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26–504 PDF 

" HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ! 109TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2006

109–434

Union Calendar No. 241

2006 CONGRESSIONAL DRUG CONTROL 

BUDGET AND POLICY ASSESSMENT: A 

REVIEW OF THE 2007 NATIONAL DRUG 

CONTROL BUDGET AND 2006 NATIONAL 

DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

SIXTH REPORT

BY THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/

index.html 

http://www.house.gov/reform

APRIL 25, 2006.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on 

the State of the Union and ordered to be printed 


congress.#13
(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

JON C. PORTER, Nevada 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

TOM LANTOS, California 

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland 

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

(Independent)

DAVID MARIN, Staff Director 

KEITH AUSBROOK, Chief Counsel 

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk 

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

J. MARC WHEAT, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JAMES KAISER, Counsel 

MALIA HOLST, Clerk 

TONY HAYWOOD, Minority Professional Staff Member 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

Washington, DC, April 25, 2006. 

Hon. J. DENNIS HASTERT, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee’s sixth report to the 

109th Congress. The committee’s report is based on a study conducted by its Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources. 

TOM DAVIS, 

Chairman. 

(III) 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

I. The National Drug Control Strategy: General Overview and Concerns 1

1. Methamphetamine ................................................................................... 7

2. Drug Interdiction Reclassified as Non-Homeland Security Mission .... 12

3. Prevention ................................................................................................ 13

4. State and Local Law Enforcement Drug Control Efforts ..................... 14

5. Interdiction ............................................................................................... 17

II. Strategic and Budgetary Analysis of Federal Drug Control Programs 

and Agencies ............................................................................................... 31

A. Department of Defense .................................................................................. 31

1. Central Transfer Account [CTA] ............................................................. 32

2. U.S. Military Support to Counterdrug Operations ............................... 33

3. Joint Interagency Task Force South [JIATF South] ............................. 33

4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft ......................................................................... 34

5. Maritime Refueling Vessel [Oiler] .......................................................... 35

6. U.S. Navy—Aviation Use of Force [AUF] .............................................. 36

7. Tethered Aerostat Radar System [TARS] .............................................. 39

8. Afghanistan Operations ........................................................................... 41

9. Colombian Operations ............................................................................. 45

10. Department of Defense Performance Measures .................................. 48

B. Department of Education ............................................................................... 49

1. Safe and Drug Free Schools .................................................................... 49

2. Student Drug Testing .............................................................................. 53

3. Lack of Diligence in Reporting to Congress ........................................... 54

C. Department of Health and Human Services ................................................ 55

1. National Institute on Drug Abuse [NIDA] ............................................. 57

2. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 

[SAMHSA] .............................................................................................. 59

D. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................... 63

1. Reorganization ......................................................................................... 63

2. Congressional Responsiveness ................................................................ 64

3. Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement [CNE] ..................................... 65

4. United States Coast Guard [USCG] ....................................................... 66

5. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] ...................................... 71

6. Customs and Border Protection [CBP] ................................................... 74

7. U.S. Border Patrol ................................................................................... 77

E. Department of Justice .................................................................................... 79

1. Assistance to State and Local Law Enforcement .................................. 79

2. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program ................................................. 80

3. Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant .............................. 81

4. Regional Information Sharing System [RISS] ....................................... 83

5. Weed and Seed Program ......................................................................... 83

6. Drug Court Program ................................................................................ 84

7. Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program [RSAT] .................. 86

8. Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative ................................................. 87

9. Prisoner Re-entry Initiative .................................................................... 88

10. Cannabis Eradication Program ............................................................. 88

11. Bureau of Prisons .................................................................................. 89

12. National Drug Intelligence Center [NDIC] .......................................... 90

13. Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA] ........................................... 91

14. Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement/Organized Crime Drug 

Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF] .................................................... 94

15. Department of Justice Financial Management ................................... 98

F. Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP] ........................................ 100

1. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas [HIDTA] .................................. 103

Page

VI

F. Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP]—Continued

2. National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign ......................................... 111

3. Drug Free Communities Program [DFC] ............................................... 116

4. Counter Drug Technology Assessment Center [CTAC] ........................ 119

5. Counter Drug Intelligence Executive Secretariat [CDX] ...................... 120

6. National Drug Court Institute [NDCI] .................................................. 121

7. National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws ...................................... 122

8. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency [USADA] and Membership Dues to World 

Anti-Doping Agency [WADA] ................................................................ 123

9. National Drug Control Program Performance Measures ..................... 124

G. Department of State ....................................................................................... 125

1. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

[INL] ....................................................................................................... 125

2. Andean Counter Drug Initiative [ACI] .................................................. 126

H. U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID] ................................ 133

1. Andean Counter Drug Initiative and Alternative Development .......... 134

2. Afghanistan and Alternative Development ........................................... 134

3. Office of Management and Budget PART Performance Evaluation .... 138

4. Harm Reduction ....................................................................................... 140

I. Department of Treasury .................................................................................. 142

1. Internal Revenue Service [IRS] Drug Control Funding ....................... 142

J. Department of Veteran Affairs [VA] .............................................................. 144

1. General ..................................................................................................... 144

2. Narrowing the Scope of the Provision of Treatment ............................. 144

3. Specialized Treatment ............................................................................. 145

4. Inter-Agency Cooperation ........................................................................ 146

VIEWS 

Additional views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman and Hon. Elijah E. Cummings ..... 147

1See National Drug Control Budget for Fiscal Year 2007: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16, 2006) (testimony of John Walters, Director, Office of National 

Drug Control Policy). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=39638.

Union Calendar No. 241

109TH CONGRESS REPORT " HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ! 2d Session 109–434

2006 CONGRESSIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AND 

POLICY ASSESSMENT: A REVIEW OF THE 2007 NATIONAL 

DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AND 2006 NATIONAL DRUG 

CONTROL STRATEGY 

APRIL 25, 2006.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 

the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. TOM DAVIS, from the Committee on Government Reform 

submitted the following 

SIXTH REPORT

On March 9, 2006, the Committee on Government Reform approved and adopted a report entitled, ‘‘2006 Congressional Drug 

Control Budget and Policy Assessment: a Review of the 2007 National Drug Control Budget and 2006 National Drug Control Strategy.’’ The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker 

of the House. 

I. THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: GENERAL OVERVIEW

AND CONCERNS

Significant progress has been made in protecting young people 

from the devastating effects of drug abuse. Director John Walters 

of the Office of National Drug Control Policy recently testified before the committee that ‘‘overall teen drug use has declined significantly since the President took office. Current use of illicit drugs 

by 8th, 10th, and 12th graders combined has dropped 19 percent 

since 2001.’’ 1 Nonetheless, the committee is concerned about the 

potential negative effects of the administration’s proposed drug control budget for FY 2007. 

2


26504.001
3

2The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 1. At http://

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs06/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 3 Id. 

4 Id. at 2. 

5 Id. 

6 Id. at 11. 

The committee believes it is necessary to remind the administration that when well-established drug programs were significantly 

reduced in the early 1990’s dramatic increases in drug use among 

our youth followed.2 From 1992 until 1996, as depicted above, drug 

use among 8th, 10th, and 12th grades doubled from near 10 percent to over 20 percent.3 Having learned this lesson in the past 

decade, the administration must acknowledge that the substantial, 

proposed cuts to the drug budget cannot be endured without an immediate and predictable increase in drug usage. 

The 2006 National Drug Control Strategy presents the administration’s approach as based upon three pillars: prevention, treatment, and interdiction.4 Each of these three pillars supplement one 

another, creating a ‘‘balanced, integrated plan aimed at . . . reducing drug use.’’ 5 The committee strongly agrees that this proposed, 

multi-faceted approach is the most effective in dealing with the 

complex social and political issues raised by illicit drug smuggling 

and abuse. 

Prevention, including primarily educational and drug-testing initiatives, seeks to reduce or eliminate the demand for illicit drugs 

on the domestic front. Prevention—‘‘stopping use before it starts,’’ 6

in the words of President Bush’s recent National Drug Strategy Report—is a vital component of any effective drug control strategy. In 

many respects, it is the most important component, since it is the 

demand for drugs that attracts the supply. Prevention aimed at reducing drug use by young people is, in turn, the most important 

kind of demand reduction. 

The Federal Government’s major prevention programs include 

the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities (SDFSC) program at the Department of Education, which includes formula 

grants to the states, and ‘‘national programs’’ that are competed for 

at the national level: the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign (the ‘‘Media Campaign’’) at the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which helps fund a national advertising campaign to educate young people and parents about the dangers of 

drug abuse; the Drug-Free Communities (DFC) program at 

ONDCP, which provides small grants to local coalitions of organizations and individuals who come together for drug use prevention efforts in their communities; and prevention programs funded 

through grants provided by the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP), part of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 

Services Administration (SAMHSA) at the Department of Health 

and Human Services (DHHS). 

The Federal Government supports significant research and development of drug prevention methods through CSAP and the 

Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) at ONDCP. 

The Federal Government also funds research into the health risks 

of drug abuse at the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), a 

division of the National Institutes of Health, the results of which 

are then publicized by NIDA and other Federal agencies. 

4

7 Id. 

Drug treatment programs set out to provide ready and effective 

means of rehabilitating those caught in the vicious cycle of substance dependence. Since ‘‘19.1 million Americans have used at 

least one illicit substance in the past month,’’ identifying those in 

need and providing accessible treatment programs are essential 

components in any drug strategy.7

Drug addiction is a complex disorder that can involve virtually 

every aspect of an individual’s functioning in the family, at work, 

and in the community. Because of addiction’s complexity and pervasive consequences, drug addiction treatment typically must involve many components. Some of those components focus directly 

on the individual’s drug use. Others focus on restoring the addicted 

individual to productive membership in the family and society. 

A variety of scientifically based approaches to drug addiction 

treatment exist. Drug addiction treatment can include behavioral 

therapy (such as counseling, cognitive therapy, or psychotherapy), 

medications, or their combination. Federal drug treatment programs are found within the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 

Services Administration, which oversees and implements drug 

treatment programs; the National Institute on Drug Abuse, which 

focuses on drug prevention research; and the Department of Health 

and Human Services, which also provides programs that address 

drug abuse treatment. 

Finally, interdiction efforts, comprised of multiple agency and 

interagency missions within the Department of Justice & Department of Homeland Security, and supported by the Department of 

Defense, have been developed over the past few decades to efficiently and dramatically disrupt the flow of illicit drugs from various source countries. 

The Government Reform Committee, particularly via the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, is responsible for oversight of all aspects of the Federal 

Government’s drug control policy and budget. Recent hearings at 

the committee and subcommittee levels have focused on drug use 

5

8See Drug Prevention Programs and the FY 2006 Drug Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 

(Apr. 26, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26210; 

Stopping the Methamphetamine Epidemic: Lessons From the Pacific Northwest: Hearing before 

the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Oct. 14, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=35704; Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 10, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=22068; ONDCP Reauthorization: The National Youth Anti-Drug 

Media Campaign: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2003); Drug Production on Public Lands—A Growing Problem: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 

Cong. (Oct. 10, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7225; To Do No Harm: Strategies For Preventing Prescription Drug 

Abuse: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10001; Marijuana and Medicine: 

The Need For a Science-Based Approach: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 

(Apr. 1, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13362; 

ONDCP Reauthorization and the National Drug Control Strategy for 2003: Hearing before the 

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 5, 2003); The Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act 2003, H.R. 2086: Hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 

108th Cong. (May 22, 2003). 9See Harm Reduction or Harm Maintenance: Is There Such a Thing as Safe Drug Abuse? 

Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=22570; Authorizing the President’s 

Vision: Making Permanent the Faith-Based and Community Initiative: H.R. 1054, The Tools for 

Community Initiative Act: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 

Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 21, 2005). 

At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29319; Recovery Now: 

The President’s Drug Treatment Initiative: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 

(Feb. 27, 2003); Faith-Based Perspectives on the Provision of Community Services—Field Hearing 

in Franklin, TN: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (June 16, 2003); The Role of 

Faith-Based Organizations in Providing Effective Social Services: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 108th Cong. (July 2, 2003); Faith-Based Perspectives on the Provision of Community 

Services—Field Hearing in Chicago, IL: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 

(Aug. 25, 2003); Faith-Based Perspectives on the Provision of Community Services—Field Hearing in Charlotte, NC: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Dec. 10, 2003); FaithBased Perspectives on the Provision of Community Services—Field Hearing in Los Angeles California: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Jan. 12, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10078; Faith-Based Perspectives 

on the Provision of Community Services—Field Hearing in Colorado Springs, CO: Hearing before 

the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee 

on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Jan. 23, 2004); Legal and Practical Issues Related to the 

Faith Based Initiative: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 23, 2004). At http:/

/reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11573; Measuring the Effectiveness of Drug Addiction Treatment Programs: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 

(Mar. 30, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11695; 

Faith Based Perspectives on the Provision of Community Services—Field Hearing in Seattle, WA: 

Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2004); Access to Recovery: Improving Participation and Access in Drug Treatment: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 

Cong. (Sept. 22, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=19353. 10See How Can the Federal Government Support Local and State Initiatives to Protect Citizens 

and Communities Against Drug-Related Violence and Witness Intimidation? Hearing before the 

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 109th Cong. (May 2, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

Continued

prevention, 8 drug addiction treatment, 9 Federal drug enforcement, 10 and international supply reduction.11

6

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26376; FY 2006 Drug Control Budget and Byrne Grant, HIDTA, and 

Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are we Jeopardizing Federal, State and Local Cooperation? 

Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=23722; Fighting Meth in America’s Heartland: Assessing Federal, State, and Local Efforts: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 109th Cong. (June 27, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29587; Fighting Meth in America’s Heartland: Assessing the Impact 

on Local Law Enforcement and Child Welfare Agencies: Hearing before the House Subcommittee 

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 

109th Cong. (July 26, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=31114; Law Enforcement and the Fight Against Methamphetamine: 

Improving Federal, State, and Local Efforts: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 

(Aug. 23, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=33151; 

ONDCP Reauthorization: The High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program and CTAC: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 

Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 8, 2003); Facing the Methamphetamine 

Problem in America: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 18, 2003). At http:/

/reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7300; Facing the Methamphetamine Problem in America: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 

Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 18, 2003). 

At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7300; How Can the 

Federal Government Assist State and Local Programs to Protect Citizens & Communities Against 

Drug-Related Violence? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 21, 2003). At 

http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7306; Fighting Methamphetamine in the Heartland: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 

Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 6, 

2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10066; Terrorist 

Financing and Money Laundering Investigations: Who Investigates and How Effective Are They? 

Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (May 11, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13993; Ice in the Ozarks: The 

Methamphetamine Epidemic in Arkansas: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 

(June 28, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=16356; Drugs and Security in a Post-9/11 World: Coordinating the 

Counternarcotics Mission at the Department of Homeland Security: Hearing before the House 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 22, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=16918; Law Enforcement and the Fight Against Methamphetamine: 

Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Nov. 18, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=20333; DOD Counternarcotics: 

What Is Congress Getting for Its Money? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 

(Apr. 21, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13557; 

The Poisoning of Paradise: Crystal Methamphetamine in Hawaii: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 108th Cong. (Aug. 2, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=17259. 11See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Can We Improve the Federal Effort To Dismantle Criminal Smuggling Organizations: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 

(July 12, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=30454; 

2006 DOD Counternarcotics Budget: Does It Deliver the Necessary Support? Hearing before the 

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 109th Cong. (May 10, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=27247; Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug Trafficking Impact Our Borders? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 

Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 14, 2005). 

At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024; Interrupting 

Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/

Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29727; The Impact of the Drug Trade on Border Security 

and National Parks: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2003); The Impact of the Drug Trade on Border Security: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 

(Apr. 15, 2003); Disrupting the Market: Strategy, Implementation, and Results in Narcotics 

Source Nations: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 9, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7484; Implementation of a NaVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
7

tional Supply Reduction Strategy: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 

Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Sept. 17, 

2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7291; Afghanistan: Law Enforcement Interdiction Efforts in Transshipment Countries to Stem the Flow of Heroin: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10843; Andean Counterdrug Initiative: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 2, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11000; Afghanistan: Are British 

Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 

(Apr. 1, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13347; 

Northern Ice: Stopping Methamphetamine Precursor Chemical Smuggling Across the U.S.-Canada Border: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 20, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13368; The Impact of the Drug 

Trade on Border Security—Field Hearing in Las Cruses, NM: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 108th Cong. (June 29, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=16366; The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan 

Columbia Successes and Remaining Challenges: Hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (June 17, 2004); Securing Our Borders: What We Have Learned From 

Government Initiatives and Citizen Patrols: Hearing before the House Committee on Government 

Reform, 108th Cong. (May 12, 2005). 12 21 U.S.C. 1703(c)(3). 13 ‘‘It is a shameful thing to be weary of inquiry when what we search for is excellent.’’ Marcus 

Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC), Roman Senator. 14 Jefferson, David J., The Meth Epidemic—Inside America’s New Drug Crisis, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 2005. 15 National Association of Counties, The Impact of Meth on Children: Out of Home Placement 

and The Criminal Effect of Meth on Communities, July 5, 2005. 

Moreover, the committee and subcommittee are responsible for 

the authorization of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and related programs.12 In fulfilling its oversight function the committee has identified and highlighted several 

fundamental issues of utmost concern that are significantly impacted by the 2007 National Drug Control Strategy and Budget 

Summary.13

1. Methamphetamine 

The committee is concerned about the administration’s complete 

unwillingness to provide any leadership or strategy to address the 

growing methamphetamine epidemic throughout the country. U.S. 

Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez stated that ‘‘in terms of damage 

to children and to our society, meth is now the most dangerous 

drug in America.’’ 14 According to surveys conducted by the National Association of Counties, meth is now the number one drug 

problem for the majority (58 percent) of county law enforcement 

agencies, and the drug is having far-reaching impacts on child welfare services.15

Methamphetamine, because of its insidious, devastating social 

and personal side effects, has presented a novel opportunity to 

raise our country’s cultural awareness of the threat of illicit drug 

use in general. The committee remains disappointed that ONDCP 

has not utilized the heightened media attention that the methamphetamine issue receives to fully develop public awareness and 

education. 

Since the first mention of a meth strategy in the long-overdue 

October 2004 ‘‘National Synthetic Drug Action Plan,’’ the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy has done nothing but repeat its intention to provide a methamphetamine strategy, as evidenced by 

the following statement in the Nation Drug Control Strategy for FY 

2006: ‘‘The Administration is in the process of developing and reVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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16The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) at 15.

leasing a strategic document that details next steps for addressing 

the problem of synthetic drugs like methamphetamine.’’ 16


26504.002
9

17Methamphetamine, 15 CQ Researcher Num. 25, 589, 592 (2006). 18Francis Murphy, UN Narcotics Watchdog Sees New Pandamic, REUTERS HEALTH, Mar. 1, 

2006. 19The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) at 15. 20Gardiner Harris, Fighting Methamphetamine, Lawmakers Reach Accord to Curb Sale of 

Cold Medicines, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at 33; at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10810FA34550C768DDDAB0994DD404482 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 21The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) at 15. 22 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD, 2005 REPORT, (Mar. 1, 2006) at 66. 

Methamphetamine has been steadily moving across the country 

for years, starting on the West coast and moving eastward, devastating countless communities in its wake.17 The President of the 

International Narcotics Control Board recently stated: ‘‘The major 

problem that they have (in the United States) is with methamphetamine . . . Methamphetamine is pandemic now.’’ 18 In response, 

the administration has only delayed, refusing to provide a necessary, comprehensive strategy. 

Absence of Administration Legislative Efforts on Methamphetamine 

The administration claims to have supported legislative efforts 

by Congress to lead in addressing the methamphetamine epidemic: 

‘‘The Bush Administration has urged Congress to enact legislation 

that would limit the amount of pseudoephedrine for retail sale to 

what could be used for individual, legitimate medical purposes.’’ 19

Despite such rhetoric, however, the administration provided no 

help to Congress when it was considering the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act that is now a part of the Patriot Act. 

In fact, a State Department memorandum sharply critical of some 

provisions of the bill circulated among congressional offices the 

night before a committee mark-up, while the New York Times reported that the FDA was working behind the scenes to block it.20

In addition, ONDCP also states: ‘‘To ensure that the drug 

[pseudoephedrine] is not rerouted away from legitimate businesses 

and consumers, the Administration is working with other countries 

to improve the flow of information to the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) about bulk shipments of this chemical.’’ 21

Although a great deal of attention has been paid to the local production of meth in small, clandestine (or ‘‘clan’’) laboratories, the 

majority of the U.S. supply of illegal meth is now believed to come 

from Mexico, or is controlled by Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Moreover, virtually all of the world’s supply of the major 

meth precursor chemical—pseudoephedrine—is manufactured overseas, in only relatively few factories. As such, meth is as much an 

international as a local problem. Of genuine concern is the report 

of the seizure of a methamphetamine laboratory in Colombia in 

2005, the first of its kind in that country.22 On its own the seizure 

appears to have little significance, however given the entrepreneurial bent Colombia drug traffickers have displayed in the past, 

neither the seizure, nor its potential, can be ignored. 

Most of the methamphetamine problem can be attributed to one 

simple fact: the U.S. and the international community have failed 

to set up an effective control system for pseudoephedrine and other 

precursor chemical products. Unlike meth, pseudoephedrine cannot 

be made clandestinely—it can only be manufactured in large facilities using very sophisticated equipment. As a groundbreaking report by The Oregonian newspaper recently showed, only a few comVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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23Suo, Steve, The Mexican Connection, OREGONIAN, June 5, 2005. 24 Id. 25DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, vol. I, (Mar. 2006) at 73. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD, 2005 REPORT, (Mar. 1, 2006) at 42. 29 Id, at 71. 30 Id, at 28. 

panies worldwide make the chemical, and virtually all of the 

world’s supply comes from three countries: Germany, India, and 

China.23 As such, it would not be very difficult for the U.S. and its 

allies to get better control of the chemical and prevent its largescale diversion. 

Instead, huge amounts of pseudoephedrine products are being 

shipped all over the world, with little or no tracking or control. 

Many nations are importing far more than they can legitimately 

consume, meaning that the excess is probably being diverted to 

meth production. Mexican imports of pseudoephedrine, the primary 

meth precursor, have risen from almost 100 tons in 2001 to nearly 

224 tons in 2003. Mexican authorities estimate their legitimate demand for pseudoephedrine at only 70 tons per year.24

The International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 

very recently released its annual report in which international precursor chemical control is substantially addressed. The INL report 

stated: ‘‘The emergence of methamphetamine as a major drug of 

abuse and a significant domestic law enforcement problem in the 

United States was the most important factor impacting U.S. chemical control in 2005.’’ 25 The report also indicates that ‘‘Mexico is 

now tightening its controls on methamphetamine precursors and 

the concern is that they will be sold to countries with fewer controls and smuggled into Mexico, or the U.S., for drug production.’’ 26

‘‘Traffickers continue to evade the reach of these initiatives by 

turning to nonparticipating countries to obtain these . . . chemicals. Many of these countries lack the legal, administrative, and 

law enforcement infrastructure to control the chemicals.’’ 27

Where precursor control legislation is tightened, traffickers have 

reverted to nations in Africa where controls are weaker.28 Further, 

traffickers are using methods of concealment for precursor chemicals that were previously reserved for the drugs themselves.29

These occurrences are causes for uneasiness for the international 

community. They add weight to the call from International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) for countries to provide pre-export notification of precursor chemicals to importing nations.30

The committee strongly encourages such international efforts to 

address the control of international precursor chemicals, but was 

very disappointed by the Department of State’s (DOS) direct opposition to the international provisions addressing precursor chemical 

reporting within the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act. 

Moreover, no substantive support, beyond technical comments, was 

received from the Department of Justice (DOJ). 

Cooperation with involved administration Departments and 

agencies, such as DEA, State, & DOJ is the specific responsibility 

of ONDCP. In sum, the committee must express its deep dissatisfaction with ONDCP which offered no support throughout the 

legislative process, despite being responsible for leading drug policy 

efforts within the administration. 

11

31For further information, see the COPS website, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/, or call the COPS 

office at (202) 616–1728. 

Beyond legislation, the committee seeks to highlight particular 

Federal programs that have been established to counteract the continuous and devastating spread of methamphetamine abuse. These 

programs, critical to mitigating the ongoing threat of methamphetamine, are in substantial danger of being severely degraded by the 

proposed FY 2007 drug control budget. Foremost among such programs are COPS Meth Hot Spots and methamphetamine-oriented 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. 

Department of Justice: Methamphetamine-Related Assistance 

(COPS Meth Hot Spots) 31

The committee has ongoing concerns about the proposed reduction in funds administered by the Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office dedicated to law enforcement activities against methamphetamine trafficking. To assist these overburdened agencies, Congress approved $63,590,000 

for fiscal year 2006 (up from $52,556,000 in fiscal year 2005) for 

policing initiatives to combat methamphetamine production and 

trafficking and to enhance policing initiatives in ‘‘drug hot spots.’’

Disappointingly, the administration again proposes to eliminate 

the remaining ‘‘Meth Hot Spots’’ funding for other anti-meth enforcement activities—which Congress has always appropriated in 

the form of specific earmarks for designated projects. 

The committee believes that Congress and the administration 

need to work together to restore and reform the additional Hot 

Spots funding. The proposed elimination of the rest of the ‘‘Meth 

Hot Spots’’ funding would greatly reduce the ability of affected 

state and local law enforcement agencies to help their Federal partners in reducing methamphetamine abuse, particularly given the 

proposed overall reduction in other state and local law enforcement 

assistance grants. 

ONDCP: Methamphetamine oriented High Intensity Drug 

Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) 

Each High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) that is primarily focused on combating the spread of methamphetamine was 

created after 1990. The Midwest HIDTA, which includes Iowa, 

Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska and South Dakota, was created specifically to fight the spread of meth in the Midwest. It promotes a comprehensive, cooperative strategy by law enforcement at the Federal, 

state and local levels to reduce drug trafficking. 

The collection of multi-agency leaders participating on individual 

HIDTA boards, individual task force boards and/or oversight committees allows for current information and trends to be shared on 

the growing concerns and dangers of methamphetamine production, distribution, and use. Nationally, the latest survey indicates 

there are 211 HIDTA task forces across the nation with 5,321 officers representing 34 states and territories which, in addition to 

other duties, are substantially involved in enforcement efforts reVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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32See Law Enforcement and the Fight Against Methamphetamine: Improving Federal, State, 

and Local Efforts: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Aug. 23, 2005) (testimony 

of John Sommer, Director, Ohio High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas). 33 H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 888 (2002). Public Law 107–296. 34 U.S. COAST GUARD, BUDGET IN BRIEF, FY 2007, Feb. 2006, Appendix B, at B–2. 35David E. Kaplan, Paying for Terror, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, (Dec. 5, 2005) at 41. 36 Id, at 42. 37 Id, at 44. 38 H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 888 (2002). Public Law 107–296. 39See National Drug Control Budget for Fiscal Year 2007: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16, 2006) (testimony of John Walters, Director, Office of National 

Drug Control Policy). 40 U.S. COAST GUARD, BUDGET IN BRIEF, FY 2007, Feb. 2006. 41 Id, Appendix B, at B–2. 

garding the distribution and/or manufacturing of methamphetamine.32

The methamphetamine issue will continue to be a high priority 

for the committee. Such commitment is necessary when Congress 

is forced to embrace a leadership role where ONDCP has left a 

void. 

2. Drug Interdiction Reclassified as Non-Homeland Security Mission within DHS 

Another issue of serious concern to the committee is the unannounced reclassification of the drug interdiction mission within 

DHS. The congressional authorization that created DHS in 2002 

specifically defined the drug interdiction mission as one of the primary missions of the Department.33 This year, without any formal 

explanation or announcement, the administration’s budget request 

for the Coast Guard recategorized ‘‘Illegal Drug Interdiction’’ and 

‘‘Other Law Enforcement’’ missions as ‘‘Non-Homeland Security’’ 

missions.34

The connection between terrorism and drug smuggling is being 

increasingly established by incoming intelligence. Antonio Maria 

Costa, the head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 

stated: ‘‘The world is seeing the birth of a new hybrid of organizedcrime-terrorist organization.’’ 35 This new hybrid, according to 

many intelligence analysts, is comprised of ‘‘terrorist organizations 

stealing whole chapters out of the criminal playbook—trafficking in 

narcotics, illegal goods, counterfeit goods, illegal aliens—and in the 

process converting their terrorist cells into criminal gangs.’’ 36 A 

stark example, ‘‘the terrorists behind the Madrid attacks were 

major drug dealers, with a network stretching from Morocco 

through Spain to Belgium and the Netherlands.’’ 37

This proposed change clearly runs contrary to the organic statute 

establishing DHS.38 When asked about the initiatives being taken 

by ONDCP to counteract this fundamental, wide reaching policy 

change, Director John Walters of ONCDP indicated a complete lack 

of awareness of the issue or its details.39 Moreover, the reclassification is not even mentioned, much less properly highlighted and explained, in the main body of the Coast Guard Budget in Brief.40

Inexplicably, the only indication of this infrastructural policy realignment must be found and interpreted from a program cost summary table.41

At a February 7, 2006, DHS budget briefing a DHS Budget officer confirmed that the reclassification is not isolated to the Coast 

Guard but is being implemented as a DHS policy throughout each 

13

42Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources staff briefing with 

DHS representatives on 2007 DHS drug budget, Feb. 7, 2006. 43 H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 888 (2002). Public Law 107–296. 44The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 1. At http://

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs06/. 45 Id, at 5. 46 Carnevale Associates, Policy Brief, FY ’07 Drug Budget: Demand Reduction Being De-Emphasized, LLC, Feb. 2006. At http://www.carnevaleassociates.com/Federal—Drug—Budget—FY07.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

agency whose mission includes drug interdiction.42 The reclassification explicitly excludes drug interdiction from the general homeland security mission of DHS and, over time, will gradually increase the ongoing diversion of resources away from drug interdiction missions. 

The committee’s skepticism concerning DHS’s transparency and 

willingness to communicate has been further strained by this unauthorized recategorization which knowingly brushes aside Congress’s 

clear intent to classify drug interdiction as a homeland security 

mission.43 In addition, ONDCP’s utter ignorance of this new DHS 

policy illustrates reason for the committee’s deep dissatisfaction 

with the leadership within the administration that ONDCP is supposed to provide. 

3. Prevention 

The administration asserts that it seeks a ‘‘balanced strategy 

that focuses on three primary elements: stopping drug use before 

it starts, healing drug users, and disrupting the market for illicit 

drugs.’’ 44 As in years past, the administration’s 2006 National 

Drug Control Strategy identifies drug use prevention—‘‘stopping 

drug use before it starts’’—as one of the three key pillars of its 

drug strategy. However, since prevention comprises only 11.7 percent of the entire FY 2007 drug control budget and represents a 

19.3 percent decrease in prevention funding from that enacted in 

FY 2006, the committee questions the administration’s claim that 

it has ‘‘set a bold agenda’’ in its prevention efforts.45

‘‘Over the FY 2001—FY 2007 period, demand reduction (preven- tion and treatment) has increased only $49 million or 1.1 percent 

whereas supply reduction (enforcement and interdiction) increased 

by $3.2 billion, or 66.1 percent.’’ 46 In light of the profound emphasis the current administration has placed on enforcement and 

interdiction, the committee questions whether prevention, which 

has steadily decreased in funding, authentically represents a ‘‘pillar’’ of the administration’s approach to the drug problem. 

With respect to particular prevention programs, the committee 

has concerns about the proposed elimination of the State Grants 

program, representing the substantial portion of the Safe and Drug 

Free Schools and Communities (SDFSC) program at the Department of Education. Congress emphatically rejected a similar proposal in last year’s budget. 

The grants distributed under the State Grants program serve as 

vital leverage that allows local communities to significantly augment their capacity to provide drug prevention programs.

Elimination of this funding will have a catastrophic effect 

in the balance of drug usage among school-aged children 

in America. Many school systems across America have 

found unique ways to combine these SDFSCA funds with 

14

47See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use Prevention: Hearing before the House Subcommittee 

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 

109th Cong, (Apr. 26, 2005) (testimony of Clarence Jones, coordinator, Safe and Drug-Free 

Youth Section, Fairfax County Public Schools). 48FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, UNIFORM CRIME RE- PORT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2002). 49DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FY 2007 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY, Annual Rep. at 107: ‘‘The 

FY 2007 President’s Budget proposes the transfer of the HIDTA program from [ONDCP] to 

OCDETF.’’ 50The National Drug Control Strategy for 2005 and the National Drug Control Budget for Fiscal Year 2006, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM REPORT, H. Rept. 109–172, (2005) at 29. 

very little local moneys in order to provide the highest 

level of drug prevention. Removing the monetary foundation of these programs could cause many if not all of them 

to collapse. I know this because in our system, one of the 

wealthiest in the nation, elimination of these funds would 

severely impact or cancel many well developed, well documented, and successful drug prevention programs. I can’t 

imagine how drug prevention programs in other smaller 

systems will survive.47

The State Grants programs serves as a vehicle for bringing effective anti-drug education to millions of young people in our schools. 

As we recommended last year, the committee strongly suggests 

that the administration take substantial steps to reform the well 

established State Grants program. 

4. State and Local Law Enforcement Drug Control Efforts 

The committee focuses much concern on the administration’s approach to programs directly impacting the cooperation between 

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and initiatives. 

Since State and local agencies make over 95 percent of the arrests 

of drug violators, the vital role carried out by non-Federal enforcement is unquestionable and indispensable to furthering intelligence 

and operational activities at the Federal level.48

The administration’s recent budget proposal to realign HIDTA 

under the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

(OCDETF) 49 while decreasing its funding, to eliminate the Edward 

Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program, and to diminish the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) would 

severely impede, if not permanently incapacitate, the current system of broad-based interagency cooperation and information sharing. 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) 

This year, the administration has requested $209 million for the 

HIDTA program but has again asked that it be moved to the Department of Justice despite the same proposal being rejected last 

year. If enacted, these proposals would effectively terminate the 

current HIDTA program. For this reason, the committee again 50

strongly opposes the budget cut, any radical reallocation of funding 

(if unaccompanied by a comprehensive, performance-based justification), and the move of the program into the Justice Department. 

Moving HIDTA into the Justice Department is highly problematic. Notably, the administration’s representatives who testified at 

the March 10, 2005, hearing declined to inform the Congress how 

HIDTA would be managed under OCDETF and how decisions 

15

51See FY 2006 Drug Control Budget and Byrne Grant, HIDTA, and Other Law enforcement 

programs: Are we jeopardizing Federal, state and local cooperation? Hearing before the House 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005). 52DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 2007 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY, Annual Rep. at 107: ‘‘The 

FY 2007 President’s Budget proposes the transfer of the HIDTA program from [ONDCP] to 

OCDETF.’’ 53The committee’s reasons for opposing the transfer of the HIDTA program to the Justice Department are discussed in greater detail in the committee’s report on H.R. 2829 (H. Rept. 109–

315, Part I, pps. 52–53). 54The Byrne Formula Grant Program was created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public 

Law 100–690). One-half of the appropriated funds is to be awarded to the states based on their 

relative populations, while the other half is to be awarded on the basis of the violent crime rates 

in the states. 

would be made at the local HIDTA.51 Such a significant change demands prior planning that can be clearly and thoroughly communicated to Congress. Transferring the HIDTA to OCDETF without 

any clear plan concerning the manner in which the program would 

be administered is not an authentic proposal that deserves consideration by Congress.52

Beyond the reasons just mentioned, the proposed transfer to the 

Justice Department is contrary to existing law and to sound drug 

enforcement policy. It would potentially be even more disruptive to 

the HIDTA program than simple budget cuts.53 From a legal perspective, transferring this program across departments is contrary 

to every authorization the Congress has passed for HIDTA. Moreover, attempting to move the program through an appropriations 

bill would almost certainly conflict with any reauthorization legislation agreed to by the House and Senate during the 109th Congress. 

In addition, eliminating or eviscerating particular HIDTAs would 

be a far greater financial loss to Federal drug enforcement efforts 

than simply the money spent by the Federal Government directly 

on their budgets. State and local agencies make significant contributions of their own agents, employees, office space, and equipment to HIDTA task forces—much of which is not reimbursed with 

Federal dollars and which frequently dwarf, in their dollar value, 

the Federal budget components of the individual HIDTAs. We risk 

losing those contributions without the individual HIDTAs. 

Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 

The committee opposes the administration’s renewed proposal to 

terminate the state formula grants portion of the Edward Byrne 

Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program. The administration 

has asked Congress to eliminate it entirely and restrict Federal assistance for state and local law enforcement programs to a series 

of enumerated grants (most of which are previously existing programs) under a ‘‘Justice Assistance’’ account. In practice, this will 

sharply limit the amount of money available to help state and local 

agencies.54

The administration’s drastic proposed cuts would create massive 

shortfalls in the budgets of state and local law enforcement agencies across the country. Numerous state and local officials have informed the committee members and staff that many programs—

particularly drug enforcement programs—within their states would 

16

55See FY 2006 Drug Control Budget and Byrne Grant, HIDTA, and other law enforcement programs: Are we jeopardizing Federal, state and local cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Tom Donahue, Director, Chicago HIDTA, and 

Mark Henry, president, Illinois Drug Enforcement Officer’s Association). 56FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, UNIFORM CRIME RE- PORT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2002). 57The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at 89. 

have to be shut down if all Byrne Grant and similar funding were 

cut off.55

Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that Federal support for 

state and local efforts lacks national impact. Particularly in the 

area of drug enforcement, state and local participation is vital to 

our national success. As mentioned above, state and local agencies 

make more than 95 percent of arrests of drug violators.56 Collectively, they have far more personnel and resources than the Federal Government does. Federal support for these agencies can have 

a very positive national impact by facilitating their involvement as 

partners in the fight against drug trafficking and other criminal activities. 

Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) 

The committee opposes the administration’s current request of only $9.6 million for the CTAC program, a drastic cut from the 

$29.7 million appropriated for fiscal year 2006 (which was itself a 

major cut from the $41.7 million appropriated for fiscal year 2005). 

The CTAC research program provides support to law enforcement 

supply reduction by developing advancement in technology for drug 

detection, communications, surveillance and methods to share drug 

crime investigative information.57 In addition, funding is available 

for research into drug abuse and addiction. Further, CTAC supports the Technology Transfer Program which supplies new 

counterdrug technologies to state and local law enforcement. The proposed decreases would cut the research program from $14 million to $9.6 million—while completely eliminating Technology 

Transfer Program (appropriated at nearly $16 million in fiscal year 

2006). The committee strongly opposes the termination of the Technology Transfer Program which provides another means of building 

operational cooperation between Federal, State, and local law enforcement. 

The committee believes that reform is the appropriate remedy for 

any CTAC difficulties. At a time when assistance to state and local 

drug enforcement is under consistent attack throughout the current 

drug control budget, it is unwise for the Federal Government to cut 

off yet another source of badly needed anti-drug trafficking technology. 

HITDA, Byrne Grants, and the CTAC Technology Transfer program represent networks of enforcement cooperation between Federal, State, and local agencies in which information, intelligence, 

and assets are shared and ultimately maximized. The particular relationships and venues for dialog that comprise this multi-level cooperation have been gradually developed since the creation of the 

first HIDTAs in 1990. 

If the proposed budget changes are implemented, it could take 

another 16 years to recover and rebuild these programs to their 

current level of operational sophistication. Consequently, the comVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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58Miles, Donna, Rumsfeld, Ecuadoran Leaders Vow Continued Cooperation, AMERICAN FORCES

PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 16, 2004, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2004/

n11162004—2004111604.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006); Department of Defense Press Briefing 

by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 

Richard Myers on Jan. 6, 2004, at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040106-

secdef1104.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 59Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources 

drug control budget briefing with Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counternarcotics, Nov. 10, 2005; Dept. of State, Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 2004, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45323.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 

2006). 60See The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan Colombia Successes and 

Remaining Challenges: Hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 

(2004) (statement of Chairman Tom Davis). 61The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 33. 62 Id. Joint service, interagency, and multinational forces in the transit zone seized 254 metric 

tons of cocaine in 2005. 63 Id. 64 Id, at 35.

mittee, after much experience with the profoundly improved and 

necessary impact made by collaboration between Federal, State, 

and local law enforcement, believes that maintaining these programs is of the highest priority. 

5. Interdiction 

It is crucial that the Federal Government pursue the most effective interdiction strategy possible. In what appears to be a rapidly 

developing partnership, illicit drug production and smuggling is 

being directly linked to terrorist cells around the world.58 Traffickers smuggle drugs, money, people, information, weapons, and 

substances the same way terrorists do. Sometimes, narco-traffickers are terrorists.59 When speaking about the Colombian insurgency, Chairman Tom Davis of the House Government Reform 

Committee stated, ‘‘These are not idealistic liberators; they’re thugs 

and terrorists, funded by the illicit drug trade.’’ 60 When drugs are 

interdicted, the financing of terrorist operations becomes more difficult.61

For the third straight year, joint service, interagency, and multinational forces in the transit zone have seized and disrupted a 

record amount of cocaine.62 A critical element of the strategy to 

disrupt the market focuses U.S. interdiction efforts on seizing cocaine and other illicit drugs bound for the U.S. from South America 

in the transit zone. The transit zone is a six million square mile 

area that encompasses Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean 

Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. Transit 

zone seizures and disruptions in 2005 amounted to 254 metric tons 

of cocaine, compared to 219 metric tons in 2004 and 176 metric 

tons in 2003.63

Transit zone interdiction is a team effort that relies on the successful execution of several steps in an interdiction continuum, including the collection and dissemination of actionable intelligence, 

the detection and monitoring of suspect vessels, and the physical 

interdiction of those vessels.64 The primary operations center and 

coordinator for detecting and monitoring suspected air and maritime drug trafficking events in the transit zone is Joint Interagency 

Task Force South (JIATF-South). Located in Key West, Florida, 

JIATF-South includes representatives from Defense, Justice, 

Homeland Security, and nations such as France, the Netherlands, 

and the United Kingdom. 

18


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65DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION ASSETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, GAO REPORT NO. 06–2000, (Nov. 2005) at 6. 66 Id, at 25; The principal source of information about cocaine flow in the transit zone is 

ONDCP’s Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM). The IACM is prepared annually for ONDCP by an interagency group representing departments and agencies involved in 

U.S. counternarcotics efforts. For 2003 and 2004, according to the interagency group, the IACM’s 

estimate of the amount of cocaine available for export was too low in relation to estimated U.S. 

and non-U.S. demand for cocaine after taking into account seizures and disruptions. 67 10 U.S.C. § 124 (1989). 68DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION ASSETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, GAO REPORT NO. 06–2000, (Nov. 2005) at 17. 69Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources 

visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida on Jan. 12, 2006.

The chart depicted above reflects JIATF-South’s estimates of the 

intercontinental flow of cocaine out of the source countries. However, estimates of the drug flow through the transit zone are problematic. In its assessment for 2004, ONDCP reported that between 

325 metric tons and 675 metric tons of cocaine may be moving toward the United States.65 Given the lower and upper bound flow 

estimates, the committee has deep reservations regarding the 

credibility of eradication, production, interdiction, and usage estimates and performance measures.66

The majority of ‘‘frontline’’ interdiction personnel and assets are 

contained within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In 

addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been designated as 

the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection 

and monitoring of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs 

into the U.S.67 DOD carries out this responsibility by providing aircraft and ships to patrol the transit zones, utilizing radars and 

other technologies to monitor drug smuggling routes, and employing tactical intelligence units. With the ongoing DOD and DHS 

focus on the global war on terrorism and illegal immigration, the 

committee is deeply concerned that many of the resources within 

these departments traditionally integral to drug interdiction will be 

increasingly diverted for anti-terror and immigration missions, and 

the administration is not adequately addressing the interagency 

detection and monitoring capabilities that support U.S. interdiction 

efforts in the transit zone. 

Increasing the challenge of interdicting drugs in the transit zones 

is the mounting shortage of detecting, monitoring and interdiction 

assets (ships, planes, and helicopters) allocated to this critical mission. This is the result of the administration’s failure to plan to replace aging DHS and DOD assets. The shortage of these assets is 

perhaps more pronounced recently because of substantial gains 

that have been made in developing ‘‘known actionable’’ maritime 

events.68 Moreover, the Director of JIATF-South recently reconfirmed what Congress was told last year: JIATF-South now has 

more actionable drug intelligence than there are interdiction assets 

available to respond to smuggling events.69 The impressive level of 

intelligence is displayed by the accompanying graphic in which 

known, specific, smuggling events are broken down to the means 

of transportation used (‘‘go-fast’’ speed boat (57.2 percent), fishing 

vessel (30.5 percent), motor vessel (9.6 percent), other (2.7 percent). 

20


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The committee is alarmed that the administration has not directly addressed the issue of insufficient interdiction assets. Equally troubling, ONDCP does not identify and discuss this issue in its 

2007 Strategy, other than to highlight the improvements in intelligence. The committee is concerned that until ONDCP clearly articulates the current shortages in drug interdiction assets, the administration will not provide the support necessary to respond. 

Another crucial piece necessary to understanding the challenge of 

the interdiction process addresses the vast distances associated 

with the high seas maritime transit zones that are manipulated by 

drug smugglers to their strategic advantage. The Eastern Pacific 

maritime transit zone, as depicted in the graphic nearby, places 

tremendous strains on U.S. interdiction intelligence, personnel, and 

assets. Over time the smugglers have measured the interdiction capabilities of these assets and have continually utilized these known 

limits to exploit weaknesses, irresolvable without an additional 

commitment of assets, to continue the flow of illegal drugs into the 

continental United States.

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In addition to the vast distance being covered, the means most 

frequently used by smugglers, even if detected, present a substantial challenge to the interdiction mission. High-speed ‘‘go-fast’’ vessels are used in the majority of the smuggling events in the transit 

zone. ‘‘Go-fast’’ vessels, which are very hard to detect by ship and 

helicopter acting without maritime patrol aircraft, are capable of 

speeds up to 40+ knots while hauling as much as four metric tons 

of cocaine. In the Eastern Pacific, these speed boats seek to avoid 

U.S. interdiction forces by taking broad, round-about paths into the 

middle of the Pacific Ocean before heading north to Mexico. In the 

Caribbean, they leave Colombia’s North Coast at night, rapidly 

transit across the Caribbean basin, and then hug the Central 

American coastline in the voyage north to Mexico. 

The number of go-fast boats involved in smuggling has increased 

substantially since 1995. Such craft are small, very fast, nearly invisible to radar, and difficult to see in daylight when painted in 

blue (seized go-fast (left) with four 200 horsepower outboard engines is pictured with a U.S. Coast Guard over-the-horizon small 

boat).

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70DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION AS- SETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, GAO RE- PORT NO. 06–2000, (Nov. 2005) at 17. 71 Id. 72 Id. 73See Illicit Drug Transit Zone in Central America: Hearing before House Subcommittee on 

the Western Hemisphere, Committee on International Relations, 109th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2005) 

(statement of Chairman Dan Burton). 74The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 33.

Since calendar year 2000, JIATF-South officials report that they 

had information about more maritime drug movements than they 

could detect visually.70 The number of ‘‘known actionable’’ maritime events in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific 

Ocean more than doubled from 154 in 2000 to 330 in 2004.71 According to JIATF-South officials, in many cases the maritime event 

is too far away for available ships and aircraft to go to the area 

and visually locate the suspected drug movement. However, once 

JIATF-South locates a suspect movement, the disruption rate has 

significantly increased since 2000—from less than 60 percent in 

2000 and 2001 to over 80 percent in 2003 to 2005.72

The critical need for Maritime Patrol Aircraft 

One of the most critical areas of concern to the committee is the 

steady reduction of DOD and DHS maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) 

patrol hours. MPA assets are the linchpin of maritime interdiction 

operations and play a key role virtually every significant maritime 

drug seizure. These aircraft provide the necessary detection and 

monitoring capability in the transit zones on which all other interdiction and law enforcement efforts depend. 

In his opening remarks to the House Committee on International 

Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere on November 

9, 2005, Chairman Dan Burton said that many of the air assets in 

the drug transit zone had been ‘‘. . . taken out of the interdiction 

business and committed to counter-terrorism and homeland security. This often leaves us with more actionable intelligence on drug 

shipments than assets to intercept them.’’ This lack of air assets 

often leaves law enforcement with no way to counteract drug shipments, leaving them to merely watch as drugs made their way into 

the country.73

While the U.S. interdiction forces have seized record amounts of 

cocaine over the past three years,74 the Coast Guard, Customs and 

Border Protection and DOD face several challenges in maintaining 

current level of assets to support transit zone interdiction operations. 

26

ON STATION FLIGHT HOURS FOR INTERDICTION IN THE TRANSIT ZONE, 

FISCAL YEARS 2000–2005


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75DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION AS- SETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, GAO RE- PORT NO. 06–2000, (Nov. 2005) at 18. 76See Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in 

Our Sails? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005) (testimony 

of Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director of JIATF-South). 77 Id.

According to JIATF-South and U.S. Interdiction Coordinator officials, because of its longer range, the P–3 aircraft can monitor a 

much larger surface area than other maritime patrol aircraft and 

can provide covert surveillance until other interdiction assets arrive.75 As displayed in the nearby graph, the availability of the 

U.S. Navy P–3 maritime patrol aircraft has steadily declined since 

2002, and will degrade JIATF-South’s ability to detect and monitor 

maritime movements.76 JIATF-South, Coast Guard, CBP, and U.S. 

Interdiction Coordinator officials stated that while some short-term 

fixes have been made, the longer-term implications of the likely 

continued declines in the monitoring and interdiction assets for the 

transit zone have not been addressed.77 The committee is concerned that the reduced availability of the U.S. Navy P–3 maritime 

patrol aircraft and the apparent lack of a suitable replacement aircraft are the most critical issues challenging the future of interdiction efforts in the transit zone. 

28

TOTAL P–3 ON-STATION FLIGHT HOURS IN THE TRANSIT ZONE, FISCAL

YEARS 2000–2005


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78The P–3 is a 40-year-old aircraft that has begun to develop cracks in its wing structure. 

Presently, the Navy plans to retire the P–3 and replace it with a different aircraft. However, 

the full fleet of aircraft will not be available until 2013, leaving a potential gap in Maritime 

Patrol hours. 79DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION AS- SETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, GAO RE- PORT NO. 06–2000, (Nov. 2005) at 18. 80 Id, at 19. 81Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Counternarcotics to Mark Souder, chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 82DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION ASSETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, GAO REPORT NO. 06–2000, (Nov. 2005) at 19. 

The availability of the P–3 aircraft has declined for several reasons. In fiscal years 2000–2003, the U.S. Navy provided the majority of P–3 maritime patrol flying hours in support of interdiction 

efforts. However, in FY 2004, the Navy began limiting the use of 

its P–3 maritime patrol aircraft for transit zone interdiction missions because of structural problems in the P–3’s wings 78 and 

other worldwide commitments. Since FY 2000, the number of hours 

flown by U.S. Navy P–3s has decreased nearly 60 percent to about 

1,500 hours in FY 2005.79 In addition, in December 2004, the Netherlands removed the P–3 aircraft it used to fly interdiction missions in the transit zone and sold its planes to Germany for use in 

the Baltic. According to the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, the P–

3s flown by the Netherlands were vital to interdiction efforts in the 

Caribbean Sea, averaging over 1,300 flight hours during fiscal 

years 2000–2004. In April 2005, the Netherlands began using the 

Fokker F–60, a shorter-range twin engine aircraft, to fly interdiction missions, but, according to Defense officials, these aircraft are 

less capable than the P–3.80

Defense Department plans to support Maritime Patrol Aircraft 

The steady reduction of DOD maritime patrol aircraft resource 

hours and the apparent gap in providing a replacement aircraft or 

unmanned aerial vehicles in the transit zone reflects woeful shortcomings in DOD’s management of its detection and monitoring responsibilities. The committee believes that if DOD is unable to fully 

perform its statutory responsibility as the lead Federal agency for 

the detection and monitoring of illicit drug trafficking, other agencies, most notably the enforcement agencies at the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), should be provided the resources necessary to fill the void in illicit drug detection, monitoring and interdiction missions. 

Customs and Border Protection plans to support Maritime 

Patrol Aircraft 

To help compensate for the reduction in U.S. Navy P–3 availability, the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has increased its P–3 maritime patrol on-station flight hours in the transit zone from about 1,777 flight hours 

in 2000 81 to over 4,300 in 2005.82 The committee strongly supports 

CBP’s increasing role in transit zone. However, CBP P–3 aircraft, 

which are formally owned and operated by the U.S. Navy, are challenged with the same maintenance issues of a Vietnam-era aircraft. 

30

83Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources 

Staff budget summary briefing with U.S. Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005; Resource hours 

committed to the drug interdiction mission include on-station hours spent on detection, monitoring and interdiction operations, and also transit hours needed for assets to get into position 

to begin operations. 84DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION ASSETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, GAO REPORT NO. 06–2000, (Nov. 2005) at 21. 

The committee has grave concerns about the apparent lack of replacement or service life extension plans for CBP’s aging air fleet. 

Also, it is not clear what steps CBP or DHS, as a whole, are taking 

to ensure continued P–3 aircraft support to counterdrug missions 

in the transit zone, and are not diverted to other CBP mission 

areas. 

We recommend that the DHS closely evaluate current CBP procurement and modernization proposals and submit recommendations to Congress that will maintain these critical MPA capabilities 

throughout the projected gap period before U.S. Navy replacement 

aircraft come on-line. Without these capabilities, DHS efforts to 

combat terrorism and illegal drug movements in the source, transit, and arrival zones and to provide interagency law enforcement 

support would be severely hindered and may threaten national security. The committee recommends CBP Air program continue to 

fully support all international and MPA missions in the transit 

zones. 

Coast Guard plans to support Maritime Patrol Aircraft 

The Coast Guard, although hampered by its aging assets, has 

also attempted to rise to the task. The Service is now dedicating 

more maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) hours to drug interdiction 

missions since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.83

However, the Coast Guard airframe which supports the MPA 

mission, the HC–130, is less capable than the P–3 aircraft, and the 

percentage of time the HC–130 maritime patrol surveillance aircraft were available to perform MPA missions was below the target 

level in fiscal year 2004. Additionally, the surface radar system on 

the aircraft is subject to frequent failures.84 In some instances, 

mission flight crews had to look out the windows of the aircraft for 

targets because the radar systems were inoperable. 

The administration has developed a strategic plan to replace the 

Coast Guard’s aging ships and aircraft. The committee believes the 

Coast Guard’s Deepwater fleet modernization project is critical to 

U.S. transit zone drug interdictions. However, the Coast Guard 

needs to develop aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles that can effectively perform the MPA mission, with the type of radars and 

sensors capable of complementing the aging fleet of P–3 currently 

performing the mission. Consequently, the administration and DHS 

need to ensure they are putting the right tools and equipment into 

the hands of Coast Guard men and women so that they may continue to effectively interdict drugs on the high seas, and deliver the 

maritime safety and security America deserves. 

31

85The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 86The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 87The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 88The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 89 Id. 90Special Press Briefing on Humanitarian Assistance for Afghanistan by Joseph Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, Nov. 15, 2001, 

at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t11152001—t1115aid.html (last visited Feb. 24, 

2006). 91 Rumsfeld, Ecuadoran Leaders Vow Continued Cooperation, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 16, 2004 at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/articles.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

II. STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL DRUG

CONTROL PROGRAMS AND AGENCIES

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)

DOD Drug Control Funding (in millions) 

DOD Drug Control FY 2005 Requested 85

FY 2005 

Final 86

FY 2006 Requested 87FY 2006 Enacted 88FY 2007 Request 89

AGENCY TOTAL ...................................................... $852.7 $1,147.8* $895.7 $936.1 $926.9

* Includes supplemental appropriations. 

Contact Information: Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs: 703–428–0711, http://www.defenselink.mil/. 

The President’s budget proposal includes approximately $927 

million for Department of Defense (DOD) counterdrug funding. 

However, this budget request does not reflect the total amount of 

money given to the Department for Drug Control programs. DOD 

has received counterdrug funds through the War Supplemental Appropriations process to support programs in Afghanistan. The committee is concerned that ONDCP does not account for this supplemental counterdrug funding. It is very difficult for ONDCP to provide effective oversight on the entire U.S. National Drug Control 

Strategy if some DOD programs are funded outside the established 

process for coordinating programs. 

The committee understands and greatly appreciates the efforts of 

U.S. Armed Forces in carrying out dangerous missions around the 

world. It was on the heels of September 11th that a changed world 

brought this marriage of drugs and terror into stark focus. In a 

special briefing on Humanitarian Assistance for Afghanistan, the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, Joseph Collins, said Osama bin Laden and the 

Taliban had been ‘‘. . . closely associated with major drug traffickers since 1996.’’ He added, ‘‘With overseas donations, kickbacks 

from Al Qaeda, and a huge drug business, the Taliban has not 

lacked for financing.’’ 90 In November 2004, an unnamed senior defense official traveling with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in Central 

America told a reporter that drug trafficking (among other illegal 

activities) in the region was helping fund Hamas and Hezbollah.91

In a January 2004 press briefing, General Richard Myers, accompanied by Secretary Rumsfeld, responded to a question concerning 

recent ship seizures in the Persian Gulf that contained illegal 

drugs. General Myers said it was clear there was a connection beVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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92Dept. of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers on Jan. 6, 2004 at http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 93See 2006 DOD Counternarcotics Budget: Does It Deliver the Necessary Support? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (May 10, 2005) (Testimony of Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/

News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=26864. 94Dept. of Defense, Office of Counternarcotics policy statement describing the link between 

counternarcotics and terrorism, at http://defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy—offices/solic/cn/ cn—terrorism.html. 95Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Department of Defense), Feb. 2006, at 29. 96Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources 

drug control budget brief with Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Counternarcotics, Nov. 10, 2005 (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources). 97Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform to DOD Secretary Rumsfeld (Sept. 

30, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 

tween terrorism and the drug business, both in South America and 

the Middle East.92 Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Counternarcotics testified in June 2005, that Colombian 

narcoterrorists receive the majority of their funds from protecting, 

‘‘taxing’’ and engaging in this illegal drug trade, and they seek to 

overthrow the freely elected Colombian government, the oldest democracy in Latin America.93 ‘‘Financial, political and operational 

linkages already exist among narcotics trafficking, smuggling at 

large, and the regional and global expansion and movement of terrorists.’’ 94

The counternarcotics mission offers a solid opportunity for DOD 

collaboration with other nations combating drug trafficking. The 

development of ties and partnerships extends beyond the drug 

issue and overlaps into other areas. For example, the Quadrennial 

Defense Review Report stated, ‘‘Where possible, the United States 

will cooperate with Russia on shared interests such as countering 

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, and counter the trafficking of narcotics.’’ 95

DOD has recently developed new counternarcotics policies and 

programs that support the Global War on Terrorism, advance security cooperation goals, and contribute to national security. In order 

to accomplish these new policies, DOD has defined ‘‘narcoterrorists’’ 

to include ‘‘Terrorists who benefit from narcotics production and 

trafficking.’’ 96

1. Central Transfer Account (CTA) 

In an effort to align DOD’s financial management accounts to 

support this new definition of narcoterrorists, the Department has 

proposed combining the one counternarcotics central transfer account (CTA) with that of the much larger counterterrorism account. 

No rationale has been offered by DOD to support this change. In 

effect, DOD would fund all counter-terrorism activities worldwide 

out of this one account. As a practical consequence, it would merely 

augment the Department’s discretion over these funds and significantly frustrate Congress’ ability to hold DOD accountable for its 

mandated counterdrug mission.97

Currently, DOD’s Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and 

Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) is responsible for supervising how 

DOD counternarcotics programs will be prioritized and coordinated 

with approved national drug strategies. Since the CTA funding 

mechanism is with the policy-maker, timely disbursements can be, 

33

98 Id; Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform to DOD Secretary Rumsfeld (Jan. 

30, 2006), at http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=39045 

(on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources); Roxana 

Tiron, Pentagon’s possible move to eliminate special ops oversight office could trigger Hill ire, 

THE HILL, Feb. 1, 2006, at http://www.thehill.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Frontpage/020106/

rumsfeld.html. 99Letter from Thomas O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Mark Souder, chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform (Oct. 11, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 100 10 U.S.C. § 124 (1989). 

and have been made to take advantage of immediate opportunities. 

The proposed takeover of the CTA would make it virtually impossible for SOLIC to continue to preserve the integrity of counterdrug 

appropriations, allow for historical data collection, and provide the 

basis for conducting cost-effectiveness and comparative analyses. 

The Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 

Drug Policy, and Human Resources raised similar concerns in correspondence to the Department.98 The committee was startled at 

the insolent response from DOD, which stated, ‘‘If we make 

changes to the Department’s internal management of the Counternarcotics program we will notify you immediately.’’ 99 The Department’s lack of coordination and clarity on this issue raises grave 

doubts and concerns about the priority and status of all counternarcotics programs within DOD. 

The committee agrees with the Department’s assertion that terrorists may benefit from drug smuggling and that the Department 

performs a critical role as the lead agency for the detection and 

monitoring of drug trafficking into the United States. Be that as 

it may, the committee opposes any attempt to change the existing 

management, structure and procedures of the Central Transfer Account. While a successful effort to combat drug smuggling can deny 

funds to terrorists, it is less clear that a successful effort against 

terrorists can impact the drug trade. The committee strongly believes that DOD’s current authority is sufficient and preserves important safeguards against the unnecessary diversion of 

counterdrug resources to non-drug interdiction operations. 

2. U.S. Military Support to Counterdrug Operations 

The Department of Defense’s role in support of stopping illicit 

drug trafficking is clearly spelled out in statute; the Department 

shall serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for 

the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.100 The Department carries out 

this responsibility by providing aircraft and ships to patrol the 

transit zones, utilizing radar and other technologies to monitor 

drug smuggling routes, and employing tactical intelligence units. 

The tactical intelligence units utilize DOD’s intelligence assets and 

procedures to collect and analyze information about smuggling 

events. 

3. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) 

The committee fully supports the efforts of DOD’s Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South), located in Key West, Florida, which serves as the central operations center for detection and 

monitoring activities covering the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific 

34

101 U.S. COAST GUARD, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, Feb. 2006, Appendix B, at B–2. 102Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida on Jan. 12, 2006; The White House, National 

Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 34. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/

policy/ndcs06/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 103Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Counternarcotics to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 

Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on file with 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 104DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION AS- SETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, GAO RE- PORT NO. 06–2000, (Nov. 2005) at 15. 105Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida on Jan. 12, 2006. 

transit zones. In recent years, JIATF South has achieved remarkable results in coordinating the detection, monitoring and eventual 

interdiction of record quantities of cocaine in the transit zone. In 

FY 2005, the Coast Guard seized over 300,000 pounds of cocaine.101

The committee recognizes the Coast Guard’s success is a direct result of the highly successful efforts of JIATF South and its participating agencies. 

We commend the work of JIATF South and fully support the 

international, interagency team effort that has led to record drug 

seizures. The teamwork and unity of effort effectively demonstrated 

at JIATF South should be fully supported and used as an example 

of how U.S. departments and agencies can work together to achieve 

a common goal.102

JIATF South’s continued success is based partly on their efforts 

in fusing a wide range of information sources to support patrolling 

ships and aircraft in the transit zones. The committee fully supports JIATF South’s focus on intelligence and support of specific 

programs such as Operation Panama Express. The committee recommends that DOD and JIATF South continue to enhance these 

programs which have produced outstanding results. 

4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft 

The committee supports the efforts of DOD to focus its counternarcotics role in areas that uniquely call for military support. However, we are concerned that DOD may not be currently capable of 

fulfilling its assigned role in the source and transit zones (i.e., 

Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Eastern Pacific Ocean).

DOD Maritime Patrol Aircraft On-station Hours 

Fiscal Year Maritime Patrol 

Aircraft 

FY 2001 103 ........................................................................................................................................................... 7,229

FY 2002 ................................................................................................................................................................ 6,425

FY 2003 ................................................................................................................................................................ 6,000

FY 2004 ................................................................................................................................................................ 4,426

FY 2005 104 ........................................................................................................................................................... 2,940

As shown above, the steady drop in DOD MPA hours has steadily reduced a much needed detection and monitoring capability in 

the transit zones and, subsequently, diminished JIATF South’s 

operational capabilities.105 JIATF South officials attribute the recent declines primarily to the reduced availability of U.S. Navy P–

3 MPA because of structural problems with the older aircraft. 

The lack of maritime patrol aircraft assets supporting JIATF 

South is a crisis, as the U.S. has been unable to respond to known 

35

106See Plan Colombia: Major Successes and New Challenges: Hearing before the House Committee on International Relations, 109th Cong. (May 11, 2005) (testimony of Speaker Dennis 

Hastert). 107Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources visit to Eleventh Coast Guard District, Alameda, CA, on Nov. 29, 2005.

shipments of drugs departing Colombia into the Caribbean and 

Eastern Pacific transit zone. Credible intelligence information far 

exceeds our ability to respond to these shipments. The committee 

believes that if DOD is unable to fully support the detection and 

monitoring mission, other agencies, most notably the enforcement 

agencies at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), should be 

provided the resources necessary to fill the critical void in drug detection, monitoring and interdiction missions. 

5. Maritime Refueling Vessel for the Eastern Pacific 

The committee is aware of and concerned about the flow of drugs 

bound for the U.S. and recognizes the unique challenges and 

vulnerabilities associated with U.S. interdiction efforts in the transit zone. At the May 11, 2005 House International Relations Committee hearing, Speaker Dennis Hastert testified that Congress 

‘‘must continue to find ways to stop those illicit drugs that are not 

eradicated from traveling through the transit zone to our 

shores.’’ 106

In the Eastern Pacific transit area, which is larger than the continental U.S., there are, on average, four ships dedicated to the 

drug interdiction mission. The example is certainly sobering: four 

ships to patrol an area larger than the continental U.S., trying to 

stop smugglers who will risk everything to evade U.S. law enforcement efforts.107

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108Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources briefing at JIATF-South, Key West, Florida, on Jan. 13, 2006. 109See Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in 

Our Sails? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005) (testimony of Rear Admiral Dennis Sirois, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29727. 110 Id, (testimony of Ralph Utley, Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator). 111 Id, (testimony of Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director of JIATF-South) (testimony of 

Rear Admiral Dennis Sirois, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard) (testimony of Mr. Charles E. Stallworth II, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine 

Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection) (testimony of Mr. Thomas M. Harrigan, Chief 

of Enforcement Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration). 112Letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics 

to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Continued

The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland 

Security report that narcotics smuggling organizations continue to 

avoid U.S. drug interdiction efforts by transiting deep into the 

Eastern Pacific ocean, often south and west of the Galapagos Islands, which is well beyond the endurance of employed U.S. 

ships.108 The graphic nearby details this intentional, evasive strategy on the part of smugglers that strikes at this persistent, yet 

unaddressed, vulnerability of U.S. efforts. The traffickers have developed a sophisticated refueling system using support ships, while 

the U.S. has nothing similar. 

Drug smugglers use the Eastern Pacific transit zone for moving 

narcotics into Mexico and then the United States. On any given 

day, U.S. and Allied forces seize an average of 100 kilograms of cocaine per ship when patrolling in the Eastern Pacific maritime 

transit zone. Because of the lack of a maritime oiler ship, the U.S. 

Coast Guard estimates it loses 100 ‘‘ship-days’’ each year due to 

lengthy refueling trips to central and South American countries.109

U.S. Navy ships conducting drug interdiction operations also face 

similar refueling challenges. 

As detailed above, interdiction efforts in the maritime transit 

zones are hampered by the absence of a refueling ship. The U.S. 

needs a maritime refueling vessel in the Eastern Pacific transit 

zone for drug interdiction operations. U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, 

and Allied warships performing drug interdiction missions currently have no ‘‘at-sea’’ refueling capability in that area and thus 

cannot operate for any significant length of time before they must 

return to port to refuel. 

Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) Ralph Utley testified 

on June 29, 2005, that there would be substantial benefits if a maritime oiler ship were employed to support interdiction activities in 

the Eastern Pacific maritime transit zone.110 At the same hearing, 

witnesses representing the Department of Defense, the U.S. Coast 

Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and the Drug Enforcement 

Administration testified that they believe the employment of a 

maritime oiler vessel would be an immediate improvement to U.S. 

interdiction operations in the transit zone.111

The U.S. Navy, which manages a fleet of refueling and support 

ships, has been unable to commit refueling ships to support the 

drug interdiction mission. On July 13, 2005, the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics wrote to the Government 

Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources that ‘‘the assets are simply not available.’’ 112

38

Resources, Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 113 109 Congressional Record H8047 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2005) (statement of Representative 

Souder), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 114 109 Congressional Record H6049 (daily ed. July 19, 2005) (statement of Representative 

Souder), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 115Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources drug control budget brief with Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Counternarcotics, on Nov. 10, 2005. 116Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources drug control budget brief with Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Counternarcotics, on Nov. 10, 2005; The White House, National Drug Control 

Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 35. 117Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources detection and monitoring brief with Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counternarcotics, on Aug. 31, 2005; Government Reform Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources visit to Coast Guard HITRON, Jacksonville, Florida, on Jan. 9, 2006. 

In the post 9/11 world, where both securing and detecting threats 

to our nation’s borders have become critical national security objectives, we cannot continue to neglect the fact that narco-traffickers 

are breaching our borders on a daily basis and transporting deadly 

narcotics onto our nation’s streets. Drug trafficking organizations 

have already adapted to these long transit routes by employing 

support ships to refuel drug laden boats on the high seas. The committee believes it is time that U.S. interdiction agencies be provided the right tools to respond to this unique opportunity to stop 

smugglers in the Eastern Pacific. 

Congress has recently attempted to address this vulnerability. 

Amendment No. 10 to H.R. 889, The Coast Guard and Maritime 

Transportation Act of 2005, was agreed to by voice vote on September 15, 2005, having received the support of leadership and the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. The Amendment 

authorized $50 million to enable the State Department’s Bureau for 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 

to purchase or lease a maritime refueling support vessel capable of 

refueling U.S. and Allied vessels engaged in drug interdiction in 

the Eastern Pacific transit zone.113

This is the second time the House voted in favor of procuring a 

drug interdiction refueling vessel. On July 19, 2005, a similar 

amendment was agreed to by voice vote and included in H.R. 2601, 

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 

2007.114

The committee commends DOD for reaching out to our international partners and requesting maritime refueling assistance. In 

November 2005, DOD stated that the Chilean Navy had an oiler 

available to support U.S. interdiction efforts in the transit zones 

and that a trial period would begin in the Spring of 2006.115

6. U.S. Navy—Aviation Use of Force (AUF) 

The committee fully supports the U.S Navy’s new armed helicopter program for drug interdiction missions.116 We believe that 

the Coast Guard’s Helicopter Interdiction Squadron (HITRON) has 

clearly demonstrated a safe and effective capability to stop fleeing, 

drug-laden speedboats. Although the process of developing the capability has been slow and was originally scheduled to be fully capable in October 2005, the committee commends the U.S. Navy for 

demonstrating flexibility and initiative to incorporate the Coast 

Guard’s techniques.117 The committee has high expectations that 

39

the new AUF capabilities will provide immediate results in interdicting go-fast smuggling vessels in the transit zones. 

7. Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) 

The degrading of the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) is 

an area of concern for the committee. As demonstrated in the 

graphic nearby, the U.S. Air Force, which took over control of 

TARS from the U.S. Customs Service, has reduced the number of 

TARS radar sites from 14 to 8. This reduction in capability has left 

the U.S. relatively blind to air and marine smuggling activities 

along the entire Gulf Coast (stretching from the east coast of Texas 

to the southern tip of Florida) and from the eastern coast of Florida 

to Puerto Rico.

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118Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform to DOD Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, to U.S. Southern Command and to U.S. Northern Command, (July 29, 2005) (on file 

with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources); Letter from Mark 

Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 

Committee on Government Reform, to Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South, (Jan. 31, 

2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 119Letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, 

to Congressman Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 120See Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States Hearing before 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 109th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2006) (testimony of John D. 

Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence). 121David E. Kaplan, Paying for Terror, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, (Dec. 5, 2005) at 50. 122See U.S. Central Command’s Counter Narcotics Program Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Senate Armed Services Committee, 109th 

Continued

The Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 

Drug Policy, and Human Resources has raised concerns in correspondence to the Department.118 In response, DOD has stated 

they have developed an over-the-horizon radar system to replace 

the old Caribbean radar network, 119 but the committee believes 

this new system has limited ability to detect vector and speed and 

that TARS is superior. In addition, DOD stated that drug smuggling through the U.S. gulf coast has always been deemed to be 

negligible. The committee is very concerned that a ‘‘gap’’ between 

detection systems may be developing in the gulf coast region. As 

record seizures and enforcement actions are increased in both the 

maritime transit zones and along the Southwest Border with Mexico, the gulf coast region will provide an easy entry way for traffickers wanting to avoid detection. 

If DOD is not committed to managing the TARS program as designed, the committee recommends that the Customs and Border 

Protection program in DHS, with appropriate funding for maintenance and improvements, regain operational responsibility for the 

TARS program. DOD, however, should retain the responsibility for 

the program’s logistics and procurement. 

8. Afghanistan Operations 

‘‘We live in a world that is full of conflict, contradictions, and accelerating change. Viewed from the perspective of the Director of 

National Intelligence, the most dramatic change of all is the exponential increase in the number of targets we must identify, track, 

and analyze. Today, in addition to hostile nation-states, we are focusing on terrorist groups, proliferation networks, alienated communities, charismatic individuals, narcotraffickers, and microscopic 

influenza.’’ 120

The connection between heroin production and terrorism in Afghanistan cannot be overstated. ‘‘The booming drug trade has given 

a strong second wind to the stubborn insurgency being waged by 

the Taliban and Islamists warlords—The ballooning dope trade is 

rapidly creating narco-states in central Asia, destroying what little 

border control exists and making it easier for terrorist groups to 

operate.’’ 121 In an April 2004 hearing, Rear Admiral Bruce Clingan 

for U.S. Central Command told the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities that 

the counternarcotics program in Afghanistan was a ‘‘key element’’ 

in the U.S. campaign against terrorism.122 The cultivation of popVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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Cong. (Apr. 2, 2004) (testimony of Rear Admiral Bruce Clingan, USN, Deputy J–3, U.S. Central 

Command). At http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2004—hr/040402-

clingan.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 123 U.S. Set to Battle Afghan Drug Trade, NEW YORK TIMES ON THE WEB, Aug. 11, 2004. 124The Opium Situation in Afghanistan as of 29 Aug. 2005, THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON

DRUGS AND CRIME, (UN REPORT), Aug. 2005. 125Philip Shishkin and David Crawford, In Afghanistan, Heroin Trade Soars Despite U.S. Aid, 

WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 18, 2006, and Declan Walsh, In Afghanistan, Taliban Turning to 

the Drug Trade, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 18, 2005. 126 Carlotta Gall, Another Year of Drug War, and the Poppy Crop Flourishes, NEW YORK TIMES

ON THE WEB, Feb. 17, 2006. 127 Briefing by Drug Enforcement Administration to the Speaker’s Drug Policy Task Force, 

Washington, DC, (Jan. 26, 2006). 128The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 38. 129 Associated Press, Drugs Main Threat in Afghanistan, General Says, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005. 130Thom Shanker, Pentagon Sees Antidrug Effort in Afghanistan, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 25, 

2005, and James Gordon Meek, DEA Team to Fight Afghani Opium Trade, NEW YORK DAILY

NEWS, Apr. 3, 2005. 131Department of Defense FY 2005 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Unified Assistance, (DOD) Feb. 2005, at 81. 

pies, which was regulated and taxed under Taliban rule, flourished 

after the elimination of the Taliban regime.123

In August 2005, the U.N. reported that opium production had decreased by 21 percent from its 2004 level but, even with this decrease, Afghanistan still ranks as the world’s largest opium supplier accounting for 87 percent of the world’s supply, according to 

the U.N.124 There is reportedly evidence that the Taliban are ordering increased poppy production from Afghan farmers in remote 

regions beyond the government’s control as a means to make 

money to finance their operations and also to weaken the Afghan 

central government.125 In Helmand province, the new governor recently stated that the Taliban have forged an alliance with drug 

smugglers, providing protection for drug convoys and mounting attacks to keep the government away and the poppy flourishing.126

The committee believes that U.S. counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan have failed to prevent the explosion in heroin production and 

trafficking. If all of Afghanistan’s opium were converted to heroin, 

the result would be 526 metric tons.127 Recent estimates from the 

United Nations office on Drugs and Crime indicate that 87 percent 

of the world’s illegal opiates are produced in Afghanistan.128

‘‘For my money, the No. 1 problem in Afghanistan is drugs,’’ said 

U.S. Marine Corps General James L. Jones, the Supreme Allied 

Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the Commander of the United 

States European Command (COMUSEUCOM).129 Despite recognition by some U.S. military leaders that drugs are currently Afghanistan’s primary security problem, DOD has played only a supporting role in counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan. The 

committee fully agrees with General Jones. The illicit drug trade 

must be addressed through a coordinated effort of involved U.S. 

agencies and coalition forces before stability and democracy can 

take hold in Afghanistan. 

In 2005, the Department of Defense increased its counternarcotics role in Afghanistan but did not become actively involved 

in counterdrug operations on the ground. The U.S. military in Afghanistan supported efforts by Afghan and U.S. agencies such as 

the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) by providing helicopter and cargo aircraft transport and planning and intelligence 

assets.130 To fund efforts to combat the drug trade in Afghanistan, DOD requested $257 million, 131 and Congress approved $242 milVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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132The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 38.

lion (Public Law 109–13, 119 Stat. 240) to fund facilities, equipment, communications, and training, and to lease and refurbish 

helicopters for the Afghan government. These funds are in addition 

to the $15.4 million in DOD’s FY 2005 Defense Budget for counternarcotics assistance to the Afghan government. 

The committee supports the goals outlined in the President’s 

Drug Control Strategy Report.132 Many of these efforts are pictured 

below, which call for helping the Afghans build a judicial system, 

construct a narcotics prosecution task force, establish border crossings and border strong points, and train and equip a counternarcotics police force. However, while the committee agrees that 

these are appropriate goals, they are better suited to programs run 

by the State Department and not efforts and missions to which 

DOD should be tasked. 

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133Press Release, House Committee on Government Reform, (Oct. 7, 2005) at 

www.reform.house.gov. 

Instead, the committee believes that the destruction of heroin 

producing laboratories, stockpiles of precursor chemicals, opium, 

and heroin should be DOD’s primary mission areas for counterdrug 

activity in Afghanistan. DOD should target and destroy Afghan 

drug production infrastructures and trafficking operations. The reluctance to target known stockpiles of opium products will encourage even more heroin production, threatening to increase heroin 

addiction in Europe and the U.S. and providing increased funding 

for the terrorists who are currently engaging our troops in Afghanistan. Until DOD shows a willingness to take effective action 

against heroin production and to closely coordinate its efforts with 

the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 

limited progress will be made. 

The committee is similarly concerned about the limited support 

being provided by DOD to U.S. and Allied agencies actually trying 

to conduct counterdrug operations in Afghanistan. DOD has been 

reluctant to provide aviation assets or other logistical support to 

DEA personnel. 

Not only does the administration need to refine U.S. mission 

areas in Afghanistan, but DOD needs to better align and coordinate with U.S. agencies with similar mission sets. The committee 

was pleased to learn of the Department’s recent decision to lease 

low-quality Soviet-era MI–17 helicopters to support and transport 

DEA teams, and believes it is long overdue. The committee recommends that the Department provide better support to DEA’s 

counterdrug efforts. 

9. Colombian Operations 

U.S. military involvement in Colombia began in 2000 under 

‘‘Plan Colombia’’ and was limited to training Colombian counternarcotics units, although U.S. forces now train the Colombian military in counterinsurgency operations. This change of emphasis is 

a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, whereby Colombia went from being a part of the ‘‘War on Drugs’’ to the ‘‘Global 

War on Terror’’ (GWOT). The danger to the Americas, even to those 

nations with long histories of self-determination, and of the political instability generated by drug trafficking was made clear by 

Chairman Tom Davis of the House Government Reform Committee 

on October 7, 2005, when he said of Colombia, ‘‘(It) is not only one 

of the oldest democracies in our hemisphere, but is also home to 

three terrorist groups who fund their guerilla activities with drugs 

smuggled into the U.S. for American consumption.’’ 133

Colombia occupies a unique position in the administration’s global war on terror, in that its targeted terrorist groups are Marxist, 

as opposed to Islamic-based, and have no reported links to Al 

Qaeda or other Islamic groups. Colombia has been involved for almost forty years in what some describe as a civil war and others 

describe as a counterinsurgency campaign against three major 

groups. The first two groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) started 

in the 1950s as Marxist revolutionary groups but reportedly have 

46

134Lieutenant Colonel Kevin W. Buckley, U.S. Support to Plan Colombia: A Heading Check 

U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 

Pa. (2004) at 1 (on file with U.S. Army War College). 135 Id. 136 Id. 137Dept. of State, Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, (2004) at http://www.state.gov/

documents/organization/45323.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 138See The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan Colombia Successes and 

Remaining Challenges: Hearing before the Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (June 

17, 2004) (testimony of Thomas O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 

and Low Intensity Conflict). 139See Testimony on the Department of Defense Counternarcotics Program in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2005: Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Senate Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong. (Apr. 2, 

2004) (testimony of Brigadier General Benjamin Mixon, U.S. Army, Director of Operations, U.S. 

Southern Command).

lost most of their ideological support and have transformed into 

violent criminal organizations.134 The other group, the rightist 

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) is a conglomerate of 

illegal self-defense groups formed in rural areas where the Colombian government did not exert a strong presence.135 All three 

groups allegedly fund their activities through drug revenues 136 and 

are on the administration’s official list of terrorist organizations.137

In June 2004 congressional testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict told House members that DOD and other U.S. agencies operating in Columbia, 

‘‘. . . seek to systematically dismantle drug trafficking networks, 

both to halt the flow of drugs into the United States, and to bolster 

the broader war on terrorism effort.’’ 138 Narcoterrorism was reported by Brigadier General Benjamin Mixon, Director of Operations, Southern Command in a hearing before Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities in April 2004, as ‘‘. . . erode(ing) the very fabric of democracy 

by spawning terrorism, corrupting public institutions, promoting 

criminal activity, undermining legitimate economies and disrupting 

social order.’’ 139

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140Kathleen T. Rhem, U.S. Military Helping Colombian Military Cope With Drug War’s Legacy, AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE, Nov. 29, 2005. 141The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 20. 142DEPT. OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT, (Feb. 2006) at 14. At http:/

/www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 143The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 21. 

About 200 special forces soldiers are currently serving as trainers, where they are limited to training in garrison and planning 

support at headquarters, and another 200 troops provide ‘‘information support’’ including intelligence, leadership, and planning support.140 Also contributing to Colombia’s success has been the Air 

Bridge Denial program.141 In 2005, this program resulted in seven 

interdictions, five impounded aircraft, the destruction of two aircraft, and the seizure of 1.5 metric tons of cocaine in Colombia. Additionally, three aircraft and 2.1 metric tons of cocaine were impounded in neighboring countries after coordination between host 

nations and JIATF South. 

In its Quadrennial Defense Review Report, released February 6, 

2006, DOD justifiably recognized its part in the successes achieved 

in helping stabilize large tracts of Colombia.

U.S. Southern Command’s support for Plan Colombia is 

yet another example of preventive action. The United 

States has worked with the Government of Colombia to 

combat the production and trafficking of illegal drugs. In 

2002, at the request of the Administration, Congress 

granted expanded authorities to help the Colombian Government wage a unified campaign against terrorism as 

well as drugs, and thereby assert effective control over its 

territory. This broader mission has helped the Colombian 

Government seize the initiative against illegal armed 

groups, demobilize thousands of illegal paramilitaries, decrease violence and return to government authority areas 

that had been under the control narcoterrorists for decades.142

The committee strongly recommends that the Department continue to fully support these important programs. These efforts, 

combined with the Government of Colombia’s efforts to attack powerful drug traffickers and extradite them to the United States has 

produced unparalleled results 143 and need to remain robust to be 

effective. 

Moreover, the committee encourages CENTCOM to coordinate 

the meeting of Colombian military and police personnel with Iraqi 

counterparts to discuss Colombian approaches to oil pipeline protection and counterdrug helicopter operations. Colombian security 

services have had vast experience and measured success guarding 

oil pipelines and carrying out tactical helicopter missions that may 

prove beneficial to both counterdrug operations and efforts to protect oil pipelines in Iraq. 

10. Department of Defense Performance Measures 

Congress has had difficulty obtaining sufficient information from 

DOD that would allow for an evaluation of the effectiveness of 

counterdrug programs at the Department. For example, the Department has not established a ship and aircraft resource hour tarVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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144The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at 15. 145 Id. 146DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION ASSETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, GAO REPORT NO. 06–2000, Nov. 2005, at 25. 147The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 148The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 149The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 150The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 151 Id.

get to support transit zone detection and monitoring programs.144

Additionally, DOD’s counternarcotics program has not yet been reviewed under the administration’s Performance Assessment Rating 

Tool (PART) process.145 GAO reported in November 2005 that DOD 

‘‘is developing performance measures that focus on the number of 

disruptions of cocaine trafficking events, but it has not yet set any 

targets or goals to assess its progress.146 The committee urges the 

Department to make greater progress in performance accountability. In particular, the committee believes that substantial increases in resources committed to the Department’s detection and 

monitoring mission in the transit zone need to be made in order 

to achieve greater supply reduction. 

B. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities State Grants Program Funding 

SDFSC State Grants FY 2005 Requested 147

FY 2005 

Final 148

FY 2006 Requested 149FY 2006 Enacted 150FY 2007 Request 151

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $610.98 $437.38 $0 $346.50 $0

* in millions. 

Contact Information: Office of SDFSC: 202–260–3954, http://

www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osdfs/index.html. 

1. Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities 

The committee has specific concerns about the administration of 

the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities (SDFSC) program at the Department of Education. Despite the strong rejection 

by Congress of last year’s budget proposal to completely eliminate 

the State grants program and ample evidence that the stated reasons behind such a step are not properly grounded, the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) has once again made the same 

proposal with the support of officials at the Department of Education. 

Congressman Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, expressed 

strong support for the State Grants Program: ‘‘Safe and Drug-Free 

Schools and similar programs have great potential as a vehicle for 

bringing effective anti-drug education to millions of young people in 

50

152See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 109th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005) (statement of Congressman Mark Souder, chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 153 Id, (statement of Congressman Elijah Cummings, ranking member, Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 154 Id, (statement of Clarence Jones, coordinator, Safe and Drug-Free Youth Section, Fairfax 

County Public Schools). 155 No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–6578 (2001). 156Public Law 89–10 (1994). 

our schools.’’ 152 Moreover, Ranking Member, Representative Elijah 

Cummings, reemphasized the same message: 

The most severe program cut in the area of prevention is 

the elimination of $441 million in funding for grants to 

States under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program 

within the Department of Education. If we enact the President’s request, the consequences will be felt in classrooms 

across the country, where States and localities simply cannot afford to fund drug education on their own.153

The grants distributed under the State Grants program serve as 

leverage that allows local communities to significantly augment 

their capacity to provide drug prevention programs. ‘‘Many school 

systems across America have found unique ways to combine these 

SDFSC funds with very little local moneys in order to provide the 

highest level of drug prevention. Removing the monetary foundation of these programs could cause many if not all of them to collapse.’’ 154

The committee is very concerned that the major reforms required 

in Title IV, Part A of the ‘‘No Child Left Behind Act’’ (NCLB) 155

were never implemented by the Department of Education. To date, 

the Department has failed to provide any guidance to the states regarding implementation of the requirements for a Uniform Management Information and Reporting System (UMIRS). 

This system was specifically included in the NCLB Act to ensure 

that uniform information, data and outcome measures for drug use 

were collected by every state in a uniform manner and reported to 

the Secretary of Education, so that progress could be measured 

within a state over time, as well as among and between all of the 

states. Congress also specifically included a minimum data set as 

part of the Safe Report required in Section 4116 of the NCLB 

Act.156

This minimum data set requires that the following drug use data 

be collected, tracked and reported to the Secretary by all states: incidence and prevalence, age of onset, perception of health risk and 

perception of social disapproval of drug use and violence by youth 

in schools and communities. As outlined in the law, the data set 

for the drug-related indicators are identical to what is currently 

being collected successfully by both the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy’s Drug-Free Communities Act grantees and the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention’s State Incentive Grant recipients. 

The Department has failed to meet the requirements of Title IV, 

Part A of the NCLB Act, intended to measure the effectiveness and 

outcomes of the SDFSC program. Consequently, Congress recently 

mandated that the following actions be taken by the Department 

51

157See http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=109—cong—reports&docid=f:hr143.109.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 158Letter from Debra A. Price, Assistant Deputy Secretary, Office of Safe and Drug Free 

Schools, Department of Education, to Congressman Mark Souder, chairman, Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, (Dec. 8, 2005) (on file with Government 

Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 159Id. 160The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 1. At http://

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs06/. 

of Education to correct this failure of implementation, in the Conference Report accompanying the FY 2006, Labor, Health and 

Human Services and Education Appropriations Act: 157

The Conference Committee is concerned that the Department of Education has neglected to report specific data to 

Congress as required under Section 4122(c) of Title IV, 

Part A of the No Child Left Behind Act. This data is required to be included in the State Report under Section 

4116 of the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities 

program. The report specifically requires all states to collect 

and report to the Secretary, in a form specified by the Secretary, the following data: incidence and prevalence, age of 

onset, perception of health risk and perception of social disapproval of drug use and violence by youth in schools and 

communities. The Conference Committee expects the Department to develop a plan for how it will collect the specified data from the states and report it to Congress in a 

timely manner. The plan should be submitted to the House 

and Senate authorizing and oversight committees within 60 

days of the passage of this bill.

The committee focuses its critique on the administration of the 

Safe and Drug-Free Schools program and the proposed elimination 

of the State Grants program. A central reason behind this proposal 

was the determination that this program was ‘‘ineffective’’ under 

OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) review for the fiscal year 2004 Budget. However, in qualifying this determination 

the PART assessment stated that the ‘‘existing program indicators 

use national surveys and don’t measure . . . drug abuse at State 

and local levels.’’ 158

The subcommittee specifically inquired in a November 17, 2005, 

letter to the Department of Education concerning the steps being 

taken to address this criticism. The Department provided the following response: ‘‘The President’s Budget request for FY 2006 recommended termination of the Safe and Drug-Free Schools State 

Grants Program.’’ 159 Staff interviews with representatives from 

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities also reconfirmed the 

administration’s adherence to the program’s claimed ‘‘ineffectiveness’’ as justification for not taking steps to reform the State 

Grants program. 

In the ‘‘Summary: FY 2007 National Drug Control Budget,’’ the 

administration once again, repeating the unfounded and inadequate reasons given last year, states: ‘‘The President’s Budget 

does not include funding for Safe and Drug-Free Schools State 

Grant Program, as grant funds are spread too thinly to support 

quality interventions and it was rated ‘‘ineffective’’ by PART because of its inability to demonstrate effectiveness.’’ 160 However, the 

52

161 EDUCATION’S DATA MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE: SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS MADE, BUT BETTER

PLANNING NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH PROJECT GOALS, GAO REPORT NO. 06–6 (Government Accounting Office), Oct. 28, 2005, at 2. 162 Id. 163See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use Prevention? Hearing Before House Subcommittee 

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 

109th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005) (statement of Congressman Mark Souder, chairman, Subcommittee 

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).

SDFSC representatives interviewed by staff acknowledged that, 

utilizing proxy measures, the Department of Education has been 

incapable of getting results to show either the effectiveness or the 

ineffectiveness of the State Grants Program. 

Moreover, SDFSC State data collection project officials developed 

a preliminary strategy designed to address the problem of collecting data from the states, such as providing exemptions from 

certain reporting requirements for some states.161 ‘‘However, this 

strategy has not been finalized, and Education has not developed 

a specific plan of action for how they might (1) help states that are 

deficient, (2) deal with state expectations for phasing out the multiple data collections, or (3) meet the expectations of their own program offices.’’ 162 The committee is dissatisfied with the degree of 

implementation on the part of the administrators of SDFDC. 

Moreover, Chairman Mark Souder made the following comments 

directly addressing the lack of support the State Grants program 

has received from the administration in general:

The administration has never attempted to reform this 

program, however, which ought to be the first step, not 

eliminating it entirely. And I want to say as a member of 

the Education Committee, and as somebody who was on it 

when we did this that we got no leadership at the time we 

authorized the program either, other than eliminating 

it.163

The committee agrees that ineffective programs should be held 

accountable. However, proposing the elimination of a program because it is supposedly ‘‘ineffective,’’ while also admitting that its effectiveness is unknown, is of utmost concern. The more serious concern arises from the Department’s contribution to the claimed inefficiency by having failed to implement congressionally-mandated 

requirements and its failure to give the States any specific guidance on how to report their data and outcomes. These failures directly impact the Department of Education’s incapacity to actually 

determine the effectiveness of the State Grants program. 

In FY 2006 Congress emphatically rejected the same administration proposal to eliminate the State Grants program. Instead of 

eliminating the program, Congress appropriated $346.5 million for 

the State Grants program. Similar to last year, the committee 

strongly suggests that the administration take substantial steps to 

reform the State Grants program rather than eliminate it. More 

specifically, the committee suggests that the administrators of the 

SDSFC program at the Department of Education be held accountable for neglecting the legal obligation to collect state data intended to measure the effectiveness and outcomes of the SDFSC 

State Grant program. 

53

164For further information, see the Department’s website at http://web99.ed.gov/GTEP/

Program2.nsf/b39cd123fd4a045b8525644400514f2b/

cea6c8f66422784785256d3c0074e597?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 26, 2006), or call the Department’s Office of SDFS at (202) 260–3428. 165The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at 17. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 

2006). 166 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002). 167The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at 17. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 

2006). 168See ONDCP news release at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press05/

122805.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

2. Student Drug Testing 164

For FY 2006, Congress appropriated $9.09 million for schoolbased drug testing programs for students. The FY 2007 request of 

$15 million is a $4.6 million increase over last year.165 The committee strongly supports this testing initiative. However, in light of 

the administrations proposal to eliminate the State Grants Program, a more significant augmentation in the funding for student 

drug testing is strongly recommended. 

By addressing accountability, drug testing in schools has proven 

the single most effective drug-prevention program in the United 

States. In 2002 the Supreme Court declared: ‘‘[W]e find that testing 

students who participate in extracurricular activities is a reasonably effective means of addressing the School District’s legitimate 

concerns in preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use.’’ 166

The administration has taken a leadership role in promoting 

drug testing in the schools. Drug testing shows great promise in 

preventing young people from using narcotics. It is also a tool for 

identifying which students will need treatment and other special 

help to get them off drugs and achieve their true potential. It is 

also an excellent tool for measuring the success of other drug use 

prevention programs, as it shows whether the true bottom line—

reducing drug use—has been achieved.’’ 167

The purpose of drug testing is not to punish students who use 

drugs but to help those in trouble by preventing drug use and helping drug-using students become drug-free in a confidential manner. 

The results of a positive drug test should be used to intervene with 

not-yet-dependent students and get drug-dependent students into 

effective treatment. After assessing the extent of the problem, parents and administrators can recommend further prevention activities such as education on the negative effects of drugs, counseling, 

and if necessary, drug treatment. 

ONDCP and the U.S. Department of Education announced the 

release of $7.2 million in Federal grants for schools to implement 

student drug testing programs in October 2005. Fifty-five grants 

were awarded to fund random student drug testing programs in 

352 schools.168 The competitive grant program supports schools in 

the design and implementation of a confidential and non-punitive 

program to randomly screen selected students and to intervene 

with assessment, referral, and intervention for students whose test 

results indicate they have used illicit drugs. 

Results from a longitudinal study, the Student Athlete Testing 

Using Random Notification Project (SATURN), reported that of the 

25 percent of students surveyed who used marijuana and of the 60 

percent who used alcohol, only 9 percent would continue to use 

54

169See http://www.studentdrugtesting.org/SDT%20DUPONT%20STUDY.pdf (last visited Feb. 

24, 2006). 170See http://www.studentdrugtesting.org/Hunterdon%20study2.PDF (last visited Feb. 24, 

2006). 171 Id. 

drugs and 12 percent would continue to use alcohol if mandatory 

drug testing were present in their schools.169 Moreover, a study at 

Hunterdon Central Regional High School in New Jersey, highlighted in the chart below, stated: ‘‘of students who reported using 

marijuana in the last year, 58 percent reported Random Drug testing (RDT) is a good excuse not to use. 81.8 percent of those students who did not use marijuana in the past year agreed that RDT 

is a good excuse not to use.’’ 170

Student Past Month Drug Use: Hunterdon County vs. National Average 171

10th US 10th 12th US 12th 

Alcohol ............................................................................................ 29.9% ↓ 35% 49.6% ↑ 48%

Been Drunk .................................................................................... 9.7% ↓ 18% 30.8% ↓ 31%

Marijuana ....................................................................................... 4.7% ↓ 17% 11.7% ↓ 21

Cocaine ........................................................................................... 0 1% 1.4 ↓ 2%

Ecstasy ........................................................................................... 0.1% NA 0.8% Na 

Heroin ............................................................................................. 0 <1% 0.6% <1%

Cigarettes ....................................................................................... 11.5% ↓ 17% 25.5% ↑ 24%

The committee supports the administration’s request of $15 million for non-punitive random student drug testing as an effective 

and economical method to deter drug use and identify those in 

need of treatment. At the same time, if prevention authentically 

represents one of the three pillars of the administration’s efforts to 

end illegal drug abuse, then the committee strongly recommends a 

substantial increase to the funding of student drug testing as an 

effective and accountable form of drug prevention. 

3. Lack of Diligence in Reporting to Congress 

The committee is seriously concerned with the Department of 

Education’s lack of due diligence in preparing for a drug prevention 

hearing held on April 26, 2005. Department of Education representatives were formally notified to prepare to testify at the April 

hearing in a December 16, 2004, briefing. Despite being put on notice in December 2004 to prepare for the hearing, ED officials 

claimed immediately prior to the hearing in April that they had not 

had enough time to sufficiently prepare to testify. 

If not constituting intentional avoidance of testifying before Congress, such unwillingness to be held accountable at least is grossly 

negligent. ED representatives have an obligation to promptly and 

reasonably respond to requests for testimony from Congress. Otherwise, the oversight function of congressional committees would be 

seriously impaired.

55

172The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 173The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 174The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 175The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 176 Id. 177The 2004 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) found that 6.0 million Americans were current (past-month) non-medical users of prescription drugs. Only marijuana was 

higher, with 14.6 million users. 178The 12 states and their relevant statutes are: Alaska [Alaska Stat. § 11.71.090 (2005)]; Arizona [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–3412.01(A) (2006)]; California [Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. 

§ 11362.5 (2006)]; Colorado [Colo. Const. Art. XVIII § 4 (2005)]; Hawaii [Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 29–

121 to 329–128 (2005)]; Maine [Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 1102 or 2382–B (5) (2005)]; Montana 

[Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50–46–101 to 50–46–210 (2005)]; Nevada [Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 453A.010 

to 453A.400 (2005)]; Oregon [Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 475.300 to 475.346 (2003)]; Rhode Island [R.I. 

Gen. Laws § 21–28.6 (2006)]; Vermont [Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 4472–4474d (2005)]; Washington 

[Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 69.51A.005 to 69.51A.902 (2005)]. 

C. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

HHS FY 2005 Requested 172

FY 2005 

Final 173

FY 2006 Requested 174FY 2006 Enacted 175FY 2007 Request 176

National Institute of Drug Abuse .......................... $1,019.1 $1,006.4 $1,010.1 $1,000.0 $994.8

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 

Administration .................................................. $2,637.7 $2,490.5 $2,498.8 $2,442.5 $2,411.1

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $3,656.8 $3,496.9 $3,508.9 $3,442.5 $3,405.9

* in millions. 

Contact Information: HHS Office of Public Affairs: 202–690–

7850, http://www.hhs.gov/budget/. 

The President’s drug control budget request for the Department 

of Health and Human Services (HHS) has historically been the 

largest single-department request. This Department is responsible 

for providing programs addressing drug abuse treatment and prevention. The President has requested a total of $70.64 billion for 

all of HHS’s programs, of which $3.4 billion is part of the drug 

budget. 

The two agencies within HHS that maintain drug control programs tracked by the President’s drug budget request are (1) National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), and (2) Substance Abuse 

and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). Conspicuously absent from the scrutiny of drug budget oversight is the Food 

and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsible for drug approval, labeling and manufacturing standards. 

Perhaps due to the lack of oversight by the administration of the 

FDA, prescription drug abuse today is a critical national problem, 

second only to marijuana abuse.177 FDA’s stubbornly consistent position is that the problem of diverted and abused drugs is solely 

one for the Drug Enforcement Administration. 

The committee notes with frustration the apparent incongruity in 

FDA’s sole authority to approve drugs—including drugs likely to be 

abused—with their official non-involvement in any sort of drug control program. Moreover, the FDA has failed to act in any meaningful way in the face of twelve states 178 approving the use of botanical marijuana for medical purposes. 

56

179See To Do No Harm: Strategies for Preventing Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing before the 

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10001. 180 In 1978, as part of a lawsuit settlement by HHS, NIDA began supplying cannabis to patients whose physicians applied for and received, a ‘‘compassionate use’’ exemption from the 

FDA. The practice was terminated in 1992, but NIDA was allowed to continue supplying cannabis to those patients receiving it at the time, and is currently supplying cannabis to seven 

patients. National Institute on Drug Abuse, ‘‘Provision of Marijuana and Other Compounds for 

Scientific Research,’’ Jan. 1998. At http://www.nida.nih.gov/about/organization/nacda/

marijuanastatement.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 181See Marijuana and Medicine: The Need for a Science-Based Approach: Hearing before the 

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/

Nora%20D.%20Volkow%20-%20NIDA.pdf. 182See Harm Reduction or Harm Maintenance—Is There Such a Thing as Safe Drug Abuse? 

Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=22570. 183Science & Response, Conference by Harm Reduction Coalition and Harm Reduction 

Project, in Salt Lake City, Utah (Aug. 19–20, 2005). HHS was listed on the conference program 

as a ‘‘primary sponsor’’ of the event. 184 HHS’s sponsorship of this meeting was the subject of a critical letter from Mark Souder, 

chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, to HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt Aug. 12, 2005. At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=32260. 185Federal Agencies and Conference Spending: Hearing before the Senate Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and International Security, 109th Cong. (Feb. 7, 2006). 

The seriousness of the prescription drug abuse problem 179

should compel, at the very least, FDA action with education and 

approval programs that specifically address this type of abuse. 

Likewise, state approval of drugs for medical use should compel the 

FDA to assert its authority under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 

as the sole agency charged with determining the safety and efficacy 

of a drug for therapeutic treatment. 

Although the FDA has never approved marijuana as a treatment 

for any condition, 180 its inaction when states independently determine that marijuana can be used for therapeutic purposes significantly undermines FDA’s statutory authority.181 It is possible that 

continued inaction on the part of FDA in these critical abuse areas 

will prompt congressional legislation to correct the problems and 

perhaps formalize a stronger drug approval role for DEA. 

Finally, the committee notes that it is unhelpful to national antidrug efforts for HHS to sponsor and participate in so called ‘‘harm 

reduction’’ conferences promoting a pro-drug legalization philosophy.182 A 2005 harm reduction conference 183 that consumed at 

least $20,000 of HHS funds promoted pro-drug themes that are 

counter to the administration’s public approach in fighting illegal 

drug use.184 One of the major sessions at this Harm Reduction conference was entitled, ‘‘We Don’t Need a War on Methamphetamine.’’ Another conference topic was ‘‘You Don’t Have to be Clean 

and Sober. Or Even Want to Be!’’

A Senate hearing 185 revealed that HHS spent more than $1.4 

billion on conferences since the year 2000. At a time when the nation’s budget is constrained and our anti-drug efforts are affected 

by certain budget restrictions, the committee views as inexcusable 

for HHS to make lavish expenditures on conferences where prodrug legalization themes are dominant. Such money would be better applied to real anti-drug efforts, such as methamphetamine 

treatment programs. 

57

186The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 187The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 188The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 189The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 190 Id. 191See U.S. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Bringing the Power of Science to Bear on Drug 

Abuse and Addiction: 5 Year Strategic Plan, 2000–2005. NIH PUBLICATION NO. 00–4774, Sept. 

2000. At http://www.drugabuse.gov/StrategicPlan/index00–05.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 192See U.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, SUCCESSFUL TRIAL CAPS 25-YEAR

BUPRENORPHINE DEVELOPMENT EFFORT, at http://www.drugabuse.gov/NIDA—notes/NNvol19N3/

Successful.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). 193See Marijuana and Medicine: The Need for A Science-Based Approach: Hearing before the 

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004) (statement of Nora Volkow, M.D., Director, 

NIDA). At http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Nora%20D.%20Volkow%20-%20NIDA.pdf (last 

visited Feb. 21, 2006). 194See NIDA’s webpage devoted to information about Marijuana: http://drugabuse.gov/

DrugPages/Marijuana.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). See also A Collection of Articles that AdContinued

1. National Institute on Drug Abuse—[NIDA]

NIDA FY 2005 Requested 186

FY 2005 

Final 187

FY 2006 Requested 188FY 2006 Enacted 189FY 2007 Request 190

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $1,019.1 $1,006.4 $1,010.1 $1,000.0 $994.8

* in millions. 

Contact Information: 301–443–1124, http://drugabuse.gov/. 

The President’s drug budget request of $994.8 million for the Na- tional Institute on Drug Abuse is a $5.2 million decrease from the 

2006 enacted amount for the Institute. This would mark a two-year 

decline in the budget for NIDA. 

NIDA is a component of the National Institutes of Health, and 

supplies critical basic research that supports a broad range of drug 

prevention and treatment programs, all designed to reduce the adverse health, economic and social consequences to individuals, families, and communities affected by drug abuse.191 NIDA’s activities 

are aimed at providing the infrastructure, research and medical 

compounds for developing new treatments for addiction, and its 

Clinical Trials Network (CTN) is designed to bridge 15 to 20-year 

gap between treatment research and practice. 

NIDA’s first priority area is prevention research in order to better understand normal brain development, how that development 

can be influenced by drugs, and how drug use harms the developing brain. NIDA has increased its emphasis on adolescent brain 

development, and the institute is currently studying the ‘‘social 

neuroscience’’ of children and evaluating the genetics, development, 

environment and co-morbidity to determine which factors play a 

role in drug use and addiction. 

The second priority area for NIDA is treatment interventions. 

NIDA was instrumental in developing buprenorphine, a treatment 

for opiate dependence, 192 and has placed an emphasis on developing new compounds to address addiction to marijuana, America’s 

most abused illegal substance.193 In particular, NIDA’s focus on 

how marijuana abuse 194 affects the adolescent brain is guiding the 

58

dress Research on Marijuana at http://drugabuse.gov/NIDA—Notes/NN0058.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 195 According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (available at http://

www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda.htm), 11.4% of youths ages 12 to 17 in 2004 reported ever misusing 

prescription pain relievers such as oxycodone and codeine, compared to 1.2% in 1989. See Institute of Medicine, Committee on the Assessment of the U.S. Drug Safety System, July 19, 2005, 

Statement of Marc J. Wheat, staff director and chief counsel, House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform. At http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Testimony%20for%20Meeting%20Two.pdf; See also To Do No 

Harm: Strategies for Preventing Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10001. 196See NIDA’s webpage devoted to information about Methamphetamine at http://

drugabuse.gov/infofacts/methamphetamine.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). 197 In FY 2001: $18.2M; FY 2002: $21.3M; FY 2003: $27.2M; FY 2004: $37.3M; FY 2005: 

$40.2M; FY 2006: $41.0M. 198This number of treatment providers is 94 more than the projected target of training 90 

treatment providers in 2005. 

agency in its development of new prevention and intervention programs. 

Also a target for treatment intervention, and second only to 

marijuana use, is the abuse of prescription drugs.195 Abuse of prescription drugs, which are cheaper than illegal drugs and can be 

easier to obtain, is increasing at an alarming rate. NIDA has developed science-based materials to educate the public and health care 

community on abuse of prescription drugs. 

Finally, NIDA recognizes the growing rate of methamphetamine 

use and addiction as a special urgency for treatment intervention 

because of its highly addictive and toxic properties.196 In addition 

to the funds NIDA devotes to general drug abuse research, NIDA 

has allocated an increasing amount of funds specifically to methamphetamine targeted research.197

NIDA views methamphetamine addiction as chronic—the addiction must be constantly treated but cannot be cured. NIDA’s focus, 

therefore, with methamphetamine is to minimize the rate of relapse. NIDA has developed three promising compounds to treat 

methamphetamine addiction, and its Methamphetamine Clinical 

Trials Group is conducting several clinical trials of medications for 

methamphetamine addiction. NIDA expects data on these medications to be available within two years. 

NIDA has created the Clinical Trials Network as a way to translate the research knowledge into successful treatment programs. 

CTNs systematically test promising behavioral, pharmacological, 

and integrated drug abuse treatments in community settings. 

There are currently seventeen CTN nodes comprised of approximately 120 providers. 

In addition to a yearly review, the CTN nodes are thoroughly 

evaluated every five years when each project must go through a recompetition process in which applications for new grants and continuation proposals can compete. The most recent competition process led to the determination that two of them would be discontinued. 

The CTN program allows evaluation of treatments from small research settings and has had measurable results in adapting behavior treatment approaches: in 2005, the project trained 184 treatment providers 198 in three treatment approaches adapted for community-based settings; to date, the CTN has included nearly 6,400 

59

199The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 200The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 201The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 202The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 203 Id. 204 CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 1306, H. REPT. NO. 102–522, at 125 (1992). 205FY 2004 prevention programs through SAMHSA were funded at $572.7M; FY 2005 preven- tion programs through SAMHSA were funded at $572.6M; FY 2006 prevention programs 

through SAMHSA are funded at $563.0M. 206 In a briefing with the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Resources staff, SAMHSA stated that the 2006 prevention reduction was realized through removing special earmarks, though this was not discussed in SAMHSA’s justification for 2006. 

Likewise, there is no discussion in the 2007 budget request justifying the prevention reduction, 

and presumably would not be explainable by the removal of earmarks. 

people participating in 21 different treatment research protocols. 

The committee is disappointed that this program is at zero growth. 

The committee recognizes the importance of prevention programs, and addressing drug abuse with a balanced strategy. 

2. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 

[SAMHSA]

SAMHSA FY 2005 Requested 199

FY 2005 

Final 200

FY 2006 Requested 201FY 2006 Enacted 202FY 2007 Request 203

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $2,637.7 $2,490.5 $2,498.8 $2,442.5 $2,411.1

* in millions. 

Contact Information: SAMHSA Office of Policy, Planning and 

Budget: 240–276–2200, http://www.samhsa.gov. 

SAMHSA was established by Congress in 1992 ‘‘to fully develop 

the Federal Government’s ability to target effectively substance 

abuse and mental health services to the people most in need and 

to translate research in these areas more effectively and more rapidly into the general health care system.’’ 204 The President has requested $2.41 billion for SAMHSA’s prevention and treatment programs. This is an overall decrease of $31.4 million from the FY 

2006 enacted amount. The President’s request includes $551.6 million for prevention programs and $1.86 billion for treatment programs. 

Prevention 

The President has requested a total of $551.6 million for 

SAMHSA’s prevention programs. Consistent with the President’s 

dramatic overall 19.3 percent reduction in prevention programs in 

the drug control budget, the amount requested for SAMHSA’s prevention efforts is $11.41 million lower than the FY 2006 enacted 

amount. This continues the ongoing decline in funds for SAMHSA’s 

prevention programs, 205 which are not justified by SAMHSA in its 

budget requests.206

Reduction in funding for our nation’s prevention efforts in the 

area of substance abuses is a matter of serious concern, because it 

impacts our first line of defense. The President’s Drug Control 

Strategy emphasizes ‘‘stopping use before it starts’’ as one of three 

national priorities for drug control. Curtailing prevention efforts 

60

207See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 109th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26210. 208See SAMHSA’s website for a description of the National Registry at http://

modelprograms.samhsa.gov/template.cfm?page=default (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). 209SAMHSA has a substance abuse treatment facility locator on its website at http://

findtreatment.samhsa.gov/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 210See Providing Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Services to Adolescents: Hearing 

before the Senate Subcommittee on Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services, Committee on 

Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong. (June 15, 2004). At http://

frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108—senate—hearings&docid=f:94384.pdf 

(last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

will only lead to an increased need for treatment, and the committee is very concerned about ensuring that prevention programs 

are adequately funded. 

SAMHSA’s prevention efforts are coordinated through the Center 

for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP), which brings prevention 

programs to all states nationwide. These programs engage states, 

communities and organizations to reduce risk factors for substance 

abuse through the Strategic Prevention Framework (SPF).207

The SPF is a step-by-step process allowing communities to implement the most effective prevention efforts for their specific needs. 

Built on evidence-based practices, it is a five-step model designed 

to (1) profile community needs and readiness (2) mobilize and build 

needed capacity (3) develop a prevention plan (4) implement programs, policies and strategies based on what is known to be effective (5) evaluate program effectiveness. 

The SPF program is accomplished through State Incentive 

Grants (SIGs) that require 85 percent of the funding must be used 

locally within the state receiving the grant. In Fiscal Year 2005, 

twenty-four states received SPF SIGs. The committee applauds 

SAMHSA’s efforts through the SPF program for its evidence-based 

approach to prevention. Through the National Registry of Effective 

Programs and Practices 208 CSAP identifies and works to increase 

model, evidence-based prevention programs in communities 

throughout the country. This demonstrable effort is faithful to the 

Drug Control Strategy’s goal of ‘‘stopping use before it starts.’’

Treatment 

The President has requested $1.86 billion for SAMHSA’s treat- ment efforts, a decrease of $19.99 million from the enacted amount 

for FY 2006. The committee is concerned about the fact that this 

is an ongoing decline in SAMHSA’s treatment budget (FY 2006 enacted budget was $38.39 million below 2005). 

SAMHSA’s treatment efforts are coordinated through the Center 

for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT). CSAT promotes the availability and quality of community-based substance abuse treatment 

programs.209 Working with other Federal agencies, state and local 

governments, organizations, and faith-based and community-based 

providers, CSAT’s goals are to increase the availability of treatment services, improve and strengthen treatment support organizations, and promote and sustain evidence-based practices.210

Within the President’s budget request for SAMHSA’s treatment 

programs, $98.2 million is being requested for the President’s Access to Recovery program (ATR). This amount is unchanged from 

the FY 2006 enacted amount. ATR is a state-run voucher program 

61

211See Access to Recovery: Improving Participation and Access in Drug Treatment: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Sept. 22, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/

Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=19353; Recovery Now Initiative: Hearing before the House 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2003). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=108—house—hearings&docid=f:86828.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 212 42 U.S.C. §§ 1921–1955 (2006). 

allowing Americans with substance abuse disorders to choose treatment and recovery support services from a range of qualified community-based providers. 

Within the ATR program, the President is requesting that $24.8 

million be dedicated to a stand-alone methamphetamine voucher 

program, intended to fund approximately ten grants at $2.5 million 

each for states where methamphetamine use and treatment is 

high. 

While the committee strongly supports a targeted approach to 

the methamphetamine plague, it is unclear how the dedicated program will materially supplement existing efforts, especially when 

the $24.8 million is not additional funding to existing efforts; rather, the request for ATR is level funded, and the proposed standalone methamphetamine voucher program represents a large portion of the existing ATR program. 

The committee strongly supports the ATR initiative. The voucher 

program achieves three key treatment objectives: consumer choice, 

effective treatment outcomes, and increased treatment capacity. 

Since the vouchers are intended to supplement current programs, 

ATR enhances outcome-oriented performance incentives in the substance abuse treatment system.211

Moreover, individuals are able to access care that might otherwise be out of reach for them, including care from faith-based providers. (Among the providers participating in the ATR program, 27 

percent are faith-based.) 

ATR requires reporting from the states to demonstrate that they 

are increasing the array of providers and the number of people 

treated. This accountability, and the array of providers, including 

faith-based providers, are characteristics applauded by the committee, which strongly supports the ATR program. 

The President’s request also includes a voucher incentive program that would provide up to 25 grant awards of $1 M to $5 M 

to States and Tribal organizations who voluntarily commit to use 

a portion of their Block Grant funds to deliver prevention and 

treatment services through vouchers. The committee commends 

this initiative to increase voucher programs. 

Block Grants 

The Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment (SAPT) Block 

Grants are administered through CSAP and CSAT. The SAPT 

Block Grants represent forty percent of total State spending on 

treatment and prevention. The Grants have been level-funded for 

two years, and the President’s request for 2007 at $1.76 billion continues this level-funding trend. 

SAPT block grants are distributed at 20 percent to prevention 

and 80 percent to treatment, in accordance with statutory requirements in the Public Health Service Act.212 As a condition for reVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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213See Measuring the Effectiveness of Drug Addiction Treatment: Hearing before the House 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 30, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11695; Performance and Outcome Measurement in Substance Abuse 

and Mental Health Programs: Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Substance Abuse and 

Mental Health Services, Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong. (July 

20, 2004). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=108—senate—hearings&docid=f:95101.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 214 Information on SAMHSA’s state data and NOMs is available at SAMHSA’s website: http:/

/nationaloutcomemeasures.samhsa.gov/./outcome/index.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

ceiving the funds, States are required to spend at least 20 percent 

of their allotment on primary prevention programs. 

The committee is concerned about the fact that there is no 

mandatorily-collected data from the states to determine measurable outcomes for the SAPT block grants. Without such data, there 

is poor accountability for the programs that are continuously funded and no meaningful measure by which to judge the effectiveness 

of SAPT-funded programs. 

This lack of outcome measures led to a PART review rating of 

‘‘ineffective’’ for the SAPT prevention and treatment programs in 

fiscal year 2005, since there was no quantifiable data by which to 

demonstrate results. The importance of performance measurement 

cannot be overstated, 213 and the committee continues to urge the 

swift adoption of consistently measurable standards to assure accountability with publicly-funded drug control programs. 

SAMHSA has identified ten domains as National Outcome Measures (NOMs) to represent meaningful outcomes for those striving 

to recover from substance abuse: (1) abstinence, (2) employment/

education, (3) crime/criminal justice, (4) stability in housing, (5) access to services/increased service capacity, (6) treatment retention, 

(7) social connectedness, (8) perception of care, (9) cost effectiveness 

and (10) use of evidence-based practices.214

In an effort to improve data collection for its programs, SAMHSA 

has made funds available for States to use in reporting data that 

is associated with the SAMHSA-identified NOMs. SAMHSA expects 32 states to take advantage of these funds for enhancing data 

collection efforts, and the agency expects all states to report on all 

NOMs elements by end of fiscal year 2007. 

Currently, many states are reporting on various NOMs, but no 

state is reporting on all NOMs. Not one state is reporting on cost 

effectiveness or use of evidence-based practices, a disappointing 

fact that the committee is watching closely.

63

215The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 216The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 217The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 218The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 219 Id.

D. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

DHS Drug Control Funding 

DHS FY 2005 215

Requested 

FY 2005 216

Final 

FY 2006 217

Requested 

FY 2006 218

Enacted 

FY 2007 219

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $2,519.4 $2,662.4 $2,936.9 $3,059.9 $3,304.6

* in millions. 

Contact Information: DHS Office of Public Affairs: 202–282–

8000, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/. 

The committee supports the President’s request for $3.3 billion 

for counterdrug activities at the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), which is a slight increase over the $3.06 billion enacted in 

fiscal year 2006. That support, however, is conditioned on the expectation that such funds will actually be used for counterdrug purposes. As discussed elsewhere, most of these funds are not actually 

designated for counterdrug purposes; instead they are merely estimates of how much time and how many resources the three main 

interdiction agencies at DHS—Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP)—will spend on counterdrug activities. 

To ensure that those estimates turn into reality, DHS must fulfill 

its responsibilities to the counterdrug mission. That will require 

not only commitment by the leadership of DHS but also diligent 

oversight by the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE) and 

ONDCP. 

1. Reorganization 

When Congress created DHS in 2002, it established an Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate. 

The Directorate was assigned the legacy agencies of the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

(INS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the port 

of entry inspector of the Department of Agriculture, the Federal Air 

Marshals Service (FAMS), and the Federal Protective Service. 

The newly created organization, once implemented, did not bring 

forth the improvements intended. Far from providing effective coordination and oversight, BTS served simply as a policy office with 

little or no operational functions, adding another layer of unnecessary bureaucracy. 

Recognizing the mistake, DHS announced the results of a ‘‘Second Stage Review’’ (2SR) in July 2005 which realigned the Department to increase its ability to prepare, prevent, and respond to terVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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220Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Chertoff’s Second Stage Review (July 13, 2005) (on file with subcommittee). Very few documents were provided to Congress 

on the Second Stage Review. 221 Jerry Seper, Bonner Pitches Merging Agencies, WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 7, 2005 at http:/

/washingtontimes.com/national/20051206–105109–9990r.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 222DHS Office of Inspector General Report, OIG–06–04, (Nov. 2005) at http://www.mipt.org/ 

(last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

rorist attacks and others emergencies.220 These changes were intended to better integrate the Department and its employees to improve the performance of their mission. The 2SR plan included the 

formation of a Directorate of Policy to serve as the primary Department-wide coordinator for policy, regulations and other initiatives. 

The new policy office assumed the functions previously performed 

by BTS. 

The committee believes that DHS’ 2SR reorganization may not 

have gone far enough, and may need to be revisited. The Department must address the problems created by the arbitrary and increasingly unworkable divisions which still exist within DHS between the bureaus of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As former CBP 

Commissioner Robert Bonner said, separating ICE and CBP was 

like separating the cops ‘‘on the beat’’ from their detectives.221 And 

even more importantly, the division means that neither ICE nor 

CBP, nor any other Federal agency, has a border security strategy 

for inside and beyond the border—not just at the land border. 

The Department’s own Inspector General has issued a report 

calling for ICE and CBP to be put back together.222 The committee 

believes that until the current organizational structure is remedied, 

DHS will continue to operate with great inefficiencies. Such inefficiencies are exemplified by the breakdowns in; 1) coordination between apprehension, detention and removal efforts; 2) coordination 

between interdiction and investigative efforts; and 3) coordination 

of intelligence activities. 

2. Congressional Responsiveness 

The committee is very concerned about the apparent lack of responsiveness on the part of DHS in providing information to Congress in a timely fashion. DHS has a legal responsibility to use due 

diligence in promptly responding to the legitimate information requests of Congress. Specifically, when DHS makes ‘‘major’’ media 

announcements such as the 2SR event or the recent Secure Border 

Initiative (SBI), there is frequently no plan behind the media 

event. These media events should be clearly premised by distinctively articulated and communicated plans, with specific details, so 

that Congress can fully understand how and where the Department 

intends to achieve its advertised goals. The committee believes that 

DHS needs to provide more strategic, internal management documents instead of just generalizations tailored for public relations 

events. 

Additionally, the committee is disappointed to report that certain 

elements of the newly created DHS bureaucracy have already distinguished themselves as major obstacles to congressional oversight. Leading this list is DHS’ Customs and Border Protection program. The frequent and consistent lack of responsiveness to congressional correspondence by this program is cause for great concern and heightened scrutiny. 

65

223 As Acting Assistant Commissioner, Charles E. Stallworth testified, ‘‘The backbone of CBP’s 

efforts in support of transit zone interdiction operations is our fleet of aging P–3 aircraft.’’ See 

Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails? 

Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005) (Statement of Charles 

E. Stallworth, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29727. 224Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform to CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner 

(Nov. 4, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 225Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, to DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff 

(Nov. 30, 2005); Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 

Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, to Acting CBP Commissioner Deborah Spero (Dec. 20, 2005); Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee 

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform to 

Acting CBP Commissioner Deborah Spero (Jan. 23, 2006) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources); Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform to DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff (Jan. 23, 2006) (on file with Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 226 Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108–458, (2004). 

The apparent lack of strategic planning, coordination and communication demonstrated as CBP reorganized its Air program has 

grave implications. CBP Air’s P–3 airplanes provide essential maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and are crucial to the Department’s and 

the nation’s efforts against drug trafficking in the ‘‘transit zone.’’ 223

They also perform other vital homeland security missions, such as 

providing airspace security. For these reasons, the committee is 

concerned about the nature of the Department’s commitment to 

maintain the current level of operation of each of the sixteen P–

3s.224

Equally disturbing is the disregard CBP has for briefing relevant 

congressional committees. The Government Reform Committee’s 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources has submitted frequent requests for information regarding 

CBP Air strategic and recapitalization plans, and only after frequent reminders has the Department responded.225 The committee 

strongly recommends that DHS renew efforts to properly update 

congressional offices on relevant issues and developments. In addition, specifically in reference to CBP, DHS needs to reestablish control of an apparently troubled operation. 

3. Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE) 

When Congress created DHS in 2002, it combined some of the 

most important anti-drug trafficking agencies in the Federal Government. To assist DHS in meeting its vital counterdrug responsibilities, Congress originally created the Counternarcotics Officer 

(CNO) position. The original law did not clearly define how the 

CNO was to fulfill those duties, nor did it give the CNO adequate 

status or resources to carry out what Congress had envisioned. In 

order to correct these problems, Congress passed legislation in 2004 

that replaced the CNO with a new Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, headed by a Director nominated by the President and 

confirmed by the Senate. 226 The law authorized up to $6 million 

of the Department’s management funds for a dedicated budget for 

the new Office. 

The committee fully supports the administration’s proposed ap- propriation of $2.8 million for the CNE program in fiscal year 2007, 

66

227DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb. 2006) at 102. 228The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 229The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 230The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 231The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 232 Id. 233 U.S. COAST GUARD, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb., 2006) at Appendix B, B–13. 234DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb. 2006) at 53. 235 U.S. COAST GUARD, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb. 2006) at 19. 

but is disappointed that there was no specific line item in the budget request.227 The additional funding is viewed as a positive indication that drug control remains a priority within DHS. However, the 

committee recommends that Congress specifically designate a line 

item for the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement in DHS appropriations legislation. Adequate and specific funding will allow DHS 

CNE to hire sufficient staff for the Office and provide critical internal oversight for the Department’s counternarcotics efforts. 

4. United States Coast Guard

U.S. Coast Guard Drug Control Funding 

USCG Drug Control Funding FY 2005 228

Requested 

FY 2005 229

Final 

FY 2006 230

Requested 

FY 2006 231

Enacted 

FY 2007 232

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $822.3 $871.9 $972.7 $1,032.4 $1,030.1

* in millions. 

Contact Information: Coast Guard Office of Public Affairs: 202–

267–1587, http://www.uscg.mil/USCG.shtm. 

The President’s budget proposal includes $8.4 billion for the U.S. 

Coast Guard, of which $1.03 billion is estimated to be used for drug 

control. Like other DHS agencies, the Coast Guard does not have 

a specific appropriation for drug interdiction activities. The committee conditionally supports this year’s proposal which is approximately the same amount as provided for drug control in fiscal year 

2006. The committee believes the administration’s proposal to ‘‘flat 

line’’ the Coast Guard budget may have a leveling effect on the 

Coast Guard’s drug interdiction removal rate and prevent the service from achieving the administration’s established performance 

standards in the upcoming year.233

As highlighted by its response to Hurricane Katrina in August 

and September of 2005, the Coast Guard has continued to struggle 

to balance new missions with traditional ones as a component within DHS. Moreover, a rapidly deteriorating fleet of ships and aircraft and limited resources made proper prioritization of the manifold missions of the Coast Guard increasingly difficult. 

Regarding competing mission interests, the committee also is 

gravely concerned with the administration’s decision, highlighted in 

the 2007 proposed budget, to tap the Coast Guard to assume the 

airborne security mission within the National Capitol Region 

(NCR) surrounding Washington, DC.234 The administration’s proposed budget includes $62.4 million for the Coast Guard to establish a permanent National Capital Region Air Defense program.235

67

236Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with U.S. Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005, (on file 

with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).

Specifically, the committee is very concerned about the impact of 

this new NCR mission on existing Coast Guard missions, and specifically, counterdrug patrols utilizing armed helicopters in the 

transit zone. It is not clear how the NCR airspace security mission 

should fall to the Coast Guard within any of the traditional or expanded DHS missions of the Coast Guard. Furthermore, no specific 

plan has been divulged to Congress explaining how the proposed 

funding ($62.4 million) would provide the additional helicopters, 

personnel and equipment necessary to adequately support the new 

mission without significantly degrading existing mission areas, including its critical work in the maritime transit zones. 

As shown in the diagram below, Coast Guard ‘‘total’’ resource 

hours devoted to counterdrug patrols since the terrorist attacks of 

September 11th, 2001 have steadily declined.236

68


26504.013
69

237 U.S. COAST GUARD, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb. 2006) at 10. 238Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and 

Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06–2000, 

(Nov. 2005) at 21; The Coast Guard uses these assets to perform a variety of missions, such 

as interdicting illicit drug shipments and illegal migrants or rescuing mariners at sea. 239Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources staff visit to Cutter GALLATIN (WMEC 721), in Key West, Florida on Jan. 14, 2006. 240 U.S. COAST GUARD, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, Feb. 2006, Appendix B, B–12. 241Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida, on Jan. 12, 2006. 242Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with U.S. Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005; Resource hours committed to the drug interdiction mission include on-station hours spent on detection, monitoring and interdiction operations, and also transit hours needed for assets to get into 

position to begin operations.

The downward trend of Coast Guard resource hours supporting 

the counterdrug mission is due to new post–9/11 operational requirements, ongoing traditional missions such as search and rescue 

and maritime safety, and the Coast Guard’s rapidly deteriorating 

inventory of aging cutters and aircraft. 

As an example, the administration’s 2007 budget proposal includes plans to decommission two veteran ships, the 61 year-old 

cutter STORIS and the 64 year-old cutter GENTIAN.237 The 

STORIS, based in Kodiak, Alaska, will be replaced by the 35 yearold cutter MUNRO. Saddled with many Vietnam-era deepwater 

cutters, the Coast Guard is challenged to perform its important 

missions with aged and nearly obsolete equipment. 

During fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the readiness rates of the 

Coast Guard’s older ships and aircraft showed a general decline, although the rates fluctuated from year to year.238 For example, 

ships used to monitor drug trafficking activities and carry the helicopters that disable and stop go-fast boats were below their target 

levels for time free of major deficiencies or loss of at least one primary mission. These declines are directly linked to the rapidly deteriorating mechanical readiness of its aged assets.239

The diagram above also shows an increasing seizure rate beginning in 2003, resulting from several record years of cocaine seizures. In 2005, the Coast Guard prevented a record 338,000 pounds 

of cocaine and more than 10,000 pounds of marijuana from reaching the U.S.240 These outstanding results were due to a combination of the Coast Guard utilizing new tools such as armed 

‘‘HITRON’’ helicopters and specialized law enforcement detachments. Equally important, the record-setting year was a result of 

increasing and improved inter-department and inter-agency cooperation, as well as significantly improved intelligence developed 

through Operation Panama Express and Joint Interagency Task 

Force South (JIATF-South). 

The Director of JIATF-South has recently stated that there continues to be more known actionable intelligence available than 

there are surface and air assets available to respond.241 The national drug interdiction community and the Coast Guard need more 

surface and air assets to respond to this growing supply of invaluable intelligence. 

The Coast Guard, although hampered by its aging assets, has attempted to rise to the task. As the following statistics show, the 

service is now dedicating more maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) 

hours to drug interdiction missions since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.242

70

243Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Counternarcotics to Congressman Mark Souder, chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources (July 13, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 244Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and 

Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations, GAO REPORT NO. 06–2000, 

(Nov. 2005) at 15. 245Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and 

Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations, GAO REPORT NO. 06–2000, 

(Nov. 2005) at 21. 246Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with U.S. Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005. 247Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and 

Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations, GAO REPORT NO. 06–2000, 

(Nov. 2005) at 25. 

U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Patrol Aircraft On-station Hours 

Fiscal Year Maritime Patrol 

Aircraft 

FY 2001 243 ........................................................................................................................................................... 1,889

FY 2002 ................................................................................................................................................................ 997

FY 2003 ................................................................................................................................................................ 1,410

FY 2004 ................................................................................................................................................................ 2,721

FY 2005 244 ........................................................................................................................................................... 2,780

However, the percentage of time the HC–130 maritime patrol 

surveillance aircraft were available to perform missions was below 

the target level in fiscal year 2004, and the surface radar system 

on the aircraft is subject to frequent failures.245 In some instances, 

mission flight crews had to look out the windows of the aircraft for 

targets because the radar systems were inoperable. 

The administration and the Coast Guard have developed a strategic plan to replace its legacy ships and aircraft. The committee 

believes the Coast Guard’s Deepwater fleet modernization project is 

critical to U.S. transit zone drug interdictions. However, the Coast 

Guard needs to develop an aircraft that can effectively perform the 

MPA mission. Consequently, the administration and DHS need to 

ensure they are putting the right tools and equipment into the 

hands of Coast Guard men and women so that they may continue 

to effectively interdict drugs on the high seas and deliver the maritime safety and security America deserves. 

Program Assessment Rating 

The committee is pleased to see improvements in the Coast 

Guard’s measures of performance, specifically regarding the drug 

interdiction program. As briefed by Coast Guard officials, the service has recently updated and aligned its measures with ONDCP’s 

established goals and leveraged improvements in intelligence.246

The Coast Guard now measures drug interdiction performance 

using a Removal Rate figure, as opposed to the previously established Seizure Rate. The new Removal Rate includes drugs seized, 

and also includes drugs jettisoned, destroyed, or otherwise lost at 

sea, and is vetted through an interagency group led by the U.S. 

Interdiction Coordinator’s (USIC) Consolidated Counterdrug database (CCDB). Although there is great concern and debate regarding 

the overall quantity of drugs smuggled through the transit zones, 

the committee is pleased to see the Coast Guard’s efforts to measure its drug control performance against national standards.247

71

248The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 249The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 250The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 251The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 252 Id. 253See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug Trafficking Impact Our Borders? 

Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 14, 2005) (Statement by John P. 

Torres, Assistant Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement). At http://reform.house.gov/

CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024. 254Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources staff visit to Messina, NY, on Aug. 15, 2005, Detroit, MI, on Aug. 16, 2005, and Bellingham, WA, on Aug. 18, 2005. 

5. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

ICE Drug Control Funding 

ICE Drug Control Funding FY 2005 248

Requested 

FY 2005 249

Final 

FY 2006 250

Requested 

FY 2006 251

Enacted 

FY 2007 252

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $575.8 $361.5 $453.3 $436.5 $477.9

* in millions. 

Contact Information: ICE Office of Public Affairs: 202–514–2648, 

http://www.ice.gov/graphics/index/htm. 

The committee supports the President’s request for ICE, which is estimated by ONDCP to include $477.9 million for drug control 

operations. This would be an increase of approximately $42 million 

over the $436.5 million enacted for fiscal year 2006. This increase, 

however, needs to be actually utilized by ICE to fulfill drug control 

responsibilities and not diverted to other missions. 

The committee is concerned about ICE’s annual budgetary shortfalls. The ongoing funding shortage has led to serious and continuous operational difficulties in pursuing drug investigations and 

other critical mission areas for the agency. It is unclear how the 

proposed 2007 budget will resolve these financial management 

issues, and allow ICE agents to fully focus on DHS investigations. 

Mission Alignment 

The committee is concerned about the evolving missions of ICE 

within DHS. It is very important that the ‘‘front line’’ officers of 

CBP and the Border Patrol have a clear and effective relationship 

with the investigators of ICE. Currently, despite being the largest 

investigative arm within the Department, it is not evident that ICE 

has a clearly established role as the lead investigative arm within 

DHS. Although ICE officials have testified that the agency is responsible for identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities at our Nation’s border, there appear to be several bureaucratic obstacles predating the creation of DHS that prevent ICE from effectively and 

consistently supporting the Department.253 Specifically, the role of 

ICE appears to vary in different regions of the country because of 

non-uniform, out-dated memoranda which have carried over from 

legacy U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Border Patrol.254 Currently, 

some U.S. Border Patrol drug seizures are turned over to the DEA 

and others are turned over to ICE, depending upon where the seiVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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255The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 32. At http://

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs06/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 256For additional information regarding Immigration and Customs Enforcement financial investigations see http://www.ice.gov/graphics/cornerstone/index.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 257 U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment, (Dec. 2005) at I. At http://www.ots.treas.gov/

docs/4/480215.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

zure occurs along the border. The fact that ICE and CBP are now 

within the same Department should be reflected in standard management protocols that eliminate circumstantially outdated management techniques. The committee recommends DHS, ICE, CBP 

and DEA move quickly to establish new protocols and procedures 

for investigating all seizures at the border, be it illegal immigrants, 

drugs or other illicit contraband. DHS’s campaign to establish ‘‘one 

face at the border’’ should be broadened to include ‘‘one investigator 

at the border.’’

Financial Investigations 

As stated in the 2006 National Drug Control Strategy, the lure 

of making large sums of cash is the main motivation that drives 

drug trafficking.255 It is critically important that U.S. law enforcement strategically target and seize moneys and revenue resulting 

from the illicit drug trade. This will cause a significant disruption 

to the supply of illegal drugs entering the U.S. and is a major focus 

both of DHS, through ICE, and the Department of Justice, through 

the OCDETF program. 

Nationally, ICE financial investigations have resulted in the seizure of more than $477 million over the past three fiscal years, 

with $100 million of that in bulk currency. Since ICE was created 

in 2003, ICE arrests in financial investigations, including those involving drug smuggling, increased from 1,224 that year to 1,567 in 

FY 2005. The number of indictments increased from 865 to 932 and 

the number of convictions increased from 703 to 823. From FY 

2003 to FY 2005, ICE agents arrested 260 individuals for bulk cash 

smuggling alone. In FY 2004, ICE agents seized nearly $159 million in currency and monetary instruments and executed approximately 1,400 arrests for financial crimes, many directly related to 

drug smuggling and drug money laundering activities.256

ICE has introduced a number of new initiatives aimed at analyzing and combating the movement of illicit funds by bulk cash 

smuggling, trade-based money laundering, courier hubs, money 

service businesses, charities, and alternative remittance systems. 

Some of these initiatives, highlighted in the U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment, include the creation of a trade transparency unit, the creation of a foreign political task force, and a 

multi-agency approach designed to target unlicensed money service 

businesses that are involved in utilizing money transmitters to 

wire illicit drug proceeds to recipients in foreign countries.257

The committee fully supports the efforts of ICE to coordinate 

DHS financial investigations. For this reason, it is important that 

ICE investigators be closely integrated into all drug and money seizures along the border by the U.S. Border Patrol and CBP officers. 

As Custom and Border Protection’s Director of Drug Interdiction, 

Greg Passic, testified before the Government Reform Subcommittee 

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, ‘‘Nothing 

is more worthless . . . than a load of dope that doesn’t belong to 

73

258See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug Trafficking Impact Our Borders? 

Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 14, 2005) (Statement by Gregory 

Passic, Director of Drug Interdiction, Custom and Border Protection). At http://reform.house.gov/

CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024. 259See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug Trafficking Impact Our Borders? 

Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 14, 2005) (Statement by John P. 

Torres, Assistant Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement). At http://reform.house.gov/

CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024. 260Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials on 

Dec. 9, 2005. 261For additional Immigration and Customs Enforcement background information and statistics see http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2003/2003ENF.pdf (last visited Feb. 

24, 2006). 262 Id. 263 Id. 264 Id. 

anybody.’’ 258 Investigators are the critical link in establishing connections between random drug seizures at the border and trafficking networks. The committee believes it is vitally important 

that all CBP seizures along the border be coordinated with ICE investigators. 

ICE coordination with OCDETF and DEA investigators is also 

paramount to a unified, effective strategy to disrupt drug supply 

revenues. Last year ICE’s Deputy Assistant Director, John Torres, 

testified that ICE does not currently participate in the OCDETF 

Drug Fusion Center because of pre-existing legal hurdles dealing 

with immigration and proprietary commercial business relations.259

The committee fully supports ICE’s pending partnership in the 

OCDETF Drug Fusion Center.260

Drug Investigations 

Like the Coast Guard, ICE has struggled to re-balance its 

counterdrug resources to sustainable levels since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. ICE agents are tasked with conducting investigations of persons and events subject to the administrative and criminal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality 

Act. Although ICE continues to enforce U.S. drug laws, primarily 

with a nexus to the border, investigative resources are lacking due 

to the expanded responsibilities of immigration enforcement. 

The role of ICE as the primary criminal immigration enforcement agency is critical to the nation’s national security. ICE has 

continued to increase its apprehensions of criminal aliens while, at 

the same time, increasing its seizures of narcotics. In 2003, DHS 

agents and officers apprehended 1,046,422 aliens. DHS removed 

186,151 aliens in FY 2003. This was an increase of approximately 

36,067 from FY 2002.261

In 2004, DHS agents and officers apprehended an estimated 

1,241,098 foreign nationals and removed 88,897 criminal aliens 

from the United States. Approximately 33,367 or 37.5 percent of 

the criminal aliens removed in 2004 were for dangerous drugs.262

In 2003, DHS agents and officers removed 79,395 criminal aliens, 

an 11 percent increase from FY 2002. Approximately 31,352 or 39 

percent of the criminal aliens removed in 2003 were for dangerous 

drugs.263

In FY 2003, ICE completed 82,236 immigration-related criminal 

investigations, an increase of 3,395 from the previous year.264

74

265The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at 53. 266The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 267The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 268The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 269The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 270 Id.

The committee is very concerned about the apparent downward 

trend in resources committed to drug investigations due to the increased demand of immigration investigations. The committee recommends that DHS and ICE take the necessary corrective actions 

to ensure DHS’ investigators at ICE have the proper resources to 

keep drug investigations a top priority at the border. 

Program Assessment Rating 

The ICE Office of Investigations received an ‘‘adequate’’ rating in 

the administration’s Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) 

process.265 The ICE Office of Investigations had 43.8 percent of 

their cases result in an enforcement consequence (arrest, indictment, conviction, seizure, fine or penalty). The committee hopes 

that ICE will continue to make progress in its performance measurement system. 

6. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

CBP Drug Control Funding 

CBP Drug Control Funding FY 2005 266

Requested 

FY 2005 267

Final 

FY 2006 268

Requested 

FY 2006 269

Enacted 

FY 2007 270

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $1,121.4 $1,429 $1,510.9 $1,591 $1,796.5

* in millions. 

Contact Information: CBP Office of Public Affairs: 202–344–

1770, http://www.cbp.gov. 

The committee supports the President’s request for $1.8 billion 

for counterdrug activities at Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

which is a sizeable increase over the $1.6 billion enacted in fiscal 

year 2006. That support, however, is conditioned on the expectation 

that such funds will actually be used for counterdrug purposes. As 

discussed previously, most of these funds are not actually designated for counterdrug purposes; instead they are merely estimates of how much time and how many resources the three ‘‘frontline forces’’ at CBP—U.S. Border Patrol, Air and Marine Program 

and Office of Field Operations—will spend on counterdrug activities. 

A significant portion of the increase to the drug budget for CBP, 

$152 million, is to support the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). The 

total increase for the SBI initiative, which includes drug and nondrug funding, is $639 million. Most of the SBI program comes in 

the form of new Border Patrol agents, and technology and assets 

designed for border operations. However, almost all of the Border 

Patrol’s drug seizures occur at checkpoints on the highways behind 

75

271 CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb. 2006) at 25. 272Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources visit to CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC), Riverside, CA, on Mar. 29, 

2005. 

the ports of entry. In other words, the new assets for Border Patrol 

aren’t primarily intended for the places where Border Patrol agents 

actually seize drugs. The committee is concerned that the only reason the administration’s ‘‘drug budget’’ shows an increase is because of these broad and often inaccurate assumptions regarding 

drug budget assets and activities. The committee strongly recommends the administration refine its drug budget methodology so 

that drug control funds will actually be used for drug control purposes. 

The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) combines 

the port of entry inspectors of the legacy Customs Service and the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service, as well as the Department of Agriculture’s port of entry inspectors, the U.S. Border Patrol, and the Air and Marine Operations (AMO) division of legacy 

Customs. The Customs inspectors, AMO aviators and boat operators, and Border Patrol agents are crucial to our drug interdiction 

and enforcement efforts. The committee is very concerned that 

drugs remain a priority at CBP as the agency vigorously attempts 

to ‘‘take control of the border.’’

CBP Air and Marine Operations 

The President’s budget includes $276 million for Operations and 

Maintenance for CBP’s Air and Marine Operations program (CBP 

Air). It is not clear what percentage of the operations and maintenance budget will be dedicated to support counterdrug missions. 

The committee is concerned that the administration’s proposal will 

not be sufficient to cover CBP Air’s current commitments in the 

‘‘source’’ zones of South America, in the transit zones, and along 

the northern border. 

The 2007 proposed budget also includes $61.3 million for the procurement of 30 small helicopters to support the Secure Border Initiative (SBI).271 The committee believes that the SBI is a worthwhile effort to control the land borders, but it should not come at 

the expense of CBP withdrawing from the counterdrug mission. It 

is unclear how the administration’s budget will support the operations, maintenance and upgrades for CBP Air’s fleet of P–3 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). The CBP P–3 aircraft provide essential 

maritime patrol coverage and as such are crucial to the administration’s efforts against drug trafficking in the transit zone. The committee strongly recommends the administration and CBP remain 

committed to the counterdrug mission and continue to provide and 

support CBP’s drug interdiction aircraft. 

Additionally, CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC), 

the agency’s primary tracking and monitoring facility located in 

Riverside, California, remains undermanned and underutilized.272

With the personnel shortfalls, AMOC managers must selectively 

choose what radar feeds to monitor, leaving the nation vulnerable 

in the sectors that AMOC cannot watch. Additionally, with the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), AMOC can perform an important role in the command, control and coordination 

for UAV operations within the Department. 

76

273Letter from Thaddeus Bingel, Assistant Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection, to 

Mark Souder, chairman, the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, (Dec. 28, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 274Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South on Jan. 12, 2006. 275Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Counternarcotics, to Congressman Mark Souder, chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources (July 13, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 276DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION ASSETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, GAO REPORT NO. 06–2000, (Nov. 2005) at 15. 

In December 2005, CBP stated that all CBP air assets will be 

tracked by AMOC in the very near future.273 The AMOC is a 

unique tool which, if used properly, can provide crucial operational 

and safety information to all CBP and Department units, especially 

as DHS operations intensify along the Southwest Border. 

As the statistics below demonstrate, and as discussed previously, 

CBP Air plays a critical role in providing air detection and interdiction support to drug control programs, both domestically and internationally. The Director of the Joint Interagency Task Force South 

(JIATF-South) recently emphasized that there continues to be more 

actionable intelligence available than there are surface and air assets available to respond.274 As a result, the national drug interdiction community needs more maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) to respond to the growing supply of invaluable intelligence. The committee recommends CBP Air continue to fully support all international and MPA missions in the transit zones to both support 

JIATF-South’s actionable intelligence and continue to directly promote record cocaine seizures on the high seas. 

Customs and Border Protection Maritime Patrol Aircraft On-station Hours 

Fiscal Year Maritime Patrol Aircraft 

FY 2001 275 ........................................................................................................................................................... 1,771

FY 2002 ................................................................................................................................................................ 2,367

FY 2003 ................................................................................................................................................................ 2,300

FY 2004 ................................................................................................................................................................ 4,654

FY 2005 276 ........................................................................................................................................................... 4,385

The committee has grave concerns about the apparent lack of replacement or modernization plans for the aging air fleet found 

within the CBP. It is not clear what steps the program or DHS are 

taking to ensure continued support to counterdrug missions. We 

recommend that the Department closely evaluate current agency 

modernization proposals and submit recommendations to Congress 

that will maintain critical air capabilities. Without these capabilities, U.S. efforts to combat terrorism and illegal drug movement in 

the source, transit, and arrival zones, provide law enforcement support, and perform other air security missions would be severely 

hindered and threaten national security. 

CBP Air and Marine Operations—Reorganization 

Regardless of the status of the proposed ICE and CBP merger, 

it is critically important to the National Drug Control Strategy that 

the fixed wing aircraft of the CBP Air program continue to support 

U.S. and Allied nation interdiction efforts in the transit zones. FisVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
77

cal year 2005 was another record year of cocaine seizures in the 

transit zones, and the CBP P–3 aircraft played a critical and necessary role in the detection and monitoring of smuggling vessels 

and further directing Coast Guard ships and helicopters towards 

their drug-laden targets. 

Last year the committee applauded DHS’ efforts to consolidate 

aviation and marine assets by merging the Border Patrol’s air and 

marine program with the legacy U.S. Customs Service Air and Marine Operations (AMO) program. The merger was intended to help 

consolidate the operation, training, maintenance, and procurement 

of these high-value/low density law enforcement assets. 

The committee’s enthusiasm was misplaced. It appears that the 

drug interdiction mission has suffered as a result of the merger. 

The AMO program has historically been responsible for interdicting 

drug-smuggling airplanes and ‘‘go-fast’’ speed boats, supporting 

Customs drug investigations and raids (as well as migrant interdictions), providing airspace security in the nation’s Capital (and at 

special events like the Olympics), and for providing critical maritime patrol aircraft, most notably the fleet of P–3 radar planes, for 

drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. 

Today, however, CBP is attempting to transfer control of most of 

AMO’s operations to individual sector chiefs of the Border Patrol. 

While the AMO program is responsible for supporting Border Patrol missions, that is only one of its traditional duties. However, despite the diversion of AMO assets from drug interdiction activities, 

no proposal from CBP has been forthcoming to address or replace 

the critical aircraft. The committee feels it is unwise for CBP to 

take such a vital national asset and ‘‘regionalize’’ it. That model did 

not serve the old Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 

well, and it will not serve DHS or the country well. 

To solve this problem, the committee recommends that DHS reestablish AMO with a clearly defined interdiction mission in the 

transit zone requiring both air support for ICE and CBP, and continuing to provide traditional MPA detection to the international, 

interagency effort led by JIATF-South. AMO should remain a truly 

national program, accountable both to the Secretary and to Congress for its crucial missions. 

7. U.S. Border Patrol 

There are over 11,000 Border Patrol agents that are assigned the 

mission of detecting and apprehending any illegal entrants between 

the ports-of-entry along the United States land borders. These illegal entries include alien and drug smugglers, potential terrorists, 

wanted criminals, and persons seeking to avoid inspection at the 

designated ports of entry. 

The committee has deep concerns about the level of commitment 

of all sectors of the Border Patrol to the drug interdiction mission. 

In many sectors, the Border Patrol appears to be far more focused 

on illegal migrant interdiction than stopping drug traffickers. 

Moreover, the Border Patrol’s willingness to cooperate with other 

law enforcement agencies on drug investigations and operations 

leaves room for improvement. Stopping illegal immigration is certainly a vital mission of the Border Patrol. If, however, the Border 

Patrol is going to be the primary agency responsible for protecting 

our nation’s land borders, it must take a more active role not only 

78

277 Jerry Seper, Bonner Pitches Merging Agencies, WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 7, 2005, at http:/

/washingtontimes.com/national/20051206–105109–9990r.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

in conducting its own drug interdiction operations, but in supporting the border-related drug investigations of other agencies as 

well. 

As noted above, former CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner recently said that separating ICE and CBP was like separating the 

cops ‘‘on the beat’’ from their detectives.277 Currently, some Border 

Patrol drug seizures are turned over to the DEA, and others are 

turned over to ICE. The fact that CBP and ICE are now both within DHS should be reflected in updated procedures and protocols. 

The current divisions between ICE and the U.S. Border Patrol 

mean that neither CBP nor ICE, nor any other Federal agency, has 

a border security strategy for inside and beyond the border. 

Shadow Wolves Customs Patrol Officers 

The committee has grave concerns about the status of the last remaining unit of Customs Patrol Officers patrolling the border, the 

‘‘Shadow Wolves’’ unit that works on the 76-mile stretch of the 

Mexico-Arizona border contained in the Tohono O’odham sovereign 

Indian Nation. The Shadow Wolves are all Native Americans, who 

combine traditional tracking methods and modern technology to 

find, follow, and arrest drug traffickers. The Shadow Wolves have 

historically been one of our nation’s most effective drug enforcement units, seizing over 100,000 pounds of narcotics annually, with 

only 15 agents. 

The Shadow Wolves were a part of the U.S. Customs Service 

until March 2003, when DHS assigned them to CBP, which in turn 

placed them under the control of the Border Patrol. Border Patrol 

management has not been successful, as the missions, priorities, 

and methods of the two groups are substantially distinct. Only 15 

of the 21 Shadow Wolves agents in uniform in 2003 are still active, 

and there is a serious risk that the rest will retire or move to other 

employers if the problems are not addressed. The Border Patrol 

itself has reportedly asked that the unit be transferred to another 

agency. 

The committee agrees that the Shadow Wolves should be moved 

to another agency within DHS. Two possible new ‘‘homes’’ for the 

unit are the Office of Air and Marine Operations (AMO) at CBP, 

or the Office of Investigations at ICE. Both of these units worked 

very successfully with the Shadow Wolves prior to 2003 (when they 

were all part of the Customs Service). The committee may pursue 

legislation to address this problem if DHS is unwilling or unable 

to take the initiative. 

Program Assessment Rating 

The overall CBP drug control program has not been reviewed 

under the administration’s Program Assessment Rating Tool 

(PART) process. However, the Office of Border Patrol, found within 

CBP, received a ‘‘Results not Demonstrated’’ rating from the PART 

process due to a lack of suitable outcome measures for the agency. 

A November 2005 GAO report noted that ‘‘CBP is developing performance measures related to operational readiness rates (a measure of its ability to responds when requested), but these rates are 

79

278DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION ASSETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, GAO RE- PORT NO. 06–2000, (Nov. 2005) at 25. 279The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 280The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 281The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 282White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 

http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 283 Id. 284See How Can the Federal Government Support Local and State Initiatives to Protect Citizens and Communities Against Drug-Related Violence and Witness Intimidation? Hearing before 

the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee 

on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (May 2, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26376 . 

not specific to transit zones or to counternarcotics activities and do 

not measure results.’’ 278 The committee recommends that CBP 

take prompt action to develop an effective performance management tool for its counterdrug programs. 

E. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The Department of Justice is home to some of the most important drug control agencies and programs in the Federal Government. As our nation’s primary law enforcement agency, its efforts 

are crucial to the struggle to reduce drug trafficking and abuse. 

Moreover, the grant programs it administers—which assist state 

and local agencies with everything from investigations to drug 

treatment for prisoners—are vital to Federal, state, and local coordination and cooperation on drug policy.

Contact Information: Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs: 202–514–2007, http://www.usdoj.gov.

1. Assistance to State and Local Law Enforcement

Methamphetamine-Related Assistance (COPS Meth Hot Spots) 

COPS Meth Hot Spots FY 2005 279

Requested 

FY 2005 280

Final 

FY 2006 281

Requested 

FY 2006 282

Enacted 

FY 2007 283

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $20 $52.6 $20 $63.59 $40.1

* in millions. 

Contact Information: COPS Office: 202–616–1728, http://

www.cops.usdoj.gov. 

The committee has ongoing concerns about the proposed reduction in funds (administered by the Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office) dedicated to law enforcement activities against methamphetamine trafficking. Methamphetamine abuse has ravaged communities across the United 

States and put severe strains on state and local enforcement agencies forced to find clandestine drug labs, clean up the environmental damage they create, protect the citizens who assist law enforcement, 284 and arrest the drug trafficking rings that operate 

them. To assist these overburdened agencies, Congress approved 

$63,590,000 for fiscal year 2006 (up from $52,556,000 in fiscal year 

2005) for policing initiatives to combat methamphetamine producVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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285The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 286The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 287White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 

http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 288 Id.

tion and trafficking and to enhance policing initiatives in ‘‘drug hot 

spots.’’

The administration has increased its request for the program from only $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2006 to $40,084,000 for fiscal 

year 2007. As in previous years, however, the administration is 

still only requesting funds for the DEA-administered fund that reimburses state and local agencies for the costs of cleaning up toxic 

meth lab sites. Thus, the administration again proposes to eliminate the remaining ‘‘Meth Hot Spots’’ funding for other anti-meth 

enforcement activities—which Congress has always spent in the 

form of specific earmarks for designated projects. 

The committee fully supports the DEA reimbursement fund and 

commends the administration for proposing to increase it. The committee also believes, however, that Congress and the administration need to work together to restore and reform the additional Hot 

Spots funding. The proposed elimination of the rest of the ‘‘Meth 

Hot Spots’’ funding would greatly reduce the ability of affected 

state and local law enforcement agencies to help their Federal partners in reducing methamphetamine abuse, particularly given the 

proposed overall reduction in other state and local law enforcement 

assistance grants. 

It should be noted, however, that Congress itself needs to take 

steps to ensure that Federal assistance is targeted to the most affected areas of the country. Excessive ‘‘earmarking’’ of these funds 

undermines their efficiency. Although many states and communities suffer from methamphetamine trafficking and abuse, Federal 

dollars are limited and must be directed to the areas where they 

will make the most difference from a national point of view. The 

committee urges Congress and the administration to work together 

in finding ways to address this issue. 

2. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program

Prescription Drug Monitoring Program FY 2005 Requested 

FY 2005 285

Final 

FY 2006 286

Requested 

FY 2006 287

Enacted 

FY 2007 288

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $0 $9.9 $5.0 $7.4 $9.919

* in millions. 

Contact Information: Department of Bureau of Justice Assistance: 202–616–6500, http://www.usdoj.gov/BJA/. 

The committee also has concerns about the continuing reductions 

in funding for a prescription drug monitoring program. For fiscal 

year 2006, Congress approved $7,500,000 for this program—but 

that was itself a 25 percent cut from 2005 funding. This year, the 

administration has requested only $9,919,000—about two-thirds of 

fiscal year 2005’s appropriated level. 

Prescription drug abuse is a serious and growing problem 

throughout the United States, as illustrated by the recent wave of 

81

289See Press Release, Meth And Steroid Use Decline Sharply Among Youth; Overall Youth 

Drug Use Down Again, ONDCP (Dec. 19, 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/

press05/121905.html. (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 290See To Do No Harm: Strategies for Preventing Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing before the 

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10843. 291See Hearing before the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on the Assessment of the U.S. 

Drug Safety System, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement by J. Marc Wheat, staff director of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources) at www.reform.house.gov/

CJDPHR/. 292 2005 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2006, Appendix, 706. 293 2006 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2007, Appendix, 708. 294 Id. 295 Note that in addition to this funding for the Byrne state formula grants, Congress also ap- propriated $191,704,000 for the so-called Byrne ‘‘discretionary grants’’—the vast majority of 

which is earmarked in the appropriations bill for specific projects. 296The Byrne Formula Grant Program was created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100–690). One-half of the appropriated funds are to be awarded to the states based on 

their relative populations, while the other half is to be awarded on the basis of the violent crime 

rates in the states. 

OxyContin and other oxycodone-related overdoses. In fact, according to the Monitoring the Future survey of drug abuse among high 

school students, prescription drugs were the only drugs that 

showed an increase in student use in 2005.289

One major difficulty facing Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies in dealing with this threat is the lack of sufficient 

information about how these drugs are being diverted from their 

proper medical uses to illegal trafficking and abuse.290 The Federal 

Government needs to continue work on the establishment of a monitoring system that would track supplies of prescription drugs and 

give law enforcement officials more information about illegal diversion.291 A truly effective program will require more, not less, financial assistance from the Federal Government. 

3. Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant

Byrne Memorial Grant FY 2005 Requested FY 2005 Final FY 2006 292

Requested 

FY 2006 293

Enacted 

FY 2007 294

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $508 $634 $0 $416.5 $0

* in millions. 

The committee opposes the administration’s renewed proposal to 

terminate the state formula grants portion of the Edward Byrne 

Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program. Congress appropriated only $416,478,000 for the formula Byrne Grants for fiscal 

year 2006, down from $634,000,000 for fiscal year 2005.295 The administration has again asked Congress to eliminate it entirely and 

restrict Federal assistance for state and local law enforcement programs to a series of enumerated grants (most of which are previously existing programs) under a ‘‘Justice Assistance’’ account. In 

practice, this will sharply limit the amount of money available to 

help state and local agencies.296

The administration’s proposed reduction appears to reflect, in additional to fiscal constraints, a concern about excessive Federal 

subsidization of law enforcement at the state and local level. The 

Federal treasury is not infinite and simply cannot pay for law enforcement at all levels and in every area. Moreover, choices about 

how much to spend on law enforcement in a state or community 

are, properly, choices that should be made at the state or local 

level—and the responsibility of paying for those choices should also 

82

297See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, HIDTA and Other Law 

Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/

Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=23722. 298 Crime in the United States 2002, 2002 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, sec. IV at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius—02/pdf/02crime.pdf. 

(last visited on Feb. 24, 2006). 

remain at that level. Excessive subsidization of state and local law 

enforcement by the Federal Government may lead to inefficiency 

and imbalance in our overall law enforcement strategy. 

The committee shares those concerns, but the administration’s 

drastic proposed cuts would create massive shortfalls in the budgets of state and local law enforcement agencies across the country. 

Numerous state and local officials have informed the committee 

members and staff that many programs—particularly drug enforcement programs—within states would have to be shut down if all 

Byrne Grant and similar funding were cut off.297

Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that Federal support for 

state and local efforts lacks national impact. Particularly in the 

area of drug enforcement, state and local participation is vital to 

our national success. State and local agencies make more than 95 

percent of arrests of drug violators.298 Collectively, they have far 

more personnel and resources than does the Federal Government. 

Federal support for these agencies can have a very positive national impact if it helps involve them as partners in the fight 

against drug trafficking and other criminal activities. 

The administration should instead propose reforms, where needed, to some of the Federal Government’s assistance grants. Specifically, legislation may be needed to help the Federal Government 

collect more data about how these grants are being used and to 

make them more accountable. Such reform proposals should be accompanied by a comprehensive plan for how, and for what specific 

purposes, future Federal assistance to state and local law enforcement should be provided. Without such a plan, the proposed massive reductions lack a complete and coherent justification and leave 

the programs vulnerable to continued earmarking and potential 

misallocation of funds.

83

299For further information on the RISS program, see the program website at http://

www.rissinfo.com/, or call the Justice Department RISS program manager at (202) 616–7829. 300The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 301The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 302The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 303The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 304 Id. 305The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 306The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 307The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 308The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 309 Id. 

4. Regional Information Sharing System 299

RISS FY 2005 300

Requested 

FY 2005 301

Final 

FY 2006 302

Requested 

FY 2006 303

Enacted 

FY 2007 304

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $45.0 $39.5 $45.0 $40.2 $39.7

* in millions. 

Contact Information: Justice Department RISS Program Manager: 202–616–7829, http://www.rissinfo.com. 

The committee supports the administration’s request for $39,676,000 for the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), 

only a 1 percent reduction from the $40,233,000 appropriated for 

fiscal year 2006. The committee believes that RISS, which facilitates electronic, computerized sharing of intelligence and information among Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, is 

an important tool in the fight against drug trafficking and other organized crime. 

The committee does question, however, why the administration 

has included the entire RISS budget request in the Drug Budget 

Summary, though the system is not exclusively intended or used 

for drug enforcement. It would be more accurate to estimate the 

percentage used for drug enforcement activities and include only 

that estimated portion in the drug budget. If the entire RISS budget is included in the drug budget, then it is unclear why none of 

the COPS grant funds are included. 

5. Weed and Seed Program

Weed & Seed Program FY 2005 305

Requested 

FY 2005 306

Final 

FY 2006 307

Requested 

FY 2006 308

Enacted 

FY 2007 309

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $58.3 $61.2 $59.6 $48.6 $49.3

* in millions. 

The committee supports the administration’s request for $49,348,000 for the Weed and Seed Program, only a 1 percent reduction from the $50,000,000 appropriated by Congress for fiscal 

year 2006. The Weed and Seed Program is an important initiative 

84

310The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 311The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 312The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 313The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 314 Id. 

designed to help state and local law enforcement agencies work 

with members of the local community to investigate and prosecute 

violent criminals and drug offenders, helping to clean up our nation’s streets. 

The PART review rated this program as ‘‘adequate,’’ and the 

committee is further encouraged by the fact that the performance 

measures selected for the program included real results—the percent reduction in homicides. The committee believes, however, that 

the performance measures for the program should also include the 

percent reduction in drug crimes or drug availability in funded 

areas. The program was not intended solely to reduce violent 

crimes but also drug crimes, and it should be reviewed on both criteria. 

The committee also believes that ONDCP should (as with some 

other programs administered by the Department of Justice) estimate the percentage of funds dedicated to illegal drug control and 

include only that part in the drug budget. Including the entire program in the drug budget is inaccurate and undermines the ability 

of Congress to review how much of the program’s resources is being 

dedicated to drug control. 

6. Drug Court Program

Drug Court Program FY 2005 310

Requested 

FY 2005 311

Final 

FY 2006 312

Requested 

FY 2006 313

Enacted 

FY 2007 314

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $70.1 $39.5 $70.1 $10.0 $69.2

* in millions. 

The committee supports the administration’s request for $69,186,000 for the drugs courts program, a significant increase 

over the $10,000,000 actually appropriated by Congress for fiscal 

year 2006. The drug courts program assists state and local governments to establish alternatives to prosecution for low-level drug offenders. Typically, a state or local agency will offer a person facing 

drug charges the option of entering a drug treatment program. If 

the defendant successfully completes the program and avoids being 

rearrested for a period thereafter, the drug charges will be 

dropped. The drug court concept is praised by law enforcement officers, judges, and addiction specialists throughout the country and 

shows a great deal of promise. 

The committee is concerned that the ever-shrinking amounts appropriated by Congress for this program jeopardize the continued 

success of drug courts. The committee notes that while drug court 

programs are likely to continue at the state and local level, Federal 

assistance has two beneficial effects. First, the financial assistance 

allows more drug offenders to benefit from them. Second, and perhaps even more important, by attaching conditions to the funding, 

85

315The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) at 86. At http://

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs06/. 316 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM REPORT, THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

FOR 2005 AND THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006, H. Rept. 109–172, 

(2005) at 47. 317See CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3199 (U.S.A. PATRIOT IMPROVEMENT AND

REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005), H. Rept. 109–333, Sec. 751 (2005). 

Congress can help ensure that they meet minimum quality standards. Without funding, Congress has little leverage to ensure that 

these programs achieve national goals. 

In light of the most recent PART review (2002) of the program, 

which found ‘‘results not demonstrated,’’ 315 the administration 

must take steps to improve the program’s accountability and performance management. The committee is encouraged that, according to the latest PART review, the Department has been able to 

improve grantees’ reporting of results. The committee also notes 

that, unlike many prevention programs, the drug courts program 

is not simply defining performance in terms of program expansion 

(i.e., the simple number of drug courts in existence) but in terms 

of actual results (i.e., the re-arrest rate of program participants). 

This is a positive development that will hopefully be expanded, not 

simply within this program but in other prevention and treatment 

initiatives. 

The committee has previously stated its belief that the drug 

courts program should monitor not simply the re-arrest rate of program participants but their drug use as well.316 Ideally, convicts 

should be sentenced to drug abstinence, not just drug treatment. 

A vigorous, mandatory system of drug testing should be applied in 

every drug court case to ensure that program participants are staying off of drugs. 

The committee acknowledges, however, that there are practical 

and (potentially) legal limits on what drug court programs can 

achieve in this regard. First, as a practical matter, drug court programs have little ability to monitor a participant’s behavior after 

the participant has completed the drug treatment program. Whether a participant has been re-arrested is fairly easy to keep track 

of (provided the participant does not move outside the drug court 

program’s jurisdiction). Drug use that does not result in re-arrest, 

however, would require drug testing to monitor. Besides being expensive, such after-completion drug testing likely would face constitutional hurdles. Unlike parolees or probationers, who (as convicts) may be required to submit to random drug tests, those who 

complete drug court programs have not been convicted of a crime. 

It is possible that the courts would hold that the Fifth Amendment 

bars such post-program drug testing. 

Given the difficulties associated with long-term, post-completion 

drug testing of drug court participants, the committee instead 

makes two recommendations. First, it is imperative that the treatment required by a drug court program be of sufficient duration to 

ensure its effectiveness. Second, any treatment program should require multiple, random drug tests, with serious and graduated consequences for participants who fail them. The House recently 

passed legislation that would mandate such testing for drug court 

programs receiving Federal funding, and the committee urges the 

Senate to enact it into law.317

86

318The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 319The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 320The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 321The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 322 Id. 323 Congressional cuts in this program need to be understood in the context of the administration’s overall drug budget proposal for fiscal year 2006, which attempted to force through severe 

cuts in drug control programs. Though Congress was able to restore some of that funding, not 

all of it could be preserved. 

7. Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) Program

RSAT FY 2005 318

Requested 

FY 2005 319

Final 

FY 2006 320

Requested 

FY 2006 321

Enacted 

FY 2007 322

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $76.1 $24.7 $44.1 $10 $0

* in millions. 

The committee opposes the administration’s proposal to terminate all funding for the RSAT program. The committee is particularly disappointed with the administration’s loss of commitment to 

providing drug treatment for state and local prisoners. Last year 

the administration requested $44,119,000 for the program, and 

only two years ago it requested $76,054,000. 

It is regrettable that Congress continues to slash funds for this 

program (appropriating only $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2006), 

which is intended to support drug treatment for prisoners in state 

and local prison systems.323 Most of our nation’s drug offenders are 

incarcerated in state or local prisons. Moreover, most of these prisoners are the kind of low-level offenders who would benefit most 

from drug treatment. (By contrast, those in the Federal prisons are 

typically major drug traffickers whose primary motive was most 

likely greed, rather than the simple need to obtain more drugs to 

feed addiction.) The committee is concerned that the administration’s reduced requests may accelerate Congress’s shrinking commitment to drug treatment in the prisons and jails. 

The committee believes that support for the program would be 

increased if the administration took steps to improve performance 

measurement for RSAT. The program’s last PART review found 

‘‘results not demonstrated,’’ and it was clear that the performance 

measures identified for the program—namely the numbers of prisoners treated under the program, and the cost per prisoner—address only the size and functioning of the program, not its end result. Performance measures should be developed to determine how 

effective the treatment provided under the program is, not simply 

how much it costs or how much is provided. Greater attention 

needs to be paid to monitoring the actual positive results of RSAT 

grants. 

87

324The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 325The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 326The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 327The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 328 Id. 329Dept. of Justice budget briefing for Staff of Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, (Dec. 2004). 

8. Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative

Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative FY 2005 324

Requested 

FY 2005 325

Final 

FY 2006 326

Requested 

FY 2006 327

Enacted 

FY 2007 328

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $48.4 $29.6 $48.4 $30.0 $29.8

* in millions. 

The committee has concerns about the administration’s request for only $29,757,000 for the Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative, which is intended to reimburse state and local prosecutors in 

border areas for the increase in local crime from border activities 

(namely, drug and people smuggling from Mexico). That would be 

a significant decrease from the $48,418,000 requested for fiscal 

year 2006 and a slight decrease from the $30,000,000 actually appropriated by Congress. The committee hopes that the reduced request does not reflect a reduced commitment on the part of the administration to helping communities overburdened by cross-border 

drug trafficking and other crime. 

The committee believes that (in accordance with congressional 

intent) the program’s funds should be directed towards border-related crime—not simply general crimes committed in the border 

area. Information provided by the Department to the staff of the 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources indicates that only a quarter (at most) of the program’s 

funds is dedicated to drug offenses, and none to immigration offenses.329

To be sure, the heavy drug and immigration caseload borne by 

Federal prosecutors in border regions may indirectly increase the 

‘‘general crime’’ caseload of state agencies—since Federal prosecutors may not be able to take on as many non-drug or non-immigration cases in those areas. Nevertheless, the committee believes that 

such a low percentage of drug cases calls the program’s justification 

into question. Moreover, it calls into question the administration’s 

decision to include the entire program budget request in the Drug 

Budget Summaries of recent years, distorting the true picture of 

Federal counter-drug activities.

88

330 2005 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2006, Appendix, 704. 331 2006 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2007, Appendix, 706. 332See Confronting Recidivism: Prisoner Re-entry Programs and a Just Future for All Americans, Hearing before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=21850. 333 Id, (testimony of Pat Nolan, president of Justice Fellowship). 334The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 335The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 336 Id. 337 Congressional cuts in this program need to be understood in the context of the administration’s overall drug budget proposal for fiscal year 2006, which attempted to force through severe 

cuts in drug control programs. Though Congress was able to restore some of that funding, not 

all of it could be preserved. 

9. Prisoner Re-entry Initiative

Prisoner Re-entry Initiative FY 2005 Requested FY 2005 Final FY 2006 330

Requested 

FY 2006 En- acted FY 2007 331

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $— $— $15 $3.0 $14.9

* in millions. 

The committee supports the administration’s request for 

$14,879,000 for a prisoner re-entry initiative, designed to assist 

faith and community-based organizations in their services to prisoners preparing to reintegrate into society after incarceration. The 

committee hopes that Congress will improve on the only $3,000,000 

approved for these kinds of programs for fiscal year 2006 (as part 

of the appropriation for the Federal prison system). 

The committee held a hearing on this issue last year 332 and was 

provided information about the significant accomplishments of faith 

and community-based organizations in the field of prisoner re-entry 

services.333 The committee believes that this proposal would be further strengthened by authorizing legislation from the Congress 

that protects the rights of faith and community-based organizations. Legislation of that kind would better define the program’s 

goals and methods of implementation. 

10. Cannabis Eradication Program

Cannabis Eradication Program FY 2005 Requested FY 2005 Final FY 2006 334

Requested 

FY 2006 335

Enacted 

FY 2007 336

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $0 $0 $20.0 $5.0 $10.7

* in millions. 

The committee has concerns about the administration’s request 

for only $10,713,000 for the Cannabis Eradication Program. Only 

a year ago, the administration requested nearly twice as much 

($19,100,000)—although it should be noted that even this year’s request is twice as much as Congress actually appropriated for fiscal 

year 2006 (only $5,000,000).337

Led by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Cannabis Eradication Program organizes joint Federal, state, and local 

enforcement actions to stop domestic marijuana cultivation. Marijuana growing has become a major problem in many parts of the 

U.S.—presenting a serious challenge to law enforcement. For example, in California’s national parks and forests, marijuana growers 

89

338See Drug Production on Public Lands—A Growing Problem: Joint Hearing before House 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, and the House Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory 

Affairs, 108th Cong. (Oct. 10, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7225. 339The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 340The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 341The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 342The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 343 Id. 344 2006 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2007, Appendix, at 702. 

(organized by Mexican drug trafficking cartels) have caused major 

environmental damage and have used violence against park rangers and tourists.338 The committee believes that, far from cutting 

this vital program, Congress and the administration should increase its scope to tackle the growing problem of marijuana cultivation. 

11. Bureau of Prisons

Bureau of Prisons FY 2005 339

Requested 

FY 2005 340

Final 

FY 2006 341

Requested 

FY 2006 342

Enacted 

FY 2007 343

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $49.3 $48.6 $49.7 $49.0 $51.0

* in millions. 

Contact Information: Bureau Of Prisons Public Affairs Division: 

812–244–4400, http://www.bop.gov. 

The committee supports the administration’s request for 

$51,000,000 for the Bureau of Prisons’ drug treatment programs. 

This would be an increase of approximately $2 million over the fiscal year 2006 enacted level. 

The committee believes that the Bureau’s efforts to reduce drug 

use and addiction by prisoners are commendable and have had 

very positive results. The Bureau should seek to actively participate in programs that strive to replicate these results in state and 

local prisons and jails, where the vast majority of drug offenders 

are incarcerated. In addition, the Bureau should foster the drug 

treatment services of faith-based providers, who bring hope for a 

better future to the prisons. 

The committee is disappointed that the administration did not 

continue its practice, begun just last year, of requesting a specific 

amount for ‘‘inmate programs.’’ That line item more clearly separated the costs of actually confining prisoners from the costs of assisting prisoners to reintegrate into society after release. In addition to drug treatment, these reintegration programs include education and vocational training. 

The committee is appreciative of the administration’s continued 

support, specifically mentioned in the Fiscal Year 2007 Budget, for 

faith-based programs such as the Life Connections Program.344 The 

committee held a hearing last year on the issue of prisoner re-entry 

90

345See Confronting Recidivism: Prisoner Re-entry Programs and a Just Future for All Americans, Hearing before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=21850. 346 2005 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2006, Appendix, 1181. 347 2006 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2007, Appendix, 673. 348Though the administration has repeatedly proposed closing the Center, Congress has continued to fund it through an earmark in the Intelligence Community Management Account, part 

of the annual Department of Defense appropriations bill. Although appropriated on that bill, the 

funds have been directed to be transferred to the Department of Justice, which Congress has 

made responsible for managing the Center. 349 Bret Schulte, A Drug War Boondoggle, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, (May 9, 2005). 

programs and is seeking ways to help promote them.345 The committee looks forward to working with the administration to continue making progress and to replicate these initiatives at the state 

and local level. 

The committee has concerns, however, about the failure of the 

administration in recent fiscal years to identify the other drug control-related costs included in the Bureau’s budget request, including the cost of incarcerating drug offenders, the cost of drug testing 

of prisoners and employees, and the cost of screening visitors and 

packages for illegal drugs. These are clearly expenditures directly 

associated with drug control, meaning that it is simply incorrect for 

ONDCP to claim that only 1.0 percent of the Bureau’s budget is 

drug related. 

12. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC)

NDIC FY 2005 Requested FY 2005 Final FY 2006 346

Requested 

FY 2006 En- acted FY 2007 347

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $34.9 $39.4 $17 $39 $15.85

* in millions. 

Contact Information: National Drug Intelligence Center Public 

Affairs: 814–532–4902, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic. 

The committee supports the administration’s request for 

$15,852,000 to fund the shutdown of the National Drug Intelligence 

Center (NDIC) and the transfer of its functions to other agencies. 

Although the goals of NDIC are worthy—the analysis of drug intelligence and the gathering of information from local law enforcement—it is not clear that the separate existence of the Center is 

necessary. Currently funded at $39 million for fiscal year 2006, 

NDIC is an expensive and duplicative use of scarce Federal drug 

enforcement resources.348

The Center is located in Johnstown, Pennsylvania and has a staff 

of nearly 400 employees. First created in 1993, it has cost the 

American taxpayers nearly $400 million. From the beginning, the 

agency was criticized as duplicative of already-existing drug intelligence centers (such as the DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center 

(EPIC) along the southwest border). Critics also questioned why a 

Federal intelligence center would be physically located so far from 

every other Federal drug enforcement agency.349

In fact, NDIC was never able to fulfill its original mission of centralizing and coordinating drug intelligence, given its remote location and the unwillingness of the other Federal agencies to contribute significant information. Instead, over time the Center took 

on two different missions: analysis of ‘‘open source’’ (i.e., publicly 

91

350 Id. 351 Id. 352DEA budget figures discussed in this section include only appropriations, and do not include funding through the Diversion Control Fee Account (DFCA)—the fees paid by the pharmaceutical industry to the DEA to finance its prescription drug diversion control activities. 353The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 354The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 355The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 356The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 357 Id.

available) information already published by other drug enforcement 

agencies and the development of software capable of analyzing documents seized by other agencies (particularly state and local agencies).350

Though these missions are acknowledged as having some marginal value by other Federal agencies, as well as drug policy analysts, it is not clear whether they alone justify the continued separate existence of NDIC or its location in Johnstown. Moreover, the 

Center has been plagued by scandal. Its director was fired in 2004 

by the Justice Department for inappropriately taking nearly 

$164,000 in official trips with his secretary.351

The committee agrees that the Center’s work has value, but also 

agrees with the administration’s assessment that the current funding is excessive, and that the separate Johnstown facility is unnecessary. In a time of shrinking budgets, it makes a great deal of 

sense to consolidate the existing resources and functions of NDIC 

within other agencies. For example, the true intelligence-gathering 

personnel and functions of the Center should be relocated to the 

southwest border at EPIC or within the new drug fusion center established by the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

(OCDETF). 

13. Drug Enforcement Administration 352

DEA FY 2005 353

Requested 

FY 2005 354

Final 

FY 2006 355

Requested 

FY 2006 356

Enacted 

FY 2007 357

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $1.66 $1.65 $1.69 $1.68 $1.74

* in billions. 

Contact Information: Drug Enforcement Administration Public 

Affairs: 202–307–7977, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/. 

The committee supports the administration’s proposal for 

$1,736,491,000 for the Drug Enforcement Administration, an increase of approximately $50 million from the $1,686,457,000 received by DEA for fiscal year 2006. The committee also supports 

the administration’s proposal to increase the Diversion Control Fee 

Account (DFCA)—the fees paid by the pharmaceutical industry to 

DEA to finance its prescription drug diversion control activities—

to approximately $212 million, an increase of over $10 million from 

the level approved by Congress for fiscal year 2006 ($201,673,000). 

92

358 CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 2862 (MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR SCIENCE, THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, JUSTICE, AND COMMERCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES FOR THE FISCAL

YEAR ENDING SEPT. 30, 2006, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), H. REPT. 109–272, at 79 (2005). 359See Law Enforcement and the Fight Against Methamphetamine: Hearing before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 109th Cong. (Nov. 18, 2004). (Statement of Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Drug Enforcement Administration). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=20333. 360 CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 2862 (MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR SCIENCE, 

THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, JUSTICE, AND COMMERCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES FOR THE FISCAL

YEAR ENDING SEPT. 30, 2006, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), H. REPT. 109–272, at 79–80 (2005). 361 Id, at 79. 

DEA Demand Reduction 

Given the tremendous cuts proposed by the administration for 

demand reduction programs government-wide, the committee can 

no longer support the administration’s proposal to eliminate the 

DEA’s Demand Reduction program. Although the committee recognizes that the DEA is a law enforcement organization, it is imperative that what few demand reduction programs remain within the 

Federal Government survive. 

The committee is grateful that the final appropriations conference report approving the DEA Demand Reduction program directed it to be targeted against methamphetamine abuse.358 For 

such a relatively small program, a specific target like methamphetamine will help to maximize its impact. 

Methamphetamine Enforcement 

The committee continues to be very concerned about the growing 

danger from methamphetamine (meth) and recommends it be a top 

priority at the DEA, and in the nation’s overall drug strategy. Meth 

is one of the most powerful and dangerous drugs available. The last 

several years have seen an unprecedented rise in its use, trafficking, and manufacturing.359 The wholesale abuse of the drug 

itself is serious enough. But when we factor in the toxic environmental effects from unregulated chemicals used in clandestine laboratories, we see that methamphetamine is taking a terrible toll. 

No community is immune. Methamphetamine abuse has devastated communities across the nation and put unsustainable 

strains on the responsible State and local enforcement agencies. 

The committee is therefore grateful that the final appropriations 

conference report directed DEA to make methamphetamine enforcement a priority.360

The committee is therefore opposed to the administration’s proposal to cut its Mobile Enforcement Teams (METs) by one-half. The 

METs, small units of DEA officers who can be rapidly deployed to 

assist local law enforcement, have been invaluable tools in the fight 

against clandestine meth labs and simply cannot be replaced. The 

committee applauds the appropriations conference report’s insistence that the METs be maintained at their current level (rather 

than reduced as proposed by the administration) and targeted at 

methamphetamine.361

The committee is also concerned about the impact of the administration’s proposal to eliminate the DEA’s Regional Enforcement 

Teams. These teams were intended to respond to major drug trafficking activity in cities or communities that did not have a permanent DEA presence. The elimination of the Regional Enforcement 

Teams could have a detrimental impact on rural communities that 

93

362 Id. 

may lack a DEA office, but that have a significant meth trafficking 

problem. 

DEA Efforts in Afghanistan 

The committee is concerned about the administration’s decision 

not to request a specific amount for its efforts there. Last year, the 

administration requested $22 million to enhance DEA’s anti-heroin 

activities in Afghanistan. It is critically important that DEA be 

fully supported in these efforts to stop heroin production and trafficking by the Department of Defense, the State Department’s 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) program, and 

the U.S. Agency for International Development. The committee remains very concerned that an insufficient level of cooperation is 

taking place in Afghanistan among State, U.S. AID, CENTCOM 

and DEA programs. A specific line item in the budget would allow 

Congress and the executive branch to account for and support 

DEA’s critical efforts in this troubled area of the world. 

The committee is grateful that the final appropriations conference report for fiscal year 2006 directed DEA to use at least 

some of its funding increase for Afghanistan and Central Asian activities.362 The committee urges the Appropriations Committee, 

however, to strongly consider designating an actual line item in the 

fiscal year 2007 budget for these activities. 

The committee is pleased to learn of the Department of Defense’s 

recent decision to lease Soviet era MI–17 helicopters to support and 

transport DEA teams and believes it is long overdue. As mentioned 

previously, it is important that DEA personnel be provided the 

tools and support necessary to safely address and curtail heroin 

production and trafficking in Afghanistan. 

Diversion Control 

As noted above, the committee supports the administration’s proposal to increase the Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA) by approximately $10 million. This program supports DEA’s efforts to 

stop the diversion of controlled substances and key precursor 

chemicals (like pseudoephedrine by meth traffickers) from being diverted to illegal uses. In an era of increased prescription drug 

abuse and rampant methamphetamine manufacturing, diversion 

control must be a top priority for U.S. drug policy. 

According to the budget, $3.4 million of the increase would be financed through ‘‘programmatic enhancements,’’ and this amount 

would be used to hire new intelligence analysts for the program. 

The remaining increase is projected to come from increased fee revenue due to increased industry profits. 

In FY 2006, the DCFA received $47,457,000 in adjustments to 

base and enhancements, which, in part, came from a transfer of 

DCFA-related costs previously paid from DEA’s direct budget. In 

late 2005, DEA’s proposal to increase the fee paid by the registrant 

community, e.g., manufacturers, distributors, pharmacists, and 

practitioners, was published in the Federal Register. The revenue 

generated from the new fee will allow DEA to cover the cost of 

2006 enhancements and the DCFA program costs in years 2007 

and 2008. 

94

363See Program Assessment Rating Tool, 2007 Budget, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/

budget/fy2007/sheets/part.xls (last visited on Feb. 24, 2006). 364The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 365The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 366The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 367The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 368 Id. 369FY 2007 USDOJ BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY 107, (2006) (‘‘The FY 2007 President’s Budget proposes the transfer of the HIDTA program from [ONDCP] to OCDETF.’’) 

Operation Panama Express 

The committee is appreciative of the administration’s stated intent in the Budget to fund ‘‘Operation Panama Express,’’ a joint 

drug intelligence operation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Department of Defense, Coast Guard and DEA personnel. The committee remains concerned that the successful intelligence driven 

programs of both Panama Express North and Panama Express 

South continue to operate with insufficient funding from the Departments of Defense, Justice and Homeland Security. Therefore, 

the committee recommends that funding for each Panama Express 

program (North and South) be clearly identified with separate line 

items and fully supported in the administration’s budget. 

Performance Measurement 

The DEA has received an ‘‘adequate’’ 363 rating through the 

PART process and has developed new goals, objectives, and strategies to support the Justice Department’s goal of reducing the availability of drugs in the U.S. by 5 percent each year. The committee 

commends this effort to improve accountability and performance 

measures. 

14. Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement/Organized Crime 

Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)

OCDETF FY 2005 Requested 364

FY 2005 

Final 365

FY 2006 Requested 366FY 2006 Enacted 367FY 2007 Request 368

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $580.6 $554 $561 $489.44 $498.5

* in millions. 

Contact Information: Executive Office for OCDETF: 202–514–

2073, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ocdetf.html. 

The committee generally supports the administration’s request 

for $498,457,000 for ‘‘Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement,’’ 

the account under which the administration places its request for 

funds for the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

(OCDETF). That is an increase of over $9 million from the FY 2006 

enacted funding of $489,440,000. The committee does not, however, 

support the additional transfer of $208 million for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program from the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to OCDETF.369 As was the 

95

370OCDETF budget briefing for Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources staff on Dec. 7, 2005. 371 Id. 

case last year, that proposal has not been nearly adequately explained or justified by the administration. 

Program Overview 

The OCDETF program, established in 1982, was intended to 

fund joint, case-specific drug enforcement ‘‘task forces’’ (both investigative and prosecutorial) between multiple Federal, state, and 

local agencies. Headquartered at the Executive Office of OCDETF 

within the Justice Department, OCDETF operates through nine regional boards that oversee funded task forces throughout the country. 

Prior to fiscal year 1998, the Justice Department’s OCDETF office actually managed joint funding not simply for Justice Department law enforcement agencies (such as DEA, FBI, and the U.S. 

Marshal’s Service), but also for non-Justice Department agencies 

such as the Customs Service and the Internal Revenue Service. Beginning in 1998, however, Congress ended this practice—meaning 

that the OCDETF office no longer controls the funding for any nonJustice Department Federal agency. Other Federal agencies involved in OCDETF ‘‘task forces’’ (such as ICE, CBP, and IRS), however, are still considered program participants and have representatives on OCDETF regional boards. 

Today, OCDETF provides funding for investigations and prosecutions of drug cases. The prosecutions are primarily funded through 

direct disbursements to local U.S. Attorney’s offices, which pay for 

the salaries of full-time Federal prosecutors. The investigations are 

funded both through direct disbursements to Federal agencies to 

pay for full-time agent salaries and through reimbursements of 

overtime pay for state and local agents working on OCDETF task 

force cases. 

In theory, to qualify for any funding under OCDETF, an agency 

or U.S. Attorney’s office must seek approval from the regional 

board and the central OCDETF office. That approval, in turn, depends on whether the funding is properly tied to a specific 

OCDETF-qualifying case. To qualify, a case must target a significant drug trafficking organization. New guidelines set forth in 2002 

eliminated eligibility for so-called ‘‘local impact’’ cases not tied to 

national or at least regional organizations.370

In practice, however, only the funding of state and local overtime 

must be approved in advance. The funding of Federal agent and 

prosecutor salaries is essentially pre-approved through an annual 

allocation and must simply be justified post hoc by demonstrating 

that the particular agency or U.S. Attorney’s office worked a sufficient number of hours on OCDETF-approved cases. By contrast, 

state and local overtime may only be paid after a case has been approved for OCDETF status.371

Issues 

The 2002 guidelines were designed to address concerns that 

OCDETF had deviated from its original charter to target major 

narcotic trafficking and money-laundering organizations by accepting drug targets that did not meet the major threshold. Despite 

96

372 Id. 373See CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 2862 (MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR

SCIENCE, THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, JUSTICE, AND COMMERCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES FOR

THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPT. 30, 2006, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), H. REPT. 109–272, at 73 

(2005). 

this, the guidelines have apparently not had any appreciable effect 

on the amount of OCDETF funds allocated to Federal agencies or 

to individual U.S. Attorneys’ offices. It is possible, however, that 

the guidelines have spurred those agencies and offices to target 

higher-level organizations.372

One of the weaknesses of the OCDETF program is that it is not 

clear how valuable the assistance being provided by OCDETF is to 

ongoing investigations of non-Justice Department agencies. NonJustice Department Federal agents involved in drug investigations, 

interviewed by the committee staff, asserted that OCDETF status 

merely gained them preferential treatment for their cases by the 

local United States Attorney’s office. It should be noted, however, 

that Congress is most likely to blame for this problem. When the 

OCDETF office’s authority over non-Justice Department agencies’ 

funding was eliminated after 1997, the OCDETF program no 

longer had much to offer to those agencies. Moreover, even the 

funding of state and local overtime is unlikely to be of much use 

to agencies focused on drug trafficking at the borders and ports of 

entry—notably ICE and the Coast Guard—because their cases 

rarely rely on state and local assistance (unlike DEA, for example). 

The committee is disappointed by the administration’s failure to 

re-submit its proposal of last year to use $58 million to fund additional narcotics agents at the FBI, as well as prosecutors. Congress 

declined to support this proposal in last year’s appropriations bill, 

with the final conference report expressing the concern that providing funding to the FBI through OCDETF would ‘‘unnecessarily 

limit the FBI’s ability to allocate resources to the highest priority 

threats such as terrorism, counterintelligence, cyber crime and 

gang enforcement.’’ 373 While these are all important priorities for 

the FBI, the committee believes that drug trafficking is an equally 

serious threat and one which FBI agents have special abilities to 

deal with. 

Keeping a certain number of FBI agents primarily focused on 

narcotics enforcement is entirely in keeping with the agency’s history and practices. Certainly the FBI should be able, as it was after 

September 11, 2001, to temporarily shift agents to urgent needs 

(such as terrorist threats) in a crisis. But Congress ought, through 

funding programs such as OCDETF, to ensure that major enforcement agencies do not ‘‘drop the ball’’ when it comes to drug enforcement, simply because some threats garner more media attention 

than others. The FBI, like other agencies, should strive to maintain 

a constant level of effort against key criminal threats (including 

drugs), regardless of the ever-shifting currents of public or political 

opinion. 

The committee does expect, however, that should Congress ever 

approve this type of request, OCDETF would monitor these new 

employees to make sure that their efforts remain focused on drug 

enforcement. OCDETF should never become a funding source for 

other agencies to conduct non-drug related activities. 

97

374Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, THE

9/11 COMMISSION, (2004). 375Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources visit to Operation Panama Express South, Sarasota, FL, on Jan. 10, 2006. 376The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) at 33. 

Drug Intelligence Fusion Center 

The committee is disappointed by the administration’s failure to 

specify in the Budget how much it proposes to spend for the recently developed OCDETF Drug Fusion Center. The committee has 

supported the continued development of the Fusion Center computer system that finds criminal linkages by matching criminal 

data inputs from a multitude of Federal drug investigative cases. 

The committee has also supported the integration of non-Justice 

Department agencies (such as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)) into the Fusion Center network and hopes that 

such integration will be completed soon. 

The committee is concerned, however, that the Fusion Center not 

become a one-way street, in which participating agencies provide 

information but receive nothing in return. Such an approach may 

hamper the potential effectiveness of other Federal, state and local 

law enforcement agencies that could benefit from the linkage information. 

The committee recommends that programs like OCDETF increase their efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing 

by drug enforcement agencies. The shortfalls in intelligence and 

key information sharing described in the 9/11 Commission Report 

are not confined to the FBI and CIA.374 Information sharing failures extend to the agencies entrusted with protecting our borders 

and interdicting illegal drugs—several of which are now combined 

in the Department of Homeland Security. In fact, the 9/11 terrorists each had to clear Federal customs and immigration authorities 

and had brushes with local law enforcement. If everyone had had 

all the information on these killers, they might not have been able 

to carry out their planned attacks. These problems can also undermine our efforts to identify and stop drug traffickers. 

Panama Express 

The committee believes that OCDETF should seek to support the 

efforts of Operation Panama Express, two interagency intelligencedriven programs managed by the Departments of Justice, Defense 

and Homeland Security. These programs should be used as models 

for future information sharing efforts and joint operations. Criminal Justice Subcommittee Chairman Mark Souder and members of 

the subcommittee staff saw first-hand the incredible effectiveness 

of Panama Express South during a recent visit.375 The intelligence 

cueing from this operation has allowed Joint Interagency Task 

Force South (JIATF-South) to optimize its DHS and DOD interdiction forces, resulting in the seizure of over 480 tons of cocaine and 

the arrest of over 1,000 individuals since its inception in February 

2000.376

The committee is concerned that these successful intelligencedriven programs continue to operate with insufficient funding from 

DOD, DHS, and the Department of Justice. These programs should 

be fully supported and enhanced. Therefore, the committee again 

recommends that funding for both Panama Express North and 

98

377Major Management Challenges at the Department of Justice, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNT- ABILITY OFFICE, at http://www.gao.gov/pas/2005/doj.htm. 378Peter Eisler, 10 years and $10B later, COPS drawing scrutiny, USA TODAY, (Apr. 11, 

2005). 379 Independent Accountants’ Report on Financial Statements, FISCAL YEAR 2004 DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, at III–9. At http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/

annualreports/pr2004/TableofContents.htm (last visited on Feb. 24, 2006). 

South be clearly identified with separate line items and fully supported within the administration’s budget. If Panama Express 

North can be given a line item (in DEA’s budget), then Panama Express South can, too. 

PART Review 

The OCDETF program has not yet been reviewed by the administration’s Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) process. 

The committee has been informed, however, that a PART review 

will take place soon. The committee believes that in addition to 

other long-term outcome measures, the OCDETF should be evaluated for its effectiveness in helping agencies focus on high-level 

drug trafficking organization targets. In particular, the PART review should determine whether the new 2002 guidelines actually 

caused OCDETF-participating agencies to focus more time on such 

high-value targets. 

15. Department of Justice Financial Management 

The Department of Justice has come under heavy criticism in recent years for its poor financial management. Beginning in 2004, 

the Government Accountability Office statement on Major Management Challenges at the Department of Justice noted that the results 

of the fiscal year 2004 financial statement audit indicated ‘‘serious 

financial issues,’’ particularly at one of Justice’s significant components, the Office of Justice Programs (OJP).377 OJP has assets of 

$8.4 billion (31 percent of DOJ’s total assets) and net costs of $4 

billion (13 percent of DOJ’s total net costs). Because OJP is such 

a large component, it is ‘‘material’’ to—meaning large enough to affect—the financial statements for the entire Department. 

The 2004 financial audit revealed serious accounting problems 

that have affected DOJ’s ability to achieve its mission. The most 

serious problems occurred in the area of grants management, including the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program. In the COPS Program alone, audits by DOJ’s Inspector General (OIG) alleged that $277 million was misspent, and that the 

OIG has requested documentation from 82 police agencies that 

have not explained in detail how they spent $111 million. It is clear 

that poor financial management has undermined confidence in the 

COPS Program and other grants programs.378

Proper accounting and management controls could prevent these 

problems. Recognizing the importance of sound financial management, Congress passed the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 to 

require Federal agencies to submit audited financial statements. 

For fiscal year 2004, DOJ’s auditors were unable to express an 

opinion as to the reliability of the financial statements, and they 

rescinded the unqualified opinion rendered on the 2003 statements.379 The committee believes it is important to recognize the 

seriousness of that audit result. In the private sector, anything 

other than an unqualified or ‘‘clean’’ audit opinion would be unacVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
99

380 Independent Auditors’ Report on Financial Statements, FISCAL YEAR 2005 DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, at III–7. At http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/

annualreports/pr2005/TableofContents.htm (last visited on Feb. 24, 2006). 381 Independent Auditors’ Report on Financial Statements, FISCAL YEAR 2005 DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, at III–14. At http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/

annualreports/pr2005/TableofContents.htm (last visited on Feb. 24, 2006). 382FISCAL YEAR 2005 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, at http://

www.gao.gov/financial/fy2005financialreport.html (last visited on Feb. 24, 2006). 

ceptable, and any restatement of a prior year’s audit would be 

front-page news. 

It is not yet clear how much progress the Department has made 

in correcting these problems. It is at least encouraging that the fiscal year 2005 independent auditors were able to express an opinion 

on OJP’s—and hence the Department’s—financial statements, noting that OJP had at last set up an adequate financial accounting 

system.380 Despite this, the independent auditors identified two 

‘‘material weaknesses’’ with the Department’s financial management and with OJP’s in particular: 

• Fundamental changes are needed in the component’s internal control to ensure that financial information can be provided timely to manage the Department’s programs and to 

prepare its financial statements within the reporting deadlines of the OMB.

• Improvements are needed in the Department’s and components’ financial systems general and application controls.381

Moreover, the last ‘‘scorecard’’ in the GAO’s Fiscal Year 2005 Financial Report of the United States Government does not indicate 

substantial improvement. The Department received a red, ‘‘Agency 

has any number of serious flaws’’ score for financial performance 

(current status as of September 30, 2005) and only a yellow, ‘‘Slippage in implementation schedule, quality of deliverables, or other 

issues requiring adjustments by agency in order to achieve initiative on a timely basis,’’ score for progress in financial performance.382

The committee urges the Department to make greater progress 

in financial accountability. In particular, the committee believes 

that substantial improvements in the Department’s financial management need to be made before Congress even considers transferring programs like the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 

(HIDTA) program to the Department.

100

383The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/budgetsum05.pdf (last 

visited Feb. 24, 2006). 384The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/office—national—drug—control—policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 385The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/ondcp.pdf (last visited Feb. 

24, 2006). 386The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/office—national—drug—control—policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 387 Id. 388See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th 

Cong. (Feb. 10, 2005) (testimony of Director Walters). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=109—house—hearings&docid=f:20878.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

F. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY (‘‘ONDCP’’)

ONDCP FY 2005 383

Requested 

FY 2005 384

Final 

FY 2006 385

Requested 

FY 2006 386

Enacted 

FY 2007 387

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $27.60 $26.80 $24.22 $26.90 $23.31

* in millions. 

Contact Information: ONDCP Public Affairs Division: 202–395–

6618, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov. 

BUDGET REQUEST

The committee generally supports the administration’s request 

for $23.31 million for operations at ONDCP. That is, however, 

below the appropriated level of $26.9 million for fiscal year 2006, 

as well as below the administration’s own requests for $24.224 million for 2006 and $27.6 million for fiscal year 2005. Director Walters, in response to written questions from the Criminal Justice 

Subcommittee last year, stated that the FY 2006 reduction reflected an attempt to shift $2.6 million of ONDCP’s rental and 

health care costs from ONDCP to the Office of Administration at 

the Executive Office of the President. Director Walters assured the 

subcommittee that no reduction in ONDCP staffing or activity 

would occur.388

The committee appreciates the fact that the administration has 

committed to maintaining current staffing levels at ONDCP. As 

noted above, however, even taking into consideration the accounting shift of $2.6 million in costs from one office of the Executive 

Office of the President to another, the administration is still requesting nearly $1.7 million less for ONDCP than it did two years 

ago. The committee would like to know whether in spite of these 

steady reductions in ONDCP funding requests, Director Walters’ 

previous assurances to the subcommittee that no reduction in staffing or operations remain in effect. The committee also trusts that 

the declining funding requests do not indicate a corresponding reduction in the administration’s commitment to the Office and its 

mission. 

Similarly, the committee is very concerned about—and will vigorously oppose—the administration’s proposal to allow the President 

to shift up to 10 percent of ONDCP’s congressionally-appropriated 

funds to any other department or program of his choosing, without 

101

389See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET: GENERAL PROVISIONS—GOVERNMENT-WIDE, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2007: APPENDIX, Proposed Sec. 835 

at 13. 390 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, REPORT: THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

FOR 2005 AND THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006, H. Rept. 109–172, 

(2005) at 27. At http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/The%20 National%20 Drug%20 

Control%20 Strategy%20 for%20 2005%20 and%20 the%20 National%20 Drug%20 Control%20 

Budget%20 for%20 Fiscal%20 Year%20 2006%20-%20 Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 391See, e.g., David J. Jefferson, et al., America’s Most Dangerous Drug, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 

2005 (quoting ONDCP spokesman Tom Riley, ‘‘I’m afraid there’s also an element of people ‘crying meth’ because it’s a hot new drug.’’); Jim Barnett, Drug Czar Ignoring New Peril, Some Say, 

SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD, Aug. 7, 2005 (‘‘Two of [ONDCP Director John] Walters’ top deputies—Dave Murray and John Horton—declared that meth still doesn’t qualify as an epidemic.’’); 

compare, Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales at the National District Attorneys Association Meeting, (July 18, 2005), at www.usdoj.gov (referring to ‘‘the epidemic of 

methamphetamine drug use,’’ and stating, ‘‘In terms of damage to children and to our society, 

meth is now the most dangerous drug in America.’’). 

seeking the approval of Congress.389 The committee is not, in principle, opposed to a temporary reprogramming authority during a 

national emergency. The administration’s proposal, however, is not 

limited to national emergencies—it would be unlimited in purpose 

and duration. 

The committee is aware that in a time of shrinking budgets, 

many agencies must share the burden of budget cuts. The committee reminds the administration, however, that ONDCP is not 

simply an administrative subdivision of the White House. It is both 

the President’s principal advisor with respect to drug control policy 

development and program oversight, and it is responsible to Congress to account for the nation’s efforts to reduce the use, manufacturing, and trafficking of illicit drugs. Reductions in its budget and 

attacks on its independence will hinder ONDCP’s ability to provide 

effective policy coordination and oversight—a result that this committee will strenuously oppose. 

OVERSIGHT AND COORDINATION BY ONDCP

The committee has ongoing concerns that ONDCP has not been 

exercising the kind of active leadership, oversight, and coordination 

of executive branch drug control efforts envisioned by Congress 

when it was authorized in 1988. As the committee noted in its report last year, ONDCP has not yet provided effective responses to 

several major challenges to Federal drug enforcement efforts.390

First, ONDCP has not taken the initiative in formulating an effective Federal anti-methamphetamine strategy. Although ONDCP 

has been involved in the administration’s very limited anti-meth efforts to date (see Section I.1. above), there is little indication that 

ONDCP has attempted to push other branches of the Federal Government to take further, necessary action. Indeed, public statements by a number of ONDCP officials suggest that the Office does 

not regard the meth epidemic as a priority—or even as an epidemic.391

Nor is there any indication that ONDCP has effectively responded to the increasing pressure on agencies such as the FBI, 

the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, and the legacy Customs Service to abandon or reduce drug enforcement in favor of homeland security and counterterrorism missions. This year, Director Walters 

apparently certified a budget request for the Department of Homeland Security that would eliminate any funding to ensure that vital 

maritime patrol aircraft will remain operational over the next 5–

102

392 CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BUDGET IN BRIEF, FY 2007, (Feb. 2006) at 25. 393See DRUG CONTROL: AGENCIES NEED TO PLAN FOR LIKELY DECLINES IN DRUG INTERDICTION ASSETS, AND DEVELOP BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, 

GAO REPORT NO. 06–2000, (Nov. 2005). 

10 years.392 As described in Section I.5. above, this would have a 

crippling effect on our long-term drug interdiction capabilities. The 

fact that Director Walters certified such a budget request as adequate raises serious questions about ONDCP’s fulfillment of its 

statutory responsibilities. 

Similarly, ONDCP must take more assertive action to respond to 

the reduced commitment of the Department of Defense to 

counterdrug efforts.393 The Defense Department has dedicated 

fewer assets to interdiction in the ‘‘transit zones’’ of the Caribbean 

and eastern Pacific Ocean, has scaled back National Guard assistance to state and local law enforcement, and—most significantly—

has failed to take effective action against the rapid growth of heroin production in Afghanistan. While the committee recognizes that 

ONDCP must frequently defer to the Defense Department on questions affecting the military, ONDCP should also be assertive in ensuring that the national priority of reducing drug trafficking is not 

forgotten, even by our government’s largest and most respected institutions. To date, however, ONDCP has been publicly silent about 

the Defense Department’s reduced commitments—and has failed to 

present Congress with any plans to ‘‘backfill’’ those reductions in 

assets and personnel for counternarcotics missions. 

It was no accident that the original legislation creating ONDCP 

was titled the ‘‘National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988’’ (emphasis added). Congress expected leadership from ONDCP on drug control issues—not simply passive support for whatever actions the 

other branches of the administration take. The committee hopes 

that the Office will increase its efforts to forge a strong, unified approach to the drug problem within the administration. 

To help the Office achieve that result, the committee included a 

number of provisions in H.R. 2829, the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2005. These provisions give 

ONDCP additional tools as it exercises its leadership responsibilities, including:

• A clear statement of congressional intent that the Director of 

ONDCP has the same rank and status as the heads of the 

executive Departments he is charged with overseeing and coordinating;

• Requirement for written strategies concerning Southwest 

Border drug trafficking, Afghan heroin and South American 

heroin and cocaine;

• Requirement for revised, government-wide General 

Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) and National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP); and

• Requirement that Federal agencies and programs with drug 

control responsibilities submit all of their drug control activity budget requests to ONDCP for review and certification.

The Office administers several programs related to drug enforcement and prevention. The committee’s views on each are set forth 

below: 

103

394The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/budgetsum05.pdf (last 

visited Feb. 24, 2006). 395The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/office—national—drug—control—policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 396The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/ondcp.pdf (last visited Feb. 

24, 2006). 397The administration requested that funding for the HIDTA program for fiscal year 2006 be 

shifted to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program at the Justice 

Department; Congress rejected that request. 398The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/office—national—drug—control—policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 399 Id. 400The administration is again requesting that the HIDTA program funding be transferred 

from ONDCP to OCDETF at the Department of Justice for fiscal year 2007. 401The specific budget language proposed by the administration is somewhat vague as to 

whether HIDTA would be officially controlled by OCDETF. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2007: APPENDIX, at 1157 (stating only that HIDTA is ‘‘to be carried 

out by the Attorney General’’). However, the appropriation requested by the administration 

would be under the ‘‘Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement’’ heading, which is (in practice) 

the appropriation for OCDETF. Id. Moreover, in its own budget submission, the Department 

states, ‘‘The FY 2007 President’s Budget proposes the transfer of the HIDTA program from 

[ONDCP] to OCDETF.’’ 2006–2007 DOJ BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY, 107. 402 Id. 

1. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program

HIDTA FY 2005 394

Requested 

FY 2005 395

Final 

FY 2006 396

Requested 397

FY 2006 398

Enacted 

FY 2007 399

Request 400

TOTAL* ................................................................... $208.4 $226.5 $100 $227 $208

* in millions. 

The committee has deep concerns about the administration’s proposals for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program. The administration has requested $208 million for the program but has again (as it did last year) proposed moving it (via the 

appropriations process) from ONDCP to the Department of Justice’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

(OCDETF).401 The administration has also stated its intention, 

should Congress approve that request, to create a ‘‘better focused’’ 

HIDTA program that will ‘‘focus funds on regions that are primary 

national drug distribution or transit zones.’’ 402 The administration 

has not explained what it means by that statement. The committee 

has received reports from sources inside the program, however, indicating that ONDCP and the Justice Department may intend to 

redirect most, if not all of the requested funding to the five 

HIDTAs originally designated in 1990—eliminating up to 23 of the 

current HIDTAs. 

PROGRAM BACKGROUND

When it was created in 1990, the program was intended to reduce the nation’s overall supply of illegal drugs by bringing together Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the 

most significant regions (each referred to as a ‘‘HIDTA’’) where 

drugs were produced, smuggled, or distributed. As the program’s 

budget has grown—from only $25 million at its inception to $228 

million in fiscal year 2005—the number of designated regions has 

grown as well. From the initial five HIDTAs in 1990, the program 

has expanded to 28 HIDTAs, and pressure is building in Congress 

to create even more of them. 

104

The program’s expansion has raised questions about what the 

true purpose of the HIDTAs really is, and whether the current program structure fulfills the mission Congress set out for it. Those 

questions are not easy to answer. Some HIDTAs are located in 

areas (such as the Southwest Border HIDTA) that clearly serve as 

major smuggling corridors, while others are located in areas more 

realistically characterized as high drug consumption zones (rather 

than production or transshipment zones) or as areas with highly localized drug production and trafficking. Even within the HIDTAs, 

some funded initiatives are targeted at major drug trafficking organizations, while others are aimed at local manifestations of the 

drug trade (like open drug markets in the streets). 

The HIDTA program is, in practice, a blend of the ‘‘national’’ and 

‘‘regional/local’’ purposes—both in terms of which areas have been 

designated as HIDTAs and which initiatives have been funded 

within each HIDTA. Even the most nationally significant HIDTAs 

(like the Southwest Border HIDTA) fund some local drug enforcement activities, while even those with the least apparent national 

impact fund some initiatives aimed at major drug trafficking organizations. 

The fact that HIDTAs fund some initiatives of greater significance to the local community and some more important to Federal 

law enforcement is not in itself a problem. In fact, the HIDTA program would not be able to carry out its primary function—to bring 

Federal, state, and local drug enforcement agencies together for cooperative efforts—if no allowance for state and local priorities were 

permitted. Neither is the fact that some HIDTAs have greater ‘‘national’’ significance than others is itself a weakness. There will always be differences in importance and focus from region to region. 

What has been a problem, however, is the program’s current inability to base its allocation of funds to the individual HIDTAs on 

any criteria at all—national, regional, or local. Congress bears 

much of the blame for this. For many years, appropriations bills 

have forbidden ONDCP from funding any HIDTA at below its previous year’s level—effectively locking in over $200 million of its 

budget. ONDCP has had true discretion over less than 10 percent 

of the program’s funds. 

The administration, for its part, has done nothing to solve this 

problem. Each appropriations bill has given ONDCP the option to 

request a reallocation of HIDTA funds by presenting a plan to the 

Appropriations Committees in the House and Senate. ONDCP has 

thus far declined to do so. 

As a result, the HIDTA program currently guarantees funds to 

the designated HIDTAs with little or no regard for efficiency, impact, or national priorities. ONDCP cannot (and until now has not 

even tried to) redirect the program’s funds in response to the everchanging drug trafficking threat. 

THE ADMINISTRATION’S PROPOSAL

In response to these difficulties, the administration has proposed 

drastic changes to the program in each of its last two budget proposals. Last year, the administration asked Congress to cut the 

program’s budget from fiscal year 2005’s enacted level of 

$228,350,000 to $100,000,000 and to transfer the administration of 

the remaining funds to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement 

105

Task Force (OCDETF), a Department of Justice program. Congress 

rejected both proposals, electing to keep HIDTA at ONDCP and to 

fund the program at $227 million. This year, the administration has requested $208 million for the 

HIDTA program but has again asked that it be moved to OCDETF. 

Moreover, as noted above, the administration has stated its intention to redirect the program dollars to those HIDTAs that are the 

most important national drug transit and distribution regions. 

If enacted, these proposals would effectively terminate the current HIDTA program. The committee believes that this would be 

a severe blow to Federal, state, and local cooperation and to drug 

enforcement in general. For this reason, the committee strongly opposes the budget cut, any radical reallocation of funding (if unaccompanied by a comprehensive, performance-based justification), 

and the move of the program into the Justice Department. 

Keeping HIDTA at its Current Funding Level 

At first glance, the administration did avoid this year one of the 

mistakes from its fiscal year 2006 budget proposal: the 56 percent 

cut in the HIDTA program budget. Instead, the administration proposes a more modest cut—$19 million—from the HIDTA budget approved by Congress for fiscal year 2006. 

The committee is concerned, however, that the higher request 

may not reflect any greater long-term commitment to the HIDTA 

program. The administration did not provide any explanation for 

the drastic cut in its budget proposal last year; neither has it provided an explanation for restoring the funding this year. This suggests that no serious study has gone into what the proper level of 

funding ought to be. Rather, it appears to reflect political and not 

practical considerations. 

In any case, the committee believes that HIDTA funding should continue at last year’s level of $227 million. The $19 million cut 

proposed by the administration would eliminate the only portion of 

the program budget that ONDCP has any real discretion over. The 

regular budgets of the existing 28 HIDTAs, together with ONDCP’s 

administrative costs for the program, would exhaust virtually all of 

the $208 million requested by the administration. Since (as noted 

above) language requiring ‘‘level funding’’ of each individual 

HIDTA has been included in Congress’ appropriations bills for 

nearly a decade, ONDCP has virtually no discretion over the allocation of those funds. 

ONDCP has had discretion over the additional funds—approximately $20 million per year—approved by Congress for the HIDTA 

program. Such funds have, in the past, been used to fund emergency counterdrug activity in specific HIDTAs (for example, maintaining National Guard assistance at ports of entry in the Southwest Border HIDTA), and to fund special, high-priority investigations of major drug trafficking organizations on the Justice Department’s Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list. 

The committee strongly supports these uses of the program discretionary funds and urges Congress to continue providing those 

funds. The committee also urges Congress, however, to delete or 

amend language included in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations bill 

prohibiting the use of any HIDTA funds for the CPOT program. 

While the committee agrees that HIDTA funds should not be rediVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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403See Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 2829: Hearing 

before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 15, 2005). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/

08dec20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/23688.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 

2006). 404The committee’s reasons for opposing the transfer of the HIDTA program to the Department of Justice are discussed in greater detail in the committee’s report on H.R. 2829 (H. Rept. 

109–315, Part I, at 52–53). 405Public Law 109–115. 406Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, et al., to House Appropriations Committee (Apr. 12, 2005) (on file with subcommittee); Letter from Senator Max Baucus, Senator 

Chuck Grassley, et al., to Senate Appropriations Committee Apr. 20, 2005 (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 407See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, HIDTA and Other Law 

Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, State and Local Cooperation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/

01sep20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 

2006). 

rected to non-HIDTA programs, ONDCP should be permitted to use 

the discretionary funds to reward those HIDTAs that target CPOT 

organizations. 

Keeping HIDTA in ONDCP 

The proposed transfer to the Justice Department is contrary to 

existing law and to sound drug enforcement policy.403 It would potentially be even more disruptive to the HIDTA program than simple budget cuts.404

First, transferring this program across departments is contrary 

to every authorization the Congress has passed for HIDTA. The 

original legislation creating HIDTA, each of the two reauthorization acts (in 1993 and 1998), and the most recent reauthorization 

bill passed by the House (H.R. 2086, passed in 2003) specifically 

placed the program in ONDCP. At no time has the House or the 

Senate passed legislation moving the program into the Department 

of Justice. Congress emphatically rejected moving HIDTA out of 

ONDCP in the final fiscal year 2006 budget.405 Letters signed by 

90 Members of the House and 56 Senators expressed Congress’ 

broad-based opposition to any transfer or substantial reduction in 

HIDTAs.406

Moreover, attempting to move the program through an appropriations bill would almost certainly conflict with any reauthorization legislation agreed to by the House and Senate during this Congress. Notably, the current reauthorization legislation approved by 

the committee, H.R. 2829, would keep the HIDTA program within 

ONDCP. 

Even apart from the legal question, moving HIDTA into the Justice Department is highly problematic. At the Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources’ March 10, 

2005 hearing on this issue, not one of the state and local officials 

who actively work with the HIDTA program supported moving the 

program into the Justice Department. Also, in written responses to 

questions submitted after the hearing, not one of the HIDTA directors supported moving the program.407

HIDTA, unlike any program currently administered by the Justice Department, seeks to bring together Federal, state, and local 

law enforcement agencies in cooperative operations, intelligence 

sharing, and investigations. Each HIDTA has an executive board 

made up of equal representation of Federal agencies on the one 

107

408See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, HIDTA and Other Law 

Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Catherine M. O’Neil, and John 

Horton). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01sep20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 409 Id, (testimony of Catherine M. O’Neil). 

hand, and state and local agencies on the other. The boards then 

decide how to allocate their budgets among various task forces and 

other operations. 

This equal voice for state and local agencies has generated an 

unprecedented level of cooperation on the part of all participants. 

It is unlikely that state and local agencies will be willing to make 

significant contributions of their personnel and resources to HIDTA 

task forces if they believe they will not have an equal say in their 

deployment. 

Notably, the administration’s representatives who testified at the 

March 10, 2005 hearing declined to inform the subcommittee about 

how HIDTA would be managed under OCDETF and how decisions 

would be made at the local HIDTA.408 The Director of OCDETF, 

Catherine O’Neil, simply stated that her program would ‘‘study’’ 

the HIDTA program if granted control by Congress and make 

changes at a later date.409 The administration has been no more 

forthcoming this year about how the Justice Department would administer the HIDTA program. 

This approach gets things backwards by demanding the authority to change the program before deciding what changes to make 

or even whether change is necessary. The committee agrees that 

some reforms of the HIDTA program may be needed. However, the 

appropriate response is for the administration first to study the 

program and then make recommendations to Congress for changes 

in management and funding for individual HIDTAs. After Congress 

has reviewed the administration’s recommendations, it can then 

decide whether to include them in reauthorizing legislation. Once 

this occurs, an appropriations request for a revised program would 

be in order. 

Two additional arguments made by the administration to justify 

moving the HIDTA program need to be addressed. First, the administration relies on the HIDTA’s Program Assessment Rating 

Tool (PART) review—which claimed that HIDTA had failed to demonstrate results—for its argument that the program must be overhauled. However, ONDCP apparently failed to provide sufficient information about the HIDTA program’s results to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and also failed to establish specific 

performance measures in time for the review. Had OMB been given 

the complete annual reports of the individual HIDTAs, which detail 

the many investigations, arrests, seizures, and other actions undertaken by the program, and had OMB waited until the performance 

measures had been fully implemented, it is difficult to see how the 

HIDTA program could have been graded significantly worse than 

the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Coast Guard, or any 

other drug enforcement agency. As noted above, the HIDTA directors have developed a uniform performance measurement system, 

which now awaits the approval of ONDCP. The committee urges 

ONDCP to adopt that system expeditiously and to resubmit HIDTA 

for PART review when sufficient data has been collected. 

108

410Press Release, Department of Justice FY 2007 Budget Request (Feb. 6, 2006) at http://

www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/Feb./06—ag—062.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

Finally, the administration argues that the program should be 

transferred in order to consolidate drug enforcement programs 

within the Department of Justice. There are two problems with 

this argument. First, even within the Federal Government, drug 

enforcement cannot be ‘‘consolidated’’ within the Justice Department. Most Federal drug interdiction personnel are employed by 

agencies at the Department of Homeland Security, namely the 

Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), each of which participate in 

individual HIDTAs. ICE and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 

which also participates in HIDTAs, also engage in significant drug 

enforcement and money-laundering investigations. 

Second, although the Justice Department certainly plays a vital 

role in drug enforcement—both through the investigative work 

done by DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 

through prosecutions in Federal court by the U.S. Attorneys’ offices—that Department does not have an exclusive focus on drug 

control. Instead, drug enforcement is but one of many disparate 

missions that the Justice Department must balance, and the committee is concerned that counterdrug money would later be absorbed there by non-counterdrug programs. For example, in its 

press release announcing the fiscal year 2007 Department of Justice budget proposal, the Department mentioned ‘‘terrorism’’ eleven 

times—and drugs only once.410

ONDCP, by contrast, is exclusively dedicated to drug control. It 

is not forced to divert resources or attention to other matters. Thus, 

an anti-drug trafficking program like HIDTA, which brings together both Justice Department and non-Justice Department Federal drug control agencies, as well as state and local drug control 

agencies, is much better located within ONDCP. 

Reallocation of HIDTA Funds 

The budget cut proposed last year by the administration—56 percent of the previous year’s enacted level—if enacted would have 

shut down most of the task forces, intelligence centers, and 

‘‘deconfliction’’ activities funded by the program. This is because either most of the 28 individual HIDTAs would have had to be eliminated, or all of them would have had to accept very deep cuts. The 

funding level requested for fiscal year 2007—$208 million—in principle avoids this problem, since it would permit each HIDTA to be 

funded at last year’s base level. 

The committee has questions, however, about how the administration intends to implement its proposal to ‘‘focus’’ the HIDTA program’s funding on only the most significant drug distribution and 

transit areas. Presumably, this means that the administration 

would reallocate funding among the various HIDTAs—ending the 

current practice of ‘‘level funding’’ for the HIDTAs. Indeed, if the 

administration has no plans to shift the program’s funds, then 

there seems to be little reason to move it from ONDCP. 

At present, however, it is unclear which HIDTAs meet the administration’s new standards—or even what the standards actually 

are. The committee is aware of reports that the administration is 

109

411See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, HIDTA and Other Law 

Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Ron Brooks, president, 

Continued

considering attempting to redirect all or most of the program’s 

funds into the original five HIDTAs. This would (if fully implemented) eliminate 23 of the existing HIDTAs, including:

Chicago HIDTA Midwest HIDTA 

Michigan HIDTA Washington/Baltimore HIDTA 

Appalachia HIDTA Milwaukee HIDTA 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA Central Florida HIDTA 

Ohio HIDTA North Texas HIDTA 

Gulf Coast HIDTA Atlanta HIDTA 

Central Valley HIDTA Hawaii HIDTA 

Lake County HIDTA Nevada HIDTA 

New England HIDTA North Florida HIDTA 

Northern California HIDTA Northwest HIDTA 

Oregon HIDTA Philadelphia/Camden HIDTA 

Puerto Rico/U.S.V.I. HIDTA 

The committee is not opposed to a reallocation of resources 

among the various HIDTAs to meet the ever-changing drug trafficking threat. Moreover, the committee strongly supports the proposition that those HIDTAs which could have the greatest potential 

impact on the national supply and distribution of drugs should receive most of the program’s funds. In fact, both of the ONDCP reauthorization bills adopted by the committee in recent years—H.R. 

2086 in 2003, and H.R. 2829 in 2005—envisioned the possibility of 

annual, evidence-based reallocations among the HIDTAs. 

The committee believes, however, that Congress must have a 

great deal more information about the administration’s long-term 

plans for the HIDTA program before it grants such sweeping authority. The termination of numerous HIDTAs will have a severe 

impact on drug enforcement in the affected regions. The 23 

HIDTAs designated after 1990 cover a broad section of the country, 

including major urban centers, island ‘‘transit zones,’’ and rural 

areas devastated by methamphetamine production and trafficking. 

The total elimination of all or most of them would have deep repercussions for drug enforcement throughout the country. 

Most importantly, the loss of these 23 HIDTAs would destroy one 

of the most significant means for Federal, state, and local cooperative efforts against drug trafficking. Federal drug agencies cannot 

expect to have real success in controlling drug trafficking without 

the assistance of state and local law enforcement—the country is 

simply too large for DEA or any other agency to police it. HIDTA 

is perhaps our most important tool for enlisting the support of 

state and local agencies for national anti-drug trafficking efforts. 

Seven representatives of state and local law enforcement agencies from around the country who work with the HIDTA program 

testified about that impact at the Criminal Justice Subcommittee’s 

hearing on March 10, 2005. They told the subcommittee that the 

vital task forces, intelligence and investigation ‘‘deconfliction’’ centers, and other interagency activities funded by HIDTA would be 

eliminated if the program ceased operations in their areas.411

110

National Narcotics Officer’s Associations Coalition, Tom Carr, Director, Washington-Baltimore 

HIDTA, Tom Donahue, Director, Chicago HIDTA, Chief Jack Harris, Phoenix Police Dept. & 

Vice-Chair, Southwest Border HIDTA, Leonard Hamm, acting Baltimore police commissioner, 

Mark Henry, president, Illinois Drug Enforcement Officer’s Association, and Sheriff Jack L. 

Merritt, Greene County, MO). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01sep20051200/

www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 412 Id, (testimony of Sheriff Jack Merritt). 413 Id, (testimony of Commissioner Leonard Hamm). 414 Id, (written responses of each HIDTA director). 

Furthermore, the loss of these HIDTAs would seriously damage 

our national anti-methamphetamine efforts. All of the HIDTAs 

with a primary or significant focus on meth were designated after 

1990. Some of these HIDTAs—such as the Midwest HIDTA and the 

Rocky Mountain HIDTA—organize Federal, state, and local efforts 

to stop the proliferation of meth labs. Other HIDTAs—most notably 

the Central Valley HIDTA in California—target the ‘‘superlabs’’ 

that have flooded the entire country with meth. In both cases, the 

loss to our anti-meth strategy would be irreparable. For example, 

Sheriff Jack Merritt of Greene County, Missouri testified last 

March that the anti-methamphetamine task force that brings together Federal, state, and local law enforcement in his community 

would be shut down without the HIDTA program.412

The impact would not be confined to anti-meth efforts, however. 

Many of the threatened HIDTAs are designed to combat the drug 

gangs that plague inner-city and other urban centers. These 

HIDTAs—including the Philadelphia/Camden, Lake County (Indiana), Washington/Baltimore, and Chicago HIDTAs—have been the 

primary centers of joint Federal, state, and local anti-drug gang activity. The elimination of these HIDTAs would destroy one of our 

best weapons against the drug dealers who terrorize city streets. 

Baltimore Police Commissioner Leonard Hamm, for example, testified last March that his anti-heroin and anti-drug gang task forces 

would also end without HIDTA assistance.413

Eliminating or eviscerating these individual HIDTAs would be a 

far greater financial loss to Federal drug enforcement efforts than 

simply the money spent by the Federal Government directly on 

their budgets. State and local agencies make significant contributions of their own agents, employees, office space, and equipment 

to HIDTA task forces—much of which is not reimbursed with Federal dollars and which frequently dwarf, in their dollar value, the 

Federal budget components of the individual HIDTAs. We risk losing those contributions without the individual HIDTAs.414

The committee proposes, instead, that the administration present 

to Congress a comprehensive, evidence-based reallocation plan for 

the HIDTA program—as permitted by recent appropriations bills 

(and as would be required by H.R. 2829). The plan would allow 

Congress to evaluate the current state of the HIDTA program overall, the purpose and impact of the individual HIDTAs, and recent 

trends that have altered the drug trafficking landscape since 

present funding levels were set in the late 1990’s. That would allow 

Congress and the administration to work together to ensure that 

HIDTA remains a vital tool in our national anti-drug efforts. 

111

415The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 416The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 417The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 418The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 419 Id. 

2. National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign

Media Campaign FY 2005 Requested 415

FY 2005 

Final 416

FY 2006 Requested 417FY 2006 Enacted 418FY 2007 Request 419

TOTAL* ................................................................... $145 $120 $120 $100 $120

* in millions. 

The committee is deeply concerned about the future of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, and believes that the administration is not working for adequate funding for it. The Campaign, an integrated effort that combines paid and donated advertising with public communications outreach to bring drug abuse 

prevention messages to young people, has suffered repeated, deep 

cuts in its budget since 2001. The cuts have been so deep that the 

Campaign is now at a crossroads: if the administration and Congress do not increase its budget, the program will likely slip into 

irrelevance. 

Program Overview and History 

The Media Campaign funds television, radio, print, and Internet 

advertisements designed to communicate the dangers of drug abuse 

to young people and parents. Most of the program’s dollars are 

spent on the purchase of advertising ‘‘time and space,’’ namely the 

cost of actually airing or printing an advertisement. The Campaign 

also funds the creation, testing, and evaluation of advertisements, 

industry outreach, and strategic partnerships with local communities. Each dollar spent on time and space must be ‘‘matched’’ by 

the entity accepting the dollar with one dollar of donated time and 

space, doubling the impact of the Campaign’s expenditures. No 

match is required for other services purchased by the Campaign, 

however. 

The Campaign was created by Congress in 1997 to expand and 

enhance the efforts of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America 

(PDFA), a not-for-profit organization created in 1987 to curb illegal 

drug use among America’s youth. In a collaborative effort, the 

PDFA solicited anti-drug ads from various ad agencies who donated their creative talent to design and produce anti-drug television ads (pro bono). The PDFA also solicited and obtained donated media airtime from the big three television networks to run 

the anti-drug ads as public service announcements (PSAs). 

For over ten years, the PDFA coordinated these activities with 

great success and at no expense to the American taxpayer. According to the annual University of Michigan Monitoring the Future 

survey, at the same time that the level of anti-drug television ads 

was rising, attitudes about the social disapproval and the perceived 

risks of illegal drug use were also rising. Likewise, there was a corVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
112

420 Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Aspects of Advertising Contract Mismanaged by the Government; Contractor Improperly Charged Some Costs, GAO, REPORT NO. GAO–01–623, (June 2001). 421 Joshua Chaffin, Former Ogilvy partner sentenced to prison, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 13, 

2005. 

responding decrease in illegal drug use among young people during 

the same period. The program seemed to be working. 

Beginning in 1991, however, the donated airtime from the big 

three media networks began to decline significantly. Throughout 

the nineties, the PDFA worked diligently to rebuild the donated air 

times to previous levels (in 1991 the estimated value of donated 

media air time was $350 million)—but that effort did not fully succeed. 

In 1996, the PDFA commissioned an ad agency study which determined that an effective media campaign would require an exposure rate of 4 times per day and frequency rate of 90 percent of 

the target audiences. The minimum cost for such an effort was determined to be $175 million (in 1996 dollars), which represented 

one-half of the $350 million donated in 1991. 

Realizing they needed help to reach their goals, the PDFA approached Congress for assistance. In 1997, President Clinton requested $175 million in Federal funds for the program, to be 

named the ‘‘National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign.’’ Congress 

appropriated $195 million (for fiscal year 1998) and ultimately gave 

statutory authorization for the program in 1998. 

Early Problems with the Campaign 

The Campaign has not been problem-free, however. Almost from 

its inception, some critics have attacked the program as either ineffective, and/or an inappropriate use of Federal funds. 

Such criticism was amplified when, in 2000, it was reported that 

Ogilvy & Mather, the advertising agency that ONDCP (through its 

contracting agent, the Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS)) had hired in 1998 to make media purchases for the Campaign, had improperly charged the government for services during 

1999. A subsequent investigation by the GAO determined that 

Ogilvy had indeed improperly billed the government and that HHS 

had inadequately managed the contract, in particular by awarding 

the contract before sufficiently determining whether Ogilvy had an 

adequate accounting system.420 A criminal investigation of Ogilvy 

by the Justice Department resulted in a settlement in 2002, under 

which the firm agreed to pay $1.8 million to the government. In 

2005, two former Ogilvy employees were convicted of conspiracy 

and making false statements in connection with the investigation.421

The negative publicity from the accounting scandal was further 

exacerbated when, despite the accounting irregularities, ONDCP’s 

new contracting agent, the Department of the Navy, exercised its 

option to renew the contract with Ogilvy in 2001. Indeed, Ogilvy 

was retained to provide services for the Campaign until the expiration of the contract in 2004. ONDCP defended the government’s decision to retain Ogilvy as reasonable in light of all the circumstances, and that argument was not without merit. Nevertheless, the continuing involvement of Ogilvy almost certainly eroded 

congressional and public support for the program. 

113

422WESTAT, EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH ANTI-DRUG MEDIA CAMPAIGN: 2003 REPORT

OF FINDINGS, (Dec. 2003), executive summary available at http://www.mediacampaign.org/publications/performance.html). 423See, e.g., CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.J. RES. 2 (MAKING CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2003, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), H. REPT. 108–10, 1345–1346 

(2003). 424 Christopher Newton, Survey: Anti-Drug Ads Have No Effect, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 14, 

2002. 425See ONDCP Reauthorization & the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Hearing 

before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee 

on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2003) (testimony of Christopher Marston). At 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=108—house—hearings&docid=f:87450.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 426PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG-FREE AMERICA, PARTNERSHIP ATTITUDE TRACKING STUDY–2003 

TEENS STUDY: SURVEY OF TEENS’ ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS TOWARD MARIJUANA, (Aug. 2003), 

at http://www.mediacampaign.org/publications/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 427 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SAMHSA, (June 2005) at http://oas.samhsa.gov/

nsduh.htm#NSDUHinfo (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 428See Monitoring the Future, 2005, at http://monitoringthefuture.org/. 429For these reasons, the committee believes that the most recent OMB PART review findings 

for the Campaign—‘‘results not demonstrated’’—are simply not based in fact. Although the diContinued

Evaluating and Reforming the Campaign 

When Congress first authorized the Campaign, it required extensive evaluations to ensure the program’s effectiveness at reducing 

youth drug use. Beginning in 1998, ONDCP commissioned the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) at HHS to conduct regular 

evaluations of the Campaign through the program’s initial authorization period (i.e., until the end of fiscal year 2003). NIDA then 

contracted with Westat, a private research firm, to evaluate the effectiveness of the Campaign-funded advertisements. 

Westat’s regular reports, the last of which was released in December 2003 (covering the period ending in June 2003), indicated 

that while the Campaign’s advertisements had some positive impact on the attitudes of parents, there was no positive impact on 

the attitudes of young people.422 This led many, including some in 

Congress, to question the utility of the Campaign.423

In response to Westat’s reports, Director Walters acknowledged 

the Campaign’s shortcomings in 2002, 424 and ONDCP undertook a 

major strategic overhaul of the program. Major changes included 

better targeting of advertisements at key age groups, a renewed 

focus on testing of advertisements before airing, and a primary 

focus on marijuana, the primary illegal drug of abuse among teenagers.425

The committee believes that the preponderance of the evidence 

indicates that the post–2002 changes have made the Campaign significantly more effective. A survey by the Partnership for a DrugFree America (PDFA) in August 2003 demonstrated a significant 

positive connection between the Campaign-funded advertisements 

and youth perceptions of marijuana use risk.426 In June 2005, the 

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 

(SAMHSA), a division of HHS, released a report showing that 

young people who reported having seen or heard prevention messages in the media during the past year were much less likely than 

their peers to report illicit drug use.427

Finally, the ultimate evidence of the Campaign’s success is the 

continuing decline since 2002 in overall drug use, and particularly 

marijuana use, among teens nationwide.428 The bottom line is that 

when adequately funded and properly managed, the Campaign 

works.429

114

rect impact of advertising on its target audience is always difficult to measure, the ultimate 

‘‘performance measure’’ for an advertising campaign is whether the target audience responded 

as hoped. In this case, it is clear that it has: young people are reporting decreased use of marijuana. While many factors may have contributed to this decline, it is hard not to give at least 

some credit to the marijuana-focused advertisements purchased by the Campaign. The committee believes that this program is showing clear results, and should be fully funded. 430See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, HIDTA and Other Law 

Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Stephen Pasierb, 

PDFA) (media advertising cost inflation has averaged between 8 and 12 percent over past 8 

years). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01sep20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/

house/pdf/109hrg/22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 431 Id, at 123. 432The committee is aware, in particular, of a dispute between ONDCP and Westat over how 

to evaluate the Campaign, which may result in the replacement of Westat. That dispute is apparently being reviewed by the GAO, with the GAO’s findings to be released sometime this year. 

Program Funding 

Despite that record of improvement and success, Congress has 

not adequately funded the Campaign in recent years. When the 

program was first created in 1997, it was funded at $195 million 

(for fiscal year 1998). From fiscal years 1999 through 2001, it was 

funded at approximately $185 million per year; thereafter Congress 

cut the budget dramatically—to $180 million in fiscal year 2002, 

$150 million in 2003, $145 million in 2004 and $120 million in 

2005. Last year, Congress approved only $100 million for fiscal 

year 2006. Following Congress’ lead, the administration began reducing its budget requests for the Campaign, from $185 million for 

fiscal year 2002, to $180 million for 2003, $170 million for 2004, 

$145 million for 2005 and $120 million for 2006. Finally, for 2007, 

the administration has broken this pattern by requesting $120 million—although this would simply restore the Campaign to 2005’s 

already low level. 

In fact, when inflation is taken into account, the budget of the Media Campaign has declined from $195 million in 1998 to only 

(approximately) $83 million (in constant 1998 dollars) for 2006—a 

drop of well over 50 percent in the Campaign’s resources. The damage to the Campaign is amplified by the fact that advertising costs 

have far outpaced the overall rate of inflation.430 Moreover, since 

the Campaign relies on the ‘‘match’’ requirement, a drop of one dollar in appropriated funds is, in fact, a two dollar cut in actual advertising exposure—since the Media Campaign cannot obtain a 

match for that lost dollar.431

In the face of these facts, Congress nevertheless began slashing 

funding for the Campaign at the precise moment when ONDCP 

corrected many of its early problems. There are probably many reasons for this. First, the negative publicity surrounding the Ogilvy 

scandal and the early Westat reports garnered far more attention 

than subsequent improvements. Second, ONDCP’s refusal (until 

just last year) to target any Campaign advertisements at the burgeoning epidemic of methamphetamine abuse meant the Campaign 

lost an opportunity to build support for the program in rural and 

other communities hardest hit by that drug. Moreover, continuing 

disputes over whether the Campaign has been effective, and even 

how to evaluate it, have also taken their toll.432

Whatever the reason, the Campaign is now at a crossroads. The 

committee urges Congress and the administration to support full 

funding for the program. If the current, greatly reduced funding 

levels are continued or lowered even further, the Campaign will no 

115

433 Anti-Drug Media Campaign: An Array of Services Was Provided, but Most Funds Were 

Committed to Buying Media Time and Space, GAO REPORT NO. GAO–05–175, Mar. 2005. 434See SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 1589 (TRANSPOR- TATION, TREASURY AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 2004), S. REPT. NO. 108–

146, (2003) at 143; See ONDCP Reauthorization: The National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Resource, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2003). At http://

frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108—house—hearings&docid=f:87450.pdf 

(last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

longer be able to function as originally envisioned by Congress in 

1998. A Campaign that cannot reach its audience with sufficient 

frequency or quality of message is probably not worth funding at 

all. The committee hopes that such a result will be avoided. 

The Future of the Campaign 

In addition to the funding problems faced by the Campaign, two 

major issues need to be addressed by Congress and the administration. First, despite the fact that the Campaign’s original, primary 

purpose was to buy media time and space for anti-drug advertisements (to ensure that they reach the national youth audience with 

sufficient frequency), a growing amount of program funds have 

been expended on other activities, such as media consultants, and 

‘‘outreach’’ to the media industry. A recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) revealed that the Campaign 

spent over 28 percent of the program’s funds from fiscal years 

2002–2004 on such activities.433

Concerns about this trend were raised by the Senate Appropriations Committee and by this committee during the 108th Congress.434 Although some such expenditures are undoubtedly necessary to ensure program effectiveness and adequate management 

of the Campaign by ONDCP, care must be taken to prevent excessive diversion of program dollars away from their primary purpose. 

This is particularly important now when the Campaign’s budget is 

shrinking. In a time of scarce resources, the program must focus 

on its major purpose of getting advertisements on the air. 

To ensure that result, the committee has twice approved legislation that would set a minimum percentage of program funds for 

purchasing media time and space. H.R. 2829 (as did H.R. 2086 during the 108th Congress) would require, under normal circumstances, that at least 77 percent of Campaign funds be spent 

on time and space. However, that percentage would rise to 82 percent when the program’s budget falls below $125 million and would 

fall to 72 percent if the budget rose above $195 million. By doing 

so, the legislation seeks to minimize the loss of media time and 

space in a time of falling budgets and to allow for greater diversification in a time of rising budgets. 

Second, although the Media Campaign has produced effective advertisements targeted at marijuana abuse since 2002, only last 

year (after a great deal of criticism from Congress and the public) 

did the ONDCP agree to use Campaign funds to produce similar 

advertisements targeted at the growing epidemic of methamphetamine abuse. ONDCP has thus far committed to spending $1 million to produce such advertisements (but has not stated how much 

it will spend to ensure that they are actually aired). 

The committee believes that the Campaign needs to do more to 

deal with methamphetamine and similar emerging drug threats. 

Last year, a bipartisan amendment to add $25 million for antiVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00121 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
116

435The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 436The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 437The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 438The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 439 Id. 440The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary, 96 (Feb. 

2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

meth advertisements to the Media Campaign’s budget was passed 

in the House. Regrettably, the Senate did not reciprocate that 

move. The committee will explore amending H.R. 2829, however, to 

set aside some percentage of Campaign funds for anti-meth and 

similar targeted advertisements for emerging drugs. 

3. Drug-Free Communities (DFC) Program

DFC FY 2005 Requested 435

FY 2005 

Final 436

FY 2006 Requested 437FY 2006 Enacted 438FY 2007 Request 439

TOTAL* ................................................................... $80 $80 $80 $80 $79.19

* in millions. 

The committee generally supports the administration’s request 

for $79,190,000 for the Drug-Free Communities (DFC) Program, 

which assists local community anti-drug coalitions to prevent substance abuse among young people. This is slightly below the same 

level of funding requested by the administration and appropriated 

by Congress for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. The reduction, however, is largely due to the fact that the administration is only requesting the maximum amount ($750,000) authorized by statute 

for the National Community Anti-Drug Coalition Institute. Last 

year, Congress appropriated funds ($2 million) exceeding the maximum amount authorized (see discussion below). 

While the committee agrees that the Institute should not be 

funded above its authorized level (see below), the committee is concerned about the administration’s unwillingness to redirect all of 

the excess funds into new coalition grants (keeping the total program funds at $80 million). If the program’s budget does not expand, many new coalitions may not be able to start their work—

particularly in the poorest communities where the need for drug 

use prevention is greatest. 

One significant issue facing the program is performance measurement. In its 2006 PART review, DFC received an ‘‘adequate’’ 

rating—higher than many similar prevention programs.440 As is 

the case with other programs, however, the targets established for 

DFC—‘‘enhancing the capabilities of community anti-drug coalitions,’’ ‘‘enhancing prevention activities,’’ and ‘‘increase[ing] citizen 

participation’’—have more to do with the processes of the program 

than with its intended result, namely reducing drug use. Although 

DFC should not be singled out for criticism on this point, ONDCP 

and other agencies involved in drug use prevention need to start 

defining success less in terms of whether the program is simply 

117

441See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, 109th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005) (statement of General Arthur T. Dean, U.S. Army, retired, 

on behalf of CADCA). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01sep20051200/

www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 442Public Law 107–82, Sec. 4(d) (2005). 443Public Law 107–82, Sec. 4(c) (2005). 444Public Law 107–82, Sec. 4(d) (2005). 445GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT, TO EXTEND THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE

DRUG-FREE COMMUNITIES SUPPORT PROGRAM FOR AN ADDITIONAL 5 YEARS, TO AUTHORIZE A 

NATIONAL COMMUNITY ANTIDRUG COALITION INSTITUTE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (H.R. 2291), 

H. REPT. 107–175, Pt. 1. 

functioning as planned and more in terms of whether its functions 

are achieving a quantifiable result. 

There is some evidence that the program is achieving that result. 

In testimony before the subcommittee on April 26, 2005, General 

Arthur Dean, chairman and CEO of the Community Anti-Drug 

Coalitions of America (CADCA), highlighted successes achieved by 

the DFC Program. According to General Dean, in communities 

where DFC grantees operate, drug use has sharply decreased in 

comparison to communities in which there is not an anti-drug presence. For example, in the period of 1993 to 2000, Cincinnati, Ohio 

achieved a 41 percent decrease in marijuana use among 7th to 12th 

graders, while communities in this region without the presence of 

an anti-drug coalition experienced a 33 percent increase.441

The committee is pleased by this evidence and hopes that coalitions receiving grants will continue to make efforts to show their 

quantifiable successes. Such data will help Congress evaluate competing programs for scarce counterdrug funding. 

National Community Anti-Drug Coalition Institute 

As noted above, the administration is only requesting $750,000 

for the Institute, which is the maximum amount authorized by 

statute for fiscal year 2007.442 The Institute, currently operated by 

CADCA, provides training and other technical assistance to coalitions receiving funds under the program.443

Congress authorized $2 million for each of the first two years of 

the Institute’s existence, but thereafter funding was to decrease to 

$1 million for two years and then $750,000 for fiscal years 2006 

and 2007.444 As this committee noted when it approved the legislation authorizing the Institute, Federal funding was only supposed 

to be temporary. The Institute was expected to seek private funding and end all dependence on the Federal budget within a few 

years.445

Committee staff have subsequently been informed by personnel 

at CADCA that the Institute has been unable to obtain the expected private funding. While the committee is sympathetic, that 

is a problem shared by many organizations and institutions. While 

$1.25 million may not seem to be a large amount of money in the 

context of the entire Federal budget, it potentially represents 

grants to at least 12 new coalitions. The committee believes that 

the Institute should be funded at no more than its authorized level, 

with additional dollars to go to new grants under the main program. 

118

446Letter from Senators Grassley and Biden to GAO (Oct. 18, 2005) at http://cadca.org/

CoalitionResources/pp-main.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 447For example, the letters sent to de-funded coalitions simply listed all possible grounds why 

the coalition was found to be ineligible—without specifying which specific grounds, or the facts 

supporting the particular determination. 448For more specific information about the controversy, see Letters from Senators Grassley 

and Biden to Director Walters, (Oct. 18, 2005, and Dec. 2, 2005) at http://cadca.org/

CoalitionResources/pp-main.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

2005 Drug-Free Communities Grant Application Process 

The committee is closely monitoring a significant dispute that 

has arisen in the wake of the 2005 DFC grants application process. 

Major changes implemented at the direction of ONDCP in the review process for grant applications have resulted in the de-funding 

of 63 community coalitions that had been receiving grants and the 

placing on probation of 88 more coalitions. The controversy threatens to undermine confidence in the program, and the committee 

hopes that it can be resolved soon. 

The changes implemented by ONDCP began with the replacement in 2004 of the agency responsible for evaluating proposals 

and awarding grants—the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) at the Justice Department—with the 

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 

(SAMHSA) at the Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS). Though ONDCP indicated to program participants that the 

change in administrator would not affect the actual administration 

of the program, in fact a number of significant changes were made 

in the evaluation procedures. 

It is still not entirely clear how the decisions to fund, de-fund, 

or place existing coalitions on probation were made by ONDCP and 

SAMHSA. The co-chairs of the Senate Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control have requested a full investigation of the revised 

process by the GAO.446 From evidence provided to the committee, 

however, several general statements may be made about the revised grant review process: 

• Unlike in previous years, the professional ‘‘peer reviews’’ of 

coalition activity were given far less importance in the final 

decision to continue funding a coalition, as many of the 

defunded coalitions received high peer review scores;

• The policy staff of ONDCP played a far more active role in 

deciding which coalitions would continue to receive funding;

• Although the grant eligibility criteria applied to the coalitions supposedly did not change, it is clear that ONDCP’s interpretation of those criteria did change, as coalitions were 

defunded on the grounds that they no longer met the eligibility criteria—and there is no evidence that the coalitions 

themselves changed in any way;

• ONDCP did a poor job of explaining to defunded and 

probationed coalitions the precise grounds for the adverse 

decision; 447 and 

• ONDCP placed 88 coalitions on probation because they supposedly exceeded a 20 percent cap on ‘‘direct services’’ spending (namely, spending on specific programs), even though the 

20 percent cap is not mentioned anywhere in statute.448

119

449See letter from Senators Grassley and Biden to Director Walters (Dec. 2, 2005) at http:/

/cadca.org/CoalitionResources/pp-main.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 450The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 451The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 452The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 453The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 454 Id. 455 Id. at 89. 

There are a number of other questions that remain to be answered, including whether the 20 percent ‘‘direct services’’ cap was 

actually used as an eligibility criteria—a policy not authorized by 

the statute. Moreover, the controversy as a whole raises the question of whether ONDCP attempted to implement a significant policy shift in the program—by essentially redefining the purposes 

and goals of DFC—through what was intended to be a merely administrative process. The committee hopes that GAO will be able 

to report back to Congress soon on this matter. 

Until then, the committee urges ONDCP and SAMHSA to reexamine some of the decisions made during the 2005 grants review 

process. In particular, it may be appropriate for ONDCP to implement an ‘‘appeals’’ process for defunded or probationed coalitions, 

as has been urged by the bipartisan co-chairs of the Senate Caucus 

on International Narcotics Control.449 The committee also expects 

that the 2006 grants review process will be conducted in a more 

transparent manner, ensuring that the program’s fairness is not 

left in doubt. 

4. Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC)

CTAC FY 2005 Requested 450

FY 2005 

Final 451

FY 2006 Requested 452FY 2006 Enacted 453FY 2007 Request 454

TOTAL* ................................................................... $40 $41.7 $30 $29.7 $9.6

* in millions. 

The committee opposes the administration’s current request for only $9.6 million for the CTAC program, a drastic cut from the 

$29.7 million appropriated for fiscal year 2006 (which was itself a 

major cut from the $41.7 million appropriated for fiscal year 2005). 

The CTAC research program provides support to law enforcement 

supply reduction by developing advancement in technology for drug 

detection, communications, surveillance and methods to share drug 

crime investigative information.455 In addition, funding is available 

for research into drug abuse and addiction. Further, CTAC supports the Technology Transfer Program which supplies new 

counterdrug technologies to state and local law enforcement. The proposed decreases would cut the research program from $14 million to $9.6 million, while completely eliminating Technology 

Transfer Program (appropriated at nearly $16 million in fiscal year 

2006). The committee strongly opposes the termination of the Technology Transfer Program. 

The program is certainly in need of greater direction and oversight. ONDCP has not taken sufficient steps to ensure that the 

Technology Transfer Program supports national goals in reducing 

120

456The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 457The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 458The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 459The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 460 Id. 

overall drug trafficking and improving interagency communication 

and cooperation. For example, ONDCP needs to make sure that 

any communications or information sharing equipment or systems 

funded by CTAC do not simply benefit the agency receiving the 

transfer. Rather, such systems or equipment should only be provided if they also link the recipient agency with other Federal, 

state, and local agencies and result in increased information sharing. 

Legislation approved by the committee (H.R. 2829) would help 

ONDCP to improve the program’s accountability and effectiveness. 

The bill would give priority, for example, to technology transfers in 

border drug trafficking regions. It would also require an annual report to Congress listing where transfers were made and what the 

criteria were for awarding them. 

The committee believes that reform of this kind—not termination—is the appropriate remedy for CTAC’s difficulties. At a 

time when assistance to state and local drug enforcement is under 

consistent attack, it is unwise for the Federal Government to cut 

off yet another source of badly needed anti-drug trafficking technology. 

5. Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX)

CDX FY 2005 Requested 456

FY 2005 

Final 457

FY 2006 Requested 458FY 2006 Enacted 459FY 2007 Request 460

TOTAL* ................................................................... $4.5 $1.98 $0 $0 $0

* in millions. 

In its report last year, the committee expressed concerns about 

the administration’s proposal to eliminate all funding for the 

Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX). Congress ultimately decided not to provide any funding for CDX for fiscal year 

2006, and it is the committee’s understanding that the last remaining member CDX staff has since been transferred to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). 

This year’s budget again proposes no funding for CDX. 

This program, which was last appropriated at slightly less than $2,000,000 for fiscal year 2005, certainly suffered from a lack of direction. It was intended to help ONDCP coordinate the drug intelligence policies and activities of multiple Federal law enforcement 

agencies, most notably through the creation of a General 

Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP). The need for that coordination is as great today as it ever was, meaning that the mission of 

CDX is far from fulfilled. 

It may well be that the functions of CDX would be better carried 

out by another agency, such as EPIC, or the new drug intelligence 

fusion center created by the Justice Department’s Organized Crime 

121

461The current General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan may be found at http://

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/gcip/index.html. 462The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 463The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 464The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 465The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 466 Id.

Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF). The administration, 

however, should set forth its specific plans for improving drug intelligence sharing, preferably through a new GCIP (which is in 

great need of updating in the post–9/11 era).461 For that reason, 

the committee included a requirement for a new GCIP in H.R. 

2829. 

6. National Drug Court Institute

National Drug Court Institute FY 2005 Requested 462

FY 2005 

Final 463

FY 2006 Requested 464FY 2006 Enacted 465FY 2007 Request 466

TOTAL* ................................................................... $1.0 $0.744 $1.0 $1.0 $0.99

* in millions. 

Contact Information: 703–575–9400, http://www.NDCI.org. 

The committee generally supports the administration’s request 

for $990,000 for the National Drug Court Institute, which is slightly less than last year’s request and the appropriated level for fiscal 

year 2006 ($1 million). The cut is small, but with the increasing 

popularity of drug court programs around the country, it is more 

important than ever that ONDCP review these programs and determine their rate of success. 

The committee believes that better guidance could help improve 

and promote these programs nationwide. A vigorous, mandatory 

system of drug testing should be applied in every drug court case 

to ensure that program participants are staying off of drugs. Convicts should be sentenced to drug abstinence, not just drug treatment. Unless participants are given incentives to overcome their 

drug abuse, it is unlikely that they will avoid future crimes. It is 

not clear that ONDCP has pursued this issue since the committee’s 

last report. The committee therefore intends to explore the matter 

further.

122

467For more information on the National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws, see the Alliance’s website at http://www.natlalliance.org/, or contact the Alliance at (703) 836–6100. 468The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 469The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 470The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 471The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 472 Id. 473See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 46 

(Feb. 10, 2005). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=109—house—hearings&docid=f:20878.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

7. National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws 467

National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws FY 2005 Requested 468

FY 2005 

Final 469

FY 2006 Requested 470FY 2006 Enacted 471FY 2007 Request 472

TOTAL* ................................................................... $0 $0.992 $0 $1.0 $0

* in millions. 

Contact Information: 703–836–6100, http://www.Natlalliance.org. 

The committee opposes the administration’s proposal to eliminate 

all Federal funding for the National Alliance for Model State Drug 

Laws, which was funded at $1,000,000 in fiscal year 2006. The Alliance serves an important function by reviewing the drug laws in 

the various states and by proposing model state laws in response 

to new drug threats or challenges. For example, the Alliance recently held a major conference on methamphetamine legislation 

and policy, bringing together law enforcement officials, addiction 

treatment professionals, elected officials, and public health officials 

from 38 states, 4 countries, the District of Columbia and Guam to 

discuss new solutions to the serious problems related to meth 

abuse, production, and trafficking. 

Most drug enforcement, treatment and prevention is provided at 

the state and local level. The Federal Government has a strong interest in effective state drug policies, and the Alliance helps to promote such policies. 

Although Director Walters has claimed that the work of the Alliance could be performed by ONDCP staff, 473 the committee strongly disagrees. Since the administration has not proposed to add any 

new staff positions to ONDCP, it is unclear which current staff 

have the additional free time to take up the work of the Alliance. 

The committee is not of the opinion that ONDCP is completely fulfilling its current responsibilities. There is thus little indication 

that the Office is prepared to provide the extensive legal analysis, 

outreach to state and local governments, and coordination of multistate information sharing that the Alliance does. 

123

474The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 475The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 476The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 477The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 478 Id. 479The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 480The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 481The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 482The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 483 Id. 

8. United States Anti-Doping Agency and Membership Dues to 

World Anti-Doping Agency

U.S. Anti-Doping Agency FY 2005 Requested 474

FY 2005 

Final 475

FY 2006 Requested 476FY 2006 Enacted 477FY 2007 Request 478

TOTAL* ................................................................... $1.5 $7.44 $7.4 $8.5 $8.5

* in millions. 

World Anti-Doping Agency FY 2005 Requested 479

FY 2005 

Final 480

FY 2006 Requested 481FY 2006 Enacted 482FY 2007 Request 483

TOTAL* ................................................................... $1.0 $1.438 $2.9 $2.9 $1.5

* in millions. 

The committee supports the administration’s request for 

$8,500,000 for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, an increase of nearly 

$7 million over the administration’s fiscal year 2005 request (and 

identical to the appropriated level for fiscal year 2006). Similarly, 

the committee generally supports the administration’s request for 

$1,500,000 for our nation’s membership dues in the World AntiDoping Agency. Through the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency and its 

international counterpart, the United States seeks to stop the use 

of illegal performance-enhancing drugs by American and international athletes in Olympic sports through education, drug testing 

programs, and similar initiatives. 

The committee remains committed to investigating steroid abuse 

in professional sports. The committee held hearings on March 17, 

2005, April 27, 2005, May 19, 2005 and June 15, 2005 to examine 

steroid abuse in professional sports and steroid use by young 

women and will continue to provide oversight regarding this issue 

in order to establish and promote adequate drug prevention and 

testing programs. The committee hopes that ONDCP and other elements of the administration will increase their efforts to stop 

steroids, doping, and other unhealthy and illegal performance enhancement practices. 

124

484The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 485The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 486The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 487The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 488 Id. 489OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, FY 2007 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUBMISSION (Feb. 2006) at 129. 490 21 U.S.C. 1705(c) (2005). 

9. National Drug Control Program Performance Measures

NDCP Performance Measures FY 2005 Requested 484

FY 2005 

Final 485

FY 2006 Requested 486FY 2006 Enacted 487FY 2007 Request 488

TOTAL* ................................................................... $2.0 $0.992 $2.0 $1.5 $1.98

* in millions. 

The committee supports the administration’s request for $1,980,000 for the further development of performance measures 

for Federal drug control programs, an increase of $480,000 from 

the $1,500,000 actually appropriated for fiscal year 2006. The committee notes, however, that the ‘‘performance measures’’ funds provided by Congress to ONDCP since fiscal year 2003 have not been 

used (nor were they intended by Congress to be used) to develop 

a truly comprehensive performance measurement system for the 

national drug control programs. Instead, the funds have been intended and used for research into discrete issues of performance 

measurement. For example, the $1.5 million appropriated for fiscal 

year 2006 will be spent to replace the Justice Department’s discontinued Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) system.489

In fact, there has been no attempt to generate a comprehensive 

performance measurement system since 2002. ONDCP was tasked 

in its 1998 reauthorization statute with developing and submitting 

a report containing a comprehensive performance measurement 

system in 1999.490 ONDCP submitted annual updates to that report through 2002, but the program was discontinued thereafter. 

Beginning in 2003, Congress began appropriating limited funds to 

ONDCP for the more limited research programs now in development. 

The problem of measuring effectiveness in drug control programs—whether enforcement, treatment, or prevention—is a difficult one. It has never been more necessary than now, however, 

when tremendous pressure is being placed on every aspect of the 

Federal budget, particularly drug control programs. Without adequate performance measures, it will be impossible to demonstrate 

the real, tangible results of the billions of dollars being spent on 

enforcement, treatment, and prevention. 

The committee hopes that ONDCP will make solid progress in 

developing and implementing such performance measures. To that 

end, the new reauthorization legislation approved by the committee 

(H.R. 2829) requires ONDCP to submit a comprehensive performance measurement system as part of each annual National Drug 

Control Strategy. While the research currently funded should continue, ONDCP needs to ensure a more systematic and inclusive 

125

491The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/agency—budget.pdf 

(last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 492The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/dept—state.pdf (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 493The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/06budget.pdf (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 494The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/dept—state.pdf (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 495 Id. 496 Id. 

measurement system that will allow Congress and the public to 

evaluate the progress made by the Federal Government against 

drug trafficking and abuse. 

G. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Department of State receives significant Federal funding in 

relation to its various drug interdiction, supply reduction and alternative development programs. 

1. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

(INL)

FY 2005 491

Requested 

FY 2005 492

Final 

FY 2006 493

Requested 

FY 2006 494

Enacted 

FY 2007 495

Request 

Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) Budget* ...... $731 $725.2 $734.5 $727.2 $721.5

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

(INCLE) Budget* ............................................... $190.6 $178 $341.2 $301 $445.2

Supplemental Account* ........................................ - $260 - - -

Total INL Budget* ................................................. $1,089.8 $2,833 $1,218.4 $1,199.6 $1,166.7

Drug Resources Percentage .................................. 84.6% 41.1% 88.3% 85.7% 76.9%

* in millions. 

Contact Information: Andean Counterdrug Initiative: 202–647–

8464, Afghanistan: 202–647–6642 (Office of Civilian Police and 

Asia, Africa and Europe Programs) or 202–647–5175 (Afghanistan 

Country Desk) http://www.state.gov/p/inl/. 

The President’s FY 2007 budget requests $721.5 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). This is a $5.7 million decrease from the FY 2006 enacted amount of $727.2 million. While 

the committee supports the FY 2007 budget request, we are concerned with the decline in the proposed levels of financial support 

for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and the dire situation in Afghanistan. It is encouraging to see that the President’s FY 2007 

budget includes $297.4 million for counterdrug support in Afghanistan.496 It is vital that the U.S. work with its allies to continue to 

stamp out drug production at the source and build and maintain 

momentum for these critical programs. 

During a committee-initiated briefing with INL held in November 2005, it was suggested by INL staff that their counter-narcotics 

mission may be better supported and achieved if their budget resources were divided between counter-narcotics missions and law 

enforcement support missions, instead of by country program. The 

INL budget is currently divided into an ACI account and an International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, 

which seems to inhibit the discretion of INL to designate resources 

126

497For more information, see the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs home page at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 498Letter from William Todd, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Civilian Police and 

Asia, Africa and Europe Programs, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 9, 2006) 

(on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 499The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/06budget.pdf. At http://

www.state.gov/documents/organization/59169.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 500The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/dept—state.pdf (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 501 Connie Veillette, Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: 

FY2006 Assistance, CRS Report No. RL 33253 (Congressional Research Service) (Jan. 27, 2006) 

at http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL33253.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

to purely counterdrug missions. This type of division may provide 

INL with more flexibility to move money to the programs or countries that are in need of additional counterdrug resources at a specific time. Although no proposals have been made to affect this 

change, the committee supports research into this possible new 

budget structure, on the condition that INL provide strong justification for this change. 

Programs operated by INL support two of the State Department’s 

strategic goals, which are ‘‘to reduce the entry of illegal drugs into 

the United States’’ and ‘‘to minimize the impact of international 

crime on the United States and its citizens.’’ 497

While counter-terrorism operations receive the highest priority in 

many of the regions of the world in which INL functions, according 

to documents received from INL, 85.75 percent of their FY 2006 

budget has been designated for counterdrug missions.498 Illegal 

drug production and trade has long been believed to finance terrorist activities, so the committee commends INL for prioritizing 

counterdrug missions. 

2. Andean Counterdrug Initiative 

The State Department’s INL Bureau and its Andean 

Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) have both received ‘‘adequate’’ ratings 

in the administration’s CY 2005 Performance Assessment Rating 

Tool (PART) process.499 The committee supports the programs’ efforts to develop long-term performance and efficiency measures. 

The committee supports the administration’s request for $721.5 

million for the ACI but is disappointed that it represents a $5.7 

million decrease from $727.2 million appropriated for FY 2006. The 

ACI budget provides support to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, 

Brazil, Venezuela and Panama.500 These funds are needed to continue programs in law enforcement, border control, crop reduction, 

alternative economic development, democratic institution building, 

and administration of justice and human rights programs in the region. It is critical to maintain the priority of funding drug control 

programs in Colombia, since 90 percent of the cocaine that enters 

the United States either originates in, or transits through, Colombia.501

The committee is also concerned about funding for the Air Bridge 

Denial program, which provides assets to conduct surveillance and 

drug interdiction in Colombia. The Air Bridge Denial program was 

once a separate line item with separate funding and requests, in 

order to facilitate congressional oversight, but is now funded 

127

502 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007: Appendix, at http://

www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/appendix.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 503See CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3057 (FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FI- NANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 2006) H.R. CONF. REP. PUBLIC LAW

109–102, at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=109—cong—bills&docid=f:h3057eh.txt.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 504 BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL

NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, (Mar. 2005) at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/

2005/vol1/html/42361.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 505The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 20. 506DEPT. OF STATE, SECRETARY OF STATE, SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AF- FAIRS, FUNCTION 150, FISCAL YEAR 2007, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/

60297.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 507 Id. 508 Id. 509Letter from Henry Hyde, chairman of the International Relations Committee, to 

Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State (Feb. 14, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 

through the ACI.502 The administration has proposed $465 million for Colombia under ACI, with approximately $13 million designated for the Air Bridge Denial program. This is a slight decrease 

from the $14 million appropriated in FY 2006.503 Moreover, the request is significantly lower than the State Department FY 2006 request for $21 million.504 As stated in the National Drug Control 

Strategy, the Air Bridge Denial program contributes to Colombia’s 

success.505 The committee agrees with this assessment, and recommends the administration provide greater support for the program. 

It is crucial that the State Department be provided with appropriate air assets and equipment, which are essential to the counternarcotics and counter-terrorism missions in the Andean Region. In 

its FY 2007 budget, the administration has requested $65.7 million 

for the Critical Flight Safety Program (CFSP), which is intended to 

upgrade aged and ailing aircraft. While this seems like a noble objective, the committee is concerned that this sum of money has 

been designated solely for upgrading 35 year-old helicopters, with 

over 10,100 airframe hours, instead of purchasing new aircraft, 

which will serve their mission for a longer period of time.506 For 

the amount of money designated to refurbish 35 year-old helicopters—with 6,000 more airframe hours than DOD customarily allows its helicopters to remain in service 507—the administration 

may be able to purchase nearly 20 new Huey II helicopters. 

Following seven years of counterdrug work, U.S. efforts in Colombia are increasingly bearing concrete results directly impacting 

the domestic supply in America. The price of cocaine and heroin 

originating from the Andean region has risen and the purity has 

decreased.508 These successes are due in large part to interdiction 

missions carried out by the Marine Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and other 

air-based interdiction efforts. In order to capitalize on these gains, 

the committee agrees with International Relations Committee 

chairman, Henry Hyde, in urging the State Department to replenish and bolster MPA air assets for the Colombian Navy.509

In order to maintain the outstanding results to date under plan 

Colombia, both with coca and opium eradication it is essential that 

the 22 aircraft (fixed and rotor) lost by the Colombian National Police (CNP) since 2000 be promptly replaced. In addition, to ensure 

the safety and ongoing training of the CNP pilots and to foster 

Colombianization of the counternarcotics program, INL should upgrade the rotary simulator and purchase a fixed wing simulator 

128

510 Id. 511 Id. 512DEPT. OF STATE, POST REPORTS, (Jan. 25, 2006), at http://foia.state.gov/phonebook/postrpt/

pr—view—all.asp?CntryID=18 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

that will assist the CNP in the performance of nighttime operations.510

In addition, in order to produce successful efforts to stem the 

flow of illicit narcotics from the Andean Region, participating parties must be adequately supplied with surveillance assets. The 

committee is pleased with the progress being made to train more 

Bell 212 pilots and to equip these aircrafts with Night Vision Goggle (NVG) capabilities as a part of the plan to improve the technical capacity of the CNP. INL held an NVG training session in 

early January 2006 for 5 Bell 212 pilots. In addition, INL has recently placed an order for 42 upgrade kits for ANVIS–6 NVGs, totaling $284,000, as well as an order for 52 new ANVIS–9 goggles, 

totaling $454,000. These new NVGs and the upgrade kits will be 

delivered in May 2006.511

The committee believes the administration should take a more 

active role to ensure that the U.S. Government provides financial 

and technical support for Colombia’s demobilization program. 

Under this program, former members of narco-terrorist organizations (such as the FARC, ELN and AUC) agree to lay down their 

weapons, stop drug trafficking, provide valuable intelligence to Colombia’s security agencies, and seek employment in the civilian 

economy. Recently, a legal dispute between the U.S. Department of 

State and the U.S. Department of Justice has delayed American 

support for Colombia’s demobilization program and has squandered 

important opportunities. The administration should actively seek to 

resolve those differences immediately to prevent any further disruption in U.S. support for this vital program. 

Finally, the committee commends the work of INL to stem the 

international flow of illicit drugs across our American borders and 

into our neighborhoods. However, the lack of significant coordination between agencies to achieve this goal is a vital concern. The 

committee is disappointed that the U.S. Department of State and 

the U.S. Department of Defense cannot agree on where to station 

crucial air assets, and that they cannot reach an agreement on a 

counter-narcotics mission. The committee is gravely concerned by 

the lack of coordination among USG agencies to achieve a comprehensive, counter-narcotics strategy and recommends that 

ONDCP take a prominent leadership role in developing and coordinating a strategy. 

Bolivia 

ACI funding is given to seven countries located in the Andean 

Region. While the focus of the initiative has historically and logically been Colombia, Bolivia has lately become a particularly volatile country. 

On December 18, 2005, Evo Morales, former leader of the Coca 

Grower’s Union, was elected president by an overwhelming majority. Morales, an indigenous cocalero, ran on a platform of nationalism. He vowed to alleviate poverty and discrimination towards indigenous persons. During his campaign, Morales promised to re-examine the current coca eradication programs.512

129

513 Coca grower in Bolivia drug post, BBC NEWS, (Jan. 28, 2006) at http://www.chron.com/disp/

story.mpl/bizarre/3619594.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 514 Coca grower in Bolivia drug post, BBC NEWS, (Jan. 28, 2006) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/

hi/americas/4658880.stm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 515 Coca grower appointed drug czar in Bolivia, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, (Jan. 28, 2006) at 

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/bizarre/3619594.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 516State Department Briefing to House Committee on International Relations, (Feb. 10, 2006). 517 Id. 518The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/dept—state.pdf (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 519 Id. 

President Morales claims that he wants to increase the production of coca for use in medicines, toothpaste and soft drinks. Eradication efforts are hampered to some extent because the cultivation 

and sale of small amounts of coca is legal in Bolivia. The United 

States contends that additional production of the plant—the main 

ingredient used to make cocaine—eventually ends up on illegal 

drug markets. To further complicate matters, the coca plant is 

prized by Bolivian indigenous farmers for traditional medicinal 

uses and herbal teas.513

Although he has been in office less than one month, Morales has 

made numerous cabinet selections believed to be based more on 

loyalty to his administration rather than qualifications or credentials for the position. Most notable was his selection of Felipe 

Caceres, a former coca grower, as Bolivia’s new drug czar. In an 

interview with BBC concerning his appointment, Mr. Caceres said 

he was convinced he would help lead a successful fight within 

President Morales’ government to end drug-trafficking in Bolivia, 

proclaimed, ‘‘What we say is no to drugs, but yes to the coca leaf,’’ 

adding he would not stop production on his own plantation.514

Prior to taking office, Morales himself was a coca farmer who 

often protested against U.S.-backed eradication efforts. Since being 

elected President, Morales has repeatedly said he is seeking a 

drug-fighting program whose emphasis would be, ‘‘No to zero coca, 

but yes to zero cocaine.’’ 515

While it is too soon to predict Morales’ stance on counter-narcotics and drug eradication, he has agreed that it, along with U.S. 

assistance, is important. During campaign speeches, Morales indicated his loyalty to coca farmers by taking the position of ‘‘long live 

coca, death to gringos.’’ However, he has altered his slogan somewhat since his election to ‘‘long live coca, death to cocaine.’’ 516

Since taking office, no eradication has occurred, although drug 

interdiction seems to be improving.517

Afghanistan 

The administration is requesting $297.4 million for the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) 

programs in Afghanistan.518 According to the ONDCP Budget Summary of the FY 2007 National Drug Control Budget, ‘‘Funds will 

be used to expand the opium poppy elimination program from 12 

to 14 provinces, providing coverage for 90 percent of the territory 

where the poppy crop is grown.’’ 519 While this funding will be used 

to accelerate the development of police programs and to reduce 

opium poppy cultivation by providing a drug control capacity, the 

committee is concerned that an insufficient level of cooperation is 

taking place in Afghanistan among State, DEA, USAID and 

130

520Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 15/ 5996 Antrag der Bundesregierung, Fortsetzung der 

Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher reitkraefte an dem Einsatz einer Internationalen 

Sicherheitsunterstuetzungstruppe in Afghanistan unter Fuehrung der NATO auf Grundlage der 

Resolutionen 1386 (2001) vom 20. Dezember des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen. 521 CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD, AFGHANISTAN: NARCOTICS AND U.S. POLICY, CRS REPORT RL 

32686 (Congressional Research Service) (Jan. 25, 2006), at http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/

RL32686.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 522Press Release, Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, Fact Sheet: Counter-Narcotics (Jan. 

31, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform). 523Summary Findings of Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 2005 (United Nations Office on Drugs 

and Crime), (Sept. 12, 2005) at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan—2005/annex—opium-afghanistan–2005–09–09.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 524DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, (Mar. 2006) vol. I, at 208. 

CENTCOM elements to assure that the issue is properly addressed. 

The committee is pleased that the President’s FY 2007 budget requests funding up front for State Department counter-narcotics 

programs in Afghanistan, rather than seeking to fund it through 

supplemental requests. Although, there is much more work to be 

done. The U.S. agencies need to coordinate and depend on many 

other countries’ assistance for military support and assistance, 

however, counterdrug operations are carried out mostly by Afghan 

forces. The German mission statement, for example, states, ‘‘The 

responsibility for drug law enforcement is with the Afghan government, it is not part of the mission of the German forces in Afghanistan. It is a central task for the German reconstruction teams to 

create an atmosphere of security in which Afghan drug law enforcement forces can be trained and in which these forces can be supported realizing their long term drug fighting strategy by the International Community.’’ 520

Despite multinational efforts to reduce poppy cultivation and 

drug trafficking in Afghanistan, in 2005 it continued to supply 87 

percent of the world’s illicit opium.521 In addition, the export of Afghan opium in 2005, which totaled $2.7 billion, was equivalent to 

52 percent of the nation’s GDP. Of this sum, 80 percent ends up 

in the pockets of drug trafficking networks, while the rest is distributed among the nation’s two million poppy farmers.522

While the number of hectares of opium poppy decreased slightly 

in FY 2005 to 104,000 hectares from 131,000 hectares in FY 2004, 

the average opium yield increased from 32 kg/ha in FY 2004 to 39 

kg/ha in FY 2005, which represented a nearly 22 percent increase 

in yield.523 According to the UN report, the Southern Region, including the Helmand province, displayed a 136.3 percent increase 

in opium poppy production from 27.8 kg/ha in 2004 to 37.9 kg/ha 

2005. 

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has made a ‘‘. . . clear commitment to stemming drug production and trade in Afghanistan and 

has set the goal of a 20 percent reduction in opium cultivation in 

2006.’’ 524 In order to assist Afghanistan in its effort to eliminate 

its illicit drug economy, strong narcotics laws and law enforcement 

must be present. The committee is pleased that the President’s FY 

2007 budget reflects and prioritizes the strategic role of the State 

Department in assisting the Government of Afghanistan in the development of its legal system and the rule of law. Both the Afghan 

Counter-narcotics Tribunal (CNT) and the Counter-narcotics Justice Center (CNJC), which have nationwide jurisdiction over prosVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
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525Press Release, Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, Fact Sheet: Strengthening the Rule 

of Law (Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform). 526See Afghanistan—Law Enforcement Interdiction Efforts in Transshipment Countries to 

Stem the Flow of Heroin: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2004) at 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=108—house—hearings&docid=f:96524.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 527 Carlotta Gall, Another Year of Drug War, and the Poppy Crop Flourishes, THE NEW YORK

TIMES, (Feb. 17, 2006) at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/17/international/asia/

17poppy.html?—r=1&oref=slogin (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 528 Id. 529See U.S. Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan: Time for Leadership: Hearing before the 

House Committee on International Relations, 109th Cong., (Mar. 17, 2005) at http://

wwwc.house.gov/international—relations/109/20058.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 530 Id. 531See Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly? Hearing before the 

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004) at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS57423 (last 

visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

ecution of mid-level and high-level drug trafficking crimes, are now 

fully operational.525

While this progress is promising, much work still remains to solidify the criminal justice system in Afghanistan and to disarm 

drug trafficking organizations.526 A recent New York Times article 

criticized the multinational poppy eradication, alternative development and law enforcement efforts in Afghanistan, noting that farmers have continued growing opium poppy against the directive of 

the head of the Afghan anti-narcotics department in the Helmand 

province, and in spite of personal pleas from President Hamid 

Karzai.527 According to Fazel Ahmad Sherzad, the head of the Afghan anti-narcotics department in the Helmand province, ‘‘Last 

year 40 percent of land was used for poppy cultivation . . . This 

year it is up to 80 percent in places.’’ According to Mr. Sherzad, 

many believe that eradication efforts last year were ‘‘a joke’’ as cultivation in Kandahar and Farah increased. Eradication missions 

even led to conflict between farmers and Afghan eradication teams 

trained by USAID alternative development contractor, DynCorp.528

In a country that is so vital to the security of the United States 

and its allies, opium growth and in turn narcotic production and 

smuggling, which are widely known to support terrorism, must be 

eliminated.529 The Taliban is currently conducting a PR campaign 

to raise drug money to carry out their terrorist activities by circulating flyers demanding farmers to continue growing poppy. According to the new governor in Helmand, the Taliban have forged 

an alliance with drug smugglers, providing protection for drug convoys and mounting attacks to keep the government away and the 

poppy flourishing.530

The committee strongly encourages the Department of State and 

other Federal agencies to coordinate their efforts with each other, 

as well as with their multinational partners and the Afghan government. The committee advises the Department of State to work 

closely with the Department of Defense in a joint effort to root out 

the production and trade of illicit narcotics, which finance the 

Taliban and potentially other terrorist groups.531 Strong government and law enforcement presence is needed in these poppy growing provinces to enforce existing laws, and to protect those who are 

carrying out the eradication and alternative development efforts. 

It is crucial that every agency responsible for carrying out the 

international counter-drug strategy remain open and mindful to 

132

532DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET, CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, at http://www.state.gov/documents/

organization/54134.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 533DEPT. OF STATE, SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, FUNCTION 150, FIS- CAL YEAR 2007. 534 Id. 535Letter from William Todd, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Civilian Police and 

Asia, Africa and Europe Programs, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 9, 2006) 

(on file with the subcommittee). 536 Id. 

structural changes that may enhance their efficiency in achieving 

this strategy. During a committee-initiated briefing with INL held 

in November 2005, INL staff suggested that counterdrug goals and 

priorities in Afghanistan may be more effectively achieved if the 

USAID Alternative Livelihoods alternative development program 

were to be moved under the supervision of, and funded through, 

INL. This move would ensure that the USAID Alternative Livelihoods program supports the counter-narcotics strategy of INL. The 

committee supports this effort. 

Methamphetamine 

According to the INL FY 2006 Budget Justification, in addition 

to its traditional mission to stem the flow of cocaine and heroin 

from Andean countries, ‘‘INL is also targeting . . . Mexico, which 

is . . . a source country for heroin, marijuana as well as 

methamphetamines. Finally, INL is also giving increased attention 

the entry of synthetic drugs via the Western Hemisphere into the 

United States.’’ 532

In FY 2007, Mexico will receive $39 million in INL funding, 

which will be used for three major programs to combat narcotics 

trafficking, including efforts to stem the flow of methamphetamine 

to America. These programs include Homeland/Border Security, 

Counternarcotics and Institutional Development.533 According to a 

State Department publication, ‘‘attacking methamphetamine production facilities will be a top enforcement priority.’’ 534 The committee supports this decision and is pleased that a substantial portion of the $39 million will be used to protect America against the 

threat of methamphetamine production and trafficking. 

According to correspondence received from INL by the committee, 

INL funds and supports a variety of precursor chemical diversion 

programs in key nations. Recent multilateral success in regulating 

the importation of precursors from Canada has shifted the flow of 

precursors from the Northern Border to the Southern Border. Mexico has become a major source of meth and its precursors, which 

are frequently smuggled into America across our common border.535 In order to address this new challenge, INL is collaborating 

with the Mexican government to establish training programs, prosecution teams, and specialized teams to dismantle methamphetamine labs. INL also contributes financial support to the International Narcotics Control Board’s Databank for Precursor Control, 

which assists governments in their effort to prevent the diversion 

of precursor chemicals.536

The committee commends the efforts of INL to assist law enforcement institutions in other countries in stemming the international 

flow of illicit narcotics. However, we encourage INL not to neglect 

the movement of precursor chemicals (those chemicals needed in 

133

537Meth still pouring through loopholes: Congress must adopt global controls to put meth ingredients out of the long reach of the Mexican drug cartels, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 24, 2006, at 

http://www.oregonlive.com/search/index.ssf?/base/editorial/

1138065917166080.xml?oregonian?ede&coll=7#continue (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 538The U.S.A. Patriot Act, Title II—The Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, S. 

2118, 108th Cong., at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=109—cong—bills&docid=f:s2118is.txt.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 539Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, to Randall Tobias, U.S. Global AIDS 

Coordinator, U.S. Department of State, (Feb. 6, 2006) at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/

02.06.06%20State%20Tobias%20USAID%20prostitution%20lies.pdf. 540 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, FY 2006, at http:/

/www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/summary.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 541MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED

PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 2006, PUBLIC LAW 109–102 TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3057, H.R. 

CONF. REPT. NO. 109–265. At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=109—cong—reports&docid=f:hr265.109.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 542 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, FY 2005, at http:/

/www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/summary.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 543 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2007: APPENDIX, at http://

www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/appendix.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 544 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AFGHANISTAN BUDGET SUMMARY, at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ane/af.html.

the production process) in the effort to reduce meth, heroin and cocaine production. Meth use and demand are increasing in the U.S. 

and elsewhere. Therefore, INL must continue to fund meth precursor interdiction, as well as law enforcement training programs, 

at appropriate levels. 

We must address the meth epidemic using a comprehensive approach of State laws restricting pseudoephedrine and production 

controls on the few factories that produce pseudoephedrine internationally.537 The committee encourages the State Department to 

work toward a protocol for global tracking of pseudoephedrine shipments. 

Finally, the committee expects the State Department to be aggressive in its implementation of the methamphetamine certification statute in the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 

2005.538

H. UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The President’s FY 2007 budget requests $337.8 million for the 

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to 

supplement counter-narcotics missions in Afghanistan and the Andean Region. This represents a $31.6 million decrease from the FY 

2006 enacted amount of $369.4. While the committee supports the 

FY 2007 budget request for USAID, we have numerous areas of 

concern, particularly with respect to deficiencies in the administration of taxpayer money.539

USAID FY 2005 Requested FY 2005 Final FY 2006 Requested 540

FY 2006 Enacted 541FY 2007 Re- quest 

ACI—Alternative Development* ............................ $229.3 542 $235.1 $216.3 $228.8 $228.8 543

Afghanistan Alternative Livelihoods* ................... $95.7 544 $175 $146 $140.6 $109

Total USAID counterdrug moneys* ........................ $325 $362.3 $410.1 $369.4 $337.8

* in millions. 

Contact Information: U.S. Agency for International Development: 202–712–4810, http://www.usaid.gov/. 

134

545The Conference Report on H.R. 3057, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–102), provides $734.5 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, of which $228.8 million was directed for alternative development 

and institution building programs, to be carried out by USAID. Of this amount, $131.2 million 

was allocated for Colombia; $37 million for Bolivia; $11.54 million for Ecuador; and $49 million 

for Peru. 546Press Release, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., USAID Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Request (Feb. 

8, 2006) at http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2006/fs060208.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 547DEPT. OF STATE, SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, FUNCTION 150, FISCAL YEAR 2007. 548 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., BUDGET JUSTIFICATION TO THE CONGRESS FY 2006, at http:/

/www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/summary.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

1. Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Alternative Development 

The committee supports the administration’s FY 2007 request for 

$721.5 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative but is disappointed that it represents a $13 million decrease from $734.5 

million appropriated for FY 2006.545 Of this FY 2007 ACI request, 

nearly $207 million will be allocated to USAID in order to carry out 

alternative development and institution-building programs.546 This 

money will fund projects needed to continue the enforcement, border control, crop reduction, alternative economic development, 

democratic institution building, and administration of justice and 

human rights programs in the region. 

While the committee applauds the work of USAID in the Andean 

Region, it is concerned with the decrease in FY 2007 funding for 

its alternative development program within the Andean 

Counterdrug Initiative. 

USAID has the responsibility to take effective action to eliminate 

illicit coca production and to establish licit, sustainable farm-level 

production capacity and economic stability in countries throughout 

the Andean Region. USAID uses ACI funds for programs in four 

Andean countries—Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador.547 These 

programs include expanding a licit agricultural economy, assisting 

displaced groups, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting 

the rule of law, human rights, and judicial reform. This work is 

crucial to our nation’s drug control strategy and must be funded at 

appropriate levels.548

The committee believes that the USAID counter-narcotics mission should coordinate more effectively with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), and because of their expertise, INL must take a more 

active lead in the apportioning of designated dollars. USAID acknowledges how important its efforts are in the ACI supply reduction and alternative development efforts, and therefore, moneys 

spent must be included in the national drug budget. 

The ACI budget provides support to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama. The subcommittee is concerned that the 13 percent reduction between 2003 and the administration’s 2005 request for the initiative (from $841 million to $731 

million) stifles the hard-earned successes that have recently become evident. 

2. Afghanistan and Alternative Development 

While the USAID alternative development programs in Colombia 

can be called a qualified success, the committee is cautious about 

making the same pronouncement of USAID’s efforts in Afghanistan. Although USAID’s Alternative Livelihoods Program (AL) is 

135

549The 1384 (2005) Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, at http://www.mcn.gov.af/imp—plan.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 550 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, AFGHANISTAN OPIUM SURVEY, 2004, (Nov. 

2004) at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan—opium—survey—2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 

24, 2006). 551 Id. 552 Id. 553 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, SUMMARY FINDINGS OF OPIUM TRENDS IN

AFGHANISTAN, 2005 (Sept. 12, 2005) at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan—2005/

annex—opium-afghanistan–2005–09–09.pdf. 

part of the strategy of ‘‘The 1384 (2005) Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan—to tackle the cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs in Afghanistan,’’ this program has failed to curtail 

Afghan opium poppy production, which has greatly increased since 

the inception of AL in 2004.549 The AL Program was initially funded at $5 million in FY 2004 but was financed at $175 million in 

FY 2005. In FY 2006, USAID will only receive $146 million for the 

AL Program, which is a $29 million decrease from FY 2005. The 

committee is concerned with the declining trend in the families of 

the AL program. USAID received $146 million for the AL Program 

in FY 2006 and has requested only $109 million for FY 2007. 

The committee encourages USAID to be clear and consistent in 

its presentation of the condition of poppy cultivation, yield and 

opium production in Afghanistan. When the term ‘‘cultivation’’ is 

used, it refers to the number of hectares that have been planted 

and the amount of land area used for planting. The Federal agencies involved in opium poppy eradication frequently use this measurement to determine the number of hectares of poppy grown and 

the number of acres devoted to poppy cultivation. The recent decrease in cultivation is indeed a significant stride in the right direction. However, it does not portray the complete picture. One must 

also look at the poppy yield to determine the success of eradication 

programs. 

The term ‘‘yield’’ refers to the quality of the actual harvest (or 

crop) of poppy in terms of its potential to produce illicit opium. 

While it is important to determine whether poppy cultivation is up 

or down, it is even more important to ensure that the opium poppy 

yield decreases. A decrease or increase in yield is often dependent 

on factors such as growing conditions and weather, which are out 

of the control of those involved in eradication. Yield may also be 

a result of better quality fertilizer and other farming techniques. 

And finally, ‘‘production’’ refers to the actual production of illicit 

opium from the good quality poppy crop. 

Under the watch of USAID and other U.S. Government agents, 

Afghan opium poppy cultivation dramatically increased, from 

80,000 hectares in 2003, to 131,000 hectares in 2004.550 Similarly, 

the production of opium increased from 3,600 metric tons (mt) in 

2003 to 4,200 mt in 2004.551 On the other hand, while opium cultivation and production increased, the average opium yield decreased from 45 kg/ha in 2003 to 32 kg/ha in 2004.552

As discussed previously, while cultivation of opium poppy decreased slightly in FY 2005 to 104,000, the average opium yield increased from 32 kg/ha in FY 2004 to 39 kg/ha in FY 2005.553 According to the UN report, the Southern Region, including the 

Helmand province, displayed a 136.3 percent increase in opium 

136

554 Id. 555Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources staff briefing with 

INL Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary on INL Afghanistan Operations, Mar. 8, 2006. 556 Id. 557 Id. 558 Id. 559Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 

poppy production from 27.8 kg/ha in 2004 to 37.9 kg/ha 2005. 

USAID focuses much of its AL program in Helmand.554

State Department’s anticipated cultivation trends for 2006 are 

alarming for Afghanistan. Only three of the thirty-four provinces in 

the country are expected to see a decrease in poppy cultivation.555

Another thirteen are expected to see increases in production, with 

seven of those seeing growth of greater than fifty percent over 

2005.556 Helmand Province alone is anticipated to produce 75,000 

to 85,000 hectares of opium poppy which represents 51 percent of 

the world’s anticipated opium poppy harvest.557

While the committee finds the initial efforts of AL praiseworthy, 

the committee urges quick action to address deficiencies. The committee is shocked and dismayed to learn that the greatest increases 

in opium poppy production have taken place in the areas where 

USAID administers its AL programs. 

FACT SHEET—AFGHANISTAN 558

2004 Variation on 

2004 2005

Net opium poppy cultivation .......................................................... 131,000 ha ¥21% 104,000 ha 

in percent of actual agricultural land .................................. 2.9% ........................ 2.3%

number of provinces affected ............................................... 32 (all) ........................ 25

Average opium yield ....................................................................... 32 kg/ha 22% 39 kg/ha 

Production of opium ....................................................................... 4200 mt ¥ 2.4% 4,100 mt 

in percent of world illicit opium production ......................... 87% ........................ 87%

Number of households involved in opium cultivation ................... 356,000 ¥13% 309,000

Number of persons involved in opium cultivation ......................... 2.3 million ........................ 2.0 million 

in percent of total population (23 million) ........................... 10% ........................ 8.7%

Average farm-gate price of fresh opium at harvest time ............. US $92 ∂11% US $102/kg 

Average farm-gate price of dry opium at harvest time ................ US $142 ¥3% US $138/kg 

Afghanistan GDP ............................................................................. US $4.7 billion ∂10.4 US $5.2 billion 

Total export value of opium to neighboring countries ................... US $2.8 billion ¥3.6% US $2.7 billion 

in percent of GDP .................................................................. 61% ........................ 52%

gross trafficking profits of Afghan traffickers ............ US $2.2 billion ¥2.7% US $2.14 billion 

total farm-gate value of opium production: ................ US $600 million 6.6% US $560-million 

Household average yearly gross income from opium of opium 

growing families ......................................................................... US $1,700 ∂6% US $1,800

Per capita gross income from opium of opium growing families US $260 ........................ US $280

Afghanistan’s GDP per capita ........................................................ US $206 ........................ US $226

Indicative gross income from opium per ha .................................. US $4,600 ∂17% US $5,400

In correspondence with the committee, USAID cited both U.S. 

and United Nations estimates, which indicate a decrease in the 

total area under cultivation for poppy in Afghanistan from 2004 to 

2005.559 These estimates, which range from a decrease of 21 percent according to the UN, to 48 percent, according to the United 

States, are misleading because they do not account for the total increase in opium poppy yield. While the total area dedicated to 

poppy cultivation decreased in 2005, improved growing conditions 

137

560See Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly? Hearing before the 

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 

Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004) at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS57423, 

(last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 561Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Fact Sheet: CounterNarcotics (Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources). 562 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, SUMMARY FINDINGS OF OPIUM TRENDS IN

AFGHANISTAN, 2005, (Sept. 12, 2005) at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan—2005/ annex—opium-afghanistan–2005–09–09.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 563The staff of the Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, received a briefing from USAID on Jan. 18, 2006, in which the lack of sufficient monitoring of fertilizer distribution was discussed. 

resulted in a higher yield than in 2004.560 Consequently, the total 

production of opium decreased by a much smaller margin than the 

decrease in the total area under cultivation.561 A better representation of the level of poppy production in Afghanistan would show 

only a 2.4 percent decrease from 2004 to 2005, and a 22 percent 

increase in opium yield.562 The committee suggests that USAID 

use the measurement of opium yield (in kilograms), rather than 

total area under cultivation, in order to properly measure progress 

in Afghanistan. 

Interviews of USAID officials by committee staff confirmed numerous deficiencies in the management of the AL program. Specifically, the committee is troubled by what it learned about AL systems for delivering crop fertilizer and monitoring its use. No standard or system had been established to certify the use of fertilizer 

for its intended application to alternative crops. The USAID officials interviewed on January 18, 2006, were unable to cite any 

steps taken in AL to ensure that fertilizer is not being diverted to 

cultivate on the opium poppy crops it was intended to help eradicate.563 However, USAID representatives recently confirmed that 

for the most recent Seed and Fertilizer distribution, USAID contractors and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) officials 

met with farmers and village elders in advance of the distribution 

to ensure that recipients used the fertilizer for licit means. From 

these meetings, a written agreement was signed with local officials 

that committed the recipients to not grow poppy; and the GAO is 

responsible for monitoring compliance. 

Similarly, in order to properly monitor the AL Program, the 

Committee urges USAID to perform vigilant oversight of both: the 

Afghanistan AL contractors Development Alternatives Inc., 

Chemonics, and PADCO; as well as those used as a part of ACI. 

USAID must be able to show that grants and contracts are awarded through a competitive process. Appropriate requirements for 

grantees or contractors must also be instituted in order to work 

with USAID. 

Finally, the committee believes that if a country is on the ‘‘majors list’’ (i.e. a major drug producer), then funding for USAID programs should be co-managed with INL, thereby facilitating more 

coordination to improve and accomplish the counter-narcotics strategy. 

In a Foreign Press Center Briefing in New York City on September 15, 2005, Nancy J. Powell, Assistant Secretary of State for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, noted the 20 

countries listed on the President’s 2005 majors list. These countries 

are: Afghanistan, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Colombia, 

Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, 

138

564See http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/1999/916.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 565 Id. 566Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 567Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 568The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at 107. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/06budget.pdf (last 

visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. In order for a country to be among the world’s largest drug 

producing/drug transit countries, it must be one in which:

‘‘(A) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year; (B) 1,000 hectares or 

more of illicit coca is cultivated or harvested during a year; 

or (C) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President 

determines that such illicit cannabis production does not 

significantly affect the United States. FAA § 481(e) (2).’’ 564

Or

‘‘(A) That is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or 

psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or (B) Through which 

are transported such drugs or substances. FAA § 481(e) 

(5).’’ 565

The USAID efforts in the Andean Region are currently funded 

through INL, whereas the USAID Alternative Livelihoods Program 

in Afghanistan is funded from a separate fund in the State Department budget. Funding for the AL Program comes from a combination of Economic Support Funds and Development Assistance 

funds.566 The committee suggests that this funding discrepancy be 

investigated and that appropriate changes be made in the funding 

source of the USAID AL Program in Afghanistan. More specifically, 

the committee strongly recommends that the Afghan AL program 

be funded through INL as in Colombia. 

3. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) PART Performance 

Evaluation of ACI 

A recent OMB Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) evaluation examined the USAID operations within the Andean 

Counterdrug Initiative over a three month period from June 30, 

2005 through September 30, 2005.567 While this was not a comprehensive PART review, it did illuminate some apparent flaws in 

the performance measures used to assess USAID programs. The 

terms used in the performance measurements are vague and must 

be defined so that performance measures accurately reflect success 

or failure. The committee believes that the performance measures 

used to assess USAID programs must be unambiguous so that the 

Agency can be properly held accountable for the taxpayer dollars 

they receive. 

The FY 2006 OMB PART Program Assessment scored the Andean Counterdrug Initiative with an overall ‘‘adequate’’ rating.568 In 

139

569 Id, at 108. 570Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 

the PART evaluation of ACI, it is clear that USAID is a crucial 

actor not only in capacity-building programs in the Andean Region 

but also in providing assistance directly to those institutions and 

communities so as to prevent the cultivation, processing and trafficking of illicit drugs. This further supports the inclusion of 

USAID programs within the ACI in the ONDCP National Drug 

Budget. 

While USAID received good marks for its yearly and long-term 

output measures (i.e. measuring hectares of licit crops in USAID 

assisted areas), the PART evaluation notes a deficiency in USAID 

outcome measurements. It should be noted, therefore, that although USAID has a long-term output measure for its alternative 

development programs in the Andean region, the agency ‘‘has not 

yet developed long-term outcome measures for the alternative development component of the program.’’ 569

The PART review also illustrated a lack of coordination and consultation at the Washington headquarters level between USAID 

and INL, specifically concerning whether the USAID alternative 

development goals sufficiently complement INL’s goals of eradication. In addition, USAID and INL must effectively collaborate 

with ONDCP when setting annual and long-term goals. INL and 

USAID have, however, committed to closer coordination in the 

planning of their complementary program goals. 

The committee strongly urges USAID to work with OMB and 

ONDCP to develop new and more detailed performance measurements to be used in the PART Program Assessment, as well as in 

ongoing outcome measurements. For example, in measuring the 

success of USAID Alternative Development Programs, it would be 

helpful to know how many villagers, either in the Andean Region 

or Afghanistan, have formally agreed not to grow illicit crops and 

not to divert seed and fertilizer for illicit purposes. Similarly, it 

would be useful to measure success by the number of acres that 

once grew illicit crops, but are now growing legal crops or have 

been used to build a business and create jobs. 

The committee commends USAID for participating in so many 

counterdrug strategy Working Groups with other Federal agencies, 

as well as with host country governments. The Working Groups include weekly counter-narcotics core group meetings at the US Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, weekly Afghanistan Working Group 

meetings, the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group (AIOG), 

in which ONDCP plays a leadership role, and the Committee for 

International Drug Control, which is periodically chaired by 

ONDCP.570 We urge ONDCP to ensure that these Working Groups 

are truly collaborative in nature and that they serve to provide cooperation, partnership and deconfliction among the parties represented. If these Working Group meetings are merely a formality, 

then they are not serving to achieve goals to stem the flow of illicit 

narcotics into America. 

140

571DEPT. OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, DRUGS, THE LAW

AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2003, at http://www.release.org.uk/news/International—Narcotics—Control—Board—040316.pdf#search=’International%20Narcotics%20Board% 

202003%20annual%20report (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 572For more information on these treaties, see the International Narcotics Control Board 

website at http://www.incb.org/incb/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 573See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 

(Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of John Walters, Director of the White House Office of National Drug 

Control Policy). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=109—house—hearings&docid=f:20878.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 574For more information on the 14th International Conference on Reduction of Drug Related 

Harm held in Chiang Mai, Thailand from Apr. 6–10, 2003, see https://www.globalhealth.org/

news/article/2194 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 

4. Harm Reduction 

A recurring criticism is that the Washington, D.C. USAID office 

exercises very little oversight over its field offices, which are largely responsible to the embassies to which they are attached, but less 

so to USAID headquarters. 

USAID field offices are known to finance the production of 

‘‘Harm Reduction’’ materials and brochures in Central Asia and 

East Asia. However, these moneys are not accounted for by the 

USAID Washington, D.C. office, or in the ONDCP national drug 

budget. ‘‘Harm Reduction’’ is an ideological position identified with 

the views of drug legalization financier George Soros, which assumes certain individuals are incapable of making healthy decisions. Advocates of this position hold that dangerous behaviors, 

such as drug abuse, therefore simply must be accepted by society 

and those who choose such lifestyles—or become trapped in them—

should be enabled to continue these behaviors in a ‘‘less harmful’’ 

manner. Often, however, these lifestyles are the result of addiction, 

mental illness or other conditions that should and can be treated 

rather than accepted as normative, healthy behaviors. 

In its annual report released March 2, 2004, the International 

Narcotics Control Board—the United Nations’ drug agency—sharply criticized ‘‘harm reduction’’ measures such as needle exchange 

programs and so-called ‘‘safe injecting rooms,’’ because such policies 

encourage drug use and violate ‘‘article 4 of the 1961 Convention 

[which] obliges State parties to ensure that the production, manufacture, import, export, distribution of, trade in, use and possession 

of drugs is to be limited exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. Therefore, from a legal point of view, such facilities violate 

the international drug control conventions.’’ 571

The committee is deeply concerned that while the International 

Narcotics Control Board was warning parties to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit 

Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) that 

government financing of ‘‘harm reduction’’ schemes may be in violation of those accords, it appears that USAID was financing a ‘‘harm 

reduction’’ agenda of its own.572

On February 10 2005, the White House Office of National Drug 

Control Policy Director John Walters testified before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources.573 He was asked about USAID’s involvement in two questionable ‘‘harm reduction’’ projects. The first project was the 14th 

International Conference on Reduction of Drug Related Harm held 

in Chiang Mai, Thailand from April 6–10, 2003.574 The conference 

141

575For more information on the Asian Harm Reduction Network, see http://ahrn.thaiis.us/

index.php?option=content&task=view&id=2117&Itemid=2 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 576Manual for Reducing Drug Related Harm in Asia, Macfarlane Burnet Centre for Medical 

Research and Asian Harm Reduction Network, (the Centre for Harm Reduction), at http://

www.chr.asn.au/freestyler/gui/files/Manual.pdf#search=’manual%20for%20reducing%20drug%20related%20harm%20in%20asia’ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 577 Id. 578 Id. 579For more information on the 14th International Conference on Reduction of Drug Related 

Harm held in Chiang Mai, Thailand from Apr. 6–10, 2003, see https://www.globalhealth.org/

news/article/2194 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 580See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 

(2005) (Statement of John Walters, Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control 

Policy), at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=109—house—hearings&docid=f:20878.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 581 Id. 

was sponsored by the International Harm Reduction Association, 

the Asian Harm Reduction Network, and cosponsored by the Centre for Harm Reduction and USAID.575

The second project was the Asian Harm Reduction Network’s 

350-page, second-edition Manual for Reducing Drug Related Harm 

in Asia (which bears a USAID logo). USAID’s role in the production 

of the manual is acknowledged inside the cover: ‘‘This publication 

was made possible through support provided by the Office of Strategic Planning, Operations, and Technical Support, Bureau for Asia 

and the Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development. . .576 Included in the second chapter of the manual, ‘‘Rationale for Harm Reduction,’’ are sections on ‘‘needle and syringe programs,’’ ‘‘sales and purchasing of injecting equipment,’’ and ‘‘removing barriers.’’ 577 In the fifth chapter, ‘‘Injecting Safely,’’ are sections devoted to ‘‘sharing of injecting equipment,’’ and ‘‘safe injecting.’’ 578

ONDCP Director Walters responded that he was not aware of the 

‘‘harm reduction’’ publication financed by USAID nor did he attend 

the USAID-cosponsored 14th International Conference on Reduction of Drug Related Harm.579 He added, however, that he has 

been aggressive in rebuking international organizations which promote ‘‘harm reduction.’’ 580 He pledged to look into this regrettable 

matter and report back to the Committee.581 He has not yet done 

so. 

While this matter is under investigation by the White House, the 

committee recommends that any drug-related programs of USAID 

be put under close oversight and management by the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. 

Ultimately, taxpayer subsidies of ‘‘Harm Reduction’’ efforts should 

be eliminated and all drug-related activity by USAID must be accounted for in the national drug budget, and, therefore, supervised 

by ONDCP. 

In February 2005, the Government Reform Subcommittee on 

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources requested 

that USAID provide comprehensive documentation of all financial 

interactions with the Soros Foundation, the Open Society Institute, 

and other organizations affiliated with George Soros or the ‘‘Harm 

Reduction’’ movement. In a letter received on January 12, 2006, 

from USAID, it is stated that, ‘‘USAID has not and does not support any ‘harm reductions’ strategies inconsistent with either U.S. 

142

582Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 583 USAID’s cooperation and disclosure was markedly improved after a Nov. 16, 2005 meeting 

with committee staff inquiring why USAID should not receive a subpoena for document requests 

left unanswered for an unreasonable amount of time. For more material on this meeting, see, 

e.g., Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, to Randall Tobias, U.S. Global AIDS 

Coordinator, U.S. Department of State, (Feb. 6, 2006) at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/

02.06.06%20State%20Tobias%20USAID%20prostitution%20lies.pdf. 584FY 2006 was the first year that the IRS received a direct appropriation to support drug 

control programs. In previous years, the IRS would receive drug control funding through the 

Department of Justice’s OCDETF program. 585The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 586The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) 587 Id. 588The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 32. At http://

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs06/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 589See Threat Convergence at the Border: How Can We Improve the Federal Effort To Dismantle Criminal Smuggling Organizations? Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 

12, 2005) (testimony of Richard M. Stana, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues, 

law or policy.’’ 582 To date, USAID has provided 11 CD-ROMs, with 

over 3000 documents detailing financial interactions with these 

groups. The committee is in the process of analyzing these documents and thanks USAID for its cooperation and disclosure.583

I. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

1. Internal Revenue Service

IRS Drug Control Funding (in millions) 

IRS Drug Control Funding FY 2005 584

Requested FY 2005 Final FY 2006 585Requested 

FY 2006 586

Enacted 

FY 2007 587

Request 

AGENCY TOTAL ...................................................... $ $ $55.6 $55.0 $55.6

Contact Information: Department of Treasury Office of Public 

Affairs: 202–622–2960, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement. 

The committee supports the President’s request for Internal Revenue Service (IRS) drug control programs, which is estimated to include $55.6 million for drug control investigations. This would be 

an increase of less than $1 million over the $55 million enacted for 

fiscal year 2006. This funding would provide 329 FTE to support 

the Department of Justice’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement 

Task Force (OCDETF) program. 

As stated in the 2006 National Drug Control Strategy, it is critically important that U.S. law enforcement focus its resources to attack the financial infrastructure of drug trafficking organizations.588 This will cause a significant disruption to the supply of illegal drugs entering the U.S. and is a major focus both of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice 

(through the OCDETF program) and the Internal Revenue Service. 

Money laundering—the process of disguising or concealing illicit 

funds to make them appear legitimate—is a serious crime, with an 

estimated $500 billion to $1 trillion laundered worldwide annually, 

according to the United Nations Office of Drug Control and Prevention.589 Money laundering provides the fuel for terrorists, drug 

143

Government Accountability Office), at http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/

EventSingle.aspx?EventID=30454. 590 Id. 591 Additional IRS background information at http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/

0,,id=98137,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006). 592More information available at http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/

0,,id=107488,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). 

dealers, arms traffickers, and other criminals to operate and expand their activities, which can have devastating social and economic consequences.590

The committee recognizes that the IRS plays a unique role in illicit drug money investigations. The IRS has sole jurisdiction for 

criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), Title 26 of 

the United States Code.591 According to the code, gross income is 

defined as ‘‘. . . all income from whatever source derived.’’ This has 

been held by the courts to include income earned from illegal activities such as drug trafficking. The primary criminal statutes violated include evasion of income tax, false income tax returns, and 

failure to file tax returns, among others. 

The IRS, as part of its core tax administration mission, addresses 

both the criminal and civil aspects of money laundering. The IRS 

Criminal Investigations Division (CID) is involved in several initiatives which identify, target, disrupt and dismantle drug traffickers. 

IRS-CI special agents ‘‘follow the money’’ within various inter-agency task forces and centers. Some of these initiatives include establishing 41 Suspicious Activity Review Teams (SAR–RT) to review 

and analyze suspicious activity data, and participation in both 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) and the Department of Justice’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

(OCDETF) initiatives.592

The committee fully supports the efforts of the IRS to support 

counterdrug financial investigations. Given the unique statutory 

authorities of the IRS, it is important that its investigators be 

closely integrated into all major drug and money seizures pursued 

by the Federal law enforcement agencies. The committee believes 

that investigators are the critical link in establishing connections 

between random drug seizures and trafficking networks.

144

593The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 594The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 595The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited 

Feb. 24, 2006). 596The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 597 Id. 598Paula P. Schnurr, Carole A. Lunney, Anjana Sengupta, & Lynn C. Waelde, A Descriptive 

Analysis of PTSD Chronicity in Vietnam Veterans, 16 J. of Traumatic Stress, (2003) at 545. 

J. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

1. General

VA Drug Control Funding 

DVA FY 2005 Requested 593

FY 2005 

Final 594

FY 2006 Requested 595FY 2006 Enacted 596FY 2007 Request 597

AGENCY TOTAL* .................................................... $822.787 $396.13 $532.947 $412.648 $428.349

* in millions. 

Contact Information: Office of Public Affairs: 202–273–6000, 

http://www.va.gov. 

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has served an essential 

role in preventing and treating the abuse of drugs by former military personnel. The committee generally supports the administration’s fiscal year 2007 budget request for VA drug control. However, the committee has particular concerns, detailed below, addressing the VA portion of the administration’s Drug Strategy and 

Budget. 

2. Narrowing the Scope of the Provision of Treatment 

The committee is deeply concerned with the administration’s 

strategy with respect to the availability of drug treatment for military personnel now returning from active deployment. The current 

VA policy allows for only a two-year window in which all military 

personnel, including National Guard, returning from duty abroad 

qualify for VA drug treatment. 

VA officials made clear that current scientific evidence indicates, 

based on studies dating back to Vietnam era personnel, that 70–

80 percent of those returning from active duty will not begin to 

seek drug treatment until two years after returning from active deployment.598 Consequently, the committee expresses deep concern 

that the VA is not making drug treatment sufficiently available to 

military personnel returning from active duty. The committee 

strongly suggests that the VA revise this policy to provide for a 

five-year window for drug treatment. 

The committee also repeats last year’s critique of the VA policy 

of restricting access to drug treatment services by excluding those 

veterans without dependents who have an income of more than 

$29,903 or do not have a service-related disability. Such an arbitrary delineation both restricts a veteran’s access to care and provides no assurance that alternative care is available. This economic 

145

599Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, drug control budget briefing with the Department of Veterans Affairs on Dec. 16, 2005. 600The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) 

at 6. 601Dr. John D. McKellar & Meghan Saweikis, M.S., Health Services for VA Substance Use 

Disorder Patients: Comparison of Utilization in Fiscal Years 2004, 2003, and 1998, (2005). 602Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, drug control budget briefing with the Department of Veterans Affairs on Dec. 16, 2005. 603 Id. 604 Id.. 605 Id. 

focus has been described as being a ‘‘Department wide’’ policy in 

staff interviews.599

Although the committee supports the position that those who are 

most unable to provide treatment by private means should receive 

treatment priority, the reality is that drug addiction and dependence, commonly resulting from active duty, do not respect the economic background of particular veterans. 

3. Specialized Treatment 

With an increase of drug abuse patients expected from currently 

deployed troops, the committee supports the estimated request of 

$428.3 million for VA drug treatment programs for fiscal year 

2007. This compares to the enacted fiscal year 2006 level of $412.6 

million.600 In fiscal year 2004, the VA reports having treated 

89,000 veterans with substance abuse disorders.601

The committee supports the VA’s prioritization on improving specialized treatment. As indicated in our most recent Staff interviews, the specific priorities are the replacement of methadone 

treatment with buprenorphine treatment for opiate addicts, the expansion of residential treatment capabilities, and generally increasing overall treatment availability.602

Patients who have acquired familiarity with methadone treatment are extremely reluctant to adopt other forms of treatment.603

In light of such difficulties involved with replacing methadone 

treatment with buprenorphine treatment, the committee supports 

the VA’s initiative to utilize buprenorphine with all new patient 

cases. VA representatives disclosed in staff interviews that approximately 138 VA physicians have received training and are currently 

prescribing buprenorphine.604 VA is also planning four regional 

training seminars for certification in prescribing buprenorphine.605

Continued training of VA physicians on buprenorphine treatment 

is also strongly supported in order that VA physicians will both understand its benefits over methadone treatment and acquire a familiarity with its implementation with new patients. The committee strongly suggests that methadone treatments be entirely 

phased out and replaced by the more effective buprenorphine treatment with new patients. 

The committee also supports the VA’s continued efforts to expand 

its residential treatment capabilities. Specialized treatment includes the cost generated by the treatment of patients with a drug 

use disorder who are treated in a substance abuse treatment program, including inpatient programs, outpatient treatment, residential treatment, and methadone and buprenorphine treatment. Staff 

interviews revealed that approximately 125,000 veterans currently 

146

606Dr. John D. McKellar & Meghan Saweikis, M.S., Health Services for VA Substance Use 

Disorder Patients: Comparison of Utilization in Fiscal Years 2004, 2003, and 1998, (2005). 607 E-mail from Dr. Richard T. Suchinsky, Associate Chief for Addictive Disorders, Department of Veterans Affairs, to James Kaiser, counsel, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 

Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, (Feb. 9, 2006, 12:42 EST) (on 

file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).

need special treatment while only 89,000 receive it, many of whom 

require residential treatment in order to receive optimal care.606

4. Inter-Departmental Cooperation 

Staff interviews indicate the VA’s strong collaboration, specifically relating to research and development, with the Center for 

Substance Abuse Treatment and the National Institute for Drug 

Abuse.

• DHHS—VA senior officials serve on the National Advisory 

Councils of NIDA, the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT), and the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP). VA officials also have a seat on a planning committee with SAMHSA on the preparation of a conference in 

March 2006, on the ‘‘Returning Veteran.’’ The Program Evaluation and Resource Center (PERC) shares data on VA programs with SAMHSA, one of the major data sets being the 

triennial Drug Abuse Program Survey (DAPS).

• DOD—VA and DOD have jointly prepared a detailed set of 

Treatment Guidelines for substance abuse for use in both departments. Both departments currently are actively involved 

in implementing the ‘‘seamless transition’’ initiative for returning veterans.

• NIDA—a number of VA investigators have grants for their 

research from NIDA, and VA was a primary site for research 

in NIDA’s medication development project.

• ONDCP—VA works closely with ONDCP on programming 

and budgetary issues relating to VA’s substance abuse treatment activities.607

Such dialog and information sharing is strongly encouraged in 

order to most efficiently utilize resources allocated towards research and development. 

(147)

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN AND HON. 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS 

The report adopted by the committee was prepared by the majority staff of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 

Human Resources, without the consultation or participation of the 

minority. Nevertheless, we concur, or do not take issue, with many 

of the majority views expressed in the report. 

Fundamentally, we share a deep concern about the substantial 

downward shift in the proportion of Federal drug control funding 

devoted to demand reduction programs (i.e., drug prevention and 

drug treatment) versus supply reduction programs (e.g., domestic 

enforcement, interdiction, and source-country eradication) since 

President Bush issued his administration’s first National Drug 

Control Strategy in 2002. If the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget 

request is enacted, prevention and treatment together will account 

for just 35.5 percent of the President’s drug budget request, down 

from 47 percent in fiscal year 2001, while supply reduction will 

have increased from 53 percent to 64.5 percent over the same period. 

With more than 20,000 Americans dying from illegal drugs annually, our Nation cannot afford to shrink from its commitment to reducing demand for illegal drugs through prevention and expanding 

access to drug treatment for those in need. The administration has 

invested much effort in attempting to alter the delivery mechanism 

for drug treatment services with its Access to Recovery voucher initiative and this year’s proposal to ‘‘voucher-ize’’ treatment services 

delivered with Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block 

Grant funding, but it has failed to make significant progress in 

closing the gap between the number of people needing treatment 

and the woefully inadequate volume of accessible treatment services. It is difficult to see how a budget that further reduces funding 

for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s Center for Substance Abuse Treatment will turn the tide. 

We hope that, like last year, Congress will reject the bulk of the 

administration’s proposed cuts for key demand reduction programs 

within the Department of Education and the Department of Health 

and Human Services and for programs, including the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program, Byrne Justice Assistance 

Grants, and Community Oriented Policing Services program, that 

support and amplify State and local drug enforcement efforts. 

HARM REDUCTION AND NEEDLE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

As in years past, we strongly disagree with the majority’s perspective and representations concerning the purpose, efficacy, and 

legality of ‘‘harm reduction’’ strategies, particularly as they relate 

to needle- or syringe-exchange programs [SEPs]. 

148

1 National Institute on Drug Abuse, Principles of HIV Prevention in Drug-Using Populations 

(NIH Pub. No. 02–4733) 13 (Mar. 2002), (online at http://www.nida.nih.gov/PDF/POHP.pdf).

In arguing the need for increased oversight of USAID activities, 

the majority offers the following mischaracterization:

‘‘Harm reduction’’ is an ideological position . . . which assumes certain individuals are incapable of making healthy 

decisions. Advocates of this position hold that dangerous 

behaviors, such as drug abuse, therefore simply must be 

accepted by society and those who choose such lifestyles—

or become trapped in them—should be enabled to continue 

these behaviors in a less harmful manner. Often however, 

these lifestyles are the result of addiction, mental illness 

o[r] other conditions that should and can be treated rather 

than accepted as normative, healthy behaviors.

Harm reduction is, in fact, a basic conceptual pillar of mainstream public health policy in many contexts. With respect to HIV 

prevention among drug abusers, harm reduction is embodied in the 

National Institute on Drug Abuse’s ‘‘Principles of HIV Prevention 

in Drug-Using Populations.’’ This publication describes a ‘‘hierarchy 

of HIV/AIDS risk-reduction messages, beginning with the most effective behavioral changes that drugs users can make,’’ as follows:

• Stop using and injecting drugs

• Enter and complete drug abuse treatment, including relapse 

prevention

• If you continue to inject drugs, take the following steps to reduce personal and public health risks:

• Never re-use or ‘‘share’’ syringes, water, or drug preparation equipment

• Use only sterile syringes obtained from a reliable source 

(e.g., a pharmacy or a syringe access program)

• Always use a new, sterile syringe to prepare and inject 

drugs

• If possible, use sterile water to prepare drugs; otherwise 

use clean water from reliable source (e.g., fresh tap 

water)

• Always use a new or disinfected container (‘‘cooker’’) and 

a new filter (‘‘cotton’’) to prepare drugs

• Clean the injection site with a new alcohol swab before 

injecting drugs

• Safely dispose of syringes after one use 1

Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Service has published ‘‘A Guide to Primary Care of People with HIV/AIDS’’ that 

advises:

The primary care provider should routinely screen for drug 

abuse and treat or refer for treatment as quickly as possible . . . [and] the provider should also counsel patients 

who are actively using drugs not to share needles with othVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00154 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
149

2 Health Resources and Services Administration, A Guide to Primary Care of People with 

HIV/AIDS, 105, 111 (2004) (online at http://hab.hrsa.gov/tools/primarycareguide/). 3Principles of HIV Prevention in Drug-Using Populations, supra note 1, at 16–17. 4 American Academy of Family Physicians, Substance and Alcohol Abuse and Addiction (2003) 

(online at http://www.aafp.org/x7096.xml). 5 American Academy of Pediatrics, Provisional Committee on Pediatric AIDS, Reducing the 

Risk of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Associated with Illicit Drug Use, Pediatrics, 

945–7 (Dec. 1994) (online at http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;94/6/

945.pdf). 6 American Academy of Physician Assistants, Needle/Syringe Access for the Prevention of HIV 

Transmission (policy paper adopted 2003) (http://www.aapa.org/policy/needle—access.html). 7 American College of Preventive Medicine, Public Policy on Needle-Exchange Programs to Reduce Drug-Associated Morbidity and Mortality, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 173–

5 (2000) (online at http://www.acpm.org/ajpm369.pdf). 8 American Medical Association, Syringe and Needle Exchange Programs (Policy Statement H–

95.958) (online at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf—new/pf—online?f—n=resultLink&doc= 

policyfiles/HnE/H-95.958.HTM&s—t=syringe+and+needle+exchange+programs&catg=AMA/

HnE&catg=AMA/BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=1&&st—p=0&nth=1&). 9 American Nurses Association, Position Statement: Needle Exchange and HIV (effective Apr. 

2, 1993) (online at http://nursingworld.org/readroom/position/blood/blnedl.htm). 10 American Psychological Association, APA Council Endorses Fair-Testing Code, Forms New 

Working Group, among Other Actions (Apr. 4, 2001) (online at http://www.apa.org/monitor/apr04/

endorses.html). 11 Association of Nurses in AIDS Care, Position Statement: Needle and Syringe Exchange (rev. 

Sept. 2002) (online at http://www.anacnet.org/media/pdfs/ PS—Needle—Syringe—Exch—4-

2003.pdf). 12 Infectious Diseases Society of America, Supporting Document for IDSA’s Policy Statement 

on Syringe Exchange, Prescribing and Paraphernalia Laws (Oct. 5, 2001) (online at http://

www.idsociety.org/Content/ContentGroups/Public—Statements—and—Policies1/Statements/SupContinued

ers and to take advantage of the programs that distribute 

clean needles.2

Neither NIDA nor HHS advocates the view that ‘‘addiction, mental illness o[r] other [unspecified treatable] conditions’’ should be 

‘‘accepted as normative, healthy behaviors’’ instead of being treated. On the contrary, their advice to public health professionals is 

consistent with ample research demonstrating that the most effective approach to preventing the spread of HIV among drug users 

is a comprehensive strategy that includes community-based outreach, drug abuse treatment, and access to sterile injection equipment.3

Since 1991, there have been at least 17 major reviews and assessments of needle exchange programs by expert bodies such as 

the National Commission on AIDS, the Institute of Medicine, the 

National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control, the 

American Medical Association, the American Society of Addiction 

Medicine, and the World Health Organization. These assessments 

have found that needle exchange programs help reduce the spread 

of AIDS and other dangerous infectious disease without encouraging or increasing drug use. In fact, according to experts, needle 

exchange programs provide valuable opportunities to reduce illegal 

drug use. 

In part as a result of these conclusions, needle exchange programs have been endorsed by a wide range of expert scientific and 

medical organizations, including the American Academy of Family 

Physicians,4 the American Academy of Pediatrics,5 the American 

Academy of Physician Assistants,6 the American College of Preventive Medicine,7 the American Medical Association,8 the American 

Nurses Association,9 the American Psychological Association,10 the 

Association of Nurses in AIDS Care,11 and the Infectious Diseases 

Society of America.12

150

porting—Document—for—IDSA’s—Policy—Statement—on—Syringe—Exchange,—Prescribing—and—

Paraphernalia—L.htm) (emphasis in original). 13 National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, The Twin Epidemics of 

Substance Use and HIV (July 1991) (online at http://www.dogwoodcenter.org/references/ 

studies91F.html#RECOMMENDATION%202). 14 National Academies, Needle Exchange Programs Reduce HIV Transmission among People 

Who Inject Illegal Drugs (Sept. 18, 1995) (online at http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/

isbn/ 0309052963?OpenDocument). 15 National Institutes of Health, Interventions to Prevent HIV Risk Behaviors (Feb. 11–13, 

1997) (Consensus Statement No. 104) (online at http://consensus.nih.gov/cons/104/

104—statement.htm).

In chronological order, expert reviews and assessments of needle 

exchange programs include the following:

• In 1991, the National Commission on AIDS, whose members included then-Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, convened a 

hearing on drug use and HIV. Based on the testimonies of expert 

witnesses at the hearing and a review of scientific evidence, the 

Commission issued a report that found:

Outreach programs which operate needle exchanges and 

distribute bleach not only help to control the spread of 

HIV, but also refer many individuals to treatment programs . . .. Most significantly, these programs, rather 

than encouraging substance use, lead a substantial number of substance users to seek treatment.13

• In 1995, a report prepared by a joint panel of the National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine reviewed the available evidence on needle exchange programs and concluded: ‘‘Needle exchange programs reduce the spread of HIV—the virus that 

causes AIDS—without increasing either the injection of illegal 

drugs among program participants or the number of new initiates to injection drug use.’’ 14

• In 1997, a Consensus Panel convened by the National Institutes 

of Health concluded:

An impressive body of evidence suggests powerful effects 

from needle exchange programs. The number of studies 

showing beneficial effects on behaviors such as needle 

sharing greatly outnumber those showing no effects. There 

is no longer doubt that these programs work. . . . Does 

needle exchange promote drug use? A preponderance of 

evidence shows either no change or decreased drug use.15

• In 1997, the Council on Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Association issued a report on the medical and scientific literature on needle exchange programs that found:

There is substantial evidence of reduced needle-sharing 

among regular participants in needle-exchange programs. 

More importantly, HIV infection rates among drug users 

have been consistently lower in cities with needle-exchange programs. . . . For example, while the HIV infection rate among injection drug users remained 1% to 2% 

in the Scottish city of Glasgow, where a needle-exchange 

program was quickly established, it reached 70% in nearby 

Edinburgh, where the response of government officials was 

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16 American Medical Association, Report 8 of the Council on Scientific Affairs (A–97) (June 

1997) (online at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/13636.html). 17 American Public Health Association, American Public Health Association Supports Lifting 

Federal Ban on Funding for Needle Exchange (Aug. 20, 1997) (online at http://www.apha.org/

news/press/1997/needle.htm). 18 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Evidence-Based Findings on the Efficacy 

of Syringe Exchange Programs: An Analysis of the Scientific Research Completed since April 

1998 (Mar. 17, 2000). 19 Institute of Medicine, No Time to Lose: Getting More from HIV Prevention, 114–5 (2000) (online at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309071372/html/1.html#pagetop). 20 Institute of Medicine, No Time to Lose: Getting More from HIV Prevention, 114–5 (2000) (online at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309071372/html/1.html#pagetop).

to implement even more stringent controls over injection 

equipment.16

• In 1997, the American Public Health Association stated that ‘‘an 

enormous body of published research’’ exists ‘‘attesting to the efficacy of clean needle exchange for reducing HIV transmission 

among drug users. Moreover, study after study has shown that 

needle exchange does not lead to an increase of illegal drug 

use.’’ 17

• In 2000, the U.S. Surgeon General and other senior scientists at 

the Department of Health and Human Services reviewed scientific research completed since April 1998 on needle exchange 

programs. In a published summary of the review, the Surgeon 

General announced:

After reviewing all of the research to date, the senior scientists of the Department and I have unanimously agreed 

that there is conclusive scientific evidence that syringe exchange programs, as part of a comprehensive HIV prevention strategy, are an effective public health intervention 

that reduces the transmission of HIV and does not encourage the use of illegal drugs.18

• In 2000, the Institute of Medicine released a report on the findings of a committee it had convened at the request of the Centers 

for Disease Control to conduct a comprehensive review of current 

HIV prevention efforts in the United States. The report described 

the evidence on needle exchange programs as ‘‘compelling’’ and 

cited a study that suggested that ‘‘expanded provision of needle 

exchange programs in the United States could have averted between 10,000 and 20,000 new infections over the past decade.’’ 19

According to the report: 

Although many communities and law enforcement officials 

have expressed concern that increasing availability of injection equipment will lead to increased drug use, criminal 

activity, and discarded contaminated syringes, studies 

have found no scientifically reliable evidence of these negative effects.20

• In 2000, the Academy for Educational Development, in a policy 

report prepared in collaboration with the Centers for Disease 

Control, observed that much research had been conducted on 

needle exchange programs. Citing this research, the report concludes that ‘‘SEPs [syringe exchange programs] have significant 

positive effects on preventing adverse health consequences assoVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:28 Apr 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00157 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\DOCS\26504.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: KATIE
152

21 Academy for Educational Development, A Comprehensive Approach: Preventing Blood-Borne 

Infections among Injection Drug Users, A7 (Dec. 2000) (online at http://www.thebody.com/cdc/

pdfs/comprehensive-approach.pdf). 22 American Society of Addiction Medicine, Public Policy of ASAM: Access to Sterile Syringes 

and Needles (adopted Dec. 20, 2000) (online at http://www.asam.org/ppol/Needle%20 Exchange.htm). 23 Centers for Disease Control, Syringe Exchange Programs (Jan. 2002) (online at http://

www.cdc.gov/idu/facts/aed—idu—syr.htm). 24 National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Principles of HIV Prevention in Drug-Using Populations: A Research-Based Guide (Mar. 2002). 25 National Institutes of Health, Management of Hepatitis C: 2002 (June 10–12, 2002) (http:/

/consensus.nih.gov/cons/116/091202116cdc—statement.htm#5). 26 Id.

ciated with injection drug use and . . . do not increase drug use 

or promote the initiation of injection drug use.’’ 21

• In 2000, the American Society of Addition Medicine reported that 

‘‘[n]eedle exchange programs have been shown to be a crucial 

component of a spectrum of HIV prevention services to injection 

drug users, resulting in an effective reduction in the transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus.’’ The Society of 

Addiction Medicine also reported that ‘‘[t]here has not been an 

increase in drug use or an increase in injection as a route of drug 

administration as a result of implementation of needle exchange 

programs, nor has there been demonstration of an increase in 

contaminated injection equipment in the community.’’ 22

• In 2002, the Centers for Disease Control summarized scientific 

studies of needle exchange programs. CDC explained: ‘‘SEPs 

have been shown to be an effective way to link some hard-toreach IDUs [intravenous drug users] with important public 

health services, including TB and STD treatment. Through their 

referrals to substance abuse treatment, SEPs can help IDUs stop 

using drugs. Studies also show that SEPs do not encourage drug 

use among SEP participants or the recruitment of first-time drug 

users.’’ 23

• In 2002, the National Institute on Drug Abuse published a research-based guide to preventing HIV in drug-using populations. 

Concerning needle exchange programs, the guide stated: ‘‘Evaluations of these programs indicate that they are an effective part 

of a comprehensive strategy to reduce the injection drug use-related spread of HIV and other blood-borne infections. In addition 

they do not encourage the use of illicit drugs.’’ 24

• In 2002, a Consensus Panel convened by the National Institutes 

of Health on management of hepatitis C found that ‘‘needle and 

syringe exchange programs . . . have been shown to be effective 

in preventing HIV transmission and are likely to be useful for 

decreasing HCV transmission.’’ 25 The panel recommended: ‘‘Institute measures to reduce transmission of HCV among IDUs, including providing access to sterile syringes through needle exchange, physician prescription, and pharmacy sales.’’ 26

• In 2003, the head of the HIV/AIDS unit of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, stated: ‘‘There 

is clear scientific evidence that needle exchange programmes 

work. They help contain the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and in a very 

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27 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Spreading the Light of 

Science: Guidelines on Harm Reduction Related to Injecting Drug Use, 53 (2003) (online at http:/

/www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf—pubs.pl?health/ hivaids/harm—reduction.pdf). 28 Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, Position Statement: Guiding Principles 

for HIV Prevention (approved June 18, 2004) (online at http://www.astho.org/policy—statements/

HIV% 20Position%20Statement.pdf). 29Letter from NIH Director Dr. Elias A. Zerhouni to Representatives Henry A. Waxman and 

Elijah E. Cummings (Oct. 7, 2004). 30World Health Organization, Policy Brief: Provision of Sterile Injecting Equipment to Reduce 

HIV Transmission (2004) (online at http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/BA463DB4-2390-

4964-9D86-11CBABCC9DA9/ 0/provisionofsterileen.pdf). 31 United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, 85 

(June 2004) (online at http://www.unaids.org/bangkok2004/GAR2004—pdf/Chapter4—

prevention—en.pdf).

cost effective way. Evidence is also clear that these programmes 

do not promote drug use.’’ 27

• In 2004, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, 

together with the National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS 

Directors, the National Association of County and City Health 

Officials, and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, stated that ‘‘[s]cientific evidence demonstrates that needle 

exchange programs and pharmacy sales of sterile syringes can be 

effective public health strategies to reduce the transmission of injection-related HIV infection without increasing drug use.’’ 28

• In 2004, Dr. Elias A. Zerhouni, Director of the National Institutes of Health, wrote a letter to Members of Congress in response to an inquiry about the scientific evidence on syringe exchange programs. The letter stated: ‘‘A number of studies conducted in the U.S. have shown that SEPs do not increase drug 

use among participants or surrounding community members and 

are associated with reductions in the incidence of HIV, hepatitis 

B, and hepatitis C in the drug-using population.’’ 29

• In 2004, a policy brief from the World Heath Organization discussed the evidence obtained from a review of more than 200 

studies on needle and syringe exchange programs. The policy 

brief reported:

There is compelling evidence that increasing the availability and utilization of sterile injecting equipment for 

both out-of-treatment and in-treatment injecting drug 

users contributes substantially to reductions in the rate of 

HIV transmission. . . . There is no convincing evidence of 

major unintended negative consequences of programmes 

providing sterile injecting equipment to injecting drug 

users, such as initiation of injecting among people who 

have not injected previously, or an increase in the duration 

or frequency of illicit drug use or drug injection.30

• In 2004, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 

noted that ‘‘[a] review comparing HIV prevalence in cities across 

the globe with and without needle and syringe programmes 

found that cities which introduced such programmes showed a 

mean annual 19 percent decrease in HIV prevalence. This compares with an 8 percent increase in cities that failed to implement prevention measures.’’ 31

We strongly believe that U.S. policy on syringe-exchange should 

be based upon scientific evidence as to its efficacy and that the 

154

32 International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board 

for 2003, 36 (online at http://www.incb.org/e/ind—ar.htm). 33Taking Drugs Can Lead to HIV/AIDS, Fact Sheet, United Nations Office on Drugs and 

Crime (2004); Spreading the Light of Science: Guidelines on Harm Reduction Relating to Injecting Drug Use, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2003). 

United States should not exercise is disproportionate influence in 

international organizations and forums to discourage the implementation of non-U.S.-funded syringe exchange programs. The 

international community should not be restricted from opting to 

implement the most effective programs to prevent the transmission 

of HIV/AIDS among injection drug users and the broader population. 

In this regard, we reiterate our previous rejection of the erroneous assertion by Chairman Davis and Subcommittee Chairman 

Souder, repeated in this report, that SEPs violate the 1961 Single 

Convention on Narcotic Drugs. As we noted in letters to Secretary 

of State Condoleezza Rice and U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Andrew S. Natsios, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has stated the following concerning 

needle-exchange:

In a number of countries, Governments have introduced 

since the end of the 1980s programmes for the exchange 

or distribution of needles or syringes for drug addicts, with 

the aim of limiting the spread of HIV/AIDS. The Board 

maintains the position expressed by it already in 1987 that 

Governments need to adopt measures that may decrease 

the sharing of hypodermic needles among injection drug 

abusers in order to limit the spread of HIV/AIDS. At the 

same time, the Board has been stressing that any prophylactic measures should not promote and/or facilitate drug 

abuse.32

Nowhere has the INCB identified SEPs as violating any provision 

of the Single Convention, despite the majority’s interpretation of 

the INCB’s 2003 report. 

In many developing and highly populous nations including Russia, China, and Vietnam, injection drug use, not sexual transmission, is the principal factor driving HIV transmission rates.33

Indeed, one in three new infections outside Africa is attributed to 

injection drug use. Even in many areas where sexual transmission 

is the principal mode of HIV transmission, injection drug use is a 

major contributing factor, because high-risk drug use behaviors 

and high-risk sexual behaviors often are linked. 

Syringe exchange may hold the promise of saving millions of 

lives in developing countries that are at high risk of suffering an 

explosion in HIV/AIDs infections as a result of IDU-driven transmission; moreover, as the scientific evidence overwhelmingly indicates, it can do so without increasing drug use among participants 

or surrounding community members.

155

Finally, we note that the committee’s 2-year-long and apparently 

ongoing inquiry into USAID activities relating to harm reduction 

still has yielded no evidence that any USAID funds have been expended in a manner inconsistent with U.S. law

HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN. 

HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS.

Æ