T.C. Memo. 2003-53

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

WATER-PURE SYSTEMS, INC., Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 11344-01. Filed February 26, 2003.

Joseph H. O’Donnell, Jr., for petitioner.

W. Randolph Shump and Pamela J. Arthur-Gerlach, for

respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

COHEN, Judge: The petition in this case was filed in

response to a Notice of Determination Concerning Worker

Classification Under Section 7436 (notice of determination)

regarding petitioner’s liabilities pursuant to the Federal

Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and the Federal Unemployment
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Tax Act (FUTA) for 1996, 1997, and 1998. The issues for decision

are: (1) Whether Martin L. Ridge (Ridge) was an employee of

petitioner for Federal employment tax purposes during 1996

through 1998 and, if so, (2) whether petitioner is entitled to

relief under section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-

600, 92 Stat. 2885, as amended (Section 530).

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and

all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and

Procedure. For convenience, FICA and FUTA taxes are collectively

referred to as employment taxes.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The facts in this matter were deemed stipulated pursuant to

Rule 91(f). The stipulated facts are incorporated in our

findings by this reference.

Petitioner’s Organization and Operations

Petitioner was incorporated in Pennsylvania on July 19,

1985, and has at all relevant times operated as an S corporation. 

Petitioner’s principal place of business was located in

Langhorne, Pennsylvania, at the address of Ridge’s personal

residence, when the petition was filed in this case.

Since its organization and through the years in issue,

petitioner provided sales and service of water purification

systems. This activity was petitioner’s only business and only
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source of income. Ridge and his wife, Jean S. Ridge

(Mrs. Ridge), each owned 50 percent of petitioner from the time

of its incorporation and throughout 1996, 1997, and 1998.

Ridge has at all times served as petitioner’s president. 

During 1996, 1997, and 1998, Ridge performed all services

necessary to generate gross receipts on behalf of petitioner. 

No other person provided services to petitioner.

During 1996, 1997, and 1998, petitioner did not make regular

payments at fixed times to Ridge for his services. Rather, Ridge

received funds from petitioner as his needs arose. Petitioner

neither classified any payment as a dividend nor distributed any

dividends to shareholders from 1996 through 1998.

Petitioner’s Tax Reporting

Petitioner timely filed Forms 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return

for an S Corporation, and related schedules, for each of the

years 1996, 1997, and 1998. Petitioner reported ordinary income

from its trade or business of $26,173.32, $17,052.98, and

$4,822.46 for 1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively. Petitioner

claimed no deduction either for compensation of officers or for

salaries and wages in 1996; for 1997 and 1998, petitioner’s

returns reflect deductions of $16,500 and $14,000, respectively,

for compensation of officers. Schedules K-1, Shareholder’s Share

of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc., attached to the returns
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show the following amounts as the pro rata share of, and as a

property distribution other than a dividend to, the stockholders:

 Shareholder 1996 1997 1998

Ridge and Mrs. Ridge $26,173.32 -- --

Ridge -- $8,526.49 $2,411.23

Mrs. Ridge -- 8,526.49 2,411.23

Petitioner’s Forms 1120S were signed by Ridge as president and by

Joseph M. Grey (Grey) as preparer.

During the period from 1996 to 1998, petitioner did not

issue any Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, to Ridge. 

Petitioner also did not issue any Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous

Income, to Ridge for 1996. For 1997 and 1998, petitioner issued

Forms 1099-MISC to Ridge reporting respective payments of $16,500

and $20,000. 

Petitioner did not file a Form 941, Employer’s Quarterly

Federal Tax Return, for any quarter in 1996, 1997, or 1998 or a

Form 940, Employer’s Annual Federal Unemployment (FUTA) Tax

Return, for 1996, 1997, or 1998.

The Ridges’ Tax Reporting

For each of the years 1996, 1997, and 1998, the Ridges

timely filed a joint Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax

Return. On these returns, the Ridges reported as ordinary income

from “Rental real estate, royalties, partnerships,

S corporations, trusts, etc.” $26,173.32 for 1996 and $23,052.98

for 1997. (Equivalent information for 1998 is unavailable
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because the copy of the 1998 return contained in the record does

not include the first two pages.) For 1996, an attached

Schedule E, Supplemental Income and Loss, characterizes the

foregoing amount as nonpassive income from Schedule K-1. For

1997, $17,052.98 is shown on Schedule E as nonpassive income from

Schedules K-1; $6,000 is shown on Schedule E and on Form 4831,

Rental Income, as rent; and $16,500 is shown on Schedule C,

Profit or Loss From Business, as gross receipts. For 1998,

$4,822.46 is shown on Schedule E as nonpassive income from

Schedules K-1, $6,000 is shown on Schedule E and on Form 4831 as

rent, and $14,000 is shown on Schedule C as gross receipts.

The Notice of Determination

On June 8, 2001, respondent sent to petitioner the notice of

determination at issue in this proceeding. The notice was based

on a determination that Ridge was to be legally classified as an

employee for purposes of Federal employment taxes and that

petitioner was not entitled to relief from such classification

pursuant to Section 530. Enclosed with the notice was a schedule

setting forth petitioner’s liabilities for FICA and FUTA taxes.

In calculating petitioner’s FICA and FUTA liabilities,

respondent concluded that only Ridge (and not Mrs. Ridge)

provided services to petitioner during the years in issue and,

accordingly, limited the computation to amounts distributed to

Ridge. As a result, for each of the years 1996, 1997, and 1998,
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respondent reclassified as wages to Ridge 50 percent of the

nonpassive income distributed by petitioner. For 1997 and 1998,

respondent also reclassified as wages the Form 1099-MISC

“nonemployee compensation” paid to Ridge.

It is stipulated that, if the Court decides that Ridge is to

be classified as an employee for Federal employment tax purposes

for all periods in 1996, 1997, and 1998, the amounts of taxes due

and owing are as set forth in the notice of determination.

ULTIMATE FINDINGS OF FACT

Ridge, as president of petitioner, performed more than minor

services and received remuneration therefor.

Petitioner did not have a reasonable basis for failing to

treat Ridge as an employee during the years in issue.

OPINION

I. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions

A. Subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code

Subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code governs payment of

employment taxes. In particular, sections 3111 and 3301 impose

taxes on employers under FICA (pertaining to Social Security) and

FUTA (pertaining to unemployment), respectively, based on wages

paid to employees. The term “wages” as used in these statutes

generally encompasses “all remuneration for employment”. Secs.

3121(a), 3306(b). “Employee” is defined for purposes of FICA

taxes in section 3121(d), and, with modifications not germane
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here, section 3306(i) makes this definition applicable for

purposes of FUTA taxes as well. Section 3121(d) provides:

SEC. 3121(d). Employee.--For purposes of this

chapter, the term “employee” means--

(1) any officer of a corporation; or

(2) any individual who, under the usual

common law rules applicable in determining the

employer-employee relationship, has the status of

an employee; or

(3) any individual (other than an individual

who is an employee under paragraph (1) or (2)) who

performs services for remuneration for any

person--

(A) as an agent-driver or commissiondriver * * *;

(B) as a full-time insurance salesman;

(C) as a home worker * * *; or

(D) as a traveling or city salesman

* * *;

* * * [under specified conditions]; or 

(4) any individual who performs services that

are included under an agreement entered into

pursuant to section 218 of the Social Security

Act.

Regulations promulgated under section 3121(d) clarify the

scope of the inclusion in paragraph (1) for corporate officers,

as follows:

Generally, an officer of a corporation is an employee

of the corporation. However, an officer of a

corporation who as such does not perform any services

or performs only minor services and who neither

receives nor is entitled to receive, directly or

indirectly, any remuneration is considered not to be an
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employee of the corporation. * * * [Sec. 31.3121(d)-

1(b), Employment Tax Regs.]

Identical language is also included in regulations promulgated

under section 3306. Sec. 31.3306(i)-1(e), Employment Tax Regs.

B. Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978

Section 530 operates in enumerated circumstances to afford

relief from employment tax liability, notwithstanding the actual

relationship between the taxpayer and the individual performing

services. The statute provides, in part:

SEC. 530. CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING WHETHER INDIVIDUALS

ARE EMPLOYEES FOR PURPOSES OF THE EMPLOYMENT TAXES.

(a) Termination of Certain Employment Tax

Liability.--

(1) In general.--If--

(A) for purposes of employment taxes, the taxpayer

did not treat an individual as an employee for any

period, and 

(B) in the case of periods after December 31,

1978, all Federal tax returns (including information

returns) required to be filed by the taxpayer with

respect to such individual for such period are filed on

a basis consistent with the taxpayer’s treatment of

such individual as not being an employee,

then, for purposes of applying such taxes for such

period with respect to the taxpayer, the individual

shall be deemed not to be an employee unless the

taxpayer had no reasonable basis for not treating such

individual as an employee.

(2) Statutory standards providing one method of

satisfying the requirements of paragraph (1).-- For

purposes of paragraph (1), a taxpayer shall in any case

be treated as having a reasonable basis for not

treating an individual as an employee for a period if

the taxpayer’s treatment of such individual for such
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period was in reasonable reliance on any of the

following:

(A) judicial precedent, published rulings,

technical advice with respect to the taxpayer, or a

letter ruling to the taxpayer;

(B) a past Internal Revenue Service audit of the

taxpayer in which there was no assessment attributable

to the treatment (for employment tax purposes) of the

individuals holding positions substantially similar to

the position held by this individual; or

(C) long-standing recognized practice of a

significant segment of the industry in which such

individual was engaged.

In specified circumstances, Section 530(e)(4) places the

burden of proof on the Commissioner with respect to certain

issues under Section 530, but this provision does not affect our

analysis here. Section 530(e)(4) applies only to periods after

December 31, 1996, so has no bearing on petitioner’s liabilities

for 1996. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.

104-188, sec. 1122(b)(3), 110 Stat. 1767. For subsequent

periods, a taxpayer desiring to take advantage of Section

530(e)(4) first must establish a prima facie case that it was

reasonable not to treat an individual as an employee and must

have fully cooperated with the Secretary. Because, as explained

in detail below, petitioner did not establish a prima facie case

that its treatment of Ridge was reasonable, the burden of proof

remains on petitioner with respect to 1997 and 1998 as well.
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II. Classification of Ridge for Employment Tax Purposes

A. Status Under FICA and FUTA Provisions

In contending that Ridge should not be classified as an

employee under the FICA and FUTA provisions of the Internal

Revenue Code, petitioner focuses on Ridge’s status as an

S corporation shareholder and alleged lack of status as a common

law employee. We briefly address these contentions seriatim.

1. Contentions Regarding S Corporation Shareholders

Petitioner cites sections 1366, 1372, and 6037(c) and

Durando v. United States, 70 F.3d 548 (9th Cir. 1995), presumably

in support of an argument that S corporation shareholders should

not be deemed employees. Sections 1366 and 6037(c) generally

require that income items of S corporations be passed through to

shareholders on a pro rata basis and reported by such

shareholders in a manner consistent with treatment on the

corporate return. These rules, however, pertain to calculation

of income tax liability under subtitle A and have no bearing on

computation of Federal employment taxes. Veterinary Surgical

Consultants, P.C. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 141, 145 (2001),

affd. sub nom. Yeagle Drywall Co. v. Commissioner, 54 Fed. Appx.

100 (3d Cir. 2002). Furthermore, an employer cannot by the

expedient of characterizing moneys paid in remuneration for

services as distributions of net income, rather than as wages,

avoid FICA and FUTA liabilities. Id. at 145-146. Thus, as in
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Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Commissioner, supra at

145-146, and Joseph M. Grey Pub. Accountant, P.C. v.

Commissioner, 119 T.C. 121, 128 (2002), we reject any suggestion

that petitioner’s passing through of its net income to

shareholders precludes the finding of an employer-employee

relationship between petitioner and Ridge. We likewise reject as

not germane to the question before us petitioner’s reliance on

section 1372, addressing fringe benefits under subtitle A, and

the reference to that statute in Durando v. United States, supra

at 551. See Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. v.

Commissioner, supra at 147-148, 150.

2. Contentions Regarding Common Law Employment

Petitioner contends that “employee” as used throughout

section 3121(d) must be construed in a manner consistent with its

use in section 3121(d)(2), such that the usual common law rules

for determining existence of an employer-employee relationship

are to be taken into account. In support of this position,

petitioner quotes the following passage from Tex. Carbonate Co.

v. Phinney, 307 F.2d 289, 291-292 (5th Cir. 1962):

The statutory definition of “employees” as

including officers of a corporation will not be so

construed as to mean that an officer is an employee

per se. Only such officers as work for it in fact are

to be so included and, in determining whether an

officer is an employee within the meaning of the

statutes the usual employer-employee tests are to be

applied. * * *
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Petitioner further emphasizes that common law focuses on whether

the alleged employer held the right to control the details of the

work performed by the individual and argues that petitioner had

neither the authority nor the ability to exert control over

Ridge. There exist, however, at least two fatal defects in

petitioner’s arguments in this regard.

First, from the standpoint of statutory construction, the

premise underlying petitioner’s position finds no support either

in the structure of the text or in the Tex. Carbonate Co. v.

Phinney, supra, decision. Section 3121(d) is written in the

disjunctive, with each of the four paragraphs expressly separated

from the next by “or”. Accordingly, each paragraph affords a

separate and independent basis for deeming one engaged to perform

services an employee. Individuals described in paragraphs (1),

(3), and (4) of section 3121(d) are therefore frequently referred

to as “statutory” employees, subject to FICA and FUTA regardless

of their status under common law. See Joseph M. Grey Pub.

Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, supra at 126.

Moreover, Tex. Carbonate Co. v. Phinney, supra, is not

authority to the contrary. Significant regulatory and statutory

developments have occurred since the years in issue in that case. 

Given that sections 31.3121(d)-1(b) and 31.3306(i)-1(e),

Employment Tax Regs., were promulgated after those years and that

the FUTA definition of “employee” then in effect appears to have
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contemplated a corporate officer who could be an independent

contractor under common law, see, e.g., sec. 1607(i), I.R.C.

1939, the Court of Appeals’ statements concerning common law

rules “may no longer be relevant.” Joseph M. Grey Pub.

Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, supra at 128 n.4. The opinion

in Tex. Carbonate Co. v. Phinney, supra at 291, recognized that,

regardless of the test purportedly being applied, “such officers

as work for * * * [a corporation] in fact” are included as

employees. The court also addressed the impact of an alleged

absence of control in that case, as follows: 

Even though an absence of control is shown, and this as

we have noted has not been done, the force of the

factor is diminished to near de minimis by the fact

that * * * [the service provider] himself was a member

of the Board of Directors, a Vice President, and the

executive of the Company in charge of its sales and the

development of its markets. * * * [Id. at 292.]

Hence, critical components of the analysis in Tex. Carbonate Co.

v. Phinney, supra, are consistent with the current regulatory

approach to officers and contrary to petitioner’s position.

Second, from a factual standpoint, even if the common law

control factor were pertinent to our evaluation, petitioner has

failed to establish a lack of control over Ridge in the

performance of his services. As in Joseph M. Grey Pub.

Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, supra at 128-129, to accept

petitioner’s contentions in this regard would be the equivalent

of disregarding the corporate form in which Ridge chose to
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conduct his business. Caselaw does not permit a taxpayer to use

his or her dual role as a shareholder of and service provider to

a corporation as grounds for ignoring the legal ramifications of

the business construct so selected. Moline Props., Inc. v.

Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-439 (1943); Joseph M. Grey Pub.

Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, supra at 129.

3. Application of Section 3121(d)(1)

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, application of

section 3121(d)(1) is not precluded or limited here by

considerations pertaining to Ridge’s status as an S corporation

shareholder or under the common law. Section 3121(d)(1) and

sections 31.3121(d)-1(b) and 31.3306(i)-1(e), Employment Tax

Regs., specify that corporate officers are to be classified as

employees if they perform more than minor services and receive or

are entitled to receive remuneration. The overwhelming weight of

the evidence here shows that Ridge’s activities vis-a-vis

petitioner met these criteria. (Accordingly, considerations with

respect to burden of proof do not affect our analysis on this

point.) Ridge at all relevant times served as petitioner’s

president and worked in all significant aspects of petitioner’s

business operations. Ridge also obtained remuneration from

petitioner as his needs arose.

Furthermore, although section 3121(d)(1) may be inapplicable

to the extent that an officer performs services in some other
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capacity, i.e., as an independent contractor, petitioner has

offered no convincing evidence that Ridge worked for or was

engaged by petitioner in a capacity other than as president. See

Joseph M. Grey Pub. Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. at

129-130; Rev. Rul. 82-83, 1982-1 C.B. 151, 152. The only items

referenced in the record that could suggest an independent

contractor relationship are the Forms 1099-MISC reporting

nonemployee compensation. These documents are uncorroborated by

other evidence, such as a service agreement, and are entitled to

little weight. See Joseph M. Grey Pub. Accountant, P.C. v.

Commissioner, supra at 130. Hence, we conclude that Ridge was an

employee of petitioner for employment tax purposes, in accordance

with section 3121(d)(1).

B. Availability of Section 530 Relief

Section 530 affords relief from employment tax liability,

notwithstanding an adverse classification, where the following

three requirements are satisfied: (1) The taxpayer has not

treated the individual, or any individual holding a substantially

similar position, as an employee for any period; (2) the taxpayer

has consistently treated the individual as not being an employee

on all tax returns for periods after December 31, 1978; and

(3) the taxpayer has a reasonable basis for not treating the

individual as an employee. Sec. 530(a)(1), (3).
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With respect to the case at bar, petitioner did not claim

entitlement to the benefits of Section 530 until posttrial

briefing. Generally, issues raised for the first time on brief

will not be considered when to do so would prevent the opposing

party from presenting evidence that might have been offered if

the issue had been timely raised. DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C.

858, 891 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992); Shelby U.S.

Distribs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 874, 885 (1979). Here,

however, even if we were to treat the issue as properly before

us, petitioner’s position is without merit. It is clear that

petitioner failed to establish a reasonable basis for not

treating Ridge as an employee.

Concerning the existence of a reasonable basis for purposes

of Section 530(a)(1), Section 530(a)(2) sets forth three

statutory safe havens. Reliance upon any of the circumstances

enumerated in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of Section 530(a)(2)

is deemed sufficient to establish the requisite reasonable basis.

Subparagraph (A) lists judicial precedent, published

rulings, technical advice with respect to the taxpayer, or a

letter ruling to the taxpayer. On brief, petitioner cites Tex.

Carbonate Co. v. Phinney, 307 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1962), and

Automated Typesetting, Inc. v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 515

(E.D. Wis. 1981), in support of the premise that petitioner
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reasonably looked to common law control concepts in classifying

Ridge.

For the reasons previously discussed, Tex. Carbonate Co. v.

Phinney, supra, does not afford a reasonable basis for disregard

of the explicit rules of section 3121(d)(1) and sections

31.3121(d)-1(b) and 31.3306(i)-1(e), Employment Tax Regs. 

Equally unavailing in this regard is Automated Typesetting, Inc.

v. United States, supra. The District Court in that case simply

evaluated the employment relationship of the involved individuals

both through a common law analysis and through application of the

provisions relating to corporate officers. Id. at 519-522. In

deciding that the individuals qualified as employees under either

rubric, the court did not repudiate the statutory treatment of

corporate executives. Id. at 520, 522; see also Joseph M. Grey

Pub. Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, supra at 129 n.5.

Moreover, even if we were to assume arguendo that the cited

cases could offer a reasonable basis for treating an officer as a

nonemployee, petitioner has failed to establish reliance on the

claimed precedent as a factual matter. To fall within the safe

harbors of Section 530(a)(2), the taxpayer must have relied on

the alleged authority during the periods in issue, at the time

the employment decisions were being made. The statute does not

countenance ex post facto justification. See 303 W. 42nd St.

Enters., Inc. v. IRS, 181 F.3d 272, 277, 279 (2d Cir. 1999)
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(reversing and remanding because it was “unclear from the record

whether * * * [the taxpayer] in fact relied on any specific

industry practice in reaching its decision to treat its * * *

[workers] as non-employee tenants, let alone whether such

reliance was reasonable”); Select Rehab, Inc. v. United States,

205 F. Supp. 2d 376, 380 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (“The taxpayer must show

that it relied upon those grounds [alleged as a reasonable

basis], and that the reliance was reasonable.”); W. Va. Pers.

Servs., Inc. v. United States, 78 AFTR 2d 96-6600, at 96-6608,

96-2 USTC par. 50,554, at 85,919 (S.D. W. Va. 1996) (“The plain

meaning of section 530(a)(2) is that only evidence known to and

relied upon by the taxpayer is relevant. Facts that are learned

after the incorrect treatment of the employees * * * are not

facts that a taxpayer relied upon in making its original decision

regarding how to treat its employees.”).

Until after trial, petitioner did not purport to rely on

Section 530 or the bases described therein and expressly

disclaimed any dependence on the statute. Petitioner’s present

claim of reliance is not credible. At trial, Ridge appeared but

presented no evidence regarding petitioner’s rationale for the

nonemployee treatment. Nor would testimony by Grey, the

accountant who advised petitioner and prepared petitioner’s tax

returns, have provided any further justification. See Veterinary

Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-48
- 19 -

(where Grey testified that he was unaware of the Tex. Carbonate

Co. v. Phinney, supra, case until posttrial briefing, during the

fall of 2001, in Joseph M. Grey Pub. Accountant, P.C. v.

Commissioner, 119 T.C. 121 (2002)). Petitioner failed to

establish that it relied on judicial precedent or, for that

matter, on any of the other sources specified in Section

530(a)(2)(A). Accordingly, we conclude that subparagraph (A)

does not aid petitioner here.

The same result obtains with respect to subparagraphs (B)

and (C). There is no evidence that respondent audited petitioner

for employment tax purposes prior to the examination underlying

the present case. Petitioner therefore cannot show reliance on a

past audit under Section 530(a)(2)(B). Likewise, petitioner has

adduced no evidence of conventions in the water filtration and

purification industry to establish longstanding industry practice

under Section 530(a)(2)(C). The safe havens of Section 530(a)(2)

are therefore inapplicable on the record before us.

In seeking to establish a reasonable basis for Ridge’s

treatment apart from the safe havens, petitioner quotes from the

following definition of “employment status” in Section 530(c)(2): 

“The term ‘employment status’ means the status of an individual,

under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the

employer-employee relationship, as an employee or as an

independent contractor (or other individual who is not an
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employee).” Petitioner apparently believes that the purported

lack of common law control makes its treatment of Ridge

reasonable within the meaning of Section 530 and that the above

definition supports this view.

Again, however, petitioner’s approach is contrary to

controlling statutes and to the facts of this case. As a matter

of construction, Section 530(c)(2) defines employment status for

purposes of certain provisions of Section 530 not germane here. 

It does not purport to override or interpret the definition of

“employee” in section 3121(d) and related regulations. Hence,

Section 530(c)(2) does not render it rational for petitioner to

have ignored the statutory mandate regarding corporate officers

and to have taken a position that was not otherwise supported by

authority. Petitioner also does not claim in actuality to have

relied on Section 530(c)(2) in deciding not to treat Ridge as an

employee in 1996, 1997, or 1998. We conclude and have found as a

fact that petitioner did not have a reasonable basis for failing

to characterize Ridge as an employee. Consequently, relief from

employment tax liability is not available to petitioner under

Section 530.

Lastly, in connection with Section 530, petitioner raises a

due process argument. Section 530(e)(1) provides that the

Internal Revenue Service “shall, before or at the commencement of

any audit inquiry relating to the employment status of one or
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more individuals who perform services for the taxpayer, provide

the taxpayer with a written notice of the provisions of this

section.” Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 sec.

1122(a), 110 Stat. 1766. On brief, petitioner alleges that it

learned of the existence of Section 530 only through the June 8,

2001, notice of determination, which postdated by a substantial

margin the commencement on July 1, 1999, of the underlying

employment tax audit. Petitioner then states:

The inaction of Respondent in not providing Petitioner

with the required Sect. 530(e)(1) notice constitutes a

serious Constitutional violation of due process rights

guaranteed to Petitioner, and Petitioner moves this

Court to allow it to recover its legal fees, since the

conduct against Petitioner by Respondent is so

egregious.

To the extent that petitioner’s due process contentions take

the form of a claim for litigation or administrative costs and

fees under section 7430, such claim is premature. Rule

231(a)(2), as pertinent here, specifies that the appropriate time

to seek recovery of legal costs follows service of a written

opinion. See McWilliams v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 320, 327

(1995); Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 533, 548 (1986).

Furthermore, even if petitioner’s allegations might be read

as a plea encompassing other remedies, petitioner has failed to

show that its situation satisfies the prerequisites for relief

under the Due Process Clause. As this Court has noted, even in a

criminal context defendants are generally required to establish
- 22 -

actual prejudice in order to obtain due process relief. Riland

v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 185, 197-198 (1982) (involving a claimed

denial of due process on account of delay in issuance of the

subject deficiency notice). The record in the instant case is

devoid of such prejudice. Although petitioner was made aware of

Section 530 at least prior to filing its petition with the Court,

petitioner failed therein to raise the statute. Petitioner then

did nothing to prepare this case for trial. Nonetheless, we have

addressed the merits of petitioner’s claim for relief under

Section 530(a), first put forth 3 months after trial, despite the

untimeliness of petitioner’s contentions. Accordingly,

petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard, and no actual

prejudice was sustained.

C. Conclusion

We hold that Ridge is an employee of petitioner pursuant to

section 3121(d)(1) and that petitioner is not entitled to relief

under Section 530. Accordingly, petitioner is liable for FICA

and FUTA taxes for the periods in issue as set forth in

respondent’s notice of determination and relevant stipulations.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for

respondent and in accordance with

stipulations as to amounts.