This version includes the e rrata dated 19N ov01-e
UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O . 00-1534
S YBL E M. V AUGHN , A PP EL L ANT ,

V

. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE

.

B e fo re KR

AM ER, Chief Judge , a

nd I VE RS and STEI

NB ERG, J

ud ge s.
O R D E R Pending be fore the Court is the appellant' s application, throug h co u n s el , for an awa rd of attorney fee s and ex penses pursuant to the Equal Ac cess to Just ice Ac t, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (EAJA).
The a ppellant, the wid o w o f v et eran Ed M. Vaug hn, soug ht review , throug h counsel, of a J une 2, 2000, dec ision of the Board of Veter ans' Appea ls (B oard or BV A) that, int er a lia, had denie d Depa rtment of Ve tera

ns Affa irs s er v i ce co n n ection for the ca use of the ve tera

n' s death. On November

30, 2000, the par

ties, citing the need f

or re adjudication in light of the ena ctment, af

ter the J une 2000 Boa

rd decision, of the Veter ans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L

. No. 10 6-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000) (V CAA), filed a joint motion for rema nd of that ser

vice- connec teddeath c laim and furthe r moved for dismiss al of the rema ining issues. The Court, via a n order of the Clerk of the Court, g rante d this mot ion on D ece mber 15, 2000. On J anuar y 4, 2001, the appe llant filed an EA J A application, seeking $1,270.03 in a ttorney fee s and expenses. On April 6, 2001, the Secre tary filed a r esponse in opposition to the appellant' s application. The Sec reta ry argues that the appellant is not a pre vaili ng party and, alter

natively , that the Secr etar y ' s position at both t he administrative and litiga

tion stage s of the proc eeding s was substantially justified. S

e e 28 U. S.C. § 2412(d)( 1)(A) . On April 19, 2001, the a ppellant filed a

reply to t h e S ec re t ar y 's response ; the appellant a sserts both that she wa s a pre vailing pa rty (under both the so-ca lled "me rits" theor y and the so -c a lle d " ine vit a

ble vic tor y " the or y ) a nd that th e S ecre tary ' s p os iti on wa s n ot s ub sta

nti a lly jus tif ie d at th e a dmi nis tr a tiv e le ve l.
On M ay 29, 2001, the United States Supreme Court issued a n opinion in Bu c k

ha nn on Bo ar

d & Car e Ho me

, I nc . v . W est V irg ini a D e p't o f H e alt h &Hu ma n R es. , 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001). I n that op ini on , th e U. S. Su

pr e me Court

he ld t hat th e so -c a lle d "' cat aly st the or y ' [wa s] no t a

pe rm iss ibl e ba sis " fo r t

he a wa rd of a tto rn e y fe e s un de r the F a ir Ho us ingAm e ndme nts Ac t of 19 88 , 4 2 U .S. C. § 3613(c) (2), a

nd the Amer icans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C

. § 1 2205. Buck hannon , 12 1 S. Ct. a t 18 43

. Th e U. S. Sup re me Court a lso re vie we d a nd re ite rated it s p ri or p re c e de nts2

defining the term "pr evailing party " for pur poses of seve ral fe e-shifting statutes. Id. at 1839-40. On J uly 12, 2001, this Court ordered s u p p lemental brie fing from the pa rties on the issue of the applicabilit y an d eff

ect of Buck

hannon , su

pra
. Vaughn v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 119 ( 2001) (pe r curiam or der)

. The appellant filed a supplemental brief on Aug ust 2, 2001, and the Secr etar y filed
a res po ns e on S e pte mbe r 4 , 2 00 1. Th e a pp e lla nt a rgue s, int e r a lia , th a t sh e is a pr e va ili ngpa

rt y under both the c ataly st theory and the mer its theory beca use she rec eived a rema

nd of her claim. The Se c re tary a rgue s th a t th e app e lla

nt i s n ot a

pr e va ili ngpa

rt y un de r t he c a ta ly st t

he or y , th e me ri ts theory , or the inevitable -victory theory

. I n Thayer v. Princ ipi , t h i s C o u rtr e c e n t l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t" t h e d e f

i n i t i o n o f ' p r e v a i l i n g p a rt y' set forth by

the S u p reme Court's opinion in Buck hannon " a

pplies to our consideration of fee applications under

the EAJA. Thayer , __ Ve t.App. ___, ___, No. 98-1782, 2001 WL1002743 (S e pt. 4, 20 01 ). Th e re fo re , " the c a ta ly st the or y is n o lo ng e r a

va ila ble to a c hie ve pr e va ili ng -p a rt y status in this Court" under the EAJA. Ibid. He nc e , w e re je c t th e a pp e lla nt' s c on te nti on

that sh e is a pre vailing pa

rty in this case under

the cataly st theory , as desc ribed in Thayer , su pra
. I n Sumner v . Principi , t h e e n ba nc C o u rth a s j u s ti s s u e d an o p i n i o n d e n y i n g an E A JA applicati o n fi l ed in a ca se whe re the appellant ha d rec eived a rema nd pursuant to Ce ru llo v. Derwinski , 1 V e t. A p p
. 1 9 5 ( 1 9 9 1 ) , i. e
. , a r e ma n d to a ll o w th e B V A Ch a ir ma n to g r a n t B VA
rec onsideration. S

u m ner ,

_ _ Vet.App. ___, ___, No. 99- 368, slip op. at 12 (Nov. 6, 2001). The Court c on c lud e d, a s to the me ri ts the or y fo r a tta ini ngpr e va ili ng -p a rt

y status , th a t " tho se Su

pr e me Court case s awa

rding preva iling-pa

rty status either require the ultimate rec eipt of a be nefit that wa s soug ht in b ri n ging the litigation, i.e., the a war d of a be nefit, or, at a minimum, a court rema nd pr e dic a te d up on a dmi nis tr a tiv e erro r." Id. at _

_ _ , s l i p o p
. at 1 1 (c i t i n g Buck hannon , su

pra , and Shalala v. Schaefe r , 509 U.S. 292 (1993)). The Court went on to deny preva iling-pa rty status there
on the g ro un ds that " a re mand do e s no t c on sti tut e ' so me re lie f on the me ri ts' un le ss t

hat r e mand

is pr e d i c a t e d

u p o n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e r

r o r " , an d t h a tt h e a

p p e l l a n tt h e r e h a d

f a i l e d t o d e mon str a te preva iling-pa

rty status unde r that "me rits" test beca use "[n]owhere is his mot ion did the Secre tary a c kn o w le d g e e r

r o r , a n d b e c a u s e , a lt e r n a ti v e ly , in r e ma

n d in g th e matt e r th e Co u rt d id n o t r e c o g n iz e adm in is tr ati ve er ror ." Ib id

. The joint motion for remand in this case reque sted a re mand " due to the re cent e nactment of the [VCAA] ". N ovember 30, 2000, J oint Moti on for Rema nd, at 2. The D ece mber 15, 2000, orde r of the Clerk of the Court g rante d the motion and thus ordere d a re mand on this same g round. Given that the sole basis for the rema nd was the enac tment of

the VCAA a

nd that the B oard' s disposit ion of t his case ha d occur

red be fo re the enac tment of the VCAA, there could not ha ve bee n any

Boa rd
err or with respe ct to the VCAA. There fore , under the rationale and test enunc iated in Sumner , the Court rejec ts the appellant' s arguments here that she has attained pre vailing- party status under the merits theory , due m er ely to her having r ece ived a r emand in this case

. See Sum ner , __ Vet.App. at ___, slip op. at 8-9 (explaining that, a lthough Sti llwe ll v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 291, 299- 300 (1994),
c ou ld b e re a d to me a n th a t " a re mand a lon e " c on fe rr e d p re va ili ng-par ty stat us up on a pp e lla nt, Sti llwe ll rema nd was in fa ct base d on BV A er ror)

.3

Finally , the appe llant arg ues that she ha s obtained pre vailing- party status under the inevitable-vic tory

test. The inevitable-vic tory test has been raised to the Court, but we have ne ver acc epted it. See , e.g. , Le ma tta v . B ro wn , 8 Ve t

. Ap p
. 5 0 4 , 5 1 0 (1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Perke t v. Sec retary of Health & Human Serv ices , 9 05 F .2 d 1 29 , 1 32 (6 th C ir . 1 99 0) , a nd ho ldi ngthat te st i na

pp lic a ble wh e re the re ha d b e en no su pers edin g le g isl a tio n) ; Chandler v. Gober , 11 Vet.App. 6, 8 ( 1997) (holding that test was not applicable wher e " victory has neither

been attained nor a ssured" ),
o ve r ruled in part by Miley v . Principi , 2 4 2 F

. 3 d 1 0 5 0 , 1 0 5 4 ( F e d

. Ci r
. 2 0 0 1 )

. Wh e re acourt ha s re mand e d a

c a se a t th e me ri ts s ta g e ba se d s ol ely on a statut or y c ha ng e , th e ine vit a

ble -v ic tor y te st would allow for pr evailing -par ty status w here the appellant later, at the EAJA stag e, could prove that he wou l d h ave preva iled at the mer its stage absent that statutory chang e. See Perke t , 905 F.2d at 13 3; se e als o Mi lto n v . S

ha lal a , 17 F.3d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1994); Gu gli e ttiv . S

e c re tar yof H e alt h & Human Serv ices , 900 F.2d 397, 402 (1st Cir. 1990). Howe ver, unde r Buck hannon , 121 S. Ct . at 1840, and Sumner , __ Ve t.A pp . at __, sli p op. a t 11- 12 , tha t tes t c a n n o lo ng e r b e via ble be c a us e it lacks the c ritical re quirement that a rema nd at t he mer its stage be pre dicated on a dminist rative e rror
. Ac c or din g ly , we ho ld that the ine vit a ble -v ic tor y te st, jus t a s the c a ta ly st te st, is no t a perm is sib le b a s is f o r e s ta b lishing preva iling-pa

rty status under the EA J A. See B uckhannon , Sumner , and T h ayer , a ll su pr a
. He nc e , w e ho ld t

hat Buck hannon , a s a

p p l i e d t o t h i s C o u rtb y Su mn e r and Thayer , both su pr a , prec l u d es t he appe llant from ac hieving preva iling-pa rty status under the me rits, cataly st, or inevitable-vic tory

test based on obtaining a re man d solely for r eadjudication in li g ht of the ena ctment of the VCAA a

nd will deny

her EA J A application. See Sum ner , __ Vet.App. at ___, slip op. at 12 (deny ing E AJ A application for fa ilure to demonstrate preva iling-pa rty status). Up on c on sid e ratio n o f t

he fo re g oin g , it

is ORDERED that the appe llant's a pplication for EA J A fe es and e x penses is DENI ED.
DA TE D: No ve mbe r 9 , 2 00 1 PER CU RI AM

.