importance for the Middle East, which could

become an out-of-area threat to Europe, has visibly grown. On the

other, Turkey's application to the European Union (EU) (formerly

European Community [EC]) and, by implication, the Western

European Union (WEU), has been deflected and delayed, causing a

great deal of concern in Turkey as to European suspicion of

Turkey. In addition, NATO as a whole and Turkey's role in

particular have come under question in the absence of a definable

threat and Western Europe's visible disinclination to shoulder

security burdens in the Balkans.

Nowhere is that disinclination and Turkish suspicion of

European objectives more clear than in the Bosnian war where

Turkey continues to see a Muslim state wiped out in Europe while

nobody takes action against Serbia. There are fears that entry

into Europe through integration with European security

organizations, the fundamental priority of Turkish foreign

policy, is in danger, and that Turkey runs a risk of being

somehow marginalized in European calculations. Accordingly,

Turkey will and has come closer to the United States to seek

support for and understanding of its ultimate objectives.

Turkey's integration into Europe is, Johnsen argues, in our

interests, and should be supported by a series of U.S.

initiatives in and out of NATO to strengthen its standing in

Europe, win support for this integration, and bolster Turkey's

self-confidence about its future prospects.

But, on the other hand, it is clear that, because of this

disconnection between Europe and Turkey, it would be fallacious

to expect that Turkey undertake a leading or even unilateral role

in assuring Balkan security or the lead in the Eastern

Mediterranean. Greco-Turkish rivalry has grown in the recent

past, and while one cannot forecast what the new Papandreou
government in Greece will do, the Bosnian war, Cyprus, and other

issues have brought this rivalry into the center of regional

security agendas and further complicated Turkey's efforts to win

support for its European objectives. Much depends on U.S.

support for Turkey, but it cannot be said that even then Turkey's

problems will be sufficiently reduced for it to satisfy its

objectives. But otherwise, there is hardly any prospect for

successful Turkish integration into Europe in the near-to-medium

term.

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere focuses on the complexities that

Turkey's own unresolved domestic issues, in particular the

Kurdish insurgency in its southeast, pose for Turkey's overall

security relationship with its Near Eastern neighbors: Syria,

Iran, and Iraq. From Dr. Pelletiere's analysis it is clear Iran

and Syria are using the Kurdish issue to coerce Turkey. They fear

Ankara's close ties with the United States which, they believe,

is a vehicle for spreading the influence of the West into the

region. Thus, support for Kurdish rebels has become an instrument

of these states' policies, to be turned on and off in order to

achieve their aims or to pressure Turkey.

Today, as Turkey assumes a clearer rivalry in the area with

Iran, he argues that Iran has stepped up its support for the

Kurdish insurgents and is using them to unhinge Turkey at home.

At the same time Turkey appears to be playing a dangerously

uncertain hand in its own policies towards the insurgents because

it is relying almost exclusively on military repression of the

movements involved and neglecting the socio-economic and

political alternatives many Western observers believe must be

employed to resolve the Kurdish issue. Indeed, the army has

evidently threatened to impose martial law in the spring of 1994

if the insurgency is not crushed. But as long as this issue

remains an increasingly vital and first-order military priority,

Turkey will face an enormous task of domestic reconstruction, be

at odds with its neighbors over their support for the insurgents,

and find itself castigated in the United States and Europe for

human rights violations. At the same time, if it continues to

resort exclusively to military tactics of counterinsurgency,

Turkey may risk the progress in democratization that it has

achieved and undermine not only its domestic stability but also

its ability to play a leading role in any international venue.

This prospect is particularly troubling because the Kurdish

areas of Turkey are the only ones in which U.S. forces are

directly engaged through our participation in OPERATION PROVIDE

COMFORT. U.S. forces, using this area for that relief operation

and for overflights and monitoring of Iraqi compliance with U.N.

resolutions, could be drawn into future hostilities over the

Kurdish issue. Since there are grounds for believing that Iran

and Iraq, as well as possibly Syria, see that U.S. engagement as

a potential base for a long-term U.S. military presence that is

directly aimed at them, there are real possibilities for an

anti-American coalition, either political or even military,
employing terrorism, low-intensity conflict operations, and the

like that could involve the United States as well as offer

serious problems for Turkey.

As numerous analysts have noted, Turkey cannot play a role

of a model and commercial entrepot for the new former Soviet

republics if it cannot solve its own extensive domestic problems.

In his chapter, detailing Turkey's relations with the new states

in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus and Russia, Dr. Stephen J.

Blank assesses the prospect for Turkey to play this role and

finds it substantially overdrawn. Both the United States and

Turkey in 1991-92 believed that Turkey ought to take a leading

role in the stabilization of the Black Sea, Transcaucasia, and

Central Asia, against revived Russian imperialism and, in

particular, Iranian-type fundamentalism. Regardless of the fact

that these new societies of largely Muslim persuasion are very

unlike Iran, it appears that Turkey's domestic problems and the

economic crisis of enormous magnitude afflicting those areas

precludes Turkey from successfully playing the role hoped for by

the United States.

Turkey's main concrete objectives have been to dominate

these new states' energy economy and thus enrich itself and tie

them into a Turkish-led economic system, and to prevent the

return of Russian military pressure to and on its borders. In

both objectives it is failing or has demonstratively failed. In

the Black Sea, efforts at security collaboration with Ukraine and

larger regional coordination through the Black Sea Economic

Cooperation Zone (BSECZ) have failed to give Turkey what it

wants. In Ukraine, failure to reform has led Ukraine to sell its

Black Sea Fleet and nuclear arms to Russia, although it denies

doing so, in return for debt relief. In the BSECZ, Greece and

Russia are combining to block any Turkish leadership role.

In the Transcaucasus, during 1993 it became clear that

Turkey was deterred effectively from acting against Armenian

expansion and threats to dismember Azerbaijan that have developed

in the course of the long war over Nagorno- Karabakh. Turkish

helplessness to aid even a pro-Ankara government and Russia's

ability to unseat that government, and replace it with a

pro-Moscow one that now has rejoined the CIS and is accepting

long-term Russian bases there denotes the breakdown of Turkey's

defense strategy. As a result of Russian overt and covert

operations throughout this region, Russian troops will be

stationed in all three states, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan,

and Russia alone will probably play the role of "peacemaker" in

the region's numerous ethnic conflicts. Turkey has also failed to

monopolize or gain a commanding role in the energy economy of

Transcaucasia. Instead it is locked in a bruising economic

rivalry with Russia over transshipment routes and pipelines. The

outcome remains undecided, but it cannot end better than in a

compromise where Russia gains the most.

Although Turkey has invested heavily in Central Asia, it is
still unable to provide what the pro-Moscow rulers of the region

most need, military security and control over energy and

transportation, and food trade. Central Asian rulers, whatever

their private inclinations, have been obliged to rejoin the

Russian economic sphere by quite brutal Muscovite policies and

have also evinced growing suspicion of Turkey's activities. 

Moreover, other states, not just Iran, Russia, and Pakistan, are

competing for influence in the region, allowing local leaders to

pick and choose among them. Turkey's own limitations emerge in

this context as the most serious factor inhibiting it from

playing the leadership role in Central Asia that was previously

expected.

Finally, there are strains growing in the relationship with

Washington. U.S. aid is being cut and converted into loans. 

Turkey's efforts to reverse that trend and get stable guarantees

has led to growing resort to mutual blackmail over aid and bases,

and a threat to condition aid on solution of the Kurdish problem.

That would mean making Turkey's entire international position

hostage to its ability to satisfy Washington and/or Europe on

this problem at a time when neither one of them appears fully

committed to helping Turkey achieve its and their interests. Thus

the report concludes with suggestions for improving the

relationship and calls for a clear U.S. strategy and concept of

U.S. and Turkish interests in the regions of mutual engagement so

that the United States can help Ankara overcome its problems.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The revolutionary upheavals taking place in Europe, the

Middle East, and the former Soviet Union have fundamentally

transformed the strategic position of Turkey, which sits astride

all three areas. The collapse of Soviet power, the continuing

uncertainties of European integration, the agony of the former

Yugoslavia, the Gulf War of 1990-91, and the first fruits of the

Arab-Israeli peace process (i.e., the accord between Israel and

the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] signed in Washington

in September 1993) pose both challenges and opportunities to

Turkey. This report, therefore, examines Turkey's strategic

conditions, analyzes its options in a fast moving international

system, assesses the implications of its policies and positions

for the United States, and offers policy recommendations, both

for Turkey and the United States.

Today the emergence of largely Turkic republics in Central

Asia onto the world political stage offers Turkey the chance to

be a model for their westernization and integration into the

world economy and culture. Alternatively, the unsettled and even

desperate conditions, including several wars, in these republics

could drag Turkey into their maelstroms and deflect it from full

integration with Europe, its chosen goal since the reforms of the

Tanzimat period, 150 years ago.

Europe, however, might rebuff Turkey's efforts to play a

larger role in the European Union (EU) (formerly European

Community [EC]), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),

the Western European Union (WEU), and any future European

security systems. Such a turn of events could force Ankara to

look East even as European rejection undercuts Turkey's claims to

be a fully western state; thus, making Turkey less attractive to

eastern societies. Alternatively, unresolved economic and ethnic

issues afflicting Turkey (that is, continuing high inflation, an

excessively bureaucratized economy, and the Kurdish issue) could

make Turkey unattractive to either the East or the West. And,

although progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process has now

dramatically transformed prospects for the region, the Middle

East is by no means free of all its multiple conflicts that could

involve Turkey and its vital interests.

In other words, Turkey's role in Europe, the Middle East,

Central Asia, and Transcaucasia will likely remain in

considerable flux for the foreseeable future. Turkey's transition

to a new system of interstate relations cannot be fixed at this

time, but the results will have tremendous effects on Turkey, the

critical regions it sits astride, and the United States. Turkey

could rise to the occasion and pioneer a vast expansion of the

economic potential of former Soviet republics in Central Asia and

Transcaucasia as it extends its sphere of influence by virtue of

its connection to these regions and Europe. Or, Turkey could be
drawn into conflicts that work against European, Central Asian,

and Middle Eastern integration and peace. The U.S. connection is

crucial because the United States has consistently promoted

Turkish integration into the Western security system since the

Truman Doctrine (1947) and Turkish membership in NATO (1952). 

And, today Turkish participation in NATO remains important, not

only for Europe and the Middle East, but for the strategic

interests of the United States. Operations DESERT STORM and

PROVIDE COMFORT manifestly displayed the strategic importance,

not only of Turkey's NATO membership, but also of its partnership

with the United States.

Similarly, as our analysis will show, the United States

actively supported Turkey's self-chosen efforts to play the role

of vanguard and model for the new republics of the former USSR in

order to stave off the threat of Islamic radicalism or of Iranian

influence. Moreover, Turkey continues to justify its importance

to Washington and Europe, e.g. the EU and WEU, in terms of its

`immense influence' over the region that it can deploy against

religious radicalism or related dangers.

If those claims are true, then Turkey's strenuous efforts to

play a leading role in the new world order will redound to

Ankara's and Washington's benefits. But, if Turkish claims are

overdrawn and Turkey cannot effectively shape the outlines of the

new order, then Washington, to the extent that it promoted

Turkish involvement abroad, will be implicated in Turkey's

subsequent failure to sustain its position. For this reason, and

due to its central geographical location, Turkey remains a key

strategic partner of the United States and its success or failure

will directly affect the national interests of the United States.

The authors, therefore, frame their analyses in terms of

Turkish policies and their implications for U.S. policy.

Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen, USA analyzes Turkey's

position and policies vis-a-vis European organizations, i.e., EU,

WEU, and NATO, and assesses Turkey's place in the current Balkan

crisis. Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere analyzes Turkey's engagement in

a key area where U.S. troops are actually engaged, i.e. our

position helping the Kurds and the impact that the Kurdish issue

has for Turco-Iranian, Turco-Iraqi, and U.S.-Turkish relations.

Finally, Dr. Stephen J. Blank analyzes Turkish policy toward the

areas opened up by the fall of Communist power and the USSR: the

Black Sea, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia. This analysis also

takes account of the dilemmas facing Turkey as a result of the

Armeno-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh that is taking place

just over the border from Turkey. The authors conclude the

analysis with recommendations for action in U.S. policy towards

Turkey.
CHAPTER 2

TURKEY AND EUROPE:

EXPECTATIONS AND COMPLICATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of communism in Europe and the peaceful

implosion of the Soviet Union have dramatically altered Turkey's

security environment, and, hence, Ankara's relations with Europe.

As seven-time prime minister and now President of Turkey Suleyman

Demirel concluded:

Turkey's position today in this part of the world is

much more important [than] it was two years ago....

Reconsidered defense, security, diplomatic, and

economic ties with Turkey are `needed more than ever.'1

Such sentiments echo throughout Turkey. As Steve Coll of The

Washington Post pointed out, "While others may debate Turkey's

importance...its own political and business elite is convinced

that the Cold War's demise offers them a new place in the sun."2

Paradoxically, Turkish political scientist Duygu Sezer has noted

that "the network of relations that Turkey built with Western

Europe at the height of the Cold War seems to have entered a

state of paralysis, if not dissolution...,"3 and concluded that

Turkish leaders will have to adapt to the new circumstances.

Given the scope and suddenness of the changes that Turkey

must face, Turkish leaders find themselves at a critical

crossroads. They must reexamine Turkey's relationship with Europe

in light of the significant opportunities--and challenges--

offered by the end of the bipolar world. This reevaluation will

demand not only that Turks reconsider their role in Europe, but

that Turkey's European allies and the United States review their

relations with Turkey.

This reassessment will occur as the United States finds

itself facing a conundrum. On the one hand, the United States has

interests that argue for strong U.S. support of Turkish goals of

increased integration in European political, economic, and

security organizations. On the other, strong U.S. support of

Turkish initiatives to facilitate increased integration with

Europe could alienate other U.S. European allies who may hesitate

to grant Turkey increased access to European institutions.

Similarly, while U.S.-Turkish interests along NATO's southern

tier, in Transcaucasia, and in Central Asia are frequently

complementary, they are not coincidental and are sometimes in

conflict. The key question for U.S. policymakers, therefore,

becomes: How does the United States balance these frequently

conflicting interests?
The first purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to identify

future Turkish goals in Europe, deduce the likelihood of those

objectives being attained, and assess the implications of Turkish

policies regarding Europe. More importantly, from a U.S.

perspective, the essay also examines potential consequences for

U.S. interests in Turkey and Europe that may emerge as a result

of Turkey redefining its relationships vis-a-vis Europe.

TURKISH GOALS IN EUROPE

Turkey's immediate objectives in Europe will likely be

little changed: ensure the territorial integrity and security of

the Republic of Turkey and increase integration with European

institutions to promote Turkey's continued economic and societal

modernization. But, it is important to realize that even though

the Turks will pursue parallel political, economic, and security

policies for their own rewards, the primary drive is not simply

improved political, economic, and security conditions. Put

simply, the overriding Turkish goal will be increased integration

with Europe; to be seen and to be perceived as being European.

The question remains, however, whether Ankara will be able to

achieve its goals or will be willing to pay the economic and

political price that may be required. The consequences of the

success or failure of these initiatives, particularly their

implications for Turkish and U.S. policies, will be the subject

of the discussion that follows.

Turkish Membership in the European Union.

One of the best ways to ensure increased integration with

Europe is full Turkish membership in the European Union (EU)

(formerly European Community [EC]). This is not a new idea, as

the Turks entered into an associate status with the EC in 1963

that was designed to provide Turkey with the time to prepare for

the rigors of full membership, for which Turkey formally applied

in 1987.4 But, the recent Maastricht Treaty for European Union

has added increased impetus for Turkey to join before, in the

words of Duygu Sezer, it is "...reduced to a non-European country

on the fringes of Europe...."5

Whether Turkey will be able to fulfill its goal of full EU

membership remains to be seen. Among Turkish elites, many

understand that Turkey's journey to full membership in the EU may

be longer than some expect.6 A critical question for Turks,

however, is not if Turkey can meet its obligations, but whether

Europe will live up to its part of the bargain. When Turkey

formally applied for EC membership in December 1987, the EC

Commission informed Ankara that the matter could not be

considered before 1993.7 As many in Turkey have noted, 1993 has

come "but the signals from Western Europe do not seem

promising."8 Thus, only one third of participants in the sweeping

study, "Turkey in 2020," believe that Turkey will actually be a

member of the EU by 2020.9
The primary reason behind this gloomy forecast is that many

of those surveyed agreed with politician Haluk Ozdalga's

conclusion that "the EC in essence is a community of common

culture and political principles rather than an organization of

economic cooperation."10 Or, more pointedly, as Turkish political

sociologist Nur Vergin commented: "The EC's principal concern in

not admitting Turkey is that `Turks will overwhelm them.'"11

Thus, many leading Turkish intellectual and political leaders are

skeptical that the EU will treat Turkey fairly, and are convinced

that once Turkey overcomes existing hurdles to EU membership, new

ones will emerge.12

These continued obstacles to full Turkish membership are

particularly galling to the Turks, given their efforts to attain

EU standards, the acceptance of Greece into the EC in 1981, and

Turkish support of the allied coalition--with its many EC

members--during the Gulf War with Iraq (1991).13 Especially

frustrating is the likelihood that several former neutrals

(Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland), and, perhaps, even

former members of the Warsaw Pact (Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, or

the Czech Republic) might "jump the queue" and gain membership

ahead of Turkey.14

Facing these obstacles, some prominent Turks have begun to

question the long cherished dream of Turkish entry into the EU.

Cem Boyner noted in 1991 that the cost of joining the EU may be

too high. This is particularly true, he noted, because "there is

no place affectionately reserved for us in that organization." He

also noted that Turks have placed too much emphasis on joining

the EU: "Had we not posed our entry into the EC as a matter of

life or death, perhaps we would not have these problems today."15

Intellectuals' Hearth President Nevzat Yalcintas echoed these

conclusions noting, "I have always seen integration with the EC

as a romantic and unrealistic policy that wastes Turkey's

time."16

Nonetheless, political leaders in Ankara and many moderates

in Turkish society have invested a good deal of political and

personal capital in Turkey's membership in the EU. If the EU

fails to grant Turkey full membership, then moderates may lose

out in Turkey. This is especially true if Turkey meets existing

requirements and perceives it is being denied membership because

of racial, religious, or cultural differences or because Western

Europeans fear being swamped by a wave of Turkish immigrant

workers.17 Nor are Turkish fears overworked, for as Bruce

Kuniholm has pointed out, "many Europeans privately express

enormous doubts about Turkey's achieving membership in the near

future."18 Should the EU reject Turkey, a considerable backlash

against Europe is likely to occur and could lead Turkey to turn

toward Central Asia and the Middle East--an outcome in neither

Turkish nor U.S. interests.19

Two sets of bilateral relations are critical for Turkish
entry into the EU and deserve brief comment. The first concerns

Germany, which exerts tremendous influence within the EU.

Historically, Germany and Turkey have enjoyed close affiliation;

however, four issues recently have clouded German-Turkish

relations. First, hesitant German support of Turkey during

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM angered many Turks and

set relations on edge.20 Second, the temporary suspension of

German military aid to Turkey because previously supplied

equipment had been used to suppress the Kurdish Workers' Party

(PKK)-led insurgency in southeastern Turkey incensed many Turks

who see the PKK threatening Turkish territorial integrity.21

Third, the German government's permissive attitude toward

PKK activities in Germany has allowed the PKK a relatively safe

base for operations against Turkish government and business

interests in Europe and is further taxing Bonn's relations with

Ankara.22 A recent example of such operations was the wave of

violent PKK demonstrations, occupations of buildings, and

hostage-taking across Europe on June 24, 1993.23 These assaults

will certainly aggravate Turks who have lobbied Germany for

increased protection of Turkish embassies and business interests,

as well as for stronger actions against the PKK. A 5-month delay

in the decision of the German government to ban the PKK has not

helped matters.24

Fourth, the rise of xenophobic groups in Germany that have

focused their sometimes deadly attacks on the 1.8 million ethnic

Turks living in Germany has also strained relations. German

government responses to right-wing violence and efforts to reform

its citizenship laws have been half-hearted, at best. Tensions

have run high as ethnic Turks in Germany have responded with

violence. Turkish government calls for protection of its citizens

or ethnic brethren and liberalization of Germany's restrictive

citizenship requirements have strained Turkish- German

relations.25 These tensions could increase if the German

government cannot end the violence.

The second key bilateral relationship concerns Greece. That

Greece and Turkey have suffered poor relations for centuries is

an understatement and requires little amplification. The catalog

of their ongoing disputes is extensive: Cyprus; control of air

and sea space in the Aegean Sea; alleged mistreatment of each

other's minorities; mutual claims of religious oppression; and

Turkish claims of Greek militarization of islands in the Aegean

in violation of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), countered by Greek

claims that the islands are threatened by Turkish invasion.26

The prognosis of future improvement is unclear, as leading

Turkish intellectuals have diametrically opposed forecasts of

future Greek-Turkish relations. While optimists formed the

majority in the study "Turkey in 2020," strong reservations about

Greece still remain. Some of the pessimism is based on

long-standing cultural and historical differences, but many

believe differences over Aegean Sea issues and the Balkans will
block improvement in relations between the two states for the

foreseeable future.27 Perhaps most serious has been the

resentment generated by Athens' continued opposition to Turkish

entry into the EU.28 Equally important, these frustrations could

be transferred to Europe, as a whole, if Turkey does not perceive

that other EU members are exerting sufficient pressure on Greece

to allow Turkey full membership in the EU.

Despite existing and potential problems with Europe and EU

membership, many Turkish policymakers still believe they have

little option but to press ahead.29 As Ismail Kara, a noted

Muslim intellectual stated:

It would be to Turkey's disadvantage if closer

relationships with Islamic nations and Turkic republics

of the Soviet Union reduce Turkey's chances of having a

say in Europe. That would condemn Turkey to being part

of the Middle East and the Far East. The reality is

that Turkey has to work hard to have a say in Europe

despite its religious, cultural, and historic ties to

the Middle East and Far East.30

Conversely, other, more nationalistic voices can be heard.

For example, in the study "Turkey in 2020," film director Halit

Refig commented, "I think that those who believe that we have to

make our plans in accordance with the West's blueprint are

wrong."31 Political sociologist Nur Vergin takes a similar tack:

Turkey is on its way to becoming an important player in

the world stage....[and] Turks have an imperial mission

that they derive from their history and the attributes

of the land they live on....[As a result,] Europe has

stopped being a guiding beacon for Turks.32

Turkish Membership in European Security Organizations.

Turkish Security Concerns. Turks have good cause to be

apprehensive about their security. Turkey has a long history of

competition and military confrontation with Russia (not simply

the Soviet Union). While the current situation looks promising,

long historical concerns have not been overcome. The devolution

of the Soviet Union has also created considerable instability

along Turkey's northeastern frontier: civil war in Georgia and a

historically hostile Armenia engaged in a war with ethnically

Turkic Azerbaijan over the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh

in Azerbaijan.

To the east and south lie Iran, Iraq, and Syria, highly

armed authoritarian regimes. Turkey supported the allied

coalition in the Gulf War against Iraq; continues to provide

bases for enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over northern Iraq;

and enforces economic sanctions against Baghdad. Iran and Syria

have supported anti-Turkey Kurdish groups; indeed, both nations
have aided the PKK-led insurgency and terror campaign waged since

1983.33 Finally, Iran and Turkey are engaged in intense

competition for influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.34

Turks also perceive risks to European Turkey. Historic

Greek-Turkish rivalries over Thrace, perceived repression of

Greek and Turkish ethnic minorities, the festering wound of

Cyprus, and conflicts over control of Aegean air and sea space

remain, even if subdued.35 While the present regime in Bulgaria

has moderated considerably from its predecessor, significant

ill-treatment of Turkish minorities occurred as recently as

1989.36 Events in the Balkans could also draw Turkey into the

ongoing conflict, with severe implications for NATO.37

Turkey, thus, faces an active insurgency intent on

dismantling the Turkish state from within and is surrounded by a

host of potential adversaries from without. Given these security

concerns, one should not be surprised, then, that the Turks have

sought closer ties with the Western European Union (WEU). What

remains to be seen, however, is whether Turkey can gain full

membership in the WEU and achieve the degree of security it

desires.

Turkish Relations with the WEU. Under terms of the

Maastricht Treaty, the WEU will act as the defense and security

arm of the European Union.38 Recognizing the rising importance of

the WEU as the security arm of a united Europe, as well as the

basis for a European defense pillar within NATO, and that

membership in the WEU offers Turkey the opportunity to shape the

evolving European Defense Identity, Turkish leaders have devoted

considerable effort to gaining entry into that organization. 

And, because WEU assistance guarantees are stronger than those of

NATO and because the Brussels Treaty is not tied to a specific

geographic area, many Turkish leaders hope that WEU membership

would bolster European support of Turkish security interests.39

Finally, and perhaps as importantly, membership in the WEU would

assist Turkey in achieving its overarching political goal of

increased integration with Europe.

Turkey has been able to achieve only associate membership in

the WEU, a result that in some ways parallels the frustrations it

has met as it seeks full membership in the EU. For example,

Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin has noted Ankara's dissatisfaction

and remarked that Turkey accepts its current status only as a

temporary measure until it achieves full membership.40

Underscoring the importance of full membership, Ian Lesser of

RAND has noted:

Turkish exclusion from these [European defense]

arrangements, regardless of their precise form, would

be understood in Ankara as a demonstration of Europe's

unwillingness to grant Turkey a legitimate security

role on the Continent.41
Continued exclusion from the full benefits of membership within

the EC and WEU could, therefore, lead to a reduction in Turkish

interest in joining Europe and in Europe's interest in such

integration.

The path to full membership in the WEU may, however, contain

potential pitfalls for Turkey. Because of Turkey's associate

status (which may prevail for some time), the defense provisions

of the Brussels Treaty do not apply to Turkey;42 that is, members

of the WEU are not required to come to Turkey's aid in the event

of aggression against Turkish territory. At the same time,

according to the membership agreement, Turkey "...will be asked

to make a financial contribution to the Organization's

budgets."43 Thus, Turkey `enjoys' the responsibilities of the WEU

without the benefit of either the right to vote on how that money

will be spent or solid security guarantees.

Additionally, as an internal WEU report pointed out,

associate membership may actually be inimical to long-term

Turkish interests: Turkey could become enmeshed in European

issues without being able to participate fully in discussions

and, undoubtedly, not in the voting process. Certainly, under the

terms of the association agreement, Turkey has the freedom to

choose when and where to become involved, but the pressure upon

Turkey to be seen as "European" could coerce the Turks to take

actions that they might not pursue were Ankara a full member.44

For Turkey to integrate more fully in the WEU could also

require the Turks to take a more "European" view of defense and

security matters. Turkey could get caught between its desires to

satisfy the United States and its goal of fuller integration with

Europe that would require moving closer to "European" ideas and,

perhaps, away from the United States. Thus, aligning more with

European policies could create tensions within the Turkish-U.S.

bilateral relationship that might hinder attainment of U.S.

policy objectives.45

Turkish Relations Within NATO. As Bruce Kuniholm, an

authority on Turkish security issues, has pointed out,

"underpinning Turkey's early role in the NATO alliance was the

principle of reciprocity."46 When Turkey joined NATO, the parties

tacitly agreed that Turkey would help contain the Soviet Union.

Should deterrence have failed, Turkey would have made its

facilities available to NATO and would have distracted as many

Soviet forces as possible from a campaign in Central Europe. In

return, Turkey fell under the Alliance's deterrent and defense

umbrella and the Alliance provided economic and military

assistance to modernize the Turkish armed forces.47

The demise of the Soviet Union has called into question the

need to sustain this reciprocal relationship. Some Turkish

commentators question whether Europeans still consider Turkey to

be a key ingredient in the European defensive scheme.48 Other

analysts have argued that although the Soviet threat has faded,
substantial risks remain along NATO's Southern Tier, and Turkey,

in particular, has quickly become the Alliance's new front

line.49

European reluctance to comprehend the risks facing Turkey

and Turkey's rising relative importance as "point man" on NATO's

southern flank stems from several conditions. First, many NATO

members remain preoccupied with the aftermath of the unification

of Germany, the continuing economic recession in Europe,

implementation of post-Maastricht issues within the EU, and the

assimilation of the former Communist states of Central and

Eastern Europe. Second, after the long cold war, nations are

intent on realizing the "peace dividend." As a result, analysis

of security issues within many states has focused inward as

nations concentrate on forecasting minimum possible defense

expenditures, reducing their forces to conform to new spending

guidelines, redefining their security policies, and adapting

strategies to new fiscal constraints.50

Third, in the wake of the Gulf War, some European allies

have expressed concerns over involvement in "out-of-NATO area"

operations. While this debate is not new,51 its focus has

sharpened because of the volatile security conditions along

Turkey's eastern and southern borders. The Turks strongly believe

that, as Secretary of State Warren Christopher has remarked,

"Turkey lives in a rough neighborhood,"52 and that this

neighborhood falls within the NATO area. Not all of Turkey's

NATO partners are enthusiastic about helping police this area,

however.53 Some NATO members fear that a conflict between Turkey

and one of its neighbors could result in Turkey invoking the

defense clause of the Washington Treaty and drawing NATO into a

confrontation that would be peripheral to overall European

interests.54

Ironically, the Turks have their own reservations about

"out-of-NATO area" operations and do not want to get caught up in

disputes between their neighbors and their NATO allies. Turkish

leaders, for example, are concerned that NATO allies will demand

use of Turkish bases and NATO infrastructure (communications,

logistics, etc.) within Turkey to conduct operations that may not

be in accord with Turkey's national interests as a regional power

or that operations might be carried out against another Islamic

state.55

Turkey, therefore, is in a dilemma. Turkey hesitates to

support its NATO allies in controversies along its borders that

it would rather avoid (such as Operations POISED HAMMER and

PROVIDE COMFORT),56 but strongly wants NATO to safeguard Turkish

security against the instability that boils along its borders.

Given these circumstances, it would appear logical for Turkey to

resolve this dilemma through deeper bilateral relations with the

United States.

TURKISH-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS
Turkish-U.S. security relations are also undergoing

reexamination, due as much to Turkish as American motivations. In

the wake of the Gulf War, for example, Chief of the Turkish

General Staff, General Dogan Gures noted that cooperation with

the United States "has slowed down." Specifically, Gures stated:

The United States suggested storing military material

and equipment at the bases in Turkey for emergency

operations. The project has not been taken up

seriously. The matter is very sensitive, and, because

of this, it is also being taken up at the political

level. Work here has also slowed, and the matter has

not been placed on the agenda. We know that U.S. aid

could be reduced, so we have drawn up measures to deal

with that eventuality.57

Continued U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military pressure

on Iraq and support of the Kurds in northern Iraq have increased

the distance that some Turks feel toward the United States. As

The Wall Street Journal noted,

Spend time in Turkey today, and what you'll hear is

increasing criticism of the U.S. military presence at

Incirlik air base, which is central to U.S. efforts to

maintain stability in the Persian Gulf, which still

supplies most of the West's energy needs.58

The Wall Street Journal questioned whether such comments marked a

critical decline in Turkish-U.S. relations, but did note that

"... serious people wouldn't ignore the possibility."59

Such criticisms also preceded recent congressional

reductions in U.S. military assistance to Turkey that will

undoubtedly exacerbate tensions. First, Congress reduced the Bush

administration's last proposed budget allocation for military aid

to Turkey from $543 million to $450 million. Second, and more

importantly, Congress converted the money from outright grants to

loan credits.60 These actions invoked considerable adverse

commentary from Turkey, which is in the midst of a multi-year,

multi-billion dollar modernization program of its armed forces.

Moreover, Turkey currently has roughly a $7.5 billion debt in

foreign military sales to the United States, as well as a total

foreign debt of approximately $40 billion,61 and another $450

million in loans will not help matters. As a result, the Turks

perceive that their nation's long contributions to NATO, support

of the U.S.-led coalition during the Gulf War, and, especially,

their difficult economic sacrifices in support of the embargo of

Iraq have not been adequately recognized by the United States.

Consequently, Turkish leaders have called for the revision of the

U.S.-Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980

(DECA).62

Originally intended to last 5 years, the DECA has been
repeatedly extended and is due to expire at the end of 1993. The

DECA stipulated that "... The United States will exert its best

efforts to provide mutually agreed upon financial and technical

assistance to Turkey's development efforts," and that "... the

United States shall use its best efforts to provide the Republic

of Turkey with defense equipment, services, and training, in

accordance with programs to be mutually agreed upon [emphasis

added]."63 Apparently, Turkish political leaders no longer

perceive that the United States is offering "its best efforts."

As one unnamed Turkish official noted,

Washington made a number of promises when it extended

DECA in the past. However, it failed to realize them.

That is a point that should be considered in the

talks.64

In an attempt to ensure future "U.S. best efforts," Turkish

officials have demanded that yearly military aid guarantees be

included in the next version of the DECA. The reported U.S.

response to this demand has unsettled the Turkish diplomatic

community. According to unnamed officials of the Turkish General

Staff participating in the negotiations, their U.S. counterpart

replied that "the United States will be forced to close down its

bases in Turkey if Ankara insists that the military aid it

receives from the United States should be guaranteed."65 Such

blunt diplomatic language caused consternation within Turkish

policy-making bodies, particularly military circles, which

undoubtedly will have an effect on Turkish perceptions of the

extent of the U.S. commitment to Turkish security concerns.

Perceived U.S. treatment of Turkey may not be the sole

motivating factor behind Turkey's decision to review its

bilateral relations with the United States. Indeed, over-reliance

on the United States may not be in Turkey's long-term interests.

As Duygu Sezer remarked in 1989: "a bilateral military

relationship with the U.S. would turn Turkey ... into a lonely

military outpost of Europe, while Western Europe closed itself

into a United Europe." Sezer also concluded that such close

bilateral relationship with the United States would play into the

hands of religious fundamentalists in Turkey, "... for it would

be seen as a defeat for the pro-Western modernists."66 Thus, for

Turkey, a two-pronged approach that includes the United States,

but continues to focus on European security arrangements will be

essential for future Turkish security and political vitality.

THE BALKANS: IMPEDIMENT TO TURKISH INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE

The ongoing crisis in the Balkans could derail Turkish

objectives of increased integration with Europe. Turks have

strong ties to their Muslim co-religionists throughout the

Balkans that pull them toward intervention in the war in

Yugoslavia. As a result of the Ottomans' long and oppressive

occupation, however, few states in the region are willing to

permit a physical Turkish presence in the Balkans outside of
Turkey.67 Consequently, Ankara is constrained from assisting

ethnic Turks or Muslims in the Balkans to the degree it feels

necessary, and a certain amount of frustration--to be added to

those already addressed--has resulted.

Turkish intervention in the ongoing crisis could generate a

severe backlash within Europe. At the least, full Turkish

membership in the EU or WEU could be delayed because of Greek

objections to Turkish activities. At the worst, Greece and Turkey

could be drawn into opposing sides of the conflict. Such a

situation could irreparably set back further Turkish integration

with Europe, result in the unravelling of NATO, or prevent the

further integration of Central and Eastern Europe with West

European organizations. Such intervention, while not likely in

the foreseeable future, cannot be dismissed out of hand and could

occur in a number of ways.

The first instance could be Turkish involvement in the

current conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Muslims make up

approximately 44 percent of Bosnia-Hercegovina's population68 and

have been the primary object of Croatian and Serbian aggression.

For nearly 2 years, the Turks have reiterated their historic and

legal responsibilities for safeguarding Muslim populations in the

Balkans, particularly in the former Yugoslavia and Albania.69 For

example, the Turkish General National Assembly noted in August

1992 that it would not accept any forcible changes to the borders

of Bosnia-Hercegovina and that:

The TGNA will consider it a humanitarian duty to take

every kind of step to stop the Serbian attacks for the

protection of the people and territorial integrity of

Bosnia-Hercegovina in case the international use of

force is delayed.70

As late as February 1993, then Turkish President Turgut Ozal

restated his position that Turkey "is responsible for looking

after the well-being of the Muslims in the Balkans."71

Turkish frustrations over the lack of European or U.N.

action to protect the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina have been

building, and Turkish leaders have become increasingly critical

of perceived Western equivocation.72 These tensions have been

eased somewhat by Turkish participation in the enforcement of the

"no-fly" zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina, and in the naval forces in

the Adriatic Sea enforcing U.N. sanctions,73 but it remains to be

seen how long these relatively limited actions will assuage

Turkish public opinion. Indeed, even with these actions, some

Turkish leaders have endorsed a more strident approach. For

example, Necmet Erbakan, leader of the Turkish Prosperity Party,

has declared that "If we come to power, we will do in Bosnia what

we did in Cyprus,"74 alluding to the 1974 Turkish invasion of

northern Cyprus.

While an outright Turkish invasion in support of their
co-religionists in Bosnia-Hercegovina is highly unlikely,

accounts of clandestine Turkish military aid have surfaced

repeatedly. For example, an anonymous source associated with the

Turkish General Staff has confirmed reports that upwards of 1,000

soldiers have been prepared for covert deployment to Bosnia to

aid Muslim forces.75 Thus, even if the Turks do not officially

intervene, their actions may be sufficient to cause a reaction

from other parties within the region that affects overall Turkish

relations in Europe. Moreover, even unfounded rumors of such

preparations are sufficient to raise suspicions among Turkey's

Balkan neighbors.

Despite the volatile situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the

level of some Turkish rhetoric, the chance of substantial overt

Turkish intervention is relatively small because reactions would

imperil overall Turkish political goals in Europe. Should the

conflict spread to Macedonia (where, it should be recalled, the

United States has deployed 500 troops as U.N. observers), Kosovo,

or Albania, however, Turkey could be drawn into a war that has

the potential to quickly escalate and engulf the entire Balkan

Peninsula.

Roughly one third of Macedonia's population is Muslim and it

has close ties with Turkey. To underscore the importance of

Turkish support of Macedonia, the late President Ozal discussed

Turkish military assistance to Macedonia during his February 1993

visit to Skopje.76 Thus, Serbian attacks against the Muslim

population of Macedonia, especially following the depredations

against Bosnian Muslims, would undoubtedly bring a strong Turkish

reaction.77

Bulgaria could also be drawn into the conflict should it

spread to Macedonia. Bulgaria has historically coveted Macedonia;

indeed, Bulgaria participated in four wars in the last century in

failed attempts to incorporate Macedonia into a "Greater

Bulgaria."78 Sofia also considers itself to be Macedonia's

guardian from Serbia, Greece, and Turkey. Although Sofia has

followed a cautious policy to date, any intervention by one of

those parties would bring about a Bulgarian reaction that would

almost certainly result in Turkish entry into the conflict.79

Bulgarian actions in Macedonia also would likely precipitate

Greek counteraction. Greece has long-standing historical claims

to portions of Macedonia, and is intent on preventing the

Bulgarians or Turks from expanding their territory or position

there.80 Greece is particularly concerned about Turkish

penetration into the Balkans. As The Wall Street Journal pointed

out, "any Turkish return to the Balkan nations it once ruled

would enflame Greece, its ancient rival, which is preparing to

deploy 35,000 troops on its border with Macedonia."81

Turkish or Bulgarian actions or intervention in Macedonia

may not be required to cause Greek intervention in Macedonian

affairs. Athens has become almost paranoid about Macedonia--as
Greek histrionics over the name, Macedonia, clearly indicate.82

Indeed, the "Macedonia Issue" contributed significantly to the

defeat of the government led by Constantine Mitsotakis in the

October 1993 elections.83 Although unlikely, the potential

exists that Greece could take unilateral action against Macedonia

to preclude such an outcome, which could bring Turkey and,

possibly, Bulgaria into the conflict.

The situation is more explosive in the Kosovo region of

Serbia. Although 90 percent of the population is ethnic Albanian

and Muslim, Kosovo is part of Serbia and Serbian nationalism has

raised Kosovo to the status of a holy place. The region is

virtually occupied by the Serbian Army which is exercising

oppressive martial law, as well as conducting a vicious campaign

designed to drive out ethnic Albanians.84 As a result, many

observers have concluded that it is only a matter of time until

the Serbs extend their "ethnic cleansing" campaign to Kosovo.85

Even should the Serbs not initiate action, the situation has

grown so tense and Albanian minorities have become so oppressed

that it is possible that Albanian Kosovar nationalists might take

steps to provoke or precipitate a Serbian action to bring about a

response from the other regional powers.86

A worst case scenario for an expansion of the ongoing Balkan

conflict could unfold as follows. Regardless of cause, the Serbs

begin ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Albania, despite a desire to

avoid war at all costs, might feel compelled to take action to

assist its brethren in Kosovo.87 In turn, the Serbs retaliate

against Albania. Given that Turkey and Albania have existing--

but publicly unspecified--defense arrangements,88 Turkey could

then likely become involved in the conflict. This would

undoubtedly bring Greece, and probably Bulgaria, into the

conflict, as well.89

Even if Turkey did not initially become involved, Macedonia-

-with its own sizeable Albanian minority, large Muslim population

(roughly one third), and fear that it might be the next target of

Serbian aggression--could be drawn into the conflict.90 The

combination of Macedonian and Albanian participation would

undoubtedly elicit Turkey's participation also. Should either

Macedonia or Turkey become involved, Greece and Bulgaria would

feel compelled to enter the fray to protect their nationalist

interests. Thus, Kosovo holds the high potential of striking the

spark that sets the Balkans ablaze once again.91

Continuation of the war in the former Yugoslavia will

complicate the achievement of Turkish goals in Europe. To date,

Ankara has displayed tremendous patience with the situation in

Bosnia-Hercegovina. How long the Turks will be able to retain

that patience remains to be seen. But, given the stakes involved,

particularly their keen desires for increased integration with

Europe, it is likely that Turkish initiatives will remain

restricted to rhetoric. That said, should the situation in

Bosnia-Hercegovina dramatically worsen, the Turks may feel
compelled to action, even at the risk of jeopardizing their

overall position in Europe. At the very least, Turkish

frustrations with Europe and the United States may increase and

exert effects in other areas (e.g., Iraq, Transcaucasia, or

Central Asia).

Should the war expand beyond Bosnia-Hercegovina into

Macedonia or Kosovo, Turkish national interests will be more

fully engaged in Balkan, as opposed to pan-European, issues. The

Turks will be faced with extremely difficult choices concerning

the price they are willing to pay for fuller integration with

Europe. Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo or aggression against

Macedonia, without what the Turks perceive to be adequate U.N.,

European, or U.S. responses, may force Turkey to intervene,

despite the costs in European integration that might be involved.

Certainly, those costs could be extremely high, and Turkey will

carefully weigh its options.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Turkey has discovered itself in a new, unfamiliar world,

"and facing it, Turkey finds itself alone--philosophically,

politically, and militarily."92 Turkish leaders have been

uncomfortable in such an isolated position and have sought ways

to extricate Turkey from its predicament. The path they have

chosen relies predominantly on increased integration with Europe.

While this conforms with Turkey's traditional approach to

ensuring Turkish security and modernization goals, it presumes

that Europe will accommodate Turkish aspirations.

Whether Europe will fully satisfy Turkish expectations is an

open question. Turkey faces considerable hurdles in achieving its

goal of full integration in the European community and European

Union. The Ottoman past remains a sticking point in

Turkish-European relations and significant religious, racial, and

cultural differences compound historical difficulties. European

concerns over the pace of human rights reform in Turkey, and the

gap between European and Turkish economic capabilities may

present difficult barriers to overcome in the short term.

Turkish security concerns are real, but Ankara should not

look to the WEU for increased support. That said, and despite its

drawbacks, associate membership in the WEU is probably the best

Turkey can achieve in the short term and Turkish leaders will

have to live with the frustrations of not achieving full

membership. The Turks can take solace that associate membership

at least gets their foot in the door, so to speak, and offers an

increased opportunity to participate in the debates that will

shape the future European security environment. Moreover, as the

WEU expands its role as the security arm of the EU, Turkey may

also be able to make its influence felt in that body.

Nonetheless, these conditions likely will not satisfy Turkish

leaders and future seeds of discontent will be sown unless Turkey

achieves full membership.
Closer security relations with the United States, although

not desirable to the Turks in many ways, may have to compensate

for the lack of support from NATO or the WEU. If European

security organizations fail to meet Turkish expectations, the

United States may have to assume a larger part of the burden of

providing security assistance to Turkey. If the United States is

unwilling to accept this charge, Turkey could turn its back on

Europe and focus its energies on the Middle East or Central Asia.

This would be a tremendous setback for the West, and the United

States should exert all possible leverage to persuade Europeans

to accommodate Turkish concerns.

These issues will also be complicated by Turkey's new

approach to the world. Turks have a great deal of energy and

potential that they want to use. Already, signs indicate a

growing Turkish awareness of its regional, as well as world,

importance and a desire to pursue a more independent policy line

in accordance with its newly perceived status. Ankara, therefore,

may take stronger, more independent positions than its U.S. and

European allies have been accustomed.

U.S. interests may dictate that the United States strongly

supports Turkish initiatives. The United States and Turkey have

complementary interests in Europe, and Turkish membership in the

EU, WEU, and other European organizations offers the possibility

of the United States being able to exert indirect influence in

the crucial institutions of Europe. At the least, having a close

ally such as Turkey "sitting at the European table" will offer

the United States a measure of influence that it might not be

able to exert independently. Additionally, the United States and

Turkey also have parallel interests in Transcaucasia, Central

Asia, and the Middle East, areas where Turkey could exert

significant influence on the behalf of the United States in

return for U.S. support of Turkish goals in Europe.

If levels of future European integration fall short of

Turkey's goals but are sufficient to meet Turkey's perceived

minimum requirements (i.e., increased access to European markets

and further evolution of Turkey's associate membership in the

WEU), Turkey could remain content with its level of participation

in Europe. But, if the extent of European integration does not

meet Turkish expectations, particularly in terms of security

arrangements, then Turkey will undoubtedly seek assistance from

the United States.

The type of assistance requested from the United States may

vary. Ankara might press Washington to support Turkey's position

in Europe. While not exactly coincidental, U.S. and Turkish

interests within Europe are largely compatible and, on the

surface, should not present significant difficulties. The one key

exception to this general rule could be the Balkans where,

because of its Islamic heritage and strong national interests,

Turkey may feel compelled to take actions contrary to U.S.
interests. To date, Turkey has displayed considerable patience

with the ongoing crisis in the Balkans, but that patience may be

wearing thin.

The problem more likely to surface is that many of Turkey's

goals in Europe conflict with desires of U.S. allies in Europe. 

This places the United States in a dilemma. For example, Turkey

could ask the United States to bring pressure on their common

allies to achieve Turkish goals of full membership in the EU or

WEU as quid pro quo for Turkish support of U.S. policies outside

of Europe (e.g., U.S. access to Incirlik, support of an operation

similar to Operation DESERT SHIELD/ STORM, or counterweight to

Syrian or Iranian hegemonic designs in the Middle East.)93 Or,

Turkey could request U.S. support of critical Turkish bilateral

interests, such as pressure on the German government to ensure

the safety of its ethnic Turk minority, as well as ease Turkish

assimilation in German society through less stringent citizenship

requirements. Alternatively, the Turks could seek U.S.

initiatives to help resolve the Cyprus question, broker an

agreement for ending Aegean air and sea territorial disputes, or

improve treatment of Turkish minorities in Greece.

All of these issues will be difficult to resolve. Given the

hardened stand of many nations over these complex matters, the

degree of pressure required to provide effective assistance to

Ankara is likely to require a level of effort that would alienate

other U.S. European allies. Thus, the United States could face a

difficult choice: support Turkey and risk alienating its European

allies or not support Turkish initiatives in Europe and

jeopardize bilateral relations with Ankara at a critical time

when Turkey supports U.S. interests not only in Europe, but also

the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

If Turkey fails to achieve full membership in the EC and

WEU, Turkish leaders would likely seek improved or expanded

bilateral relations with the United States. Undoubtedly, Ankara

will desire continued economic aid, particularly military aid

that contributes to the timely completion of Turkey's 10 year

modernization program of its armed forces. Turkey may also look

to the United States to open wider its markets to Turkish goods

and services that will support the general modernization of

Turkish industry and society.

Nor may the United States be able to deny Turkey such

assistance. As the United States shifts to a regional strategy,

Turkey may possess considerable leverage in future relations with

the United States. Turkish support of U.S. interests, or at least

pursuit of complementary objectives (such as in Central Asia or

the Middle East), could benefit the United States. In the

economic arena, greater and faster Turkish economic success could

bolster Russian and Ukrainian economies, which could translate

into greater overall stability in Europe.

Thus, the United States may face difficult choices in the
midst of redefining its world role and the strategy to effect

that role. This review also comes at a time when U.S. leaders are

focusing more sharply on domestic issues and are spending less

time on foreign affairs. The United States also finds its

resources stretched, which in this context translates into

increasingly constrained military and foreign aid funds. The

United States, therefore, may be forced to reevaluate its

priorities--continue its past policies emphasizing Central Europe

or concentrate more on Turkey?

Should Turkish expectations of fuller integration with

European political, economic, and security institutions go

unfulfilled, Turkey could turn its back on Europe and focus on

developing relations in the Middle East and Central Asia. Should

this occur, the United States may be called upon to bolster

Turkey's economic and security interests. This may require the

United States to support new Turkish initiatives in Central Asia,

an area that, heretofore, has been marginal to U.S. interests.

Alternatively, the United States could become more embroiled in

the Kurdish issue or entangled in local disputes in the Middle

East. These new burdens could arrive at a time when the United

States appears uncertain of its role in Europe,94 and the Clinton

administration may find it difficult to generate the public or

congressional support that may be necessary to satisfy Turkish

expectations.

European, U.S., and Turkish interests will be best served if

Turkey remains engaged in Europe. Unfortunately, Europeans may

not take the steps necessary to ensure continued Turkish

integration. If these issues are not resolved and Turkey

disengages from Europe, European and, more importantly, U.S.

interests in Europe, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the

Middle East will suffer. Thus, it is incumbent upon the United

States to take steps to preclude such an eventuality.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS

The United States must continue to encourage its European

allies to acknowledge Turkey's importance in the post-cold war

security environment, to include greater participation in

European political and security organizations. More than

rhetoric will be required; concrete actions will have to be taken

to raise European consciousness of Turkey's strategic importance

and to assuage Turkish anxieties. The following initiatives

represent potential actions that the United States should

undertake.

Economic Initiatives.

• Assist Turkey in ways that will contribute toward Turkey's

eventual membership in the EU. For example,

-- Further open U.S. markets to Turkish merchandise.
-- Restructure Turkey's foreign military sales debt to

optimize Turkey's ability to repay. Forgive existing foreign

military sales debts.

-- Provide economic advice and assistance, particularly

concerning privatization of industry, that will help Turkey

overcome the hurdles to its membership in the EU.

-- Encourage greater private American investment in

Turkey.

Diplomatic Initiatives.

• Bring influence to bear on European allies to overcome

obstacles to full Turkish membership in pan-European institutions

such as the WEU and EU.

• Encourage European nations, especially Germany, to

maintain safety of ethnic Turks and to liberalize immigration and

citizenship requirements.

• Increase diplomatic efforts to broker resolution of the

outstanding Greek-Turkish issues over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea.

Security Initiatives.

• Continue to support Turkey's military modernization

program.

-- As the U.S. Armed Forces proceed with their draw

down, continue to provide surplus equipment that enhances Turkish

military capabilities.

-- Provide military assistance grants as opposed to

credits.

-- Persuade Congress to reexamine the de facto 7/10

military aid distribution between Greece and Turkey. This does

not imply that Greece should be placed in a subservient position

vis-a-vis Turkey, but a more stringent strategic cost benefit

analysis may be in order.

• The United States must exert influence in NATO that

ensures Turkish security anxieties are addressed. For example,

-- Ensure continued funding of existing and planned

NATO infrastructure projects in Turkey. This will require

Congress to appropriate more money to support the NATO

infrastructure fund than it has shown itself willing to do in the

post-cold war era.

-- Promote additional infrastructure projects in Turkey
that enhance the modernization and effectiveness of Turkish

forces. This may require reducing funds available within the

Central Region.

-- Increase Turkish command and staff officer

representation in appropriate NATO commands (e.g., NATO

headquarters, SHAPE, AFSOUTH, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps).

-- While recognizing the political difficulties

involved, the United States may wish to support Ankara's bid to

have the headquarters of the Multinational Division, South

located in Turkey.

-- NATO, and if necessary the United States, could

increase the levels of exchanges and exercises with Turkey.

• Given Turkish sensitivities about bilateral relationships,

the United States should pursue security initiatives in a

multilateral format. This approach offers two benefits:

-- Ankara will not be forced into the role of junior

partner.

-- Multilateral negotiations ensure that Europeans are

continually involved with important Turkish issues and can be

used as a means of educating European allies about the strategic

importance of Turkey.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER 2

1. Steve Coll, "The Turkish Question: How Important Is It?,"

The Washington Post, May 24, 1993, p. A13.

2. Ibid.

3. Duygu Sezer, "Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma,"

International Spectator, Vol. 27, No. 1, January-March 1992, p.

22.

4. Harry B. Ellis, The Common Market, Cleveland: The World

Publishing Co., 1965, p. 88; Ian Lesser, Mediterranean Security:

New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy, Santa Monica,

CA: RAND, 1992, p. 88, note 5, and Ian Lesser, Bridge or Barrier?

Turkey and the West After the Cold War, Santa Monica, CA: RAND,

1992, p. 8.

5. Duygu Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policy: Challenges of

Adaptation to the Post-INF Era," Royal United Services Institute

Journal, Vol. 134, No. 4, Winter 1989, p. 53.

6. See, for example, comments contained in Sahin Alpay,

"Turkey in 2020," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service

(FBIS)-WEU-91-122-S, June 25, 1991 (hereafter Alpay, "Turkey in

2020"), pp. 16-18. "Turkey in 2020" is the result of interviews
with 32 of Turkey's leading intellectuals from all walks of life:

politicians, academics, scientists, artists, writers, film

makers, journalists, businessmen, etc.

7. Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2, p. 41.

8. Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policy," p. 53.

9. Alpay, "Turkey in 2020," p. 19.

10. Ibid., p. 24. Ozdalga is former deputy leader of the

Democratic Left Party.

11. Ibid., p. 25.

12. "Geopolitical Overload," The Wall Street Journal,

November 20, 1992, p. A14.

13. For an example of the extent to which the Turks are

willing to go in order to satisfy the EU, see John Murray Brown,

"Turkey's EC courtship lowers the trade barriers," Financial

Times (London), August 4, 1993, p. 4.

14. Morris Abramowitz, "Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Ozal,"

Foreign Policy," No. 91, Summer 1993, p. 167. For example, the

Turks were angered when Austria apparently moved ahead of Turkey

in EU membership discussions. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," p.

41. This anger will be exacerbated, no doubt, by the recent EU

invitation to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,

Romania, and Bulgaria to join the EU. Alan Riding, "European

Community Sets Terms for 6 Former Soviet Allies to Join," The New

York Times, June 23, 1993, p. A8.

15. All of the above taken from, Alpay, "Turkey in 2020," p.

26. Boyner is the past president of the Turkish Industrialists'

Businessmen's Association.

16. Ibid.

17. This is particularly true of Greece, Belgium, and

Germany (the first because of proximity to Turkey and the latter

two because they already have large Turkish populations).

Nicholas Gianaris, Greece and Turkey: Economic and Geopolitical

Perspectives, New York: Praeger, pp. 165, 166, and 168. Much of

Western Europe suffers from a rising tide of anti-immigrant bias.

Attacks against ethnic Turks in Germany have been most prominent,

of late. See, for example, Marc Fisher, "Germany's Turks Erupt

With Pent-up Anger," The Washington Post, June 2, 1993, p. A21,

and Andrew Nagorski and Theresa Waldrop, "The Laws of Blood,"

Newsweek, June 14, 1993, p. 38-39.

18. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," p. 42.
19. Ibid.

20. For examples of Turkish sensitivities, see TRT

Television Network, January 28, 1992 in "Leaders Hold Panel

Discussion on Foreign Policy," FBIS-WEU-92-020, January 28, 1992,

p. 27.

21. Note, for example, Prime Minister Demirel's comments in

Bonn in February 1993 that the Germans needed to reconsider their

attitudes toward the PKK. Frankfurter Allgemeine, February 22,

1993, p. 3 in FBIS-WEU-93-041, March 4, 1993, p. 42. For a brief

synopsis of the suspension of German military aid because former

German equipment was used against Kurds, see Marc Fisher, "Bonn

Extends Ban on Arms to Turkey," The Washington Post, March 27,

1992, p. A17, or John Murray Brown, "Review follows as US cancels

grants," London Financial Times, November 18, 1992, p. 6. Even

though the Germans later lifted the ban, the move still rankled

the Turks, who resented what they perceived as Germans meddling

in their internal affairs. This imbroglio followed close on the

heels of German hesitation to reinforce Turkey during the Gulf

War in December 1990. Even though aid has been restored, Bonn

announced that supposedly due to fiscal constraints associated

with unification, Germany will end its long-standing military aid

to Turkey by 1995. Hamburg, DPA, November 2, 1992, in

FBIS-WEU-92-213, November 3, 1992, p. 39.

22. Die Welt, June 26, 1993, in "Kurdish Problem Seen

Hurting Ties with Ankara," FBIS-WEU-93-122, June 26, 1993, p. 13.

23. A brief account is contained in "The Kurds Are

Suffering," Newsweek, July 5, 1993, p. 37. See also, "Press Views

Kurdish Attacks," in FBIS-WEU-93-121, June 25, 1993, p. 6, and

"Article Gives Background on PKK Activities," in FBIS-WEU-93-124,

June 30, 1993, p. 7. Nor was this wave of violence the first such

case. Less violent instances also occurred in March 1992. See

"Arson Attack Aimed at Turkish Bank in Wiesbaden," "Turkish

`Separatists' Attack Hannover Bank," "Turkish Embassy, Airline

Office Attacked" [Belgium], and "Group of `Separatists' Attack

Turkish Interests" [Netherlands], all in FBIS-WEU-92-057, March

24, 1992, pp. 7 and 9.

24. Frankfurter Rundschau, June 30, 1993, in

FBIS-WEU-93-125, July 1, 1993, p. 28. The Federal Interior

Minister Manfred Kanther announced on November 26, 1993, that the

PKK was henceforth banned in Germany. DPA, November 26, 1993, in

"Kanther Bans Kurdistan Workers Party," FBIS-WEU-93-226, November

26, 1993, p. 27.

25. See, for example, Nagorski and Waldrop, "The Laws of

Blood," pp. 38-39. Between 1977-1990 only 13,000 of 1.8 million

Turks residing in Germany gained German citizenship, due largely

to long residency requirements, stiff fees, and language and

cultural tests. Fisher, "Germany's Turks Erupt with Pent-Up

Anger," p. A21.
26. All above from, WEU Document 1341, "Turkey," November 6,

1992, pp. 8-9. Examples of differences are manifold. Greece and

Turkey nearly went to war over the Aegean in 1988, and Turkey

would consider Greek expansion of sea territorial limits from 6

to 12 miles as an act of war. (Derya Sazak, "The Changing World

and Turkey," Milliyet, December 12, 1991, in FBIS-WEU-92-014,

January 28, 1992, p. 58. In February 1993, the Turks protested

the Greek expulsion of four Muslim religious leaders from Western

Thrace. (Anatolia, February 25, 1993, in FBIS-WEU-93-039, March

2, 1993, p. 59.) Turkish authorities demanded in March 1993 that

Greece investigate a fire that demolished a historic mosque in

Alexandroupolis and provide a suitable place of worship in the

interim. (Ankara TRT Television Network, March 17, 1993, in

FBIS-WEU-93-054, March 23, 1993, p. 49. The Greek government did,

indeed, build a new mosque.) An excellent account of

Greek-Turkish Aegean issues may be found in Tozun Bahcheli,

Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,

1990, Chapter 5, pp. 129-167. See also, Andrew Wilson, The Aegean

Struggle, Adelphi Paper No. 155, London: International Institute

for Strategic Studies, 1979.

27. Alpay, "Turkey in 2020," pp. 30-31.

28. See Gianaris, Greece and Turkey: Economic and

Geopolitical Perspectives, p. 165. Also Sabri Sayari, "Turkey:

The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis,"

Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, Winter 1992, p. 12.

29. Kuniholm, for example, concludes that the Turks will

continue low key efforts to full membership and take up the offer

of a customs union with the EU by 1995. "Turkey and the West," p.

41.

30. Alpay, "Turkey in 2020," p. 25.

31. Ibid., p. 26.

32. Ibid.

33. For reports on Syrian support of PKK groups see, for

example, Cumhuriyet, January 8, 1992, in "Syria Urged To Focus On

Border Security Issues," FBIS-WEU-92-014, January 22, 1992, pp.

52-53. Reports of Iranian support of PKK, see Paris, AFP, July

20, 1993, in "Iranian Envoy Summoned Over Backing of Rebels,"

FBIS-WEU-93-137, July 20, 1993, p. 68, and Hurriyet, July 16,

1993, in "Six PKK Camps Reportedly Established in Iran,"

FBIS-WEU-93-137, July 20, 1993, p. 70. A detailed discussion of

the PKK insurgency can be found in Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds

in Turkey, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990.

34. For Turkish-Iranian competition, see "Iran and Turkey

Vie for Soviet Carcass," Helsingen Sonomat (Helsinki), November

29, 1991, in FBIS-WEU-91-251, December 31, 1991, pp. 57-58. See
also "The Great Game, Chapter Two," Newsweek, February 3, 1992,

pp. 28-29.

35. A brief overview of Greek-Turkish problems in this

century alone can be found in George Lenczowski, The Middle East

in World Affairs, 4th ed., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

1980, pp. 98-110, 146-147, and 161-166. The seriousness of issues

in the Aegean is underscored by the fact that as late as 1988,

the two nations nearly went to war over territorial claims in the

Aegean Sea, and in Derya Sazak's conclusion in "The Changing

World of Turkey," Milliyet, December 12, 1991, in

FBIS-WEU-92-014, January 22, 1992, p. 58, that Turkey would view

a Greek extension of its territorial sea limits from 6 miles to

12 miles as an act of war.

36. See, for instance, Thomas Goltz, "Thousands of Ethnic

Turks Deported in Bulgarian Assimilation Campaign," The

Washington Post, June 15, 1989, p. A34, and Marc Fisher,

"Refugees Describe Bulgaria's Campaign Against Turks," The

Washington Post, June 21, 1989, p. A16.

37. For example, the long-standing Greek-Turkish-Bulgarian

competition over Macedonia could blossom once again. See, for

instance, George Kenney, "From Bosnian Crisis to All-Out War,"

The New York Times, June 20, 1993, p. E17; Martin Sieff, "Active

U.S. Support of Macedonia Urged," The Washington Times, December

2, 1992, p. 9; and Robert Greenberger, "Macedonian Lesson for

Clinton," The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1992, p. A14.

38. Elements of the Maastricht Treaty can be found in

Article D, Draft Treaty on Political Union, December 10, 1991.

Turkish attitudes about the importance of shaping the European

Defense Identity may be found in Lesser, Mediterranean Security, pp. 100-101.

39. Terms of the Brussels Treaty may be found in Sir Ian

Beckett, The North Atlantic Treaty, the Brussels Treaty, and the

Charter of the Unit Nations, London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd.,

1950, Appendix 4, pp. 65ff. Because of its security concerns,

Ankara places greater importance on membership in the WEU than in

the EU. See Lesser, Mediterranean Security, p. 100.

40. Tercuman, November 7, 1992, in FBIS-WEU-92-235, December

7, 1992, p. 54.

41. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier?, p. 12.

42. The Petersberg Declaration that stipulated the various

levels of membership within the WEU very specifically noted, "

...associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the

modified Brussels Treaty [emphasis added]...." Paragraph III. B.,

Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, June 19, 1992 in Letter from the

Assembly, No. 12, July 1992, p. 15.
43. Paragraph 3, Document of Associate Membership of WEU of

the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic

of Turkey, in Letter from the Assembly, No. 14, February 1993.

44. WEU Document 1341, "Turkey," p. 23. Alternatively,

because of its associate membership, a state involved with a full

WEU member might attack Turkey out of a belief that Turkey would

come to the assistance of a fellow WEU member. As a purely

hypothetical example, Bulgaria might attack Turkey because of a

dispute with Greece.

45. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier?, pp. 25-26.

46. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," p. 34.

47. Ibid.

48. Sezer, "Turkish Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma," p. 22.

49. See, for example, the case argued in William T. Johnsen,

NATO's New Front Line: The Growing Importance of the Southern

Tier, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

50. For example, many NATO members continue to redefine

their post-cold war security policies and force structures. The

United States has gone past the "Base Force" and announced the

results of the "Bottom Up Review" in September 1993; the Germans

appear to be in a continuous state of flux; and United Kingdom

forces are undergoing an upward revision after initial cuts

proved too severe. All other nations are undergoing similar

trials and tribulations.

51. The debate goes back to the original drafting of the

Washington Treaty. See Douglas T. Stuart, Can NATO Transcend Its

European Borders?, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, 1991, pp. 1-2. In the past, the debate focused on the

actions of major powers outside the confines of the geographic

area defined in Article 6 of the Washington Treaty and the

reluctance of members to be drawn into bilateral conflicts that

did not directly affect NATO interests or where NATO members had

differing policies (e.g., the Middle East). For a brief

discussion of NATO "out-of-area" operations and their

ramifications for NATO, see ibid. A fuller discussion may be

found in Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of

Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems Since 1949, Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1990.

52. Elaine Sciolino, "Christopher Gives Turks Plan to End

Rights Abuse," The New York Times, June 13, 1993, p. 11.

53. The most prominent example was the German hesitation to

support Turkey during the Gulf War. See, for example, Marc

Fisher, "NATO to Send Warplanes to Defend Turkey," The Washington

Post, January 3, 1991, p. A17, and Marc Fisher, "Germany
Reluctant to Defend Turkey If Iraq Retaliates," The Washington

Post, January 22, 1991, p. A20. Turkish views are outlined in

Lesser, Mediterranean Security, p. 101.

54. Graham E. Fuller, Turkey Faces East: New Orientations

Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union, Santa Monica,

CA: RAND, 1992, pp. 34-36, 45-46. For example, Turkey could

become embroiled with Iran because of competition over Azerbaijan

or Central Asia or continued Iranian support of the PKK

insurgency. Other, equally plausible, scenarios might include

confrontation with Syria or Iraq over Turkish control of the

Tigris and Euphrates Rivers; or confrontation with Armenia

because of its war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.

55. Lesser, Mediterranean Security, p. 101. The current

situation in Iraq is a pertinent example of this conundrum.

56. Thus, one sees the debates within Turkey over whether

Operation POISED HAMMER (coalition forces enforcing the no-fly

zones over northern Iraq) should be allowed to continue. For

examples of the debates, see Norman Kempster, "Angered Turks May

Halt Use of Air Base," Los Angeles Times (Washington ed.),

January 28, 1993, p. 3, and Sabah (Istanbul), May 12, 1993, in

FBIS-WEU-93-097, May 21, 1993, p. 70. Despite the debates,

Turkey continues to support PROVIDE COMFORT and POISED HAMMER. 

"NSC Decides to Extend State of Emergency, Poised Hammer,"

FBIS-WEU-93-118, June 22, 1993, p. 76.

57. Milliyet, January 22, 1992, p. 10, in "General Staff

Chief Views Terrorism, U.S. Aid," FBIS-WEU-92-020, January 30,

1992, p. 28.

58. "Geopolitical Overload," The Wall Street Journal, November 20, 1992, p. A14.

59. Ibid.

60. Milliyet, May 2, 1993, p. 16, in "Commentary Criticizes

U.S. Aid," FBIS-WEU-93-086, May 6, 1993, p. 54.

61. Lale Sariibrahimoglu, "Turkey seeks review of US defence

agreement," Jane's Defence Weekly, January 30, 1993, p. 9, and

Abramowitz, "Dateline Ankara," p. 178.

62. Roy Rowden, "Turkey seeks revised pact on bases, report

says," Stars and Stripes (Europe), March 12, 1993, p. 8, and

Sariibrahimoglu, "Turkey seeks review of US defence agreement."

63. Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, March 29,

1980, in U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol.

32, Part 3, 1979-1980, p. 3326.

64. Sami Kohen, Milliyet, May 2, 1993, p. 6 in "Commentary

Criticizes U.S. Aid," FBIS-WEU-93-086, May 6, 1993, p. 54.
Additionally, Washington announced in December 1992 that 8 of 12

U.S. installations in Turkey will be closed by the end of 1993.

Sariibrahimoglu, "Turkey seeks review of US defence agreement,"

p. 9.

65. Milliyet, July 29, 1993, p. 13 in "U.S. Military Aid,

Washington's Approach Viewed," FBIS-WEU-93-149, August 5, 1993,

p. 44.

66. Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policy," p. 53.

67. "The Year's Impending Tragedy," The Wall Street Journal,

January 4, 1993, p. A10.

68. "The Former Yugoslavia: A Map Portfolio," Springfield,

VA: National Technical Information Service, Map 7.

69. Early statements of Turkish responsibilities and

concerns can be found in Gunaydin (Istanbul), September 10, 1991,

p. 8 in FBIS-WEU- 91-178, September 13, 1991, p. 29.

70. Ankara Turkiye Radilari Network, August 25, 1992, in

"Joint Memorandum on Bosnia," FBIS-WEU-92-166, August 26, 1992,

p. 43.

71. That is, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and

Greek Thrace. Chuck Sudetic, "Bosnia Neighbors Nervously Seek

Pacts," The New York Times, February 17, 1993, p. 8.

72. For the increasing tone of Turkish rhetoric see, for

example, Robert Mauther, "Turkey criticises allies on Bosnia,"

London Financial Times, September 29, 1992, p. 3; Ankara TRT

Television Network, December 17, 1992, in "Turkey Supports Use of

Force," FBIS-WEU-92-244, December 18, 1992, p. 1; James Yuenger,

"Turkey Urges Desert Storm for Bosnia," Chicago Tribune, February

28, 1993, p. 1; and Ankara TRT Television Network, April 28,

1993, in "Turkish Chief of Staff Urges NATO Action in Bosnia,"

FBIS-WEU-93-081, April 29, 1993, p. 2.

73. Ankara TRT Television Network, April 28, 1993, in

"Turkish Chief of Staff Urges NATO Action in Bosnia,"

FBIS-WEU-93-081, April 29, 1993, p. 2, and Yuenger, "Turkey Urges

Desert Storm for Bosnia," February 28, 1993, p. 1, respectively.

These actions have set Greek-Turkish relations on edge. For

example, Greece refused to allow Turkish aircraft to use Greek

air space to fly from Turkey to Italy to participate in the

enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia. (Athens Elliniki

Radhiofonia Radio Network, April 17, 1993, in "Regime Rejects

Turkish Request," FBIS-WEU-93-073, April 19, 1993.) When Turkish

F-16 and C-130 aircraft then used international air space within

the Athens Flight Information Region, Greek aircraft intercepted

and, according to Turkish sources, "harassed" the Turkish

aircraft. See, for example, Ankara TRT Television Network, May 3,

1993, in "Ankara Rejects Greek Protest Over Planes' Flight Path,"
FBIS-WEU-93-086, May 6, 1993, p. 55.

74. Sassan Tabatabai, "Muslim World and Bosnia," The

Christian Science Monitor, May 11, 1993, p. 18.

75. Ibid., "Turkish Volunteers Fighting for Bosnia,"

FBIS-WEU-92-234, December 4, 1992, p. 71, and Ozgur Gundem,

January 14, 1993, pp. 1, 11 in "Paper Reports Troops To Be Sent

To Bosnia," FBIS-WEU-93-012, January 21, 1993, p. 81.

76. Sudetic, "Bosnia Neighbors Nervously Seek Pacts," p. 8.

77. Martin Sieff, "Active U.S. Support of Macedonia Urged,"

The Washington Times, December 2, 1992, p. 9.

78. The Balkan War of 1912, the Balkan War of 1913, World

War I, and World War II.

79. Sieff, "Active U.S. Support of Macedonia Urged," p. 9,

and Carol J. Williams, "Neighbors Fear Being Pulled In to [sic]

Yugoslav War," Los Angeles Times (Washington ed.), November 2,

1992, p. 2, and Misha Glenny, "Is Macedonia Next?" The New York

Times, July 30, 1993, p. A27.

80. Information contained in this paragraph has been taken

from Roger Thurow, "Balkan Tinderbox," The Wall Street Journal, November 17, 1992, p. A1; Sieff, "Active U.S. Support of

Macedonia Urged," p. 9; and Sudetic, "Bosnia Neighbors Nervously

Seek Pacts," p. 8.

81. "The Year's Impending Tragedy," The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 1993, p. A10.

82. Greek complaints about the name Macedonia go back to the

breakup of Yugoslavia and continue through the present. For early

concerns see, for example, "Mitsotakis Warns Skopje on

Territorial Claims" and "Elaborates Further on Macedonia," both

in FBIS-WEU-91-222, November 18, 1991, pp. 33-35; "Athens Breaks

Off Talks with Skopje Delegation," in FBIS-WEU-92-003, January 6,

1992, p. 56; and Blaine Harden, "Greece Blocks Recognition of

Macedonia," The Washington Post, June 10, 1992, p. A25. More

recent statements of Greek concern may be found in, for example,

"Mitsotakis Lists Conditions for Skopje," FBIS-WEU-93-035,

February 24, 1993, p. 55. A concise account of successful Greek

lobbying efforts in the United States over the "Macedonia

Question" can be found in Robert S. Greenberger, "Macedonian

Lesson for Clinton," The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1992,

p. A14.

83. I Kathimerini (Athens), January 17, 1993, p. 1 in

"Columnist Warns of Humiliation over Skopje," FBIS-WEU-93-013,

January 22, 1993, p. 54. In fact, it could be argued that the

Macedonia issue is the prime factor that precipitated the October

1993 elections in Greece. In April 1992, then Prime Minister
Mitsotakis fired his Foreign Minister, Andonios Samaras, over the

latter's hard line stand on the recognition of Macedonia. Samaras

subsequently led a revolt within the ruling party that slowly

chipped away at Mitsotakis' majority until the Prime Minister

felt compelled to call for a general election--which his party

soundly lost.

84. See, for example, Thurow, "Balkan Tinderbox," and Robert

L. Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," The Wall Street

Journal, June 29, 1992, p. A14.

85. See, for example, Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a

Balkan War," p. A14; George Kenney, "Blueprint for a Wider War,"

The New York Times, September 30, 1992, p. A25; and Thurow,

"Balkan Tinderbox," p. A1.

86. Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," p. A14,

and "The Year's Impending Tragedy," p. A10.

87. Of the many reports that raise this possibility, see,

for example, "The Year's Impending Tragedy," p. A10, and Keatley,

"Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," p. A14.

88. "The Year's Impending Tragedy," p. A10.

89. Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," p. A14.

90. Sieff, "Active U.S. support of Macedonia urged," p. 9,

and Greenberger, "Macedonian Lesson for Clinton," p. A14.

91. Nor is this a fanciful scenario. Numerous regional

experts and correspondents have offered a similar explanation for

possible escalation of the conflict. See, for example, Keatley,

"Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," p. A14; Kenney, "Blueprint

for a Wider War," p. A25; Thurow, "Balkan Tinderbox," p. A1;

Anatolia (Ankara), November 21, 1992, in FBIS-WEU-92-226, "Chief

of Staff: War `May Break Out' in Balkans," pp. 45-46; Sudetic,

"Bosnia Neighbors Nervously Seek Pacts," p. 8; and George Kenney,

"From Balkan Crisis to All-Out War," The New York Times, June

20, 1993, p. E17.

92. Sezer, "Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma," p.

31.

93. In early 1993, for example, then President Ozal

intimated that if the United Nations and Europe did not take

stronger action to end the violence in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Turkey

would deny access to Incirlik air base which is being used to

enforce the "no-fly" zone over northern Iraq and to protect Iraqi

Kurds. See Kempster, "Angered Turks May Halt Use of Air Base," p.

3. Misha Glenny posits, for example, that "President Clinton's

attempt to lift the U.N. arms embargo on the Bosnian Government

was informed partly by the perception that Turkey has become

crucial to American strategic interests in the Near East,
surrounded as it is by oil-rich Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq."

"Carnage in Bosnia, for Starters," The New York Times, July 29,

1993, p. A23.

94. Statements by Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff and

the subsequent flurry of public discussion on the future use of

U.S. power are the most prominent examples. See, for instance,

Daniel Williams and John M. Goshko, "Reduced U.S. World Role

Outlined but Soon Altered," The Washington Post, May 26, 1993, p.

A1.
CHAPTER 3

TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

THE KURDISH CONNECTION

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

INTRODUCTION

As the previous chapter has shown, Turkey has for many years

been focused on Europe. It has been attempting to integrate

itself into the European community. As part of that intention, it

has virtually turned its back on the Middle East, even though for

centuries Turkey was predominantly a Middle East power.1

It is ironic in this respect that today the principal threat

to Turkey's security originates in the Middle East. Radical

groups, which are carrying out subversive operations against the

Turkish state, are based there. The author is referring, of

course, to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the Armenian Secret

Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Hizbollah. These

groups have within recent years mounted a formidable threat to

Turkey's internal security. The activity of the PKK in particular

has been such that, in the eyes of many, unless checked, the PKK

will push Turkey into a civil war.2

This chapter will describe the origin of the PKK-directed

threat to Turkey. It will show that the PKK, and the other

radical organizations working with it, are the agents of Syria

and Iran, and that the radical states promoted these groups to

block what they perceived to be NATO advances in the region.

The chapter will further show that Syria and Iran look on

Turkey as a Trojan Horse whereby NATO is penetrating areas the

radicals claim as their sphere of influence. Weak as they are,

Damascus and Tehran are incapable of mounting a conventional

military threat to Ankara, and therefore they rely on indirect

power. They use terror as a means of harassing Turkey and to

discourage it from taking actions which the radicals deplore.

For example, in June of this year, 29 Turkish embassies and

missions in Europe were attached by the PKK.3 This wave of

violence that swept across Europe was promoted by Iran and, to a

lesser degree, Syria, this chapter will argue. The aim of the

attacks was to get Turkey to withdraw its support from Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT.

PROVIDE COMFORT, as is well known, represents an effort by

the United States to protect the Kurds from the wrath of Saddam

Husayn.4

 To Syria and Iran, however, it is something more

sinister. They see it as a thinly contrived effort on the part of

Turkey and the United States to establish a permanent NATO

military presence in the region, targeted on the Gulf.
Fear of NATO intervention on the part of the radicals goes

back many years. This chapter begins with an examination of how

Syria and Iran first developed their fears about NATO, and of

Turkey's alleged role as a NATO agent in the Middle East.

THE TERROR WAR AGAINST TURKEY

In December 1982 forces from nations belonging to NATO

entered Lebanon to separate warring Israelis and Arabs. They did

not come as NATO representatives. Indeed, no connection between

them and the Alliance was claimed; the units were officially

described as the Multi-National Force (MNF). Syria and Iran,

however, did not believe this distinction. To them, these were

NATO troops and they were coming to help Israel take over the

Levant. As a consequence of this perception, the radicals

mobilized against the intervention.5

The story of the terror war in Lebanon is so well known it

need not be recounted here. However, what is not known,

generally, is that Syria and Iran waged a similar campaign

against Turkey. Starting in 1983, Damascus and Tehran used

Kurdish and Armenian (and some Arab) assets to combat Ankara, and

they did it because, in their eyes, Turkey was subverting the

northern Gulf by helping NATO establish a military presence

there.

Fears in Damascus and Tehran had been aroused by NATO

maneuvers in southeastern Anatolia,6 which took place in June

1983. During these exercises, Turkish units crossed into Iraq on

a mission that has never been adequately explained. Turkey

claimed at the time that it was going after "bandits."7 However

this may be, the action was seen to benefit Iraq. Baghdad could

barely police its northern provinces at this time, and having

Turkey, in effect, do the job for it, was an enormous help.8

The fact that Turkey would seemingly abandon its professed

neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War deeply disturbed Syria's

President Hafez Assad.9 He viewed Iraq's President Saddam Hussein

as his arch rival, and had done everything in his power to topple

the Iraqi leader.

Now, not only was Turkey coming to Iraq's aid militarily,

there were other equally disturbing developments. Starting in

1982, it became obvious that Washington and Baghdad were moving

toward a rapprochement. The two had severed diplomatic relations

in 1967, and for years Iraq was considered among the inveterate

foes of both Tel Aviv and Washington.

In 1982, however, Congressman Stephen Solarz, a foremost

champion of Israel, visited Baghdad, after which Saddam publicly

expressed his belief that Israel was entitled to secure borders

in the Middle East. Right after that Saddam ejected several

terrorist groups from Baghdad, including the notorious Abu Nidal
organization. This opened the way for the U.S. State Department

to remove Iraq from its list of nations supporting terrorism, and

a relatively short time later Washington and Baghdad exchanged

ambassadors.10

Obviously these moves threatened Syria's position. In

effect, this was a throwback to the days of the Baghdad Pact,

when the United States had what appeared to be an unassailable

position in the Gulf.11 Hence, Assad (and the Khomeini regime as

well) devised a counter-strategy to offset these developments.

This was the start of the terror war mounted by Syria and

Iran against Turkey (and to a lesser degree Baghdad.)12 The

principal agents in this war were the Kurdish pesh merga

(guerrilla fighters who inhabit geographical Kurdistan), and

specifically the PKK, which at this time was a virtually unknown

organization. We will now look at how the PKK progressed, under

the tutelage of Syria and Iran, from a nonentity to become one

the most feared terrorist organizations in the Middle East, and

the principal threat to Turkey's stability today.

THE RISE OF THE PKK

Turkey's history of democratic practice is in many respects

exemplary among Middle Eastern nations. In 1950 Turkey's ruling

Republican Peoples Party (RPP) held elections in which,

unexpectedly, it was defeated. It stepped down.13

In the Middle East, where ruling parties almost never give

up power voluntarily, this was an extraordinary performance. 

Nonetheless, the parties that succeeded the RPP proved corrupt,14

and by the late 1970s Turkey was in the grip of a virtual civil

war, with self-proclaimed leftists and rightists battling each

other in the streets of Istanbul and Ankara. Finally, Turkey's

army intervened, drove the civilian government from power, and

purged Turkey of the many radical groups.15

One of the groups thus forced into exile was the PKK, which

professed to be the vanguard of the Kurdish separatist movement

in Turkey. This was a grand boast; in fact the PKK at this time

had little following. Turkey has a large Kurdish population (of

over 10 million),16 but, in the late 1960s, this population was

not active politically.17 Hence, the PKK claimed the title of

leader of the Turkish-Kurdish resistance by default--there was no

other significant Turkish-Kurdish opposition, or none, at any

rate, that espoused separatism.18

The PKK comprised mainly lower class ghetto youths,

self-styled Marxists. This was the time of the Maoist Revolution,

and youths throughout the world were embracing China's conception

of Marxist ideology. Like a lot of other youth groups at the

time, the PKK's understanding of Marxism was dim--as evidenced by

its program, which called for little else than "emancipating"

southeastern Anatolia (the home of Turkey's Kurdish community).
As to what would occur once liberation was secured--the PKK

cadres seemed unsure.19

The PKK, after being purged by Turkey's army, fled to Syria

where Assad took it under his protection.20 In 1983, he selected

this group to participate in, and ultimately to lead, the terror

war against Turkey.21

Assad first, however, had to move the PKK into a position

where it could act, and for this he turned to Masoud Barzani,

head of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).22 This was an

Iraqi-Kurdish group that participated in Iran's 1983 invasion of

northern Iraq. Afterward, the KDP guerrillas had infiltrated Iraq

along the Turkish border, and established bases there.

Assad wanted Barzani to take the PKK under his wing so that

the group could use his bases to infiltrate southeastern Turkey

and stir up a popular revolt. Barzani initially declined, for

fear of antagonizing the Turks.23 His father, Mulla Mustafa

Barzani, had led the Kurdish revolt against Baghdad from 1961

until 1975, and during that time had made it a rule always to

cooperate with Ankara. Indeed, the elder Mulla Mustafa had gone

so far as to assist the Turkish army in its repression of rebel

Turkish-Kurds. Ultimately, however, Assad prevailed, and the PKK

cadres joined Barzani in the north.

For awhile nothing was heard of the PKK, and then in July 

1984 it exploded into the headlines with a spectacular operation

that targeted two Turkish-Kurdish towns--Semdinli and Eruh. (See

Figure 1.) PKK cadres, divided into two sections, smuggled

themselves into Turkey and attacked the towns, located at widely

dispersed points in the southeast.24 This operation greatly

embarrassed the Turkish army, inasmuch as, prior to it, there had

been only minimal anti-government activity in the area.

Turkey responded by entering into an accord with Baghdad

whereby Saddam Hussein gave permission to Turkish units to enter

Iraq in order to comb the northern territory for PKK

guerrillas.25 Damascus and Tehran were outraged at this agreement,

and protested against it, but being weak neither could hope to

block it. Nonetheless, they took what action they could--which

basically consisted of stepping up their assistance to the

various anti-Turkish groups; in effect, they increased their

pressure on Turkey. For example, Iran offered to provide the PKK

a base along the Iranian-Turkish border at Urmia (See Figure 1).

At the same time, it invited the ASALA to open an office in

Tehran. (Shortly after this two Turkish diplomats were slain in

the Iranian capital, an event that nearly caused a break in

diplomatic relations between Iran and Turkey.26)

From late 1984 until 1987 a tug of war went on in Iraqi

Kurdistan and southeastern Turkey, with Syria and Iran on one

side supporting the Kurdish rebels, and Iraq and Turkey seeking

to repress them. Then, in 1988, Iraq unexpectedly turned the
tables on Iran, forcing it to capitulate in its 8-year war

against Baghdad. As might be imagined, the Kurdish rebellion in

Iraq died as soon as the Iranians surrendered. The PKK forces,

however, did not go out of action. They hung on in the rugged

mountains of southeastern Turkey. They were constrained, however,

from doing much; the whole security picture in the region had

changed after Iran lost the war.

AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE

The end of the Iran-Iraq War ushered in a brief period of

stability in the northern region of Iraq and southeastern

Anatolia. The Iranians stopped meddling with the Kurds, as they

had to fear Iraqi retribution. As for the Syrians, they were

severely compromised--Assad had backed a loser, which in the

Middle East is a bad thing to do. To save face, he had to

disassociate himself from the Kurdish resistance publicly. 

The big winner--along with Iraq--was Turkey. Between roughly

August 1988 and the eruption of the crisis in Kuwait, Turkey's

internal situation was relatively secure. Rebel activity in the

southeast continued at a low ebb. However, as long as there was
no support forthcoming from the Iraqi Kurds, it was manageable.

In Iraq, Saddam expanded his pacification campaign. During

the war he had cleared the Iraq-Iran border of Kurds, now he

extended his cordon sanitaire to include the Turkish-Iraqi border

as well. The Iraqis built model cities to house the displaced

Kurdish villagers. The Kurds were upset at being forced from

their homes. The Ba'thists, however, felt that their action was

justified--to bring the north into his orbit, Saddam had to

control the Kurds' smuggling operations. The quarantine now in

effect did that. For years all of the states in the area had been

plagued by Kurdish smugglers. Now, the base of their operations

was shut down, a most salutary development from the standpoint of

regional governments. For the first time since the late 1950s

geographical Kurdistan was relatively peaceful. And then Iraq

invaded Kuwait.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

At the direction of the late President Turgut Ozal, Turkey

played a major role in DESERT STORM. Indeed, Ozal violated

cardinal principles laid down by Turkey's founder Kemal Ataturk

to help out the coalition.

In the mid-1920s, Ataturk enjoined the Turks to cultivate

good relations with their immediate neighbors--Iraq, Iran and

Syria. This policy was meant to offset distrust among the

neighbors caused by policies of previous Turkish governments.

However, with the development of the Kuwait crisis, Ozal changed

course, virtually offering to go to war with neighbor Iraq, at

the behest of the Bush administration. To be sure, Turkey did not

take this step, but had it not been for Turkey's support the

coalition would not have defeated Iraq as easily as it did.

For example, the interdiction of Iraq's oil pipelines

through Turkey practically ensured the success of the West's

economic embargo. The stationing of U.S. fighter aircraft at

Turkey's Incirlik air base put enormous pressure on Iraq to

withstand a potential thrust from the north. Also (and this is a

factor easy to overlook) the post-conflict Kurdish rebellion

succeeded largely because Turkey had discontinued its

border-monitoring operations.

There has been speculation as to why Ozal was so forthcoming

to the United States. There really should be no mystery about

this--for Turkey it was a shrewd and effective move. Washington

needed of allies, and were Turkey to help out, there would be

rewards to come. This was undoubtedly true. Even so, Ozal

encountered stiff opposition at home to his policies. The

principles of Kemalism are meaningful to Turks. No matter how

many material benefits they might reap, Turks would not renounce

the legacy of the man who had founded their country. This

particularly was the case with the army officers.27
Turkey's Army Chief of Staff resigned shortly after Ozal

took his stand in support of the coalition.28 Indeed, due to the

opposition of the army, Ozal was kept from doing more for the

anti-Iraq forces. For example, the coalition originally

considered the idea of developing a second front against Iraq in

Turkey--this never happened.29 We do not know what role the

Turkish military played in preventing this, but we do know that

it opposed the plan. There was also a controversy over the use of

Incirlik by the coalition.30

In the face of such opposition, it is remarkable that Ozal

prevailed. Several commentators have maintained that he did so by

force of his personality.31 The author of this chapter believes

that he had more going for him than that--he had a most

compelling argument that he could use.

Since the end of World War I, Turkey has had a special

interest in Mosul, which was stripped from its control by the

League of Nations. Many Turks continue to believe that the

northern Iraqi province, originally part of the Ottoman Empire,

should once more be returned to them (See Figure 1).32

Thus, Ozal could argue that, if Turkey did not participate

actively in Operation DESERT STORM, it could not influence the

outcome of the war, which could cost it dearly. Iraq certainly

was going to lose. The question was how big, and what precisely

it would forfeit. If the Iraqi state dissolved, what would be the

fate of Mosul? The possibility existed that some sort of

independent Kurdish entity would emerge.

The idea that Mosul might become Kurdish was anathema to

Turkey's politicians (not to mention the army). Hence, Ozal could

argue that he had to back the coalition, or else Turkey could be

cheated of Mosul for the second time; and Mosul--as all Turks

were aware--included the rich oil fields of Kirkuk.33 Whether

Ozal used this argument is not known. We do know, however, that

considerable sentiment exists in Turkey against turning Mosul

over to the Kurds. Were this to occur, the author believes, the

Turkish army would intervene to prevent it. In any event, Turkey

did stand by Washington throughout DESERT STORM, and afterward

was set to receive its reward. However here Ozal's plans went

awry. With the abrupt and unexpected stampede of thousands of

Kurds into Turkey, the character of the war changed. The conflict

came home to the Turks; they now found themselves in the

international spotlight, portrayed, initially, at least, in a

none too flattering way.34

THE COSTS TO TURKEY

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT tested Ozal's pro-coalition policy

in two main areas. First, it strained Turkey's economy in ways

that it could not absorb. Initially, Ankara had to care for the

Kurdish refugees. Turks complained that they were being asked

single-handedly to rectify the plight of these people.
Further, the instrument for aiding the Kurds was the army,

which was unfortunate. The army, whose primary mission to date

had been policing Kurds (i.e., repressing them) was being asked

to dispense charity. This, the army found galling, because mixed

among the Kurdish civilians were the pesh merga, against whom it

had been warring for almost a decade.

With the world watching (via CNN), Turkey could hardly turn

its back on this problem. It did help out, but Ozal never

survived the blow to his prestige. In parliamentary elections

Ozal's party lost heavily, to the point where his government was

removed from office. To a large extent, the elections became a

referendum on the President's handling of the Kurdish issue, in

which he personally was repudiated. Ozal could maintain that he

would go on directing Turkish foreign policy.35 In fact, he got

no such opportunity, because now events really began to turn

against him. Powerful interests in the West had begun to call for

the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. This, of

course, was something that no Turk--not even Ozal--could

countenance.36 As stated earlier, Turks generally were concerned

about the fate of Mosul, should Iraq be dismembered. Now, the

very outcome that Turks feared apparently was going to transpire.

As the United States came more and more to back the Kurds,

their stock soared. Barzani, (along with Jalal Talabani of the

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK]), had become the leader of the

Iraqi Kurds, and now the U.S. State Department invited him to

Washington, an unprecedented show of regard.37 However, just as

things appeared to be going well for the Kurds, the PKK returned

to the scene. As noted earlier the PKK had maintained a presence

in southeastern Turkey, even after the Iran-Iraq War ended. Now,

it took advantage of the chaos resulting from DESERT STORM to

smuggle more of its cadres into the region. Thus, while world

public opinion embraced the Kurds, the Turkish army was attacked

by the most violent wing of the Kurdish movement.38 The

appearance of the PKK was announced spectacularly with a

firebombing of an Istanbul department store. A mob shouting "long

live Kurdistan" set the seven-story building ablaze, killing 11

people.39

Turkey's response was to intensify military repression

throughout the southeast, and, when violence continued in the

region, to reinstate the policy of cross-border raiding into Iraq

(essentially it undertook to cleanse the border region). When the

world community protested this, the Turkish army turned a deaf

ear. The initial cross-border operation was followed by more.40

Ozal, his power sharply curtailed, could not deflect the

army from its course. Indeed, the officers could claim to be

defending Turkey's vital interests, because all Turks--or at

least all non-Kurdish Turks--agreed that Kurdish separatism was a

menace; anything that promoted it must be expunged.
Unexpectedly the Iraqi Kurds became involved in the crisis.

 In October 1992, Barzani and Talabani held a parley with

Turkey's army commanders, in which they pleaded for an end to the

army's operations. It appeared that, in conducting the raids, the

Turkish army made no distinction between innocent Iraqi Kurds and

PKK cadres--any Kurds that it encountered were attacked.

The Turkish commanders rebuffed the Iraqi Kurds' entreaties,

until Talabani publicly denounced the PKK as "tools" of the

Iranians. His colleague Barzani echoed this sentiment, saying,

"It's no secret, Iran and Syria are aiding the Turkish rebels.

Each has his own purpose and aim but the ultimate aim they all

agree on is to undermine the Kurdish movement, and destroy what

we have here (in Iraq)."41 After that, the Turkish army, and the

Barzani and Talabani Kurds, joined forces to purge the northern

region of the PKK.42

DE JA VU ALL OVER AGAIN

Effectively, the Kurds are now back where they were in the

1970s.43 Barzani and Talabani--by agreeing to cooperate with the

Turkish army--have reinstated the policy of Mulla Mustafa

Barzani, Masoud's father, i.e., assisting Turkey to repress the

Turkish-Kurdish resistance. Further, by throwing in their lot

with the Turkish army, the Iraqi Kurdish leaders have ended

whatever hope they might have had of gaining independence. They

are now hostages of the Turks.

Ankara will not allow them to form a state; the most that it

will do is sanction some sort of de facto independent status for

them.44 Thus, the Iraqi Kurds are left hanging, in a kind of

limbo, as it were--neither part of Iraq, nor independent, and

they suffer the worst of both worlds.

Baghdad has adopted the stance that, since it does not rule

the north, it will not look out for the area. Supply of

electricity and potable water, maintenance of highways--all this

has been discontinued. The Kurds must provide such services

themselves, something they cannot do. For help, the Kurds have

turned to the international relief agencies. But the agencies are

badly overworked, and are cutting back on their operations. Thus

the Kurds are not receiving nearly the help that they need.45

One would expect the United States to come to the Kurds'

aid. However, this has not happened, apparently because

Washington does not view the situation as permanent. U.S.

policymakers seem to believe that Saddam's days are numbered, and

therefore things will turn out right once he is gone. (In the

author's view this is a miscalculation.)

The Turkish army, however has reason to be pleased with the

setup--as it should be. Its situation is salutory. Whenever it

perceives that the Kurds are getting out of line, it pounces on

them, after which it returns to Turkey to take up its stance of
vigilance once again. And for this, it is well supplied with

weapons and resources.46 The army has something that all armies

crave--a well-defined, concrete mission.

The only question is, what is the effect of all this likely

to be on Turkey? Turkey has a Kurdish problem. It is not

attempting to deal with it, except through repression.47 Is it

likely that in the long term this approach will pay off? For the

answer to that we need to look at the economics of the

situation.48

ECONOMICS

The Turks, like their neighbors the Iranians and Iraqis, are

fiercely nationalistic.49 In line with this, Turkey tried in the

1960s and throughout most of the 1970s to become self-reliant by

practicing import substitution. The attempt failed, but not for

lack of commitment on the part of Turkey's rulers.

Turkish governments regularly subsidized the public sector.

By 1977, however, the policy had to be abandoned; Turkey could no

longer borrow the funds it needed to continue public funding

(international lenders, having decided that Turkey was not a good

risk, withdrew their support).

With that Turkey had but one effective option--to put itself

in the hands of the International Monetary Fund, which, in return

for painful concessions on Turkey's part, agreed to restructure

its debts. he IMF wanted Turkey to shift its focus to exports,

and, to make Turkish products competitive internationally, Ankara

was asked to pursue a policy of domestic austerity. This meant

cutting wages, eliminating unnecessary jobs, and devaluating the

currency.

As we will show, the IMF-imposed regimen was not a total

success. In the short run, however--and in specific areas--it

worked amazingly well. Turkey's balance of payments became more

stable, exports increased dramatically and inflation dropped

dramatically, as well.50

These results probably could not have been achieved,

however, had there not been a military coup. As noted above,

there had been a military takeover in Turkey in the late 1970s.

In power, the army imposed measures that Turkey's weak civilian

leaders would not attempt.51 In effect, Turkey's economic

rejuvenation was carried out under martial law.

Even at this, Turkey's economy would probably not have

turned around were it not for another factor. Turkey was able to

develop regional markets to supplement those of Europe and the

United States. This was essential because after 1985, when the

price of oil plummeted, some of its western markets dried up.

Turkey faced a similar falling off in the Middle East--however in

this area it had something else going for it.
The Iran-Iraq War benefited Turkey by making the

belligerents depend on it for survival. For example, early in the

war Iraq's seaborne oil line was cut by Iran's takeover of the

Gulf. Baghdad had to move oil to market through Turkey.52 For

that it paid Ankara stiff transit fees. In addition it agreed to

provide Turkey with oil at below market prices.

Iran similarly depended on Turkey for the transit of vitally

needed supplies. Machine parts, food, and basic consumer products

were trucked to Iran through Turkey. Whenever this traffic was

interdicted, Iran faced crisis.53 Thus, the period of the

Iran-Iraq War had a stimulating effect on Turkey's regional

trade. It also created a foundation on which all the regional

states could build when the Iran-Iraq War ended.

For a brief period after the war Turkey and its neighbors

undertook to cooperate economically, and then came Kuwait. With

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and President Bush's pressure on

Turkey to support the coalition, Ankara's regional market

collapsed. Its trade with Iraq was interdicted by the

U.N.-imposed embargo. Transit fees for oil and oil at bargain

prices were discontinued.54

To be sure, the coalition made up part of the shortfall.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait together contributed $12 billion dollars

in aid to the frontline states, including Turkey.55 In addition,

Washington increased Turkey's textile quota.56 Germany moved a

battalion to Turkey to support DESERT STORM, and afterward left

all of the unit's equipment for Turkey's use.57

This largesse, however, did not change the reality of

Turkey's altered economic position. Just when it appeared that

Turkey's economy was about to take off, it foundered. Iran was

still a trading partner, but after the end of the Iran-Iraq War

Tehran found itself constrained in many of the same ways as Iraq.

(Attempts by Rafsanjani to turn Iran's economy around after the

disastrous defeat in the Iran-Iraq War have, so far, not proved

successful.)

Turkey thus emerged from Operation DESERT STORM in a

compromised position. It had definitely benefited in terms of

gaining the good will of the United States. Not only did

President Bush channel many direct and indirect perquisites its

way, but he also held out hope of more rewards to come. For

example, Bush strongly supported the idea of an American opening

to the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, in which Turkey

would become the agent of America's cultural and economic

advance. Bush also backed Turkey's bid to become a full member of

the European Economic Community, and even went so far as to

endorse Turkey's position on Cyprus.58

All these prospects of aid are now up in the air--

immediately after DESERT STORM, President Bush was voted out of
office. Faced with severe economic constraints, the U.S. Congress

began looking for economies, and in the process cut Turkey's

regular allotment of foreign aid. Whereas Bush's last aid request

to ongress for Turkey was $543 million, Congress has now cut that

to $450 million and is converting it to loans.59 As for the other

schemes promoted by Bush, they may not be realized.

Turkey will presumably continue to receive aid from the IMF.

However, as noted above there is a downside to the Fund's

assistance. IMF-mandated reforms have imposed hardships on

Turkey's population. Job losses have never really been recouped.

Wages, cut to make Turkey competitive on the world market, remain

low. Inflation, after dropping dramatically, has now shot up

again to over 70 percent.60

Thus, the Turkish people have borne the brunt of the

IMF-imposed measures. Hardest hit has been the rural sector, and

this, by and large, comprises the Kurds. This is troubling

because the formerly passive Kurdish population is docile no

longer--not since the advent of the PKK.

TURKEY AND THE PKK TODAY

As suggested earlier, the PKK became the vanguard of the

Turkish-Kurdish struggle practically by default. There were no

active Kurdish opposition groups, and hence the field of

opposition was pretty much left to it. At the same time (also 

noted) the PKK cadres were not really far removed from ghetto

toughs. As long as this was the perception (that is, that the PKK

cadres were thugs), Turkish authorities could hope to make

headway against them, counting on the support of peace-loving

Kurds who were offended by violence.

For awhile it seemed that the PKK would be extinguished. 

Had it not been for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the author feels,

it probably would have been. The operation did two things for the

PKK. It enabled the party to expand its operations in the

southeast, after Baghdad's cleansing operations had rendered it

virtually defunct.

Along with this, the PKK benefited from international media

coverage of the Kurds. Kurds who had given up on their Kurdish

identity are now insisting upon it. Since the PKK is the group

inside Turkey that is avowedly Kurdish, more and more Kurds are

identifying with it.

Thus, Turkey's heretofore suppressed Kurdish minority has

grown assertive, and this in turn has transformed conditions in

the southern region. From being a sleepy backwater of modern

Turkish society, it has turned into a hotbed of revolt.

A BASE FOR REVOLT

Although Kurds are in the forefront of the opposition in
Turkey, it would be wrong to assume that domestic unrest is a

specifically Kurdish phenomenon. Inside Turkey today a number of

subversive groups operate. Some of the most lethal are not

Kurdish at all.61 At the same time, all profit from the poor

economic conditions with which Turkey is currently afflicted.

The rise of the PKK has transformed the political climate

by, in effect, establishing a safe haven for the disaffected

groups, and this, in turn, has enhanced their survival chances. 

No longer are they restricted to operating underground in Ankara

and Istanbul; they can now hide out in the provinces, alongside

the PKK.

To be sure, Turkish security forces are present throughout

this region; but Turkish police are no different from police

anywhere--to operate efficiently they depend on information. If

the local Kurds will not cooperate, the police are handicapped.

This seems to be the present situation--otherwise why has the

army been unable to make good its threat to eliminate the

radicals?

One could argue that in the long term there is no cause for

concern. After all, the Iraqi-Turkish border is closed; the Iraqi

Kurds have teamed up with the Turkish army against the PKK. Is it

not just a matter of time before the rebellion is crushed? To be

sure, there would be grounds for optimism, were it not that Iran

has become a factor in the equation. The author will now attempt

to show that, as Talabani has charged, Iran and Syria have

resumed their intrigues against Turkey.

HOW DID THIS HAPPEN?

Iran is a rival of Turkey in a number of areas. However,

neither Ankara nor Tehran wish to go to war with each other. 

Moreover, Hashemi Rafsanjani, as Iran's president, has reasons of

his own for wanting to avoid a break with the Turks. His

opposition in the Tehran government comprises radicals who oppose

Turkey as an impious, anti-Islamic regime.62 Hence Rafsanjani is

drawn to support Ankara on the principle of "the enemy of my

enemy is my friend."

Nonetheless, Rafsanjani is Khomeini's heir, and it was a

basic precept of the late Ayatollah's teaching that the United

States is the number one enemy of Iran. No reason exists to

believe that Rafsanjani--or any of the men around him--have given

up on this opinion.

And this is where the difficulty comes in. Earlier we

described how Syria and Iran both came to view Turkey as a Trojan

Horse. It, in their eyes, is a vehicle whereby NATO spreads its

influence throughout the region.

The mullahs who presently rule Iran have imbibed that view.

 This feeling (of mistrust for Ankara) flared anew during
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Having a NATO force next door in Iraqi

Kurdistan was not something the mullas relished. They waited

anxiously for the operation to end; after which they expected

that the Western forces would depart. When this did not happen--

when instead the operation dragged out, the mullas became greatly

upset. They blasted Turkey, claiming that Ankara's accommodation

of the United States damaged Turkish-Iranian relations.63

Some Iranian commentators have pointed to the situation that

obtained with the Kurds in the 1970s, when Mulla Mustafa led the

Iraqi-Kurdish resistance movement. We have already alluded to

this in our study. At that time, northern Iraq was turned into a

base--not only for the Turkish army, but for the CIA, the Shah's

security force SAVAK, and the Israelis.

The Iranian leaders remember all this, and thus they regard

the present setup in Kurdistan with suspicion. PROVIDE COMFORT is

not perceived by them to be a humanitarian operation. It is yet

another stage in the NATO's attempt to takeover in the region.64

In addition, the Iranians' suspicions have been reinforced by

Washington's recent espousal of the so-called policy of "Dual

Containment." Under it, the Iranians would be subjected to

controls, the aim of which would be to deny them access to

certain weapons and technology they could use to modernize their

military.65 In effect, Iran's treatment by the West would not

differ greatly from what Iraq is undergoing.

For Rafsanjani, Washington's policy change confirms his

deepest suspicions, and this has put the Iranian leader on the

spot. What should he do? It appears that he has made up his mind

to revive the terror war.

IRAN'S RESPONSE

At the end of June 1993 expatriate Kurdish workers all over

Europe erupted in a rampage of attacks on Turkish embassies and

missions. Twenty-nine cities were involved and thousands of

demonstrators took part. Nothing like this has been seen since

the 1960s.66

Western intelligence and the media, in speculating about the

rampages, blamed the PKK. No one, however, questioned whether the

group had received outside aid, which ought to have been a

consideration.

It is not possible that the PKK could have performed an

operation like this on its own; it was far too ambitious an

undertaking. There would have had to have been an infrastructure

on which the protestors could have relied, and the PKK does not

have such a network. Moreover, the operation would have required

considerable funding (there aren't that many committed PKK

members in Europe).

There are really only three states that could have
masterminded the embassy attacks. Iraq obviously comes to mind.

However, Iraq dismantled its terrorist apparatus in 1983, and

there is no evidence that it subsequently geared back up

(rebuilding a network of this sort is no easy thing to do). 

Further, it is unlikely that Iraq would have links to the PKK, an

organization based in Damascus, the capital of its arch rival.

Syria is the next likely candidate. Turkey has consistently

accused Assad of supporting the PKK, and has been pressing him to

close down PKK offices in Damascus.67 The Syrians have refused to

do this. However, at the same time, Assad has kept a low profile

lately. He does not wish to be perceived as a sponsor of

terrorism, while the peace talks with Israel are in process. It

is the author's belief that Assad is following essentially the

same strategy with the PKK he pursued earlier--he is keeping open

his lines to the group, while being careful not to be seen to be

openly backing it.

That leaves Tehran as the real culprit. Here the evidence

would appear to be compelling. Iran has the infrastructure in

place throughout Europe to assist in attacks of this nature.68

Further, it has recently been targeting Ankara on another front.

 In July of this year, members of the pro-Iranian Hizbollah

burned down a hotel in Ankara at which a professed supporter of

author Salman Rushdie was staying.69 The Turkish media publicly

branded Tehran as the instigator of this attack. In addition,

several prominent Turkish journalists (outspoken secularists)

have been assassinated by groups the Turkish media has tied to

Tehran.70

Finally we know that Iran has a history of perpetrating this

type of action. As we have just detailed, it did this throughout

the 1980s. All of the tactics that Iran employed then are being

used now--attacks against Turkish embassies and diplomats, the

staging of cross-border raids into Turkey from Iranian bases.

Even the assets that are being employed are identical--the PKK,

ASALA, and Hizbollah. In crude terms, Tehran has the modus

operandi for a job like this, and this--when it comes to dealing

with terrorists--is crucial.

The final clinching factor, however, is the timing of the

embassy attacks--they came on June 24, one day before the Turkish

parliament by a voice vote agreed to extend permission of the

United States to use Incirlik for overflights of Iraq in

connection with PROVIDE COMFORT. In the meantime, the Turkish

government has formally accused Iran of supporting the

terrorists; it claims to have conclusive evidence to prove

this.71

WHAT TO DO?

At the heart of this problem, in the author's view, is the

Turkish army-Barzani-Talabani deal, and Washington's response to

it. By seeming to have accepted the deal, U.S. policymakers have
fostered the belief that the Kurds are an instrument of U.S.

policy.

To an American this may seem farfetched, but one must try to

view the matter through the eyes of a Middle Easterner. The

situation in Kurdistan today too much resembles the setup in the

1970s, when Mulla Mustafa made his deal with the Shah of Iran,

the CIA and Israel. Then, the north of Iraq was perceived by many

as a base of imperialism and Zionism--and that is the way it is

being seen (at least in Iran) today.

To counter this impression Washington might want to rethink

its policy toward the Kurds. It needs to show that it is

primarily interested in their welfare and is not merely wielding

them as a weapon against Saddam Hussein. In the author's view

there is a way of doing this.

Earlier this year the Iraqi Kurds declared their support for

a federated Iraq.72 This would be a state combining a Kurdish

area in the north with another in the south comprising the Arabs-

-two regions under the rule of Baghdad.

Washington should push the Kurds to start negotiations with

Baghdad on this proposal. The Ba'thists would like to end the

economic embargo, and would probably go along with a federation--

provided that they retained key portfolios in the government,

with the Kurds left to manage their local affairs.

The deal would have to be made with Saddam since no other

Iraqi leader could make it stick, and this would mean that

Washington would have to abandon its aim of deposing the Iraqi

President. But, in the author's view, it is not Washington's job

to depose foreign heads of state. This is something for the

Iraqi people to do.

The process of setting up the federation would take time,

but, as long as there was movement, events should be allowed to

work themselves out. The important thing is that matters not be

permitted to drift, as they are doing now. It is this drift that

is exciting suspicions among the regional actors that the United

States is striving for hegemonic control. (The idea being that as

long as the situation is not resolved, the United States is

enabled to keep a military presence in the area.)

What about the regional actors--how would they react to this

proposal? If Tehran and Damascus truly are worried about the

extension of NATO power into the region, then federation should

be reassuring to them. Under the arrangement, the Kurds would not

require a NATO shield, and the allied forces could speedily

depart.

Also, as part of the deal the border to Turkey would be

closed, thus shutting off the PKK. This would benefit all the

states that have large Kurdish populations because none is
anxious to see the emergence of a separate Kurdish nation. The

Turkish Kurds would suffer, to be sure, but then, the United

States has influence with Ankara, which it can use to protect the

Turkish Kurds.

Moreover, under a federated setup, northern Iraq would be a

much more orderly place. Whatever else, the Iraqi Ba'th Party is

disposed to maintain order. It would never tolerate smuggling,

and all of the other lawless pursuits that currently are going on

in the area.73

TURKEY AND THE FUTURE

Many have argued that Turkey is on the threshold of a golden

era, and indeed it does appear that opportunities are available

to it in a number of areas. For example, Turkey could be enriched

by selling water from the newly built Ataturk Dam. Numerous

Middle Eastern states, including Israel and Kuwait, would leap at

the opportunity to tap into this resource.74 There is also talk

of establishing a region-wide electric grid.75

None of this, however, is going to happen if the area is

torn apart with strife, and this brings us to consider the

alternative to the solution that we are proposing. Barring some

constructive move, we are certain to see more anti-Turkish

activity in the days ahead, both in Europe and the Kurdish areas

of Turkey and Iraq. This means that Ankara is going to have to

devote more and more of its limited economic resources to

quelling disturbances in the Kurdish community.

Further, military action against the Kurds is bound to have

an adverse influence on Turkey's relations with countries in

Europe and with the United States. Already there have been calls

both here and abroad for Turkey to correct what are viewed as

human rights abuses.76

Turkey does not need this sort of grief. It would be far

better, if it could put the Kurdish problem behind it, and devote

itself to building up its economy. Moreover, this might also

improve its chances of gaining entry to the European Economic

Community. As was pointed out in the last chapter, much of the

Europeans' concern about granting Turkey membership derives from

their unhappiness at having so many expatriate Turks living in

their midst. If Turkey's economy improves, many of these Turks

would leave Europe to take jobs at home.

THE EFFECTS ON AMERICA

There is a postscript to this whole affair; That is, it

obviously also affects the United States. Sooner or later, in the

author's view, the PKK is going to start targeting American

interests. The group is extremely radical, and, in its public

statements, has frequently denounced the United States.
Moreover, U.S. forces at Incirlik are exposed to attack by

the PKK. The American public is obviously unhappy about military

operations in areas where the vital interests of the United

States are not at risk.

In the author's view, America does not need a military

presence in northern Iraq.77 It does not add to our security

position in the Middle East. Also, when one considers the terrain

that American troops would have to fight in (were this to be

necessary), the situation becomes nightmarish.

At the same time, any disengagement from Kurdistan is sure

to outrage the Kurds' numerous supporters in the United States

and Europe. Given this fact, the Clinton administration may not

see its way clear to act. This is understandable.

However, the Administration should then begin to calculate

the costs of going on with things as they are--both in terms of

money and lives. The U.S. military should inform the President

what would be required to maintain our current presence in the

area--under the worst case scenario, where U.S. troops were

actually coming under assault.

Finally, American policymakers should begin consultations

with the Turks about how they view events. We need to be certain

of where they stand in this. If the author is correct, they are

being drawn into a situation that is fraught with danger. At the

least they face a prolonged bout of instability. At worst there

is the prospect of civil war looming ahead.

There are indications that the Turkish government would like

to disassociate itself from PROVIDE COMFORT, and then it would be

prepared to strive for some equable solution to the Kurdish

problem.78 U.S. policymakers should proceed on the basis that

this is the case, and then try to work with Ankara on this

matter.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER 3

1. For a concise, but authoritative, review of Turkey's

experience as a major Middle Eastern power, see George Lenczowski

The Middle East in World Affairs, Ithaca: Cornell University

Press, 1980.

2. See "Turkish Leader to Press U.S. on Iraqi Embargo," The

New York Times, October 14, 1993; "Turkey's War With Kurds

Reaches New Ferocity, The New York Times, October 18, 1993;

"Turkey Pushes for an End To U.N.'s Embargo of Iraq," The Wall

Street Journal, October 14, 1992; "Attacks Focus the Spotlight on

Kurds' Tangled Affairs," The New York Times, June 25, 1993, and

"Turkey's War Against Kurds Embarrasses Ankara," The New York

Times, September 5, 1992. Turkey's problem with the Kurds goes

back to the peace settlement after World War I. At the time,

certain Kurdish tribes, in effect, sabotaged Turkey's claim to
the province of Mosul (see below). As a result the League of

Nations assigned Mosul to Iraq, then under British mandate. When

the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk, drove the British

from Anatolia, he turned against the Kurds, whom, he felt, had

betrayed him. He denied them minority status in the newly formed

Turkish state, a denial that has persisted to this day. To

ultra-nationalist Turks no such thing as a Kurd exists--there are

only "mountain Turks." The best source on the origins of the

Kurdish problem in Turkey is C.J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and

Arabs, London: Oxford University Press, 1957.

3. During this rampage, Turkish diplomats were taken hostage

by the Kurds, and in subsequent clashes between demonstrators and

the police one Kurd and one Swiss policeman were killed. See

"Kurdish Militants Raid Turkish Sites In European Cities," The

New York Times, June 25, 1993.

4. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT began April 6, 1991 as a

combined task force deployed with the mission of facilitating the

return of Kurdish refugees to Iraq. Subsequently, the mission was

expanded to include the stationing of U.S. fighter aircraft at

Turkey's Incirlik air base. From this base, the United States

flies covering missions over northern Iraq. Under the conditions

of its establishment, Turkey's Grand National Assembly (GNA) must

approve the operation's continuance. The GNA has voted to extend

it four times--December 1991, June 1992, December 1992 and June

1993.

5. The attitude of radicals in the Middle East toward the

MNF intervention is expressed by Hussein Moussavi, leader of the

Hizbollah, in the following extract from Robert Fisk's Pity the

Poor Nation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 521- 522.

Fisk quotes Moussavi as saying:

`God is capable of giving Muslims victory, whether the

aggression comes from France, America or Italy (these

were the three countries that intervened, ed.).... The

Imam Ali says that we may throw the stone back from

where it has been thrown and that evil cannot be

repelled except by evil. Our Prophet Mohammed--praised

be his name--has invoked us to carry the sword to

defend our honor.'

But Moussavi has some decidedly political views with

which he tries to justify his belief in violence. The

Americans, he says, have come to Lebanon `to achieve

the results that America wants.' The MNF is a NATO

force and America is dealing with `some traditional

leaders' in Lebanon and ignoring what Moussavi calls

`popular Islamic elements.'

Fisk, former Middle East correspondent for The London Times has

written probably the best account of the long, bloody Lebanese

War. For the official Syrian line on NATO in the Middle East see
the articles cited in endnote 6.

6. The maneuvers were called "Adventure Express." See

FBIS-WEU 83-120, June 21, 1983, "NATO Exercises Concluded: Unity

Shown." For Syrian and Iranian reaction to them see, Foreign

Broadcast Information Service-Middle East (Henceforth

FBIS-MEA)-83-128, July 1, 1983, "AL-BATH Comments on NATO

Exercises in Turkey;" FBIS-MEA-83-140, July 20, 1983, "Damascus

TV Comments on Al-Jumayyil U.S. Visit," and FBIS-MEA-138, July

18, 1983, "AL-BA'TH Discusses U.S. Middle East Plan." Also see

FBIS-MEA-140, July 20, 1983, "Syria, Iran, Libya and PDRY Protest

U.S. Maneuvers." For Iran's position see Foreign Broadcast

Information Service -South Asia (Henceforth FBIS-SAS)-84-133,

July 10, 1984, "Khamene'i: U.S. to Rally Gulf Countries."

7. Michael Gunter (The Kurds in Turkey, Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1990, p. 72) claims the incursion was provoked by

PKK units, which attacked a Turkish patrol along the border.

There apparently was such an attack in May 1983. But official

Turkish statements on the incursion never mention the PKK,

referring instead to "Armenian terrorists as well as people being

sought by security forces." The author has conducted interviews

with sources he regards as reliable, and, as a result, has

reached the conclusion that the PKK was not operational in the

area at this time. There may have been individual PKK members

hiding out in northern Iraq when the incursion occurred (see

endnote 8), but the group was not carrying on an active guerrilla

war there. See FBIS-WEU-83-184, May 27 1983, "Troops Cross Iraqi

Border in 'Mop-up Operation'"; FBIS-WEU-83-106, June 1, 1983,

"Official Spokesman on Contacts With Iraq"; FBIS-WEU-83-106, June

6, 1983, "Commandos Purge Separatist Kurds, Silence Radio." For

official statements by the Iraqi and Turkish foreign ministries

on the action see FBIS-MEA-83-105, May 31, 1983, "Foreign

Ministry Statement on Border Issues," and op. cit., "Turkish

Foreign Minister Gives Note to President." Also FBIS-MEA-83-175,

September 8, 1983, "Further on Turkish Interior Minister's

Visit," and FBIS-MEA-176, September 9, 1983, "Turkish Interior

Minister Signs Cooperation Pact."

8. Iraq was outnumbered in the war against Iran three to

one. Tehran attempted to exploit this advantage by keeping

relentless pressure on Iraqi positions in the south around

Basrah. Under this pressure, Iraq found it impossible to spare

troops from the southern front to police the north, and therefore

tried to make do by using Popular Army units (Ba'thist

militiamen) for this job. These proved woefully inadequate, and

consequently it was not long before almost the entire north

slipped from Baghdad's control. The area became a haven for

desperate individuals of every description (draft dodgers,

smugglers, and some political dissidents). At the same time,

however, as of the spring of 1983 there was little organized

anti-government activity in the north--that does not come until

after Iran's invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan in July of that year.

This enabled groups like the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) to
infiltrate the region and set up bases there. For Syria's

involvement with the Kurds at this juncture see Stephen C.

Pelletiere, The Kurds and Their Agas: An Assessment of the

Situation in Northern Iraq, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, 1991; also for the Turkish attitude toward

Syria and the Kurds see FBIS-WEU-83-121, June 22 1983, "Syria

Will Not Protect Kurdish Militants," and FBIS-WEU-83-124, June

27, 1983, "Ankara Protests Terrorists `Escape to Syria'."

9. Assad's perception that Turkey was abandoning its

neutrality was influenced by another event at the time, namely

Ankara's reaction to the invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan by Tehran.

Tehran had been preparing its invasion for some time, massing

troops along the Iraq-Iran border at Haj Umran. It was common

knowledge the Iranians intended to raise the Iraqi Kurdish tribes

against Baghdad. This scheme was effectively squelched by

Turkey's border-crossing, which demonstrated that Ankara would

not respect international frontiers. If the Kurdish tribes joined

forces with the invading Iranians, Turkey was prepared to come

into the war on the side of Iraq. Perhaps as a result of this

(obviously, the author does not know), the Kurdish tribes did not

revolt, and Iran's invasion failed. Subsequently, Saddam was able

to bring practically the entire Kurdish community in the north

over to his side by offering to enroll them as fursan (knights)

in a paramilitary force called "The Knights of Salhadin." The

Kurds served for pay (which was quite lucrative) and were not

required to leave their tribal area. Throughout the war the

fursan was effective in preventing Iran, Syria, and their Kurdish

allies from developing a second front in the Kurdish region. For

background on this episode see Pelletiere, The Kurds and Their

Agas.

10. For background on this rapprochement see Stephen C.

Pelletiere, The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos In a Vacuum, Westport, CT.

Praeger, 1992. Also FBIS-MEA-83-007, January 11, 1983, "25

August Solarz Interview with Saddam Husayn," also The New York

Times, "Iraq makes public conversation between President Saddam

Hussein and U.S. Representative Stephen J. Solarz,", January 3,

1983, also FBIS-MEA-83-106, January 10, 1983, "Aziz on

Willingness for Talks With Israel," and FBIS-MEA-84-161, August

17, 1984, "Tariq Aziz Receives Congressman Solarz." For

information on U.S. assistance to Baghdad see FBIS-MEA-83-092,

May 11, 1983, "Aziz Confers With Schultz," and an accompanying

article, "Aziz Confers With Delors"; also FBIS-MEA-83-186,

September 23, 1983, "Aziz Departs for UN." On the expulsion of

the terrorist groups see FBIS-MEA-228, November, 25, 1983, "Sabri

Al Banna Followers Reportedly Expelled."

11. The Baghdad Pact allied Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and

Pakistan, with the United States as an associate member. Even

though Washington had only associate membership status, it

nonetheless was the Pact's mainstay. The Pact meant that Western

influence ringed the Gulf, with Washington able to count as

allies, not only Saudi Arabia, but Iran (under the Shah) and
Iraq, which was then ruled by the Hashemites. The revolt of Arab

nationalist forces in Iraq in 1958 caused the Pact to fall apart.

For the best account of the Pact see Lenczowski, The Middle East

in World Affairs.

12. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into the

Iraqi aspect of the terror war. Briefly, this was directed by the

so-called Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq

(SCIRI) based in Tehran. SCIRI was led by the members of the al

Hakim family. Prominent in the family were a number of Shia

clerics, several of whom had fled Iraq for Iran before the

outbreak of the war. These clerics directed operations against

Iraq, including setting off bombs in downtown Baghdad. Saddam

responded by rounding up members of the family still resident in

Iraq and threatening to kill one for every terrorist act that

occurred. After Saddam executed several of the al Hakims, the

SCIRI-directed phase of the terror war ceased.

13. For background on this see Lenczowski, The Middle East

in World Affairs.

14. In 1960, the Turkish military took power and imprisoned

President Bayar, Premier Mendares, and other cabinet members. 

Mendares was subsequently hung. See Lenczowski, The Middle East

in World Affairs.

15. After purging the various radical groups, the army

returned to the barracks, surrendering power to the civilians.

This was cited at the time as another triumph of democracy. See

"Turgut Ozal, 66, Dies in Ankara; Pugnacious President of

Turkey," The New York Times, April 18, 1993, also "Reformer who

built on Ataturk's legacy," The Financial Times, April 19, 1993.

16. There are over 16 million Kurds in the Middle East and

southern Russia. The breakdown is 10 million in Turkey, four

million in Iran, 2 1/2 million in Iraq, and 500,000 in Syria,

with perhaps 50,000 in the Russia.

17. The whole of Turkey was in turmoil in the late 1960s,

but the Kurdish community, centered in the rural areas, was

relatively quiescent. Almost all of the protests were going on in

the cities, on the university campuses. There certainly was

nothing resembling an active guerrilla movement in the

Turkish-Kurdish area at this time.

18. Turkey was rife with opposition groups during the late

1960s, but all paid lip service to the principle of Turkish

national integrity. Only the PKK espoused the separation of the

Kurdish lands from the rest of the country--hence the appellation

separatists.

19. See "Turkey--The Challenge of the Kurdistan Workers

Party," Hazhir Teimourian, Jane's Intelligence Review, January

1993.
20. The best source for investigating the PKK's career

during this period is Michael Gunter's The Kurds in Turkey,

specifically pp. 71-73. The author disputes several of Gunter's

conclusions, particularly concerning the PKK's size and strength

at this time. But, for a sense of the group's importance to

Syria, his book is useful.

21. For background on this episode see Pelletiere, The Kurds

and Their Agas.

22. Barzani had joined a Syrian-sponsored National Patriotic

and Democratic Front, which was violently anti-American. The

following are excerpts from a report in Syria's official press in

November 1984: "Masoud Barzani, leader of the Democratic Party of

Kurdistan, praised President Hafez al Asad; his basic role and

wise leadership in confronting the imperialist Zionist forces in

the region.... Regarding the Iran-Iraq war...Barzani said that

this war is a war of imperialism and that imperialism entrusted

Saddam Husayn to wage it, especially since it provides great

gains in the region to imperialist Israel.... The leaders of the

National Patriotic and Democratic Front denounced the current new

steps (by the United States) to form the Amman-Cairo-Baghdad

Alliance." See FBIS-MEA-84-216, November 6, 1984.

23. Barzani is the son of the famous guerrilla leader, Mulla

Mustafa Barzani, who from roughly 1961 until 1975 ruled over the

Kurdish area of Iraq as a virtual warlord. Mulla Mustafa is one

of the more fascinating figures in modern Middle East history,

and also one of the most controversial. In the 1970s he accepted

aid from the Shah of Iran, the CIA and Israel and mounted a

rebellion against Baghdad. Abruptly, in 1975, the Shah withdrew

his support and the rebellion collapsed. Barzani and his forces

fled to Iran, and Barzani's sons--who took over the movement

after he died--became embittered against the United States for

its role in abandoning their father. Masoud Barzani allied

himself with Khomeini against the United States, and later (as we

have described here) with Syria. For details on Mulla Mustafa's

career see Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Kurds: An Unstable Element

in the Gulf, Westview: Boulder, CO, 1984. Also see Pelletiere,

The Kurds and Their Agas; also Gunter, The Kurds In Turkey. For

specific details on Mulla Mustafa's work for the CIA, the Shah

and Israel see the House Select Committee on Intelligence Report

(the Pike Report).

24. A look at Figure 1 will show that the attackers of

Semdinli almost certainly entered Turkey from Iran, evidence that

Syria and Iran were cooperating to support the terrorists.

25. For details of these raids see The Kurds and Their Agas. Also see FBIS-WEU-84-161, August 17, 1984, "Kurdish Separatists

Attack Military Garrison," FBIS-WEU-84-172, September 4, 1984,

"Foreign Ministry Denies Troops Crossing Borders,"

FBIS-WEU-84-164, August 22, 1984, "Nine Deaths Reported in 15
August Kurdish Attack," FBIS-WEU-84-174 September 6, 1984,

"Security Forces Continue Operations in Southeast," and

FBIS-WEU-84-207, October 17, 1984, "Unrest Continues in Southeast

Anatolia."

26. For background on ASALA see Gerard Chaliand and Yves

Ternon, The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistence, London: Zed

Press, 1983, pp. 1-11. For background on ASALA attacks on Turkish

diplomats see FBIS-WEU-071, April 11, 1984, "Armenian

Organization Threatens Ankara, Ozal;" FBIS-WEU-84-074, April 16,

1984, "ASALA Threatens Ozal Against Visiting Iran," FBIS-WEU-084,

April 30, 1984, "Armenians Attack Two Turkish Citizens in

Tehran," FBIS-WEU-84-121, June 21, 1984, "Armenian Group

Responsible for Vienna Bombing," FBIS-WEU-84-127, June 29, 1984,

"ASALA Threatens Olympic Team." And finally, see FBIS-WEU84-205, October 22, 1984, "Iran Implicated in Southeast Attacks,

Talks Held; Reaction to Iran Allegations; Ozal: Terrorists From

Iran." Also FBIS-MEA-83-058 March, 24, 1983, "Turkey warns Syria

Over Aid to Armenians," FBIS-MEA-83-151, August 4, 1983, "Syrian

Agents Helped Iran." Also FBIS-WEU-84-086, May 2, 1984, "Ozal

Returns From Iran Visit; Makes Statement on Armenian Terror," and

FBIS-WEU-84-088, May 4, 1984, "Ozal Blames Armenians for Paris

Bombing." For the PKK Base at Urmia see FBIS-WEU-93-140, "PKK

Member Reveals Iranian Links With Terrorist Activity," July 23,

1993.

27. See "Turkey Urged to Bolster Military Role," The

Washington Post, December 10, 1990.

28. See "Turks Rethinking Regional Roles," The Washington

Post, February 24, 1993. ("But those Turks who argued for the

country to take a prominent role internationally were cutting

against the deeply ingrained legacy of Kemal Ataturk"...[who]

directed that the country keep focus firmly at home.") See also

"Allied Strike Force Forms in Turkey," The New York Times, July

25, 1991 ("On both the political left and right, and within the

military, critics complain that Turkey has given up sovereignty

over its own land to foreign troops. If there is a point of

agreement it is that virtually no one wants the strike force to

linger long.")

29. "Turks Rethinking Regional Roles," The Washington Post. ("It [opposition to the United States] is part of the political

ethic that led a coalition of Turkish military and civilians to

sharply limit Turkey's role in the Persian Gulf War, thwarting

Ozal's desire to send Turkish troops to help evict Iraq from

Kuwait.")

30. See "Turkish Force Buildup at Iraqi Border Raises

Concern in Iran and Syria," The Washington Post, January 29,

1991, also "Turkish Official Renounces Military Attack Against

Iraq," The Washington Post, January 16, 1991; "Turkey Gives U.S.

Limited Base Use," The New York Times, January 14, 1991. ("Turkey

agreed this weekend to let the United States use air bases
here...but said operations would be confined to humanitarian and

limited logistical support.") Also "Turkey asks NATO Force To

Bolster Iraqi Frontier," The Washington Post, December 20, 1990,

and "U.S. Use of Bases Poses Risk for Turkey," The Washington

Post, January 21, 1991. ("The Ataturk-influenced military

establishment feel(s) that shared borders with Iran, Iraq and

Syria dictate caution and (it) fear(s) the Arabs will not soon

forget aid to the U.S.-led coalition.") "Ankara Authorizes Use of

Mediterranean Base for U.S. Attacks on Iraq," The New York Times,

January 18, 1991. For the controversy over flying missions out of

Incirlik see "U.S. Planes Strike Iraq From Bases in Turkey," The

Washington Post, January 19, 1991.

31. This was the purport of many of the obituaries on Ozal

produced at his death. See "Turgut Ozal, 66, Dies in Ankara,

Pugnacious President of Turkey," The New York Times, April 18,

1993, and "Reformer who built on Ataturk's legacy," The Financial

Times, April 19, 1993.

32. When Turkey and Britain ceased fighting each other at

the end of World I, the Turkish army held Mosul. However, British

forces, ignoring the armistice, continued to push north and

seized the area, including its oil deposits. Ataturk subsequently

renounced Turkey's rights to Mosul in the Lausanne Treaty, but

its loss has always rankled. For details see Kurds, Turks and

Arabs.

33. Iraq's richest oil fields are around Kirkuk, and,

although the Kurds maintain that Kirkuk is Kurdish, in fact it is

no longer so. The Iraqi government has settled many Arabs there

over the years to work the oil fields. The city also has a large

Turkomen population, which has resided there for centuries.

34. Television coverage of the Kurds' stampede over the

border into Turkey emphasized the victims' distress as they

huddled on bare mountainsides in the bitter cold. Many TV

commentators sought to blame the Turks for not doing more for the

refugees. See "Bush, In Turkey Mutes War Talk," The New York

Times, July 21, 1991 ("Turkish officials felt the rest of the

world unfairly focused on Kurds huddling in filthy camps, rather

than on Turkish aid brought to the refugees' remote mountain

haven and on the burden imposed by the influx of Iraqi refugees

into the country's poorest region.")

35. Ozal's role in Turkey at this time was unique. He held

the post of President, which was supposed to be largely

ceremonial. However, he personally transformed the office into a

real power position. After the elections, when Ozal's party lost

seats, he remained as President, and tried to go on dominating

Turkish politics. See "Turkish Election Results May Shift Basic

Policy," The New York Times, November 18, 1991.

36. Among Turkish politicians, Ozal was probably the most

openly supportive of the Kurds. Whereas others refused even to
utter the word Kurd--claiming that these people were actually

"mountain Turks"--Ozal regarded such behavior as indefensible.

See "Succession, Kurds Pose Challenges," The Washington Post, May

24, 1993.

37. See "Turkey Says Bush Rejects Kurdistan," The New York

Times, September 4, 1992; also "U.S.-Backed Group Obscure in

Iraq," The Washington Post, June 23 1993.

38. There is no mystery about how the PKK was able to step

up its operations in the area. Given the resulting chaos, it

would have been a simple feat to infiltrate additional cadres.

What is puzzling are the numbers reported. Reliable sources put

the PKK's strength (at the time of DESERT STORM) at between 5,000

and 10,000. This is extraordinary--the group never had more than

a few hundred throughout the entire Iran-Iraq War. It has been

suggested that the PKK was buying recruits. (A State Department

official told the author, "The PKK is the employer of last

resort.") Another theory is that many of the alleged PKK cadres

were in fact Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The author finds both

these theories plausible (although the suggestion that the PKK

paid for members raises the question of where did the money come

from?). For reports on the initial attacks see "Kurdish Clashes

in Turkey," The Washington Post, July 12, 1991.

39. See "Firebombing kills 11 at Istanbul store," The

Philadelphia Inquirer, December 26, 1991. It is estimated that

since the inception of the PKK's active war against the Turkish

government, some 7000 lives have been lost.

40. See "Turkey Sets Up Buffer Zone In North Iraq to Curb

Rebels," The Washington Post, August 8, 1992; "Turks Attack

Separatist Kurds in North Iraq," The New York Times, August 7,

1992; "Turkey Says It Made Raids Inside Iraq," The Washington

Post, August 6, 1992, and "Kurdish Rebels, Turkish Troops Clash;

Dozens Reported Killed," The Washington Post, August 31, 1992.

Also "Violence Intensifies Between Turkey, Kurds," The Washington

Post, June 26, 1992; "Kurds In Turkey Seem To Be Nearing

Full-scale Revolt," The New York Times, March 30, 1992, and

"Turkey's Efforts to Quell Rebel Kurds Raises Alarm in Ankara and

Europe," The New York Times, March 27, 1992. Also "Bonn Condemns

Turkey For Attacks on Kurds," The Washington Post, March 27,

1992.

41. Talabani's accusation caught the western media by

surprise because, until then, most experts on the PKK had tabbed

Iraq as their benefactor. That Talabani (who had much to gain

from fostering the view that Baghdad was behind this) would

instead point to Iran, lends credence to his claim. See "Iran Is

Reported to Aid Turkish Kurds in Iraq," The New York Times, October 25, 1992; "Iraqi Kurds Say Iran Is Backing A Rival

Faction," The Washington Post, October 25, 1992; "Turkish Army

Presses Offensive in Iraq," The Washington Post, October 24,

1992; "An Odd Alliance Subdues Turkey's Kurdish Rebels," The New
York Times, November 24, 1992, and a letter to The New York

Times, "On Iraq-Turkey Border, Kurds Are Being Used to Kill

Kurds," October 28, 1992.

42. However, the Iraqi Kurds refused to hand over captured

Turkish Kurds to the Turkish army, which angered the latter. The

Turkish commanders charged the Iraqi Kurds had merely absorbed

the PKK into their ranks. Assured by the Barzanis that the PKK

was interned in camps below the 36th parallel, the Turkish army

commanders threatened to invade central Iraq to destroy them. See

FBIS-WEU-93-118, "PKK Said To Shift Camp to Iraq With Talabani's

Help," June 22, 1993; also Istanbul, IKIBIN'I DOGRU, November 8,

1992.

43. For an account of the Kurdish movement in Iraq under

Mulla Mustafa Barzani during the 1960s and 1970s, when the Kurds

were essentially serving the interests of various Western

governments, see Pelletiere, The Kurds: An Unstable Element in

the Gulf. For an account of how the Kurdish population suffered

because of Mulla Mustafa's policy see Pelletiere, The Kurds and

Their Agas.

44. For the hostility of Turkey's President Demirel toward

the Kurds see "Turkey Says Bush Rejects Kurdistan," The New York

Times, September 4, 1992.

45. See "U.N. Warns of End to Kurdish Relief," The New York

Times, May 23, 1993, and "Aid Workers in Kurdistan Fear Attacks,"

The Washington Post, July 8, 1993.

46. In fact, many of the weapons the Turks are using against

the Kurds originally came from the United States, although

certainly Washington never intended that they should be used so.

On Secretary of State Christopher's promise of continued military

aid, including helicopter gun ships see "Turkey's First Woman PM

Must Reforge Party Image," The Financial Times, June 14, 1993,

and "Christopher Gives Turks Plan to End Rights Abuses," The New

York Times, June 13, 1993.

47. See FBIS-WEU-93-144, "Government Handling of Kurds

Viewed," July 29, 1993.

48. In addition we regard the present situation of the Iraqi

Kurds as potentially explosive. The Iraqi Kurds are being asked

to perpetuate a state of affairs that is against their interests.

It is unrealistic to suppose that they will put up with this

ambiguous arrangement indefinitely. See "Desperate Kurds Consider

Turning Once More to Saddam," The Washington Post, June 23, 1993.

49. For his discussion of Turkey's economic situation the

author used, among other works, The International Financial

Statistics Yearbook, International Monetary Fund, 1992; Direction

of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund, September 1991;

Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, International Monetary
Fund, 1988; Turkey, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London,

1991, and World Development Report, 1991, The World Bank.

50. See "Turgut Ozal, 66, Dies in Ankara."

51. See "Reformer who built on Ataturk's legacy," The

Financial Times, April 19, 1993.

52. At the start of the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad had only one

means of getting its oil to market (other than trucking it

through Jordan); that was a single pipeline through Turkey. By

1983, it had contracted to build a second line through Turkey,

which was rushed to completion. Still, until Saudi Arabia allowed

Iraq to tap into its pipelines to the Red Sea (which came

comparatively late in the war), Turkey was Iraq's only conduit to

the world market.

53. Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, even as it was continually

clashing with Tehran over the Kurds, Ankara continued to permit

vital supplies to transit its territory to reach Iran. However,

periodically it would remind Tehran of its dependence on Turkey

by holding up that traffic at the Turkish-Iranian border.

54. Iraq's trade with Turkey at this time was estimated to

be $3 billion a year. See "Quick Action by Turkey On Sanctions a

Starter," The New York Times, August 8, 1990. At the time, Iraq

supplied half of Turkey's oil imports and paid it $300 million a

year in transit fees. See "Iraqi Official Urges Turkey Not to

Shut Oil Pipeline," The New York Times, August 6, 1990.

55. Ibid.

56. "U.S. Boosts Turkish Textile Quotas," The Washington

Post, November 21, 1990.

57. See "Turning Foreign Pledges of Aid Into Reality Proves

a Delicate Task," The Washington Post, September 23, 1990.

58. See "Bush in Turkey, Mutes War Talk," The New York

Times, July 21, 1991; "Clinton to Continue Foreign Aid Cut," The

Washington Post, August 14, 1993; also "The Turkish Question: How

Important is It?" The Washington Post, May 24, 1993.

59. See "Clinton to Continue Foreign Aid Cuts, The

Washington Post, August 14, 1993, Milliyet, May 2, 1993, p. 16,

in "Commentary Criticizes U.S. Aid," FBIS-WEU-93-086, May 6,

1993, p. 54; Lynn E. Davis, "FY 1994 Security Assistance Budget

Requests", U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,

Dispatch, IV, No. 22, May 31, 1993, pp. 402-405, "U.S. Military

Aid, Washington's Approach Viewed," FBIS-WEU-93-149, August 5,

1993, pp. 44-45.

60. See "A debut of fire for Turkey's premier," The

Financial Times, June 14, 1993; "Economic woes mount for Ciller,"
The Financial Times, August 6, 1993; "Turkey's first woman PM

must reforge party image," The Financial Times, June 14, 1993,

and "The Turkish Question: How Important Is It?" The Washington

Post, May 24, 1993.

61. Among the most lethal is Dev Sol. It is Marxist--more

truly so than the PKK, in the sense that Dev Sol cadres have an

appreciation of, and respect for Marxist analysis.

62. Included in this category of extreme radicals would be

men like Motashami Pur and Ahmad Khomeini. It is perhaps

significant that Motashami, who is still a power in Tehran, was

Iran's ambassador to Damascus at the time that Iran and Syria

first orchestrated the terror war.

63. See FBIS-NES-91-185, September 24, 1991, "U.S. Said

Damaging Tehran-Ankara Relations."

64. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, in an interview

made the following comment--"Kurdistan is fast becoming a region

where the revolution is maturing. For that reason, efforts are

under way to control Kurdistan by making use primarily of the

U.S. "Hammer Force" (PROVIDE COMFORT, ed.), and the

collaborationists. A revolutionary Kurdistan means the

emancipation of the Middle East from the control of imperialism."

FBIS-WEU-93-133, July 14, 1992. Also see "Iran and the Kurds,"

Middle East International, August 6, 1993 ("...suspicion that the

U.S. intends to use the [Kurds'] western-protected enclave in

northern Iraq to undermine the regime in Tehran is at least

partly responsible for the recent escalation of attacks by

Iranian forces against Iranian Kurdish rebel groups."). Iran's

Kurds, long dormant politically, have recently revived and begun

attacking the Rafsanjani government. Also see "PKK Official on

Iranian, U.S. Kurdish Policy," FBIS-WEU-93-099, May 25, 1993

("The developments in the north and south have rendered the Iraqi

territory dangerous for Iran. Add to this the irritation felt by

the United States against the Iranian regime, then the

possibility arises of the south turning into a base for the

toppling of the Iranian regime."). See also "Rebel Radio Views

Tripartite Meeting in Tehran, FBIS-NES-93-112, June 14, 1993.

("Iran has a bone to pick with Turkey because it let the United

States and its allies use its military bases to protect the Iraqi

Kurds.")

65. See "White House to Step Up Plans to Isolate Iran,

Iraq," The Washington Post, May 23, 1993.

66. See "Attacks Focus the Spotlight on Kurds' Tangled

Affairs," The New York Times, June 25, 1993, and "Kurdish

Militants Raid Turkish Sites In European Cities," Ibid.

67. See "Turkey Tells Syria to Cease Aid to Kurds," The

Financial Times, March 31, 1992; also "Lebanon To be Told Not To

Back PKK, To Close Camps," FBIS-WEU-93-147, August 3, 1993;
"Paper Reports on Foreign Support for PKK," FBIS-WEU-92-066,

April 6, 1992, and "Ciller Briefed on PKK Camps in Iran, Syrian

Role," FBIS-WEU-93-145, July 30, 1993.

68. Iranian ambassadors, operating out of their European

embassies, direct terrorist networks. The central direction point

of this network is considered to be the Iranian embassy in the

Vatican. See Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam, Boulder, CO:

Westview, 1993, p. 100.

69. See "Hizbullah Sentiment Seen Spreading: Unsolved

Murders Rise," FBIS-WEU-93-052, March 19, 1993.; also "Beat The

Devil," The Nation, July 26, 1993.

70. See "Turkey Accuses Islamic Ring That Killed 3--Has

Links to Iran," The New York Times, February 5, 1993.

71. See FBIS-WEU-93-137, July 20, 1993, "Summons Iranian

Envoy on PKK 'Complicity'"; also "Iranian Embassy Official Denies

Reports of PKK Support," FBIS-WEU-93-137, and "PKK Member Reveals

Iranian Links With 'Terrorist Activity'," FBIS-WEU-93-140, July

23, 1993.

72. For background see Clarence J. Moran, "The Kurdish

Problem: Federalism or an Emerging State," Carlisle Barracks, PA:

U.S. Army War College, 1993.

73. See "Kurds Creating a Country On the Hostile Soil of

Iraq," The New York Times, August 12, 1992.

74. See "Official Criticizes Turkish Water Policy, Dam

Project" (Iraq), FBIS-NEA, August 24, 1993.

75. See "Turkey seeks consensus on Kurds," The Financial

Times, November 17, 1992.

76. See "Pentagon Reviews Foreign Military Aid to Address

Human Rights Concerns," The Washington Post, June 9, 1993.

77. See Stephen C. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson II, Oil

and the New World System: CENTCOM Rethinks Its Mission, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 8, 1992.

78. See endnote 2 for comments by Turkish leaders on this

point.
CHAPTER 4

TURKEY'S STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT

IN THE FORMER USSR AND U.S. INTERESTS

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the USSR has transformed Turkey's

geostrategic engagement with the post-Soviet successor states,

and presents Turkey with both unprecedented opportunities and

risks. Turkey engages all the post-Soviet successor states in

relationships of trade and arms transfers, conducts economic and

defense discussions with Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea, and

is Russia's rival for influence in the Black Sea, Central Asia,

and Transcaucasia. Turkey's Transcaucasian and Central Asian

policies have also fostered a regional rivalry with Iran. This

complex network of Turkish policies and regional relations also

has potential repercussions for U.S. interests.

The most serious of these exist in Transcaucasia. The war

over Nagorno-Karabakh could embroil Turkey with Armenia and

Russia in a war it cannot win. This war and its consequences have

also displayed Turkey's inability to aid Azerbaijan. If Turkey

cannot stop Azerbaijan from reverting to a Russian sphere, that

calls into question Turkey's prospects throughout the former

USSR. In that case Central Asia and Transcaucasia's future would

once again be an open question, signifying the unsettled quality

of the local state systems.1

 Menaced in modern times by the spread of Russian/Soviet

power, Turkey has used either of two strategies. One strategy

relied upon forging coalitions with other European or Western

powers--the United States--to resist Russian ambitions and defend

Turkey. NATO exemplifies that strategy. The second strategy

accepted a wide spectrum of cooperative ties with Russia running

from partnership through friendship all the way to temporary

Russian tutelage.

Currently facing a democratic but unstable Russia that shows

continuing interest in its former imperial peripheries, Turkey

has borrowed a leaf from both strategies. Turkey seeks to

preserve its friendship and large economic ties with Russia. At

the same time it pursues a robust, but controlled policy to

spread Turkish influence in Transcaucasia, the Black Sea, and

Central Asia to form a zone of influence and keep Russia away

from Turkey's borders.

TURKEY'S REGIONAL POLICY GOALS

Apart from the open war between Armenians and Azerbaijan

over Nagorno-Karabakh, there is a hidden regional conflict

between Turkey's drive to build a zone of influence in
Transcaucasia and Russia's determination not to be excluded from

its traditional spheres of influence. Turkey's strategy to

achieve influence reflected its calculus of Ankara's regional

interests and of U.S. support for Turkish policy. The Bush

administration, and apparently now the Clinton administration as

well, openly encouraged Turkey to proclaim itself a Westernizing

model for the former Soviet republics to block Iran's (and

perhaps covertly Russia's) influence in Transcaucasia and Central

Asia.2

But because Turkey also acts in the Balkans and the Middle

East and faces a long-standing Kurdish insurgency at home, it

cannot refrain from strategic engagement in those areas to

concentrate exclusively in Transcaucasia. Turkey's position at

the junction of these regions prevents undue concentration on any

one area lest it lose influence in the others. Turkey must claim

a presence in all four areas. As the late President Ozal said,

Whatever the shape of things to come, we will be the

real elements and most important pieces of the status

quo and new order to be established in the region from

the Balkans to Central Asia. In this region, there

cannot be a status quo or political order that will

exclude us.3

Although Ozal's vision was probably far more expansive than

all the states in these regions would like, many of them need to

have a Turkish presence in order to block other contenders for

regional preeminence, e.g. Russia. Yevhen Marchuk, the head of

Ukraine's Security Service, listed Turkish participation in

assuring Ukraine's security as a high priority for Kiev. Turkey's

experiment in capitalism and democracy, and its military

prominence in the Black Sea as Russo-Ukrainian forces have

diminished make it an important factor in Ukraine's security and

a model for Ukraine. Creating a multilateral security system in

the Black Sea and Mediterranean to protect Ukraine and Turkey

from economic or military threats and their mutual military

cooperation thus became part of both states' agendas.4

Domestic economic factors also affect Turkey's policies and

ability to play the role of a model. In July 1993, Turkey had a

73 percent annual inflation rate and its state budget is

operating at the limits of its capacity. Its capital resources

are also heavily engaged in the mammoth Ataturk Dam and

hydroelectric project and a substantial military modernization

program. In addition, 30 percent of its expanding military budget

goes to contain the Kurds who appear to be a growing burden.5

Finally, Turkey's annual per capita income is only $2000, a

figure that needs to grow if Turkey is to overcome internal and

international economic challenges.

Another factor affecting Turkey's strategy is Turkish

defense policy. Turkey is undergoing large-scale long-term

defense modernization. The military's high status in policy
making and society, the impact of DESERT STORM, and the violence

in Kurdistan and the Transcaucasus are invoked to justify this

program.6 The program aims to build modern forces needed to

ensure Turkish security and gain self-sufficiency in production.7

Turkish officials also say they need to develop a capability to

produce and sell arms to Central Asian states, thus linking

economic and military factors to foreign policy.8 Turkey also is

restructuring its forces to make missile defense a high priority

against proliferation threats from its neighbors. The program

evidently will cost $12 billion, a 20 percent increase over

original estimates.9 Turkey's inflation rate, military

modernization, and the socio-economic costs of the Kurdish

insurgency all suggest a broad unfinished domestic agenda that

constrains Turkey fiscally and economically from playing a

leading or dominating role in the ex-Soviet republics. Those

constraints also suggest the high importance of economic goals in

Turkey's overall foreign strategic engagement including the CIS.

Equally important is the fact that Chief of Staff, General Mattei

Dogan Gures, frankly stated that the Kurdish threat to Turkey's

territorial integrity is the military's first priority.10 This

line of policy all but rules out serious consideration of

military action on behalf of Azerbaijan in its current crisis.

Gures' dictum not only reflects an inward looking military policy

that rejects foreign activity, it also reflects the limits that

Turkey's economy and military modernization program place on

Turkey's war-fighting capabilities.

That consideration takes us to the heart of Turkey's

strategic dilemma. Turkey wants to and feels called upon by

others, e.g. Ukraine, to extend its influence, in President

Demirel's words, "From the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China."

 Yet domestic economic factors mean Turkey cannot afford to play

this primarily economic role. Nor can Ankara escape the fact that

efforts to play this role will inevitably increase tensions with

Russia and Iran and could lead to military challenges that it

cannot or will not accept, e.g. intervention on behalf of

Azerbaijan. As Demirel recently observed, Turkey does not govern

Azerbaijan and thus cannot intervene in a sovereign state's

domestic affairs.11

Indeed, to reach a level where it can play this prominent

economic role abroad based on a flourishing domestic economy,

Turkey's key goal throughout the former USSR apparently is access

to economic markets, particularly in energy. To protect its

energy sources from interruptions by Iran, Iraq, or Russia,

Turkey seeks a continuous pipeline linking it, through Azerbaijan

and the Caspian Sea, with Kazakhstan and Central Asia. A prime

strategic objective is a leading position in the transport, if

not exploration, extraction, and refining, of Azeri and Central

Asian oil and gas to the West. Attaining these objectives would

make Turkey the middleman in an extremely lucrative East-West

energy business and offer it an enormous windfall.12 Those are

Turkey's real stakes in the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
This war, fought by local Armenians for freedom from Azeri

and Soviet oppression so that they can unite with Armenia could

dismember Azerbaijan, and bring all the outside powers: Turkey,

Iran, and Russia into the conflict. Turkey has backed the former

Azeri government of Abulfaz Elchibey, an outspoken Pan-Turk, and

provided it with much assistance. The payoff to Ankara was to be

a postwar Azerbaijan that showcased the Turkish model and

provided Turkey with this uninterrupted supply of Central Asian

and Azeri gas and oil. In 1992 Foreign Minister Cetin proposed a

territorial realignment as part of a peace settlement that would

attain those very goals.

Cetin proposed, with U.S. support, that should a cease-fire

occur and negotiations begin, the postwar settlement should

create a pure Armenian state out of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh

and a continuous, purely Muslim, Turkic, state of Azerbaijan

incorporating the formerly detached area of Nakhichevan.(See

Figure 2.) This territorial exchange would allow construction of

a pipeline whose path conformed to Turkey's objectives.13

Under this plan, Azerbaijan would remain intact but it and

Armenia would be dependent on Turkey while Turkey obtained its

cherished pipeline. The plan cuts off Iran and Russia from those

energy routes and Russia from Transcaucasia as Central Asian oil

and gas go directly to Turkey and Europe, making Turkey a major

player in the energy game.14 This plan also would effectively

reorient much of Central Asia's economy from Russia to Turkey and
the West since energy is that region's main source of foreign

exchange. Turkey could then lead Central Asia and Transcaucasia

into overall economic integration and even alliance.15

But Turkey's support for that solution and its potential

future ramifications, in turn, have led Iran and Russia to

counter Turkish efforts for leverage over the region's energy

sources and its overall economy. At present, for example, Iran

has blocked Turkey's TIR (Transit Highway International) trucks

from its highways, effectively obstructing overland trade with

Azerbaijan and Central Asia. This has forced Turkey to retaliate

in kind for what it believes are politically dictated actions.16

Such actions indicate the value that rival regional actors place

upon economic relationships in the former Soviet republics.

On Turkey's part, President Demirel told a recent gathering

of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) of Muslim states,

which now includes the ex-Soviet republics, that Turkey strongly

believes in those ex-republics' immense development potential. 

The condition for that development is that they follow Turkey's

example by freeing the private sector and coalescing in a common

trading bloc.17 His speech showed that he sees Turkey's role as

analogous to Germany's in the EC. He also stressed the centrality

of energy cooperation as a precondition for unity.

Utilization of the rich energy potential of the region in a

manner whereby the needs of all the countries of the region are

satisfied and extension to international markets becomes possible

is an issue of special importance which leads to the

establishment of lasting ties.18

Demirel's remarks show the close linkage between Turkey's

energy objectives and Turkey and the ECO's ability to weld the

new republics into an economic `common market.' Turkey's

economic limitations already cast doubt upon this endeavor's

success; but its failure in Azerbaijan throws Turkey's entire

strategic profile as a model and leader into question.

TURKISH SECURITY AND THE WAR IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH

The Nagorno-Karabakh war starkly illustrates how vulnerable

Turkey's grand design is to continued local warfare. This war

also has unappealing implications for Turkey's overall security

interests. Those vital interests include a friendly and stable

Azerbaijan, Armenia's recognition that it depends on Turkey, and

ultimately a regional regime that precludes direct Russian

military pressure on Turkey.19

More importantly, the continuing Nagorno-Karabakh war may

prevent Turkey from realizing its ambitions, bring back the

Russians, possibly introduce Iran into the region, and intensify

the risks of a much wider and more dangerous war. This is

particularly true since the Armenian forces exploited the coup

against Elchibey to break a cease-fire based on U.N. Resolution
882 and seize more Azeri territory during July-August 1993. If

the extreme nationalist Dashnak Party members (who appear to

control the Nagorno-Karabakh army) have their way, they will

apparently use their victories to engineer the secession of the

Lach and/or Lezgin peoples from Azerbaijan. This action would

effectively dismember Azerbaijan, forcing Turkey to act,20 as

well as Iran. Already Iran has strongly protested Armenian

forces' advance all the way to the its border.21 If Turkey

intervenes, it could then also face the Russian division

stationed on the border under the Tashkent Treaty on collective

security of the CIS that Armenia and Russia signed. Russian

analysts state that because that force has no air defense, 

Russia can only support it by threats of nuclear retaliation, a

factor that has deterred Turkey.22

Because Turkey is deterred from active intervention in the

Nagorno-Karabakh war, it cannot unilaterally reshape the future

Transcaucasia's regional order and terminate Russian military

pressure on its border. Turkish analysts note that the military

cannot be expected to act as Azerbaijan's "subcontractor" for

security. And, with good reason, they place little credence in a

U.N. peacekeeping mission. Nor does Turkey wish to support the

new Aliev regime in Baku until and unless a referendum is held by

Azeris on their government. All these factors combine to deter

Turkey from intervention despite its threats to the Armenian

forces.23 Still, Turkey's condition of being deterred does not

mean Turkey cannot reach any of its goals. Rather Turkey must

accept a large degree of Russian participation and perhaps even

predominance in any regional settlement. So Turkey has had to

accept a trilateral political solution and probably a secondary

role. Turkey, Russia, and the United States recently coauthored

U.N. Resolution 882 authorizing a cease-fire in Azerbaijan and

Nagorno-Karabakh, a sign that the other coauthors recognize that

Turkey has regional interests.

But continued war in Nagorno-Karabakh threatens even that

more modest objective. And, the chaos in Azerbaijan compounds

that threat because it has led to the breakdown of the cease-fire

accords and renewed fighting. Indeed, Turkey's alarm at new

trends is palpable. On July 26, 1993, it proposed that U.N.

peacemakers, including Turkish forces, be sent to Azerbaijan.24

This would not be seen in Erevan or Moscow as peacekeeping, but

as Turkey's intervention in the region to save Baku and Elchibey.

This proposal would almost certainly be unacceptable to Erevan,

the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, Iran, and to Russia, which is

determined to monopolize peacekeeping operations in the former

USSR. Turkish papers also talk of attacking the new government in

Baku before the CSCE for violating human rights and even suggest

sanctions.25 However, it is unlikely that either proposal will be

adopted. Those proposals signify Turkey's failed policies, not

strength, and reflect Ankara's inability to save its client and

sustain a pro-Turkish regime in Baku. The government there, led

by Geidar Aliyev and the rebel commander, now Defense Minister,

Guseinov, intend to restore Azerbaijan's integrity and reverse
Elchibey's insufficient attention to Russia.26

Thus, this war exposes the weakness of Turkish strategy and

policy. Although Turkey became progressively more ready in 1993

to display coercive diplomacy by military forces to make its

point it still could not or would not do anything for Elchibey.27

It was in keeping with Turkish policy to speak more resolutely

than it acts. But the failure of coercive diplomacy to seriously

deter the Armenians could, in time, further stimulate an already

aroused Turkish public opinion unhappy with Azeri defeats to

demand real pressure on Armenia in support of Azerbaijan which is

racially, culturally, and politically very close to Turkey. 

Turkey's ability to stay out of this war, its clear desire, is,

therefore, potentially limited by the fact that public agitation

for a tough line has become the daily stuff of domestic

politics.28 Should public opinion grasp the full measure of

Turkey's failure it may well turn against the government and

demand tougher policies at home or abroad. Whatever the outcome,

Turkey must now reappraise its strategy and policy. Furthermore,

if Armenian forces stay at the Iranian-Azeri border and do indeed

bifurcate Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and Turkey will have to join

hands to compel an Armenian retreat and a territorial solution.

In September 1993, Armenian advances to the Azeri border with

Iran compelled Iran to mass troops on its side of the border and

led Turkey to take its own precautionary military actions on its

border with Armenia. Both of these military measures remain in

effect at the time of this writing. Joint intervention would

restore Russia's position in the Transcaucasus, offer Iran a

legitimate role there as well as respectability by virtue of its

moderation and association with Moscow and Ankara, and leave

Turkey with marginal gains at best.

Thus today Turkey loses either way. If the cease-fire

negotiated under the terms of U.N. Resolution 882 before the coup

against Elchibey is restored and negotiations begin, Russian, not

Turkish, influence will predominate in Baku and Erevan because

Russia is Erevan's protector against Turkey and the new regime in

Baku looks towards Moscow, not Ankara, as a regional patron. On

the other hand, continued war and breakdown of the cease-fire

could also threaten Turkish interests for several reasons.

First, continued fighting makes it almost impossible for

Turkey to realize its vital economic and energy goals and

investments in Azerbaijan. Baku now spends 2/3 of its national

income on the war. It cannot invest at home and thereby attract

foreign investments, nor can it assist Turkey's energy or

investment policies. Baku has already suspended previous pipeline

negotiations and inclines towards Russian participation, a

serious blow to Turkey's interests.29

Second, as of the cease-fire Armenian forces had opened up

two direct corridors to Nagorno-Karabakh, one through Kelbadzhar

and the other to the south through territory inhabited by Lach

and Lezgin peoples. Continued fighting could stimulate
Dashnak-influenced Armenian commanders to dismember Azerbaijan

and give these peoples autonomous or even independent status.

That would break up Azerbaijan and sever its connections to the

Azeri-inhabited province of Nakhichevan, giving Armenia a much

greater land border with Iran. Or it could lead to Iran's

intervention in the war and the peace process.30 Both

alternatives are a disaster for Ankara. Azerbaijan's amputation

could also trigger Kurdish pressure to create a state partly out

of Turkey or irredentist pressure by Armenian radicals for

territorial compensation for the massacres of 1915-22.31 And

dismemberment of Azerbaijan is an outcome that Turkey's highest

officials have stated they would not tolerate.32

Third, Armenia historically has depended on its Russian

connection to block Turkey and prevent an Azeri-Russian

rapprochement. If Armenia prevails and Erevan or Baku turns to

Russia for help, Turkey could fail to achieve its regional

policy's main goals, cooperation with Baku and Armenian

subservience, while Russian influence would return to Turkey's

borders. That outcome accords with Russia's policy. Russia

announced in 1992-93 that its troops in the North Caucasus and

Moldova will remain until a political solution amenable to Russia

is worked out and that a Transcaucasus Military District will be

formed to control strategically important axes there.33 As

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Shakhray said,

Russia has an interest in preserving the integrity of

Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and in maintaining

their political independence and sovereignty. For their

part, these states should understand that their

political independence, integrity, and development

depend on the fact of whether they have normal

relations with Russia. The disruption of the balance

between various forces and interests leads to

redistribution of power, property, and spheres of

influence, and all this results in armed conflicts.34

Fourth, Turkey views a possible Dashnak government as a

threat since that party carries a bitter tradition of

anti-Turkish struggle for the genocide of 1915-22, itself the

fruit of years of violent struggles. The Dashnak party in Armenia

and Nagorno-Karabakh demands Turkish territorial compensations,

is a breeding ground for anti-Turkish Armenian terrorism, and

appears to be linking up with the Kurdish PKK.35 An Armenia freed

from dependence on Turkey or that is unstable and even conducts

various forms of low-level conflicts against Turkey or its

interests greatly adds to Turkish security problems. For example,

the PKK has targeted the pipelines from Azerbaijan and talks

openly of support from and links to Armenia.36 If such an

alliance does come to pass, it would join together two of

Turkey's security dilemmas and greatly complicate Turkish policy.

Fifth, a continued war might draw Turkey in, which would be

against its best interests. Turkish leaders believe any

intervention against Armenia would be interpreted abroad as a
Muslim-Christian war, divert U.S. and European support from

Turkey to Armenia, enhance Iran's position as a supporter of

Armenia, and seriously complicate ties with Europe, Moscow,

Tehran, and Washington.37 Such intervention also belies Demirel's

basic goals of a peaceful circle around Turkey. Thus any war

against the Dashnaks for Azerbaijan could rupture Turkish

alliances and threatens incalculable and probably protracted

outcomes.38

Although Presidents Ozal and Demirel warned Armenia in

increasingly strident terms about the integrity of Azerbaijan and

Turkey's limited patience during its offensives in early 1993,

the offensives have continued. Thus, in April-May 1993, despite

strong signs of the military's reluctance to enter the war,

Turkey heightened its forces' readiness on the border, and

intensified aerial reconnaissance in an unmistakable signal and

act of coercive diplomacy to Armenia and Armenian forces.39 Yet,

the Azeri army kept losing, a coup unseated Elchibey, Armenian

offensives continue unabated, and Turkey had to climb down from

the escalation ladder. All this indicates that Turkey cannot

deploy military power for Azerbaijan or elsewhere in the CIS. And

this failure to deploy usable force to serve policy is even more

marked because the April alert on the border was apparently the

second time that Turkey resorted to high-level military threats

and signals against Armenia, the first being in May 1992.40

Sixth, Turkish intervention also would undo the domestic

military modernization program and reverse the military

priorities laid down by General Gures. Precisely because

intervention raises those prospects, a protracted war in

Transcaucasia would set back progress on other key sectors of

Turkey's overall security policy.

The seventh reason why intervention is against Turkey's

interests is because its armed forces may not be suited to such a

low-intensity conflict type of war. Turkey's General Staff warily

viewed participation in Operation DESERT STORM. Its attitude

stemmed from fidelity to Ataturk's strictures against foreign

adventurism, fears of compromising Turkish sovereignty by acting

in a coalition, and concerns about Iraqi retaliation. However,

above and beyond those political concerns,

The military leadership apparently had serious doubts

about Turkey's ability to deploy and sustain forces

beyond their own territory, or even to conduct

large-scale mobile operations on the border with Iraq.

In short, close observation of the campaign in the Gulf

confirmed the unpreparedness of the Turkish armed

forces to wage modern conventional warfare. It has even

cast doubt on the value of the relatively modern

equipment to be acquired from the allies as a result of

the CFE agreement.41

An open-ended low intensity conflict or worse in Transcaucasia
would certainly be beyond an army of this caliber.

Finally, prolongation of the war also carries the threat of

Iranian political, and perhaps subsequent military, intervention.

Iran, too, cannot allow Armenian forces to dismember Azerbaijan.

Iran's intervention could inflame the Islamic issue at home or

abroad against Turkey and link up with the Kurds.42 For those

reasons Anakara can only be part of the trilateral initiative

that at least accepted that Turkey has regional interests. But

that is a poor surrogate for the grand design born when the USSR

collapsed.

TURKISH POLICY IMPASSE: TURKEY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Turkey's policy impasse highlights the fact that its

strategic economic, political, and military ways and means do not

suffice to realize its 1991-93 objective of a zone of Turkish

influence. In Nagorno-Karabakh all of those policy instruments

proved to be unavailing. Since Demirel's accession to the

presidency in May 1993 the future direction of policy is unclear.

The new government of Tansu Ciller may well concentrate on

domestic economic issues. In that case, Ciller would necessarily

have to redefine Turkey's strategic objectives abroad and could

narrow them considerably. The outcome of any strategic review

also depends on regional conditions in the former Soviet

republics and in the other areas of Turkish engagement which may

be beyond Turkish control. For now, Turkey must also redouble its

efforts to avert direct military participation in

Nagorno-Karabakh and rethink its local objectives because its

former strategic goals there clearly can no longer be sustained.

This conclusion also applies to the fact that Turkey's

overall strategic engagement abroad reflects the internal and

external political dimension of Turkey's self-identification,

i.e., its sense of mission and how others see it. Traditionally

Turkish elites identified with Europe and sought integration with

it. However the Soviet collapse has affected Western perceptions

of Turkey's importance for Europe. Its application to the EU has

been deflected. Absent a Soviet threat, Turkey's importance to

the Pentagon, in Europe, and NATO has declined. There is a trend

to see Turkey almost exclusively in its Asiatic and Middle

Eastern context.43 Should Europe rebuff it, Turkey may look

eastward for areas to enlarge its influence and obtain a new

post-Ataturk and anti-Western mission and identity.44 That new

identity and mission could weaken Turkish involvement in Europe

or lead it into very complex regional crises in the Muslim world.

Indeed, Turkish officials argue that if Turkey cannot fully

enter the EU and WEU any time soon, its value to Central Asia as

a Western state greatly declines. Then Turkey will find it

difficult to play a stabilizing role in an area supposedly

menaced by resurgent Islamic fundamentalism. Former Acting Prime

Minister Erdal Inonu told EC leaders that if Turkey is to use its

`immense influence' on those regions to move them to democracy
and markets, it must be a full member of the EC, an unlikely

prospect, but one showing Turkey's true priorities.45 But should

Turkey be rejected by Europe and then turn east it could likely

be bogged down in Central Asia or Transcaucasia, and be unable to

influence Europe, the Black Sea, and the Balkans.

While Turkey's interest in Central Asia probably does not

mean a revived Ottomanism or Pan-Turkism, interest in the Turkic

peoples of the former USSR and the recovery of communications and

cultural-economic ties with them is clearly growing.46 Turkey,

with strong U.S. backing, has presented itself as a model of an

economically well-developed, technically advanced, secular state

that respects but limits Islam in politics, and has a stable

democratic political system. Yet this approach has until now also

implied Turkey's leadership, an approach that severely

overestimates Turkish power and could lead to serious crises.47

Closer bilateral ties and parallel interests with the United

States in the ex-Soviet areas seemed, in 1991-92, to offer Turkey

an alternative rationale for its strategic importance and a

renewed sense of mission. The turn towards the former Soviet

republics confirmed Turkey's strategic importance and even its

leadership role to itself and Washington and allowed it to escape

the deeper implications of the Kurdish problem, i.e., the need to

revise Ataturk's heritage of an exclusively Turkish state for

solving today's geopolitical problems. Dugyu Sezer argues,

In a very important sense, the scope of the Kurdish

confrontation with the Turkish state attests to the

failure of Turkish nationalism and the ethos of

modernization to create a unitary state and a

participatory society within which Kurdish ethnic and

cultural identity might have flourished without

challenging the state.48

While Gures and Ciller reject anything that smacks of

separatism and an end to the unitary state, successful export of

Turkey's model to Central Asia seemed to demonstrate the

continuing validity of Turkey's model to Turks.49 Turkey could

then have its Ataturkian cake and eat it, too, preserving the

domestic structure of Ataturk's model, while venturing upon a

much bolder foreign policy.

Unfortunately, the outcome in Transcaucasia and the dawning

rivalry with Russia in the Black Sea and with other states, as

well in Central Asia, has failed to accord with the dream. This

observation, in turn, leads to a profoundly important point that

belies the comfortable assumptions involved in looking abroad to

escape domestic pressures. U.S. support for Turkey will depend

much more on a democratic Turkish resolution of its human rights,

i.e., Kurdish problem, a problem that can only be solved by

massive domestic economic growth, as Prime Minister Ciller quite

visibly knows.50 Ciller apparently will face a tough intramural

struggle with the army that wants to continue the tough policy
towards the Kurds that focuses on military repression of Kurdish

terrorism and downplays a more integrative and balanced economic

and political approach.51 Continuing harsh repression will make

it harder for the United States to claim that human rights are

obeyed. Any Turkish policy along those lines thereby risks U.S.

economic and political support. Since U.S. support for Turkey as

a model was and is crucial to the success of Turkey's entry into

Europe and penetration of Central Asia, a harsh anti-Kurd policy

would limit U.S. support and could limit Turkish activism abroad.

Secretary of State Christopher's recent talks with Turkey

indicated a mutual desire to expand U.S.-Turkish relationships

even though aid has recently been cut. But Secretary Christopher

also explicitly linked aid and support to human rights.52 While

economic factors may play a larger role than before, Turkey

clearly wants increased economic and technological assistance as

defense aid falls. Indeed, despite the severe budget cuts in

overall U.S. foreign aid and to Turkey in particular, Turkey

continues to demand guarantees on the amount of future military

aid.53 However, since progress on human rights is a major

condition for upgrading the relationship, Turkey must make

progress on the Kurds, i.e., demilitarize its policy, to continue

being a Western `interlocutor' and model for Central Asia. If

Turkey cannot resolve the Kurdish issue to U.S. satisfaction,

U.S. economic constraints will make aid to Turkey much harder to

justify. Then Turkey's strategic posture, that the United States

openly supported, will be still more exposed.

At the same time, U.S. negotiators have apparently told

Turkey that if it continues to seek guarantees to reverse the

last few years' downward trend in aid, "the United States will be

forced to close down its bases in Turkey."54 Although this may be

a bluff, some Turkish officials believe that the recent

U.S.-Bulgarian rapprochement signifies a long-term process to

relocate those bases.55

The conditionality of U.S. aid and support for Turkey's

effort to lead a grouping of Central Asian states also points up

the precariousness of Turkey's domestic structures. Flight from

unresolved domestic and economic issues posed by the Kurds to

expansive foreign policies is not a satisfactory resolution of

domestic issues. Sezer's 1981 admonition remains valid.

Unfortunately, despite the absence of obvious military

threats, the very precariousness of Turkey's domestic situation

exposes her to precisely the kind of internal and external

pressures which may dangerously undermine her ability to stand on

her own feet and formulate a coherent security policy. This

internal instability is currently the major source of Turkey's

insecurity.56

In other words, unless Turkey makes progress on its Kurdish

problem it cannot play the major role in the Turkic world that it

dreams of. By the same token if it cannot adjust outcomes in
Azerbaijan, it cannot do so anywhere else.57 Thus to achieve its

foreign policy objectives, Turkey must first settle its domestic

agenda. But these linkages of Turkey's domestic and foreign

policy also apply to its relationship with the United States.

Even as U.S. policy has promoted an expansive Turkish thrust

abroad, Washington is now retrenching and neither can nor will

support Turkish objectives in the future as in the past, thereby

exposing Turkey to more risks that Ankara can argue it took at

U.S. behest. That is not a satisfactory basis for the future of

the bilateral relationship.

TURKEY AND RUSSIA IN EUROPE, THE BLACK SEA, AND TRANSCAUCASIA

Wherever Turkey's policy engages the post-Soviet republics,

it also meets an increasingly clear Russian resistance. This

resistance takes the form of Russia's overt and covert efforts to

obtain military bases in the Transcaucasus; to become the sole

mediator in the Abkhaz-Georgian and Nagorno-Karabakh wars; to

unhinge the Elchibey government in Azerbaijan in mid-1993; to

compel all three Transcaucasian states to join the CIS and allow

for the stationing of Russian bases in their territory,

`strategic partnership' and a treaty with Iran; to control the

flow of energy products through Russian territory and not Turkey;

and to collaborate with Greece against Turkey in Europe and the

Black Sea Straits. In the Black Sea region, Marchuk's

observations that Ukrainian-Turkish collaboration is a priority

for Kiev's security policy and both states' subsequent agreement

on military cooperation are exactly what alarms Russia about

Turkish policies and causes it to resist them.58 Russian

observers fear that dividing the Black Sea Fleet among the

littoral states gives Turkey an operational-strategic advantage

that would allow it to blockade the Bosporous and the littoral

states. Then Turkey (or NATO) could strangle those states'

seaborne trade, or allow NATO into the Black Sea with impunity.59

They also fear that, under the pretext of U.N. peacekeeping to

monitor the Georgian-Abkhazian or Nagorno-Karabakh war, NATO can

threaten the littoral states in these or other ways.60

Recent Russian political and military commentary also

evinces growing suspicion of Turkish aims in Transcaucasia and

Central Asia. Those reports postulate a `Turkic belt' of local

states and efforts to freeze Russia out of energy pipelines

there.61 Russia's ambassador to Ankara warned that any effort to

stir up Pan-Turkism in Central Asia or the Transcaucasus would

trigger Russian Pan-Slavism, a force he did not define.62

Military writers in particular charge that Turkey is

allowing NATO into the Black Sea, fomenting Pan-Turkism, seeking

local unilateral domination, or pursuing a leading role in an

anti-Russian `Baltic-Black Sea' security system.63 The proximity

of the Danube to the war in Yugoslavia and Turkish staging areas

in the Black Sea heightens their concerns. On February 24, 1993

Krasnaia Zvezda stated that "Any WEU actions on the Danube must

be approved by Russia."64 The Black Sea Fleet's Commander in
Chief, Admiral Baltin, has expressed concern lest France, Spain,

and Italy participate in a Black Sea blockade of Yugoslavia and

over the November 1992 Bulgarian-NATO joint exercises there.65

For these reasons, the September 1993 Russo-Ukrainian accord

allowing Russia to buy out Ukraine's share of the Black Sea Fleet

in return for Kiev's debts to Moscow leaves Turkey face-to-face

with Russia and substantially degrades the role Ukraine could

have played in maintaining Black Sea security. Russian

opposition to Turkey's aims in the vicinity of the Black Sea will

likely grow from now on.

Russia has also recently asked for changes in the

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to allow it to deploy

more conventional forces in what is now the North Caucasian

Military district. Russian officials cite their concerns over the

wars between Georgia and Abkhazia, among the North Caucasian

republics, and the Nagorno-Karabakh War.66 More candidly,

however, they admit to a great and deep-seated fear of Turkish

influence and/or Muslim fundamentalism, which they often,

wrongly, lump together.67 Ambassador Richard Armitage, the Bush

administration's coordinator for aid to Russia, noted that the

military dislikes the terms and limits in the CFE treaty and may

also wish to use these troops to add pressure on Ukraine.68 That

too is against Turkish interests since any such move would

restore Russian military pressure to the Black Sea and would

entail an imperial Russian state structure that would necessarily

be authoritarian and a great destabilizer in Eurasia.

Russia's request to revise the CFE accords "angered" Ankara

who dismissed "the threat from the south" as "very meaningless."

Ankara is reportedly anxious about "whether Russia is trying to

extend its sovereignty to the Caucasus region by avoiding the

responsibilities it has undertaken within the framework of the

agreement on conventional arms reduction."69 Ankara views any

reopening of the CFE Treaty as touching off "a significant arms

race in Europe," and has formally opposed it.70 Official sources

also reject Russian fears about the wars to its south,

Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are in the southern

part of Russia. In view of the agreement on arms

reductions, they have a total of 1,800 tanks. However,

Russia has 6,000 tanks. That the three republics, which

have internal problems and disputes with each other,

would pose a threat to Russia is impossible. Meanwhile

Russia does not have a border with Turkey anymore.71

These Russian political moves, continued fighting in the

Black Sea littoral, Georgia versus Abkhazia and the war over

Nagorno-Karabakh, and tensions with Ukraine indicate that for

Turkey, the Russian threat is by no means dead, even if it is

frozen for the moment. The strains over the CFE Treaty, plus the

other issues aggravating relations with Moscow illustrate that

the ancient Turco-Russian rivalry in Eurasia continues, albeit

under the conditions of the new international order.
Russia continues to view Turkey as an adjacent power and

therefore will resist any deployment of forces in Turkey from

which it believes it could be attacked. Russia's proximity to

Turkey creates in Russian thinking the notion that Turkey is part

of its natural defense perimeter. Accordingly, Moscow tends to

view Turkey's military preparedness as illegitimate while Russian

policies are conceived, not bilaterally, but in a global or

Pan-European strategic context that legitimates their

activities.72

In addition, although a consensus that Turkey not be the

base for a NATO or other attack on the USSR and now Russia has

existed for several years in Turkey, Russia still expresses alarm

at any Muslim unity. It prefers a disunited Middle East on its

borders to one united by any common interest or ideology.

Therefore Turkey's efforts to organize the Black Sea region,

Central Asia, and the Caucasus stimulate an equally strong

Russian counter-effort. Russia's response takes the shape of

proposals to send Russian peacekeeping forces into Azerbaijan and

to station troops in Armenia and around the former Soviet bases,

and warnings against intervention to deter Turkey and Iran. Both

Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Defense Minister Grachev have also

made it clear that Russia supports Azerbaijan's territorial

integrity and Kozyrev observed that Russia's political aim is a

peace settlement that will enhance its position in both Armenia

and Azerbaijan.73

Part of Russia's reply to Turkey is Yeltsin's call for

military bases in Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia, crucial areas

for Turkey.74 Russia has also fashioned an anti-Turkish entente

with Greece. In Greece, President Yeltsin conceded that he and

then Prime Minister Mitsotakis had discussed the Muslim threat in

the Balkans and the southern borders of the former USSR. Both men

reiterated the total coincidence of their views on Bosnia and the

necessity of vetoing any effort to intervene there.75

Russia and Greece also proposed to locate the Black Sea

Trade and Development Bank in Salonika, not Istanbul. Russia

also tried to prevent formation an economic, cultural, and

political-legal commission within the BSECZ since that would

enable that organization to discuss political issues like

Russia's intervention in Moldova, as Moldova's Head of

Parliament, Petre Lucinschi proposed.76

Russian resistance to the BSECZ's falling under Turkish

influence or leadership is another crucial aspect of its

resistance to Ankara's policies. This is because Turkey's

initiative in creating the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone

was a linchpin in both its "Eastern" and "Western" policies. 

Through its association with the EC it hoped to lead its partners

in the BSECZ towards integration with the EC and thus play a

unifying and vanguard role in the Black Sea region and beyond. 

Turkey would be the leading integrator of the Black Sea states
and Central Asia with Europe. Its influence would have grown to

the extent that these states achieved economic and political

stabilization and that could lead even to the amelioration of

rivalry with Greece. Thus Izvestiya's correspondent writes,

Something more undoubtedly lies behind these arguments.

 Moscow is gradually assuming the role of chief arbiter

in Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Dniester region and does

not wish for competition from anyone. In addition,

people in the Kremlin and on Smolenskaya Square

[Foreign Ministry building] do not want the BSECZ,

which was created on Turkey's initiative, to be turned

into a tool for the expansion of Ankara's political

influence in the region.77

As noted above, Russia and Iran also signed a treaty of

strategic partnership that aims to coordinate politics with Iran

in the ex-Soviet republics and which has paid handsome arms

transfer dividends for Iran. Finally another dispute is beginning

over Russian oil shipments through the Straits. Turkey has warned

that Russian efforts to ship its own oil and that of Kazakhstan

and Azerbaijan through the Straits will force closure of the

Bosporous to allow the daily passage of two 130,000 ton vessels.

Therefore the Bosporous will be closed to Russian maritime

traffic 300 days a year to allow those tankers to pass through.

That will lead to obstruction of 55.8 percent of Russian trade,

or according to Prime Minister Ciller's letter to President

Yeltsin, 68 percent of that trade.

Although Russian officials claim they have no other ports

available to them through the Baltic or through Odessa, this does

not deter Turkish officials. They argue that Russia must

cooperate with Turkey on the proposed pipeline project or face

obstruction of its foreign trade. They contend that the risk of

accidents, and of environmental damage to the Straits is what

drives them. Turkey has duly suggested that Russia use existing

pipelines to channel exports to a proposed pipeline from Baku to

Ceyhan in Turkey that links up to Georgia and Russia.

Alternatively Turkey offers to lay a pipeline from Samsun or

Zonguldak on the Black Sea to Kirikkale. Then oil could be pumped

through the refinery linking Central Anatolia and Ceyhan to the

Mediterranean Sea.78 Thus oil from Central Asia and Azerbaijan

would be diverted from the pipeline to Novorossisk on the Black

Sea from whence it would go through the Bosporous, to an overland

pipeline that goes through Georgia, Armenia or Iran to

Southeastern Turkey (where the Kurdish issue is at its most

intense). Of course, the threat of closure of the Straits,

however justified, is the long-standing strategic threat to

Russia that it has always regarded as intolerable. And the issue

joined here reflects the centrality of energy issues in regional

geopolitics and security agendas.

Turkey's policy also reflects a tough-minded effort to

revise the Montreux Treaty of 1936 allowing unhampered peacetime
transit of tankers and merchant ships through the Straits. Until

now the Foreign Ministry had vetoed reopening that treaty as a

taboo. But now it is determined to revise the treaty, allegedly

to protect the Straits and Istanbul from ecological or other

economic damages.79 Whether those threats to the littoral of the

Straits are real or not, the threat to close down Russia's trade

and the determination to secure a pipeline linking Turkey with

the energy rich regions of the former USSR are quite tangible, as

this episode shows. As the Financial Times reports, this Turkish

pipeline project is the economic lifeline and centerpiece of an

ambitious foreign policy to overcome the obstacles to Turkish

economic linkages with Central Asia. Meanwhile, for Russia the

prospect of losing control over its former satellites' natural

resource base and access to ports and refineries when it is

brandishing its economic power is also intolerable, a fact that

Turkey probably underestimated.80 Moreover the Financial Times

also observes that revision of the Montreux Treaty would likely

prejudice relations with all the littoral states in the Black Sea

and undermine the BSECZ set-up to cement regional trade ties.81

Four conclusions emerge from these conditions of

Russo-Turkish relations. First, Russia and Turkey are engaged in

an ever clearer regional rivalry from the Black Sea through

Transcaucasia to Central Asia. Second, Russian policies, in the

Black Sea, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia outline a growing

effort against Turkey and towards common cause with its enemies

and rivals, Greece and Iran. Third, because of this regional

rivalry, NATO still has enormous relevance to Turkey's security

and interests abroad. It is not by accident that Georgian

President Shevarnadze, who accused the Russian army of

intervening against Georgia in Abkhazia and highly values the

relationship with Turkey, has asked NATO, the North Atlantic

Cooperation Council (NACC), and Presidents Kohl and Clinton to

intervene diplomatically and politically in the region's

conflicts and undertake peacekeeping efforts there to restrain

Russian influence.82

Fourth, just as domestic economic constraints restrict

Turkey's regional influence, so too is Russian resistance a key

external factor that will prevent realization of the dream of

greater Turkish influence. Turkish officials apparently are

coming to grasp this. The new ambassador to Moscow, Ayhan Kamel,

told the Russian weekly, New Times, that the needs of the Central

Asian and Caucasian republics exceeds Turkey's resources and

potentials. Hence Turkey wants to get others, including Russia,

to help in reconstructing the republics. Pointedly, he added,

We maintain that Russia must necessarily aid the

Central Asian and Caucasian countries. There are two

reasons for that. Firstly, you lived in common with

them for one or two centuries. Secondly, these

countries have a considerable Russian minority. Hence

we believe Turkey and Russia could cooperate in aiding

them. We regard Russia there not as a rival, but rather
as a valuable partner with whom we should cooperate in

that respect.83

Turkey has had to recognize that Russia's regional influence

cannot be dislodged. Either it acts with Russia and accepts

partnership with it or it faces Moscow's superior power to resist

and obstruct Turkish initiatives. Even as it blocks Turkish

ambitions in Eurasia, Russia pursues a peaceful relationship with

Turkey and even sells it arms because both sides are wary of any

"Islamic" threat and have a substantial bilateral trade. In

addition Russia must be able to use the Black Sea and the Straits

for its seaborne trade. Those two factors give Turkey some

leverage. Nonetheless they do not erase the constant dynamics of

the bilateral relationship, i.e. Russian suspicion of Turkish

objectives and ability to resist them.

As in the past, Russia's proximity to Turkey and belief that

Turkey is inside its maritime and overall defense perimeter still

create a constant pressure on Turkey to defend her sovereignty

rather than undertake grandiose anti-Russian objectives, even now

when Russia is weak.84 Thus in Central Asia, the Black Sea, and

Transcaucasia, Russian resistance to Turkish ambitions, combined

with Turkey's inability to fully secure its objectives will

likely force Turkey to retract its dream of regional leadership.

TURKISH OBJECTIVES IN CENTRAL ASIA

Turkish goals in Central Asia are easy to see. At the

macro-strategic level the overriding goal is to win many points

of economic, cultural, and political leverage in Central Asia to

preclude reversion to Russian control or movement towards

Iranian-style fundamentalism. Russia has historically oppressed

its Muslims and threatened Turkey's integrity. Iran-backed

fundamentalism could threaten Turkey's integrity if it is coupled

with support for the Kurds.85 But it more likely threatens the

profound political and institutional secularization at the heart

of Ataturk's legacy. In addition, Turkey wants to reinforce

Western perceptions of its ability to contain potential threats

from unstable Muslim areas. Turkey believes that the stronger its

position as a westernizing model for Central Asia, the stronger

its claim on the West for support.86 And by acting accordingly

Turkey makes that claim on the West.

For those reasons, the leverage Turkey seeks abroad need not

be interpreted as revived Pan-Turkism (though its rhetoric often

fans such fears). But that quest for strong points could also

seduce Turkey into really believing it is some sort of elder

brother, spokesman for, or more than a model for former Soviet

republics. Turkey's approach has already alarmed Central Asia and

Turkey's regional rivals: China, Iran, and Russia.87 Nonetheless

Turkey apparently remains committed to a strong regional presence

as a guarantor of stability and progress. As Premier, Demirel

proclaimed Turkey's readiness to assume political responsibility

from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China, and that it has
never been as important for the United States or Europe as it is

today. More recently he expressed his hope that Turkey will

become one of the world's 10 major powers "some time in the

future."88 Ozal was even more outspoken as shown by his statement

quoted above at the "Turkic World Fraternity Friendship and

Cooperation Convention" in Antalya in March 1993.89

Rhetorically such statements go far beyond Demirel's very

cautious diplomacy to create merely a `peaceful circle' around

Turkey and eschew Ozal's more grandiose vistas.90 But the

rhetoric reveals Turkey's choice of a demanding agenda in

Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Turkey must now be a factor for

regional stability and progress in regions dotted by conflicts

real or potential, a reversal of Ataturk's rejection of

Pan-Turkic policies. If we assess Turkish policies as preventive

diplomacy against ethnic conflicts, revived Russian domination,

or Islamic fundamentalism, we get a good sense of Turkey's

macro-strategic objectives in Central Asia that its other aims

serve.

For example, Turkey's extensive economic activity here aims

at achieving market access and connections to future business so

that its expanding economy has strong ties to these areas and

leverage over their future economic policies. Turkish

investments in telecommunications and in promoting the regional

Latinization of languages and alphabets also serve to deflect

Central Asia and the Transcaucasus away from Russia and Iran and

lead Turkey into clashes with Russia and Iran, which also are

trying to regain or obtain strong positions here. Russia has even

been willing to create crises in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to

retain its position.91 Russia also wholly dominates Central Asian

states' security and makes clear its intentions not to let them

out of its economic grasp.92 Iran and Russia, as we have seen,

also compete vigorously with Turkey for pipeline routes and

investments.

This leads to the third objective of Turkish activity: i.e.,

initiatives like the ECO. Those programs show that Turkey's

interests cannot be ignored and it can undertake key initiatives

to enhance regional security. But this goal involves a yet to be

reconciled contradiction. Turkey competes regionally both on its

own behalf and on behalf of Washington and the West. But to

establish its bona fides regionally it must convince local actors

that it pursues an independent regional policy and is not a U.S.

agent.93 Until Turkey resolves this contradiction it will find it

hard to attain its regional objectives in the new republics. 

But, to be able to compete regionally it must collaborate with

Washington to secure vital economic assistance and entree into

Europe. Therefore it cannot break free of the contradiction that

is the inherent price of Turkey's post-1991 security posture.

INSTRUMENTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA

In Central Asia, Turkey has undertaken broadly linked
political, cultural, communications, and economic initiatives. 

Turkey moved fast to recognize and open embassies in all the new

states and to sponsor their membership in international agencies

like the CSCE and international or regional economic

organizations.94 Ankara has accepted some 10,000 students from

the new republics for higher education in Turkey and has begun

educating their officers in its institutions (apart from military

assistance provided to Azerbaijan in its war). It has set up

television links in Turkish with Central Asia through Intelsat,

funded Latinization and supplied materials, e.g., textbooks, to

create a common linguistic and educational base with Central

Asia, and invested substantially to integrate telecommunications

with these states.95

But the most visible and large-scale activity centers around

economic investments and assistance. Economic ties by direct

bilateral deals and creation of multilateral fora for economic

consultation and growth represent the deepest thrust of Turkey's

Central Asian policy. This is most visible in Turkish efforts to

gain access or direct control over energy sources and pipelines.

So too, the investments in telecommunications, education, and

linguistic rapprochement with Central Asia have a large economic

component and expectation of sizable future returns.96

Characteristically, Ozal embraced a still more grandiose vision,

namely, that within 15 years economic borders would have

disappeared even if political ones remain.97 The most optimistic

forecast was Turkish dominance in Central Asian markets, a kind

of common Turkic market. Turkey may have hoped for that after

November 1992, when these states met in Ankara. But closer

examination suggests that a Turkic common market is not in the

cards.98

Large-scale economic activity also takes place in the TACD

(Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Development), an autonomous

organization within the Foreign Ministry. It is developing a

volunteers project to work with the United Nations Development

Program (UNDP). The TACD, since its birth in 1992, has a $406

million budget to oversee, help, and develop projects for Central

Asia, the Caspian, Balkans, Black Sea, Eastern Europe, Near and

Middle East, Mediterranean, etc. It is supposed to supervise

assistance to those countries in education, culture, and

economics. It is involved in the Intelsat exchange but also is

developing projected satellite launches with and to Central Asia

and a fiber optic network linked to the ex-Soviet republics. The

TACD is building a highway to Central Asia through Iran, is

considering a regional university like the Middle East Technical

University, and is planning for the Trans-Eurasia Investment and

Development Bank headquartered in Ankara.99 This bank would also

be attached to the ECO.

Turkish airlines are also trying to corner Central Asia's

commercial airline routes.100 Official media also report around

1000 joint ventures with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan alone: gold

mining and refining, textile mills and factories, pipelines,
hotel refurbishing, and telecommunications networks. Turkey has

allocated between $1.1 and $1.2 billion in credits to Central

Asia and authorized $975 million in loans to the Turkic republics

that are backed by $200 million from Turkey's banks. Finally

many businesses are active locally.101 Taken at face value, these

economic and cultural ties suggest Turkey's strong posture as a

regional model, elder brother, and stabilizer.

ASSESSING TURKEY'S STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT

However, a deeper analysis of Turkey's Central Asian policy

suggests that while Turkey will undoubtedly achieve points of

influence or leverage upon regional developments, a leadership

role there is beyond its present capabilities. Several factors

are at work: Central Asian republics' aspirations for an

independent and diversified foreign policy, other states'

political-economic rivalry with Turkey, and Turkey's own economic

limitations due to its own extensive strategic agenda. Taken

together these factors' interaction argues against Turkish

dominance over Central Asia, as was feared in 1991-92 by many

Russian observers. Rather, it appears that a new version of the

old `Great Game' has already begun to draw the United States and

many other regional and extra-regional actors into the area. For

example, Turkey's drive for preeminence in Central Asia

undoubtedly led Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev to proclaim a

`strategic partnership' and sign what amounts to a nonaggression

pact with Iran in Tehran.102

Similarly Russia has recently quite openly and brutally

deployed its economic and military power in Central Asia to

install or maintain pro-Moscow policies and ex-Communist

dictators. Since these dictators depend on Moscow for their

security and economic means of survival, pro-Turkish policies are

ruled out. Even in democratic Kyrgyzstan Vice-President Feliks

Kulov told NATO that Kyrgyzstan pays "great attention to

strengthening of the military alliance with Russia taking into

account the single system of the armed forces and economic

dependence in the sphere of the army's logistic support."103

The July 1993 decision by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to

work towards economic integration excluded Central Asia,

evidently deliberately. Russian Vice-Premier Shokhin made it

clear that Central Asians cannot flirt with or join economic

unions of Islamic states including Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran,

and still be included in this union.104 In other words, if they do

not opt for Russia, they will be out of the ruble zone and also

unable to function economically. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also

made clear Russia's ultimate goal that, "the governments proceed

from the fact that economic integration cannot be effective in

isolation without a wider, multilateral mutual action in the

political, defence, and legislative areas." Kozyrev further

developed this goal with his notion of a `shield' against

fundamentalism and a "club of friends of regional stability" in

Central Asia.105
Yet despite Russian pressure, Central Asian states do not

intend to be Turkey's `younger brothers.' Although grateful for

economic assistance, they are diversifying their sources of

foreign investment and interest to escape dependence on any one

state and they are also wary of Turkish ambitions.106 Central

Asian states resisted Turkish pressure for a true common market

at the ECO's 1992 Ankara conference.107 Finally, Russia, Turkey,

Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, China, India, Pakistan, South Korea,

Japan, and the United States now compete for Central Asian energy

resources or investments. Turkey cannot overcome this rivalry

and local interest in diversifying foreign investment and

influence.108

Furthermore, despite Turkish public and state interest in

Central Asian investments, through November 1992 Turkish exports

to Central Asia were only 2 percent of total exports. Only $150

million has been allocated from the $1.2 billion credits to these

states. And only $175 million of the available loans have been

utilized by the Turkic republics.109 Turkey's debt and high

inflation have also inhibited direct investment in Central Asian

energy. Istanbul may become a center of the oil business; but

Turkey cannot compete with Western oil companies in Central Asia

and Azerbaijan. It will more likely be an intermediary, not an

independent force in regional energy politics.110

Additionally, the Central Asian states obviously still

depend on Russian forces for security and to keep their internal

opposition from coming to power. In the final analysis they have

no choice. Turkey cannot protect them and never had any political

connection with the area. All these states repeatedly cite close

ties with Russia as their priority.111

Therefore while Turkey will undoubtedly obtain important

markets and some local influence, it is unlikely to realize its

larger dreams there. These republics may be Turkey's "dreamland"

but the reality will likely be very different. This conclusion

suggests that Turkey can promote its own and U.S. interests in an

anti-fundamentalist Central Asia based on `the Turkish model'

only up to a point. Turkey may be a model for Central Asia. But

even so it cannot offer what Central Asian leaders and their

publics most crave on the scale that they need it. Any effort to

provide that economic-political role of main benefactor will

saddle Turkey, and thus the United States with commitments beyond

their means. Such Turkish exertions would also further arouse the

suspicions of every state in the area. Turkey's actual powers are

consequently more limited than its ambitions might lead others to

think.

CONCLUSIONS

Central Asia is a vital area neither for Turkey nor the

United States, although it is important to Turkey for reasons of

consanguinity, ambition, and desire to block Russia and Iran.
Turkey cannot defend or subsidize it nor can the United States. 

Ultimately, U.S. and Turkish interests comprise largely economic

and political goals and instruments to realize them. Turkey will

play a role in the regional balance of power. But only Russia, as

is the case in Tadzhikistan, can overcome the immense logistical

and strategic difficulties of military involvement in Central

Asia that is the acid test of real influence there. A Turkish

effort to play this role also contradicts a successful resolution

of Turkey's domestic security problems.

This same condition holds true for the Transcaucasus as long

as Turkey's border with Armenia is stabilized. If that border is

unstable, either a war with incalculable conclusions or a

political settlement in which Turkey is the loser is quite

likely. Indeed, by September 1993 it was apparent that Turkey's

policy in Transcaucasia had reached a dead end. Azerbaijan,

facing the threat of Armenian military partition, is opting to

join the CIS to obtain formal guarantees of Russian military

protection. Those guarantees, which also extend to Armenia, would

give Russia the formal basis to regain its regional

preeminence.112 And, if Russia extends its collective security

treaty to cover Azerbaijan as well as Armenia, it would be

logical to expect both Russian `peacekeeping' forces in the

former and permanent installations, i.e., bases there and perhaps

in or near the Caspian Sea to defend against Armenia, and by

extension, Iran and Turkey. Moreover, Turkey and Azerbaijan both

had to urge Russia to mediate the war as the only way to prevent

a wider war should Armenian forces go towards Nakhichevan, where

Turkey has treaty rights going back to 1921, or Iran.113 Here,

too, Turkey will be an important, but not decisive factor in the

new version of the great game. As Ambassador Kamel indicated,

partnership with Russia, and mainly on Russia's terms or

sufferance, is the best it can hope for. Apparently neither

Ankara nor Washington will take on Russia here. As a senior

Turkish Foreign Ministry official observed, Turkey's mistake was

that it had excessive expectations and ignored the Russian

factor.114 This turn of events graphically demonstrates both the

U.S.' and Turkey's regional weakness. Recently both Turkey and

the United States accepted Aliev's regime as a fait accompli.115 

A U.S. Government that will not commit to defend Bosnia will not

do so for Abkhazia, Georgia, Armenia, or Tadzhikistan.

Turkish objectives in those areas, although superficially

congruent with U.S. aims, do, in fact, go beyond what are, after

all, marginal U.S. interests. is part of the evolving U.S. policy

of `dual isolation' of Iran and Iraq, the United States will

probably have to rely more on Turkey in Central Asia and

Transcaucasia.116 However, continued pressure on Iraq exacts a

high price for Turkey, the depression of its southeastern region,

the locus of Kurdish unrest, and the closure of the Iraqi

pipeline which was a vital source of revenue. Thus Turkey now

wants to open the Iraqi pipeline, against U.S. interests.117 Thus

our pressure on Iraq affects vital Turkish interests and

undermines its domestic security, even as that pressure logically
suggests a greater Turkish role in the Muslim world. 

Turco-Russian rivalry in the Balkans, Near and Middle East is

also reviving. That revival, in turn, will force Washington to

choose between Russian and Turkish influence in the former USSR.

Russia is now well-placed to win this contest, especially given

traditional U.S. disinterest in these regions. That victory will

undo Turkey's role in our anti-Iraq and anti-Iran policy, a role

that is already onerous to Turkey.

Thus, U.S. policy has yet to resolve the contradictions

based on support for Ankara and Moscow against Baghdad and Tehran

when Russia and Iran are allying against Turkey in Central Asia

and Transcaucasia. Since Washington cannot defend Turkey's

regional objectives without intensifying strains with Russia,

Iran, and local `insurgents,' a negotiated solution offering the

Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh real national and personal autonomy

within an Azerbaijan constrained by treaty and international

guarantees, and mutual guarantees against economic warfare and

other belligerent acts seems a sounder basis for the

Transcaucasus. But no such plan is remotely visible. Instead, as

of September 1993 Armenian forces are driving to the Iranian

border and threaten to bifurcate Azerbaijan.118 Clearly neither

Ankara nor Washington has a viable program of action for the

Transcaucasus. And this has stimulated domestic opposition to

Ciller's government at home. Professor Mumtaz Soysal of Turkey's

Social Democratic Party said that since Turkey "did not know the

world in which it wished to play a role," it had created

expectations far beyond what its financial means could fulfill.

Other critics of the regime speak in even more apocalyptic terms,

i.e., that Turkey has lost its chance to become a regional

leader.119 Therefore any effort to push Turkey forward as the U.S.

regional `point man' runs aground at a time when the United

States is already cutting its aid to Turkey, is changing aid to

loans, introducing human rights conditions for it, and

threatening to close U.S. bases if Turkey does not like these

terms.120

Turkish official calls for foreign investment in Central

Asia underscore the fact that it is beyond Turkey's dreams to

dominate the area as it had hoped.121 These requests display the

limits on Turkish policy, not its strength. Meanwhile U.S. policy

supports Turkish efforts to block Russia, Iran, and Iraq and deny

them energy markets and influence in these regions. Yet the aid

to which Turkey feels entitled is already beyond the will of the

United States. This makes Washington an object of suspicion among

Turks.122 While Turkey will be a major player, preeminence in the

former Soviet Muslim republics is beyond its means, risks its

alliance with the United States, its political integrity and

stability, and neglects the Middle East and Europe, its true

priority.

Turkish officials now boast that the United States must

consult it before embarking on any policy in all four regions.123

Yet, that cannot imply a U.S. blank check that may have to be
paid in full plus interest. Turkey's strategic dilemma is

serious. But pursuit of a pro-Turkish zone in the former USSR

for its own and for Washington's benefit is not the answer.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER 4

1. Alan Cowell, "Turkey Loses Its Allure as a Patron in

Central Asian Nation", The New York Times, August 14, 1993, p. 3.

2. Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. to Counter Iran in Central

Asia," The New York Times, February 6, 1992, p. A3; John E. Yang,

"U.S., Turkey Pledge Aid to New States," The Washington Post,

February 12, 1992, p. A30; "U.S. Struggle Against Radical Islamic

Movements Viewed," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western

Europe (henceforth FBIS-WEU)-93-158, August 18, 1993, p. 38.

3. "Ozal Gives Opening Speech", FBIS-WEU 93-057, March 26,

1993, p. 5. See also President Demirel's observation that

"Because of our central geographic position, we have to be active

in many regions." "Demirel on Kurds, Ties to EC," FBIS-WEU93-134, July 15, 1993, p. 60.

4. "Marchuk Favors Good Russia Relations", Foreign Broadcast

Information Service, Central Eurasia (henceforth FBIS-USR),

93-006, January 15, 1993, p. 11; Dmitry Volsky, "The Black Sea:

What's Beyond the Horizon," New Times, No. 25, 1993, p. 24;

"Kravchuk Discusses Cooperation With Turkish Defense Minister",

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia

(henceforth FBIS-SOV)-93-134, July 15, 1993, p. 47.

5. "Paper Reports Inflation, Price Hikes," FBIS-WEU-93-092,

May 14, 1993, p. 44; "Treasury Said Facing `Very Difficult

Situation'," FBIS-WEU-92-094, May 14, 1992, p. 43; Chris Hedges,

"Turkey Off Balance as Death Ends a Long Rivalry," The New York

Times, May 20, 1993, p. A3; John Murray Brown, "Economic Woes

Mount for Ciller," Financial Times, August 6, 1993, p. 2;

Jonathan C. Randal, "Turks Rethinking Regional Roles," The

Washington Post, February 24, 1993, p. A15.

6. Ian O. Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West

After the Cold War," Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, eds.,

Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 119-120; Robert Block,

"NATO Adds Fuel to Balkan Arms Race," The Independent, London,

July 21, 1993, p. 10; "Defense Industry Expands To Meet Risk of

Threats," FBIS-WEU-93-055, March 24, 1993, p. 53; Mohammed

Ziarati, "Turkish Security Policy After the Cold War," Middle

East International, February 5, 1993, p. 19.

7. Stafford Mawhinney, "Turkey Nears Completion of Pact to

Buy Russian Arms," Defense News, September 7-13, 1992, p. 32;

"Military-Political Cooperation of Turkey and the United States,"

Joint Publications Research Service, Foreign Military Review, (henceforth JPRS-UFM)-93-001-L, from Zarubezhnoe Voennoe
Obozrenie, No. 7, July 1992, pp. 10-13, March 18, 1993, pp. 4-7;

Hakki Aris, "Turkish Defence Procurement: A Status Report of

Current Programmes," Military Technology, April 1993, pp. 40-47;

"Plan To Modernize Forces Detailed," FBIS-WEU-92-141, July 22,

1992, pp. 37-38.

8. "Turkey Looks for Trading Partners," Jane's Defence

Weekly, February 13, 1993, p. 50.

9. Sitki Egeli, "Turks Fear Ballistic Menace," Defense News,

May 31-June 6, 1993, p. 19; "Missile Defense System Sought:

Patriot System Faulted," FBIS-WEU-93-097, May 21, 1993, p. 71.

10. "General Staff Chief on PKK, Martial Law, Coup,"

FBIS-WEU, 93-131, July 12, 1993, p. 56.

11. "Demirel Discusses Foreign, Domestic Issues,"

FBIS-WEU-93-131, July 12, 1993, p. 51.

12. Steve Coll, "Drilling for Stakes in a Post-Communist

World," The Washington Post Weekly, June 7-13, 1993, pp. 16-17.

13. "Nagorno-Karabakh Plan Proposed," FBIS-WEU-92-059, March

26, 1992, p. 3; "Lachin Corridor Territorial Redistribution Plan

Outlined," FBIS-USR-92-109, August 28, 1992, pp. 86-87; "Cetin

Said To Propose `Exchange," FBIS-WEU-93-066, April 8, 1993, p.

56; Paul A. Goble, "Coping With the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis,"

Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol XVI, No.2, Summer 1992, pp.

19-26.

14. Ibid., "Cetin Said To Propose Exchange", p. 56; Raymond

Bonner, "War in Caucasus Shows Ethnic Hate's Front Line," The New

York Times, August 2, 1993, p. A6.

15. "Shevarnadze, Turkey's Demirel Discuss Future of

Caucasus," FBIS-SOV-93-077, April 23, 1993, p. 58; Coll, pp.

16-17.

16. "Security Crisis With Iran Affects Economic Ties,"

FBIS-WEU- 93-150, August 6, 1993, pp. 39-40.

17. "President Demirel Inaugurates the Second ECO Summit,"

Newspot, July 15, 1993, p. 2.

18. Ibid.

19. Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in

Modern History, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993,

pp. 120-126.

20. Lee Hockstader, "Major Offensive Laid to Armenians," The

Washington Post, August 26, 1993, p. 26.

21. Ibid.
22. Dmitry Volsky, "The Explosive Karabakh Conflict," New

Times, No. 16, 1993, p. 24; J.D. Crouch II, William Van Cleave,

et al, "The Politics of Reform in Russia," Global Affairs, Vol.

VII, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 197.

23. "Azerbaijan's Situation, Turkey's Involvement Viewed,"

FBIS- WEU-93-146, August 2, 1993, pp. 53-54.

24. National Public Radio, All Things Considered, July 26,

1993.

25. "'Final Warning' To Be Issued to `Stalin of Baku'

Aliyev," FBIS-WEU-93-140, July 23, 1993, p. 54; "Ciller Requests

International Peace Force in Azerbaijan," FBIS-WEU-93-142, July

27, 1993, p. 58; and, as reported on National Public Radio, All

Things Considered, July 26, 1993.

26. "Aliev 4 Jul Interview on Sociopolitical Situation",

FBIS- SOV-93-127, July 6, 1993, p. 76; and, as Aliev recently

said, his entire life binds him to Russia. "Aliyev Reflects on

Career, Return to Power," FBIS-USR-93-105, August 13, 1993, p. 9.

27. Cowell, p. 3; "Azerbaijan's Situation," pp. 53-54;

"Inonu; Intervention in Karabakh Conflict Possibility,"

FBIS-WEU-03-143, July 28, 1993, p. 54.

28. Elizabeth Fuller, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Can Turkey Remain

Neutral," RFE/RL Research Report, I, No. 14, April 3, 1992, pp.

36-38; Blaine Harden, "Turkey Fears Pull of Caucasus War," The

Washington Post, March 19, 1992, p. A17; "Foreign Minister Cetin

Interviewed on Foreign Policy," FBIS-WEU-93-161, August 23, 1993,

pp. 57-58. If anything the pressure has grown since April 1992;

"Effects of Oil Policy on Republic's Politics," FBIS-USR-93-105,

August 13, 1993, pp. 9-10; Elizabeth Fuller, "Azerbaijan's June

Revolution," RFE/RL Research Report, II, No. 32, August 13, 1993,

p. 29.

29. Hockstader, p. 26.

30. Elizabeth Fuller, "Mediators for Transcaucasia's

Conflicts," The World Today, May 1993, p. 92.

31. Jonathan Aves, "Post-Soviet Transcaucasia", unpublished

paper of the Royal Institute of International Affairs for the

Post-Soviet Business Forum, 1992, pp. 12-15; Elizabeth Fuller,

"Caucasus: The Lezgin Campaign for Autonomy", RFE/RL Research

Report, I, No. 41, October 16, 1992, pp. 30-32.

32. The most recently reiterated example of Turkey's stance

is in Hockstader, p. 26.

33. See for example, "Russian Plan To Deploy Divisions in

Armenia Criticized," FBIS-SOV-93-158, August 18, 1993, p. 52;
"Fate of Munitions Industry," Joint Publications Research

Service, Military Affairs, (henceforth JPRS-UMA)-93-015, May 11,

1993, p. 52.

34. "Shakhray on Settlement of Conflicts in Caucasus,"

FBIS-SOV- 93-141, July 26, 1993, p. 11.

35. Fuller, "Mediators," p. 92; "PKK Ties With Armenia,

Transfer of Camps Reported," FBIS-WEU-93-099, May 25, 1993, p.

42; "Sezgin: PKK Cooperates With ASALA; Trades in Drugs,"

FBIS-WEU-93-108, June 8, 1993, p. 59; "Ocalan Said to Meet

Armenians in Bid for Support," FBIS-WEU-93-108, June 8, 1993, pp.

59-60.

36. "PKK Attacks Stall Azeri Pipeline Project,"

FBIS-WEU-93-112, June 14, 1993, pp. 58-59.

37. Leslie Gelb, "War in Nakhichevan," The New York Times, May 22, 1992, p. A20; Sami Kohen, "Turkey Avoids Force in Armenia

Strife," Christian Science Monitor, June 8, 1992, p. 4; Alan

Cowell, "Turk Warns of a Religious War in Azerbaijan," The New

York Times, March 12, 1992, p. 11.

38. Ibid., Kohen, p. 4.

39. "Border, Military Measures," FBIS-WEU-93-069, April 13,

1993, pp. 37-38.

40. Eleanor Randolph, "Iran, Turkey, Denounce Armenian

`Aggression'," The Washington Post, May 20, 1992, pp. A25, 31;

Deborah Seward, "Turks Urged to Stay Out of Conflict," Harrisburg

Patriot-News, May 21, 1992, p. A7.

41. Lesser, p. 120.

42. See Chapter 3.

43. Lesser, pp. 99-131.

44. Ibid.; and Graham Fuller, "Turkey's Eastern

Orientation," Fuller and Lesser, pp. 37-97.

45. This influence is also to be deployed to forestall a

Christian-Muslim `Cold War.' "Warns of Christian-Muslim `Cold

War'," FBIS-WEU-93-042, March 5, 1993, pp. 4-5.

46. Paul Henze, "Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century,"

Fuller and Lesser, pp. 28-31; Fuller, "Turkey's Eastern

Orientation," pp. 66-69.

47. Friedman, Yang, Henry Kamm, "Turkey Is Looking for

Advantage in Region's New Ex-Soviet Nations," The New York Times, June 27, 1992, p. 3; and Secretary of State Warren Christopher's

remarks in Newspot, June 17, 1993, p. 4.
48. Sezer, "Turkey's Grand Strategy," p. 31.

49. John M. Goshko, "U.S. to Expand Relations With Turkey,"

The Washington Post, June 13, 1993, p. A28.

50. "Ciller Interviewed on Policy," FBIS-WEU-93-123, June

29, 1993, pp. 71-73; "Ciller Addresses Grand National Assembly,"

FBIS-WEU- 93-128, July 7, 1993, pp. 67-81.

51. Hugh Pope, "Obstacles for the First Lady," Middle East

International, June 25, 1993, p. 11.

52. "Cetin, Christopher Hold News Conference,"

FBIS-WEU-93-113, June 15, 1993, p. 71.

53. Ibid.; "More on Cetin Remarks," Ibid., pp. 71-72; John

M. Goshko, "Clinton to Continue Foreign Aid Cuts," The Washington

Post, August 14, 1993, p. A13; Lynn E. Davis, "FY 1994 Security

Assistance Budget Requests," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of

Public Affairs, Dispatch, IV, No. 22, May 31, 1993, pp. 402-405;

"U.S. Military Aid, Washington's Approach Viewed,"

FBIS-WEU-93-149, August 5, 1993, pp. 44-45.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies,"

Adelphi Papers, No. 164, London: International Institute for

Security Studies, 1981, p. 39.

57. Cowell, "Turkey Loses Its Allure," p. 3; Randal, p. A15.

58. "Marchuk Favors Good Russia Relationship," p.11; Volsky,

"The Black Sea," p. 24; "Kravchuk Discusses Cooperation With

Turkish Defense Minister," p. 47. Russia's coercive tactics to

buy out the Ukrainian share of the Black Sea Fleet demonstrate

the importance Moscow attaches to its undisputed and sole naval

presence in that sea and were urged as a precondition to recovery

of Russia's interests there by two analysts in May 1993, "Pursuit

of RF Interests in Black Sea Zone, Transcaucasus Urged,"

FBIS-USR-93-068, June 1, 1993, pp. 107-108.

59. Ibid., "Black Sea Admiral Says NATO `Probing' Area,"

FBIS-SOV-93-095, May 19, 1993, p. 2; "Admiral Gromov's Visit to

Turkey Viewed," FBIS-SOV-93-137, July 20, 1993, pp. 13-14;

"Ukrainian Moves on Black Sea Fleet Deplored," FBIS-SOV-93-098,

May 24, 1993, pp. 21-22.

60. Ibid., "Change in Balance of Power Due to Black Sea

Fleet Division," JPRS-UMA-93-008, March 10, 1993, pp. 9-10.

61. "Turkey's Role in Balkans, Stance on Yugoslav Conflict
Eyed," FBIS-USR-93-035, March 20, 1993, pp. 68-70; "U.S., Israel

Seek `Foothold' in Central Asia," FBIS-SOV-92-013, January 21,

1992, p. 6; "Agenda in Former Soviet Central Asia Pondered,"

FBIS-SOV-93-065, April 7, 1993, p. 1; "Russia's Role in Karabakh

Crisis Pondered," FBIS-USR-92-139, October 30, 1992, pp. 6-7;

"Pursuit of RF Interests," pp. 107-108; "Turkish Influence in

Central Asia Examined," FBIS-USR-93-009, January 27, 1993, p.

117-118; "Russia Fears Impact of Central Asia Moves," FBIS-USR93-070, June 7, 1993, pp. 2-3; "Turkey," Current Digest of the

Post-Soviet Press, XLV, No. 19, June 9, 1993, pp. 16-18; "Turkish

Diplomacy in CIS, Quest for International Role Examined,"

FBIS-USR-92-075, June 19, 1992, pp. 4-6.

62. "Russian Ambassador Interviewed About Central Asia,"

FBIS-WEU-92-105, June 1, 1992, p. 43; "Part Two: Armenia

Discussed," FBIS-WEU-93-079, April 27, 1993, p. 61.

63. For example, "Turkish Role in Transcaucasus Viewed,"

FBIS-SOV-93-080, April 28, 1993, pp. 1-2; Change in Balance of

Power, pp. 35-36; "Turkey's Role in Balkans, pp. 68-70; "Russia

Fears Impact," pp. 2-3; Turkey, pp. 16-18.

64. Krasnaia Zvezda, February 24, 1993.

65. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, London, December

12, 1992. This information and note No. 62 were graciously

supplied by Mr. Donald Ross of the U.S. Office of Naval

Intelligence.

66. Michael R. Gordon, "Russians Seeking Arms Pact Change,"

The New York Times, June 11, 1993, p. A5.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. "Ankara Reacts to Russia's Initiative on Arms

Reduction," FBIS-WEU-93-123, June 29, 1993, p. 68.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," pp. 28-39.

73. "Russia Warns Iran", Associated Press, September 8,

1993; "Russian Ambassador Views Issues", FBIS-SOV-93-112, June

14, 1993, p. 78; "Russian Plan to Deploy Divisions," p. 52;

"Kozyrev Suggests `Peacemaking' Forces in Kelbadzharskiy,"

FBIS-SOV-93-072, April 16, 1993, pp.11-12; "Cetin Notes Agreement

on Karabakh," FBIS-SOV-93-159, August 19, 1993, p. 4; "Pursuit of

RF Interests," pp. 107-108; "Kozyrev Outlines Problems in

Transcaucasus", FBIS-SOV-July 15, 1993, pp. 2-3.
74. Daniel Sneider, "Russia Ponders U.S.-Style Network of

Overseas Bases," Defense News, June 14-20, 1993, p. 8.

75. "Yeltsin Concludes Visit to Greece, Signs Treaty," FBISSOV-93-125, July 1, 1993, pp. 4-6; Dmitry Volsky, "Moscow-Athens:

A Southern Path to Europe," New Times, No. 28, 1993, p. 25.

76. "Moscow Opposes Politicization of New Black Sea

Community," FBIS-SOV-93-120, June 24, 1993, p. 2.

77. Ibid.; Faruk Sen, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A

Supplement to the EC?," Aussenpolitik, No. 3, 1993, pp. 286-287.

78. "Article Views Russia's Dilemma on Oil Shipments," FBISWEU-93-152, August 10, 1993, pp. 44-45; "Ciller Sends Yeltsin

Message on Ties, Oil Transport," FBIS-WEU-93-14, August 26, 1993,

p. 43.

79. Ibid.; "Article Views Russia's Dilemma," pp. 44-45;

Coll, "Drilling for High Stakes," p. 17; "Cetin Discusses

Elchibey Referendum, Oil Transport," FBIS-WEU-93-148, August 4,

1993, pp. 53-54; "Moves To Control Vessels Through Straits Seen,"

FBIS-WEU-93-148, August 4, 1993, p. 55.

80. John Murray-Brown, "Prestige in the Pipeline," Financial

Times, September 7, 1993, p. 18.

81. Ibid.

82. "Shevarnadze Asks NATO To Act as Peacekeeper in

Caucasus," FBIS-SOV-93-122, June 28, 1993, pp. 79-80;

"Shevarnadze Tells Russia To Leave CIS `Alone',"

FBIS-SOV-93-085A, May 5, 1993, p. 10; Celestine Bohlen, "In

Sovereign Georgia, Crime, Civil War, and Empty Coffers," The New

York Times, August 26, 1993, pp. A1, 14.

83. "Partners Rather Than Rivals," New Times, No. 32, 1993,

pp. 24-25.

84. Sezer, "Turkish Security Policies," pp. 28-39.

85. See Chapter 3.

86. Fuller, pp. 37-97; "Warns of Christian-Muslim `Cold

War'," pp. 4-5.

87. Lilian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the

Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World," China

Quarterly, No. 133, March 1993, pp. 111-129; "`Turkic Union' Said

Feared, FBIS-WEU-92-245, December 21, 1992, p. 61.

88. "Demirel Addresses Congress," FBIS-WEU-93-057, March 26,

1993, pp. 6-7; "Turkic World: Guarantee of Peace," Newspot, April

1, 1993, pp. 1, 4.
89. "Ozal Gives Opening Speech," p. 5.

90. For example, "Demirel Grants Interview on Foreign

Policy," FBIS-WEU-92-005, January 8, 1992, p. 51; "Demirel Speaks

to Ambassadors to CIS States," FBIS-WEU-92-052, March 17, 1992,

pp. 42-43; "Demirel Warns Against Idea of War in the Balkans,"

FBIS-WEU-93-031, February 18, 1993, p. 55.

91. "President Discusses Economy, International Relations,"

FBIS-SOV-93-092, May 14, 1993, p. 50; "Tereshchenko Cited on

Economic Disputes With Russia," FBIS-SOV-93-121, June 25, 1993,

p. 54.

92. Bess Brown, "Central Asian States Seek Russian Help,"

RFE/RL Research Report, II, No. 25, June 18, 1993, pp. 83-88.

93. Fuller, pp. 66-76.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.; "Turkish Diplomacy in CIS," pp. 4-6; Amalia Van

Gent, "Turkey's Claim to Leadership in Central Asia," Swiss

Review of World Affairs, May 1992, pp. 21-22; "Turkey's Relations

With Neighbouring States of the Former Soviet Union," Background

Brief, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, December 1992, pp.

2-3.

96. Michael Frenchman, "Turkey Reaches Out to the Central

Asian Republics," Newspot, May 6, 1993, p. 2; "Turkish-Backed,

Turkish- Language Paper Appears in Uzbekistan," FBIS-USR-92-097,

August 3, 1992, pp. 105-106.

97. "Ozal, Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev Address Meeting,"

FBIS-WEU- 92-150, August 4, 1992, p. 46.

98. "Turkic Summit Did Not Achieve `Expected Result',"

FBIS-WEU-92-215, November 5, 1992, p. 74; "Kazakhstan Blamed for

Failure," FBIS-WEU-92-215, November 5, 1992, pp. 74-75.

99. "Report on Multifaceted Aid to Turkic Republics,"

FBIS-WEU- 92-140, July 21, 1992, pp. 54-55.

100. Frenchman, p. 2.

101. Ibid.

102. "Status of Russian-Iranian Relations, Changes in Iran

Viewed," FBIS-USR-93-073, June 14, 1993, p. 64; Dmitry Volsky, "A

New Look At Cooperation With Iran," New Times, No. 15, 1993, p.

27.

103. "Kyrgyzstan: Vice President Discusses Armed Forces,

Military Alliance," FBIS-SOV-93-121 A, June 25, 1993, p. 10.
104. Steven Erlanger, "3 Slavic Ex-Soviet Lands to Press

Economic Union," The New York Times, July 15, 1993, p. A10.

105. John Lloyd, "Slav States Pledge Economic Union,"

Financial Times, July 12, 1993, p. 2; "Kozyrev Outlines

Priorities, Strategies in Tajikistan," FBIS-SOV-93-148, August 4,

1993, pp. 5-7.

106. Brown, pp. 19-31.

107. "Turkic Summit," p. 74; Kazakhstan, pp. 74-75.

108. Coll, "Drilling for High Stakes," pp. 16-17.

109. Steve Coll, "The Turkish Question: How Important Is

It," The Washington Post, May 24, 1993, pp. A13-14.

110. Coll, "Drilling for High Stakes," pp. 16-17.

111. Brown, pp. 19-31; also see "Nazarbayev Discuses Minsk

Summit in Moscow," FBIS-SOV-93-075A, April 21, 1993, pp. 1-2.

112. John Lloyd, "Azeris May Join CIS and Improve Chances of

Peace," Financial Times, September 7, 1993, p. 2.

113. Margaret Shapiro, "Russian Mediation Urged in

Caucasus," The Washington Post, September 9, 1993, p. A30.

114. Sami Kohen, "Turkey Finds Its Influence Waning, As

Russia's Rises," Christian Science Monitor, September 9, 1993, p.

7.

115. "U.S. Turkish Support for Azerbaijan's Aliyev Noted,"

FBIS-WEU-93-161, August 23, 1993, p. 59; "Alliance With

Azerbaijan's Aliyev Deemed Expedient," FBIS-WEU-93-163, August

25, 1993, p. 57.

116. Douglas Jehl, "Fearing More Hostility From Iran, U.S.

Considers Moves to Isolate It," The New York Times, May 27, 1993,

p. A1.

117. "Iraq Said To Launch Initiative to Normalize

Relations," FBIS-WEU-93-162, August 24, 1993, pp. 53-54; "Secret

Talks Held on Oil Transport," FBIS-WEU-93-162, August 24, 1993,

pp. 54-55.

118. Hockstader.

119. Cowell, "Turkey Loses Its Allure," p. A3; Kohen,

"Turkey Finds Its Influence," p. 7.

120. Cetin, "Christopher Hold News Conference," p. 71; "More

on Cetin Remarks," Ibid., pp. 71-72; Goshko, p. A13; Davis, pp.
402-405; "U.S. Military," pp. 44-45.

121. "Partners Rather Than Rivals," pp. 24-25; "Fire, Fury

and Nationalism", U.S. News and World Report, July 6, 1992, pp.

44-46.

122. "Turks Continue to View U.S. Unfavorably," Opinion

Research Memorandum, U.S. Information Agency, Washington, January

13, 1993.

123. "Cetin Interviewed on Bosnia: Ties With Iran; Cyprus

Issue," FBIS-WEU-93-042, March 5, 1993, p. 56.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As of autumn 1993, there is no doubt that Turkey stands at a

crossroads as it attempts to formulate a strategy appropriate to

its position. Turkey's international position today is not what

its elites or the United States confidently expected in 1991. 

Therefore Turkey needs to rethink its strategy. Several of the

objectives and policies it eagerly embraced in the wake of the

Soviet collapse and Operation DESERT STORM have been revealed to

be incompatible with Turkish interests or beyond Turkish

capacities. The effort to propel Turkey into a leading regional

position has stimulated an assertive Russian response that Turkey

cannot and will not resist. We also, like the Turkish government,

believe that Iran is using Turkey's internal unrest due to the

Kurdish problem to destabilize it in Iran's rivalry with Turkey

for position and influence in Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

The problem of the Kurds complicates both Turkey's domestic

sources of strength abroad and Turkey's international position

vis-a-vis Iraq, Iran, and potentially, Armenia. Perhaps for those

reasons Prime Minister Ciller was evidently pondering emphasizing

economics over military instruments to deal with the domestic

Kurdish problem.1 This emphasis on enhancing Turkey's economic

strength and position and on recovering Turkey's position in the

international energy market has also led Ankara to support

lifting the ban on Iraqi export of oil, in particular, opening

the pipeline from Iraq through Turkey. Those specific policies

towards Iraq directly clash with the U.S. policy of treating Iraq

as an enemy and imposing punitive restraints upon it.2

In Transcaucasia, however, we find the most pressing and

urgent need for a rethinking of Turkish security strategy. Turkey

has apparently lost or is losing out to Russian policy in the

Armeno-Azeri war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Continuing Armenian

offensives, if unchecked, could lead to war involving Turkey and

even Russia and Iran against Erevan, which would be a disaster

for Turkey as its leaders recognize. On the other hand, it

appears that Russia is successfully employing the full range of

both overt and covert political and military operations against

the fighters in this war and in the Georgian-Abkhazian one to

reassert its position as the sole arbiter and protector of the

Caucasus and Transcaucasus.3 The attainment of that goal would

deprive Turkey of the chance to achieve that coveted objective

which had influenced policy after 1991. Russia's actions take on

a decidedly sinister light when the general climate of military

insubordination and independence of the Russian armed forces is

factored into the equation, because it is unclear whether or not

the Yeltsin government knows and is controlling these covert as

well as overt operations. As we have seen, the overt policy is to

restore Russian regional primacy. But if local or central

military actors are undertaking their own actions with a view

towards restoring a "Pax Russica" in the area, the consequences
of their actions could lead to intensification or spread of the

fighting in and around Azerbaijan. Neither answer is comforting

to those who count either on stability in the CIS or on the

permanent end of the Russian empire.4

At the same time, the United States is apparently willing to

back the Turkish demand, constraining maritime oil shipments

through the Straits, thus ranging the United States against an

important Russian interest in that part of the world.5 Because

the Clinton administration has not announced a public posture on

the war in Transcaucasia, it cannot be known whether this support

on oil transport signifies a U.S. move towards an overall policy

position on the Transcaucasus and the entire region. However,

because the Bush and Clinton administrations have supported

Turkey's efforts to upgrade its influence in the old Soviet

empire until now, the U.S. Government evidently will have to

articulate its position and interests in this region. By the same

token, a reformulation of U.S. policy towards Iraq may become

necessary if the combined weight of the Kurdish problem in Turkey

and Turkey's need for oil and trade revenues from Iraq leads it

out of the embargo and support for Iraq's international

isolation. The concatenation of events in Central Asia, the

Kurdish problem, and Transcaucasia all point, therefore, to the

urgent necessity of rethinking the entire range of U.S and

Turkish interests, both singly and in tandem, with regard to

those regions.

Turkey's European policies will also have to be reassessed.

 Turkey's priority still remains its European connection.6

 The

sons of Ataturk still look to the West. And their turn to Central

Asia has the object of appearing as Europeans to Central Asia and

of using the promise of stabilizing that region as a lever with

which to enter the EU, WEU, and the new Europe. But here, too,

Turkey has found Greco-Russian resistance to its efforts in the

Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and those states' resistance

to its policies or potential policies in Yugoslavia's wars.

Similarly Turkey is dismayed at the West's refusal, through its

various security organizations, to take an active role in

terminating the aggression it perceives directed against the

Bosnian Muslims and potentially threatening Muslims in Kossovo.

The various wars from Yugoslavia to Tadzhikistan that have

broken out since 1991 have all acted to reduce Turkey's regional

prospects in both Europe and Asia. The crisis in the Balkans

aggravates Greco-Turkish rivalries, and triggers European alarm

about Muslim influence in Europe. The wars in Georgia and

Transcaucasia preclude the very stabilization needed there by

Turkey to make its economic-political presence felt. Similarly

the economic collapse of Ukraine that forced it into a deal with

Russia over its nuclear weapons and the Black Sea Fleet precludes

both stabilization of Ukraine and too overt a connection with

Turkey. And the ongoing war in Tadzhikistan that has led to the

further introduction of Russian troops along with Russia's blunt

efforts at regional economic coercion of that area have also
deflected Central Asian states from Turkey.

Thus, in all the areas of concern that we have analyzed,

Turkish objectives are receding further from attainment and are

increasingly seen as beyond Turkey's foreseeable capabilities. To

attain its priority goals in Europe and Asia, Turkey probably

will have to obtain increasing support from the United States. 

However, Turkish interests could, as in the Iraqi case, introduce

frictions with the United States. Turkish official opinion

apparently was also disturbed by President Clinton's U.N. speech

because it apparently implied to Ankara that the U.N. and the

United States could not or would not address the Transcaucasian

and/or Bosnian wars, an approach that called U.N. credibility

into question and effectively left Turkey as a lone `front-line'

state confronting a resurgent Russia, and defiant Serbia and

Armenia.7 And, on Iraq, Turkey is apparently reversing the threat

made by the Clinton administration that it might further cut back

aid to Turkey if it continues to demand guaranteed security

subsidies irrespective of its Kurdish policy. Prime Minister

Ciller hinted that if the United States does not arrange to

recompense Turkey for its losses due to the Iraqi embargo, it

might not extend its agreement to allow its airfield and roads to

be used to supply Iraqi Kurds in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.8

 Thus

a tone of mutual blackmail is creeping into U.S.-Turkish

relations even as we proclaim Turkey a model against Iranian

backed fundamentalism and a bulwark against Russia.

The problem here is that at the same time as the United

States has encouraged Turkey to expand its objectives, its means

for doing so are shrinking. In Russia, the government fully

believes that the West and the U.N. have implicitly recognized

Moscow's mandate, under the guise of peacekeeping, to restore its

hegemony in Transcaucasia. Both that hegemony and Western

support for it are fundamental objectives of the Yeltsin

government.9 And Russia's demand for revising the CFE Treaty in

Transcaucasia is widely, and rightly we would argue, seen in

Ankara an intending "to obstruct the possibility of any direct or

indirect intervention in the region by other countries, as was

the case when the former Soviet Union existed."10 Yet apart from

inviting Prime Minister Shevarnadze of Georgia to Washington,

supporting Georgia's independence, covertly attempting as we did

to strengthen its security services, and offering small amounts

of aid to it, the United States has yet to outline a policy for

the Transcaucasus or a strategy to stop Russian imperial

restoration there. Although our special ambassador to the area,

John Maresca, has stated U.S. opposition to exclusive Russian

peacekeeping and favored a role for Turkey, more than this is

needed.11

Thus Turkey is essentially forced to confront the Russians

with only intangible means of support from the United States. 

Turkish friction with key states like Russia, or with the Kurds,

or other Muslim or European states may contribute to the decline

of U.S. support which apparently is ebbing due to international
retrenchment. Or alternatively, such frictions might force

Washington into a position of having to choose between Turkish

and other states' or actors' key interests which are more

important to it, e.g. Russia. Presumably that is the reason why

Prime Minister Ciller told the press before her trip to

Washington that she hoped to persuade the United States to view

the Middle East and Transcaucasia "through Turkish lenses."12

At the same time Turkey clearly needs the United States to

smooth her way into Europe. But the Kurdish insurgency has become

a threat to all of Turkey's vital international objectives. 

Turkey believes that Iran and Armenia are behind PKK attacks and

that some of these attacks by the Kurds in Turkey and the

Armenians in Azerbaijan are directed against Turkish oil

pipelines to dissuade Western investment and disrupt its vital

energy programs. Moreover Armenia and Iran each are evidently

assisting the PKK in its attacks.13 By the fall of 1993 it had

also become clear that there was no end in sight to the Kurdish

insurgency and it was reaching a new level of ferocity, to the

extent that the Turkish military, which was running the

counter-insurgency program, has promised to crush the insurgency

by spring 1994 or institute martial law.14

American and Western observers in Turkey concur that this

primarily military approach is doomed to fail with incalculable

consequences, and our analysis agrees with that conclusion. But

evidently, mindful of Turkey's role in NATO, and agreeing with

Ankara's depiction of the insurgents as terrorists, they have

held back from speaking out.15 Yet, at the same time, this

spreading insurgency makes it impossible for Turkey to play its

expected role elsewhere and leads to friction over aid with the

United States. Most importantly, it has become apparent to Ciller

and her government that the Kurdish problem is the greatest

present obstacle to membership in the EU, inasmuch as the

European Parliament is now demanding fundamental changes in

Turkish policy towards the Kurds.16 So, in Europe as well,

Turkey's domestic and security problems, as Sezer noted above,

are inextricably enmeshed.

Thus there is a need for a rethinking of American policy

vis-a-vis Turkey's European objectives, the Kurds, Iraq, and for

clear U.S. and Turkish objectives in Transcaucasia and Central

Asia. Although both sides are in constant communication, they

need to rethink and harmonize their perspectives to achieve more

meaningful cooperation and to integrate Turkey more fully with

Europe so that it can play the larger role to which it aspires.

The most fundamental task for the United States is to clarify its

own objectives with regard to the areas and issues in question:

Balkans, Central Asia, Transcaucasus, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria,

Russian imperial longings, and Turkish integration in Europe. It

must undertake that clarification with Turkey which must likewise

clarify its interests and capabilities. Then together the two

states must devise a program to strengthen their mutual

capability to achieve those interests that are vital to both and
which can be attainable over time, even in a worst case scenario.

Turkey cannot be made to do for the United States what

Ankara cannot do for itself or what Washington will not or cannot

do either. If the Russian empire is to be stopped in the South

then the United States and Ankara must provide the resources

necessary to achieve that overriding geopolitical goal. If

neither side is willing, and Turkey will not act unilaterally,

then we should forget about pushing Turkey into the breach

against both Teheran and Moscow as we undercut it because of

displeasure with its domestic politics. Therefore, the authors

have outlined specific suggestions as to how U.S.-Turkish

relations may be further consolidated and how a coherent Turkish

policy that positively contributes to regional security may be

jointly devised. We recommend the following specific U.S. actions

apart from the need to outline general regional objectives in

cooperation with Ankara.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The United States must continue to encourage its European

allies to acknowledge Turkey's importance in the post-cold war

security environment, to include greater participation in

European political and security organizations. More than

rhetoric will be required; concrete actions will have to be taken

to raise European consciousness of Turkey's strategic importance

and to assuage Turkish anxieties.

The following initiatives represent potential actions that

the United States should undertake.

Economic Initiatives.

• Assist Turkey in ways that will contribute toward Turkey's

eventual membership in the EU. For example,

-- Further open U.S. markets to Turkish merchandise.

-- Restructure Turkey's foreign military sales debt to

optimize Turkey's ability to repay. Forgive foreign military

sales debts, whenever possible.

-- Provide economic advice and assistance, particularly

concerning privatization of industry, that will help Turkey

overcome the hurdles to its membership in the EU.

-- Encourage greater private American investment in

Turkey.

Diplomatic Initiatives.

• Influence European allies to overcome obstacles to full

Turkish membership in pan-European institutions such as the WEU
and EU.

• Encourage European nations, especially Germany, to

maintain safety of ethnic Turks and to liberalize immigration and

citizenship requirements.

• Increase diplomatic efforts to broker resolution of the

outstanding Greek-Turkish issues over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea.

Security Initiatives.

• Continue to support to Turkey's military modernization

program.

-- As the U.S. Armed Forces proceed with their draw

down, continue to provide surplus equipment that enhances Turkish

military capabilities.

-- Provide military assistance grants as opposed to

credits.

-- Persuade Congress to reexamine the de facto 7/10

military aid distribution between Greece and Turkey. This does

not imply that Greece should be placed in a subservient position

vis-a-vis Turkey, but a more stringent strategic cost benefit

analysis may be in order.

• The United States must exert influence in NATO that

ensures Turkish security anxieties are addressed. For example,

-- Ensure continued funding of existing and planned

NATO infrastructure projects in Turkey.

-- Promote additional infrastructure projects in Turkey

that enhance the modernization and effectiveness of Turkish

forces. This may require reducing funds available within the

Central Region.

-- Increase Turkish command and staff officer

representation in appropriate NATO commands (e.g., NATO

headquarters, SHAPE, AFSOUTH, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps).

-- While recognizing the political difficulties

involved, the United States may wish to support Ankara's bid to

have the headquarters of the Multinational Division, South

located in Turkey.

-- NATO, and if necessary the United States, could

increase the levels of exchanges and exercises with Turkey.

• Given Turkish sensitivities about bilateral relationships,

the United States should pursue security initiatives in a

multilateral format. This approach offers two benefits:
-- Ankara will not be forced into the role of junior

partner.

-- Multilateral negotiations ensure that Europeans are

continually involved with important Turkish issues and can be

used as a means of educating European allies about the strategic

importance of Turkey.

Initiatives Regarding Kurdistan and the Former Soviet Union.

• With regard to the Kurdish insurgency, the United States

should privately try to get Ankara to seek a solution

incorporating more economic and political means that do not

entail exclusive military repression but do safeguard the

integrity of the country.

-- This also entails pressure, both public and private,

against Iran, Syria, and Armenia to the extent that they are

aiding the PKK. The shift to economic-political steps combined

with military ones should be the carrot and this pressure the

stick.

-- Particularly with respect to Armenia, which is

conniving at the dismemberment of Azerbaijan, this pressure

should be made public and contingent upon an end to aid for the

PKK and a cease-fire and move to negotiations. More than most

places, Armenia is vulnerable to sanctions and economic pressure.

Although this means taking on the Armenian lobby here, the stakes

are worth it because this war is no longer in defense of a

threatened minority, but a war to destroy Azerbaijan.

-- To overcome the regional economic distress in

Southeast Turkey due to the repercussions stemming from the

embargo of Iraq's oil, the United States ought to allow Turkey

concessionary aid for economic development there. This would also

alleviate the economic sources of local unrest.

• The United States must decide what its objectives in

Central Asia are apart from human rights and decide to what

degree it will support the region's independence from Russia,

especially in energy. It might well consider assistance in the

energy, transportation, and agricultural areas to those states,

either alone or with Turkey, to overcome problems in the most

crucial sectors and promote their further growth and economic

integration.

• Similarly it is necessary to outline a coherent policy

with regard to the wars in Transcaucasia and the shape of an

international settlement for Nagorno-Karabakh that secures the

interests of both the local belligerents, as well as Turkey,

Russia, and Iran. Threatened sanctions against Armenia, as

suggested above should be considered as well as the use of a

multilateral peacemaking (not peacekeeping) force, or perhaps
U.S., Turkish, and Russian forces in the area until a settlement

is reached.

-- By the same token a clearer line is needed with

regard to Georgia which is the obvious victim of Russian efforts

to dismember it, not unlike what Serbia has done in Bosnia. Once

again the authors reiterate that a strategy, not just

declarative policies, is essential to prevent a return of the

Russian empire and of the conviction that such a trend is

supported abroad.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER 5

1. "Ciller Interviewed on Policy," FBIS-WEU-93-123, June 29,

1993, pp. 71-73; "Ciller Addresses Grand National Assembly,"

FBIS-WEU-93-128, July 7, 1993, pp. 67-81.

2. See the reports beginning with "Initiative Launched to

Lift Embargo on Iraq," FBIS-WEU-93-171, September 7, 1993, pp.

53-54.

3. See the very disturbing findings in Thomas Goltz, "The

Hidden Russian Hand," Foreign Policy, No. 92, Fall 1993, pp.

92-116; and Catherine Dale, "Turmoil in Abkhazia: Russian

Responses," RFE/RL Research Report, II, No. 34, August 27, 1993,

pp. 48-57.

4. Ibid., and Goltz, pp. 92-116.

5. "U.S. Officials View Traffic Through Straits of

Bosporous," FBIS- WEU, 93-171, September 7, 1993, pp. 55-56.

6. Fouad Ajami, "The Summoning," Foreign Affairs, Vol.

LXXII, No. 4, September/October, 1993, p. 5.

7. "Clinton's UN Address Fails To Reassure Turkey,"

FBIS-WEU- 93-194, October 8, 1993, p. 69.

8. William Safire, "Ally for Sale," The New York Times, October 28, 1993, p. A27.

9. "Deputy Foreign Minister on UN Support for Peacekeeping,"

FBIS-SOV-93-179, September 17, 1993, pp. 6-7; Alexander

Iskandaryan, "Diplomacy as the Continuation of War," New Times, No. 40, 1993, pp. 16-17.

10. "Yeltsin Letter to Demirel on Military Presence Causes

Stir: Officials React," FBIS-WEU-93-186, September 28, 1993, p.

54.

11. "Azerbaijani Envoy on Oil Iran; U.S. Envoy's Remarks

Cited," Ibid., p. 55.

12. "Ciller Comments on Goal of U.S. Visit, Somalia, Iraq,"
FBIS-WEU-93-198, October 15, 1993, p. 71.

13. "Armenian, PKK Military Moves Linked To Azerbaijani Oil

Deal," FBIS-WEU-93-167, August 31, 1993, pp. 56-57.

14. Safire, p. A27; Alan Cowell, "Turks' War With Kurds

Reaches a New Ferocity," The New York Times, October 18, 1993, p.

A3; "Ocalan, Officials View Army, PKK Actions," FBIS-WEU-93-192,

October 6, 1993, p. 81.

15. Ibid.

16. "Ciller Interviewed on Conflicts in Bosnia, Caucasus,"

FBIS-WEU-93-183, September 23, 1993, p. 53.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK has been an Associate Professor of

Russian/Soviet Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute since

1989. Prior to this appointment, Dr. Blank was Associate

Professor for Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace

Doctrine, Research, and Education of Air University at Maxwell

Air Force Base. Dr. Blank's M.A. and PhD. are in Russian history

from the University of Chicago. He has published numerous

articles on Soviet military and foreign policies, notably in the

Third World, and is the author of a forthcoming study of the

Soviet Commissariat of Nationalities and editor of books on

Soviet foreign policies in Latin America and on the future of the

Soviet military.

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN has been a Strategic Research Analyst at the

Strategic Studies Institute since 1991. Commissioned in the

Infantry, LTC Johnsen has served in a variety of troop leading,

command and staff assignments in the 25th Infantry Division and

7th Infantry Division (Light). He has also served as Assistant

Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms

Control Analyst in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

(SHAPE). LTC Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the U.S. Military

Academy and a M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke University.

STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE is a Research Professor of National

Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the

University of California, Berkeley, in 1978. He is the author of

the books, The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Persian Gulf, and the recently published Chaos in a Vacuum: The Iran-Iraq War. Additionally, he is author of the Strategic Studies Institute

reports, The Kurds and Their Agas: An Assessment of the Situation

in Northern Iraq; Mass Action and Islamic Fundamentalism: The

Revolt of the Brooms; and Oil and the New World System: CENTCOM

Rethinks Its Mission; and coauthor of Iraqi Power and U.S.

Security in the Middle East and Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq

War.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. Stephen L. Blank

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mr. Daniel B. Barnett

*****

Illustrations

Mrs. Roberta Hill

Mr. James E. Kistler