Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1384 | February 12, 2019 Page 1 of 19

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Nicholas F. Wallace

Deputy Public Defender

Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cody J. Chambless,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 12, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-1384

Appeal from the

Allen Superior Court

The Honorable

John F. Surbeck, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

02D06-1801-F5-1

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1384 | February 12, 2019 Page 2 of 19

[1] Cody J. Chambless (“Chambless”) appeals his convictions for Level 5 felony 

domestic battery,

1 Level 6 felony domestic battery,2 and Level 6 felony 

strangulation3 arising from the assault of his girlfriend (“K.B.”) He raises three 

evidentiary issues and one sufficiency of evidence issue, which we restate as 

follows:

I. Regarding admission of evidence, whether the trial court: (A) 

committed fundamental error in admitting K.B.’s 911 phone call 

into evidence; (B) abused its discretion in admitting K.B.’s 

statement to the medic who treated her that Chambless was her 

attacker; and (C) abused its discretion in admitting the jail phone 

conversation between Chambless and K.B. in which K.B. 

accused Chambless of choking her; and

II. Whether sufficient evidence supports Chambless’s 

convictions.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Chambless was K.B.’s boyfriend. Tr. Vol. 1 at 24. On Christmas day of 2017,

K.B. was living with Chambless in an Allen County apartment. Id. at 24-25. 

K.B. was working ninety-six hours per pay period as a cook at the Pilot truck 

stop while Chambless was unemployed. Id. at 25. K.B. worked Christmas Eve 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(c).

2

See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(b).

3

See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9.
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from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Christmas morning. Id. at 26. She arrived home 

at about 7:25 or 7:30 a.m.; Chambless was at home watching television and 

drinking. Id. K.B. put on her pajamas and rested for a few hours, and when 

she awoke, Chambless was still drinking. Id.

[3] K.B. was tired of Chambless’s drinking, which she described as an everyday 

occurrence: “every time I come home he’s drinking, every time I wake up 

before work, he’s drinking . . . . So he was drinking and that really upset me.” 

Id. at 26-27. They argued and fought; K.B. threatened to leave Chambless, 

warning him that it was “his drinking or me.” Id. at 27. During the fight, 

Chambless punched holes in the wall and broke a door on an upstairs 

bathroom. Id. at 27-28; State’s Ex. 6, 8. The fight occurred around 10:10 a.m. 

Id. at 52.

[4] K.B. ran from the apartment to a BP gas station two or three blocks away. Tr. 

Vol. 1 at 28-29, 48. Even though it was cold outside, K.B., in her haste, did not 

don a winter coat or boots, instead wearing only a shirt, pants, and regular 

shoes. Id. 28-29, 53. When she arrived at the BP station, K.B. told the 

employees about the fight, and they called 911 for her. Id. at 28-29. During the 

call, K.B. told the police that Chambless had beaten her. Id. at 28. She also 

said that she was having trouble breathing. Id. at 30. Her breathing sounded 

labored and wheezy. See State’s Ex. 1. 

[5] Medics, including Marah Bradbury (“Medic Bradbury”), responded to the 911 

call and tended to K.B. at the gas station by checking her blood pressure and 
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pulse. Tr. Vol. 1 at 30, 47. K.B. told Medic Bradbury that Chambless had

assaulted her. Id. at 30, 48. Offering more details, K.B. said that Chambless

slapped her in the face and strangled her with his hands, making her feel like 

she would faint. Id. at 48. K.B. also told Medic Bradbury that she escaped 

Chambless “just in time” and ran to the gas station to call for help. Id. Medic 

Bradbury observed abrasions to each side of K.B.’s jaw and a bruise on the 

bottom of K.B.’s neck. Id. at 47.

[6] Police officers, including Officer Robert Geiger of the Fort Wayne Police 

Department (“Officer Geiger”), also responded to the 911 call, arriving at the 

BP station around 10:30 a.m. Id. at 36, 51-52. K.B. was still upset and crying 

when she spoke with Officer Geiger; she told him that she was still afraid. Id. at 

37, 51. K.B. told the officers that Chambless had strangled her. Id. at 36. 

Officer Geiger observed redness around K.B.’s neck. Id. at 53. Later that day, 

K.B. spoke to Detective Michael Epps of the Fort Wayne Police Department

(“Detective Epps”), and likewise told him that Chambless had choked her. Id.

at 40, 57. Detective Epps observed a scratch on K.B.’s neck and swelling on her 

left cheek. Id. at 57.

[7] The State charged Chambless with three counts: Count I, Level 5 felony 

domestic battery with a prior domestic battery conviction where K.B. was the 

victim; Count II, Level 6 felony domestic battery with a prior domestic battery 

conviction where someone other than K.B. was the victim; and Count III, 

Level 6 felony strangulation. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 14-18.
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[8] Chambless was initially incarcerated at the Allen County Jail. Upon placement 

there, inmates such as Chambless receive a packet that tells them that the jail 

monitors inmate phone calls. Tr. Vol. 1 at 61-62. The same information is 

posted in every cell block. Id. at 62. When an inmate uses a jail phone, an 

audio recording reminds the inmate that the phone call is monitored. Id. On 

December 26, 2017, while Chambless was in jail, he and K.B. spoke on the 

phone about their fight from the previous night. Id. at 65, 70; State’s Ex. 11. In 

their conversation, K.B. told Chambless: “you strangled the fuck” out of me.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 70; State’s Ex. 11.

[9] At Chambless’s jury trial, the State tendered, and the trial court admitted, an 

audio recording of K.B.’s 911 call without objection from Chambless. Tr. Vol. 1

at 22-23. The trial court also admitted, this time over Chambless’s hearsay 

objection, the audio recording of Chambless’s phone call from jail to K.B. Id. 

at 63-65; 70; State’s Ex. 11. The State tendered Exhibit 11 through Corporal Jeff 

Kroemer of the Allen County Sheriff’s Department, who operated the phone 

system at the Allen County Jail, and who listened to the conversation between 

Chambless and K.B. The exhibit was published to the jury. Tr. Vol. 1 at 66.

[10] The State also elicited testimony, over Chambless’s objection, from Medic

Bradbury, who recounted K.B.’s statements to Medic Bradbury that Chambless

had assaulted K.B. by striking her and choking her and that she had escaped 

“just in time” to run to the gas station for help. Id. at 30, 40-41, 46-49.
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[11] When K.B. testified, she recanted her allegation that Chambless had assaulted 

her. She said Chambless had not choked her but that she had choked herself, 

explaining:

[K.B.]: Because I was just tired of everything, I’m tired of the 

stress and going through everything. I was to the point where I 

was just ready to end my life. I lost my daughter six (6) years 

ago, towards, four (4) days before Christmas, and living with 

that, it hurts. I’ve never gotten help for it. I don’t know if I ever 

will.

. . . .

[Defense counsel]: Okay. We just heard on the 911 call, as [the 

deputy prosecutor] said, that you told them my boyfriend 

assaulted me. Why would you tell them that? 

[K.B.]: Cause I was just tired of everything, the stress, everything 

going on at home, him drinking, him not working. I’m the only 

one paying the bills. Yeah, he goes on Craigslist and sells his 

stuff, trade his stuff to help out, yeah. It helps out with the food 

and everything, and cigarettes, but it’s – the bigger picture I’m 

looking at . . . bills, somewhere for us to live, and a roof over our 

head, and it’s just all the stress and everything. I just couldn’t 

take it no more, and I didn’t mean to do that for him. I 

apologize, and it’s not right.

. . . .

[Defense counsel]: How were you going to get him out of the 

house? 
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[K.B.]: Make up lies just to get him out cause I know you would 

have to evict him cause he established residency there, he gets 

mail there. So the only way is the eviction and I wasn’t going to 

go through another stressor on top of another stressor, the 

eviction process, and then going to court for the eviction. It’s just 

– the only thing I knew is get him to go to jail, is the only thing I 

knew.

Id. at 31-33.

[12] The jury found Chambless guilty as charged. Id. at 86-89. At sentencing, the 

trial court merged Counts II and III into Count I and sentenced Chambless to 

five years, with three years executed and two years suspended to probation. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 8-9, 93. Chambless now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Chambless raises three evidentiary issues and one sufficiency issue. Regarding

the former, he argues that the trial court should not have admitted the following 

three pieces of evidence, all out-of-court statements: 1) the recording of K.B.’s 

911 phone call; 2) the part of Medic Bradbury’s testimony that recounted K.B.’s 

statement that Chambless was her attacker; and 3) the recording of the jail 

phone call. Because he did not object at trial to the admission of the 911 call, 

Chambless tries to resurrect that claim by alleging fundamental error. 

Regarding the latter issue, he argues that the State failed to present sufficient 

evidence to support his convictions because the State’s only evidence was 

inadmissible hearsay. He notes that, at trial, K.B. recanted her allegations. 
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Thus, he claims that the guilty verdict is “completely against logic and sound 

reasoning.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. 

I. Evidentiary Issues

[14] As to Chambless’s evidentiary claims, we note that a trial court has broad 

discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we disturb those 

rulings only upon an abuse of that discretion. Carr v. State, 106 N.E.3d 546, 552 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. An abuse occurs only where the trial court’s 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. 

Palmer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ind. 1999). There is a strong presumption 

that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 

239, 247 (Ind. 2002). In determining the admissibility of evidence, we will only 

consider evidence that favors the trial court’s ruling and unrefuted evidence that 

favors a defendant. Sallee v. State, 777 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 

We will not reverse a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if we may sustain it on any 

ground. See Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 780 (Ind. 2002).

[15] Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at 

the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 

matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible except 

as provided by law or by other court rules. Ind. Evidence Rule 802.

A. K.B.’s Statements in 911 Phone Call

[16] Chambless argues that it was fundamental error to admit the 911 call, claiming, 

inter alia, that K.B.’s statements in the call were hearsay, which were not 
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admissible as excited utterances because the State did not pose questions to 

K.B. as to whether she was under stress when she made the call or establish a 

time frame between the time of the fight and the 911 call. “Thus, no proper 

foundation was laid for an excited utterance exception to the prohibition 

against hearsay.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. The fundamental error exception is 

extremely narrow and encompasses only errors so blatant that the trial judge 

should have acted independently to correct the situation. See Durden v. State, 99 

N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018). Chambless concedes that to prevail on a claim of 

fundamental error, he must show that the admission of the 911 call made “a fair 

trial impossible.” See id.

[17] As Chambless acknowledges, a trial court may admit hearsay that qualifies 

under the excited utterance exception. See Ind. Evidence Rule 803(2). An 

excited utterance is a “statement relating to a startling event or condition made 

while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Id. The 

rationale behind admitting excited utterances is that startling events and 

absence of opportunity for reflection vest the statements with reliability and 

reduce the likelihood of falsification. 13 Robert Lowell Miller Jr., Indiana 

Practice: Indiana Evidence § 803.102 (3d ed. 2007). Whether a statement 

constitutes an excited utterance is a factual determination subject to a clearly 

erroneous standard of review. Davenport v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ind. 

2001).

[18] To use this exception, the proponent of the evidence must establish three 

foundations: (1) a startling event; (2) a statement made while the declarant was 
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under the stress of excitement caused by the event; and (3) that the statement 

relates to the event. Id. We do not apply this test mechanically but consider the 

particularities of each case. Young v. State, 980 N.E.2d 412, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012). “The heart of the inquiry is whether the declarant was incapable of 

thoughtful reflection.” Id. “A declaration does not lack spontaneity simply 

because it was an answer to a question. Whether given in response to a 

question or not, the statement must be unrehearsed and made while still under 

the stress of excitement from the startling event.” Yamobi v. State, 672 N.E.2d 

1344, 1346 (Ind. 1996).

[19] The event and utterance need not be contemporaneous, though lapse of time is 

a factor to consider when deciding if the statement was spontaneous and 

unrehearsed. Holmes v. State, 480 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Ind. 1985). The longer the 

time between an event and an utterance, the greater the likelihood that the 

statement is a narrative of past events instead of an excited utterance. See Lewis 

v. State, 554 N.E.2d 1133, 1136 (Ind. 1990) (discussing res gestae exception, “the 

possibility of shrewd and self-calculated answer” was not precluded but was in 

fact facilitated by the passage of time). However, the greater the stress caused 

by the event, the longer the effects of the stress can endure. For instance, in 

Yamobi, 672 N.E.2d at 1346-48, our Supreme Court held that a statement as 

long as one hour after a shooting was admissible as an excited utterance. In 

Newbill v. State, 884 N.E.2d 383, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, a rape 

victim’s 911 phone call at least four hours after the rape was admissible under 

the excited utterance exception.
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[20] Chambless’s arguments that the State did not ask K.B. on direct exam whether 

she was under stress when she made the call or establish a time frame between 

the fight and the call are unavailing. The testimony at trial clearly showed the 

contrary. K.B. had been beaten and strangled, clearly a startling event, one that 

made her run from the apartment “just in time,” not taking the time to wear a 

coat and winter boots despite the cold weather. See Tr. Vol 1 at 28-29, 48, 53. 

Further, the fact that Chambless, during the altercation, punched holes in the 

wall and broke a door to an upstairs bathroom accentuated the emotional 

intensity of the event. See id. at 27-28; State’s Ex. 8. K.B. had trouble breathing 

during her 911 call further illustrating her distressed state of mind. Tr. Vol. 1 at 

30. Because the fight occurred at 10:10 a.m. and K.B. called 911 no later than 

10:28 a.m., her statement to the 911 operator occurred a short time after she 

was attacked, not giving her time for thoughtful reflection. See id. at 36, 51-52; 

see also Yamobi, 672 N.E.2d at 1346 (statement one hour after shooting was an 

excited utterance) and Newbill, 884 N.E.2d at 397 (rape victim’s 911 phone call 

at least four hours after incident was admissible as an excited utterance). 

[21] These facts easily established the foundational requirements for excited 

utterances: (1) a startling event; (2) a statement made under the stress of the 

event; and (3) a statement that relates to the event. Davenport, 749 N.E.2d at 

1144. They also establish that K.B.’s statements during the 911 call were 

unrehearsed and made while still under the stress from the fight. See Yamobi, 

672 N.E.2d at 1346. K.B.’s statements during the 911 call were admissible as 
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excited utterances, and there was no error, fundamental or otherwise, in 

allowing the jury to hear this evidence.

B. K.B.’s Statements to Medic Bradbury

[22] Chambless argues that Medic Bradbury’s statement that recounted K.B.’s 

allegation to Medic Bradbury that Chambless had assaulted her was 

inadmissible hearsay. Chambless acknowledges that statements made pursuant 

to medical treatment or diagnosis are admissible under Indiana Rule of 

Evidence 803(4), but he claims that statements about the identity of the 

perpetrator who caused the injuries are not admissible under this exception.

4

[23] Indiana Evidence Rule 803(4) provides that statements for purposes of medical 

diagnosis or treatment are admissible if the statement:

(A) is made by a person seeking medical diagnosis or treatment;

(B) is made for--and is reasonably pertinent to--medical diagnosis 

or treatment; and

(C) describes medical history; past or present symptoms, pain or 

sensations; their inception; or their general cause.

 

4 Chambless has waived this claim because while he made a general objection at trial on hearsay grounds at 

the outset of Medic Bradbury’s testimony, he failed to object on these more specific grounds when Medic 

Bradbury testified that K.B. told her that Chambless was her attacker. Tr. Vol 1 at 48. A party may not add 

to or change his grounds for objections on appeal. Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Ind. 2010). Any 

ground not raised at trial is not available on appeal. Id. Nonetheless, we will review this claim on the merits.
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Id. This hearsay exception is “based upon the belief that a declarant’s selfinterest in seeking medical treatment renders it unlikely that the declarant 

would mislead the medical personnel person she wants to treat her.” Miles v. 

State, 777 N.E.2d 767, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing McClain v. State, 675 

N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. 1996)). 

[24] Such statements usually do not include statements that identify the perpetrator 

because the identity of the perpetrator is usually not necessary to provide 

effective medical care. Perry v. State, 956 N.E.2d 41, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); 

Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1024-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). However, where 

the identity of the perpetrator is relevant to appropriate diagnosis and 

treatment, we have upheld the admission of statements that identify a 

perpetrator. In Nash, for instance, we found that a rape victim’s statement to an 

emergency room nurse that her estranged husband had raped her was relevant 

to her treatment because part of the nurse’s job was to determine if a person was 

a victim of abuse and, if so, determining the identity of perpetrator would help

the nurse recommend appropriate counseling resources and how to advise the 

victim about avoiding further domestic abuse. Id. at 1025. Nash also discussed 

how other jurisdictions had used this rationale to admit children’s statements to 

medical providers that identified the perpetrator of abuse. 

The reason for allowing such testimony is “that knowledge of the 

perpetrator is important to the treatment of psychological injuries 

that may relate to the identity of the perpetrator and to the 

removal of the child from the abuser’s custody or control.” 2 

John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 278 at n.9. . . . 

[T]he identity of the child abuser is not only pertinent to treating 
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the child’s emotional and psychological injuries, but also 

necessary to prevent a child from being returned to an abusive 

environment. Accordingly, where a child abuser is a member of 

the family or household, this person’s identity is particularly 

pertinent to the medical personnel’s recommendation with 

respect to treatment. 

Id. at 1024-25. 

[25] United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1993) discussed this rationale 

in rape cases: 

The physician generally must know who the abuser was in order 

to render proper treatment because the physician’s treatment will 

necessarily differ when the abuser is a member of the victim’s 

family or household. In the domestic sexual abuse case, for 

example, the treating physician may recommend special therapy 

or counseling and instruct the victim to remove herself from the 

dangerous environment by leaving the home and seeking shelter 

elsewhere. In short, the domestic sexual abuser’s identity is 

admissible under Rule 803(4) where the abuser has such an 

intimate relationship with the victim that the abuser’s identity 

becomes “reasonably pertinent” to the victim’s proper treatment.

See also Perry, 956 N.E.2d at 49.

[26] The same reasoning applies here. K.B.’s identification of Chambless, her livein boyfriend, as her attacker was relevant to Medic Bradbury’s diagnosis and 

treatment of K.B. As with any medical professional, Medic Bradbury would 

need to tailor her diagnosis and treatment to the particularities of each case. 

Her treatment and recommendations for a victim of domestic abuse would 

undoubtedly differ, in some regards, from the treatment and recommendations 
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she would give a victim who was assaulted by a stranger. See Joe, 8 F.3d at 

1494-95. Special therapy or counseling is often appropriate for victims of 

domestic violence. See Nash, 754 N.E.2d at 1025. Thus, learning from K.B. 

that Chambless was her attacker would help Medic Bradbury assess what kind 

of counseling services would best suit K.B. and could result in K.B. being 

directed to one of the local domestic violence shelters.

[27] Thus, while the identification of an attacker in a statement to a medical 

professional is normally not admissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(4), 

K.B.’s statement here identifying Chambless as her attacker was admissible to 

aid Medic Bradbury in her diagnosis and treatment of K.B. Thus, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in admitting this statement.5

C. K.B.’s Statements During Jail Phone Call

[28] Chambless contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into 

evidence a recording of the jail phone call conversation between him and K.B., 

particularly K.B.’s statement to Chambless during that conversation that “you 

strangled the fuck out of me”. Tr. Vol. 1 at 70; State’s Ex. 11. Chambless

acknowledges that his own statements during the conversation were admissible 

 

5 K.B.’s statement to Medic Bradbury was also arguably admissible under the exited utterance exception. 

While the record does not explicitly state that K.B. spoke to Medic Bradbury around the same time she made 

her 911 call, the most reasonable interpretation of the record suggests that both conversations occurred 

around the same time. Because K.B. was clearly agitated and stressed when she made her 911 call, she was 

likely in the same state of mind when she told Medic Bradbury that Chambless was the person who attacked 

her. See Tr. Vol 1 at 37, 51.
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as statements against interest but claims this reason does not justify admission 

of K.B.’s statements during that conversation.

[29] Chambless fails to recognize that recordings of telephone calls made from jail 

are admissible when the defendant discusses the crime for which he is 

incarcerated. Baer v. State, 866 N.E.2d 752, 762 (Ind. 2007); King v. State, 985 

N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In Baer, the defendant was advised that 

jail phone conversations were recorded. Id. 

[30] The same is true here. Inmates at the Allen County Jail receive a packet that 

provides information about the jail’s policies, including the policy that allows 

jail personnel to monitor inmate phone calls. Tr. Vol. 1 at 61-62. The same 

information is posted in every cell block, and when an inmate uses a jail phone, 

an audio recording reminds the inmate about the policy. Id. Thus, Chambless

was warned that his phone conversations, including his conversation with K.B., 

would be recorded. Id. Nonetheless, he chose, at his own risk, to discuss his 

crime over the phone with K.B. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in admitting the jail phone conversation between Chambless and K.B. See Baer, 

866 N.E.2d at 762.

6

 

 

6 Chambless’s final argument regarding evidence admitted at trial is that even if the admission of each 

statement was, standing alone, harmless error, the cumulative effect of the erroneous rulings resulted in 

fundamental error. Because we find no error regarding any of these evidentiary issues, this argument has no 

merit.
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II. Sufficiency of Evidence

[31] Chambless claims the State failed to present sufficient evidence for his 

convictions because they rested solely on the inadmissible hearsay statements 

from the 911 call, the testimony of Medic Bradbury, and the jail phone 

conversation. Thus, Chambless argues, the only evidence addressing his guilt 

was K.B.’s recantation at trial that Chambless had assaulted her. Therefore, he 

contends we should invoke the incredible dubiosity rule to impinge on what is 

usually the jury’s responsibility to judge witness credibility. See Moore v. State, 

27 N.E.3d 749, 754 (Ind. 2015).

[32] When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or 

judge the credibility of the witnesses, and it is the jury’s role to weigh conflicting 

evidence. Alkhalidi v. State, 753 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ind. 2001). We consider only 

the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Id. 

We will affirm the trial court if the probative evidence and reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom could have allowed the jury to find a defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. A conviction can be sustained on the 

uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the 

victim. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We will not second 

guess a jury’s assessment of witness credibility unless the witness’s testimony is 

inherently improbable. See Holden v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1049, 1053 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004), trans. denied. 
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[33] Here, we reject Chambless’s argument that the State failed to present sufficient 

evidence for his convictions. It is not true that K.B.’s convictions were 

supported only by her out-of-court statements. Independent evidence of the 

assault came from: (1) Medic Bradbury’s observation of abrasions to each side 

of K.B.’s jaw and a bruise on the bottom of K.B.’s neck; (2) Officer Geiger’s 

observations of redness around K.B.’s neck; and (3) Detective Epps’s 

observations of a scratch on K.B.’s neck and swelling on her left cheek. Tr. Vol. 

1 at 47, 53, 57.

[34] This independent evidence is especially important because where, as here, a 

victim recants, a conviction may not rest on a repudiated out-of-court statement 

unless there is substantial independent evidence of probative value from which 

the jury could find that the repudiated statement is credible. Peckinpaugh v. 

State, 447 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Ind. 1983). Here, the testimony of Medic 

Bradbury, Officer Geiger, and Detective Epps regarding her injuries provided 

such substantial evidence that allowed the jury to find that K.B.’s repudiated 

statement was, in fact, credible. See id. 

[35] Finally, Chambless’s incredible dubiosity argument is unavailing. Under the 

incredible dubiosity rule, a court will impinge on the jury's responsibility to 

judge the credibility of the witnesses only when it has confronted inherently 

improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony 

of incredible dubiosity. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d at 755. This rule applies only 

when a witness contradicts herself in a single statement or while testifying; it 

does not apply to conflicts between multiple statements. See Glenn v. State, 884 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1384 | February 12, 2019 Page 19 of 19

N.E.2d 347, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied; see also Buckner v. State, 857 

N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). When a witness’s trial testimony 

contradicts a statement she made before trial, it is the jury’s province to decide 

which statement to believe. Glenn, 884 N.E.2d at 356. Discrepancies between 

pretrial statements and trial testimony go to the weight of testimony and 

credibility of the witness but do not render such testimony incredibly dubious.

Holeton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 539, 542-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Thus, the 

incredible dubiosity doctrine does not apply here because the contradiction was 

between K.B.’s pre-trial statements and her trial testimony, not within her trial 

testimony itself. Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence for 

Chambless’s convictions. 

[36] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.