J-S47016-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.V.F., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 424 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 17, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001212-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.V.F., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 427 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 17, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001724-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, MOULTON, JJ., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2017

In these consolidated appeals,1 A.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the 

January 17, 2017 decree terminating her parental rights to her son, J.V.F. 

____________________________________________

1 On March 15, 2017, this Court sua sponte consolidated Mother’s two 

appeals – one challenging the decree terminating Mother’s parental rights 

and one challenging the trial court’s order changing the goal to adoption. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 513.
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(“Child”), born in October 2014, and from the order dated the same date 

changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption.2 We affirm. 

DHS opened a case file for Child in December 2014 due to drug and 

alcohol concerns with Mother. N.T., 1/17/17, at 6. On August 18, 2015, the 

trial court adjudicated Child dependent. Child was placed with, and 

continues to reside with, Paternal Grandmother. The trial court summarized 

the relevant factual and procedural history as follows:

On December 24, 2014 an initial Single Case Plan (SCP) 

was created. The SCP objectives for Mother were to 

address any drug and alcohol abuse issues[;] comply with 

a drug and alcohol assessment; comply with 

recommendation; []only take medication as prescribed; 

refrain from use [of] any illegal drugs or alcohol[;] and 

participate in individual mental health therapy.[3]

. . .

On November 2, 2015, it was reported that Mother was 

scheduled for a drug and alcohol assessment on 

September 21, 2015 and did not attend. The Court 

ordered Mother to follow all SCP objectives; and referred 

Mother to [the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”)] for a full 

drug and alcohol screen with dual diagnosis, an 

assessment, monitoring, and three random drug screens 

prior to the next court date.

____________________________________________

2 Child’s father is deceased.

3 The most recent SCP objectives for Mother were to “comply with a 

drug and alcohol assessment, to comply with those recommendations, to 

only take medications as prescribed, [to] not use any illegal drugs or alcohol 

and to participate in individual therapy, as well as maintain stable housing.” 

N.T., 1/17/17, at 7.
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On January 21, 2016, it was reported that on November 2,

2015, Mother had a positive drug screen and that on 

December 7, 2015, Mother tested positive for 

benzodiazepines and opiates.

On January 25, 2016, the Court ordered that if Mother’s 

program did not have drug screens, Mother was to be 

referred to CEU for three random screens.

On March 2, 2016, the Court ordered Mother to sign [a] 

release of information form.

. . .

On May 9, 2016, Mother tested positive for 

benzodiazepines, creatinine, and opiates.

The CEU reported that Mother failed to come to CEU on 

June 10, 2016 to provide documentation for her current 

treatment status.

Trial Ct. Op., 3/27/17, at 1-2.

On December 9, 2016, DHS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to Child and to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. 

On January 17, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the petition. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally delivered its decree 

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights and changing Child’s 

permanency goal to adoption. The trial court entered its decree on that 

same date. On January 30, 2017, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review and 

determination:

1. Did the [t]rial judge rule in error that the 

Philadelphia City Solicitor’s Office [met] its burden of 

proof that Mother’s parental rights to her [child] 

should be terminated.
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2. Did the trial judge rule in error that the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the [child].

3. Did the trial judge rule in error by changing the 

goal to adoption.

Mother’s Brief at 3.

We first address Mother’s claim regarding the termination of her 

parental rights. 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of 

fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they 

are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted). If the trial court’s decision is supported by competent 

evidence, this Court must affirm the decision. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 

511 (Pa.Super. 2007).

Termination of parental rights is governed by statute. 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511. The portion of the statute relevant to this appeal provides as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused 

or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . .

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will 

not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child within a reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.

. . .

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 
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inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 

“In termination cases, the burden is upon [the petitioner] to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the 

termination of parental rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 

(Pa.Super. 2009). We have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and 

convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty 

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting

In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Super. 2003)).

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). This Court need only agree with the trial 

court’s decision as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as 

section 2511(b), to affirm the termination. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 

380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). We will examine the facts of this case 

under section 2511(a)(1). 

As it relates to section 2511(a)(1), the pertinent inquiry for our review 

is as follows: 

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(1), the moving party must 

produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct 

sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of 
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the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. . . . Section 2511 does not 

require that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or 

failure to perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental 

rights may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if 

the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform 

parental duties.

In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 285 (Pa.Super. 1999) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)). Although 

the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition are the most 

critical to the analysis, “the trial court must consider the whole history of a 

given case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.” 

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004). Additionally, to the 

extent that the trial court based its decision to terminate parental rights 

pursuant to subsection (a)(1), “the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first 

initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). In In re C.M.S., we explained, “[a] parent is required to 

exert a sincere and genuine effort to maintain a parent-child relationship; 

the parent must use all available resources to preserve the parental 

relationship and must exercise ‘reasonable firmness’ in resisting obstacles 

placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.” 832 A.2d 

457, 462 (Pa.Super. 2003).
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Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the trial court must then 

engage in three additional lines of inquiry: “(1) the parent’s explanation for 

his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and 

child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on 

the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (quoting In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 

91 (PA. 1998)).

In granting DHS’s petition for involuntary termination, the trial court 

determined as follows:

In the instant matter, Mother was given [SCP] objectives 

in December 2014 to address issues of drug and alcohol 

abuse and individual mental health treatment/therapy. 

Parenting classes for Mother [were] later incorporated in 

Mother’s SCP objectives. Testimony of the social worker 

revealed[] Mother failed to provide documentation of 

completion of mental health treatment. Moreover, Mother 

failed to demonstrate she could successfully complete an 

intensive outpatient drug and alcohol treatment program. 

Mother[] failed to maintain continuous participation in a 

dual diagnosis treatment of the several programs she 

attended. Mother failed [to] maintain sobriety for a 

substantial period of time[.] Mother testified she tested 

positive for benzodiazepines, marijuana and opiates on 

December 12, 2016. Furthermore, Mother testified she did 

not attend several request for random drug screens. 

Testimony of the social worker revealed that one of the 

drug and alcohol treatment centers stated Mother needed 

to be reassessed for a higher level of care and failed to 

stay for the reassessment.

Furthermore, testimony of the social worker revealed 

Mother . . . completed only 4 of 12 sessions of parenting 

classes during the seventeen (17) month life of the case. 
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. . .

In the present matter, during the seventeen months (17) 

[Child] has been in DHS care, Mother has struggled with 

maintaining sobriety. The social worker’s testimony 

revealed [M]other’s history of substance abuse and an 

outstanding arrest warrant are the issues that necessitated 

the child’s placement with DHS. Furthermore, testimony 

revealed unsupervised visits were changed to supervised 

due to Mother’s failure to provide documentation of mental 

health [and] drug and alcohol treatment compliance. 

Trial Ct. Op., 3/27/17, at 4-5 (internal citations to record omitted). 

Mother argues that she has remedied the SCP goals put in place by 

DHS. Namely, Mother asserts that she completed a chemical dependency 

treatment program in July 2015, is currently enrolled in a thirty-day drug 

and alcohol treatment program, and completed a parenting class. 

We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s determination. 

Child was initially removed because of concerns regarding Mother’s drug and 

alcohol use, mental health issues, and housing. Contrary to Mother’s claims, 

Mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues persist. Ana Arguendas, 

the social worker assigned to Child, testified that she has not received any 

documentation from Mother regarding her completion of drug and alcohol 

treatment. N.T., 1/17/17, at 7-8. Indeed, Mother tested positive for drugs 

at several court hearings, most recently on December 12, 2016, just one 

month prior to the termination hearing. Id. at 10, 21. Arguendas also 

testified that Mother only completed four of twelve sessions for parenting 

classes during the life of this case. Id. at 12, 16. While testimony 

presented supports the contention that Mother is attempting to address her 
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substance abuse issues, she was not in a position to assume the caregiver 

role for Child at the time of the termination hearing. Id. at 42. In fact, 

Mother did not seek drug treatment until after DHS filed its termination 

petition. Id.; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) (“With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to [subsection (a)(1)], the court shall not consider any efforts 

by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first 

initiated subsequent to the giving notice of the filing of the petition.”).

Thus, the record confirms that Mother refused or failed to perform 

parental duties for the six months immediately preceding the filing of DHS’s 

termination petition on December 9, 2016. The record establishes that, due 

to Mother’s noncompliance with mental health and drug and alcohol 

treatment, Mother’s visits with Child were reduced to supervised visits, once 

per week. N.T., 1/17/17, at 19-20; Permanency Review Order (NonPlacement), 5/9/16, at 1. Although Mother made an effort to attend the 

visits she had with Child, Mother failed to address the concerns expressed by 

the court, which ultimately led to Child’s removal. Accordingly, we conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to section 2511(a)(1).

Mother next argues the trial court erred in finding termination of her 

parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of Child under section 2511(b). 

“Section 2511(b) ‘focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 
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welfare of the child.’” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 

(Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 

(Pa.Super.2010)). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability 

are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re 

C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2005). The trial court must also 

“discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. 

The mere finding of a parent-child bond does not preclude termination of 

parental rights. Rather, the trial court must examine the status of the bond 

to determine whether its termination “would destroy an existing, necessary 

and beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 

(Pa.Super. 2003). “[A] court may properly terminate parental bonds which 

exist in form but not in substance when preservation of the parental bond 

would consign a child to an indefinite, unhappy, and unstable future devoid 

of the irreducible minimum parental care to which that child is entitled.” In 

re J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 958 (Pa.Super. 1990) (emphasis in original). 

In addressing the best interests and welfare of Child, the trial court 

found:

In the instant matter, the testimony established that 

[Child] would not suffer any irreparable emotional harm if 

Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Testimony of 

the social worker was that [Child] and his foster parent, 

paternal grandmother, are very bonded and attached. 

Furthermore, the social worker testified [Child] is 

flourishing extremely well and acknowledges his foster 

parent as “Mom”. Testimony established there was a 

parent/child bond between [Child] and his foster parent 
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which did not exist between [Child] and his biological 

mother. Foster parent testified she loved [Child] and 

would be prepared to adopt [Child] if it became the [trial 

court’s] goal.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/17, at 6 (internal citations omitted). 

The record supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s primary bond 

is with his foster mother, Paternal Grandmother, rather than Mother. 

Further, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Child will not suffer 

irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights are terminated. It was within 

the trial court’s discretion to accept Arguendas’ testimony, and to conclude 

that the benefits of a permanent home with Paternal Grandmother would 

outweigh any emotional distress Child might experience if Mother’s parental 

rights were terminated. 

Based on the record before us, we find no error or abuse of discretion 

in the trial court’s conclusion regarding subsection (b) that Child’s 

developmental, emotional, and physical needs and welfare are best met by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights. Where the trial court’s determination 

is supported by the record, this Court must affirm. See In re R.L.T.M., 860 

A.2d 190, 191 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

Finally, we address Mother’s challenge to the order changing the goal 

for Child to adoption. 

In cases involving a court’s [decree] changing the 

placement goal . . . to adoption, our standard of review is 

abuse of discretion. To hold [that] the trial court abused 

its discretion, we must determine that its judgment was 

manifestly unreasonable, that the court disregarded the 

law, or that its action was a result of partiality, prejudice, 
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bias or ill will. While this Court is bound by the facts 

determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the court’s 

inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a 

responsibility to ensure that the record represents a 

comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has 

applied the appropriate legal principles to that record. 

Therefore, our scope of review is broad. 

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). However, we are mindful that “[w]hen the trial 

court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we will 

affirm ‘even if the record could also support an opposite result.’” In re N.C., 

909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting In re Adoption of R.J.S., 

901 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa.Super. 2006)).

Furthermore, this Court has stated, 

Placement of and custody issues pertaining to 

dependent children are controlled by the Juvenile Act [42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-65], which was amended in 1998 to 

conform to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act 

(“ASFA”). The policy underlying these statutes is to 

prevent children from languishing indefinitely in foster

care, with its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, and 

long-term parental commitment. Consistent with this 

underlying policy, the 1998 amendments to the Juvenile 

Act, as required by the ASFA, place the focus of 

dependency proceedings, including change of goal 

proceedings, on the child. Safety, permanency, and wellbeing of the child must take precedence over all other 

considerations, including the rights of the parents. 

Id. (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 

Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act provides in relevant part:

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency 

hearing.-- At each permanency hearing, a court shall 

determine all of the following:
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(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of 

compliance with the permanency plan developed for the 

child.

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child.

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the 

child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the 

permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.

. . .

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the 

last 22 months or the court has determined that 

aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts 

to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the child from 

the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to preserve 

and reunify the family need not be made or continue to be 

made, whether the county agency has filed or sought to 

join a petition to terminate parental rights and to identify, 

recruit, process and approve a qualified family to adopt the 

child unless:

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best 

suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of 

the child;

(ii) the county agency has documented a compelling 

reason for determining that filing a petition to 

terminate parental rights would not serve the needs 

and welfare of the child; or

(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with 

necessary services to achieve the safe return to the 

child’s parent, guardian or custodian within the time 

frames set forth in the permanency plan.
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42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f); see In re S.B., 943 A.2d at 977.

“The trial court must focus on the child and determine the goal with 

reference to the child’s best interests, not those of the parents.” In re S.B., 

943 A.2d at 978. As this Court has held, “[a] child’s life simply cannot be 

put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.” In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 824 (quoting In re 

Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa.Super. 2003)) (alteration in 

original). 

Mother argues that the goal change was not in Child’s best interests. 

Mother emphasizes that she participated in parenting classes, completed a 

chemical dependence treatment program in July 2015, and is currently 

enrolled in a thirty-day drug treatment program. 

The trial court determined that the goal change to adoption would be 

in Child’s best interest because Child had been in placement for over 17 

months and was adjusting well in his foster home, and because Mother had 

failed to meet any of her SCP goals established by DHS. N.T., 1/17/17, at 

33-34.

The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are properly 

supported in the record. Child was first placed with his paternal 

grandmother on June 1, 2015, and Child had been in custody of DHS for a 

period of more than 17 months at the time of the January 17, 2017 hearing. 

N.T., 1/17/17, at 8; Trial Ct. Op., 3/27/17, at 1. DHS established the SCP 
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goals for Mother, including: address drug and alcohol issues, only take 

medications as prescribed, refrain from using illegal drugs and alcohol, 

improve emotional/mental health, complete a full mental health assessment, 

visit with Child as permitted and scheduled, attend parenting classes, and 

address physical health issues. N.T., 1/17/17, at 7.

Mother has failed to demonstrate that she can successfully complete 

an intensive outpatient drug and alcohol treatment program, having 

attended six programs during the life of this case and failed to complete any 

one of the six programs. Id. at 12. Moreover, Mother only completed four 

of twelve sessions for parenting classes. Id.

Child has adjusted well living with Paternal Grandmother, referring to 

her as “mom.” Id. at 8. Child is bonded to Paternal Grandmother. 

Arguendas testified that Child is doing “extremely well” with Paternal 

Grandmother, such that termination of Mother’s parental rights would not 

cause irreparable harm to Child. Id.

Based upon this evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in finding that Child’s welfare would best be served by 

changing the goal to adoption. As this determination is supported by the 

record, we may not disturb it on appeal. See N.C., 909 A.2d at 823. 

Decree and order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/25/2017