SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0063-22 

A.U.B.,1

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

E.L., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Submitted April 17, 2024 – Decided May 7, 2024 

Before Judges Currier, Firko, and Susswein. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, 

Docket No. FM-04-1307-20. 

Weinberg Kaplan & Smith, PA, attorneys for appellant 

(David M. Lipshutz, on the briefs). 

Zucker Steinberg & Wixted, PA, attorneys for 

respondent (David Warren Sufrin, on the brief). 

1

 We utilize the initials of the parties involved in this matter to protect their 

privacy and their child. R. 1:38-3(d)(3) and (13). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0063-22

PER CURIAM 

 Defendant E.L. appeals from the Family Part's June 27, 2022 judgment of 

divorce (JOD) awarding her former husband, plaintiff A.U.B., sole legal and 

physical custody of the parties' child, S.B., born in April 2016. The judge 

awarded defendant parenting time on alternate weekends; prohibited the 

maternal grandparents from having contact with the child; and ordered 

defendant to engage in therapy to address various issues, including her inability 

to resist her parents' influence. 

The judge found defendant and her parents had attempted to alienate the 

child from plaintiff, repeatedly made decisions that were not in the child's best 

interests, and orchestrated a false weapons charge against plaintiff. In addition, 

defendant appeals from the August 12, 2022 order denying her motion for 

reconsideration insofar as it restricted the maternal grandparents' access to the 

child. 

 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision in the JOD granting 

plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of S.B. However, we remand to the 

Family Part to modify its August 12, 2022 order to clarify the prohibition against 

the maternal grandparents' contact with S.B. restricts defendant from allowing 
3 A-0063-22

her parents to visit the child until her therapist provides the requisite opinion on 

her ability to resist their influence. 

I.

 We summarize the facts developed in the record. The parties married in 

2014 in Virginia. They met in 2008 at an out-of-state drug recovery facility. 

Both parties have a history of serious substance abuse; plaintiff's sobriety dates 

back to 2001, and defendant's dates back to 2008. In addition to struggling with 

addiction, defendant has a history of traumatic events, which included being 

molested in kindergarten, raped while at boarding school, and being drugged 

and gang raped as an adult. When the parties met, defendant worked as a 

secretary at a university and obtained a bachelor's degree in corporate 

communications. 

 In 2013, plaintiff, who has a bachelor's degree in psychology, founded a 

substance use disorder treatment center. Defendant worked at the center as a 

therapist and later as plaintiff's executive assistant. After they got married, the 

parties lived out of state. 

 In August 2016, the parties and their infant child moved to New Jersey 

where plaintiff opened a treatment facility, which he sold two years later. In 

2019 plaintiff began working for a substance abuse policy group, which required 
4 A-0063-22

him to travel once or twice a week. Defendant was the child's primary caregiver 

during the parties' marriage. 

Domestic Violence 

 The last week of January 2020, plaintiff left home for a business trip. He 

was scheduled to return on February 3, 2020. On January 28, 2020, defendant 

went to the police station seeking to obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO) 

against plaintiff. For reasons that are not entirely clear in the record, defendant 

did not initially intend to report that plaintiff sexually assaulted her, but to report 

there was a rifle and a gun box in the attic before, it turns out, she knew it was

there. Three days later, defendant and her sister searched the attic and actually 

found the rifle. They videotaped the search. Defendant and her sister left the 

rifle in the attic, and defendant went away on vacation. 

On February 3, 2020, defendant returned to the police station, 

accompanied by her sister and her mother, C.L., and sought a TRO, alleging 

plaintiff had sexually, physically, and emotionally abused her. Defendant stated 

during her police interview that she "faked" all her orgasms "100% of the time" 

during the parties' sexual relations, which plaintiff later countered negated her 

claims of rape. As a result of those disclosures, plaintiff was also charged 

criminally with a weapons offense and multiple sexual assault charges. That 
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day, defendant obtained a TRO against plaintiff, which prohibited him from 

having any contact with her or the child, and barred plaintiff from the parties' 

home and the child's school. Defendant and her Florida treatment associates, 

who were also some of plaintiff's former colleagues, publicly posted the charges 

on social media. 

 At the final restraining order (FRO) hearing conducted three weeks later, 

defendant, who was the sole witness, testified about two incidents of rape and 

detailed episodes of physical and emotional abuse inflicted on her by plaintiff. 

After the close of the evidence, the judge awarded defendant an FRO against 

plaintiff and continued the restraints in the TRO. Plaintiff's motion for 

reconsideration was denied. We affirmed E.B. v. A.B., No. A-3241-20 (App. 

Div. Feb. 6, 2023). 

 In March 2020, a grand jury charged plaintiff with first-degree aggravated 

sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a). He was incarcerated pending his criminal 

trial. The next month, plaintiff pled guilty to a reduced charge of fourth-degree 

criminal coercion, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5. He was sentenced to a three-year term of 

probation in accordance with the plea agreement and was released on the day of 
6 A-0063-22

his sentencing.2 Plaintiff was never charged or convicted of any firearms 

violations, and the prosecutor ultimately returned the rifle to him. 

Zoom Calls 

 While plaintiff was incarcerated, defendant and the child moved out of 

state to where the maternal grandparents resided. After he was released from 

incarceration in April 2020, plaintiff wanted to move back to the marital 

residence, but defendant refused his request, claiming she was only visiting her 

parents and would return to New Jersey. Consequently, defendant moved into 

a hotel and later to an apartment where he was residing at the time of the divorce 

trial. 

 Following his release from incarceration, plaintiff began having daily 

Zoom calls with the child, who was not yet four years old. Defendant initiated 

the Zoom calls due to the child's young age. Many of the Zoom calls were 

2

 On September 24, 2020, plaintiff moved to vacate his guilty plea, claiming he 

was "forced" to accept this plea because "[his] house was stolen, [his] child was 

kidnapped," the COVID-19 pandemic had begun, and a guilty plea would result 

in his immediate release. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff's motion 

for reconsideration of that order was also denied. Plaintiff appealed from both 

decisions, and we affirmed. State v. A.U.B., No. A-1942-20 (App. Div. Feb. 6, 

2023). 
7 A-0063-22

recorded by both parties. Conversations were also recorded between the parties 

and played at the divorce trial. 

The Divorce Litigation 

 On June 23, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce, and defendant 

filed a counterclaim. Plaintiff sought sole custody. The judge conducted a nonconsecutive fourteen-day trial from February 22 to May 17, 2022. The parties, 

one custody expert, and C.L.—who is a lawyer—testified during the trial. 

Plaintiff acknowledged his extensive stints in rehabilitation during his youth and 

his twenty-one years of sobriety. He stated he was successful in recovery after 

previous failures in high schools and programs, and explained his criminal 

record for check fraud and assaulting his drug dealer were related to his 

substance abuse issue. 

 At the time of trial, plaintiff was unemployed, which he attributed to 

defendant's publicizing her allegations against him and his role as a 

whistleblower against the "treatment industry" where he previously worked. 

Plaintiff testified that initially he was amenable to shared custody of the child, 

but he now sought sole custody because of defendant's false accusations against 

him and her interference with his visitation. In terms of false allegations of 

abuse, plaintiff stated defendant had filed "[eleven] . . . false [Division of Child 
8 A-0063-22

Protection and Permanency (Division)] complaints" against him, which always 

arose just before the next court date. 

 Plaintiff testified that in 2018, his father was moving out of the country 

and brought "an old .22 caliber hunting rifle" for safekeeping to the parties' New 

Jersey home. According to plaintiff, he did not want the gun, but accepted the 

rifle from his father in a locked box and never opened it. Plaintiff testified that 

since their child was a baby at the time, the parties agreed to send the rifle to 

defendant's parents, who had firearms. Plaintiff "assumed" defendant brought 

the rifle to her parents because he never saw it again. 

 Plaintiff denied the sexual assault allegations at the divorce trial, stating 

the parties' sexual relationship was consensual. He testified that defendant was 

"a trained sex worker" who clearly conveyed when she wanted to have sex. 

Plaintiff stated they only had anal sex if defendant initiated it, and it always 

stopped when she expressed any pain. Plaintiff acknowledged using profane 

language against defendant, but denied doing so in the child's presence. 

 Plaintiff presented portions of the parties' recorded conversations. In one 

clip from a June 20, 2020 Zoom call, plaintiff accused defendant of 

"orchestrat[ing] this whole thing" against him, including the weapons charge. 

Plaintiff presented another clip to support his assertion that the parties' sex was 
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consensual. In response to plaintiff's questions, in one clip defendant said, "a 

lot of it started off that way"—meaning consensual sex—but that it was "very 

complicated" due to their "power dynamics," which caused her to feel 

"subservient" and as if she "had to comply." While plaintiff acknowledged the 

"pressure" and "power dynamics," he denied it constituted rape. 

 In the other clip, the parties discussed the alleged January 28, 2020 rape 

incident. Defendant claimed she had pneumonia at the time, and the sex was 

not consensual. However, defendant also conceded she had told the police the 

incident was consensual. But defendant added that the police had asked her if 

she "wanted to," and she responded "no." 

 Plaintiff testified that in a recorded May 29, 2020 Zoom call, defendant 

pressured him to sell the marital residence and then "forced" the child to tell him 

that the child wanted a new home. In another recording, plaintiff told the child 

they were going to be "stuck" in New Jersey "forever," and the child echoed 

plaintiff's comments. 

 Plaintiff introduced several clips to demonstrate his claim of parental 

alienation. In a July 16, 2020 clip, plaintiff asked the child for a "virtual hug" 

at the end of their Zoom call, and defendant interrupted, explaining that child 

psychologists recommend that children not be forced to hug goodbye. Plaintiff 
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testified the child was not resisting giving him a virtual hug and did not want to 

end the call. In an August 6, 2020 clip, the child told plaintiff that he did not 

want plaintiff to "take [him] away," and plaintiff "need[ed] to stop taking our 

money." 

 Plaintiff also presented two recordings of defendant talking about 

circumcising the child, which plaintiff claimed was a "blackmail tactic" by her 

to obtain an "endless supply of money" from him. In one of these recordings, 

defendant made a "snip, snip" gesture with her hands after she reminded plaintiff 

that she had full medical "consent." In the recording, defendant then said she 

would not circumcise the child, but that plaintiff would have to explain this 

decision to the child when he became a teenager. Plaintiff testified defendant 

then sought a court order authorizing circumcision, which was denied. 

 In the second clip dated August 30, 2020, defendant stated that her 

therapist recommended she avoid making "any big choices"—including about 

circumcision—even if she had legal decision-making authority. The clip also 

reveals plaintiff stated defendant sought custody because of her "malignant 

narcissism" and that she engaged in a "cancel culture campaign against [him]." 

 Plaintiff testified that he was also granted supervised visits in addition to 

the Zoom calls. Despite being released from incarceration in April 2020, 
11 A-0063-22

plaintiff stated his in-person visits did not commence until January 2021, and 

lasted until April 2021, at which time he began having unsupervised parenting 

time. 

 Plaintiff testified that he attributed the delay in supervised visits to the 

maternal family's interference, stating he had proposed four visitation 

supervisors, which had to be mutually agreed upon, but the maternal family 

rejected them all. Plaintiff stated defendant proposed E.T. as a visitation 

supervisor. Plaintiff initially agreed to E.T., but withdrew his consent after he 

learned that defendant was romantically involved with E.T. and E.T. knew 

defendant's attorney. 

 The record shows the parties finally agreed to two visitation supervisors—

R.O. and L.J. When R.O. could not supervise a visit, plaintiff unilaterally 

substituted him with N.D., who was not approved. Plaintiff claimed he notified 

defendant and C.L. of the substitution, but they objected. Plaintiff construed 

defendant's response as further evidence that she and C.L. "shame[d]" and 

"attack[ed]" anyone who "trie[d] to support [him]."

 Plaintiff testified a confrontation ensued between himself and the maternal 

grandparents at the next visitation exchange when they demanded to know more 

about N.D. before allowing visitation to continue. The exchange was recorded 
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by both plaintiff and defendant's father, R.L., and played at trial. The recordings 

were lengthy and acrimonious. Plaintiff stated the visit was thwarted by 

defendant's parents even though he brought L.J., who was approved, along with 

N.D. to supervise. 

 Plaintiff testified that L.J. supervised approximately twenty visits. During 

one visit, L.J. found a pocket in the child's overalls that was sewn shut. Plaintiff 

explained that he ripped the stitching out and found a USB recording device in 

the pocket. Plaintiff testified that during their next visit, the child searched for 

the recording device in plaintiff's room so he could return it to C.L. Plaintiff 

stated the child was "freaking out about it for probably an hour," and submitted 

two clips verifying the child trying to get the recording device back from 

plaintiff, resulting in the child having a tantrum.

 After recovering the device, plaintiff testified that he discovered it 

contained inadvertently recorded conversations between defendant and C.L., 

which he described as capturing their "campaign" against him. In one clip, 

plaintiff testified defendant and C.L. discussed who should take responsibility 

for planting the recording device if they got caught, with defendant offering to 

take the blame. In a second clip between defendant, C.L., and the child, after 

he brought home the book, "The Lorax," C.L. told the child the book was boring 
13 A-0063-22

and "made [her] eyes bleed, it's so bad," and the child mimicked her and said he 

wanted to "throw [the book] away" because it would make his "brain bleed." 

 On the issue of alienation, plaintiff also testified that towards the end of 

the trial, defendant's parents instructed the child's school not to allow plaintiff's 

parents to pick him up. Plaintiff added that defendant had "perjured" herself 

repeatedly when she: accused him of rape and domestic violence; described the 

weapon found in the home as an "assault rifle," as opposed to a hunting rifle; 

misrepresented that he and the child had dual citizenship in Switzerland; and 

denied that she had moved to her parents' home out of state. 

Plaintiff initially wanted to share joint custody of the child, but at trial 

opposed joint custody due to defendant's actions and testified that he has not had 

access to the child's school, teachers, or medical records since his arrest, but 

admittedly never specifically asked to access this information. Plaintiff also 

stated that he wanted to participate in the child's therapy, but defendant had 

"lied" to his therapists and told them that he was not interested. 

 In addition to seeking sole custody, plaintiff testified he objected to C.L. 

having any contact with the child. Plaintiff referred to C.L. as a "racist," a 

"f****** monster," and a "deplorable pathetic excuse for a mother." He stated 
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C.L. should "go kidnap another grandchild" and "should rot in prison in this life 

and burn in hell in the next." 

 During cross-examination, defense counsel played two recorded 

conversations between the parties, where defendant expressed her fear and 

mistrust of plaintiff. Plaintiff answered he had been "sick," was facing pressure, 

and thus "acted out sexually." Plaintiff denied engaging in assaultive or violent 

behavior, but agreed he was manipulative. He also agreed with defendant's 

description that she was his "outlet for [his] rage and anger." Plaintiff testified 

he made these comments to take "accountability" for his behavior—referring to 

his frequent absences from the home and his addiction to video games and 

pornography—but denied that his apologies were an admission to rape. 

 Defendant testified that plaintiff regularly used profane and disparaging 

language against her in the child's presence, such as "[s]tupid bitch, whore, 

worthless c***, ungrateful bitch, and piece of s***." She claimed that he did 

not want her to work outside the home and isolated her. Defendant recounted 

an argument between the parties when the child was young and claimed she tried 

to walk away with the child. But plaintiff grabbed the child's car seat from her, 

pressed her against a wall, and put his hand around her throat. 
15 A-0063-22

 Describing another incident when the parties resided in Florida, defendant 

testified that plaintiff choked her, causing her to vomit. Defendant also stated 

that when she was pregnant, she had an ear infection and plaintiff had yelled at 

her so loudly that her ear drum "ruptured and blood came out," resulting in 

permanent hearing loss. 

 Defendant reiterated portions of the testimony she gave at the FRO 

hearing. In particular, defendant testified that plaintiff had raped her for 

"[s]everal years" during their marriage. She conceded they sometimes had 

consensual sex, but testified plaintiff forced her to have anal sex against her will 

once or twice a month, and estimated that he raped her "a significant number of 

times." 

In one instance, defendant recalled plaintiff chased her and forced himself 

into the bathroom where she was hiding and raped her. Defendant stated the 

child walked into the bathroom and saw her crying. Defendant explained she 

had forgotten about this incident, but was recalling incidents of abuse through 

her "therapeutic process." According to defendant, the last occurrence of sexual 

assault took place on January 28, 2020, when plaintiff left for a business trip. 

 Defendant stated she believed plaintiff's abusive behavior adversely 

impacted their child and described him as "a functional mute" because he rarely 
16 A-0063-22

spoke after the parties separated. Defendant also testified the child "used to 

wake up every morning screaming crying" and a few weeks after plaintiff's 

arrest, this behavior stopped. Defendant claimed that the child sometimes 

imitated plaintiff by grabbing her throat. 

 On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged she had worked as a 

stripper and had engaged in sex acts for money with her employer. Defendant 

admitted she started to "remember" the rape because her friends triggered her 

memory after she spoke to them because she had "blocked it out." 

 Regarding the rifle, defendant testified on cross-examination that she and 

her sister "searched for hours" before they found it in a "green box" in the attic. 

Defendant claimed she knew nothing about the rifle or the green box, which, for 

all she knew, "could have been Christmas ornaments." Defendant denied ever 

having a conversation with plaintiff about the rifle and denied her father-in-law 

dropped it off at their prior home two years earlier. At the divorce trial, 

defendant testified that she "ha[d] a feeling" plaintiff obtained the rifle when 

patrolling on the back of a truck with the "Sandinistas." 

 Defendant testified that the child often presented with unexplained 

injuries after visits with plaintiff, but denied making any allegations to the 

Division or asking others to report on her behalf. While defendant stated she 
17 A-0063-22

did not think plaintiff was physically abusing the child, she thought that plaintiff 

"yell[ed] at him a lot" to get the child to be quiet. Plaintiff did not dispute that 

the child had bruises, but suggested defendant or C.L. "bruis[ed] him up 

themselves." 

 Defendant requested a joint custody award and feared that sole legal 

custody to plaintiff would "eliminate [her] from [the child's] life." Defendant 

stated she agreed to engage in parallel parenting, as suggested by the custody 

evaluator, Dr. Gregory M. Joseph, where each parent maintains separate 

parenting lanes and does not interfere in the other's parenting choices. 

Defendant countered plaintiff's testimony and claimed that she shared the 

child's medical, dental, and educational records with him in the past. In addition, 

defendant testified that she had given plaintiff's contact information to the 

child's therapist, but plaintiff was "anti-therapist," and never returned the 

therapist's phone call. Defendant admitted she did not notify plaintiff that the 

child might have to repeat kindergarten, but claimed plaintiff was already aware 

of this. 

 Defendant acknowledged that C.L. was too involved in the litigation, but 

said "her intentions were good." Defendant felt she made a lot of mistakes and 

testified that she had brought "shame to the family," whereas C.L. was an 
18 A-0063-22

intelligent lawyer who "made a lot of good decisions in her lifetime." Defendant 

explained that her past mistakes harmed her relationship with C.L., and she 

thought following her mother's lead now would help to mend their relationship. 

 The record shows that a heated exchange took place between counsel for 

the parties during defendant's cross-examination. The judge paused the 

proceedings and inquired about defendant's mental health. In response, 

defendant listed information she had gathered on plaintiff, his family, and his 

attorney. 

 C.L. testified about a phone call between plaintiff and the child where 

plaintiff talked about the child being kidnapped and commented that C.L. was 

"bad." C.L. testified that plaintiff repeatedly accused her and her husband of 

kidnapping the child. C.L. acknowledged she had sewn the recording device in 

the child's clothing, but testified she did so out of concern for him. C.L. denied 

asking the child to retrieve the device from plaintiff. 

 Dr. Joseph, a psychologist, prepared an evaluation, interviewed the 

parties, the child, the maternal grandparents, and defendant's therapists. In his 

report, Dr. Joseph opined that defendant was a nurturing and communicative 

parent, but noted she "struggled to effectively assert appropriate authority" and 
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appeared stressed by the child's anger and defiance, choosing to negotiate and 

compromise rather than set firm limits. 

 At trial, Dr. Joseph concluded that defendant presented with "ongoing 

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms" and persecutory ideation. Dr. 

Joseph opined that defendant's past traumatic experiences—unrelated to 

plaintiff—impaired her "perceptions, emotional regulation, and impulse 

control," resulting in a tendency to "overperceive" and "overreact to" danger and 

harm, both in terms of her and the child's safety. 

 Dr. Joseph explained that defendant's therapists felt pressured by her to 

call the Division on three occasions to report: (1) emotional abuse because 

plaintiff had discussed the litigation with the child; (2) red marks on the child's 

legs, which the child said could be bug bites; and (3) the child's comments that 

plaintiff had "squished" him, which the Division concluded was a tight hug. 

None of these allegations were substantiated by the Division. 

 Dr. Joseph concluded that the abuse allegations were unsupported by any 

evidence, and reflected defendant's negative perception of plaintiff. Dr. Joseph 

observed that defendant was "virtually incapable" of viewing any interaction 

between plaintiff and the child as safe or positive. Based upon a conversation 

Dr. Joseph reviewed between defendant and C.L. from the recording device, he 
20 A-0063-22

found it was "their conviction that [plaintiff] is this dangerous person that's 

going to harm the child" and their "find[ing] ways to take him out of [the child's] 

life." 

 Dr. Joseph testified that defendant and her family are so "entrenched in 

their way of seeing things" and "on the lookout for" abuse. In support of his 

opinion, Dr. Joseph testified about a visitation journal that the maternal family 

had provided him summarizing the child's visits and calls with plaintiff. After 

comparing the entries to the parties' recordings, Dr. Joseph noted that the journal 

did not accurately reflect the recorded visits, and overly emphasized any 

negative aspects. 

Dr. Joseph agreed that the child sometimes refused or was reluctant to 

speak to plaintiff, but opined this is "fairly typical" for a child his age. When 

the child became upset about an upcoming visit, Dr. Joseph found the maternal 

family made "little effort to console or encourage him," and instead, watched 

him have a tantrum or made comments about how it was "really sad" he had to 

speak to plaintiff. 

 Dr. Joseph reviewed the Zoom calls and interpreted them as defendant's 

admission that she had falsified the allegations and "orchestrated the gun 

charge" "to gain the upper hand in this litigation" by obtaining a TRO against 
21 A-0063-22

plaintiff. The expert also interpreted defendant's responses about the parties' 

sexual relationship as an admission it was consensual and viewed defendant's 

behavior in the Zoom calls as contradictory of her claim that she was a victim 

of sexual abuse and feared plaintiff. 

 Dr. Joseph opined defendant lacked confidence and was "very influenced" 

by C.L., who was "overzealous" and "calling the shots," with defendant 

"following rather than leading." He viewed C.L.'s comments about "The Lorax" 

as "damaging," noting the child "cherished" the book and wanted to share it with 

plaintiff, but C.L.'s actions "interfered with their connection on that level." Dr. 

Joseph noted the recording device—and the child's attempt to retrieve it—as 

another example of the child being "bandied about in the case." 

 Regarding plaintiff's parenting style, Dr. Joseph described it as having 

"high nurturance, communication, and control." Dr. Joseph observed plaintiff 

was "attentive to [the child's] needs," but gave him "greater latitude to explore 

and express himself" than defendant. According to Dr. Joseph, plaintiff was 

"more demonstrative and authoritative" with the child when he struggled with 

frustration and defiant behaviors. 

 Dr. Joseph found plaintiff was "surprisingly hopeful and determined" 

about the litigation, with "good control of his emotions and solid frustration 
22 A-0063-22

tolerance." He criticized plaintiff for sharing too much information about the 

litigation with the child, but noted plaintiff did so in response to the child's 

questions. Dr. Joseph opined that some of plaintiff's comments were 

"unhealthy" and "inappropriate," specifically referencing a recording about 

killing defendant's attorney, but explained that plaintiff's "motivation [was] 

different" because he was frustrated and attempting to explain the litigation. 

 Dr. Joseph noted plaintiff's psychological testing profile revealed 

"persecutory ideation" about his belief that he had been "framed," and it was not 

"unreasonable" for plaintiff to fear defendant would continue to make false child 

abuse allegations against him. 

 Dr. Joseph spoke with the child separately and in bonding sessions with 

both parties. The expert described the child as very aware of the parties' conflict 

evidenced by his repeated references to lawyers and jail. During the bonding 

sessions, Dr. Joseph noted the child gave lengthy, robotic monologues about the 

litigation, which "appeared to have been coached," and echoed defendant's own 

complaints. The coached statements were inconsistent with "the steady comfort, 

love, and affection" that he otherwise displayed for plaintiff. 

 Dr. Joseph recommended that the parties share legal and physical custody 

of the child notwithstanding his concerns of alienation by defendant and her 
23 A-0063-22

family. However, Dr. Joseph cautioned that if defendant or her family continued 

interfering in the child's relationship with plaintiff, then the judge should 

consider "requiring supervision." Because of the parties' behaviors, Dr. Joseph 

opined there was a "high risk" of the child "becoming alienated from [plaintiff]" 

since the child was still young and unable to separate his positive interactions 

with plaintiff from the negative comments he received from defendant and her 

family. Dr. Joseph expressed concern that the child presented with such 

"polarized perception" that he could, in the future, "resist or reject contact with 

[plaintiff]." 

 Defense counsel played a few clips from the child's Zoom calls with 

plaintiff during Dr. Joseph's testimony. In one call, plaintiff spoke to the child 

about "monsters," allegedly referring to defendant's family. In another call, 

plaintiff blamed "a very bad man"—meaning defendant's attorney—for his legal 

problems using child-friendly and legal terms to describe his complaints. In 

response, the child said, "I will get rid of that boy," referring to defendant's 

attorney, and plaintiff added, "I hope he dies." When the child threatened to 

"kill him with guns," plaintiff interrupted and told him not to say that, but 

continued with his complaints against defense counsel. 
24 A-0063-22

The Judge's Decision 

 The judge rendered an oral decision on the record, which was incorporated 

into the JOD, granting plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the child. The 

judge awarded defendant parenting time on alternate weekends. In her decision, 

the judge determined defendant's testimony was inconsistent and peppered with 

irrelevant and unrelated negative statements about plaintiff. The judge 

emphasized that defendant's inappropriate behavior had prompted [the judge] to 

interrupt the proceedings, "to see if [defendant] needed counseling or 

something." 

 In addition, the judge referred to plaintiff as a "bully" who "was in control 

of the litigation," highlighting his disregard for court orders to stop talking and 

his effort to control the presentation of the evidence. The judge described 

plaintiff as an "obnoxious difficult individual," who "was a jerk" to defendant 

and was "not a good guy," yet noted she chose to marry him and have a child 

with him. 

 The judge summarized the events that precipitated the parties' separation. 

The judge found that, following a dispute between the parties, defendant and her 

family "plotted" "to get rid of" plaintiff, "orchestrated the whole thing," and 

criticized defendant for failing to consider how these tactics impacted the child. 
25 A-0063-22

The judge found that defendant had "[c]learly made up" the weapons charge to 

"set [plaintiff] up," and rejected her testimony on this issue as "literally ma[king] 

no sense." The judge concluded that after defendant reported the rifle to the 

police, "one lie [begot] another," and it just kept snowballing," resulting in the 

sexual assault disclosure. 

 The judge said she did not "know . . . what the situation was with the sex 

with them" noting that defendant first said, "it was consensual, then it wasn't 

consensual, then it was consensual, then it wasn't consensual." Defendant 

"couldn't keep track of what it was," or when it happened. The judge 

acknowledged that defendant's allegations may have been true, but did not know 

this "to be a fact" because "[n]one of it was shown to [the court]." The judge 

also was not convinced that defendant was afraid of plaintiff, based on her 

demeanor in the recorded conversations. 

 The judge credited plaintiff's testimony that, after his release from 

incarceration, defendant intentionally barred plaintiff's access to the marital 

home and prevented his visitation with the child. The judge viewed defendant's 

family as "blocking [plaintiff] at every turn," including with the selection of the 

visitation supervisor. 
26 A-0063-22

 The judge chastised both parties for recording one another and the child, 

and for posting their private disputes on social media. While the judge criticized 

plaintiff for dragging the child into the litigation and his "cross-examin[ation] 

of defendant and the child in the recordings, the judge gave plaintiff "the benefit 

of the doubt" because he was trying to defend himself against defendant's 

allegations. Most disturbing in the judge's view was defendant and C.L.'s 

decision to sew a recording device into the child's clothing, which the judge 

concluded was "inexcusable." The judge found "on balance" that defendant's 

behavior was "the worst," reasoning she and C.L. and the rest of her family had 

alienated the child from plaintiff. 

 The judge questioned Dr. Joseph's recommendation of joint custody and 

said she "had to do something now" due to the parties' inability to agree on 

anything and the judge's fear that an award of joint custody would "tear this 

child apart." In terms of who should be granted sole custody, the judge reviewed 

the fourteen statutory factors identified in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), namely: 

the parents' ability to agree, communicate and 

cooperate in matters relating to the child; the parents' 

willingness to accept custody and any history of 

unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on 

substantiated abuse; the interaction and relationship of 

the child with its parents and siblings; the history of 

domestic violence, if any; the safety of the child and the 

safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other 
27 A-0063-22

parent; the preference of the child when of sufficient 

age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent 

decision; the needs of the child; the stability of the 

home environment offered; the quality and continuity 

of the child's education; the fitness of the parents; the 

geographical proximity of the parents' homes; the 

extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior 

to or subsequent to the separation; the parents' 

employment responsibilities; and the age and number

of the children. 

[Ibid.] 

Reviewing the parties' past behaviors, the judge concluded that plaintiff 

was better suited to communicate and cooperate in matters relating to the child 

(factor one). Similarly, highlighting defendant's deficiencies as a co-parent, the 

judge found that plaintiff would better accept the custodial arrangement and 

facilitate parenting time (factor two). The judge noted that defendant lacked 

"the proper judgment to parent" because "she allowed other people to push her 

around," prioritized her disputes with plaintiff over [the child's] relationship 

with him, and "destroyed any chance of cooperation between the parties." The 

judge noted defendant's fear that plaintiff would harm the child, but found no 

evidence supported this fear. Instead, defendant "hurt" plaintiff's relationship 

with the child "every chance she got," including by making false allegation to 

the Division and interfering with the parental grandparents' access to the child. 
28 A-0063-22

 With respect to the parties' interactions with the child's "parents and 

siblings" (factor three), the judge focused on defendant's negative behavior 

towards plaintiff. While defendant was child's primary caregiver, the judge

stated she "systemically" took plaintiff "out of the picture" and disparaged him 

both publicly and privately, including in the child's presence. 

 The judge next considered the parties' history of domestic violence (factor 

four). The judge noted that defendant never alleged that plaintiff hit her or the 

child, and thus viewed the FRO as "a neutral restraining order situation" with 

respect to domestic violence and added that the FRO would protect defendant 

from any future harm. 

While reiterating that there was no threat of physical harm to the child 

(factor five), the judge found that defendant's family's actions in sewing a 

recording device into his clothing was "completely abusive," as were their 

attempts to have the child retrieve the device from plaintiff. In terms of stability 

of the home environment (factor eight), the judge said the parent who receives 

sole custody of the child would also receive the marital home to ensure "the 

quality and continuity of his education" (factor nine). 

 The judge held that both parents were "minimally fit," but weighed this 

factor in favor of plaintiff (factor ten). Although both parties had launched 
29 A-0063-22

social media "campaign[s]" against one another, the court noted that defendant 

"started it," adding that she had "destroyed his life" with her false allegations 

and "reveled in it." 

 The judge weighed in defendant's favor the "extent and quality of time 

spent with the child prior to the separation" (factor twelve), as she was the child's 

primary caregiver. The judge also considered the parties' employment 

responsibilities (factor thirteen), stating that neither of them worked, thus this 

was "really pretty neutral on both ends." Because they had support from their 

respective families, the judge found that both parties were able to meet the 

child's needs.3

 The judge concluded that the factors weighed in plaintiff's favor and 

awarded him sole legal and physical custody. The judge also ordered plaintiff 

to engage in anger management courses and ordered defendant to continue 

therapeutic counseling to help her "understand what it means to be a co-parent." 

The judge also completely barred the maternal grandparents' from any 

contact with the child, explaining that until defendant's counselor reported "that 

she's able to withstand their control of her," they could not have contact with the 

3

 The judge did not address factors six, seven, eleven, or fourteen, as they are 

not relevant to this case. 
30 A-0063-22

child. The judge viewed the defendant's family's "manipulat[ion]" of this case 

as the biggest concern and viewed C.L. as the instigator, saying she 

"orchestrated the gun" with defendant, encouraged defendant to keep plaintiff 

in jail, and when the weapons charge proved to be insufficient, defendant's 

family "started with the other stuff." 

Defendant moved for reconsideration of the JOD and to join C.L. as a 

party in the dissolution action. Plaintiff cross-moved seeking to clarify 

possession of the former marital home and the right of first refusal to purchase 

it. On August 17, 2022, the judge denied most of the relief sought in the 

motions. However, the judge modified the JOD to clarify visitation and phone 

contact and permitted plaintiff to relocate outside of the child's school district. 

A memorializing order was entered. 

On September 8, 2022, defendant filed an emergent order to show cause 

seeking primary custody of the child, contending that plaintiff was relocating 

outside the geographic limits set forth in the August 17, 2022 order to a lesser 

quality school district. The application was denied, with the judge finding 

plaintiff had moved to an apartment in a town less than ten miles from the former 

marital home whose school system was ranked higher than the child's prior 

school. This appeal followed. 
31 A-0063-22

On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred: 

(1) by awarding sole custody to plaintiff contrary to 

this State's legislative preference for shared custody 

and against the recommendation of Dr. Joseph, who 

recommended shared custody; 

(2) in failing to consider defendant's allegations of 

domestic violence and sexual abuse in the best 

interests analysis; 

(3) by not accepting as true all of the allegations set 

forth in the TRO based on the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel; and 

(4) in restricting the maternal grandparents' contact 

with the child, arguing such a prohibition exceeded

the judge's authority. 

II. 

Our review of a family court order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154 

N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Generally, the family court's factual findings "are binding 

on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at 

412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv's, Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 

(1974)). The scope of appellate review of a Family Part judge's findings 

following a bench trial is limited. N.T.V. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215 

(App. Div. 2015) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411). 

The conclusions of Family Part judges regarding child custody "are 

entitled to great weight and will not be lightly disturbed on appeal." DeVita v. 
32 A-0063-22

DeVita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 123 (App. Div. 1976) (citing Sheehan v. Sheehan, 

51 N.J. Super. 276, 295 (App. Div. 1958)). Because this court recognizes "the 

special expertise of judges hearing matters in the Family Part," Parish v. Parish, 

412 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412), we will 

only disturb the Family Part's factual findings if "they are 'so wholly 

insupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 

N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 483-84). 

An appellate court, in consequence, will only reverse the family court's 

conclusions if those conclusions are so "'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark'" 

that they result in the denial of justice. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. at 48 (quoting 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). The Family 

Part's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. See N.J. Div. of Youth 

& Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183 (2010). 

"Discretionary determinations, supported by the record, are examined to 

discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci, 

448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547 

(2006)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision "rested on 

an impermissible basis, considered irrelevant or inappropriate factors, failed to 

consider controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with or 
33 A-0063-22

unsupported by competent evidence." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 

(App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Challenges 

to legal conclusions, as well as the trial court's interpretation of the law, are 

subject to de novo review. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 565 (citing Reese v. Weis, 

430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)). 

III. 

 In claiming the judge erred in awarding plaintiff sole legal and physical 

custody of the child, defendant asks us to conduct a de novo review of the 

decision, contending that the judge's findings were insufficient and unsupported 

by the record. We disagree. As stated above, our review of a court's factual 

findings is for an abuse of discretion. 

 "In custody cases, it is well settled that the court's primary consideration 

is the best interests of the children." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 

(App. Div. 2007). The focus is on the "safety, happiness, physical, mental and 

moral welfare" of the children. Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536 (1956). 

New Jersey carries a "legislative preference for custody decrees that allow both 

parents full and genuine involvement in the lives of their children following a 

divorce." Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. at 485. To that end, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 provides 

that: 
34 A-0063-22

[I]t is in the public policy of this State to assure minor 

children of frequent and continuing contact with both 

parents after the parents have separated or dissolved 

their marriage and that it is in the public interest to 

encourage parents to share the rights and 

responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this 

policy. 

Notwithstanding the preference for joint custody, "the decision 

concerning the type of custody arrangement [is left] to the sound discretion of 

the trial court[.]" Nufrio v. Nufrio, 341 N.J. Super. 548, 555 (App. Div. 2001) 

(quoting Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 611 (1995)) (alterations in original). 

Thus, a court may award joint custody, sole custody with a provision for 

"appropriate parenting time for the noncustodial parent," or another arrangement 

that "the court may determine to be in the best interests of the child." N.J.S.A. 

9:2-4(a) to (c). The court must also "identify on the record the specific factors 

that justify the arrangement." See J.G. v. J.H., 457 N.J. Super. 365, 374 (App. 

Div. 2019) (quoting Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 322 (2017)). 

 Here, it is readily apparent the judge was cognizant of her charge to review 

the fourteen statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) when assessing custody. 

In rejecting joint custody, the judge expressed concern about the parties' 

acrimony and their inability to shield the child from their disputes. The judge's 
35 A-0063-22

finding is supported by the dozens of recordings, which demonstrate the parties' 

inability to protect the child from their adult conversations. 

"[A] successful joint custody arrangement" can exist even where the 

parents disagree, so long as they are "able to isolate their personal conflicts from 

their roles as parents," "spar[ing]" the child from "whatever resentments and 

rancor the parents may harbor." Beck, 86 N.J. at 498-99. Here, the record 

clearly establishes that the parties were unable to exercise such restraint. As the 

judge appropriately found, the parties had a distrust of one another, and they 

repeatedly resorted to airing their disputes on social media, even after she 

instructed them to not do so. 

 The judge was well within her discretion to deviate from Dr. Joseph's 

recommendation of shared legal and physical custody. A factfinder is free to 

accept or reject, in full or in part, the opinions of qualified experts. Brown v. 

Brown, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 478 (App. Div. 2002). While a custody expert's 

opinion "should be carefully considered by a judge when appropriate, such 

opinions do not relieve the trial judge from the ultimate responsibility of 

determining what type of custody arrangement is in the best interest of the 

child." D.A. v. R.C., 438 N.J. Super. 431, 454 (App. Div. 2014). This 

determination remains "the exclusive obligation of the trial judge." Ibid. 
36 A-0063-22

 Moreover, Dr. Joseph recognized the difficulties shared custody would 

create and was "pessimistic" about its likelihood of success, particularly noting 

defendant's "entrenched" negative view of plaintiff. Referring to N.J.S.A. 9:2-

4(c), the judge concluded that plaintiff was better suited as the primary custodial 

parent, and an award of sole custody was in the child's best interests. The record 

supports that determination, including the judge's extensive credibility findings, 

which are entitled to "great deference." D.A., 438 N.J. Super. at 451. 

 Defendant challenges the judge's overall assessment of the custody 

factors, contending the judge did not afford proper weight to her domestic 

violence and sexual assault allegations. Defendant interprets the judge's finding 

as contrary to the legislature's presumption that custody should be awarded to 

the non-abusive spouse. 

However, domestic violence is just "one of several factors requiring 

consideration" when determining custody in a divorce proceeding. R.K. v. F.K., 

437 N.J. Super. 58, 65 (App. Div. 2014). See also Terry v. Terry, 270 N.J. 

Super. 105, 119 (App. Div. 1994) (reversing custody award to the mother where 

"the only differentiating factor" was the father's concession to one act of 

physical abuse and his "lack of credibility in his denial of non-physical abuse"). 

Thus, in custody disputes within a divorce proceeding—as compared to when a 
37 A-0063-22

custody determination is part of a domestic violence hearing, which is governed 

by N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(11)—there is no "mechanical presumption" in favor of 

the non-offending spouse. R.K., 437 N.J. Super. at 66. The expectation is that 

the Family Part judge will "weigh the seriousness of the history of domestic 

violence against the other N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 factors." Ibid. 

 Here, the judge did not explicitly determine whether plaintiff raped 

defendant. The judge found defendant's allegations were contradictory and 

inconsistent, but observed there may be some truth to her claims. And, the judge 

did not reference the findings made by the judge who presided over the FRO 

hearing, but acknowledged the existence of the FRO and construed it as "a 

neutral restraining order situation." Saliently, the judge found the domestic 

violence allegations did not involve the child. Moreover, the judge considered 

how the domestic violence related to the child's best interests. Dr. Joseph's 

evaluation did not reveal the child was exposed to or aware of any domestic 

violence. Thus, even if defendant's allegations were true, the judge properly 

considered the impact of any domestic violence on the child's best interests. 

A court's failure to consider a child's exposure to domestic violence may 

undermine its best interests analysis. See, e.g., J.D. v. M.A.D., 429 N.J. Super. 

34, 45 (App. Div. 2012) (in the context of a FRO proceeding, the trial court erred 
38 A-0063-22

in giving temporary custody to the parent accused of the abuse, where the 

children witnessed the abuse and had "an inappropriate awareness of the 

problems between their parents"). Domestic violence is but one factor to 

consider. R.K., 437 N.J. Super. at 65. We are satisfied weighing this factor 

more heavily in defendant's favor would not have changed the outcome. 

The judge highlighted that plaintiff was the parent better able to 

communicate, cooperate, and facilitate parenting time in considering factors one 

and two. N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). In contrast, the judge found that defendant's 

alienating behaviors undermined her ability to foster a relationship between 

plaintiff and the child. 

A parent's repeated inability to co-parent and interfere with the other 

parent can support an award of sole legal custody to the other parent. Nufrio, 

241 N.J. Super. at 555. See also Beck, 86 N.J. at 499 ("[W]hen the actions of

[an uncooperative] parent deprive the child of the kind of relationship with the 

other parent that is deemed to be in the child's best interests, removing the child 

from the custody of the uncooperative parent may well be appropriate as a 

remedy of last resort."). 

As Dr. Joseph explained, defendant was incapable of finding any positive 

element in plaintiff's relationship with the child, and her inability resulted in her 
39 A-0063-22

alienating behavior and interference with parenting time. And, defendant did 

very little to promote plaintiff's relationship with the child. According to Dr. 

Joseph, while the child's young age allowed him to separate his positive 

experiences from defendant's negative descriptions of plaintiff, there was a 

genuine threat that the child eventually would reject plaintiff if defendant's 

behavior persisted. The record supports this determination. 

 Referencing plaintiff's shortcomings in co-parenting and communicating, 

the judge ultimately concluded that defendant's deficiencies far outweighed 

those of plaintiff. Thus, the judge did not err in weighing factors one and two 

in plaintiff's favor. 

 When assessing whether either party posed a risk of physical harm to the 

child under factor five, the judge aptly concluded neither party did. However, 

the judge found defendant's family placed the child at risk of emotional harm. 

There was also support in the record for the judge's conclusion that while both 

parties were "minimally fit," defendant was less fit due to her purported false 

allegations against plaintiff, alienating behaviors, and lack of awareness of how 

this impacted the child under factor ten. The record supports the judge's findings 

and conclusions as to factors five and ten. 
40 A-0063-22

 Factor twelve was the only factor the judge weighed in defendant's favor 

because she was the child's primary caregiver throughout his life. However, Dr. 

Joseph noted—and the judge found—both parties had a warm, loving 

relationship with the child. 

 The judge performed the required best interests analysis under N.J.S.A. 

9:2-4(c) and addressed all the relevant factors. Contrary to defendant's 

contention, the judge did not make an erroneous decision in granting sole 

custody to plaintiff. The judge aptly concluded, based upon the substantial 

credible evidence in the record, it would be in the best interests of the child for 

plaintiff to have sole custody. The record supports the judge's findings and 

conclusions, and we discern no basis to disturb the judge's decision on custody 

and parenting time. 

IV. 

 Next, for the first time on appeal, defendant argues the judge misapplied 

the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Defendant claims the judge allowed plaintiff 

to re-litigate the rape allegations underlying the FRO even though the issues 

were formerly adjudicated and proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Collateral estoppel prevents the re-litigation of issues formerly 

adjudicated and fully disposed of. Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J. Super. 558, 565-
41 A-0063-22

66 (App. Div. 2002). The notion of judicial efficiency prevents the duplication 

of lawsuits with the same issues, the same parties, and the same witnesses. 

Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 26 (1989); see also State v. 

Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 186 (1977) (explaining that collateral estoppel bars relitigation of any issue decided in prior action). 

For collateral estoppel to apply, the issues must be identical to the ones 

presented in the prior proceedings, the issues must have been actually litigated 

in the prior proceeding, the court must have entered a final judgment, the issues 

raised in the new complaint must have been essential to the prior judgment, and 

the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party in 

the earlier proceeding. Olivieri v. YMF Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521 (2006). 

Here, collateral estoppel did not prevent the judge from re-hearing 

testimony and re-deciding issues that were discussed in the FRO hearing. In 

L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J. Super. 76, 86-89 (App. Div. 2014), we declined to give 

preclusive effect to an FRO hearing in a civil action based on the same 

allegations because of the procedural differences between the two proceedings. 

In L.T., the plaintiff alleged assault in a Law Division tort case after 

successfully obtaining an FRO against the defendant. Id. at 81-82. The trial 

court applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel and barred the defendant from 
42 A-0063-22

defending against the plaintiff's allegations of assault. Id. at 83-84. Noting the 

summary nature of an FRO trial as compared to the procedure in the Law 

Division, and the higher standard of proof for the punitive damages sought by 

the plaintiff in the intentional tort action, we reversed. 

Unlike the situation in L.T., here plaintiff did not testify at the FRO 

hearing. Thus, the judge issuing the FRO could only make factual findings and 

credibility determinations based on the testimony and evidence adduced during 

the FRO hearing. Here, the trial judge heard from and was able to observe both 

parties during the divorce trial. 

In the matter under review, the evidence at the FRO hearing was largely 

limited to defendant's testimony against plaintiff, most likely because of the 

criminal case pending against him at the time. There was no discovery or expert 

reports or opinions. Therefore, plaintiff's ability to defend against defendant's 

allegations in the TRO was severely limited. L.T., 438 N.J. Super. at 87-88. In 

contrast, both parties testified at the dissolution hearing, presented numerous 

video and audio recordings to support their positions—which were made after 

the FRO hearing—and retained Dr. Joseph as a joint custody expert. Our review 

of the record de novo convinces us the judge did not err because collateral 

estoppel is inapplicable here. 
43 A-0063-22

V.

 Finally, defendant asserts the judge erred in restricting the maternal 

grandparents' contact with the child on the basis it was contrary to his best 

interests. The JOD provides: 

"[C.L.] and [R.L.] shall have no contact with the minor child at all until 

the [c]ourt receives a report from defendant's counselor indicating that 

[defendant] is capable of making decisions independent from the [maternal 

grandparents'] influence." 

 Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, (1) arguing that the judge 

did not have the authority to limit the maternal grandparents access to the child 

because they were not parties to the litigation, and (2) asking to join the maternal 

grandparents to the litigation. 

The judge denied her application, agreeing that the maternal grandparents 

were not parties to the divorce proceeding. The judge stated that the maternal 

"grandparents don't have any rights" except through defendant.4 The judge also 

expanded on her findings for restricting the maternal grandparents' access to the 

child, stating "they conspired to destroy" the child's relationship with plaintiff 

4

 The judge also mistakenly stated that "grandparents don't have any visitation 

rights in the State of New Jersey." See N.J.S.A. 9:72-7.1 (the grandparent 

visitation statute). 
44 A-0063-22

and defendant "was too weak" to stop them. While the judge attributed this 

primarily to C.L., she implicated R.L. as well, finding that the maternal

grandparents "operate[d] as a unit," R.L. was present in various recordings, he 

was married to C.L., and he was unable to "speak up to" her. The judge found 

that their actions were detrimental to the child's best interests. 

 On appeal, defendant argues there was no evidence that the maternal 

grandparents conspired to destroy the child. Defendant argues any misbehavior 

was warranted because plaintiff had raped defendant. Defendant also questions 

the restriction on R.L.'s contact, given his limited role. 

 The Family Part has the authority "to make judgments or orders 

concerning care, custody, education and maintenance" of a minor child who is 

the subject of a custody dispute. N.J.S.A. 9:2-3. The focus of every custody 

and parenting time determination is "on the 'safety, happiness, physical, mental 

and moral welfare' of the children." Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 105 (quoting 

Fantony, 21 N.J. at 536). 

As articulated by our Supreme Court in Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 

317-18 (1997): 

The "best-interest[s]-of-the-child" standard is more 

than a statement of the primary criterion for decision or 

the factors to be considered; it is an expression of the 

court's special responsibility to safeguard the interests 
45 A-0063-22

of the child at the center of a custody dispute because 

the child cannot be presumed to be protected by the

adversarial process. 

Our courts have relied on the above cited language as authority to restrict a 

parent from exposing the child to a third party, if such exposure is contrary to 

the child's best interests. This authority is viewed as an extension of the court's 

parens patriae authority. DeVita v. DeVita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 127-28 (App. 

Div. 1976) (citing Clemens v. Clemens, 20 N.J. Super. 383, 389 (App. Div. 

1952)). Implicit in these holdings is the Family Part's authority to craft custody 

and parenting time in a manner that furthers the child's best interests. 

 While R.L.'s conduct certainly did not rise to the level of C.L.'s, the judge 

found both of them had assisted defendant in "orchestrating" charges against 

plaintiff, and both interfered with visitation, as evidenced in the recordings. 

Moreover, Dr. Josephs' report included an interview with R.L., who echoed 

defendant's and C.L.'s complaints about plaintiff as an abuser. 

When reviewing a denial for reconsideration, the appellate court will 

affirm the trial court's decision "unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion." 

Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020) (quoting Hous. Auth. of 

Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994)). However, to the extent the trial 
46 A-0063-22

court's decision implicates questions of law, those legal rulings are reviewed de 

novo. Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187, 197 (App. Div. 2020). 

 Because the maternal grandparents' interfering behaviors were well 

documented, and Dr. Joseph expressed similar concerns about their interactions 

with the child, the judge's determination was supported by substantial credible 

evidence in the record. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in denying 

defendant's motion for reconsideration. 

 We affirm the judge's determination to restrict C.L.'s and R.L.'s access to 

the child until further order of the court. However, we remand to the Family 

Part to enter an amended JOD to place the obligation on defendant to restrict the 

maternal grandparents from having access to the child until further order of the 

court because the maternal grandparents are not parties to this action. 

 To the extent we have not specifically addressed defendant's remaining 

claims, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

 Affirmed in part, remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.