FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2022-3114

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LAURA R. CARROLL,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.

Coleman L. Robinson, Judge.

April 10, 2024

ROWE, J.

When the results of Tate High School’s 2020 homecoming 

queen election came in, Laura Carroll’s daughter appeared to have 

won convincingly. But not everyone was convinced. The teacher 

responsible for administering the election reported to school 

officials that many votes in the election had been flagged by the 

election application software—and that every flagged vote had 

been cast for Carroll’s daughter. At the time, Carroll was an 

assistant principal at Bellview Elementary School, with districtwide access to all student accounts in the school district’s FOCUS 

portal. It was suspected by some that Carroll’s daughter had access 

to her mother’s credentials to the FOCUS portal and had used that 

access to acquire confidential student information. Information

that she then used to cast votes for herself in the homecoming 
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queen election. The school district appointed Gary Marsh to 

investigate the report. Marsh concluded that the suspicions 

linking Carroll to the improperly cast votes were well-founded.

Tate High School allowed students to vote for homecoming 

queen through an application called Election Runner. On election 

day, Election Runner administrators reported to the school district 

that one hundred seventeen votes had been flagged as “false.” To 

cast votes in the election, students had to verify their identity 

using their student identification number and their date of birth. 

This information was available in FOCUS. All the votes flagged by 

Election Runner were from students whose records had been 

accessed from Carroll’s FOCUS account in the thirty days before 

the election. And every flagged vote was cast for Carroll’s 

daughter. 

As an assistant principal at Belleview with administrator 

access, Carroll could use FOCUS to review confidential 

information for any student in the school district, including grades, 

attendance, and mental health records. Marsh reviewed a report 

from the school’s information management system and confirmed 

that Carroll’s FOCUS credentials were used to view confidential 

information of two hundred twelve Tate High School students in 

the thirty days before the homecoming queen election. And in the 

year before the election, confidential records of three hundred 

thirty-nine students at Tate were accessed with Carroll’s 

credentials. As Carroll worked at the elementary school, it was 

unclear why she would have needed to access records of students 

at Tate.

District officials decided to question Carroll to see if she had 

an explanation for accessing so many high school student records. 

Marsh went to Belleview to speak with Carroll, but she refused to 

talk to him. Marsh then asked Carroll to come to the school 

district’s office for a formal interview. 

When Carroll arrived, she was questioned for an hour by 

Marsh, with another school district official present—the

information technology security manager. Carroll sat close to the 

door in the conference room where she was questioned. Marsh 

confirmed to Carroll that she was free to leave at any time. Carroll 
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answered some questions but she refused to answer others. At 

times, she stated: “Well, I’m not going to tell you that,” and “I’m 

not going to tell you.” She did admit that she had provided her 

daughter with access to her FOCUS credentials in the past. 

When the school district’s investigation concluded, Marsh 

reported the data breach to the Florida Department of Law 

Enforcement. FDLE investigated and verified that someone using 

Carroll’s credentials illegally accessed confidential records of Tate 

High School students in FOCUS. FDLE confirmed that one 

hundred seventeen votes in the homecoming queen election

originated from a single Internet Protocol (IP) address. FDLE 

traced the IP address to Verizon and back to Carroll’s cell phone 

number.

FDLE also obtained nine written statements from Tate High 

School students and one teacher who attested that they had 

witnessed Carroll’s daughter using her mother’s FOCUS 

credentials or that the daughter had spoken with them about such 

use. One student reported that Carroll’s daughter had bragged 

about using her mother’s FOCUS credentials for the past four 

years, from the time she was a freshman at Tate. FDLE learned 

that FOCUS users had to change their passwords every forty-five 

days—meaning that Carroll’s daughter would have needed to 

regularly obtain or discover Carroll’s new passwords. FDLE also 

reviewed a written statement provided by Carroll’s daughter, 

admitting that she had access to Carroll’s FOCUS account.

FDLE also obtained records of the administrative hearing on 

the expulsion of Carroll’s daughter from school. During the 

hearing, Carroll submitted a letter to the hearing officer, stating 

that her daughter was guilty of accessing information from 

Carroll’s FOCUS account. Carroll admitted that she herself had 

viewed the records of hundreds of students at Tate by using her 

district administrator access.
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FDLE applied for a warrant for Carroll’s arrest. Carroll* was

arrested and charged with (1) accessing a computer system 

without authorization, (2) illegal use of personal identification 

information, (3) unlawful use of a two-way communications device 

to facilitate the commission of a felony, and (4) conspiracy to 

commit a felony. 

Carroll moved to suppress the statements she made during 

the meeting with Marsh. She argued that her statements were 

coerced in violation of her right against self-incrimination because 

she feared adverse employment consequences if she did not 

cooperate with Marsh. The trial court denied the motion. 

Carroll then pleaded no contest to the use of a two-way 

communications device to facilitate a felony in exchange for the 

State dropping the other three charges. She reserved the right to 

appeal the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. The trial 

court withheld adjudication and sentenced her to eighteen months 

of probation. This timely appeal follows. 

A defendant may seek an appeal after entering a guilty or no 

contest plea if the issue is expressly reserved and dispositive. 

Massey v. State, 324 So. 3d 40, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). An issue is 

dispositive if the State stipulates to dispositiveness or “if the 

evidence that is the subject of the motion is necessary to obtain a 

conviction.” Le Boss v. State, 359 So. 3d 436, 440–41 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2023). The admission of Carroll’s statements to Marsh would have 

been dispositive. 

This court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress under a mixed standard. Tyson v. State, 351 So. 3d 1184, 

1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). The court’s factual findings must be 

supported by competent, substantial evidence, and the court’s 

legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id.

* The State charged Carroll’s daughter with the same offenses. 

After her successful completion of a pretrial intervention program, 

the State dismissed the charges against the daughter. 
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Carroll argues that the trial court should have suppressed her 

statements to Marsh because she was coerced into answering his 

questions in violation of her privilege against self-incrimination. 

She claims that she believed her job would be adversely affected if 

she did not answer Marsh’s questions. Citing Garrity v. New 

Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), Carroll argues that her coerced

incriminatory statements may not be used in a criminal proceeding 

against her. As we will explain, the trial court correctly determined

that Garrity did not require suppression of Carroll’s statements.

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 

article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provide that no 

person will be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 

against himself. This prohibition not only allows a person to refuse 

to testify against himself at a criminal trial when he is a defendant, 

but also “privileges him not to answer official questions put to him 

in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, 

where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal 

proceedings.” Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).

In the context of government employment, if a government 

employer coerces an employee to surrender her privilege against 

self-incrimination by threatening the employee with an adverse 

employment action for refusing to answer questions from the 

employer, any incriminating statements may not be used in a 

future criminal proceeding. Id. at 78–79. In Garrity, police officers 

were questioned during an internal investigation about the alleged 

fixing of traffic tickets. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494. Before 

questioning, each officer was warned “(1) that anything he said 

might be used against him in any state criminal proceeding; (2) 

that he had the privilege to refuse to answer if the disclosure would 

tend to incriminate him; but (3) that if he refused to answer he 

would be subject to removal from office.” Id. Given the choice “to 

forfeit their jobs or incriminate themselves,” the officers confessed, 

and their statements were later used in a criminal prosecution. Id.

at 497. 

The Supreme Court held that the option of losing their jobs or 

giving self-incriminating testimony was “the antithesis of free 

choice to speak out or to remain silent.” Id. “Where the choice is 

between the rock and the whirlpool, duress is inherent in deciding 
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to waive one or the other.” Id. at 498 (quotations omitted). For this 

reason, the Supreme Court held that “the protection of the 

individual under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced 

statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of 

statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that 

it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of 

our body politic.” Id. at 500. 

The immunity recognized in Garrity extends not only to a 

government employee’s incriminatory statements obtained during 

questioning when the employer is a law enforcement agency but 

also when other government employers question employees with a 

threat of adverse employment action if they refuse to answer 

questions. See Cropsey v. Sch. Bd. of Manatee Cnty., 19 So. 3d 351, 

355 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (considering Garrity immunity in the

context of statements made by a public school teacher to her school 

board employer). This is because the privilege against selfincrimination applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, 

wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal 

responsibility him who gives it.” McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 

34, 40 (1924). 

But before a government employee is entitled to Garrity

immunity for incriminatory statements provided to her employer, 

she must show she was threatened with an adverse employment 

action if she failed to answer her employer’s questions. See 

Cropsey, 19 So. 3d at 355. The threat of an adverse employment 

action may be direct or implied. See United States v. Vangates, 287 

F.3d 1315, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2002).

At issue here is whether there was an implied threat by the 

school district. Carroll does not contend that Marsh directly 

threatened to fire her or take any other adverse employment action 

if she refused to answer his questions. Instead, she argues that she 

believed that she would be terminated if she refused. But to be 

entitled to suppression of her statements to Marsh, it was not 

enough that Carroll subjectively believed that she would suffer an 

adverse employment action if she refused to answer Marsh’s 

questions. Rather, her belief had to be objectively reasonable. State 

v. Socarras, 272 So. 3d 488, 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). An employee’s 

subjective belief “will not be considered objectively reasonable if 
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the state has played no role in creating the impression that the 

refusal to give a statement will be met with termination of 

employment.” Id. (quoting United States v. Camacho, 739 F. Supp. 

1504, 1515 (S.D. Fla. 1990)). A trial court must consider the 

totality of the circumstances when determining whether an 

employee’s belief is objectively reasonable. Vangates, 287 F.3d at 

1322.

Carroll argued that her belief that she would suffer adverse 

consequences was objectively reasonable because (1) the school 

district’s letter compelling her to appear for questioning was the 

functional equivalent of a subpoena; (2) Marsh did not advise her 

that she was not required to answer his questions; and (3) there 

was an expectation that administrators would cooperate with 

school district investigations. We disagree. Under the 

circumstances of this case, Carroll’s subjective belief that she 

would suffer an adverse employment action if she did not answer 

Marsh’s questions was not objectively reasonable. 

First, the letter directing Carroll to appear for an interview at 

the school district office provides, “You are to appear.” The letter 

did not state that Carroll would be sanctioned for failing to appear 

and did not tell her that she had to waive her Fifth Amendment 

rights. Rather, the letter was more of a general directive to 

cooperate. See Socarras, 272 So. 3d at 496–97 (explaining that a 

directive to cooperate is not so coercive to create a reasonably 

objective belief under Garrity). 

Second, Marsh may not have advised Carroll that she did not 

have to speak with him, but Carroll’s interactions with Marsh 

show that she did not feel compelled to answer his questions. When 

Marsh approached her at Belleview, she refused to answer any of 

his questions. And during the more formal interview at the school 

district office, Carroll confirmed with Marsh that she was free to 

leave the interview at any time. She was seated closest to the door 

of the conference room. And there was nothing about the 

questioning that signified that Carroll could not leave. Carroll also 

refused to answer some of Marsh’s questions. Those refusals 

contradict her claim that she felt compelled to answer Marsh and 

that she believed her refusal to do so would subject her to adverse 

employment actions. See Socarras, 272 So. 3d at 498 (“As in 
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Murphy, Socarras ‘apparently felt no compunction about 

adamantly denying’ he engaged in criminal activity, strongly 

suggesting any subjective belief of employment sanctions ‘did not 

overwhelm his resistance.’” (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 

U.S. 420, 438 (1984))).

Finally, Carroll argues that there was an expectation that 

administrators would cooperate with school district investigations. 

But “the mere fact that an employee may have felt compelled to 

make a statement to his colleagues and superiors as a normal part 

of his duties is not sufficient to implicate Garrity.” Id. at 496 

(quoting People v. Koverman, 38 P.3d 85, 89 (Colo. 2002)). Carroll 

has identified no school district rule or policy that required her to 

answer Marsh’s questions or face termination. Marsh told Carroll 

that the school district expected administrators to cooperate with 

investigations, but he never told her that she had to answer his 

questions or that she would be subject to a sanction for failing to 

do so. And even when faced with this information, Carroll still 

refused to answer some of Marsh’s questions.

On these facts, Carroll did not have an objectively reasonable 

belief that she would be subject to adverse employment 

consequences if she did not answer questions from her employer. 

For this reason, the trial court did not err when it concluded that 

Carroll’s incriminatory statements to Marsh should not be 

suppressed on grounds of Garrity immunity.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Luke Newman of Luke Newman, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
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Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren L. Shippy, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.