UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O
. 07-1392
RAYMOND E. D OUGL AS , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. E RI C K. S H I N SEKI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls (Argued F ebrua

ry 10, 2009 Dec ided April 17, 2009)
Robert Legg , o f A rl ing ton , V ir g ini a , w a s o n th e ple a din g s f or the a pp e lla nt.
R u d r e n d u Sin h a m a h a

p a tra, with whom John H. Thompson , A c tin g Ge ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , Assistant G ener al Counsel; and Gayle E . Strommen , Deputy Assistant Gener al Counsel, all of Washington D.C., we re on the pleading s for the a ppellee.
Be fore KASOL D, L ANCE, and DA VI S, Judges

. KASOL D, Judge : Vietnam veter an Ray mond E

. Doug las appea ls throug h counsel that pa rt of an Ap ri l 3, 20 07 , B oa

rd of Ve te ra

ns ' Ap pe a ls (B oa

rd ) de c isi on that de nie d his c la im fo r d isa bil ity comp ensation for diabetes mellitus beca use entitlement to presumptive ser vice c onnection on the basis of exposure to herbic ides including Ag ent Ora ng e during his V ietnam servic e wa s rebutted by aff irmative evide nce to the contrary

. For the reasons stated below, the decision of the B oard w ill be aff irmed.

I. F AC TS Mr. Doug las serve d in the U.S

. Marine Corps from September 1969 to June 1973. I n 1976, he wa s diag nosed with Crohn' s disease, w hich he doe s not assert is servic e con n ec ted. As par t of his treatment for Crohn' s disease, he t ook steroids, specific ally Prednisone. Mr. Doug las applied for disabili ty c o mp e n s a ti o nf

o r d ia b e te s in N o v e mb e r

2 0 0 3

. I ns u

p p o rt o f h is c la im , M r
. D oug las submitt ed private re cords, includingone fr om a Dr. Per hala that state s that Mr. Do u glas was2

" be g inn ingto e xpe ri ence sig nif ic ant i ssu e s w ithc hr on ic ste ro id u se . T he iss ue s f or e mos t are his diabetic tende ncy

. . . ." Re cord ( R.) at 234. I n April 2004, the Cleveland, O hio reg ional office (RO)

or de re d a me dic a l e xami natio n. Th e e ng a g e me nt m e mor and um s ta te s: Reg ardingthe veter an's cl aim for diabe tes mellitus ty pe 2, his in country

Vietnam se rv ic e ha s b e e n v e ri fi e d. Th e me dic a l evi de nc e the ve te ra n p ro vid e d w ithhis c la im shows he has a

n extensive history

of steroid use due to his medical conditions. . . . Please provide an opinion with rationale a s to whether the veter an' s diabetes is due to h is u se of

ste ro ids

. R. at 979. I n response , two VA endoc rinolog ists opined that Mr. Doug las' s diabetes is more li kely than not seconda

ry to his chronic steroid use . R. at 1001, 1005.

II. AR G UM EN TS OF THE P AR TIES Mr. Doug las does not ar g ue that the e vidence obtained by the Secr etary

fails to rebut the pr e su mpt ion

of se rv ic e c on ne c tio n. Ra the r, he argue s th a t th e Se c re tary la c ke d the autho ri ty

to de ve lop the re bu tta l e vid e nc e and /or , if he ha d the a

uth or ity to de ve lop su c h e vid e nc e , he did so in

a ma tte r that imp e rm iss ibl y su g g e ste d or re qu e ste d an ans we r that wo uld a id on ly in de nying his

c la im. I n s up po rt of his fi rs t argume nt, Mr

. Do ug la s a sse rt s that the Se c re tary de ve lop e d th is c la im

s o l el y t o re b u t M r. Do u gl as 's p re s u mp t i v e- s er v i ce -c o n n ec t i o ncl ai m i nv i o l at i o no f t h e C o u rt 's holding in Mariano v. Principi , 17 Vet.App. 305, 312 (2 0 0 3 ) t h at " VA may not order a dditional development f

or the sole pur

pose of obtaining " unf

avora ble evidenc e. Appe llant's B rief ( App. B r.) at 9. I n support of his second a rg ument, Mr. Doug las argues that the VAeng ag ement memora ndum impermissibly

reque sted that the VA examiners rebut his favor able medical opi nion in violation of Colay on g v . W

est , 12 Vet.App. 524 ( 1999). The Secre tary ag ree s that Mr. Doug las is prima fac ie entitled to the pre sumption of service

connec tion for his diabetes, but he a rg ues that he ha s the statutory authority and duty to gather evidenc e nece ssary to ma ke a deter mination on a claim. Fur ther, he argues that his r equests for information and e vidence did not compromise the fa irness of the a djudication.A l s o not ex pl i ci t l y s t at ed i n s t at ut e, but i nh er ent i n t he r es po ns i bi l i t i es of t he Secr et ar y , i s t he dut y t o prot ect 1 the p u b lic f

isc

. S e e B ro c k v . P ie rc e C o u n ty , 4 76 U

. S. 2 53 , 2 59

- 60 (198 6) (g ene r al l y recogn i zi ng t hat publ i c a gen ci es b y the ir v e ry na tur e re p re se n t the p u b lic i n te re st a n d , a s su c h , h a v e a d u ty t o p ro te c t b o th th e p u b lic fisc a n d the inte g rity o f t h e go v e rn m e n t p ro g ra m s the y re p re se n t); Ri baudo v
. Ni chol s on , 2 1 V e t.A p p . 1 3 7 , 1 5 2 (2 0 0 7 ) (S c h o e le n , J., co ncurri ng i n pa rt a nd d i ss ent i ng in p art ) (noti ng that the " Se cret ary p l ays the r o l e o f t he guardian of

t he p ub l i c f

i sc"); R h o d a n v. W

est , 12 V et

. A p p
. 55 , 57 , 58 (19 9 8 ) ( H o l d away, J. , co ncurri ng) ( " [I ]t m ust b e rem em b ered t hat t he Se cret ary i s no t m erel y represent i ng t he d ep art m ent al i nt erest s, he i s, i n a l arger s ense, represent i ng t he t axp ayer s o f t hi s co unt ry and def endi ng t he publ i c f

i s c f ro m t he pay ment of

un j us t i f i ed cl ai ms.
. . . T her e i s a dut y t o ens ur e t hat , i ns of ar as p o s s i b l e , o n l y c l a i m s e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n t h e l a w a r e p a i d

. Th e p u b l i c f i s c a n d t h e t a x p a y e r m u s t b e p r o t e c t e d f r om unjus t i f i ed cl ai m s. " ). 3 III . A NA LY SIS A. Duty To De ve lop a

Cla im 1. The Secre tary has broad authority to develop a claim. I t is well settled that the Secre tary has an a ffirma

tive duty to assist the vetera

n in developing evidenc e to substantiate a c laim. See 38 U.S. C . § 5103A; see also Mc Lendon v. Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 79, 85 ( 2006) (" [I ]t is the Secre tary who has the aff irmative, statutory duty to a ssist t he veter an in making his case." ). Contrary to Mr. Doug las' s argument, howeve r, thi s d uty does not evisce rate the commensurate duty to otherwise pr operly

develop the c laim so that a dec ision may be

ma de t o aw ar d

o r d e n y t h e c l a i m
. A l t h o u g h n o te xp l i c i t l y s t a t e d i ns t a tu t e , t h e d

u t y t o p r o p e rl y develop a claim is inherent in the r esponsibiliti es of the Sec reta ry to e x ecute and administer the la ws applicable to the Depa

rtment o f Ve t er an s Affairs. See 38 U. S.C. § 3 03 ; se e als o S te ga ll v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 268, 271 (1998) (" I t is the Secre tary who is r esponsible for the ' proper execution and administration of all laws administere d by the Depa

rtment and for

the contr o l, direction, and manag ement of the Depa

rtment.' " ( quoting se ction 303)). 1 The duty to properly

develop a

claim is impli cit also within a number of statutes g overning the processing of claims. For example, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b), the Secr etar y is require d to "c onsider all information and lay and medical evidenc e of rec ord," which necessar ily implies the duty to secure information and e vidence for the r ec o rd i n t h e fi rst instance. 38 U .S.C. § 5107(b). Moreove r, the Sec reta

ry is require d to weig h "positive a nd neg ative e v idence reg ardingany issue materia l to the deter

mination of the matter [and] give the benef it of the doubt to the claimant," which

a ls o im p li e d ly an d n e c e s s ar il y s u p p o rts th e c o n c lu s io n th a t th e Se c r e ta r y is to g a th er a ll of the evidenc e, both positive and negative, that is materia l to rende ring a dec ision on a claim. Id. ; se e als o4

Ortiz v. Principi , 2 74 F .3 d 136 1 (F e d. Cir . 200 1) (q uo tin g se c tio n 510 7 an d hold ing that th e be ne fi t of the doubt is not for applica tion when the neg ative evide nce outwe ighs the positive evidence ). Simi larly , pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5106, heads of the Feder al depa rtments and ag encie s are require d to provide the Sec reta ry with suc h information as he r equests " for pur poses of de termining the elig ibilit y

for or amount of bene fits," wh i ch p resupposes the Secre tary ' s duty to make such a

n elig ibilit y deter mination. 38 U.S.C

. § 5106. And, elig ibilit y is othe rwise established by statutes that require veter an status, exist en ce of a disability , a nexus betwee n the veter an' s service and that disability , the deg ree of disability and the e ffe ctive date of the disability to establ i s h a cla im for service -conne cted disability compensation. Se e Colla ro v . W est , 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 ( Fe d. Cir. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ac kn o wl ed gi n g t h e p re ce d i n g el em en t s as t h e f i v e c o m m o nel em en t s o f a v et er an 's application for

benef its); e.g. , 3 8 U .S. C. § § 1 11 0 ( e s t a b l i s hin g ba sic e nti tle me nt t o w art ime dis a bil ity compensation), 1121 (establishing basic e ntitlement to wartime death compen sation), 1131 (e st a b l i s h i n g b a s i c e n t i t l e m e n tt o p e a c e t i m e d i s a b i l i t y c o mp e n s a t i o n ) , 1 1 4 1 ( e s t a b l i s h i n g b a s ic entitlement to peac etime death compensation). Dec isions of the Boa

rd also must be base d "on the entire recor d

. . . and upon conside ration of a ll e vid e nc e and

ma te ri a l of

re c or d a nd a pp lic a ble pr ov isi on s of law an d re g ulatio n. " 38 U. S.C. § 7104(a) . The F eder al Circuit ha s held that this statute does not " sug g est that the VA should g ive

more we ight to a pie ce of evidenc e base d solely

on its sourc e," ref

lecting , inter alia, that evidenc e in the rec ord may

come f rom multipl e sourc es. W hite v. Principi , 243 F.3d 1378, 1381 ( Fe d. Cir. 2001). Although statutes evince the implicit duty of the Sec reta

ry to dev elop all of the evidence

r e l e v an tt o m a k i n g a d e c i s i o n o n a c l a i m , t h e S e c r e t ar y' s r e g u l a t i o n s ar e m o r e e x p l i c i t

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, reg ulation

r e qu ir e s th e b e n e f

it o f th e d o u b t t o b e g iv e nto a

c la im an t o n ly

w h e ns u c h d o u

b t a rises "a fter c are ful consider ation of all procurable and asse mbled data. " 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2008) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; cf

. Or tiz , su pra (also quoting § 3.102 when holding that the bene fit of the doubt is not for application when the neg ative evide nce outweig hs the positive e vidence ). Section 3.303 (a) of title 38, Code of Fe dera l Re g ulations, dire cts that eac h disabling condition "must be c onsidered

on the ba sis of

[int e r a lia ] al l p ertinent med ica l and lay e vid e nc e " and

that " de te rm inatio ns a s to

s e r v ic e c o n n e c ti o n w il l b e b a s e d o n r e v ie w of the ent ir e e v ide nc e of r e c or d ") (empha sis added.).5

38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2008). F urther, § 3.304 ( c) of title 38, Code of Feder al R eg ulations, states that "[t]he development of e vidence in connec tion with claims for servic e conne ction wi l l be

acc omplishe d when de emed ne cessa ry ," a lthough the r eg ulation also cautions that deve lopment

" sh ou ld n ot b e un de rt ake n w he n e vid e nc e pr e se nt i s su ff ic ie nt f or thi s d e te rm ination." 38 C.F .R. § 3 .3 04 (c ) ( 20 08 ); see also Shoffner v. Princ ipi , 16 Vet.App. 208, 213 (2002) (stating that § 3.304(c) g ives the Secr etar

y "the discretion to deter mine how much deve lopmen t i s nece ssary for a de te rm inatio n o f s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n" ); Str uc k v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 145, 155 (1 9 9 6 ) (3 8 U.S.C. § 5125 is "pe rmissive in nature, a lthough c lear ly it would not permit the Boar d to a ct in an ar bitrary and ca pricious manner

in not crediting a cla imant's me dical evide nce" ). The Secre tary also has the authority to schedule a

veter an for a medical e x amination, unless doing so w ould be ar bitrary and capr icious. See Kowalski v. Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 171, 177 ( 2005). Wit hout doubt, the Secre tary is r equire d to pr ocure evidenc e "in an impartial, unbiased, a nd neutra l manner," see Au sti n v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 547, 553 ( 1994) (" [B]asic fair play require s that

e vid e nc e be pr oc ur e d b y

the a g e nc y

in a n im pa rt ia l, unb ia se d, and

ne utr a l ma

nn e r. " ), bu t th e re a lso is n o d ou bt t he Se c re tary

ha s th e a uth or ity to d e ve lop the c la im, wh ic h inc lud e s the g a the ri ngof a ll information and evidence rele vant and materia l thereto, positive and ne g ative, suff icient to rende r a dec ision thereon. 2. The Secre tary may de velop e videnc e that might rebut the presumption of serviceconnec tion. I n line with the above d i scussion, we a lso find that the Secre tary ' s authority to develop a claim nec es s ar i l y includes the a uthority to collect and de velop evidenc e that mig ht rebut the presumption of ser

vice c onnection. Cong ress not only cre ated a presumption of ser vice c onnection for c erta in diseases a

nd disabiliti es, it expl icitly stated that the p re s u m p t i o n was re buttable. See 38 U. S.C. §§ 11 12 , 1 11 3; see also W agner v. Princ ipi , 370 F.3d 1089 ( Fe d. Cir. 2004) (cla rifying burdens of proof related to pr esumptions of soundness and a g g ravation, impl icitly rec og nizi ng that t h e S e c r e t ar

y, i n o r d e r t o r e b u t s u c h p r e s u mp t i o n s , c an an d s h o u l d g a t h e r e v i d e n c e )

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, when, inter

alia, " there is affirmative evidenc e to the contra ry ," the presumption cre ated by section 1112 (amongcer

tain other statutory

presumptions) " will not be in order." 38 U.S.C. § 1112. Precluding the Secre tary from g ather ing evidenc e that could re but the presumption of ser vice

connec ti o n w o u ld y ie ld th e a b s u r d r e s u lt o f c o n v e rti n g th e r e b u tt a b le p r e s u mp ti o n c r e a ted by6

Congr ess into a virtually

unrebuttable presumption, except in those few instanc es whe re the claimant submitt ed the very

evidenc e that re butted the pre sumption. See U nited States v. X-Citeme nt Video, Inc. , 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) (" Some applications of re spondents' position would produce re sults that

we re no t me re ly

od d, bu t po sit ive ly

a bs ur d.

. . . We do no t a ssume that Co ng re ss, in p a ssi nglaws , int e nd e d s uch res ul ts." ); Timex V.I., I nc. v. U nited States , 157 F.3d 879, 886 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998) (" statut or y c on str uc tio n th a t c a

us e s a bs ur d r e su lts is t o be avo id ed if a t a ll p os sib le " ); Gardner v. D e rwinski , 1 V e t.A

pp . 5 84 , 5 87 (1 99 1) (n oti ngthe lim ite d " ' a bs ur d r e su lt' e xce pti on

to t he pla in meaning rule" ). Such a result would frustrate, i f not rende r m eaning less, the s tatutory mandate that the pre sumption "will not be in order" when ther e " there is affirmative evidenc e to the contr ary ." 38 U. S.C. § 1 11 2; cf

. Kent v. Principi , 3 89 F .3 d 1 38 0, 13 83 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 4) (n oti ngwi th r e g a rd to the pre sumption of sound co n dition that the "pre sumption would be meaning less if [] conflicting evidenc e could not be considere d" and reje cting a " per se rule ba rringrebuttal of the presumption")

. This we c annot sanc tion. See M yore v . Nicholson , 489 F.3d 1207, 1211 ( Fe d. Cir. 2007) (" ' Statutory int e rp re ta tio n b e g ins wi th t he langua g e of

the statut e , th e pla in me anin g of wh ic h w e de ri ve fr om i ts t ex tan d i t s s t ru ct u re ' " ( qu o t i n g McEnte e v. M eri t S ys
. Prot. Bd. , 404 F.3d 1320, 1328 ( Fe d. Cir. 20 05 )) ); see also Transco Prods. Inc. v . PerformanceContracting, Inc. , 38 F.3d 551, 556 ( Fe d. Cir. 19 94 ) ( " Whe n s ta tut or

y int e rp re ta tio n is a t is su e , the p lai n a nd un a mbi g uo us me anin g of a statut e preva ils in t he abse nce of clea rly expressed leg islative intent to the contrar y .")

. 3. Ge ne ra l e

x pr essi on s m us t bere ad

in c on te x t. I n support of his argument that the Secre tary is not permitted to develop evidenc e to re but the pr e su mpt ion

tha t his dia be te s is du e to e xpos ur e to A g e nt O ra ng e duri nghis se rv ic e in V ie tna m, Mr. Doug las relies he avily on the statement in Mariano , 17 Vet.App. at 312, that it "would not be permissible for V A to undertake such a dditional development if a purp os e was to obta in evidence again st an app ell ant 's case ." Id

. (empha sis a dded). This sing le sentenc e, althoug h rende red w ithout further explanation, states a broa d, g ener al p ro p o s ition, that was revisited by the Court in Hart v. Ma ns fie ld , 21 Vet.App. 505 (2007). Ha rt state d that a dd iti on a l de ve lop me nt i s n ot p e rm itt e d " if the purpose wa s to obtain evidence ag ainst t h e claim," and fur ther noted that if the evidenc e wa s insufficient to make a dec ision on the claim, then the Secr et ar y wa s re q u i red to obtain a medical examination. Id . at 508 (e mphasis added)

.7

A s Ch ie f Ju s ti c e M ar s h a ll n o te d lo n g a g o , g e n e r a l e xp r e s s io n s mu s t b e ta k e nin th e c o n te xt in which they

wer e re ndere d. Specifica lly , he stated: I t is a max im not to be disreg arde d, that g ener al expressions, in every op ini on , a

re to b e taken in c on ne c tio n w iththe c a se in w hic h th os e expressions are use d. I f they g o beyond the ca s e, they may be re sp e c te d, bu t ou g ht n ot to co ntr ol the jud g me nt i n a su bs e qu e nt s uit w h e n t h e v e r

y p o i n t i s p r e s e n t e d f

o r d e c i s i o n
. T h e r e a s on of thi s ma xim is ob vio us . T he qu e sti on a c tua lly be fo re the Cou

rt is investigated w i t h car e, and c onsidered in its full extent. Other pr inc ipl e s w hic h ma

y se rv e to i llu str a te it, are c on sid e re d in the ir relation to the case d ec ided, but their possible bea ring on all other case s is seldom completely investigated.
Coh e ns v . V

irg ini a , 19 U.S. 264, 399-400 (1821). O ur examination of Mariano reve als that its broad and g ener al proposition, restated a bove, wa s noted in the context of rejec ting a medical e x amination repor t beca use the e x amination was not conducte d in substantial compliance with a B oard r emand order

. See Mariano , 1 7 V e t.A pp . at 31 1- 12 ; see also Cohens , su pra . Acc ording ly , it must be take n in context and not applied broadly or without close examination. Moreove r, the funda

mental inquiry

during judicial ap p el l ate review is not the subjec tive intent of the individual adjudicator below at the time the medical e x amination repor t was re quested but, r ather , the objective nece ssity of g ather ing further evidenc e, and whether it wa s g ather ed "in a n im part ial , u nb ias ed, and

neu tr al m ann er." Au sti n , 6 Vet.App. at 553. Assuming arguendo that the subjective purpose of the VAadjudicator could be de termined, it would not b e controll ing. B ad intent on the part o f a VA e mploy ee in se eking additional evidenc e ca nnot lead to the g rant of benef its that are not supported or other wise authorized by

law. See O

PM v. R ichmond , 496 U.S. 414 (1 99 0) (h old ingthat pay

me nts fr om the F e de ra l tre a sury are lim ite d to thos e a uth or ize d b y

statut e and that er

roneous advice g iven by a Gover nment employ ee to be nefits claimant did not estop the Gover nment from deny

ing be nefits not otherwise pe rmitted by law). T h i s i s n ot to say that the Mariano state me nt h a s n o a pp lic a tio n. Whil e it i s w e ll s e ttl e d th a t on on e ha nd the du ty to a ssi st i s
no t a lic e ns e to c on tin

ue g a the ri ng e vid e nc e in t he ho pe s o f f

ind inge vid e nc e to s up po rt the c la im, Gobbe r v. De rwinski , 2 Vet.App. 470, 472 ( 1992), the Mariano statement provides the corollar y there to: the duty

to gat her e vidence sufficie nt to render a dec ision is not a license to continue g a the ri nge vid e nc e in t

he ho pe s o f f

ind inge vid e nc e a g a ins t th e c la im.8

Ultimately , the Secr etar

y is not vested only

with the authority

to ga ther e vidence that might rebut the pr esumption in section 1112, he also has a n aff irmative duty

to gather the e vidence

nece ssary to rende r an infor

med dec ision on the claim, even if that means gathering and deve loping

ne g a tiv e e vid e nc e , pr ov ide d he do e s so " in an imp art ia l, un bia se d, and ne utr a l man ner. " Au st in , 6 Vet.App. at 553. I n this inst ance , the evidenc e submitted by the claimant r easona

bly raised a n iss ue re g ard ingthe a

pp li cabi li ty

of the pr e su mpt ion

pr ov ide d in

se c tio n 1 11 2. Spe c if

ic a lly , th is evidenc e raised t he reasonable possibili ty that Mr. Doug las' s disability resulted f rom an interve ning

cause that arose betwee n service and the onset of t he dis ability

. Under these c ircumstance s, which the Secr etar

y explained was the ba sis for see king another me dical examination and opinion, it was not error for the Sec reta

ry to seek that a dditional medical examination and opinion. B. Eng ag ement Memora

ndum I mplicit withi n Mr. Doug las' s additional argument that the RO' s eng ag ement memora ndum in this case wa s "ta inted" be cause it was obtained for the sole purpose of re butting the pr esumption of se rv ic e c on ne c tio n is that th e Se c re tary wa s n ot o bta ini ngthi s in fo rm a tio n in an imp a rt ia l,

u nb i a s e d , an d

n e u t r a l m an n e r
. T h i s ar g u m e n t i s n o ts u p p o rt e d b y t h e r e c o r d

o r t h e l aw
. In Colayong , th is C ourt

he ld t hat a VAe ng a g e me nt l e tte r r e qu e sti ngan e xami ne r to " fe e l f re e to r e fute [a] private phy sician' s repor t . . . w[as] fata lly

flawe d in that 'a

question may

not sugg est an a

nswer or limit t he fie ld of inquiry by the expert.' ") . 12 Vet.App. at 534-35 (quoting Bi e lby v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 260, 268 ( 1994)). The e ng ag ement memora ndum in this instance ha d no such impermissib l e s ug g estion or limit ation. Rather, it noted that Mr. Doug las' s Vietnam ser vice f or pre sumptive-service -conne ction purp os e s h a d b e e n v e ri fi e d a nd tha t f ur the r a na ly sis wa s n e e de d to rule ou t a po te nti a l a lte rn a te etiology of his diabetes, a

nd asked the VA endocrinolog ists to "pr ovide an opinion with rationale a s to whether

th e v et er an 's d i abetes is due to his use of steroids." R. at 979. Succinctly stated, the

en gage m en tm em o ra n d

u m d i d n o t h i n g m o re t h an as k fo r an o p i n i o nre gar d i n g a p o s s i b l e e t i o l o gy that was re asonably ra i s ed b y the evidenc e submitted by Mr. Doug las. I n this reg ard, the Court

o b s er v es t h at en gage m en t l et t er s ca n n o t b e p ro h i b i t edfr o m s p ec i fi ca l l y i d en t i fy i n g t h e a d

j u d i ca t o r's

conce rn. Without g uidance , there is a g reat r isk that the opinion produced w ill not address the issue of c on c e rn fo r t he a dju dic a tor . A

re qu e st f or a me dic a l op ini on

is n ot i mpe rm iss ibl y

le a din g sim

ply9

be c a us e it r a ise s a the or

y that mig ht le a d to the de nia l of the c la im. Ra the r i t is imp e rm iss ibl e on ly if — w he n c on sid e re d in

tot o — it c omm un ic ate s th a t th e a dju dic a tor wi sh e s to re c e ive a sp e c if ic

answe r to the question posed. Ac cording ly Mr. Dougla s 's relianc e on Colayong is mispl ace d and his argume nt f

a ils

.

IV

. CO NC LU SION Upon consider ation of the for eg oing, the Boa rd' s April 3, 2007, decision is AFF I RMED.