[Cite as Gordon v. Mt. Carmel Farms, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-1313.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

CLERMONT COUNTY

JASON GORDON, et al.,

Appellees,

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MT. CARMEL FARMS LLC,

Appellant.

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CASE NO. CA2023-03-012

O P I N I O N

4/8/2024

APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Case No. 2020 CVH 000194

Santen & Hughes, and Brian P. O'Connor, for appellant.

John Woliver, for appellees.

HENDRICKSON, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Mt. Carmel Farms, LLC ("MCF"), appeals the trial 

court's decision finding it in contempt of the court's injunction in favor of PlaintiffsAppellees, Jason and Nicole Gordon. 

Factual Background

{¶ 2} The Gordons own a home at 4340 Mt. Carmel Road in Union Township, 
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Clermont County. They received the property from a relative and built a house there in 

2005. Their property is zoned for single family residential use under the Union Township 

Zoning Resolution ("UTZR"). MCF owns the property located at 4370 Mt. Carmel Road 

and it is zoned as an estate residential district.1 In 2019, the Gordons gave a small part 

of their land that touches MCF's property to Jason Gordon's brother. As a result, the 

Gordons' property shares no boundary with MCF's. However, the Gordons' property 

remains within several hundred feet of MCF's. 

{¶ 3} Over the years, MCF permitted various businesses to operate on its 

property, including two landscaping businesses, an auto repair business, a concrete 

sawing company, a steel fabricator, and an exercise equipment business. The Gordons'

property and MCF's property share a common ingress and egress easement that consists 

of a 30-foot-wide gravel road that extends several hundred feet in length. Part of this 

easement crosses over a portion of the Gordons' property. The businesses operating on 

MCF's property use this easement as well as an additional road MCF paved on its 

property to enter and exit the area. 

Procedural Background

{¶ 4} The Gordons filed the instant suit in 2020. Their original complaint named 

MCF as well as Union Township and its zoning director as defendants. However, after 

much procedural wrangling, including appellate litigation, the latter parties were 

dismissed. See generally, Gordon v. Mt. Carmel Farms, LLC, 12th Dist. Clermont No. 

CA2020-09-054, 2021-Ohio-1233.

{¶ 5} The Gordons only named MCF in their first amended complaint. The 

Gordons alleged and later presented evidence of various injuries resulting from MCF 

1. Part of Mt. Carmel's property is in Clermont County and part of it is in Hamilton County. The Hamilton 

County portion is zoned for light industrial use. 
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allowing businesses to operate on its property: (1) decreased property value for the 

Gordons; (2) "substantial" traffic on their shared easement; (3) significant noise and dust; 

(4) medical treatment for their children as a result of the dust; (5) damage to the shared 

easement; and (6) impairment of the scenic view of their property. 

{¶ 6} The complaint petitioned for declaratory judgment that MCF's use of its 

property violated the UTZR and that the shared easement was not necessary for MCF's 

use. The complaint also requested an injunction to prevent MCF "from continuing uses 

on [its] property in violation of" zoning regulations and "preventing all such nuisance 

activities * * *."

{¶ 7} In July of 2022, the Gordons moved for a preliminary injunction. The motion 

requested that the trial court issue an injunction "pursuant to R.C. 519.24 against [MCF] 

enjoining all activity [on its property] which violates the UTZR." The motion also requested 

the trial court issue a preliminary injunction pursuant to Civ.R. 65 to prohibit MCF from 

constructing any new structures on its property that violated zoning codes. 

{¶ 8} The parties briefed the issue and an evidentiary hearing was held on 

September 9, 2022. The trial court and counsel had in-depth discussion on both Civ.R. 

65 and R.C. 519.24's applicability to the hearing and the Gordons' request for a 

preliminary injunction. As part of that discussion, counsel for MCF stated, "[M]y 

understanding is we're not here today for their one bite at the apple under the statutory 

[R.C. 519.24] injunction. If we are, so be it. But I don't think they're entitled to come back 

later and again argue for it with more evidence." 

{¶ 9} After the hearing, the parties agreed that MCF was not going to construct 

new structures that potentially violated zoning regulations, and the Gordons withdrew that 

part of their motion. The parties also submitted additional briefing after the hearing 

regarding the applicability of Civ.R. 65 and R.C. 519.24. 
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{¶ 10} On October 4, 2022, the trial court granted the Gordons an injunction. In its 

decision, the trial court found that besides some timber harvesting, "all of the other uses 

MCF has employed and currently employs for its properties are illegal under the UTZR."

(Emphasis sic.) The trial court also found the Gordons' property was adjacent or 

neighboring property to MCF's and that the Gordons were especially damaged by MCF's 

use of the property because of, among other things, "excessive traffic, noise, dust, and 

light pollution," damage to the easement and culvert, and diminishment of the scenic view 

at the property. 

{¶ 11} The trial court also observed:

MCF argues that a preliminary injunction should not be issued 

because it is meant to maintain the status quo of the parties 

pending final adjudication, and in this case MCF's illegal uses 

have been occurring for years. While it is true that MCF has 

been operating outside of the UTZR for years * * * MCF 

consistently contracts with new tenants. And with each new 

business that opens * * * the plaintiffs experience greater and 

more prolonged harm. 

{¶ 12} Citing these and other reasons, the trial court issued an injunction under 

R.C. 519.24 that "restrained [MCF] from using or permitting the use of its property * * * in 

any way inconsistent with 'ER' Estate Residential permitted uses under the [UTZR]." The 

order continued, "Businesses that are not consistent with 'ER' Estate Residential 

permitted use include, but are not limited to: automotive repair shops, concrete sawing 

businesses, steel fabricating businesses, landscaping businesses, and storage 

businesses." The Court's order gave MCF 30 days to comply with the order and bring 

the property into compliance. 

{¶ 13} Approximately two months later, the Gordons filed a motion to find MCF in 

contempt for violating the injunction. In February of 2023, the trial court found that several 

businesses no longer operated on the property, including steel fabrication, concrete 
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sawing, graphics and apparel, and safety equipment businesses. However, the court also 

found that two landscaping companies continued to operate on the property and stored 

work vehicles and equipment there, "including trucks, excavators, snow plows [sic], 

shipping containers, salt storage, and other miscellaneous items."

2

 

{¶ 14} The trial court also took notice of Jason Gordon's testimony that the shared 

easement "continue[d] to experience a high volume of traffic * * * from vehicles traveling 

to and from MCF's property." As a result of these findings and testimony, the trial court 

found MCF in contempt and ordered MCF be fined $1,000 per day for each day violations 

persist. The trial court later stayed its imposition of fines pending this appeal. 

Standards of Review

{¶ 15} "To support a contempt finding, the moving party must establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that a valid court order exists, that the offending party had 

knowledge of the order, and that the offending party violated such order." Donlon v. 

Lineback, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2016-03-015, 2016-Ohio-7739, citing Hetterick v.

Hetterick, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-02-002, 2013-Ohio-15, ¶ 35. The standard of 

review for contempt orders is abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 39. A trial court abuses its 

discretion when it acts "unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably." Bowman v. Leisz, 

12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-02-029, 2014-Ohio-4763, ¶ 17, citing Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, (1983). This "connotes more than an error of law or 

judgment." Id. 

{¶ 16} Contempt proceedings also necessitate review of the order a party is found 

to have violated, even if that underlying order is not appealable. Smith v. Chester Twp. 

Bd. of Trustees, 60 Ohio St.2d 13, 16, (1979). The burden of proof for injunctive relief is 

2. The trial court also found that a third company operated on MCF's property, but there was no evidence 

of what that company did, so the trial court did not sanction MCF regarding that company. 
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clear and convincing evidence which "provide[s] in the mind of the trier of facts a firm 

belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established." Freeman Indus. Prods., 

L.L.C. v. Armor Metal Group Acquisitions, Inc., 193 Ohio App.3d 438, 2011-Ohio-1995, ¶ 

17 (12th Dist.). A reviewing court will not overturn the decision to grant a preliminary 

injunction unless an abuse of discretion occurs. Id. 

{¶ 17} Finally, questions of law, including statutory construction and an injunction's 

vagueness, are reviewed de novo. Willow Grove, Ltd. v. Olmsted Twp. Bd. of Zoning 

Appeals, 169 Ohio St.3d 759, 2022-Ohio-4364, ¶ 16, citing Cleveland Clinic Found. v. 

Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, ¶ 25, in turn 

citing Lang v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 134 Ohio St.3d 296, 2012-Ohio-5366, ¶ 

12; see also Columbus v. State, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 22AP-676, 2023-Ohio-2858, ¶

25-27.

Discussion

{¶ 18} On appeal, MCF raises a single assignment of error: 

{¶ 19} Assignment of Error No. 1: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 

APPELLANT IN CIVIL CONTEMPT.

{¶ 20} Within this assignment of error, MCF raises three separate issues for our 

review.

A. Appellant's First Issue Presented for Review and 

Argument: A court's generic order restraining a party 

from using property "in any way inconsistent" with a 

zoning resolution is too generic to be enforced by civil 

contempt.

{¶ 21} MCF argues on appeal that the trial court's injunction was impermissibly 

vague and "did not specifically tell [MCF] what it was ordering [MCF] to do * * *."

{¶ 22} Under Civ.R. 65(D), injunctions "shall be specific in terms; shall describe in 

reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or 
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acts sought to be restrained * * *." The Ohio Supreme Court has observed that an 

injunction meets this standard where, "'an ordinary person reading the court's order [is] 

able to ascertain from the document itself exactly what conduct is proscribed.'" Planned 

Parenthood Assn. of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Project Jericho, 52 Ohio St.3d 56, 60 (1990), 

quoting 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 2955, at 536-537

(1973). While injunction orders should be specific and provide adequate notice of what 

is expected, they need not be perfect and cover every conceivable situation in minute 

detail. Dunn v. Ransom, 4th Dist. Pike No. 10CA806, 2011-Ohio-4253, ¶ 112, citing

Adkins v. Boetcher, 4th Dist. Ross No. 08CA3060, 2010-Ohio-554, ¶ 43.

{¶ 23} Put simply, MCF's arguments attempt to manufacture legal controversy by 

ignoring a critical part of the court's order. The trial court not only prohibited MCF from 

using its property "in any way inconsistent" with the UTZR but illustrated exactly what it 

meant in the next sentence by listing types of businesses not consistent with its order, 

including, "but * * * not limited to: automotive repair shops, concrete sawing businesses, 

steel fabricating businesses, landscaping businesses, and storage businesses." 

{¶ 24} These were the exact types of businesses MCF was found to have let 

operate on its property. Consistent with the trial court's order, MCF had all businesses 

removed from its property except two the court found were landscaping companies. Such 

companies were explicitly covered by the injunction. Importantly, MCF does not contest 

the finding by the trial court that landscaping businesses remain on its property and store 

their equipment there. 

{¶ 25} We find the trial court's injunction was not impermissibly vague. 

B. Appellant's Second Issue Presented for Review and 

Argument: R.C. 519.24 narrowly limits those who have 

standing to institute an action for a statutory injunction 

to those who are adjacent or neighboring a defendant's 

parcel and are especially damaged by the alleged zoning 
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violation.

{¶ 26} MCF also argues on appeal that the Gordons have no standing under R.C. 

519.24 because their property no longer shares a property line with MCF's as a result of 

the 2019 transfer of property to Jason Gordon's brother. Further, MCF argues that the 

Gordons are not "especially damaged" because their property value has increased. 

{¶ 27} R.C. 519.24 states that when "any adjacent or neighboring property owner 

who would be especially damaged by [a violation of applicable zoning regulations] * * * 

may institute injunction * * * or any other appropriate action or proceeding to prevent, 

enjoin, abate, or remove" unlawful activity at a property. "Adjacent" and "neighboring"

are not defined by the statue. In such cases, courts "afford the terms their plain, everyday 

meanings, looking to how such words are ordinarily used * * *. This work includes reading 

words in their context and construing them 'according to the rules of grammar and 

common usage.'" State ex rel. More Bratenahl v. Village of Bratenahl, 157 Ohio St.3d 

309, 2019-Ohio-3233, ¶12, citing Great Lakes Bar Control, Inc. v. Testa, 156 Ohio St.3d 

199, 2018-Ohio-5207, ¶ 8-10, in turn quoting R.C. 1.42. As a result, courts often look to 

dictionaries to determine a word's meaning. Athens v. McClain, 163 Ohio St.3d 61, 2020-

Ohio-5146, ¶ 30. 

{¶ 28} R.C. 519.24 is nearly identical to its predecessor, G.C. 3180-49 (effective 

September 25, 1947). That statute also used the terms "adjacent" or "neighboring." In 

the 1940s, "adjacent" and "neighboring" were used relatively interchangeably. Adjacent, 

Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed. 1942) ("Lying near or close, or contiguous; 

neighboring; bordering on; * * *."); Adjacent, The New Century Dictionary of the English 

Language (1946) ("Lying near (to); neighboring; contiguous."); Neighboring, Webster's 

New International Dictionary (2d Ed. 1942) ("Living or being near; adjacent; * * *."); 

Neighboring, The New Century Dictionary of the English Language (1946) ("Living or 
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situated near; adjacent."). 

{¶ 29} Today, these words have more discernable differences. Merriam-Webster 

Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adjacent, (accessed Mar. 27, 

2024) ("Having a common endpoint or border."). Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/neighboring (accessed Mar. 27, 2024). 

("One living or located near another."). 

{¶ 30} What is clear from these definitions is that they have relative or indefinite 

meanings that should be determined by the way they are used in the statute. Loichot v. 

Allstate Dev. Corp., 33 Ohio App.2d 121, 125-26 (5th Dist.1963). The use of "or" between 

"adjacent" and "neighboring" implies the words have different meanings. State v. 

Hensley, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-06-055, 2023-Ohio-119, ¶ 25. After considering 

the above definitions and how the words are used in R.C. 519.24, the statute does not 

require a shared border with offending property. Wilkins v. Harrisburg, 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 14AP-1028, 2015-Ohio-5472, ¶ 29-35; see also Loichot, at 125. 

{¶ 31} Here, only a small parcel of land, once owned by the Gordons before being 

gifted within the family, separates their land from MCF's, and the Gordons' property 

remains within several hundred feet of MCF's. As a result, the Gordons' property is 

sufficiently near or close to MCF's to be covered under R.C. 519.24. 

{¶ 32} Due to their close proximity, we also find the Gordons have been "especially 

damaged." Special injury or damage occurs when the "injury suffered by the plaintiff 

which is different in kind rather than degree from that suffered by other members of the 

public exercising the same public right." Verbillion v. Enon Sand & Gravel, LLC, 2nd Dist. 

Clark No. 2021-CA-1, 2021-Ohio-3850, ¶ 45. While special injury can be demonstrated 

through decreased property values, nuisances which interfere with one's use of their land 

can also be deemed special damages meriting issuance of injunctive relief. See Id. at ¶ 
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45-47; Camp Washington Community Bd., Inc. v. Rece, 104 Ohio App.3d 750, 754 (1st 

Dist.1995), citing Miller v. W. Carrollton, 91 Ohio App.3d 291, 296, (2nd Dist.1993); see 

also Combs ex rel. Estate of Combs v. Baker, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA 2001-01-020, 2001 

WL 1525324, *5; Busch v. Vosler, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA96-09-014, 1997 WL 277271,

*2 (May 27, 1997), citing Miller.

{¶ 33} While there is little in the record to substantiate the Gordons' belief that their 

property value decreased, there is ample evidence the businesses that operated on 

MCF's property caused various issues for the Gordons, including "excessive traffic, noise, 

dust, and light pollution," damage to the easement and culvert, and diminishment of the 

scenic view at their property. MCF does not contest these findings on appeal. 

{¶ 34} Therefore, we find that the Gordons have standing under R.C. 519.24.

C. Appellant's Third Issue Presented for Review and 

Argument: A preliminary injunction should be used to 

preserve the status quo.

{¶ 35} MCF argues that the trial court's injunction was improper because it altered 

the status quo before a trial on the merits by forcing it to remove businesses that had 

been operating on its properties for years. MCF also suggests that the trial court acted 

improperly because it "decided to leapfrog a full trial on the merits and issue a preliminary 

injunction and then a contempt order based on a limited record." 

{¶ 36} We have previously held that in general, "[t]he purpose of a preliminary 

injunction is to preserve a status between the parties pending a trial on the merits."

Freeman Indus. Prods., L.L.C. v. Armor Metal Group Acquisitions, Inc., 193 Ohio App.3d 

438, 2011-Ohio-1995, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.), quoting Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 140 

Ohio App.3d 260, 267 (1st Dist.2000). However, preservation of the status quo concerns 

preliminary injunctions issued pursuant to Civ.R. 65. Here, the trial court issued the 

injunction pursuant to R.C. 519.24.
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{¶ 37} R.C. 519.24 is a "special statute." Kroeger v. Std. Oil Co. of Ohio, 12th Dist. 

Clermont No. CA88-11-086, 1989 WL 87837, *5; Brown v. Sperry, 23 Ohio App.2d 163, 

167 (3rd Dist.1970); Ameigh v. Baycliffs Corp., 127 Ohio App.3d 254, 260 (6th Dist.1998). 

Under R.C. 2502.02, "'Special proceeding' means an action or proceeding that is specially 

created by statute * * *." The Civil Rules apply to all legal proceedings except "special 

statutory" proceedings where they are "clearly inapplicable." Civ.R. 1(C). The Ohio 

Supreme Court has held that the Civil Rules are clearly inapplicable "when [its] use will 

alter the basic statutory purpose for which the specific procedure was originally provided 

in the special statutory action." Ferguson v. State, 151 Ohio St.3d 265, 2017-Ohio-7844, 

¶ 24, quoting Price v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 70 Ohio St.2d 131, 133 (1982). 

{¶ 38} We have observed in the past that "[b]ecause [R.C. 519.24] grants the 

injunctive remedy, [a plaintiff is] not required to plead or prove an irreparable injury or that 

there is no adequate remedy at law, as is required by Civ.R. 65 * * *. [A plaintiff is] required 

to demonstrate only that the property was being used in violation of the zoning ordinance." 

Union Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Old 74 Corp., 137 Ohio App.3d 289, 294-95 (12th 

Dist.2000), citing Kroeger, 1989 WL 87837 at *5; and Miller v. Byler, 5th Dist. Stark No. 

CA-8262, 1991 WL 34877, *1 (Mar. 11, 1991).

{¶ 39} Additionally, R.C. 519.24 provides that when a property is used in violation 

of zoning ordinances, "any adjacent or neighboring property owner who would be 

especially damaged by such violation * * * may institute injunction * * * proceeding[s] to 

prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove such unlawful * * * use." Preventing or enjoining

unlawful use suggests the possibility of an injunction preserving the status quo, like a 

Civ.R. 65 preliminary injunction. However, abating or removing an unlawful use

necessarily involves making a change to the status quo. Therefore, the plain language 

of R.C. 519.24 makes injunctions issued under that statute different from preliminary
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injunctions issued under Civ.R. 65 because the statute is explicitly not limited to 

preserving the status quo. 

{¶ 40} Stated differently, injunctions granted under R.C. 519.24 are more specific 

in nature and can be broader in purpose than preliminary injunctions granted under Civ.R. 

65. While the trial court called its injunction a "preliminary" injunction, its alteration of the 

status quo is expressly provided for by R.C. 519.24. The trial court's injunction order was 

extensive in its analysis of R.C. 519.24, the Gordons right to relief under the statute, and 

in its application of the evidence presented. On appeal, MCF takes no issue with the 

court's factual findings, including that the companies operating on its property did so in 

violation of the UTZR. Under the statute, that finding allowed the companies to be 

removed from the property entirely. 

{¶ 41} As a result, MCF's arguments regarding an impermissible alteration of the 

status quo fail. 

{¶ 42} We also find that MCF did not raise below or otherwise flesh out how the 

trial court's injunction and contempt orders short circuited the proceedings below, are 

"based on a limited record," or may have otherwise been in error. We have consistently 

held that "a party cannot raise new issues or legal theories for the first time on appeal 

because such issues or theories are deemed waived." State v. Keating, 12th Dist. 

Clermont No. CA2019-08-064, 2020-Ohio-2770, ¶ 27; State v. Salem, 12th Dist. Butler 

No. CA2023-01-002, 2023-Ohio-2914, ¶ 19. Additionally, "appellate courts [do not] have 

to consider an error which the complaining party 'could have called, but did not call, to the 

trial court's attention at a time when such error could have been avoided or corrected by 

the trial court.'" State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman, 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 81 (1997), 

quoting State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117 (1997). These maxims are "designed 

to afford the opposing party a meaningful opportunity to respond to issues or errors that 
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may affect or vitiate his or her cause." Id. 

{¶ 43} MCF's counsel stated at the September 9, 2022 evidentiary hearing, "[M]y 

understanding is we're not here today for their one bite at the apple under the statutory 

[R.C. 519.24] injunction. If we are, so be it. But I don't think [the Gordons are] entitled to 

come back later and again argue for it with more evidence." MCF therefore indicated 

preparedness to proceed at the hearing regardless of whether the trial court's injunction 

simply prevented or enjoined more unlawful use, similar to a preliminary injunction, or 

abated or removed such use entirely, which the trial court chose to do. This statement 

further suggests MCF did not need more time to supplement the factual record before the 

trial court issued its injunction. MCF only expressed concern that the Gordons should not 

be able to argue for relief multiple times and present more evidence on the issue later. 

{¶ 44} Therefore, the procedural concerns MCF raises on appeal were not only not 

raised below, but inconsistent with its arguments at the trial level. 

Conclusion

{¶ 45} In summary, we find the trial court's preliminary injunction order was not 

vague. Additionally, the Gordons have standing to pursue a cause of action under R.C. 

519.24. Finally, the language of R.C. 519.24 permitted the trial court to alter the status 

quo. MCF's arguments to the contrary are unavailing, unsubstantiated, or contradicted 

by the record. 

{¶ 46} As a result of the foregoing, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in issuing the injunction or in finding MCF in contempt. 

{¶ 47} We overrule MCF's sole assignment of error.

{¶ 48} Judgment affirmed. 

PIPER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.