Coping With an Oiled Sea

March 1990

OTA-BP-O-63

NTIS order #PB90-219973
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Coping With An Oiled Sea: An Analysis of

Oil Spill Response Technologies, OTA-BP-O-63 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, March 1990).

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

ii
Foreword

In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in March, 1989, a myriad of

investigations were initiated to evaluate the causes of that accident and to propose remedies. The Office of Technology Assessment was asked to study the Nation’s oil spill

clean-up capabilities and to assess the technologies for responding to such catastrophic

spills in the future. The request for this study came from Senator Ted Stevens, a member of the Technology Assessment Board, and from Congressman Billy Tauzin, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Committee on

Merchant Marine and Fisheries. This background paper presents the results of OTA’s

analysis. It discusses the current technologies and capabilities in the United States and

abroad and evaluates the prospects for future improvements.

Cleaning up a discharge of millions of gallons of oil at sea under even moderate environmental conditions is an extraordinary problem. Current national capabilities to respond effectively to such an accident are marginal at best. OTA’s analysis shows that

improvements could be made, and that those offering the greatest benefits would not

require technological breakthroughs –just good engineering design and testing, skilled

maintenance and training, timely access to and availability of the most appropriate and

substantial systems, and the means to make rapid, informed decisions. One must

understand, however, that even the best national response system will have inherent

practical limitations that will hinder spill response efforts for catastrophic events–

sometimes to a major extent. For that reason it is important to pay at least equal attention to preventive measures as to response systems. In this area, the proverbial ounce of

prevention is worth many, many pounds of cure.

Director

. . . 111
OTA Oil Spill Study Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Robert W. Niblock, Oceans and Environment Program Manager

Project Staff

Peter A. Johnson, Project Director

William E. Westermeyer, Co-Project Director

James E. Mielke, Specialist in Marine and Earth Sciences1

Contractors

Virgil F. Keith, ECO, Inc.

Richard Willis, ECO, Inc.

Administrative Staff

Kathleen A. Beil, Administrative Assistant

Sally Van Aller, Secretary

I Congressional Research Service, Science Policy Division, Library of Congress.

iv
Contents

Chapter 1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 2. Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 3. Oil Spill Response Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......11

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....11

Mechanical Spill Response Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Dispersants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......19

Burning, Bioremediation, and Other Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......22

Quantity and Distribution of Response Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . .......24

Chapter 4. U.S. Oil Spill Response Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....27

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......27

Technology: Which Cleanup Method? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......27

Decisionmaking: Democratic and Authoritarian Approaches . . . . .......28

Responsibility: The Polluter or the Government? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......28

Logistics: Essential to Quick Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......29

Beach Cleanup: How Much Emphasis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......30

Federal Regulations and Emergency Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......31

Equipment Testing: How Realistic? How Effective? . . . . . . . . . . . .......32

Personnel, Training, and Drills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...33

Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......34

Chapter 5. Selected European Oil Spill Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..39

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......39

French Oil Spill Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......39

Dutch Oil Spill Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......41

United Kingdom Oil Spill Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...43

Norwegian Oil Spill Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....44

General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......46

Appendix A. Mechanical Containment and Cleanup Technologies . . . . . . .......51

Appendix B. Quantity and Distribution of U.S. Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . .......58

Appendix C. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..68

Appendix D. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......70
Contents

Figures

Figure Page

3-1.

3-2.

3-3.

3-4.

A-1.

A-2.

A-3.

A-4.

A-5.

A-6.

A-7.

A-8.

A-9.

A-10.

A-n .

Table

2-10

3-1.

4-1.

4-2.

5-1.

A-1.

B-1.

B-2.

B-3.

B-4.

B-5.

B-6.

B-7.

B-8.

B-9.

B-10.

Spread of an Exxon Valdez-Sized Oil Spill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....11

Vessel-of-Opportunity Skimming System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......17

West German THOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..18

Schematic Drawing of the Navy’s Class V Oil Skimmer . . . . . . . . . .......18

Components of a Boom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ....5I

Weir Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......52

Floating Suction Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

Schematic Drawing of a Weir Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......53

Vortex Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......53

Disc Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......54

Rope Mop Skimmer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....55

Paddle Belt Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......56

Sorbent Belt Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......56

Sorbent Lifting Belt Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......56

Submersion Belt Skimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...57

Tables

Page

Large Oil Spills: A List of 66 Spills Greater Than 2 Million Gallons,

1967 to Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Equipment Required To Deploy Response Elements . . . . . . . . . . . .......20

Suggestions Received by the Coast Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....36

Selection of Planned R&D Efforts by Federal Agencies and Industry . . . . .38

Summary of Oil Spill Response Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......47

Boom Classification According to Freeboard and Draft . . . . . . . . . .......52

Major Types, Quantities, and Location of U.S. Navy Spill

Response Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......59

Major National Strike Force Equipment of the U.S. Coast Guard .. .....59

Major Sources of Skimmers in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......60

Major Sources of Containment Boom in the United States . . . . . . .......61

Major Sources of Offloading Pumps in the United States . . . . . . . .......62

Major Sources of Dispersant Delivery Systems in the United States .....63

Alyeska Response Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....64

Equipment Based at the Oil Spill Response Center,

Southampton, U.K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....64

Petroleum Industry Response Organization Regional Center

Capital Equipment Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..66

U.S. Oil Spill Co-Ops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..67
Chapter 1

Overview

The March 24, 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in

Prince William Sound, Alaska dramatically illuminated the gap between the assumed and

actual capability of industry and government

to respond to catastrophic oil spills. There

are many reasons why this gap wasn’t better

appreciated before March 24: elaborate oil

spill contingency plans had been prepared and

approved; oil spill equipment had been developed and stocked; major damaging spills had

occurred infrequently, and almost never in

the United States; and a nebulous faith had

existed that technology and American corporate management and know-how could prevent and/or significantly mitigate the worst

disasters.

The Exxon Valdez accident shattered this

complacency. In the aftermath of the spill a

small army of people has been put to work

around the country studying how the United

States can do a better job preventing spills and

how it can be better prepared to fight one that

does occur. In this background paper, OTA examines the state-of-the-art of oil spill technologies and response capabilities. On an

encouraging note, it appears that improvements can be made in oil spill cleanup technology and, perhaps even more, in the way we

organize ourselves to apply the most appropriate technologies to fight oil spills. Such

improvements should result in a reduced risk

of significant damage from a major spill in the

future.

However, the unfortunate reality is that,

short of eliminating oil transportation at sea

entirely, there is no perfect solution to offshore oil spills. It is certain that oil spills will

occur again. If improvements in prevention

technology are made, the frequency of major

spills may decrease, but improvements are

unlikely to eliminate oil spills entirely, and a

very large spill under adverse conditions

could still overwhelm our capacity to respond

effectively. Even using the best technology

available and assuming a timely and coordinated response effort, it is not realistic to expect that a significant amount of oil from a

major offshore spill could be recovered, except under the most ideal conditions. Historically, it has been unusual for more than 10 to

15 percent of oil to be recovered from a large

spill, where attempts have been made to recover it. With improvements in technology

and response capability, it should become feasible to do much better, but it is unlikely that

technical improvements will result in recovery of even half the oil from a typical large

spill.

It is not feasible to be prepared for all contingencies: each oil spill is unique in terms of

location, weather, oceanographic conditions,

time of occurrence, characteristics of the oil,

equipment available, and experience of response personnel. Accidents are unpredictable. They may be caused by “acts of God” or

human error, both of which are impossible to

fully anticipate or control. The ideal conditions in which cleanup technology would be

most effective rarely occur in the real world.

The U.S. industry has concentrated its efforts in developing technology to fight the numerous small spills in harbors and protected

waters. On the one hand, industry has oversold its ability to fight major spills, and the

government has largely relied on private capabilities; on the other, the public’s expectation

about what can be accomplished once a major

spill has occurred has been too high. Prevention of major spills, although beyond the

scope of this study, must be a high priority.2

I For the purP=9 of thi9 report the terms “catastrophic, “ “major)” and “large offshore” spills refer to discharges in excess of 1

million gallons of oil that occur in open waters subject to rough seas, high currents, or other adverse environmental factors.

2For a de~]~ diws5ion of prevention Meawres, see U.S. Conwess, OffIce of T~hno]o~ Assessment, oil ~mn.SpOrtdkm by

Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution and Safety Measunx (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, July 1975).

1
—.————

2 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

It is important to put the environmental

impacts of a major oil spill into perspective.

Such a spill is indeed a catastrophe, but oil

spills are not the worst type of pollution with

which Federal and State authorities have to

deal. In terms of threats to human health and

persistence in the environment, spills of hazardous chemicals or radioactive waste can be

far larger problems, and accidents involving

dangerous materials can cause significant loss

of life. Nevertheless, it is a serious problem

when a large quantity of oil is spilled in a

coastal or near-coastal area. The public is particularly concerned about large spills in sensitive areas because the effects on the local ecosystem are acute, often initially devastating

both to biota and economic activities. Oil can

be toxic to organisms that come into contact

with it and can cause major problems with

recreational or other uses of coastal regions,

such as commercial fishing in Alaska. If large

amounts of oil reach the shore, the oil may

persist for long periods, even though natural

degradation mechanisms do assist recovery.3

As bad as the Exxon Valdez accident was, it

could have been far worse: only about onefifth of the crude oil the tanker was carrying

was released. Fortunately, the rest was offloaded. The Amoco Cadiz did spill its entire

cargo off the coast of France in 1978, a cargo

roughly the same size as that carried by the

Exxon Valdez.4 Significantly, neither the oil

industry, the Federal Government, nor the

State of Alaska were prepared to deal with a

spill the size of the Exxon Valdez spill. It was

fortunate, in a sense, that the spiller in this incident was a major international oil company

capable of marshaling significant resources,

rather than a small tanker company.

s~ 1974 the supe~ker Me~~ Spi]]ed some 16.2 million gallons of oil ~er grounding in the Strait of Magellan. Essentially, no

cleanup occurred and at least half of the oil lost washed onto about 50 miles of shoreline. A study by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration about 6 years aiter the spill concluded that much of the oil remained in sediments, along beaches, and in

marshes. In heavily oiled, sheltered areas, it seems likely that the oil will persist for more than 100 years.

4TheAmoco CacZiz spill released 66.4 million gallons of light crude oil off the Brittany coast in France. Prevailing winds kept the slick

near the coast for 1 month, eventually oilingabout 200 miles of coastline. In a 19S5 report, Oil in the Sea, the National Research Council

estimated that it would take decades before the environment recovered.
Chapter 2

Findings

The Exxon Valdez accident was the largest

spill (about 10.8 million gallons or 35,000

tons) in U.S. history. Not since the Santa Barbara oil spill 20 years earlier has as much public concern been voiced about the inability of

government and industry to respond effectively to large oil spills. Although such spills

have occurred worldwide at the rate of 3 to 5

per year since the Torrey Canyon accident off

England in 1967, many of these (table 2-1)

have escaped U.S. attention. This OTA study

is not directed at an evaluation of what went

wrong with the Exxon Valdez but is focused on

the response capabilities (or lack thereof) that

were brought to bear in the Exxon Valdez

spill, as well as in other large offshore spills.

Two factors are important to the question

of why public and private oil spill response capabilities seem so limited today. First, very

large accidents and catastrophic oil spills have

not occurred very often in U.S. waters. The

last major tanker spill near the United States

was the Alvenus spill off the Gulf Coast in

1984. It was about one-third the size of the Exxon Valdez spill, and, even though a large portion of the 2.7 million gallon spill was deposited on Texas beaches, the type of oil and the

local conditions were such that beach cleanup

was reasonably effective. Second, many believed that the responsible industry and government agencies were prepared. The exhaustive contingency plans appeared to be

evidence of the preparation and demonstration of adequate capabilities.

In the light of actual events, the response

capabilities of both government and private

entities proved inadequate for an Exxon Valdez type of accident. It is also clear that the

few other large offshore spills that have oc-

%ob cmdt U.S. Coast Guad

The Exxon Valdez, flanked by two tugboats,

in Prince William Sound.

curred in U.S. coastal waters in the past 10 to

15 years have mostly escaped public attention, largely because natural events dispersed

or mitigated the impacts. One spill caught

fire, burning most of the oil; others happened

where favorable winds and currents carried

and dispersed most of the oil to the open seal

Many people have asked how can we be so

ill-prepared for massive oil spills in the modern world of high technology. Perhaps the

United States has not given attention to developing appropriate technology in this arena;

maybe we haven’t made needed investments

in research; or maybe management of the response was just inept.

This OTA study addresses the question of

technological promises and limitations. The

technology now available for oil spill cleanup

in the United States and overseas has many

limitations affecting capabilities in real world

situations. This has resulted in only very

small percentages of actual cleanup for almost all past major ocean spills. Some sources

claim that the most oil that can be recovered

I In the Bumah ~a~e accident off the Gulf Coast in 1979, the oil caught fire and resulted in most of the spill burning up. In theAr@

Merchant spill off New England in 1976, the offshore winds carried almost all of the oil out to sea and it was dissipated in the open

ocean.
4 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

Table 2-1 -Large Oil Spills: A List of 66 Spills Greater Than 2 Million Gallons, 1967 to Present

Volume

(millions

No. Date Spill Location of gallons) Ref(s)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

38

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

1979-1980

1983

1983

1978

1979

1980-1981

1979

1967

1980

1972

1981

1976

1970

1977

1979

1978

1975

1985

1985

1978

1971

1989

1974

1983

1970

1978

1978

1983

1985

1968

1970

1974

1973

1980

1989

1978

1979

1971

1972

1976

1977

1972

1970

1969

1977

1976

1976

1969

1969

1977

lxtoc 1, Well Blowout

Nowruz Oil Field, Well Blowout(s)

Castillo de Beliver/Broke, Fire

Amoco Cadiz/Grounding

Aegean Captain/Atlantic Empress

D-103 Libya, Well Blowout

Atlantic EmpresslFire

Torrey Canyon/Grounding

Irenes Serenade/Fire

Sea Star/Collision, Fire

Kuwait Nat’l Petroleum Tank

Urquiola/Grounding

Othello/Collision

Hawaiian Patriot/Fire

Independents

No. 126 Well/Pipe

Jakob Maersk

BP Storage Tank

Nova/Collision

BP, Shell Fuel Dept.

Wafra

Kharg 5, Explosion

Metula/Grounding

Assimi/Fire

Polycommander

Tohoku Storage Tanks, Earthquake

Andros Patria

Pericles GC

Ranger, TX, Well Blowout

World Glory/Hull Failure

Ennerdale/struck Granite

Mizushima Refinery, Tank Rupture

Napier

Juan A. Lavalleja

Exxon Valdez/Grounding

Turkish Petroleum Corporation

Burmah Agate/Collision, Fire

Texaco Oklahoma, 120 mi. offshore

Tinder

St. Peter

Irene’s Challenge

Golden Drake

Chryssi

Pacocean/Broke in two

Caribbean Sea

Grand Zenith/Disappearance

Cretan star

Keo/Hull failure

Storage Tank

Ekofisk Bravo, Well Blowout

Mexico

Persian Gulf

South Africa

France

Off Tobago

Libya

Barbados

England

Greece

Gulf of Oman

Kuwait

Spain

Sweden

N Pacific

Turkey

Iran

Portugal

Nigeria

Iran

Zimbabwe

South Africa

Morocco

Chile

off Oman

Spain

Japan

Spain

Qatar

Texas

South Africa

Seychelles

Japan

SE Pacific

Algeria

Alaska

Turkey

Texas

North Carolina

Mediterranean

SE Pacific

Pacific

NW Atlantic

NW Atlantic

NW Pacific

E Pacific

NW Atlantic

Indian Ocean

Massachusetts

New Jersey

North Sea

139-428*

80-185

50-80’

67-76

49*

42

41 .5*

35.7-38.6*

12.3-36.6*

35.3*

31.2

27-30.7’

18.4 -30.7

30.4*

28.9

28

25*

23.9

21.4

20

19.6*

19

16

15.8*

3-15.3

15

14.6

14

6.3-13.7

13.5

12.6

11.3

11*

11

10.8

10.7

1 .3-10 .7*

9.2-10.7

10.4

10.4

10.4

9.5

9.5

9.2

9.2

8.9

8.9

8.8

8.4

4.6-8.2

abgh

ab

abe

abfhm

abl

a

abl

bcf

am

bf

a

bf

bcf

bf

a

a

a

g

cf

a

c

a

a

a

bk

bcf

cf

cdf

f

a

i

a

abc

cf

f

f

f

f

f

f

f

f

f

bf

b

bf

a. A List of the 20..., 1989. f. Butler, 1978. j. Ganten, 1985. n. Tracey, 1988.

b. Reuters, 1989. g. Woods and Hannah, 1981. k. Quina et al., 1987. 0. Ocean Industry, 1980.

c. Van Gelder-Ottway..., 1976. h. Teal and Howarth, 1984. 1. Horn and Neil, 1981. p. NRC, 1975.

d. A Basic Spill..., 1981. i. Caleb Brett, 1989 m. Bao-Kang, 1987. q. Journal of Commerce, 1/4/90.

e. Lord et al., 1987.

Tinker spdls from the kan/lraq war were not goneralty available

● Fire burned part of spill

SOURCE: Exxon Corp and Of?lca of Technology Aasassment
Chapter 2–Findings .5

Table 2-1- Large Oil Spills: A List of 66 Spills Greater Than 2 Million Gallons, 1967 to Present (Continued)

Volume

(millions

No. Date Spill Location of gallons) Ref(s)

51 1972 Giuseppi Guilietti NE Atlantic 8 f

52 1977 Venpet and Venoil/Collision South Africa 7.4-8 ef

53 1976 Argo Merchant/Grounding Massachusetts 7.7 bfh

54 1967 Humble Oil Pipeline, Offshore Leak Louisiana 6 7 n

55 1973 Jawacta Baltic Sea 6.1 c

56 1967 R.C. Stoner Wake Island 6 c

57 1970 Marlena Sicily 4.3 c

58 1970 Pipeline Saudi Arabia 4.2 c

59 1971 Oil Well Persian Gulf 4,2 c

60 1980 Tanio/Broke amidships France 4.2 j

61 1988 Ashland Storage Tank, Rupture Pennsylvania 3.8 b

62 1969 Santa Barbara Channel, Well Blowout California 1.4-3,4 dfp

63 1970 Arrow/Grounding Nova Scotia 1.5-3.1 ch

64 1970 Storage Tank Pennsylvania 3 c

65 1984 Alvenus/Grounding Louisiana 2.8 b

66 1970 Offshore Platform, Well Blowout Louisiana 2.7 c

a. A List of the 20..., 1989. f. Butter, 1978.

b. Reuters, 1989. g. Woods and Hannah, 1981

c. Van Gelder-Ottway..., 1976. h. Teal and Howarth, 1984.

d. A Basic Spill..., 1981. i. Caleb Brett, 1989

e. Lord et al., 1987.

Tanker spills from the Iran/Iraq war were not generally available

● Fire burned part of spill

SOURCE: Exxon Corp and Office of Technology Assessment

after a major spill is 10 to 15 percent.2 OTA

obtained data from several documented open

ocean large tanker spills that show the actual

oil recovered at sea has been less than 10 percent of oil discharged –usually much less.

Probably between 6 and 8 percent of the oil

spilled by the Exxon Valdez was recovered at

sea,3 although, as of this writing, Exxon is still

in the process of developing a recovery estimate. Under the best conditions, with the best

technology, with technology that is immediately available, and with the ablest organization, cleanup capabilities could be substantially improved. However, technical experts

have widely ranging views on the magnitude

of potential improvements, mainly because

j. Ganten, 1985. n. Tracey, 1988.

k. Quina et al., 1987. 0. Ocean Industry, 1980.

I. Horn and Neil, 1981. p. NRC, 1975.

m. Bao-Kang, 1987. q. Journal of Commerce, 1/4/90.

the best conditions seldom occur in the real

world.4

Many claim that techniques other than mechanical recovery could be used to mitigate

the effects of a large offshore oil spill without

actually picking up the oil. These techniques

include use of dispersants and burning. In fact

these other techniques have seldom been used

successfully. In some cases public concerns

about side effects have prevented their use

(these include possible toxic effects of dispersed oil and air emissions from burning oil).

In other cases, sea conditions or the condition

of the spilled oil have resulted in poor performance of these techniques.

ZU.S. ~ner~ Ac~unting o~ce, Ade~a~ of Preparation and Response to Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, October 1989.

ow~ter p~ker, ~aska Oi] Spi]] Commission, personal communication, Feb. 12, IW.

4At OTA’S Oil Spill workshop in August 1989, several experts agreed that the high end of recovery capabilities for large ocean spills

might hypothetically reach more than 30 percent with the best technology.
6 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

The main question, therefore, is what improvements could be expected if new technologies or techniques were employed in the

future. This OTA study has concluded that

improvements could be made and that the

most obvious improvements would not require any technological breakthroughs-just

good engineering design and testing, good

maintenance and training, timely access to

the most appropriate systems, and rapid, informed decisions. The improvements that can

be made, however, also have limitations, and

the inherent practical difficulties of recovering oil from the ocean will always hinder spill

response efforts, sometimes to a major extent.

The key findings from this OTA evaluation

are summarized below:

Mechanical containment and recovery is

the primary U.S. oil spill response

method. The technology currently available for mechanical oil spill cleanup has

many limitations, and only very small

percentages of oil have been cleaned up

from most major spills. While new designs have appeared over the years, the

basic technology has not changed in the

past decade.

Current mechanical containment and recovery technology (especially that available in the United States) is not usually

effective in waves greater than 6 feet,

winds greater than 20 knots, and currents greater than 1 knot (perpendicular

to a boom). Wind and current conditions

in U.S. port areas, not to mention offshore areas, often exceed these limits,

leaving little margin for the effective use

of existing mechanical equipment.

Improvements in mechanical recovery

technologies that can be expected from

stepped-up research and development

efforts are unlikely to result in dramatic

increases in total oil recovered from a

catastrophic spill. In general, the improvements that are likely to offer

greater effectiveness for large offshore

spills involve larger, more costly equipment, strategically located for quick response.

One prospect for reducing the high cost

of more effective containment and recovery equipment for large spills is to employ dual purpose vessels. Army Corps of

Engineers’ dredges, for example, could

be designed or retrofitted with oil spill

recovery equipment, and be on call to

fight spills as needed. Commercial

barges, Coast Guard vessels, and other

vessels of opportunity may also be employed. Such an approach may also offer

the advantage of keeping more equipment in strategic locations.

Dispersants, like mechanical cleanup

methods, have their place as an oil spill

countermeasures tool. Greater use of

dispersants has been hampered in part

by concerns about toxicity and in part by

concerns about effectiveness. Currently

available dispersants are less toxic than

the oil they dispersers but dispersed oil

can be toxic until it breaks down or is diluted sufficiently, and it will impact a

greater fraction of the water column (or

the sea bottom if used in shallow water)

than undispersed oil. Dispersant use

may involve a trade-off between the environmental effects of a treated oil slick

with the shoreline impacts of an untreated one.

The effectiveness of dispersants is perhaps of more concern than their toxicity.

A number of experts disagree about the

effectiveness of dispersants, and there is

as yet no reliable method to test effectiveness in field operations. Although

5Nation~ mse~ch Counci], Using Oil Spill Dispersants on the Sea (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989), p. 3.
Chapter 2-–Findings ● 7

●

●

some currently available dispersants

have proved effective in ideal situations,

ideal conditions rarely exist in the real

world. Research to improve dispersant

effectiveness is continuing and appears

to be producing some encouraging results.

Abroad, some countries rely almost exclusively on mechanical cleanup methods (e.g., Norway and the Netherlands),

while others (e.g., the United Kingdom)

rely almost exclusively on dispersants.

Some countries have much larger mechanical systems than those currently

available in the United States (e.g., dual

purpose dredges in the Netherlands) and

thus have much greater capacities for

high volume recovery. Different policies

regarding the use of mechanical methods are due largely to different physical

conditions in each country; different

dispersant policies relate to varying perceptions about their effectiveness and

toxicity.

In situ burning of spilled oil appears to

have merit in certain spill situations, especially if the oil can be contained and

thickened with the use of fireproof

booms. This technique is not currently

an important oil spill countermeasure

but is being investigated further in the

United States. Some experiments have

resulted in high burn percentages and

thus high removal rates. Nevertheless,

burning is probably also limited in its applications. Igniting and keeping a slick

burning may be a problem in some circumstances; in others, burning may

jeopardize the stricken vessel and any oil

remaining on board– oil which might

otherwise be off-loaded; and the resultant visible air pollution (which must,

however, be balanced against the invisible air pollution caused by allowing

evaporation of the toxic volatile components of the oil) may be unacceptable. “ A

Despite the shortcomings of all existing

countermeasure approaches, each may

have applications in certain situations.

There is no one general solution to an oil

spill. Many technologies may be very effective in certain applications but completely inappropriate in others. Regardless of the technique(s) employed, the

effectiveness of the response will be

greatly enhanced if there is a rapid response by a professional response team

that understands which techniques are

best under which conditions. The speed

of a response is critical and is dependent

on rapid decisionmaking, logistics, and

training.

—

Decisionmaking: If important decisions, such as how to deploy mechanical equipment and whether to

use dispersants, are not made within

the first few hours after a major spill,

the spill may be beyond effective control. Rapid decisionmaking is difficult in the United States, in part

because oil companies have the responsibility to clean up major spills

but not the authority to use all

means they deem appropriate. Rapid

decisionmaking could be enhanced if

the government were responsible for

combating major vessel spills, as is

the case inmost European countries;

if authority within the government

were more centralized; and if,

through more thorough contingency

planning, a greater number of decisions could be made without delay.

Logistics: Having the right equipment on scene when needed is essential to a rapid response. Equipment

may either be strategically located or

rapidly moved to the spill site, but in

either case the recovery effort will

only be as good as the weakest link in

the system. Response system elements such as adequate ships or
8 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

●

●

barges to accept recovered oil, temporary storage sites, and a means to

dispose the recovered oil are often

crucial to a successful operation and

are often ignored.

– Training: A career track for oil spill

response professionals does not now

exist in the Federal Government.

With the Coast Guard rotation system currently in effect, operational

expertise is hard to come by, and

even if developed, maybe lost before

required. The establishment of a

trained professional cadre to fight oil

spills throughout the country (and

perhaps abroad too) could make a

significant difference in the government’s ability to respond rapidly to

spills. To be effective, professional

training must include the conduct of

periodic exercises and contingency

plan testing.

The response to a major spill would be

more rapid and efficient if certain regulations could be waived or streamlined.

Regulations that are appropriate under

normal operating procedures but which

may cause unnecessary delay in emergency situations include: 1) Clean Water

Act restrictions that prohibit the decanting of oily water collected during cleanup

operations, and 2) Jones Act restrictions

that restrict the use of available foreign

vessels without a waiver.

The oil industry, through a new Petroleum Industry Response Organization

(PIRO), proposes to establish 5 or more

regional oil spill response centers and

claims it could endow each with the capability to fight a 30,000-ton (about 9

million gallons) spill. In January 1990

the PIRO Steering Committee recommended adoption of this proposal with a

5-year budget of almost $400 million and

membership by 20 oil companies. This is

a worthwhile concept and could bring

●

●

about a major increase in U.S. capabilities when implemented. However, industry and the appropriate Federal agencies

must work together to devise an efficient, integrated approach to fighting

major oil spills. The benefits of the regional center approach could be enhanced if the specific organization, function, and outfitting of each center were

jointly determined. Also, if the government continues to rely on private resources for spill response, it must carefully monitor the availability and

capability of those resources.

Increased R&D on oil spill response technologies will likely yield incremental

benefits. Important problems can be

better understood, but technological

breakthroughs that would result in major improvements in mechanical cleanup

capabilities are unlikely. The most important problems have to do with 1) providing technical backup for decisions on

use of techniques such as dispersants

and other chemicals, 2) developing technical standards based on full-scale tests

of capabilities of specific equipment, and

3) sound engineering design and construction of substantial and reliable systems in enough quantities to meet performance requirements for oil recovery

under real world operating conditions.

One aspect of future technical improvements – that of pollution prevention –

may provide significant benefits to the

overall oil spill problem. While many

have advocated this as an area needing

attention, it has not been included in the

scope of this OTA study. A 1975 OTA

study (ref. 2, chapter 1) addresses this issue and an on-going National Academy

of Sciences/National Research Council

study is investigating the current situation with regard to the double-bottom,

double-hull issue.
Chapter 2–Findings . 9

● Given the difficulty of containing and has been effective except under ideal

cleaning up a catastrophic spill at sea, weather conditions. Efforts are probably

many have advocated more attention to needed, however, to improve capabilities

techniques that would protect priority of protective systems and to assure the

coastal areas (e.g., booms). OTA has not availability of the best equipment.

found evidence that shoreline protection
Chapter 3

Oil Spill Response Technologies

INTRODUCTION

The capability to respond effectively to a

major offshore oil spill is a combination of

three principal factors:

1.

2.

3.

the physical conditions at the time of the

accident or spill;

the suitability, capacity, and availability

of the technology deployed to fight the

spill; and

the skills, training, readiness, and decisionmaking capabilities of the organizations and people with responsibilities for

combating the spill.

This OTA study focuses on the second factor

while recognizing the major influences of the

other two and how they interact.

Adverse physical conditions that may be

present at any spill site always contribute to

the difficulty of responding efficiently and effectively. Some of the key conditions that affect a response effort include:

Spreading of Oil. Oil spilled on the water

spreads rapidly. The spreading rate depends

on the type of oil, its volume, wind and sea

conditions, and the amount of weathering

that occurs. Figure 3-1 shows the effect of

spreading for calm water conditions and uniform slick thickness–not necessarily real

world conditions. It can be seen that, for an

Exxon Valdez type of spill, the oil can spread

over 6 square miles (almost 4,000 acres) during the first 12 hours.1 The huge area encompassed by a large spill means substantial

amounts of equipment are needed to respond.

Spreading also enhances evaporation and solution of the oil by creating a large active surface area. In addition, an oil slick tends to

Figure 3-1 -Spread of an Exxon Valdez-Sized

Oil Spill

12 hours 24 hours 2 days 3 days 4 days

Note: Assuming no wind or current

SOURCE: Engineering Computer Optecnomlcs, Inc (ECO)

fragment into a number of smaller patches

with time, and thus, even larger total surface

areas must be covered with any available recovery equipment.

Composition of Oil. The viscosity of the oil

can be a critical factor in the response effort.

In addition, oil spills in rough seas quickly become emulsions as they mix with water and

form “chocolate mousse, ” a substance which

is very difficult to pump. High viscosity oils

are more difficult to recover mechanically and

disperse than low viscosity oils. Also, weathering processes such as evaporation, water takeup, oxidation, and biodegradation will increase the viscosity. Certain crude oils (such

as Alaskan crude) become very difficult to

pump when temperatures reach about O to 5

degrees Celsius. In addition, the effectiveness

of dispersants and the burning process decreases as viscosity and emulsification increase. Also, the total volume of oil/water

emulsion (mousse) can reach several times

the initial oil spill volume.

‘If all of the containment boom in the U.S. Navy inventory could be deployed to this type of spill site within the first 12 hours, it

would barely be enough to encircle such a spill. In fact, the U.S. Navy response was not even requested until more than 1 week aller the

Exxon Val& accident.

11
—.

12 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

Sea Conditions. Most existing mechanical

equipment becomes much less effective in

waves greater than 3 to 6 feet. In addition,

small vessels cannot be used, and deployment

of gear in rough seas can be difficult. Currents

can cause oil to move in unpredictable directions, and booms become ineffective when

current velocity exceeds about 1 knot perpendicular to the face of the boom.

Weather Conditions. Weather such as

snow, fog, heavy rain, high winds, and low

temperatures all adversely affect the deployment and operation of equipment.

Location of Spill. If the spill is near the

shoreline and the drift is toward shore, it will

be very difficult to prevent beach contamination, no matter how ideal the conditions. The

more remote a spill, the more difficult it is to

get equipment to the site quickly.

Logistics. It is critical to be able to move

equipment and personnel to the spill site as

rapidly as possible. Also, all aspects of the

transportation network are important–

barges and other support vessels are often

overlooked or not available.

Safety. Response to a large spill must include consideration of fire and explosion potential of the slick under the right temperature and atmospheric conditions. The

protection of people aboard the vessel and

those working on clean-up operations is critical. The safety of the stranded vessel itself is

also important, especially if part of the cargo

can be recovered before it is all spilled.

The above factors affect the ability of any

response effort to mitigate the effects of a

large offshore spill. OTA has reviewed three

major categories of existing technologies for

oil spill response: mechanical recovery; dispersants; and burning, bioremediation, and

other techniques. In general, none of the currently available technologies are adequate to

respond to and mitigate major offshore spills

of the Exxon Valdez type and size (over 10 million gallons).

In the United States, almost all of the existing technology in the private sector has been

developed for use in harbors and other protected waters. The Coast Guard and the Navy

have equipment in their inventory that was

designed for offshore areas in terms of deployability and ruggedness, but it is limited to

moderate sea states, low currents, and moderate-size spills. No private U.S. oil spill cooperative has the ability to deal with large, catastrophic spills. The few large cooperatives in

the United States have equipment that is

more appropriate for platform spills. The

Coast Guard has only minimal equipment of

its own and depends, in large part, on private

industry to supply systems to respond to

spills. The Coast Guard has not developed any

new equipment in recent years, and the number of strike teams has been reduced from

three to two. The Navy’s spill response capability is probably more substantial than that

of any other government agency, but its

equipment has been designed to be air-transportable and, thus, is limited in size and capacity.

MECHANICAL SPILL

RESPONSE TECHNOLOGIES

Mechanical recovery of spilled oilcan be accomplished by a variety of techniques. A large

number of different systems have been designed and built over the last 20 years. The

World Catalog of Oil Spill Response Products,

for instance, includes hundreds of harbor,

calm water, and offshore booms and skimmers designed for a variety of spills and conditions, in addition to hundreds of sorbants that

soak up oil.2 Oil spill containment and

2FMXM ~hu]ze (d.), world Catalog of Oil Spill Response Pm&cts (Bsltimore, ~: Port city press, 1*7), 470 PP.
Chapter 3–Oil Spill Response Technologies .1.3

cleanup technology has improved marginally

over the past two decades, but private and

Federal research efforts in the United States

diminished greatly in the 1980s. Mechanical

spill response technologies can be divided into

two major categories: containment booms

and oil recovery devices. Several containment

and cleanup devices are discussed below.

More details are included in appendix A.

Booms

Booms range in vertical dimension from

under 1 foot for protecting calm water areas

to over 7 feet for offshore applications.

Smaller booms are less expensive, lighter, and

easier to deploy. Large offshore booms require larger boats, heavier equipment, and

often specialized equipment to deploy and recover. Most booms, including large offshore

booms as well as smaller booms, become ineffective in currents over 1 knot and wave

heights over 6 feet. Systems designed for more

severe conditions in the Norwegian sector of

the North Sea are required by the Norwegian

government to be effective in waves up to 9

feet and currents of 1.5 knots. However, in

wave heights in the range of 6 to 9 feet, the efficiency of the equipment decreases as oil escapes the boom. In wave heights above 9 feet,

oil is whipped into the water and splashed

over the booms, and little recovery is possible.

One type of boom, designed for rapid deployment, is pumped full of air (in an upper

flotation chamber) and water (in a lower ballast chamber) as it is pulled off a reel. Thus,

one trade-off is between rapid deployment using continuous air inflation versus slower deployment but less reliance on continuously

operating inflation equipment. Booms that

can be deployed from a reel and do not require

fhoib cmdi~ V7konm Intematimd, Lti.

A weir boom corralling an oil spill.

that sections be bolted together are generally

easier to handle offshore. Future developments are not likely to be in the direction of

greater ability to operate in harsher sea conditions but more toward ease of operation

within the limits now attained.

Booms ranging from 18 inches to 80 inches

were used at the Exxon Valdez spill in Prince

William Sounds According to one spill response supervisor at the spill, the largest

booms were no better at containing oil than

booms in the 32 to 42 inch range, but the

larger booms were useful to slow down the

larger boats that could not otherwise tow

slowly enough.4

3En@n&ring Computer Opt=nomics, Inc. (EC! O), “Analysis of Oil Spill Response Tahnologies, ” contractor report PreP~ed for

the Ofllce of Technology Assessment, July 1989.

41bid.
14 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

Fhc@ edit Jlm Miako

Heavy-duty boom on reel at the Southampton,

U.K. Oil Spill Service Centre.

Air bubble barriers are another type of containment device. If air is pumped into a perforated pipe below the water surface, the rising

bubbles cause the surface water to flow away

from the pipe. Air barriers are more effective

in calm waters and when used at freed installations. An air bubble barrier was employed in

the 1969 Santa Barbara spill with little success. This equipment requires large amounts

of compressed air and presents logistical

problems, which probably would make it unsuitable for remote areas.

A promising future addition to containment technology may be the high pressure

water jet barrier. The water jet system is designed to herd oil, much like a barrier, but under a wide variety of operating conditions. It

can be mounted on and used with oil recovery

devices.

Skimmers

Several basic types of skimmers are available; some of the more common are suction

and weir skimmers and skimmers with a moving surface such as a belt, oil-absorbent rope

mop, or disks (see appendix A). Each has its

strengths and weaknesses, and no single type

is best for all situations or types of oil. Even

the most effective skimmers have rarely accounted for recovery of more than a few percent of oil from large spills.

Suction skimmers generally have a fairly

high oil recovery rate because of their high

pumping capacity, but they do not discriminate well between oil and water and thus have

a low recovery efficiency.s They are simple to

operate but do not work well in choppy waves.

Weir skimmers have the advantages of being

simple and reliable, and they have a fairly

high recovery rate. However, most (especially

rigid types) do not work well in waves. Conventional weir skimmers also have problems

in becoming clogged with debris. There are a

variety of belt skimmers, some with belts of

absorbent material, some without, and some

that can be used either way. Belt skimmers

with the belt inclined to the water and the upper surface moving upward can generally handle debris very well. They also can be expected

to have a relatively high oil recovery rate and

high efficiency. Disk skimmers rely on the adhesion of oil on rotating disks. Because of the

large vertical dimensions of the disks, they are

relatively more effective in waves, and the

larger skimmers are effective in fairly high sea

states. Disk skimmers have a high recovery efficiency, which can be a considerable advantage if storage volume is limited. Among their

disadvantages are their vulnerability to becoming clogged with debris, their ineffectiveness with mousse, and their more complicated design (which makes them more likely

to break down). Rope mop skimmers have a

long loop of absorbent oleophilic (oil loving)

material that floats on the surface of the water

The oil recovery rate, measured in gallons per minute, is the rate at which pure oil is recovered. Recovery efficiency is the percent

oil in the recovered mixture. Robert Schulze (cd.), World Cakdog of Oil Spill Response Products (Baltimore, MD: Port City Press,

1987), p. 213.
Chapter 3–Oil Spill Response Technologies ● 15

A disk skimmer deployed behind a boom. This model has

the capacity to recover about 50 tons of oil per hour.

and is then pulled through a wringer to remove oil. These skimmers have a high recovery efficiency, are easy to deploy off the side of

a vessel, and are relatively easy to maintain.

Evaluation of Capabilities

In wind and currents, a boom must be designed with proper ballast to remain vertical

and to maintain an effective height in the

water. Other problems of containing oil in a

current are related to the hydrodynamics of

oil in moving water. As an oil slick increases in

thickness against the boom, the oil extends

deeper into the water. Only about 10 percent

rises above the waterline. In other words, an

oil slick floats in much the same way as an iceberg. As current velocity increases, more oil is

driven against the barrier. When a critical velocity for the depth of the barrier is exceeded,

oil will migrate down the barrier and escape

underneath. Another problem is entrainment

or dispersion of oil droplets in the water as it

flows past oil held against a barrier. The rate

at which droplets of oil enter the water and

flow beneath the barrier depends on the current speed (or the relative velocity between

the barrier and the water if the barrier is being

towed) and properties of the oil itself. Both

entrainment and migration of the slick under

a barrier become significant problems at current speeds in excess of 1 knot perpendicular

to the boom face.6 Badly designed booms may

fail below this current speed. The difficulties

in handling barriers in open ocean waters are

compounded by the fact that ships towing

booms must navigate at very slow speeds

where it is difficult to maintain steering

control.

Booms have probably reached their practical limits in terms of the maximum wind and

wave conditions in which they can be expected

to retain oil. Additional improvement will

most likely result from advances in ease of deployment and possible development of new,

lighter weight, durable materials.

Skimmer performance varies widely depending on the viscosity of the oil being recovered. Most skimmers have a range of viscosities in which they work best and can be

roughly grouped according to the oil viscosity

in which they are most effective. A generalized

grouping of skimmer performance according

to oil viscosity is shown below.

Light Oil

Weir

Suction

Submersion belts

Submersion plane

Medium Oil

Disk

Rope mop

Sorbent belt

Sorbent lifting belt

Sorbent submersion belt

Boom-skimmer

Vortex

(continued)

61 hot ew~s 1.2 miles per hour.
—

16 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

Photo credit: Jim Mhlke

A “Foxtail” rope mop skimmer deployed in a

Norwegian test tank.

Heavy Oil

Paddle belt

Sorbent lifting belt disc (large offshore

types only)

Rope mop (high viscosity, but not

Bunker-C)

Weir with progressive cavity pump

In general, even the most rugged mechanical containment “and recovery equipment is

limited in effectiveness to waves of less than 6

feet, winds of less than 20 knots, and currents

less than 1 knot. Average wind and current

conditions in many U.S. port areas come close

to these limits leaving little margin for effective use of mechanical equipment. Thus, it

would be normal to expect periods when

weather conditions would preclude operation

of mechanical containment and recovery

equipment in any U.S. port area.

Even under ideal conditions, with equipment and trained personnel nearby and good

weather, it is not realistic to expect to recover

more than 30 percent of the oil from a major

spill. Probably less than half that amount is

more likely. The rapid spreading and fragmentation of oil that occurs after a spill has

made cleanup of large percentages of oil

exceedingly difficult. Historically, recovery

from major spills has amounted to only a few

percent, if there was any attempt at recovery

at all.

Mechanical Cleanup Enhancers

A number of products have been marketed

to assist in the recovery of spilled oil. One

chemical that has undergone preliminary

testing and appears to offer some promise is a

nontoxic polymer, polyisobutylene, which

comes in the form of a white powder and renders oil visco-elastic. This change makes the

oil adhere to recovery surfaces, thereby

greatly increasing the effectiveness of oil

skimmers, particularly rotating disk and

drum types. Rope mop type skimmers do not

appear to be well suited to the use of this

treating agent because the increased viscoelasticity makes the squeezing of the rope

more difficult. This material has also been

shown to be effective at treatment ratios as

low as one part in 1,000.7 It does not appear to

reduce spreading or increase thickness sufficiently to assist in situ burning. One potential

problem may be applying and mixing it with

oil in large, spread-out spills.

Other chemicals have been developed to

break or prevent emulsions. These products

have the ability to convert the water-in-oil

emulsion to two separate phases. The advantage of doing this is that the oil can then be

Werv F. Fingas, “Chemical Treatment of Oil Spills,” Alaska Arctic Offshore Oil Spill Response Technology Workshop Proceedings,

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 762, April 1989, p. 33.
Chapter 3– Oil Spill Response Technologies ● 17

recovered more efficiently or dispersed or

burned more successfully. Most of these products are hydrophilic (water-loving) surfactants. The problem with these surfactants is

that the surfactant is more soluble in water

than in oil and will quickly leave the system if

there is sufficient water. One product being

tested by Environment Canada is a demoussifier – a mixture of long-chain polymers that

does not have the drawback mentioned above.

Although not yet available, laboratory tests

show this material will prevent the formation

of water-in-oil emulsions at treatment ratios

as low as 1:2,000. As with other treating

agents, application and mixing in large spills

may be difficult. Like dispersants, mechanical

cleanup enhancers require certification before

they can be considered for use.

Integrated Systems and Deployment

The difficulties encountered in spill responses with respect to obtaining and deploying boom and skimmer handling vessels and

oil storage vessels have led to the propositioning of chemicals and equipment and development of integrated systems that are equipped

to perform all the functions of the mechanical

recovery process. Integrated systems fall into

three categories: vessel-of-opportunity systems; single purpose, specially designed oil

spill response vessels; and multiple purpose

vessels, of which one of the purposes is oil spill

recovery. These systems use conventional

skimmer techniques to recover the oil and are

subject to the efficiencies and shortcomings of

those systems. However, they also have the

advantage of being independent of other supporting equipment in their recovery process,

until their storage capacity is exceeded.

Vessel-of-opportunity skimming systems

(VOSS) are systems designed to be deployed

from any suitable vessel that maybe available

in the area. They incorporate portable skimmers that are not integrated into a dedicated

vessel. The skimmer system is freed to the

side of the vessel, and recovers oil while the

Figure 3-2-Vessel-of-Opportunity Skimming System

support vessel

Pumping subsystem Oil/water

separator

SOURCE: Engineering Computer Optecnomics, Inc (EIX3)

vessel progresses through the slick (figure

3-2). While these systems have the advantage

of greater mobility, they are limited to the

suitability of vessels in the area.

Specially designed oil spill response vessels capable of operating in the open ocean

have been developed by European firms,

mainly Dutch and German. These are large

vessels, unlike some of the smaller skimmers

described previously. One of the more innovative is a tank vessel hinged at the stern that

operates in a “V” configuration, using its split

hulls to form a boom-like collecting system

(figure 3-3). Two of these vessels are in use and

a third has been ordered by Mexico. These systems have the advantage of being complete

systems with significant onboard oil/water

separation capability and storage capacity.

Disadvantages include their high cost and,

since they are not air transportable, their

more limited range of use.
18 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

Figure 34-Schematic

Variable speed positive

displacement pump

Figure 3-3-Schematic Drawing of West German

Split Vessel THOR

SOURCE: MC Dredge lachnotogy Corp

Drawing of the Navy’s Class V Oil Skimmer

Hydraulic motor

Powered

squeeze roller Powered main

a

SOURCE: U S Navy
—

Chapter 3–Oil Spill Response Technologies .19

Multiple-purpose vessels are an economical

approach to large-scale, oil spill response systems. The publicity surrounding the use of

the Soviet dredge in the Exxon Valdez spill has

focused attention on the use of dredges and

other vessels as platforms for oil spill response systems. The Soviet dredge was designed from the beginning as a trailing hopper

dredge with oil recovery capability. The first

report of building a dredge with the dual role

of oil spill response was in 1977 with the design of the Cosmos, a Dutch ship. The great capacity of these vessels for storage of viscous

materials and their pumping systems (including suction hoses up to 24 inches in diameter)

make them ideal for recovering very viscous

weathered oil. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

dredges were also used in the Alaskan oil spill,

but without specific modification. Initial design modifications would include spark suppressing electrical systems, oil/water separation equipment, and ventilation systems for

dealing with flammable volatiles. Unmodified

dredges would be limited to recovering weathered oil that presents no fire hazard. The advantages of dual-purpose dredge vessels are

their usefulness as a dredge during most of

their lifetimes and their large capacity in the

event of a major spill. Both the U.S. Coast

Guard and the Army Corps of Engineers are

studying the use of multi-purpose vessels. The

Coast Guard is studying the feasibility of giving buoy tender vessels oil spill cleanup capabilities, and may add this capability to new

buoy tenders as they are built.

Recovery and containment systems cannot

be deployed at the site without the provision

of significant support resources. These support resources include material handling

equipment such as forklifts and cranes, boom

and skimmer handling vessels, storage vessels, surveillance airplanes, and trained personnel. Table 3-1 shows the minimum equipment required to deploy various response

components.

DISPERSANTS

Perhaps the most controversial issue in the

field of oil spill response is the use of chemicals to disperse the oil. In general a dispersant

is sprayed onto a slick to reduce the cohesiveness of the slick so that the oil can be broken

into small droplets by wind, wave, and current

action. The oil droplets disperse into the

water column where they become diluted to

low concentrations and are subjected to natural processes such as biodegradation.

Much of the controversy that has surrounded the use of dispersants has arisen

from their impact on the environment. While

early dispersants were toxic, modern dispersants are less toxic than the oil itself.8 Even so,

the use of dispersants involves making an environmental trade-off. In essence, this involves trading the potential short-term environmental effects of a treated slick against the

possible long-term shoreline impacts and

other effects of an untreated one. The primary

impact of a dispersed slick comes from the oil

dispersing into the upper water column.

While it will rapidly become diluted, the initial concentrations may exceed the acute toxicity threshold of organisms in the upper few

meters of the water column. In certain seasons or sensitive areas, this maybe a trade-off

that authorities are unwilling to make.

In an untreated spill, evaporation may be

responsible for the loss of one-third or more of

the oil in a period of a few hours or a day.

While hydrocarbons dissolved in water also

evaporate, many of the hydrocarbons that dissolve (mainly aromatics) appear to produce

the most immediate biological toxicity.9

8Nation~ ~semch Councl], Marine Boat-d, Using Oil Spiil Dispersants on the Sea (Washin@on, DC: National Academy Press, 1989).

‘Ibid., p. 240.
. .

20 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

Table 3-1--Equipment Required To Deploy Response Elements

Personnel

System Staging area To site Onsite (per system)

CONTAINMENT Space

Forklift-4 ton

Crane-4 ton

Maintenance

facilities

Spares

Vessel with minimum of

8’ x 20’ clear deck

space for each 2000’

of boom

A-frame/davit/handling equipment with

minimum one ton capacity

Boats capable of tending boom

— one if boom anchor used

– two if no boom anchor used

2

2 per boat

4 to 6

7 to 8

RECOVERY

Skimming

barrier

Vessel with minimum of

8’ x 35’ clear deck

space per system

A-frame/davit/handling equipment with

minimum one ton capacity

Two boats for maintaining barrier

opening and shape and capable of

operating at low speed-1 to 2 knots

Barge for receipt of recovered oil

Tug to tend barge or to shuttle barge to

onshore storage location

Platform for prime power (may be barge)

A-frame/davit/handling equipment with

minimum one ton capacity

Two boats for maintaining barrier

opening and shape

Barge for receipt of recovered oil

Tug to tend barge or to shuttle barge

to onshore storage location

Boat with 10-ton crane at 35’ reach

deploy and recover

A-frame/davit handling equipment

minimum one ton capability for

deployment and recovery

Barge for receipt of recovered oil

Tug to tend barge or to shuttle

barge to onshore storage location

spac e

Forklift- I O ton

Crane-10 ton

Maintenance

facilities

Spares

Self-propelled

skimmer

Vessel with minimum of

12’ x 35’ clear deck

space per system

Forklift-10 ton

Crane-10 ton

Maintenance

facilities

Spares

3 to deploy

2 to operate

Vessel-ofopportunity

skimmer

Space

Forklift-10 ton

Crane-10 ton

Maintenance

facilities

Spares

Vessel with minimum of

8’ x 24’ clear deck

space per system

DISPERSANT

APPLICATION

Air deliverable Pumps to

transfer from

barrels to tank

truck

Tank truck

Ground personnel

See onsite requirements Surveillance aircraft for spotting

Aircraft equipped to spray dispersant

2

vessel Space

Forklift-8 ton

Crane-8 ton

Maintenance

facilities

Spares

Vessel with 8’ x 24’ clear

deck space

Surveillance aircraft for spotting

Vessel capable of accepting

vessel system

2 to 3 to

deploy

2 to operate

deliverable

TRANSFER

PUMPS Spac e Vessel with approximate

8’ x 24’ clear deck

space

Helicopter with l-ton

lift capacity

Barge for receipt of off-loaded oil

Tug to tend barge or to shuttle

barge to onshore storage location

Hoses and couplings

Fenders

Forklift-2 ton

Maintenance

facilities

Spares

SOURCE: Engineering timputer Optecnomics, Inc (ECO), “Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies,” contractor repotl prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, July 19SS
—— — .——-——

Chapter 3– Oil Spill Response Technologies .21

The immediate ecological impacts of dispersed oil vary. In open waters, organisms on

the surface will be less affected by dispersed

oil than by an oil slick, but organisms in the

water column will receive greater exposure

from dispersed oil. In shallow areas, less water

is available to dilute the dispersed oil to less

than lethal concentrations, so organisms will

be more severely impacted by dispersed oil.

Consequently, dispersant use is generally limited to deeper water. Although some immediate biological effects of dispersed oil may be

greater than for untreated oil, long-term effects on most habitats, such as salt marshes,

sea grasses, and mangroves, are less, and these

habitats recover faster if oil is dispersed before it reaches these areas.10 Thus, the primary biological benefits of dispersant use are

to reduce the hazard to birds (unless the dispersant is sprayed directly on them) and to

prevent oil from stranding on shorelines.

Sometimes, it may be more the aesthetic

value that is protected, particularly if

stranded oil is removed from beaches and

rocky shorelines by high-pressure hot water

at the sacrifice of the local biological communities.

Further advantages of using dispersants in

combating a large oil spill are that they can be

rapidly deployed (by aircraft) over a large

area, may be used when sea conditions preclude mechanical response, and, if successful,

can be a very cost-effective oil spill countermeasure. Dispersants can be applied by either

fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, or systems installed on a vessel. The most efficient system

for large spills is the Airborne Dispersant Delivery System, a portable unit developed for

use on any available C-130. Dispersants are

most effective when they are applied early, because the oil becomes less dispersible as its

viscosity increases. However, dispersants that

are effective on higher viscosity oils are being

developed. The major consideration in applyPbb CKWI1: J/m Mm/kc

Airborne Dispersant Delivery System, or ADDS pack, seen

mounted on a flatbed for easy transport to a C-130 airplane.

ing the dispersant is to achieve a relatively

uniform application on the oil without undue

wind drift loss. Most dispersants require an

application of dispersant to oil in a ratio of

about 1:10 to 1:20. As with mechanical equipment, prepositioning of dispersants is necessary to achieve an early and effective response.

In a major study published in 1989, the National Research Council generally approved

the use of dispersants and recommended that

they be considered as a potential first response option along With mechanical cleanup.11 Mechanical cleanup has the advantage of

removing oil from the marine environment

(although, thereby, creating a waste disposa l

problem onshore) but is generally limited by

inability to cover a large slick area in a reasonable period of time. Dispersants are one of the

few countermeasures that can be applied to a

large area in a timely manner. One other question surrounding dispersants, however, is the

‘“Ibid., p. 4.

‘ ‘Ibid.
——

22 ● Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

lack of hard data about their effectiveness in

actual spill conditions. The National Research

Council recommended further research in

this area. One difficulty, in particular, is in establishing a methodology for determining dispersant effectiveness at sea.

How well dispersants work depends on sea

conditions and application techniques as well

as on the chemical nature of both the dispersants and the oil. A certain amount of wave energy is desirable to achieve mixing, whereas a

calm sea reduces the immediate effectiveness

of dispersants. Improvements have been

made in application techniques, but they still

appear short of being routinely optimal. Further gains could be made from research in this

area.

BURNING,

BIOREMEDIATION, AND

OTHER TECHNIQUES

In Situ Burning

In situ burning is the process of burning an

oil spill in place either with or without the use

of fire containment boom. In order to ignite

oil on water, the oil must be relatively fresh,

and the slick must be at least 3 millimeters

thick. To ensure thickness and to isolate oil

from contact with a stricken vessel or other

object, fireproof booms may be used. Since

the more volatile components of spilled oil

immediately begin to evaporate, there is less

potential for successful in situ burning as the

slick ages. Some oil residue (about a 1 millimeter thick layer) will remain in the water after burning oil because the flame is always

quenched by heat losses to the water surface

when the oil layer gets thin. Such residue is itself a problem to clean up, but burn efficiencies of over 90 percent can be obtained, particularly if the oil is confined with booms or

other means to keep the oil layer as thick as

possible. Since less evaporation takes place in

cold regions, in situ burning maybe more successful in these areas.

Several techniques have been devised for igniting oil spills. Devices used include floating

igniters that can be deployed by air and the

helitorch igniter, which is a tank system containing gelled gasoline suspended on cables

below a helicopter. One device under design is

a laser ignition system using two coupled lasers from a helicopter to heat and ignite oil

spills.

Burning has been used in response to accidental oil spills with varying success. The use

of burning to remove oil from the water produces a trade-off that must be evaluated by local authorities. The trade-off is between removing oil from the water and releasing the

products of combustion into the atmosphere.

Measurements thus far indicate that combustion products released into the atmosphere

are no more hazardous than those released by

evaporating oil, and that the total environmental loading of toxic components remains

the same or is reduced by the combustion of

crude oil spills on water.12 Burning produces

black sooty smoke that is a highly visible pollutant and may raise concerns about human

health effects, whereas oil on the surface of

the water, while also polluting in terms of

volatiles entering the atmosphere, is usually

perceived by the public to be less threatening

to human health.

The aesthetic trade-off is not only one of

ocean v. atmosphere, but also one of time

frame, the short-term impact of smoke and

combustion products versus the longer-term

impact of an oiled shoreline. The major incentive to burn the oil is not only to remove it

lpDa~d D4 Evms, “In$itu Burning of Oi] spi]]s,” Alaska Arctic Offshore Oi] Spi]] RespOnSe Technolo~ workshop Proc*inW,

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 762, April 1989, p. 53.
Chapter 3–Oil Spill Response Technologies 23

from the water but to reduce the probability

of its becoming stranded on shore.

In some circumstances (e.g., if oil is not isolated from the vessel that spilled it) burning

could put a stricken vessel, its remaining

cargo, and any personnel still on board at risk.

The intentional sacrifice of a vessel and its

cargo may ultimately cost less than the total

cost of a spill that could not be controlled, but

this is rarely obvious at the time a response

decision must be made. The decision to deliberately set fire to a vessel is one that most people would be very reluctant to make, especially if considerable oil remains on board and

if there appear to be other response options.

In the case of the Exxon Valdez, much more oil

remained on the ship than was spilled. Most of

this oil was successfully offloaded, thereby

averting the greater tragedy that would have

occurred if this oil also had spilled. Even so,

Exxon’s total costs to fight this spill greatly

exceeded the value of the ship and its cargo.

Bioremediation

Bioremediation is the in situ use of microbes to biodegrade and oxidize hydrocarbon

molecules. Biodegradants can be marine bacteria naturally occurring in the spill area, nonindigenous naturally occurring bacteria, genetically engineered microbes, and nutrients

that can be added to enhance biological oxidation. Tests of this technique on water have

shown little or no enhancement over the naturally occurring biodegradation.13 Use of

bioremediation on impacted shorelines, however, has apparently been successful in some

cases. Exxon, in conjunction with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), recently

conducted a large-scale test of this technique

in cleaning up beaches soiled by the Exxon

Valdez spill. About 70 miles of shoreline were

coated with two kinds of nitrogen- and phosphorus-bearing fertilizers to boost indigenous

bacterial populations.14 Initial results are inconclusive, but the data are still being evaluated. One difficulty is measuring the effectiveness of the technique.

Proponents of bioremediation say it is potentially the least damaging and least costly of

cleanup techniques, particularly for soiled

beaches. Its use on water, however, would appear to be limited except perhaps as a follow

up to other actions. The major disadvantage

of bioremediation is the long time frame involved. On beaches where it could take 5 to 7

years for oil to breakdown under natural conditions, bioremediation with fertilizer could

reduce that to 2 to 5 years.15 Research needs to

be conducted on the effect on local habitat

from increased microbial populations and nutrient levels. Efforts to engineer new microorganisms or to identify and cultivate more efficient ones may be promising.

Miscellaneous Chemical Agents

Gelling Agents

Gelling agents change liquid oil into a solid

to aid in recovery or are directed toward

tanker accidents where pollution might be

avoided or diminished by gelling the oil remaining in the tanks. Gelling agents require

mixing with oil and allowing adequate time

for the gel to set. Some gels set in a matter of

minutes, whereas others, depending on environmental conditions, require about 8 hours

to form modest strength and several days to

form substantial strength. Field tests have

shown that large amounts of gelling agent

13F~nws, op. cit., footnote 7! p- 30”

14Mwk cra~ord, ~fE=on ~ts on Bu~ in ~as~ C]eanup,” Sc&nc+E, w)]. 245, Aug. 18, 1989, p. 704.

1

‘Ibid.
——

24 ● Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

may be required, up to 40 per cent of the volume of the oil itself.16 For these reasons gelling agents are not generally stocked for use

by spill responders.

Herding Agents

Herding agents are designed to contract a

spill and keep it from spreading. Herding

agents are limited in effectiveness and are

more successful in controlling small, thin

slicks. Tests and actual use of these products

showed that utility was limited to very calm

waters. Due to their limited application and

operating spectrum, there is little remaining

use of herding agents at this time.

Sinking Agents

Sinking agents, such as hydrophobic chalk,

have been used to prevent oil from reaching

shore. The French used about 3,000 tons of

powdered chalk to sink an estimated 20,000

tons of oil following the 1967 Torrey Canyon

spill. Very little sunken oil came ashore. However, Canadian tests of several sinking agents

have shown that none were effective in holding oil after the initial sinking and that it

slowly leached back to the surface over a few

days.17 Because the sinking mass causes suffocation of bottom life and also exposes many

bottom-dwelling organisms to oil, sinking

agents are generally forbidden by environmental regulatory agencies.

Combustion Promoters

Burning agents have been developed to assist in the combustion of oil, but these generally have not functioned well in actual practice. Burning agents are of two generic types,

sorbents and pyrotechnical compositions.

Sorbents function by collecting oil in thicker

masses to assist in burning, and pyrotechnical

compositions keep the slick burning. Burning

agents are of limited use because of the large

amount of material needed for a beneficial effect and by the fact that in situ burning can be

accomplished without them.

QUANTITY AND

DISTRIBUTION OF

RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

Although oil spill response equipment is

widely distributed around the United States,

the availability of equipment for responding

to major spills is limited. Principal stocks are

held by the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard,

and industry cooperatives.

The Navy has two major equipment depots,

one in Williamsburg, Virginia the other in

Stockton, California. A small amount of

equipment is located in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

The primary mission of Navy resources is to

fight spills from Navy ships and facilities;

however, its equipment is considered a national resource, and, as in the case of the Exxon Valdez spill (in which equipment from

both major Navy depots was used), may be

called on in emergencies. The Navy has invested a total of approximately $30 million for

its equipment. Since much of this equipment

was purchased in the mid-1970s, its replacement value would be much greater than this

(rough estimates are over $100 million). Navy

equipment currently constitutes the largest

equipment stock available in the United

States applicable for fighting large, offshore

spills. The principal Navy countermeasures

equipment are 24 Navy-modified belt skimmers, each with a capacity of about 250 gallons per minute. These skimmers were used in

the Exxon Valdez spill, but were no match for

the huge volume of oil to be recovered. They

16Finws, op. cit., footnote 7! p- 29”

“Ibid., p. 31.
Chapter 3– Oil Spill Response Technologies .25

PhoitJ cmdt U.S. Cosst Guad

U.S. Navy Marco Class V skimmer deployed in

Prince William Sound.

are also not capable of effective recovery in

rough seas (above sea state 3). The Navy has

no dispersant capability. A potential constraint to efficient operations is that the Navy

must depend on outside contractors for offloading recovered oil, as it has no tank barges

of its own. Appendix B contains an inventory

of the Navy’s principal resources.

The U.S. Coast Guard also maintains two

important equipment stocks, one at its Atlantic Strike Team base in Mobile, Alabama, the

second at its Pacific Strike Team base at

Hamilton Air Force Base, California. Three

Strike Teams were maintained until 1987,

when the Atlantic and Gulf Strike Teams were

consolidated due to budget constraints. Coast

Guard stocks include a number of Open

Water Oil Containment and Recovery Systems, the principal elements of which are

skimming barriers, pumps, and storage bladders (dracones). This equipment is not sufficient to combat a major spill. The Coast

Guard relies on private contractors for additional mechanical cleanup equipment. A significant amount of equipment at the two

Coast Guard Strike Team bases is devoted to

the important mission of off-loading (lighterPhoIu cmdt US. Coast Guwd

Dracone fuel bladder used for temporary storage of

recovered oil.

ing) stricken vessels to minimize the loss of

oil. The Coast Guard has about 20 Air Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer Systems for this

purpose. Appendix B contains a summary of

Coast Guard stock.

Much of the rest of the availabIe oil spill response equipment in the United States is

maintained by industry oil spill cooperatives.

There are approximately 93 of these cooperatives in the United States (see app. B), but virtually all are designed for fighting spills in

protected harbors, sheltered waters, and inland areas.18 According to the American Petroleum Institute’s recent Task Force Report

on Oil Spills, “no U.S. cooperative has been

designed to deal with a catastrophic spill. ”19

Moreover, little of the available industry

equipment would be applicable for more rigorous offshore conditions. Cooperative and

other equipment that could be suitable offshore is listed in appendix B, as is a listing of

the Alyeska Cooperative’s recent acquisitions.

The largest oil spill cooperative in the world

is the Oil Spill Response Ltd. (OSR) base in

Southampton, England. The base is equipped

‘8American Petroleum Institute, “Task Force Report on Oil Spills,” June 14, 1989, p. 10.

1

‘Ibid.
——

26 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

with the capability to respond to large offshore spills. (Because Exxon is a full member

of this cooperative, it was able to use 50 percent of the equipment on hand at the time to

fight the Exxon Valdez spill. OSR base equipment was among the first out of state equipment to arrive in Prince William Sound.) The

base has been stocked with the intent to be

able to respond simultaneously to two

10,000-ton spills (two 3-million gallon

spills).20 Whether this capability could be met

in practice is difficult to determine. In general, such estimates of response capacity typically depend on the manufacturer’s estimates,

and such information may be overstated and

applicable primarily to ideal conditions. OTA

estimates that the capability of the Southampton cooperative is roughly equivalent to

that of one of the U.S. Navy depots. OSR base

equipment is also listed in appendix B.

The industry has proposed to remedy the

lack of equipment for fighting major spills by

establishing five regional oil spill response

centers and equipping each with the capability to respond to a 30,000-ton spill. Each Petroleum Industry Response Organization

(PIRO) center would contain lightering equipment, booms, skimmers, dispersant equipment, and other ancillary equipment, and

would be manned by oil spill professionals.

The estimated capital cost for each center

would be roughly $24 million in 1990 dollars.

Although PIRO claims that this amount will

enable its response centers to cope with

30,000-ton (9.2 million-gallon) spills, these

claims have yet to be evaluated by an independent organization. It is thus not certain

whether response funding will be adequate.

The Navy, for instance, estimates that each of

its 2 major depots have equipment whose replacement value is about $50 million, and this

equipment provided only a limited capability

to respond to the Exxon Valdez spill. Nevertheless, it is difficult to evaluate response center capabilities by comparing equipment costs

alone. Variables such as equipment maintenance, training, and logistics plans are also

very important. Proposed regional center

capital equipment is presented in appendix B.

In sum, the only significant stock of oil spill

response equipment that is readily available,

tested, and maintained for fighting a large offshore spill in the United States is that of the

U.S. Navy. In Europe, the large industry cooperative at Southampton has a significant capability roughly equivalent to one of the two

Navy depots. Other industry capabilities in

the United States are either insignificant or

not readily available for offshore spills. The

API/PIRO proposal for establishing new

equipment depots in the United States at strategic locations will significantly improve industry capabilities. However, it is still uncertain whether PIRO would be capable of

recovering significant portions of a large offshore spill. It also appears that the funds proposed to be allocated by PIRO may be inadequate for the goal.

mA ~rop~ has ~n made t. expand the OSR base so that it will be capable ofhandlingtwo30,000-ton sPills. M.D. ~ng,~sis~t

Manager, Oil Spill Service Centre, personal communication, Jan. 22, 1990.
———— .

Chapter 4

U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the Exxon Valdez spill, few saw U.S.

oil spill policy as wanting. A seemingly sophisticated response system had been in place for

almost 20 years. Even though there had not

been a spill in U.S. waters that aroused similar

national attention since the 1969 Santa Barbara well blowout, the system seemed to work

well. On previous pages we have addressed

some of the technology issues associated with

responding to spills. However, use of better

technology alone will not solve U.S. response

problems. On the following pages we consider

several aspects of U.S. oil spill response policy,

identify some of the problem areas, and suggest some potential solutions. The section after this investigates how several European

countries are organized to fight major spills.

TECHNOLOGY: WHICH

CLEANUP METHOD?

Currently, the most likely oil spill countermeasures approach to be used in the United

States for spills at sea is to rely on mechanical

containment and cleanup methods, i.e.,

booms and skimmers. Even though available

booms and skimmers are limited in capacity

and capability, they can be deployed in almost

any region without concern about additional

environmental damage. Such is not the case

for dispersants, however, where some limits

on their use are usually considered. Modern

dispersants are considered safe for many offshore regions, but up to now they have been

seldom used. Questions about dispersant toxicity largely have been laid to rest by new formulations, but they do not remove the oil itself and thus many oppose their use. In

addition, important questions about the effectiveness of dispersants have not been settled.

Burning as a countermeasures approach has

been the subject of experiments, and some believe it holds promise under certain favorable

conditions.

There is no single or perfect solution to the

general problem of dealing with oil on the

water. As noted elsewhere in our report, each

of several available methods has strengths

and weaknesses. Each oil spill is unique, and

the approach that works well or at least reasonably well in one situation may work poorly

in another. Participants in OTA’s oil spill

workshop generally agreed that for the most

effective response, all approaches must be

available to those fighting the spill. This provides the ability to use whatever technique(s)

are most appropriate in each case. In particular, better understanding of the conditions

and locations under which dispersant use and

burning would be appropriate and/or preferable to mechanical equipment is needed.

Related to this, a systematic approach is essential. It makes little sense to have skimmers

and booms available but inadequate space for

temporary storage of recovered oil or no plan

for permanently disposing the oil. Hence,

barges or other storage vessels, for example,

are as important to the recovery system as

skimmers. Similarly, it makes no sense to

stock dispersants without an immediately

available delivery system. One cannot neglect

any element of a comprehensive plan and expect to mount effective oil spill countermeasures. Undoubtedly, the performance of an individual piece of equipment is less important

than the overall performance of the system.

Moreover, since all spills are different and

since resources are usually limited, an integrated system that works reasonably well for

several different types of spills (e.g., for viscous oil and for low viscosity oil) and as the

physical properties of the spill change with

time is preferable to one that works well in

one situation but poorly in another.

27
28 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

DECISIONMAKING:

DEMOCRATIC AND

AUTHORITARIAN

APPROACHES

The current U.S. approach to fighting major oil spills, unlike the approach of some

European countries, is more democratic than

authoritarian. Democratic decisionmaking,

however, may not be as appropriate for making decisions in emergency situations where

speed is essential.

Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard provides

anon-scene coordinator (OSC) for most major

spill responses in coastal waters and along adjacent shorelines. The OSC’s initial responsibility is to determine whether the polluter can

cope with the spill. If not, the OSC is empowered to take control of the spill response. In

practice, however, his decisions are subject to

the oversight of numerous interested parties.

For example, a Regional Response Team, consisting of regional representatives of various

Federal agencies, has considerable sway over

the OSC’s decisions. The OSC must also be

mindful of legitimate State and local concerns. The interests of these groups maybe in

conflict. It is thus difficult, if not impossible,

for the OSC to act quickly. Unfortunately,

large spills not rapidly contained will soon be

out of control.

It maybe possible to devise a spill response

policy that would enable decisions to be made

quickly and effectively. It would have to minimize unnecessary and counterproductive interference by others, but at the same time

take account of the legitimate concerns of

those affected. In many European countries,

it appears that the on-scene coordinator is in

effect an on-scene commander, that is, someone who has the unquestioned authority to act

quickly. Greater authority for U.S. on-scene

coordinators could be coupled with a greater

effort by all involved to determine, before a

spill, what decisions will be made if a particular event occurs–what type response is acceptable, what is not, and when and where a

particular response is acceptable. Agreement

should be reached before the event, for example, about the circumstances under which dispersants may be used. Once the spill occurs,

some decisions could be almost automatic.

Planning of this nature should be addressed

before spills in Regional Contingency Plans

and in Federal Local Contingency Plans.

RESPONSIBILITY: THE

POLLUTER OR THE

GOVERNMENT?

The current practice in the United States is

that the polluter is responsible unless he cannot cope with the situation, at which point the

Federal Government – the Coast Guard in the

case of offshore spills– will take charge.1 Although a rather detailed organization – including a National Response Team, Regional

Response Teams, on-scene coordinators, and

a National Strike Force– has been established to support the Coast Guard, there are

several problems with this approach, as illustrated by the Exxon Valdez spill. First, given

the necessity of acting quickly, by the time the

Coast Guard determines that the polluter is

incapable of dealing with a spill, it may well be

too late for anyone to mount a successful

countermeasures effort. Second, the Coast

Guard does not now have the resources to

mount an effective response to a catastrophic

spill, especially one that has not been quickly

contained.

‘The National Response Team, “A Report on the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Response System, ’’Annual Report, March

19s9, pp. &7.
Chapter 4– U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues .29

Several critics of current U.S. response policy2 have pointed out that although the polluter is initially responsible for the cleanup, he

lacks the authority to respond as he thinks

appropriate. The oil industry, and in particular, the new Petroleum Industry Response

Organization (PIRO), although willing to provide equipment and personnel to respond to a

spill, argue that large spills should automatically be managed by the Federal Government.3 Such an action would place both responsibility and authority for cleaning up a

spill in the same hands and, theoretically, enable a clear and unambiguous command

structure. Small spills which do not create

special cleanup problems could still be handled with local spill resources.

As noted elsewhere in our report, virtually

all European governments have assumed responsibility for responding to major vessel

spills. Although operators of fixed installations, such as offshore platforms, are generally still responsible for oil spill cleanup, governments have generally concluded that it is

unreasonable to expect the same degree of

preparedness for a vessel spill that might occur anywhere at sea. The polluter, however, is

still liable to pay all reasonable costs of the

spill.

In the United States, the Federal Government could adopt a similar approach of assuming responsibility for large spills regardless of the polluter’s capability. Tha t

approach would include a full evaluation of

current Federal capabilities and abilities to

marshal public and private resources quickly.

The Coast Guard, or whatever agency is assigned responsibility for combating major

spills, would have to be given the appropriate

resources to do the job.

LOGISTICS: ESSENTIAL TO

QUICK RESPONSE

A rapid response is essential for effective

spill cleanup, so one must either have response equipment near a spill site or have the

capability to get to a spill quickly. In a country

the size of the United States, it is impractical

to station equipment for fighting catastrophic

spills every few miles along the coast. Clearly,

it is also the case that the risk of oil spills is

much greater in some areas than others—

areas such as busy tanker lanes and ports.

An oil industry proposal indicates that it will

establish, through its new Petroleum Industry Response Organization, five major regional oil spill response depots and a number

of small “presaging” bases. The regional centers would be located in the Northeast, midSouthAtlantic, Gulf Coast, Pacific Southwest,

and Pacific Northwest.4 This is a more decentralized approach than the Navy’s strategy.

The U.S. Navy, a large amount of whose

equipment was used to fight the Exxon Valdez

spill, relies mainly on two equipment depots,

one on the East Coast and one on the West. All

Navy equipment is designed (or modified) and

packaged so that it is capable of being trucked

or airlifted anywhere in the United States.

The U.S. Coast Guard currently has two

Strike Teams, one in Mobile, Alabama and

one at Hamilton Air Force Base in California.

At the present time, the Coast Guard is better

prepared to off-load stricken tankers than to

fight major spills. It relies heavily on commercial contractors for spill responses.

Both centralized and decentralized logistics

strategies may be effective. However, in either

2For ~mp]e, the ~~mation~ Tankers Owners Pollution Federation.

%e American Petroleum Institute, “Task Force Report on Oil Spills,” June 14, 1989. p. iv.

4SWnng commit-~P~ ~d ~mmendations on the Imp]emen~tion of PIRO. J~. 5, 1990, p. 54
——

30 ● Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

case it is still necessary to have the capability

to get to the spill site quickly, and not just

with the appropriate skimmers and booms or

dispersants, as the case may be, but also, as

necessary, with barges to hold recovered oil,

and with the other necessary equipment that

would constitute a complete response system.

The whole system will be ineffective as long as

any element is missing. For instance, while

dispersants and dispersant application systems are available, the timely availability of

aircraft to apply dispersants has been a problem. This problem has been addressed in several European countries by having contract

aircraft on call for emergencies (the U.S. oil

industry would like to be able to use government-owned C-130s, e.g., National Guard aircraft, in the future.) Some European countries also have initiated “sleeping contracts”

with local vessel owners to ensure that barges,

towboats, and other ancillary equipment are

available in emergencies.

Much improvement is obviously needed in

the national capability to deliver response

equipment to the scene of a spill quickly.

Some combination of government and private

resources will probably always be needed, and

thus clear lines of authority and carefully coPhoRJ credit U.S. Coast GfJad

Using hot water to “clean” the beaches of

Prince William Sound

ordinated plans for deploying these resources

are essential.

BEACH CLEANUP: HOW

MUCH EMPHASIS?

In many cases, no matter how successful

the response to a catastrophic oil spill at sea, a

significant fraction of the spilled oil is likely to

reach shore. The public was appropriately

outraged when efforts to control the Exxon

Valdez spill failed and a significant amount of

oil from the spill contaminated hundreds of

miles of Alaska’s coastline. Although hundreds of millions of dollars were spent “cleaning” the shoreline, many scientists and oil

spill professionals have concluded that, except for the benefit gained by appearing to be

doing something useful, the money spent was

largely wasted.

While considerable public pressure exists to

take immediate action to restore polluted

shorelines to prespill conditions, this inherently costly, labor intensive undertaking has

seldom had more than modest success, particularly on rocky shorelines. Moreover, in

some instances, shoreline cleanup has resulted in more damage than good. Marshes

and other wetlands are particularly vulnerable to mechanical cleanup methods, but

cleanup of sandy and rocky beaches can also

cause additional damage. In some instances,

the best course of action, although not a satisfying one, is to do nothing and let the beach

slowly recover naturally.

It maybe possible to give greater attention

to beach protection and beach cleanup, but

the inherent limitations of the available

equipment and methods should be made clear

to all involved to eliminate false expectations.

As noted elsewhere in our report, beach cleaning activities in Europe are usually the responsibility of local authorities. Local authorities in France, for example, have strategically

placed stocks of everything from rakes and

shovels and hot water pumps to booms. The
—

Chapter 4– U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues .31

Norwegians have gone so far as to require a local response capability in each of the 52 areas

that comprise the coastal zone. Where not already done, more attention to defensive

booming may require that local and State

authorities devise detailed plans and purchase equipment to protect the most sensitive

and vulnerable areas.

Bioremediation--the application of nutrients to speed the degradation of oil – is emerging as one promising technique for future

beach cleaning. Experiments are now being

conducted in Alaska, and the results of these

tests will be carefully evaluated over the next

year. Nevertheless, effective application of

this technique may also be quite limited. Research is being conducted on other chemical

treatments as well.

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

AND EMERGENCY

SITUATIONS

There may exist some situations where

what may be appropriate laws or regulations

for normal situations unnecessarily hinder effective cleanup operations during emergency

situations. Some OTA workshop participants

noted, for instance, that the Federal Clean

Water Act, in prohibiting oily discharges from

tankers5

, makes no exception for the decanting of water collected with oil during skimming operations. Since a considerable amount

of water may be collected with oil, the capacity of whatever storage vessel is used may be

rapidly reached, unless water that has been or

could be separated from the oil can be discharged. This may be accomplished with very

little oil reentering the sea. If not done, once

storage capacity is reached, skimming operations must cease until oil and water can be offloaded. This may result in far less oil being recovered, for example, as the skimmer sits idle

and as the oil spreads further, weathers, and

in general becomes more difficult to skim. Ordinary discharge permits may be granted, but

may take up to 18 months to obtain. Thus, a

general permit preapproving discharge of oily

water during oil spill emergencies may be useful to consider.

Second, several foreign vessels were used in

recovery operations during the Exxon Valdez

spill. Such vessels may either be on the scene

and therefore handy for mounting portable

skimmers or in themselves specialized oil spill

vessels. However, under U.S. law, foreign vessels cannot automatically be used in emergency situations as “vessels of opportunity. ”

The Jones Act prohibits foreign vessels from

engaging in coastwise trade, and this act has

been interpreted to apply to vessels that

transport recovered oil from an offshore site

to an off-loading terminal on shore.6 Waivers

to this regulation may be obtained only if a

national security concern can be demonstrated.

The Exxon Valdez spill was considered to fall

into this category, and waivers were granted

by the U.S. Customs Service without undue

delay for about a dozen vessels to help in

cleanup operations. National security concerns may sometimes be difficult to justify,

however, so a general waiver of Jones Act restrictions may be appropriate for oil spill

emergencies.

Third, U.S. customs regulations require

that foreign equipment formally pass through

customs and that duty be paid. Since customs

delays are possible, some have suggested that

these regulations could be a potential stumbling block to efficient cleanup operations.

This concern appears to have little merit, as

the Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to waive the regulation in connection with

5The ~t~h~n ~]e~~ ~rohibit~ dixhuws that “cause a fi]m or sheen u~n or discoloration of the surface of the water or adjoining

shorelines... ” 40 Code of Federal Regulations, Sees. 110.2, 110.3, and 110.4.

epaul He~]md, U.S. customs service, personal communication, NOV. 15, 1989
32 ● Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

emergency situations.7 Waivers are usually

obtained without undue delay.

Finally, the ultimate disposal of recovered

oil and oiled articles from the Exxon Valdez

spill proved contentious. The industry wanted

to incinerate, and, in some instances, openly

burn recovered material. It complained because it could not get permits to do so quickly

enough. The State of Alaska hesitated in issuing permits because it wanted to be certain

that this method of disposal would not cause

an air quality problem. Permits took 2 to 3

months to obtain. Decisionmaking about final

disposal of recovered material may not be as

urgent as many other decisions that must be

made, but when large amounts of oil and oily

debris are being recovered by numerous recovery assets, temporary storage capacity

may be quickly overwhelmed. In the future it

would seem appropriate that contingency

plans include plans for waste disposal, specifying for instance, what kind of incinerators are

to be used and where they are located.

EQUIPMENT TESTING: HOW

REALISTIC? HOW

EFFECTIVE?

Equipment testing is an important element

of any research and development program.

Equipment testing in large tanks, such as in

the now closed Oil and Hazardous Materials

Simulated Environmental Test Tank (the

OHMSETT facility), provides useful information – especially because variable factors such

as wave height can be controlled-but is no

substitute for testing at sea under realistic

conditions. Currently, very little performance

data exists on the open ocean, and few laboratory effectiveness tests have been correlated

with real field conditions. In particular, no

testing with oil has been conducted in recent

years in U.S. waters.

There are, necessarily, safety limits to how

realistic tests can be. Where safety is not a factor, however, oil spill researchers would like

to be able to conduct occasional controlled offshore oil spills for scientific and equipment

testing purposes. Such test spills have been

conducted in Canada, Norway, the United

Kingdom, and France, for instance, and have

provided valuable data. While not strictly prohibited in U.S. waters, the “red tape” associated with obtaining permission from the Environmental Protection Agency has effectively

blocked intentional spills, according to some

OTA workshop participants. One participant

noted that a minimum of 20,000 gallons (65

tons) would be needed for a realistic test. Testing at sea, while clearly useful, is also expensive, perhaps costing up to $1 million every

time a test is conducted.

As an alternative or supplement to testing

equipment offshore with intentionally spilled

oil, some have suggested that U.S. Government personnel take advantage of so-called

“spills of opportunity” for testing equipment

and/or for providing occasions for response

personnel to refine skills. The U.S. Government does have a formal program in place to

take advantage of spills of opportunity to

evaluate equipment, but spills of opportunity

do not usually represent ideal test situations.

For one, the control over environmental variables that is needed for scientific purposes is

not possible during these spills. In addition,

researchers may be perceived as being in the

way of the cleanup operation.

A related testing issue is the measurement

of effectiveness. For some types of equipment,

e.g., containment booms, a standard test protocol has been developed to measure effectiveness.8 It is still very difficult, however, to

719 CFR 10.107.

8Ed ‘l’’ennygon, Mjner~g Management Service, OTA Workshop, Aug. 15, 1989.
Chapter 4– U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues ● 33

measure quantitatively the effectiveness of

skimmers and dispersants.9 Lack of an adequate measure of effectiveness has much to do

with the controversy over how effective dispersants are (and in what situations).

PERSONNEL, TRAINING,

AND DRILLS

The availability of skilled personnel for

fighting oil spills is possibly more important

than having the ideal type of equipment for a

particular spill. The objective of maintaining

a work force of oil spill response experts has

been frustrated on several counts, however,

not least of which is because major oil spills

have been rare events in the United States. In

all, there exist too little knowledge and experience among those who may have some responsibility for fighting major spills.

The U.S. Coast Guard, which provides onscene coordinators for spills and, if necessary,

a strike team, does not have a career track for

oil spill experts. Both the Captain of the Port,

who would be designated on-scene coordinator in a spill, and strike team commanders

rotate to other positions after 2 to 4 year assignments. Although they receive simulation

and classroom training, few are able to acquire experience fighting major spills.10 The

U.S. Navy has contract personnel dedicated to

oil spill response. The Navy may be called to

provide equipment and help fight major U.S.

oil spills (as in the case of the Exxon Valdez

spill]; however, the primary responsibility of

its oil spill unit is to support Navy operations

worldwide. Would-be contractors find it difficult to stay in business given the rarity of major spills. Those that do exist largely to support industry cooperatives, and neither the

cooperatives nor the contractors have much

experience dealing with catastrophic spills.11

To remedy this situation, several OTA

workshop participants suggested that the

United States create a professional cadre, perhaps within the Coast Guard and/or within

the private sector, whose entire career is dedicated to dealing with spills around the country. Such a group could be available to respond to all major U.S. spills as well as to

provide advice and assistance for smaller

spills. Rather than losing experience through

rotation and reassignment, a group of oil spill

professionals would retain and build experience. The skills and experience of such a group

might be enhanced further by giving it the capability to advise or participate in responses

to major spills elsewhere in the world, as

needed. Moreover, it may be prudent (although more expensive at the time) to overrespond to certain types of spills. If a spill

turns out to be less severe than initially

thought, advantage may still be taken by using the response as a training exercise. (Funds

spent when an overresponse proves not to be

justified may be more than offset on those

occasions when the initial response is justified). Oil spill experts must maintain skills

that may not be required for long intervals.

Notably, the petroleum industry, through its

proposed Petroleum Industry Response Organization, has proposed to man each of its regional response centers with “dedicated,

trained personnel” and to stress training and

drilling of its personnel.12

Personnel training must include instruction about the capabilities and limitations of a

range of countermeasures techniques and

equipment. Most of the equipment on the

9Mem Finws, OTA Workshop, Aug. 15) 1989.

JoMr. Jim O’Brien, OOPS, Inc., OTA workshop, Aug. 15, 1989.

I IThe ~erim Petro]eum Institute, “Task Force R.ePrt on Oi] Spi]]S,” June 14, 1989. p. 10.

121bid. p. iv.
34 ● Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

market is operator sensitive; hence, the performance of a given piece of equipment is directly related to the operator’s knowledge of

it. Also, contingency plans need occasional

testing, preferably full scale testing of the

complete containment, cleanup, and disposal

system. With few major spills, complacency

may easily become a problem unless steps are

taken to counteract it. Contingency plan testing should involve State and local authorities

who will have some responsibility in the event

of a spill, as well as oil spill professionals.

The National Forest Service has developed

one system for responding to natural disasters

that may be worth emulating. Its Incident

Command System for forest fire fighting is

based on a complete training program for individuals within various separate organizations who can be called on in the event of a

large fire. This system creates a management

structure for responding to these rare events.

This same approach could be applied to large

oil spills.

RESEARCH AND

DEVELOPMENT

Organizations and Programs

Several agencies within the Federal Government are engaged in oil spill countermeasures

research and development. The three most

important are the Department of the Interior

(DOI), the Department of Transportation

(DOT), and the Environmental protection

Agency (EPA).

Within the DOI, oil spill research is conducted by the Technology, Assessment, and

Research Branch of the Minerals Management Service (MMS). Among other things,

MMS has plans to:

finalize offshore equipment test procedures,

continue field verification of in situ burning,

continue refining airborne oil thickness

sensors,

conduct final testing of the high-speed

water jet barrier boom,

develop beach line cleanup techniques

that are environmentally acceptable,

continue to conduct research to improve

the effectiveness of chemical treatment

agents,

continue developing a remote sensor for

detecting oil in broken ice and darkness,

finalize standard equipment and technique test procedures, and

continue assessing the behavior of heavy

oils.13

MMS would also like to reopen the Oil and

Hazardous Materials Simulated Environmental Test Tank– the OHMSETT facility,

located in New Jersey. OHMSETT was formerly operated as a cooperative interagency

program to evaluate oil spill response equipment and procedures, but closed when funding dried up.

The Department of the Interior has increased funding for oil spill research in response to the Exxon Valdez spill. Notably, it

has entered into an agreement with the

American Petroleum Institute to jointly fund

some research and development. Each will

contribute $1 million per year for the next 3

years. The projects listed above are among

131n@ra~ncyP]mningworkshop on oil spi]] Research and Development, Sep. 26-2’7, 1989, Groten, CT. workshop report prep~ed

by Decisions and Designs, Inc., Arlington, VA.
Chapter 4–U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues .3.5

those being considered for funding. Some of

the research may be done in cooperation with

other agencies and with parallel Canadian efforts.

Oil spill research and development in the

Department of Transportation is carried out

by the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard

proposes to spend about $4.1 million in fiscal

year 1990 on oil spill response projects and

about $1.8 million on prevention projects. It is

considering allocation of funds for the following oil spill response projects:

•

Ž

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

spill response information system development,

spill response training aids development,

surveillance systems development,

satellite imagery for spill tracking,

rapid deployment technology assessment,

tanker salvage and countermeasures development,

mechanical recovery systems development,

OHMSETT support,

Coast Guard countermeasures/equipment development,

chemical countermeasures technology

assessment,

in-situ burning development,

short term test and evaluation in Alaska,

and

spill response personnel health and

safety. 14

In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill,

the Coast Guard R&D center in Groten, Connecticut acted as a clearinghouse for proposals and suggestions concerning cleanup. As table 4-1 indicates, 139 of these proposals were

considered to have immediate applicability

for combating the Exxon Valdez spill. Although a significant number of proposals

were rejected as not feasible, a still sizable

number merit future investigation by government and industry researchers.

EPA plans to spend $1 million during 1990

for oil spill research. This funding will be

largely devoted to the continuation of the

shoreline bioremediation program started

last year in Alaska. EPA and Exxon have

signed a cooperative agreement to carry out

the research. Exxon has provided a total of $3

million to date for this program. EPA is currently developing a 5-year research plan,

which will be implemented if Congress passes

the implementing legislation.

Several other agencies are also conducting

important oil spill response research and development. The Army Corps of Engineers

used two dredges to recover some of the oil

spilled by the Exxon Valdez, and is now investigating how to use its dredges more effectively. The National Institute of Standards

and Technology, in conjunction with MMS

and the American Petroleum Institute, is conducting in situ burning research. And the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is developing electronic communications

for response situations and studying the fate

and behavior of oil.

The Exxon Valdez spill also galvanized oil

industry support for spill research and development. In April of 1989 the American Petroleum Institute created an oil spill Task Force

to review industry operations in the areas of

l~u.s. coast Gumd ~re]iminW mmine en~ronmen~ prot~lon research ~d deve]oprnent p]an, fitiyear 1990. NOV. 18, 1989.

(Draft).
—

36 ● Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

Table 4-1 -Suggestions Received by the

Coast Guard

category Number

Proposals for future government investigation:

Bioremediation

Chemical (dispersant, degreaser)

Physical (solidification, absorbent, etc.)

Collection - vessel

Collection - mechanical

Skimmer - booms

Hull patching

Oil movement

Wild-life cleanup

Incineration

Miscellaneous

25% of database

Proposals forwarded to Exxon:

Bioremediation

Chemical (dispersant, degreaser)

Total

Physical (solidification, absorbent, etc.)

Collection - vessel

Collection - mechanical

Skimmer - booms

Hull patching

Oil movement

Wild-life cleanup

Incineration

Miscellaneous

22% of database Total

Other responses:

34

14

19

17

17

30

4

3

5

4

l 3

160

2

24

36

14

19

—

—

—

5

39

139

● Previous research/application indicates method

not feasible

● Letters of general concern

53% of database

SOURCE: United States Coast Guard, 1990

oil spill prevention and response. As a result of

the Task Force’s deliberations, the industry

created the Petroleum Industry Response Organization (PIRO). In addition to establishing

the operational capability to respond to catastrophic oil spills, PIRO will design and manage a research and development program. The

oil industry has pledged $30 million to $35

million to PIRO during its first five years for

this purpose and expects to contribute $1 million to $4 million per year thereafter. Six major subject areas have been identified:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

preventing loss of oil from or away from

the ship,

on-water oil recovery and treatment,

preventing and mitigating shoreline impact,

fate and effects of oil in the environment,

wildlife preservation, and

health and safety.15

Among those projects on which PIRO

would expend the most funds during the initial 5 year period are bioremediation of

shorelines, development of chemical dispersants and skimmers for on-water recovery and

treatment, and development of absorbents

and absorbents for shoreline use.16 In all,

some 38 projects have been considered for

funding. PIRO recognizes a need to coordinate with government agencies to avoid duplication of research.

Both Senate and House oil spill bills (S 686

and HR 1465, respectively) pending as of this

writing provide for the establishment and

funding of oil spill research and development

programs. Among the priority research identified in the Senate bill are on-water oil recovery and treatment, prevention of loss away

from vessels, and prevention and mitigation

of shoreline impacts. The House bill specifies – among other things– research, development, and demonstration of new or improved

systems of mechanical, chemical, biological,

15PIRO 1rnp]ernen~t@ Inc., dral?, statement of PIRO’S proposed R&D program, o~. 10, 1989.

‘EIbid.
Chapter 4- U.S. Oil Spill Response Policy Issues .37

and other methods (including the use of dispersants, solvents, and bioremediation) for

the recovery, removal, and disposal of oil.

Both bills establish coordinating committees

to oversee oil pollution research. The House

bill would establish a minimum of six regional

research centers at universities or other research institutions to address one or more of

the research needs identified in the bill. The

Senate bill would establish a Prince William

Sound Oil Spill Recovery Institute to identify

and develop the best technology for dealing

with spills in arctic and subarctic marine environments.

Discussion

OTA’s investigation of oil spill response

technologies indicates that the country’s ability to recover oil from large spills is inadequate. It can be improved, but a large technology research and development effort does not

offer the promise of major breakthroughs. Although most of the R&D projects proposed by

government and industry appear to be worthwhile, OTA’s analysis shows that only modest

and gradual improvements can be expected

from most mechanical response technology

R&D. And it is important to remember that

technology is only one of many variables that

can affect the recovery of oil from a spill. The

benefits likely to result from improvements in

technology alone may not be noticed in the

ultimate amount of oil recovered from any

major spill. An R&D program can be justified,

however, on the basis of the need to maintain

the best capability possible and to understand

the most appropriate uses, capabilities, and

limitations of all the systems that may be

available in the future.

Creation of a program to test oil spill equipment under realistic, at-sea conditions — occasionally using real oil —is particularly desirable. OTA’s analysis indicates that much

equipment has mechanical deficiencies because it has never been field-tested. Testing

has been conducted in the past at the now

closed OHMSETT facility. Additional work at

a reopened OHMSETT may be useful, but a

bigger payoff would result by testing response

technologies at sea. Although controlled spills

have been allowed in many European countries (sometimes with U.S. observers present),

it has been more than 10 years since an experimental offshore oil spill has been allowed in

the United States. In light of recent events, it

would be useful to allow occasional experimental spills to test equipment. Whatever

U.S. testing is undertaken should be coordinated with similar efforts in other countries.

OTA’s investigations also show that coordination of R&D efforts within the government,

between the government and the private sector, and among the many other interests

worldwide is essential to reaching desired

goals with minimum waste of resources. The

several Federal agencies with R&D programs

have different purposes and perspectives, but

there is considerable overlap as well. MMS,

the Coast Guard, and EPA are all concerned

with acceptable standards and evaluation of

performance of cleanup systems. They must

work together to agree on final results, but

one agency could take the lead in major program funding for best efficiency.

It is also vital that the Federal Government

coordinate its efforts with those of private industry, especially if a substantial R&D program by PIRO gets underway as planned. This

is important for several reasons. First, the

industry work may be directed at its own priorities; government priorities could be different and require additional work in areas not

covered by industry. Second, the government

must be completely knowledgeable about new

technologies and techniques if it is to fulfill its

role as principal coordinator and/or manager

of future response efforts. Third, if the industry supports good, credible programs in certain areas, it would be wasteful for the government to duplicate the effort.
38 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

An area in which greater collaboration between the United States and other countries

on oil spill issues could lead to a sizable payoff

is research and development. The United

States and Canada have long cooperated on oil

spill R&D, and this relationship appears to

have been profitable for both countries. However, aside from the biennial Oil Spill Conference meetings, at which research findings are

often presented by foreigners, no formal

forum exists for the exchange of information

between the United States and other countries. OTA has observed that there appears to

be a significant amount of overlap in the research of organizations like the French Center

for Documentation, Research, and Experimentation on accidental pollution (CEDRE),

the British Warren Springs Laboratory, and

the Dutch State Waterways Board with oil

spill researchers in the U.S. government.

Greater coordination and/or collaboration

could lead to less duplication, faster dissemination of research results, faster progress on

problems of mutual concern, and a better use

of limited R&D funds.

Table 4-2 displays a summary of R&D plans

for the organizations that OTA has contacted

and that have current plans for oil spill R&D

expenditures over the next few years. The

planned programs of PIRO, the Coast Guard,

MMS (in cooperation with API), and the EPA

are displayed and broken down into several

research areas with notations of high, medium, low, or no priority under each. The total

planned expenditures are about $10 million to

$15 million per year in the near term. About

two-thirds will be from industry and onethird from government. It can be seen that

there are many areas of multiple interest that

could lead to waste if not carefully coordinated. It can also be seen that some areas that

seem to offer promise of future improvement

may be neglected. For example, it appears

that the engineering of complete systems for

rapid deployment, recovery, handling, storage, and support for large operations— perhaps including vessels of opportunity– is one

area where additional progress is needed. No

group appears to be focusing on deployment

systems as a whole (although PIRO has plans

to do so). Another potential oversight is the

needed development of more reliable and rugged components in mechanical recovery

equipment to handle viscous oils, water emulsions, debris, etc.

In general, however, R&D attention by the

several groups that have planned programs

appears to be focused on important problems.

If these plans are carried out, if they are wellcoordinated, and if developments become the

basis of a major expansion of equipment resources strategically deployed in high readiness condition — this would offer needed improvements in national response capability.

Table 4-2-Selection of Planned R&D Efforts by

Federal Agencies and Industry

Research coast MMS

area PIRO Guard (with API) EPA

Surveillance/

data . . . . . . . . . . . . . - H H M

Deployment

systems . . . . . . . . . . – M L -

Source

containment . . . . . L H — —

Mechanical

recovery . . . . . . . . . L H L

Dispersants . . . . . . . H L M M

Bioremediation . . . . H — — H

Burning . . . . . . . . . M H H -—

Other/

shoreline

remediation ., ., . . . M — H M

Fate and

effects . . . . . . . . . H — H

Health and

safety ., . . . . . . . . . . L M —

Disposal . . . . . . . . . M — — —

Training/ Bio Test

testing ... , . . . . . . . – H M with Exxon

($3 million)

Proposed

Budgets

$ million/yr . . . . . . . $7 $3-$4 $2 $1

NOTE: Hi = High PIRO = Petroleum Industry Response Organization

M = Medium MMS = Minerals Management Service

L = Low API = American Petroleum Instttute

EPA = Environmental Protection Agency

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990
Chapter 5

Selected European Oil Spill Policies

INTRODUCTION

In order to investigate oil spill technologies

in use abroad and to learn how the United

States might benefit from the oil spill experiences and policies of some other countries,

OTA staff visited four countries bordering the

North Sea in September, 1989: France, the

Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Norway. OTA’s trip was coordinated by the International Petroleum Industry Environmental

Conservation Association and included visits

to a number of government and industry organizations in these countries. The four countries selected represent a wide range of technologies and countermeasures policies. Below

are some of the highlights of our findings.

FRENCH OIL SPILL POLICY

The French seriously began to consider a

comprehensive approach to fighting oil spills

in the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon

grounding off England in 1967, but French

policy evolved significantly as a consequence

of France’s unfortunate experience with the

Amoco Cadiz spill in 1978. This accident, in

which approximately 223,000 tons (68 million

gallons) of oil were spilled along the Brittany

coast, was about 6.5 times as large as the Exxon Valdez spill, making it the fourth largest

in history (table 5-l).

Notably, the French have assigned responsibility for fighting oil spills at sea to the

French Navy, whose responsibilities are generally the equivalent of those of both the U.S.

Navy and U.S. Coast Guard. Although emphasis is placed on spill prevention, once a

spill has occurred the French Navy has the

authority to use whatever means are deemed

most appropriate to fight the spill. Oil that

has reached the shoreline is the responsibility

of local authorities.

For fighting oil spills at sea, the offshore

area surrounding France has been divided

into three maritime regions. Oil spill responses within each region are directed by the

responsible Maritime Prefect, a senior Navy

officer who is also responsible for the defense

of the area.1 The Maritime Prefect’s first priority is to prevent maritime accidents by enforcing navigation regulations. Traffic separation lanes have been established in some

areas, and large, ocean-going tugs are used as

both “watch dogs” and rescue ships. In the

event of a spill, the Maritime Prefect functions as onscene commander rather than onscene coordinator, and hence has considerably

more authority than his U.S. Coast Guard

counterpart. (If a similar arrangement were in

effect in the United States, at least 4 “maritime prefects, ” possibly U.S. Coast Guard officers, would be required, one each for the East,

Gulf, West, and Alaskan coasts). Relatively

minor spills are handled with local equipment. If a spill occurs that is larger than local

resources can handle, an offshore marine pollution plan, POLMAR MER, is invoked, and

the Maritime Prefect can then draw on the

equipment and expertise of other regions,

and, if necessary, of private stocks.

Local civil authorities are responsible for

containment and cleanup when an oil spill

reaches or threatens to reach land. Each of

France’s 26 coastal departments (states) prepares its own POLMAR TERRE response

plan, which the prefect (governor) of each department can invoke in the event of a major

threat. The plans identify priority areas to be

‘G. Marchand, G. Bergot, M. Melguen, and G. Peigne, “French Know-How in the Prevention and Fight Against Accidental Oil Spills, ”

1987 Oil Spill Conference Proceedings, Apr. &9, 1987, Baltimore, MD, pp. 15-22.

39
40 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

protected and specify how booms will be installed in these areas, what public and private

equipment is available, and where storage

sites and treatment centers for recovered

products are located.2 Small spills are handled

by commune officials (mainly by fire departments) with local equipment stocks. The

Army may be called for major spills and used

to clean beaches with material and equipment

from the POLMAR stocks. Having experienced major beach pollution and having recognized that a significant proportion of any

major spill may reach the coastline no matter

what measures are taken, the French have put

much effort into research and development of

beach cleaning equipment and into planning

and training for beach cleanup. OTA found

French beach cleaning technology and organization to be an impressive element of its oil

spill cleanup plans. There is no comparable

emphasis on defensive beach protection

measures in the United States.

Stocks of equipment for fighting offshore

spills are maintained at POLMAR centers in

Brest, Cherbourg, and Toulon, the headquarters of each of the three maritime regions, and

also in Le Havre, Lorient, Port de Bouc, and

Ajaccio. Purchase and maintenance of this

equipment is the responsibility of the French

Ministry of Defense. Booms for the protection

of sensitive nearshore and onshore areas are

located in eight POLMAR centers around the

country, so that no part of the coastline is further than 250 kilometers from a boom storage

center. Equipment for land cleaning operaPhoEJ cnxfit Jim Mieh

French sand washing machine.

21bid.
Chapter 5–Selected European Oil Spill Policies ● 41

tions (e.g., sand washing equipment and hot

water pumps) is stationed at two of these

eight centers.3 The Secretary of State for the

Sea is responsible for the purchase of equipment for onshore activities.

Unlike the three other countries OTA visited, the French do not rely primarily on one

countermeasure technique. Both mechanical

equipment and dispersants are at their disposal, and the technique or techniques best

suited to the circumstances will be employed.

While recovery at sea is preferable, the Navy

may use dispersants without conferring with

others if the spill is seaward of environmentally sensitive areas (as a rule of thumb, where

the water depth is greater than 30 meters).

French mechanical cleanup equipment is

not radically different from that available in

the United States. Some French technology,

including the Egmolap skimmers successfully

used in nearshore operations in Prince William Sound, is available in the United States.

Beach cleaning technology (e.g., sand washers) is innovative and deserves some attention

for use in the United States. Also, the French

have been experimenting with biodegradation

accelerating agents. They supplied one of the

products (Inipol eap 22) for bioremediation

experiments in Prince William Sound.

In the wake of the Amoco Cadiz oil spill the

French government established CEDRE, the

Center for Documentation, Research, and

Experimentation on accidental pollution.

Among other things CEDRE advises authorities responsible for pollution control about

state-of-the-art techniques, assists and advises authorities during crises, trains personnel, conducts research to improve existing

methods, and tests equipment (including occasional testing in small, deliberate oil spills

at sea). The organization has a permanent

staff of 26 and a budget of 10 million francs

per year. There is no equivalent U.S. organization, although counterparts of many of

Ptwfo credit Jim Midke

French Egmolap skimmers stockpiled at the POLMAR center

in Brest. Egmolap skimmers were used to recover oil

in nearshore areas of Prince William Sound.

CEDRE’s missions are spread around various

U.S. Executive Branch agencies. CEDRE is a

key element in the French oil spill countermeasures approach. Its existence ensures that

at least some attention is devoted to oil spill

issues in the sometimes long periods between

major spills.

DUTCH OIL SPILL POLICY

The Dutch rely entirely on mechanical recovery for fighting spills as they have no confidence in the effectiveness of chemical dispersants. The most notable aspect of Dutch

reliance on mechanical means is their use of

large dual purpose vessels. Large skimming

vessels have advantages over small skimmers

because they can simultaneously skim and

store much more oil than a small vessel and

because they can operate in heavier seas. Nevertheless, large, dedicated spill vessels are expensive to maintain and operate and slow to

respond to distant spill sites. The Dutch argue

that a large vessel built purely for pollution

control purposes would be idle for the greater

%entre POLMAR de Brest, “The Fight Against Oil Pollution on the Coastline: Missions and Methods of the POLMAR Centers,”

May 1987.
——.

42 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

part of its life and is therefore economically

difficult to justify.4 However, vessels that can

be put to use in periods between oil spills are

much more attractive. Hopper dredges are especially suitable for dual use purposes in the

Netherlands: the country is small, has a sandy

coastline, and has significant dredging needs

in important ports and waterways. These

dredges can be equipped with recovery equipment and can hold sizable amounts of recovered oil. Dredges normally operate in areas

where the risk of oil spills is high– the approach channels to ports. Moreover, it takes

only a few minutes for a hopper dredge to discharge its cargo and to be available for spill

cleanup duties.

The Rijkswaterstaat, or State Waterways

Board, is responsible for vessel pollution

countermeasures at sea, along the coast, and

in the main navigable waterways in ports.5 It

also conducts oil spill research. As in France,

although the government takes charge in the

event of vessel spills, the polluter is liable for

all cleanup costs. Oil companies are expected

to fight platform spills. In the event of a large

tanker spill, one or more dredges may be

called into cleanup action. Notably, dredges

are under contract to the government rather

than owned by it. Where the flash point of the

spilled oil is high enough, any dredge under

contract may be used. If the flash point is below 140°F, which is occasionally the case, a

dredge designed to tanker specifications (e.g.,

the Cosmos) is used. When called, a dredge

drops its spoil, proceeds to its base, is fitted

with sweeping arms for oil containment and

recovery, and sails to the spill site to begin recovery. The whole process generally takes

about four hours, although Dutch dredges are

seldom further than 20 kilometers from their

bases.

The Dutch system is intended (perhaps optimistically) to be able to cope with a 30,000

cubic meter spill (about the size of the Exxon

Valdez spill) in 3 days. Assuming that about

50 percent of a spill evaporates, mechanical

equipment must be able to recover 15,000 cubic meters. In all, 7 units, each unit containing

200 meters of boom, 2 sweeping arms, a recovery vessel, and an assistant vessel, are available to meet this goal.

Dual use dredges could prove useful in the

United States. Although no single approach is

likely to be the magic solution for all situations, major port areas where dredges are operating would be primary candidates for such

systems. As with other approaches, supporting equipment and facilities must also be

available. The usefulness of oil skimming

dredges in areas far from ports, for which significant time would be required to reach, is

less obvious, although in some cases dredges

may be able to steam to a spill site in time to

make a difference in the cleanup effort. The

Dutch State Waterways Board suggested to

OTA that 10 to 20 sets of sweeping arms, located at key ports around the United States,

might be adequate coverage. Existing dredges

either owned or chartered by the Army Corps

of Engineers could be converted to accept the

sweeping arms. IHC estimates that costs to

reconfigure dredges to accept sweeping arms

would be about $400,000 per vessel, and that

the equipment itself– which could be shared

among several vessels–would cost about

$600,000 per set. At present, the Army Corps

of Engineers has no responsibilities for oil

spills, so a change in the basic U.S. approach

would be required.

d~c D~& T~hno]o~ Corp., “The IHC S]icktrai] and Its Possible Application in the U. S.A.,” Prepared for U.S. Army CorPs of

Engineers, Trailing Suction Hopper Workgroup Session, Atlantic City, NJ, June 14-15, 1989.

s~~comwative Study Ofpo]lution Contro] Po]iq and Contingency Plans in France and in the Wnn Aflreement Member countries)”

paper presented at the Nineteenth Meeting of the Bonn Agreement Working Group on Operational, Technical, and Scientific Questions Concerning Counter Pollution Activities, Renesse: May 3-6, 1989, p. 22.
Chapter 5–Selected European Oil Spill Policies ● 43

UNITED KINGDOM

OIL SPILL POLICY

Responsibility for responding to offshore

tanker spills in the United Kingdom is accepted by the central government. The government provides the response equipment, directs the response operation, maintains and

updates the national contingency plan, and reviews developments in pollution control

equipments This authority has been delegated to the Marine Pollution Control Unit

(MPCU) of the Department of Transport. The

MPCU is assisted by the Coastguard, whose

primary role with respect to marine pollution

is to detect and report pollution incidents. Response to platform spills in the North Sea is

the responsibility of the operator. Response

policy for these spills is set by the Department

of Energy, but the MPCU provides advice and

may help with the cleanup operations if the

operator’s resources prove inadequate. Pollution that reaches shore is primarily the responsibility of local authorities, but the

MPCU advises and assists as required. In a

major coastal pollution incident (one beyond

the resources of a local authority) the MPCU

would set up a Joint Response Center and

would then coordinate and lead the onshore

response to ensure a fully integrated at-sea

and on-shore cleanup operation.7 Stocks of

specialized beach cleaning equipment are held

by the MPCU to supplement local resources.

Cleanup costs are initially borne by the

MPCU, but where the polluter can be identified, he will be required to refund the costs of

the measures.

It is the policy of the British government to

rely on dispersants as a first line of defense for

oil spills; mechanical recovery plays a secondary role. This policy is based on the government’s lack of faith in the effectiveness of mechanical equipment in weather conditions and

sea states typical of the North Sea and other

waters surrounding the United Kingdom and

on the view that recent advances in dispersants have improved their effectiveness and

made them much less toxic. According to the

MPCU General Information Notes, “The only

operationally proven technique for combating

oil at sea in the conditions prevalent around

the coastline is spraying with dispersants.”8

Only dispersants which have passed appropriate tests may be used. Immediately after a

spill occurs, a determination is made as to

whether dispersant use would be safe and effective. The MPCU consults with the Fisheries Department and the Nature Conservancy

Council on the appropriateness of dispersant

use in sensitive areas and in water less than 1

mile from shore or less than 20 meters in

depth.

The MPCU currently has seven airplanes

under contract for applying dispersants. Two

remote sensing aircraft are available to direct

the response effort. Aircraft and dispersants

are strategically positioned at airports around

the country. During daylight, aircraft must be

ready to fly within 30 minutes of notification;

at night they must be ready within 2 hours.

Hence, the MPCU is able to start spraying dispersants very soon after a spill occurs, an important advantage since effectiveness depends

on early application, and in most cases oil can

no longer be dispersed after about 48 hours.

The Unit also has dispersant spraying equipment fitted to a number of commercial tugs

located at strategic positions around the U.K.

coast; a small amount of mechanical recovery

equipment to deploy in chartered vessels; a

stock of cargo transfer equipment for lighterGW.H.H. McLeod, “Contro] Ofoi] Po]]ution Response Activities,” The Remote Sensing of Oil Slicks, A.E. KAX@ (cd. ) (London: John

Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 1989), p. 115.

~partment of Transport, “MPCU General Information Notes. ”

‘Ibid. p. 10.
44 ● Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

ing operations; and stockpiles of beach cleaning equipment.

During OTA’s visit, two tankers collided off

the Humber Estuary, resulting in an oil spill

of 800 tons. The MPCU determined that the

oil could be dispersed, and had the spraying

operation under way within 3.5 hours. In the

United States, both the decision to use dispersants and the mobilization of airplanes and

ships may take much longer.

With available dispersant equipment, the

MPCU maintains it can treat 5,000 tons of oil

at sea in a 48-hour period. Planned upgrades

in the aircraft fleet will increase this capability to 14,000 tons. The MPCU assumes that in

most coastal spills the greater part of the oil

will come ashore and estimates that with the

assistance of MPCU beach cleaning equipment a local authority can clean up some

6,000 tons of oiled material from beaches

every 7 to 10 days.

In the event of a very large spill, the MPCU

may ask for assistance from neighboring

countries. The United Kingdom and seven

other countries bordering the North Sea have

entered the Agreement for Co-operation in

Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by

Oil, commonly called the Bonn Agreement, to

facilitate the sharing of equipment and the exchange of information about oil spill countermeasures. The United Kingdom also has bilateral oil spill agreements with France (the

Manche Plan) and Norway (the Norbrit Plan).

Although no formal agreement exists between

industry and the government, the MPCU may

also ask for assistance from the oil industry’s

oil spill response base, located in Southampton, England. The Southampton base

currently maintains one of the largest stocks

of oil spill equipment in the world, valued at

about 4 million pounds. Exxon is a paying

member of this cooperative, and was therefore able to use about half of the Southampton stock in the Exxon Valdez spill. The

Southampton Base is a joint venture company. The full participants are Esso, British

Petroleum, Shell, Texaco, and Mobil. These

full participants can call on a maximum of 50

percent of the available equipment to respond

to spill emergencies worldwide. Petro Canada

is a lesser participant and, as such, may only

use equipment in proportion to its contribution.

The MPCU also funds a research program

to develop improved techniques for predicting the behavior of spilled oil, dealing with it

at sea, and predicting its environmental impact. This program also covers hazardous

chemicals.

NORWEGIAN

OIL SPILL POLICY

Oil pollution control policy in Norway is the

responsibility of the State Pollution Control

Authority (SPCA) within the Ministry of the

Environment. For major pollution, the SPCA

presides over the Government Action Control

Group, which also includes representatives

from other government ministries, the oil industry, and the scientific community. Responsibilities for actual cleanup are divided among

the SPCA, local authorities, and the offshore

oil companies. In general, the polluter is responsible for cleaning up oil spills, but if the

polluter is incapable of handling a spill or if

extra help is required, the SPCA may, at its

discretion, take over the operation.9 In this

sense, Norwegian oil spill policy is similar to

that of the United States. In practice, the oil

and gas industry has prepared specifically to

respond to offshore platform spills, while the

SPCA generally expects to respond to spills

from ships– an important difference between

U.S. and Norwegian approaches.

The SPCA has decreed that oil pollution

will be fought by mechanical means to the extent possible. Dispersants are used only if mechanical cleanup has proved ineffective and

YI’he Norwegian State Pollution Control Authority, “Oil Pollution Control: Emergency Services in Norway,” February 1983.
Chapter 5–Selected European Oil Spill Policies . 45

Photo crwh Jim Mielke

Norwegian Transrec weir skimming system.

only with approval from the SPCA. The SPCA

requires that the offshore oil and gas industry

be able to recover 8,000 tons of oil per day,

that the equipment for doing so be able to operate in significant wave heights of up to 2 meters and in currents of up to 1.5 knots, and

that this equipment beat the spill site within

48 hours of a spill. The SPCA has also imposed requirements on refineries and large

terminals. These are required to be able to

cope with 5,000-ton spills.

To meet offshore requirements, the eleven

oil and gas companies that operate on the

Norwegian continental shelf have organized

the Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies (NOFO). NOFO maintains a total of 14 oil recovery and transfer

(Transrec) systems and 8,750 meters of heavy

duty boom at 5 strategic locations along the

Norwegian coast. The Transrec systems have

been designed for operation in rough North

Sea conditions and are among the largest

skimming and transfer systems available anywhere. These systems have been designed to

be mounted on the large industry work boats

that make regular shuttles between shore

bases and offshore platforms, and, hence, are

never far from an equipment depot. These

boats have a storage capacity of about 1,000

tons.

Local authorities are responsible for fighting spills on and within 3 miles of the coast.

Fifty-two municipal and intermunicipal contingency areas have been designated, and

within each area an Oil Pollution Control

Committee, with direct responsibility for the

cleanup effort, has been established. Local resources are used for small spills. The costs of

municipal oil spill equipment are shared

equally between the central and local governments.

Spills that are larger than can be handled locally and/or beyond the capacity of the polluter to handle are in part or totally taken over

by the SPCA. The SPCA has established 12

equipment depots at strategic locations along

the coast. Each depot is stocked with about $1

million (U. S.) worth of equipment, including

heavy, medium-heavy, and light booms, one

large and two smaller skimmers, and a supply

of beach cleaning equipment. In addition, the

SPCA has contracted with a number of coastal

tankers, tugs, and purse seine fishing vessels.

These vessels are on call and maybe used in a

large spill. The purse seiners can be equipped

with skimmers and operate as both oil recovery vessels and oil storage vessels. In all, municipal, state, and private organizations have

established a total of 17 oil spill depots along

the coast containing about 60 miles of light

and heavy booms and 300 skimmers. Numerous storage and boom towing vessels are on

call.

Norway has made a strong commitment to

oil spill response training. The SPCA’s Oil

Spill Control Center in Horten offers a series

of courses and exercises in oil spill control. A

most impressive aspect of this program is the

wide range of personnel that participate: virtually all municipal, state, and private employees involved in decisionmaking and/or

cleanup operations in Norway receive train-
46 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

mm Credit Ml W@3smmn!ymf

Large offshore boom on reel, used by the Norwegian Clean

Seas Association for Operating Companies (NOFO).

ing. The goals of this program are to train personnel to know their responsibilities in an

emergency spill situation and to give them the

knowledge and experience needed to meet

these responsibilities. As one notable training

device, the Center has developed an elaborate

“tactical exercise.” In this exercise accident

situations are simulated and trainees play the

roles they would play in a real emergency situation. Such roles may range from state or municipal decisionmaker to master of a vessel to

a fisherman complaining of damaged gear. In

addition to simulations, major seagoing exercises (which can include experimental, controlled oil spills) are conducted yearly. A consequence of the emphasis on training in

Norway is that those with oil spill cleanup responsibilities at all levels of government and

industry– an estimated 3,000 people—are

well informed about the decisionmaking process and about the types of things that can go

wrong. Uncertainty about how to respond appears to have been reduced to a minimum.

GENERAL COMMENTS

There exist almost as many approaches to

fighting oil spills in Europe as there are European countries (table 5-l). The degree of reliance on mechanical cleanup methods is one

area, for example, where the full range of possible approaches are exhibited: some countries rely exclusively on mechanical cleanup

methods, others on both mechanical methods

and dispersants, and still others almost solely

on dispersants. No European country, however, relies on burning as an important part of

its spill response arsenal. Some other variables include the type of mechanical equipment preferred, the government agency assigned primary authority for oil spill

response, the division of authority between local and statewide officials, the amount of oil

for which countermeasures must be prepared

to deal, the role of private industry in cleanup

efforts, and the preferred approach to training, drills, and equipment testing.

These differences are based, in part, on circumstances peculiar to each country, e.g., the

use of dual purpose dredges seems to make

particularly good sense in the Netherlands,

given the amount of local dredging activity, as

does the use of large work boats for countermeasures platforms in Norway, given their

utility in rough seas and the fact that these

vessels regularly shuttle between the offshore

platforms and shore bases. No doubt different

approaches are also based on the different experiences of each country. In European countries, as in the United States, progress is

made, much of the time, by the pressure of

events, and revisions in contingency plans

have been made in several countries in the aftermath of major pollution incidents.10 Importantly, some differences among countries

seem to be based on different perceptions

about the effectiveness of a technique, about

risk, and/or about costs v. benefits, i.e., on

IoOp. cit., fOOtnOte 5, Pa& 39.
Table 5-1 -Summary of Oil Spill Response Arrangements

Central government Responsibility for clean-up

departments

Country primarily involved At sea On-shore Policy for clean-up at sea Clean-up resources

Belgium

Denmark

Ministry of Defense

Ministry of Interior

Navy Coastal municipalities; Civil

Defense Corps

Dispersants applied from vessels Limited mainly to dispersants and

spraying equipment.

National Agency

for Environmental

Protection

National Agency for

Environmental

Protection; coastal

local authorities;

Civil Defense Corps

Containment and recovery

almost exclusively

although provision for limited

use of dispersants

Specialized vessels equipped with

booms and skimmers. Also equipment

and materials for shore clean-up in

district stockpiles.

Ministry of

Environment

France Secretary of State

for the Sea

Ministry of Defense

Ministry of Interior

Ministry of

Transport

Maritime Prefect

(Navy)

Coastal communes:

Commissioner of

the Department

Containment and recovery

preferred but dispersants

used in designated areas

Extensive stocks of specialized equip

ment and materials in regional stockpiles.

Also strike teams and aircraft for

dispersant spraying.

Specialized vessels, booms, skimmers,

spraying equipment and dispersants.

Federal

Republic of

Germany

Federal Board of

Waterways and

Navigation;

coastal states

North Sea

Directorate of

State Waterways

Board

Coastal states Containment and recovery

preferred but dispersants

also used in North Sea

Containment and recovery

exclusively

Specialized vessels, including combined

dredgers/oil combating ships equipped

with oil recovery equipment. Other

vessels for deploying booms. Other

equipment held by salvage and private

contractors.

Extensive stocks of specialized equipment and trained response teams at 12

regional centers.

Netherlands Ministry of Transport

and Public Works

Coastal provincial

and municipal

states

Norway Ministry of

Environment

State Pollution

Control

Authority/Maritime

Directorate

Coast Guard

Service

Coastal community

and intercommunity

areas

Containment and recovery almost

exclusively, but will consider

dispersants if mechanical means

are ineffective

Municipal fire

brigades; provincial

authorities

Containment and recovery

preferred although dispersant

application permissible under

certain conditions

Large fleet of vessels equipped for antipollution work, Extensive stocks of

clean-up equipment in some 30 coastal

sites.

7 dedicated spraying aircraft, vesselmounted spray gear and extensive

stocks of dispersant. Also containment

Sweden Ministry of Defense

United

Kingdom

Department of

Transport

Marine Pollution

Control Unit of

Maritime

Directorate

Marine Pollution

Control Unit of

Maritime

Directorate; coastal

local authorities

Aerial application of dispersants;

containment and recovery

where applicable

and recovery equipment and equipment

for shore clean-up in 3 regional stockpiles.

SOURCE: J N Archer and I C white, “Organlsatton to mmbat 011 SpIllS: The Case for Coordmatlon of Government Practice, ” International Tanker Owners Pollutlon Federation, p 5
—

48 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

many of the issues currently being debated in

the United States.

It is clear that no single countermeasures

practice will be applicable in all locales and for

all types of oil spills. This is especially true in

the United States, a large country with thousands of miles of coastline. Yet some approaches adopted in Europe deserve serious

consideration for applicable parts of the

United States. Among these:

equip existing dredges with oil recovery

capabilities (as in the Netherlands) in the

U.S. port areas where dredges routinely

operate,

expand the use of supply vessels as platforms for heavy duty skimmers (as in

Norway) in such oil production areas as

the Gulf of Mexico and Southern California,

preapprove dispersants for use in nonsensitive areas using on-call airplanes for

delivery systems (as in the U.K.),

expand training and contingency planning exercises (as in Norway).

Despite differences, several generalizations

about European oil spill response policies

may be made. With respect to terminals, refineries, offshore platforms, and other fixed

facilities, the general rule is that the party

causing the pollution should clean it up. Operators of these facilities are expected to have

contingency plans and to provide equipment

and materials in the event of a spill.11 Direct

government involvement in the response generally only takes place if the polluter is unable

to cope with the spill. Virtually without exception, however, the central government–

whether represented by the ministry of defense, environment, transportation, etc. in

any given country– is assigned responsibility

for vessel spills.

Most countries accept that it would be

unrealistic to expect the same level and

promptness of response if the polluting

source was a vessel at sea, especially if the

owner or operator had no presence in the

country whose shores were threatened. For

this reason, in northwest Europe the responsibility for combating oil pollution

from tankers and other vessels is normally

accepted by governments on the understanding that the costs of any reasonable

measures taken will be recoverable from

the owner and his insurer.12

For these types of spills, unlike the current

situation in the United States, both the responsibility and the authority for cleanup are

in the hands of the central government.

Also, there is a distinction in most European countries between those responsible for

combating oil at sea and those responsible for

dealing with it on the coast.13 On shore, responsibility for implementing initial cleanup

measures usually lies with local authorities,

with the central government often providing

advice and coordination. As the actual or potential impact of a spill increases, central governments assume more responsibility, and

are able to provide equipment, logistic support, and technical and financial assistance.

Coordination between local onshore responsibilities and central government offshore responsibilities is usually the charge of a single

government department or committee. Several European countries (e.g., France and

Norway) appear to be far better equipped and/

or organized than the United States to respond to spills that reach or threaten the

coast.

I IJ.N. ~cher ~d I.C. mite, “Or~izatiOn to combat oil spills: The Case for Coordination of Government practice, ” The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd.

‘21bid. p. 3.

‘31bid. p. 4.
Chapter 5–Selected European Oil Spill Policies .49

A wide variety of mechanical cleanup technology is used in Europe. Some types of

booms and skimmers in use or under development may offer some marginal advantages to

equipment manufactured in the United

States; however, OTA found no evidence that

European technology was dramatically better

than that available in the United States. Much

of this technology is, in fact, marketed in the

United States, and those responsible for purchasing equipment are (or are becoming) familiar with it. Some European equipment was

used in the Exxon Valdez oil spill. French Egmolap skimmers used in beach cleaning were

reportedly particularly successful.

OTA was impressed with the total amount

of equipment available in Europe. In the event

of a major spill, countries have not only their

own local, regional, and national equipment

stocks on which to draw, but could also have

access to equipment from other nearby countries and from the private sector. Several cooperative agreements exist. In addition to the

Bonn Agreement, already discussed, the Commission of European Communities (CEC) in

Brussels has a task force that can provide expertise to member countries that need advice.

The CEC maintains a list of equipment

throughout Europe that potentially could be

used in the event of a large spill. Also, a number of bilateral agreements exist to facilitate

cooperation regarding oil spills occurring on

or near the offshore boundaries. (While helpful, these bilateral agreements do not always

work to each country’s satisfaction, e.g., when

one country’s policy is to use dispersants and

the other’s is to rely on mechanical equipment).

All European countries OTA visited assured us that they were prepared for major oil

spills. We suspect that had we toured U.S. facilities before the Exxon Valdez accident, we

would have received similar assurances, so

European confidence is at least somewhat

questionable. On the whole, however, European countries are better organized than the

United States, have more resources on which

to draw, and conduct more frequent training

exercises. In part this is due to activity undertaken in response to unfortunate experiences

with their own major oil spills. As some Europeans readily admitted, no country, no matter

how well organized and equipped, would have

been able to cope satisfactorily with a spill the

size of the Exxon Valdez spill — particularly in

such a remote location.
Appendix A

Mechanical Containment and Cleanup Technologies

Containment Booms

Oil spill containment barriers or booms are floating devices generally resembling short curtains that

restrict an oil slick from spreading beyond the barrier. Several designs have been produced for conditions ranging from protected waters to open ocean.

Some barriers are designed to be towed, while others remain stationary. Barriers designed for protected waters would be less effective in strong currents or heavy waves but generally are more easily

deployed than offshore booms. Oil spill containment booms generally have five operating components as shown in figure A-1.

Float

The float is the buoyancy member that keeps the

boom riding on the surface of the water. Heavier

booms or booms used in rough seas need more

buoyancy and therefore have a larger volume of

float materials. Floats may be rigid or flexible and

should be relatively smooth so that they don’t trap

Figure A-1 -Components of a Boom

Ballast weight/ft

total boom weight/ft

SOURCE: World Catalog of 011 Spill Response Products

debris or produce vortices that may cause the loss of

oil under the boom.

Freeboard

The freeboard is the vertical height of the boom

above the water. The freeboard prevents oil from

washing over the top of the boom, but if it is too

high, the boom may be pushed over in high winds.

The boom must be flexible enough to rise and fall

with the waves so that the freeboard is not lost with

each passing wave.

skirt

The skirt is the continuous portion of the boom

below the floats. The skirt helps to contain the oil.

While a deeper skirt is more effective in containing

oil, increasing skirt depth increases the current load

on the tension members of the boom.

Tension Member

Tension members consist of any elements such as

cables, chains, lines, or boom fabric that carry the

horizontal tension loads on the boom.

Ballast

Weight is applied to the bottom of the skirt to improve boom performance. Ballast is generally a

chain (which also serves as a tension member) or a

series of weights along the entire length of the

boom.

There are two basic types of booms in general use

today: fence booms and curtain booms. Fence

booms have a rigid or semirigid material as a containment screen for oil floating on the water. Curtain booms have a flexible skirt held down by ballast weights or a tension chain or cable. Their major

difference is the way in which they respond to

waves, current, and wind. If current and wind roll a

fence boom away from the vertical, there is a loss of

freeboard and draft. A curtain boom has a flexible

skirt that is free to move independently of the freeboard and flotation, thus movement of the skirt

away from vertical does not necessarily mean loss of

51
52 ● Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

freeboard. Other booms, not necessarily of different types, are designed for special purposes. These

include fireproof booms, ice booms designed for

spills in ice-filled water, and sorbant booms used to

contain and absorb small amounts of oil in relatively calm waters.

Booms are classified according to their physical

characteristics, which include freeboard, draft, reserve buoyancy to weight ratio, total tensile

strength, skirt fabric tensile strength, and skirt fabric tear strength. Although all of these characteristics are important, only the freeboard and draft will

be mentioned hereto convey an idea of the overall

size of booms that are used for various applications

(table A-l).

In the above classification, based on that used in

the World Catalog of Oil Spill Response Products,

calm water is defined to have a significant wave

height of less than 1 foot, harbors less than 3 feet,

and offshore less than 6 feet. The significant wave

height is the maximum wave height for which

booms in that category are likely to be effective.

The table shows that booms recommended for harbors and offshore are quite large. A boom recommended for harbors would have a vertical dimension (freeboard plus draft) of 22 to 42 inches and a

boom recommended for offshore use would have a

vertical dimension of more than 42 inches.

These classifications should be used with some

flexibility. For example, offshore booms typically

have long skirts. However, in offshore areas of fast

currents a shorter skirt may be more effective. In

this case, a boom classified as a harbor boom maybe

more suitable than an offshore boom.

Table A-1 - Boom Classification According to

Freeboard and Draft

Freeboard Draft

Service (inches) (inches)

Calm water 4-1o 6-12

Harbor 10-18 12-24

Offshore >18 >24

SOURCE: Office of Technology Aaaessment, 1990

Mechanical Recovery Devices

Several devices have been developed to collect oil

from surface waters. Since the efficiency of an oil recovery device is improved by increasing the thickness or depth of an oil slick, these devices are frequently used in combination with containment

barriers. Oil spill recovery skimmers are generally

separated into categories according to the way in

which they pick up oil. Fourteen categories and subcategories can be identified. These are defined as

follows:

Weir – A skimmer that has an interior basin

with a slightly submerged lip over which the oil

floats and is collected by gravity (figure A-2). The

weir is generally a floating skimming head used

with a pump to continuously empty the collecting

basin. These skimmers work best if the edge of the

weir is right at the oil/water interface, but in practice, this adjustment is difficult to achieve and

maintain. Weir skimmers have the advantages of

being simple, reliable, and commonly available. In

thick layers of oil (25 mm or more), weir skimmers

have high recovery rates with a recovery efficiency

of around 50 per cent. In thinner slicks (1 to 8 mm),

the recovery efficiency drops to 10 per cent. Conventional floating weir skimmers have problems in

becoming clogged with debris and do not work well

in waves. Archimedes screw devices have been incorporated in some weir skimmers to grind up debris.

suction – A suction skimmer is a simple suction

head acting somewhat like a weir used on a floating

hose from a vacuum truck or portable suction pump

(figure A-3). Pump suction draws the oil to the

Figure A-2 - Weir Skimmer

Oil

k

SOURCE: World Catalog of Oil Spill Response Products.
Appendix A-Mechanical Containment and Cleanup Technologies ● 53

skimmer head. This also is the same principle used

when a suction hopper dredge is converted to oil

spill recovery. The advantages of suction skimmers

are that they are simple to operate, shallow draft,

and can be used nearly everywhere, even under

piers. They are likely to have a fairly high pumping

rate but with a low recovery efficiency, particularly

in a thin slick. They are not effective, however, if

there is any appreciable water movement such as

choppy waves.

Boom Skimmer – A boom skimmer is a recovery

system with one or more skimmers mounted in the

face of a spill containment boom, regardless of the

skimmer type, although the recovery device is generally a weir (figure A-4). Weirs installed on booms

that can follow the wave surface reasonably well are

kept near the surface of the water and therefore

able to maintain a high rate of recovery. In general,

boom skimmers have a high rate of recovery and are

designed for dealing with large spills at sea. Since

the weir is employed in the collection pocket of the

boom, recovery efficiency is increased. Boom skimmers are large pieces of equipment with many

working parts needing maintenance. They are adversely affected by the same debris problems as

other weirs.

Vortex – A vortex skimmer draws oil and water

into a collection chamber and separates it by centrifugal force (figure A-5). This centrifugal action

discharges the water out of the bottom and concentrates the oil so that it can be pumped off through a

hose to storage. This principle is sometimes combined with a weir serving as the collection chamber.

Vortex skimmers can achieve a reasonable recovery

rate in medium to heavy oils, but generally have a

fairly low efficiency.

Moving Surface – Moving surface skimmers utilize a moving material that absorbs or causes oil to

adhere to it in preference to water. The oilcoated

material then passes over a scraper, squeezer, or

other device to remove and recover the oil in a

sump. There are several varieties of moving surface

skimmers including, disk/drum, brush, rope mop,

and belt types as follows:

Disk/Drum– Any disk or drum devices that rely

on the adhesion of oil to a solid surface (figure A-6).

Disk type devices have a series of vertical disks that

are rotated through the oil surface. Drum skimmers

have a horizontal drum that rotates through the

slick. Many small disk skimmers have the disadvantages of being expensive, complicated, more likely

to break down, and vulnerable to becoming clogged

Figure A-3– Floating Suction Skimmer

T Suction hose

SOURCE: World Catalog of 011 Spill Response Products

Figure A-4-Schematic Drawing of a Weir Skimmer

Air tube ——1

Vane pump \

Oil discharge tube

SOURCE: Vikoma International

Figure A-5-Vortex

SOURCE: World Catalog of 011 Spill Rasponse Products

out
54 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

Figure A-6- Disc Skimmer

SOURCE: World Catalog of Oil Spill Response Products

with debris. On the other hand, they have high recovery efficiency which can be a considerable advantage if storage volume is limited. Large disk

skimmers are likely to be more durable and some

disk skimmers have vanes or screens to keep out debris. Because of the vertical dimensions of the disk,

disk skimmers are effective in waves. Some large

floating disk skimmers are effective in fairly high

sea states.

Brush – Skimmer with a horizontal brush that

rotates through the oil and past a scraper which removes the oil into a sump. This skimmer is designed

for recovering highly viscous oil and oil on ice.

Rope Mop – Rope mop skimmers employ along,

continuous loop of absorbent oleophilic (oil loving)

material that floats on the surface of the water and

is then led through a combination scraper-wringer

that removes the oil along with some water (figure

A-7). Rope mops can be deployed from shore and

the rope guided around a pulley that has been secured offshore or can be operated from boats. Rope

mop skimmers generally have a high recovery efficiency and are most effective in medium viscosity

oils. Rope mops can operate in shallow water, water

filled with debris, water mixed with ice, and under

ice. They are relatively easy to maintain.

Belt – Belt skimmers are identical in that they

all employ a moving belt which mayor may not be of

absorbent material. Six types of belt skimmers can

be identified.

1. Paddle Belts – Paddles are attached to the belt

to lift oil out of the water (figure A-8). A typical paddle belt skimmer pulls oil up a ramp using four or

more paddles. Paddle belt skimmers have a high recovery rate and operate best in medium to high viscosity oils, but are likely to have problems in short

period waves.1 They also handle debris very well.

2. Sorbent Belts – A sorbent belt skimmer is one

that has a continuous, flat belt that moves horizontally over the water in the well of the collection vessel (figure A-9). High recovery rates can be expected

and debris handling is excellent. This skimmer was

developed for the U.S. Coast Guard as a zero relative velocity skimmer with the belt moving as fast as

the vessel is traveling forward (or current moving

aft). Apparently, while technically feasible, it has

not been very practical operationally and has never

been commercially produced. Perhaps further development could prove useful.

3. Sorbent Lifting Belts – A sorbent belt skimmer that has a belt inclined to the water’s surface

and lifts the oil out of the water (figure A-10). Sorbent lifting belts are made of porous oleophilic material that allows water to pass through. The belt

passes through a set of rollers where the oil is

scraped and wrung out of the belt. Sorbent lifting

belt skimmers are often mounted on fairly large

vessels and are intended for use in harbors and offshore. They can be expected to have a high recovery

rate and high efficiency.

4. Brush Lifting Belts – These skimmers have a

chain of brushes that lift the oil from the water.

Cleaning devices remove oil from the brushes at the

top of the ramp. These would be particularly useful

in large spills of highly viscous oil.

5. Submersion Belts – The operating principle of

submersion belt skimmers is the opposite of lifting

belt skimmers (figure A-n). Instead of carrying the

oil up out of the water, the submersion belt moves

along a plane forcing the oil under water. The oil

then surfaces in a collection sump. Submersion belt

skimmers work best in low viscosity oils and thin

slicks, in contrast to most other skimmers that require thick accumulations of oil for most effective

operation.

‘World Catalog, p. 226.
—.

.
56 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

Figure A-8-Paddle Belt Skimmer

Paddles h

Figure A-9- Sorbent Belt Skimmer

Transfer

pump

Twin I

SOURCE: World Catalog of Oil Spill Response Products

SOURCE: World Catalog of Oil Spill Responaa Products

Figure A-10--Sorbent Lifting Belt Skimmer

Direction for

skimming

t 1

SOURCE: Wortd Catalog of Oil Spill Response Prcducts
Appendix A-Mechanical Containment and Cleanup Technologies ● 57

Figure A-n –Submersion Belt Skimmer

I Collected floatage I

I # I

SOURCE: World Catalog of Oil Spill Response Products
Appendix B

Quantity and Distribution of U.S. Equipment

The following tables provide information on the

tree, quantity, and location of major oil spill response equipment within the continental United

States. The first two tables identify U.S. Navy and

U.S. Coast Guard equipment. The following four tables list skimmers, booms, dispersant delivery systems, and off-loading pumps that could be applicable for offshore spills. Except for the Navy

equipment maintained at Williamsburg, Virginia

and Stockton, California and the Coast Guard

equipment in Mobile, Alabama and Hamilton Air

Force Base, California, this equipment is held by industry oil spill cooperatives. The 93 cooperatives

are listed in the next table, and, following this, the

new equipment acquisitions of the Alyeska cooperative following the Exxon Valdez spill are identified.

Next, we list the equipment based at the Oil Spill

Service Centre in Southampton England, about

half of which was used in the Exxon Valdez spill. Finally, the equipment proposed to be purchased for

each regional oil spill response center to be established by the Petroleum Industry Response Organization is presented. A caveat: response capability

depends on much more than the type of equipment

on hand, including such variables as maintenance,

training, and logistics, so conclusions about the

capabilities of the organizations presented here

based solely on examining equipment are likely to

be inaccurate.
—

Appendix B–Quantity and Distribution of U.S. Equipment .59

Table B-1 -Major Types, Quantities, and Location

of U.S. Navy Spill Response Equipment

Table B-2– Major National Strike Force

Equipment of the U.S. Coast Guard

Quantities/location

Pearl

Williamsburg, Stockton, Harbor,

Equipment description Virginia California Hawaii

Spilled oil recovery equipment:

Skimmer vessel system

(36’ aluminum hull) . . . . . .

Skimming system

(sorbent belt voss) . . . . . . .

Skimming system

(screw pump voss) . . . . . . .

Skimmer, sorbent

rope mop (36”) . . . . . . . . . .

Boom vans

(42” x 1980’ boom) . . . . . .

Boom mooring system

Boom handling boat

(24’ 260 hp) . . . . . . . . . . .

Boom tending boats

(19’ x 23’ inflatable) . . . . . .

Boom tending boats

(18’ rigid hull) . . . . . . . . . . .

136,000 gal oil

storage bladder .

26,000 gal oil

storage bladder . . . . . . . . .

Pumping equipment:

Pump, 6“ submersible

Floating hose (6” x 100’)

Hot tap system . .,

Boarding kit. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Firefighting system ., ., . .

Ancillary equipment:

Command trailer

(40’ communications

and command center)

Command van

(20’ communications

and command center)

Fender system

(8’ x 12’ foam) . . . . . . .

Fender system

(14’ x 60’ Ip air) . .

Fender system

(10’ x 50’ Ip air) . . . . . . . .

Shop vans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rigging vans . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Personnel bunk van . . . . . . . 2 0

Beach transfer system

(4-wheel drive veh.) . . 1

Communication system

(SAT phone, land) . . . . . . . 1 0

Communication system

(SAT phone, ship) . . . . . . . . 1

Oil/water separator

(parallel plate

100 gal/rein) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Cleaning system van . . . . . . 1

Atlantic Pacific

team team

Spilled oil recovery equipment:

Open Water Oil Containment and

Recovery Systems:

Skimming barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Fast surface delivery systems . . . . . . . . 11

Pumping subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Dracone barges (various sizes) . . . . . . 8

Expandi harbor boom (1,600 feet) 1

Pumping equipment:

Air Deliverable Anti-Pollution

Transfer Systems (ADAPTS):

Prime movers . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . 7

Submersible pumps . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Hydraulic hose (5,000 feet) . . . . . . 1

Discharge hose (4,000 feet) . . ., 1

Fuel bladders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?

Viscous oil pumping systems

Prime movers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Submersible pumps . . . . . . . . . . ., ?

Chemical transfer systems . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Nonsubmersible pumps . . . . . . . . . . 9

Ancillary equipment:

Command Posts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Tractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Boats (various small boats) . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

All purpose vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Trailers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Radios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., 42

Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Monitoring equipment . . . . . . . ?

Testing equipment . . . ., . . ?

19

11

17

4

0

13

15

1

1

8

1

8

7

16

2

2

6

5

12

36

7

Y

‘f

SOURCE: U S Coast Guard, 1989

SOURCE: U S Navy, 1989
Table B-3--Major Sources of Skimmers in the United States

Storage Performance c

7

sea state Expected d

Region Location service type No.a Typea

2 3 Viscosity Debris availability

East cost Davisville, RI Weir B N 1,700 1,000 G G-F F G F B

Sorbent lifting

belt

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

Sorbent lifting belt

Weir

Weir

Weir

Weir

120

120

1,000

Williamsburg, VA G F G A

Davisville, RI

Davisville, RI

Mobile, AL

Venice, LA

Venice, LA

Venice, LA

Intercostal, IA

Cameron, IA

Cameron, LA

Houma, IA

Grand Isle, IA

Geand isle, LA

Rockport, TX

Galveston, TX

Stockton, Ca

Port San Luis, CA

Port San Luis, CA

Santa Barbara, CA

Santa Barbara, CA

G

F

G

G

G

G

G

G

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

G-F F

F P

G

G

Gulf coast

west coast

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

F

F

F

G A

c

c

c

c

A

c

c

c

c

c

G

F

G

F

F

F

Hdamilton AFB, CA Weir

Concord, CA Weir

San Pedro, CA Weir

San Pedro, CA Weir

San Pedro, CA Weir

Seattle, WA Submersion

belt

Valdez Weir

G

G

120

G c

c

Alaska

G

G

Valdez Weir

Dutch Hahrbor Weir

Dutch Harbor Weir

Deadhorse Weir

Y

N

N

Y

B

G

G

Dutch Harbor Weir G Voo . .N o 120 G B/C

a B = Barrier Skimmer

SC = Seif-pmpeliadhsif-contahwd skimmer

VOO = Skimmer system operatad from a “Vessel of Opportunity”

b Y = %if-~O@Sd

N = Requires external

rfmwwceoftheeystem aaawhoie, including barriers. support, arc Where poaawible, information on the performance characteristics (P = poor, F = farr, and G = good) of the equipment m

:j!&!:g$:!Ij!j?:;&:mzk

ions decated 2 sea state perforrnacne, and (3) composrhon of the oil encountered In addition, a sense of the ready availability of the resources IS provided as not all assets can be Utilized m a

1S4662, “Oil Poilutbn Response Planning Guide for Extreme Weatherm

.,

A = Readiiyavailabia in moat cases.

‘isW%!wg, VA and Stockton, CA

ent is mainly government resources of the U.S @asf Guard and the U S Navy Coaat Guard equiopment is baaed at Mobiie, ALand Hamitton Air Force Base, CA Navy

equipment is primarily based at Willi

B = Equipmentwhkh maykeavailabiedependingon apecificequipment needs andcircustances existing atthetimeof need These aaaetsare mainly held by cooperativesfor the convenience of its membership within

adefhed area dtheras amatterofoperating or economic necesa ity. in the case of the former (such as offshore lease equipments), warvere from govemrnentaientitres may have to reobtained, oragraement may

be required among the members 10 cease or reduce operations

C = Resources that maybe made avaiiabie but only within a specified area Equipment that is permanently Inatalied on a vessel would, for instance, only be available within that vessel’s areai limitation

SOURCE: Engineering Cornpuater Optecnomics, inc (ECO), “Anatyais of Oii SpIii Reaponse Technoiogksa,- contractor reporl prepared for the Office of Technology Asaessmnt, July 19S9
Table 54- Major Sources of Containment Boom in the United States

Total Free Unlit Tensile Sea state

length board Draft weight strength performance a

Expectedc

Region Location (feet) (inches) (inches) (per 100’) (Ibs) 1 2 3 Maximum availability

East coast Davisville, RI

Davisville, RI

Davisville, RI

Williamsburg, VA

Gulf coast Mobile, AL

Mobile, AL

Grand Isle, LA

Venice, LA

Venice, LA

Intracoastal, TX

Galveston, IX

Rockport, TX

West coast Concord, CA

Concord, CA

San Pedro, CA

San Pedro, CA

San Pedro, CA

San Pedro, CA

San Pedro, CA

San Pedro, CA

San Pedro, CA

Santa Barbara, CA

Santa Barbara, CA

Santa Barbara, CA

Santa Barbara, CA

Santa Barbara, CA

Stockton, CA

Hamilton AFB, CA

Seattle, WA

Seattle, WA

Alaska Valdez

Valdez

Valdez

Deadhorse

Deadhorse

Deadhorse

Dutch Harbor

Anchorage

23

27

c

B/C

B/C

B/C

B/C

a Rating indicat~ ~tlmated performance of the s~tem ss a whole, including barriers, support, etc Where possible, information on the performance characteristics (P = poor, F = fair, and G = good) of the equlPment Is given

In terms of ( 1 ) gallons affected, (2) sea state performance, and (3) mmposrtlon of the 011 encountered In addmon, a sense of the ready avmlatxhty of the resources IS provrded as not all assets can be uhhzed m a direct manner

SOURCE: COMDTINST M164662, “OIl Pollutlon Resopnse Planning Guide for Extreme Weather”

bMeasured m feet

c AvsulabllKy IS mdlcaled as follows:

A=

B.

c=

SOURCE:

Readdy available m most cases This equipment is mamfy government resources of the U S Coast Guard and the U S Navy Coast Guard equipment IS based at Mobile, AL and HamlRon Air Force Base, CA

Navy equipment is primarily based at Wilhemsburg, VA and Stockton, CA

Equipment which may be available depending on specfic equipment needs and cwcumstances exlstmg at the time of need These assets are mamly held by cooperatives for the convenience of its membership wrfhm a defined area either as a matter of operating or ecorromlc necesslfy In the case of the former (Such as offshore lease requirements), warvers from governmental entttms may have to be

obtained, or agreement may be reqwred among the members to cease or reduce operations

Resources tfrat maybe made avatlable but onfy wrthin a specrfied area Equipment that IS permarrentty installed on a vessel would, for instance, only be avarlable within that vessel’s areal hrnltatlon

Engmeermg Computer Optecnomics, Inc (ECO), “Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies, - contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, July 19S9
Table B-5-Major Sources of Offloading Pumps in the United States

Performance characteristics

Units capacity Viscosity Debris tolerance Emulsify Expected

Region Type city (gal/min) Light Heavy Silt Gravel Seaweed liquids availability b

East coast Destroil Williamsburg, VA 2 310 G P G G F G A

Thune-Eureka Williamsburg, VA 10 2000 F G G G P P A

Viscous Oil Elizabeth City, NC 1200 0 F G G G P P A

Gulf coast Adapts Mobile, AL 12 1000 P G G G P P A

Viscous Oil Mobile, AL 1200 0 F G G G P P A

west coast Adapts Hamilton AFB, CA 12 1000 P G G G P P A

Viscous Oil Hamilton AFB, CA 2200 0 F G G G P P A

Thune-Eureka Stockton, CA 11 2000 F G G G P P A

Destroil Stockton, CA 2 310 G P G G F G A

Adapts Concord, CA 1 1000 P G G G P P B

Adapts Concord, CA 1 1000 P G G G P P B

Alaska Destroil Anchorage, AK 1 310 G P G G F G B

stops Valdez, AK 2 1000 G G G G P P B

Other Thune-Eureka Detroit, Ml 5200 0 F G G G P P A

Adapts Detroit, Ml 2 1000 P G G G P P A

a P = pcor, F = tier, G = good

bAvailability is indicated as follows:

A =

B =

SOURCE:

Readily available in moat cases This equipment is mainly government resources of the U S Coast Guard and the U S Navy Coast Guard equipment is baaed at Mobile, AL and Harmlton Air Force Base, CA

Navy equipment is primarily based at Williamsburg, VA and Stockton, CA.

Equipment which may be available depending on specific equipment needs and circumstances exmtmg at the time of need These assets are mainly held by cooperatives for the convemence of its membership within a defined area erther as a matter of operating or economjc names ity In the case of the former (Such as offshore lease requuements), waivers from governmental entities may have to be

obtained, or agreement may be required among the members to cease or reduce operations

Engineering Computer Optecnomics, Inc (ECO), “Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technoi~y Aeeasement, July 19S9.
Appendix B–Quantity and Distribution of U.S. Equipment .63

Table B-6- Major Sources of Dispersant Delivery Systems in the United States

Oil treatment a Storage

rate comparison capacity Expected

Location Platform (gal/rein) (gallons) availability

East Coast Davisville, RI

Gulf Coast Grand Isle, LA

Houma, IA

Rockport, TX

Galveston, TX

Chandler, AR

Chandler, AR

Mesa, AR

West Coast San Pedro, CA

San Pedro, CA

Santa Barbara, CA

Santa Barbara, CA

Santa Barbara, CA

Alaska Anchorage, AK

Anchorage, AK

Boat

Boat

Boat

Boat

Boat

DC-4

ADDS/C-130

DC-4

Boat

Boat c

Boat c

Boat c

Boat

Boat

Helicopter

500

500

500

Less than 8000

Less than 8000

Less than 8000

4a

4a

4a

48

48

500

1600

5 0 0

500

500

2500

2500

Drums

Drums

Drums

Drums

Drums

Drums

Drums

B

B

B

B

B

B

A

B

B

c

c

c

B

B

B

a ~URcE: COMDTINST Ml ~ 2, C,OII ~llution Response plannlng Guide for Extreme Weather,”’ Rating mdlcates estimated Performance of the system as a whole, including barriem, support, etc

b Av~lablli~ is mdcatecf ss follows:

A = Readily avatlable m most cases This equipment is mainly government resources of the U S Coast Guard and the U S Navy Coast Guard equipment IS based at

Mobile, AL and Hamilton Air Force Base, CA Navy equipment is prlmarlly based at Wllllamsburg, VA and Stockton, CA

B = Equipment which maybe available depending on specific equipment needs and circumstances exlstmg at the time of need These assets are mainly held by

cooperatives for the convenience of Its membership wrthln a defined area edher as a matter of opera!lng or economic necessity In the case of the former (Such

as offshore lease requirements), waivers from governmental enttttes may have to be obtained, or agreement may be required among the members to cease or

reduce operations

C = Resources that may be made available but only within a specified area Equipment that IS permanently installed on a vessel would, for Instance, only be available wtthm that vessel’s areal limitation

c Installed on response vessel

SOURCE: Engmeenng Computer Optecnomlcs, Inc (ECO), “Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, July 1989
64 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

Table B-7- Alyeska Response Equipment

Since the Exxon Valdez spill incident, Alyeska has substantiality increased the amount of spill response equipment that it has on hand to

respond to any future spills. The equipment obtained is listed below.

3 ERVs Escort Response Vessels – ERVs are 210- 1

(Ship Escort) foot converted ocean going, ice (Knowles Head)

strengthened tugs. These vessels have

twin variable pitch propellers and bow

thrusters for increased maneuverability.

Each ERV is equipped with:

● 2 Vikoma Seaskimmer 50’s 2

(nameplate 385 bbl/hr each) (Valdez)

● 1,600 ft. RoBoom Ocean 2000 on deck reels

● 3,000 ft. Expandi 4300 Boom

(self inflating)

● 4,000 bbl recovered oil storage capacity.

Weir Boom Response Vessel – equipped

with:

● 2 Framo Transec boom/skimmer systems 2

(initially 1 Vikoma weir boom skimming (Valdez)

system - nameplate 4200 bbl/hr)

● 20-foot work boat.

Dynamic Skimming System - A 180,000 bbl

equipped with:

● 2 Marflex Sweep Arms (nameplate

2100 bbl/hr).

Lightening Vessel – A 140,000 bbl integrated

tug/barge equipped with:

. Fenders

● 3 Framo salvage pumps

● Ancillary salvage equipment (hoses, etc.)

● Moorings.

Storage Barges – (73,000 bbl and 63,000

bbl). Each equipped with an assortment of:

● Spill containment booms including

Vikoma HI 950 Boom, Scot Boom, Arctic

Harbor Boom (total approximately

16,000 ft.)

● Supersucker pump/skimming systems

● Absorbent materials.

Ship Assist Tugs – Two tugs available for

pollution response duties. \ r

Other Resources Available for Spill Response

● 62,000 gallons of dispersant

● 2 aerial dispersant applicators

(ADDS PACKS)

● Dispersant application systems mounted

on escort vessels

● Fire boon, igniters, and other burning

● A portable communications module

● Reconnaissance aircraft

SOURCE: Aiyeska 1990

Table B-8-Equipment Based at the Oil Spill Response Center, Southampton, U.K.

SOURCE: Oil Spill Responae Cantre, Southampton, Unltad Kngdom, 1969
Appendix B–Quantity and Distribution of U.S. Equipment .65

Table B-8- Equipment Based at the Oil Spill Response Center, Southampton, U.K. (Continued)

Item Quantity Item Quantity

2.

3.

4.

5.

Skimmers (continued)

Egmolap, heavy oil belt skimmer 1

Clam Shell Skimmer 3

Heavy Fuel Oil Skimmers, toothed disk

skimmers 2

Heavy Oil Skimmers (medium) 2

Heavy Oil Skimmer (small) 1

HIAB Jib with power pack 4

Vacuum Box for use with BP Vacuum Head 3

Dunlop Dracone 1D5, capacity 100 tons 1

Dunlop Dracone 1E, capacity 30 tons 1

Leigh Flexible Pillow Tanks, capacity 25 tons 10

Leigh Flexible Pillow Tanks, capacity 12 tons 10

Fastank Storage Unit with liners, capacity 7 tons 17

Hoyle P/U Storage Tank, capacity 25 tons

Skimmex Storage Tank, capacity 6 to 7 tons

Skimmex Storage Tank, capacity 2.5 tons

Vikoma Pillow Tank, capacity 30,000 liters

Avon Storage Tank, capacity 25,000 liters

Thune Eureka CCN 100 Pump

Spate Pump 3B 5

Putzmeister Concrete Pump, screw and ram

pump

Desmi/Destroil Screw Pump

Godiva Fire Pump 1

WSL Offshore Spray Unit

Biggs Wall Wide Spray Unit

Rototech TC3 Spray Module

WSL Inshore Spray Unit

Seaguard Pack Super Dispersant Spray Unit

Backpack sprayers– Falcon 2 gallons

Falcon 3 gallons

Gell set unit

Beach Pump AR-30 2

Beach Pump AR-15 2

Additional hose – 70m on reel

50m on reel

Pillow Tanks, capacity 300 gallons

Aerial Dispersant Delivery System

2

1

1

2

1

2

1

4

11

1

2

7

1

17

5

1

11

6

3

1

6.

7.

8.

9.

Sailor VHF Radio Type RT 144,61 channels 3

Motorola VHF Radio Type HT 200, 6 channels 6

Motorola VHF Radio Type MX 300S, 24 channels 6

Stomo VHF Radio Type 500, 3 channels 2

Aquastar Radio Telephone Type WP/1, 24

channels 1

Lafayette VHF Scanning Monitor, 7 channels 3

Telescopic Masts, 9m 3

Floodlights 2

Zodiac 16 ft. inflatable boat 1

Avon 12 ft. inflatable boat 1

Alvis Stalwart Amphibious Vehicle 1

High pressure hot water cleaners 5

Hipower multipurpose power packs 7

Bauer Compressor Type 1C40 1

Rollalong Mobile Command Center 1

Mini Power Pack, diesel power pack on wheels 5

45 ft. work boat 1

Fast personnel carrier 1

28m training/operation vessel 1

Air transportable work boat 1

Vikoma Emergency Air Blower for boom

inflation 5

Small air blowers 13

Vulcanisers for on-sits boom repair 5

Boom cleaner, Ro-Clean system 1

Mooring buoys, anchors, chains

Rotary hand pump for filling knapsack

dispersant sprayers 2

Hand pump for liquid transfer 1

Atlas Copco Air Compressor 1

Welding units 3

Road trailers 3

Fork lift trucks 3

Ford tractor 1

Foam generator 1

Video camera/recorder 1

Camera and accessories 1

Absorbants, booms, pillows, pads, etc.

SOURCE: Oil Spill Response Centre, Southampton, United Kingdom, 1989
66 . Coping With an Oiled Sea: An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies

Table B-9-Petroleum Industry Response Organization: Proposed Capital Equipment

for Each of Five Regional Centers

Current

number Current

Item estimated $ estimate

Lightening:

Pumps 4 $851,524

Fenders 8 $240,000

Dracones 8 $1,000,000

Containment boom (ft):

Offshore

Medium

Lightweight

Skimming barrier

Skimmers:

Skimming barrier

Other skimmers

Power packs

Dispersant equipment:

Adds pack

Helicopter system

Dispersant chemical

Other:

vessels

Office equipment & computers

Bird cleaning

Protective boom (lightweight boom)

Temporary oil storage (Dracones)

Forklifts, compressors, etc.

Trailers/cargo containers

Maintenance shop equipment

Vehicles, 4-wheel drive

Tractors for trailers

Pre-stages barges

Other equipment

Spare parts

30,000

30,000

10,000

4,000

4

14

0

1

4

50,000

$1,891,524

$3,974,580

$1,917,900

$5,892,480

Major equipment subtotal

$1,870,000

$2,770,382

(Included in skimmer cost)

$4,840,382

$500,000

$121,080

$800,000

$1,221,080

$13,845,448

$4,000,000

$130,000 ab

$20,000 a

$587,300

$1,750,000

$500,000 a

$380,000

$25,000 a

$120,000 a

$540,000

1,750,000

$200,000

$800,000

Other subtotal

$10,582,300

$10,582,300

Equipment total for one regional center: $24,207,746

Equipment total for five regional centers: $121,038,731

Headquarters office equipment and computers: $130,000

Total capital equipment $121,188,731

a Indicates data not available to allow reprojection of costs

b Pll estimate for non-mainframe computers = $2.0 million/regional center

SOURCE: Petroleum Industry Response Organization (PIRO), 1990.
Appendix B–Quantity and Distribution of U.S. Equipment .67

Table B-10– U.S. Oil Spill Co-Ops

Alaska Clean Seas

Anchorage, AL

Altoona Area Industry

Association

Altoona, PA

Arco-Total Cooperative

Traverse City, Ml

Atlanta Area Terminals Oil

Doraville, GA

Bi-State Metropolitan Oil

Bettendorf, IA

Boston Harbor Oil Spill

Cooperative

East Boston, MA

Bridgeport Harbor Pollution

Abatement Committee

Bridgeport, CT

Buffalo River & Harbor Oil

Spill Cooperative

Buffalo, NY

Burlington Harbor Pollution

Abatement Committee

Montpelier, VT

Central New York Oil Spill

Cooperative

Rochester, NY

Central New York Oil Spill

Containment

Rochester, NY

Charleston Industry Liquid

Spillage Control

Committee, Inc

North Charleston, SC

Clean Atlantic Associates

New Orleans, LA

Clean Bay

Concord, CA

Clean Caribbean Cooperative

East Boston, MA

Clean Channel Association

Mont Belvieu, TX

Clean Coastal Waters

Long Beach, CA

Clean Gulf Associates

New Orleans, LA

Clean Harbors Cooperative

Perth Amboy, NJ

Clean Islands Council

Honolulu, HI

Clean Land & Harbor, Inc

Wilmington, NC

Clean Rivers Association

Convent, IA

Clean Rivers Cooperative

Portland, OR

Clean Rivers/Coos Bay

cooperative

Coos Bay, OR

Clean Islands Council

Honolulu, HI

Clean Seas

Carpinteria, CA

Clean Sound Cooperative

Seattle, WA

Continental Shelf Associates

Jupiter, FL

Connecticut River Pollution

Control Committee

Hartford, CT

Cook Inlet Response

Organization

Nikiski, AK

Corpus Christi Area Oil

Spill control Association

Corpus Christi, TX

Delaware Bay & River

Cooperate

Lewes, DE

Delaware River Co-Operative

Philadelphia PA

Detroit Area Industrial

Mutual Aid

Detroit, Ml

Evansville Mutual Assistance

Association

Evansville, IN

Fairfax City Petroleum

Terminals Air & Water

Conservation & Safety

Organization

Fairfax, VA

Four Corners Area Oil Control

Coordination Committee

Cortez, CO

Greater Caribbean Energy and

Environmental Foundation

Miami, FL

Greater Cincinnati Hazardous

Material Control Committee

Cincinnati, OH

Green Bay Oil Men’s Clean

Waters Control Board

Green Bay, WI

Humboldt Bay Oil Spill

Cooperative

Eureka CA

Jacksonville Spillage

Control, Inc

Jacksonville, FL

Marine Industry Group

Gretna LA

Massachusetts Petroleum Council

Boston, MA

Memphis Area Petroleum

Assistance Association

Memphis, TN

Metro-Milwaukee Petroleum

Operations Group

Middletown-Portland Cooperative

Portland, CT

Miss-Ota-Croix Oil Control

Coordination Committee

St Paul, MN

Montana-Wyoming Oil Control

Coordination Committee

Laurel, MT

Muskegon Tri-Cities Mutual

Assistance Association

North Muskegon, Ml

Mutual Assistance Pact-Wichita

Tulsa, OK

Nashville Mutual Assistance

Association

Nashville, TN

National Fire Protection

Association

Quincy, MA

Neches River Oil Control

committee

Beaumont, TX

New Haven Harbor Petroleum

Cooperative

New Haven, CT

Norwalk Abatement Committee

Norwalk, CT

Oil City Petroleum Co-op

Committee

Oceanside, NY

Pensacola Spillage

Control, Inc

Pensacola, FL

Peoria-Tazewell Conservation

Committee

Pekin, IL

Petroleum Committee of

Sioux Falls for Environmental

Protection

Yankton, SD

Plattsburg-Lake Champlain Oil

Spill Control Committee

Plattsburgh, NY

Port of Miami Spillage

Cleanup Committee

Miami, FL

Port Manatee Environmental

Protection Association

Palmetto, FL

Port of Palm Beach Environmental

Protection Committee

Riviera Beach, FL

Port Canaveral/Brevard County

Spillage Cleanup Committee, Inc

Cape Canaveral, FL

Port Everglades Spillage

Committee

Ft. Lauderdale, FL

Portsmouth Harbor Oil Spill

Committee

Concord, NH

Pt. Everglades Spillage Cleanup

Ft Lauderdale, FL

Roanoke Valley Mutual Aid

Association

Roanoke, VA

Savannah River Oil Control

Coordinating committee

Savannah, GA

Southeast Wyoming Oil Spill

Cooperative

Casper, WY

Stamford West Branch Harbor

Association

Stamford, CT

Tampa Port Committee for

Spillage Control, Inc

Tampa FL

Texas City Harbor Oil Spillage

Contingency Program

Texas City, TX

Thames River petroleum

Cooperative

Norwich, CT

The Port of Mobile Oil Spill

cooperative

Mobile, AL

Toledo Harbor Spill Control

Committee

Toledo, OH

Tri-City Industrial

Anti-Pollution Committee

Braintree, MA

Tri-State Pollution Prevention

and Cleanup Committee

Charleston, WV

Tulsa Area Oil Control Committee

Tulsa OK

Ulster/Greene Counties Harbor

Pollution Control Cooperative

Port Ewen, NY

Utica-Rome Oil Pollution Control

Committee

Marcy, NY

Vicksburg Association for Clean

Port & River

Vicksburg, MS

Will-Grundy Industrial

Conservation Committee

Lockport, IL

Milwaukee, WI

SOURCE: Robert .%hulze, op clt, footnote 5
Appendix C

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the many individuals and organizations in the United States and abroad who

shared their special knowledge, expertise, and information with us in the preparation of this study.

We are especially indebted to those who participated in our oil spill countermeasures workshop

and to those who critiqued our first draft.

Special thanks go to John S. Lemlin of the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Organization in London, who organized a

comprehensive series of meetings for us with government and industry organizations responsible for

combating oil spills in Europe, and to our gracious

hosts in the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Norway.

Participants, OTA Workshop on Oil

Spill Countermeasures Technology,

August 15, 1989

David Evans

National Institute of Standards and

Technology

Mervin Fingas

Environment Canada

Jack R. Gould

American Petroleum Institute

Gerald Greener

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Stuart A. Horn

Mobil Oil Corp.

Don Kash

University of Oklahoma “

Virgil Keith

Engineering Computer Optecnomics, Inc.

James T. Leigh

Delaware Bay & River Cooperative

Jack Mortenson

Clean Bay, Concord, California

Jim O’Brien

OOPS, Inc.

M. Ruud Ouwerkerk

IHC Dredge Technology Corp.

John Teal

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Peter A. Tebeau

U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development

Center

Ed Tennyson

Minerals Management Service

William Walker

Naval Sea Systems Command

Richard Willis

Engineering Computer Optecnomics, Inc.

Donald B. Wood

Exxon Production Research Co.

Other Contributors

Winy Anderson

State Pollution Control Authority (Norway)

James Caldwell

RBI, Inc.

Wayne Becker

U.S. Coast Guard

Ken Blower

British Petroleum International, Ltd.

(London, U. K.)

Simon Bommelje

Texaco Petroleum (Netherlands)

Charles Bookman

National Research Council

Larry Coker

Exxon Chemical Co.

John D. Costello

PIRO Implementation, Inc.

David Creole

U.S. Coast Guard

Brian Dicks

ITOPF, Ltd. (London, U. K.)

Dennis Dooley

Alaska Oil Spill Commission

68
Appendix C–Acknowledgments .69

Mike Emge

U.S. Coast Guard

Tony Greenwood

Esso U.K. (London, U. K.)

John Gregory

Minerals Management Service

Amy R. Hammer

Exxon Corp.

Biff Holt

U.S. Coast Guard

Steve Hobkinson

Vikoma International, Ltd. (Cowes, U. K.)

Kurt Jakobson

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Donald S. Jensen

U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development

Center

Jan Lane

U.S. Department of Energy

Capt. R.M. Larrabee

U.S. Coast Guard

Martin Lee

Congressional Research Service

John S. Lemlin

International Petroleum Industry

Environmental Conservation Association

(London, U. K.)

Doug Lentsch

U.S. Coast Guard

D.W. Lerch

MARCO Pollution Control

M.D. Long

Oil Spill Service Centre (Southampton, U. K.)

Ottar Longva

State Pollution Control Authority (Norway)

Ron Maccaroni

U.S. General Accounting Office

Hamish McLeod

Department of Transport (London, U. K.)

Jim Makris

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Marthe Melguen

CEDRE (France)

T.H. Moller

ITOPF, Ltd. (London, U. K.)

Alan Molyneux

Texaco (Belgium)

Hugh Parker

ITOPF, Ltd. (London, U. K.)

Walter Parker

Alaska Oil Spill Commission

Georges Peigne

CEDRE (France)

Tormod Petterson

Esso Norge as. (Norway)

Brent Pyburn

BP International Ltd. (Southampton, U. K.)

Keith C. Reynolds

Vikoma International Ltd. (Cowes, U. K.)

Nabil Saad

Exxon Chemical Co.

Daniel F. Sheehan

U.S. Coast Guard

Lisa Speer

Natural Resources Defense Council

Robert Steele

Exxon Production Research Co.

Widar Skogly

Norsk Oljevernforening For Operatorselskap

(Norway)

Joseph Stahovec

Naval Sea Systems Command

Jan Thorman

Minerals Management Service

Bernard Tramier

Elf Aquitaine (France)

Marjorie Walsh

Exxon Chemical Co.

Robert Williams

Novatec, Inc.

Ian C. White

ITOPF, Ltd. (London, U. K.)
Appendix D

Acronyms

API

CEC

CEDRE

DOT

DOI

EPA

MPCU

MMS

NOFO

American Petroleum Institute

Commission of European

Communities

Center for Documentation,

Research, and Experimentation on

Accidental Pollution (France)

Department of Transportation

Department of the Interior

Environmental Protection Agency

Marine Pollution Control Unit

(United Kingdom)

Minerals Management Service

Norwegian Clean Seas Association

for Operating Companies

(Norway)

OHMSETT Oil and Hazardous Materials

Simulated Environmental Test

Tank

OSR Oil Spill Response Ltd.

(Southampton, U. K.)

OSC On-Scene Coordinator

PIRO Petroleum Industry Response

Organization

USCG United States Coast Guard

SPCA State Pollution Control Authority

(Norway)

VOSS Vessel-of-Opportunity Skimming

Systems

70