Members of the 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 

(August 1994) 

Private Citizens 

Daniel J. Elazar, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

Mary Ellen Joyce, Arlington, Virginia 

William F. Winter, Chairman, Jackson, Mississippi 

Members of the U.S. Senate 

Byron L. Dorgan, North Dakota 

Dave Durenberger, Minnesota 

Vucuncy 

Members of the U.S. House of Representatives 

James R Moran, Virginia 

Donald M. Payne, New Jersey 

Steven H. Schiff, New Mexico 

Officers of the Executive Branch, U.S. Government 

Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Marcia L. Hale, Assistant to the President 

and Director of Intergovernmental Affairs 

Richard W. Riley, U.S. Secretary of Education 

Governors 

Arne H. Carlson, Minnesota 

Howard Dean, Vermont 

Michael 0. Leavitt, Utah 

Robert J. Miller, Nevada 

Mayors 

Victor H. Ashe, Knoxville, Tennessee 

Robert M. Isaac, Colorado Springs, Colorado 

Edward G. Rendell, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

Bruce Todd, Austin, Texas 

Members of State Legislatures 

Paul Bud Burke, President, Kansas Senate 

Art Hamilton, Minority Leader, Arizona House of Representatives 

Samuel B. Nunez, Jr., President, Louisiana Senate 

Elected County Officials 

Gloria Molina, Los Angeles County, California, Board of Supervisors 

John H. Stroger, Jr., Cook County, Illinois, Commission 

Barbara Sheen Todd, Pinellas County, Florida, Board of Commissioners 
AN INFORMATION REPORT 

PLANNING TO GOVERN 

U.S. Advisory Commission 

on Intergovernmental Relations 

September 1994 

M-191 
US. Advisory Commission on 

Intergovernmental Relations 

800 K Street, NW 

South Building 

Suite 450 

Washington, DC 20575 

FAX (202) 653-5429 

(202) 653-5640 

ii U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Planning to Govern helps bring the planning 

and governing processes together to pave the 

way for improvement in the quality of governmental decisionmaking and in the results. A 

politically sensitive planning process can improve a plan’s chances for success. The report 

synthesizes the complex subject of planningspecifically for drought-within the democratic 

process. 

Five types of knowledge are necessary to the 

success of any public policy planning process: 

(1) Water law; 

(2) Political cultures and the history of key 

issues; 

(3) Organizations, decisionmakers, other 

stakeholders: 

(4) How to work for needed changes in 

laws, organizations, and political environments; and 

(5) How to follow through with effective, 

Involvement is the key to a planning process 

that creates buy-in by the essential players. At 

least five types of groups need to be involved: 

(1) Bureaucracies (including water rnanaglong-term implementation. 

ers); 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations iii 
(2) Public policymakers (including legislative, judicial, and political officials); 

(3) Interest groups (including advocacy 

groups and independent experts or analys ts); 

(4) The media; and 

(5) The general public. 

Leaving any of these players out of the process can cause significant trouble in implementing public policies, plans, and programs. 

The complexity of public decisionmaking is 

daunting to many of the essential participants. 

Thus, to be successful, it is necessary to: 

(1) Provide nontechnical citizens and 

elected officials with an understanding 

of the key facts; 

(2) Get diverse interest groups to see each 

other’s viewpoints; 

(3) Get separate governments and agencies 

to see how their responsibilities interrelate; and 

(4) Establish constructive interactions 

among all the players. 

Intergovernmental and interagency coordination processes yield positive results only with 

great effort. Barriers to be overcome may include turf protection and the use of laws and 

procedures to close off discussion of potential 

solutions to problems. These barriers to cooperation may be lowered by freely sharing knowledge with all parties. 

The formal tools of interorganizational 

coordination are contracts, compacts, agreements, and memoranda of understanding. 

These tools have been used in drought planning 

to: 

(1) Gather and share information about 

water conditions; 

(2) Interconnect independent water supply 

systems; 

sponding to drought conditions; 

(3) Establish contingency plans for re- 

(4) Agree on trigger mechanisms to activate contingency plans; and 

(5) Evaluate the process. 

Water managers and drought plannerslike other public managers and planners -need 

the political process and the public support it 

can bring. They should work hard to bring their 

political partners and the other stakeholders 

into the.planning process. Developing the political elements of plans often may be more demanding than developing the physical elements. 

In short, this report emphasizes the need to: 

(1) Prepare studies of legal issues, political 

cultures, and institutional, political, and 

other interests; 

(2) Develop plans through an open and visible involvement process; 

(3) Include all of the necessary implementation elements in the plan; and 

(4) Get the key decisionmakers to take responsibility for action. 

This report was developed as part of the 

National Drought Study conducted by the U.S. 

Army Corps for the Congress. The background 

studies on which the report are based are expected to be published by the Corps in avolume 

of the National Drought Study entitled Governing Drought. 

iv U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
~~ 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This report was written by Bruce D. 

McDowell, ACIR’s Director of Government 

Policy Research. It is based on initial drafts 

prepared by William Blomquist of the Department of Political Science at Indiana University, 

and on a series of background studies prepared 

by Helen Birss, David S. Harrison, and Deen 

Ruiz, Northwest Policy Center, University of 

Washington; Hanna J. Cortnec University of 

Arizona; Charles L. LQncaster, formerly at the 

University of Virginia; Kai h? Lee, Center for 

Environmental Studies, Williams College; William B. Lord, University of Arizona; and ‘Vivian 

E. Watts, former Virginia legislator and Secretary of Public Safety. 

This report was prepared for the Institute 

for Water Resources of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers as part of the National Drought 

Study. The Commission would like to express 

its appreciation to Willinrn J. Werick, the Corps’ 

project manager. 

Thanks also are expressed to Robert Kirby of 

the Virginia Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations for arranging our presentation of the findings of the James River 

Drought Preparedness Study to the Virginia 

ACIR. 

The Commission also thanks all those who 

participated in reviewing and commenting on 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations v 
the study, including the following who attended 

thinkers’ and critics’ sessions: 

Bruce Adam, South Florida Water Management District; DavidAllee, Cornell University; D. Craig Bell, Western States Water Council; 

Michael Brennan, Fish and Wildlife Service, 

U.S. Department of the Interior; Robert Brurnbaugh, Institute for Water Resources, US. 

Army Corps of Engineers; Jo Clark, Western 

Governors’ Association; Michael Clinton, Bookman-Edmonston Engineering; Betsy Cody, Congressional Research Service, Library of 

Congress; William G. Colman, consultant, Potomac, Maryland; Kristen Dillon, Western Governors’ Association; David Getches, School of 

Law, University of Colorado; 

Jerome Gilbert, Orinda, California; Frank 

Gregg, Water Resources Research Center, University of Arizona; Keith Higgiinson, Idaho Department of Water Resources; Louise Jacobs, 

Council of State Governments; Stephen Light, 

South Florida Water District; Thomas J. Lochen, James River Drought Preparedness 

Study, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; William 

McDonald, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department of the Interior, Denver; Richard P 

Nathan, Rockefeller Institute, State University 

of New York; Ronald North, University of Georgia; Bridget O’Grady, American Water Resources Association; Lav Olson, Office of Sen. 

Dave Durenberger; Erlinda Patron Virginia Department of Environmental Quality. 

Paul Peterson, Harvard University; Terrence 

Raftery, National Governors’ Association; Peter 

Rogers, Harvard University; Rodney Sakrison, 

Washington State Department of Ecology; Ted 

Schud, Arlington, Virginia; Phil Shimer, Western Governors’ Association; Eileen Sirnonson, 

Amherst, Massachusetts; George A. Sinner, former Governor of North Dakota; Roland Steiner, 

Interstate Commission on the Potomac River 

Basin; John Volkman, Northwest Power Planning Council; William Walkel; Water Resources 

Institute, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 

State University; Thomas Wehri, Soil Conservation Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 

Tony Willardson, Western States Water Council; 

and Pat Wodson, Virginia Department of Environmental Quality. 

At ACIR, Joan A. Casey edited the report, 

and Cheryl A. Fortineau provided secretarial 

support. 

Responsibility for the contents of the report 

lies with the Commission and its staff. The 

Commission approved the report for publication on April 14, 1994, 

William E. Davis I11 

Executive Director 

vi U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
CONTENTS 

Introduction ............................................................ Plan to GovernDrought .................................................. 

Three Levels of Decisionmaking ......................................... Constitutional ..................................................... Collective Choice .................................................. Operational ....................................................... 

The Political Elements of Drought Planning ............................... Study Water Law ................................................... Study Water Politics ................................................ 

Work for Change .................................................. Involve the Players ................................................. 

Supporting Effective Involvement ........................................ 

Alternative Dispute Resolution ....................................... Overcoming Barriers ............................................... Capitalize on Real Droughts ......................................... 

Interagency Coordination .............................................. Establishing Follow-Through ............................................ 

Study Key Water Institutions. Decisionmakers. and Other Stakeholders ........ 

Drought Simulation ................................................ 

Conclusion .......................................................... 

1 

3 

4 

4 

4 

4 

4 

7 

7 

9 

11 

11 

18 

18 

21 

21 

22 

23 

26 

27 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations vii 
viii U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
~ ~ ~_____ 

INTRODUCTION 

Drought planning often examines only the 

physical aspects of the problem - hydrology, 

water sources and facilities, and the technologies to supplement, conserve, and manage water 

quantity and quality. If the planning stops there, 

the technical solutions to droughts are dropped 

into the laps of elected officials, and everyone 

hopes for the best. Often, disappointment follows. The plan is neither adopted nor used. The 

planning exercise is wasted. 

Nothing frustrates the average drought 

planner more, perhaps, than politics. Too often, 

the planner does not understand the political 

process, and the officials who need to act on the 

plan do not understand or do not agree with or 

have serious objections to the plan. Planners 

and the politicians may end up seeing each other as foes rather than as allies working to accomplish common objectives. 

This report synthesizes, in nontechnical language, the complex subject of planning within 

the democratic process. The planners and the 

politicians-and many other stakeholdersmust be allies if a drought plan is to benefit the 

public. 

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) prepared this 

report as part of the National Drought Study 

conducted by the Institute for Water Resources 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1 
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The analysis draws in part on papers prepared for the 

Corps' study.' ACIR, with a bipartisan federal-state-local membership, draws also on 35 

years of experience with a wide variety of cornplex intergovernmental issues, including water 

resources planning and management.* For planning processes, individual states may have a 

similar organization that can be called on to advise on intergovernmental relationships in preparing various kinds of plans (see Box 1). ACIR 

maintains a directory of these organizations. 

Colorado Iowa Minnesota North Dakota Tennessee 

Connecticut Louisiana Missouri Ohio Utah 

Florida Maine Montana Oklahoma Virginia 

Illinois Maryland New York South Carolina Washington 

l Indiana Massachusetts North Carolina South Dakota Wisconsin 

~ 

Box 1 

States that Have State-Local Relations Bodies, 1993 

Source: U.S. ACIR, Directory of Intergovernmental Contacts (Washington, DC, 1993) 

2 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
PLAN TO GOVERN DROUGHT 

Planning for the physical aspects of drought 

might be thought of as deciding what needs to 

be done. For example, water supply facilities 

might be expanded, water might be transferred, 

conservation might be prescribed, or water 

might be rationed. These are all technical solutions to the drought problem. 

The political question-the question of governing-is how to accomplish the technically 

prescribed actions. The answer lies in the democratic process. From this perspective, Drought 

Planning translates into the Democratic Process, or DP = DP. 

The technical prescriptions may call for tax 

increases; personal sacrifice and inconvenience; 

changes in established water rights and use patterns; potential damage to business profits; and 

new forms of cooperation and coordination 

among governments, separate governmental 

agencies, independent private utilities, regulatory bodies, and others. These prescriptions can 

create difficult political issues, especially if not 

balanced by clearly perceived benefits. 

The reactions of consumers, taxpayers, voters, independent governments, separate agencies, and autonomous utilities will be felt in the 

political process. The worse those reactions are, 

the worse will be the chances for adopting and 

implementing a drought plan. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 3 
Three levels of Decisionmaking 

There are at least three important levels of 

democratic de~isionmaking:~ 

Constitutional 

This level of decisionmaking establishes basic long-term principles that guide the governmental process. It is determined by the U.S. 

Constitution and the 50 state constitutions, plus 

constitutional amendments. The U.S. and state 

supreme courts interpret constitutional issues. 

Interstate compacts on water issues-negotiated by the states, enacted by the state legislatures, and confirmed by the Congress-also 

create fundamental, long-lasting, and difficultto-change rules governing water management. 

Indian Tribal Governments operate in accordance with treaties between the tribes and 

the United States. These treaties frequently establish relatively immutable, although often undefined, water rights. This special tribal 

relationship generally is not subject to state law. 

Collective Choice 

This level of decisionmaking consists of the 

laws that establish contemporary public judgments. These judgments, which can change 

more frequently and more easily than constitutional principles, reflect the political times, political compromises, competition for funding 

within public budgets, and other factors. To the 

extent that the lawmaking process is truly representative, the laws reflect “the will of the people.” Laws may express such values as “The 

environment is important,” or “I don’t want to 

have lawn sprinkling bans three years out of 

four.” These choices are made by the Congress, 

state legislatures, city councils, county governing bodies, town and village councils, tribal councils, and the governing boards of special districts, 

public authorities, and public utilities. These 

choices may be subject to judicial challenge. 

Operational 

This level of decisionmaking involves administrative rulemaking, the granting of water 

permits, and many other activities designed to 

carry out laws in accordance with constitutional 

principles. Decisionmakers may have less discretion at this level, depending on how specific 

the laws are. Decisions at this level can have 

important consequences, and they may be challenged in court if they are controversial. 

Negotiated rulemaking procedures-a relatively recent innovation-seek to build consensus before new rules are established to reduce 

the likelihood of a court challenge. 

All three levels of decisionmaking are essential to sound drought planning and to the implementation of such plans. 

The Political Elements 

of Drought Planning 

A politically sensitive planning process can 

improve the drought plan’s chances for success. 

Studies of the governing issues are just as essential as the studies of physical issues. These 

studies can help develop at least five types of 

knowledge that are necessary to the success of 

the drought plan: 

Water law; 

Political cultures in the area and the 

history of the key water issues; 

Organizations, decisionmakers, and 

stakeholders who will be affected and 

who can help implement (or block) the 

plan; 

How to work for needed changes in the 

laws, organizations, and political environments of the area; and 

How to follow through with effective, 

long-term implementation of the plan. 

Two recently adopted national water policy 

statements emphasize the importance of taking 

4 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
this approach. The first is known as the Park 

City Principles (see Box 2), which grew out of a 

series of workshops held in Park City, Utah, 

during 1991 and 1992 by the Western Governors’ Association and the Western States Water 

Council. The key point of that two-year consultation process was the recognition that, “In 

most cases, developing. . . technical solutions is 

less of a problem than overcoming the reluctance 

of affected parties to negotiate in good faith.” 

The second recent national statement on 

water policy was developed by the Senior Advisory Group on Federal-State-Local Cooperation in Water Governance, appointed by the 

tal Relations (ACIR). ACIR endorsed the statement in June 1992 (see Box 3). The key finding 

was that, “Systems of water governance in many 

parts of the United States are insufficient to 

support the needs of the people in a timely and 

environmentally, economically, and socially 

balanced way.” 

Studies of these essential governing issues 

should begin at the earliest stages of the drought 

planning effort, and should receive equal emphasis and be integrated with the technical 

studies of physical issues. 

The five elements of the governing plan are 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmen- outlined and illustrated briefly below. 

Box 2 

The “Park City Principles” 

Findings 

The status quo is not working well; we are trying to 

solve new problems with old mechanisms. 

There is a need for high level leadership to articulate and promote a new paradigm of water resources management that extends beyond the 

historical emphasis on physical water development for economic growth. 

In most cases, developing and implementing 

technical solutions is less of a problem than overcoming the reluctance of affected parties to negotiate in good faith. 

Changing organizations is not as essential as 

changing the institutional missions and decisionmaking processes of existing organizations. 

Recommendations 

There should be meaningful legal and administrative recognition of diverse interests in water resource values. 

The “problem-shed” encompassing a problem 

and all of the affected interests is the appropriate 

scale for resolving complex water problems. 

Water problems should be approached in a systemic or holistic way that recognizes crosscutting 

issues, cross-border impacts and concerns, and 

multiple water needs. 

Policies should be responsive and should value 

diversity and economic, social, and environmental values. 

Problems should be solved at the lowest available level of government that fits the problem-shed, with appropriate empowerment of such 

governments to exercise authority at the problem-shed level. 

Authority and accountability should be decentralized within national policy parameters, with a federal policy of recognizing and supporting the key 

role of states in water management and delegating specific federal water-related programs to 

states and tribes. 

Negotiation, market-based approaches, and performance standards are preferred over command-and-control methods for reaching and implementing solutions. 

The criteriafor evaluating policies and policymaking processes are equity, efficiency, accessibility, 

feasibility, efficacy, and cettainty balanced with 

f I exi b i 1 it y. 

Source: Western Governors’ Association and Western 

States Water Council 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 5 
Box 3 

Principles, Findings, and Recommendations of the AClR Senior Advisory Group 

on Federal-State-Local Cooperation in Water Governance 

(Abridged) 

Principles 

1. The nation’s environmental well-being, economic development, and international competitiveness require strategically wise uses of the nation’s finite and unevenly distributed surface and 

groundwater resources. . . . 

2..... 

3. me nation’s governments, systems of water 

rights, and administrative structures and procedures must be able to recognize and reconcile 

changing water needs and environmental requirements, and to create appropriate incentives for effective, efficient, and environmentally sound public and private use and conservation of water in 

times of plenty as well as times of drought. 

4. The federal government has the constitutional 

responsibility-and the responsibility as a landowner and water resources developer and manager - to allow for and promote sound governance 

of water resources by state, tribal, and local governments. 

Findings 

1. Systems of water governance in many parts of 

the United States are insufficient to support the 

needs of the people in a timely and environmentally, economically, and socially balanced way. . . . 

2..... 

3. Changing values and demands for the uses of 

water are creating serious conflicts among competing water uses. 

4. Inadequate governmental responses to these 

issues may result from: 

a. Narrowly focused laws, organizations, programs, and regulations that invite polarization 

and inhibit collaborative problem solving; and 

b. A lack of coordination mechanisms to help 

link federal, state, tribal, and local efforts to 

find solutions to water resources problemsespecially basinwide, interbasin, and interstate problems. 

5. The present process sometimes leads to intergovernmental gridlock-an inability of the governments of the United States to meet the nation’s needs. 

6. There is an urgent need for a more positive and 

flexible problem-solving approach to meeting 

America’s water needs. This approach should include proactive, environmentally sound water resources planning; greater collaboration among 

the federal, state, tribal, and local governments; 

and negotiation and dispute resolution encom 

passing the variety of needs within large and 

small water basins. 

Recommendations 

7. Federal Responsibilities 

The federal government should become a more 

effective partner in helping solve the nation’s water problems. . . . 

2. State Leadership 

To the extent that each demonstrates willingness, capacity, leadership, and commitment, the 

federal government should turn over to the states 

authority to administer water quality, stream flow, 

wetlands, and related standards. . . . 

3. lnterstate Water Basin Governance 

Many river basins and large groundwater aquifers 

extend beyond state boundaries. Governing 

them effectively requires the establishment of 

special intergovernmental agreements and organizations with authority over water quality and 

quantity matters, including connections between 

surface and underground systems, hydropower 

generation, irrigation, navigation, fish and wildlife, and related issues. 

To facilitate establishment of such agreements and organizations, where needed, the 

Congress should authorize and approve the creation of interstate regional mechanisms, including, in some cases, joint federal-interstate compacts.. . . 

6 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
Study Water law over Indian and instream water rights. The 

Congress settles some of these issues by enacting new laws and by providing funds to expand 

water storage and distribution facilities. 

Drought emergency powers, if any, are authorized by state law and enacted by local ordinances. They may temporarily abridge normal 

water rights. 

Water laws are highly complex and constantly changing. Some of the principal issues 

are: water use permits, site-specific programs 

(critical areas), quantification/adjudication, 

public interest, priority issues, instream flows, 

conservation, transbasin diversions, and conjunctive management of surface and underground supplies? 

Drought planners need to have an up-todate study of the exact legal situation for a particular area, including the identification of any 

deficiencies in existing law that might create 

barriers to implementing the drought plan. Box 4 

illustrates how some important changes were 

made in Arizona water law over the past 15 years. 

In general, state laws determine water 

rights, priorities for use, and allocations and 

reallocations of water rights among competing 

users. In the East, “riparian rights” allow those 

who live on a water course to make use of the 

water as it passes by. In the West, those who 

began to use the water first own the rights to it; 

newcomers may not find any water left for their 

use. Underground water generally has been 

available to anyone who drills for and pumps it. 

Some states have comprehensive water laws 

relating to water allocations and reallocations, 

including emergency priorities. Other states 

may have enacted site-specific solutions to critical problems. These state laws are built around 

“the public trust doctrine,” which recognizes that, 

to a certain extent, water is an essential public 

resource, not just a matter of private rights. 

The basic systems of water rights have been 

changing. For example, while the traditional 

concepts of surface water rights refer to taking 

water out oft rivers, streams, and reservoirs, 

some environmental laws and tribal treaties 

have defined rights for keeping certain amounts 

of water in the streams. In the case of underground water, demand has been so great in some 

places as to draw-down the water table dangerously (water mining), and permit systems have 

been instituted to limit or reverse the damage. 

The instruments for determining the use 

of water from reservoirs and water transfers 

from one basin to another include negotiated 

agreements, interstate compacts ratified by 

the state legislatures, and federal laws and 

rzgwhiicm. Negot.&& h&basjn lransfers 

may involve payments. Interstate river basin 

commissions have been established in a few 

cases, sometimes with powerful struggles between lawmakers and 

Major interstate water disputes and disputes over the use of water in federal reservoirs 

have been settled by the U.S. Supreme Court. 

The federal courts also get involved in disputes 

Study Water Politics 

Four drought planning case studies were 

prepared by the Corps of Engineers as part of the 

National Drought Study. In each case, a different 

political environment was encountered. 

Virginia-There is a long tradition of local 

and industrial water users operating with almost no statewide regulations on quantity allocations and no federal dams. Until very 

recently, the Water Control Board has been concerned exclusively with quality. Now, the board 

has beengjven Jjmjted authority to set up a 

quantity permit system, particularly in response 

to federal instream flow requirements. It is proceeding slowly and cautiously. A state water allocation role is considered a high political risk. 

The James River study covered half the 

state. The basin is water-rich upstream, and 

water-starved downstream. There is no state or 

federal role in allocating the waters of the river. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 7 
Box 4 

Arizona Water Laws 

Changed Fundamentally 

On several occasions since the late 

1970s, Arizona officials have modified the 

rules governing the allocation and use of water 

supplies. These efforts reflect the importance 

of institutional control to affected groups. 

In the late 1970s, the U.S. Department of 

the Interior threatened to withhold funding for 

the Central Arizona Project (CAP) - a reclamation project designed to convey Colorado River water to farms and cities-unless the state 

controlled its escalating overdraft on local 

groundwater supplies. This federal warning 

came on the heels of an Arizona Supreme Court 

decision restricting groundwater rights to overlying landowners, which cast doubt on the ability 

of cities and mines to withdraw and transport 

groundwater. The two events precipitated a re 

view of Arizona water rights law. 

In 1980, after intensive negotiations 

among municipal, mining, and agricultural interests brokered by the governor, the Arizona 

legislature passed the Arizona Groundwater 

Management Act. The law repealed and 

supplanted all previous groundwater legislation. It designates Active Management Areas 

(AMAs) and Irrigation Non-Expansion Areas 

(INAs), with boundaries closely related to major groundwater areas. The goal is to limit the 

growth of water consumption in the INAs and 

to eliminate overdraft within the AMAs by 2025 

(except one predominantly agricultural AMA). 

Groundwater rights have been assigned 

within the AMAs. Water withdrawal fees are assessed against pumping to help finance the 

management activities. The law also created 

the Arizona Department of Water Resources 

(ADWR) and provided for the creation of advisory boards within each AMA. With passage of 

the 1980 law, the Department of the Interior released funding for CAP, and deliveries of water 

began by the end of the 1980s. 

The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act did not solve all problems arising 

from the state’s arid climate and rapid growth. 

New laws have been necessary. Arizona 

policymakers and agency personnel have had 

to oppose several attempts to weaken or overturn the groundwater policy reforms. 

Such a role has been proposed in the past without political response from the state. 

The study team saw the lack of this state 

role as such a significant problem that a special 

study of the political situation was prepared 

and presented to the Virginia Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations as well 

as to the drought planning advisory groups 

throughout the basin. 

West Virginia-The Kanawha River is controlled by a federal dam. There is little problem 

with drought. There is, however, a challenge of 

adjusting to a new whitewater rafting industry 

that demands high-volume water releases in the 

fall to extend the rafting season and sustain the 

state’s economy. This nontraditional demand is 

being dealt with through close communications 

among the affected parties. 

Osage-Marais des Cygnes River Basin, 

Kansas and Missouri-Major federal dams 

provide the primary water management mechanism. However, the states have very different 

water rights systems. Missouri uses a riparian 

approach downstream, while Kansas appropriates guaranteed amounts of water to local water 

districts upstream. There is great difficulty in 

meshing these approaches. 

Seattle-Tacoma, Washington-There is a 

strong tradition of local water districts in the 

metropolitan area. The largest is the Seattle 

Water Department, which sells water to many 

smaller districts. Tacoma has a separate system 

with a separate supply. 

Rapid urban growth, two recent droughts 

(including a serious one during the study period), and growing recognition of instream requirements are increasing pressure on the 

Cedar and Green River Basins. Suggestions for 

solving these problems have included interconnecting the basins, consolidating the districts, 

and augmenting storage capacity. Indian water 

rights also are involved. The Corps of Engineers 

operates a major dam on the Green River serving Tacoma. 

8 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
There are many other water allocation 

problems throughout the state of Washington, 

so the state government moved aggressively to 

regionalize the water allocation process. The 

system for doing this was established through a 

statewide negotiation among all major water 

interests, which produced The Chelan Agreement (see Box 5). 

Box 5 

The Chelan Agreement 

for Water Resources Planning 

in the State of Washington 

Created the statewide Water Resources Forum to establish policies for: 

0 Regional Planning 

0 lnstream Flows 

0 Hydraulic Continuity 

Provided for regional planning to be initiated 

by a government in the affected area that: 

0 Gives notice of intent to plan 

0 Identifies the potential planning region 

0 Convenes a meeting of affected local 

and tribal governments and state 

agencies 

Affected governments establish an Interim 

Coordinating Entity to: 

0 Convene a public meeting 

0 

Establish the planning process 

0 

Establish caucuses of interest groups 

Meet with the caucuses to establish 

the representative Regional Planning 

Group (RPG) 

Sets up a permanent Coordinating 

Entity (CE) 

Drafts a Scoping Document and planning schedule (with the CE) for approval by the state Department of 

Ecology 

0 Negotiates needed interagency and 

intergovernmental agreements to help 

with the planning 

0 Prepares the plan 

0 Takes steps to implement the plan 

0 Periodically reevaluates and modifies 

the plan 

The RPG: 

0 

The dominance of Seattle, and its numerous 

contracts with surrounding water districts, 

creates an imbalance in the negotiation system 

envisioned by the state for considering water 

allocations within the region. There also is a 

political split on water issues within the Seattle 

government. There are efforts to settle the 

Seattle issues locally before tackling the 

Seattle-Tacoma regional issues.6 A state process 

provides for intervention in the region’s water 

decisionmaking if necessary. 

A new drought plan is likely to gain greater 

and quicker acceptance if it builds on existing 

plans and agreements than if it attempts to 

make a complete break with the past. Box 6 

illustrates the influence of past droughts on the 

current drought planning process in the 

Seattle-Tacoma region. 

Study Key Water Institutions, 

Decisionmakers, and Other Stakeholders 

The purpose of a study of stakeholders is to 

identify all players who will be affected or who 

have a role in helping implement or block the 

plan and to identify their roles. This inventory 

should include relevant coordinating institutions. 

Water Managers. Drought planners usually 

know most of the important federal, state, and 

local players within the traditional “water community.” However, thorough drought planning 

encompasses more than just a river system, the 

management of its dams and irrigation systems, 

and the operation of municipal water systems. 

Groundwater and water quality regulators must 

be included, as well as interstate water commissions where they exist. 

Water Users and the Public. Many affected 

constituencies also are recognized. They include traditional agricultural and urban water 

users, and major water-using industries. The 

newer publics, which need equal attention, include instream users, such as those using waters 

for recreation and the fish and wildlife interests. 

The general public has an interest in issues of 

fairness, equity, and tax rates. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 9 
Box 6 

Building on Existing Plans and Practices 

in the Cedar-Green River Drought Preparedness Study 

The Cedar River and Green River basins in 

western Washington State extend from the Cascade Mountains to Puget Sound. Most of the Cedar River basin is located southeast of Seattle in 

King County. The Cedar River meets about twothirds of the municipal and industrial water supply 

needs of the Seattle metropolitan area, but minimum instream flows must be maintained to protect 

fisheries and support recreational uses. Between 

Puget Sound and Lake Washington, the Chester 

Morse Reservoir and the Hiram M. Chittenden 

Locks on the Cedar River must be operated to control flooding and protect stream flows, to avoid 

saltwater intrusion from the sound into Lake Washington, and to maintain Lake Washington water 

levels within a range that prevents damage to 

houseboats and the floating bridges of Interstate 

90 and State Route 520. 

The Green River drainage area, in the southern 

portion of King County, is adjacent to the Cedar 

River area. It provides water for municipal and industrial uses, particularly in Tacoma. The Howard 

A. Hansom Dam serves as a flood control and water storage facility, and the city of Tacoma diverts 

water downstream from the dam. Controlled releases from the dam maintain minimum stream 

flows that protect fisheries and recreational uses. 

After a severe drought in the latter half of 1987, 

during which water use restrictions were imposed 

in both basins, the Seattle Water Department, the 

Tacoma Water Division, and the state reviewed 

their drought and water-emergency programs. The 

Seattle Water Department developed a water supply plan that includes drought and emergency options. The Tacoma Water Division prepared a water conservation plan. 

To build on these efforts, the local agencies 

engaged in discussions with representatives of 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers concerning the 

operation of dams and reservoirs on the Cedar and 

Green rivers. They also undertook a drought preparedness study to (1) document drought management plans in the basins; (2) identify possible 

actions that could improve water management 

during drought; and (3) produce a drought preparedness plan with emergency, tactical, and strategic response options. The following objectives 

are being pursued: 

Establish a regional data base for use 

in interagency drought management 

decisionmaking; 

Establish agreed-on indicators of drought 

occurrence to trigger agency responses; 

Institute a process for communication 

among affected agencies prior to and during droughts; 

Institute processes for review and improvement of agencies’ and local utilities’ 

drought and water emergency plans; and 

Consider the applicability of various river 

basin models as aids to interagency 

decisionmaking. 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

The Judiciary. The judiciary’s role is be- tribal lawmakers and chief executives-and 

coming more important as water demand presses harder on available supplies. Water rights 

established by state and federal constitutions 

and laws, and by Indian treaties, are increasingly important, and they may be difficult to 

change to reflect evolving circumstances. Legal 

advice on these matters is needed in the planning process. 

Political Officials. Finally, and perhaps 

most importantly, the federal, state, local, and 

their top aides-are major players. This group 

includes the President, governors, mayors, 

county executives, and tribal chiefs, plus the 

members of Congress, state legislators, city 

council members, township supervisors, members of county governing bodies, and tribal 

council members. 

These officials make water laws, and can 

change them. They write the rules and regulations for drought emergency steps. They pro10 U.S. Advisory Coinmission on Intergovernmental Relations 
Box 7 

C e da r-G ree n River Bas ins 

Major PI ayers 

Seattle Metropolitan Water System 

(3 Caucuses) 

1. Seattle Caucus 

Seattle Water Department (SWD) 

Mayor of Seattle 

Seattle City Council 

2. Suburban Cities Association 

8 Municipalities (Contract with SWD) 

3. King County Water Alliance 

18 Water Districts (Contract with SWD) 

Tacoma Metropolitan Area 

Tacoma City Department of Public Utilities, 

Water Division 

South King County Regional Water 

Association 

Pierce County Regional Water Association 

Muckleshoot Tribe 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Other Major Players 

Washington Department of Ecology 

Washington Department of Wildlife 

Washington Department of Fisheries 

Tulalip Indian Tribe 

King County 

Major Issues 

Rapid growth in Seattle 

Seattle Water Department’s contractual obligation to supply adequate water to 27 municipalities and water districts 

Pressure on existing capacity of the SWD 

system 

Dominance by SWD 

Approach of a Chelan-style regional planning process for Seattle-Tacoma, with a 

much wider geographic reach than the current Seattle system 

Emerging discussion of alternative water governance structures with broader geographical 

reach than SWD 

vide the funds and rules for drought planning; 

water resources development and management; 

and protection of water quality, environmental 

quality, and endangered species. They also play 

important roles in determining the economic 

development and land use policies that influence water demand. 

Stakeholder Analysis. The Seattle-Tacoma 

(Cedar-Green Rivers) drought planning case 

study prepared a thorough stakeholder analysis 

(see Box ’7). It included an inventory of all the 

major players and personal interviews with 

many of them to uncover their fundamental 

views on critical issues. Two new pressures for 

change were the state-mandated Chelan-style 

regional planning process and emerging political discussions of alternative water governance 

structures that would mute the influence of the 

Seattle Water Department outside the city and 

give greater recognition to suburban officials. 

Work for Change 

With the results of these studies of laws, 

politics, and players in hand-in addition to the 

traditional technical studies-plan-making can 

begin. Plans should not be made before these 

facts are available because they are likely to 

violate essential political and social realities, 

and be impossible to implement. 

The studies will identify many issues that go 

well beyond the usual technical planning exercise. The planing process, then, should be 

viewed as a political process in which numerous 

conflicts will need to be resolved. The process 

should be solidly informed by the physical realities and possibilities, but it also needs to create 

a “buy-in” commitment by all (or most) of the 

key stakeholders, including public officials and 

the interested parties. To the extent that this 

buy-in is not achieved, implementation of the 

plan will be less likely. 

Involve the Players 

Involvement is the key to a drought planning process that creates buy-in by the essential 

players. They need to be involved from the moment they are identified, so they do not feel left 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 11 
out and so their insights can help inform and 

strengthen the process. There is a wide array of 

techniques for citizen participation, public involvement, public information, and participa- 0 Bureaucracies (including water managtory decisionmaking (see Box 8). 

At least five types of groups (often referred 

to as stakeholders) need to be involved: 

ers); 

Box 8 

Citizen Participation Forms, Techniques, and Means of Facilitating 

Forms 

1. Organizational 

0 Citizen Groups 

0 Special Interest Groups 

0 Program Clienteles 

0 Official Citizen Advisory Committees, 

Task Forces, and Commissions 

2. Individual 

0 Voting 

0 Program Client 

0 Making Statements 

0 Testifying 

0 Attending Meetings 

0 Working in Public Projects 

0 Campaigning/Lobbying 

0 LegaVAdministrative Appeals 

0 Demonstrating 

3. Information Dissemination 

0 Open Government 

0 Public Information Meetings 

0 Conferences 

0 Publications 

0 Mass Media 

0 Displays/Exhibits/Etc. 

0 Mail 

0 Advertising/Notices 

0 Hot Lines 

0 Drop-in Centers 

0 Correspondence 

4. Information Collection 

0 Hearings 

0 Workshops/Meetings/Conferences 

0 Consultation 

0 Government Records 

0 Non-Government Documents 

(Content Analysis) 

0 Participant Observers 

0 Surveys/Polls 

Tech n i q u es 

1. Legal 

2. Interactive 

0 Arbitration 

0 Mediation 

0 Coordinator/Catalyst 

0 Plural (advocacy) Planning 

0 Group Dynamics 

0 Focus Groups 

0 Policy Capturing 

0 Policy Delphi 

0 Priority Setting 

0 Design-In 

0 Game Simulation 

3. Technological 

0 Interactive Cable TV 

0 Teleconferencing by Compute 

0 Real-Time Computer Polling 

and Feedback 

0 Interactive Computer Graphics/Game 

Simulation 

Means of Facilitating 

1. Simplify and Clarify the Process 

2. Provide Training to: 

0 Citizens 

0 Public Officials and Staffs 

3. Provide Trained Staff to: 

0 Citizen Groups 

0 Government Agencies 

0 Citizen Groups 

0 Certain Individual Citizens 

5. Provide Economic Assistance 

and Incentives for Citizens to Participate 

0 Cost Reimbursement 

0 Honoraria 

4. Provide Technical Assistance to: 

Source: U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Citizen Participation in the American Federal 

System (Washington, DC, 1979), pp. 81-82. 

12 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
0 Public policymakers (including legislative, judicial, and executive officials); Box 9 

Highlights 

0 Interest groups (including advocacy 

groups and independent experts or analys ts); 

0 The press (including all forms of the 

public information media); and 

0 The general public (including many specific sectors). 

Leaving some of these players out of the 

process can cause significant trouble later. The 

planners may not know, at the beginning of the 

process, everyone who should be involved. If the 

planning process is open and publicly visible 

from the beginning, those who want to be involved are likely to make themselves known. 

Because not everyone can be involved in 

every meeting, there must be avariety of participation opportunities and techniques. The process must proceed in the open so there is no 

perception that secret deals are being made. 

The methods used may have to be tailored to the 

traditions in a particular area. 

Surveys of Involvement Techniques. Different techniques serve different purposes and 

groups. A special summary of citizen involvement techniques for water planning purposes 

was prepared for the National Drought Study 

by Hanna J. Cortner of the Water Resources 

Research Center at the University of Arizona 

(see Box 9). 

Circles of Influence. The “circles of influence” technique starts with a small core of key 

people who act as a steering committee. It expands to involve others in concentric fashion 

(see Box 10). 

Special Citizen Advisory Committee. The 

Water Supply Citizens Advisory Committee 

(WSCAC) was established by the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority in 1977 as a 

temporary body to review a proposed water 

Public involvement in water resources has 

evolved through the following eras: 

0 Closed participation @re-1960s) 

0 Maximum feasible participation (1 960s) 

0 Environmentalism (1970s) 

0 Collaborative decision building (1 980s) 

The trend is toward more direct and open participation by citizens, with the manager in a facilitative role. 

Experience has identified the most effective 

kinds of public involvement approaches and 

techniques. 

The roles of citizens, managers, and analysts 

need to be reconciled: 

Citizens are not just those who show up 

at public meetings; they are a much 

broader group. 

Public involvement and social impact 

analysis are distinct but related activities. 

0 Public involvement creates publlc 

learning. 

0 In the public involvement context, the 

public administrator is less a “neutral” 

facilitator and more a teacher and 

guide. 

0 Expert and facilitator roles are distinct. 

0 Resource planning and management 

decisions are inherently political exercises, involving value-based choices 

among competing conceptions of the 

public interest. 

0 There is a fine line between analysis as 

carefully crafted political argument and 

outright advocacy. 

Public participation is not a technical exercise, 

but an ongoing political exercise in democratic governance. 

0 

0 

Source: Hanna J. Cortner, “Reconciling Citizen, 

Analyst, and Manager Roles in Democratic Governance: Public Involvement Challenges in the 1990s.” 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 13 
Box 10 

Circles of Influence: 

One Means of Involving Key Stakeholders in Drought Planning 

14 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
supply diversion for the Boston metropolitan 

area. The committee’s technical analysis and 

public information work was so useful that it 

was made permanent. It has a small independent staff paid for by the authority. The committee’s staff has full access to the authority’s 

data bases so that it can develop alternative 

analyses of proposals (see Box 11, page 16). 

Negotiation. The process in Washington 

State that produced the Chelan Agreement for 

regionalizing the water reallocation process involved a relatively small negotiating group that 

represented the eight major water interests in 

the state. Each representative related to a larger 

caucus of interested persons (see Box 12, page 

16). One result of this agreement was to establish regions within the state, each with a similarly structured negotiating process. 

Another landmark water negotiation resulted in what has become known as the Pyramid Lake Agreement. Developed with 

facilitators, the agreement settled a long-standing dispute over water rights between two 

states, an Indian tribe, a power company, and 

federal requirements for instream water. The 

negotiated agreement was ratified by federal 

legislation (see Box 13, page 17). 

In another situation, involvement of the parties to a water dispute in negotiations was used 

to avoid the uncertain, and perhaps arbitrary, 

results of a court case. The case involves the 

management of six rivers in Alabama, Florida, 

and Georgia. Disputes arose over a proposal by 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to reallocate 

more water from its dam for the rapidly growing 

Atlanta metropolitan area. Alabama sued the 

Corps to stop the reallocation. Georgia joined 

the suit on the Corps’ side, and Florida joined 

the suit on Alabama’s side. The risks of a court 

decision led the four parties to form negotiating 

teams to find an out-of-court solution. In 1992, 

it was agreed to set aside the lawsuit for three 

years, during which time the parties would study 

the multiple problems and reach solutions jointly. 

The study is under way (see Box 14, page 18). 

In the Washington, DC area, plans for construction of as many as 16 major dams on the 

Potomac River to ensure adequate water for 

the nation’s capital raised so much opposition 

that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began 

looking for alternatives. A task force representing 25 water supply agencies called for 

interconnecting existing storage facilities, 

building one small facility, and coordinating 

management of the system. This ensured adequate long-term supplies much more quickly 

and inexpensively than the 16-dam proposal, 

and caused much less environmental damage 

(see Box 15, page 19). 

The Press. Involving the press offers additional challenges. Press relations is a complex 

field, and drought planning teams should get 

professional advice about it. A few basics can 

be summarized here, however: 

The whole process should be as open as 

possible to the press and others. 

Data collection and analyses should be 

as objective as possible. 

A wide range of alternatives should be 

examined. 

Diverse viewpoints should be solicited 

and responded to creatively and cons truc t ively. 

In short, the process should be on the up and up 

so that it can be respected by the press and by 

the public. 

Good press can be especially important to 

the strategic planning process when: 

(1) Bond referendums are needed to fund 

(2) Friendly elected officials are up for eleckey facilities; 

tion; 

(3) Officials are voting on water budgets; 

(4) Key water legislation is being considered; 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 15 
Box I I 

The Water Supply Citizens Advisory Committee (WSCAC) 

to the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority: 

Government-Supported Public Participation 

Originally formed in 1977 to review a proposed water 

supply diversion for the metropolitan Boston area, the 

Water Supply Citizens Advisory Committee (VVSCAC) to 

the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) 

represents an unusual awroach to mim citizen 

bodies, such as the statewide drought task forces 85- 

tablished in 1981, 1986, and 1988. 

WSCAC members regard the following as the most 

important lessons learned: -- - 

Informed citizen input on major pollcydecisions 

requires an independent, full-time staff answerable only to the committee. 

participation in water resoUrCe policy c!ecisions. WSCAC 

provides ongoing public input for the MWRA and state 

agencies. The MWRA provides WSCAC with funding for 

office space, exDenses, and staff. 

WSCACs membership Is balanced geographically and 

by interest (representing watershed communities, public officials, environmental groups, waw USBIS, 

and so on). with its staff answab4 only to the mmrnlttee, WSCAC condllcts independent mean31 on water 

policy questions and pcoposed actions. WSCAC membersorganizeintotaskforcesdevotedtomoreintensive 

study of particular issues. 

WSCAC has developed a network of expert consultants, developed public information materials, and 

participated in securing passage of state legislation, 

such as the lnterbasin Transfer Act of 1983, the Water 

Management Act of 1985, and the Watershed Protection Act of 1992. In addition, state officials have 

tapped WSCAC for representation on other review 

0 Active citizen participation is a good investment, 

ensuring publicly supportable, cost-effective, 

and environmentally sound decisions. 

Citizen input committees need to communicate 

with the public as well as with the agencies they 

advise. 

Effective citizen input entails responsibilitiesfor 

both the citizens’ committee and the affected 

agencies: the citizens’ committee must engage 

in pertinent, factual, and thoughtful critlcism of 

the agency (avoiding broad emotional attacks), 

and agency officials must respond receptively 

and professionally to the input provided by the 

citizens’ committee (avoiding the tendency to 

retrenchment and Inhospitality). 

0 

Box 12 

The Chelan Agreement: Building Consensus through Decisionmaking Structure 

Washington State’s Chelan Agreement emerged 

from a process intended to create a system for reallocat- ing water within the state’s 62 drainage basins. The 

stnrctwe of the decisionmaking process contributed 

strongly to the rWging of the agreement among the af- fect& interests. 

The Chelan Agreement process was stimulated 

by a legislative review of water policy and discussions 

with Indian tribes. In Spring 1990, eight statewide caucuses-each representing a major water interest 

(state government, Indian tribes, local governments, 

fisheries, recreation, environmentalists, business, 

and agriculture) -were convened by a professional 

mediator at a two-day retreat. Caucus members 

agreed to designate representatives to a 24-member 

negotiating team charged with drafting basin planning procedures. 

Team members completed their drafting work at a 

retreat at Ch~h in Nov0mb~ 1990. SaeVons d tb 

The draft agreement was signed by representatives of 

all eight caucuses on March 8, 1991. 

The Chelan Agreement contains proposals for 

water conservation and growth management, establishes a pilot process for drainage basin planning 

and an interim process for resolving issues in ‘critical 

areas” elsewhere in the state, and authorizes the formation of a State Water Resources Forum, organized 

with the same caucus and negotiating team structure, 

to make recommendations to state policymakers. 

Rather than designating a lead agency, the 

agreement assigns responsibility for basin planning 

to state agencies, local governments, and Indian 

tribes, with a structure for representing interests, resolving disputes, reaching agreement. and assigning 

implementation responsibility. To encourage parties 

to resolve disagreements, a default condition provides that basin planning projects failing to meet 8stab\kYM dgadlines ?wM tb \he tbntrol o\ the state 

draft agreement were approved unless they were re 

garded as ‘fatally flawed.” 

Department of Ecology. 

16 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
Box 13 

The Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake 

Water Rights Settlement: 

A Negotiated Compromise in a Long-Disputed Watershed 

Water users have feuded over the waters of the 

Truckee and Carson rivers in northem California 

and westem Nevada for more than 80 years. Disputes arose over diversions of water under state 

laws in California and Nevada, the use of instream flows for hydropower generation, federal 

reserved rights of Indian tribes, and environmental concerns over lnstream flows, wetlands, and 

species preservation. 

Negotiators for California and Nevada, the Pyramid Lake Indian Tribe, and the Sierra Pacific 

Power Company resolved at least some of these 

disputes, leading to passage of theTruckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act 

(Title II of the Fallon-Paiute-Shoshone Indian 

Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990). In so 

doing, they had to overcome decades of disagreement while working within the accumulated constraints of laws and court decrees. Both 

the negotiation process and the resulting legislation are being hailed as examples for the resolution of western water conflicts. 

Californians and Nevadans make extensive diversions of water from the Truckee and Carson 

rivers for irrigation, municipal, and industrial 

uses. The Sierra Pacific Power Company has hydroelectric facilities in both states and provides 

Nevada’s Reno-Sparks area with its municipal 

water supply, so it had interests in both the preservation of instream flows and diversions for 

consumptive uses. The Pyramid Tribe relies on 

fishing from the rivers and Pyramid Lake for subsistence and income, so their goal was to maintain water levels in the rivers and the lake. The 

tribe and allied environmentalists were concerned with the survival of two culturally significant but threatened species of fish indigenous to 

Pyramid Lake. 

Although California and Nevada negotiated an 

interstate water compact in the 1960s to govern 

Truckee and Carson rlver waters, the Congress 

balked at ratifying it on the grounds that tribal 

and environmental interests had not been incorporated adequately. Efforts to break the impasse were unsuccessful through the 1970s 

and the first half of the 1980s. 

Beglnnlng In 1987, U.S. Senator Harry Reid 

(D-Nev.) and his staff attempted to reinvigorate 

the negotiations and to include the federal, Indian, and environmental concerns that had 

blocked full agreement and implementation in 

the past. New negotiations were organized 

among the four largest interests. This approach 

left out several affected parties, but it was felt 

that some earlier efforts had suffered from the 

number of participants who were involved. 

Senator Reid broke the representatives of the 

four groups into subgroups and met with them 

regularly, with members of his staff serving as 

facilitators for subgroup meetings. The facilitators enabled the parties to generate win-win 

solutions and to discover alternatives that reconciled apparently conflicting interests. 

The larger, more complicated, and intense 

conflicts were resolved first, paving the way 

for dealing with other concerns. As subgroups 

neared agreements, Reid and his staff gradually expanded the negotiations to include additional parties. As more progress was made, 

the number of participants grew, and large 

sessions were held to report on what had been 

accomplished and solicit input on remaining 

issues. In less than two years, all of the parties 

were in agreement, and the Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Agreement was signed. It 

was submitted to the Congress as a bill on August 4, 1989, was passed by Congress and 

signed into law by President George Bush on 

November 16, 1990. Its provisions are being 

implemented. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 17 
Box 14 

The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Watershed: 

Direct Negotiations Among Constitutional Sovereigns 

The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) watershed drains about 20,000 square miles of the southeastern United States into the Gulf of Mexico. The 

Chattahoochee River flows south from northern Georgia and forms part of the boundary between Georgia 

and Alabama. At the Florida border, it is joined by the 

Flint River, a spring-fed stream that drains west central 

Georgia. The Apalachicola River is formed by the confluence of the Chattahoochee and the Flint and flows 

through the Florida Panhandle. 

Only the Chattahoochee has water storage reservoirs. 

The largest of these are In the upper area of the watershed-not well positioned to control flows downstream in the Apalachicola River. Management was 

compllcated by the fact that the three states have differentsystemsfor regulating surface andgroundwater 

withdrawals, water quality, and wastewater discharges, and uneven implementation and enforce 

ment. Droughtsduring the 1980s accentuated the potential conflicts inherent in the watershed’s location 

and physical characteristics. 

The Atianta metropolitan area draws about 70 percent 

of its drinking water from the upper Chattahoochee. 

After a 16-year study, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers concluded in 1989 that the best way to accommodate growth would be to reallocate some water 

used for hydropower generation. The proposed reallocations would have doubled Atlanta’s take from 

Lake Sidney Lanier- up to 66 million gallons per day. 

In November 1989, Alabama filed a federal suit 

against the Corps, alleging that it had failed to abide 

by the provisions of the National Environmental Policy 

Act (NEPA). Alabama was concerned about loss of 

water rights and decreased instream flows consisting 

of a higher proportion of wastewater discharges. Alabama claimed that future development along its eastern border would suffer if the Corps’ plan were implemented. 

Because Alabama’s suit would have restricted Atlanta’s water supply to current quantities, Georgla joined 

the lawsuit on the Corps’ side. Georgia and the Atlanta 

Regional Commission claimed that restricting Atlanta’s growth would mean forgoing 680,OOO jobs and up 

to $127 billion in wages and salaries by 2010. Georgia 

officials intensified the dispute in November 1990 by 

announcing plans to construct a 4,200-acre regional 

reservoiron theTallapoosa Rivet, which flowsdirectly 

into Alabama and feeds the Alabama River. 

Florida joined the lawsuit on Alabama’s side. It 

clalmed that reduced Chattahoochee River flows 

could harm navigation on the Apalachicola River and 

the delicate ecology of Apalachicola Bay. Apalachicola River flows were also threatened by diminished 

Flint River flows due to increased agricultural withdrawals in Georgia. Florida’s oyster industry also 

would be hurt. The bay and estuary provide 90 percent of the state’s and 10 percent of the nation’s oyster harvest. However, estuarine protection was not a 

recognized purpose in the Corps’ operation of the 

Chattahoochee reservoirs, and controlled releases 

were made on the basis of flood control and navigation needs. 

After the lawsuit was filed, negotiators for the states 

and the Corps worked out an agreement using alternative dispute resolution techniques. On January 3, 

1992, the governors of the three states and Corps off icials signed an agreement to coordinate water withdrawals from the ACF watershed and the neighboring Alabama-Coosa-Tallapsa watershed. A jointly 

funded three-year study, with a conflict resolution 

procedure, will determine water needs and their eco- nomic and environmental impacts. Georgia agreed 

to defer its plans for the reservoir on the Taliapoosa, 

the Corps and the Atlanta Regional Commission 

agreed to hold water withdrawal increases to a minimum, and Alabama agreed to drop its lawsuit until 

completion of the study. The formation of a tri-state 

water commission also is under consideration. 

The direct negotiation process has proved fruitful, 

but it has not included all interested parties directly. 

Other stakeholders represented by the state or the 

Corps negotiators include: metropolitan Atianta residents; residents of other municipalities that use the 

river for water supply or wastewater disposal: recreational and resident users of Lake Lanier and other 

reservoirs; industrlal and agricultural water users; 

navigation interests; environmentalists In Georgia 

and Alabama; other federal agencies, such as the 

Fish and Wildlife Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Geologic Survey, the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the 

Southeastern Power Administration. 

18 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
Box 15 

The Potomac River Basin: 

Interorganizational Cooperation 

to Interconnect Water Storage 

For decades, analyses of water supply in the 

Washington, DC, metropolitan area predicted 

an impending water crisis. Plans for addressing the crisis invariably included the construction and operation of several (in one plan, as 

many as 16) major new reservoirs. Clearly, 

such plans potentially involved considerable 

expenses and environmental impacts. 

A 1977 study of the situation by the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers concluded that the region 

would not necessarily be short of water if existing supplies and storage were used more efficiently. A potential solution to the situation lay 

in coordinating the activities of water suppliers. Over the next five years (a fraction of the 

time needed for designing, financing, and constructing surface storage facilities), officials of 

25 water supply agencies in the area formed a 

regional task force that worked with the Corps 

on improving water storage capacity manage 

ment. In July 1982, eight agreements were 

signed for maintaining flows of the Potomac 

River, allocating water in periods of low flow, 

coordinating the operation of existing storage facilities, and sharing the costs of future storage 

capac‘ty expansions, if needed. 

A special concern was the potential environmental effects, especially on the tldal estuary 

downstream from Washington, from either reduced Potomac flows or the construction 

plans that had been thought necessary earlier. 

The coordination plans, instead, provide for 

the maintenance of sufficient flow in the Potomac to preserve environmental values. 

These interorganizational arrangements are 

estimated to have saved between $200 million 

and $1 billion compared to the plans for constructing additional storage. Only one small 

politan Washington area, and adequate water 

supplies and storage are assured to 2020. In 

fact, the Potomac River system and its reservoirs are believed to have enough capacity to 

supply the region’s anticipated 2010 population even in a drought as bad as the worst on 

record. 

fl~wp/?plcali’acMy wasrequiredinmeme/r@ 

(5) Governmental reorganizations affecting water programs are under consideration; and 

(6) The public is being asked to cooperate 

in cutting water use during a drought 

emergency. 

Supporting Effective Involvement 

Decisionmaking for drought preparedness 

is highly complex and getting more complex 

every year. It is a daunting responsibility to: 

(1) Ensure that nontechnical citizens and 

elected officials understand the key 

facts; 

(2) Get diverse interest groups to see each 

other’s viewpoints; 

(3) Get separate governments and agencies 

to see how their responsibilities interrelate; and 

(4) Establish constructive interactions 

among all the players. 

Computer-assisted techniques are becoming available to help meet this decisionmaking 

challenge. Two such devices were reviewed for 

the National Drought Study by William B. Lord 

(see Box 16, page 20). 

Drought Simulation 

One of the computer-assisted devicesSTELLA II-is a general purpose simulation 

program based on differential equations. It employs a graphical user interface and other 

“user-friendly” features that speed up the process of creating a model directly with the officials and other stakeholders. This involvement 

in creating the model gives the users confidence 

in the process when they use it to address real 

policy issues. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 19 
Box 16 

Highlights 

Drought preparedness planning increasingly is 

characterized by: 

0 Growing complexity; 

Reduced emphasis on conventional water de 

velopment structures (such as dams) and increased emphasis on management options 

(such as conservation); 

Reduced emphasis on federal government 

money and actlvlty and increased emphasis 

on state and local money and activity; and 

increased emphasis on shared responslbillties, a wider range of objectives and stakeholders, institutional changes, intergovernmental 

relations, and dispute resolution processes. 

Two distinct, but related, types of decision processes are needed to cope with drought. 

1. Strategic long-range planning to "drought 

proof" the region as much as is practicable 

before a drought occurs. 

2. Tactical real-time decisionmaking during 

times when drought conditions exceed those 

taken care of by drought proofing. 

Both of these decision processes can be assisted 

by computerized decision support systems. 

Strategic planning can assist in two ways: 

1. Identifying the growing range of values that 

need water, and assisting in finding societal 

trade-offs among them. MATS (Multi-Attribute 

Tradeoff System, developed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation) is suitable for this purpose. 

Accurately simulating the physical, institutional, and societal behaviors in the water region 

under varying drought conditions, using interactive "gaming" exercises with the key stakeholders and decisionmakers. The STELLA II 

model was used successfully for this purpose 

in the four local drought planning studies prepared as part of the National Drought Plan. 

Tactical drought planning and readiness can be enhanced by the use of simulation models such as 

STELLA 11. 

0 

0 

2. 

Source: William B. Lord, "Decision Making in 

Drought Preparedness Studies." 

STELLA I1 simulates not just hydrologic 

and engineering systems but also the populations served, institutions and regulations, and a 

wide range of alternative long-term strategies 

and immediate tactical steps that might be used 

to help solve drought problems. 

STELLA II was used in the Corps' four 

drought planning studies to allow the stakeholders to interact in exploring the likely impacts and consequences of their policy options. 

Hypothetical "what if" games allowed the players to interact in a less threatening way, to 

discover and avoid mistakes and share innovations. Bringing diverse players together in the 

gaming situation builds rapport that can be 

helpful later when they must work together to 

make real drought-related decisions. 

Use of the STELLA II simulation model 

had the following results: 

James River Basin Study (Virginia)-The 

workshop made it obvious to a wide range 

of affected parties that state law offered no 

help in solving drought problems. 

Cedar-Green River Basins Study (Washington)-One workshop with technical experts 

demonstrated the effectiveness of proposed 

technical solutions to a "virtual drought." A 

second workshop with close staff advisors 

to the governor and mayors demonstrated 

how regional cooperation could help 

achieve better drought solutions and improve public relations. 

Kanawha River Study (West Virginia)-The workshop familiarized many 

stakeholders with the economic effects of 

alternative proposals for the Corps' management of the river, and is expected to 

reduce future criticisms compared to those 

heard during the 1988 drought. 

Marais des Cygnes-Osage River Basin 

Study (Kansas-Missouri) -The workshop 

helped demonstrate the effects of different 

water laws in the two states and bring the 

20 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
affected parties together more than had 

been possible in the past. 

Alternative Dispute Resolution 

Alternative dispute resolution, which has 

come into greater use in recent years, uses 

negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and facilitation. Negotiated rulemaking is a related 

technique. If the parties agree to use these 

techniques, rather than submitting to a formal 

judicial or rulemaking process, assistance is 

available (see Box 17). 

In 1990, all federal agencies were given authority and encouragement to use these techniques (see Box 18). Many state and local 

governments also are moving in this direction. 

Over corn i n g Bar r i e r s 

The techniques of involvement are no panacea. Elected officials may be too busy with 

other issues or not sufficiently interested to participate. Reporters may have better stories to 

cover. Some stakeholders may see their interests better served by going to court than by 

Box 17 

Resources for Assistance 

with Alternative Dispute Resolution 

and Negotiated Rulemaking 

Administrative Conference of the U.S. 

1120 L Street, NW, Suite 500 

Washington, DC 20037-1 568 

(202) 254-7020 

National Institute for Dispute Resolution 

1726 M Street, NW, Suite 500 

Washington, DC 20036 

Many state governments and universities, as 

well as private practitioners, provide dispute 

resolution services. 

(202 ) 466-4764 

*These organizations maintain rosters of 

qualified mediators and facilitators. 

Box 78 

Federal Authority for ADR 

and Negotiated Rulemaking 

Two federal laws enacted in November 1990 

amended the Administrative Procedure Act to 

include and encourage the use of alternative 

dispute resolution and negotiated rulemaking. 

The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 

(1 01 STAT 2736) requires each federal agency 

to promote dispute resolution as an alternative 

to litigation by (1) designating a senior official 

as the agency's Dispute Resolution Specialist; (2) providing training for agency personnel, 

especially those responsible for implementing 

dispute resolution; (3) reviewing the agency's 

contracts, grants, and other assistance programs to ensure that dispute resolution is authorized and promoted; and (4) adopting a 

policy governing the potential use of dispute 

resolution techniques in consultation with the 

Administrative Conference of the United 

States and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. 

The Negotiated Rulemaking Act (101 STAT. 

4969) allows federal agencies to encourage 

early and continuing participation in the 

rulemaking process by representatives of potentially affected interests, toward the purpose 

of achieving consensus on the text of a proposed rule. 

joining in a negotiation or a simulation exercise 

or a coordinating process. 

The sincerity, objectivity, and openness of 

the planning process, and user friendly support, 

are likely to be contagious. The more stakeholders who get involved, the greater will be the 

attraction to join, To help overcome reluctance 

to involvement in the planning process, work 

groups should be convened by an organization 

having adequate geographic scope and objectivity to gain the confidence of all parties. 

The problem of missing players should be 

dealt with constructively, They should be sent 

all materials prepared for meetings and should 

be polled for opinions on the issues and invited 

to send representatives. Issues most needing 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 21 
their input should be highlighted, and personal 

briefings should be offered. As the process 

moves along, special opportunities for involvement should be offered. 

Intergovernmental and interagency coordination processes yield positive results only with 

great effort. Too often, protecting turf becomes 

paramount. Laws and procedures may be invoked to close off discussion of potential 

solutions to problems. These barriers to cooperation may be lowered by freely sharing the 

knowledge gained in the planning process with 

all parties. 

Capitalize on Real Droughts 

It helps to take advantage of a real drought. 

During a drought, it is difficult to plan; there is 

too much else to do, and nerves are too frayed to 

allow objective reflection. Immediately following a drought, while the event is still fresh-as is 

the resulting public, political, and institutional 

turmoil-interest in planning will be high. This 

may be the best time to involve new players in 

the process and to reevaluate previously developed plans and processes to see how the 

drought could have been handled better. 

This point is illustrated in Lessons Learned 

from the California Drought: 1987-1 992, which is 

part of the National Drought Study series. 

Among the lessons were several that showed the 

importance of organizational, legislative, legal, 

and public involvement factors (see Box 19). 

This drought focused public attention on the 

shortcomings of the existing water management 

systems and the need to reform water laws, 

institutions, and management processes to 

avoid even greater hardships from future 

droughts as California’s population and economy continue to grow. 

The catalytic power of a drought is also 

illustrated by a California case in which consumers of the San Gabriel River watershed in 

the Los Angeles metropolitan area withstood 

the 1945-1965 drought with limited harm. The 

institutional arrangements developed during 

Box 19 

Drought Governance 

and Management Lessons 

from California 

Strategic Planning 

The surest way to mitigate the adverse social, 

environmental, and economic impacts of a 

sustained drought is to obtain more water 

through long-term strategic planning that in- volves all the relevant parties. 

Water in aquifers (usually managed by differ- ent institutions than surface water) continues 

to be the most effective strategic weapon 

against drought. 

Local and regional interconnections among wa- ter supply systems (usually governed and man- aged by multiple institutions) proved to be good 

insurance against severe water shortages. 

Land use regulation (administered by multiple 

local governments) must be the mechanism 

for urban growth management policies that ac- cept limited water supply. 

The nature of social, environmental, and eco- nomic impacts of a sustained drought demands more careful and realistic drought plan- ning and decisionmaking processes. 

Drought Response 

Early drought response actions by governing 

officials and managers and proper timing of 

tactical measures are essential in short-term 

management of droughts. 

The success of drought response plans 

should be measured in terms of minimizing 

and equitably redistributing the impacts of 

shortages through the political process. 

The overall success of water rationing plans de- pends on their design and reliance on increases 

in water rates. Market forces are an effective way 

of reallocating restricted water supplies. 

Mass media can play a positive role in drought 

response, especially if guidelines are followed. 

Institutional Change 

Severe droughts can expose some inadequa- cies in the performance and roles of state and 

federal water institutions that would not other- wise be apparent. 

Severe drought can change longstanding rela- tionships and balances of power in the competition for water. 

22 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
those years (see Box 20) linked water user organizations, water agencies, and related decisionmakers in a governing system that allocated 

both surface and groundwater supplies among 

competing interests, while seeking supplemental sources to accommodate future growth. 

With small modifications, those institutions 

coped with the 1987-1992 drought, despite the 

additional growth that had occurred throughout the watershed. 

The need to keep drought contingency plans 

current is illustrated by the case of the recent 

drought in the Missouri River Basin, where the 

assumptions about relative needs made in 1944 

were challenged politically and judicially in the 

1990s (see Box 21, page 24). 

Interagency Coordination 

Despite the hydrologic unity of the water 

resource and ecological elements of a basin, 

many separate public and private organizations 

exercise different responsibilities within a baBox 20 

The San Gabriel River Watershed: 

Basin and Watershed Governance Structures Created by Water Users 

Southem California’s rapid growth and urbanization in the 1920s and 1930s led to some critical 

overdrafts on local water supplies, especially in 

the heavily developed San Gabriel watershed, 

which encompasses much of the Los Angeles-Long Beach metropolitan area. Even the 

availability of imported Colorado River water 

through the facilities of the Metropolitan Water 

District of Southern California (MWD) did not 

stem the deterioration of local supplies. Unrestrained by California water law, most pumpers 

preferred extracting dwindling underground supplies to the more expensive imported water. 

An extended drought that began in 1945 intensified efforts of pumpers in the four groundwater 

basins of the watershed to understand and re 

spond to their situation. Users in the small Raymond Basin at the upper end of the watershed negotiated a stipulated judgment defining and limiting their pumping rights in order to stabilize the ba- sin, on which they depended for most of their water. Users in the West Basin at the downstream end 

of the watershed formed the West Basin Water 

Conservation Group, reorganized as the West Ba- sin Water Association in 1946. Similar associations were formed in the Central Basin in 1950 

and in the Main San Gabriel Basin in 1955. 

The associations became forums for the discussion of basin water conditions and possible re 

sponses to them. The responses included the 

formation of municipal water districts to provide 

access to imported supplemental water, the negotiation of limitations on pumping from the 

local groundwater supplies, and the establish 

ment of artificial recharge programs to replenish 

the groundwater basins with imported water. In 

the West and Central basins, freshwater injec- tion barriers were created along the coast to halt 

the spread of seawater intrusion. 

Water users also created a San Gabriel River 

watershed governance structure. Those in the 

downstream Central and West basins brought a 

suit in 1959 against the upstream users to force 

a firm allocation of the waters of the river. Negotiating committees for the upper and lower areas worked out aformula for dividing the river’s 

flow each year based on rainfall conditions in 

the upper area, and set up a watershed governance structure to monitor compliance with the 

judgment and consider modifications. 

These basin and watershed governance arrangements were crafted over several years by 

the water users. Their efforts were supported by 

the work of the California legislature, the California Department of Water Resources, and the 

Los Angeles County Flood Control District (now 

part of the county Department of Public Works). 

Their success in eliminating overdraft in one of 

the nation’s most heavily developed metropolitan regions, even though the drought that began 

in 1945 held on for 20 years, indicates that 

sound water resource management can be 

closely tailored to local situations with the lead- ership of local water users. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 23 
Box 21 

The Missouri River Basin: 

Multiple Interests and Uses Collide in a Drought 

In the late 1980s and early 199Os, the Missouri 

River Basin, which includes part or all of ten 

states, experienced its worst drought since the 

1930s. Upstream, the U.S. Army Corps of Engi- neers operates six dams on the Missouri River. 

Downstream, between Sioux City, Iowa, and St. 

Louis, the Corps operates 735 miles of the river 

for navigation. The river is tapped for municipal 

and industrial uses along its entire reach. 

Under normal weather conditions, the Corps 

can operate the facilities to satisfy all project 

purposes. With the recent drought, the Corps 

was unable to meet all users’ demands, and 

competition for the remaining supplies intenslfied, particularly between upper states’ recreation and irrigation interests and lower states’ 

navigation interests. 

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 

found that the Corps was following drought 

contingency plans for the Missouri River system that were based on 1944 assumptions 

about the amount of water needed for navigation and irrigation, which no longer reflect conditions. In particular, those plans give lower 

priority to recreational uses. 

When the Congress approved the Missouri River 

reservoir system in 1944, the Corps estimated 

the ultimate navigation demand on the river at 12 

million tons per year. However, at its highest, it 

was 3.3 million tons in 1977. By 1988, it had de 

clined to 2.2 million tons. Under drought opera- tions, despite releases from upstream reservoirs 

to assure downstream flows, navigation fell to 

1.4 million tons in 1990. 

Upstream, the reservoir system was anticipated 

to provide irrigation water for 2.2 million acres of 

farmland, but some of the facilities were never 

constructed. For example, the 1944 legislation 

envisioned more than 900,000 acres of irrigation 

in South Dakota, but the Congress never approved funding for more than 24,000acres. At the 

same time, the dams and reservoirs inundated 

about 530,000 acres of prime bottom land in the 

state. Together, Montana, North Dakota, and 

South Dakota lost about 1.2 million acres of 

bottom land to the reservoirs in exchange for 

Washington’s promises of irrigation projects 

that never materialized. 

The upper states have developed recreational 

fishing and boating industries around the reservoirs that generate more Income than irrigation 

uses. According to U.S. Sen. Byron Dorgan 

(D-N.D.), the Corps‘ drought operation calls for 

lowering reservoir levels for the sake of a $14 

million navigation industry while sacrificing a 

$67 million recreation industry upstream. Down- stream Interests respond that navigation has 

suffered from the drought, and the Corps’ operations simply spread the suffering around rather 

than making downstreamers bear it all. Without 

arguing the merits of navigation versus fishing, 

the Corps maintains that its operations must reflect recreation’s lower priority as set forth in the 

1944 law. The Corps contends that only the 

Congress can change those priorities. 

In May 1990, a federal district judge in Bismarck, North Dakota, sided with Montana, 

North Dakota, and South Dakota, and ordered 

the Corps to limit releases from Lake Oahe (in 

North and South Dakota) in order to preserve the 

walleye spawn, which the states associated 

with $20 million from fishing tourism. The Corps 

appealed, arguing that releases were necessary to protect navigation and nesting areas for 

two endangered bird species downstream. 

The U.S Justice Department represented the 

Corps, and argued that reservoir system man- agement decisions were not subject to judicial 

review. A threejudge panel of the Eighth Circuit 

Court of Appeals voted 2-1 to stay the distrlct 

judge’s order. The judges accepted the Corps’ 

argument that the courts should not interfere 

with its complex reservoir-management decisions. 

In February 1991, Montana, North Dakota, and 

South Dakota filed a suit in federal court challenging the Corps’ practice of categorizing all 

project purposes as either primary or secondary. In the meantime, the Corps has set up regional conferences seeking comments to help 

update the Missouri River Master Manual that 

guides its operation of the system. 

24 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
sin. The drought planning process, therefore, 

seeks to coordinate many organizations. 

The formal tools of interorganizational 

coordination are contracts, compacts, agreements, and memoranda of understanding. 

These tools can be used in drought planning to: 

Gather and share information about 

water conditions; 

Interconnect independent water supply 

systems; 

Establish contingency plans for responding to drought conditions with 

appropriate facility operations, water 

pricing, and conservation strategies; 

Agree on trigger mechanisms to activate these contingency plans; and 

Evaluate the process. 

Many such agreements have been developed. For example, in the extremely water-short 

southern region of Orange County, California, 

water supply agencies have created a system of 

interconnections and use agreements to share 

scarce supplies during drought or when localized interruptions of service result from damage 

to supply lines or storage facilities. Such coordination has saved each agency money. 

In Solano County, California, water coordination contracts have tied local underground 

water supplies together with state and federal 

government surface water supplies to form a 

more reliable conjunctive management system 

for municipal, agricultural, military, and other 

purposes (see Box 22). 

For Idaho’s drought management plan, the 

Department of Water Resources (IDWR) analyzes forecast data concerning the upcoming 

year’s water supply and notifies the governor if 

a shortfall is expected. Upon the direction of the 

governor, IDWR assembles a water supply 

committee to organize and coordinate 

drought-related activities. 

~~ 

Box 22 

The Solano Project: 

Stabilizing a Water Supply through 

lnterjurisdictional Contracting 

The Solano Project, built in the 1960s by the 

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, captures the waters of Putah Creek from the mountains in 

northern California’s Napa and Lake counties, 

and directs their controlled flows toward the 

farmland and cities of Solano County, one of 

the fastest growing counties in the state. Two 

local agencies, the Solano County Flood Control and Water Conservation District and the 

Solano Irrigation District, were organized to 

contract with the Bureau for the Solano Project 

and the construction and operation of a water 

distribution system. 

With the aid of an interest-free loan from the 

Bureau, the irrigation district built the $1 5 million distribution system that conveys Putah 

Creek water through its territory. The Bureau 

entered into a Master Water Contract with the 

Flood Control and Water Consetvation District 

for the control and distribution of waterfromthe 

Solano Project. The flood control district subcontracted its responsibilities to the irrigation 

district. The Bureau contracted the operation 

of the Solano Project headworks to the district, 

which also has acquired the licenses to construct and operate hydroelectric facilities at 

the headworks. 

As a result, the Solano Irrigation District is in a 

position to operate all aspects of the Solano 

Project headworks and distribution system for 

conveying surface water supplies into and 

through most of Solano County. As increasing 

portions of the county urbanized since the 

1960s, the district entered into agreements 

with municipalities to supply water. 

The Putah Plain Groundwater Basin is located 

within Solano County, mostly within the territory of the Solano irrigation District. With its operation of the Solano Project facilities, the district is able to pursue a sophisticated conjunctive management program that takes advantage of surface water supplies when they are 

available and relies on stored groundwater 

supplies when surface water is more scarce or 

in those parts of its territory that are hard to 

reach with surface water. This conjunctive 

management program has helped protect Solano County’s cities and farms from drought. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 25 
The Idaho water supply committee is composed of representatives of IDWR, the state 

Bureau of Disaster Services, Department of 

Agriculture, Department of Fish and Game, 

and Division of Environmental Quality, plus 

the Cooperative Extension Service of the University of Idaho, and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. 

Geological Survey, U.S. Forest Service, and National Weather Service. The state plan provides 

for subcommittees dealing with water data, 

public information, and different water use 

categories. 

The committee reviews water supply information and develops and oversees the implementation of drought mitigation measures, 

including conservation. The committee is 

charged with monitoring and evaluating results 

and designing adjustments to the drought plan. 

The prior specification of this interagency, 

intergovernmental committee facilitates interorganizational coordination by providing a forum for addressing all critical areas of need. 

Information sharing, specification of operating 

procedures for physical facilities, design and 

implementation of conservation measures, and 

evaluation of results can all occur within the 

framework of this committee. The annual monitoring of conditions keeps this mechanism 

ready to meet contingencies. 

New Organizations and Laws. If new organizations or new laws are needed, the plan 

should specify how they will be enacted. 

Agreements, Contracts, and Compacts. If 

interagency or intergovernmental agreements 

and contracts (or even interstate compacts) are 

needed, the plan should spell them out and 

provide for their negotiation. Studies that cross 

state lines may be particularly difficult. If adjoining states have significantly different water 

laws and political traditions (e.g., Kansas and 

Missouri), coordination will be more difficult. 

lkigger Mechanisms. Permanent mechanisms should be set up to trigger coordinated 

drought response activities by all the appropriate parties. 

Readiness. A program should be established to ensure readiness to respond to 

drought emergencies. These emergencies come 

along only now and then, plans get old and 

perhaps forgotten. A drought plan may be obsolete or too unfamiliar to be of much use if it 

has not been kept alive. In the Potomac River 

Basin, annual drought drills are held in which 

the key players manage a simulated drought 

(see Box 23). 

Budgets. Budgets needed to expand water 

Establishing Follow-Through 

Planningwithout action has no effect. Thus, 

the planning process needs to go a step beyond 

determining what should be done to determine 

how and by whom it will be done. 

The planning process is ideally suited to 

making these decisions because it involves all 

the parties and facilitates constructive interaction. The plan should not be considered complete until it identifies the parties responsible 

for implementing each recommendation and 

gets their commitment to take on their assigned 

responsibilities. 

Box 23 

The Potomac River Basin: 

Improving Analysis and Readiness 

through Drought Simulation 

A drought management simulation is conducted annually by the Interstate Commission 

on the Potomac River Basin and the three largest water utilities in the region. The week-plus 

exercise allows managers to employ and balance various tools, including three storage 

reservoirs, computer models that help maximize use of stored water, methods of sharing 

among water managers data about river flow 

and water demands, and a series of agree- ments among the utilities for Imposing water 

conservation measures. 

26 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
supplies, establish water conservation programs, interconnect existing supplies, and through with needed actions. 

take the responsibility for following 

maintain the planning and drought-drill processes will need to be coordinated and enacted. 

These key implementation activities cannot 

be left to chance. If they are not in the plan, and 

if the planning process does not create commitment by the responsible parties-by virtue of 

their having been involved-there is a strong likelihood that the plan will not be implemented. 

Conclusion 

Water managers and drought planners need 

the political process and the public support it 

can bring. They should work as hard (or harder) 

to bring political partners-and the other stakeholder’s who are necessary to build a workable 

consensus-into the planning process as they 

do to perfect the physical elements of the plan. 

Developing the political elements of drought 

plans often may be more demanding than developing the physical elements. 

This report has emphasized the need to: 

0 Prepare thorough studies of the legal issues, the political cultures, and all of the 

institutional, political, and other stakeholders’ interests in drought planning 

and management. 

a Develop the drought management plan 

through an open and visible involvement 

process that (1) embraces all the players 

and brings them in; (2) informs them as 

thoroughly as possible about the physical, social, political, and economic factors relevant to the plan; (3) facilitates 

interaction; and (4) resolves conflicts 

fairly and equitably. The process should 

include the mass media and the general 

public. 

0 Include all of the necessary implementation elements in theplan, and get the key 

decisionmakers to buy in sufficiently to 

Specialists will be needed to help the 

0 Lawyers for the legal studies; 

0 Political and social scientists for the 

studies of political cultures and stakeholders; and 

0 Citizen participation experts, meeting 

facilitators, conflict resolution experts, 

and experts skilled in computer modeling and decision-support systems. 

Droughts are not easily predicted, and the 

demands for water (including instream uses) 

have been growing more rapidly than supplies 

in recent years. Thus, drought planning needs to 

be flexible and constantly under review. 

Notes 

drought planners with these tasks: 

‘The papers on governance issues prepared for the National Drought Study are: 

William B. Lord, “Decision Making in Drought 

Preparedness Studies”-establishes a framework for un- derstanding the different types of decisions in governing 

water and managing droughts, and describes some support tools that can help planning decisionmakers. Lord 

describes three levels of decisions: constitutional, collective choice, and operational. 

Hanna J. Cortner, “Reconciling Citizen, Analyst, 

and Manager Roles in Democratic Governance: Public 

Involvement Challenges in the 1990s”-traces the evo- lution of citizen involvement through four eras (closed 

participation, maximum feasible participation, environmental activism, and collaborative decision building) 

and describes how the sometimes divergent goals of citizens, managers, and analysts can be reconciled in the 

current era of collaborative decision building for water 

resources management. 

Charles L. Laneaster, “Assessment of Water Law 

and Drought Management”-examines broad trends 

and nine specific issues in contemporary water law, and 

draws implications for water managers, including the 

need to change some laws. 

Vivian E. Watts, “Enacting a Virginia Water Man- agement Plan”-part of the James River Basin drought 

planning case study, shows how operational water managers can identify the need for legislative change and di- rectly help to sensitize the state political climate to this 

need. 

David S. Hamson, Helen Birss, and Deen Ruiz, 

“Water Governance in the Cedar and Green River BaU.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 27 
sins”-includes a detailed stakeholder analysis of virtu- ally all the public and private parties having interests in 

water policies in the two adjacent basins. It also provides 

managers, analysts, political actors, and others in the ba- sin with a scorecard on the players that they can rely on 

as they work to improve drought preparedness. 

2The membership of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations includes 3 private citizens and 3 

members of the federal executive branch, appointed di- rectly by the President; 4 governors (nominated by the 

National Governors’ Association), 4 mayors (nominated 

by the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National 

League of Cities), 3 state legislators (nominated by the 

National Conference of State Legislatures), 3 elected 

county officials (nominated by the National Association 

of Counties), appointed by the President; 3 members of 

the U.S. Senate, appointed by the President of the Sen- ate; and 3 members of the U.S. House of Representa- tives, appointed by the Speaker of the House. Members 

serve two-year terms and may be reappointed if they re- main in office. 

William B. Lord and Douglas S. Kenney, “Resolving In- terstate Water Conflicts: The Impact Approach,” Intergovernmental Perspective 19 (Winter 1993): 19-23. 

See Lord. 

See Lancaster. 

See Harrison, Birss, and Ruiz. 

28 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
Recent ACIR Publications 

Federally Induced Costs Affecting State and Local Governments. M.193. 1994 ................. $20.00 

Local Government Responsibilities in Health Care. M.192. 1994 ............................. $10.00 

Taxation of Interstate Mail Order Sales: 1994 Revenue Estimates. SR.18. 1994 ................ $8.00 

Child Care: The Need for Federal-State-Local Coordination. A.128. 1994 ..................... $10.00 

State and Local Ravel Taxes. M.189. 1994 ................................................ $8.00 

Local Government Autonomy: Needs for State Constitutional, Statutom and Judicial Clarification, 

Characteristics of Federal Grants-in-Aid to State and Local Governments: Grants Funded FY 1993. 

Directory of Intergovernmental Contacts. SR.17. 1993 ...................................... $10.00 

High Performance Public Works: A New Federal Infrastructure Investment Strategy for America, 

Metropolitan Organization: Comparisons of the Allegheny and St . Louis Case Studies. SR.15. 1993 . $8.00 

Federal Grant Programs in Fiscal Year 1992 Their Numbers. Sizes. and Fragmentation Indexes 

in Historical Perspective. SR.14. 1993 ................................................. $10.00 

RTS 1991: State Revenue Capacity and Effort. M.187. 1993 ................................. $20.00 

State Laws Governing Local Government Structure and Administration. M.186. 1993 ......... $10.00 

Federal Regulation of State and Local Governments: The Mixed Record of the 1980s. A.126. 1993 $15.00 

The Role of General Government Elected Officials in Criminal Justice. A.125. 1993 ........... $25.00 

The National Guard: Defending the Nation and the States. A.124. 1993 ...................... $15.00 

Guide to the Criminal Justice System for General Government Elected Officials. M.184. 1993 . . $8.00 

Intergovernmental Decisionmaking for Environment and Public Works. A.122. 1992 ........... $10.00 

Federal Statutory Preemption of State and Local Authority: Histo- Inventoq and Issues. 

Toward a Federal Infrastructure Strategy: Issues and Options. A.120. 1992 ................... $8.00 

Medicaid: Intergovernmental 'Rends and Options. A.119. 1992 .............................. $10.00 

Local Boundary Commissions: Status and Roles in Forming. Adjusting and Dissolving 

Local Government Boundaries. M.183. 1992 ........................................... $8.00 

Metropolitan Organization: The Allegheny County Case. M.181. 1992 ........................... $10.00 

The Changing Public Sector: Shifts in Governmental Spending and Employment. M.178. 1991 . . $15.00 

Coordinating Water Resources in the Federal System: The Groundwater.Surface Water 

Connection. A.118. 1991 ............................................................ $15.00 

Interjurisdictional Tax and Policy Competition: Good or Bad for the Federal System? M.177. 1991 . . $10.00 

The Structure of State Aid to Elementary and Secondary Education. M.175. 1990 ............. $10.00 

Representative Expenditures: Addressing the Neglected Dimension of Fiscal Capautx M.174. 1990 . $20.00 

Mandates: Cases in State-Local Relations. M.173. 1990 ..................................... $10.00 

Intergovernmental Regulation of Telecommunications. A.115. 1990 .......................... $10.00 

Local Revenue Diversification: 

Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism. 1994. Vol . 1. M.190. 1994 .......................... $24.95 

A.127. 1993 ........................................................................ $10.00 

M.188. 1994 ....................................................................... $10.00 

SR.16. 1993 ........................................................................ $10.00 

State Solvency Regulation of Property-Casualty and Life Insurance Companies. A.123. 1992 .... $20.00 

A.121. 1992 ........................................................................ $10.00 

Rural Economies. SR.13. 1990 ....................................................... $8.00 

Local Sales Taxes. SR.12. 1989 ....................................................... $8.00 

Local Income Taxes. SR.lO. 1988 ..................................................... $5.00 

User Charges. SR.6. 1987 ............................................................ $5.00 

State Taxation of Banks: Issues and Options. M.168. 1989 ................................... $10.00 

State Regulation of Banks in an Era of Deregulation. A.llO. 1988 ............................ $10.00 

State Constitutions in the Federal System: Selected Issues and Opportunities for State Initiatives. 

Residential Community Associations: 

A.113. 1989 ........................................................................ $15.00 

Private Governments in the Intergovernmental System? A.112. 1989 ..................... $10.00 

$5.00 

and Architectural Barrier Removal. A.111. 1989 ....................................... $10.00 

Assisting the Homeless: State and Local Responses in an Era of Limited Resources. M.161. 1988 ... $10.00 

. Questions and Answers for Public Oflicials. M.166. 1989 ................................. Disability Rights Mandates: Federal and State Compliance with Employment Protections 

The Organization of Local Public Economies. A.109.1987 ................................... $5.00