[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-13132

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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-01097-MHS

LASHAUN Y. CARTER, 

individually and on behalf of all others similarly 

situated who consent to their inclusion in a collective action, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DOLL HOUSE II, INC., 

a corporation, 

d.b.a. Stilettos Gentlemen's Club, 

THEO LAMBROS, 

an individual, 

 Defendants - Appellants.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(June 25, 2015)

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Before JORDAN and DUBINA, Circuit Judges and GOLDBERG,* Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Defendants/Appellants Dollhouse, Inc., Stilettos Gentlemen's Club, and 

Theo Lambros appeal the district court’s order denying in part and granting in part 

their motion to compel arbitration in plaintiffs/appellees Fair Labor Standards Act 

(“FLSA”) complaint. 

We first conclude that we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal because 

the order is an appealable interlocutory order. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). We 

generally apply the de novo standard of review to a district court’s denial of a 

motion to compel arbitration. See Jenkins v. First American Cash Advance of 

Georgia, LLC., 400 F.3d 868, 873 (11th Cir. 2005). This court reviews the district 

court’s factual findings for clear error. Multi-Fin. Secs. Corp. v. King, 386 F.3d 

1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 2004). 

After reviewing the record, reading the parties briefs, and having the benefit 

of oral argument, we agree with the district court that the October Agreement is 

enforceable but not retroactive. We base our affirmance of the district court’s 

order regarding the October Agreement on general principles of contract 

interpretation applicable to all arbitration agreements. The October Agreement 

 * Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, United States Judge with the United States Court of 

International Trade, sitting by designation.

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clearly refers “only” to “any dispute regarding this contract/agreement.” This 

arbitration clause is similar to one we examined in Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 

F.3d 1113, 1116-17 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogation recognized by Williams v. NCL 

(Bahamas) Ltd., 686 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2012). In Thomas, we refused to apply 

retroactively an arbitration clause that provided that “[a]ny and all disputes arising 

out of or in connection with this Agreement, . . . shall be referred to, and finally 

resolved by arbitration.” Id. at 1117. We concluded that “if the parties had 

intended retroactivity, they would have explicitly said so.” Id. at 1119. Because 

there is nothing in the October Agreement regarding retroactivity, we conclude the 

district court correctly refused to apply the arbitration provision to any claims that 

arose before October 2013. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order as it 

relates to the October Agreement.

Concerning the April Agreement, it is apparent from the record that the 

district court made factfindings based on inferences from dates rather than live 

testimony. We believe the better course would have been for the district court to 

conduct an evidentiary hearing, take live testimony and then make findings of fact. 

Accordingly, we vacate that part of the district court’s order concerning the April 

Agreement and remand this case for the district court to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing.

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AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

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