[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-10235

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cr-00122-PGB-TBS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

CHRISTOPHER GERARD DICKERSON, 

a.k.a. Casual, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(June 13, 2019)

Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 1 of 7 
2

Christopher Dickerson appeals his convictions for conspiracy to distribute 

and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846; distribution and possession with intent to distribute 

heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(e), (2); and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). On appeal, he argues 

that the district court should have suppressed an incriminating statement that he 

made because he was being interrogated by law enforcement when he made the 

statement, he had not yet been read his Miranda1 rights, and he had previously 

requested an attorney.

A district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress is reviewed 

under a mixed standard of review, where we review the district court’s findings of 

fact for clear error and the district court’s application of law to those facts de novo. 

United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2007). The court’s 

factual findings are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. 

Id. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we may review the entire 

 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 2 of 7 
3

record, including trial testimony. United States v. Morales, 893 F.3d 1360, 1367 

(11th Cir. 2018).

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in 

any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In 

Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the government “may not use statements, 

whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 

defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 

secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. As 

part of the procedure to safeguard a defendant’s right against self-incrimination, 

the government must inform the defendant that he has the right to remain silent, 

anything he says may be used against him in court, and he can consult with a 

lawyer and have a lawyer present with him during interrogation. Id. at 467-73. 

Once the accused invokes his right to counsel, authorities may not subject him to 

further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless the 

accused himself initiates further communication with the police. Edwards v. 

Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). However, if the suspect’s reference to an 

attorney is “ambiguous or equivocal” from the perspective of a reasonable officer, 

law enforcement is not required to stop questioning. Davis v. United States, 512 

U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 

Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 3 of 7 
4

Interrogation occurs “whenever a person in custody is subjected to either 

express questioning or its functional equivalent,” which refers to words or actions 

that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 

response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). “Voluntary 

incriminating statements, however, not made in response to an officer’s 

questioning are freely admissible” even after Miranda rights are asserted. United 

States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Miranda, 384 

U.S. at 478 (“Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth 

Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.”). 

The admission of statements in violation of Miranda is subject to harmless 

error analysis. United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1435 (11th Cir. 1991). This 

determination requires: (1) a two-fold inquiry into the effect of (A) the erroneously 

admitted statement upon the other evidence introduced, and (B) the conduct of the 

defense; and (2) whether, absent the illegal statement, the remaining evidence 

establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

First, as to the issue of whether Dickerson actually requested a lawyer at the 

scene of his arrest and invoked his Miranda rights—based on Officer Detitto’s

testimony that Dickerson said that he wanted to “think about it”—Dickerson’s 

reference to having an attorney was ambiguous. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. Because 

Dickerson did not affirmatively request an attorney, law enforcement was not 

Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 4 of 7 
5

required to refrain from questioning him. Id. Regardless, the issue of whether 

Dickerson requested an attorney is not dispositive because, as discussed more 

below, the district court did not err in concluding that Dickerson was not being 

interrogated and his statement was voluntary.

Based on the testimony given both at the suppression hearing and trial and a 

review of the recorded interview, Officer Middleton was reading Dickerson his 

charges and explaining the associated penalties immediately before Dickerson 

made an incriminating statement, not unlike the officers in Suggs showing the 

suspect the indictment right before the suspect incriminated himself. Suggs, 755 

F.2d at 1541-42. Although Middleton did warn Dickerson that he could get a 

longer sentence if he did not cooperate, those statements were made after 

Dickerson had incriminated himself and thus could not have been said to elicit his

incriminating statement. Therefore, the district court reasonably concluded that 

Middleton’s statements were not the “functional equivalent of interrogation.”

Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01. Moreover, even if Dickerson was being interrogated, his 

incriminating statement was not responsive to Middleton’s statement that he would 

be considered an armed career criminal. Id. at 1542. Dickerson interrupted 

Middleton’s explanation of the penalties to make his incriminating statement. 

Therefore, his voluntary incriminating statement was properly admissible. Suggs, 

755 F.2d at 1541. 

Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 5 of 7 
6

To the extent that Dickerson relies on Officer Roman’s question about 

whether he could remove his mask, Officer Roman’s question was not the 

functional equivalent of interrogation under Miranda because a reasonable officer 

would not have thought that the question was likely to elicit an incriminating 

response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 (1980). Moreover, Dickerson did not make

his statement until a few minutes after Officer Roman asked him about removing 

the mask, and Dickerson’s statement was unresponsive to Officer Roman’s 

statements about his mask. Suggs, 755 F.2d at 1542. Though Dickerson argues 

that Roman’s actions created a coercive environment, the focus of the inquiry is on 

the officer’s reasonable expectation of the suspect’s response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 

300-01 (1980).

Even if the incriminating statement did violate Miranda, the error was 

harmless. Beale, 921 F.2d at 1435. Though Dickerson argues that the statement 

had a spillover effect on the drug charges by making the jury believe he was a “bad 

guy,” this argument is rebutted by the fact that the jury acquitted him of several of 

the drug charges, showing that the jury considered the evidence against each of the 

drug charges and was not improperly influenced by Dickerson’s incriminating

statement. Further, both Officer Roman and Officer Gwizdala testified at length 

about the sale of firearms that underlaid the charge, and both were directly 

involved in and witnesses to that transaction. Both were also able to identify the 

Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 6 of 7 
7

firearms that were purchased from Dickerson. Therefore, even without 

Dickerson’s incriminating statement, the remaining evidence established his guilt 

as to the firearms charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Beale, 921 F.2d at 1435. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 18-10235 Date Filed: 06/13/2019 Page: 7 of 7