IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-17-1205 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201603179 

v. 

Travis D. Nettles DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: November 9, 2018 

* * * * * 

 Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Dexter L. Phillips, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

JENSEN, J. 

I. Introduction 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Travis Nettles, appeals the judgment of the Lucas County Court 

of Common Pleas, sentencing him to 18 years to life after accepting his guilty plea to one 

count of murder with a firearm specification, and imposing an additional consecutive 
2. 

sentence of 982 days in prison after finding appellant to be in violation of the terms of his 

previously imposed postrelease control. 

A. Facts and Procedural Background 

{¶ 2} On November 30, 2016, appellant was indicted on one count of murder in 

violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) and R.C. 2929.02, an unspecified felony, one count of 

felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and (D), a felony of the second 

degree, one count of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 

2923.13(A)(2) and (B), a felony of the third degree, and one count of tampering with 

evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) and (B), a felony of the third degree. 

Firearms specifications were attached to all counts except for tampering with evidence. 

{¶ 3} Following pretrial discovery, appellant filed a motion to suppress on March 

10, 2017. In his motion, appellant argued that incriminating statements he made to 

Maumee and Toledo police should be suppressed because they were made prior to a 

recitation of Miranda rights and during the course of a custodial interrogation. Further, 

appellant argued that his waiver of his right against self-incrimination was not valid 

because he was not taking his mental health medication at the time of the waiver, 

rendering him incapable of appreciating the nature of his rights or the consequences of 

waiving such rights. 

{¶ 4} One week after appellant filed his motion to suppress, the state filed its 

memorandum in opposition, in which it argued that appellant was not in custody at the 

time he was questioned by Maumee police. Rather, the state urged that the questioning 
3. 

of appellant was brief, and noted that appellant was not handcuffed or subject to physical 

restraints during the questioning. The state noted that Maumee police only questioned 

appellant prior to his arrest and transport to the Toledo Safety Building. Once arrested, 

Appellant was no longer questioned by Maumee police. Because appellant was not in 

custody at the time of the initial questioning, the state asserted that he was not entitled to 

be read his Miranda rights. Further, the state asserted that Maumee police had probable 

cause to arrest appellant and transport him to the Toledo Safety Building after he 

confessed his involvement with a murder that occurred in Toledo. 

{¶ 5} Once in the custody of Toledo police, appellant was informed of his 

Miranda rights and agreed to waive his right to be free from self-incrimination. 

According to the state, Toledo police did not question appellant until after he waived his 

rights. Therefore, the state argued that, even if appellant’s statements to Maumee police 

were subject to suppression, the statements appellant made to Toledo police after being 

informed of, and waiving, his Miranda rights, should not be suppressed. On that point, 

the state urged that the statement made to Toledo police was not the product of a single, 

unwarned sequence of questioning because the timing and setting of the first and second 

interrogations were different, one occurring in Maumee and the other in Toledo. 

Moreover, the state noted that the two interrogations were conducted by different law 

enforcement agencies, and the statement provided during the first interrogation was 

incomplete compared with the detailed statement appellant provided to Toledo police 

after waiving his Miranda rights. 
4. 

{¶ 6} As to appellant’s argument that his waiver of his right against selfincrimination was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the state argued that there was 

no evidence to substantiate his claim of a lack of mental capacity, nor was there any 

indication of police coercion. In support of the state’s contention that appellant was 

aware of the rights he was waiving and the consequences that flowed from that waiver, 

the state noted that appellant was “a twenty-nine year old adult with numerous contacts 

with the criminal justice system.” 

{¶ 7} On May 9, 2017, appellant appeared before the trial court for a hearing on 

his motion to suppress. The state presented testimony from officer Jeffrey Medere of the 

Maumee Police Department, and detective Larry Anderson of the Toledo Police 

Department. Upon consideration of the testimony provided at the hearing, the trial court 

found that appellant was not in custody when he was questioned by Maumee police. 

Further, the court concluded that appellant was properly transported to the Toledo Safety 

Building for further questioning once he indicated that he had been involved in a murder. 

The court found that appellant understood his Miranda rights, properly waived them, and 

then proceeded to make a voluntary statement to Toledo police. Consequently, the trial 

court found appellant’s arguments unavailing, and denied the motion to suppress. 

{¶ 8} Following the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress, the state 

informed the court that a plea agreement had been reached with appellant. Appellant 

then entered a plea of guilty to one count of murder and an attendant firearm 

specification. After a thorough Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court accepted appellant’s 
5. 

guilty plea, found him guilty of murder with a firearm specification, and dismissed the 

remaining three counts contained in the indictment, as well as the firearms specifications 

attached to those counts pursuant to the plea agreement. 

{¶ 9} The court proceeded immediately to sentencing, at which time the court 

ordered appellant to serve 15 years to life on the murder count, along with a mandatory 

consecutive sentence of three years for the firearm specification. Because appellant was 

on postrelease control at the time of the murder, the trial court imposed an additional 

consecutive prison sentence of 982 days. 

{¶ 10} Appellant’s timely appeal followed. 

B. Assignments of Error

{¶ 11} On appeal, appellant assigns the following errors for our review: 

I. The trial [court] abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s 

motion to suppress his statements. 

II. The trial [court] abused its discretion by accepting Appellant’s 

guilty [plea] which was not offered voluntarily. 

III. The trial court committed error to the prejudice of Appellant by 

imposing the costs of prosecution without consideration of Appellant’s 

present or future ability to pay. 

 
6. 

II. Analysis 

A. Denial of Appellant’s Motion to Suppress 

{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. Specifically, appellant asserts 

that his waiver of Miranda rights was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, 

because he was emotional at the time and was without his mental health medication. In 

response, the state contends that the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress is not 

subject to review in this case because appellant waived his argument by entering a guilty 

plea. 

{¶ 13} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “[a] valid guilty plea by a 

counseled defendant * * * generally waives the right to appeal all prior nonjurisdictional 

defects, including the denial of a motion to suppress.” State v. Beasley, 152 Ohio St.3d 

470, 2018-Ohio-16, 97 N.E.3d 474, ¶ 15, citing State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 

2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 78 and State v. Obermiller, 147 Ohio St.3d 175, 

2016-Ohio-1594, 63 N.E.3d 93, ¶ 56. Because appellant entered a guilty plea in this 

case, appellant’s argument concerning the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress 

has been waived. 

{¶ 14} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-taken. 

B. Appellant’s Guilty Plea 

{¶ 15} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his guilty plea was 

not offered voluntarily. 
7. 

{¶ 16} A guilty plea is constitutionally valid only if it is entered knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 

(1996). To ensure a no-contest or guilty plea is made knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily, the trial court must engage the defendant in a colloquy pursuant to Crim.R. 

11(C) and inform him of certain constitutional and nonconstitutional rights. Id. 

{¶ 17} Crim.R. 11(C) provides, in pertinent part: 

(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or 

a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest 

without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the 

following: 

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, 

with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum 

penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for 

probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the 

sentencing hearing. 

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, 

upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence. 

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, 

to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for 
8. 

obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to 

prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the 

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. 

{¶ 18} The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to ensure that the information 

a defendant needs to make a voluntary and intelligent decision about pleading guilty is 

conveyed to him. State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). 

{¶ 19} “There are two levels of compliance with Crim.R. 11(C): strict and 

substantial.” State v. Burnette, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-16-1272, L-16-1273, 2017-Ohio8424, ¶ 24. In explaining the defendant’s constitutional rights, the court must strictly 

comply with Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 

N.E.2d 462, ¶ 31; State v. Rinehart, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-11-030, 2013-Ohio-3372, ¶ 

17. The court need not use the exact language in the rule, but must explain the rights in a 

manner that is reasonably intelligible to the defendant. Rinehart at ¶ 17, citing Ballard at 

paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 20} For non-constitutional rights, substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) is 

sufficient. Clark at ¶ 31; Rinehart at ¶ 18. “Substantial compliance means that under the 

totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of 

his plea and the rights he is waiving.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 

474 (1990). 

{¶ 21} Here, appellant argues that his guilty plea was not offered voluntarily 

because he was precluded from continuing his trial date and retaining private counsel. 
9. 

Appellant fails to identify how the trial court abused its discretion in denying his lastminute continuance aimed at securing new counsel. Moreover, appellant fails to 

demonstrate how the trial court’s denial of his fifth request for a continuance, after 

having already granted the first four requests, impacted his decision to enter a guilty plea. 

{¶ 22} During the Crim.R. 11 colloquy in this case, the trial court explained to 

appellant that his guilty plea would result in a mandatory prison sentence of 18 years to 

life, a discretionary fine of up to $20,000, and the possibility of a life term of postrelease 

control. The trial court further explained that appellant’s guilty plea would result in a 

violation of the terms of his previously-imposed postrelease control, which would extend 

appellant’s prison sentence by 982 days. Appellant, a 28-year-old individual with a GED 

and some college coursework, indicated that he understood the consequences of entering 

his guilty plea. The trial court then asked appellant if he was under the influence of any 

drugs, alcohol, or medication that would interfere with his ability to understand the plea 

proceedings. Appellant indicated that he was not under the influence of any such 

substances, and affirmed that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation. 

{¶ 23} Moving to appellant’s constitutional rights, the trial court explained that 

appellant was entitled to his choice of a trial by jury or to the bench. The court informed 

appellant that the state would have the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Next, the court explained to appellant that he had the right to cross-examine the 

state’s witnesses and call witnesses of his own. Further, the court articulated appellant’s 

right to remain silent. 
10. 

{¶ 24} After setting forth appellant’s constitutional rights, the trial court asked 

appellant if he understood that, by entering a guilty plea, he was waiving his rights, as 

well as his right to appeal any matters except those issues pertaining to the Crim.R. 11 

colloquy. Appellant indicated that he understood his rights, as well as the consequences 

of entering his guilty plea. 

{¶ 25} Prior to accepting appellant’s guilty plea, the trial court provided 

appellant’s counsel an opportunity to review the written plea form that was prepared in 

this case, which reiterated appellant’s constitutional rights and the consequences of 

entering a guilty plea. After appellant reviewed and signed the plea form, the trial court 

asked appellant if he had any questions concerning the contents of the form, to which 

appellant responded in the negative. Thereafter, the trial court found that appellant was 

advised of his constitutional rights and entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

waiver of those rights. Consequently, the court accepted appellant’s plea of guilty. 

{¶ 26} In light of the foregoing colloquy that took place at the plea hearing in this 

case, we find that the trial court properly informed appellant of his constitutional and 

non-constitutional rights under Crim.R. 11(C). As a result, we conclude that appellant’s 

guilty plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 

{¶ 27} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is not well-taken. 

 
11. 

C. Imposition of Costs 

{¶ 28} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred 

by ordering his to pay the costs of prosecution, supervision, confinement, and assigned 

counsel, without considering his present or future ability to pay such costs. 

{¶ 29} We review the trial court’s imposition of costs and financial sanctions to 

determine whether the imposition of such costs was contrary to law. R.C. 2953.08(A)(4) 

and (G)(2)(b); State v. Farless, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-15-1060 and L-15-1061, 2016-

Ohio-1571. 

{¶ 30} At sentencing, the trial court did not discuss the imposition of costs, nor did 

it inquire as to appellant’s present or future ability to pay costs. However, the sentencing 

entry in this case states: “Defendant found to have, or reasonably may be expected to 

have, the means to pay all or part of the applicable costs of supervision, confinement, 

assigned counsel, and prosecution as authorized by law. Defendant ordered to reimburse 

the State of Ohio and Lucas County for such costs.” 

{¶ 31} Under R.C. 2947.23, the trial court is required to assess the costs of 

prosecution in all criminal cases against all convicted defendants regardless of their 

financial status, and no hearing is required before ordering the payment of court costs. 

Therefore, the court properly imposed these costs. 

{¶ 32} Regarding the costs of confinement, R.C. 2929.18(A)(5)(a)(ii) requires the 

imposition of such costs against all convicted defendants to the extent the defendant is 

able to pay. Likewise, R.C. 2941.51(D) provides that all or part of the cost of appointed 
12. 

counsel may be imposed upon a defendant if the court determines that the offender 

“[h]as, or reasonably may be expected to have, the means to meet some part of the costs 

of the services rendered.” 

{¶ 33} Prior to the imposition of costs of assigned counsel and confinement, the 

court is not required to conduct a hearing on a defendant’s ability to pay; rather, the 

record must contain some evidence that the court considered the defendant’s financial 

ability to pay. State v. Baughman, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1045, 2012-Ohio-5327, ¶ 

43, citing State v. Maloy, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1350, 2011-Ohio-6919, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 34} Here, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the trial court 

considered appellant’s present or future ability to pay the costs of confinement or 

appointed counsel. The state argues that appellant’s attempt at retaining counsel prior to 

the plea hearing is indicative of his ability to pay these costs. However, the manner in 

which appellant was going to pay for retained counsel was not discussed and is not part 

of the record. Further, no additional evidence of appellant’s assets is contained in the 

record, and appellant will be serving a potential life sentence as a result of his guilty plea. 

On these facts, we find that the trial court’s imposition of the costs of confinement and 

appointed counsel was contrary to law, and must be vacated. See State v. Johnson, 6th 

Dist. Lucas No. L-16-1165, 2017-Ohio-8206, ¶ 25 (vacating the imposition of costs of 

confinement and appointed counsel where the record contained no evidence that the trial 

court considered the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing such costs). 

{¶ 35} Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is well-taken, in part. 
13. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 36} In light of the foregoing, the trial court’s imposition of the costs of 

confinement and appointed counsel is vacated. In all other respects, the judgment of the 

Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Pursuant to App.R. 24, the state is 

ordered to pay the costs of this appeal. 

Judgment affirmed, in part 

and vacated, in part. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Arlene Singer, J. 

_______________________________ 

James D. Jensen, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.