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29–836PDF 2006

9/11 FIVE YEARS LATER:

GAUGING ISLAMIST TERRORISM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND 

NONPROLIFERATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 7, 2006

Serial No. 109–212

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NONPROLIFERATION

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

DARRELL ISSA, California, Vice Chairman 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

TOM SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DON MACDONALD, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

EDWARD A. BURRIER, Professional Staff Member 

GENELL BROWN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs, The Heritage 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 5

Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, The Center 

for Security Policy ................................................................................................ 10

Walid Phares, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies ..................................................................................................................... 23

Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson, Deputy Director, Transnational Threats Project 

and Fellow, Center for Stratgic and International Studies .............................. 30

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Peter Brookes: Prepared statement ................................................................ 7

Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.: Prepared statement .................................................... 13

Walid Phares, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 26

Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson: Prepared statement .................................................. 34

(1)

9/11 FIVE YEARS LATER: 

GAUGING ISLAMIST TERRORISM 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

AND NONPROLIFERATION, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:28 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing will now come to order. Monday, September 11, 2006, marks the 5-year anniversary of the terrorist attacks launched by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network against 

the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which killed over 3,000 

U.S. citizens. On this day, Americans will appropriately remember 

their fallen countrymen. Inevitably, the question will be asked: Are 

we safer? Yes, we are, but the unfortunate reality is that the 

Islamist terrorist threat to our country will endure, perhaps for 

decades. Today’s hearing is meant to gauge progress in the struggle 

against Islamist terrorism with a view toward policy and educating 

the American public about this threat. 

As President Bush stated this week, and as this Subcommittee 

has examined, al-Qaeda since 9/11—under the attack by the United 

States and others—has had to drastically reconfigure. Recently, 

British authorities disrupted a plot to simultaneously explode up to 

10 commercial airliners over the Atlantic Ocean en route to the 

United States. Although the plot appears to involve several ‘‘homegrown’’ British jihadists of Pakistani descent, connections to Pakistan may suggest firmer command and control by ‘‘al-Qaeda central’’ than counterterrorism officials previously understood. As 

summed up recently by a top British official, the threat from 

Islamist terrorists ‘‘is real, it’s here, it’s deadly, and it’s enduring.’’

This summer offered a stark reminder of state-sponsored terrorism, as Iran-backed Hezbollah rained rockets on Israel. I was in 

Haifa during one of those attacks and I saw the damage. These 

rockets can only be fired indiscriminately and are used to terrorize 

civilians. I saw a hospital, Rambam, where there were over 500 

people injured by these rocket attacks. Hezbollah is formidable. 

Prime Minister Olmert suggested to me that the press revelations 

of intelligence and security methods have hampered their counterterrorism efforts. 

Just as the terrorists have evolved, we as a Government and society must evolve too. 

2

Judge Richard Posner wrote last month:

‘‘To the extent that our laws do handicap us in fighting terrorists, it is one more sign that we do not take the threat of terrorism seriously enough to be willing to reexamine a commitment to a rather extravagant conception of civil liberties that 

was formed in a different and safer era.’’

The overreaction to the Administration’s terrorist surveillance program, which aims to intercept al-Qaeda communications, tells me 

that Judge Posner is on the mark. The desperate need today is to 

find out who the terrorists are, and we shouldn’t shy away from 

doing so aggressively. 

We should learn a few lessons from others who have extensive 

experience in dealing with terrorism on their soil. One way to do 

this would be to restart the debate over the creation of a domestic 

intelligence service without police powers, similar to the British 

MI5. Criminal prosecution and intelligence collection are vastly different tasks, and to date, several have given the FBI poor marks 

on intelligence collection. We wouldn’t need to consider such steps 

if the threat weren’t all too deadly and enduring. 

The challenge is grave. Looking across the map, Islamists have 

taken control of large swaths of territory in Somalia, and other 

parts of Africa remain susceptible to terrorist exploitation; our dependence upon Middle East oil funds schools of hate; Iraq’s future 

is at a crossroads; Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons; 

Afghanistan is showing worrying signs of regression; in the world’s 

largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, a once tolerant Islam, is being 

radicalized; in Europe, a large, mobile, and educated Muslim population includes some who are attracted to terrorism, and who hold 

passports that do not require a visa to enter the United States; in 

the tri-border area of South America, Hezbollah raises funds; the 

Caucasus, southern Thailand . . . almost nowhere is immune to 

radical Islamist thought, and all parts of this chessboard are equally urgent. Complacency is another enemy we face, including here 

at home, where things as elementary as border security have been 

woefully neglected, as the Subcommittee heard in July field hearings. 

Moving forward, we won’t have lasting success against Islamist 

terrorism until we are able to counter al-Qaeda’s ideological appeal. 

Given the large number of people around the world already sympathetic to Osama bin Laden, this will be a monumental effort. But 

with proliferating access to WMD knowledge and material, none 

more important. All means of national power must be harnessed 

for this effort. 

I will close by commenting on the tendency of some to ascribe 

most every terrorist threat to our Nation. Listening to some would 

have you believe that there would be no terrorism were it not for 

supposed shortcomings of Administration policy. They have failed 

to note that the forces driving terrorism—Islamic radicalism—have 

been long in the making. Indeed, our Nation was attacked several 

times before 9/11. Constructive criticism is good, but the bottom 

line is that we haven’t been hit since 9/11, despite facing a determined and resourceful enemy. Homeland and national security policy, while not perfect, deserves credit for this. 

3

I will now turn to the Ranking Member for any opening comments he may have. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these hearings. It is appropriate as we approach the fifth anniversary of September 11 that we look at the last 5 years and we look at the global war on terror. And I want to echo your comments that this is 

not a matter where a change in U.S. foreign policy would do anything more than whet the appetite of those planning every day to 

kill as many Americans as possible. 

We should point out that when 9/11 was being conceived and 

planned was the high point of the Israeli-Arab peace process, a 

time at which Israel was making the maximum level of concessions 

and when there was minimum violence in the territories. And yet 

that was the very time that Osama bin Laden plotted his attacks. 

It is very clear that bin Laden would not be satisfied with a change 

in the United States/Israel policy. He wishes the destruction of the 

Saudi Government, and that would only whet his appetite until the 

Iberian Peninsula was once again returned to Islamic rule, et 

cetera, et cetera. We cannot appease those who demand one bite of 

the apple. We would whet their appetite for more. 

We most focus on one thing and that is nuclear weapons in the 

hands of the Iranian state. I don’t think anybody in this room 

needs me to go through the rendition, but I will point out that nuclear weapons in the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran could 

be used against Israel, could be smuggled into the United States, 

or could be used against the Iranian people should there ever be 

an uprising or an endangerment of this regime. 

Now, the Administration has an image in the world as being 

super aggressive. The decision not to just confront and threaten 

Saddam, but to invade Iraq, is the one thing that the Administration is known for, and this was an area where they were over aggressive. But with the exception of the invasion of Iraq, this Administration has done little or nothing among the many things it 

should have done. 

Now, we also did invade Afghanistan, but my friend Dennis 

Kucinich voted for that. It is hard to say the Administration was 

blazing trails of aggressiveness in its decision to invade Afghanistan and topple the Taliban. But it is in the area of dealing with 

Iran where we have been meekest and most ineffectual, and the 

centrifuges turn as we talk. 

Now, President Ahmadinejad has told us what we should do. He 

says we should bow down and surrender. Mr. Ahmadinejad, we already have. We have opened our markets to Iranian exports, not 

oil, but just the stuff they couldn’t sell anywhere else and that we 

don’t need. We refuse to apply the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, and 

while there was a time when foreign oil companies would abstain 

from investing in Iran because they feared that perhaps the United 

States would actually follow the law, they have learned that this 

Administration is willing to—I don’t know whether it is quite a 

criminal act, but it is certainly a failure to carry out the law with 

regard to investments in the energy sector of Iran. And as a result, 

the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act may be extended by this Congress but 

will be ignored by this Administration. 

4

The Administration acquiesces in well over a billion dollars of 

concessionary World Bank loans. So I have to go back to my constituents, some of whom, as all of our constituents do, question 

whether we should have an assertive foreign policy or foreign aid 

or any involvement. Isolationism has always been a strain in America. And I have to admit to them that while I support foreign aid, 

a portion of our foreign aid money is going to Tehran, and the Administration let it happen. Of course, the money gets laundered at 

the World Bank before it actually goes to Tehran. 

And then, finally, the State Department decides to give a visa to 

Iranian former President Khatami. So you have an individual who, 

for quite a period of years, headed the largest terror organization 

in the world—namely, the Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Iran—who is invited into our country. 

But that isn’t enough. Unlike every other Iranian, he is not subject to fingerprinting. But that isn’t enough. We decide to use taxpayer dollars to subsidize the terrorism tour, the terrorism promotion tour of President Khatami. Yes, our tax dollars are paying 

for his security. You may wonder what kind of security the Islamic 

Republic gave to our officials when they were last in Tehran, or 

you may wonder who pays the security when the Rolling Stones 

tour America, and then you realize the Rolling Stones aren’t promoting terrorism, Khatami is. And you can claim that Khatami 

wasn’t the number one official in the Iranian regime when he had 

the title of President. Does that matter? Do we invite the number 

two or the number three or the number 5 official of al-Qaeda to 

tour our country? No. 

But there is a certain symmetry to all of this. During Khatami’s 

administration in Iran, that government, both before and after 

9/11, provided safe harbor and protection to al-Qaeda terrorists and 

used Iranian taxpayer dollars to do so. 

Today, during the Bush Administration, United States taxpayer 

dollars are used to provide safe harbor and protection for Khatami. 

So, you see, everything is balanced. 

We need an Administration that really places stopping Iran having nuclear weapons as its number one priority, not just in word 

but in deed. The problem with this Administration is that it has 

literally hundreds of first priorities. Oh, sure, getting Russian cooperation in the Security Council on the Iran issue is a number one 

priority. But so is making sure that Russia’s influence over 

Moldova is reduced, and so is trying to prevent Russia from having 

any influence in Belarus or Chechnya. So we have a circumstance 

where we will not link in our discussions with Russia anything 

they care about with what we supposedly link as a first priority. 

Likewise, in dealing with China, we never link their currency 

manipulation and our willingness to turn a blind eye to it with 

their support for Iran and the Security Council. The result will be 

either no sanctions or ridiculously weak sanctions. 

We will not be able to turn to the Iranian people and point out 

to them that there is an economic cost and a world relationship 

cost to the policy of their government to keep the centrifuges turning. And the only bright spot for this Administration is that the 

Iranian nuclear test will not occur until after it leaves office. 

5

Ahmadinejad tells us to bow down and surrender. I think a foreign policy that refuses linkage in our discussions with Russia and 

China, and that admits Khatami for a tour of the United States for 

him to support terrorism, indicates that Mr. Ahmadinejad’s advice 

is being accepted in the White House. I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. I understand that two of our witnesses have travel 

plans. I apologize for our late start because we had a series of votes 

on the Floor. Perhaps we should go to Mr. Peter Brookes and Mr. 

Frank Gaffney first. I will briefly introduce the two of you. If you 

summarize to 3 minutes, and then we could ask you some questions; and then, Dr. Phares, we will go to you and Mr. Sanderson, 

and we will be back on schedule. 

Peter Brookes is a Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National 

Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation. He is the author of 

the recently published book, A Devil’s Triangle: Terrorism, Weapons 

of Mass Destruction and Rogue States. He was recently appointed 

by Congress as a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission. Among his previous positions he has served as 

a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs and as a staff member on this very Committee. 

We also have Frank Gaffney, the founder and president of the 

Center for Security Policy in Washington, DC. He is the lead author of War Footing: 10 Steps America Must Take to Prevail in the 

War for the Free World. In addition to being a weekly columnist for 

the Washington Times, Mr. Gaffney has also contributed to a number of national publications. Previously he served as the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security policy, as well as 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and 

Arms Control Policy. 

Gentlemen, we will start with Mr. Brookes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PETER BROOKES, SENIOR FELLOW, 

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. BROOKES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members of 

the Committee. It is an honor and privilege to be here with you 

today and be back in my old haunts when I served under Chairman Ben Gilman. 

I also want to commend you for this very timely hearing. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Pull the microphone a little closer. 

Mr. BROOKES. Okay. And I also, before I get started here, I also 

want to say that these views are my own and don’t represent the 

views of my employer, the Heritage Foundation. I will just go 

ahead and summarize quickly, Mr. Chairman, so we can try to 

move along as quickly as possible. 

I remember where I was on September 11. I happened to be on 

the taxiway at Dulles Airport while planes were being flown into 

the World Trade Center and into the Pentagon, and but for the 

grace of God, I was almost on American Airlines Flight 77 when 

I was heading out to Hawaii, South Korea, and Japan on official 

duties. I chose a later flight, but I was out there on the taxiway. 

And that brush with fate tells me that we really have two—makes 

me very much in touch with the idea that we have two enemies in 

the war on terror; one is terrorism and the other is complacency. 

6

I am really worried about that today. I disagree with many of 

those who say today that the threat is no longer with us. I think 

that that is exactly what those who wish to hurt us would like us 

to believe. I think we have made progress in fighting terrorism, but 

my view is that this long war is far from over. I am concerned 

about some recent events such as the stalemate in the war between 

Israel and Hezbollah and how it may have buoyed the political 

Islamists and Islamist extremists, and that is particularly troubling to me. 

Iran and Afghanistan also continue to be significant and highly 

symbolic challenges on the terror front. I think a premature withdrawal from either would only embolden Islamic radicals and terrorist extremists in their efforts, leading to more death and destruction for Americans and others. I think we are dealing with a 

protean or evolving enemy. A lot of these terrorists, as you know, 

are home grown. They are being radicalized by clerics over the 

Internet, by terrorist recruiters. Terrorist groups now not only include males, but there are women; there are even pregnant mothers, as we saw in the U.K. plot, and converts to Islam, too. 

My view is that al-Qaeda is no longer a terrorist group, as it was 

on 9/11, but it is a terrorist movement. And I think it has become 

a worldwide inspiration to terrorist ‘‘wannabes’’ around the world, 

and I think this makes terrorism for us today more diverse geographically. It makes it less predictable overall and more challenging to defeat. 

I do believe also that our first line of defense is good, actionable 

intelligence. That definitely includes the most vigorous collection 

and analysis of foreign and domestic terrorist-related information 

that our domestic laws and American values such as civil liberties 

will permit. 

I support well-crafted intelligent law enforcement programs like 

the National Security Agency’s terrorist surveillance program, the 

PATRIOT Act, and the tracking of terrorist-related international financial transactions, among others. 

International intelligence and law enforcement operations are a 

force multiplier in fighting the transnational threat of terrorism. 

Al-Qaeda and its acolytes continue to improve and evolve their 

operational terrorist techniques and trade craft and are becoming 

increasingly sophisticated in their handiwork. They are making 

tremendous use of the Internet, as you well know, for passing operational information, sharing terrorist trade craft information, and 

recruiting new members and fundraising. 

Moreover, while al-Qaeda is crippled, it is not dead, and its ability to inspire other would-be terrorists may be greater than ever. 

Even more troubling are the growing ties among terrorist groups 

and their sponsors and between terrorist state sponsors of terrorism like Iran and Syria. 

While some groups may not seem to be natural allies, divided by 

sectarian, ethnic, or other cultural divides, they are clearly willing 

to cooperate with each other in achieving common objectives. 

Another issue that I think needs to be looked at, and you mentioned it, Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks, is safe havens. 

I am particularly worried about the agreement between Pakistan 

and some groups along the Afghan border. I think that the ComVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:19 Oct 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\ITN\090706\29836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
7

mittee really should look into this issue. It is not quite clear to me 

exactly what we are dealing with here, but I have concerns that alQaeda’s presence in the Pakistan territorial areas, and also as we 

press the offensive in Afghanistan, that Taliban members might 

find refuge or safe haven in Pakistan. So I think that is something 

that the Committee should look at. 

I am also worried about Indonesia and the Philippines, as you 

mentioned, as well as Somalia. 

The bottom line: While we have made significant progress in securing the homeland and fighting terrorism overseas, complacency 

about this challenge will prove to be deadly, potentially making the 

horrors of 9/11 seem minor in comparison. 

Our Nation, our citizens, our Nation’s interests, are still squarely 

in the terrorists’ cross-hairs. The fact that we haven’t suffered a 

terrorist attack in almost 5 years probably has more to do with 

their inability to undertake an attack in the post-9/11 environment, 

due to homeland security measures and improved intelligence, than 

their desire to strike us. Well-intentioned hopes and wishes that Islamic terror is something that happens overseas, such as in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, the U.K., or Spain, or is limited to the unspeakable 

horrors of 9/11 nearly 5 years ago, are not based in reality in my 

view. 

We have to continue to be more imaginative and innovative in 

fighting terrorism, but especially overseas where counterterrorism 

partners and security may not be as vigilant or as effective as it 

is here at home. Regrettably, this latest conspiracy in the U.K. may 

not be the last of terrorist plots meant to occur on or near the fifth 

anniversary of 9/11 by al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda followers. It certainly 

won’t be the last major terrorist scheme we face in our life as 

Americans. But, Mr. Chairman, equally dangerous is our own complacency about the safety and security of this great Nation against 

the Islamic terrorist threat. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you Mr. Brookes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brookes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. PETER BROOKES, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL

SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is an honor and privilege to appear 

before you today to discuss the issue of Islamist terrorism in the shadow of the fifth 

anniversary of the tragedy of 9/11. 

I want to commend you for holding this very timely hearing as there are many 

questions being asked that should be addressed in a prestigious, open forum such 

as this. 

I am testifying here today as an individual, and my views do not necessarily reflect the views of my employer, The Heritage Foundation. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my remarks and submit 

my full testimony for the record. 

Mr. Chairman, like every other American of a certain age, I’ll never forget where 

I was on the morning of September 11th, 2001. 

While planes were crashing into the World Trade Center, I sat on the taxiway 

at Dulles airport on a United Airlines flight 837 bound for San Francisco, just a few 

planes behind the ill-fated American Airlines flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon, where I served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. 

Just two weeks prior to 9/11, my executive assistant, Judy Stephens, had offered 

me the choice of the earlier American Airlines flight—flight 77—as I planned my 

trip to meet with defense counterparts at Pacific Command in Hawaii, Japan and 

South Korea. 

8

I chose the later fight, but for the grace of God do I sit here before you today. 

That brush with fate—and the continual troubling news from abroad such as the 

British foiling of a terrorist plot to bring down airliners over the Atlantic—reinforces 

to me that we have two enemies in the War on Terror: the terrorists themselves 

and our own complacency. 

Just shy of five years since 9/11, even though we have made progress in fighting 

extremism, the reality is that the ‘‘Long War’’ against terrorism appears to be far

from over. 

The ‘‘stalemate’’ in the recent Israel-Hezbollah war, and how it has buoyed not 

only political Islamists and Islamic extremists, but Iran and Syria as well, is particularly troubling. 

Iraq and Afghanistan also continue to be significant—and highly symbolic—challenges on the terror front. In my view, Iraq and Afghanistan still remain the central 

fronts in the War on Terror. A premature withdrawal from either would only embolden Islamic radicals and terrorist extremists in their efforts, leading to more 

death and destruction for Americans and others. 

But this latest major terrorist conspiracy in the U.K., described by British authorities as an act to commit ‘‘mass murder on an unimaginable scale,’’ calls for us 

to pay attention to some new—and enduring—lessons as we continue fighting terrorism both at home and abroad. 

First: We’re dealing with a protean enemy. Today’s terrorists are often ‘‘homegrown,’’ being radicalized both at home and abroad by terrorist recruiters, clerics 

and over the Internet. Terrorist groups now include women, pregnant mothers, and 

converts to Islam. The recent U.K. airline plot and last year’s 7/7 London attacks 

are evidence of these trends. 

Al Qaeda—which was a terrorist group on 9/11—is now a global terrorist movement. Much to his frustration, Osama bin Laden is now more of a worldwide inspiration to his terrorist ‘‘disciples’’ than an active commander, directing day-day terrorist operations. 

Unfortunately, Osama bin Laden’s loss of operational control has served al 

Qaeda’s purposes, making Islamic terrorism more diverse geographically, less predictable overall and more challenging to defeat. 

Second: Our first line of defense is good, actionable intelligence. That definitely 

includes the most vigorous collection and analysis of foreign—and domestic—terrorist-related information that our domestic laws and American values, such as civil 

liberties, will permit. 

The foiling of the U.K. airline plot and other terrorist plots clearly shows the importance—and wisdom—behind well-crafted intelligence and law enforcement programs like the National Security Agency’s Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), the 

Patriot Act and the tracking of terrorist-related international financial transactions, 

among others. 

Third: International intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation is a force multiplier in fighting the transnational threat of terrorism. The U.S./U.K. collaboration 

in foiling this terrorist operation is well known, but cooperation with Pakistan 

proved to be critical in ending the conspiracy. The recent bombing plot against 

trains in Germany was nipped in the bud by a tip from Lebanese intelligence. 

International cooperation in intelligence and law enforcement allows authorities 

to be proactive, rather than reactive, in fighting the terrorist scourge. Being ahead 

of the curve means preventing lives from being taken by terrorists instead of investigating how terrorists took the lives after the fact. 

A note of caution is also warranted in framing counterterrorism cooperation. 

When sharing sensitive counterterrorism information, it is critical that the U.S. find 

‘‘trusted agents’’ within foreign government intelligence and law enforcement agencies that in some cases are penetrated by radicals and or extremists, working 

against our efforts. 

Fourth: Al Qaeda and its acolytes continue to improve and evolve their operational terrorist techniques and tradecraft, including becoming increasingly sophisticated in their handiwork. They are already making tremendous use of the Internet 

for passing operational information, sharing terrorist tradecraft information, recruiting new members and fundraising. 

The recent U.K. plot is a good example of their efforts at innovation: These terrorists reportedly planned to smuggle undetectable components such as ‘‘liquid explosive ingredients and detonating devices disguised as beverages, electronic devices, 

and other common objects’’ aboard the targeted aircraft. 

While this looks similar to a mid-’90s al Qaeda operation code-named Bojinka

hatched out of the Philippines to bring down 10 or so U.S. planes over the Pacific, 

these new techniques were meant to evade post-9/11 security scrutiny. 

9

You can’t help but wonder whether any airport screeners—in Britain or anywhere 

else—would have been able to prevent the execution of this sophisticated plot if it 

hadn’t been interrupted before it went into action. 

While al Qaeda is crippled, it is not dead—and its ability to inspire other wouldbe terrorists may be greater than ever. Even more troubling are the growing ties 

among terrorist groups and their state sponsors—and between state sponsors of terrorism like Iran and Syria. While some groups may not seem to be natural allies, 

divided by sectarian, ethnic or other cultural divides, they are clearly willing to cooperate with each other in achieving common objectives. 

Another critical issue is the outcome in Iraq. A failure to defeat terrorism in Iraq 

will only validate—once again—its use as a deadly, political tool, encouraging others 

to embrace the ideology and tactics of terrorism. 

Safe havens, more specifically preventing the establishment of terrorist safe havens, are also an important issue. In this regard, I am particularly worried about 

the islands of the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos, Pakistan’s border with 

Afghanistan and Somalia. 

The bottom line? While we’ve made significant progress in securing the homeland 

and fighting terrorism overseas, complacency about the challenge of Islamist terrorism will prove to be deadly, potentially making the horrors of 9/11 seem minor 

in comparison. 

Our nation, our citizens and our national interests are still squarely in the terrorists’ crosshairs. The fact that we have not suffered a terrorist attack here in the 

United States in nearly five years may have more to do with their inability to undertake an attack in the post-9/11 environment due to the homeland security measures we’ve taken and improvements in intelligence collection and analysis than their 

desire to strike us. 

Well-intentioned hopes and wishes that Islamic terrorism is something that now 

only happens overseas, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, the U.K. or Spain, or was limited to the unspeakable horrors of 9/11, nearly five years ago, are not based in reality—in my view. 

This means that we have to be more imaginative and innovative in our defense 

of our interests than the terrorists are on offense. We shouldn’t only be looking for 

terrorists under the proverbial lamppost because that is where the light is brightest. 

We have to continue to be imaginative and innovative in fighting terrorism. 

For instance, we need new security procedures, education, technologies and intelligence sources that can detect and prevent terrorist attacks against American interests and citizens—especially overseas—where counterterrorism or security may not 

be as vigilant or effective as it is here at home. 

Of course, being on the offense against the terrorists—using all of the ‘‘hard’’—

and ‘‘soft’’—instruments of national power, and in cooperation with international 

partners on intelligence and law enforcement—is our best defense. 

Regrettably, the U.K. airliner conspiracy may not be the last of the terror plots 

meant to occur on or near the fifth anniversary of 9/11 by al Qaeda or al Qaedawannabes. It certainly won’t be the last major terrorist scheme we will face in our 

lifetimes as Americans. 

While the foiled U.K. plot was a clear win in the War on Terror, probably preventing the death of as many—or more than—the number who tragically died on 

9/11, equally dangerous to our safety and security at home and abroad is our own 

complacency about the safety and security of this great nation against the Islamist 

terrorist threat.

Heritage Foundation Senior Fellow Peter Brookes is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Hill staffer, CIA officer and Naval officer, and the author of the 

book ‘‘A Devil’s Triangle: Terrorism, WMD and Rogue States.’’ (Rowman & 

Littlefield, 2005) 

CONNECTING DOTS: NSA NEEDS PHONE RECORDS

New York Post Online Edition 

Peter Brookes

May 16, 2006—Gen. Michael Hayden is going to get an early Memorial Day BBQing on Thursday. The CIA director-nominee will appear before the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence, and the senators are sure to go ballistic over the National Security Agency’s telephone-calling-record database. Yet, despite the nonsense 

that the politically motivated mainstream media and the left have been spouting on 

the NSA program, this critical counterterrorism effort isn’t intrusive, illegal—or unnecessary. 

10

Let’s start by dispelling some of the more prominent myths perpetuated about the 

program: 

It’s intrusive: Wrong. The billions of telephone-calling records voluntarily provided 

to the NSA by AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth are anonymous. This means they’re 

just phone numbers—the caller’s names/addresses aren’t identified in the calling 

record. 

Moreover, these records include nothing on any of the substance of the phone 

calls—just the number, the date and duration. This doesn’t mean that your phone 

calls are being monitored by the NSA—or anyone else. That requires a court order. 

It’s illegal: Wrong. It’s perfectly legal for the government to receive this information. These are considered mere business records. In fact, the Supreme Court has 

explicitly ruled that the Fourth Amendment (i.e., the right against unreasonable 

search and seizure) doesn’t include phone-calling records. 

In Smith v. Maryland (1979), the court found that the Fourth Amendment doesn’t 

protect calling records because when you voluntarily use the phone, you voluntarily 

share that info with every telephone company that handles the call along the way 

to its destination. 

It’s unnecessary: Wrong. The program is focused on terrorists, especially the al 

Qaeda threat. While we’ve made progress in neutralizing al Qaeda, the terrorist 

group remains dangerous and deadly—and has promised to strike here at home 

again. 

In fact, the decentralization of al Qaeda has made it a more unpredictable (i.e., 

challenging) target for homeland security. And the bombings in London last July remind us of the increased threat arising from homegrown terrorists. 

The most glaring absence in all the uproar is a good example of how this information might be used to prevent a terrorist act right here in the United States. 

Suppose the FBI identifies—today—a terrorist suspect (e.g., Terrorist A) located 

right here in the United States from information received from a foreign intelligence 

service after a raid on an al Qaeda safe house abroad. 

Beyond taking immediate steps to prevent a terrorist attack, one of the first questions that law enforcement is going to want to answer is whether Terrorist A is 

working alone, or as part of a cell or larger group operating here. 

There are a couple of ways of determining this. One method is by looking at 

how—and with whom—Terrorist A communicates. This is often referred to as ‘‘communications-network analysis.’’

But, while you might be able to identify with whom Terrorist A is communicating 

by monitoring his phone calls once you’ve determined his terrorist ties, you still 

don’t know with whom else he communicated with in the past. 

That’s why the NSA wanted the calling-record database. With it, law-enforcement 

agents can determine the phone numbers of Terrorist A’s previous contacts. Equally 

importantly, they can find out with whom else Terrorist A’s contacts have talked 

with. 

Through analysis of Terrorist A’s (and associates’) calling patterns using NSA’s 

database and supercomputers, officials can develop a schematic of the terrorist organization’s structure, members—even chain of command. 

In other words, they can connect the dots. 

No telling what a difference such a counterterrorism program might have had in 

preventing 9/11, if such network analysis had been done on the communications patterns of the al Qaeda hijackers. 

Sad to say, we live in a time when we should no longer be shocked at the lengths 

the mainstream media, or other irresponsible leakers of classified information, will 

go to advance their anti-Bush political agenda—even if it means harming our national security. 

We need to remind ourselves that it isn’t by chance that we haven’t had a terrorist attack here in the United States in almost five years. It’s because we’ve established a significant counterterrorism program both at home and abroad, including 

this NSA effort.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Gaffney. 

STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR., PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE CENTER FOR SECURITY 

POLICY 

Mr. GAFFNEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for including me in your 

deliberations on what I think is the single most important issue of 

11

our time; namely, the nature of the conflict in which we find ourselves and what it will take for us to prevail in it. 

I understand you are going to admit into the record all of our 

statements, and I will just very quickly try to summarize key 

points in mine. 

The first is that we do have to be clear about the nature of the 

enemy we are confronting. This war is not about Iraq alone. It is 

not even a war on terror. Though we are fighting a war in Iraq, 

to be sure, and we certainly are confronting the use of terror as an 

asymmetric weapon, it is a grave disservice, it seems to me, to persist in talking to the American people about this as though those 

are really what we are up against, when in fact I think it is much 

more accurate to describe this as a war for the free world, a global 

conflict against, first and foremost, ideological movement. 

Peter has talked about al-Qaeda. I would suggest it is not alQaeda’s movement. Al-Qaeda is one manifestation of something 

that I think is properly described as Islamofascism. That is an important way to characterize this because I think it helps describe 

this as something political and totalitarian, very much of a piece 

with previous movements of a similar kind and different from the 

way most Muslims around the world practice their faith. That is 

critically important for two reasons to make this distinction: One 

is because to do otherwise is to drive all Muslims into the enemy’s 

hands, something that they aspire to, the enemy, and something 

that would be a strategic disaster for us. 

The other reason that we need to understand this as an ideological movement is it compels us to adopt ideological tools to counter 

it. 

In my submitted testimony, Mr. Chairman, I have drawn on 

some of the material that we had in the book that you mention: 

War Footing. I would just very quickly summarize some of those 

ideological tools or counter ideological tools, if you would, as born 

of very much the same sort of mindset that Ronald Reagan used 

to defeat the last terrible totalitarian movement with global ambitions; namely, Soviet communism. They are, in short, a comprehensive strategy using energy, financial, legal and security measures, 

and integrating them into what might be called a political warfare 

program. Its goals should be to undermine and divide the enemy, 

to split apart and peel away the enemy’s base, to deny the enemy 

the social support infrastructure and, needless to say, the safe havens that shelter its forces, fund its operations and provide its 

cadre, pitting enemy factions against one another wherever possible, and most especially, discrediting the ideological belief system 

that legitimizes its cause. 

I have in my submitted remarks a number of recommendations. 

I would only mention a couple very quickly. One is we have got to 

stop evading this issue out of a sense of political correctness or a 

reluctance to talk about ideology or buy into claims by some in the 

Muslim American leadership, about which I will have more to say 

in a minute, that you can’t talk about this ideology and Islam in 

the same sentence. That is wrong. We need to delegitimize Islamist 

extremism, first and foremost, in the eyes of Muslims. And there 

are a number of ways to do that, some of which I think can be very 

effective indeed. 

12

There is a role for Congress. I had the privilege of serving under 

Senator Scoop Jackson many years ago, and witnessed the effect 

that the Jackson-Vanik amendment had in bringing about an end 

to Soviet communism, a start made before Ronald Reagan came 

and finished the job. 

We need to use our strengths. This body is made up of experts 

in the business of political warfare. You and your staff, you and 

your consultants, you and your campaign managers understand 

these tools very well. They need to be vectored at our enemies, not 

just at each other. We need to invest in the tools, the instruments 

of political warfare. 

This Committee, and, Chairman Royce, you in particular, have 

taken an interest in some of these instruments. I commend you for 

that. We need to redouble the effort to get our messages out in the 

variety of media that are available today. We need not least to reinforce and strengthen our friends. This is a point that we lose 

sight of too much, I am afraid. And one of those, Israel, is in the 

front lines of this, and I think we need to look hard at whether we 

are providing it and other allies adequate support. 

You asked for a status report on all this, Mr. Chairman. I would 

just say that I think there have been some steps made in the right 

direction. I am encouraged by some of the statements coming out 

of the Administration, alas, very lately, about the character of the 

enemy and the nature of this ideological movement. But much, 

much more needs to be done. Specifically, I would suggest we need 

to get this country on a war footing, to mobilize it as we have in 

the past when we faced similar kinds of problems. We have to. And 

I commend Congressman Sherman for this. We have to bring coherence to this effort because whether it is the Khatami visit, or 

whether it is the notion that we can’t negotiate with the bin 

Ladens of the world, rightly so, but we can negotiate with their 

Shiia Islamofascist counterparts in Iran is crazy making and, I 

think, discredits our efforts. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would just conclude by saying that one 

of the things that worries me most, I agree with Peter about the 

complacency. I also think we are severely disserved by the efforts 

of those inside our own country who are trying to confuse or obscure or otherwise give comfort to our enemies in this ideological 

movement. And some of these are people who have been built up 

over time as an apparatus inside the United States, as elsewhere, 

for precisely these sorts of political influence or political warfare 

purposes. And I have mentioned a number of organizations that I 

think are of particular concern in this regard, many of them funded 

by the Saudis, our putative allies and friends, but doing real damage to the public’s understanding of the nature of the enemy and 

our mobilization to fight it. 

This is a strategic mistake of the first order, to impute to these 

self-appointed Muslim American leadership organizations the 

standing that they claim, let alone relying upon them to do such 

things as sensitivity training of the FBI and the military about 

how to deal with Muslims. I think this is a grievous mistake. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would just say that we do indeed face 

an increasingly complex and dangerous world. It is a matter of 

time before these enemies secure the weapons of mass destruction 

13

that the Congressman has talked about, and wield them against us 

with devastating effect. 

I agree with your assessment. I am glad you quoted Judge 

Posner who I think is a very thoughtful man on these subjects. We 

must become more serious about this war. The steps that I have 

outlined here and that are elaborated upon in the book, are, I 

think, all going to be adopted. It is a question of whether we do 

it as a matter of urgency and seriousness before we are attacked 

again, and potentially far worse than we were 5 years ago, or 

whether we do it afterwards. 

Thank you for your seriousness on the subject, Mr. Chairman, 

and I appreciate the opportunity to comment on these points. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gaffney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR., PRESIDENT AND CHIEF

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY

Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to be afforded the opportunity to contribute to this 

Committee’s deliberations about what is, arguably, the most important issues of our 

time: the nature of the conflict in which we find ourselves and what it will take for 

us to prevail in it. 

CLARITY ABOUT THE ENEMY

This war is not just about Iraq, any more than it is simply a ‘‘war on terror.’’ To 

be sure, we are fighting in Iraq and we are contending with the use of terror as 

an asymmetric weapon. It is, however, a serious misunderstanding of the nature of 

this war—and a grave disservice to the American people—to confine our thinking 

about it just to the theater or front that is Iraq and what we ‘‘do’’ about it in isolation. The same is true of the characterization that our enemy is ‘‘terror’’ or ‘‘terrorists.’’

Rather, we are in the midst of the latest in a series of death-struggles between, 

on the one hand, a totalitarian ideology bent on world domination and the destruction of all who stand in the way of that goal and, on the other, freedom-loving peoples. I call it the War for the Free World. 

As President Bush and his senior subordinates have pointed out in recent days, 

contemporary totalitarians have much in common with their predecessors, the Fascists, Nazis and Communists. For example, today’s enemies amount to an ideological 

vanguard or cadre that constitute a relatively small percentage of a much larger 

population. Like their forerunners, today’s totalitarians seek to dominate the latter 

through violence, coercion and indoctrination. As ever, propaganda, repression, financial rewards and the prospect of future glory are used to establish and maintain 

effective control of the base. Once that has been accomplished, our generation’s totalitarians will inevitably attempt to conquer other populations and lands, as well. 

There is, of course, an important difference between the current crop of totalitarians and their predecessors: Those that threaten us most immediately cloak their 

cause, and justify their aggressive behavior, with a patina of religion. For this reason, I believe they are most accurately described as ‘‘Islamofascists’’ (or Islamist, for 

short). President Bush has used a variation on the theme, calling them ‘‘Islamic fascists.’’

WHY THE IDEOLOGICAL ASPECT MATTERS

It is imperative to appreciate the ideological character of our enemy for two reasons: 

First, recognizing that we are up against a totalitarian political movement permits a strategically vital distinction to be drawn between the vast majority of Muslims around the world who practice their faith in a tolerant, peaceable manner, consistent with the laws and values of civil societies, and the Islamofascists who do not. 

The latter seek to subjugate such Muslims and non-Muslims alike under a Talibanstyle form of repressive religious rule they describe as Shari’a. 

Clarity on this point is made more difficult by three factors: 1) the concerted efforts of some to obscure this distinction (about which I will have more to say in a 

moment); 2) the fact that Islamofascists find in some passages of the Koran and certain traditions in Islam justification for their behavior; and 3) by the success the 

Islamofascists have had in suppressing public expressions of opposition from MusVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:19 Oct 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\ITN\090706\29836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
14

lims who do not subscribe to their Islamist creed. For the moment, however, such 

a distinction clearly does exist and it behooves us to help Muslim opponents of the 

Islamofascists survive and prevail over our common foes. 

Secondly, recognizing that we are up against a totalitarian ideology is essential 

to the adoption of instruments of warfare appropriate to defeating its adherents. 

The U.S. military and our homeland defenders have important roles to play in carrying the fight to the enemy and protecting us against their predations here. They 

must be equipped with the wherewithal to do so. 

For the former, this requires a substantial and sustained ramp-up in defense 

spending, sufficient personnel and training and the steady support of the American 

people for the troops and their mission. The latter must be given intelligence, law 

enforcement and civil defense tools of sufficient quality, utility and flexibility to 

meet the dynamic threats of today and tomorrow. I would put in this category measures like those contained in the Patriot Act, the recently disclosed Terrorism Surveillance Program and bank transaction monitoring effort. 

These steps while absolutely necessary, are not likely to be sufficient. In the final 

analysis, though, this war will be won or lost at the political and ideological level. 

HOW TO WAGE IDEOLOGICAL WAR AGAINST THE ISLAMOFASCISTS

In our recent book entitled War Footing: Ten Steps America Must Take to Prevail 

in the War for the Free World (www.WarFooting.com), my colleagues and I described 

how President Reagan waged political warfare against the last horrific totalitarian 

movement seeking world domination—Soviet Communism. To summarize, these involve:

. . . Marshal[ling] an array of energy, financial, legal, and security measures 

[and] ‘‘integrat[ing them] within an overall strategy of political warfare, a form 

of war that specifically attacks the ideological and psychological factors that motivate our enemies. 

Political and psychological warfare strategies are designed to undermine and 

divide the enemy: splitting apart and peeling away the enemy’s support base; 

denying the enemy the social support infrastructure that shelters its forces, 

funds its operations, and provides its cadres; pitting enemy factions against one 

another; and discrediting the ideological belief system that legitimizes its cause.

In War Footing, we offer a number of specific recommendations about how America could implement such strategies at this juncture. They include the following:

1. Stop evading the issue. No government strategy to date for the so-called ‘‘War 

on Terror’’ has included political warfare as an element of the American arsenal. 

2. Devise, staff up, and begin executing a political warfare strategy. Countering the 

Islamofascist ideology must be its principal focus. 

3. De-legitimize Islamist extremism in the eyes of Muslims, and especially its potential supporters. We need to show that, although violent Islamism is certainly a 

problem for us in the West, it is a vastly greater problem for the Muslim community.

• Challenge the Islamists on religious grounds. Many Muslim leaders teach the 

message of civility and tolerance, and their voices need to be amplified. We 

can help call attention to contradictions between Islamism and the Koran, on 

such matters as prohibitions of violence against Muslims; relations between 

Muslims and ‘‘people of the book’’ (Jews and Christians); the ban on compulsion in religion; the doctrine of jihad; the rules of war; killing of innocent civilians, prohibition of suicide, and so forth.

• Expose economic disaster. There is ample evidence that Islamism, and its imposition of Shari’a law, results in crippling limitations to economic development, and thus to the socioeconomic well-being of Muslims. Relevant cases 

are Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, and Nigeria.

• Celebrate educational opportunity. Radical Islam has a strongly negative effect on educational standards, due to its narrow emphasis on Koranic instruction which fails to equip graduates with any practical job skills, destining 

them for jihad or unemployment. Where Islamists hold sway, an erosion in 

quality similarly afflicts what had been secular educational systems. There is 

evidence, moreover, that with the proliferation of madrassa education, functional illiteracy is spreading, and literacy rates for women are stagnating. 

Any serious effort at political warfare must emphasize the huge costs to societies that do not fully use the talents of half of their population.

• Emphasize progress. Shari’a-ruled countries exhibit a strong bias against 

science and technology education, to the huge detriment of their economic deVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:19 Oct 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\ITN\090706\29836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
15

velopment. The 2004 UN Report on Arab Human Development shows that the 

Arab world has yet to join the Industrial Revolution—let alone the Information Revolution—and that it neither produces much scientific literature nor 

carries out real research. A successful political warfare strategy must highlight this key failure by documenting the numerous religious prohibitions and 

restrictions on scientific and technological pursuit imposed by Islamist ideology.

• Enshrine human rights. The regular and officially sanctioned abuse of basic 

human rights in Shari’a-dominated countries is yet another glaring Islamist 

misdeed that needs to be exposed. Such abuse includes the widespread judicial and customary discrimination and outright mistreatment of women, from 

uncivilized practices such as forced marriages to truly inhumane treatment 

such as genital mutilation and ‘‘honor’’ killings. Virtually all of these extreme 

Islamist tenets and practices stand in direct contradiction to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights—an international human rights standard 

to which all of the Shari’a-dominated countries nominally adhere.

4. Use legislative vehicles for political warfare. Congress has an important role to 

play. The groundbreaking 1972 Jackson-Vanik Amendment made favorable trade relations with the Soviet Union contingent on its permitting free emigration. Under 

the leadership of the remarkable Senator Henry M. Jackson, this legislation proved 

to be a powerful congressionally created political weapon, one that was used to decisive effect in de-legitimizing totalitarian Soviet Communism. Sanctions legislation 

and assistance to democratic opposition movements can serve a similar purpose in 

the War for the Free World. 

5. Use our strengths. The good news is that Americans are among the world’s experts at political warfare. The bad news is that we mainly use it against each other:

After all, the strategies and tactics of any hard-fought election campaign are precisely the stuff of applied political warfare. The talent, creativity, ingenuity, and, 

yes, ruthlessness of top-flight political campaign strategists of both parties should 

be mustered for the purpose of fighting our enemies and helping our friends rather 

than fighting each other. 

The model for such an effort is the ‘‘dollar-a-year man,’’ the highly skilled privatesector leaders who volunteered their services to the government to assist in the 

World War II effort. With this kind of help, we could quickly be well on the way 

to building a national political warfare capability. 

6. Invest in the instruments of political warfare, including public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, intended to influence perceptions, attitudes, and actions abroad, must 

be viewed as a form of political warfare. We have been dramatically underfunding 

an important area of natural American expertise and capability: multimedia communications aimed at foreign audiences. As part of our War Footing strategy, we 

must stop nickel-and-diming our international broadcasting operations. All too frequently in recent years, we have increased transmission to one region at the expense of reducing it to another. 

An immediate and sweeping ramp-up of our international broadcasting capabilities is needed to provide high-quality programming:

• Voice of America; ‘‘free radios’’; new services like Radio Sawa and Al Hurra; 

and support for the extremely effective private-sector broadcasts (for example, 

those beamed into Iran from Los Angeles and more innovative, sometimes 

covertly sponsored forms).

• A range of formats (television, satellite, AM/FM or shortwave radio or both, 

and the Internet).

• Operating twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, where appropriate.

• Serving every country currently or potentially under assault from Islamism.

The cost of such an ambitious undertaking—though appreciably greater than the 

stingy investment we are making in international communications today—pales by 

comparison with the costs of military warfare. The investment will be well repaid 

if it helps us protect and expand the Free World against the Islamists and their 

friends, without resorting to further use of military force. 

7. Use the Internet as a tool of political warfare. In particular, the power of creative Web sites,Webcasting, and blogging should be aggressively exploited. 

8. Strengthen the CIA clandestine services, and authorize and fund them for longterm strategic political warfare. 

9. Grant the Department of Defense the primary responsibility for political warfare. Just as the State Department leads in public diplomacy, the ‘‘warfare’’ side of 

16

communications is legitimately a Pentagon function and must not be assigned to our 

diplomats. 

10. Don’t forget political warfare in non-Islamist areas. The United States must 

combat adversarial political warfare wherever it arises, even in countries traditionally considered friendly. Despite their differences, the United States and Germany 

continue to have strong political, economic, cultural, and military ties. Yet the Socialist/Green coalition ruling Germany during the first years of the war went out 

of bounds in its differences with U.S. policy—to the point of deliberately undermining American security interests for the sake of political gain in domestic elections. When politicians cross the line between opposition and sabotage, the United 

States must have capabilities to battle them politically. 

11. Reinforce and strengthen our friends. By demonstrating that there are not only 

consequences for opposing us, but also real and tangible benefits from supporting 

us, we can maximize the chances of our success. Critical in this regard is the American commitment to the continued survival of one of the most exposed countries of 

the Free World: Israel. 

A STATUS REPORT

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to say that much needs to be done in all of these areas. 

I commend President Bush for the courageous way in which he has begun to talk 

about the Islamic fascists and the totalitarian ideology they seek to use to justify 

the destruction of anti-Islamist Muslims and non-Muslims, alike. This is an absolutely essential precondition to other vital steps. 

Yet, as the foregoing list suggests, unless the President’s rhetoric is backed up 

with decisive actions—that is, putting the country on a true war footing, involving 

among other things, devising the requisite political warfare strategies and applying 

proven techniques to execute them—it will neither deserve nor receive the needed 

support from the American people, let alone translate into victory. 

It is imperative, moreover, that U.S. policy be coherent and that still is not always 

the case. For example, it was striking that, in his excellent speech before the Military Officers Association of America on September 5th, President Bush forcefully explained why it is not possible to appease or negotiate with Islamofascists like al 

Qaeda and its allies. He then proceeded to show convincingly that the behavior and 

ambitions of such Sunni extremists are shared by their Shia counterparts led by 

Iran. Yet, his State Department is actively promoting the notion that we can safely 

and successfully engage in negotiations with Islamofascists like Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad and the ruling mullahs in Tehran. 

Friends and foes alike are affected in ways harmful to our interests by such a 

manifest lack of consistency and principle. (One case in point is the recent, increasingly aggressive behavior of Iran, both directly on the nuclear issue and in Iraq and 

through its proxy, Hezbollah, in Lebanon. Another is the deal recently struck by our 

putative ally, Pakistan with tribal leaders in its western territories, affording what 

amounts to a safe haven there for al Qaeda.) The same applies to the American people. 

THE ENEMY WITHIN

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we must recognize that America’s current totalitarian foe 

enjoys an advantage of which its forerunners could only have dreamt: Thanks in 

large measure to an investment by Saudi Arabia going back three decades and costing many tens of billions of dollars, there is in place in this country an apparatus 

that is at best sympathetic to the Islamists, and at worst an incipient Fifth Column. 

This apparatus has a substantial organizational footprint all across the United 

States. Its elements include: mosques and associated religious schools (madrassas), 

by some estimates 80% of which have their financing provided by Saudi Arabia; indoctrination efforts on college campuses; recruitment programs run under the guise 

of prison and military chaplain programs; and front organizations responsible for political influence operations aimed at professional, ecumenical, media and governmental targets. 

The Bush Administration, the Congress and the press must be alive to the danger 

posed by such entities and their activities. This is especially true insofar as these 

organizations have realized that, by cloaking themselves as adherents to a religion

rather than an ideological movement, they can exploit civil liberties afforded by tolerant liberal democracies to undermine them. 

Yet, to an astonishing degree, nearly five years into the active phase of this War 

for the Free World, we continue to treat many of these organizations—notably, the 

Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Islamic Society of North America, the 

Muslim Students Associations and others associated with and/or funded by the 

17

Saudi-directed Muslim World League—as though they are what they purport to be: 

legitimate leaders of the Muslim-American and Arab-American communities and 

both necessary and valued interlocutors with those communities. 

In my view, such organizations do not represent the majority of this country’s 

Muslims or Arabs. It is a strategic mistake of the first order to legitimate their bid 

to do so by: having senior U.S. government officials meet with and seek the counsel 

of their representatives, allowing such groups to shape—let alone dictate—policy or 

entrust to them such tasks as ‘‘Muslim sensitivity training’’ for the FBI, military 

or other agencies. 

The Islamist footprint in America places a special premium on having robust intelligence sources and methods and effective cooperation between the intelligence 

and law enforcement communities. Since U.S. soil is also a theater in the War for 

the Free World, it behooves us to ensure that the Commander-in-Chief’s inherent 

powers to intercept and monitor battlefield communications remains unencumbered, 

even when at least one of the parties to such communications is in the United 

States. 

CONCLUSION

In short, Mr. Chairman, we confront a complex, multifaceted and increasingly 

dangerous world. Islamofascists are on the march. They benefit from the state-sponsorship of oil-rich regimes that subscribe to one strain or another of this totalitarian 

ideology. Such wealth and the determination to destroy us that is a central purpose 

of our enemies makes it—all other things being equal—just a matter of time before 

their attacks on us and/or our allies are inflicted with weapons of mass destruction. 

To make matters worse, governments that are not themselves Islamist (such as 

that of Vladimir Putin in Russia, the Communist Chinese, Kim Jong Il’s regime in 

North Korea and Hugo Chavez’s in Venezuela) are aiding and abetting the 

Islamofascists. 

This combination of factors leaves us no choice but to get far more serious about 

this war than we have been to date. Serious in terms of the nature of the enemy. 

Serious in terms of what it will take to defeat it—from a vastly larger investment 

in our military to the mobilization of our people, resources and energies. And serious 

about adopting the policies and programs, including counter-ideological political 

warfare-related ones, necessary to ensure that we prevail in this War for the Free 

World. 

I hope that my observations today will help this Committee and the Congress play 

their respective, indispensable roles in achieving that level of seriousness.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you Mr. Gaffney. We will go to a quick round 

of questioning here from our panel, starting with Mr. Sherman and 

then going to Mr. Poe and Congresswoman Watson. After that we 

will go to Dr. Phares and Mr. Sanderson. 

Do you have any questions at this time? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. I would point out that one of the big questions is why we haven’t been hit so far. I would point out that the 

Islamic terrorists have learned something. When they carried out 

a successful attack against the United States on 9/11, it rallied 

America to undertake action, some of it poorly planned, against 

them. When they attacked Madrid, it mobilized that country to 

withdraw from Iraq and to some extent the war on terrorism in 

general. So I wonder, have the terrorists decided that the way to 

use terrorism most effectively is to attack Europeans and/or flights 

between the United States and Europe on the theory that that, by 

picking off our allies one at a time, that that will be an effective 

strategy, and/or have they determined that attacks on American 

soil are counterproductive to their efforts? 

Mr. GAFFNEY. I don’t think any of us know the answer to that 

question. My guess is that this movement is sufficiently inchoate, 

that there is probably not any direct, you know, command and control that is saying let’s attack now or let’s not attack now or let’s 

attack them or not attack the others. The truth is I think we are 

seeing evidence that people are trying to attack us. So I think part 

18

of this is a function of the law enforcement and intelligence authorities doing their job, having the tools they need to do the job, 

thank God, doing it successfully. I think, frankly, part of this is 

providence. But I must tell you also, Congressman, I worry that 

part of this is, to the extent that there may be deliberation going 

on here, that there is a decision that has been made to try to hurt 

us in a very substantial way, rather than in piecemeal fashion that 

might simply have the effect of reenergizing this country, perhaps 

getting the adoption of this war footing that I am talking about. 

There are ways that it is clear that a very very catastrophic effect 

could be achieved by these people, and I worry that they are working toward that rather than using more isolated and less consequential attacks to provoke us. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would like both you and the other witness who 

were testifying earlier to answer this in the context of Timothy 

McVeigh demonstrated that you don’t have to be a rocket scientist 

to blow up a building in America. The recent arrests in London 

have shown that if you try to carry out an operation of 9/11 proportions, that that is difficult to do, particularly in a post-9/11 world. 

Why is al-Qaeda not hitting us one building at a time? Are they 

really incapable of blowing up any building anywhere in the United 

States, or have they decided that they just don’t want to do something of a modest scale? 

Mr. BROOKES. Mr. Sherman, I think they would do it if they 

could. I think we have put up significant barriers to them using intelligence, law enforcement, legal mechanisms, taking the fight 

overseas. I think they would definitely do it. I think that we have 

just gotten in their way as they have seen us as the biggest obstacle to achieving their global ambitions. I think we have done the 

same thing here. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You think we have got them disempowered in the 

United States to the point where they are not as powerful as Timothy McVeigh? 

Mr. BROOKES. I would say that that is the case, although I—

gosh, knock on wood, right? But I think that that is the case. I 

think we have put a lot of barriers in their way and it is extremely 

difficult for them to undertake an act of terrorism here in the U.S. 

But that doesn’t undermine their desire to do so. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I believe my time has expired. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Both of you made comments 

about the fact that our Government is evading the issue. We have 

complacency. That is kind of the general attitude. I would like to 

just be specific about that. What do you mean? Either one of you. 

Mr. BROOKES. Well, there have been a number of commentators, 

journals, magazines, academics opining about why we have not had 

an attack; that this scourge is beyond us, that it happened on 9/11, 

it is not going to happen again. And I am very concerned that we 

will let down our guard. And if we do, then I think, just as I said 

to Mr. Sherman, that we are going to see some sort of terrible 

event either happening here, or, what I am really worried about is 

overseas where some of our counterterrorism partners and the security isn’t at the levels that we see here in the United States. 

19

Mr. GAFFNEY. Congressman, I would say that evidence of complacency that worries me is the misunderstanding that we can afford defeatism with respect to any aspect of this conflict. The notion that we can safely withdraw from Iraq, for example, because 

it has turned out to be hard and messy, is, I am afraid, evidence 

of people who are not approaching this with the appropriate seriousness. It certainly doesn’t equate to an appreciation that we will 

find ourselves emboldening these Islamofascists were we to yield to 

them anywhere, let alone in a major place like Iraq where we have 

tried so hard to have things come out differently. 

That is the complacency that I worry about, and we see it in a 

lot of polls that people think, oh, this doesn’t have anything to do 

with the war on terror, as well as confusion about whether, as 

Peter says, there really is a war on terror. 

Mr. POE. What do you see—you said the global mission of terrorists. I am from Texas so keep it simple. What is the global mission 

that you see of terrorists? 

Mr. GAFFNEY. The global ambition, I think, is what I was trying 

to get across, that I am referring to, is to create a worldwide 

Islamist government; caliphate, some call it. Some have other 

names for it. But the idea is to compel all Muslims, as I say, many 

of whom do not want to go there, as well as all non-Muslims, to 

subject themselves to this form of government. That is the totalitarian ambition of a political character, which is really quite reminiscent to that of others that preceded it, Nazism, communism, except this has got that overlay that it is God’s will to have it be this 

way. 

Mr. POE. One quick question. The two bombs that were found in 

suitcases in Germany in the last 2 weeks that did not detonate, I 

think the jury is still out on why they didn’t detonate. Who do you 

think is responsible for that? 

Mr. BROOKES. It appears to come from Lebanon. And in fact as 

I mentioned the importance of international cooperation, the Germans from my understanding received a tip from Lebanese intelligence about this. And it appears that the would-be terrorists were 

somewhat bunglers as well in terms of their trade craft and in 

terms of their ability to put these weapons together. But the fact 

is that it certainly could have been a tragedy on the scale of what 

we saw in Madrid or even in London. 

Mr. ROYCE. The answer from the terrorists was that the Danish 

cartoonists were responsible because they were responding to the 

Danish cartoons and thought that they would take their battle for 

some reason to the German civilian population in response. That 

was their quote. 

Congressman Diane Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. Much of what I am going to say I am directing toward Mr. Gaffney. I was listening very intently and reading over 

your remarks. I find them very contradictory. You talk about we 

must use the tools of ideology, and then you talk about a war on 

terrorism. Well, if terrorism is an ideology, who are you pointing 

your guns at? 

You talk about defeatism. You talk about not pulling our troops 

out of Iraq. Who is the enemy in Iraq? I have not been able to idenVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:19 Oct 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\090706\29836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
20

tify is it the Sunnis; is it the Shiites; is it the Kurds; is it the Iranians? 

Now I hear the Administration trying to say the war on terrorism is on the fields in Iraq. I want to quote something Martin 

Luther King said: ‘‘An eye for an eye leaves everyone blind. A tooth 

for a tooth leaves everyone toothless. A body for a body will leave 

everyone dead.’’

How have you won the war on terrorism? If it is an ideology, 

then what is victory in Iraq? Why do we have to have guns pointed 

and ammunition if we are trying to win a movement? I don’t even 

think we ought to call it a war. It is a movement against, I think, 

terrorism; is it not? You can respond in just a minute. 

And then, too, of course, I am antiwar. Do you think we will ever 

evolve to the level where we don’t have to use a gun or other weapons to fight terrorism? How do we win the hearts and the minds 

of people who want to do us harm and who hate us? Do we actually 

go on foreign soil and shoot everyone in sight that we think might 

be? 

I am very confused. If you say we must use the tools of political 

warfare against terrorism, and then we talk about Muslim ideology, they seem to think it is a global war against Islam. And so 

how do you separate it out, you know, the shooting war and the 

war for the minds and hearts? And how do we show we have won 

it in Iraq? When is victory declared? The President says when they 

stand up, we will stand down. What does that mean? 

And we have had more of our people killed since they declared 

mission accomplished. I thought our mission was to go in, find the 

weapons of mass destruction, get Saddam Hussein, put him on 

trial, and give justice. We are still fighting. And I don’t understand 

what it is. They have an elected Parliament. I don’t understand 

what victory is in Iraq. Can you explain, please? 

Mr. GAFFNEY. I will try to do justice to as many of those questions as I can in the short time. 

Ms. WATSON. I have personally eschewed this term, war on terror, because, as I said in my statement, I think it confuses people 

as to the fact that terror is not an enemy. It is not an enemy in 

Iraq, it is not an enemy in London, it is not an enemy in New York. 

Terror is a tool used by people, most of whom at the moment are 

adherents to this ideology. The ideology I call Islamofascism is 

about totalitarian political goals. It is true, I think, in Iraq, although not all of the people engaged in that struggle are necessarily Islamofascist. There seems to be some remnants of the 

Ba’athists who are supposedly secular. But many of them are 

Sunni Islamofascists or Shiite Islamofascists. We are fighting them 

there, I believe, today in the hope that we will help the Iraqi people 

who have exhibited a desire not to live under a kind of regime like 

the Taliban imposed. 

Ms. WATSON. Can you tell me who they are? It is kind of a faceless enemy, correct? 

Mr. GAFFNEY. Well, I mean, there are faces that have been associated with it. Some of them are like Zarqawi, for example. 

Ms. WATSON. No. No. Who are the current—who is the current 

enemy in Iraq? Who do you want to kill? Who do you want to stop? 

Who is our target? 

21

Mr. GAFFNEY. Let me come to that question, if I may. I think 

there are people like Sadr and his ilk who are people we are fighting today. But my point in the testimony and particularly in the 

book, Congresswoman, is we cannot win this war by using just 

military means. We don’t have the military means to win this war 

globally if it comes to that. The point of my testimony is to lay out 

a whole series of nonmilitary means. And, indeed, we talk in the 

book about a comprehensive strategy that is out of 10 steps, only 

1 of them has to do with the military. 

So my feeling is, not unlike yours, that we all should be antiwar. 

We shouldn’t have to wage war against people unless it is absolutely necessary. I personally believe that it was against Saddam 

Hussein. I believe it will probably be against some of these 

Islamofascists. But the trick is going to be and our success will 

hinge upon our application of this strategy, to use these other tools 

where we can, to strengthen those Muslims who do not want to go 

the way the Islamofascists would take them, and to help make 

common cause against these guys to defeat them nonmilitarily 

wherever possible, but using force where absolutely necessary. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask one question, if I could, of Mr. Brookes. 

In December last year, the New York Times disclosed the Terrorist 

Surveillance Program, which aimed to interdict al-Qaeda communications. Could you please walk us through this program, and, in 

your opinion, how detrimental to our efforts was this revelation? I 

shared in my opening statement the comment that the Prime Minister of Israel, Prime Minister Olmert, made to me about his feeling about how detrimental this was. 

Mr. BROOKES. Well, you touched on two things, Chairman. And 

I am not briefed into the Terrorist Surveillance Program, but from 

working on the outside here, and having worked in the Navy in 

cryptotology, and worked with NSA, I have some understandings of 

it. 

You touched on two points. One is the leaks. These hurt us, there 

is no doubt about it. If you talk to people in the Intelligence Community, and we know how important intelligence cooperation is 

with international partners, that these leaks really hurt us. Not 

only are they embarrassing, in some cases there are some countries 

where the populace is not fond of Uncle Sam, the United States, 

and they really don’t want their cooperation with us known even 

though that cooperation is important to both sides. So sometimes 

it is embarrassing. It also can endanger field operatives. It can also 

disclose important sources and methods of intelligence. 

It is really a tragedy. It is not only a crime, it is also a tragedy, 

and it undermines our efforts, especially of those brave men and 

women in the intelligence field and in the military, who are doing 

their best to protect us. 

But in terms of the program, what this is is simply network analysis. I am not a lawyer, but it seems to me from the lawyers I have 

spoken to that this is not an illegal program. It allows us to track 

terrorist communications. It allows us to create a network, if we 

have a known terrorist or a terrorist suspect, of who they are communicating with, that is critically important to us foiling plots. 

The President hasn’t been completely forthcoming about operations because of the sensitivity of the program or the successes of 

22

this program, but it seems clear to me that it has; it is an important tool in our tool kit for dealing with terrorism, and it is important to our security, and it seems to me that it is really indispensable in fighting challenges of terrorism today. 

So my view is that, really, not only the leaks hurt us and the 

leak of a sensitive program like this, because it tells the terrorists 

exactly what they might do to evade our detection, but it also ultimately hurts us in trying to defend this country. Intelligence is our 

first line of defense, and without it I think we are actually fighting 

or trying to undertake this effort with one arm tied behind our 

backs. 

Mr. ROYCE. We had an opportunity in two field hearings that I 

held, one in Laredo, Texas, to hear from one local sheriff who told 

us they are concerned that the border with Mexico is being used 

as the front door to this country and that the terrorists are already 

in our back yards. As the sheriff said, many of the illegal immigrants from countries of special interest are apprehended along the 

southwest border. To avoid apprehension, we feel that many of 

these terrorists attempt to blend in with persons of Hispanic origin 

when entering the country. Any thoughts on that? 

Mr. GAFFNEY. I think that is a very distinct possibility. We recommend that we put a fence across that border. Unfortunately the 

reality is that we have already let a lot of folks into this country, 

and I am sure that some of them have already been insinuated in 

who are in this category. 

Mr. ROYCE. Fortunately, the brother of one of the Hezbollah 

operatives was apprehended in Detroit. But he came in in the 

trunk of a car across the border and then was subsequently caught 

in a scam raising money for Hezbollah in Detroit. 

Mr. Brookes, any thoughts? 

Mr. BROOKES. I have heard the same sort of thing. I think that 

is something we have to be very concerned about as well as our 

northern border. I don’t think it is just the southern border. I have 

some concerns about Canada’s immigration policy. And so I don’t 

think it is just the southern border, and I share your concerns. 

Mr. ROYCE. Gentlemen, watch your clocks. You might feel lucky 

to get out to Dulles before your flight is out. But I am going to go 

now to Dr. Walid Phares and Mr. Sanderson. 

Dr. Walid Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the 

Defense of Democracies as well as the European Foundation for 

Democracy. He has authored eight books on terrorism in the Middle East, the most recent being, Future Jihad, which I am currently reading. He also leads the Foundations of Future of Terrorism. He is a terrorism analyst for MSNBC. Dr. Phares is frequently consulted by European commissioners, European Parliament members, and legislators, officials, and diplomats. 

We also have Mr. Thomas Sanderson. He is the deputy director 

and fellow in the CSIS Transnational Threats Project. He is also 

the codirector of the Multilateral Terrorism Intelligence Sharing 

Project and the Private Sector Advisory Group. He has served as 

a defense analyst with the Science Applications International Corporation, where he conducted extensive studies of terrorist groups 

for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency Office of Counterterrorism 

Analysis. Mr. Sanderson is a terrorism course instructor, lecturer, 

23

and a consultant for the U.S. Government, for the private sector, 

and for media and academic communities. Thank you, Mr. 

Sanderson. 

Dr. Phares. 

STATEMENT OF WALID PHARES, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. PHARES. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman, Congresswoman Watson, thank you very much for inviting me. It is a 

privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss this 

very important issue. My contribution is titled ‘‘Projecting Future 

Jihadi Terrorism Five Years after 9/11.’’ The full text of my remarks have been submitted to your office. You could have access 

to them. 

I have worked on understanding the mind of those who I call and 

define as jihadists with all the various schools of thought they have 

for the last 25 years. I have analyzed their strategies, plans, thinking process; met with some; exchanged articles; published articles 

in various languages including Arabic; and followed through the 

way they have evolved for about a quarter of a century before the 

end of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, and, of course, leading into 

9/11. 

The first point I would like to raise quickly is about, as my colleague mentioned before me, Mr. Frank Gaffney, who is the 

enemy? And in Congress and elsewhere, the same in the European 

Parliament, are beginning to engage in debate with the first point, 

who is that enemy? And is it really only a terrorist organization? 

Does the terrorist organization express a tip of the iceberg which 

is much bigger, much deeper? Who makes a terrorist? Usually is 

it the school? Is it a network? So on and so forth. 

There are two quick points in the issue of defining the enemy. 

One is the name. Two, who are these organizations? With regard 

to the name, I do suggest, strongly suggest, that the U.S. Government and democracies around the world really cross that line and 

begin officially to define the identity of these organizations and 

movements. Yes, we have heard that officials here and across the 

Atlantic have used a variety of names, including Islamofascism, 

Islamoterrorism, terrorism, Islamists, and there has been many, 

many debates about it because of the link to religion. The terrorists 

themselves, those who attacked us on 9/11, we continue to battle 

with in the Sunni Triangle, those who have linked themselves to 

Osama bin Laden from Sudan to Algeria to the Horn of Africa to 

all over the world, they call themselves—they have a name for 

themselves. It is the al jihadiyun, the jihadists. The National Socialists of Europe, Fascists of Italy, have called themselves with 

names that were used until the end of that war. 

So I move to suggest that the countries involved in the war on 

terror would finalize and define, and the legislative branches are 

very important in this process, the name of that enemy with the 

name that the enemy uses for itself; that is, the jihadists. 

The jihadists are of two ideological trees. It is very important in 

order to project into the future to understand that these are two 

different trees. One is the Salafists, those who include all sorts of 

groups such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Jemaah 

24

Islamiyah. They have one vision of the world, one vision of the future of that world. And the other tree are the Khomeinists, the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini. 

And I think the United States and its allies for the last 25 years 

have been dealing with two trees, meaning with two type of strategies. Sometimes they do converge, and other times they are diverging, and we need to look at both scenarios. When those are fighting 

at the same time, against the same enemy. When one of them is 

stopping, the other is moving forward. 

I do think that our counterterrorism strategy, our defense strategy in the war on terror at least after 9/11 should a little bit reform 

in the way of thinking and the way of recapturing the whole picture of that war waged against the United States. And Congress 

should do a great job in refining this and teaching actually the 

public, because we do have a massive confusion Madam Congresswoman spoke about, and that has to be dealt with if we want to 

be successful in the outcome of the so-called war on terror. 

Quickly, the jihadi wars against the U.S. leading to 9/11 should 

lead us to understand what were the projections for the wars 

against the U.S. after 9/11 and, of course, into the future, which 

is the theme that, Mr. Chairman, you assigned us with. 

It is strategically important to reassess the campaigns against 

America leading to 9/11. We have seen different things, different 

groups doing different battles against us for the last 25 years. The 

Jihadist Khomeinist followers of Iran, Hezbollah and others engaged the United States from 1983 at least—if you want to call 

1980 with the crisis of the Embassy, that would be fine as well—

but engaged us violently from 1983 to 1990. They stopped in 1990. 

They converted their strategy into solidification of their power in 

the Middle East, engaging Israel, engaging other forces in the region, preparing for the future engagement with the United States 

that we may be looking at very seriously if we decide to adopt a 

different policy with Iran if Ahmadinejad’s regime would like to acquire those weapons of mass destruction, let us call them nuclear, 

no matter what the U.N. Would have to decide. 

In the 1990s then, something else happened. The Salafists, 

jihadists who were not engaging the United States in the 1980s, 

but preparing for their attack 10 years after, were basically engaging against a variety of battlefields, Kashmir, Sudan, Palestine, 

Chechnya. I mean, these are facts that should be factored into the 

strategic analysis of how they move. What do they really want? A 

group among them that formed al-Qaeda—and I hope that our Government will begin a good perception of why did al-Qaeda decide 

to do 9/11. Some part of it has been discussed and debated in the 

9/11 Commission proceedings 2 years ago; some other aspects have 

still to be addressed, and I will address at least one point of these 

issues. 

On that point, Mr. Chairman, the major strategic failure of the 

U.S. and of its allies was the inability to identify or to counter the 

jihadi penetration and action both internationally and nationally 

before 9/11. That is—before 9/11. That is a major lesson. And the 

9/11 Commission final report of 2004 covered a significant aspect 

of these historical failures, no doubt about it, throughout the 1990s, 

but missed two major ones. First, the fact that the U.S. and its alVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:19 Oct 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\090706\29836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
25

lies did not identify the ideology of jihadism as the producer of terrorists and terrorism. If we don’t identify that, we are going to continue that war against the terrorists, but not against the factory. 

And, second, the fact that the jihadists strategic penetration, ideological penetration of the homeland here and of the other democratic nations elsewhere was a threat to national security. The ideology that produces a jihadist is the one that basically is responsible for the acts of terrorism. 

Since 9/11—allow me, Mr. Chairman, now to answer quickly 

some of the questions that your Committee has put forth for us. Is 

there a progress in the struggle against Islamic terrorism, I would 

call it jihadism? My answer summarizes as, ‘‘Yes, but.’’ Internationally, al-Qaeda lost a regime. That is important to keep in mind. 

And, more important is the fact that they were not able in the following 5 years to produce another regime. So they lost the regime. 

They certainly have been able to recruit larger numbers of militants, but from Islamist pools—from Islamist fundamentalist pools 

that have been produced for the previous 20 years. But in return, 

the fact that a number of societies have been able—have been unable, actually, to access to freedom have been able to produce antijihadist energies by people who were freed, that has to be taken 

into consideration. And the results of the societies that have been 

freed even partially is not going to be seen immediately, because 

those civil societies who have been freed are not going to use the 

Kalishnikovs and counter terrorism with explosives. They are going 

to produce the next generation, which is going to cut off the oxygen, the ideological oxygen, to the fundamentalists. 

If the American public doesn’t understand that the current confrontation is not going to bear fruit in terms of finding weapons of 

mass destruction or finding Osama bin Laden somewhere; it is 

about finding the next generation with whom we in the West or the 

international community could work for a better future with no 

weapons and no confrontations in the future. 

To summarize it, before 9/11 the jihadists were fighting a downhill battle against us. Since 9/11, we are fighting an uphill battle 

against them. We haven’t yet reached the tipping point where we 

will be fighting a downhill battle against them. And that is very 

important in our assessment in the U.S. and elsewhere about that 

war. 

Within the United States totally, al-Qaeda lost one thing we need 

to be aware of. They lost the ability for a surprise war against the 

United States, but not the ability for surprise attacks against the 

United States. There is the difference between breaking down national security, as was the case, for example, in Madrid. And in 

Madrid, what al-Qaeda won was to break down the will for engagement of the jihadists in Spain. In the United States and in Great 

Britain, that didn’t happen. And this is a very important difference 

that we need to look at. 

The rise of homeland security, although not perfect—I would say 

very imperfect—by itself engaged the resources of the United 

States, both government and civil society, to actually understand 

that there is a threat. Before 9/11, we were blind. We were culturally blind, ideologically blind, politically blind, not as an Administration or previous Administrations, in my sense, but as a Nation, 

26

to the whole—to the fact that we have been targeted by the 

jihadists for a simple reason. I have been a professor for 14 years, 

and I have seen many, many classrooms. If we are not taught and 

explained by our own academic establishment that this Nation basically is facing a threat of the kind of national socialism, fascism, 

or Bolshevism, or racism, or other, then certainly our times are not 

going to be engaged in the resistance against that part of terrorism. 

The second question, was Islamic terrorism weakened? I would 

say yes. However, the international coalition thrusted into the 

areas of where the jihadists are coming from. It opened a space for 

anti-jihadist forces to engage. But it did not really help very much 

those societies to tip the balance. On the other hand, the jihadists 

have further infiltrated democracies, not just the United States, 

but elsewhere, have lost the ability for a first generation of 

jihadists. We are not going to see much of Mohamed Atta, Ziad 

Jarrah kind of jihadists who are going to cross the Atlantic and attack us. They may, but who they are counting on are U.S. citizens 

born here, speaks the language, no accent, having the citizenship, 

and yet being touched by this ideology. 

This leads me to the conclusion that the enemy for the future is 

going to be the capacity of al-Qaeda to instill the ideology in the 

mind of young people, including within the United States, and they 

on their own will be more lethal because they are part of this Nation, and that could cause us tremendous trouble. 

There are plenty of other comments I would like to make. I will 

just summarize that my points would have been, yes, we do have 

three deficiencies in the war on terror. I could expand on that. Yes, 

they are drawing support from pools that already exist within the 

Nation. Americans by instinct are understandable of the fact that 

we are at war, but the debate they see—and I am going to be very 

honest and direct about it—make them undecided as to what are 

the next stage of that war on terror. 

And I conclude by saying that one recommendation: We need to 

win the battle of identifying the enemy. We need to win the battle 

of at least intercepting the terrorists before they act, but before 

they become terrorists as well. We need to intercept the jihadists 

before they become terrorists. And, finally, it is very important to 

understand that in order to defeat this ideology, and I think this 

goes straight to the code of Congress, of any legislative branch, we 

need to address that ideology and see if an ideology that calls for 

violence, directly calls for violence, could be legal in a democracy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Phares. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Phares follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WALID PHARES, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR

THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

‘‘PROJECTING FUTURE JIHADI TERRORISM FIVE YEARS AFTER 9/11’’

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman, Members of the Committee, 

It is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss the theme 

‘‘9/11: Five Years Later, Gauging Islamist Terrorism.’’ My contribution is titled: 

‘‘Projecting Future Jihadi Terrorism, five years after 9/11’’

27

1. Who is the enemy? 

The first question to be addressed is the identification of the enemy. Who are they 

and how do we identify them? For one analytical mistake made at this level would 

send the United States and its allies fighting either the wrong war or against the 

wrong enemy: America’s efforts may be derailed by an enemy deflecting our attention from the real objectives, or deflected from engaging the enemy’s most vital assets he has against us. 

a. The issue of the name: 

The enemy who flew airliners against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, the one 

the US defeated in Tora Bora and are still engaging in the Sunni triangle in Iraq; 

and that enemy which is still striking against Democracies and allies around the 

world has a name for itself: Jihadists (al jihadiyun). It uses an ideology with a 

name, Jihadism (al jihadiya); it recruits with a very specific set of doctrines and 

operates under ideologically-grounded strategies: Hence, the U.S needs to be specific 

in calling the enemy with its real name. U.S leaders shouldn’t be vague in their description of the enemy as Terrorists-only or to be dragged into the enemy’s trap as 

to alleged distortion of ‘‘what Jihad could mean.’’ U.S leaders can surely use a variety of descriptions, such as Islamists, Islamo-Fascists, Islamic-Terrorists, but the US 

Government and the allies in the War on Terror should define the enemy officially 

as Jihadists. 

b. The two trees 

The Jihadists are of two ideological types: Salafist, who are radicals who developed within Sunni societies, and Khomenists, who are radicals who developed within Shiia communities. The Salafists have various ideological and political branches: 

Wahabis, Muslim Brotherhood, Tablighi and others. From this ‘‘tree’’ came al 

Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Jemaa Islamiya, Salafi Combat Group, and dozens 

of smaller groups around the world. The Khomeinists are the radical clerics in control of Iran. They have created Hezbollah in Lebanon, and along with the latter expanded cells around the world. The head of Salafi Jihadists today is al Qaeda; the 

head of Khomeinist Jihadism is the Iranian regime. 

2 The Jihadi wars against the US leading to 9/11

It is strategically important to reassess the history of the Jihadi campaigns

against America leading to 9/11. The first Terrorist engagement against U.S presence was by Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah as of 1983 in Beirut. The Khomeinist direct Terror campaign lasted till 1990 before it entered a second stage of regional 

expansion, and strategic penetration and preparation worldwide and within the 

United States for the future. The Salafi Jihadists before 1990, were concentrating 

on the Soviet Union, but preparing against America and the West. Since 1990, they 

refocused on the US, on its allies and within the Arab World. 

During the 1990s, the Salafi Jihadists waged Terror in multiple countries, including in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Russia, Kashmir, Sudan, the Philippines, and beyond. 

Their international network, al Qaeda concentrated on the United States. Al Qaeda 

and its allies penetrated Democracies and America since the 1990s. The major strategic failure of the U.S and of its allies was their inability to identify or to counter 

the Jihadi penetration and action both internationally and nationally. The 9/11 

Commission Final Report of 2004 covered a significant aspect of these historical failures throughout the 1990s, but missed two major ones: First, the fact that the U.S 

and its allies didn’t identify the ideology of Jihadism as the producer of Terrorists 

and Terrorism; and second, the fact that the Jihadi strategic penetration of the 

Homeland was in fact a threat to national security. A ‘‘September 11’’ was possible 

because the enemy counted on the poor perception by the Government, little mobilization by the public, and more importantly, the possibility that the Jihadi factory 

within America will be able to produce Future Terrorism. 

3) War with Jihadism since 9/11

a) Is there a progress in the struggle against ‘‘Islamic Terrorism?’’

There has been a significant progress in the conflict with Jihadi-Terrorism, both 

internationally and within the U.S Homeland. 

Internationally: al Qaeda lost the one regime that provided a state-sponsoring of 

its worldwide activities, Afghanistan. It wasn’t able to reclaim any other regime yet. 

While it has recruited larger numbers of militants from the Islamist pools around 

the world, anti-Jihadist energies were also freed in many countries such as in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon, as well as in other areas. More countries are putting 

minimal energies against the rising Jihadi efforts, which is a better global situation 

28

than before 9/11. This is progress in the war but the turning point—in either direction—didn’t occur yet. 

Within the US: Al Qaeda lost the ability of a strategic surprise war since 9/11, 

but not its ability for strikes yet. By creating the Homeland Security Structure and 

maintaining a minimal mobilization of the public, the US Government has been 

making progress on the domestic front, in comparison with regression before 9/11. 

But this progress, both internationally and domestically, is hanging on the ability 

of the United States and its allies to move forward, faster and with a strategic mutation in the next stage of the War with al Qaeda, while also preparing for the possibility of the engagement by the ‘‘Khomeinist’’ threat abruptly. If the US stops, 

waiver, or confuse its vision of its enemies and their plans, the entire progress can 

be reversed to the advantage of the Jihadi Terrorists. 

b) Was ‘‘Islamic Terrorism’’ weakened? 

In summary: The Islamists have been weakened in ways they haven’t understood 

yet, but they would soon realize and act accordingly; but at the same time they have 

empowered themselves in the US in ways Americans haven’t fully grasped yet, but 

they can still reverse. By thrusting into their areas of production and spreading, the 

US-led coalition opened spaces for counter-Jihadi forces to rise. Al Qaeda and its 

allies, and the Iranian regime and its allies feel the danger but they can’t assess 

the long term challenge they will be facing. Unfortunately, the international coalition also doesn’t seem to realize that with few more initiatives, it can turn the tide 

on the Jihadists. However a number of strategic shortcomings are stopping the coalition from turning that tide. If the US-led campaign is not given the opportunity 

to redirect some of its resources into engaging the War of Ideas successfully, the 

future of this War on Terror is at risk. The Islamists-Jihadists have also penetrated 

Democracies, including the US, in ways that aren’t fully comprehended yet among 

the public and large segment of Government. They have been weakened in their 

pre-9/11 classical abilities to infiltrate. But their second generation is growing in recruitment and thus in Terrorism potential, until a higher level mobilization takes 

place in America. 

c) Are there deficiencies in the struggle against ‘‘Islamic Terrorism?’’

Yes there are three types of deficiencies:

1. A war of ideas is still been waged against the American strategic perception 

of the enemy. Ideological efforts are ongoing to blur the vision of Americans 

in general, media and Government in particular with regards to the identity 

of the enemy, its aims, its strategies and the strategies needed to defeat it.

2. One result of the misperception of the enemy is granting the Jihadists more 

time and capacity to further infiltrate and penetrate the country.

3. Another result of the misperception of the enemy is failing to empower potential allies in the Greater Middle East, particularly civil society entities. 

d) How has Jihadism evolved since 9/

11

Inside the US and its allies in Europe, the Jihadist movement is absorbing the 

counter terrorism pressures, analyzing the measures and is mutating to bypass 

them. It has designed two stages in its warfare: One is the development stage. It 

covers the spread of the ideology, the recruitment from the indoctrinated pools of 

militants, and the penetration of the national systems. The second stage occurs 

when the strikes are prepared and launched. U.S systems are countering them only 

at the final stage that is, in their preparation for Terror activities. 

e) From where are they drawing support? 

The Jihadists inside the United States are drawing their support from the reality 

that their space of indoctrination, recruitment and mobilization is not under legal 

or public sanctioning or pressure. They can operate up to 90% of their strategic 

growth under the current laws. 

f) Are Americans complacent in considering the terrorist threat? 

Since 9/11, the subsequent conflicts, and the Terror horrors around the world, the 

American public in general is developing a greater concern regarding the Jihadi Terror threat. Most Americans, by instincts and through images, understand that the 

threat is real and great. But the public is submitted to diverging final analysis on 

the War on Terror on behalf of its officials, politicians, media and academics. Thus 

the full talents of society are not mobilized yet. 

29

g) What does the recent Hezbollah/Israel conflict mean for the broader struggle against terrorism? 

Hezbollah’s initial trigger of the War with Israel in July 2006, regardless of the 

current consequences, indicated that the Iran-Syria axis has reached a point of non 

return with the international community and has decided to wage a wider Terror 

war to deflect the immediate pressures: The UN Nuclear crisis with the 

Ahmedinijad regime and the UN investigation in the assassination of former Prime 

Minister Hariri regarding Syria. In fact the greater concerns of Tehran and Damascus are the democracy experiments in the region and across their borders, from 

Afghani and Iraqi elections to the Cedars Revolution in Lebanon. The course of 

events in Lebanon and Iraq shows, despite the UN resolutions 1559 and 1701, that 

the intelligence-Terrorist apparatus of the Iranian and Syrian regimes, of Hezbollah 

and other organizations including Hamas and PIJ, are moving to position themselves to act not only to confront Israel, but to renew the Terror war in Lebanon, 

increase Terror involvement in Iraq, trigger additional Terror action from Gaza and 

the West Bank, and threaten moderate Arab countries. A more dangerous move on 

behalf of this regional axis would be to use its assets and networks around the 

world and within the US for Terror activities, when decision in that sense is made. 

But the most dangerous threat to be faced by American and Western security, if 

not international security, would be in the next five years, actions taken simultaneously by both ‘‘trees,’’ even without direct coordination, and eventually using unconventional weapons. 

4: General recommendations 

Five years after, learning from the road to 9/11, and reading in the strategies of 

the Jihadists from both ‘‘trees,’’ I would offer the following recommendations, some 

of which I have advanced in my book Future Jihad. A: The U.S and its allies must deliver and win the battle of identifying, defining 

and naming the enemy. Legislative branches in America and within Democracies 

worldwide must have the political courage, the right knowledge and the wisdom to 

address this challenge. The current state of national and international laws is not 

able to provide a historic basis for Governments, media and public to mobilize fully 

against an enemy living and thriving within these societies. 

B: Counter Terrorism strategies must be designed to intercept the Jihadists before 

they engage in Terror acts, and intercept the ideological threat before it produce the 

Jihadists. To do so, the public must be granted the knowledge and provided with 

the right information. With a higher level of national talents, Homeland Security’s 

capacities will meet the growing challenge before it reaches irreversible trends. 

C: From other countries one could learn from components of successful experiences: Jordan and Morocco in the Muslim confrontation of Islamist extremism, the 

UK and Australia in their counter Terrorism tactics; but also learn from the resistance of civil societies to Terrorist ideologies in the Greater Middle East. 

D: The nation is facing the challenge of what is being described as a choice between Civil Liberties and National Security: It is a false choice that shouldn’t be 

imposed on the citizens of America and Democracies worldwide. For by educating, 

informing and preparing citizens, legislators, judges and public servants regarding 

the nature of the enemy, a common understanding of its ideology, plans and tactics, 

would bring together the various components of US national security and justice, 

without even having to weaken liberties. A better informed judge (known as 

Counter Terrorism Judges in Europe) would work faster and easier with Law enforcement, and better informed citizens wouldn’t feel that the choice is even to be 

made between security and rights. From that perspective ‘‘Monitoring’’ will be directed at the Terrorists and citizens would be excluded systematically from discrimination. The real resistance against Terrorism will be achieved when citizens will be 

part of that effort to isolate the Terrorists. 

C: To better ‘‘attack the ideology fueling Terrorism’’ the United States must first 

pin it down, explain it, name it and expose it. The US Congress, representing the 

American People must enact laws that would equate the Jihadism of al Qaeda and 

Hezbollah with racism and Terrorism. Once the public at home and civil societies 

overseas can see the ideology of the enemy, then they can isolate it and reject it 

as is the case of Fascism, Nazism and Racism. Salafist and Khomeinist Jihadism 

are the pillars of Jihadism. They should be denounced and rendered illegal: Militant 

ideologies, that renders segments of humanity vulnerable to violence, murder and 

genocide cannot be allowed to recruit within civil societies. 

In conclusion, the United States and its allies are delivering an up hill battle 

against an enemy that has prepared for and declared a universal war against free 

societies and democracy, decades before America decided to respond. However to 

reach the turning point in the War on Terror, the War of Ideas has to be won: The 

30

American public has to be granted real knowledge of the enemy and civil societies 

overseas have to be granted real support. This is how Jihadi Terrorism can be defeated historically. 

In closing, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony 

today. I look forward to responding to any question that you might have.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Sanderson. 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS M. SANDERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT AND FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR STRATGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. SANDERSON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman 

Royce, and Ranking Member Sherman and Congresswoman Watson, for this opportunity to testify today. 

I won’t go much into my opening statement. A lot of that has 

been covered. So what I would like to do is just address briefly the 

specific questions that were offered today: Has Islamist terrorism 

been weakened? I think in short the answer to that question appears to be no, despite some tactical victories. I think—I am happy 

to see that people have identified that this is about an ideological 

movement and a violent Islamist extremist movement, and not 

about terrorism itself. That is a tremendously important distinction. 

There is little recognition that what we face is a widespread 

struggle within Islam, and that by definition U.S. Western or nonMuslim forces are on multiple levels not able to confront and ultimately vanquish Islamist extremism. The movement’s components 

are part ideological, part religious, part social, and part political. 

We don’t understand what those components are. We can identify 

them, but we cannot understand them without tremendous help on 

the ground. It is a local battle. 

The solutions include, first and foremost, working with and supporting local Muslim and Arab leaders, while at the same time 

shifting emphasis away from our largely military-led response, very 

good in Afghanistan, ill-advised in Iraq. But at this point so many 

other components are needed, and until this becomes—this understanding and this shift becomes a core component of our strategy, 

we will continue treading water. 

Is the American public complacent? Yes, I believe so. And no 

matter which side you are sitting on, whether you support a robust 

military-led intervention or a multifaceted approach that includes 

all elements of power, I think that Americans are complacent about 

this. People still want to believe that they are safe, despite the fact 

of what happened on 9/11, and that is pretty frustrating. 

Who supports violent extremist movements and engaging terrorism? Clearly, a wide variety of people. States have always supported it. That has been reduced. One of the positive aspects of the 

war in Iraq is that it has certainly put countries on notice that 

there is no safe harbor. If you are going to support terrorists, you 

are no different than the terrorist groups themselves, and you will 

be targeted. 

Individuals, charities, business people, families, travel groups. 

The negative side of the Iraq war has really expanded the number 

of supporters and the variety of supporters, I am afraid to say. 

Young Muslim men and some women continue to fill the ranks of 

established and recently rising homegrown groups. As you know 

31

well by now, New York’s Muslim population offers fertile ground 

for recruitment, planning, and support. And many Muslim and 

Arab countries’ support comes from similar youth who often sit idle 

for lack of opportunity, but they also have access to satellite television, to the Internet, to DVDs, to traveling jihadists, folks who 

go around the world supporting these ideas. They have great access 

to information, but few outlets. 

How has violent extremism evolved in the last 5 years? You have 

heard ad nauseam, it has gone from al-Qaeda central to a 

networked, franchised movement. We have no fears that soon after 

the successful toppling of the Taliban, that is where it went. 

The emergence of self-starter groups dominates the landscape 

now, but it is not the only thing. I still believe that al-Qaeda remains capable of conducting attacks—not conducting attacks, but 

of planning, and certainly of inspiring attacks. Instructions can 

pass from bin Laden or from Zawahiri through a maze of human 

couriers and eventually show up on videophone via videophone, fax, 

e-mail, CD, DVD, Web sites, or through individuals. There is no inability for them to get that message out and for them to get instructions out. And, besides, we have Aljazeera playing tapes, and 

we know that these signal people to take any plan off the shelf and 

put it into action. He said, attack at will. 

Assessing the threat policy priorities. The recent announcement 

by President Bush that the top operational leaders of the September 11 attacks will be brought to trial is an important step. For 

too long the U.S. has been crippled by the widespread perception 

that we do not hold ourselves to the highest legal standards. But 

it takes much more than PR and even deeds at home such as 

bringing these individuals to trial. Subtle but strong pressure on 

Muslim and Arab to enact genuine social and economic and political reforms are vital. 

The Israeli-Palestinian problem deserves a robust and determinative attention. I heard before from before Congressman Sherman clearly that at the height of our best work on that is when 

these acts were being planned. But, of course, these acts and these 

attacks were being planned based on grievances that go back for 

a tremendous amount of time. But, nonetheless, take away as 

many items from their extremist agenda as possible. 

There also remains a longstanding threat to our security, and, in 

fact, the world security, and that is Russian tactical nuclear weapons. They continue to be relegated to the back burner of policy priorities. If our leaders don’t want the next smoking gun to be a 

mushroom cloud, then why have we not made more progress in securing the thousands of remaining tactical nuclear weapons? 

Weapons of mass destruction demand immediate attention. After 

all, if our primary motivation for going into Iraq was WMD, why 

aren’t Russian loose tactical nuclear weapons a top priority? That 

is a very fair question to ask. While the probability of nuclear 

weapon use is low, the consequences go far beyond our imagination. 

How do we measure success and failures? In such a multifaceted 

transnational problem about which the U.S. only understands part 

and can only make a certain amount of impact, metrics cannot be 

reliable, but there are some measurements that can offer us an inVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:19 Oct 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\090706\29836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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dication of trends and of our own securities or trends toward security. The numbers of remaining Russian tactical nuclear weapons 

are one of them. The degree of that security, that hopefully steadily 

reducing number of those, is one metric. 

Public opinion in the Muslim world, not a perfect indicator, but 

certainly one measure. 

The degree of social, political, and economic reform in countries 

that produce many of these extremists could also serve as an indicator of the broader struggle to reduce numbers in power, in reach 

of these movements. 

A reduction in the number of madrassas or reform in the number 

of these madrassas, these Koranic schools that you are familiar 

with that produce young men who hate India, hate Israel, hate the 

United States, hate the West, reforming them or reducing those 

numbers would be a metric that would be encouraging, but, again, 

not the end-all. 

Finally, a drop in terrorist incidents and the number of people 

killed can serve as an indicator, but we have to be very careful 

here. That factor cannot be relied on, because while small actors 

and less ambitious plans may be foiled, future spectaculars likely 

to be attempted by al-Qaeda, which I do believe they are thinking 

about doing, and other groups, will be years in the making and 

could surprise us just as we think the trend is turning positive. 

Are government agencies properly structured to combat international terrorism? It will come as no surprise to you to hear me 

say that I think we are in deep trouble in this regard. A lot of my 

contacts throughout the national security community report mixed 

messages about the structure and restructuring of our agencies. 

Seventy-five percent I would say are negative, with most of it directed toward DHS and the FBI. In a recent report that we did 

that just came out this week, you have a copy of it up there, with 

a fair assessment of six different areas, we refer to the DHS as a 

holding company and not as an integrated department. 

There is also disbelief and discouragement over the role of the 

Office of Director of National Intelligence and its increasing size. 

But, most of all, it is the Pentagon’s trump card over the DNI that 

causes most people to shake their heads. As you well know, a late 

addition to the legislation creating John Negroponte’s office was 

that the authorities granted to the DNI respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of heads of departments of the 

United States Government. This obviously is a problem and is contradictory to the will to put Ambassador Negroponte in charge of 

all intelligence capabilities. 

What is the proper balance between civil liberties and aggressively checking terrorism? Terrorists are using technology that at 

times exceeds our surveillance capabilities and countermeasures, 

and which exploits our rules governing investigations and monitoring. We should not fail to change these laws and respond to the 

enemies’ tactics as soon as possible. But because we are a Nation 

of laws, and importantly because Congress has the constitutional 

role in formulating or amending them, any changes should be made 

with your full participation. 

Are Iran and Hezbollah more of a threat than al-Qaeda? Very 

difficult to say, but there is no doubt a profound threat. Iran’s apVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:19 Oct 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\090706\29836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
33

parent interest in attaining nuclear weapons upsets the balance of 

power in the region. In addition to Israel’s reaction, which will be 

forceful, Saudi Arabia and Egypt may feel compelled to sharply increase their military capabilities and to possibly pursue nuclear 

weapons, which would not be good. 

Before al-Qaeda’s September 11th attack, Hezbollah killed more 

Americans than any other terrorist groups. They are lethal, highly 

skilled, whether they are dug in in southern Lebanon or conducting 

operations overseas, where they have scored some pretty impressive strikes and operations. We know about them in Argentina, in 

Australia, recruitment in the Gulf of Guinea, West Africa dealing 

with the diamond trade, in North Carolina with the cigarette 

smuggling case. They are good, and they can do basically anything. 

Highly skilled. 

What could be done to better attack the ideology fueling Islamist 

terrorism? That has been covered, so let me skip that in the interest of time. 

Your last question was, in 2011, what will we see? I think that 

a lot of American citizens and leaders are not happy where we are 

today, and 5 years came pretty quickly, and I think 2011 is going 

to arrive just as quickly, and serious thought needs to go into our 

plans and policies to make sure that we don’t feel as insecure then 

as I think people do now. 

Some of the things we will ask: Why didn’t we take control of 

more loose Russian nuclear weapons, which should be one of our 

number one top priorities? How did we allow Afghanistan to be retaken by a combined Taliban/al-Qaeda force? They are amassing in 

numbers of 500 and 600; just a couple years ago in bands of 5 and 

6 people. Opium production, over 6,000 tons. This will fuel and 

swell the coffers of terror groups. I mean, this is a huge problem. 

We might also ask how is it that Hezbollah gained control of 

most of Lebanon? And how did we allow the emergence of a miniIranian protectorate in southern Iraq in control of a lot of revenues? Why are soldiers still in Iraq? Why have we spent $400 billion? 

Some of the positive questions we may be asking if we do the 

right things: How did America help local Muslim and Arab leaders 

successfully confront Islamist extremists in their countries? How 

were Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri finally killed, and where were 

they living? Why didn’t we begin a highly successful 2007 Bush 

plan, a version of the Marshall Plan, that invested money and time 

in the massive, widespread provision of social and economic services to Muslim countries that put us in a great light? So much of 

it, again, is about hearts and minds. You have heard that ad nauseam, but that remains to be true. 

A brief conclusion. Administration officials are, in fact, speaking 

of the struggle against violent Islamist extremism as a long war. 

And it is true that the enemy’s proven abilities to successfully 

adapt to countermeasure signals that several more cycles of action 

and reaction will dot the horizon. But there is much that other nations and the United States have to do before this struggle’s outcome is no longer in doubt. 

During the Cold War, the U.S. and our allies built tremendous 

intelligence, academic, economic, and other capabilities to confront 

34

1 ‘‘Five Years After 9/11: Accomplishments and Continuing Challenges,’’ A reference document 

produced by the staff of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. 

September 1, 2006. 2 Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘‘Winning the ‘War on Terrorism:’ The Need for A Fundamentally 

Different Strategy,’’ Center for Strategic and International Studies. Draft version, September, 

2006, P. 3. 

and eventually prevail against the totalitarian adversary. Today we 

boast few of those capabilities. We do not speak radical Islam’s language, understand their culture and history, nor can we pretend to 

solve their problems with military or other means. The role to be 

played by Muslim and Arab leaders in countries where these struggles within Islam and with secular leaders are taking place will be 

paramount. As soon as the United States begins this wholesale 

shift in emphasis, the sooner we will be reopening all those American culture centers that we have closed over the last few years. 

Thank you very much for your time. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sanderson. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sanderson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS M. SANDERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT AND FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATGIC AND

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Introduction 

After five years of tremendous effort and expense rendered by the United States 

of America and our allies in the ‘‘global war on terror,’’ there has been some 

progress made in preventing follow-on terror attacks. Tactical victories have been 

secured by means of killing or capturing major terrorist planners and operators. 

Major military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown mixed results on terror threat. While the U.S. has ‘‘deprived al Qaeda of sanctuary in Afghanistan,’’ 1

the failure to commit sufficient troops and other resources now has the country 

heading back towards instability. A massive increase in opium production will increase finances for the Taliban and al Qaeda, while the reconstitution of the Taliban 

military capability has been a deeply unwelcome development. In Iraq, the U.S. executed what many will argue was the single most harmful act since September 11. 

While the invasion has put other nations on notice that any inkling of terror support will lead to its destruction, the war has provided terrorists with a major propaganda victory, a real-world training camp for terrorists and insurgents, while also 

dramatically altering the once-solid moral reputation of the United States. 

Has Islamist terrorism been weakened? 

In short, the answer to that question appears to be no. But more importantly, we 

need to recognize that it is not the right question to ask. One of the most significant 

shortcomings in our strategy for the ‘‘long war’’ continues to weaken us by 

misdirecting our resources and attention. There is little recognition and resulting 

policy that what we face is a widespread struggle within Islam, and that by definition the United States and Western forces are ill-equipped on multiple levels to confront and ultimately vanquish violent Islamist extremism. Terrorism is the tool used 

by these movements, and pursuing the actors, their sanctuaries, finances, and their 

weapons only treats the symptoms of a much larger problem for which we can only 

provide one small part of the solution. The movement’s components are part ideological, part religious, part social, part political.2 The solutions include, first and foremost, working with and supporting local Muslim and Arab leaders while at the 

same time shifting emphasis away from our largely military-led response. Until this 

becomes a core component of our strategy, we will continue treading water. 

Support for terrorism 

When you consider that extensive polling of foreign attitudes by the Pew Foundation shows record lows for respect and approval of the United States and our policies, it takes little convincing to claim that support for violent extremist groups and 

terrorism is easy to come by. In addition to be relatively inexpensive to plan and 

conduct a terror strike, the means of raising, laundering, and transferring that 

money are myriad. The informal banking system known as hawala alone suggests 

that we will never stop more than a fraction of the funds transferred between violent extremists and their supporters. The nexus between terrorism and crime has 

35

3Sydney Jones, International Crisis Group. New York Times video interview, Jakarta, Indonesia, August 4, 2006. 4Sydney Jones, Ibid. 

also narrowed. Terrorists are dominant in all manner of transnational crime, and 

the record opium crop in Afghanistan is a very sobering reminder of how hard the 

struggle is. 

Europe has emerged as a major hub for violent extremist activity. Young men and 

some women among Europe’s 15–20 million Muslims offer fertile ground for recruitment, planning, and support. In many Muslim and Arab countries, support comes 

from similar youth who ply neighborhoods where unemployment is high despite 

quality education. Compounding these economic conditions is the deterioration of 

traditional social structures, and the failure realize promises of political and social 

reform. Repression from leaders in Egypt, Uzbekistan and other nations is a major 

underpinning of the street-level support. Overall, sources of support have shifted 

from states to individuals, charities, business people, families, and tribal groups. 

Much of the support, as the hawala example shows, has gone underground in part 

because of strong finance measures and the threat of sanctions led by the United 

States. 

The evolution and status of transnational terrorism and al Qaeda 

It is well known at this point that violent extremism has spread significantly 

since September 11, and that the original core threat of al Qaeda has transformed 

from a central organization into a global, politico-religious, ideological movement. 

The emergence of self-starter groups has dominated the landscape of terrorism. 

They are inspired and motivated by events and the apparent confirmation of their 

‘‘world view’’ that Islam is under attack and that they have a direct role in defending it. Al Qaeda, I believe, is still able to direct attacks. Al Qaeda may be reduced 

as a core, combat capable unit, but its planning and guidance functions remain, and 

its ideology is ‘‘mobile and potent.’’ 3 There is little evidence to date that the August 

2006 London aircraft plot had direct al Qaeda control, but what is clear is that those 

arrested were inspired by Osama Bin Laden’s agenda. It also appears to be the case 

that self-starters in Europe and elsewhere feel compelled to make a journey to Pakistan or Afghanistan—not so much for training as for spiritual and moral support 

from those in or close to al Qaeda Central. This trend in and of itself is something 

to exploit. 

Whether direct or indirect, bin Laden and his remaining confederates in ‘‘al Qaeda 

Central’’ are likely still able to develop and send details for attacks. Video and audio 

releases by al Qaeda’s leadership remind followers that they are supported and expected to do their part in the global war against the ‘‘infidels.’’ Instructions or the 

simple spiritual support for terrorist actions by widely scattered ‘‘self-starters’’ can 

be passed through a maze of human couriers, none of which is likely to betray bin 

Laden or the broader movement. These messages can then find their way to those 

who need it by phone, fax, email, CD/DVD, websites, or through traveling extremists and supporters. The options are numerous, and the countermeasures few. 

To be certain, there is some notable progress against extremist groups. In Indonesia, we have seen significant progress against the group al-Jemaah al-Islamiya 

(JI). Thanks in large part to Australian assistance, Indonesia has sent 200 suspects 

through a speedy, transparent and increasingly fair justice system.4 The JI threat 

has diminished, making Indonesia one of the bright spots. This case is a good example of the right approach: it must be local in nature, and involve empowering and 

assisting local leaders. 

Addressing terrorism: policy priorities 

The recent announcement by President Bush that the top operational leaders of 

the September 11 attacks will be bought to trial is an important step. For too long 

the U.S. has been crippled by the widespread perception that we do not hold ourselves to the highest legal standards of due process, right to counsel, and guaranteed minimum human rights. The flow of young men and women into the ranks of 

violent Islamist extremist organizations has continued unabated over the last five 

years in part due to this sinking moral image of the United States. The well-worn 

concept of ‘‘winning hearts and minds’’ is repeated for a reason: it is a core, indispensable part of the solution. But there is an important caveat here: we can never 

advertise out way out of this immense problem, we need our Muslim partners to 

lead the way. That will include subtle but strong pressure on leaders to enact genuine social, economic, and political reforms. Minimizing the appearance of outside 

direction or control is vital, it is too easy for extremists to make hay of American 

36

5 Interview with attorney Jonathan Winer, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for International Law Enforcement. September 4, 2006. 6 Jonathan Winer interview, September 4, 2006. 

meddling. For too long we have been seen as the ‘‘power behind the power’’ in places 

such as Egypt, Jordan and Israel. 

Top Middle East and terrorism expert Anthony Cordesman reminds us that what 

we confront are violent extremist movements that most often have a cause confined 

to a particular state. There is no overarching global, connected campaign against 

the U.S., but rather local battles that need to be treated on an individual basis. The 

factors that make up these struggles are ones with which the U.S. is unfamiliar and 

lacks significant understanding. They include social, religious, cultural, historical 

and ideological elements that Muslims and Arabs have an inherent understanding 

of. So if we hope for success, we must act in concert with our partners, and allow 

them to lead. 

Some of our polices have been short-changed. There continues to be the widespread perception that the U.S. approach to the Israeli/Palestinian question has 

never been fair or intended to elicit real solutions. While untrue in many ways, perception is reality to those who support and take part in terror strikes. Equally as 

pressing as giving the Israeli/Palestinian problem our robust and determined attention, there remains a long-standing threat to our security, and in fact the world’s 

security. Russian tactical nuclear weapons continue to be relegated to the 

backburner of policy priorities. If our leaders ‘‘don’t want the next smoking gun to 

be a mushroom cloud,’’ then why have we not made more progress in securing the 

thousands of remaining tactical nuclear weapons? Weapons of Mass Destruction demand immediate attention. After all, if our priority motivation for invading Iraq was 

to remove WMD, why are we not moving with dispatch to secure the thousands of 

known, functioning, transportable weapons in Russia that could fall prey to theft 

or smuggling? Some of our enemies are implacable and are driven by apocalyptic 

visions of this confrontation. For them, nothing we do will matter. If given the opportunity to strike with WMD, they will do so. 

What degree should ‘‘metrics’’ play in our strategy? 

In such a multifaceted, transnational problem about which the U.S. only understands parts of, the use of metrics simply cannot be reliable. But there are some 

measurements that can offer us an indication trends and our security. In returning 

to the previous issue of Russia’s ‘‘loose nukes’’ we could look at a decreasing number 

of available tactical warheads as encouraging. Nothing could change our way of life 

and the global economy more than the use of WMD, so their numbers and location 

should be monitored assiduously. 

While not an entirely accurate barometer, it is clear that we will derive a good 

sense of where we figure in the struggle by monitoring public opinion in the Muslim 

world.5 While hard to quantify, the degree of social, political and economic reform 

in countries that produce many Islamist extremists would serve as an indicator of 

how the broader struggle to reduce the numbers, power and reach of these movements. Also, a reduction in the numbers of madrassas (Koranic schools) in Pakistan, 

the Philippines, and elsewhere would also be encouraging. Finally, a drop in terrorist incidents and the numbers of people killed can also serve as an indicator. But 

this factor cannot be relied on too heavily. While smaller actors and less ambitious 

plans may be foiled, the future ‘‘spectaculars’’ likely to be attempted by al Qaeda 

and other groups will be years in the making, and could surprise us just as we think 

the trend was turning positive. 

Are government agencies properly structured to combat international terrorism? 

A comprehensive assessment would be necessary to determine this, and I am 

doubtful that a successful one could be carried out. Competing interests that could 

lose influence and resources in still-needed restructuring will make many positive 

changes elusive. A review of law enforcement and regulatory agencies’ transnational 

capabilities would provide insight and answers to this question. Jonathan Winer, an 

intelligence and money-laundering expert and attorney, who served previously as 

U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Law Enforcement, believes that measuring the degree to which the CIA, State Department, Pentagon 

and other relevant agencies are ‘‘now functioning on a trans-border basis as well as 

on a country basis’’ 6 could indicate if restructuring has been successful. The failure 

to halt the attack narcotics trade in Afghanistan is also one metric that suggests 

that the U.S. government is paying insufficient attention to some of the most important issues. 

37

7 ‘‘Five Years After 9/11: An Assessment,’’ CSIS Press, September 1, 2006

In the recent report by the staff of the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS) asserts that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ‘‘is a holding company, not an integrated department.’’ 7 There are very few people who would 

argue that DHS has enhanced America’s overall security. Contacts throughout the 

national security and law enforcement community relay mixed messages about the 

structure of our agencies. I believe 75% of the comments I hear are negative, with 

most of it directed towards DHS and the FBI. There is also disbelief and discouragement over the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and 

its increasing size. But most of all, it is the Pentagon’s trump card over the DNI 

that causes most people to shake their heads. A late addition to the legislation creating that office provided that ‘‘the authorities granted to the Director of National 

Intelligence . . . respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the 

heads of the departments of the United States Government concerning such departments.’’ Many intelligence experts and officials felt this dealt a crippling blow to the 

DNI’s authority and ability to manage the 16 member intelligence community to the 

degree necessary for real change and effectiveness. 

Some reforms of the intelligence community are still underway, and thus it is very 

difficult to measure their progress. CIA analysts indicate that morale is low as they 

lose staff to the National Counterterrorism Center, which according to several people is ‘‘winning’’ that internal struggle. 

What constitutes victory in the ‘‘GWOT’’ and what is a reasonable timeframe for success? 

Success will be determined in many ways. A reduction in the number of recruits 

to carry out violent action in support of extremist ideologies stands as one of the 

most important. But getting there will be tremendously difficult. We will have to 

rely on some degree of internal dissolution as this movement is too complex and resilient to die U.S. hands alone. 

The term war is debilitating. Yes, in the first few days it was helpful in rallying 

the U.S. public and some of our allies, but it now hinders our response. It is an abrasive term for allies who don’t see the threat as existential, and whose publics 

know a very different reality of war. The ‘‘war’’ is off-putting to many Americans 

who believe it allows for an open-ended timeframe and too much latitude for U.S. 

government responses on our own soil and overseas. Others feel it is totally appropriate and support it wholeheartedly. There is clear evidence that being on a war 

footing has weakened our cause: witness our posture towards battlefield prisoners, 

Abu Ghraib, secret prisons, Guantanamo. This caused deep and widespread damage 

to our reputation, and motivated huge numbers of people to join the fight against 

America. 

When Muslim and Arab leaders are fair and responsive to their populations, we 

can expect an increased chance of peace and security. Whether a war or a campaign 

or a long struggle, we are in it and it will take a long time to arrive at a sense 

of victory or at least security . . . if ever. Internal forces and actors will determine 

the duration of this battle, and less so U.S. actions. It merits repeating that the U.S. 

can only hasten the dissolution of Islamist extremism to a small degree—the burden 

is on Muslims and the capabilities are with the local political, religious and intellectual leaders from Arab and Muslim nations. 

To many of the actors we confront, the U.S. represents a target’s bulls eye. We 

are the ‘‘far enemy’’ with the highest point value. But the battles are to be won 

country by country and by an array of moderate forces and influences within national borders. Outside influence, especially if driven by the U.S. military or government, will fail if not conducted with the utmost care and respect. Osama Bin Laden 

believes America will be the second domino to fall after the Soviet Union, and that 

he and his movement are significantly responsible for this. They think America can 

be defeated. 

What is the proper balance between civil liberties and aggressively checking terrorism? 

Jim Fallows, National Correspondent of the Atlantic, notes that America’s biggest 

threat is not what al Qaeda can do to us, but what we will do to ourselves in response to the threat. There is certain truth to this, and I believe that we have suffered as a country when actions were taken in haste or without the participation 

of Congress. 

There can be no doubt that terrorists are using technology that at times exceeds 

our own surveillance capabilities and countermeasures, and which exploits our rules 

governing investigations and monitoring. We should not fail to change these laws 

38

8Lebanese brothers Chawki and Mohamad Hammoud were convicted of selling cigarettes purchased in North Carolina and sold over state lines in Michigan and Maryland and then using 

the proceeds to purchase night-vision goggles, mine detection equipment, laser designators, GPS 

equipment, and blasting caps. This ‘‘material support to terrorists’’ made its way to the 

Hezbollah-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Hezbollah operatives, with the support of Iran, 

were responsible for the 1992 and 1994 bombings of Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires, 

Argentina. Hezbollah has also been active in the ‘‘blood diamond trade in West Africa. And in 

Australia, Hezbollah has recruited members from the region and raised money from an often 

unwilling Lebanese immigrant community. 9 Cordesman, ‘‘Winning the ‘War on Terrorism:’ The Need for A Fundamentally Different 

Strategy’’ P. 3

and respond to the enemy’s tactics as soon as possible. But because we are a nation 

of laws and importantly because Congress has a constitutional role in formulating 

or amending them, any changes should be made with its participation, even if kept 

secret from the general public. As of now, and due to the secret and complex nature 

of intelligence, it is unclear whether the current tradeoff between civil liberties and 

security is even knowable or quantifiable. And there are a number of different opinions on this subject. There does seem to be room for compromise. Many people I 

have spoken to on both sides of the issue agree on two basic points: changes have 

to be made to our laws, but they must be done through proper channels and with 

sufficient consideration of their long term effect. 

Attorney Jonathan Winer fairly asks ‘‘what is the evidence that any particular reduction in civil liberties has led to any reduction in the terrorist threat?’’ With regard to the NSA wiretapping controversy, little evidence appears to support the notion that court orders were not necessary. On the issue of torture and in reflection 

of U.S. human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, it is widely known that prisoners offer false testimony simply to stop the torture. Ultimately, Mr. Winer believes that ‘‘civil liberties do not have to be infringed to check terrorism. Traditional 

military and law enforcement and regulatory techniques, updated to reflect technological changes, are sufficient.’’

Are Iran and Hezbollah more of a threat than Al Qaeda? 

Recent hostilities in the Middle East serve as a sober reminder that Hezbollah 

and its state sponsor Iran pose serious threats to the region and possible to the 

United States. Iran’s apparent efforts to build a nuclear arsenal is an ominous development. Combining Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s threat to ‘‘wipe Israel off 

the map’’ with Israel’s well known policy of preemptively striking core national security threats, there is trouble not far over the horizon. 

Iran clearly presents a number of problems for the United States, our allies and 

nations the Persian Gulf region. Others, though believe that Iran is simply acting 

in its own interests and that such moves do not constitute a fundamental threat. 

In so far as Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons upsets the balance of power in 

the region, this is clearly another issue. In addition to Israel’s reaction, Saudi Arabia and Egypt may feel compelled to sharply increase their military capabilities and 

to possibly pursue nuclear weapons. 

Before al Qaeda’s September 11 attack, Hezbollah killed more Americans than 

any other terrorist group. Hezbollah’s relative success during the recent fighting in 

Lebanon is a problem for the U.S. and for states around the world. The terrorist 

group’s ability to stop the Israeli army and to sustain withering air strikes provided 

it with real legitimacy by demonstrating the power of transnational, sub-state movements. Any strike on Iran is likely to be met with the unleashing of Hezbollah on 

U.S. targets throughout the region and possibly the world. Hezbollah’s far flung 

global operations, led by Imad Mughniyah, have been found in Argentina, Europe, 

the U.S. (North Carolina), Australia, and Africa’s Gulf of Guinea, among other 

places.8 Iran’s (and Syria’s support of Hezbollah is common knowledge. 

What could be done to better attack the ideology fueling Islamist terrorism? 

Returning to the insights of Anthony Cordesman, the threat of Islamic extremism 

is a national phenomenon that can best be met through local forces on a countryby-country basis, and not through a ‘‘globally connected effort.’’ Cordesman notes

. . . the real war on terrorism can only be won within Islam and at a religious 

and ideological level. This does not mean that improving every aspect of 

counterterrorism at the national, regional and global level is not important. It 

does mean that no amount of outside action by the United States, Europe or 

non-Islamic states can do more than partially contain the violence. It is only 

the religious, political and intellectual leaders of Islamic countries and communities, particularly in the Arab world, that can successfully engage and defeat 

Islamic extremism at a religious, intellectual, political and cultural level.9

39

Recognizing that insight, there are nonetheless a number of actions the United 

States can take, and actions we can avoid. With costs for the Iraq war running at 

$5 billion per month, the U.S. can certainly spend a fraction of that to improve social services to Muslims in a number of countries, and thus rebuild the foundation 

of goodwill. Imagine what the construction of 10 U.S. hospital ships similar to the 

USNS Mercy would do to the U.S. standing. These ships would be staffed with, 

among others, Muslim doctors from around the world, to provide thousands of people with free access to vital medical care. A lot of news is made of individual Iraqi 

children who are flown to the U.S. for special medical procedures, so imagine the 

impact of placing these hospital ships on rotation the world over. The ships would 

become iconic, and the U.S. would be remembered for its generosity as it was in 

post-war Europe and as we are now in post-tsunami Indonesia. 

Another helpful policy can include promoting tolerant Muslim leaders in any 

country they are found, and arresting those who spew intolerant hate speech and 

support terrorist operations. One major component of U.S. efforts to counter extremist ideologies has been to promote democratic rule. This is a risky and sometimes 

ineffective policy for a number of reasons. First, Western values, however wonderful 

we believe and know they are, are often unwelcome and not transferable to many 

people. It may be a disappointing reality, but a reality nonetheless. In places with 

a history of democracy or a willingness to consider it, it has to be preceded by political reform to help adjust cultural and social attitudes and civic structures. As with 

medicine, improper dosage can be harmful. 

Greater efforts to partner with Muslim and Arab countries on a range of scientific, 

medical, cultural, technological, business and academic initiatives can do much to 

reduce the widespread sense of Muslim loss and disrespect. In addition to bringing 

leaders from these fields to the United States, we in turn should make every effort 

to enable American students and scholars to spend time in those same countries. 

Not only will these exchanges build goodwill and understanding, but we will also 

establish a generation of people with the cultural awareness and language skills 

needed in the event of future hostilities (too Machiavellian?) ;) 

Five years from now, what will we see? 

2006 arrived very quickly, and I don’t think many America citizens or their leaders are very happy with where we are. 2011 will arrive just as quickly, and serious 

thought and effort needs to go into plans and policies to make sure we don’t feel 

as insecure then as we do now. 

Some of the more ominous questions we may be asking include

1. Why didn’t we make loose Russian nuclear weapons our core, number one 

priority?

2. How did we allow Afghanistan to be retaken by a combined Taliban/al 

Qaeda force?

3. How is it that Hezbollah gained control of most of Lebanon?

4. How is it that we allowed the emergence of a ‘‘mini-Iranian protectorate’’ 

that wound up controlling much of Iraq’s oil revenues in what emerged as 

the independent, free Islamic State of Iran?

5. Why did we think the Muslim Brotherhood would remain a moderate force 

in Egypt once they took control of the country and the military following 

the deposing of President Hosni Mubarak?

6. And how could we have possibly failed to block a fundamentalist takeover 

of Saudi Arabia by neo-Salafi/Wahabbi clerics?

7. With Iran in possession of nuclear weapons and sufficient ballistic missile 

capabilities, what leverage is there against their emboldened theocracy and 

clerical leadership that provides support for Islamist extremist movements 

across Europe, Russia, Central Asia, Northern Africa, Canada, Latin America?

8. ‘‘Why are our soldiers still in Iraq? And what do we have to show for $400 

billion and 5,000 Americans dead?

9. Why did we trade our cherished, hard-won civil rights for an ill-defined 

level of security?

10. Why are our traditional allies no longer our friends, and why are our new 

allies the kinds of countries we confronted during the Cold War?

11. Why did we not pressure secular, one-party Muslim regimes to reform?

12. Why didn’t we put all of our energy into the extremists’ number one recruitment issue: the Israeli/Palestinian problem?

40

13. Why are there so few Americans in foreign countries, and why are so many 

openly attacked when they are there?

14. Why have we closed so many embassies?

15. What more could we have done to keep Pakistan from being taken over by 

pro-Islamist generals?

More encouraging questions may be

1. How did America help local Muslim and Arab leaders successfully confront 

Islamic extremists in their countries?

2. How were Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri finally killed and 

where were they living?

3. Why didn’t we begin the highly successful 2007 ‘‘Bush Plan’’ that invested 

money and time into massive, widespread provision of social and economic 

services to Muslims in at risk nations?

4. What other nations might become relative success stories like Afghanistan?

5. How many more American Information Centers will we re-open on Muslim 

countries this year?

6. On which day this year will the 100,000th foreign Muslim student begin 

school in America, and when will their American counterpart arrive in their 

country? 

Conclusion 

Administration officials are in fact speaking of the struggle against violent 

Islamist extremism as the ‘‘long war.’’ And it is true that the enemy’s proven ability 

to successfully adapt to our countermeasures signals that several more cycles of action/reaction will dot the horizon. But there is much that other nations and the 

United States have to do before this struggle’s outcome is no longer in doubt. During 

the Cold War the United States and our allies built tremendous military, intelligence, academic, and economic capabilities to confront and eventually prevail 

against a totalitarian adversary. Today, we boast few of these capabilities. We do 

not speak radical Islam’s language, understand their culture and history, nor can 

we pretend to solve their problems with military or other means. The role to be 

played by Muslim and Arab leaders in countries where these struggles within Islam 

and with secular leaders are taking place will be paramount. As soon as the United 

States begins this wholesale shift in emphasis, the sooner we will be re-opening 

those American Cultural Centers.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do need to leave 

soon, but I want to ask a few questions. 

First, I would like this panel, particularly Dr. Phares, to comment on the question I raised earlier. And that is, why hasn’t there 

been a Timothy McVeigh-style truck full of fertilizer blowing up of 

a building anywhere in the United States? Is this because the 

forces against us don’t even have one or two guys that can rent a 

truck? Or is it because they just don’t see it as a good idea to engage in moderately destructive activity? 

Mr. PHARES. A very complex question. The easiest way to answer 

it would be reading the mind of the jihadist and see why wouldn’t 

they start a Hamas-like, Islamic jihad-like series of attacks against 

buildings using trucks, or a Hezbollah-like attack in 1983. 

It has to do with two levels. Number one, al-Qaeda central, 

meaning those individuals who are trained to cross countries or are 

at the service of al-Qaeda, they act on behalf of a strategic view, 

not just of hatred. They see a building, I have a truck, and I will 

do it. Al-Qaeda central will not, in my humble assessment, engage 

the little or limited assets that they have below the level of acquiring a capacity of 9/11 kind of attacks. So if we didn’t have them, 

it doesn’t mean we won’t have them; it means that the planning 

strategy of al-Qaeda is to have at least as much as 9/11. 

41

Mr. SHERMAN. Is this because of their ego or their desire to 

achieve superstar status among their potential supporters? 

Mr. PHARES. That could be one psychological element. The other 

element is they think like us strategically; they have commanders 

and troops, what we call assets. What they have in the United 

States accordingly linked to al-Qaeda are in the dozens. Would 

they use those dozens with the possibility of being arrested? Look 

at what happened in the case of the U.K. One person was able to 

dismantle a whole network of probably 25 people. 

The more concerning is that the second level al-Qaeda, second 

generation, are those who are born here who have connected with 

al-Qaeda. Those, the future attacks by these, are still ahead of us. 

It didn’t happen yet. Many of these cells have been dismantled. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What we have also seen in Britain is that the 

homegrown terrorists grew up in Britain, had friends in Britain, 

and were therefore more likely to disclose and allowed to leak their 

plans. It is certainly a lot easier to infiltrate a mosque in my district than it is—or any other Islamic group in my district, most of 

whose members are going to be patriotic Americans, than it is to 

infiltrate a small group of al-Qaeda operatives sent into our country. 

Mr. Sanderson, I know you have pointed out the nuclear, loose 

nukes. I couldn’t agree with you more. We have proven an ability 

as a society to survive a 9/11 attack. I don’t know whether the 

West can survive and go on if we are faced by a nuclear attack. 

And that is why my greatest fears are the Iranian program and, 

of course, the loose nukes. 

And the witnesses who spoke earlier spoke of complacency. There 

is no great—there are two kinds of complacency. One is sloth. 

Americans are not slothful. The other is distraction. You do a lot 

of stuff, but you are so arrogant and complacent about one threat 

that you feel you can deal with everything else. 

During World War II, it was real clear. We had to beat the 

Nazis; we therefore cooperated with Stalin. In contrast, right now 

we are waging a little miniwar against Russia. And, trust me, 

Putin is no Stalin, but we feel that we have got to weaken Russian 

influence over Moldavia, for example. Well, if you have to do that, 

you have to do at least 100 other things that I don’t have time to 

name. And if you have to do 100 things, then you are not going to 

get your key things done. 

Likewise, we are so complacent about terrorism and the Iranian 

nuclear threat that we feel that we can deal with China on the currency issue independent of what China does on Iran. We just want 

to indulge ourselves and do whatever we feel like doing with regard 

to China’s trade issues, and respond to the contingencies and care 

about them, and we don’t have to trouble ourselves to try to get 

China’s support on Iran because, after all, we care about hundreds 

of things including Chinese currency, and no one of them is actually more important than anything else. 

The question I have for you, and this is a bit of a diversion from 

the comments I just made, is you have these madrassas that you 

referred to, and Dr. Phares commented that these could be the 

sources of new terrorists. To what extent are the Saudis funding 

madrassas in the United States? And are they funding madrassas 

42

that are religious institutions that we can all be proud of, or are 

they funding teachers who teach hate? 

Mr. SANDERSON. I am sure Dr. Phares will have more to say on 

this than I do, but my understanding is that the Saudis are funding schools in the United States, they are funding the reading materials that come into prisons in the United States, and that they 

are funding——

Mr. SHERMAN. And what do these materials say? Because if they 

are funding copies of the Koran in English translation or in the 

original Arabic, that might be just fine. Have you found—and I will 

ask Dr. Phares as well—materials paid for by the Saudis or probably paid for by the Saudis that are jihadist in nature? 

Mr. PHARES. Certainly. There are several reports that could be 

made available to you and to the members of the commission on 

Saudi funding over 20 years. We are not talking about Saudi funding over a few years only. And that is on two levels. So the funding 

that goes to religious institutions, which are also educational 

madrassas, goes to the managements of these organizations. 

Now, the problem is that the appointment of managers to these 

institutions is done in accordance with the radical clerics who are 

very influential in Saudi Arabia. I don’t want to go into the inside 

of Saudi Arabia, but there is an orange, and there is a red. The 

Saudis in general are favorable to Wahhabism, but inside that 

state you have radical clerics who are very militant about it. So it 

is a Saudi problem. The end product is, yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I am going to confront the Saudi Ambassador, 

it is going to have to be with something more specific. The Saudis 

may be funding mosques in the United States. The best way to get 

at this is to look at the written materials that they pay for printing, or the written materials used in institutions where they are 

paying to keep the lights on and paying to keep the buildings open. 

What materials do you have used in Saudi-funded institutions or 

printed by with Saudi money that are a departure from normal 

Islam and reflect a terrorist or jihadist view? 

Mr. PHARES. Well, we can open the textbooks that are being used 

by these institutions, these madrassas, funded by the Saudis, and 

that is open information, and look at those textbooks. Certainly 80 

percent of the textbooks have to do with regular teaching of religion and of issues with religion. But there is a 20 percent or so, 

I am trying to quantify, of this information which is a direct call 

to Wahhabism, not so different from what the Salafists and the 

jihadists are defining as their enemies in Iraq or another part of 

the world. 

For example, I will give you one example. When you distinguish 

in one community between those who go by these teachings and 

those who do not go by these teachings and call them the kuffar, 

it is an Arabic word for infidels, and then you prescribe that these 

kuffars are the enemies of the right path, this is equivalent in our 

cultural, political culture, of discrimination and the isolation of 

part of society. That alone is a problem in democracies, and that 

is part of the educational curriculum that we have seen and we 

could provide information about. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I hope you provide that information and indicate who paid for the printing of each document or textbook, and/

43

or at least some of the mosques in which that book is used, because 

it is not enough to just wave around a book. There has to be a connection between that and either Saudi paying for the printing of 

the book or the Saudi paying for the institutions that employ it. 

I see the other witness also has a comment. 

Mr. SANDERSON. I would just say, I don’t have any evidence myself, but I have heard anecdotal evidence as to the content of some 

of the publications that have come into United States prisons and 

into schools at the hands of the Saudis in the past, but personally 

have not seen it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The other point I will make is that it is just absolutely wrong for us to allow these materials into prisons. The first 

amendment has limits in prisons. Prisoners are not accorded most 

of the civil rights, like the ability to live where you want to live. 

They are prisoners. And we need to—we can’t let material into 

prisons just because the cover says that it is a religious text. 

Mr. ROYCE. I think Freedom House has a pretty good document 

with some of the specific evidence that was funded from Saudi 

sources, and we will share that with the Committee Members. 

We will go now to Congresswoman Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to sincerely thank you 

for this hearing. These two gentlemen who have been on those hot 

seats all of this time probably have presented to us the most 

thoughtful and insightful discussion of where we are now. And I 

have been saying this for a long time. So I am going to thank you 

for indulging us with this. 

I am going to throw some concepts out at you, and either one of 

you or both of you I would hope would comment. 

Mr. Phares, you talk about the long war. I think—or is that Mr. 

Sanderson? Let me see whose paper I have in front of me. 

Mr. SANDERSON. I did reference it in my conclusion. 

Ms. WATSON. Okay. And then I would like to hear some talk 

about the long war versus the Cold War and a civil war in Iraq. 

But you are raising issues that I think we have been complacent 

about. Mr. Brookes says America is complacent. I hear patter coming from the policymakers about this war on terrorism in Iraq, and 

as an Ambassador, I become thoroughly confused, because one 

thing you learn when you go out to your post in a foreign country: 

You had better understand something about their customs, their 

traditions, and their ways of thinking, or you are not going to succeed at your mission. And I could read everything they put in front 

of me at the State Department. I had 6 years to do it. But nothing 

replaces the experience and living in a foreign country and knowing that, regardless of what we say according to our principles and 

values, our provisions—I was in Micronesia—that it is the land 

marquis or the high chief that calls the tune. So I am actually elated for the two of you bringing these issues up, because that is the 

real world. 

And you said today, we boast few of these capabilities. We do not 

speak radical Islam’s language, or we do not understand their culture and history, nor can we pretend to solve their problems with 

military or other means. And I am wondering, you know, we support Israel. We are one-sided with that support. But are we ever 

44

going to solve the problems for them between the Palestinians and 

Israel? Lebanon, Hezbollah, Israel, longstanding issues. 

Can America in our isolation and our feeling that we are pretty 

safe here—and then all of a sudden we get hit with 9/11. But you 

are the first two that have really started us on a path of thinking 

differently, and I want to commend you for that. 

I would like to hear you, Dr. Phares, come back and do some lecturing and some teaching. I heard you say you have been a professor. 

Mr. Sanderson, I would like to have you come and reiterate what 

you feel are the tools that we are going to have to need if we are 

going to succeed with anything. 

I want to think—I have been with our Chairman, and I know he 

gets it, because I have been with you. We went into Sudan; and he 

said, you know, something is going on here beyond guns and bullets. Something is going on. Until we get to that, we cannot make 

much—so we came back and said, let’s get our State Department 

staff over there. We have got to deal with what is happening, genocide. 

So thank you for awakening these thoughts and the content. 

I want to end by saying if you want to comment on the long war 

versus the Cold War, the Civil War and these wars; and I hope we 

can move from thinking that it has to be a war. It ought to be a 

movement based on some understanding of who these enemies of 

our American, Western democracy way of life are. And I think we 

have been complacent. I don’t think we have dealt enough with 

that. 

With that, I end what I have to say; and I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Congresswoman Watson. I will give you 

a copy of Dr. Phares book when I finish it. It is really interesting. 

Mr. PHARES. Congresswoman, I am overwhelmed by your words. 

I am pretty happy that we are engaging in this dialogue. Let me 

be brief in making a few comments about both of the things you 

raised. 

Number one, the war issue. Had we in the United States and in 

democracies—I always link the entire international community—

believed in the same views we had, one, the previous war of ideas, 

when the Soviet Union collapsed and it engaged at that time, not 

10 or 11 or 12 years after, in finding who are our partners among 

those civil societies in the greater Middle East, in the Muslim 

world, in Africa, probably the war on terror either would not have 

happened or it would have happened in a very limited way. And 

I will explain myself. 

You just mentioned Sudan. I myself have published, wrote about 

Sudan, was a voice in the wilderness in the early ’90s about raising 

the issue of Sudan and was always wondering why is it that the 

international community would be so vivid in intervening everywhere, in Latin America, with the European dissidents. We have 

gone twice to Yugoslavia, rightly so, to help people who are in 

need. And 1 million Black Africans have been killed in a war basically with the jihadists, the same ones that visited us on September 11, and yet we haven’t even intervened for so many years 

or invited some of those victims in the United States. And yourself, 

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you are aware how devastating that problem in Sudan is. And now 

we have a situation in Darfur where it has been qualified finally 

not just by the United States but by even the United Nations as 

a genocide. 

The problem that I see as happening in the war on terror is because we have not been aware of these crises and the rise of these 

fundamentalist radical views which do not represent the majority 

neither in the Arab world nor in the Muslim world, but a minority 

which is armed, which is strong, such were the social nationalists 

in Germany after the collapse of the Weimar Republic was. Certainly they could carry the force of representation of these societies. 

The other example, Madam Congresswoman, comes from Lebanon, since you just mentioned it. At the first opportunity, the 

international community, thankfully, the United States, France, 

Europeans, Arab moderates, worked together on the issue of Lebanon, issue resolution 1559 in 2004, regardless of our political debates inside this nation. 

The very first moment the Lebanese were given the opportunity 

to express themselves freely, what did they do? We have been hearing about Lebanon for 20 years as the land of Hezbollah and the 

land of radicalism. We saw 1.5 million people, not armed, men, 

women, children, taking to the streets of Beirut in the Cedars Revolution. An overwhelming number of Lebanese do not want war, 

any kind of war, including holy war. They want normal peaceful 

times. 

The first elections in Lebanon you have a majority of people who 

believe in the same way. The problem is that violence and terrorism obstruct the democratic process. 

Sometimes we find ourselves—I am talking about myself as an 

American today—in the way of putting efforts. We put effort to 

bring down the Apartheid regime in South Africa. We didn’t have 

to do war. We did economics. 

We threatened a regime in Haiti which was oppressive of the 

people of Haiti. We sent an aircraft carrier. Thankfully, we didn’t 

have to do more than that. 

In other cases, in Yugoslavia, we had to engage because of the 

difficult equation that existed there. 

In Lebanon, not one shot and we had seen the Lebanese deploy. 

My point is, for the future, there is a war of ideas that has to 

be won so that the war on terror will be won as well. That is why 

in most of my points I am quoting for engaging those dissidents, 

the democracy forces, the women’s movements, the students’ movement, minorities in the greater Middle East. Actually, the majorities walk with us. We need to reach out and find them, Madam. 

Mr. SANDERSON. Congresswoman, thank you for your comments. 

I appreciate them. 

Let me share two points with you. I was recently in Indonesia 

on a State Department international visitors trip. I went to about 

six different cities, and there was a Foreign Service Officer there 

named Paul Berg, who is now at the Army War College for a year. 

He was so impressive you could not believe it. His skills in 

Bahasan Indonesian language were phenomenal. Everywhere we 

went he garnered tremendous respect. Everyone loved him. He 

could walk in any door, any government office. 

46

That is just what we need. We need a cadre of people who have 

that level of experience and the cultural understanding for the good 

that it does in a Machiavellian but realistic way so that when we 

do have a confrontation or things do go sour with a country we 

have people who understand those people. Now, it may be a dark 

way to look at it, but that, in fact, is a reality. But we have to prepare for that. It was so impressive. A little goes a long way, and 

he had a lot, and, boy, he just changed minds left and right. And 

he was alone, basically, in Atjeh, in Medan as the counsel general, 

and he felt totally safe because he was one of them, and it was 

really impressive. The long war. We invested 12 to $13 trillion to fight the Soviets. 

The Soviets, characterized with a known language and we had 

hundreds of people that understood it within the CIA and other departments; it was a bounded threat; it was a hierarchical threat; 

it was symmetrical to us. And with that money we developed intelligence capabilities to penetrate that threat. 

The current threat, radical Islamists: Languages that few of us 

know, cultures that we do not know, an unbounded threat, no hierarchy, and few intelligence capabilities designed to penetrate that 

threat. We have got a long, long way to go. 

And you know what? In the Cold War, we were basically omnipotent. We had everything we needed almost. But now we need to go 

to our friends. It is a local battle. There will be times when it is 

a war, where we will be fighting, but this is so comprehensive and 

so much more multifaceted than our confrontation with the Soviets, 

and we really need to build the tools. 9/11 we reached into that 

quiver to pull out the arrows we had there for the Cold War. They 

are blunt and devoid of nuance. We need new skills. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask a question of Walid. What does the recent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah mean in terms of the 

wider war against Islamic terrorism? 

As I mentioned to you, I was there in Haifa. I had an opportunity 

to see part of that. How do you see Lebanon playing out? 

And then I would ask Tom a question about his statement that 

the growing Muslim communities in western Europe are a cause 

for concern. Most of these countries enjoy the status of being a participant in the visa waiver program with the United States. I am 

thinking about the news we got about those who are looking to 

take a flight to the United States with the intent to take down 

those 10 jetliners. Is this something Congress should be reevaluating in terms of that visa waiver program under these circumstances? 

Also, how concerned are you, Tom, about Europe as a sanctuary? 

I am thinking about some of the things Walid said earlier. We have 

got a mosque there in London in which, as we talk about recruitment, is a cause of real concern. We see some of the words of radical call to action, call to jihad that go on there in that main 

Finsbury Park mosque; and I just wonder how we tackle that. 

So, Dr. Phares, if you would like to start. 

Mr. PHARES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

One remark before I address the issue of the Lebanon, 

Hezbollah, Iran, Israel, Syria conflict. There is a big difference between what the peoples of the region want if you give them that 

47

freedom to express themselves and what that either regimes or 

radical organizations want. I see many, including my students or 

compatriots in America and in Europe, confused about why do people hate each other? 

It is not that nations hate each other. Every time we have an opportunity for a civil society to express itself without being under a 

regime of hate or threatened by an organization that hates, then 

you are going to have different perspectives. 

The majority of the Lebanese in this case, since we were talking 

about Hezbollah, showed the whole world, the cameras 1.5 million 

people in the Cedars Revolution that all they want is the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon and the Israelis, of 

course, from the south, that all militias are disarmed. It is not normal to have a militia which want to wage wars at its own timing 

that exists in a country which needs peace and stability. 

The decision by Secretary General of Hezbollah to wage that first 

operation on July 12, 13 is not just a local decision by Hezbollah. 

It has been proven by statements both in Iran and also in Lebanon 

that there is a regional understanding between the Iranian regime 

of Mr. Ahmadinejad, the Syrian regime of Mr. Bashar al-Assad and 

Hezbollah, who feel that they are threatening their own interests 

to deflect the international community from dealing with these interests. 

And I will tell you quickly what I think these interests are: To 

direct Hezbollah to inflame the situation with Israel, a matter that 

Hezbollah could have done since 2000. Why is it on July 12, 2006, 

6 years after the withdrawal of the Israelis, they waged that war? 

Three reasons, Mr. Chairman. Number one, we all know the regime of Iran is in trouble with the international community on the 

issue of the nuclear. The Syrian regime of Mr. Bashar al-Assad is 

in trouble with the same United Nations—not talking about America or Israel or France; I am talking about the Security Council of 

the United Nations—on the issue of the assassination of former 

Prime Minister Hariri of Lebanon, and the results were about to 

be rendered. Hezbollah is in trouble with the majority of the other 

Lebanese political parties on the issue of this army. 

So three interests coming together thought that by reigniting a 

war with the Israelis, a war that most of the societies in the east 

do not want—most of the Arabs do not want wars. They have been 

shocked enough by what has happened in Iraq, what has happened 

in terms of terrorist wars around the world. 

My concern is that a decision has been reached at the level of 

the two regimes and Hezbollah, meaning Tehran, Damascus and 

Hezbollah, to confront the international community. They drew red 

lines in the sand saying that they are not going to stop on the 

project of nuclear for a variety of reasons, that they are not going 

to comply with the United Nations rendering the sentence or the 

results on the Hariri assassination. 

Syria’s regime, its President, made a couple of statements, very 

important, on the fact that they would not relinquish their influence on Lebanon, and Hezbollah will not want to disarm. 

Having said that, it has consequences. It has been mentioned by 

the members of panel and yourself that if a regime wants to confront an international community and has access to nuclear weapVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:19 Oct 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\090706\29836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ons, we are talking about a serious threat. If Hezbollah wants to 

refuse the disarming by any means—and Hezbollah has cells not 

just in Lebanon but also around the world, including in the United 

States—I would move to consider this as a very concerning matter 

for ournational security. And I move to say that we have not finished the war with the al-Qaeda, and the Hezbollah may consider 

a confrontation if Iran would order them to do so. 

So we may well have to—our national security would have to 

consider to deal with the possibility, the scenario, as dark as it is, 

that both organizations and both movements would be striking, not 

necessarily in coordination, against the United States and democracies around the world. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, Doctor. And Tom. 

Mr. SANDERSON. Congressman, I am afraid that Europe presents 

a huge problem; and I think you are well aware of that. Let me 

just describe the environment and a common demographic. 

You have got between 15 million and 20 million Muslims in Europe. They are not well assimilated. Many of them disenfranchised. 

You have second and third generations, young men and some 

women whose parents came to Europe from Algeria, from Morocco, 

from a host of nations. So those young men do not have allegiance 

to their host country, nor do they have direct connections to their 

parents’ home country, making them highly susceptible in this environment where they are disrespected, humiliated, 

disenfranchised and, even in the middle class, still kept out of 

choice neighborhoods, so therefore susceptible to the 3,000–4,000 

pro al-Qaeda Web sites. The extremists, imams who seek refuge in 

those countries from repression in the Middle East, from returning 

jihadist fighters from Iraq, Chechyna, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and 

from CDs and DVDs and from their friends. I mean, a tremendous 

swirl of influence around people who lack an identity, lack an allegiance, and therefore are highly susceptible to this. 

Think about the influence of a young Army soldier who comes 

back home to New Hampshire and meets with the local high 

school, the inspiration that he or she is from having fought in Iraq 

or Afghanistan or elsewhere. Imagine that same fighter coming 

back from Iraq meeting with these kids who are not integrated in 

society. A huge problem. 

Visa waiver also a problem. Al-Qaeda and like-minded groups 

are tremendously savvy. They are looking at every countermeasure 

we put out there in developing their countermeasures. They will 

penetrate the borders of the United States. I believe they are here. 

I am not an alarmist, but I am a realist. I think they are here. 

Okay, so we ban liquids from being brought on airplanes. Well, 

what do they do? They mimic drug traffickers and start to swallow 

condoms filled with plastic explosives or put them in other places. 

These are the kind of innovations that people who are true believers and see the destruction of the United States as necessary will 

do. These are things that are not beyond the realm of the possible. 

And I think that Europe does present a problem. 

There are debates over what direction that Muslim community is 

heading, and the Economist had a good cover story called Eurabia 

a few months back. It is a good read; and, in fact, I am meeting 

with the primary author of that. There are some positives and negVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:19 Oct 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\090706\29836.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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atives, but, nonetheless, that is fertile ground. And they are got 

going to be dumb enough to choose Mohamed Atta again to leads 

these fights. They are going to get converts. We saw a woman go 

from Belgium who blew herself up in Iraq. That is a trend that will 

increase. 

Mr. ROYCE. Some of that we have already seen quite of bit of in 

the prisons, but we have also seen it in my home district in Garden 

Grove. We had a convert whose family was Jewish. He was converted. Now he is with al-Qaeda and is making statements on 

tapes and you can hear him on Aljazeera or on CNN. 

Well, I want to thank both of you for your testimony. You have 

been very patient, and our audience has been very patient. Thank 

you all. 

I think we heard some very important testimony which Congresswoman Watson and I and the other Committee Members really appreciate. 

We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:18 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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