Civilian Space Policy and Applications

June 1982

NTIS order #PB82-234444
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 82-600564

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This assessment responds to a request to the Office of Technology Assessment

(OTA) from the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation for an

evaluation of the present state and possible future directions of space applications

technologies in the civilian sector. Four technologies are examined in detail: satellite

communications, land remote sensing, materials processing in space, and space

transportation. In addition, the assessment investigates the national policy that has

guided the development of these and other applications technologies.

For the past quarter century, the United States has been the acknowledged world

leader in the exploration of space and the use of technologies developed to operate in

the space environment. Now, however, the United States faces increasing foreign

competition in many areas of the space program, particularly in applications with

commercial promise. Civilian Space Policy and Applications examines several means

for addressing this competitive challenge. In particular, it investigates the options

available for the future deployment of U.S. land remote-sensing systems, and explores

the status of advanced satellite communications research within the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration. Further, the report assesses the potential for

manufacturing useful products in space and for commercializing space transportation

systems.

OTA was greatly aided by the advice of the project advisory panel, as well as by

participants in several specialized workshops. The contributions of contractors, who

provided important analyses, and of numerous individuals and organizations that gave

generously of their time and knowledge, are gratefully appreciated.

Director

.,. Ill
Civilian Space Policy and Applications Advisory Panel

American

Fred E. Bradley

McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co.

Sam Brown

Private Consultant

John G. Burke

Department of History

University of California

Hal Clement (Harry Stubbs)

Author

Terry Dawson, Jr.

The Analytic Sciences Corp.

Hugh Downs

American Broadcasting Co.

Daniel J. Fink

General Electric Co.

Arnold Frutkin

The Burroughs Corp.

Eilene Galloway

International Institute of Space Law of

Jerry Grey, Chairman

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Michael B. McElroy

Center for Earth and Planetary Physics

Harvard University

James A. Michener

Author

Bernard J. O’Keefe

EG&G, Inc.

Thomas O. Paine

Northrop Corp.

Merton J. Peck

Department of Economics

Yale University

Charles Sheldon *

Science Policy Research Division

Congressional Research Service

Marcia Smith

Science Policy Research Division “

Congressional Research Service

t h e Martin Summerfield

Ivan Getting

Consultant

Willis M. Hawkins

Lockheed Corp.

Ida R. Hoos

Space Sciences Laboratory

University of California

James A. Loveli

Fisk Telephone Systems, Inc.

Princeton Combustion Research Laboratories, Inc.

Verner E. Suomi

Space Science & Engineering Center

University of Wisconsin

Anthony F. C. Wallace

Department of Anthropology

University of Pennsylvania

Roy A. Welch

Department of Geography

University of Georgia

NOTE: The Advisory Panel provided advice and comment throughout the assessment, but the members do

not necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse the report for which OTA assumes full responsibility.

.

* Deceased,

iv
Civilian Space Policy and Applications Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Ray A. Williamson, Project Director

Adam Wasserman

Philip P. Chandler, II Richard DalBello* Gordon Law

Richard Marsten** Thomas Thornberg***

Contributors

Scott Finer Donna Valtri

Administrative Staff

paula Walden

Jannie Coles Marion Fitzhugh

Contractors

Trudy Bell Leonard David Russell

John Logsdon Thomas Potts

Jean G. Monroe

Drew Rowland

Edward Risley

lnlow

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

● In-house contractor

● ● project Director until March 1981.

***On detail from NASA (Septem!xr 1980 September 1981)
Workshop on Policy Alternatives

Jerry Grey, Chairman John Logsdon

American Institute of Aeronautics Technoscience Associates

and Astronautics Arthur Morrissey

Russell Drew Office of Science and Technology

Science and Technology Consultants Policy

Executive Office of the President Louis Friedman

Planetary Society Willis Shapley

Private Consultant Ronald Konkel

Planning Offices

National Bureau of Standards

Workshop on Commercialization of Land Remote

Ralph Bernstein Robert Greenberg

IBM Scientific Center Private Consultant

Dennis Burnett Leonard Jaffe

COMSAT Computer Sciences Corp.

Charles Dannaman Vladimir Naleskewicz

Sensing

Space Operations Group Satellite Systems Engineering

General Electric Co.

David Ferguson

Information Systems and Services

Workshop Materials Processing in Space

Darrell Branscome Charles Fritts

Committee on Science and National Productivity Group

Technology U.S. General Accountimz Office

U.S. House-of Representatives Laurence Gilchrist

Joseph E. Coleman Space Applications Board

McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. National Research Council

David Cummings James A. Kirk

Universities Space Research Department of Mechanical

Associations Engineering

Donald Edgecombe The University of Maryland

Battelle Columbus Laboratories

Robert Shaw

Exxon Enterprises

Jerome Simonoff

Citibank

David Williamson

NASA Headquarters

Charles Sheffield

Earth Satellite Corp.

Don Walklet

Terra-Mar Associates

R. Gordon Williams

TRW Electronics and Defense

John Logsdon

Graduate Program in Science,

Technology, and Public Policy

George Washington University

Louis Testardi

Material Processing in Space Divison

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Workshop on International Issues in Commercial Space Systems

Jean-Pierre Fouquet Ryo Kimura Wilfred Mellors

Scientific Attache for S~ace Affairs International Space Division European Space Agency

Embassy of France o Science & Technology

Agency Embassy of Japan Kenneth Pederson

Tadahico Inada International Affairs

NASDA Representative Sebastian Lasher NASA Headquarters

Embassy of Japan INTELSAT

Workshop on Space Transportation Issues

W. C. Armstrong Gilbert Keyes

Northrop Services, Inc. Boeing Aerospace Co.

William French Gilbert Moore

United Technology Corp. Thiokol Corp.

Chuck Gould Morgan Sanborn

Rockwell International Corp. Rockwell International Corp.

Don Ingram Charles Tringali

Grumman Aerospace Corp. Lockheed Corp.

vi

Robert White

General Dynamics Corp.

James Wilson

McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co,

Kenneth Zitek

Martin Marietta Aerospace Corp.
Workshop on Remote Sensing: Government User Concerns

Wolf Drews Charles parrish

World Bank Earth Resources Data Analysis

Roland Inlow Charles Paul

O A O Agency for International

Ahmed Meer Development

Department of State Irv Pikus

James Nycum National Science Foundation

U.S. Genera! Accounting Office Bruce Rado

Georgia State Department of

National Resources

Edward Risley

Department of the Interior

William Wigton

Department of Agriculture

Richard Williams

U.S. Geological Survey

Acknowledge ments

OTA thanks the following people who took time to provide information or to review part or all of the study.

john Alic

Office of Technology Assessment

john Benson

Private Consultant

Marjorie Blumenthal

Office of Technology Assessment

Harvey Brooks

Harvard University

j. R. Burnett

Defense Systems Group

TWR, Inc.

R. P. Buschmann

Lockheed Corp.

Joseph Coleman

McDonnell Douglas

William Colglazier

Harvard University

Burt CowIan

Private Consultant

Kenneth Craib

Astronautics CO.

Resource Development Corp.

Ray Crowe!!

Office of Technology Assessment

Jean Pierre Fouquet

French Embassy

J. L. Gait

International and Business Affairs

Planning

General Electric Co.

G. J. Gleghorn

TRW DSSG

Noel Hinners

National Air & Space Museum

Roland Inlow

O A O

Tadahiko lnada

NASDA Representative

Embassy of Japan

S. E. James

FSD Houston

IBM Corp.

David Johnson

National Oceanic

Administration

D. J. Jones, Jr.

General Dynamic

and Atmospheric

Convair Division

Systems Development Corp.

Thomas Karas

Private Consultant

G. W. Keyes

Boeing Aerospace Co.

R. L. Kline

Grumman Aerospace Corp.

Sebastian Lasher

INTELSAT

Pamela Mack

Private Consultant

Joseph Mahon

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

M. J. Maltagliati

Aerospace Industries Association of

America, Inc.

Wilfred Mellors

European Space Agency

Arthur Morrisey

Martin Marietta Aerospace Corp.

Charles Parrish

The Naisbett Group

Kenneth Pederson

International Affairs

NASA Headquarters

R. A. Pepping

McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co

Ian Pryke

European Space Agency

William Raney

NASA Headquarters

Edward Risley

U.S. Geological Survey

Department of the Interior

A. Schnapf

RCA Astroelectronics Division

RCA Corp.

Willis Shapley

Private Consultant

peter Sharfman

Office of Technology Assessment

Michael Simon

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Delbert Smith

COMSAT

Norman Terrell

Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency

Louis Testardi

Materials Processing in Space

Division

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

P. S. Visher

Hughes Aircraft Co.

M. 1. Yarymoych

North American Aerospace

Operations

Rockwell International Corp.

Charles Yost

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

S. L. Zieberg

Martin Marietta Aerospace Corp.

VII
Contents

Chapter Page

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8

9

10,

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

issues and Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program . . . . . . . . . . . 81

U.S. Civilian Space Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Relationship Between the Civilian and National Security Space

Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

International Efforts in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Commercialization of Space Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

Institutional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

APPENDIXES

Appendix Page

A. Institutional Evolution of the U.S. Space Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

B. Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the

Department of the Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

C. Foreign Agriculture Service, Department of Agriculture, Crop Condition

Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

D. Materials Science and Engineering in Microgravity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334

E ,World Climate, the Oceans, and Early indications of Climatic Change . . . . . 341

F. The International Legal Regime of Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

G. Background for International Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

H. Industrial Innovative Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365

1. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as Amended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372

Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385

ix
Chapter 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Contents

Page

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Space Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Specific Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Amending the National Aeronautics and Space Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Civilian/Military Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Emphasis of the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Future Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Strong Response to Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Moderate Response to Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Low Level of Response to Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Policy for Space Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Federal Operation of Space Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Commercial Ownership of Space Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Advanced Satellite Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Satellite Land Remote Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Materials Processing in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Space Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

International Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Policy for Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Charting the Policy Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chapter 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OVERVIEW

The United States orbited its first satellite in

1958, nearly a quarter century ago. In the intervening years, the United States has made great

strides in developing peaceful and practical uses

of space technology. However, in spite of the

dramatic successes of the space program, among

which are the recent flights of the Columbia shuttle orbiter, many informed observers express considerable unease about the future of our civilian

efforts in space, particularly in light of increased

foreign competition and stringent fiscal restraints.

Because of these uncertainties and also because of emerging new prospects for using the

space environment, this assessment was requested by the Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation, and endorsed by the

House Committee on Science and Technology.

It investigates America’s civilian space policy from

the point of view of its effects on the primary areas

of space applications technology, including space

transportation. It does not address military/intelligence applications projects, activities in space

science, or space exploration except insofar as

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The successful launching (11-12-81) and return (11-14-81) of the second flight of space shuttle Columbia.

The first reuse of a manned spacecraft with Astronauts Joe H. Engle and Richard H. Truly aboard

3
4 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

these affect civilian applications. Its aim is to investigate Federal policies, public and private institutions, and the external circumstances that

shape space applications today. In keeping with

this emphasis, the assessment explores the question of Federal involvement in space research

and development (R&D), the issues that arise

in the transition from R&D to full-fledged operaSPACE

Current Status

In 1958, the basic institutions and policy principles for civilian space activities were established

in the National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act.

This supporting structure, though amended and

extended by legislation and presidential directives, remains essentially unchanged to this day.

During this time much has happened–not only

with regard to the space program, but also with

regard to the commercial, national, and international context within which the program

functions.

One of the most striking changes since 1958

is that space applications are now common and

pervasive parts of day-to-day life. We rely increasingly on space for vital private and public functions (commercial communications and military

reconnaissance) and for useful services (land

remote sensing, navigation, and weather forecasting). In the near future, we can foresee commercial possibilities for processing materials in space.

All of these applications of space technology require the support of a space transportation system, including launch vehicles, spaceports, and

tracking networks.

In spite of these advances, however, there is

no overall agreement about the direction or

scope the civilian space program should assume

in the future. For the most part, our increasing

reliance on space systems has not been appreciated by the general public, which responds most

readily to spectacular manned and scientific missions.

For space applications in particular, lack of

agreement on appropriate goals has made it diftional status, when and under what circumstances commercial involvement is appropriate,

and how to respond to commercial competition

from overseas. It also addresses questions of

space policy suggested by the Nation’s experience with applications of technology in

space.

POLICY

ficult for the executive agencies to set specific

timetables for developing space systems that meet

user needs, to encourage private sector investment, and to initiate new and/or implement mandated programs. In addition, there is no clear and

predictable policy or process to define at what

rate and by what criteria the transfer of technology from Government research, development,

and demonstration programs to the private sector should take place.

The lack of consensus is of concern because

many desirable space activities require continued

Federal support. The Government continues to

play a crucial role in at least four areas that are

essential to the Nation’s future in space but have

little potential for immediate commercial return:

contribution to advanced R&D, continuation of

space science, provision of public goods and

services, and regulation/coordination of national efforts, particularly with respect to international agreements.

The failure to agree about the aims of the U.S.

space program has occurred as other nations

have been expanding their own programs. When

the U.S. space program began, the Soviet Union

was our only competitor in space. The Soviets

have never challenged our leadership in space

applications. Now, however, international competition in space applications is a reality. The

Europeans and the Japanese have targeted specific space technologies for development, and

they will soon be providing stiff competition for

services heretofore offered only by the United

States. Their increased activities threaten the loss

of significant revenue opportunities for the United

States as well as a potential loss of prestige and
Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 5

influence. Japanese and European technologies

now capture a small but growing portion of the

world market in satellite communications technology. Their position is likely to strengthen in

time. In the near future they are also likely to be

in a similar position with respect to launch services and remote-sensing systems.

Unless the United States is prepared to commit more of its public and private resources to

space than it now does, it will lose its preeminence in space applications during the 1980’s.

Both technological and commercial leadership

are at stake. The U.S. leadership position will

depend not only or even primarily on spending

more money, but on effectively allocating our

technical, financial, and institutional resources

to meet international competition. Given the

likely constraints on the Federal budget, it will

be important to decide in what areas the United

States wishes to compete, because attempts to

maintain a comprehensive program without additional capital and manpower may lead to second-best technology and systems and/or inadequate institutional support.

Although the Federal Government must continue to play an important part in space, it cannot do the job by itself. The twin factors of

diminishing Federal resources for civilian space

activities and the dynamic qualities of the private sector make it important that the private

sector participate more actively in U.S. space

efforts. A great part of the success of the European and Japanese programs results from their

institutional arrangements within which private

and public sectors can work well together.

Specific Issues

Amending the National Aeronautics and

Space Act

The NAS Act allows for a very broad range of

activities; in itself it is not a constraint on enacting or implementing U.S. programs. However, it may need to be amended to allow the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) to operate space systems after the R&D

phase is complete, or explicitly to encourage

commercialization of space applications technology developed under Federal sponsorship.

In addition, certain provisions of the act, such

as the commitment to leadership in space, and

the civilian/military separation, may have to be

reinterpreted in light of current needs. Possible

changes or reinterpretations are raised as appropriate in the following discussion.

Civilian/Military Relationships

The separation of the military from the civilian

space program has served this country well. It has

allowed both programs to develop along paths

that reflect their different roles and missions. The

civilian program has been conducted openly and

has provided spectacular technological achievements, many useful applications, and solid scientific research results; the military and national intelligence activities, while providing critical

security services, have contributed significantly

to our understanding of space. Cooperation and

technology transfer between the two programs

have involved launch vehicles, launch and recovery facilities, tracking and communications, and

an array of spacecraft technologies, to the mutual

benefit of both programs.

In certain cases, the sensitive and highly classified nature of military and intelligence space systems has made it difficult to transfer technology

from these programs to the civilian sector. As the

military program has grown in the past decade,

such difficulties have become more common.

The joint military and civilian roles in NASA’s central program, development of the space shuttle,

have raised serious questions of how to divide

financial and operational responsibilities. In addition, the rise in military activities may occasion

doubt in many foreign countries about the

peaceful and civilian character of the civilian

space program. The current climate of domestic

fiscal restraint and competition with other countries argues for: 1) more timely transfer of military technological capacity to the civilian sector; 2) assurance that past restraints on permissible civilian applications activities be reexamined; 3) appropriate assignment of lead responsibility where classified and unclassified space

programs have similar technical requirements;

and 4) increased joint management of programs

common to both.
6 ● Civilian Space policy and Applications

Emphasis of the Program

The current institutional structure of the

civilian space program is well-suited to major

programs of technology development such as

Apollo or shuttle. It is probably too large and

too tehnologically ambitious in an environment

of level or decreasing budgets for programs having few major new projects. NASA’s organization

would constitute an effective base for embarking on a substantial new project, but it is not well-

-suited to undertake broad responsibilities for

operations.

Embarking on any ambitious development project involving advanced technology carries with

it the inherent risk of fiscal and institutional commitment which, unless carefully planned, could

overwhelm other important parts of the space

program. The experience with the shuttle is illustrative of this danger. Because of insufficient

allowance for unforeseen (but not unexpected)

development problems, it has been significantly

more expensive and difficult to bring to full operational status than originally estimated. The unintended (and unfortunate) result is that, during

a period of constrained Federal budgets, important space science and space applications projects have been slighted.

Future Programs

In considering programs in space applications,

one must take into account the overall context

within which such an effort would take place. The

future of the U.S. space program as a whole will

depend on three key factors: 1) the desire to develop space technology to meet national needs,

2) the degree and kind of foreign competition,

and 3) the amount of Federal and private resources available,

OTA has selected alternatives that bracket a

range of possible future space programs, with emphasis on the implications for the four applications technologies addressed in the report. In the

following, three possible levels of U.S. response

to foreign competition are used to order options

for space applications. Foreign competition was

chosen as a basis for comparison because it leads

to the clearest distinctions between options.

Strong Response to Competition

This response would require a strong political

commitment and a consequent increase in the

Federal budget for space. A strong response to

competition could lead to two different space

programs, depending on the nature of the competitive threat. it would follow from the evaluation that energetic development of U.S. space

technology would lead to a strong competitive

position for the United States in other high technology areas as well.

●

●

Apollo-1ike, Government-run program. The

structure of the U.S. civilian space program

was decisively shaped in the early 1960’s by

the high-risk, manned Apollo program and

its associated projects. As in the Apollo era,

commitment to a new large centerpiece

project such as a permanent manned space

station, or a manned exploration of Mars

could be prompted by major new civilian

and military initiatives from the Soviet Union,

coupled with a desire to build on the technical and institutional resources developed

over the past two decades. A strong U.S. response could also include a focus on applications projects as part of an effort to emphasize certain capabilities such as communications or remote sensing in conjunction

with a central program. In either case, such

efforts would be Government dominated,

with commercial activities probably taking

a secondary place to the goal of increasing

U.S. prestige.

Competitive, applications-oriented program.

A strong reaction to European, Japanese, and

possible Soviet economic competition in applications systems could lead to an aggressive

Federal effort to maintain U.S. technological

and commercial preeminence across-theboard. It would be based on the estimation

that foreign government support and subsidy

for their own programs could be met only

by similar support in the United States. Such

a program might well be dominated by the

Federal Government, but because one of its

primary aims would be to develop commercial applications, strong efforts would be

made to enlist private industry as a major

partner. I
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 7

Summary of Operational Landsat Applications in the Statesa

A.

B.

c.

D.

Water Resources Management

SOURCE: National Governors Conference.

Moderate Response to Competition

This response would follow from an evaluation

that foreign competition in space constitutes a

significant, but not overriding commercial or ●

political challenge. There are two variations:

● Single emphasis program (majority of

resources devoted to a single project, e.g.,

the shuttle). This option describes the current situation, where NASA’s other applications and science efforts have been steadily

reduced as shuttle development has taken

a dominant share of a constrained overall

budget. Private sector involvement in applications would be strongly encouraged. Particular “targets of opportunity” would have

to be selected to take best advantage of financial resources.

Program with several emphases. This configuration could occur when the shuttle

becomes fully operational, or if it were taken

out of NASA and operated by a private firm,

a separate Government agency, or the military. Though NASA’s overall budget would

be reduced, nontransportation applications

might then have a larger and protected share

of NASA’S lower budget; their portion could

not be reduced as a result of increased

budgeting demands from the transportation
8 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

activities. Private sector participation in extended, cooperative generic R&D would be

solicited to reduce costs and increase the

prospects for commercialization. For simi- ●

Iar reasons, NASA’s space science programs

could also be expanded.

Low Level of Response to Competition

This response would result from a view of foreign competition as either not threatening or

unimportant, and a low estimate of the intrinsic

value of the public benefits of space applications,

coupled with severe constraints on the Federal

civilian space budget.

Severe/y constrained. Additional large cuts

in the civilian space budget would leave very

little room for new applications projects; the

amount available for them would depend in

part on the resources devoted to the shuttle. Major programs and perhaps entire

categories of activities in science and applications would have to be eliminated and some

field centers would have to be restructured

or closed. Private sector efforts would be encouraged, but significant Federal funding for

joint projects would not be available.

Transfer of all of NASA’s applications responsibilities. A possible response to civilian

budget cuts and a weak competitive response by the United States would be to

transfer any remaining Government applications programs, particularly the shuttle, to

the Department of Defense (DOD) and

other Government agencies. Appropriate

NASA laboratories and facilities would be

transferred to DOD, Interior, Commerce,

and universities or private firms. NASA

would retain responsibility only for basic

research in space science and aeronautics,

with little or no applications R&D or operational role, Such a scenario would require

a radical restructuring of the civilian space

program. It should be recognized that a

transfer of some NASA activities to DOD

may be desirable even without major budget

cuts, as suggested above in the section entitled “Program with several emphases. ”

1959 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 T.Q,a 77 78 79 80 81 1982

Yea r

a T,Q, s Transitional Quarter.

SOURCE: Off Ice of Management and Budget,
Ch I—Executive Summary ● 9

-. —-. ——- —— .—————..—— —.—.— —— —— .—-——— -— — — .—.— — — —

POLICY FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS

What are the appropriate roles of the U.S.

Government in funding or otherwise encouraging civilian space applications research, development, and demonstration? Who should operate

space systems once they are developed and

demonstrated? Discussion of these two fundamental questions forms the basis of much of

this assessment.

Federal Operation of Space Systems

At present, NASA is the civilian agency designated to conduct R&D of space systems and to

operate launchers. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) operates the

weather satellites and is scheduled to assume

operation of the Landsat system until the latter

is transferred to private hands. Decisions on when

a technically successful space system changes

from R&D to operational status, and where operational responsibility lies (whether in NASA, a

separate agency, a mission agency, or a private

firm), have been made ad hoc. Insofar as the current procedure maintains flexibility, it has worked

well; nonetheless, the absence of guidelines for

the transition from R&D to operations leads to

uncertainty and inefficiency in the various

programs.

In particular, NASA’s role in operating, as opposed to developing, applications systems needs

to be clarified. The NAS Act itself gives NASA only

limited operational responsibilities, and succeeding executive and congressional interpretations of the act make it clear that NASA is not

to be primarily an operations agency, with the

exception of providing launch services. Nevertheless, one approach to circumventing potential conflict between NASA and the Federal agencies which manage space systems and to easing

the transition of applications systems from R&D

to operational status would be to restructure

NASA’s charter in the NAS Act and to allow it

to operate selected Federal civilian space systems. Such a broadening of NASA’s role would

require the agency to restructure itself internally

so that it couId gain expertise in specific mission

areas.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

ERTS-1 satellite counting down, July 1972. The ERTS program

was the first step in merging space and remote-sensing

technologies into a system devoted to managing the Earth’s

resources more efficiently
10 ● Civilian space Policy and Applications

On the other hand, insofar as the mission agencies already have the necessary knowledge and

supportive institutional structures, there are good

reasons to place mission-related space systems

in their care. It must be noted, though, that space

systems often support the activities of several mission agencies. If mission agencies are to operate

space systems, the lead agency with respect to

each application should be designated early in

the R&D phase in order that it may be involved

in designing specifications and planning for the

demonstration phase, with a view to the services

they are to provide to other agencies and the

private sector.

Whether space systems are operated by NASA

or by other Federal agencies, adequate planning

for the use of space technology requires that the

needs of ultimate users of the new technology

be considered in the development stages. potential users must also be involved in planning and

evaluating the demonstration experiments.

Commercial Ownership of

Space Systems

One important way to strengthen the Nation’s

space program is to enlist a greater share of private resources and responsibility in space technology. To do so will require the development

of innovative institutional mechanisms and incentives, examples of which are discussed later in

this chapter. One way to focus attention on this

aspect of the space program would be to amend

the NAS Act to include commericalization as an

explicit goal for appropriate space systems.

There is no single best model for commercializing space applications technologies. The particular series of steps that led to the COMSAT

Corp., for example, though effective in promoting

satellite communications, will not necessarily

serve as a paradigm for other technologies. Commercialization of other space technologies requires that the special circumstances and different

requirements of each be considered in determining whether and to what extent any system

should be privately owned. At a minimum, regardless of the means considered appropriate for

transfer of federally developed technology into

the private sector, at a minimum interested industrial participants should be involved in planning for the demonstration phase (i.e., the phase

prior to commercialization) in financing, in setting technical specifications, and in articulating

the goals of potential customers.

The effectiveness of tax and other incentives

(e.g., patent policy and antitrust policy) for encouraging stronger industry participation in space

technology R&D varies according to the technology and the industry. Though general policies

such as changes in depreciation allowances or

tax credits for R&D can have major effects on

private investments, OTA has not evaluated the

implications for space of such approaches. The

“Joint Endeavor Agreement (JEA),” recently introduced by NASA, is a promising and innovative initiative to encourage private sector interest

by allowing individual treatment of industry

needs in the context of NASA’s overall goals.

Through JEA, NASA agrees to provide free shuttle launches and limited on-board services for

private sector experiments or technology demonstration programs that meet certain criteria—such

as technical merit, contribution to innovation,

and acceptable business arrangements. Though

originally designed to encourage private sector

participation in NASA’s materials processing program, JEA, along with similar arrangements allowing for different degrees of participation,

may also be useful in encouraging new advances

in satellite communications and remote sensing.

In addition, NASA could also encourage industrial development of space R&D by offering

to launch experimental private sector devices or

satellites in return for some portion of their activity being devoted to public service. Another

possibility is to allow NASA to collect a royalty

fee on future profits from satellites in return for

a free launch.

If the move to commercialize space applications technologies is to develop successfully, Government and industry must show an increased

willingness to work together to share the risks and

benefits of new technology. In particular, private

firms must not expect publicly financed technologies to be transferred gratis, and Government

agencies must be willing to relinquish control
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 1 1

over their projects and to plan ahead for eventual commercialization.

Commercializing space technology raises a

number of complicated regulatory issues. Domestic and international problems concerning direct

broadcasting technologies, remote sensing of foreign territories without prior consent, and the

development of private launch vehicles have

already arisen. As the technology to support

materials processing in space improves, new

chemicals, alloys, and pharmaceuticals may be

produced, some of which may require Government oversight to assure their content, quality,

and safety. Because the technologies and the

regulatory issues each raises are so different,

regulation of each is best handled by agencies

that specialize in each technology. In some cases,

such as developing new drugs, regulatory policies

(e.g., those of the Food and Drug Administration)

are already in place; in others, such as private

operation of launch vehicles, new policies or institutions are likely to be required.

Technologies

Of the many technologies that can be applied

in space, OTA chose advanced satellite communications, land remote sensing, materials processing, and space transportation to study because:

1 ) these technologies raise issues that are of current interest, 2) they illustrate a range of issues

faced by space applications, and 3) they have

commercial potential.

Advanced Satellite Communications

The private sector has operated communications satellite systems since 1964. Today, largely

because of original research conducted by NASA

and several private laboratories, the industry is

flourishing. It is the most profitable area of space

technology to date. In 1973, because of strong

industry pressure, NASA began to phase out its

advanced satellite communications research program. By 1977, however, the communications industry had decided that NASA had a role to play

and urged it to begin advanced communications

research again. Although NASA reinstituted a

small program in 1978 ($26.7 million in 1981 and

$15.9 million in 1982), it may need to be expanded. Consequently, in order to strengthen

NASA’s role in supporting advances in satellite

communications technology, it may be desirable

for Congress to direct NASA to pursue a vigorous program in advanced satellite communications R&D.

Projections of increasing demands for communications services, especially television distribution, indicate that technology for exploiting the

Ka-band (30/20 GHz) of the radio spectrum can

be developed into profitable operational systems

well before 2000. Development and demonstration of this technology require at least some

generic research of the sot-t not customarily done

by the private sector. Already the Europeans and

the Japanese are developing 30/20 GHz systems

heavily subsidized by their governments. The virtual certainty that foreign systems will come online sometime in this decade has occasioned

debate about whether NASA should undertake

a large 30/20 technology R&D program, including

flight-testing of 30/20 hardware. Proponents of

a NASA program argue that the private sector

alone cannot afford to develop 30/20 systems, but

that if they are not developed, the United States

will lose an important market and its strong lead

in communications technology. An important

consideration is that several companies are

already doing some Ka-band work near 30/20

GHz for the military. It appears that 30/20 development is an area in which creative new

mechanisms for Government/private sector cooperation could be tried. A joint public/private

demonstration project, with substantial financial participation from several corporations,

might be possible and desirable. However, in

order to encourage the private sector to enter

into such an arrangement, appropriate incentives would have to be devised.

On the other hand, perhaps the salient issue

for commercial 30/20 systems, especially in the

United States, is not whether NASA should lead

the way, but when the private sector judges it

appropriate to bring such systems into the market. Systems currently in use, both satellite and

ground based, can still be substantially improved,

and the private sector is working to do so. Until

most of these improvements are made, private

firms, acting alone, may not find it advantageous
12 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The Communications Problem

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

to jump to 30/20, even if firms of other nations

do. However, there is no doubt that eventually

the United States will need to develop 30/20. The

question is when. An important consideration is

that crowding of the geosynchronous orbit and

the radio spectrum has led to international political problems that the private sector cannot

resolve on its own. Accelerating the availability

of 30/20 technology could render these problems

more tractable.

The case of 30/20 demonstrates that in satellite

communications, as with other space applications

technology=, the United States lacks a consistent

policy to assure coordination of military, civilian,

and industry efforts. This absence of clear vision

will again become a problem as a new configuration for communications satellites, large communication space platforms, becomes possible

in the 1990’s. Large communications platforms

could support large multibeam antennas and the

associated switching electronics needed for vastly

expanded point-to-point services. The major

question to be answered by a possible development and demonstration project is whether the

alleviation of congestion in the geostationary orbit

and reduced costs outweigh the problems of assembling them in orbit. A further important question is whether the risk of development is low

enough so that the private sector will be able to

develop large communications platforms on its

own, or whether a NASA program is necessary

or desirable, perhaps in cooperation with

INTELSAT or other interested international

parties.

Many of the pressing issues in satellite communications are not related directly to the use

of space but concern regulation or involve questions of national sovereignty. Direct broadcast

television and geostationary orbit allocation are

examples of such important issues (see the recent

OTA repot-t, Radio frequency Use and Management: Impacts From the World Administrative
Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 1 3 — . — — . . — ... .—.———.——— - . - — ———-—. -

Radio Conference of 1979). Although these issues

are not fully addressed in this report, it is important to note that because the Federal Government

and relevant international organizations have not

decided how direct broadcast television is to be

regulated, industry’s investment in this technology is laden with extra risks. Designing appropriate regulations requires considerable technical

knowledge and some research. In order to aid

the regulatory bodies, it may be desirable to modify NASA’s legislative charter to direct the agency to support the research needs of their prospective regulatory actions.

Satellite Land Remote Sensing

The future of U.S. civilian satellite land

remote sensing is in considerable doubt. The

question of what to do with the U.S. system is

a critical one for the future of the management

and development of U.S. natural resources.

Whatever is decided, the question should be

resolved with dispatch. The needs of the data

users make it essential that continuity of data

flow be maintained and that price increases be

predictable and incremental. However, at the

present time, it is unclear whether the United

States will have a civilian remote-sensing capability after the flight of Landsat D, and what

prices will be charged for data. Landsat D is

scheduled to be launched in the third quarter of

fiscal year 1982 and has a mission goal of approximately 3 years.

NASA has managed the Landsat program as a

quasi-operational system for several years. Under

its leadership, the value of Landsat data for providing synoptic views of the Earth has been

proved. The launch of Landsat D will bring this

technology nearer to operational status under the

management of NOAA. However, there are several general concerns about the viability of the

Landsat program. First, because Landsat D will

carry new and untried sensors as well as proved

ones, one cannot be certain that it will provide

full operational service. In addition, budget

restrictions might make it difficult for NASA to

complete and launch Landsat D’, an identical satellite that is now in production. Finally, the determination of the French, the Japanese, and the

European Space Agency to build their own satPhoto credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Landsat-D, an experimental satellite used primarily for

monitoring and management of food and fiber resources,

water resources, mineral and petroleum explorations, land

cover, and land use mapping

ellite remote-sensing systems makes it certain that

the United States will no longer have a monopoly

in providing these services; the French have

already begun to market their SPOT system,

scheduled for operation in 1984. In addition, the

Soviet Union has recently flown a new advanced

land remote-sensing satellite. Although it is

unclear what use they plan to make of their new

capability, the Soviets could also compete with

the United States in this important technology.

CURRENT POLICY: PRIVATE SECTOR OWNERSHIP

Both the previous and the current administrations have been committed in principle to commercializing a satellite remote-sensing system,

but, no specific guidelines have been provided

to specify the terms and speed of transition to

the private sector. More than 3 years of experience in exploring the possible institutional arrangements have already demonstrated that the

transition is likely to be very difficult to accomplish. Several general proposals have been

made for the means of transfer to the private

sector.
14 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

●

●

●

Designating a single entity (either an existing

corporation, or one created by legislation) to

own and operate the entire existing system

(space and ground segments).

Establishing a laissez-faire policy that would

leave to the marketplace the decision to launch

and operate the entire system, with the Federal

Government committed to leaving the field at

a specific time.

Commercializing the space and terrestrial

segments independently of one another, either

through designation or laissez-faire.

Each possibility has potential benefits and drawbacks. One promising means of effecting transfer

to the private sector would be to commercialize

the space and the ground segments at different

rates. The ground segment already has a strong

private component; the small, but important

value-added industry, which processes and enhances satellite data to meet particular user

needs, is certainly growing, if not yet flourishing.

The remainder of the ground segment, the receiving and processing centers, could be operated

by the private sector, provided continuity of dataflow from the space segment were assured. In

the next 5 to 10 years, the market is not likely

to sustain commercial operation of the entire

satellite land remote-sensing system without

substantial direct or indirect Government fundings. A multilevel pricing structure, in which

some users pay more than others, or an explicit

subsidy to the operating entity could be used. No

matter how Government funding is provided,

however, commercialization of the ground segment for land remote sensing will require a Federal commitment to the long-term, user-oriented

operation of the satellite portion of the system.

Placing the satellite land remote-sensing system in private hands creates an inherent conflict of interest for the firms that control the

distribution of primary data. This might create

significant problems for foreign users, particularly those less developed countries whose main

economic and social potential lies in exploiting

indigenous raw materials or agricultural products.

Some less developed countries fear that a commercial operation may give private corporations

or industrialized countries access to vital resource

information before the sensed country is able to

obtain it. Even if controls deemed adequate by

the United States are instituted to prevent unscrupulous use of the data, other nations may still

judge private control of the data to be unacceptable, and might try to promote international oversight and control in various international forums.

MULTILATERAL ALTERNATIVE TO CURRENT POLICY

The concerns of other nations might be

alleviated and a much stronger market for land

remote-sensing data developed if, instead of

continuing a domestic system, the United States

offered to share the ownership and operation

of Landsat with other nations. A single

multilateral management authority could assume

responsibility for global operation of a land

remote-sensing system; its responsibility would

include establishing technical specifications, procuring and operating satellites, and receiving and

preprocessing satellite data. Such an approach

would spread the investment risk, as well as encourage member nations to be more aggressive

in developing their own internal markets for

satellite data. It could also contribute to the

development of a strong market for U.S. dataprocessing hardware and software, and broad

data-processing services. In addition, a multilateral system might make it easier to use the

power of Landsat data in combination with

weather satellite data to tackle some of the pressing global problems that face the world, such as

the buildup of carbon dioxide, or deforestation.

If the United States is to pursue the initiative of

a multilateral system, it must do so soon. The

French SPOT system is well along in the planning

phase and the Japanese system will follow a few

years after SPOT is in place. India, Brazil, and

China are planning to develop their own systems

in the 1990’s.

However, if the system were internationalized,

the United States could no longer determine its

characteristics unilaterally. The United States

could not guarantee that the resulting system

would continue to serve U.S. needs to the same

extent as the current Landsat system. To retain

control, the United States would need to develop

and market its next generation of Landsats in a

much more aggressive manner.
Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 1 5

CONTINUED FEDERAL OWNERSHIP

An alternative to either a privately held or an

internationally owned satellite remote-sensing

system is a thoroughgoing commitment to a system owned and managed by the Federal Government. Meteorological satellites, which, like

Landsat, provide data of benefit to the general

public, have always been owned and managed

by the Government. Unlike satellite communications technology, which is already fully commercialized, and materials processing in space,

which, if successful at all, seems particularly appropriate for private sector operation, satellite

remote sensing could certainly be retained as a

Government system on the grounds that the good

it provides is primarily public. At the present time,

100 percent of the costs are borne by the Government through the budgets of NASA and the Department of the Interior, and about so percent

of the data soId are “purchased” by various Government agencies. The Government, in effect,

makes the market.

Materials Processing in Space

The prospects for manufacturing commercial

products in space are unclear, based on data

obtained to date from limited in-space and terrestrial studies. Additional fundamental science

and technology research such as will be conducted in Spacelab is required before the private

sector can be expected to initiate large-scale, expensive manufacturing of goods in space. However experiments that have been conducted so

far do suggest that the pursuit of space processing techniques might yield unique high-value,

low-volume products for the pharmaceutical,

electronics, chemical, “specialty” glass, and advanced alloy industries. Much of this research will

also lead to greater understanding of the effects

of gravity on chemical and physical processes.

At Ieast two commercial ventures to produce

commercial products or services in space are

underway through joint endeavor agreements

with NASA. Other firms have also begun to express interest in similar projects.

In addition to the lack of adequate knowledge,

other factors that will affect the willingness of

some companies to invest in space R&D are:

1 ) the cost of experimentation in space, 2) the

Ieadtime needed to design experiments and

schedule shuttle flights at optimal times, 3) need

for multiple-flight opportunities in many cases,

4) uncertainty of return on investment, 5) industry

distrust of long-term arrangements with Government, and 6) unfamiliarity with space systems and

the benefits they may offer.

The United States can expect significant competition in the long term from Germany, France,

Japan, and the Soviet Union, all of which are conducting a wide range of experiments in materials

processing. [n the near term, according to their

published plans, their efforts will concentrate on

the basic science end of the R&D spectrum. Although at present it is sharply curtailed by budget

reductions, the U.S. effort is directed toward

commercializing this technology as well as pursuing R&D. At present it is unclear which programs will produce the greater near-term results.

Space Transportation

Civilian space transportation, by means of

both the reusable shuttle and expendable launch

vehicles, is likely to remain a function of the

Federal Government throughout this decade.

The aerospace industry is reluctant to assume

ownership of the presently operating space

launching systems because: 1) the majority user

is the Government, 2) the Federal Government

owns and controls the existing facilities, 3) the

initial investments are very high compared to expected revenues, and 4) indemnification in case

of disasters (e.g., an explosion on the launch pad,

or misguidance) could be very expensive.

The aerospace industry has been willing, however, to operate any and all space transportation

services under contract to the Government.

There has also been some limited commercialization of space transportation hardware. Upper

launch stages are routinely sold directly to the

user, rather than through the Government. All

lower stages of expendable launch vehicles

(Scout, Delta, Atlas, and Titan), however, are still

purchased and launched under the control of the

Federal Government.

If the Space Transportation System (the shuttle and its related components) is to be commer-
16 ● Civilian space Policy and Applications —— —.... ..- —_ .-— — . —.-——-—— — —— . . . ..—.— ——— —

Current NASA Expendable Launch Vehicles

150

10C

5(I

o

40

30

20

10

0

a) Payload values are for east launch from Eastern Test Range for Delta and

Atlas Centaur

b) Scout values are for launch from wallops,

c) Atlas E/F values are for launch from Western Test Range

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

cialized, the Federal Government will have to offer realistic incentives to the private sector.

These might include: 1) committed purchase of

an attractive number of flights, 2) provision of an

accelerated schedule of investment credits, 3) low

rental costs for Federal launch facilities, and

4) decision by the Government not to recoup invested costs,

NASA had planned to phase out most expendable launch vehicles in the mid 1980’s as the

space shuttle becomes fully operational, However, it appears that the growing future need for

launch services will exceed the shuttle’s availability, If demand outpaces availability, and if the

United States has no expendable vehicles ready

to launch commercial satellites at affordable

prices, then the private sector will be forced to

continue to purchase launch services from the

French. NASA is now reconsidering its policy, As

experience is gained with the shuttle, the launch

needs for the future will be clearer than they are

today, and decisions regarding the phaseout

could be made in light of more realistic demand

projections. It may even be appropriate to continue R&D of expendable launchers, particularly to develop a low-cost reliable launcher for

boosting small payloads to geosynchronous orbit.

U.S. dominance of free world space transportation faces strong competition. The Ariane Expendable Launcher, developed by the European

Space Agency, is being marketed by a private,

French-incorporated company. Several U.S. companies have already changed their plans to

launch on the shuttle, in favor of launching on

Ariane. The Japanese now launch their own satellites by means of Delta-class launchers, which

they construct under agreements with the U.S.

firms that developed the technology. The Soviets

and the Chinese also launch their own satellites,

but with locally developed technology. The Soviets are willing to place satellites of certain other

countries in orbit. Thus, although the foreign mar-
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 1 7

ket for satellite launches is growing, foreign capability is also growing rapidly.

in addition to launch vehicles developed by the

Government, at least one private U.S. company

plans to build and launch its own commercial expendable launchers. This fact has caused the

Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal

Communications Commission, the State Department, and NASA to begin to analyze the regulatory problems that may result from private

launches from the United States and other nations. At this writing, it is unclear what agency(ies)

will have the responsibility for such issues as:

launch authorization, aerial and maritime clearance, the development of new commercial

launch sites, the need for a system of indemnification, and payload authorization. These issues are

more likely to be resolved if a lead agency is designated to coordinate launch regulations.

International Issues

NASA has had marked success in arranging cooperative ventures in space with other countries.

However, as has been noted previously, foreign

competition is almost certain to increase. One

result is some kinds of cooperative international

ventures will become more difficult to initiate or

sustain. In particular, projects having potential

commercial payoff, such as future activities in

materials processing that may prove of interest

to chemical or pharmaceutical companies will be

problematic. On the other hand, there may be

more scope for joint ventures, or subcontracting,

between companies from different countries,

notably in selling equipment and services to the

third world.

Proliferation of direct broadcast satellite

systems and improvements in the resolution of

civilian remote sensing data raise issues of national sovereignty and open data policy. Many

countries fear that unregulated translational radio

and (especially) TV broadcasts direct to home

receivers will undermine their sovereignty and

their cultural values. Direct transmissions would

also provide unwelcome competition for national

broadcast monopolies. Issues surrounding the appropriate use of direct broadcasting systems are

likely to be raised in the context of recent international proposals to regulate the free flow of

information. Similarly, many countries fear that

unrestricted dissemination of high-resolution remote-sensing data would threaten their sovereignty and national security. The question of requiring the prior consent of a country before selling or otherwise distributing high-resolution satellite data has been debated frequently at the

United Nations and other international bodies.

Policy for Science

U.S. leadership in developing innovative technology results from the strength of its scientific,

engineering, and educational institutions. innovations in space applications require that these institutions maintain their interest in the opportunities for science and engineering made possible by continued operations in space. If the vitality of the U.S. space program is to be preserved,

the United States must also be willing to commit sufficient resources and attention to basic

science research and advanced engineering in

all areas related to space, including space sciences. A healthy program includes: support of

educational programs in science and engineering, innovation in laboratory equipment, and

basic research in science and engineering. It

would maintain a strong space science effort: new

missions to gather data in and from space, a corresponding set of projects to guarantee adequate

analysis of these data, and a stable infrastructure

of facilities and support technologies.

Charting the Policy Future

The discussion in the first section of this summary describes current problems that reach all

segments of the civilian space program. A pervasive element is the lack of consistent long-term

goals and clear policy initiatives, from either the

executive or the legislative branches of the Government. This situation derives in part from the

fact that since the Apollo decision was made in

1961, the number of major actors in civilian space

activities has increased from one agency (NASA)

to include six Federal agencies and numerous private firms. Not surprisingly, the many groups with

direct and indirect interests in space agree neither

about the overall importance of the civilian space
18 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

program nor about specific applications projects.

In the absence of broad consensus and a means

for deciding between opposing views, the scope

of individual projects is determined by the annual budget deliberations among the executive

agencies, the Office of Management and Budget

(OMB), and Congress. Over time, the sum of

these decisions determines the overall course of

the space program. However, the annual budget

cycle bears little relationship to the long-term,

evolutionary cycle of space systems. In addition,

OMB has not chosen to view investment in space

activities from a long-range perspective. Until

such time as a broad consensus is formed, it is

left to the President or Congress to set forth a

coherent, strategic framework for civilian space

policy. In the absence of such direction, the current drift will continue and worsen.

Periodic, open, high-level discussion of the

space program is needed to focus attention and

sharpen debate on our national objectives in

space. Reviews of space policy such as those being conducted by the President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy, and by Congress,

including this assessment, serve part of this purpose. Nevertheless, such one-time efforts cannot

substitute for a sustained forum for debate about

the program. In order to plan for the future of

the space program in the context of other national needs, the United States needs a multirepresentative forum to discuss and recommend

comprehensive, long-term goals. Such a forum

could coordinate the interests of all the major

actors in order to allow equitable and stable

decisions to be made about the overall direction of the civilian space program. Though such

a body would not itself direct the course of the

space program, because this responsibility lies

with the President and Congress, it could focus

the debate and provide timely advice.

Several different institutional options are discussed in this report. They range from establishing

a new Department of R&D, of which NASA

would be a part, to establishing a commission to

advise the President and Congress on space. One

attractive option in the executive branch would

be a reconstituted and broadened National Aeronautics and Space Council, with representatives

from civilian agencies, DOD, and the private

sector.

Because Congress is the Government’s major

forum for the representation of differing views,

it is there that one would expect to see the interests of different parties debated. However,

space issues have not always received the coordinated attention from the committees that they

probably deserve. In addition, the space activities

of the Federal Government are carried out by a

variety of mission agencies, most of which are

not concerned primarily with space. As space

technologies have developed and begun to affect so many aspects of our society, space issues

have come to be dealt with in several different

committees and subcommittees. If the different

views are to be synthesized into a consistent

space policy, coordination of responsibility is

necessary. Congress would then be in position

to formulate a comprehensive space policy that

would set long-term goals for the U.S. space program, military and civilian.

If the congressional committees wish the issues

to be raised and debated in a noncongressional

environment, an option for bringing together the

major interests in space would be a Presidential

commission with a limited lifetime, established

under concurrent resolution by Congress. To be

most effective, it should also include representation from Congress. After the commission’s

business was completed, congressional hearings

on its report could be held, followed by a new

or revised charter for the space program and a

clear statement of goals. This option would not

remove the need for further governmental action.

A temporary commission, though highly useful

for initiating a new focus for the space program,

cannot substitute for longer term policymaking

and coordinating bodies in the executive or the

legislative branches.
Chapter 2

INTRODUCTION

.
Contents

Page

Introduction, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Organization of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

●
Chapter 2

INTRODUCTION

The space age is 25 years old. Yet in this short

time period, one-third of an average citizen’s lifespan, the United States has landed men on the

Moon, explored portions of the two nearest planets, Mars and Venus, and flown near Jupiter and

Saturn. A thriving satellite communications and

data transfer industry has also been established,

and a highly successful satellite weather observation system has been developed. The United

States is on the threshold of an operational land

remote-sensing system and will soon be experimenting with new industrial processes in space.

In just a quarter of a century, this country has

come to rely in a significant way on the unique

vantage point and special properties of space.

The stunning success of the first flight of the

space shuttle raised anew U.S. aspirations for a

vital, useful space program, reflective of the recently developed technical capabilities. Yet in

spite of substantial technical progress and a new

capability to place men and objects in orbit, this

country’s civilian space policy lacks a coherent

strategic framework. Though lack of clear direction affects the entire space program, public and

private, it has had a particularly detrimental effect on the applications of space technology. In

spite of the increasing dependence on space

technologies, there is some uncertainty about the

future direction and what questions should be

asked.

Requested by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, ’ and endorsed by the House Science and Technology

Committee2 this assessment attempts to lay the

foundation for a broad review of national space

policy, particularly as such policy may relate to

civilian applications of space technology, including space transportation but not including tracking, data, and relay or navigation systems. Because the “changing nature of this country’s activities in space raises a number of economic,

1 Letter from the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation requesting the OTA Space Policy and Applications Assessment, September 1978.

2Le~er from the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on

Science and Technology, June 1981.

social, legal and political questions,” OTA was

asked to develop “criteria and analyses to assist

Congress in deciding the many complicated public policy issues that are likely to arise in charting the Nation’s future in space. ”

Although this report analyses the effects of policy decisions on applications of space technology,

it also takes a broader view. In examining decisions made in an applications context, certain issues surfaced that affect the entire space program.

The course of shuttle development, the emphasis

on cost-benefit analysis, and the absence of broad

consensus and consistent support for the overall

space program goals have had their effects on

programs outside of space applications. As far as

is possible, this assessment addresses these wider

policy areas and suggests policy options for making the civilian space program a more robust part

of the Nation’s future. It does not explore the national security space program except insofar as

it affects the civilian space program.

Applications of space technology involve rather

different assumptions than do scientific missions

such as planetary exploration or the deployment

of telescopes in space. They therefore necessitate

a different policy treatment. The National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act of 1958 established

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as a research and development

(R&D) agency for space technology. In that role,

it has served the Nation well. Yet development

implies that a point will be reached when a new

device or technical system is ready for use in an

operational mode. It is at this juncture, in the

transfer of developed technology to the realm of

routine operation, that many of the most important issues in applications of space technology

surface. Technology developed with NASA funds

is technology paid for by the U.S. taxpayer. Will

another agency or a private firm receive the technology? If so, how will the transfer be made? The

history of the space program provides us with several examples of how that transfer can be efjL@@r from the LJ. !j. Senate Committee on Commerce, science,

and Transportation, op. cit.

21
22 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

fected. Communications satellites were “spun

off” to the private sector very early, weather satellites to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Navigation satellites have remained under Department of Defense control; terminal equipment for civilian use

is available commercially. Land remote-sensing

satellites are at a historic juncture in their

development as they pass from R&D to operational status, This assessment examines different

possibilities for their future operations.

In addition to the issues raised in considering

the transition from Government-supported R&D

to operational status, there is a prior concern:

when, where, and for how long should the Government involve itself in funding space R&D efforts? By its nature, space R&D is expensive, largely because the costs of raising people and materials beyond the atmosphere and supporting life

in orbit are very high. The risks of R&D in space

are also high, not only because traveling to space

is inherently risky to humans and equipment, but

also because so little is yet known about the effects of extended microgravity and high vacuum

on physical and chemical processes. Even with

more than two decades of experience the United

States still has little more than 8 hours of experimental results on space-based processing of materials. These risks also bear an economic cost

that must be taken into account when considering R&D in space. What is the proper balance

between Government and private funding for

R&D? What incentives are needed to encourage

the private sector to assume a major role in innovation of space technology? What are the effects

of emerging foreign competition on the U.S.

space program?

These and other issues in the space program

exist in the context of similar issues relating to

Government-supported R&D in other Federal

programs. Accordingly, a considerable body of

analysis on this broader subject is already available. For space, however, many of the issues are

too current to have been discussed in detail.

Hence, a major part of OTA’s task was to determine just what are the important issues for space

applications. In order to identify and refine the

issues that are amenable to policy treatment, OTA

convened a series of workshops that drew together experts from the major space technologies

OTA selected to study. They treated:

Remote sensing: Government user concerns.

Though still an R&D system, the Landsat program has provided data to users of remotesensing data since 1972. This workshop was

an effort to learn what problems some of the

major users of the data had faced in the past

and what concerns they have for the future

as the Landsat program moves into operational status. It included Federal, State, and

local users of the data, as well as representatives of two private corporations that process

Landsat data, and the international banking

community.

Commercialization of remote land sensing.

Several proposals have been made to transfer part or all of the current Landsat system

to the private sector. This workshop convened to: 1) assess the strength of the market for remotely sensed data from space and

to identify the factors that affect this market,

and 2) explore appropriate models for commercializing remote sensing. Since space

communications technology is already highly commercialized, OTA invited several participants who have had considerable experience with the communications satellite industry as well.

Space transportation issues. For the present,

NASA will be operating the space transportation system. What interest does private industry have in owning and/or operating a

reusable shuttle-like transportation system?

Is industry interested in marketing and

launching expendable launch vehicles? This

workshop asked these questions and, in addition, explored the nature of the incentives

that the aerospace industry sees as necessary

to help it do further space transportation and

space construction research, development,

and demonstration.

Materials processing in space. The shuttle

has raised expectations for using the special

properties of space to manufacture lowmass, high-value products that cannot be

made on Earth. This workshop explored the

state of national and international programs

in materials processing and the prospects for
Ch. 2—introduction ● 2 3

manufacturing products in space. It discussed the NASA/industry Joint Endeavor

Program, which brings NASA into working

partnerships with other firms, and suggested

other incentives that could attract industry

to invest in R&D in space.

● International issues in commercial space systems. Other industrialized countries of the

world also have a strong presence in space,

some components of which will compete directly with U.S. systems. This workshop explored the complicated relationship between

cooperation and competition in space in the

free world and compared commercialization

policies in the United States, Europe, and

Japan. Among other topics, it discussed the

private French corporations Spotimage and

Arianespace, and the competitive challenge

that they present to comparable U.S. systems, as well as the prospects for future multinational applications organizations like

INTELSAT.

Following the development of the issues in

these five workshops, OTA convened a Workshop on Policy Alternatives to consider a variety

of options for addressing the major concerns

identified. The workshop identified as crucial the

need to develop a high-level Federal forum for

reaching consensus on the direction of the space

program and devoted substantial discussion to

policy options addressing this need.

In addition to the workshops, several contractors contributed to this report, as well as a number of individuals conversant with the issues discussed herein. A large body of literature now exists on the space program, but we as a society

are just beginning to understand the depth and

breadth of its effects on our economic, social, and

political fabric. Policy analysts are now able to

perceive long-term effects of past decisions and

can assess with more boldness the possible future

effects of our efforts in space.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

Space technology, whether we are aware of it

or not, is pervasive in our lives. After the presentation of the report’s chief issues and findings in

chapter 3 the main body of the report begins in

chapter 4. Conceived out of concern over Soviet

achievements in space in 1957, the NAS Act remains a basic foundation for national space policy. Chapter 4 discusses the policy history of the

U.S. space program and outlines the changes that

have been made since 1958 in space policy.

Based on an analysis of past history, it also suggests areas for review today.

Chapter 5 begins with a discussion illustrating

our dependence on space technology, followed

by a summary of the current status of the U.S.

space program and a short section on U.S. public

attitudes and perceptions about space.

After summarizing the major features of the militarv space program and how it interacts with the

civilian program, chapter 6 discusses the question of the separation between the two programs

that is built into the 1958 NAS Act. It also explores

the important question of transfer of technology

developed for the military space programs to civilian uses, and how the pace of that transfer might

be increased for the ultimate benefit of the civilian

program.

Chapter 7 presents the current status of foreign

space achievements and future prospects for continued cooperation and competition between the

United States and other states in space science.

Of major concern is the competition in space applications that foreign entities pose for U.S. efforts. This chapter also outlines some of the general foreign policy questions raised by different

space policies, along with the outstanding international legal problems that could affect U.S. applications programs.

Chapter 8 summarizes the prospects for transferring the results of space R&D to the private

realm for commercial exploitation, it also describes the process that American industry follows

in deciding to do R&D. In a more specific way,
24 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

it further develops the kinds of incentives and barriers to entering upon a program for space R&D.

Institutional effectiveness is critical to policy

success. The institutional questions that have to

be solved in transferring an R&D system to operational status, whether it be operated for the public

good or for private profit, are complex. Because

Government policy strongly conditions the framework within which private sector activities exist,

chapter 9 builds on the issues concerning commercialization of R&D that are developed in

chapter 7, as they relate to institutions. It also

reviews the institutional frameworks that have

been set up in the public good.

Whereas each of the preceding chapters raises

several policy issues, chapter 10 summarizes the

policy foundation of U.S. space activities. Further,

it suggests new policies and integrates them with

the policy framework that now exists. It analyzes

a range of major policy options that could form

the foundation for the U.S. future in space.

The appendixes contain material that was considered germane to the assessment, but too detailed for inclusion in the body of the report.

Among these are summaries of case studies prepared for this assessment by the Bureau of Land

Management and the Foreign Agricultural Services of the Department of the Interior and the National Climate Program in NOAA of the Department of Commerce. Three contributed reports

on materials processing in space from the TRW

Corp., McDonnell Douglas Corp., and from

NASA, plus material gathered by an OTA contractor make up the case study on materials processing.
Chapter 3

ISSUES AND FINDINGS

9

Contents

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Section 1: General Policy Issues. . . . . . . .

Introduction: The Inadequacy of

Current Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Issue 1: What Are the Key Factors of

the Current Situation? . . . . . . . . . . .

Reliance on Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Need for Continued Federal

Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Competition. . . . . . . . . .

Need for Greater Private Sector

Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Present Government Institutions

Ill-Suited to Current Conditions . . .

Issue 2: How Are We To Manage Our

Future in Space? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Future Options for the Civilian Space

Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Toward a Coherent Federal Space

Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

27

27

27

28

28

28

28

29

29

29

29

33

Page

Overall Prospects for Space

Applications Technologies . . . . . . . . 34

Issue 3: What Policy Principles Have

Guided the U.S. Civilian

Space Program? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

To Maintain National Preeminence.. 35

To Derive Economic and Social

Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

To Increase Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . 38

To Keep Civilian and Military Space

Activities Separate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

To Limit NASA to R& D. . . . . . . . . . . . 47

To Foster International Cooperation . 43

Section 2: Applications Policy Issues . . . . 44

Introduction: Generic and Specific

Technology Issues...........,.. 4 4

Communications Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Issue 4: What Are the R&D Needs for

Optimal Advances in Satellite

Communications? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Increasing Use of the Geostationary

Orbit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NASA’s Past and Future Roles . . . . . .

Opportunity at 30/20 GHz . . . . . . . . .

Crowding at 6/4 GHz . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Large Communications Platforms. . . .

Land Remote Sensing by Satellite. . . . . . .

Issue 5: What Role Should the Federal

Government. Play in Developing or

Operating a Satellite RemoteSensing System? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Characteristics of Satellite Remote

Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., .

Current Status of the U.S. Land

Remote-Sensing Satellite System . . .

Criteria for a Satellite RemoteSensing System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Foreign Users of Landsat Data . . . . . .

Importance of Landsat Data:

Three Asian Countries . . . . . . . . . . .

Importance of Landsat Data: Case of

Costa Rica. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Market for Satellite Remote-Sensing

Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commercialization of Remote

Sensing: Domestic and Foreign

Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Foreign Policy Concerns . . . . . . ... , .

Foreign Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Potential Policy Initiatives for a Land

Remote-Sensing Satellite System , . .

Potential of Land Remote-Sensing

Data and the U.S. Economy ., . . . .

Materials Processing in Space . . . . . . . . . .

Issue 6: What Are the Technological

and Commercial Prospects

for MPS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 7

48

48

48

51

53

53

53

53

54

57

58

60

61

62

63

64

64

66

67

67

Page

Requirements for the

Commercialization of MPS

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Government Incentives for

MPS Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

How Business Sees NASA . . . . . . . . . 70

Possible New Institutional

Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

The Space industrialization

Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

International Competition in MPS . . . 73

Space, Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Issue 7: What Are the Major Barriers

to Commercialization of Space

Transportation Facilities and

Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

The Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Military and Civilian Use of the

Shuttle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Foreign Competition in Space

Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Regulatory Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Prospects for Commercialization . . . . 76

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page

1.

2.

Summary Matrix of Primary Policy -

Principles Across Four Major Space

Application Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Data Needs of Foreign and

Domestic Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Chapter 3

ISSUES AND FINDINGS

OVERVIEW

As its title indicates, the scope of this assessment has been determined by two axes: space

policy as it pertains to applications and space

policy in general. Although the major consideration has been to explore the issues surrounding

space applications technologies, it has been important to frame that exploration by a consideration of issues germane to the entire civilian space

program.

This chapter gathers the principal issues and

findings of the entire assessment. Some of these

are treated in greater detail elsewhere in the

assessment; others, particularly those which concern the technologies themselves, are discussed

in full here. The chapter has, therefore, been

divided into two major sections: “General Policy

Issues” and “Applications Policy Issues.”

SECTION 1: GENERAL POLICY ISSUES

Introduction: The Inadequacy of

Current Policy

From the beginning of the space age nearly 25

years ago, there has been general public agreement that the United States should play a major

role in the utilization of space. Although there

continue to be questions about appropriate funding levels and the relative priority of specific projects, the United States as a nation has been and

remains committed to the development of space

activities.

The National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act

of 1958 articulated the policy principles for

overall guidance of the U.S. civilian space program, but the act alone has not provided (and

cannot be expected to provide) the particular

goals for civilian space activities. Lacking such

guidance, the space program has instead been

directed by political and budgetary pressures not

always relevant to a logically ordered exploration

and use of space. At the same time, none of the

policymaking bodies successively established in

the executive branch nor any of the congressional

committees have been able to ensure that a longrange plan of particular policies and programs

would be pursued.

Furthermore, it may be important to recast the

NAS Act to reflect the development over the past

25 years of significant U.S. capability to conduct

space operations. The act was designed to develop these capabilities rather than to give

guidance on how to make use of them once developed. In particular, very important services are

or soon can be provided by space applications

technologies, but specific policies to ensure that

their potential is fully realized are not in place.

The goal of this assessment, therefore, is to examine the interrelation of space policy and space

applications technologies, four of which—satellite

communications, land remote sensing, materials

processing in space (MPS), and space transportation—are treated in detail. Weather observations and navigation are not covered except by

reference. It should be noted that space transportation is not usually considered an applications

technology. OTA’s reason for so classifying it is

that it, like the other applications, is a means to

further ends, and also has a strong potential for

commercialization.

Six policy principles form the core of the NAS

Act. These six, which are discussed in detail later

in this chapter, have provided the framework and

goals in accordance with which the civilian space

program has evolved to the present day. These

principles may be stated as follows:

that U.S. preeminence in space science and

applications be maintained;

2 7
28 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

●

●

●

●

●

that economic and social benefits be derived;

that knowledge be increased;

that civilian and military activities be separated (though they are to be coordinated

and are not to duplicate one another unnecessarily);

that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the civilian agency, be

limited largely to research and development

(R&D); and

that international cooperation be fostered.

Issue 1: What Are the Key Factors of the

Current Situation?

Reliance on Space

We depend increasingly on space for vital public and private services (national security and

commercial communications); we rely on it for

useful services (remote sensing of land, navigation, and weather reporting); we can foresee

commercial possibilities for MPS in the near term.

All of these space applications require an adequate space transportation system, including

launch vehicles, spaceports, and tracking networks. Because of our significant reliance on

space, we will certainly retain some sort of space

program. However, broad agreement about the

direction or scope the program should assume

in the future has not been achieved. Furthermore,

there is no set of procedures in place whereby

a national consensus about the future program

can be generated.

Need for Continued Federal Activities

Lack of basic agreement is of concern for the

whole U.S. space program, not only for applications technologies. But it is of particular concern

for the latter because the range of desirable

civilian space applications, on account of their

economic risk and high expense, cannot be undertaken by the private sector alone, in accordance with ordinary market forces. On the other

hand, it is inappropriate and unnecessary for the

Federal Government to undertake all of the space

activities in the United States. For the foreseeable

future, we will continue to be in a period of

mixed public and private responsibilities. In order

to ensure the success of our space ventures, a

determination of the appropriate Federal role

should be made and, once made, pursued consistently. In this assessment, at least four areas in

which the Federal Government should continue

to be involved are identified: contribution to advanced R&D, provision of public goods and services, continuation of space science, and coordination of national efforts, particularly with

respect to international agreements.

International Competition

The United States no longer has a monopoly

on free world space activities. The Europeans and

the Japanese have targeted specific space

technologies for development and are already

providing stiff competition for a number of services and facilities heretofore offered only by the

United States (e.g., launch facilities and communications ground stations). in particular, the

French will soon be marketing an expendable

launch vehicle, the Ariane, to compete with the

shuttle, and they plan to begin operating, in 1984,

the Systeme Probatoire d’Observation Terrestrial

(SPOT) remote-sensing system to compete with

the land remote-sensing satellite system (Landsat). Making good use of available U.S. technology, the Japanese are developing their own

launchers, as well as communications and remote

sensing satellites, particularly for ocean surveillance. The Europeans and the Japanese have also

developed excellent space science programs.

The Europeans are not only technologically

competitive, but have founded new semiprivate

institutions, e.g., Arianespace and Spotimage, to

operate and market their new systems. These institutions are subsidized by their sponsoring

governments and are, therefore, able to price

their services significantly lower or offer more attractive financial terms than could unsubsidized

firms. In addition, their profitmaking character encourages them to seek efficiencies that a program

managed by government agencies might not.

Through the European Space Agency (ESA),

member countries cooperate in developing advanced systems for which no one country has all

the resources required (expertise as well as

capital).
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 2 9

Need for Greater Private Sector Participation

A great part of the promise of the European and

Japanese programs results from the structure of

their institutions, under which private and public

sectors can work well together. Their plans, however, should not necessarily cause the United

States to imitate their institutional arrangements,

but to discover equally effective arrangements

compatible with our political and economic traditions. The twin factors of the diminution of Federal resources for civilian space activities, and the

dynamism of the private sector, make it important that private corporations participate more actively in U.S. space efforts whenever commercial success is possible. if we are to develop space

applications that have the most social value,

signals from users must guide our efforts; it is the

private sector that responds to and uses such

guidance most effectively in the marketplace.

Above all, we must remain flexible in determining whether one sector or the other, or some

novel combination of the two, should assume the

responsibility for particular activities. As responsibilities are divided, it is essential to consider

both the stage of development–basic research,

development, demonstration, or operations–and

the kind of application—communications, remote

sensing, materials processing, or transportation,

To help meet foreign commercial competition

as well as to foster the more efficient use of our

national resources, the United States should continue to seek further innovative relationships, like

the Joint Endeavor Agreements (JEAs) sponsored

by NASA, which bring public and private sectors

into effective partnership in planning for and carrying out space activities. Because we have been

less than effective in discovering such arrangements, many of our space applications systems

have not evolved smoothly from research to operational status.

Present Government Institutions Ill-Suited

to Current Conditions

By charter and by subsequent legislation, NASA

is primarily responsible for the R&D of civilian

space systems, not their operation. The exception to this rule is NASA’s operation of space

transportation systems, including launch vehicles,

spaceports, and tracking systems. Responsibility

for operating other federally owned civilian

systems rests with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); it operates

U.S. weather satellites and is scheduled to

manage the Landsat system as well.

NASA’s emphasis on developing new technologies makes sense in the context of a highly visible project on which national prestige is staked.

In the current political and economic context

(i.e., diminishing Federal resources allocated to

space, increasing competition from abroad, and

growing need to involve the U.S. private sector

more substantially), NASA and other Federal institutions which make extensive use of spacederived data may require reorientation, first, to

ensure that a balance of diverse space activities

emerges, and second, to be more responsive to

user needs. Some specific suggestions for possible reorientation appear in chapter 10; chapter

9 explores the principles upon which such reorientation could be based.

Issue 2: How Are We to Manage

Our Future in Space?

Future Options for the Civilian Space Program

This section considers a range of legislative approaches the Congress could take concerning applications of space technology. Although these

options are derived from considering the specific

technologies we have addressed in this report

(i.e., satellite communications, land remote sensing, materials processing and space transportation), they generally reflect the needs of the entire spectrum of space applications. At one end

of the range, Federal involvement dominates, and

public goals drive the development of all space

applications. At the other, Federal involvement

is very low, and the pursuit of space applications

is a function almost solely of private sector

activity.

The U.S. space program is an investment for

the Nation. Consideration of options for the U.S.

space program must take into account what we

can do, what we can afford to do, and what we

must do, to meet external competition and in-
30 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ternal demands. What we can do is determined

by our technical and institutional capabilities;

what we can afford to do is bounded by overall

Federal resources and judged by ranking the

value of space activities against other Federal programs; what we must do is driven by external

challenge and domestic requirements. The relative importance to be granted these various

determinants is, finally, a political decision. The

shape of the resulting program can vary widely,

but it is important that Congress recognize the

cost of inconsistent Federal support of planned

programs. The time stretching from initial concept, through research, development, and demonstration (RD&D), to final operations may include major political changes. if these changes

occasion major financial perturbations, both

money and talent are lost.

Our technical and institutional capabilities provide, perhaps, the least constraint. The success

of Apollo proves that we can undertake and complete challenging new projects. We have a wide

range of future possibilities to choose from, and

we have much of the experience and expertise

necessary to carry them out. The availability of

Federal resources, on the other hand, is less

predictable, depending, as it does, on the overall

state of the economy. It is expensive to develop

space technology, and for the next 3 or 4 years,

at least, many Federal programs are likely to be

under severe financial constraint. In addition, the

relative priority of space activities in the national

economy depends on an evaluation of their contribution to overall national goals. Though the

need for some civilian space program is clear, its

appropriate level is not. Finally, as international

competition increases, serious thought must be

given to planning an effective response.

Space applications exist in the context of an

overall Federal commitment to the exploration

and use of space for civilian and military purposes. Accordingly, the following discussion outlines the legislative choices OTA has selected for

discussion and relates them to the sorts of overall

programs within which they might exist. The

three levels of overall commitment presented

below are determined by different evaluations of

foreign competition.

HIGHLY COMPETITIVE APPLICATIONS PROGRAM

As other parts of this report have stressed, the

competitive challenge from other nations is strong

and growing. With the exceptions of materials

processing, in which competition has not yet

developed because it is too new, and of navigation satellites, all space applications originally

developed in the United States now face competition from other countries. For both economic

and political reasons, foreign activities must be

taken seriously by U.S. policymakers. Strong Federal intervention might be warranted if failure to

pursue new technologies would result in significant loss of revenue or U.S. prestige, or if the

threat was much greater than could be met by

current Federal and private programs. A highly

competitive applications program would fit most

appropriately into an overall space program that

seeks to achieve ambitious goals. Two different

approaches bear consideration.

Ž Apollo-like program. Such a space program

would likely arise only in response to a perceived threat from the Soviets. If they were to

initiate an ambitious and highly publicized

project such as a manned planetary mission,

or a large, advanced orbital base, space might

again become an area of superpower competition in which we tried to best Soviet efforts.

New applications and enhanced capabilities

for existing ones could result as byproducts of

a singly focused space effort. The institutional

structure and large budget required to complete the R&D for a single large project could

lend itself, for example, to development of a

new generation of communications or land remote-sensing satellites. If competition were to

focus on a single dramatic project, it could spill

over into a broad range of areas if the United

States attempted to emphasize its across-theboard capabilities, as it did during the Apollo

program. The development of the shuttle,

however, argues the reverse: a single

showpiece program might drain all others of

much-needed funds.

Because this program would be politically

motivated, it would be aimed primarily at increasing U.S. prestige in a short period of time,

and therefore would inevitably be dominated
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 3 1 — — .— —-———.————— — ————. —

by the Government. The private sector would

be seen as the source of expertise and contracting capability, but would not, at least immediately, be a prime beneficiary of U.S. programs. Encouragement of commercial activities other than those directly supportive of the

major project would depend on the overall resources available: unless these resources were

substantial, large crash programs could absorb

funding and expertise to such a degree that

other interests would receive little attention.

● Applications-dominated program. If competition from European and Japanese and, possibly, Soviet applications systems were seen as

especially threatening, it might be appropriate

to concentrate an aggressive Federal effort on

maintaining U.S. preeminence across-theboard. This course of action would place a high

value on civilian space technology as an instrument for maintaining U.S. technical capabilities

and general economic strength. It would be

based on the estimation that the support and

subsidy of foreign governments for their own

programs could be met only by similar support

in the United States.

This program would emphasize the applications segment of NASA’s activities, including

space transportation, and could be carried out

even without a commitment to a very large

single project. It would require a significant

redirection away from NASA’s present orientation toward spectacular missions. Except for

use of the shuttle, manned programs would be

reemphasized and made a part of specific applications projects, where pertinent. Space

science research that contributed directly to

applications efforts would receive priority;

basic research that used shuttle capabilities in

near Earth orbit would be favored over expensive planetary probes and long-term experiments. Like the politically motivated Apollotype program, this highly competitive course

of action would be dominated by the Government, but insofar as its aim would be leadership in commercial applications, private industry would be encouraged to become a full

partner. various joint-ventures and other

cooperative agreements might be encouraged.

The high costs of Government subsidy in such

a program could be justified as leading to eventual commercial payoff, as well as considerable

public sector benefits.

MODERATELY COMPETITIVE

APPLICATIONS PROGRAM

Such a response to foreign commercial competition would arise from the judgment that the

United States retains significant strength in many

sectors and should target “areas of opportunity”

for Federal attention. Private-sector involvement

in development projects and in planning for eventual takeover of potential commercial systems

would be encouraged. In the near term, 30/20

GHz communications technology, land remote

sensing, and space transportation are the most

likely areas to receive Federal attention under this

scenario. Materials processing projects would be

aided, largely through use of JEAs. Federal involvement would be initiated on the grounds that

the private sector cannot afford the high risks of

entering a given area without help. Industry

groups would be encouraged to expand their involvement by entering into joint ventures with

each other and with the Government where appropriate (see ch. 8 for a full discussion of some

of these possibilities). Technology transfer from

military to civilian use would be increased wherever possible.

This applications program could fit the following general scenarios:

Budget-constrained, with most resources

devoted to a single large project (e.g., the

shuttle). This reflects the current situation

where more than 50 percent of the NASA

budget is devoted to the shuttle. Although

the effort to develop less expensive transportation to space will eventually benefit the entire space program, at present it has led to

foreclosing or deferring many opportunities

in space science and in applications. Under

such conditions, if the applications program

(exclusive of space transportation) is to prosper, the private sector must be involved to

a much greater extent. If that involvement

is not forthcoming, the U.S. competitive position will necessarily suffer. Of particular
32 ● Civilian space policy and Applications

concern is the future of 30/20 GHz communications technology (see “Communications

Technology,” below) and land remote sensing by satellite (see “Land Remote Sensing,”

below).

Budget-constrained– “balanced spending. ”

This is not the current situation, but one that

might prevail when the shuttle is fully operational and its costs are borne by the users—

provided NASA’s budgets stay relatively

level. Under “balanced spending” conditions, an applications program (including advances in space transportation) would consume a significant portion of the budget.

Space science would receive a comparable

share. NASA would play a strong role in developing new communications and remotesensing systems, in conducting experiments

in materials processing, and in planning and

constructing space platforms and large structures. The private sector would be solicited

to participate in many of these activities.

NONCOMPETITIVE APPLICATIONS PROGRAMS

If the competition from other states is not considered especially threatening to the U.S.

economy, and to our general position of leadership, and if space applications are not viewed as

worth developing for the public benefits that

might be derived, a greatly reduced Federal effort in space applications would be a potential

policy option. Such a stance would force dependence on private investments to develop and operate space systems, but would not provide appreciable Federal funding to do so.

Although this option could apply to any of the

civilian space programs considered above, it is

more likely to be part of a highly constrained

civilian space program:

● Severely constrained. Such a program, some

30 to 50 percent smaller than the current

one, would allow little room for a civilian

Federal applications effort, especially given

the large percentage required for continued

development of the shuttle. Major programs

and perhaps entire categories of activities

would be eliminated. Depending on the size

of the cuts it might be necessary virtually to

eliminate space science and/or defer production of parts of the space transportation system. It could not allow for a major Federal

role in developing the next generation of

communications satellites or remote-sensing

technologies. In this situation, private attempts to develop or operate space systems

would be encouraged, but significant Federal

funding for joint projects would not be available. Transfer of technology developed by

the military to the civilian realm could provide incentives for private involvement, especially if military spending on space were

relatively unconstrained. This might allow

the private sector to concentrate on modifying military-derived technologies to civilian

uses and on developing areas, such as materials processing in space, where the military

is not heavily involved.

DISPERSAL OF NASA’S RESPONSIBILITIES

This would result if, because of budget constraints and a desire to consolidate all Government space programs, the shuttle and other applications developments were to be transferred

to the Department of Defense (DOD) and other

Government agencies. Under such a scenario,

advanced communications, atmospheric (weather and climate) sensing, and land and ocean

remote sensing would be developed first for the

military, and spun off to the private sector or

civilian agencies later, if ever. Desensitized data

could be made available for civilian consumption and sale to other nations through public entities or through specially licensed private corporations. However, a much more relaxed view

of security would have to prevail if the data were

to be as valuable as data derived from competitive international systems. Launches would

be conducted by the military, with appropriate

arrangements for private sector and foreign users.

NASA would retain responsibility only for basic

research in space science. NASA’s centers now

working on applications and operations would

be turned over to DOD, Interior, Commerce, or

universities and private firms. Such a scenario

would contravene a major premise of the NAS

Act, that civilian and military space activities are
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 3 3

—

to be conducted separately, and hence might require explicit legislation. It would certainly raise

questions about the act’s premise that “activities

in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes

for the benefit of all mankind.”~

Toward a Coherent Federal Space Policy

partly because most civilian space technologies

arise within NASA, which is primarily an agent

of technology push, commercial interests and initiatives have not developed to the extent that

they ordinarily do in industry. Other contributing

factors include: lack of consistent congressional

or executive policy direction facilitating the

development of a stable market, the complexity

of the technologies themselves, and the high costs

and economic risks the private sector would have

to bear. Aside from the general public, whose interest is periodically sparked by space spectaculars, the communities NASA serves have up

to now been users rather than partners. Lacking

on the one hand effective guidance from the Congress or the President, and on the other an adequate forum in which user needs may be expressed, civilian space policy is often made de

facto by NASA and the Office of Management

and Budget (OMB). Essentially, there are two

problems. First, the United States currently lacks

the appropriate means to bring the scientific,

commercial, and political communities into consensus about the broad goals for civilian space

activities. Second, the Federal Government has

given insufficient attention to establishing arrangements whereby the private sector can be

brought into effective partnership in the development and operation of civilian space systems.

Lack of foresight and, especially, lack of coordination have characterized much of the recent

U.S. space effort. Increasingly, the direction and

scope of our space program are determined by

the annual budget deliberations among the executive agencies, OMB, and the Congress. This

approach presents several problems, one of

which is that annual budget cycles bear little relation to the long-term evolutionary cycle of space

systems. Another is that by its nature, OMB is not

‘National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended (Public

Law 85-568, 85th Cong., H.R. 12575, July 29, 1958, 72 Stat. 426.)

sec. 102 (a).

well suited to view investment in space activities

in long-range perspective, Finally, insofar as the

civilian space program remains essentially

NASA’s to direct, it suffers from inattention to the

concerns of users, those in the public sector, as

represented by Government agencies, as well as

those in the private sector. In order to focus the

U.S. civilian space program and to introduce

more consistency into all U.S. space activities,

the President or the Congress must set forth new

goals. In the absence of such direction the current drift will continue and worsen.

In order to focus attention on the country’s objectives in space, periodic high-level review and

discussion are needed. The Carter administration

undertook several reviews of space policy under

the aegis of the National Security Council which

resulted in Administration Policy Directives

PD-37, 42, and 54 (see ch. 10). In the Reagan administration, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is conducting a major policy

review for a Cabinet Council chaired by the

Secretary of Commerce. It is scheduled for completion sometime in 1982. Such reviews are

useful for focusing attention on the needs of the

space program. However, these short-term,

highly focused reviews cannot substitute for sustained examination of our long-term goals in

space and high-level attention to policy setting.

The many authorization and appropriations

hearings on space within the Congress, as well

as reports from its support agencies, keep the

Congress informed on pressing space policy

issues. However, because of the press of other

items on the national agenda, the relatively small

weight that space matters receive in most congressional districts, and the fact that space issues

are dealt with in several different committees,

space policy has not received sustained and

broad-based attention. It would be helpful to

establish a high-level, multirepresentative body

to recommend goals and objectives for the overall U.S. space effort. Such a body should be able

to articulate, and gain support for, the broad goals

of our civilian space program, and to suggest

major programs to implement these goals, though

it should not be expected to achieve consensus

on all the details of our future space effotts.

Indeed, consensus on specific activities, e.g., the
34 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

level of effort devoted to space science, may

never be reached, for at that level, the political

process of balancing competing interests (with input from the scientific establishment) properly

takes precedence.

Several alternatives for this proposed body,

varying in potential effectiveness and feasibility

are as follows:

●

●

●

Establish a new version of the National

Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC). As

it operated in the past, the NASC consisted

of a permanent White House group, chaired

by the Vice President and composed of representatives from the major Federal agencies.

It was charged with recommending policy

and programs directly to the president. If a

future council is to be effective, its chairman

would have to take a significant personal interest in space activities. A membership restricted to Federal agencies, however, would

not include all of the potentially interested

parties. To represent the broader perspective characteristic of the maturity of the U.S.

presence in space, a reconstituted NASC

should also include several members from

the private sector in addition to those of the

Federal agencies.

Activate the Policy Review Committee

(Space) in the National Security Council

(NSC), the body charged in the Carter administration with advising and recommending on space matters. If chaired by a civilian

Cabinet-level officer, it would have visibility. However, such a course of action might

have the drawback of overemphasizing national security interests at the expense of the

scientific, Government-user, and commercial representatives.

Establish a Presidential or national commission composed of representatives from all

the major communities interested in space.

The terms of the commissioners should be

long enough to outlive any particular administration. The influence of such a commission would depend on the personalities

and talents of its members and the receptivity

of various administrations rather than on a

solid political/institutional base. Key Members of Congress should be included as

members of the commission.

Raise the importance of OSTP. Within the

executive branch, civilian and military space

policy is studied and formulated in OSTP and

NSC. Currently, OSTP is conducting a policy

review. Although this arrangement may

serve as a focus for developing space policy,

access to the President may not be direct

enough to insure his attention to the needs

of the civilian space program.

Institute joint congressional hearings. At

present, civilian space activities are reviewed

by separate subcommittees of the House and

Senate. For many years, both Houses had

full committees responsible for space. One

way to put space more prominently on the

congressional agenda might be to reestablish full committees whose staff and members would have a strong interest in establishing goals and supervising their implementation. Periodic joint hearings between committees responsible for various aspects of the

civilian and military space programs would

help to provide coordination of national

policy.

Though each option has attractive features,

none appears to resolve completely the twin

issues of representing all major participants fairly and adequately, and of influencing key decisionmakers. Without a commitment from the legislative and the executive branches to pursue a

long-term course, none of these alternatives can

be effective. However, their activities could at

least define the major problems over time and

ensure that regular reports are sent to the President or Congress.

Overall Prospects for Space

Applications Technologies

Whereas the military and political threat of the

Soviet Union sparked the initial drive toward U.S.

preeminence in space, the challenge to U.S. leadership in applications programs now and for the

forseeable future will come from commercial

competition from our allies. The Japanese and

the Europeans have heavily involved their private

sectors with government programs. These government/industry partnerships have made for
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 3 5

vigorous space programs; government contributes various kinds of subsidies and technical

resources as well as a sense of national interest,

the private sector contributes a whole range of

commercial and technical expertise along with

risk capital. Although the United States still retains its lead in technology in most space applications, foreign technical and managerial capabilities are growing rapidly.

Of the four space applications technologies

here under review, U.S. success with satellite

communications is in many respects exemplary.

To begin with, it is flourishing. The rate of growth

in this industry has been and probably will continue to be over 20 percent per year. It provides

an increasingly greater range of services on which

users worldwide have come to rely. The keys to

its success seem to have been the early and major

involvement of the private sector and a firm

understanding of the potential market.

There is, however, no single model for commercializing space applications technologies.

Markets for each are in different states of development; the proportion of activities aimed at public

(rather than private) good varies from one technology to the next; and the maturity of the technologies themselves is not the same. Furthermore, there may be some portions of these technologies that are not at all suited for commercialization. The special needs and effects of each

technology should therefore be considered in

commercializing technology developed by the

Government.

Issue 3: What

Guided the U.S

Policy Principles Have

Civilian Space Program?

Before the issues specific to each of the technologies are addressed, it is useful to consider the

foundation upon which the space program now

rests, the 1958 NAS Act. The discussion in this

section considers six of the major policy principles articulated in the act and in subsequent executive and legislative directives. Although the

act contains other principles (e.g., that peaceful

uses of space are to be developed, and that

benefits to all mankind are to be sought), the principles selected for discussion in this assessment

suffice to allow reasoned consideration of civilian

space policy. Indeed, these six principles form

the core of U.S. civilian space policy, and they

have helped to shape the programs and institutions for implementing that policy.

The six policy principles may be stated as

follows:

that U.S. preeminence in space science and

applications be maintained;

that economic and social benefits be

derived;

that knowledge be increased;

that civilian and military activities be separated (though they are to be coordinated

and are not to duplicate one another unnecessarily);

that NASA, the civilian agency, be limited

largely to R&D; and

that international cooperation be fostered.

Thus, the issues and findings organized by these

six policy principles include those that are generic

to all four technologies under review, and those

that extend beyond space applications to the conduct of the entire civilian space program.

To Maintain National Preeminence

[n what sense has the United States been

a leader in space applications? Is it still so

today? For how long can we expect to maintain our leadership?

Especially since World War II the United States

has seen itself as preeminent in science and technology and as having a special expertise in both

the military and civilian applications thereof.

Maintaining a technological edge has been considered crucial for several reasons. First, national

security has become increasingly dependent on

rapid and sustained technical advances in electronics, aerospace, and nuclear energy. Second,

high technology has increasingly become a strategic sector of the economy; that is, high technology so thoroughly pervades other sectors of

the economy that the United States cannot afford to be dependent on foreign countries to provide it. Other advanced nations behave similarly. Third, economic competitiveness in global

markets, as well as continued domestic prosperi-
36 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ty, stems in large part from a broad R&D base

in high-technology industries. Particularly in

highly developed countries such as the United

States, where the costs of labor and raw materials

are high, advanced technology products are a

major export item. For the preceding reasons,

and also because scientific and technical progress

gives a general impression of vitality and strength,

scientific and political decisionmakers often

believe our political influence abroad to be directly dependent on national programs in the

sciences and on advancements in high-technology sectors of the economy.

Attention to national preeminence has been the

major formative influence on the conduct of the

U.S. civilian space program. The 1958 NAS Act

states as one of its aims “the preservation of the

role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and

in the application thereof . . . “2 At its inception,

the space program had to meet the perceived

threat to U.S. national security from the launch

of Sputnik and subsequent Soviet space initiatives. The design of our manned programs of the

1960’s and the shape of NASA’s institutional

structure were driven primarily by considerations

of national security and political prominence, and

only secondarily by regard for potential economic

and scientific benefits. If the Soviets had been

allowed to achieve clear superiority in any major

category of space activity, they would, in the

judgment of U.S. political leaders, have been likely to gain increased political support from neutral

countries. As a nation, we refused to accept second place. Therefore, the United States embarked on a comprehensive and accelerated program that included the development of a variety

of expendable launch vehicles, communications

satellites, manned vehicles, and several orbital

and planetary scientific probes. By the end of the

1960’s, we succeeded in matching or bettering

achievements of the Soviets in virtually every

area: in addition to our celebrated victory in the

race to the Moon, U.S. communications satellites

were providing operational global service in the

International Telecommunication Satellite Organization (I NTELSAT) system; U.S. meteorological

Zlbid., Sec. 102 (C) (5).

satellites were making local weather coverage

available to many parts of the world; U.S. launchers were available to other countries for scientific and applications projects; an ambitious program of unmanned planetary missions to explore

Mars and the other planets was underway; and

a promising remote-sensing technology was

under development, the data from which were

to be made available at low cost to all countries.

As a result, the United States was able to reap

the political and economic gains of unchallenged

superiority in space applications.

In the following years, however, this picture

began to change. Defeated in the race to man

the Moon, the Soviet Union concentrated on developing a permanent manned Earth orbital

laboratory, the Salyut. From 1975 to 1981, while

the United States flew no manned missions, the

Soviets flew 20, some of up to 6 months in duration. The Soviets conducted extensive experiments in materials processing, remote sensing,

and the biological sciences, and they gained additional experience in remote-controlled rendezvous and docking, and operation of manned systems. The U. S. S.R. ’S investment in planetary exploration and space science and applications has

also been extensive, in some cases more than that

of the United States, but for the most part has

yielded fewer results. Though less spectacular

than the U.S. flights of a decade ago, the steady

program of the Soviets has produced valuable experience largely unavailable in the West. Cooperative ventures with other Communist countries,

as well as with India and France, have provided

them significant political gains, too. Future Soviet

plans are unclear, but are likely to include development of larger permanent orbital stations,

an operational land remote-sensing system, highperformance boosters, and, eventually, manned

planetary missions.

More important to the present situation is that

Japan and several European countries have recently developed a number of advanced space

technologies, many of which are comparable and

in some cases superior to those of the United

States and the Soviet Union. In addition, they

have established a number of innovative institutional arrangements that allow significant privatesector/government cooperation. Beginning in the
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 3 7

early 1960’s, Europe and Japan saw the importance of developing competitive space capabilities to avoid political and economic dependence

on the superpowers. Though their space budgets

have only been a fraction of those of the United

States and the Soviet Union, their programs have

achieved success by eschewing development of

expensive manned capabilities, borrowing technology from the United States, and concentrating

on a few key applications. Their motivations have

varied, from France’s highly political desire for

independence and a domestic technology base

to support military programs, to Japan’s perception of the space market as an arena in which

advanced technology is likely to yield high longterm profits. Especially significant has been the

devleopment of an independent launch capability in the form of ESA’S Ariane and Japan’s N-1

and N-2 vehicles.

Because of the U.S. space program’s historical

emphasis on very large, expensive manned programs, and because of institutional and political

difficulties in transferring technology from the

public to the private sector and in coordinating

private sector activities, commercial competition

from heavily subsidized foreign space systems

may prove difficult to meet, Though the United

States will retain its lead in state-of-the-art

technologies and especially in manned flight, its

institutional and financial capacity to support

operational systems and to meet user needs is

very much in question.

To Derive Economic and Social Benefits

The civilian space program has been the source

of an important flow of economic and social benefits. Some of these benefits have been derived

indirectly through the spinoffs from technology

developed for NASA, while others have resulted

from direct technology transfers to the private

sector and to Government agencies. Insofar as

commercialization of space applications technologies is a natural and accepted process in a

capitalist society, the problems inherent in industry’s attempts to commercialize technology

orginally developed by or for NASA are of particular importance for this assessment.

Does the commercialization of space-based

technology differ from the commercialization of Earth-based technology?

The commercialization of new technology is

the last state of a complex process of innovation.

Generally, this process begins with a period of

basic scientific research, proceeds through a stage

where practical applications are sought, and terminates in the identification of potentially marketable products. The time required for such a

project, the number of participants, and the cost

will all vary, depending on the nature of the research and the existing store of knowledge.

In the private sector, the decision to invest in

innovation is generally motivated by desire to sustain profits. Investments in innovation, like other

investments, are required to meet criteria of

return on investment. Profitmaking enterprises

tend to invest in projects which are designed to

satisfy a recognized market or management need.

Expensive, long-term, and high-risk endeavors

have to be justified by a reasonable expectation

of high payoff and future profit. This basic rule

applies, whether the proposed innovation is in

Earth- or space-based technology.

Innovation in space-based technology is inherently expensive and highly dependent on

Government interest and cooperation; it involves

untried technology and is often not driven by

clearly defined markets. As a result, such activities

cannot easily attract corporate capital. Given this

generalization, it is important to review the pattern of past and current private sector investments

in space technology.

The most obvious example of the successful

commercialization of a space technology is the

communications satellite. Early private sector interest in satellite communications was motivated

by the realization that satellites provided a more

efficient and less expensive alternative to the

then-existing means of long-distance communication. Substantial private sector investment was

later required to utilize this technology; however,

the investment was made with the knowledge

that the technology was well-understood and the

market large and well-defined. Other space-based
38 ● civilian Space Policy and Applications

technologies, such as remote sensing and materials processing, do not share these advantages.

Much of the present dialog about the commercialization of new space systems concerns untried

technologies directed toward undefined markets.

As a result, the private sector’s aversion to expensive, high-risk endeavors and undefined markets has prevented and will continue to militate

against major private investment in these areas.

Though reluctant to undertake the commercialization of specific space-based technologies, the

private sector has been actively involved in spacerelated support services, providing such necessities as flight hardware, project financing, insurance, and tracking and control facilities. This

limitation of private sector involvement is understandable, for these suppont services require only

limited risk, and rely on preexisting and/or Government-funded technology or contracts.

To date, the major industrial participant in

space activities has been the aerospace industry.

This fact may be attributed to that industry’s

familiarity with space technology, to its close

working relationship with Government, and to

its willingness to take a long view of product

development. Other industries have been reluctant to engage in research projects which require

knowledge, personnel, and support facilities

which they do not already have.

Without substantial budget support from the

Government, private investment in new space

technologies, such as materials processing,

remote sensing, and space transportation systems, can be expected to proceed at a pace and

in a manner consistent with normal investment

practices in the private sector. There is some

cause to believe, however, that the amount of

private sector resources devoted to space may

increase in the near future. This inference is largely the result of what might be termed a disaggregation of space investment opportunities. In

other words, as the opportunities for relatively

small investments in space technology multiply,

different industries are likely to pursue individual

profitmaking activities. Instead of one firm attempting to undertake a major space project, numerous firms, pursuing their own interests in particular segments of a space system, may indirectly

accomplish the same result. Examples of such a

situation now exist in land remote sensing and

materials processing.

In land remote sensing, it is very unlikely that

the private sector could finance and operate the

presently structured Earth observation system.

(See Issue 5.) However, it is possible that if the

space and ground segments were separated, one

or more private firms could profitably operate the

ground segment of such a system. Similarly, in

materials processing, the investment required for

a single firm to identify a product, to design and

launch the necessary experiments, and then to

manufacture the product in space, is too great

to attract industry’s interest. However, recent activities in the aerospace industry indicate a willingness to design multiuser instrumentation to be

used in conjunction with the shuttle for a wide

va’riety of in-space research. After its development, this instrumentation would be rented to

other private sector organizations for specific

research projects. As the cost of in-space research

is gradually spread among a number of participants, the risk to any single firm will be reduced,

and the industry’s investment in space should increase. (See Issue 6.)

To Increase Knowledge

The goal of increasing knowledge is more characteristic of the space sciences than of the development of applications technologies. Nonetheless, the goal of achieving a balanced and

sound space policy requires that it be fostered.

In addition, space science, especially studies of

the near-Earth environment, plays a key role in

the design and implementation of successful applications projects. An important aspect of this

goal is that it mediates between maintaining national preeminence and promoting international

cooperation.

NASA, the National Science Foundation (NSF),

and the universities set the agenda and direction

of basic space science research. The National

Academy of Sciences, through its Space Science

Board, also plays an important role in this process, The yearly budget process determines the

level of funding for space science among the

many other competitors for portions of the Federal budget.
Ch. 3—issues ● nd Findings ● 39

Although this study did not assess the adequacy

of the U.S. space science effort, nor the institutions and procedures used to determine its goals,

it is clear that a thriving space applications

technology program depends on maintaining a

strong U.S. base in many key areas of science and

tech nology.3

What problems are associated with assuming a continual growth of the knowledge base?

Conducting research in space is becoming

more expensive, primarily because the easiest

studies have already been done. Furthermore,

justifying basic science research is difficult

because direct tangible benefits from a quest for

knowledge cannot be immediately shown. Thus,

it is somewhat more difficult to generate public

support outside of spectaculars such as the Mars

Viking landing or the Voyager missions to the

outer planets.

As missions have become more complex and

expensive, and therefore more infrequent, it is

becoming increasingly difficult for Government

and universities to maintain their science teams.4

As a result, there may soon be a narrowing of the

base from which new ideas can come.

Finally, there is a tendency within NASA to

focus on development and launch of new spacecraft or payloads. Anaiysis of data and interpretation of existing information or of material from

past missions tend to be given lower priority and

funding. In addition, the planning for data

analysis prior to missions has often been inadequate. Space science has suffered from budget

reductions caused by the growing costs of the

shuttle program in an era of fiscal constraint. For

a long time, there has been inadequate integration of space-based and ground-based science

priorities, as well. Here, as in space applications,

the appropriate allocation of financial resources

could be assisted by an effective forum in which

comprehensive and long-term national civilian

space policy goals could be established.

‘James A. Van Allen, “U.S. Space Science and Technology, ” 5cience, Oct. 30, 1981, vol. 214, No. 4520.

4“Space Science Research in the United States, OTA Workshop,”

May 5, 1982,

To Keep Civilian and Military

Space Activities Separate

A cornerstone of U.S. space policy has been

that civilian and military programs are to be conducted separately. Up to the era of the shuttle,

this separation has served the Nation well: independence of the civilian space program has reduced concerns of other nations that the United

States might impose a Pax Americana in space

or that space might become just another arena

for military competition; good relations between

NASA and DOD have reduced unnecessary duplication and promoted technology transfer; and

the civilian space program has served as a hightechnology analog of the Peace Corps—a point

of focus for peaceful and scientific national aspirations and international cooperation.

Recent developments have led to serious concerns that the separation of the two programs

may be diminished, that NASA funding and technical resources may be preempted by military

uses, or even that much of the civilian program

may be subsumed under the military. The shuttle in particular, which will be operated by NASA,

though used by both NASA and DOD, is a compromise between the requirements of both. Because of this joint usage, there have been suggestions that DOD assume all responsibilities for

space transportation.

Within certain boundaries, technology transfer

from DOD to NASA has generally worked well

enough in the past, but the current climate of

fiscal restraint argues for a more effective, more

timely transfer of military technology to the

civilian sector. The United States finds itself facing considerable competition from Japan and

Europe. Two different technologies illustrate the

problems we face:

● Development of 30/20 GHz technology. In

order to meet this competition, the United

States is being pressed to begin a program

to develop and demonstrate a civilian 30/20

GHz communications system. At the same

time, however, military contractors are

working on systems related to such a civilian

system. Many believe that the technology

developed for the military can be transferred

to the civilian sector at a cost saving that
40 ● civilian space policy and Applications

●

would permit a commercial system to reach

operational status rapidly.

Development of multilinear array (MLA)

technology for a civilian land remote-sensing system. The French are already working

on MLA technology for their SPOT remotesensing system. Although this technology is

well known to military engineers, independent development of a U.S. civilian system

would entail an expensive R&D program

and, subsequently, an expensive demonstration project.

How can technology transfer from the military to the civilian sector be facilitated and

increased?

There has been, and continues to be, a recognized need for military use of various space platforms to accomplish national defense missions.

Though the civilian program is separate from

DOD’s program, they interact at both the management and technical levels. The 1958 NAS Act

specified the establishment of a civilian agency,

called for technology transfer between the civilian

and military programs, and established an external coordinating mechanism, NASC, to mediate

any interagency conflicts. In the intervening

years, NASA’s program has been subject to extensive public scrutiny, and it has developed an

applications component which, because of our

political philosophy and tradition, is oriented

primarily toward developing systems that will

eventually be operated by the private sector. The

programs of DOD (and the intelligence community) have been highly classified, subject to

no extensive public debate or scrutiny, and have

been highly focused on mission applications.

These differing objectives (and others mentioned

elsewhere in this report) have led to the development of separate systems in many areas, but have

not precluded common usage of certain systems.

The primary example of a common system is,

of course, the shuttle. This system, the major

elements of which are funded by NASA, was intended from its very beginning to satisfy the mission needs of both NASA and DOD. DOD

funded the development of an interim upper

stage, the shuttle launch complex at Vandenberg

AFB, and extensive missions applications studies.

In addition, DOD will bear the costs of producing its own shuttle-compatible payloads. Overall,

the two agencies have worked well together on

the shuttle program, their cooperation ensured

by commitments at the highest policy levels.

At the same time, the payload programs of the

two agencies (focusing on applications only) have

developed along parallel, but generally separate

paths. in some areas, though, DOD’s technology

has not been unique and, in fact, has benefited

from work done by NASA and the private sector. For example, first generation military sea

communications services were supplied by transponders Ieased from civilian maritime satellites;

the FLTSATCOM system became operational

later. Similarly, DOD has learned from, as well

as contributed to, the technologies of geosynchronous satellite emplacement, of orbit control

and station-keeping, and of satellite housekeeping

(i.e., thermal control, power supplies, signal processing, etc.). In addition, the two sectors have

shared information on satellite structures, altitude

and attitude control, sensors, and a miscellany

of such items as composition of the upper atmosphere and transmission/reflection characteristics of the Earth and its atmosphere.

There remains a significant concern about the

store of military technology, largely unknown to

the public, that lies behind the curtain of security classification blanketing most of DOD’s activities and interests in space. It is important to

recognize the nature of the barriers that exist with

respect to accessibility of DOD’s technology—for

use either in the private sector or in the civilian

public sector (by NASA or NOAA). The technology may be:

Unique to a given DOD mission. To reveal

that DOD possesses a given technology

would be to reveal that a specific classified

mission was being pursued.

Not suitable for civilian use, Missions unique

to DOD may require the development of systems with characteristics (and associated

costs) unnecessary in the civilian sector. For

example, the security and survivability criteria driving the design of many DOD systems result in a degree of redundancy and

circuit hardening unneeded in civilian sat-
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 4 1

ellites. If, in addition, a satellite with such

characteristics were introduced into civilian

use, the measures employed to ensure the

survivability and security of its military twin

might be compromised.

● More advanced than needed for civilian applications. In Earth observations, for example, military intelligence requires that data

of very high resolution be collected-a standard of performance well beyond that required (or even desired) for most civilian purposes. Adoption of specific military systems

or specific technology may be restricted for

several reasons: it may reveal how capable

U.S. systems are, and it may reveal that a particular technology, generally considered to

be well understood, achieves higher performance through special modifications.

These barriers apply to a greater or lesser

degree to specific Earth-sensing and communications capabilities, and they derive

from concerns for national security, concerns that cannot be ignored in assessing the

question of technology transfer from DOD

to NASA.

However, there are cases in which the existence of a DOD technological capability

(though not necessarily the latest development)

has been shielded unnecessarily. In such a case,

NASA has had to develop a demonstration system

incorporating the same technology before it can

be transferred to the public domain. Such measures are wasteful of public resources and should

be given careful review in the light of current

resource constraints.

To Limit NASA to R&D

With the exception of launch facilities and

space transportation in general, NASA’s work has

been confined to R&D–largely because when the

1958 act was written, the question of Government operation of, as yet nonexistent, space applications technologies was not of great concern

to the framers of the act. In addition to its many

contributions to aeronautics technology, NASA

has developed communications and Earth observations systems, and has studied the potential for

manufacturing products in space. The experience

of the past quarter century with respect to NASA’s

limitation to R&D has been mixed. A primary

benefit of NASA’s emphasis is that it has been

able to make rapid technological progress because it has not had to develop expertise either

in operation of service systems or in commercial

development. Drawbacks include pursuit of some

projects that may be impractical because they are

developed with insufficient appreciation of user

requirements and constraints, and inefficient

transfer of technology and services to potential

operators.

Prior to 1958, the National Advisory Council

for Aeronautics (NACA) operated according to

a general policy, set in 1946, that directed R&D

to cease prior to development of specific designs

of commercial aircraft equipment. This specific

development was viewed as the proper role of

industry. Government research was oriented

toward proving a concept and generating sufficient data to permit an industrial designing process to start with a good chance of successful completion from both the technical and economic

point of view. This mission is simpler for the case

of aeronautical research than for space applications efforts, however, because the civil aviation

market has been well defined for decades. Unfortunately, this same high degree of market articulation is not the case for all space applications

technologies. The market for international communications services was rather well understood

in the early 1960’s. Consequently, commercialization could proceed from NASA generic

R&D much as aeronautic technology did in the

past. For materials processing in space, however,

the market is embryonic, and simple proof of

concept will not move MPS into commercialization. Thus, the precedents of how and when to

shift development into the private sector fit less

well for MPS.

Primarily because the NAS Act is silent on the

question of who is to operate space applications

(except for transportation), decisions about when

a system is ready for operation, and who should

be given responsibility for operating it, are made

ad hoc. For satellite communications, Congress

decided after much debate that responsibility for

operations should reside in the private sector, but

because of fears that open entry would result in

a virtual communications monopoly by one firm,
42 • Civilian Space Policy and Applications

namely, the American Telephone and Telegraph

Co. (AT&T), it created the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) in 1962. The polar

orbiting TIROS weather satellite system was given

to the Weather Bureau, within the Department

of Commerce, to operate in 1961. When NOAA

was formed in 1970, operation of the weather

satellites was given to that agency. It now

operates the geostationary operational environmental satellite system as well.

Land remote sensing from space, after considerable infighting among the mission agencies, was

finally assigned to NOAA in 1978, principally because of its expertise in operating satellites,

though it had no prior experience in the special

issues surrounding land remote sensing. According to that policy decision, NOAA was also to investigate and develop mechanisms for eventually

transferring Landsat to the private sector. Meanwhile, the Government committed itself to assuring continuity of the data flow from Landsat. Current policy calls for transfer of Landsat to the

private sector “as soon as possible” and provides

for no follow-on to the program if private operators do not assume operational responsibility.

NOAA was also to operate the now-cancelled

National Ocean Satellite System.

In materials processing, NASA is pursuing a

vigorous basic research program. As the commercial viability of this technology becomes clearer,

it seems likely that private industry, with NASA’s

help, will pursue specific opportunities for developing manufactured items in space. As with aeronautics or communications satellites, the Government’s role in materials processing R&D will

change as the technology matures.

The rationale for maintaining a separation between R&D and operations is that better, more

innovative research may be done by an agency

in which finding new and better ways to accomplish a task is the agency’s primary concern. On

the other hand, leaving an agency free from the

ofien pedestrian tasks of operating a complicated

technology for the public good may result in a

configuration of technology that will not serve the

eventual user well, either technically or economically, Also, without a closely involved client

intending to assume responsibility for operations,

an R&D agency may not be motivated to make

appropriate tradeoffs between cost and performance; there may be unnecessary “gold plating.”

Furthermore, the user agency can concentrate

on operations and avoid unproductive conflict

between engineers and users. Users tend to be

conservative: they would rather stay with a working system that they know and trust than risk their

time and resources on an untried system even

if it promises a vast improvement in capability.

Clearly, a proper balance must be struck.

The primary issues of concern in Governmentoperated applications systems are when and how

the transition is to be made from R&D to operational status and who has control over the course

of R&D. Though different systems should be

treated with flexibility as this transition is planned,

the lack of clear and consistent principles for

transfer introduces uncertainty and inefficiency.

Perhaps the most important consideration is that

potential users of a new system must be identified

as soon as possible and brought into the process

of planning its eventual operation. The cases of

Landsat and the weather satellites have shown

how difficult this transition can be to carry out.

With all good will on both sides, the perceived

needs of the users and the far-seeing vision of the

engineers and scientists were not always compatible. One of the reasons for the user community’s current dissatisfaction with certain aspects of

Landsat is that it has remained an R&D system

too long.

If the Government is going to be the operator

of an applications system, one way to avoid interagency transition problems is to assign operational responsibility to the development agency.

For space applications, NASA would assume this

role, which has worked well for space transportation. In such a case, NASA would then have

to develop competence in a variety of new fields

in order to plan effectively for the operational

phase and to carry out the plan when it is implemented. If NASA were assigned an operational

role in areas other than space transportation, the

transition from development to operations could

be made smoother and would be more likely to

lead to early returns from investment in space applications R&D. Where the period of governmen-
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 4 3

tal operations is likely to be of limited duration

(e.g., for remote sensing), making NASA the

operational agency seems appropriate.

When the private sector is to operate the applications technology once Government R&D is

complete, the issues are somewhat different and

involve the vital question of whether Government

should be doing the R&D at all. The primary

reason for the Government to sponsor R&D, as

well as demonstration, in technologies intended

for eventual commercial exploitation is to reduce

uncertainties about the technical and economic

risks associated with space applications systems.

The key issue in making the transition from a

Federal R&D program to a commercial operation

is what additional Federal actions, if any, are

needed once the technology has proved its

viability, The Government has a generally weak

record in understanding the marketplace, although the aeronautical program in NASA has

had a long history of moving technology successfully to the private sector. As a further complication, nonaerospace industry has had little experience in working with Government on space

activities.

The Federal agencies are learning how to collaborate effectively with business in the development of commercial opportunities based on Government-developed technology. Effective collaboration has been most effective in certain

specific areas such as aeronautics, where the

sometimes adversarial relationship between the

public and private sectors has not developed.

Eventually, however, the Government is likely to

become more sensitive to commercial considerations in its dealings with new technology. As this

kind of learning continues, Government can become a more effective partner with the Nation’s

investment firms and industries in maintaining

U.S. economic leadership based on technological

supremacy. However, there are probably inherent limitations in Government’s ability to accommodate all private sector priorities.

To Foster International Cooperation

What benefits has the United States received from its cooperative programs? How

is the desire for cooperation reconciled with

maintaining U.S. preeminence?

The 1958 act encourages “Cooperation by the

United States with other nations and groups of

nations in work done pursuant to this act and the

peaceful application of the results thereof.”5

Though in some ways opposed to the goal of

maintaining national leadership, U.S. cooperative

efforts have made useful contributions to overall

political and foreign policy aims. By entering into

a variety of formal and informal agreements with

foreign governments (ranging from provision of

scientific and technical data and participation in

NASA science experiments to direct access to

U.S. applications technology), the United States

has encouraged potential partners to look favorably on the U.S. space effort.

In return, the United States has gained a variety

of tangible and intangible benefits. At first, in the

context of competition with the Soviet Union, the

United States enlisted the support of allies and

potential allies by offering them a stake in the new

and adventurous space program. In addition, we

gained access to a large number of foreign sites

to provide tracking and relay stations for manned

missions. Scientific data as well as general information were widely disseminated, in accordance

with our basic decision—diametrically opposed

to that of the Soviets—to provide the world with

open coverage of U.S. successes and failures. Our

civilian space program has provided a concrete

demonstration of what we mean by an open

society.

The United States took a leading role in establishing INTELSAT in 1964 and in arranging for

broad international participation in the system.

The United States profited through its initial

SNatiOnal Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Op. cit., Sec. 102.

(c) (7).
44 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

dominance of INTELSAT and its position as the

main supplier of INTELSAT hardware. Because

of the position of the United States, the Soviet

Union did not join INTELSAT, leaving the United

States as the central figure in international satellite

communications.

The United States has attempted in a number

of ways to involve third-world countries in its

space program. The direct-broadcast experiments

conducted by NASA’s applications technology

satellites in 1976 enabled India and Brazil to evaluate the feasibility of transmitting educational

programing to remote rural areas. The Landsat

remote-sensing system was made accessible to

all countries through the sale of global data at low

prices, the establishment of foreign ground stations, and technical/economic assistance to less

developed countries provided by the Agency for

International Development. In addition to fostering goodwill, U.S. openness has helped forestall

criticism directed at direct-broadcast and remotesensing systems that operate across national

boundaries.

The United States has long had a policy of selling launches—vehicles and tracking facilities—

to foreign users for peaceful purposes. In one

major instance of direct technology transfer,

Japan has been allowed to produce Thor-Delta

expendable vehicles under license. Many scientific and R&D missions have been carried out for

developed and less-developed countries, in addition to cooperative ventures between NASA

and outside agencies.

More recently, the rise of competitive European

and Japanese capabilities, along with increasing

antagonism toward the United States on the part

of third-world countries, has strained our cooperative posture. European participation in the

space transportation system has been extensive;

the European Space Agency is building Spacelab

(at its own expense), in return for free flights on

the shuttle. European and Japanese payload specialists will participate in upcoming Spacelab missions. Though, overall, the Spacelab/shuttle arrangement appears to be satisfactory to both

sides, differences have arisen over timing of

delivery, costs, and participation in operational

decisions. More generally, there are unresolved

issues concerning the proper extent of cooperative ventures and of information sharing about

potentially competitive commercial products,

particularly in materials processing. Cancellation

of the U.S. portion of the international solar polar

mission (ISPM) has made the Europeans wary of

entering other cooperative ventures with the

United States.

In international organizations, especially the

UN’s Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space, the U.S. position on several important

legal and regulatory issues has increasingly come

under attack. The United States was instrumental in drafting the major treaties dealing with outer

space and in establishing the principle that broadcasting and data collection from satellites could

be carried out without interference based on

claims of national sovereignty. However, many

third-world and Communist countries are resisting possible transmission of radio and, especially, television programing across their borders, as

well as the collection and dissemination of highresolution imagery of their territories without

prior permission. Cooperation with the United

States may be disrupted by disagreements over

these issues, especially as Japan and Europe are

rapidly becoming alternative sources of comparable services and products and may make

concessions to third-world and Communist countries as a means for gaining commercial advantage over the United States.

SECTION 2: APPLICATIONS POLICY ISSUES

Introduction: Generic and Specific space technologies—e.g., the appropriate rate of

Technology Issues transfer from military to civilian uses, or the appropriate role of the Government in supporting

Each of the major space applications technol- R&D. In addition, each technology also creates

ogies raises certain issues that are generic to all several issues that are specific to it alone—e.g.,
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 4 5

the resolution limit of civilian land remote sens- issues by technology and the policy principle

ing by satellites. under which they fit most appropriately. The

Through a series of workshops, OTA estab- generic issues were discussed in the previous secIished a set of generic and specific issues that tion. The following section discusses the most imunderlie this assessment. Table 1 groups these portant specific issues, technology by technology.

Table 1 .—Summary Matrix of Primary Policy Principles Across Four Major Space Application Technologies

Policy principle Communications Land remote sensing

Civilian/military split

International cooperation

Leadership in science and

technology and application

thereof

NASA focus on R&D

Expansion of scientific

knowledge (basic science

research)

Development and operation

of space vehicles

(spacecraft)

Promote commercialization

of civilian applications

1.

2.

1.

2.

3.

4.

1.

2.

3.

1.

2.

1.

1.

2.

1,

2.

Is the transfer of technology from the military to

the civilian sector adequate?

Common/shared systems: a) What problems may

the civilian sector face if the military can

preempt civilian use? b) How should costs be

shared?

How should the United States respond to foreign

competition in ground and space hardware?

What are the impacts of Third World requirements for spectrum frequency allocation?

What policy focus should the United States

develop toward foreign cooperation in satellite

communications R&D?

What are the implications of U.S. application of

its antitrust policies in foreign countries?

What improvements need to be made in policy

implementation?

How should United States respond to foreign

competition?

What national goals or programs should the

United States pursue?

What is NASA’s role vis-a-vis the private sector?

How should program discontinuities be handled?

What is NASA’S role?

What should NASA’s role be regarding

demonstrating publicly useful systems?

Do civilian agencies have a role to play in

operating satellite communications systems?

How should regulatory problems (delays) be

handled?

How should the Government regulate DBS nationality and internationally?

1.`

2.

3.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

1.

1.

2.

3.

1.

1.

2.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6,

7.

8.

Is the transfer of technology from the military to the

civilian sector adequate?

What limits of resolution are appropriate to civilian

systems?

What impact would declassifying existing military

data have on prospects for transferring satellite

remote sensing to the civilian sector?

How will the problems of sovereignty and/or fairness

be addressed?

What are the benefits/drawbacks of an international

system for remote-sensing system? (a la INTELSAT or

some other model).

What problems arise in our relations with other

countries regarding private v. U.S. Government

ownership of remote-sensing system?

What should U.S. policy be regarding U.S. agency

use of data collected by foreign systems?

What is the impact of the U.S.S.R. as a competitor

in remote sensing?

What are the effects on the foreign user of an interruption of the data flow from Landsat?

Are we losing our leadership in land remote

sensing?

Is the policy regarding flights of opportunity

adequate?

What steps might be taken to improve user inputs to

the R&D process?

What continuing roles do NASA and NOAA have?

What is NASA’s role?

Why hasn’t the system been made operational?

What mechanism(s) is (are) needed to decide on the

operational readiness of a technology?

How can the market for data be aggregated and expanded?

How should the technology be transferred to the

private sector?

What should policy be regarding data availability

from R&D systems?

What incentives does industry require to commercialize remote sensing?

What institutional models might be appropriate?

How do we determine that a technology is ready for

commercialization?

Should system continuity be assured?

Who should decide what sensors are required for an

operational system?
46 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table I.—Summary Matrix of Primary Policy Principles Across Four Major

Space Application Technologies (continued)

Materials processing (MPS)

Space transportation structures and manufacturing in space Common issues

1.

3.

1.

2.

1 .

1.

2.

3.

1.

1.

1.

2.

3.

4.

What should be DOD’s role and share? 1!

What problems arise from the military’s

right of preemption of a launch

opportunity? 2.

What problems occur from military influence on space transportation system

design? How would this affect cost and

pricing?

What problems arise with the perception 1.

of shuttle as a military system?

How should we respond to competition

from foreign transportation systems?

What should the policy be regarding maintaining national facilities?

What role can industry play as potential

operator/owner of space transportation?

Who decides what continuing R&D is

needed?

Should the operational system(s) pay for

further R&D?

What is NASA’s role?

Who will operate the space transportation

system in the near term? The far term?

How can the market for space transportation services be aggregated?

How can shuttle pricing policies be made

more certain?

What regulatory/political constraints are

needed for privately run systems?

What incentives might be needed to encourage private investment In owning and

operating space transportation components or systems?

1.

2.

1.

2.

1.

1.

Is there adequate coordination of ef- 1. Is there adequate transfer of technology from

forts between military and civilian

sectors? 2.

On what basis can a potential spacebased materials lab be shared?

To what extent is the prospect of 1.

commercial competition detrimental

to scientific cooperation? 2.

How should the United States

respond to potential foreign

competition?

Is Spacelab an adequate base for

future MPS experiments?

Who should pay for basic groundbased research?

Who decides what space-based

research to do? Who pays?

How should costs of space-based

materials lab be allocated? a) How is

the lab shared between Government,

industry, and academia?

What new facilities may be needed

to promote space-based materials

processing?

3.

4.

5.

1.

2.

1.

2.

3.

1.

1.

2.

3.

1.

2.

3.

4.

military to civilian?

How should systems be shared?

What should our policies be regarding international competition?

What institutions may be needed to address

international competition?

Is the United States a reliable partner for

cooperative programs?

Is it possible or desirable for the United

States to institute Government-indust~

cooperative ventures similar to those of other

nations?

How should the United States protect

technology developed by Government R&D?

Given that portions of U.S. policy are sound, how

can policy implementation be improved?

Is the lack of program goals the problem with

the space program or is it lack of implementation of existing policy?

What different role should Government and

industry play?

Who should perform oversight?

What is NASA’s role in continuing R&D after

commercialization of a system?

What is NASA’s role?

Who decides when a technology is ready for

the operational mode?

What criteria should be used to determine the

operational readiness of a technology?

What role should NASA have in operating

proven space systems?

What steps should be taken to reduce risk to

the private sector?

What incentives are needed to encourage

private investment in space technology?

What should be the policy regarding operation of expendable launch vehicles?

What Iegal agreements/restraints are needed

to transfer technology developed with public

funding to the private sector?

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment.
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 4 7

COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES

Issue 4: What Are the R&D Needs for

Optimal Advances in

Satellite Communications?

Because the satellite communications industry

has already achieved the status of big business,

R&D is a significant part of its competitive stance.

Nonetheless, there is a point, based on industry’s

own view of return on investment, beyond which

it is unwilling to commit funds for advanced

R&D–where the risks are great, the payoffs

uncertain, the technology unproved, and the

time-scale of needs unclear. For this reason, the

pioneers in advanced R&D are likely to be the

Federal Government, industry/Government joint

ventures, or, if antitrust laws permit, private consortia formed ad hoc. It is widely believed that

individual firms cannot afford to finance the frontend costs of performing truly advanced development or substantial basic research,

Up to now, U.S. leadership in this field has not

been threatened. But recently, Japan and several

European countries have entered this field determined to compete successfully.6 Supported by

government-sponsored R&D as well as contracts

awarded by INTELSAT, European and Japanese

firms have developed competitive satellite subsystems and are now capable of designing, building, and operating complete telecommunications

systems. In several areas, foreign development

programs are more advanced than those in the

United States. More concerned to maintain their

competitive position with respect to one another

than worried about possible antitrust violations,

U.S. firms seem unwilling to coordinate an industrywide response to this potential threat to

their markets.

NASA took an early lead in the development

of communications satellites, and even after commercial success had been achieved, the agency

continued to conduct R&D for advanced technologies. These included advanced stabilization

techniques, the control of satellite position in synbAnthony J. Calio, statement before the Subcommittee on Space

Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess., July

8, 1981, p. 13.

chronous orbit, and, in the last of the series, a

demonstration of broadcast technology from the

satellite to small, low-cost ground stations.

In 1973, OMB, acting on recommendations

from the Office of Telecommunications Policy,

greatly restricted funding for NASA’s R&D in

advanced communications. The assumption underlying this decision was that the U.S. private

sector could conduct its own advanced R&D,

making NASA’s further participation mostly unnecessary. In the event, however, the private sector has, for the most part, been content to exploit proved technologies already available and

to package them in even larger satellites; it has

done little R&D of advanced systems. As a result,

many of the new developments in satellite communication have come from the Europeans and

the Japanese; in some areas they seem to have

leapfrogged U.S. technology.

In this situation it is appropriate to ask what role

NASA should play in responding to current needs

for advanced R&D. One possibility is for NASA

to proceed with plans to complete a demonstration flight of a 30/20 GHz satellite system. Other

possibilities include demonstration projects for

a large communications platform, and, at a much

lower level of expenditure, a large deployable

antenna. In addition, NASA could continue to

support a number of smaller projects for 30/20

GHz subsystem work.

Increasing Use of the Geostationary Orbit

By far the most useful communications satellites

are those stationed in geosynchronous orbit

(GSO) in which they rotate about the Earth, in

the plane of the Equator, at an angular velocity

equal to that of the Earth itself. Stationed at a

point above the Earth’s Equator, a communications satellite in GSO can provide continuous

coverage of nearly a third of the Earth’s surface

with a broad beam antenna.

Because many satellite systems must share relatively small numbers of orbit slots in space and

frequency bands in the spectrum, there is a limit

to the number of spacecraft that can be stationed

in a given arc of GSO. Satellites must be sufficient-
48 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Iy separated to avoid radio interference, the separation required for a given level of technological

maturity being subject to several physical constraints. In general, satellites along the geostationary arc can use the same frequencies only if

they are far enough apart so that ground stations

can point at one and not receive an interfering

signal from its neighbor on either side.

To guarantee noninterference, the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC) and international regulatory agencies have established

minimum orbital separations and have assigned

satellites to specific locations called orbital slots.

Each slot can accommodate one or more satellites that, between them, utilize the full range of

suitable frequencies. All the slots in view of the

United States are filled with existing or authorized satellites, and FCC has had to choose from

several competing carriers for allocating the last

few slots. When the capacity of these satellites,

operating at either C or Ku band, is fully utilized

(projected to occur in the last half of this decade),

the growth of this industry will come to a halt–

unless a solution is found and implemented.7 Two

possible solutions that will be examined here are

Ka band technology and large communication

platforms.

NASA’S Past and Future Roles

Through the middle 1960’s and 1970’s, NASA

played a leading role in R&D for communications

satellite technology. Beginning in 1973, however,

NASA’s program was phased down considerably,

on the assumption that the private sector would

continue necessary R&D. The industry did indeed

make noteworthy progress in a number of areas,

but only because these areas offered: 1) a modest

risk for the cost, 2) a relatively immediate market

payoff, and 3) affordable development costs. As

it has turned out, however, the private sector has

not funded long-term, high-risk, and high-cost

satellite communications research.

While the U.S. satellite communication R&D

program slowed between 1973 and 1979, the

Japanese and European efforts accelerated. The

z~enera[ Dynamics, Convair Division, and Comsat Corporation,

“Geostationary Platform Systems Concepts Definition Follow-On

Study,” final review, July 28, 1981, pp. 8-38; see also, Calio, op.

cit. p. 14.

japanese have already launched a direct broadcast satellite for tests and preliminary operations

in the Ku band. Although the first two satellites

in this program were bought from U.S. industry,

all subsequent models will be made in Japan. It

is also noteworthy that the Japanese have become the leading supplier of INTELSAT Earth stations and, because of very advanced technology

and established production lines, are likely to take

the world market lead in the sale of TV receiveonly (TVRO) Earth stations designed specifically

for direct-broadcast reception. Some see these

efforts by the Japanese and similar activities in

Europe as serious threats to the U.S. lead in

satellite technology, systems, and market share.

Opportunity at 30/20 GHz

There are three frequency bands allocated for

the use of civilian communications satellites: the

C bands (6 GHz uplink, 4 GHz downlink), the

Ku bands (14 GHz, 12 GHz), and the Ka bands

(30 GHz, 20 GHz). The technology for transmission and reception in the C bands was developed

first; almost all commercial satellites now operate

in the C band.

Crowding at 6/4 GHz

While it is true that satellite communications

systems operating in the C band (6/4 GHz) are

successful and cost effective, two major problems

are becoming increasingly apparent. First, the

number of useful locations in GSO has been used

up. With current technology, a 4° orbital separation between satellites operating in the C band

is required. Not long ago, a 50 separation was

required, and, as transmitting and receiving technology improves, a 3” separation may soon

become standard.a Although it is theoretically

possible to reduce the separation between satellites further, each reduction increases the costs

of controlling the satellites’ susceptibility to interference. Despite the introduction of new

beam-shaping technology that will further reduce

interference, the point at which it becomes impractical to squeeze additional satellites operating

at 6/4 GHz into desirable parking spaces in GSO

is nevertheless rapidly approaching. Therefore,

Scalio, op. cit., p. 14.
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 4 9

we are indeed running out of GSO locations with

good “look angles” for 6/4 systems.

The second problem is coordination with

ground microwave systems operating in the 6/4

GHz bands. These ground-based systems are

radio relay systems, used primarily for telex,

telegraph, and voice traffic. The problems are that

the satellite ground transmitters cause 6 GHz interference at the radio relay system receivers, and

that the radio relay system transmitters cause 4

GHz interference at the ground receivers of the

satellite system. As these ground-based systems

proliferate, it has become too costly to protect

colocated two-way satellite ground terminals near

metropolitan areas against interference. This

problem is especially acute in heavily populated

areas such as Japan, Western Europe, and the

Northeast United States.

FUTURE NEEDS

As demand rapidly outpaces capacity of C band

satellite systems, the United States has to make

some difficult decisions as to what step to take

next. Should we fully develop the Ku band?

Should we jump to the Ka band? Should we attempt to deploy fibre optics more rapidly? Should

we buy facilities and technology for service in the

Ku and Ka bands from the Japanese and the Europeans?

There are two main advantages of going directly to Ka: first, the enormous spectrum spread between 20 and 30 GHz allows for transmissions

of much greater bandwidth and, hence, much

greater versatility; and second, there are many

more orbital parking slots if the Ka band is used.

Projections of demand for transponders in the

1990’s differ on the question of the ability of the

Ku band to handle the traffic. If projections are

limited to increases in voice and data traffic,

technical improvements will probably allow the

Ku band to suffice up to approximately 199s2000. On the other hand, if there is a large increase in video traffic, particularly for teleconferencing, the Ku band will be exhausted by about

1992. It follows that while the Ku band represents

a near-term solution to the problem of crowding

in the C band—e.g., the decision of Satellite

Business Systems (SBS) to operate at 14/12

GHz–projected long-term requirements can be

met only by moving to the Ka band. On the other

hand, there are several unresolved technical and

economic questions that prevent immediate establishment of an operational Ka system.

The main advantage of developing Ku systems

is that the technology is already fully tested. The

disadvantage is that the Ku band will not be able

to meet the needs of a greatly expanded video

market. In particular, with Ku only, full action,

large screen video teleconferencing will almost

certainly not be possible; only the expanded

capacity of 30/20 can handle the large data flow

of such a high-quality system. Ku band is, however, an important interim solution; whereas C

band allocations total about 700 MHz, Ku provides 1500 MHz. As a ready technology, Ku can

meet a service market having three times the

capacity of the already crowded C band. Ka technology on the other hand is not ready for commercial use, and experiences three to five times

the transmission losses experienced at Ku.

A potential competitor to satellite systems is

transmission by fibre optics. By the 1990’s, fiber

optics will have come into its own as a major

ground-based supplier of communications needs,

However, no matter how well this technology

performs, or how extensive its network becomes, it will not be on-line widely enough to

fulfill the requirements of the expanding markets

of the 1980’s. Furthermore, unlike satellite beams,

fibre optics is line-switched, not area-covering;

therefore, it is not so likely to be competitive for

broadcast or distribution services.

COMPETITION ABROAD

The Japanese and the Europeans have already

begun to develop 30/20 Ka systems. One reason

that they have moved to 30/20 is that they already

use the 14/1 2 Ku band for commercial radio.

Therefore, if they paid exclusive attention to

developing satellite systems in the Ku band, they

would face the same kinds of interference problems there that plague the United States in the

C band. Similarly, the United States already has

INTELSAT-V and an SBS satellite and will soon

have TDRSS/AW–all operating in Ku band. Five

new Ku systems, to be launched in 1983-85, are

under development.
5(’) ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

More important, however, the Japanese and

the Europeans have concluded that the future of

satellite communications systems lies in developing systems to exploit the Ka band, though they

are deploying Ku systems as well. Precisely because the Ku band represents only an interim

solution, they have decided to attempt long-range

domination of the satellite communications market. The Italian firm, Telespazio, for example,

hopes to be in the forefront of 30/20 development, and plans to introduce a system to handle

domestic telephone service and data traffic. In

congressional testimony, some U.S. companies

in effect agree with the foreign evaluation, albeit

in hindsight, for they argue that without the continuation of a strong U.S. Government program,

foreign countries will almost surely dominate the

multibillion-dollar international communications

satellite markets of the 1990’s.9 A strong U.S. program is, however, not synonymous with 30/20

exclusively; aggressive deployment of Ku is important also. But a renewed effort by NASA

would concentrate on development and demonstration of Ka technology because the agency has

already completed these tasks for Ku with the CTS

experimental satellite, from 1971 to 1977. At this

point, the industry has the knowledge and technology to proceed at Ku, without further need

for NASA to do product improvement.

One course of action made possible by the development of 30/20 systems abroad is that U.S.

firms could buy the facilities and services

developed elsewhere. But to allow ourselves to

fall into second place in an important area of

space applications would be to ignore a basic

tenet of U.S. space policy -i.e., that the United

States will maintain a position of leadership. Once

the United States allows itself to take a back seat

in the development and deployment of this (or

any) technology, it becomes ever more difficult

to regain the lead. The United States cannot lightly abandon any area of technological leadership

(especially in a strategic sector such as communications), given the economic importance of

maintaining a favorable trade balance in hightechnology products.

gDavid McElroy, MaRin Newman, and Johan Benson, statements

before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of

the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess., July 9, 1981, p. 149.

POTENTIAL MILITARY INTERFACE

U.S. aerospace companies are developing significant new satellite technology for the military,

some of it designed for use at 30/20 GHz.1° Those

firms do not (and could not afford to) maintain

separate working groups for military and civilian

applications of a given technology. Rather, it is

standard procedure for the same group to work

on both. As important work has been done for

the military at 30/20 and higher bands, the expertise exists to initiate a civilian program in short

order (see ch. 6 for the broader context of this

discussion).

By 1980, NASA and the Air Force had decided

on joint funding of traveling wave tube development, in which the Air Force Space Division

would provide 30 percent of the total funding.

The Air Force, on the other hand, would handle

the IMPAIT transmitter development, with NASA

funding only a portion of that. For antijamming

purposes, DOD is interested in a 44 GHz uplink

band, but NASA is not. Thus, it seems clear that

with the military interest in 30/20 (and 40), the

research will continue with or without NASA.11

Although there would be some problems with

transferring the technology because of military

emphases on security and survivability, such

problems have been solved before and, in principle, could be in the present case.

RESPONSE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

In congressional testimony, private industry

representatives have provided an unequivocal

answer: no individual firm can finance the R&D

costs of 30/20 technology.lz On the other hand,

though the industry as a whole, acting as a consortium, might be able to provide the financing,

the structure of such an arrangement would have

to be carefully drawn so as to conflict neither with

‘Whomas F. Rogers, Edward C. Aldredge, Jr., and Elizabeth Young,

in separate statements before the Subcommittee on Space Science

and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology,

U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 2, 1982.

I ljohn H, McE[roy, statement before the subcommittee on Tran$

portation, Aviation, and Communications and the Subcommittee

on Science, Research, and Technology of the Committee on Science

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2d

sess., May 21, 1980.

IZDonald B. Nowakoski, statement before the Subcommittee on

Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess.,

jliy 8, 1981, pp. 56-57.
Ch. 3—issues and Findings Ž 51

present antitrust laws nor with the competitive

positions of the corporations.

This is not to say that private industry has not

in the past and will not in the future engage in

significant R&D. It is, rather, to say that industrial

R&D is generally conducted in support of primary

business goals. Unlike NASA’s R&D, it is productor service-oriented. Furthermore, an acceptable

percentage of industrial R&D must result in profitable business applications.

Furthermore, firms in the industry see themselves as spending to the corporate limit in fulfilling needs for short-term R&D. There are not

enough funds to be applied to a long-term program like civilian 30/20. NASA estimates, and industry concurs, that the agency’s flight program

to test 30/20 technology will cost $250 million

to $400 million over 3 to 5 years. A commercial

R&D program in satellite communications hardware (which a carrier conducts in a lab) is, by

contrast, on the order of $10 million per year.

SOME CONCERNS

One reason for concern is that the costs of flight

testing 30/20 technology are estimated on the assumption that NASA would do the tests. It is often

the case (and industry makes it frequently in other

contexts) that industry can do certain kinds of

tasks more economically than government can.

Presumably, therefore, if one of the large

aerospace companies conducted flight tests of

30/20 technology for civilian use, the costs would

be substantially lower. Whether industry would

argue that they still could not undertake the

necessary R&D, even if the Government furnished launch, data acquisition, and tracking

services free, is an open question. The complicating factor, however, is that no appropriate

spacecraft bus exists. It is not certain that a Kuband bus will suit Ka-band technology. if a new

spacecraft is required, it will cost over $100 million, excluding the costs of the new communications hardware to be tested. Nevertheless, if, for

example, a consortium of the major satellite firms,

builders and carriers, received contributions of

$10 million dollars per year from each, over a

5-year period, a demonstration project could be

privately funded.

A second reason for skepticism is that the risks

seem somewhat overestimated. The technology

has already been bench-tested; the launch systems are not problematic. Thus, besides the complex but manageable business of developing a

suitable spacecraft, there remains only the task

of mating proved technology and reliable launch

facilities. Additionally, market studies of the commercial potential of Ka-band technology have

been made and have been uniformly encouraging. ’ 3 In short, the technical risks do not seem

great, while the prospects of return are high.

A final area of concern, one which verges on

questions of policy, is that insufficient consideration seems to have been given to the possibility

of establishing a joint management structure for

development of 30/20 technology. The Government might be a guarantor or a partner in such

an arrangement, One potentially attractive Government-industry relationship for 30/20 technology, as well as for the large communications

platform, might be a variation on the JEA currently instituted to promote materials processing in

space. In such an agreement, the Government

could offer to bear the cost of launching a communications satellite in return for a guarantee of

a specified amount of public service communications from the satellite. If successful, both parties would benefit, If not, the losses would be

shared.

Large Communications Platforms

TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS

As one important means of meeting the problem of crowding in GSO, large communications

platforms (LCPS), on which several transmission

facilities are mounted together, are a promising

new configuration of technology. In addition to

fixed and mobile communications an LCP may

provide direct broadcast, navigational, meteorological, and Earth observation services, and support for scientific payloads, thus becoming a multimission platform. The large capital expenditures

and the number of technological advances re-

— . —

1 JEliZab@h L. Young, statement before the Subcommittee on

Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess.,

Jllly 10, 1981, pp. 122-123.
52 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

quired make LCPS a much more speculative prospect than are 30/20 GHz satellite systems.

In general, an LCP is distinguished from conventional communications satellites by greater

capacity, connectivity, and switching capability.

The LCP would provide high capacity by means

of multiple spot beams and multiple bands. It

would provide good connectivity for a wide range

of communications users, and it would offer very

substantial in-orbit switching capability, far

beyond that attainable by conventional satellites.14

The use of LCPS would bring several substantial changes:

●

●

●

The high power of the platform would drastically lower the power needs and therefore

the cost of the ground segment, resulting in

a proliferation of Earth stations. Space segment costs per channel would drop, despite

the larger initial investment required.

The large capacity of the platforms would

result in a requirement for fewer slots in the

geostationary orbit. This would relieve the

congestion that would result from the use of

conventional satellites.

The switching capability of the large platforms would eliminate the need for complex

switching at the Earth stations. Earth stations

would no longer be required to access more

than one spacecraft.ls

The cost savings for LCPS, estimated to be substantial,16 would result from three areas in which

economies of scale could be achieved. These

economies result from:17

reduced mass in orbit:

–lower bus mass per pound of payload, and

—much lower payload mass to perform the

same mission,

slightly lower production cost per pound of

hardware, and

14Future Systems Inc., Large Communications P/atforms Versus

Sma/ler Sate//ites, prepared for NASA Headquarters, February 1979,

p. ii.

‘sIbid., p. 203.

IGlbid., pp. 203-204.

1 zGeneral Dynamics, Op. cit., Pp. 8-15.

. much lower transportation cost per pound

—more efficient utilization of shuttle

capacity.

The critical need of the satellite communications industry of the 1990’s will be a spacecraft

capable of supporting the large multi beam antennas and switches needed to provide large-scale

frequency reuse for point-to-point services. A

large platform in GSO is ideally suited for this task.

All other services provided by the platform must

be compatible with this primary mission–i.e.,

they must not interfere with or compete for bandwidth with the point-to-point payloads.18 The

primary and secondary services of LCPs in geostationary orbit may be broken out as follows:19

Primary use:

● Fixed point-to-point services:

–direct-to-user (DTU) or customer premise

services (CPS) network, and

–high-volume trunking (HVT), domestic,

regional, and international.

Compatible services:

mobile services:

—air mobile,

—sea mobile, and

–land mobile,

Broadcast and relay services:

–TV distribution (separate Ku-band allocation,

—educational TV,

–direct-to-home TV,

—tracking and data relay, and

–data collection.

DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS

The development of large space platforms

would require a significant number of technical

accomplishments, though what has to be done

to make them successful is, as theory, wellunderstood. Thus, they represent significantly

more than a relatively larger step in the evolutionary pattern that satellites have always followed–from smaller to larger, from less to more

reliable.

‘* Ibid., pp. 8-44.

lqlbid., pp. 8-45.
Ch. 3—Issues and Findings ● 5 3

There are definite prerequisites that can, for the

forseeable future, be provided only by the United

States. First of all, the shuttle itself must be

brought to operational status. Second, a vehicle

capable of transferring a platform from low Earthorbit (LEO), where its components would be

brought up on several shuttle flights and then

assembled, to its destination in GSO must be

developed and proved. Third, satellite servicing

and construction techniques (including extensive

life-support and extra-vehicular activity (EVA), will

have to be developed and demonstrated by

NASA in LEO before the private sector will consider deploying LCPS in GSO. Next, certain improvements in the technology for the platform

itself are needed. Of these, one is the design of

antenna beams capable of very accurate pointing; this project, however, is an extension of present technology. Another is the development of

a high-speed, low-power switch to interconnect

the several antenna beams. Finally, the general

requirements of long life and high reliability must

be assured to compensate for the much greater

expense of an LCP.

The requirements of long life and high reliability

could be met in two ways. Either the hardware

might be constructed to maximize these characteristics, or it might be deemed more feasible to

rely on in-orbit maintenance of the platform.

Maintenance, in turn, might be accomplished

robotically by, for example, NASA’s projected

teleoperator, a remotely controlled device that

would replace certain modules aboard the platform. Alternately, a manned orbital station in

LEO, which might be deployed in 1990-2000,

could be assigned maintenance duties; personnel would be dispatched to a platform on a transfer vehicle, not only to replace modules, but, if

necessary, to make more extensive repairs. All

of this must be accomplished at GSO and will

require substantial development for an upper

stage and for the shuttle itself.

LAND REMOTE SENSING BY SATELLITE

Issue 5: What Role Should the

Federal Government Play in

Developing or Operating a Satellite

Remote-Sensing System?

Characteristics of Satellite Remote Sensing

Satellite remote sensing is one component of

a broad range of technologies and techniques

that are used to acquire data about the Earth’s

resources. They range from simple direct human

observation and measurement, to high-altitude

aircraft photography, to sensing by satellite. Thus,

satellite remote sensing exists as one element of

an activity that has been part of the human scene

since it first became desirable to survey the extent and kind of resources available for human

use.

Satellite sensing has unique properties that

separate it from earlier methods: ease of operation, once established; the ability to see other

lands without intruding in the country or its

airspace; the ability to sample very large areas

in a single “scene”; and the ability to produce

an enormous data flow in digital form suitable

for direct computer processing. Unlike other

methods, its development and present operation

rest solely with the Government.

Each of these characteristics, as well as others

that will become apparent in the ensuing discussion, present new opportunities to the traditional

users of remotely sensed data, but they also raise

issues that must be resolved before satellite remote sensing can become a large and thriving

component of resource observation and development.

Current Status of the U.S. Land Remote-Sensing

Satellite Program

The world’s first civilian land remote-sensing

satellite was launched by NASA in 1972. Originally named the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS), the name was later changed to Landsat 1. The Landsat 1 and Landsat 2 satellites no

longer provide data to users. Landsat 3 functions
54 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

only partially. The present sensors are a multispectral scanner (MSS) that can sense the surface

of the Earth in four different spectral bands, each

with 80 m resolution, and two television-like

cameras called return beam vidicons (RBV). Used

together, the two sensor systems can produce

data products that achieve 30 m resolution. The

data from Landsat are transmitted to Earth by

radio link and received at some 12 stations

located in various countries around the world (fig.

6). The MSS sensors aboard Landsat 3 are returning only partial data, though the RBV sensors are

functioning normally. A new satellite, having a

broad resolution, high spectral coverage sensor

called a thematic mapper (sensitive to emissions

in seven spectral bands) is scheduled for deployment in late summer 1982. This satellite is

designated Landsat D. A second satellite with

similar sensors, Landsat D’, has been scheduled

for launch in 1985.

Although the system has been an R&D system

designed to verify the potential of satellite remote

sensing, through the efforts of NASA, the data

from Landsats 1, 2, and 3 have attracted a wide

variety of users (resource managers) in this country and abroad. These users consider Landsat data

to be an invaluable component of the larger

realm of resource inventory data from all sources

(see apps. B and C for details). For some, data

from Landsat have become a baseline requirement of their daily routine. For others, these data

serve the secondary, but important role of a comparison data base. Generally, the users treat Landsat as if it were an operational system, even

though it is still officially an R&D system managed

by NASA.20

Although the system has found a variety of

users, it has yet to demonstrate that it can attract

a large enough market for satellite data to support even the management and operations of the

system without large Federal outlays. Part of the

problem is simply one of technological maturity. Very few technical improvements have been

made in the characteristics of the data available

from Landsat since 1972.21 Many applications will

ZO’’Planning for a Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite

System: A Discussion of Issues and Options,” Department of Commerce, June 1980.

ZI ~, Depa~ment of the Interior Position paper on the privateSeCtor Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities, ” Department of the Interior, October 1981.

require a satellite system of greater capability:

higher spatial resolution, stereo imagery, and

broader spectral coverage. A more important

reason Landsat has not attracted a larger number

of customers, however, is the uncertainty about

whether the Landsat system will continue.

Many users of remote-sensing data from civilian

satellites express considerable frustration with the

current U.S. program. Though it is at a relatively

primitive stage, the technology is far ahead of the

institutional arrangements necessary to collect

and distribute the data in a timely and predictable

manner. From the users’ viewpoint, the program

is in disarray, and is characterized by a lack of

clear direction and by organizational am bivaIence.22 According to U.S. policy, as articulated

in the Carter administration’s Presidential Directive 54,23 NOAA will be responsible for managing civilian operational land remote-sensing activities after the multispectral scanner aboard

Landsat D becomes operational in January 1983.

NASA will remain in charge of R&D of satellite

remote sensing for the civilian sector. This administration, as well as the previous one, is committed to transferring land remote sensing by

satellite to the private sector. The current policy

is to make this transfer “as soon as possible.”24

Criteria for a Satellite Remote-Sensing System

Regardless of who operates a civilian satellite

land remote-sensing system, the Federal Government or the private sector, the major users of

satellite data have basic general needs for the

conduct of an operational system, needs which

they have expressed clearly.25 26 Because each

user has specific data needs (e.g., resolution,

spectral ranges) closely related to his applications,

each will have a different view of the specific

technology most suitable for his purposes. However, given an operational system for acquiring

remote-sensing data by satellite, most users agree

on the following minimal criteria:

22’’ Remote Sensing Government User Concerns, ” OTA Workshop, May 1981.

zJPresidental Directive 54, White House Press Release, Nov. 20,

1979.

24J. wright, ~pa~ment of commerce statement, U.S. Senak and

House of Representatives hearing on Civil Land Remote Sensing

Systems, July 22, 1981.

250TA Workshop, op. cit.

X4J.S. Senate and House of Representatives hearing on Civil Land

Remote Sensing Systems, July 22 and 23, 1981.
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 5 5

Ž Continuity of data flow. Reliable, continuous

flow of data is regarded by operational users

as mandatory. For each user, the term “continuous data flow” has a slightly different

meaning. However, it generally means being able to acquire the data that a satellite

could have taken, or did take, in a timely

manner appropriate to a given application.

In the past, the data flow has been interrupted or slowed by failure of the tape recorders on the satellites, a natural enough

occurrence in an R&D system but unacceptable in an operational one. Therefore, in

order to ensure continuity, the users need

the most reliable possible system, consistent

with obtaining the necessary data. A backup

satellite for deployment should the first

satellite fail in a major way is also an important requirement.

Delivery of data to the user has also been

interrupted or slowed by the inability of the

data center at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight

Center to process Landsat data fast enough .27

Domestic users have experienced delays of

up to 6 months in the delivery of Landsat

data. Certain time-dependent data needs,

such as those of agriculture or pollution control programs, cannot be served if the data

cannot be processed within a few days (see

table 2). The work of other programs is also

slowed considerably by such delays.

Continuity of data also means retaining

data acquired in previous years. Landsat

satellites have provided data since 1972,

when the first remote-sensing satellite was

launched. The data are stored on magnetic

tapes that deteriorate over time. Thus, the

tapes must be rerecorded in order to save

the data. Because of the storage problems

involved with saving everything, the EROS

Data Center has selected standard scenes of

cloud-free data over the world. The NASA

Goddard Data Center is transferring these

scenes from the early tapes to the computer

compatible tapes (CCT), that will be stored

at the EROS Data Center and available upon

request to users. In the course of identifying the scenes to be saved, the EROS Data

ZY~TA Workshop, op. cit.

Table 2.—Data Needs of Foreign and Domestic Users

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Agriculture (Federal, State, and private): specific sampling areas chosen according to the crop; time-dependent

data related to crop calendars and the weather patterns

Forestry (Federal, State, and private): specific sampling

areas; twice per year at preselected dates

Geology and nonrenewable resources (Federal, State,

and private): wide variety of areas; seasonal data in addition to one-time sampling

Civil engineering and land use (State and private):

populated areas; repeat data required over scale of

months or years to determine trends of land use

Cartography (Federal, State, and private): all areas; repeat

data as needed to update maps

Coasta/zone management (Federal and State): monitoring of all coastlands at selected dates depending on

local seasons

pollution monitoring (Federal and State): broad, selected

areas; highly time-dependent needs both for routine

monitoring and in response to emergencies

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment.

●

Center notified users of Goddard’s intentions

and asked them to suggest which scenes to

save. Some early data, which are currently

being stored at Goddard, are scheduled for

destruction. However, for many users, these

early observations represent a valuable and

irreplaceable baseline for comparison with

later observations. In addition, much of the

only cloud-free global coverage dates from

this early period in space remote sensing.

Users agree that it is important to retain these

early data and make them available upon request. They represent a large investment and

a valuable global resource for the future.

Looking toward the future, the users of

Landsat data are concerned that data will not

have begun flowing from Landsat D before

the flow from Landsats 2 and 3 ceases. Will

Landsat D be available soon enough to

assure continuity of the data flow? There are

presently no plans for backup should D fail

to operate as planned.

Quality and integrity of data. It is important

that data acquired in different time periods

be comparable and of uniform quality.

Landsat data are initially “preprocessed”

at Goddard; the results are in the form of

high-density digital Tapes (H DDTs). These

HDDTS are then sent to the EROS Data Center for processing. EROS in turn supplies data

to users either in the form of film imagery

or as CCTS. Some additional special process94-91!3 O - 82 - 5
56 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ing of data to meet particular user needs is

done at EROS; other similar processing is

done by various value-added companies.

Four problems have surfaced in the data

stream from satellite to user. First, the quality

of data tapes is not always maintained at a

high level. Users complain that errors introduced in the HDDTs from Goddard are

passed through and appear in the CCTS from

EROS. Second, abrupt changes over time in

the format of CCTS, again a function of the

R&D nature of the system, have seriously inconvenienced users. These changes have

made it impossible to process older CCTS

with the techniques for processing current

CCTS. Users must therefore go to unanticipated and sometimes extraordinary lengths

to process the earlier tapes. These format

changes were made without sufficiently consulting the needs of the user community.

Thirdly, not all users want to purchase preprocessed data because preprocessing necessarily causes some degradation of quality

or loss of information. For some applications,

it is better to have raw data as they come

off the spacecraft. Finally, maintenance and

management of the data base have been inadequate.

● Adequate collection of primary data. For a

truly global satellite remote-sensing system,

all data must be collected.

As the example of Costa Rica illustrates

(see below under “Foreign Uses of Landsat

Data”), the United States lost an important

opportunity to sell Landsat data because

Costa Rica is just out of range of receiving

stations and because Landsat 3’s tape recorders are unreliable. The tracking and data

relay satellite system (TDRSS), when it is

completed, will serve to gather and relay

data from Landsat D and D’. Until then we

will be dependent on foreign ground stations

for MSS data received by D and D’, because

these spacecraft will carry no tape recorders.

Although the U.S. agreements require the

foreign ground stations to make their data

available to others in accordance with our

open data practices, it is not clear that the

foreign ground stations will respond to requests for data in a timely and efficient manner. Users in some countries, including the

United States, have experienced difficulties

in the past in obtaining needed data quickly from foreign ground stations.

● Adequate consultation with the user commun;ty. This is an essential element of an operational space remote-sensing system,

whether run by the Federal Government or

by the private sector.

Although NASA has consulted other Federal agency users, neither users in the private

sector nor those in State and local government have been included in any way in the

key decisionmaking processes. A successful

operational system depends on the full participation of all elements involved on an

ongoing basis.

In an effort to build interest in the capabilities of Landsat, NASA has sought the advice of the user community about its needs

with respect to sensors and resolution limits.

However, as maybe appropriate in an R&D

system, NASA has approached the problems

of the future orbital height, orbital planes,

and orbital path of the Landsat D satellite

from the point of view of optimizing spacecraft design, rather than the data product.

This approach will result in abrupt changes

in data format and further disruption of the

data base, to the discomfort of the potential

purchasers of the data from Landsat D. Consequently, the user community displays considerable skepticism about the Federal commitment to operate a complete land remotesensing system via civilian satellite, tailored

to providing standard and predictable data

products for the public and private organizations that are attempting to integrate Landsat data into an ongoing operation,

Continuation of remote-sensing R&D. The

current Landsat capabilities, though they

satisfy the basic needs of a large portion of

the potential users, are also limited.

Users such as those represented by the

Geosat Committee28 are very interested in

using stereo images of the Earth for exploration of mineral and energy resources. Geosat

has suggested development of the so-called

2a’’ Satellite Remote Sensing Data–An Unrealized Potential for

the Earth Science Community, the Geosat Committee Inc., 1977.”
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 5 7

“stereosat” remote-sensing satellite.29 Cartographers would benefit from stereo imaging and from higher resolution. Many other

users agree that an automated mapping satellite system based on multilineal array technology (MLA), a so-called “MAPSAT,” would

serve their needs for high-resolution (20 m)30

stereo imagery as well as their multispectral

and spatial requirements and be far cheaper

than Landsat D or D’,31

Even the heavy users of current Landsat

data will find their needs expanding as they

gain experience with the data and understand their potential. They are likely to find

needs for data from new sensors and advanced data relay subsystems.

● Price of data. The major concern of the users

with regard to price of data is that inevitable

price increases be reasonably predictable

and incremental.

Current data prices are much lower than

the marginal costs of generating the data.

Users recognize that future data prices will

be higher as the prices are increased to

reflect marginal costs. However, users would

not purchase the same volume of data if the

prices were doubled or tripled suddenly.

Some State and local government users also

face the difficulty of a 2-year budget cycle .32

If data prices are raised precipitously, these

users cannot adjust to the increase for up to

2 years, and will be forced to purchase fewer

data products than their needs would actually dictate. At a minimum, there should be

a declining Federal price subsidy to bridge

the gap in budget adjustment.

On the whole, these are not hardware or technology problems, but rather derive from the

management and structure of the system. The

larger problem, at least in part, seems to be that

NASA, in an effort to test a broad spectrum of

applications and to interest potential users around

291 bid.

30A. P. Colvocoresses, “Proposed Parameters for Mapsat: Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing, ” vol. 45, No. 4,

pp. 501-506, April 1979.

31 Itek Corp., final report, “Conceptual Design of an Automated

Mapping Satellite (Mapsat), ” January 1981.

32B. f&jo, statement to U.S. Senate and House of Representatives,

hearing on Civil Land Remote Sensing Systems, July 22, 1981.

the world in using remote-sensing data, created

a de facto operational system .33 Its effort was

driven, in part, by a desire to justify the R&D program to OMB. However, being by established

policy an R&D, not an operations agency, NASA

has not been able to manage or fund an operational system, and has therefore been unable to

guarantee its continuity. Nor was NASA directed

to assume operational responsibilities by the

President or the Congress. NOAA, in turn, is not

scheduled to assume the management of the system until 1983 (after Landsat D is launched). Circumstances such as these have made the users

extremely wary of investing in the manpower,

hardware, and software to process Landsat data,

Further, these uncertainties have limited the size

and vitality of the market for Landsat data as well

as that of the private data-processing (value-

-added) industry.

In short, the future direction of satellite land

remote sensing has reached an impasse: the users

refuse to invest further in Landsat data because

the system is not operational, but many of them

also oppose changes because they have become

dependent on the system as it is currently configured. On the other hand, no existing institution, Federal or private, seems appropriate to

undertake operations: first, because there are not

enough users, and second, because the present

system is not advanced enough to generate a

large market. Among other things, this has led

to a situation in which the French, using technology originally developed in this country, will

shortly provide very strong commercial competition in land remote sensing. They have designed

their SPOT system from the first to be an operational system and have included user needs in

the system specifications.

Foreign Users of Landsat Data

One of the basic tenets of the 1958 NAS Act

is that “activities in space should be devoted to

peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.” 34 Our Landsat system, with receiving stations distributed around the world and a pracJJp. Mack, “space Science for Applications: The History of Landsat. ’ in Space Science Comes of Age, P. A. Hanle and V. D.

Chamberlain (cd.), Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981.

JQNational Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, op. cit.
58 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

tice of open data sales, certainly satisfies the injunction of the NAS Act. It also satisfies section

102c (7) of the act, directing “cooperation by the

United States with other nations and groups of

nations in work done pursuant to this act and in

the peaceful application of the results thereof.”

In fact, from a pure cost-benefit approach, remote

sensing by satellite only makes sense as a global

system. For the continental United States alone,

the investment in Landsat far exceeds the cost

of obtaining equivalent data by other means.

However, U.S. corporations and Government

agencies also need foreign data in order to pursue their operations abroad. More importantly,

Landsat, by providing low-cost images of the

world to all purchasers, has enhanced our status

in the world. Our willingness to join others in

solving problems of regional or global import cannot but strengthen our overall position in the

world as a leader concerned for the good of all.35

Importance of Landsat Data:

Three Asian Countries

Foreign users of Landsat data have found them

very helpful for problems of resource management and control. The experiences of several

Asian countries illustrate the potential of Landsat for these uses. Asia serves as an excellent example because it is the location of five of the

original 10 countries selected by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)S6 in

1975 for initial testing of the applicability of using

Landsat data for resource management problems

in developing nations. Two criteria have to be

met for this technology to be successful in

resource management applications: a practical

means of transferring it to the country must be

found, and the data flow should be maintained

over an extended time. A brief historical review

of three of the original Asian programs and their

present day applications provide insight into the

ability of Landsat to meet these criteria.

Bangladesh began its use of Landsat data with

the help of USAID. This Asian country was in35c. K. Pau[, and A. C. Mascarenhas, “Remote Sensing in ~velop

ment,” Science, vol. 214, No. 4517, 1981.

MT. W. Wagner, and D. S. Lowe, AID’s Remote Sensing Grant

Program (Ann Arbor: Environmental Research Institute of Michigan,

1978, pp. 11-22).

terested in testing the use of Landsat data for

deriving information on agricultural production

and land use in order to promote optimal development of a section of northeastern Bangladesh.

The initial project was quite successful and

regional information on rice and other crop production was obtained during the 1975 winter season. Interpretation of Landsat data during this

project also provided detailed information concerning changing pond, stream, and flood patterns, data that are invaluable for planning at both

regional and village levels.37 After this initial introduction of Landsat technology, its use in Bangladesh has rapidly expanded with diverse government programs in agriculture, forestry, oceanography, fisheries, and disaster prevention. In

1980, in an effort to enhance the return from this

effective and developing technology, Bangladesh

established the Space Research and Remote Sensing Organization (SPARRSO), a lead government

agency for R&D and operational activities.38

Sri Lanka is an island nation whose economy

is highly dependent upon agricultural production.

Because of such constraints as the rugged topography and its effect on transportation, as well as

a paucity of trained field personnel, continual effective ground survey of agricultural production

is not feasible on a continuing basis. In 1975, the

Ministry of Agriculture and Lands requested

USAID assistance for establishing local capability to use remote-sensing technology for accurate

agricultural inventories. Specifically, the

Ministry requested assistance in digitally processing Landsat data. This project resulted in the

development of an operations manual and digital

analysis capability in that country. Although the

accuracy was less than would be desired in a

mature program for estimating agricultural acreage, Landsat was recognized as a valuable resource management tool, and in 1978 a national

remote-sensing center was established.~ USAID

37M. A. H. Pramanik, and A. K. M. Alam, “Space and Remote

Sensing Activities in Bangladesh,” proceedings of the Second Asian

Conference on Remote Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981, 1-2-l.

MJT. W. Wagner, op. cit., pp. 69-81.

Jgchristopher Nanayakkara, “The Sri Lankan Experience in Remote Sensing, ” proceedings of the Second Asian Conference on

Remote Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981, 1-7-l,

q. Geiser, M. Sommer, and E. Nanayakkara, The Sri Lanka/Swiss

Satellite Imagery Interpretation Project: Repott on Test Phase (Colombo: Center for Remote Sensing, 1981).
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 5 9

provided a followup grant in response to a Center

request for the development of a simplified lowcost Landsat data-processing system to address

specific resource needs. This system will be

delivered to the Center in 1982. A unique program also currently under way in Sri Lanka reflects the value that another industrial nation

places on the application of U.S. space-derived

data for development assistance. The Swiss are

training Sri Lanka resource managers in techniques for using U.S. Landsat data for monitoring rice production. Sri Lanka is also using

remote-sensing data for monitoring land use and

for mapping its forest cover. Sri Lanka views Landsat as a successful technology that can be employed without heavy capital investment if the

project is well planned, and is optimistic about

the possibilities for using future satellites.4

1

Thailand began its leadership role among the

developing nations of Asia by establishing a national remote-sensing program in 1971. The major goal of Thailand’s program was to develop the

means to use remote-sensing technologies effectively for natural resource management. As a

result of its early initiatives, Thailand’s Royal

Forestry Department was one of the first departments of any country to develop an operational

Landsat-based system for monitoring deforestation. Today, information derived from Landsat

data is a major component of the forestry policy

decisions of this Asian nation.42 USAID’S 1975

joint project with the Thai agricultural department

that sought to obtain acreage information as

part of the annual rice, corn, and sugar cane

survey was of limited value. Two major constraining factors affected this project: 1 ) continuous

cloud cover during scheduled sampling periods

and prior to harvest prevented data acquisition

by Landsat; and 2) the available Thai computers

had not been programmed for Landsat data analysis prior to terminating this project.43 However,

the USAID project was beneficial in providing exAlchrlstopher Nanayakkara, “The Sri Lankan Experience in Remote Sensing, ” proceedings of the Second Asian Conference on

Remote Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981, 1-7-6.

AZSanga Sabhasri, pradisth Cheosakul, Boon Indrambarya and

Suvit Vibulsresth. “National Remote Sensing Activities in Thailand,”

unpublished report to the Second Asian Conference on Remote

Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981.

43T. W. Wagner, op. cit., P P. 77-BI.

perience with Landsat sampling and data analysis

techniques. This experience contributed to later

successes such as the national rubber plantation

survey and a continuing soil erosion study by the

agricultural department. Landsat data are being

widely used by other government agencies, including the Department of Mineral Resources and

the Royal Irrigation Department. Thailand is completing a major Landsat/Metsat ground receiving

station that should provide timely data to the Thai

user service center beginning in late 1982. Thailand has not only committed itself to using data

from Landsat, but it has also shown its determination to assist other Asian countries. Data from this

ground station will be made available to these

nations.

These selected Asian cases demonstrate the

utility of Landsat technology for peaceful uses and

its applications to the resource management

problems of developing nations. Landsat technology has not only been successfully introduced,

but has been shown to be effective in monitoring resources over time, These factors make it an

effective tool in global resource development.

One must remain cognizant that Landsat technology, although transferable to developing

countries, is not a simple technology. It therefore

demands complex man/computer interaction and

timely current data for the analysis of most

renewable resource problems.

However, though foreign users of Landsat data

have made good use of them, they often face

problems very similar to those troubling domestic

users. The experiences of an Italian land planning

firm are not atypical of user experience in the

United States and abroad44. This firm attempted

to integrate Landsat data into its normal data

stream from aircraft and ground survey. After first

learning how to make the best use of the data,

it then experienced difficulties in obtaining timely

data and data that were of high quality. As a

result, it has made much less use of Landsat data

then originally planned. Instead of being a major

component of the firm’s land planning efforts,

these data serve only a secondary role in its total

scheme.

44G. C. Bernardino, “European Industrial Space Projects, ” American Astronautical Society, 19th Goddard Memorial Symposium,

March 1981,
60 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

A short case history of one country’s attempt

to use Landsat data will illustrate other problems

foreign users have faced. It also provides another

illustration of the usefulness and cost effectiveness

of Landsat data for attacking important renewable

resource problems.

Importance of Landsat Data: Case of Costa Rica

Deforestation and subsequent desertification

have become problems of great concern in many

countries throughout the world. The case of

Costa Rica demonstrates the importance of Landsat data for dealing with these problems and the

potential tragedy of unavailability of these data

through discontinuity in Landsat service.

The Government of Costa Rica (GOCR) Ministry of Agriculture was aware in the early 1970’s

that loss of forest cover and watersheds had

become a major problem. Personnel in the ministry knew that a complete forest inventory would

be necessary in order to assess the extent of the

problem, but that if contemporary ground truth

and survey methods alone were used, 25 years

would be needed to complete the inventory. By

that time, there might be no forests to save.

Recognizing that the problem was beyond the

capabilities of his staff, the Minister of Agriculture

requested assistance from the USAID to determine whether Landsat technology could be applied effectively to map the resources of Costa

Rica. USAID commissioned a study that was completed in March 1977.45 This initial study concluded that the deforestation problem was even

more severe than GOCR had thought, and that

a combined aircraft and satellite remote-sensing

program might be the most cost-effective way to

determine the full extent of the problem. Data

from Landsat could not alone do the entire job

because some areas (the watersheds most at risk)

required detailed mapping and analysis at scales

and resolution beyond the capability of the current Landsat series.

As a second step in determining the feasibility

of relying on Landsat data, USAID contracted for

a test and demonstration project, which was comqS”An Assessment of Resource Inventory and Environmental problems in Costa Rica,” Report to USAID, Office of Development Resources, LA/DR, contract No. AI D/afr-c-l 135-8, March 1977.

pleted in March 1978.* The principal conclusions

for the forest sector were the digital-processed

Landsat data would be the most cost-effective alternative for “Level l“ forest cover maps at a scale

of 1 :200,000, and that color infrared (CIR) photography would be the best choice for “Level 11”

and Level Ill” mapping. Landsat data could also

be used effectively for urban mapping and analysis, but would be cost effective only if coupled

with a project to maintain the forests that would

absorb the primary costs.

The major problem confronted in the second

phase of the project was that of obtaining “current” Landsat data. After an initial request to

NASA was ignored, it was necessary for the President of Costa Rica to make a direct personal request to the White House in order to have the

tape recorder aboard Landsat 3 activated, so that

data on Costa Rica could be collected, stored,

and relayed in a timely fashion.

The third phase of the Costa Rican study was

the pilot project (conducted between January

1978, and June 1979).47 Here the objective was

to develop in Costa Rica an operational system

for resource management. The system was to be

tested and established on a cross-sectional area

representing more than 20 percent of the entire

country and running from the Caribbean to the

Pacific. This project demonstrated that a nationwide program based on CIR photography and

Landsat data was both possible and practical.

Such a program would be remarkably cost effective: the entire forest survey task could be accomplished in less than 3 years for about $1

million (compared with the earlier GOCR estimate of 25 years and $20 million, using only

ground and aircraft surveys.)

Despite the clear need for such a nationwide

program in Costa Rica, despite its cost effectiveness, and despite significant investments both

by GOCR and by the United States, today–3

years later—no system to use Landsat data is yet

a“The Utility, Cost, and Effectiveness of Remote Sensing for Forest

and Urban Sector Assessment in Costa Rica, report to USAID/ROD/

LA/US and USAID/Costa Rica, contract No. AID/afr-C-l 135-9-10,

March 1978.

47’’ Design of a Natural Resources lnvento~ and Information System for Costa Rica: The Pilot Project Report, ” report for USAID,

contract No. Al D/la-C-l 253, June, 1979.
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 6 1

in place in Costa Rica because of the unreliability of the present Land sat system. The system for

deforestation analysis does not exist because

sparse data were supplied and because the

United States made no credible assurance that

continuity of data would be maintained in the

future. During the entire period of the pilot project (January 1978 through June 1979), only six

images were obtained over the western half of

the area and only two over the eastern half. Wetseason data were never obtained, and no CCT

was ever available for the one usable image over

the eastern section. On the basis of this experience, GOCR decided not to fund a nationwide operational program.

Many of these user problems are due to the

R&D nature of the current system, but they point

up the care that will be needed in planning for

a future operational system, whether operated by

the government, the private sector, or a mix of

both.

Market for Satellite Remote-Sensing Data

Whatever entity (ies) operates a U.S. satellite

land remote-sensing system, the size and breadth

of the market for the data it supplies is of major

concern. in either case, recovery of the costs of

investment and upkeep (particularly those of the

space segment) is necessary. In a publicly owned

system, political benefits, such as its use as a tool

of foreign policy or its value in enhancing U.S.

technological superiority, may justify a reasonable

shortfall in cost recovery. But in a privately owned

system operating with no taxpayer subsidy, the

market alone must bear the entire burden of recovering these costs.

The market for remote sensing data from space

divides naturally into two categories: The market

for primary data provided directly from the space

segment, and the much more lucrative market

for value-added data, which represents the largest

part of the ground segment. Based on its review

of the size and nature of the market,QB OTA can

make the following observations:

● Size of the market. The true extent of the

market for primary satellite remote-sensing —

a“Commercialization of Remote Sensing, ” OTA Workshop, May

1981.

●

●

data is unknown. The domestic market consists of two kinds of users, the government

(local, State, and Federal), and the private

sector. Federal Government users generate

the largest demand in this category today.

Although the records of the EROS Data Center and the NASA Goddard Distribution Center indicate a relatively small primary market

(approximately $5.7 million per year sold by

the United States directly )49 this estimate

reflects only a portion of the true market,

which could be at least as much as 50 percent greater. Some users obtain data directly

from other users at a portion of the original

cost, or gratis (i.e., a certain amount of data

sharing occurs). so

Even if the exact distribution of original

satellite data were known, however, it would

represent only a fraction of the value of data

after they are computer-processed to provide

particular information. For example, the cost

of a CCT is currently $200 to $300. To process the data contained on a specific CCT and

to present it in usable form to the ultimate

user of the data can cost between $1,000 and

$20,000, depending on how much information is extracted from it or merged with it,

and the number of steps taken to enhance

the original information. Processing satellite

remote-sensing data thus represents a significant investment opportunity for a firm, especially one that is already capable of digitally processing remote-sensing data from aircraft. Currently, some 60 firms are known

to be capable of processing Landsat digital

data. Another 35 firms (28 United States, 7

foreign) sell computer-processing equipment

for Landsat, which range in price from

$50,000 to $500,000. Firms providing digital

processing of photographic data might also

be interested, because the basic techniques

for enhancing image data by computer are

similar for all applications, though most film

processors would lack the analytical expertise in land resources.

Nature of the market. One of the major difficulties in defining the full extent of the

——— 49’’ Status of NASA’s Landsat–D,” GAO briefing, July 1981.

‘“’’ Commercialization of Remote Sensing, ” OTA Workshop, May

1981.
62 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

market is its extremely diffuse and dispersed

condition. Each major category of user, both

foreign and domestic, has different spectral

and resolution requirements, is interested in

different geographical areas, or needs data

on a different time schedule. Table 1 summarizes the categories of major users and

their general needs for Landsat data.

In order to understand fully the data needs of

each user group, it would be necessary to analyze

in detail the records of the EROS Data Center,

the NASA Goddard Data Processing Center, and

the foreign ground stations to determine:

● Who uses the data (specific users identified

by discipline)?

Ž What regions are requested? With what frequency? Under what time constraints?

From this information and a projection of user

requirements, future market potential might be

determined. Predictions about new markets,

foreign and domestic, would have to be added

to this information to reach an estimate of the

total size of the market for Landsat data. To OTA’s

knowledge, no analysis has reached the level of

detail required for making reasoned decisions

about the potential for commercialization of the

technology,

Commercialization of Remote Sensing:

Domestic and Foreign Concerns

If commercialization of civil land remote-sensing satellite activities is to occur, the major questions before the country at this time are how and

at what speed the transition to the private sector

should be accomplished. Conversion from public

to private ownership and operation of the civilian

land remote-sensing system would affect the user

community in a variety of ways. Users perceive

that both advantages and disadvantages will result

from the change. In addition to the concerns of

users previously expressed in relation to an operational system, they have raised the following concerns specific to a commercial enterprise:

● Open data. The U.S. current [y supports and

follows the practice that any party, regardless

of nationality, may purchase Landsat data,

regardless of the country from which they

●

●

are derived. This conforms to long-standing

U.S. policy on the sale of maps prepared by

the U.S. Geological Survey. Users fear that

this practice may be discontinued. The question of whether unrestricted dissemination

of remotely sensed data violates the sovereignty of a sensed nation has occasioned vigorous debate in the U.N. and other forums

for many years; no agreement has yet been

reached. Many countries have objected on

the grounds that they do not wish important

information about indigenous mineral resources, crop conditions, or military activities

to be made public. Private operation may

heighten suspicion that such data will be

used to enable interests outside the country to gain a competitive advantage, or that

data may be sold secretly to political adversaries. These concerns will increase sharply

as new sensors improve upon the current

resolution of 80 m for the MSS aboard Landsats 2 and 3.

Resolution limits. What regulations will be

imposed concerning the limit of resolution

of the sensors? The thematic mapper on

Landsat D and D’ will be capable of 30-m

resolution. The SPOT sensors will reach resolutions down to 20 and 10 m. Will there

be restrictions on dissemination of high-resolution data from some areas? For some applications (e.g., forestry), resolutions of 1 to

5 m over small areas would be useful. Further, as other users become more accustomed to the capabilities of remote sensing,

and as their ability to handle massive

amounts of data improves and costs decrease, they are likely to find need for data

of higher resolution. As in other aspects of

satellite remote sensing, users want to be involved in the decision making process for

determining the limits to resolution. Resolution limits will also be of major international

concern.

Competition from governments. Both the

potential operators of remote-sensing systems and the value-added firms are concerned about potential competition from

governments, either the United States or

foreign entities. For example, NASA may
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 6 3

now compete with private industry when it

institutes an R&D project in a university or

government facility to process Landsat data.

These projects often result in computer software that competes directly with software

packages developed by private value-added

data processors.

● Price of data. The user community is quite

concerned about the price of primary data

from a privately owned satellite system. It

fears a dramatic increase in price if total costs

are to be recovered. 51 This is especially true

for users who require repeat data on a time

scale of weeks or months. For users whose

needs are largely for one-time data from a

particular region, the cost of a single CCT is

not as critical. It is doubtful that the price

elasticity is sufficient to allow prices to be

raised to a full cost recovery level in the next

few years,

● Continuing Federal R&D. users recognize

that neither they nor the actual operators of

land remote sensing are willing to provide

the resources to fund continuing R&D in the

private sector. Yet there are a number of

technological improvements that could be

made to the system even after Landsat D and

D’ are operational (e.g., stereo imagery,

higher resolution, greater spectral coverage).

Users therefore see the need for continued

research by the Federal Government, and for

substantial involvement by the user community in the decisions about the directions

such research should take.

• Archived data. What wiII happen to the archived data that have already been provided

by Landsats 2 and 3, the shuttle, Skylab, and

other means if the private sector assumes responsibility for U.S. satellite remote-sensing

activities? As mentioned earlier, users are

very concerned that the previous data be retained. But retaining them is very costly because the high-density digital tapes have a

limited lifetime and, therefore, must be recopied at regular intervals.

Sljoint hearings, July 1981, oP. cit.

Foreign Policy Concerns

W/hat commitments does the United States

have to foreign purchasers of Landsat data if the

entire system is in private hands? Other countries,

particularly LDCS, are well aware that the possession of remote-sensing data carries with it the

concomitant power to affect resource development. In considering transfer of Landsat or other

satellite information systems to private hands,

U.S. policy makers must consider the effects on

our relationships with other countries. In addition, there is an added foreign and domestic

problem of conflict of interest if a private corporate operator or its subsidiaries are allowed to

offer value-added services. Advance knowledge

of certain time-dependent data such as crop condition or water availability has the potential for

exploitation by the firm before others could obtain the data.

The largest market for satellite land remotesensing data might eventually be the totality of

foreign users. if foreign governments are to depend primarily on U.S. satellite data, they will,

in most cases, have to restructure any systems

they presently use for monitoring and managing

their resources. If the space and primary delivery

system were publicly held, and if a country experienced problems with the pace of data delivery, or with the continuity or quality of data, it

could then petition for redress directly through

diplomatic channels. If the space and/or reception component were in private hands, such

recourse could be only indirect. Competition

from other satellite systems could mitigate this difficulty somewhat, if the data were totally compatible. Private operators would then have considerable incentive to meet contractual agreements. However, data from other systems

(French, Japanese, or Soviet) will not be exactly

compatible with those from the Landsat MSS. Will

the U.S Government therefore regulate the sale

of remote-sensing data to other states? If so,

guidelines will have to be drawn up by an agency designated for the purpose.

Foreign users of Landsat data have purchased

ground stations and data on the understanding

that the system would be subject to possible data

gaps, change of data format, and other deficien-
64 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

cies peculiar to a system in development. According to the policy of the previous administration,

however, they could look forward to data continuity through the 1980’s. In light of the resolve

to transfer Landsat technology quickly to the

private sector, foreign users who have invested

in Landsat receiving stations and data-processing

equipment are questioning the value of our commitments. Total foreign investment in ground stations is about $60 million. Additional investments

in data-processing equipment have also been

made, as well as systems to integrate Landsat data

with other necessary data. How will these ground

stations and associated processing capabilities be

integrated with a private system?

As sensors improve, the civilian capabilities for

land remote sensing will grow uncomfortably

close to military/intelligence standards. The

satellites owned by the private sector will therefore require close supervision and oversight by

the Government to: 1) monitor their technical capabilities, and 2) prevent use of the data derived

from them inimical to the security of the United

States.

Foreign Competition

Direct commercial competition to the U.S

Landsat system will come from France’s SPOT satellites starting in 1985, at about the time Landsat

D’ is now scheduled to be launched. The SPOT

sensors will provide multispectral spatial resolution of 20 m, and panchromatic resolution of

10 m (compared with Landsat D’s TM resolution

of 30 m); in addition, SPOT will be able to

“point” its sensors to the side, allowing it to acquire stereoscopic data. Unlike the more expensive and fragile optical-mechanical sensors on

Landsat, SPOT will use relatively simple solid-state

MLA. The establishment of a semiprivate company, Spotimage, to market SPOT data and services greatly enhances its competitiveness, especially in the absence of similar organizational certainty for Landsat; pricing for the two systems is

not yet firm. Spotimage is heavily subsidized: the

French Government has funded purchase and

launch of the first satellite as well as all

preliminary R&D, and owns the overwhelming

majority of stock in the company. The first SPOT

satellite will be launched in 1984 on the French

launcher Ariane, and Spotimage is committed to

maintaining an operational system for 10 years.

In the area of ocean surveillance, the Japanese

Marine Observation Satellite (MOS) system is

scheduled to begin operations in 1985. The satellite’s sensors will be capable of observing land

masses as well; this satellite is likely to be the

precursor to an operational land remote-sensing

system (for further details, see ch. 7).

Potential Policy Initiatives for a Land RemoteSensing Satellite System

If the United States is to continue to play a role

in the operation of a satellite land remote-sensing system, what mode of operation would be

most desirable? OTA has explored a number of

options for continued operation of a Landsat-type

system (see ch. 10 for further details). Before a

decision is made to proceed with any one of

them, each option would require much more detailed study than it was possible to provide in this

assessment.

Ž Designated private entity. The Government

could ensure that its data needs were met by

private operators by licensing a single U.S. entity to operate the satellite system. This could

be done fairly quickly if a sufficient subsidy

were provided, either through direct support

for the difference between income and expenditures or through a Government guaranteed market.

This option might suffer the objection from

some foreign countries, particularly less

developed countries (LDCS), that leaving the

data distribution function in private hands

might allow corporations from developed

countries to use the resource information in

remote-sensing data unfairly for their own

profit. This objection could be circumvented

if the licensed corporation were a separately

incorporated firm prohibited from entering

other fields; it would be, essentially, a regulated monopoly.

● Continued Federal operation of the space segment only. In this scenario, the Federal

Government would continue to operate the

space segment while turning over the distribution of preprocessed data to private sector
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 6 5

operators. The rationale for such an approach

is that the private sector cannot make a profit

by operating the entire land remote-sensing

system, but the Federal Government does not

have the expertise to market satellite data effectively and promote their expanded use.

Even if the relevant market experience could

be obtained in the Government, Federal operation of an enterprise that the private sector might operate more efficiently would be

inappropriate.

This option might meet with the same objection that private ownership of the entire

system would, viz., that it gives too much

power over resources to a private corporation.

● Laissez-faire private ownership and operation.

The Government could declare that after

Landsat D & D’ reach the end of their useful

life, it will terminate operation of land remote

sensing from space (present administration

policy) and leave the field open to all participants. The data needs of the U.S. civilian

agencies would be filled by any supplier of

satellite data, including foreign companies,

and U.S. ground stations and related equipment would be sold to the highest qualified

bidder or converted to other uses. The Government might be able to protect its future

data needs by aggressive marketing of Landsat D & D’ data in the expectation that a strong

market would encourage active private sector participation in land remote sensing, or by

using suitably degraded data obtained from

reconnaissance satellites. As for the designated

private entity option, the Government could

provide the incentive for this option by

guaranteeing a market.

For the near term, however, a number of

factors make this option the least likely to result in an operational satellite remote-sensing

system :52 1) the market is likely to remain small

enough that private ventures would sustain

very high risk; 2) other, less suitable, but less

expensive data alternatives are available (if full

recovery of Landsat operating and maintenance costs is assumed); and 3) the largest

benefits to accrue are likely to be public good

‘

z

’’Commercialization of Remote Sensing,” OTA Workshop, May

1981.

●

benefits (i.e., the Government will remain the

largest purchaser of data). Therefore, this option carries with it the danger that the U.S. data

source will simply disappear if the private sector fails to find customers to cover the cost.

If U.S. companies chose not to launch a satellite, or if the data taken by U.S. satellites

were not of the sort or quality to meet the

needs of mission agencies, the Government

might be in the position of having to purchase

data from the French or the Japanese.

Broad-based cooperative arrangement. The

United States could follow a policy that would

include other nations in the ownership and

operation of satellite remote sensing by setting up an international entity patterned after

the interim INTELSAT agreement in which this

country retained majority control for a specified period.

Under this arrangement, a single management authority with multinational participation

would assume responsibility for global operation of a land remote-sensing system, including

establishing technical specification, procuring

and operating satellites, and receiving and preprocessing satellite data. Such an approach

would spread the investment risk, as well as

encourage other nations to be more aggressive

in developing their own internal markets for

satellite data. It could also facilitate the eventual development of joint ocean remote sensing systems and lead to global systems that

would join land, ocean, and weather data in

order to monitor critical environmental factors.

Perhaps the major advantages of this option

are that it might well forestall wasteful competition among national entities and that it

would provide an important forum in which

international issues could be resolved within

the confines of responsibility for an operational

system.

The major disadvantage of this approach is

that the United States would no longer control its own system, still the only one in existence. U.S. users would face strong competition for their views in an organization that included other major users of remote-sensing

data, and U.S. technology suppliers could no

longer count on assured sales. Because of sen-
66 ● Civilian Space policy and Applications

●

sitive issues involving national sovereignty and

resolution limits, the United States would have

no guarantee that the resulting system would

continue to serve U.S. needs as well as a U. S.-

operated system. If the Landsat system is discontinued, however, a multinational entity,

with its possible drawbacks, would be far better than the alternative of having to purchase

data from Spotimage.

On the other hand, a multinational system

might alleviate fears of the less developed nations that the industrialized nations will use

their superior technology to exploit the resources of the LDCS. By buying shares in a

multinational system, the LDCS would have

the same access to data as any other country

in the system.

Continued Federal ownership. Although current policy is to transfer Landsat to private

ownership, it would still be possible to reverse

that decision and make a thoroughgoing commitment to a system owned and managed by

the Federal Government. Meteorological satellites, which, like Landsat, provide data of

benefit to the generaI public, have always

been owned and managed by the Government. Unlike satellite communications, which

is already fully commercialized, and materials

processing in space, which, if successful at all,

seems particularly appropriate for privatesector operation, satellite remote sensing

could certainly be retained as a Government

system on the grounds that the good it provides is primarily public. At the present time,

about 50 percent of the data sold is purchased

by Government agencies. The Government,

in effect, makes the market.

This comes about because most of the needs

for data are for the management of renewable

natural resources (e.g., agriculture, forestry,

range lands). Even for those resources owned

by the private sector, Federal and State government agencies set policies, quotas, and price

supports on a regional basis that direct and

constrain the management of these resources.

Few private operators own enough land to find

the expense of using Landsat data worthwhile,

but the government agencies find the use of

Landsat data highly cost effective for their functions (see the Bureau of Land Management

and Foreign Agricultural Services case studies

in apps. B and C).

As the last part of this section on land remote

sensing argues, the data needs of the developers

of nonreusable resources are large. However,

even though the extractive industry finds Landsat data highly useful, its data needs will remain

less than those of the managers of renewable

resources simply because the latter require repetitive data. Therefore, in the Unites States, the

majority user of data from a Landsat system is likely to remain the Federal and State Governments.

Potential of Land Remote-Sensing Data

and the U.S. Economy

There is no doubt that satellite land remotesensing data are useful for inventorying and

managing the world’s renewable and nonrenewable natural resources. Table 1 lists the areas in

which satellite data are already being used in costeffective ways for these purposes. Appendixes B

and C illustrate the use two Federal agencies

make of Landsat data. As emphasized above in

the section on the data market, however, the

variety of users and their different data needs,

coupled with slow technical advancement and

considerable uncertainty about the status of the

Landsat system have acted to inhibit the market

that many users53 insist is there to be tapped.

Continuing to develop land remote sensing

thus represents a certain economic risk for the

Government or the private sector. If the market

cannot sustain the investment, the losses could

be great. However, the Government and private

industry have already committed more than $1

billion to the Landsat venture. To fail to make the

best use of these sunk costs represents a considerable loss as well. As the need to manage

global resources efficiently and inexpensively

grows with the expansion of the population, the

need for a land remote sensing system increases

proportionally. The use of Landsat data by Costa

Rica is a case in point. For that country, use of

Landsat data is not only the least expensive and

—

5J’’Analysis of the Private Market for Landsat Products and Applacations, ” report by OAO Corp. for NASA contract No.

NASW3358, 1981.
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 6 7

the most efficient way to monitor the rate of

depletion of its forests, it seems to be the only

means for meeting the problem in time. 54

As large-scale forestry management methods

improve, the worth of satellite-derived data will

likely increase for domestic uses as well. The

same is likely to be true for the other categories

of table 1. However, perhaps the most critical

area for the U.S. economy is in nonrenewable

resources such as coal, oil, gas, and minerals.

Even at the slower rates of energy consumption

increase we have recently experienced, 55 our

dependence on foreign petroleum sources has

and will continue to be strong, primarily because

our own recovery rate for oil will continue to

decrease in the future.56 Greatly increased exploration efforts will be needed to keep pace with

the loss of U.S. reserves. Landsat data now play

an important role in energy and minerals exploration, especially in regions where vast land areas

must be evaluated. However, as far as the extractive resources industry is concerned, the use of

Landsat data is still in its early development

stages. 57 In spite of this fact, it is the largest single

private purchaser of Landsat data. The extractive

industry has now bought data covering from 10

million to 15 million square miles of the Earth’s

54’’ Design of a Natural Resources Inventory and Information

System for Costa Rica,” June 1979, op. cit.

SsWeekly petroleum Status Report, U.S. Department of Energy,

Energy Information Administration, Mar. 5, 1982.

Sbu.!j. Congress, office of Technology Assessment, “world petroleum Availability, 1980-2000,” technical memorandum, October

1980, OTA-TM-E-5.

57’’ Satellite Remote Sensing Data–An Unrealized Potential for

the Earth Science Community,” the Geosat Committee, Inc., 1977.

land surface. This is in spite of the fact that the

current system lacks stereoscopic capabilities, nor

does it gather the most appropriate spectral data

for this industry’s use.sG Though it is difficult to

assign a precise worth to the use of satellite data,

because the process of exploitation involves a

variety of techniques and often takes many years

to achieve success, those who use the data are

convinced of its usefulness and argue that if the

present capabilities were increased, their task

would be greatly simplified. 59 The support of an

operational surveillance system tailored to mineral resources does not appear to be outside the

financial capability of a consortium of resource

companies, though there would be problems of

competition between members of such a consortium to be solved.

The French SPOT system offers the sort of significant improvement in data capabilities that

would be most useful to the exploration industry.

However, American industry is reluctant to be

forced to rely on foreign sources for their data,

since it is unclear to what data they may or may

not have access. Similar concerns apply to minerals exploration in this country and abroad. The

question of what to do with the U.S. land remotesensing system is a critical one for the future of

the management and development of U.S. natural resources. Whatever is decided, the question should be resolved with dispatch.

Sglbid.

‘

g

’’ Department of the Interior Position Paper on the Private Sector Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities,” U.S. Geological Survey, 1981.

MATERIALS PROCESSING IN SPACE (MPS)

Issue 6: What Are the Technological and

Commercial Prospects for MPS?

The primary motivation for MPS research is to

use the microgravity environment unique to

space for scientific and commercial applications.

process variables such as temperature, composition, and fluid flow may be controlled far better

in an environment of microgravity. As a result,

some materials can be manufactured in space

with greater precision and fewer defects; others,

which cannot be made at all on Earth, may

become possible for the first time. MPS looks particularly promising for pharmaceuticals, electronic devices, optical equipment, and metal

alloysobo

60WVjA, kfaterja/S Processing in Space: Early Experiments, Washington, D. C., 1980.
68 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The U.S. civilian program has so far conducted

rather limited MPS experimentation in space, and

the results have been inconclusive.GO if there are

great days ahead for MPS, they must be preceded

by years of research and major improvements in

orbiting facilities.

Despite the need for further basic research,

there may well be near-term opportunities for

commercializing particular, carefully chosen

technologies. Under a Joint Endeavor Agreement

with NASA, the McDonneil Douglas Aeronautics

Co., (working with Ortho Pharmaceutical) and

the GTI Corp. are both moving vigorously ahead

on R&D projects. Several other major corporations, including John Deere, TRW, INCO, and

DuPont, have made significant commitments to

early exploratory R&D. If MPS is found to be well

suited to commercialization, several issues arise

with regard to how and when it can be taken over

by the private sector and by what means the U.S.

Government can facilitate the transition.

Requirements for the Commercialization of

MPS Technology

The space processing experiments that have

been conducted so far have focused on identifying potential new processes and products.

Because the research conducted to date has been

basic, with subsequent commercial applications

uncertain, there has been little private investment

in this area. Private industry will invest its risk

capital only if it is reasonably confident that the

five conditions listed below are met.

1. There is a reasonable chance that research efforts will result in a commercially viable product or process.

A firm seeking investment opportunities must

be reasonably certain that a proposed product

or process innovation can be developed in a

given time, at an affordable cost, and that there

is a market capable of supporting a price that provides an adequate return on investment. The twin

factors of time and cost are extremely important

to a firm, especially during periods of economic

instability. Projects that require large initial investment and take a long time to show a return usual61The National Research council, /vfateria/s Processing in space,

Washington, D. C., 1978, p. 5.

Iy do not compete well for corporate capital. Projects that stimulate further corporate investment

as they begin to show promising returns are much

more attractive; however, there are currently few

such opportunities in the MPS area. In order to

make a reasonable projection as to a project’s

possible rate of return on investment, a firm must

have a clear view of the relevant market. When

dealing with a new technology without a welldefined market, the firm’s projections become

more suspect, so that its investment in that

technology would be at greater risk. The combined burden of developing new markets simultaneously with new technology may inhibit investment in MPS. It should be noted, however,

that some MPS technologies (e.g., electrophoretic

processing) will be directed toward well-defined

Earth markets (e.g., pharmaceuticals). In these instances, the decision to invest in MPS technology

may be preceded by standard market analyses.

2. The benefits of processing in space will

be substantially greater than those of

processing on the ground.

The MPS experimentation conducted to date

indicates that many innovative uses of the space

environment are possible. From a commercial

perspective, however, the question is not what

projects are technically possible, but rather which

are economically viable. For example, it has been

claimed that if semiconductor electronic crystals

were grown in space, they would be purer, with

fewer imperfections, and would therefore perform better. However, a recent study by the National Research Council has found that the quality

of the preprocessed material is not the limiting

consideration for most devices presently manufactured.G t Therefore, though space-based manufacture of these devices may offer certain improvements, it is not clear that the benefits of the

improvements outweigh the costs of producing

them.

3. The market for the product will not be

replaced by advances in Earth-based

production.

It is possible that improvements in Earth-based

technology may make certain processing techGzlbid., p. 38.
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 6 9

niques possible that previously could only be

done in space. Evidence for this view is provided

by recent advances in the manufacture of glass

products through the use of acoustic levitation,

and by the enlargement of latex polymers by

means of new chemical tech niques.G3 To the extent that such improvements confer some of the

advantages of space-based processing without the

high costs of in-space production, there is less

incentive to’invest resources in expensive space

technology.

4 . intellectual property rights in space technology must be assured.

Though NASA has given assurance that industry

will retain the rights to patents and trade secrets

developed while working with NASA, such assurances are in the form of policy and regulations,

not law. The present law vests the ownership of

intellectual property developed under contract

with NASA in the Government, but allows the

Administrator to waive such rights. NASA has

been consistent in its policy of not claiming an

interest in such rights, but the specter of patent

and trade secret loss, either through a change in

policy or as a result of a legal challenge by third

parties, still remains.

There is current congressional interest in new

patent legislation that would grant greater rights

to private developers working under Government

contract.b5 Present law, however, is more liberal

with small business, universities, and nonprofit

firms than with large contractors. The status of

proprietary information and trade secrets is consistently more uncertain.

5. National commitment must be certain.

Industry’s planning is hindered by the fact that

all space research depends on a Federal funding

commitment to NASA, but the level of that commitment remains uncertain. Decreases in NASA’s

appropriations will cause delays in the flight

testing of space technology. Such delays are costly, and in some circumstances could mean, at the

corporate level, the difference between a sucbj/ndustry Week, Mar. 3, 1980, p. 90.

MNAS Act 1958, see 305 (a); 42 USC 2457.

bSGerald J. Mossinghoff, “intellectual Property Right in Space

Utilization, ” address before the ALI-ABA Conference, “Doing Business in Space,” Washington, D. C., Nov. 12-14, 1981.

cessful project and a failure (as measured by

dollar-return). Should MPS technology appear to

offer a commercially viable product, some type

of long-term, in-orbit facility may be necessary

to assure the continuing supply of specific quantities of the product. At present, NASA cannot

provide credible assurance that such a facility will

be provided.

Government Incentives for MPS Research

In chapter 5, NASA’s MPS activities are described. What follows is a discussion of the programs NASA has initiated to enlist commercial

support in moving MPS toward operational status.

The ultimate goals of NASA’s MPS program are

to:66

●

●

●

perform research to improve industrial technology or to develop new products;

prepare research quantities of space products for comparison with Earth-based products; and

encourage the production of commercially

viable materials.

In hope of commercializing MPS, NASA has established three levels of working relationships

with the private sector. On all three levels, the

relationships are agreements between NASA and

its partners to cooperate in a defined area. Each

agrees to accomplish specific tasks and to provide its own funding. The grading of these relationships marks the degree of the signatories’

commitments.

For companies interested in the application of

microgravity technology, but not ready to commit themselves to a specific space flight experiment or venture, the Technical Exchange Agreement (TEA) has been developed. Under a TEA,

NASA and a company agree to exchange technical information and to cooperated in the conduct and analysis of continuing ground-based

research programs. In this agreement, a firm can

familiarize itself, at minimal expense, with

microgravity technology and its potential applicability to a product line. Under the TEA, the

private company funds its own participation and

— .- —

bbRobert A. Frosch, “NASA Guidelines Regarding Early Usage of

Space for Industrial Purposes, ” NASA Internal Document, June 25,

1979.
70 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

obtains direct access to and results from NASA’s

facilities and research; in return, NASA gains the

support and expertise of the company’s research

capability.

In an Industrial Guest Investigators Agreement

(IGIA), NASA and industry share sufficient mutual

scientific interest that a company arranges for one

of its scientists to collaborate (at company expense) with a NASA-sponsored principal investigator on a space flight MPS experiment. Once

the parties agree to the IGI’s contribution to the

objectives of the experiment, he becomes a

member of the investigating team, thus adding

industrial expertise and insight to the experiment.

The joint Endeavor Agreement (JEA) is a

cooperative arrangement in which a private sector offeror and NASA share common program objectives, program responsibilities, and financial

risk. The objective of a JEA is to encourage early

private sector investment in MPS by sharing in

the cost and risk of initial space ventures and to

determine the ability of MPS to meet needs of

the marketplace. A JEA is a legal agreement between equal partners; it does not initiate procurement. Under a JEA, NASA and its partner exchange no funds. An offeror from the private sector selects an experiment and/or a technology

demonstration in compliance with NASA’s objectives for its MPS program, conducts the

necessary ground investigation, and develops

flight hardware at company expense.

As incentive for a JEA investment, NASA agrees

to provide transportation on the shuttle, provided

that the project meets certain basic criteria, such

as technical merit, contribution to innovation,

and acceptable business arrangements. As a further incentive, the participant is allowed to retain certain proprietary rights to the results, particularly the proprietary information that would

yield a competitive edge in marketing products

based on the MPS flight data. NASA agrees not

to enter into a JEA with a second potential source

to investigate a similar space-based process.

NASA also receives sufficient flight data to

evaluate the significance of the results, and can

require as part of the JEA that any promising

results be applied commercially on a timely basis;

if in NASA’s judgment the participant does not

commercialize the results within a reasonable

time, NASA is allowed to publish the research

findings.

By establishing legal and managerial mechanisms by which the cost and risk of early commercial ventures can be shared, “constructive

partnerships” have been formed between the

Government and the private sector. A number

of cooperative agreements are in various stages

of discussion. Agreements now in force, and

those that have been publicly disclosed are:hz

●

●

●

●

A TEA was signed in 1981 with Deere& Co.,

to study the effects of microgravity on solidification of metals. More recently, TEAs have

been signed with INCO and DuPont.

An IGI was appointed in 1980 by TRW to

study directional solidification.

Signed in January 1980, the first JEA pairs

NASA with McDonnell Douglas. The process

to be investigated is continuous flow electrophoresis (CFE), in which materials in solution are separated by subjecting them to an

electrical field as they flow continuously

through a chamber. The CFE experiment, to

be flown in the shuttle, is designed to demonstrate the applicability of the process to

the production of marketable quantities of

pharmaceutical products. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. has joined McDonnell

Douglas as a partner in this MPS business

venture.

GTI Corp. signed the second NASA JEA in

January 1982. Under this agreement, NASA

will fly a multiple microexperiment flight

package (MMFP) to be developed for GTI by

a third party. The MMFP will be a furnace

with multiple subenclosures designed to perform and control several separate experiments in solidification, GTI’s role in this

JEA is to serve as a broker between NASA

and potential investors, customers, inventors, and hardware manufacturers.

How Business Sees NASA

Industry’s respect for NASA’s accomplishments

and technical talent is high. However, doing

business with NASA is complex, involving par67R, L. Brown, and L. K. Zoner, “Avenues and Incentives for Commercial Use of a Low-G Environment, ” MPS Projects Office, Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama, undated.
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 7 1

ticular NASA policies and general Government

policies. Uncertainty about NASA’s level of funding, short- or long-term, makes for an unstable environment for private investment. To date, industry has not been assured that NASA will have

enough funding to continue development of MPS

systems beyond the early research stage. If unable

to rely on NASA for continued basic development

of new technology, industry sees no long-term

future for MPS (whatever the temporary success

of McDonnell Douglas and CT!).

Additionally, industry not involved in MPS generally finds NASA’s JEAs to be in various ways

unrealistic. Some industry observers read NASA

as (in order to free itself to do little other than

basic R&D) seeking partners who can do everything—marketing, financing, hardware development, etc NASA’s agreement with GTI is a bold

step toward meeting this objection. Through the

guest investigator, technical exchange, and joint

endeavor process, individual companies, concentrating on discrete tasks, can more easily enter

the MPS field.

Businesses that have considered some commercial activity in space have also expressed concern over the potential loss of intellectual property rights (e.g., patent, trade secret, and industrial

techniques). There are several reasons for this

concern: 1 ) should such intellectual property

become a matter of “Government record,” competitors might be able to obtain this information

through the Freedom of Information Act, 2) the

1958 NAS Act provision which states that NASA

shall “provide for the widest practical and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its activities, “ is at odds with the industry’s

desire to maintain the secrecy of R&D directed

to potentially valuable products; and 3) section

305 of the NAS Act vests in the United States, subject to the discretion of the NASA Administrator,

the right to any invention “made in the performance of any work under any contract” with

NASA. Though NASA’s Administrators have consistently waived the Government’s rights under

the act, industry’s concerns remain.

——

‘–MOTA workshop, Materials Processing in Space, May 1981.

‘Possible New Institutional Frameworks

Though NASA is attempting to encourage private-sector interest in MPS through its TEAs, IGIs,

and JEAs, a different institutional framework may

eventually be needed, if the private sector is to

be brought into MPS in a major way. To date,

discussion has centered around three possible

structures: an organization like COMSAT, a space

industrialization corporation, and a possible consortium of industries. No consensus on this question has yet emerged.

The COMSAT Model. In this scenario, a private

corporation, established by legislative action, but

financed through the issuance of capital stock,

would be given a monopoly in the provision of

processing facilities in space. The Government

would retain some degree of internal control over

the organization by holding a number of positions on the board of directors, by regulating

competition in the procurement of equipment

and services and by involvement in the ratemaking process.

The purpose of such a corporation would be

to supply a space platform with various facilities

and services that users could rent. The extent of

use by NASA, as a customer, and the degree of

Government R&D performed on such a platform

would be matters of policy to be decided at some

point in the future.

A structure like COMSAT’S has certain advantages. First of all, even with the substantial interest

generated in MPS over the past 2 years, private

corporations might not wish individually to provide all the services needed to support separate

processing facilities. Secondly, despite the obvious differences between communications and

materials processing, one can envision an important similarity in the ways in which they might

be conducted in space. A private concern might

well operate a space platform with various facilities and services that users could rent. So described, such a platform could as well be used

for materials processing as for communications.

In neither case does the operator of the platform

concern itself with the use to which its rented

facilities are put. In both cases the operator might

be expected to put some of these facilities to its

own use.

94-915 0 - 82 - 6
72 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The biggest obstacle to the creation of a federally chartered structure is that the basic science on

which MPS would be founded is insufficient for

marketable quantities of products to appear in

the near term. It is the view of ESA, for example,

that at least 10 more years of basic science are

needed before serious consideration of commercializing MPS can be given.69 ESA, therefore, considers MPS a scientific rather than an applications

program.

Two objections to the federally chartered structure have surfaced. One is that, at its founding,

COMSAT was supported by significant expertise

already existing in corporations and Government

agencies. No such MPS expertise now exists. The

other is that COMSAT entered an established and

revenue-producing market, whereas a similar

MPS corporation would be entering an unknown

market. In any case, objections to the COMSAT

model for MPS that are founded on various insufficiencies (whether of basic science, of relevant expertise, or of ready markets for products)

argue for no more than a delay in the time when

such a corporation might be chartered.

Although no organizations are now processing

materials in space, to the extent that processes

to be implemented in an MPS program are extensions of current terrestrial processes, relevant

expertise exists in abundance. ’o Furthermore, to

the extent that MPS products may improve the

quality of similar terrestrial products by one or

more orders of magnitude, marketability for some

of them appears high.

The Space Industrialization Corporation (SIC)

Introduced primarily as a means to provoke

public discussion, the Space Industrialization Act

of 1979 (H. R. 2337) called for:71

Establishment of a Space Industrialization Corporation to provide a means for financing the development of new products, processes, and industries using the properties of the space environment.

bgsee Ch. 7, p. 179.

ZOOTA Workshop, Material Processing in Space, May 1981.

zlThe Space Industrialization Act of 1979, Hearings on H.R. 2337,

before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of

the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st sess.

H.R. 2337 was introduced to address the problems of the private sector in developing space

processing capabilities and to provide a thorough

and orderly examination of the means to reduce

the business venture risk of using space for commercial purposes.

If SIC were established, it would function essentially as an investment bank, providing capital

through direct equity investments, loans, and

loan guaranties. The problems most often cited

by those opposing SIC in its present form are that

such an organization is premature and that it may

interfere with the activities of NASA.72

Some fear that given our limited knowledge

of MPS science and engineering, SIC might encourage technically and economically unsound

projects, which could have a negative impact on

the evolution of space industrialization. They also

argue that if companies are not required to put

up their own money, they will take excessive risks

and give projects inadequate management attention.

A different set of concerns regarding the SIC

center around how this organization would affect NASA’s continuing activities. NASA has been

given a broad mandate to serve as a research and

development center for U.S. space technology.

SIC, as described above, would function primarily

as an investment bank. Viewed in the abstract,

these two entities would appear not to interfere

mutually, but to be perfectly compatible. What

many fear, however, is that, because space industrialization technology and its commercial applications are yet unproved, SIC could do little

more than supply funds for basic R&D. If this

were the case, then instead of complementing

NASA, SIC would act as a competitor.

INDUSTRY CONSORTIUM

One way to encourage high-risk, expensive

MPS research is to allow firms jointly to fund these

activities. By allowing the sharing of key resources

such as facilities, personnel and capital funds, the

cost and the risk of space-based innovation would

be reduced. A consortium of these firms-would

also have considerable market strength because

it could share the combined expertise of its

zzlbid., testimony of Robert A. Frosch, p. 78.
Ch. 3—Issues and Findings ● 7 3

members, which normally address differing customer communities or markets.

The structure of such a consortium would have

to be carefully drawn so as not to be in violation

of U.S. antitrust laws.73 Simply stated, these laws

are designed to prevent monopolistic market

structures and/or collusion between competitors

leading to price fixing and market or customer

allocation. It is possible that a consortium as

described above could violate both of these

tenets.

Because of the time and expense involved in

most antitrust litigation, firms tend to be cautious

when dealing with their competitors. it is unlikely

that in the absence of a well-articulated Government policy condoning such conduct that potentially interested firms would form such a consortium. In 1980, however, the Justice Department

issued guidelines “clarifying” its position on

cooperative ventures: as long as these ventures

are open to all prospective participants and the

research they undertake is fundamental and long

range, the Department will probably not object.74

More than a score of the largest U.S. computer

manufacturers and their semiconductor suppliers

are forming just such a research consortium

under the Semiconductor industries Association. 75

International Competition in MPS

The European states and the Japanese agree

that MPS has great long-term promise, and

they support extensive basic research preparatory

to possible commercial ventures. The ESA-funded

Spacelab designed to be flown on the shuttle will

provide facilities for such MPS experiments.

The Germans, who are the prime contractors

on Spacelab, are particularly interested in MPS

and plan an extensive combination of scientific

and industrial projects, with some hope of significant near-term results.7b The French have fewer

near-term activities, but are hoping for extensive

future use of the Ariane launcher to orbit processing facilities for scientific and industrial uses.77

The Japanese program is similar to that of the

Germans.78 The Japanese plan to conduct MPS

studies aboard Spacelab, and are using an extensive sounding rocket program to gain preliminary

knowledge. The Japanese expect that in the long

term at least some MPS work will result in the

development of marketable products.

Far more extensive than any MPS efforts in the

West, the Soviet MPS program has, so far as can

be ascertained, been geared to manufacturing

process research, much of which extends to

studies of terrestrial production techniques.79

Because there is no private sector to participate

in the Soviet space program, and perforce, no

concern for commercialization, any inference

from Soviet experience in MPS to Western attempts to commercialize would be risky. Soviet

MPS experiments, which have been conducted

aboard the Salyut 6 manned orbital lab, appear

likely to continue at a high rate during the next

few years.

Perhaps the best lesson to be drawn from this

cursory review of the activities of other nations

is that the United States has a variety of paths it

may follow in the development of MPS technology. If it is to establish and sustain a successful,

long-term MPS program, basic research must

surely go forward. The speed of this research and

the extent of private sector involvement are matters of policy to be decided in the context of our

overall space goals.

A key question for the near future is the extent

of international cooperation in MPS basic research. U.S.-European collaboration on SpaceIab makes it possible to conduct joint efforts at

the basic science level, provided competitive

strains are not too great.

mlj. s. Department of justice, Antitrust Guide Concerning Research joint Ventures, November 1980.

741bid.

‘sTom Alexander, “The Right Remedy for R&D Lag,” Fortune,

Jan. 25, 1982.

%See ch, 7, pp. 192-193.

Tzsee ch. 7, pp. 190-191.

TaSee ch. 7, pp. 201-202.

Tvsee ch. 7, p, 207.
74 . Civilan Space Policy and Applications

SPACE TRANSPORTATION

Issue 7: What are the Major Barriers

to Commercialization of

Space Transportation Facilities

and Services?

Though the shuttle opens the door to relatively

inexpensive access to space, it makes the problem of transferring the U.S. civilian space transportation capability to the private sector more

complex. Because the shuttle is new, its track

record is insufficient to allow corporations to

assess its long-term expenses and risks. Full commercialization of expendable launch vehicles

(ELVS), however, is possible now. But whether

a private launch service using ELVS could offer

a price competitive with the technologically

superior shuttle or the ESA-subsidized Ariane remains an open question. Therefore, the near-term

prospects for commercializing U.S. space transportation are unclear, and the long-term prospects ride with the shuttle. In any case, the single

major impediment to commercialization of U.S.

launch systems is the absence of a comprehensive Government policy that favors and encourages the participation of the private sector.

The Background

In the United States the Federal Government

has heretofore provided launch vehicles and

launch services for all users. While DOD generally launches its own spacecraft, NASA has provided these services for its own missions and, on

a reimbursable basis, for other U.S. Government

users, foreign governments, and private entities.

(NASA’s policy on reimbursement seeks, in general, to recover incremental, out-of-pocket costs

only, not capital already invested.) Of the roughly

20 to 30 U.S. launches per year over the last 10

years, about one-third were DOD’s, one-third

were NASA’s own spacecraft, and the remaining third were for other United States or foreign

government users and private entities. NASA’s

mission model80 for the space transportation

system (STS) for the next 10 years or so shows

~“Final Flight Manifest for Space Shuttle,” Aerospace ~ai/y, Dec.

18, 1981, pp. 253-257.

about the same ratio. A recent study by the

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), however, has projected a significant additional need for total launches, primarily for commercial communications satellites.8

1

Until 1981, all U.S. experience had been with

ELVS. Until recently, civilian ELVS were to be

phased out by the mid-1980s, and the sole U.S.

launch capability was to be the NASA STS, represented primarily by the shuttle and its

associated upper stage components. However,

delays and uncertainties in the shuttle program

have caused NASA to reexamine this policy. Proponents of retaining ELVS argue that the number

of launches that will be needed will exceed the

capacity of the shuttle, leaving the United States

without sufficient launch capacity if ELVS are

phased out.

Private industry has not generally marketed

launch hardware or services directly to customers. ELVS are sold to NASA, which then charges

the customer. Industry has, of course, built the

launch vehicles under Government contract and

to a degree, lesser (for NASA) or greater (for

DOD), provided contracted-for launch services

at Government launch facilities. However, NASA

has remained responsible for providing launch

facilities and support services to all users. Already,

NASA is facing its first competition. Arianespace,

a private French corporation with substantial

Government ownership, has begun selling

launches after a successful development program. Certain private corporations, such as Space

Services, Inc., of the United States, hope to offer

launch vehicles and services within a few years.

An investment banking firm, William Sword, Inc.,

has offered to fund a fifth shuttle orbiter in return

for exclusive rights to market commercial payloads. Already, small military rockets and satellite

kick stages have been commercialized, and one

of the shuttle upper stages, the SSUS-D, is being

El American institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, projection

of non-Federal Demand for Space Transportation Services Through

2000, Jan. 19, 1981,

s2AviatjOn week arid $pace Technology, “Firm Sets Down-Payment for Buy of Space Shuttle,” Jan. 18, 1982.
Ch, 3—issues and Findings ● 7 5

sold by the manufacturer (McDonnell Douglas)

directly to the end user rather than to NASA.

Military and Civilian Use of the Shuttle

DOD is the only other U.S. launch agency,

handling many of its own launches. How will

DOD share the shuttle with civilian users? DOD

has the right to preempt civilian flights in case

of need. How will that right and its other special

requirements affect hardware and launch costs?

Generally speaking, OTA has not found any of

these concerns to be major impediments to civilian use of the shuttle—provided that the projected launch schedule of one flight every 2 or

3 weeks is attained. Once this planned flexibility of the shuttle system has been realized, a DOD

preemption of a shuttle flight would probably

have little adverse affect on civilian needs, most

of which are not time-sensitive over periods of

a few weeks. For now, it is essential that at least

one line of ELVS be retained, both to provide additional capacity and to back-up the shuttle, In

addition, it may be prudent to continue development of expendable launch vehicle technology

for certain payloads (see ch. 10).

The questions of DOD’s share and requirements in STS decisions are mostly settled, but retain historical interest. The shuttle was planned

to be a “national” program; i.e., it would serve

all customary U.S. launch needs for payloads that

were in the shuttle range. Specifically, this implied that NASA and DOD would need to define

a common, acceptable payload bay size, operating characteristics, and compatible subsystems.

The major premise was that such a substantial

investment in a new technological capability

could not reasonably be made unless it could

serve the broadest set of national needs. The initial concept included the possibility that DOD

would assume some degree of responsibility to

fund development of the shuttIe. This was subsequently modified in view of DOD’s rather substantial budgets already in existence for other

weapons systems and space developments; the

shuttle was included in NASA’s budget, though,

of course, support for the program rested on congressional recognition of its military uses. It was

agreed that DOD’s direct share of the program

development costs would be limited to two items:

a west coast launch site for the shuttle, and

development of an interim upper stage (I US) for

boosting shuttle payloads into higher orbits.

The resulting agreement gave NASA the responsibility to purchase and operate the STS for

everyone. DOD would have missions solely for

its use, but NASA would own and operate the

launch capability equitably for all users. Certain

DOD requirements did drive initial shuttle costs

higher than the estimates of NASA’s original proposal, but most requirements also resulted in

greater, if more costly, capabilities. As DOD has

generated additional requirements (for its own

mission control center for example), the Department has itself bought these capabilities. This division of responsibility is expected to hold henceforth. NASA’s pricing policy for the shuttle remains problematic, especially in view of the 73

percent increase in the projected average cost

of a standard mission (from $16.1 million in June

1976 to $27.9 million as of September 1980).

According to a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) study, NASA is “locked into a pricing policy that encourages space transportation

system use at NASA’s expense and at the expense

of the space science, applications, and aeronautics programs. GAO believes DOD and other

government agencies should bear a greater share

of the shuttle’s early years operations costs . . .“13

3

The division of the U.S. space program into

civilian and military components has been a

valuable tool of foreign policy. DOD’s involvement with and ultimate use of the shuttle have

raised the issue of the possible militarization of

the entire U.S. space program, a possibility that

is unsettling to other nations, especially the third

world and the Soviet Union. The United States

has assured other nations that the programs will

remain separate, but their concerns are likely to

remain until the passage of time and experience

with the shuttle show whether or not the civilian

program remains unmilitarized.

83 General Accounting offiCf?, “NASA Must Reconsider Operations Pricing Policy to Components for Cost Growth of the Space

Transportation Systems, ” Feb. 23, 1982, pp. ii-iii.
76 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Foreign Competition in Space Transportation

Currently, the United States has no policy regarding foreign competition in space transportation. Though the Soviet Union has had a reliable

launch capability for 25 years and has launched

satellites for several other countries, it does not

sell launches. However, commercial competition

from the ESA’S Ariane ELV is now a reality. The

Ariane (which is approximately twice the size of

the U.S. Delta) has recently completed a successful series of test flights, and the Europeans

are now selling space on future launches. Already

several U.S. telecommunications companies have

switched from NASA launches to Ariane, and

more such decisions can be expected because

fewer shuttle opportunities are available and U.S.

ELVS have become more expensive. The Ariane’s

attractiveness is enhanced by the creation of

Arianespace to market the Ariane and provide

launch services. Arianespace, in conjunction with

European banks, is offering customers belowmarket financing and other financial incentives

that compare favorably to present U.S. pricing

procedures. Arianespace plans initially for five to

six launches per year, rising to 10 per year in the

mid-l 980s.

The Japanese space agency, NASDA, is currently building and operating modified Delta launchers, designated N-1 and N-11, built under license

from McDonnell Douglas. At present the Japanese are prohibited from selling launch services

to third parties without U.S. permission; development of a completely Japanese launcher is

planned but is not likely to be completed before

the end of the decade.

Regulatory Needs

There is now no clarity with regard to regulation of private launches from the United States,

largely because there is no single Federal authority for overseeing private space activities from

launch to flight termination. The absence of such

authority creates a number of problems. First, although certain agencies (FAA, FCC) exercise limited authority over private rocket launches, the

absence of clear Government policy and procedures creates confusion as to who has the authority to authorize a private launch. Second, existing

Federal launch centers, because of launch conflicts and space limitations, may not be sufficient

to meet the future demands of private spaceflight

operations. The proper role of Government in the

construction, operation, and regulation of new

commercial launch sites has yet to be addressed.

Indeed, the issue is so recent that the Federal

agencies that have interest or jurisdiction have

just begun to address it. Finally, it may be prudent to devise some type of mandatory insurance

scheme to indemnify the Government and protect the general populace from the possibility of

accidents resulting from private launches.

Once a comprehensive regulatory scheme is

adopted and a clear Government policy articulated, the institutional risks inherent in

operating a private launch system will be

diminished, and greater private sector participation may occur.

Prospects for Commercialization

Though the complete transfer of shuttle operations to the private sector does not seem likely

in the near future, there is no reason why the

private sector could not eventually supply this

service. As technical experience is gained, the

reliability of shuttle systems proved, and information is obtained concerning the real costs of

operating the shuttle, the commercial potential

of this system will also begin to be understood.

If the transfer of the shuttle to the private sector

is determined to be in the national interest, firm

Government policies to this effect must be articulated and, where necessary, supported by financial incentives.

No private sector firm has yet expressed interest

in operating the entire shuttle system (i.e., orbiters

and related launch hardware, and ground support and maintenance facilities), but there has

been some interest in the operation or ownership of discrete parts of the launch service. Currently there are three areas where private sector

involvement may become important:

Tracking, telemetry and control.–ln 1979

COMSAT established the first commercial

launch control facility that offered services

previously only provided by NASA. As space

activities become more common, oppor-
Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 7 7

●

●

tunities for the private sector to provide these

services will increase.

Shuttle refurbishment.–currently, NASA

contracts with more than 25 private firms to

refurbish the orbiter between flights. NASA

has recently decided to find one firm to act

as a manager for the entire process.

Orbiter ownership.–As mentioned above,

a U.S. investment banking firm announced

its interest in purchasing the fifth orbiter, with

the provision that NASA would continue to

operate the vehicle but that its payload

capacity would be marketed by the private

owner. Should this venture prove to be successful, the likelihood that other orbiters will

be privately owned will be greatly increased.

Full commercialization of ELVS, however, is

possible now. There are few if any unknowns surrounding their operation. The market for

launches is steadily growing: though it is not large

enough to support all the expendable lines

(Titans, Atlas-Centaurs, Deltas, etc.), it could certainly support one of them. Because of various

uncertainties, the aerospace companies have not

shown much interest in dealing directly with any

group backing private launch services. A possibility here would be the mediation of a third-party

broker, A further possibility might be the formation of a Government-chartered private corporation to provide launch services, leasing facilities

at Kennedy Space Center. Rapid commercialization of U.S. ELVS would provide immediate advantages: competition for the Ariane, added incentive to NASA to bring the costs of shuttle

operations down, and a backup system for the

shuttle should it meet unexpected problems.
Chapter 4

DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM

*
Page

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Early Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Major Characteristics of the Space Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Open and Public Nature of the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Use of industry and University Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Public Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

International Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Major Milestones in Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

The International Geophysical Year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as Amended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

The Apollo Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

INTELSAT/COMSAT Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Weather Satellite Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. W. . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Scientific Research and Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Post-Apollo Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Earth Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Space Task Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

The Shuttle Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Communications R&D Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

President’s Space Policy Statement of 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

NSC Policy Review Committee (Space) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Chapter 4

DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM

— —

INTRODUCTION

Nearly a quarter century after Explorer I and

the U.S. entry into the space age, the space shuttle now presents the Nation with new and expanded opportunities for space operations. In the

coming months and years, we will learn to operate and use the new capabilities of this system.

It is indeed ironic that, at this time of brave new

beginnings, the Nation again faces important

questions about the future of the civilian space

program.

At the inception of the space program, the

United States perceived Soviet initiatives in space

as political, military, and technological threats.

Having seen space as a field in which to compete, the United States directed its space program

toward the primary objective of exceeding Soviet

achievements. With the passage of time, and the

great success of Apollo, Soviet competition no

longer challenges the United States politically. But

as the Soviet challenge has vanished, so has the

motivation of beating the competition. Now the

United States is faced with the more sophisticated

challenge of devising a balanced policy framework—a framework that will enable the United

States to identify new objectives and stimulate the

Nation to achieve them. Lacking such a perspective, the Nation has, instead, begun to evaluate

space more pragmatically. This evaluation suggests that “activities will be pursued in space

when it appears that U.S. national objectives can

most efficiently be met through space activities.’”

It contrasts with the aggressive acceptance of the

“role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in

the application thereof . . . ,“ as prescribed in the

National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act of

1958.2 The act itself, however, established no spe1“White House Fact Sheet on U.S. Civil Space Policy,” Oct. 11,

1978.

2National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, and

related legislation. Prepared at the request of Hon. Howard W.

Cannon, Chairman Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate, December 1978.

The dawn of a new age in space flight, Space shuttle

Columbia blasts off Pad 39a, April 12, 1981, with astronauts

John Young and Bob Crippen aboard

81
82 ● civilian Space Policy and Applications

cific manned or unmanned missions, outlined no

priorities, nor specified a funding level at which

the program was to be carried out. Instead, the

commitment to Apollo set the civilian space program on the expansionary course that provides

the baseline for current comparisons. Likewise,

this commitment generated the momentum that

is largely responsible for sustaining the program

today. But now, with current budgetary stringency, commitments to civilian projects are few and

uncertain, though the military and national security programs continue to grow. Consequently,

it is timely, as we embark on the next decade of

space activity, to scrutinize and to consider revising the framework of U.S. space policy.

Basic to any overall assessment of the U.S. civilian space program, particularly one which seeks

to assist Congress in setting public policy for

charting the Nation’s future in space, is an interpretive, retrospective review of our current posture in space, how the United States has proceeded to develop its current program and the

capabilities on which the program is based, the

role of various external factors such as international competition, the processes that have

shaped its current posture, and other relevant

forces and environmental factors that led to, or

provided the foundation for, the current situation

facing the United States in space. This chapter

presents the results of such a retrospective review

applied to the civilian space program of the

United States, emphasizing those aspects that are

relevant to space applications. It is intended to

highlight issues and lessons learned, as well as

characteristics of previous decisions regarding the

program that may have applicability to current

and future developments.

The civilian space program of the United States

has grown from its early beginnings as part of

operations in connection with the International

Geophysical Year, to the great successes of

Apollo, Viking, and Voyager, in the short span

of one generation—a little over 20 years. Thus,

history and current practice are woven together

in a tapestry, with many threads still in place that

bind past and present: still present are many individuals in the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) who have been with the

agency since its beginning, contractors that have

played a continuing role over this period, and institutional relations that are relatively unchanged

since the earliest days of the agency. There are

both strengths and weaknesses in such a situation. To the extent that it is desirable to prevent

making the same mistakes as one’s predecessors,

such continuity and institutional memory is important. To the extent that it serves to limit the

Nation’s ability to take a fresh look at the program, how it functions and how it should respond

to a changing external environment, the strong

links to the past may inhibit the agency from

becoming a dynamic vehicle of change and the

source of new initiatives involving the use of

space systems.

In addition, the relatively short span between

establishment of NASA and this assessment

makes it difficult to separate the objective views

of participants from a tendency to defend their

own decisions and roles. Because of this problem,

this history and analysis is primarily based on specific events, documented roles and decisions,

observed consequences, and supporting statements.

Although the civilian space program is a relatively recent activity of the U.S. Government, it

is unique among Government programs in its

high public visibility. It has been the subject of

many historical evaluations and popular histories.

NASA from its very beginning devoted attention

to the development of an official chronology, and

in the past there was an annual report of space

activities submitted to Congress, summarizing the

full scope of the U.S. civilian space program.

Together, these resources report the history and

evolution of the civilian space program in great

detail, and there will be no effort in this report

to duplicate such materials. The specific programs

or decisions discussed in the sections that follow

have been selected to illustrate an issue or to support a conclusion so the material selected is

not a comprehensive or exhaustive Iising of

milestones or significant events. In keeping with

this assessment’s focus on civilian activities, the

present chapter does not discuss the extensive

military space program except as it illustrates a

policy issue of significance for the civilian space

program. Its focus is primarily on NASA’s activities, though it includes some discussion of programs of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA).
Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 83

— —————-. —- ————

EARLY DEVELOPMENT

The early development of the U.S. space effort was primarily a specialist’s concern; that is,

the scientific research objectives associated with

the prospect of access to the upper atmosphere

and eventually to an Earth-orbiting platform were

the province of a relatively small community of

scientists and engineers. This community included a few universities, not-for-profit institutions, and several defense laboratories. There was

associated with this research-oriented community

a larger engineering-oriented group that was developing propulsion systems, radio and inertial

guidance systems, and control systems for ballistic

missiles. This second group provided much of the

basic launch vehicle technology for the civilian

program. Before Sputnik in 1957, these groups

pursued their objectives in relative obscurity.

In the wake of Sputnik, however, the public

demand for a U.S. response galvanized Congress

and the executive branch to act. Seeking to revitalize technological and scientific development

across-the-board, they instituted programs to develop better science and engineering education,

to increase Federal support for science, to attract

greater numbers of young people to technical careers, and to improve military systems.

One of the first measures taken was to appoint

a full-time Science Adviser to the President, Dr.

James Killian, and to establish the President’s

Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), a group of

18 respected senior scientists and engineers. They

were asked to review and comment on the measures needed to carry out the peacetime mobilizaSpacecraft used in the early stages of space exploration
84 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

tion of skills in science and technology called for

by the President. Clearly, the major topics of review were: 1 ) the U.S. response to Soviet space

achievements and 2) the national security programs needed to counter Soviet military developments, particularly their ability to launch

ballistic missiles and to detonate hydrogen

bombs.

One of the first tasks at hand was to explain

to the public the significance of the Soviet and

U.S. entry into space. Many people could not

understand how orbital flight around the Earth

was possible, and they found its realization threatening. Thus, in its first public report, PSAC found

it necessary, in 1958, first, to expound Newton’s

laws of motion to explain “why satellites stay up,”

and second to assure the public that the Soviet

space achievements did not signal a serious, imminent threat to U.S. national security.3 In this

same report, PSAC outlined the future evolution

of the space program, including (under the categories of near-, mid-, and long-term possibilities)

the full range of missions that the United States,

with time, could adopt as the national space program. The remarkable feature of the report was

the very complete characterization of future applications, including manned planetary exploration and a lunar base, both listed as long-term

goals, and both still possible as targets for future

space activity.

{n those early days of civilian space activity, the

principal objectives were to acquire new knowlJ/ntro~uctjon tO Outer Space, report of the President’s Science

Advisory Committee, 1958.

MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS

In order to build a foundation for the analysis

of later chapters, this section will highlight a number of important characteristics of the U.S. civilian

space program which have been instrumental in

setting the stage for current issues.

Open and Public Nature of the Program

As the NAS Act separated civilian and military

space activities, the civilian space program was

edge, performing specific functions that were enhanced or made uniquely possible by utilizing

space platforms, and to strengthen national prestige and self-confidence, badly shaken by a succession of Soviet “firsts” in space. These objectives appeared prominently in the NAS Act,

which was prompted by Sputnik and very quickly

drafted and signed into law in July 1958.

As is clear from chapter 5, the essential character of the civilian space program has not

changed significantly in the succeeding years: we

still seek new knowledge about the Earth, the

Moon, the Sun, the planets, and the more distant objects in space; we remain active in exploiting applications that make use of the unique vantage point or the unique environment (low gravity, high vacuum) of space; we still attend to exploration and technological “muscleflexing” in

programs such as the space shuttle. Perhaps one

of the most remarkable aspects of the way the

space program has developed is the fact that the

opportunities and areas of activity in the space

program have not changed appreciably over a

quarter century. The developments in space applications, the mission opportunities in science,

and the manned space exploration program have

largely followed the scenario laid out by the early

advisers and space proponents—if anything, they

have failed to equal the imagination and vision

of these early projections. This suggests that we

have not yet penetrated beyond the initial learning phase of space activity to a more mature treatment of and familiarity with space systems, and

how they can best serve us.

OF THE SPACE PROGRAM

open to public scrutiny from its inception. This

characteristic of the program has helped to shape

and, in a sense, to constrain the U.S. civilian program. As the public has become more knowledgeable about space capabilities and costs, the

objectives of NASA’s program have required

more detailed justification, more planning, and

even some marketing in order to build sufficient

public understanding and acceptance. The growing complexity of technology and missions in
Ch. 4—f)evelopment and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 85

space applications and science requires more

sophisticated public understanding than did some

of the earlier programs, As a result, NASA’s task

of justifying its activities to the public has become

more difficult.

Contrasted with the public acceptance and support that NASA requires is the more restricted

nature of the decision process for the space program in the military and intelligence arenas. Here,

the very large majority of the program is space

applications, that is, activities which assist in performing a specific mission or missions and which

are therefore amenable to cost-benefit analysis.

It is quite often the case that any one of several

alternatives may achieve the objectives of a given

mission, and that tradeoffs may determine the optimal allocation of resources from among the various alternatives available, For the most part, this

decision process takes place in the closed world

of the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Central Intelligence Agency. There is, consequently,

no need to sell the program to the public, nor

do elected public officials participate in the selection, the configuration, or the operation of missions. The important element in this process is

the mechanism for generating requirements. The

requirements provide a target toward which the

technical community can work and by which the

proposed system may be evaluated. It would be

difficult to devise an analogue to this mechanism

suitable for use in the civilian program because

in the early stages of R&D, civilian users and, perforce, their requirements cannot be identified.

Use of Industry and University Support

From its very beginning, the space program has

been a high-technology endeavor, and the average citizen has not easily understood its operative

concepts. Early failures in both launch vehicles

and satellites dramatized the problems associated

with space operations and taught invaluable lessons to those who were actively participating in

their development. Practices and techniques that

were adequate for most terrestrial systems had

to be modified and adapted to the demanding

requirements imposed by the space environment.

As a result, highly skilled industrial teams were

formed. These teams learned to apply specialized

manufacturing and environmental specifications

and found ways in which they could be satisfied.

They also developed a wide variety of associated

techniques that could be perfected only through

actual space missions. Such specialized knowledge and specialized capability in industry and

universities represent a national resource that, if

lost, could not be easily duplicated.

An important characteristic of the U.S. program

in this regard has been the diversity of industrial,

university, and Government resources that were

drawn into active participation in all aspects of

the program. Through this diversity of resources,

there has been enough competition so that new

ideas have had an opportunity to surface, space

expertise has been acquired by many technical

teams, and the entire program has been strengthened. Furthermore, significant diversity has

always characterized intragovernment space activities. NASA’s predecessor and major constituent element, the National Advisory Committee

on Aeronautics (NACA), developed a major field

laboratory structure (Langiey, Ames, and Lewis

Research Centers), and it promoted valuable

cross-fertilization through good working relations

with its principal customers—DOD and the commercial aeronautical industry. When space activities began, and the level of effort was substantially raised, in accordance with our commitment

to the success of Apollo, NASA elaborated

NACA’S pattern: it created new government

research centers, each playing a major role in

program management, and each having unique

facilities and a modest in-house research and

technology development capability. NASA also

enlisted the support of its counterparts in DOD,

particularly with respect to launch vehicles (Thor,

Atlas, Agena).

With a few notable exceptions, manufacturing

and detailed system development were the province of industry, while university teams designed

the instruments and experiments, formulated the

overall science objectives, and constituted the

user community for the space science program.

For the most part, the relationships among these

contributors have been beneficial and positive.

From time to time, however, some concerns have

surfaced. For example, the university experiment-
86 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ers complain about the privileged position of their

competitors inside the NASA research centers,

or NASA headquarters claims it lacks adequate

control over the centers. An abiding concern of

industry is that they will lose a significant business

base from a combination of NASA’s shrinking

budgets and its desire to maintain an in-house

establishment.

Overall, the United States continues to call on

and use capabilities that were created as part of

the major expansion during the Apollo program.

However, shrinking NASA budgets, particularly

when inflation is taken into account, have

gradually eroded the contractor base supporting the civilian space program. Many contractors

now prefer to work on DOD’s space program.

New civilian activity has slowed overall, particularly in some of the advanced scientific areas.

Similarly, universities made significant commitments to space in the early expansionist days, and

many specialized university space institutes or

laboratories were established. Several factors

threaten the ability of universities to continue

their support of the space program. These factors include: increasing time intervals between

successive launches; lack of funds to support continued data collection and processing of data

from satellites after their initial period of operation; reduced funding for exploitation of data

already gathered; and increasing complexity and

Ieadtimes between initiation of an experiment

and the actual flight opportunity. The support for

the space program from universities and industry

has enabled the United States to succeed in increasingly advanced and more challenging missions. This base of suport will be the key to the

successful performance of commitments yet to

be made. Clearly, the vigor of space-related programs in industry and universities is an appropriate subject for periodic evaluation.

Public Understanding

The community most immediately affected by

the awesome character of launching artificial satellites were those who operated, constructed,

and designed the various interdependent systems. The inception of manned flight brought the

wonder of space exploration home to us all. For

now our space program had become not only

a scientific investigation of a new medium, but

a human adventure into the unknown. As the first

astronauts were selected, communications media

hastened to canonize them as national heroes.

Through extensive publicity, particularly live

television coverage, people throughout the world

followed the early manned flights with great interest. Familiarity with the astronauts, their space

vehicles, and the new jargon of the space age led

to some understanding of the relevant concepts:

weightlessness (or “microgravity”), how satellites

and launch vehicles operate, the difference between synchronous and low-altitude orbits, the

concept of satellite communciations relay, and

Earth observations from space for weather or

other purposes, all became topics of casual conversation.

In addition, even rather esoteric subjects of scientific investigation, such as the structure of the

Van Allen belts around the Earth, the composition and characteristics of the Moon, and the

nature of the planets in our solar system, became

matters of general interest. The space program,

which began as the province of specialists, generated ever more publicity and discussion, so that

the general public was eager to learn of, and participate vicariously in, the planning and flight of

new missions.

Yet, even as the public came to understand the

first steps into space, succeeding missions and

systems became more enterprising: simple instruments were being supplemented by complex devices and systems, plans were made to investigate new objects, and the first surveys of these

objects were followed by detailed and highly specialized analyses. In Earth-orbital applications,

naive signal propagation and tracking devices

evolved into sophisticated relay stations with

multiple channel capacity and multiple spot

beam retransmission capability; simple cameras

and optical scanning devices were complemented by multispectral scanners and infrared

or microwave imagers; and the tracking systems

were supplemented by laser trackers of high

spatial and range precision. The experiments to

be performed by the next generation of space

missions are even more complex.
Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 87

Thus, the open and public nature of the civilian

space program, coupled with its high technology

content, presents a special challenge to policymakers and the leadership in the civilian space

community, if there is to be some continued development of public understanding of space missions, program objectives, and the possible

returns to be expected.

International Cooperation

It is impossible to discuss the overall U.S. space

program without mentioning its international

component. From its very beginning, the civilian

space program has had an international character. International cooperation in science led to

the first satellite launches as part of the multinational International Geophysical Year. The

1958 NAS Act explicitly recognized the objective

of fostering international cooperation, and it

charged NASA with integrating this objective into

the overall program. Yet the consideration which

dominated space policy in the early years was

competition with the Soviet Union, and policy

decisions during this period tended to protect

U.S. interests against possible foreign preemption.

Our treatment of international cooperation has

also varied considerably, depending on the type

of activity—space science, applications, or

manned flight.

The approach taken to science has favored data

exchange, large-scale cooperative experiments

where multiple measurements at geographically dispersed locations are involved, and to a very

limited extent, foreign experiments on U.S. satellites or use of data acquired by the United States

(such as lunar samples). In general, the United

States has regarded cooperative efforts in science

as less problematic than those in other areas,

although it has been assumed that the United

States would participate in each area of space science with sufficient vigor so that we would remain in the forefront of current research and

would not abandon any area to foreign competition.

In applications, the most notable activity has

been the commitment to a single international

communications satellite system, INTELSAT, and

the creation of a chosen private entity, COMSAT,

to represent the United States and, initially, to

be technical manager for the system. In this area

of commercial interest, many nations had to cooperate if links among the various communications systems were to be established. To this end,

the creation of a new international institution

seemed the most feasible means. On the other

hand, introduction of Earth remote sensing

through the experimental Landsat system has not

yet required extensive international cooperation, so that no international institution to collect data has been created.Q Of course, there has

been extensive international dialog regarding

Earth observations, and the sale both of the received data and of ground stations for direct reception of Landsat output are proceeding apace.

Thus the Landsat program has not been without

substantial international participation or commercial interest. It has been customary for Government to supply meteorological data as a public

service, and this practice was continued with

weather satellites. As in the case of terrestrial

weather observations, free and open exchange

of data has been the rule, where the United States

makes ground stations available for receipt of U.S.

meteorological data. Cooperation has grown in

this area, particularly as part of a series of largescale atmospheric ocean observation programs

that gave other nations greater experience and

an incentive to create their own meteorological

capability at geosynchronous orbit. Navigational

aid, also largely a Government service, was originally used to support military (submarine and

surface ship) operations, but was later opened

to civilian and international users merely by their

purchase of the appropriate receiver. A more advanced system of position location is under development; it too will be available to civilian and

international users.

Manned space flight, by its nature a very costly aspect of the space program, has been carried

out only by the two space superpowers, the

United States and the U.S.S.R. With the exception of lunar exploration, the U.S.S.R. has pioneered this area and has flown international

4Remote Sensing of Earth Resources, Panel on Science and Technology Thirteenth Meeting, proceedings before the Committee on

Science and Aeronautics, House of Representatives, 92d Cong.,

2d sess.; Jan. 25, 26, 27, 1972; No. 13, Washington, D.C.

94-915 0 - .9? - ‘
88 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

crews with members from Socialist bloc countries. The U.S. program is moving toward international participation in manned flight with the

advent of shuttle operations and a manned laboratory payload (Spacelab) supplied by a European consortium. Indeed, the shuttle system is

an international cooperative venture, and the

shuttle itself may very well be flown by multinational crews. In early manned operations, including Apollo, the need for close contact and global

monitoring of flight crews and their capsules required tracking, communications stations, and

recovery units around the world. These were part

of a large-scale cooperative international framework established by NASA (and DOD) that supported the manned flight program and many unmanned operations as well.

More recently, other nations have designed

and begun to test space systems that will compete directly with U.S. projects in communications, remote sensing, and transportation (ch. 7).

Thus, cooperation and competition are both present in the international aspects of the civilian

space program. As a result, there is a certain flexibility in U.S. space policy, ensuring that analysis

and debate will continue.

MAJOR MILESTONES IN SPACE

The following milestones have been selected

to illustrate the major issues and characteristics

of the civilian space program of the United States

and to lay a foundation for a retrospective assessment of our current posture in space.

The International Geophysical Year (IGY)

U.S. participation in the IGY program provided

the explicit rationale for entry into civilian space

activities. It was fundamental to this participation

that the experiments would be open and the results published, consistent with the traditions of

scientific research. There would be international

discussions and exchange of results, and the

knowledge gained would become part of the

global scientific literature. in this work, therefore,

were laid the foundations for an open and public

civilian program with a fundamental objective:

expansion of human knowledge. This contrasts

with the military and intelligence space objectives

—support of the national security of the United

States–and the high degree of secrecy associated

with most of their activities.

The search for knowledge is still an important

objective of the U.S. space program and can

serve to link people of diverse cultural and political backgrounds. It involves its own form of competition, but also enables nations to cooperate,

leaving a political deposition of value beyond the

scientific measurements that are made.

National Aeronautics and Space

Act of 1958, as Amended

The basic foundation for the civilian space program is Public Law 85-568, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. This act was the

result of compromise, but represented a victory

for those who supported a space program conducted principally by an independent civilian

agency. The policy guidance in the act, essentially unchanged from its original form, specified

that “activities in space should be devoted to

peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind.”

It also enumerated a set of broad objectives:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Expansion of human knowledge.

Improvement of aeronautical and space

vehicles.

Development and operation of vehicles

(spacecraft).

Study of potential benefits to be gained from

aeronautical and space activities.

Preservation of the role of the United States

as a leader in aeronautical and space science

technology and their applications.

Publication of information about discoveries.

Cooperation between the United States and

other nations.

Effective utilization of the scientific and engineering resources of the United States. -

Significantly, the act is silent on responsibilities

for operational space systems beyond DOD’s role
Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 89

with regard to national defense. By implication,

since the “aeronautical and space activities” that

are the principal responsibility of NASA, are defined as “research . . ., development, construction, testing, and operation for research purposes

of aeronautical and space vehicles, and such

other activities as may be required for the exploration of space, ” operational roles are expected

to be carried out by other agencies. At the time

the act was written, however, its framers did not

foresee the variety of space applications that are

now possible. That the act neither specifies nor

precludes operational responsibilities for NASA

suggests a pragmatic approach to each functional

area and a flexibility in determining which agency

should take the lead in operating any given system. (NOAA’s current assignment as the lead

agency for Earth observational satellite systems

in the civil sector may also need reexamination

and evaluation in the light of its activities since

assuming this role about a year ago.)

This report presents a more detailed summary

of the 1958 NAS Act in chapter 3. The following

observations are appropriate here, however. The

legislative mandate for NASA has had great effect

on the institutional configuration of the agency,

but has provided little guidance on the pace and

content of the program. In some areas, notably

space communications R&D and Earth resources

systems, the act was of no use in resolving policy

differences or in guiding executive branch action.

Recent congressional action, such as in the

energy area, has been much more aggressive in

spelling out the objective of technological programs and giving guidance on the level of intended or expected spending, but not all such

efforts represent a good legislative model. Clearly,

a balance between a detailed congressional mandate and a restrictive overspecification of the program must be struck.

The Apollo Commitment

No other single event has so profoundly shaped

the U.S. space program and current issues as the

decision for man to go to the Moon and return

within the decade of the 1960’s. Much has been

written about the personalities and pressures that

led to Kennedy’s decision, and that discussion

will not be rehearsed here. The most important

aspects of Apollo for this assessment are its legacy

and the issues flowing from that legacy.

The major characteristics of the Apollo proposal

were:

●

●

●

●

●

A multiyear joint executive branch and congressional commitment.

An extremely challenging technological feat,

feasible in principle, but with a great many

engineering problems, and under a significant time constraint.

A political measure–aimed at foreign policy

goals, national prestige, and self-confidence.

Commitment to a major expansion in the

civil space program and in the institutional

base for the program.

Required contractor teams on a scale not

previously attempted.

In the process of accomplishing its goals, NASA

added significantly to its laboratory structure, creating a combined Government-contractor work

force that exceeded 400,000 people at its peaks

Though Apollo dominated the agency’s priorities,

there was also a presidential commitment to pursue satellite communications and meteorology,

and programs in these areas also expanded during the 1960’s. During this period, many were

strongly attracted to the challenge and the promise of space activity.

However, even before the first successful lunar

landing, there were signs of change. NASA budget outlays, which peaked at nearly $6 billion in

1966, began decreasing by almost $500,000 a

year for the next 4 years. The total work force

dropped from 400,000 to 160,000 in the same

period, beginning a period of aerospace unemployment that was to have significant impact on

future commitments to manned flight programs.

(Of the decrease in aerospace employment over

this period, over 220,000 was in direct contractor employment, while only 6,000 was in civil

service or direct support service manpower.) A

backlash developed in the scientific and engineering professions when individuals found that

their opportunities for careers in aerospace were

sThe u.s. civilian Space Program—look at options. OMB Issues

Paper, Oct. 14, 1971.
90 . civilian Space Policy and Applications

disappearing. During the peak readjustment period, the political liability of large-scale unemployment in this work force prompted direct, Government-supported, ameliorative measures. As a result of this expansion and rapid contraction in the

aerospace industry, political resistance to future

decisions causing major disruptions in the work

force may be anticipated. (See discussion of the

space shuttle decision below).

During the decade of the 1960’s, therefore, the

overarching commitment to Apollo focused the

space program; other space activities throve

amidst Apollonian largesse. By the beginning of

the 1970’s, however, the program had lost its

focus, and the continuing projects, all smaller in

scope, began to lose their way in the twilight of

fiscal restraint.

The large-scale commitment to the Apollo program left a legacy that did not dissipate easily.

This legacy, while mostly positive, was also somewhat disruptive because no equivalent subsequent project was identified. National prestige

from such an amazing accomplishment continued long after the event, but ordinary citizens

soon lost interest in space and began to ask: if

we can put a man on the Moon, why can’t

we . . .

INTELSAT/COMSAT Commitment

Recognition of the importance of space platforms for communications came early in the

space program. As the common carrier responsible for long distance communications in the

United States, A.T.&T. funded a low-altitude satellite, Telstar, while Hughes Aircraft Co. constructed the Syncom series of satellites, which

were intended for synchronous orbit placement.

(The concept of a synchronous communications

satellite was first suggested in 1945.6) With the

beginning of the Kennedy administration and a

much more activist role for Government in space,

however, the role of the private sector was rewritten for the newly created COMSAT Corp., the

chosen vehicle for U.S. participation in a commercial communications satellite system (a single,

bArthur c. clarke, “Extraterrestrial Relays: Can Rocket StatiOns

Give Worldwide Radio Coverage?” Wire/ess Wor/~ October 1945,

pp. 305-308.

global system). NASA was to support COMSAT

with R&D and with launch services, for which the

agency was to be reimbursed. The COMSAT Act

was passed in 1962, the first stock was issued in

1964, and its first satellite, Early Bird, was

launched into synchronous orbit over the Atlantic in April 1965.7

In 1964, the INTELSAT Agreements were

opened for signature, and COMSAT was designated the manager for the system. INTELSAT provided a means for gaining international agreement on the extent and type of services to be supplied, the charges for such services, the procurement policies, and a host of related matters. In

the United States, where there is no single governmental entity responsible for providing telecommunications service, the relationships among

the various potential suppliers of domestic satellite telecommunications services are regulated by

the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

In 1970, after many years of debate, the principle of open entry and competition for domestic

services was announced, followed by specific

authorizations of domestic satellite services by

FCC in December 1972,8 which finally opened

up the domestic market to a variety of suppliers

of such services. The regulatory and commercial

environment for domestic communications satellite services continues to change so as to affect

the structure of the industry and the relationships

among the various services and common or specialized carriers. In addition, maritime services

have been initiated, backed by the U.S. Navy’s

guarantee to lease services from the system for

defined periods. An international organization,

INMARSAT, somewhat parallel to INTELSAT, was

started for support of these services.

U.S. experience in the development of structures to provide services that exploit the

capabilities of satellites has been unique from

several standpoints:

1. New institutions were established: the quasipublic, domestic corporation, COMSAT, and

the international entity, INTELSAT. Both

TCommunicat;onS Statellhe Act of 1962, Public Law 87-624, 87th

Cong., H.R. 11040, Aug. 31, 1962.

Scomsat @j& to the Intelsat, Marisat, and Comstar satellite SYStems, 95 L’Enfant Plaza, S. W., Washington, D.C. 20024.
Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 91

2.

3.

were important in gaining support and cooperation from other nations.

The Federal Government initially provided

major support of R&D for communications

satellite technology, in accordance with the

act establishing COMSAT. The Nixon administration, however, as part of its policy of promoting more activity in the private sector,

decided to downgrade NASA’s program in

satellite communications, terminating demonstrations of new spacecraft and substituting a low-level program of technology development. The Carter administration reversed

field: NASA’s R&D in space communications

was to be returned to a higher level.

The aerospace industry played the role of

major suppliers of satellites and ground

equipment; NASA provided reimbursable

launch services.

Before the space age, the communications industry was already well established: the outlines

of its structure were fairly clear; the services it

provided were well understood; and regulations

governing its activities were in place. A new technology, space satellite communications relays,

revolutionized the industry: space provided a

unique, high-altitude vantage point, to and from

which a variety of signals could be transmitted.

Consequently, national policies had to be revised

in order to cope with the new space systems.

The example of satellite communications shows

that NASA’s role in the R&D of applications

technologies may be interpreted in several ways,

depending on an administration’s staging of the

interaction between the private sector and the

agency. This history indicates some lack of clarity in the legislative mandate. Willingness to take

risks in forming new institutional arrangements

(e.g., COMSAT or INTELSAT) can have a beneficial effect on development of a specific service.

An organized user community, the readiness of

a given technology, an established tradition of

commercial services with an approximate value

set for each—all are important factors in determining the success of a space application.

Weather Satellite Services

The use of satellites for global synoptic coverage of the Earth began with the experimental

launch of Tires 1 in 1960, as a joint effort of DOD

and NASA. This satellite’s global cloud coverage

pictures were the first in a long series, characterized by incremental improvements in succeeding

satellites and by developments in their use in obtaining atmospheric and meteorological observations.g Because DOD’s requirements were so

different from NASA’s, two separate meteorological satellite programs—one civilian, one military

—were established. NASA’s satellites were integrated into the Federal Government’s system for

providing U.S. users with information regarding

local and synoptic weather. These satellites also

provided weather data to other nations and to

international entities. Here, as well as in other

civilian applications services, NASA led the way

in identifying appropriate technologies for air and

space platforms. In the case of weather satellites,

the relationship between NASA and its user agency was a somewhat turbulent one, occasioning

considerable interaction and debate before a suitable working relationship was developed. For

weather satellite services, NASA functions as a

launching agency and also provides (through

coordination with the user) the early experimental development of satellite sensors and platforms.

These are, at a suitable time in their evolution,

incorporated into operational systems for whose

management the user agency, currently NOAA,

is specifically responsible. (The present good

working relationship between NASA and NOAA

forms the background for the decision to assign

operational responsibility for civil operational

Earth resources sensing to NOAA.) The major patterns that emerged from the early experience with

weather satellites were:

Ž Strong Government role. NASA developed

and NOAA operates a primarily civilian

service.

9NASA News, capsule t-iistory of Weather Satellites, Release No.

76-1 46; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C, 20546,
●●
Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program . 93

●

●

Extensive cooperation with other nations.

The United States participates in large-scale

experiments and provides open and ready

access to the results.

Open data policy. Data are supplied . .

worldwide to”all users.

Because of the doubtful commercial potential

of weather satellite services, the Government’s

role of operator (as well as developer) of weather

satellite systems was not controversial. As a result,

the weather program, unlike the Landsat program, has sparked no debate over management

structure, data handling, or pace of development.

If the data provided by the weather programs

were to be of commercial value, they would require additional processing and integration with

other, related data. Until the recent COMSAT interest in assuming ownership of the meteorological satellites along with the Landsat system the

possibility that the private sector might convert

such data collection and interpretation to its own

use seemed remote.

The weather satellite program has shown that

global cooperation has been most active and effective in meteorological and weather services–

areas where commercial and national security interests are muted. Relations among NASA,

NOAA, and the user community demonstrate

that it is possible to have separate R&D, operational, and user responsibilities, and yet to maintain a viable service. Reasonable technological

progress has been made under this arrangement.

Separate military and civilian programs have existed because of differing user requirements, and

prospects that military and civilian users can

make greater use of common data streams, channeled separately to each, must remain subject to

periodic review.

Scientific Research and Exploration

As pointed out in the section on the international Geophysical Year, the initial rationale for

the U.S. civilian space program was based on the

IOj. V. Charyle, testimony before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of the Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, July 22, 23, 1981.

need for scientific research in space. A continuing strong, science-based program has been characteristic of the civilian space effort since its very

beginning. There are some important features of

the science program that require further comment:

●

●

●

University participation. The major participants in science programs have been university-based experimenters who provided the

basic ideas for measurements to be made

and, in some cases, the basic designs of the

instruments to be flown to make these measurements. Commercial interest is almost invisible, and the principal competition for experimenter roles is between government laboratory scientists and university science

teams.

National Academy of Sciences. 11 The National Academy of Sciences, through its

Space Science Board, has done much to set

the agenda for space science, identifying

both a general rationale for many measurement programs and the specific nature of the

most attractive experiments. The Academy’s

pronouncements have also had a major role

in such areas as lunar quarantine and planetary contamination, even to the point of

stimulating major investments for such items

as a quarantine facility for handling lunar

samples and astronauts on their return from

the Moon. In planetary programs, the Academy’s recommendations were instrumental

in determining the criteria for judging the acceptable degree of risk that Earth microorganisms might contaminate a planet’s surface. The Academy’s influence was reflected

in the programs by the requirements for prolonged heat soak sterilization, for spacecraft

encapsulization, and for selection of acceptable trajectories of approach to the planet.

International cooperation. Historically, the

science program has been international in

scope, and it appears to be moving toward

even greater international cooperation in the

11 Outer P~net5 &p/oration, 1972-1985, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C., 1971, and Opportunities and Choices

in Space Science, 1974, Space Science Board, National Research

Council; National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C., Nov.

11, 1974.
94 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

design of missions and the development of

experiment payloads.

Difficulty of keeping project teams. As missions become more complex, expensive,

and international in flavor, and as the time

between mission opportunities grows, it

becomes increasingly difficult for U.S. science teams to remain active and involved

with the program. Even assuming that only

the best teams are retained, there is nevertheless a narrowing of the base from which

new experiments and ideas originate, with

resultant long-term negative impact on the

quality of NASA’s science effort. Fewer flight

opportunities also may bring about a subtle

leaning toward NASA experimenters, although it is intended that there be no bias

toward the in-house groups; and

Emphasis on spacecraft. The tendency

within NASA has been to focus on development and launch of the spacecraft and its

payload, and its operation to obtain the

desired data. Data analysis and interpretation and continuing exploitation of the information or material from these missions

tends to be given lower priority and is almost

always in need of greater budget support.

Post-Apollo Planning

In the mid-1960’s, planners from NASA joined

PSAC, which had kept a close involvement with

space policy (despite being overruled at critical

points such as the choice of lunar landing mode)

to look toward the post-Apollo period and to consider possible courses of action. In February 1967,

PSAC published a comprehensive report attempting to answer the basic question, “Where does

the Nation go in space in the post-Apollo period?”lz Consistent with the major emphasis of the

civilian program started by Apollo, one of the major preoccupations of that report was the future

evolution of the manned flight program, for resolution of this issue would affect the budget more

than any other. The advisory panels that drafted

the report were acutely aware of the importance

of Apollo in stimulating a very vigorous and broad

lz~~e space ~fogfa~ in the Post-Apo/lo Period, a Report of the

President’s Science Advisory Committee, the White House, February 1967.

program, and recognized that the next step of

equivalent scope would be a commitment to

manned planetary exploration. They did not,

however, endorse such a commitment. Instead,

they recommended a more balanced program in

which manned planetary exploration was still

very much in the long-term picture, but which

would place greater emphasis on unmanned science and applications missions in the short term.

Manned flight would continue, but at a much

more leisurely pace. Interestingly, the report recommended work toward a space station module

in the mid-l970’s, but suggested that this date

could slip depending on the pace of a national

commitment toward manned planetary exploration. The major justification for such a station was

long-duration studies of how humans react to

lengthy exposure to the space environment. In

the foreword to the PSAC report, the President

set a conservative tone, stating that the “opportunities in space are great but the costs are high

. . . “ without endorsing a future program or set

of new guidelines.

NASA pressed forward with ambitious plans for

post-Apollo lunar exploration, further development of the space station, manned planetary flight

options using Apollo-based hardware and exotic

new systems, such as the nuclear rocket then

under development. No approval of such plans

was forthcoming from a Johnson administration

that was preoccupied with the costs and public

impact of the Vietnam conflict. Thus, the dramatic decline in NASA budgets mentioned earlier

began. Although NASA planning was somewhat

fragmented among the various program offices

and lacked coherence, the problem resulted principally not from a lack of planning, but rather

from a failure to generate consensus on what the

Nation wanted from its civilian space program and

was willing to pay for.

Long-range planning exercises can have a beneficial result because they help to clarify the options and develop consensus on what the next

steps should be. However, they have little effect

on obtaining political and budgetary commitments, which often appear to depend more on

external factors such as national or international

crises.
Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program Ž 95

Earth Observations

The experience gained in flying weather satellites and from military reconnaissance programs

(not publicly discussed at that time because of

a policy decision to protect the “fact that” such

activities were taking place) indicated both the

feasibility and value of Earth observations, provided there was sufficient resolution either spatially or spectrally to evaluate the nature of the observed scene. J Since there were multiple uses

and users for Earth observation data, and no one

single user appeared to have a dominant role or

need, there was considerable delay between recognition of the value of satellite remote-sensing

observations and the initiation of a program to

obtain them from space. There were a number

of reasons for this delay. Among them were:

●

●

Concern by the national security community

that there would be some international protests if sufficiently high-resolution civil data

were to be collected that would have intelligence/military value. This was resolved by

setting a limit on the resolution permitted for

any civil system;

Lack of a clear lead agency responsibility.

The Department of the Interior tried to solve

this problem in 1967 by announcing an

EROS satellite program for Earth observations

primarily of geological interest, but this announcement was made without obtaining

White House, Bureau of the Budget, Office

of Science and Technology, or National

Security Council (NSC) approval. Consequently, it was killed quietly (largely because

these approval and coordination steps had

not been taken) in the budget process. NASA

had the responsibility for the necessary R&D,

and the weather satellite experience demonstrated that a suitable working arrangement could be established between the R&D

leader and the operator and user. NASA

began to exercise this role and pull together

the various potential users in connection

with the definition of the experimental Earth

13A Retrospective on Earth-Resource Surveys: Arguments About

Technology, Analysis, Politics, and Bureaucracy. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Photogrammetric Engineering and

Remote Sensing, vol. 42, No. 2, February 1976, Washington, D.C.

Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS). But

this effort occurred at a time when the general attitude toward space ventures was

changing from the expansionary vision of

Apollo to a more conservative and costconscious approach. The recommendations

of PSAC are indicative:

. . . a reasonably clear case of potential utility must be made, which includes potential

economic benefit, before significant

development costs are assumed.

. , . space technology has passed the point

where the demonstration of mere feasibility of a particular application has any technological or prestige significance.14

In this environment, NASA was initially

unable to provide credible cost-benefit data

and user contributions that would substantiate the need for such a system. Further

studies ensued, more user support was enlisted, and still the case for ERTS did not appear persuasive. Finally it was approved,

largely on faith that existence of a real data

stream from the satellite would stimulate

uses (and users) enough to build a positive

cost-benefit case to proceed toward an operational system.

Opposition from those who supported aircraft for Earth surveys. While not as significant as the factors mentioned above, the active promotion of the use of high-altitude aircraft as an alternative to spacecraft platforms

showed the acceptance of satellite remote

sensing. The arguments about the relative

merits of each approach are not important

to this assessment, but it is significant that

aircraft data collection would probably have

been carried out by one or more private contractors whereas ERTS required NASA management, direction, and participation in data

handling, spacecraft operational control, etc.

While NASA opposed reliance on aircraft,

it nevertheless recognized their value and

subsequently organized a substantial highaltitude aircraft program based on the U-2.

Of course, the ease of global coverage for

a satellite as compared with an aircraft was

not contested. It was simply unclear at that

laThe Space program in the Post-Apollo Period, PSAC, Wruav

1967.
96 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

SUN

(

time how ERTS data on other countries

would be collected and used, particularly in

a processed or interpreted form.

● Lack of an organized user community in the

private sector. Much of the early interest in

Earth observations from space centered in

Federal Government agencies whose missions could be accomplished more effectively if satellite data were available. Neither

State and local governments nor potential

users in the private sector were willing to

make early commitments. In each category,

there was a typical pattern: the potential user

might find the data useful, but was largely

incapable of analyzing his needs or even of

conducting the research necessary to understand them more adequately. Therefore,

NASA was funded to support a wide array

of user experiments as part of ERTS-1, in

order to improve the base of understanding

of the value of the satellite output. (Lack of

an organized and established user community for ERTS, or Landsat, as it was renamed,

contrasts with the situation for early space

telecommunications services where the entities for long-haul telephone services already

existed. Similarly, there has been no institutional innovation for Earth sensing, either nationally or internationally, as there was in the

case of COMSAT and INTELSAT.)

Space Task Group

At the beginning of the Nixon administration,

the Apollo program was rapidly coming to a successful close, but no clear definition of a postApollo space program had emerged. Early planning efforts had failed to yield a consensus, and

space program budgets had decreased dramatically, presenting the new administration with

growing unemployment in the aerospace industry

as well as a major technological agency that did

not have clear signals regarding its future. in order

to address these problems, the presidential Space

Task Group (STG) was established under the

chairmanship of the Vice President. The STG

review was the first comprehensive interagency

planning effort that was carried out with respect

to the civilian space program. It also included a

component directed toward future military applications in space and was subject to special

security classification restrictions. Its principal

focus, however, was on the future nature and

pace of activities in connection with the civilian

manned space flight program, While NASA’s

leadership was not particularly pleased to have

its future programs become the object of an interagency planning effort, it recognized the need

for broader consensus regarding its future objectives, particularly because the new administration had made no budget commitment. (This lack

of budget commitment was a continuation of the

trend that had begun in the Johnson administration.) The assignment for STG included taking a

rather long-range perspective extending out

through the decade. As in the earlier review by

the PSAC, a key issue was the question of

whether to propose a new manned mission to

the planets.

In their recommendations, STG recommended commitment to a balanced program that

included science, applications, and technology

development objectives, but no immediate commitment to manned planetary missions. They sug1 srhe poSt.Ap//o Space Program: Directions for the Future, Space

Task Group Report to the President, September 1969.
Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program . 97

gested no change in institutional structure nor an

operations role for NASA. Emphasizing international cooperation, STG was given special emphasis and it was suggested that NASA should

give greater attention to possible cooperative opportunities. The major technological development STG suggested was the reusable space shuttle system that could eventually lead to development of a permanent space station. The clear priority was for shuttle development first, with space

station modules as a potential future technical

development. Manned planetary exploration was

retained as a long-range option for the civilian

space program with a “manned Mars mission before the end of this century as a first target.”

STG presented a number of budget options in

connection with these recommendations, permitting the program that was recommended to be

carried out at several rates. The response to STG

recommendations was not immediately forthcoming. The President’s advisers, faced with

other serious budget and international relations

problems including the Vietnam conflict, deferred

action on the basic recommendations until the

subsequent budget cycle. At this point, in a very

general response to the recommendations, the

clear image of a relatively conservative and constrained program emerged. New mission commitments were folded into a general ceiling for the

agency that was established at slightly above $3

billion.

The Space Task Group effort was notable for

a number of reasons:

●

●

●

●

●

It was the first major interagency planning

effort with regard to the civilian space

program.

It involved participation from the general

public as well as agency representatives.

OMB was involved, with the explicit reservation that its participation would not preclude its normal budget review and analysis

when specific budget requests were proposed.

It was comprehensive in including both

DOD as well as NASA interests, particularly

with regard to launch vehicles.

it took a long-term view, specifically focusing on the next decade.

● It did not attempt to seek a single consensus on the program level, but rather provided

a number of options from which the President could select.

STG provides an interesting example of the difficulty of making long-term plans for the space

program. The administrator of NASA was obviously in a position that he would have rather

avoided (it being certainly less difficult to deal

with a single OMB review on the budget and program than to obtain consensus from an interagency group, several members of which may have

competitive objectives). Hence, STG represented,

on the surface, a very difficult forum for presentation, analysis, and eventual development of a

consensus on the NASA program. In this forum,

the view of both NASA and DOD representatives

tended to favor continuing large-scale space investments with a multitude of new systems identified by their technical laboratory and supporting contractor structures. A more restrained note

was set by OMB and OSTP representatives. As

the deliberations in STG proceeded, the question

of a major new focus for the civilian program in

the next decade, equivalent to the role that

Apollo played in the previous decade, became

a major issue.

In general, STG believed that the technology

existed for a manned Mars mission and that such

a mission, if accepted as a new goal, could serve

to energize and focus attention on the space program in a beneficial way. The Vice President became convinced that such a mission would be

an exercise of leadership which he viewed as

missing from the space area and he supported

this goal as a target. He was not able to convince

the remaining members of the task group that this

goal was realistic, and acceptable to the public,

but it was endorsed in a somewhat ambiguous

way as a “potential” goal or “option” for the program. In this way, it could serve to guide decisions regarding the development of new capability for man in space. In STG’S recommendations,

the terminology was chosen very carefully in

order to maintain an option for the Vice president and the Administrator of NASA to make

further appeals that would support their program

objectives and yet have a report to the President
98 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

that all STG participants could approve. In addition, there were certain “code words” that were

used that had considerable significance beyond

their direct connotation. For example, the use of

the term “new capability” implied very specifically a development program that would involve a

manned, reusable launch vehicle as the first

major element. On completion of this first development, the next major commitment would be

to a continuing orbital habitat for man, i.e., a

space station. The order in which these new

systems would be developed was a major source

of controversy within STG, and the eventual

agreement on the shuttle as the first element represented a major change in direction within

NASA.

The space shuttle appeared to be a logical and

most effective way to maintain the capability for

continuing use of man in space while simultaneously providing a capability for launch and

recovery of unmanned space payloads as well.

At the time, the space shuttle was not completely

defined, but its essential and desirable operating

characteristics were clearly spelled out.lb The alternatives for maintaining a manned flight capability were: continued use of Apollo hardware in

the future, wherein the cost and reliability of each

succeeding hardware set would become more

difficult to predict; or the development of a new

capsule and launch vehicle combination such as

the Titan Ill, a modified Gemini system.

Overall, STG accomplished several important

objectives. It clarified the nature of the major options facing the Nation with regard to the space

program. it identified the rough costs associated

with pursuing many of these options. It suggested

several new emphases for the space program (international cooperation, new systems that were

reusable) and the increased development of applications. it made a clear call for continuing the

man in space program and suggested the logical

steps in that program. However, it did not proclaim a specific new Apollo-type goal. As a consequence, in the minds of many space enthusiasts, it did not go far enough. On the other hand,

to those who were concerned about the magnilbNeW Space Trans~fiation Systems, an AIAA assessment, Jan.

9, 1973. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1290

Avenue of the Americas, N. Y., New York 10019.

tude of space expenditures and questioned the

value gained from those expenditures, the STG

report appeared to be too optimistic, too positive

regarding the nature of new space opportunities.

This ambiguity permitted individuals with somewhat different perspectives to see in it what they

wished to see while the report retained some of

its essential characteristics. Specifically, it permitted the Vice president to advocate a vigorous

new commitment such as a manned mission to

the planets before the end of the century and

OMB to look at a program which eventually was

projected at a very modest continuing budget

level. STG issued its report as a public document

after briefing the President, and it was in this

period that public and congressional response

was evaluated to determine the nature of the

commitment that could develop around the concepts that were proposed. It was only later, in

the context of specific budget reviews, that the

decisions would be taken on the STG recommendations.

Interagency reviews can serve to build a constituency for space program initiatives. For example, the STG recommendation focused attention

on the space shuttle program as the next major

step in technology development. NASA in-house

planning exercises do not appear to have the

same effect. A key element is participation by

elements of the Executive Office of the President

in order to bridge the communications gap from

agency to President. Such reviews are not sufficient to generate a political commitment to costly

new programs, but may be a necessary precursor.

The Shuttle Decision

In the period immediately after the STG report,

NASA programs continued with no major new

commitment to a new development. During this

period, the attention of the agency was focused

on completing revisits to the Moon using already

developed and purchased Apollo hardware, and

using a modified version of this hardware in a prototype manned habitat called Skylab.17 Skylab

was an effort to stretch the utility of Apollo hardI zArneriCa NeW &cade in Space, a report to the Space Task

Group prepared by National Aeronautics and Space Administration, September 1969.
Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 99

ware, demonstrate manned flight in Earth orbit

over a prolonged period, and perform a number of operations, including observations with a

solar telescope, During this period, NASA was

given initial exploratory funding for the space

shuttle design and early development work on

a new liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen, high-pressure rocket engine that would be suitable for a

shuttle. The need to make a major commitment

to the shuttle came to a focus in the context of

the review of the fiscal year 1973 budget that was

carried out in the fall of 1971. At that time, the

reelection campaign of 1972 loomed on the horizon for the Nixon administration. Also at that

time, unemployment in the aerospace industry

was a major political embarrassment, and the

review of the NASA program in the fall of 1971

gave particular attention to the short-term employment picture. NASA was by this time committed to a shuttle development program as the

next major step in the advancement of space

technology. Also developed by NASA was a

major economic evaluation of the shuttle based

on an elaborate mission model that projected

missions in various categories of activities out

through the end of the decade. In NASA’s presentations, the economic benefit of proceeding with

a space shuttle was part of its argument in favor

of adopting this program. To the analysts in OMB,

however, this argument was unpersuasive, because, in part, shuttle development costs were

highly speculative and the mission model contained a large number of questionable assumptions about the civilian program. In the analysis

for the fiscal year 1973 budget, the major issue

was whether or not the United States should continue with a manned flight program, and if so,

with what technical systems. OMB concluded

that the United States would derive a majority

of the benefits from space activities without a

manned flight component. However, this decision would have had dramatic impact on the

nature of the NASA establishment (resulting in

the closing of at least two major centers) and

would have lowered NASA budgets to approximately $2 billion or less per year. At this rate,

there could still be a very vigorous unmanned

science and applications program. Manned flight,

on the other hand, could be continued, either

with modified and extended Apollo hardware,

with a new-generation space capsule, or as part

of a space shuttle program in which man would

be involved both as a pilot and as a participant

in Earth-orbital experiment programs (including

the launch and recovery of unmanned satellite

systems from low-Earth orbit).

A firm commitment to the space shuttle remained an open question until the very last

Presidential decisions were being made on the

fiscal year 1973 program. During this period, the

employment impact of a positive decision on the

shuttle was analyzed in great detail. In January

1972, the President made a well-publicized commitment to a space shuttle development program.

This commitment was constrained by some key

guidelines:

●

●

●

The shuttle would be carried out under a

budget target rather than on the basis of a

schedule that had to be met. The budget target that was eventually agreed to was for a

considerably scaled-down shuttle from the

one originally projected by NASA, with a

development program cost targeted at slightly over $5 billion in constant 1971 dollars.

The shuttle was expected to be a “national”

program, that is, it would serve all agency

launch needs for payloads that were in the

shuttle range. Specifically, this requirement

implied that NASA and DOD would need

to define a common, acceptable payload bay

size, operating characteristics, and compatible subsystems. (At the time, the questions

to be resolved included whether DOD

would have its own shuttle orbiter, whether

DOD would have its own crews, whether

classified payloads would be incorporated

with an unclassified payload, etc.) The major

premise was that such a substantial investment in a new technological capability could

not reasonably be made unless it would

serve or be capable of serving the broadest

set of national needs.

The initial concept included the possibility

that DOD would assume some degree of

funding responsibility for shuttle development. This was subsequently modified in

view of the rather substantial DOD budgets

already in existence for other weapons systems and space developments. It was agreed
100 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

that DOD’s share of the program development costs would be limited to DOD funding for the west coast launch site for the shuttle and a companion interim upper stage development for boosting shuttle payloads into

higher orbits.

● International cooperation in the shuttle program was also an objective; it was satisfied

by the eventual agreement that the Europeans would construct a laboratory module

to be carried as a shuttle payload.

The shuttle decision was a multiyear development commitment, not as aggressive or substantial as NASA would have liked, but yet ensuring

the continuing utilization of the technical development and management capabilities of the

Johnson and Marshall Space Flight Centers and

a new development activity for the Kennedy

Space Center. Most viewed the shuttle as a program that would act to stimulate some technology

development, but would not be so complex or

difficult to achieve as to be threatened by major

overruns or schedule delays. The shuttle had

great potential for changing the way people

would think about placing payloads into space;

e.g., it would change the design of these payloads

to allow reuse and repair, it would permit human

tending and space checkout prior to launch into

orbit, it would increase the flexibility of space

operations to allow larger crews and potentially

less-trained scientific personnel to conduct operations in space, and ultimately it would be the key

to any continuing Earth-orbital habitat for man,

since it would provide resupply at a much more

reasonable cost than use of expendable vehicles.

On the negative side, the President and Congress recognized that initiating shuttle development and terminating the limited program utilizing existing Apollo hardware would result in a

hiatus in manned flight for a period of 4 to 5 years.

During this period the Soviet Union would have

an opportunity to initiate new space spectaculars

with uncertain international and domestic political impact. The commitment to substantial shuttle development funding within a constrained

NASA budget implied an additional problem. As

part of the shuttle commitment, NASA was given

some assurance it could plan on level budgets,

in constant dollars, for the duration of the shuttle development program. Thus, growth in shuttle funding requirements would have a tendency to squeeze out other new programs. It was

this aspect that was viewed with great alarm by

those who supported greater emphasis on space

science and applications activities. Thus, the shuttle decision was not a completely happy one in

this community. One of the most important

lessons to be learned from the shuttle decision

is that a commitment to continued manned space

flight has the greatest budget impact and is the

most politically driven part of the space program.

Such factors as aerospace employment or national image therefore have a strong bearing on

Photo credit: Nationa/ Aeronauts and Space Administration

Air Force Titan ///-C lifting off to launch Applications

Technology Satellite 6, May 30, 1974. The first in a

generation of NASA communications satellites
Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 101

decisions that are made and must be factored into

the technical aspects.

Communications R&D Decision

NASA responsibility for a leadership role in

developing space capabilities, performing the

necessary R&D in all of the areas of interest involving space systems, had included an early and

substantial role in developing the basic technologies that were vital to the increasingly sophisticated civilian communications satellite business.

These technologies were demonstrated in a series

of applications technology satellites. The technologies included advanced stabilization techniques,

the control of satellite position in synchronous

orbit and, in the last satellite of the series, a

demonstration of broadcast technology from the

satellite to small, low-cost ground stations.

The second of these broadcast satellites that

was scheduled to be launched was terminated

by OMB. Additionally, OMB acted to reduce significantly the role of NASA as developer and

demonstrator of advanced satellite telecommunications technology. The leadership for this

change in emphasis came from the Office of

Telecommunications Policy (OTP) and was consistent with the trend to place greater responsibility in the private sector for telecommunications

systems developments. The assumption underlying this decision was that NASA’s contributions

were not necessary to maintain the sophistication of current and projected communications

satellite systems. In addition, OTP believed that

the revenues obtained from satellite communications to support work in the industry at such

technical centers as the COMSAT Laboratories

were sufficient to enable incremental improvements to be made during the foreseeable

future. DOD’s R&D role in telecommunications

satellites was not similarly reduced, and it was expected that DOD would continue to support

technology advances in this area.

The most immediate effect of the decision was

to stimulate the technology development activities of a number of potential foreign competitors in the telecommunications satellite area,

because the basic approach of U.S. industry was

to continue to exploit the proved technologies

that were available and to package these technologies in larger and more capable satellites.

Thus, in the intervening years, the telecommunications technology advancements that were

typically a responsibility of NASA have for the

most part not occurred in the United States. Starting from a very inferior technological position,

the Europeans and the Japanese have built considerable competence in this field, and in some

areas appear to have leapfrogged U.S. technology.

The decision of the Carter administration to

return more responsibility to NASA for R&D in

satellite communications provided, somewhat

belatedly, that the agency would again assert itself

in this field as an agent for technology push.

NASA has interpreted its charge to mean that satellite systems initiated under this new, invigorated

program should have a potential direct application; the agency expects industry to support these

programs to some degree. The current plan includes, first, development of collaborative agreements certifying to OMB that industry’s interest

is genuine, and second, provision that any demonstration system, if successful, may have a direct

application,

Without Government support for high-risk applications systems R&D, the competitive posture

of the United States may slip vis-~-vis other nations that do subsidize their industry. The current legislative authority for NASA does not preclude major reductions in its role as a sponsor

of advanced R&D, suggesting an opportunity to

clarify the meaning and significance of “leadership in aeronautical and space activities” as stated

in the NAS Act,

President’s Space Policy

Statement of 1978

In october 1978, President Carter released a

space policy statement that summarized the important aspects of the administration review of

space policy and provided guidance regarding

the President’s view of national objectives in the

space program over the next several years. This

statement reaffirmed endorsement of a balanced

space program and committed the administration

to the continued development of the space shut-
102 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

tle system and its use during the coming decade.

However, the statement made no new commitments and specifically rejected any major new

technological development. No multiyear program or goal was set to provide a focus for the

program and the general philosophy was best

characterized by the statement that “activities will

be pursued in space when it appears that national

objectives can most efficiently be met through

space activities. ” Overall, the policy statement

left many questions unanswered. It made several

statements about what the United States would

not do in space but remained very general regarding the nature of what we would do in space. In

addition, it became clear that fiscal constraints

were likely, and as a consequence, commitment

to specific multiyear programs was very likely to

be taken only with great care. This announcement was received with some dismay by the congressional leaders involved with the space program and by the aerospace community. This concern spawned a number of hearings and proposed legislative approaches to a more vigorous

space policy for the United States and led to the

request to. OTA for the current assessment.

NSC Policy Review Committee (Space)

The review of space policy undertaken by the

Carter administration revealed that there was no

procedure for adjudicating interagency disagreements about space issues. To remedy this defect,

a policy review committee chaired by the Director of OSTP was established within the NSC structure to address such issues as might arise. This

role had previously been played by the National

Aeronautics and Space Council until it was abolished in 1973. An important consequence of utilizing the NSC structure is a rather strong orientation towards national security and military affairs. Issues arising in the civilian space program

often have international importance, but as a matter of practice, they have been considered separately from those concerning national security or

the military space program. The placement of this

mechanism under the NSC provides a somewhat

different flavor to the approach to civilian space

policysetting. It is also important to note that this

mechanism is intended to provide a means for

resolving issues but not to provide planning or

goal setting for space activities.

An alternative to the NSC structure would have

been to conduct space policy review under the

auspices of the Federal Coordinating Council for

Science, Engineering, and Technology, a group

that has a parallel function and is also chaired

by the Director of the OSTP. The Federal Council has a charter, and is specifically charged with

the coordination of activities among the principal

agencies performing R&D, the recommendation

of policy, and associated questions. Yet this

mechanism was avoided in favor of the NSC setting. In part, this recognizes the great importance

of space to the national security, the greater influence of the NSC, and the fact that the space

policy review originally arose in the context of

an issue regarding civilian/military space relationships.
Chapter 5

U.S. CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM
Contents

Page

Our Dependence on Space . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Current Status and Planned Future

Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

New Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Satellite Remote Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Ocean Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Earth Resources Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Landsat Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Space Segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Ground Segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Other Remote-Sensing Programs . . . . 122

International Weather Activities . . . . . 125

Materials Processing in Space . . . . . . 125

Space Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Space Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Solar Power in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Space Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Public Attitudes on Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Pubiic Opinion and Space Policy:

1965-80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

interest Groups and Space Policy . . . 140

Space Achievement and Public

Opinion: 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

U.S. Government Civilian Satellite

Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

U.S. Military Satellite Systems. . . . . . . 106

Selected Groups of Civilian Spacecraft

Launched by NASA From 1950

to 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Selected Groups of Potential Future

NASA Spacecraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Overview of Landsat Applications in

the 50 States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Summary of Operational Landsat

Applications in the States . . . . . . . . . . 121

Table No. Page

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

STS Operations Traffic Model . . . . . . . 128

Distribution of Opinion Toward

Federal Spending on the Space

Program: 1973 Through 1980. . . . . . . 137

Percentage of Americans Favoring

Increased Funding, and Relative

Priority Rankings, for ll Areas of

Federal Government Spending, 1977

and 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Public Priorities for Federal R&D

Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Perceived Benefits From Space

Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Profile of Public Attitudes of Space

Exploration: “in General Do You

Favor or Oppose the Exploration of

Outer Space?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

How Would You Rank the Importance

of Various Uses of the Space

Shuttle? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

“ls the Space Shuttle Program Worth

Spending Several Billion Dollars Over

the Next IO Years to Develop Its Full

Potential?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Page

l. The Communications Problem . . . . . . . 112

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9,

Earth Resources Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Landsat Bands and Electromagnetic

Spectrum Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Current and Probable Landsat Ground

Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Shuttle Manifest Through 1984. . . . . . . 129

Current NASA Expendable Launch

Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Initial Space Station Conception . . . . . 130

Solar Power Satellite Reference

System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Long-Term Trend Polling Results of

U.S. Public Opinion on the Federal

Space Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Chapter 5

U.S. CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM

OUR DEPENDENCE ON SPACE

The extent to which the modern world in general and the United States in particular have become dependent on space technology is not generally appreciated. If the United States were to

cease using space systems, day-to-day life and

business activities throughout society would be

disrupted. National security would be jeopardized as well. This section outlines the effects of

doing without space, first in the civilian sector,

then in the military sector. Tables 3 and 4 list the

major U.S. space systems.

In the civilian sector, long-cl;stance communications would be perhaps hardest hit. Already

over two-thirds of all overseas telephone traffic

is carried over satellite links provided by the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (1 NTELSAT) system. Not only would private

citizens be unable to complete many of their

calls, but the rates for those calls completed

would have to rise in order to provide enough

capital to lay additional transatlantic cable to

replace the capacity lost from satellite circuits.

News reporting all over the world would be

severely restricted and delayed. Global television

reporting would be out of the question, so that

news from the international wire services would

be restricted to stories and photographs that

could be taped or transmitted as they were before

the space age, through uncertain and congested

ground links or via private courier. Newspaper

editors in the United States would be left in the

same quandary as their television counterparts,

especially in receiving news from remoter regions

such as the Middle East, South Africa, and Southeast Asia.

Domestic television service of the major networks would be severely curtailed, not only to

relatively remote locations such as Alaska and

Hawaii, but even within the continental United

States, About two-thirds of all cable television

service would be shut down, for much of both

the basic-service national programing as well as

premium pay-television programing is transmitted

to cable television systems across the Nation via

Table 3.—U.S. Government Civilian Satellite Systems

Program Orbit Purpose

GOES (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous

NOAA (3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous

TDRSS (first launch. . . . . . . . Geosynchronous

early 1983)

HEAO (High Energy

Astronomy Observatory). . . LEO

NIMBUS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Polar

TIROS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Polar

Landsat-3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Polar

Landsat-D (mid 1982). . . . . . . Polar

DE (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) Elliptical

(Dynamics Explorer). . . . . . . . (1) LEO

SBS (3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous

RCA (4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous

Comstar (4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous

Westar (3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous

AT&T (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous

Marisat (3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geosynchronous

Meteorological

Meteorological

Communications relay from other

satellites to ground

Scientific

Meteorological

Meteorological

Earth observation

Electromagnetic field observation,

space science

Scientific

Communication data, voice, video

Communication data, voice, video

Communication (COMSAT) data,

voice, video

Communication (Western Union) data,

voice, video

Communication data, voice, video

Marine Communication (COMSAT) data

& voice

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

105
106 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 4.—U.S. Military Satellite Systems

Program Satellites Functions

Defense Satellite

Communications System II

(DSCS 11).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Satellite Data System (SDS).

Air Force Satellite

Communications System

(A FSATCOM) . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . 4 active High capacity super high frequency

2 dormant spares communications. Part of Worldwide Military

Command and Control System (WWMCCS).

. . . . 3 Carries AFSATCOM transponders.

. . . . Radio transponders carrod on UHF communications among National Command

SDS, FLTSATCOM (other Authority, Joint Chiefs. Military Commanders in

satellites?) Chief, and nuclear capable forces.

Fleet Satellite Communications

(FLTSATCOM). .............. 3 UHF and separate SHF uplink. Naval

Communications System operates over U.S.

Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, Contains some

jam-resistant 5-KHz channels for AFSATCOM,

1,500-KHz channel for Presidential support for

network of regional commands.

Early warning of ICBM, SLBM launches by infrared

detection of rocket plumes. Also carries visible

light detectors and radiation sensors for

detecting nuclear explosions. Provides

surveillance of missile test launches.

Area-search and close-look remote sensing.

Defense Support Program

(DSP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Photographic Reconnaissance. . . 2 types

Electronic (Signals) Intelligence. . At least 5 launches

since 1973

Geodetic Satellite. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Defense Meteorological. . . . . . . . . 2 block 5D spacecraft

Navy Navigation Satellite

System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TRANSIT (5 operating?) NOVA

Global Positioning System

(GPS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..6 NAVSTAR (18 now planned)

Integrated Operational Nuclear

Detection System (IONDS). . . . . Aboard GPS, beginning with

NAVSTAR 5

Space Detection and Tracking

System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ground-based cameras, radar,

and radio receivers

Photographic mapping in three dimensions.

Radar altimeter for topographical mapping of

Iand and seacoasts.

Visual and infrared images satellite programs (most

recent launch weather conditions, global failed)

coverage four times a day.

Measurement in Doppler shift of radio emissions

from satellites permits ship and aircraft

navigators to find position.

Precisely timed radio beacons will allow users to

determine position in three dimensions to within

10 m velocity to O.lm/sec.

Detect and monitor nuclear explosions worldwide

using bhangmeter sensors and GPS location

data.

Data funneled into Aerospace Defense Command

Space Defense Operations Center,

Colorado Springs, Colo. Identification and

tracking of objects in space.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 107

communications satellite transponders, Future

plans for a variety of direct broadcast satellite

television and information programs to private

homes and businesses would be canceled.

Several less obvious services would no longer

be possible. Weather reporting would be severely hampered; no synoptic view of large portions

of the Earth from either polar orbits or from geosynchronous orbit would be available. These

services are especially necessary for viewing the

development of large weather patterns over the

ocean several hundred miles off shore. Meteorologists would have to rely once again on piecing together fragments of weather observations

from observation ships, radiosonde balloons,

buoys, and light aircraft. Furthermore, observations of long-term changes in the ocean, atmosphere and polar ice would no longer be readily

available. Without them, we could not predict

long-term trends as well as we do now.

Navigation services would be significantly curtailed. Already more than 1,000 ships rely on satellite transmissions to ascertain their positions

with great accuracy. Similar services soon to be

made available for use in remote land regions

would no longer be possible. Ship-to-shore and

ship-to-ship communications via the global maritime satellite communications system (MARlSAT)

would be dangerously reduced; the task of the

Navy, Coast Guard, and commercial ships on

search-and-rescue missions would therefore be

even more difficult. The International Maritime

Satellite Organization (l NMARSAT) would have

no raison d’être.

Satellite remote-sensing services, which have

been important for the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior, would be eliminated. No longer would satellite sensors be available to improve the management of the Nation’s

agriculture, forest, range, land and water resources—or to monitor large-scale catastrophic

events such as the eruption of Mount St. Helens.

Worldwide crop forecasting, an essential service

for the U.S. agricultural sector, would be made

much more difficult, nor would the United States

be able to help developing countries to inventory and manage their own resources.

No longer would satellites be available for gathering data for studying the movement of air

masses and the transformation of pollutants in the

lower atmosphere. Similarly, of longer term concern, it would no longer be possible to monitor

the chemistry, radiation exchange, and dynamics

of the upper atmosphere in order to predict the

long-term effects of human activities on these

regions. Therefore, it might not be possible to

know until too late whether man-made chemicals

will continue to reduce the amount of ozone in

the ozone layer, and what ill effects such a reduction might have on human life in this generation

and the next.

The NIMBUS weather satellites of the National

Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA) with their coastal-zone color scanners,

would no longer observe the colors of the oceans

over vast areas—revealing the murky green regions rich in plankton that are feeding grounds

for schools of fish. Without this information,

fishing fleets would expend 10 to 20 percent

more marine fuel to locate their catches, and

would pass along that increase in cost to the consumer as a higher price for seafood.

The search for new sources of minerals and energy resources would be curtailed; sensors under

development, such as improved magnetometers

or the multilineal array would not be sent into

orbit. Without the data they promise to return,

the ability to search for resources of long-range

strategic importance, such as cobalt, titanium,

and petroleum would be hindered.

Not only would all these applications become

impossible, but many parts of space science

would cease. No longer would spacecraft be

launched into orbit to study the activity of the

Sun or to observe the atmosphere and surface

of the planets. In the absence of orbiting sensors

and telescopes above the atmosphere to investigate radiation at wavelengths unattainable on

Earth, ultraviolet, X-rays, gamma rays, cosmic

rays, future understanding of the structure and

evolution of the universe would be severely limited.

Meanwhile, in the military sector, many systems on which we rely for national security and
108 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

for which adequate substitutes do not exist would

be lost. Perhaps the most dangerous loss would

be the capability to monitor the military activities

of potential enemies. Surveillance satellites,

which monitor the ground with high resolution

at visible and infrared wavelengths, with synthetic-aperature radar, and by electronic “ferret”

listening devices, are essential to ensure that foreign countries observe the terms of arms control

treaties and to provide early warning of a nuclear

attack. Military and diplomatic communications

abroad and at sea would be slower, less reliable

and less secure. There would be less ready access

to high-speed instant communications between

ground stations, field commanders, ships, submarines and long-range strategic bombers. Navigation and global positioning for military units

would be deprived of the high degree of precision available through the use of positional satellite systems.

The way in which our society does business

would be seriously affected by the loss of space.

Not only would the availability of space services

be cut off, but the revenue from those services

would cease to flow. Perhaps hardest hit would

be corporations in the communications business.

Many of the major cable television operators

would suffer, since their principal revenue flows

from satellite-carried pay-television programmers

such as Home Box Office, Showtime, and a dozen others. Furthermore, the loss of commercially sponsored “basic” cable programing beamed

from satellite transponders would cause advertisers to cancel their commercials and withdraw

their support-resulting in the bankruptcy of a

number of programing sources. Western Union

with its WESTAR satellites, RCA with its SATCOM

satellites, would feel similar blows, although the

impact would be somewhat lessened since

the parent companies are diversified. Still,

those employees directly connected with

those companies’ space segments—plus companies such as the Communications Satellite

Corporation (COMSAT) whose entire business

was related to space—would find themselves

either idled or in desperate straits.

A final but important result of the dependence

on space systems is that a large number of jobs

and business opportunities would be lost if space

activities ceased. Not only would future entrepreneurial activities in such areas as materials

processing be cut off at the outset, the disappearance of space science as an existing discipline would wash up into the halls of major contracting centers such as the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Calif., and in major universities heavily committed to space investigation

(some 10 to 20). With the dissolution of the

civilian space activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), agreements with some 100 prime contractors would

be canceled–forcing those contractors to cancel

orders from subcontractors for specialized components. Since approximately two-thirds of the

U.S. civilian space budget is awarded each year

to private contractors, as those commitments

disappeared some 50,000 jobs with contractors

related to space would also disappear—undoubtedly adding a bit more burden to the unemployment rolls. Furthermore, those companies

affected would probably retrench a bit on corporate advertising in various trade and lay publications. That loss in advertising revenue would

cause a number of the heavily space-oriented

publications to reduce the number of editorial

pages in each issue and to perhaps contract their

staffs.

Although many workers connected with space

activities would probably find other employment

(a good number in military and civilian high technology), an important infrastructure of expertise

and experience would be lost. The future U.S.

position in many areas of advanced technology

would also be jeopardized—e.g., sensors, data

analysis, precision control systems. in addition,

through losing the extension of our society’s collective eyes and ears throughout the solar system, and losing the heartpounding excitement of

sharing an astronaut’s launch and experiments

in orbit, the United States would lose an important aspect of its shared national experience—

the sense of adventure, confidence, self-esteem

and world leadership provided by pursuing and

succeeding at space

years.

The conclusion of

United States would

terns is that it would

activities over the past 25

imagining what life in the

be like without space syscertainly be very different
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program . 109

and in many respects poorer. The extent of our argue that our dependence on space is great and

present uses of space systems and the increas- will increase.

ing promise of future uses of space technology

CURRENT STATUS AND PLANNED FUTURE ACTIVITIES

This section reviews the civilian space activities video transmissions. It includes broadcasting from

of the United States in Government, industry, and one point to many, distributed over relatively

academia, and the direction those activities are large areas; position-location activities such as

likely to take in the near future (through 1990). navigation, traffic control, and search and rescue;

Department of Defense (DOD) space activities and transmissions to, from, and among mobile

are not treated in detail in this report except as transmitters and receivers (e.g., aircraft, ships,

they directly relate to the civilian program. Table motor vehicles).

5 offers a glimpse of the generic space flight activities and spacecraft that have comprised the In the civilian sector, point-to-point satellite

U.S. civilian program. Table 6 shows NASA’s communications has been a commercial activflight programs for the future. ity since the Communications Satellite Act of 1962

Applications

Communications

established COMSAT and designated it to represent U.S. interests in international, commercial

satellite communication. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) “Open Skies” decision in 1970 opened domestic satellite communiBroadly speaking, satellite communications cations services to competition among commercomprises point-to-point message, data, and cial entities. Today (early 1982) there are four

Table 5.—Selected Groups of Civilian Spacecraft Launched by NASA From 1950 to 1980

Launches

Sponsor Number

Purpose Spacecraft names (if not NASA) successful/total Years

Astrophysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Planetary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Communicaions—R&D

operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Meteorology—R&D

operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Geodesy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Terrestrial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Oceanography . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Explorer, Orbiting Observatories ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . .

Pioneer, Mariner, Viking, Voyager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Echo, Relay, Syncom, ATS,

Intelsat, Westar, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commercial . . . .

TIROS, Nimbus, SMS (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ITOS, GOES, NOAA(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NOAA. . . . . . . . . .

Explorer, PAGEOS, GEOS, LAGEOS (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ERTS, Landsat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Seasat (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60/74

20/24

13/16

39/43

22/24

19/22

717

3/3

1/1

1961-80

1962-78

1960-74

1962-80

1959-78

1966-80

1964-76

1972-78

1978

(l), (2), (3) Also benefit oceanography: (2) GOES series DCS

NOAA series DCS, IR

Spacecraft Sensor

(3) GEOS-3 ALT

(1) TIROS-N DCS, IR

NIMBUS-5 MR (4) Seasat sensor complement:

NIMBUS-6 DCS, MR ALT, IR, MR, SAR, SCAT

NIMBUS-7 CS, MR

SMS DCS

Sensor key:

ALT . . . . . . . Altimeter

Cs . . . . . . . . Color scanner

DCS. . . . . . . Data collection system

IR . . . . . . . . . Infrared radiometer

MR. . . . . . . . Microwave radiometer

SAR. . . . . . . Synthetic aperture radar

SCAT. . . . . . Scatterometer

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
110 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 6.—Selected Groups of Potential Future NASA Spacecraft

Earliest

Purpose Spacecraft names Acronym launch

Astrophysics ● 8 explorer-class satellites 1981-87

● Space telescope 1985

Origin of plasmas in Earth’s neighborhood OPEN 1987

Gamma Ray Observatory GRO 1988

Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility AXAF 1989

Planetary ● Galileo (Jupiter) 1985

Halley Comet Flyby 1985

Venus orbiting imaging radar VOIR 1988

Communications–R&D 30/20 GHZ 1987

Meteorology—R&D ● Earth radiation budget experiment ERBE 1984

Upper atmospheric research satellite UARS 1988

NOAA next and GOES next 1989, 1990

Geodesy Gravity Satellite (1) GRAVSAT 1987

Terrestrial ● Landsat D & D’ 1982, 1983

Oceanography Topography experiment TOPEX 1987

Free-flying imaging radar experiment (2) FIREX 1988

● These are the only spacecraft currently under development.

(1) Also benefits oceanography.

(2) Also benefits terrestrial.

separate domestic systems in orbit, with a total

of 10 satellites, providing voice, data, video, and

networking distribution services to a variety of

clients: 1 ) the Comstar system of COMSAT General provides services to the American Telephone

and Telegraph Co. (AT&T) and the General Telephone and Electronics Corp.; 2) the RCA American Communications system furnishes point-topoint and video network distribution services to

private customers as well as to cable and terrestrial broadcasting systems; 3) Western Union’s

WESTAR supplies point-to-point services to private customers and video and radio network distribution services to the Public Broadcasting Service and National Public Radio; and 4) Satellite

Business Systems (SBS) provides data transmission services to industrial organizations. In addition, several other firms, among them Fairchild

Industries’ American Satellite Co., Southern Pacific Communications, and Xerox Corp. ’s XTEN,

supply specialized communication services

through transponders leased from satellite-owning corporations. Other firms, not in the business

of transmission, lease satellite data or voice channels directly from members of other sets of carriers.

In addition, COMSAT General owns and operates the MARlSAT system, providing message and

data transmission services to ships at sea. Until

1973, COMSAT also managed the INTELSAT system, a global, commercial satellite communications system providing voice, data, and video

transmission services to 103 countries. As manager for INTELSAT, COMSAT specified, procured,

arranged for launch, and controlled satellites in

the INTELSAT system. Under the definitive arrangements, entered into force in 1973, most of

these functions have been taken over by the Director General of INTELSAT, assisted by an international staff, though COMSAT retains some responsibilities. Domestic carriers perform these

functions themselves for their own satellites.

NASA provides launches and launch services for

all corporations under reimbursable contract

arrangements.

Technology

Most communications satellites are placed in

geostationary satellite orbit (GSO), a circular orbit

the center of which coincides with the Earth’s

center, and which lies in the plane of the Earth’s

Equator. It has a radius of some 42,200 km, which

corresponds to an altitude of some 35,800 km

above the Equator. On the GSO, a satellite moves

around the polar axis with the same period and

in the same sense as does the Earth: as a result,

the satellite, if visible, would appear from the

Earth to be stationed at a fixed point in the sky.
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 111

Because its celestial latitude is fixed at 0°, a GSO

satellite’s position is defined by its longitude.

The definition of the GSO given above is theoretical because several natural forces perturb the

orbit of the spacecraft. A satellite placed in GSO

and then left unattended will suffer changes both

in its longitude and in its latitude, Seen from the

ground, these changes become alterations in the

elevation and azimuth angle of the satellite. In

order to keep the satellite in GSO, it is necessary

to resort to artificial, “stationkeeping devices. ”

At present, stationkeeping is considered adequately accurate if the satellite is maintained

within a range of &/–O. 10 in both longitude and

latitude. Because of the remaining motions of the

satellite, GSO is not actually a circle, but rather

a narrow torus with dimensions corresponding

to some 150 km of north-south variation and 30

km of altitude variation.

GSO belongs to a broader family of orbits

called geosynchronous; these orbits are generally

inclined with respect to the equatorial plane, they

may be circular or elliptical, but satellites move

on them with the same period, and with the same

sense of rotation, as the Earth. Geosynchronous

satellites are seen from the ground to describe

figures of 24-hour periods and varying shapes.1

Commercial communications satellites (except

for some early U.S. experiments and some developed by the U .S. S. R.) lie in GSO. The reason for

this choice is that advantages of GSO far outweigh its disadvantages. The advantages are as

follows:2

●

●

●

The satellite remains essentially stationary

relative to look angle of the Earth station antennas; the cost of computer-controlled

tracking of the satellite can be avoided. A

fixed antenna (with provision for manual adjustment) will suffice.

There is no need to switch from one satellite

to another as one disappears over the horizon.

Because the radius of GSO is so large, a GSO

satellite is in line-of-sight from 42.4 percent

of the Earth’s surface (or 38 percent, if angles

‘ International Aeronautical Federation, ‘ ‘On the Efficient Use of

the Geostationary Orbit, ” 1980, p. 8.

2James Martin, Communications satellites, p. 45.

●

of elevation below 50 are not used). A large

number of Earth stations may thus intercommu nicate.

Three communications satellites can provide

coverage of 90 percent of the globe; only the

polar regions cannot be reached.

The disadvantages of GSO satellites are:3

●

●

Latitudes greater than 81 .25° north and

south (or 77o, if angles of elevation below

5° are excluded) are not covered.

Because of the distance of the satellite, the

received signal power, which diminishes inversely as the square of the distance, is weak,

and the signal propagation delay is 270 milIiseconds. To minimize the effects of this

time delay and the associated effects of echo,

which are problems both in voice conversations and in error correction equipment

used with high-speed data circuits, echo suppressors and echo chancellors have been developed.

For a given position of GSO, there is a definite

area on the surface of the Earth within which all

points can effectively intercommunicate with

a satellite in that given position, the so-called service zone. In order to cover a maximal service

zone, positions for the satellite are severely

limited. Satellites intended for intercontinental,

or generally, global service must by necessity

have priority for certain orbital longitude slots,

once the service zone has been defined. (This

comment applies not only to telecommunication

services, but also to the observation zone in cases

of meteorological or Earth observation missions.)

On the other hand, satellites that service or

observe a relatively small area of the Earth’s surface can generally be positioned with greater flexibility, the more so the lower the mean latitude

of the served areas. However, small service areas

that extend to higher latitudes will also be limited

in their satellite positions because of the limited

visibility of the GSO from high latitudes.

As a result of these various constraints imposed

on the positions of GSO satellites, with radiofrequency constraints not yet considered, the GSO

is not, and probably will never be, populated with

lbid., p. 45.
112 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

—

a uniform density of satellites. [t follows that congestion in desirable arcs of the GSO will proceed

more rapidly as demand for service grows than

was initially envisioned by the regulatory agencies (fig. 1).

Radiofrequency allocations and GSO positions

are controlled by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). ITU is responsible for the

maintenance of international cooperation in communications and it assigns operating frequencies

and GSO slots to satellite communications systems.

With the early satellites, the enormous distances involved, the limited channel capacity,

and the limited power available to the transponders–transmitter-and-receiver pairs on the

spacecraft-dictated that Earth stations use

powerful transmitters, very large antennas, and

sensitive receivers. Those requirements generally

still hold true, but contemporary commercial

communications satellites carry a dozen or more

transponders, each capable of relaying as many

as 600 voice channels. Wide-band signals are

beamed to the satellite from an Earth station on

an assigned up-link (Earth-to-space) frequency;

the satellite receives the signals and retransmits

them on a down-link (space-to-Earth) frequency

to an Earth station that may be thousands of kilometers away from the transmitting Earth station.

By convention, to describe the band used by a

particular satellite, the up-link frequency is given,

followed by the down-link frequency (e.g., 6/4

GHz).

Satellites must be sufficiently separated to avoid

radio interference. The required separation between satellites depends on several factors, including the beamwidths of satellite and Earthstation antennas, the side-lobe performance of

Earth-station antennas, the modulation technique

employed, and the carrier frequency of the transfigure 1 .—The Communications Problem

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 113

missions. Currently, a 30 separation of spacecraft

operating in the 6/4 GHz band is required. In any

case, only a limited number of spacecraft can be

accommodated in a given arc of geostationary

orbit.

Current commercial communications satellites

operate primarily in two bands of the microwave

region of the radio spectrum, the 6/4 and the

14/1 2 GHz bands (or, the C and the Ku bands,

respectively), well above the band used for ultra

high frequency (UHF) television broadcasting. At

these frequencies, signals are propagated in

straight lines, requiring the satellite to be within

line-of-sight of Earth stations. The very narrow

beam widths require that the ground and satellite

antennas be alined precisely, within a fraction of

a minute of arc.

As use of the 14/12 band is still in its early

stages, nearly all commercially operated communications satellites operate in the 6/4 band.

Because this band is shared with heavily congested microwave relay systems, collocating an

Earth station poses the problem of finding an interference-free location. There are few such locations around large population centers, which

have the greatest need for communications services. Moreover, relatively large antennas and

costly Earth stations are required to provide highdensity telephone-type traffic. Once the allocated

band is filled, further increases in satellite capacity can be achieved only by reuse of the available

frequency spectrum. Reuse is possible both by

reducing the down-link beam width and by increasing the satellite antenna gain so that different

beams cover different service areas.

Capacity can be further increased by polarization diversity. A vertically polarized beam can be

transmitted along with a horizontally polarized

beam of the same frequency, and the two can

be detected and received separately. Polarization

diversity occurs when two beams with identical

or overlapping frequency bands are orthogonally polarized. Receivers are designed to respond

to only one polarization, so that the same frequency band can be used twice within the same

coverage area— i.e., using two polarized beams

in the same frequency range doubles the amount

of information that can be sent with that bandwidth.

From 1980 to 1990, increasing demand for

North American satellite circuits will outstrip the

available capacity of the geostationary orbit for

6/4 GHz systems, even with the application of

frequency reuse techniques. In addition, the difficulty of locating Earth stations in and near the

communication sources in population centers

will accelerate the use of the higher frequency

bands. To meet these projected demands, additional satellites will become operational in the

14/1 2 GHz bands. Because there is no sharing

of these frequencies in the United States with the

terrestrial radio relay service, Earth stations could

be located directly in cities. Recent research (the

CTS experiment) has indicated that 3-m ground

antennas are adequate for J 4/12 reception. Techniques such as increased satellite transmitter

power, higher antenna gain, and spot beam

spacecraft antennas must compensate for this use

of smaller ground antennas and the occasional

rain attenuation in the higher frequency bands

(discussed below). A disadvantage of spot beam

antennas is that the area they can serve is reduced. Thus, multiple spot beams must be provided, and satellite transmitter power increased

to cover the same total area as before.

A constraint on operations in the 14/12 GHz

band is that signals transmitted from the satellite

to Earth can suffer significant attenuation during

periods of intense rainfall (a problem that will

be worse at 30/20 GHz, the Ka band). Measurements and analysis.have been made of the effects

of this attenuation on satellite signal propagation.

Satellite systems using this band must have high

power levels (a factor that increases their cost),

rely on paired Earth stations geographically separated (“diversity”), or have some other form of

backup, if all ground locations require that service be available nearly 100 percent of the time.

However, for many commercial applications, rain

outages can be tolerated.

An important factor in satellite communication

in the 1980’s will be the use of the space shuttle

for many launches. The shuttle will facilitate the

introduction of physically larger, more powerful

satellites with increased capabilities. However,

to achieve synchronous orbit, expendable rockets

to boost payloads from low-Earth orbit (LEO) will

also be needed. In addition, so-called large plat-
114 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

——. .

forms may be assembled in LEO, where their

components have been transported on two or

more shuttle flights, and then raised to GSO with

an expendable upper stage. Frequency reuse

techniques will be common on next generation

satellites, providing a further significant increase

in total available capacity. Future satellites will

also have increased sensitivity in up-link reception, increased effective down-link power, and

reduced susceptibility to interference from signals

associated with adjacent satellites in geostationary

orbit.

Except for AT&T’s LEO TELSTAR, flown in 1962,

the basic research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) establishing the practicality of

satellite communications was done by NASA,

with substantial industrial involvement. RD&D for

direct broadcast satellites, including early attempts to develop market constituencies, was

also done by NASA. From 1973, when its satellite

communications research and development

(R&D) activities were curtailed on the assumption that the private sector would continue the

R&D, until 1980, NASA did not pursue such activities vigorously except for completing the direct

broadcast satellite programs of ATS-6 and, in conjunction with the Canadians, CTS.

New Programs

In 1980, because of growing concern over the

perceived loss of a technological lead in communications satellites, NASA reactivated its R&D

program at 30/20 GHz. This work is directed

toward wideband transponder capability intended to explore the allocated but unoccupied

bands at 30/20 GHz. Technologies under development include onboard switching, solid state

transmitters, switched, multiple-beam antennas,

and low-noise receivers for satellite use. NASA

hopes to demonstrate the new band technologies

in orbit on a new satellite, to be developed for

a 1986 launch. The system concept is based on

traffic projections developed for NASA by two

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Satellite frequencies
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 115

satellite communications carriers, COMSAT and

American Satellite Co. NASA is also developing

adaptive, multibeam antenna technology at

L-band, the band in use for maritime (and aeronautical) satellite communications use.

While NASA pursues a program currently dominated by R&D at 30/20 GHz, commercial entities are expanding their channel capacities in

lower frequency bands at 6/4 GHz and 14/12

GHz. SBS’S launch in the fall of 1980 marks the

first U.S. commercial satellite use of the 14/12

GHz band (Ku band). Canada’s ANIK-B and-C

were the first domestic satellites to exploit that

band, predating SBS by 2 years or more.

INTELSAT-V, launched in late-l 980, is carrying

traffic at both 6/4 and 14/12 GHz. Commercial

carriers’ plans for future satellites through the

199o’s continue to concentrate on these bands,

using multiple-beam antenna technologies and

the frequency reuse technologies first developed

in the late 1970’s and continuing in development

today. Multiple-beam antenna technologies refer

to the use of a single antenna to send and receive

more than one frequency signal. Frequency reuse

technologies refer to the ability to handle the

same frequency in different modes, thereby increasing capacity without increasing spectrum

use.

Continuing advances in technology, many of

them by industry in the late 1970’s as markets

for 12 GHz Earth stations became viable, have

made it possible for commercial carriers to provide many of the services initially demonstrated

on ATS-6 by NASA under the classification “community broadcasting. ” Cable program distribution, interactive services such as multipoint

teleconferencing, educational broadcasting, and

remote health-care services are now being provided by the commercial carriers. These services,

together with the traditional point-to-point services, are carried on first generation satellites

operating at 6/4 GHz.

Advances in bandwidth compression and frequency reuse technologies appear, for perhaps

the next decade, to allow first generation satellites

to keep pace with traffic projections. Second generation satellites such an INTELSAT-V and Advanced WESTAR, which will start flying in the

nexts years, include increased capacity sufficient

to accommodate traffic projections by using new

technologies such as switchable, multiple-beam

antennas, onboard switching and signal processing, and frequency reuse capabilities at frequencies of 6/4, 14/1 1, and 14/12 GHz. These will require developing large, possibly deployable space

structures, distributed, solid state transmitters and

low-noise receivers, precise and possibly adaptive phase control, and attitude stabilization in

the presence of solar-array or antenna-structure

motions.

Except for the 9-m deployable antenna of

NASA’s ATS-6, DOD (on the Defense Satellite

Communications System, Phase Ill) and the commercial sector (l NTELSAT-V, Advanced WESTAR)

have the lead in multiple, switched-beam antennas and in somewhat larger, deployable antenna structures. ATS-6 included, these spacecraft

types are the first so-called orbiting antenna

farms, carrying capability for multiband, multibeam communications services. As future traffic

projections indicate a limitation of capacity, plans

for the first satellite generation of the 1990’s could

be expected to include 30/20 GHz frequencies

in addition to 6/4, 14/1 1, and 14/12 GHz. The

trend will be toward fewer, larger satellites carrying more bands, more beams, and more diverse

services. These satellites will incorporate some

of the space construction techniques developed

during the 1980’s.

Commercial sector hardware is provided by industrial firms, many of them Japanese, French,

German, and Italian. As part of its reactivated program, NASA will conduct R&D in advanced technologies for low-cost Earth stations. The results

of this R&D, which also involves industrial firms,

are intended for transfer to the private sector.

NASA’s customary applications experiment-demonstration activities with its ATS satellite series

have been transferred to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration

(NTIA) in the Department of Commerce, together

with responsibility for stimulating new applications experiments and demonstrations and for aggregating future markets.
116 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System

Advanced WESTAR is a variation of the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) being

leased by NASA from Space Communications Co.

TDRSS comprises two satellites in synchronous

orbit, controlled from a master station at White

Sands, N. Mex., and used to track and relay data

from LEO satellites to the ground. it will replace

much of NASA’s terrestrial Space Tracking and

Data Network (STDN) and will increase the potential for continuous coverage of other, LEO satellites. For the lowest-altitude orbits, coverage will

increase from about 15 to 85 percent, providing

a great improvement in timely data acquisition

for NASA experimental and NOAA operations.

This capability will greatly reduce the need for

costly and unreliable satellite data recorders.

While Advanced WESTAR carries 6/4, 14/11, and

14/1 2 GHz capability, TDRSS also carries capability in the space research bands at 1.7/1 .8, and

2.0/2.3 GHz. Both spacecraft use the same basic

structure, including deployable antennas for

some of the three or four bands they carry. The

first TDRSS launch is planned for the shuttle in

early 1983, the second 6 months later. Two Advanced WESTARs will be launched in 1984; one

will be dedicated to commercial service and the

other will serve as a shared spare between NASA

and Space Communications Co.

Navigation

Most of the U.S. work on navigation has been

done by DOD. The Navy navigation satellite system transmissions have been made available to

the public for the cost of the receiver and position-fixing computer equipment. Position can be

fixed to an accuracy of 50 ft if processing time

is long enough (up to 12 hours). Such performance is suitable for ships but not for aircraft,

whose positions change too rapidly.

Work by NASA and the European Space Research Organization in 1969-70 had defined a

system (Aerosat) that could work for aircraft.

Capable of handling 500 aircraft simultaneously,

it was also of interest for air traffic control.

Responsibility for Aerosat was transferred to the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) early in

1971. in 1973, work on it was terminated.

NASA has continued to pursue studies in search

and rescue, but not in navigation or traffic control, based on special receivers attached to NOAA

meteorological satellites to detect signals of distress beacons carried by aircraft and ships. NASA

is pursuing this experimental work cooperatively with DOD, the Department of Transportation,

and with Canada, France, and the U.S.S.R. The

United States is providing the spacecraft, launch

vehicles, and the U.S. ground stations; Canada

is providing the space telecommunications equipment and ground station in their country; and,

France is providing an onboard processor and

receiver. The Soviet Union will launch and maintain in orbit two spacecraft operationally compatible with the U. S., Canadian, and French system and will operate their own ground station.

in addition to NASA, DOD, and the Department

of Transportation are expected to purchase and

operate ground stations and participate in the

program test and evaluation phase while NOAA

is providing the spacecraft for modification.

Satellite Remote Sensing

Remote sensing from satellites is one important

component of the general field of detecting,

recognizing, and evaluating objects from a distance by means of advanced electro-optical instruments with cybernetic interpretation. Radar,

sonar, astronomical and aerial photography are

all forms of remote sensing. Satellite remote sensing is used in conjunction with aerial photography and aerial radar scanning to assess and help

to control the productivity of the surface of the

Earth, to help locate subsurface resources, and

to understand, forecast, and, eventually, help

control the environment.

Satellite remote sensing will be discussed in this

section under the following three categories:

1) ocean sensing; 2) Earth resources sensing; and

3) environmental sensing. Listed in this order,

they lead from an area with no current operational systems to an area that has had operational

space systems for 14 years.

Ocean Sensing

This is the newest, least developed of satellite

remote-sensing efforts. NASA, NOAA, DOD and
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 117

the oceanographic science community all recognize the tremendous potential that satellites have

for the study of the world’s oceans. Gathering

ocean data from satellites may be the only reasonable way to observe ocean processes routinely and continuously. Currently, there are no existing or planned U.S. civilian operational oceansensing satellite systems.

NASA’s SEASAT, which was flown in 1978 and

failed prematurely after 6 months, was a satellite

demonstration to show what an operational

ocean-sensing system could do. Each of SEASAT’s

complement of sensors had been flown before

but never together on a civilian, ocean-oriented

spacecraft.

Along with SEASAT, NIMBUS, and the Geodynamic Experimental Ocean Satellite (GEOS) data

have been used in ocean studies. NIMBUS is

classed as an experimental weather/climate

spacecraft; GEOS was primarily to study ocean

waves. The data these satellites supply consist

primarily of global wind fields, sea states, surface

temperature, ice coverage, and ocean color.

SEASAT data have demonstrated that scatterometer observations enable space mapping of the

detailed structure of the ocean surface wind

fields, including atmospheric fronts and

typhoons. Altimeter observations enable mapping

of surface waves and circulation features such as

the Gulf Stream and mesoscale eddies. Microwave radiometer observations enable mapping

of the characteristics of sea ice. Color scanner

observations enable mapping of chlorophyll concentration. Taken collectively, these observations

will help enable the determination of the general

circulation of the ocean—both the wind-driven

and geostrophic components—along with sea ice

coverage and primary biological productivity in

the oceans.

Applications of ocean sensing divide into two

classes—operational and scientific. NOAA uses

the data from the experiments to support its operational responsibilities that include: the management and conservation of marine resources; the

preservation, conservation, and development of

U.S. coastal resources; the prediction of weather;

and, the provision of maps, charts, surveys, and

other specialized data for navigation. Ocean sensing from space is expected to contribute to safety, to improve the efficiency of weather forecasting, and to reduce the cost of shipping operations, air transportation, offshore oil and gas exploration and drilling, platform operations, marine construction, commercial fishing, pollution

monitoring, ice monitoring, and marine search

and rescue.

NASA, in conjunction with academia, will use

the data primarily for R&D in weather and climate. NASA also will increase its participation

with the oceanographic community by supporting university scientists and encouraging further

commercial participation in carrying out a number of advanced studies for future research missions in applying satellite remote sensing to

oceanography.

NASA’s ocean research programs will include

processing SEASAT data records into final geophysical units and their subsequent analysis; evaluation of the performance of X/L/C-band aircraft

synthetic aperture radar (SAR) in conjunction with

experiments undertaken by the National Science

Foundation (NSF) on warm Gulf Stream rings and

coastal ocean dynamics; characterization of sea

ice properties by various remote-sensing techniques; definition of altimetry dependence on sea

state; investigation of photoplankton productivity

associated with physical and chemical ocean

properties near the Nantucket Shoals, in cooperation with the National Marine Fisheries Service;

refinement of techniques for assimilation of wind

data from the scatterometer into numerical models; and development of a shipborne Iidar system

for basic studies of optical oceanography. The

ocean processes program will develop techniques

for assimilating satellite data–especially scatterometer wind data—into numerical models, and

demonstrate a remote-sensing system that will

supply specific global oceanographic data on a

routine and repetitive basis to meet specific user

needs.

Earth Resources Sensing

The U.S. program addresses the needs for gathering the vital information required for managing

the world’s limited food, water, energy supplies,

and mineral resources, and for identifying poten-
118 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

tial geodetic (primarily earthquake) hazards. Its

objective is to develop and demonstrate the use

of space technology for providing the United

States with a global capability for monitoring and

forecasting major agricultural commodities, managing water resources, assessing land use, improving the exploration for mineral and energy

resources, and understanding the dynamic characteristics of the Earth’s crust. Many, if not most,

Federal agencies use space data in the day-to-day

conduct of their missions (see fig. 2).

Numerous State and local governments, many

in conjunction with academia, use satellite data

for a whole range of projects, including land cover classification, wetland development, and water

management (see tables 7 and 8). The universities

are studying ways to manipulate the data and

apply them to a variety of problems. Industry has

made some use of space-generated data, especially in its search for nonrenewable resources.

Several companies that are characterized as “value-added” firms take the raw satellite data, manipulate it, integrate it with other data and sell

the information products to a variety of users.

Currently there are no plans for a Federal operational Earth resources-sensing satellite system.

NOAA will shortly (1983) assume operation of

NASA’s experimental Landsat system, but there

are no plans for the Government to continue to

operate a satellite land remote-sensing system

once Landsat fails. NASA’s principal activities include pursuing the R&D necessary for developing and improving space remote-sensing capabilities and the related information extraction techniques, providing for the acquisition of space

data, and joint research, development, and test

projects with users. Its goal is to establish the

routine use of global data collection systems.

American industry has been the dominant source

of equipment, provided largely under Government funding, for the U.S. remote-sensing effort.

It has supplied spacecraft, sensing instruments,

Earth stations, data processing equipment, and

information extraction devices.

Landsat Technology

Space Segment

The return beam vidicon (RBV), a kind of television camera, was initally promoted for use in

Landsat by the Department of the Interior. The

RBV uses a shutter to expose a light-sensitive plate

and then scans the plate with an electron beam

to capture the image on videotape or to radio it

to the ground. Although Landsat 3 carries only

two RBVS, three of these devices would allow the

reconstruction of color pictures. Each RBV image from Landsat 3 covers an area 90 km on a

side (180 km total swath) and has an equivalent

instantaneous field of view (IFOV) of 40 m. The

low distortion of the RBV makes its especially useful for mapmaking.

The multispectral scanner (MSS) uses a mirror

to scan the scene on the ground one line at a

time, reflecting the light onto a series of detectors (photoelectric cells) sensitive to four different

spectral regions. MSS scans a swath 185 km wide

and has an IFOV of 80 m, which for many scenes

is approximately equivalent to a photographic

resolution of about 160 m. MSS provides better

spectral resolution, but higher distortion, than

does RBV. It was therefore championed by the

Department of Agriculture (USDA) as particularly

useful for monitoring crops.

The thematic mapper (TM) is a remote sensor

with seven spectral bands covering the visible,

near-infrared, and thermal infrared regions of the

spectrum (see fig. 3). It is now scheduled for

launch in the third quarter of 1982 aboard Landsat D, from which it will achieve complete coverage of the Earth’s surface every 16 days.

The TM is designed to satisfy more demanding

performance specifications than have previously been applied to an instrument of its type. In

response to these requirements, the design incorporates advanced state-of-the-technology materials, structures, control techniques, calibration

mechanisms, data handling, and electronics. De-
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 119

Figure 2.— Earth Resources Sensing

&Y- ,

The top photograph shows upper Delaware, Maryland, and the Virgina peninsula taken from the Landsat 1 satellite at an altitude

of 568 miles. The photo at bottom left shows a technician performing a quality control assessment of the Landsat 1 photo while

on the bottom right, a technician prepared a negative of the Landsat 1 photo for printing in the Goddard Space Flight Center processing facility.
120 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 7.—Overview of Landsat Applications in the 50 States

Land

Water Forestry/ Wildlife resources Environmental Geologic

State resources rangeland management management management Agriculture mapping

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

lowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

x

x

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

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x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x x x

SOURCE: National Governors Conference,
,

Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 121

Table 8.—Summary of Operational Landsat Applications in the Statesa

A.

B.

c.

D,

(4)

SOURCE: National Governors Conference

velopment and fabrication of the TM are proceeding on schedule. Most of the subsystem parameters which have been tested so far have met

or exceeded specifications.

Ground Segment

Data can be transmitted to Earth when the satellite is within view of one of the receiving stations (fig. 4)—the NASA stations in Alaska, California, and Maryland, and nine foreign-owned and

-operated stations that function under agreements

with NASA. Data acquired while the spacecraft

.

is beyond the range of a ground station are stored

by an onboard, wide-band video tape recorder

until it is within range of a U.S. station. The rate

of data transmission from satellite to ground station is on the order of megabits/second.

A control center at the Goddard Space Flight

Center (Goddard) monitors and commands the

satellite to acquire and transmit data directly to

U.S. or foreign ground stations.

The master recordings (station tapes) received

at U.S. ground stations of Landsat 3 are sent to

Goddard for preprocessing. This initial step in

data reduction consists of segregating data from

each of the spectral bands and applying two sorts

of corrections: a) radiometric corrections to account for the difference in response of the detectors in the various spectral bands, and b) geomet-
122 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Figure 3.—Landsat Bands and Electromagnetic Spectrum Comparison

a

Thematic mapper.

SOURCE: U.S. Geological Survey,

ric corrections that account for distortions in the

satellite viewing process and relate the received

data to the exact position on the ground that was

observed by the satellite. The results of this preprocessing are recorded in the form of high-density digital tape (H DDT), either as fully corrected

data, or with the required geometric corrections

only noted on the tape. Foreign ground stations

perform an equivalent function, although not all

of them apply a full set of corrections.

HDDTs are provided to the Department of the

Interior’s EROS Data Center in Sioux Falls, S.

Dak., and the USDA facility in Houston, Tex. At

the EROS Data Center, the data in HDDT form

are put through additional computer processes

to convert them into standard data products suitable for sale to public or private sector customers.

They, in turn, may use these products in that form

or further process them for their own use or for

resale to additional customers.

Two classes of standard data products are available: film imagery, which is convenient for those

accustomed to working with maps and photographs, and computer compatible tapes (CCTS).

The tape form is suitable for input to standard

computers and lends itself to automated or specialized data handling and analysis. The digital

form of CCTS makes them especially appropriate

for integration with other digital data.

For most uses, the data as they emerge from

preprocessing at Goddard and processing at

EROS are still in raw form. It is at this point that

firms in the private sector step in to process Landsat data further. Such firms constitute the value-

-added industry. Value-added firms are found

both in the United States and abroad; most of

them are small. The kinds of work they perform

are: image processing, image enhancement, image interpretation, and integration of Landsat data

with data from other sources.

Other Remote-Sensing Programs

Currently Federal experimental or scientific

flight programs include the Landsat series,

Magsat, and the Heat Capacity Mapping Mission

(HCMM). Landsat 3 is aging but continues to be
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program . 123

Figure 4. —Current and Probable Landsat Ground Stations

t i 7% i i I

1 1 t

the primary source of Earth resources data. Landsat D will soon be launched, and if plans to

launch the follow-on satellite, Landsat D’, come

to fruition, both are expected to operate until the

mid- to late-l 980’s. New sensor capabilities on

Landsats D and D’ are expected to be especially

useful for nonrenewable resources observations.

Magsat, launched in 1979, has charted the Earth’s

magnetic fields to aid in navigation and to provide a better understanding of the solid Earth for

geophysical and geologic studies; and, the

HCMM has made global measurements of Earth

surface temperature variation to aid in locating

mineral resources and in measuring water runoff

from snowmelt. NASA is also planning to fly experiments on early space shuttle missions designed to test the applicability of active microwave measurements, and of high-resolution imagery for mapping investigations. IT is also studying how to define the appropriate space systems

for gravity measurements for solid Earth studies,

for global stereoscopic imagery for resource exploration, and for improved remote sensors for

multiple applications.

NASA has also entered into joint R&D activities

with other Federal agencies (USDA, USDC,

USAID) to advance the understanding of how to

apply multiple data sources in improving agricultural early warning and crop commodity forecasting (AgRISTARS). The AgRISTARS program has

been somewhat restructured by lengthening the

schedules and changing the program scope in

several areas. This restructuring has been caused

by constraints on the fiscal year 1982 budgets of

the involved agencies and the delay in the availability of Landsat D. Other joint research activities

are planned with additional Federal agencies and

with international organizations for advancing the

scientific knowledge of the solid Earth.
124 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ENVIRONMENTAL SENSING

understanding the dynamics and limitations of

our environment is essential to our long-term survival and important to many day-to-day activities.

The global interrelationships between the atmosphere, ocean, land, and space environments can

be studied only from space. These programs are

aided by data from the ocean and Earth resources

sensing systems.

The operational meteorological satellite systems

of NOAA (GOES and TIROS) form the backbone

of the environmental program. Prediction of the

weather, monitoring and control of pollution,

ship routing, storm warning, and modeling of

long-term trends in climate and the stratosphere

are all areas of study.

NOAA’s operational responsibility regarding

weather and climate is to monitor the weather

and prepare weather forecasts for a myriad of

users. NOAA, therefore, has the responsibility for

the ground-based observation systems, the operational meteorological satellite system, and the

related receiving , analyzing, and disseminating

systems that turn the space and ground data into

weather forecasts. For the space segment, NOAA

coordinates with NASA for the improvement of

the space and space-tied systems and for the procurement of spacecraft and launch arrangements.

NOAA is also charged with conducting R&D in

the analysis and application of satellite data.

The primary and routine use of the satellite data

from the NOAA system is, of course, weather predicting. NOAA transforms them into a broad variety of weather projections and distributes them

throughout the world. In addition to being used

in real-time weather predicting operations, they

are also placed in archives for future theoretical

research and case studies. These data are widely used by meteorologists and environmental scientists in Government and academia in routine

operations throughout the world and are considered indispensable for conducting atmospheric analyses and preparing short-range weather

forecasts.

Users of weather data vary in their involvement

with determining the standard weather forecasting services provided by NOAA. Aviators in wellestablished working groups provide regular data

on their needs through FAA. However, only

about one-third of the farming sector is wellserved by standard NOAA products. Private

weather services provide specialized forecasting

to many users whose requirements are not met

by those products.

NASA studies and flight missions are directed

at all characteristics of the atmosphere, including

upper atmospheric and tropospheric air quality,

global weather, severe storms, oceanic processes,

and general climate.

NASA launched three atmospheric research/

demonstration satellites in the late 1970’s,

SEASAT, NIMBUS-7, and Stratospheric Aerosol

and Gas Experiment (SAGE). As noted above,

SEASAT has ceased to function, but returned significant ocean data, which are being studied.

NIMBUS-7 and SAGE are performing satisfactorily. SAGE primarily measures atmospheric concentrations of ozone and aerosols in an attempt

to show how pollutants might be transported

globally. NASA has planned to launch the Halogen Occultation Experiment (HALOE) and the

Earth Radiation Budget Experiments (ERBE) spacecraft in the mid-l 980’s. HALOE will measure

global atmospheric profiles of key species involved in the depletion of stratospheric ozone.

ERBE is to measure the radiation balance over the

globe to gain basic insights into the reasons for

climatic fluctuations. NASA’s advanced planning

includes the uses of satellites for the simultaneous

global study of the radiative, chemical, and dynamic processes occurring in the upper atmosphere.

It is apparent that air pollution problems must

be solved on a regional basis, and that global

chemical budgets (e.g., carbon dioxide) act both

as tracers of transport processes and as a background for regional events. NASA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and NSF are

focusing on these areas with field analytical and

laboratory studies to quantify the global carbonnitrogen-ozone and sulfur-ammonia-aerosol

chemical systems. Data derived from spacecraft

are essential to these efforts.

Severe storms, tornados, damaging downdrafts,

and destructive lightning are being studied by

NOAA and NASA to improve observation and
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 125

forecasting of such events. Remotely sensed data

from NASA’s severe environmental storms and

mesoscale experiment, and ongoing mesoscale

modeling efforts for forecast improvement with

computer interactive systems will lead to a joint

NASA/NOAA project at NOAA’s National Severe

Storm Forecast Center, similar to the recently successful frost-freeze warning demonstration in

Florida. Improved airborne wind measurement

tools and temperature and moisture sounders on

the GOES-D spacecraft are being evaluated.

International Weather Activities

WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION (WMO)

The United States participates in international

meteorological programs through WMO, a specialized agency of the United Nations that was

established in 1951. It was formed in order to establish, coordinate, and improve meteorological

services throughout the world, U.S. operational

and experimental meteorological satellites contribute to this effort. WMO members obtain access to meteorological information from U.S.

weather satellites indirectly through a WMO network of international, regional, and national

meteorological centers, and directly from automatic picture transmission (APT) receiving sets.

GLOBAL ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH

PROGRAM (GARP)

As part of the U.S. worldwide weather R&D

activities, NOAA, NSF, and NASA participate

through the National Research Council in GARP.

GARP’s goal is to conduct studies to understand

the atmosphere, It is sponsored by WMO and

the International Council of Scientific Unions,

with participation and funding provided by all

member nations. Current U.S. activities for GARP

are directed at analyzing parts of the data from

the recently successful GARP global weather experiment, assessing the requirements for improved operational forecasting and defining

future remote measurement requirements. This

experiment, conducted in 1979, provided a

unique set of data that did not exist before. As

a result, atmospheric numerical forecast models

have been improved and space research is being directed to improved temperature sounders,

surface pressure instruments, passive and active

microwave moisture sensors, wind sensors, and

rainfall measurements technique.

Materials Processing in Space (MPS)

MPS is both a set of new technologies designed

to exploit the unique environment of space and

a developing program to implement these technologies. The unique properties that make space

an ideal environment for processing certain kinds

of materials are: 1 ) the availability of unlimited,

unfiltered solar radiation; 2) the existence of a

near-perfect vacuum; 3) a range of temperatures,

from –200° to +200”F; and, most important,

4) microgravity–an almost complete absence of

gravitational force. VVith the exception of longterm microgravity, these properties can be well

enough approximated on Earth to allow their extended effects on materials processing to be investigated. The factor of microgravity, however,

is what makes MPS so attractive.

Process variables such as temperature, composition, and fluid flow may be controlled far better in an environment of microgravity. As a result,

some materials may be manufactured in space

with greater precision and fewer defects; others,

which cannot be made at all on Earth, may become possible for the first time. MPS looks particularly promising for pharmaceuticals, electronic components, optical equipment, and metal

alloys.

Already, a U.S. program to implement these

technologies is taking shape. NASA has established an MPS program to pursue the basic science and the applied R&D of microgravity environments. Within NASA’s MPS program, a Commercial Applications Office has been set up to

encourage the private sector to participate.

EARLY WORK IN SPACE

During the earlier years of the Apollo Program,

several unusual phenomena, peculiar to microgravity, were first observed. First considered only

as posing problems in the engineering of spacecraft systems, these phenomena were later recognized as clues for inventing processes to manufacture products in space for use on Earth. To

broaden the discussion, NASA organized symposia in 1968 and 1969 for industry representatives
to discuss the possibilities of MPS. NASA also

established in 1969 a new program, “Materials

Science and Manufacturing in Space.”

Through the early 1970’s, in-space research

was conducted on Apollo, Skylab, and ApolloSoyuz missions. Aboard Apollo 14, 16, and 17,

several necessarily brief, but important experiments were performed to investigate certain basic

processes (i.e., heat flow and convection, electrophoresis, and composite casting). Skylab, the

orbiting space laboratory station, allowed for

much more extensive experimentation. Altogether, three teams of astronauts conducted 15 MPS

experiments. Skylab’s materials processing facility, including a multipurpose electric furnace, provided the means of studying more complex processes: crystal growth, metal alloying, eutectics,

welding and brazing, fluid effects, and combustion, Again, the 1975 flight of the Apollo-Soyuz

test project continued the research conducted on

the Apollo and Skylab missions. The processes

investigated included: electrophoresis, crystal

growth of semiconductors, processing of magnets, convection induced by surface tension, density separation during solidification of two alloys,

and halide eutectic growth. Throughout these

missions, the experiments performed in space

were essentially repetitions of techniques used

in terrestrial materials processing.

CONCURRENT WORK ON EARTH

NASA has perfected three terrestrial facilities

for attaining microgravity for short periods: drop

tubes and drop towers, aircraft flying high-altitude

parabolic trajectories, and sounding rockets.

These facilities allow relatively low-cost experimentation for MPS investigators to establish and

set experimental parameters, to establish proof

of concept, and to provide specimens for laboratory research.

Drop tubes and towers allow spacelike microgravity conditions to be achieved for some 2 to

4 seconds. In drop tubes, molten droplets are

released into a vertical evacuated tube (either 100

or 300 ft long) and are solidified during free fall.

in drop towers, small rockets (used to overcome

friction) thrust canisters containing experiment

packages down vertical guide rails. These apparatus provide useful opportunities, however fleeting, to study both high-temperature calorimetry

and changes in density, surface tension, and volume as liquids solidify.

Although longer in duration by an order of

magnitude (1 O to 60 seconds), the microgravity

attained by NASA aircraft (KC-132s and F-104Bs)

is much less steady than that of drop tubes and

towers. The aircraft, therefore, do not provide a

suitable environment for precise experimentation, but are useful for training crews and for

developing and verifying tests of experiment

hardware.

Since introducing the Space Processing Application Rocket (SPAR) Program in 1975, NASA has

flown nine sounding rocket missions. These

flights provide 4 to 7 minutes of microgravity.

However, severe stresses during launch significantly constrain the design of experiments. The

SPAR program has resulted in an inventory of

low-cost hardware suitable for longer duration

experiments during shuttle operations.

FUTURE PLANS

From the foregoing discussion of work already

done in space and on Earth, one can see that

significant future evolution of MPS experimentation lies in the direction of providing an extended

microgravity environment along with more complex hardware. The space shuttle transportation

system holds the key to MPS development. Major

shuttle facilities for MPS experimentation (small

self-contained payloads, the materials experiment

assembly, and Spacelab) can be used on shuttle

flights lasting up to 1 month,

Small self-contained payloads are packages

flown in containers rented by NASA to companies, universities, or private individuals. The

payloads, designed by the users, operate under

their own power and carry their own recording

systems. Some of them may also be used as testbeds for broader experimentation aboard SpaceIab.

The materials experiment assembly (MEA), the

first article of new materials processing hardware

to be flown in the shuttle, is also designed to operate under its own power in its preliminary version. Later models will draw power from the shuttle. Accommodating as many as four experiments
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program . 127

in separately sealed subenclosures, MEA contains

a control computer, a heat rejection system, and

data recorders.

Spacelab, the centerpiece of NASA’s new MPS

system, has two major components, the module

and the pallets. The module provides a habitable

laboratory for scientists and engineers to work

comfortably in space. The pallets form an open

porch in the cargo bay of the orbiter, where instruments may be exposed to space and various

experimental apparatus may be accommodated.

Four MPS instruments are currently under development for deployment on Space lab. The fluid experiment system uses Schlieren photography

and holography to study fluid behavior under

microgravity. In the vapor crystal growth system,

crystals are to be grown from fluids, vapors, or

melts of solid materials; the results are recorded

by video and holography. The pallet-mounted,

acoustic, containerless, positioning module is

used to control the position and rotation of a sample to be raised to a temperature of 1,600 degrees

by radiant heat. The solidification experiment

system employs a modular furnace in which up

to 16 samples per flight may be processed. Solidification may be achieved, either under uniform heating and cooling, or directionally, by

means of a temperature gradient.

There are several other MPS activities planned

for development if funds are approved. There are

also important long-term prospects for more advanced activities. These and the various foreign

efforts, current or planned, are discussed elsewhere in this assessment.

Space Transportation

Currently the U.S. Government has the sole

capability in the United States to launch both

manned and unmanned payloads from Earth,

Each capability presents different opportunities

and different constraints.

MANNED SPACE SYSTEMS

The space transportation system (STS) that has

been developed by NASA, with extensive industrial involvement under Government funding, is

the sole U.S. system planned to carry humans and

objects into space in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Expendable launch vehicles (ELVS) will continue to

provide launch services through the early transition period.

The major components of the STS initially include the reusable space shuttle, upper stages,

the remote manipulator system, and the workshop Spacelab. The shuttle will be launched from

both the east and west coasts of the United States

with a nominal payload capability of 65,000

pounds (29,500 kg) into LEO (1 85-1,110 km). It

can carry a crew of three to seven persons for

mission durations up to 30 days.

The space shuttle orbiter, an aircraft-like, reusable spacecraft, will be used to carry payloads

to Earth orbit and deploy them from its cargo bay.

The remote manipulator system can be attached

to the orbiter bay to aid the crew in deploying

or retrieving payloads in space, Upper stages will

be included with those payloads that must go farther than LEO, i.e., on missions to the planets or

to geosynchronous orbit. Spacelab is a complete

orbital laboratory that fits into the cargo bay and

connects with the crew compartment of the

orbiter. It will make possible a variety of humandirected experiments in the space environment.

Planned utilization of STS may be seen in table

9 and figure 5.

NASA is conducting numerous studies to provide advanced capabilities for STS:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Thrust augmentation—a study to supplement

the existing shuttle capability with strap-on

assist rockets;

Solar electric propulsion systems–solarpowered ion-engine upper stages for varying orbit and payload requirements;

Orbita/ transfer vehic/es–manned and unmanned vehicles capable of moving payloads from the LEO attainable by the shuttle, either to a different LEO or to higher

orbits;

Teleoperator maneuvering system–a remotely controlled payload maneuvering

unit;

Deployable antenna—an experiment to test

the feasibility of deploying very large antennas;

Space p/atforms–shuttle-deployable platforms to perform as test beds for experiments
128 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 9.–STS Operations Traffic Model (34 flights through 1985)

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 7 11 16 21 29 34 38 38 38 38 38 29 344

Refights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . – – 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 8 12 17 23 31 36 40 40 40 40 40 31 365

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

in space construction for space science and

applications;

● Large space structure experiments—to test

the ability to construct large structures in

space;

● Liquid-fueled upper stage—an upper stage

for use with the shuttle, that will be powered

by a liquid fuel rather than solid propellant,

thereby providing greater controllability and

payload capacity.

EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES

The existing Government expendable launch

vehicles used for routine civilian launches now

(Scout, Delta, Atlas, and Centaur) are scheduled

to be phased out by about 1985 or 1986. Should

the Centaur be selected for the liquid-fueled shuttle upper stage, its production will continue, but

not as an Earth to Earth-orbit launch vehicle. Figure 6 illustrates the normal payload capacity for

these ELVS.

As previously mentioned, the U.S. Government

is the only entity in the United States currently

launching payloads into space. However, at least

one privately owned U.S. company, Space Services, Inc., has indicated that its Percheron

launcher will be ready in the near future (1 to

2 years). Maximum payloads for the Percheron

are planned to be 700 kg into LEO by 1982, and

200 kg into geosynchronous orbit by 1983.

Space Construction

NASA is planning numerous experiments to test

and demonstrate the ability and utility of constructing objects in space. It is clear that space

platforms for operational or experimental work

will need to be constructed in space because their

size will likely preclude launching them in one

piece from Earth. Component (beam) builders

have been tested on Earth and await testing in

space. Should a permanent orbiting space station

be included in the space program, its construction will of necessity be carried out in space. In

addition, if solar power satellites are deployed,

they will have to be constructed in space.

Design requirements are being established for

both manned and unmanned permanent platforms that will incorporate evolutionary power

systems. NASA is analyzing the feasibility and

benefits of low-Earth orbital science and applications space platforms, which would aggregate
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 129 —

Figure 5.—Shuttle Manifest Through 1984

. .

,“.

. .

.s.

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Administration

many long-duration space experiments on unmanned, shuttle-tended platforms. The postulated initial system could accommodate science

and applications payloads, demonstrate on-orbit

servicing and payload exchange, conduct multidisciplinary investigations, and provide an evolutionary space power system. It could grow to include a capability for materials processing experiments, and eventually a habitat for life science and human research (fig. 7).

NASA is also studying a large communications

platform that could alleviate the potential saturation of orbit arc and frequency spectrum by aggregating most communications payloads on a

common support bus. This platform would be

serviced and upgraded remotely by a teleopera-

.:” ”

tor (also under study). For the longer range, NASA

is studying a permanent, manned Space Operations Center to establish, service, upgrade, and

operate both the low- and high-altitude platforms.

Its future potential uses could be to tend and

refurbish a reusable orbital transfer vehicle orbiting between low and geostationary orbits and

to construct and assemble large orbiting structures.

In order to plan for support of future possible

permanent platforms and facilities, NASA intends

to extend its research into a series of developmental test flights and space demonstrations in large

space structures, satellite services near to and

remote from shuttle, including satellite placement, retrieval and repair, and proof test of a

satellite tethered from the orbiter.
130 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications — — — — — —

Figure 6.—Current NASA Expendable Launch Vehicles

150

1

10

0

a) Payload values are for east launch from ESMC for Delta and Atlas Cc

b) Scout values are for launch from Wallops

c) Atlas E/F values are for launch from WSMC and use of a TE 364-4 AK

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Figure 7.—initial Space Station Conception

Illustration credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

!ntaur

M

Solar Power in Space

The constancy and strength of sunlight in Sun

synchronous or geosynchronous orbits makes the

conversion of sunlight to electrical power especially attractive either for use in space or for transmission to terrestrial receivers. Currently, the only

active program in the United States is NASA’s program to provide an orbiting photovoltaic power

supply that could be used by a spacecraft, including the shuttle, to supplement its normal

power supply. A 25 kW module can supply

power for a spacelab or construction mission of

60 days or more. After 60 days the flight would

be limited by such factors as food and drinking

water. The module could also supply plug-in

power for free-flying payloads that would dock
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program . 131

— . . . . .

with it, and it could be detached and parked in

orbit between shuttle missions. One version

couId itself fly free of the orbiter with instruments

for, say, studying the Sun or Earth. Another could

be attached to a free-flying spacelab for longduration missions like observing the Sun continuously through two or more 28-day solar cycles

or studying plants or animal specimens through

several generations.

The solar power satellite (SPS), originally proposed in 1968, was the subject of major studies

by NASA, the Department of Energy, the National

Academy of Sciences, and OTA4 (fig. 8). The lat4U .S. Department of Energy, Program Assessment Report Statement oi Flncflngs, NASA/DOE, Satellite Power Systems Concept Development and Evaluation Program, November 1980; National

Figure 8. —Solar Power

Array

structure

Solar cell array

ter two studies concluded that, although SPS was

technically feasible, its high initial cost, environmental and health uncertainties, and lower

estimates for the future demand for electricity

preclude a major research effort at this time. OTA

identified possible research funding levels that

range from $0 to $30 million. There are no specific research funds for SPS in the 1982 Federal

budget.

Academy of Science, Electric Power From Orbit: A Critque of a

5atellite Power system, 1981; Office of Technology Assessment, Solar

Power 5_ate//ites, OTA-E-144 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government

Printing Office, August 1981.

Satellite Reference System

ity

.

. $

.

. .

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
132 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Space Science

Although OTA was not asked to assess space

science, we felt it necessary, as a point of information, to describe the current U.S. space science programs. Parts of the life sciences program

do have implications for the application of space

technology for human benefit. This area is centered in NASA and utilizes space systems, supported by ground-based and airborne observations, to conduct scientific investigations to advance our knowledge of the Earth and interstellar

space, the other stars of our galaxy, and the universe as a whole. NASA also conducts a life sciences program to further the exploration and use

of space by studying space biology and medicine

and the origin and evolution of life. Near-term

activities focus on investigations of human physiology and of the effects of the space environment

on man.

The Office of Space Science and Applications

at NASA funds the following science programs,

though the funding levels of some may be

reduced.

PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY PROGRAM

The major objective of the physics and astronomy program is to increase our knowledge and

understanding of the solar terrestrial space environment and the origin, evolution, structure, and

composition of the universe, including the Sun,

the stars, and the other celestial bodies. Spacebased research is being conducted to investigate

the physics, chemistry, and transport processes

occurring in the Earth’s magnetosphere, ionosphere, and atmosphere, and the responses of

the transport processes to solar phenomena and

variability; the structure and dynamics of the Sun

and its long- and short-term variations; cosmic

ray, X-ray, gamma ray, ultraviolet, optical, infrared, and radio emissions from stars, interstellar

gas and dust, pulsars, neutron stars, quasars,

black holes, and other celestial sources; and the

law governing the interactions and processes occurring in the universe. Many of the phenomena

being investigated in the physics and astronomy

program are not detectable from ground-based

observatories because of the obscuring or distorting effects of the Earth’s atmosphere.

HIGH ENERGY ASTRONOMY OBSERVATORIES

(HEAO) DEVELOPMENT

A major scientific objective of the HEAO program is to observe and investigate not only those

)(-ray sources that are already known, but also

a much larger number which, because of their

distance or their low intensity, remained undetected prior to HEAO. This work has detected

classes of intrinsically weak X-ray sources within

our own galaxy, as well as stronger sources outside our galaxy. Other equally important objectives include the observation of rare species of

cosmic rays, which are crucial to our understanding of heavy element formation, and the search

for nuclear gamma ray lines, which are important in understanding the origin of the elements.

This program promises to advance our understanding of newly discovered processes that

release extraordinary amounts of energy. It will

also enhance our understanding of the creation

of matter, and deepen our knowledge of observed phenomena such as quasars, pulsars,

novae, and supernovae.

SPACE TELESCOPE (ST) DEVELOPMENT

The space telescope is expected to make a

major contribution to understanding the stars and

galaxies, the nature and behavior of the gas and

dust between them, and the broad question of

the origin and scale of the universe.

It will enhance the ability of astronomers to

study radiation in the visible and ultraviolet

regions of the spectrum. Because of its location

above the atmosphere, it will be more sensitive

than ground-based telescopes of comparable diameter and will record greater detail about the

objects under study. It will make it possible to

look far into the distant past of our universe.

The telescope should also contribute significantly to the study of the early stages of stars and

the formation of solar systems and to the observation of such highly evolved objects as supernova

remnants and white dwarf stars. With it we may

be able to determine the nature of quasars, and

the processes by which they emit such enormous

amounts of energy. It will also be possible to

study nearby individual stars and perhaps determine if they have planetary systems.
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 133

No budget cuts are foreseen for the space telescope.

GAMMA RAY OBSERVATORY (GRO) DEVELOPMENT

The objective of the GRO program is to measure gamma ray radiation from the universe in

order to explore the fundamental physical processes powering it: Certain celestial phenomena

can be studied only at gamma ray energies. These

include direct evidence of the synthesis of the

chemical elements; high-energy astrophysical

processes occurring in supernovae, neutron stars,

and black holes; gamma ray burst sources; diffuse gamma ray radiation and unique gamma rayemitting objects that may exist. Gamma rays represent one of the last frontiers of the electromagnetic spectrum to be explored, because the required detector technology has only recently

been developed. The low flux levels of gamma

ray quanta, and the high background they produce through their interaction with the Earth’s

atmosphere, coupled with the demand for better spectral, spatial, and temporal resolution of

source features, combine to require that large

gamma ray instruments be flown in space for a

prolonged period. Observations of gamma rays

are likely to provide unique information on the

most astronomically intriguing objects yet

discovered: quasars, neutron stars, and black

holes.

EXPLORER DEVELOPMENT

The Explorer program provides the principal

means of conducting astronomical studies and

long-term investigations of solar physics and of

the near-Earth interplanetary environment that

have limited, specific objectives and do not require major satellite observatories. Included in

the present program are missions to study atmospheric and magnetospheric physics; magnetospheric boundaries; interplanetary phenomena;

and X-ray, ultraviolet, and infrared astronomy.

SUBORBITAL PROGRAMS

The sounding rocket program provides versatile, relatively low cost research tools that complement the capabilities of balloons, aircraft, freeflying spacecraft and the space shuttle in all the

space science disciplines, including the study of

the Earth’s ionosphere and magnetosphere, space

plasma physics, stellar astronomy, solar astronomy, and high-energy astrophysics. Activities are

conducted on both a domestic and an international cooperative basis. The current level of activity is about 60 rocket flights per year.

THE PLANETARY PROGRAM

This program includes the scientific exploration

of our solar system; the planets, their satellites,

the comets and asteroids, and the interplanetary

medium. The program objectives are to understand the origin and evolution of the solar system,

to understand the Earth through comparative

studies with the other planets, and to understand

how the appearance of life in the solar system

is related to the chemical history of the system.

The strategy that has been adopted calls for

equal study of the terrestrial-like inner planets,

the giant gaseous outer planets, and the small

bodies (comets and asteroids). Missions to these

planetary bodies start at the level of reconnaissance and exploration, to achieve the most

fundamental characterization of the bodies, and

proceed to a level of detailed study, The reconnaissance phase of inner planet exploration

began in the 1960’s, and has now been completed.

Mars has provided a program focus because

of its potential as a site of biological activity, and

the Viking landings in 1976 carried out the exploration of this planet forward to a new, high

level of scientific and technological achievement,

setting the stage for the next step of detailed

study. Analyses of the Moon rock samples returned by Apollo continue to be highly productive, as new insights into the early history of the

inner solar system are achieved and as our theoretical concepts are revised accordingly. The continuing Pioneer Venus mission is taking the study

of our nearest neighbor, and closest planetary

analog, beyond the reconnaissance stage to the

point where we have made a basic characterization of the massive cloud-covered atmosphere

of Venus.

The Galileo mission will conduct direct and

long-duration studies of Jupiter. The objectives

of this program are to conduct a comprehensive

exploration of Jupiter, its atmosphere, magnetosphere, and satellites, utilizing a new deep space-
134 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

craft concept that combines both remote sensing and direct measurements on an orbiter spacecraft with separate atmospheric probe. Galileo

is the only planetary program still under development and is scheduled for launch in 1984.

MISSION OPERATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS

The mission operations and data analysis program funds the operations phase of planetary missions after development, launch, and initial inflight checkout are complete. IT also provides for

multi mission flight support. Currently, active

planetary missions being supported within mission operations and data analysis are Voyager,

Pioneer Venus, Pioneer 6-II, Helios, and Viking.

The objective of the Voyager mission to the

outer planets is to conduct scientific studies of

the Jupiter and Saturn planetary systems, including their numerous satellites and the rings of

Saturn. While the two spacecraft are cruising to

the outer planets, they are also performing continuing investigations of the interplanetary

medium. Since their launches in 1977, the two

Voyager spacecraft have encountered both Jupiter and Saturn and returned spectacular data and

pictures.

Subsequent to the Saturn encounters, the

spacecraft will continue to provide data on the

interplanetary medium. Voyager 1 will investigate

the outer limits of our solar system and Voyager

2 will go on to Uranus and Neptune.

LIFE SCIENCES PROGRAM

The objective of the life sciences program is to

conduct studies in the areas of space biology and

medicine, and thereby to expand scientific

knowledge of the origin and evolution of life, The

realization of this objective, which is intimately

linked to our understanding of the basic mechanisms of biological and medical processes, is

achieved through a program of research conducted both on Earth and in space. The near-term

activities will help us to discover and investigate

the effects of the space environment on humans

to facilitate their safe, useful participation in space

activities. The life sciences program utilizes a

composite of disciplines addressing all space-related problems in biology and medicine.

The life sciences program is composed of three

major programs. The first consists of flight and

ground-based experiments, whereby the physiological effects of the space environment on

humans are explored. The unique properties of

space (e.g., microgravity, radiation, etc.) provide,

for the first time in our history, an opportunity

to explore significant problems in biology under

a controlled set of conditions that cannot be adequately duplicated in laboratories on Earth. The

second is the continuous inflight observation of

crews venturing in space and the testing and refining of countermeasures and establishing requirements in human space exploration. The

third is the studies in exobiology, with special emphasis on a problem of profound philosophical

and scientific significance: origins and the

distribution of life in the universe.

The life sciences operational medicine program

is the catalyst responsible for bringing the science,

technology, and practice of medicine to bear on

solving the problems of sustaining, supporting,

and protecting individuals working in the space

environment. This includes assurances that physical welfare and performance are preserved and

that adequate treatment of inflight illnesses or injuries is provided.

The biomedical research program objective is

to develop the basic medical knowledge needed

to enable men and women to operate more effectively in space, The program is organized into

discrete elements with each designed primarily

to rectify a particular physiological problem expected to affect the human organism in prolonged or repetitive space flight. Thus, motion

sickness, bone loss, and hormonal disturbances

are the subjects of a continued search for mechanisms and countermeasures. The program is

largely dependent upon the use of ground-based

analogs of space flight.

The space biology activity will explore the role

of gravity in life processes and use gravity as an

environmental tool to investigate fundamental

biological questions. Specific objectives are to:

1 ) investigate and identify the role of gravity in

plant and animal cellular processes, embryonic

development, morphology and physiology;

2) identify the mechanisms of gravity sensing and
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program . 135

transmission of gravity-perception information

within both plants and animals; 3) identify the

interactive effects of gravity and other stimuIi

(e.g., light) and stresses (e.g., vibration) on the

development of metabolism of organisms; 4) use

gravity to study the normal nature and properties of living organisms; and 5) extend the limits

of knowledge about plant and animal growth and

metabolism to provide for long-term survival and

multigeneration reproduction of life in space. This

program provides basic ground-based information in support of future space flight experiments

and life support systems environment. This includes assurances that physical welfare and performance is preserved and that adequate treatment of inflight illness or injuries is provided.

Exobiology is the study of the origin, evolution,

and distribution of life and life-related molecules

on Earth and beyond. Sophisticated analyses of

life as we know it, its chemical precursors and

its origin, coupled with extrapolation to extraterrestrial environments, affords a unique opportunity to address a most fundamental question regarding the existence of such processes beyond the

Earth. Theories about chemical evolution and the

origin of life are being refined to reflect results

from the most recent planetary and astronomical

explorations. The current research program also

is uncovering an intimate association between the

origin and evolution of life on Earth and the processes that shaped the evolution of the solar system

itself. These discoveries have highlighted gaps in

our knowledge which, when completed as the

program expands, will ultimately allow tests of

the concept of universality of biological proc

esses.

It may be useful to describe one additiona

space science program that has now been sig

nificantly cut back, because this cutback has

ramifications for future international cooperation

in space applications.

The international solar polar mission (ISPM) was

a joint NASA and European Space Agency mission designed to obtain the first view of the solar

system from a new perspective—a view from far

above and far below the plane in which the planets orbit the Sun’s equator, i.e., over the poles

of the Sun. The two spacecraft would have aided

i n the study of the relationship between the Sun

and its magnetic field and particle emissions (solar

wind and cosmic rays) as a function of solar latitude, and hence might have allowed us to gain

insight into the possible effects of solar activity

on the Earth’s weather and climate. The objective of the international solar polar mission was

to conduct an exploration of those regions of the

heliosphere above and below the equatorial

plane of the Sun. Observations in the extreme,

high-latitude regions of the sun have not been

made before, and evidence indicates that this

region of space is greatly different from the region

in which the Earth is located.

The U.S. spacecraft for ISPM was canceled on

account of budget constraints. The issues raised

by its cancellation are discussed in chapter 7.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON SPACE

Democratic government is based on the prem- ers, and molders of public attitudes and opinion

ise that there should be some linkage between as well as representatives of the public in the

public attitudes and political choice, not only in political process. Thus, the following account of

general but also with respect to specific issues on public attitudes about the space program needs

the public agenda. This linkage is not a one-way to be interpreted with the understanding that genpath, of course; public officials are leaders, teach- eral public opinion is only one determinant of
136 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

public policy, and that its influence is rarely

direct. Public opinion more frequently acts as a

general constraint, setting boundaries within

which political leaders are free to chose, or as

an indirect shaping influence on the attitudes of

elites inside and outside of government; most

often, it is these attitudes that are closely correlated with specific policy choices.

From this analysis it follows that:

1.

2.

During the early years of the U.S. space program, the general public was willing to accept the interpretation of society’s leaders

as to the significance of space activities. This

made it possible for the United States to first

adopt a moderate response to Soviet space

achievement, then to reverse policy and to

enter into competition with the Soviets, even

though public attitudes seemed to be opposed to such competition.

More recently, public understanding of the

space program, - and a supportive public attitude toward that program, have increased

to the point where they may have political

impact. Although an official’s position on

space-related issues may not be a crucial

determinant of electoral success, prospace

attitudes, and particularly, groups organized

to reflect them, appear to be having some

impact in influencing public policy with

respect to the U.S. space program.

It is important, however, even if the second of

these propositions is accepted, to recognize that

“while it has considerable intellectual interest and

entertainment value, space exploration is not a

daily concern of the general public. . . . The levels of interest and information in this area are especially Iow.”s Thus it is likely that public attitudes will provide the background, but not much

more, against which national space policy will

continue to be formulated.

Public Opinion and Space Policy: 1965-80

A striking example of a leadership decision not

being constrained by apparent public opinion is

the U.S. commitment to a manned lunar landing.

In the very month that President John F. Kennedy

announced that he was setting as a national goal

a lunar expedition before 1970, the Gallup Poll

reported that the public was opposed by a 58 to

33 percent margin to spending the up to $40 billion such an enterprise would require, Until very

recently, only once since 1965 has the percentage of U.S. adults calling for the United States

to do more in space exceeded the portion believing that the Government should do less. Figure

9 compares this division of opinion for the period

‘National Science Board, Science Indicators, /980, p. 169.

Figure 9.–Long-Term Trend Polling Results of U.S. Public Opinion on the Federal Space Effort

60 r

50

t

0/0 1 : 1 I ~ I I I , ~ 1 i, I

, I, I, I,, 1 I ~,, I, ~ ,1 I,, t,,,1, ~ 1\,,, I,, , I, ,, I,, , I,, , I,, ,

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

NOTE: Responses to question of whether government should “do more” or “do less” In support of space exploration, 1985-1981.

SOURCE: For 1965-1975, Herbert Krugman, “Public Attitudes toward the Apollo Program, ” Journal of Comrnurr/cations, vol. 27, No. 4 (1977), More recent data are

derived from Trendex Polls taken for the General Electric Co.
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 137

from 1965 to 1981; the recent shift toward a

markedly more prospace position is clear from

this chart.

Table 10, which reports opinions for the 1973-

80 period, is even more revealing, both in terms

of the longer term trends and in terms of the current uprising in prospace opinion. Only in recent

years have space “antagonists” comprised less

than an absolute majority, and the explicitly prospace group grew only slowly, from 7.4 percent

in 1973 to 11.6 percent in 1978. Most recently,

however, the figure for those believing the United

States is spending too little on space has jumped

to 18 percent, and space antagonists are now

only 39 percent of the total. The size of the

“space neutral” segment has stayed constant,

and thus the gain in support for expanded space

spending appears to reflect a real shift in opinion.

In 1980, for the first time, those of the opinion

that space spending should not be lowered outnumbered those holding the opposite view, 53

percent to 39 percent.6

While prospace opinion appears to be increasing, the priority assigned to the space program

has historically remained low. Tables 11 and 12

demonstrate this both for Government priorities

in general (table 11) and for priorities within science and technology (table 12). What is most relevant in table 11 is that only the “military, armaments, and defense” category showed a greater

increase in percentage in favor between 1977 and

1980 than did the “space exploration program,”

although this increase only moved space one

rank up the priority scale. According to one analyst, “the increasing approval of space activities

among Americans over the past several years is

GRobert D. McWilliams, “The Improving Socio-Political Situation

of the American Space Program in the Early 1980’ s,” paper prepared

for Fifth Princeton/AIAA Conference on Space Manufacturing, May

1981, p. 2.

Table IO.—Distribution of Opinion Toward Federal Spending on the Space Program:

1973 Through 1980 (percentages)

1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980

Too little . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 7.7 7.4 9.1 10.1 11.6 18.0

About right . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.3 27.5 30.1 28.0 34.4 35.0 34.6

Too much . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4 61.0 58.1 60.2 49.6 47.2 39.1

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 3.6 4.4 2.5 5.9 6.5 8.3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

SOURCE National Opinion Research Center Polls as reported In Robert D. McWilllams, “The Improving Soclo-PoliticalSituation of the American Space Program in the Early 1980s, ” paper prepared for Fifth Princeton/AIAA Conference on

Space Manufacturing, May 1981

Table ll.—Percentages of Americans Favoring Increased Funding, and Relative

Priority Rankings, for 11 Areas of Federal Government Spending, 1977 and 1980

1977 1977 1980 1980 Percent

percent rank percent rank increase

Halting the rising crime rate . . . . . . . . . . . 70.0 1 72.0 1 2.0

Dealing with drug addiction . . . . . . . . . . . 59.5 64.5 2 5.0

Improving-protecting Nation’s health . . . 58.5 : 57.1 4 – 1.4

Improving-protecting the environment . . 51.2 4 50.8 6 – 0,4

Improving Nation’s education system. . . 49.5 5 54.9 5 5.4

Solving problems of the big cities . . . . . . 46.9 6 45.8 7 -1. 1

Improving conditions for blacks. . . . . . . . 27.3 26.2 8 – 1.1

Military, armaments and defense . . . . . . 25.7 ; 60.2 3 34.5

Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.0 9 14.0 10 1.0

Space exploration program . . . . . . . . . . . 10.7 10 19.6 9 8.9

Foreign aid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 11 5.4 11 1.7

SOURCE’ Robert D. McWilliams, “The lmProving Socio-Political Situation of the American Space Program in the Early 1980s,”

paper prepared for Fifth Princeton/AIAA Conference on Space Manufacturing, May 1981
138 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 12.—Public Priorities for Federal R&D Spending

Most preferred Least preferred

Funding objective Response Rank Response Rank

Improving health care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Developing energy sources and

conserving energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Improving education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reducing crime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Developing or improving methods

for producing food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reducing and controlling pollution . . . . . . . . . .

Developing or improving weapons

for outer space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Preventing and treating drug addiction . . . . . . .

Developing faster and safer public

transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Improving the safety of automobiles . . . . . . . . .

Finding better birth control methods . . . . . . . . .

Discovering new basic knowledge about

man and nature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Exploring outer space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Predicting and controlling the weather . . . . . . .

815

754

630

587

368

358

266

259

210

155

139

135

99

60

1 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

60

40

55

82

253

113

403

195

430

284

705

577

705

592

12

14

13

11

8

10

5

7

1,5

4

1.5

3

technology funding from your tax money?”

not a trend that is riding mainly on the coattails

of militarism or growing faith in science and technology. Rather, it seems that Americans may be

coming to view the space program as being conducive to the achievement of other types of goals

of which they are in favor. ”7

One indication of what the public expects from

space exploration is presented in table 13. A national survey taken for NSF asked adults to identify benefits they believed would result from exploring outer space. Listed in table 13 are those

benefits mentioned either first or second by respondents. What is striking about the results is

the high ranking given to an indirect benefit of

the program (“improve other technologies”) and

the low rankings given to direct economic benefits (“find industrial use, “ “create jobs and other

economic benefits”). Compared with other technology-related issues such as nuclear power

or chemical food additives, a greater proportion

of Americans see space exploration as producing substantially more benefits than potential

harm.8

It is possible to construct a profile of those who

most “support” and those who most “oppose”

the U.S. space program, if “support” and “oppose” are defined as deviations of more than 10

percent from the average of all Americans. Table

14 contains such a profile, Those who support

the space program tend to have one or more of

the following characteristics: male, between 25

and 34, college-educated, professional or technical employment, working for government, income over $25,000/yearr and living in the West.

Opponents of the space program tend to be:

female, over 65, black, less than a high school

degree, laborers and service workers, and under

$5,000 income. One more relevant characteristic

that emerges from another opinion study is that

those who support increased space spending are

significantly more likely to vote than those who

believe that too much is spent on space; over 72

percent of those who supported an increase in

space budgets in 1980 voted in the 1976 Presidential election, while only 56 percent of those

calling for reduced spending voted that year.9

7

1 bid., p. 8

‘National Science Board, op. cit., p. 170. 9MclA/illiams, op. cit., p. 16.
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program Ž 139

Table 13.—Perceived Benefits From Space Exploration

First or

Benefits second mention

Improve other technologies (e.g., computers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

Find mineral or other wealth, other resources, sources of energy . . . . . . . . 200

Increase knowledge of universe and/or of man’s origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Find new areas for future habitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Contact other civilizations, other forms of life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Improve rocketry and missile (military) technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Find industrial use for space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Find new kinds of food/places to raise more food products . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Create jobs and other economic benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Learn about weather and how to control it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

SOURCE: Institute of Survey Research, p. 164

Table 14.—Profile of Public Attitudes of Space

Exploration: “In General, Do You Favor or Oppose the

Exploration of Outer Space?”

Percent Percent

Group characteristics favor oppose

All . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 31

Men. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 22

Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 38

Age 25 t0 34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 23

Age over 65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 50

Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 49

O to 8 years of schooling . . . . . . . . . . . 32 50

9 to 11 years of schooling . . . . . . . . . . 40 50

Some college, no degree . . . . . . . . . . 74 19

Bachelor’ s degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 15

Graduate degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 10

Professional or technical job. . . . . . . 78 16

Operatives and laborers . . . . . . . . . . . 43 43

Service workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 41

Work for government . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 17

Under $5,000 income . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 55

$25,000 to $49,999 income . . . . . . . . . 76 17

Over $50,000 income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 15

Live in West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 20

aonlY those ~ha~acteristics tflat differ by more than 10 Percent ‘rem overall

opinion are included.

SOURCE: Institute for Survey Research, Vo/ //, Deta//ed Fmd/rrgs, p 170.

The demographic makeup of the “prospace”

group appears to be undergoing some changes

in recent years, although its general characteristics as profiled in table 11 have remained stable.

Among those changes:

● recent increases in prospace attitude are

much more marked among the most highly

educated;

● formerly, “lower” and “working” classes

were more antispace than were “middle”

and “upper” classes. Recently, however, the

“middle” and “working” have become

●

●

more space positive than either “upper” or

“lower” class respondents;

prospace attitudes have increased substantially among whites and only negligibly

among blacks; and

support for space is increasing faster for

divorcees than for any other marital class.10

There has been a suggestion that the shifts in

space-positive attitudes with respect to variables

of social class and education “provide a classic

example of how social change tends to begin and

develop in society. Innovations generally find

their beginnings in the ideas and efforts of the

more highly educated members of the uppermiddle class and, if they survive and grow more

prevalent in the upper strata, they then tend to

catch on at the lower socioeconomic levels.” The

same analyst argues that “the resurgence of

space-positivism in America since 1975 was

spawned by the upper and middle social classes.

The trend then began to spread throughout the

general public with the classic pattern that has

characterized other prominent American social

movements such as the feminist and civil rights

crusaders.’” 11

One of the most striking recent developments

in the space policy field is the emergence of a

number of organized prospace groups. As the

quotation just cited suggests, the aggregation of

individual opinions into more-or-less broadly

based interest groups with middle and working

class roots is part of the traditional pattern by

IOMCwilliarnS, op. cit., pp. 10-1s.

11 Ibid., p. 14.
140 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

which issues are given increased attention on the

public agenda. perhaps this is what is happening with respect to space. The following section

describes the recent emergence of a space interest group network.

Interest Groups and Space Policy

During the 1970’s, interest groups organized

around one or a few issues and claiming to represent broad sectors of the general popuIation—

so-called “public” interest groups—became an

increasingly important influence on public policy.

In part, the increased influence came at the expense of political parties as vehicles for articulating, influencing, and implementing the public’s

policy preferences.12 Thus the rapid increase in

space interest groups in recent years may be a

development of political significance. A May 1980

survey of space interest groups identified 39 organizations with nationwide activities.ls In the past

2 years, and particularly with the transition in administrations, there have been a number of onetime efforts organized ad hoc to mobilize opinion

on space policy; these groups have provided a

base for such mobilization efforts.

There is an active “Coordinating Committee on

Space” that attempts to identify areas of agreement and disagreement among the major prospace groups; its membership includes 11 of the

most active organizations. There are two general

types of prospace groups: 1 ) traditional professional groups, and 2) citizen support groups.

Most prominent among the former are:

. American Institute of Aeronautics and

Astronautics, the professional society for

people in the aeronautics and astronautics

field, with almost 30,000 members.

● American Astronautic/ Society, a group of

individuals with professional interest in

space. Current membership is about 1,000.

1 zchar[es Chafer, “The Role of Public Interest Groups In SPace

Policy, ” jerry Grey and Christine Krop (eds.), Space A4anufacturirrg ///, Proceedings of the Fourth Princeton/AIAA Conference (New

York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1979),

pp. 185-189.

13Trudy Bell, “Space Activists on the Rise, ” /nsight, AugustSeptember 1980, pp. 1, 3, 10, 13-15.

●

●

●

Aerospace Industries Association, a consortium of major aerospace firms that functions

as a trade association.

Nationa/ Space C/ub, a Washington-based

group of business and government leaders

in the space field.

University Space Research Association, a

consortium of universities active in space

research that operates several facilities under

NASA contract.

Among the most active and/or largest of the

public interest or citizen support space groups

are:

●

●

●

●

●

●

De/ta-Vee, a citizen-supported, nonprofit

corporation that channels public contributions into the support of specific space activities, such as the continued operation of the

Viking spacecraft on Mars and a U.S. Halley’s Comet Mission.

High Frontier, a group formulating a national

strategy to make maximum use of space

technology to counter the threat of Soviet

military power, to replace current nuclear

strategy with one based on space defense,

and to promote the industrial and commercial potentials of space.

Institute for the Social Science Study of

Space, which sponsors research and publications related to the social science aspects of

space exploration and development.

L-5 Society, which emphasizes human settlement in space as a long-term goal. Founded

in 1975 by Gerard K. O’Neill, it has broadened its scope to most aspects of space policy. Its membership is between 3,OOO and

4,OOO individuals.

Nationa/ Space /nstitute, the largest of the

broadly based space groups, with over

10,000 members. Founded in 1975 by Wernher von Braun, its emphasis is on communication with general audiences.

P/anetary Society, which promotes awareness of and public involvement in planetary

exploration and search for extraterrestrial

life. Publishes newsletter, supports research,

organizes meetings. Has grown to over

100,000 members in just over a year.
Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 141

●

●

●

Space Foundation, a private foundation for

support of space industrialization.

Space Studies Institute, a research performing and supporting group with focus on use

of nonterrestrial resources.

World Space Foundation, a group supporting research projects to accelerate space exploration (e.g., solar sail).

The purposes of these and other space groups

fall into three general categories:

1. educating and informing the public;

2. conducting research themselves; and

3. funding external research.

Recently added to the list are groups explicitly

engaging in political activities. There were attempts to organize prospace Political Action

Committees (PACS) for the 1980 election, and at

least one prospace PAC remains in existence.

The influence of these various organizations

and groups on space policy is difficult to estimate.

Certainly, as the Reagan administration took office in january 1981 and as the proposed NASA

budget was cut several times in the following

year, there have been a number of attempts by

one or a coalition of these groups to mobilize

opinion in support of specific projects (e.g., a mission to Halley’s Comet) or for the civilian space

program in general. Whether the reductions in

the NASA budget would have been even more

severe, had not these groups been active, is a

question difficult or impossible to answer.

Finally, note should be taken of the emergence

of a Congressional Space Caucus, and a supporting Congressional Staff Space Group. This caucus

is initially limited to the House of Representatives;

its goal is to increase the awareness of Members

and staff of the benefits of the Nation’s space

effort.

Space Achievement and

Public Opinion: 1981

With two successful flights of the shuttle Columbia and the encounter of Voyager 2 with

Saturn, 1981 was a year of spectacular space

achievement for the United States. Several public

opinion polls have confirmed that the citizens of

the United States were quite supportive of these

achievements.

●

●

●

A May 1981 Harris survey, taken less than

1 month after the initial shuttle flight, found

76 percent of Americans calling the shuttle

“a major breakthrough for U.S. technology

and know-how’ and a 63 to 33 percent

majority favoring the expenditure of several

billions of dollars over the next decade to

develop the full potential of the shuttle. The

Harris poll noted that “after the 1969 Moon

landing, a 64 to 30 percent majority did not

feel it was worthwhile to spend an additional

$4 billion on the Apollo space program” and

commented that “current support for spending on the space program is even more significant in view of the current overwhelming preference for cutting Federal spending. ”

An August 1981 Associated Press-NBC

survey found that 60 percent of U.S. adults

thought that the United States was not

spending enough or was spending about the

right amount on the space program, and 66

percent believed that the shuttle was a good

investment for the United States.

An October 1981 Associated Press-NBC poll

confirmed the results of the earlier survey,

finding that 60 percent of respondents think

the shuttle program is a good investment, 30

percent do not, and 10 percent aren’t sure.

A further examination of the results of the May

Harris poll suggests both that support for the

space program is not evenly distributed across

all strata of U.S. society and that the reasons for

the support differ substantially among respondents (see tables 15 and 16). The August poll found

that 49 percent of respondents believed that the

emphasis of the Nation’s space program should

be primarily on national defense, 32 percent cited

scientific exploration, 10 percent cited both, and

9 percent were not sure. By October, these responses had shifted, with 43 percent in support

of a defense emphasis and 40 percent favoring

an emphasis on scientific exploration. In this latter poll, 46 percent of respondents believed that

the United States should keep its space program
142 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 15.—How Would You Rank the Importance of Various Uses

of the Space Shuttle?

Only Not very

Very somewhat important

important important at all Not sure

Percent Percent Percent Percent

Doing experiments with new

pharmaceutical products that can

help cure disease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 11 5 2

Developing a military capability in

space beyond what the Russians are

doing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 20 10 2

Putting new communications satellites

in space at a much lower cost . . . . . . 64 25 9 2

Doing scientific research on metals,

chemicals, and living cells in space . 55 27 16 2

Picking up other U.S. space satellites

and repairing them in space. . . . . . . . 47 32 19 2

SOURCE: May 1981 Harris Survey.

Table 16.— “IS the Space Shuttle Program Worth

Spending Severai Billion Dollars Over the Next 10

Years to Develop its Full Potential?”

Not

Worth it worth it Not sure

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

College educated . . . . .

Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Women . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Blacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Republicans . . . . . . . . .

Democrats . . . . . . . . . .

Conservatives. . . . . . . .

Liberals . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Percent

63

71

76

52

45

71

57

66

57

Percent

33

26

21

43

53

26

39

30

41

Percent

4

3

3

2

3

4

4

2

SOURCE: May 1981 Harris Survey.

separate from the programs of other nations, 32

percent favored a joint space program between

the United States and the U. S. S. R., and 15 percent favored joint ventures with other countries,

but not with the Soviet Union.

Opinion polls, taken singly, do not reveal fundamental views underlying the shifting tides of

opinion. Thus, the facts that by 1981 the success

of the shuttle and of the Voyager missions spurred

public interest in the U.S. space program and that

a clear majority of the public was found to favor

the program do not in themselves prove that

there is deep public support for space. But,

viewed in the context of a quarter century of

space activities, the recent upswing in opinion

in favor of the space program appears significant.

First of all, current support is part of a long-term

trend of increasing support. It cannot, therefore,

be explained as the result only of shuttle and

Voyager successes. Second, the trend of increasing support coincides with the proliferation and

growth of citizens’ support groups. As public

education about space is perhaps the major overall goal of these groups, their efforts have been

the effect, if not the cause, of continued rising

interest in space. Third, the Space Caucus, arising as a “back bench” movement within Congress, rather than in response to the leadership,

is evidence for a genuine space constituency, i.e.,

one whose real interests, economic, political, or

scientific, are at stake. These three conditions suggest that public awareness of space issues is increasing and that official space policy may begin

to receive more constant scrutiny among at least

the attentive public. This would seem to bode

well for those who believe that increased understanding of the benefits of U.S. activity in space

will lead to continued and firmer public support

for that activity.
Chapter 6

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE

CIVILIAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY

SPACE PROGRAMS
Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Access to Classified Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Summary Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Separate Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Technology Transfer.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Asymmetrical Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Status of National Security Space Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Current System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Future Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Civilian-National Security Relationships in Space: 1957-81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Early Policy Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

Program Relationships in the Early Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Current Policy and Policy Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

Policy Formulation and Program Stresses in the Post-Apollo Period . . . . . . . . 154

Recent Policy Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Current Administration Policy Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Current Institutional and Programmatic Characteristics of Civilian and

National Security Space Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Mission Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Openness v. Need for Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Differences in the Institutional Support Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

International Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Common Civilian-National Security Needs and Cooperative Activities . . . . . 159

Issues and Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Technology Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Security Classification Barriers . 162

Interagency Review Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Future of the Space Shuttle System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Man-in-Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

Common-Use Systems (Unmanned). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

Civilian Use of Data From DOD-Operated Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Institutional Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

The Original Rationale Reconsidered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Options for Future Civilian-National Security Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

FIGURE

Figure No. Page

10. Historical Budget Summary–Budget Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Chapter 6

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN AND

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

INTRODUCTION

Over the years, the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration (NASA), the Department of

Defense (DOD), and other Federal agencies have

evolved a set of interlocking responsibilities for

U.S. space activities. NASA is designated as the

lead agency for most U.S. civilian space efforts.

DOD, in accordance with the National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act of 1958, undertakes “activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the

development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development (R&D) necessary to make effective provision for the defense

of the United States). ” Responsibility for coordinating the efforts of the civilian and the military

programs was initially vested in the National Aeronautics and Space Council (see ch. 10) and a

Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, although

both were later abolished under Presidential reorganization plans. It was explicitly recognized

that the President was ultimately responsible for

dividing specific responsibilities between DOD

and NASA.

The premise that there is a need for separate

civilian and national security space programs has

been examined and reaffirmed by several highIevel policy reviews in the intervening years–

each concluding that the characteristics of the

primary missions of each program justified the

distinct institutional structures that had been developed. These reviews also affirmed that relations between the two programs should be continually scrutinized and that opportunities for

cooperation or better coordination should be

sought.

Now that NASA and DOD have been conducting space programs for nearly 25 years, under

separate charters but with overlapping interests,

it is appropriate to consider the current status and

probable future of their relationships in light of

overall U.S. civilian space policy. The recent rapid

growth and projections of even more rapid future

increases in military space programs and budgets

make such a reconsideration essential.

Access to Classified Information

Any analysis of the relationships between the

civilian and the national security programs that

is intended for public dissemination has to confront the problem of access to classified information. Information is classified and placed under

restrictive security controls if its unrestricted

publication is deemed to harm the national security. Classified data were not used in the preparation of this report. Though discussion of the implications of classified-unclassified program relationships at an unclassified level is necessarily incomplete and sometimes unconvincing, it is nevertheless the only available approach to presentation of such matters to the general public. The

material that follows has been written in such a

way as to provide sufficient insight into the types

of issues the classified programs generate and to

ensure that the analyses and discussion of options

are reasonable. Inevitably, there will be conclusions or observations that could be evaluated

more completely in a classified document.

It must also be recognized that there are different degrees of classification within the military/

intelligence programs. The most highly classified

are the so-called “National Technical Means”

and related systems; information about these

systems is very closely kept, even within the national security community. These systems are

mostly involved in strategic reconnaissance.

Many military systems, on the other hand, such

as communications and navigation satellites, are

not themselves classified, though certain details

of the technologies involved are kept secret.

145
146 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Cooperation Between DOD and NASA in U.S.

I

h Vehicle

1
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs . 147

Summary Assessment

Separate Programs

Space systems provide an increasing number

of vital services to support a variety of military

and intelligence missions. Continued technological advances, along with the need to counter an

increasing level of military space activities by the

Soviet Union, will expand the range of desirable

national security programs. Similarly, on the civilian side advancing technology will make possible space activities that could contribute significantly to a number of high-priority national objectives. These include: 1 ) to enhance the image and

prestige of the United States through continuing

man-in-space activities; 2) to provide a base for

commercial space services, most notably for communications; 3) to conduct research; 4) to extend

the technology base for space and launching

systems; and 5) to perform valuable public services such as meteorological observations, storm

warning, and other Earth observation or communication tasks.

In today’s environment of growth in expenditures for national security combined with reductions in civilian activities, it is necessary to consider the continued appropriateness of separate

programs and separate institutions. This is

especially important with the advent of the space

transportation system, which represents a large

new area of common interest and new opportunities for technology sharing. Three basic options

seem possible: 1 ) separate civilian and military

programs; 2) independent space R&D agency for

all Federal space programs, civilian and military;

and 3) absorption of NASA by DOD and other

Federal agencies. These options are discussed

under the heading “Institutional Change. ”

Technology Transfer

Classification barriers necessarily protect sensitive national security information, but their existence disposes many in the civilian community

to attribute unknown but vastly superior capabilities to classified systems. This leads to the

claim that if military technology could be transferred more rapidly and more thoroughly to the

civilian sector, civilian programs would benefit

greatly from these superior capabilities. This view

is, for the most part, oversimplified and fails to

recognize important differences in agency missions and the resulting needs for space systems.

Different mission objectives entail different emphases on performance characteristics and other

design considerations in the development and

adaptation of advanced technology. For example, a military system may have to be able to

operate in a hostile environment, so that military

specifications are frequently more stringent than

those for civilian purposes.

Nevertheless, the adequacy of technology

transfer between civilian and national security

programs remains an important issue that will be

examined in some detail in this chapter, The following observations summarize this analysis:

●

●

●

●

Technology flows in both directions, and

both sectors have benefited from such transfers. General-use space technology is transferred with relativ ease; mission-specific

technology only with great difficulty.

There are few incentives and, frequently,

practical penalties for either a national security or a civilian program manager to enter

cooperative technology sharing arrangements with other programs.

The need to protect certain information and

technology for national security purposes

limits its accessibility to civilian users.

Procedures exist to enable selected individuals from civilian agencies to gain access to

classified systems and information, but this

access is imperfect for a variety of reasons;

continued management attention is needed

to keep these procedures functioning effectively.

Asymmetrical Relationships

The need to protect national security space activities and products results in a continuing asymmetry in the relationships between the two programs. In general, systems operated by DOD are

of high national priority; they are established in

response to needs that are not easily questioned

by those outside of the national security decisionmaking structure. Similarly, the determination of

the boundary between classified and unclassified

technology is made within the national security

community. As a result, limitations have been set
148 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

on the allowable performance of civilian systems.

These limitations tend to persist and act as continuing constraints on civilian users; in some

cases, the civilian user community does not know

the details of the restrictions that exist. There are

few opportunities for the civilian community to

question these restrictions, except within forums

such as the National security Council (NW,

where civilian agency interests are inevitably of

secondary importance. These asymmetries suggest the need for a forum in which the civilian

and national security space relationships can be

equitably reviewed from a disinterested perspective, as discussed in chapters 3 and 10.

National security concerns affect most, if not

all, civilian space applications programs; therefore, a discussion of the relationships between

the two sectors is especially pertinent to this

assessment. An outline of the DOD-operated programs is given in the following section, but the

limitations that result from describing them on

the basis of unclassified data must be kept in

mind.

STATUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

The national security uses of space technology

are quite varied; however, they are all “applications” in that space technology is one means to

achieve various national security objectives. The

United States depends heavily on space-based

systems: 1 ) to conduct continuing surveillance of

activities in many areas of the world, particularly those controlled by its potential adversaries,

and to monitor compliance with international

agreements; 2) to provide timely warning of attacks on the United States and allied territory; and

3) to communicate with U.S. military forces

around the world and at sea. The U.S. national

security community is also actively exploring

other space activities, including: 1 ) the need to

protect both civilian and security assets already

in orbit from Soviet antisatellite systems; 2) the

ability to assure “freedom of the roads” for U.S.

spacecraft and launch vehicles by developing a

deterrent in the form of an antisatellite interceptor; 3) and the long-range potential of spacebased weapons for defending the United States

and its allies against hostile actions. The sum total

of these activities comprises a fast growing national security space program; many military analysts see space technology as having a revolutionary impact on national strategy and national power in coming years. ’

‘A recent study of the potentials of armed conflict in space is G.

Harry Stine, Confrontation in Space (Prentice-Hall, 1981); see also

the recently published report High Frontier, from the Heritage

Foundation.

Current Systems

Precise figures regarding expenditures for

DOD-supported space efforts are unavailable

because many of them are classified. Figure 10

compared published data on spending for civilian

(NASA) and military (DOD) space activities. Over

the past several years, the national security

budget has been growing at a much faster rate

than the civilian one, and is now larger in absolute terms than the civilian budget. When one

recognizes that the single major item in the NASA

budget, the shuttle, will have DOD as its single

largest user, the emphasis on national security applications of space becomes even more marked.

Current national security space systems perform (although in a very different context) functions similar to those performed by civilian space

systems. Classification of these systems prohibits

a full description of them in this analysis;2 the

following brief descriptions are thus intended only to emphasize the support role played by currently operational national security space systems:

zFUrther information on intelligence and defense activities in space

is contained in, for example, Trudy E. Bell, “America’s Other Space

Program,” The Sciences, December “1979; Eberhard Rechtin,

“Future Milita~ Applications in Space,” Speech to International

Aerospace Symposium, Paris, June 1981; Thomas H. Karas, /rnp/ications of Space Technology for Strategic Nuclear Competition, Occasional Paper 25, The Stanley Foundation; j. Preston Layton, “Military Space in Transition, ” Aeronautics and Astronautics, October

1981; the annual Aeronautics and Space Report of the President

contains an approved description of naticmal security space efforts.
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs • 149

Figure 10.—Historical Budget Summary-Budget Authority

6

5

I

t- /

/

~ Defense

.

1 . . . . I i 1 1 1 I 1 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 1 I I I 1

1959 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

Year

a

T, Q. - Transitional Quarter.

SOURCE Of f!ce of Management and Budgel

● Earth observation. —It was only in October

1978 that the existence of strategic surveillance satellites was officially acknowledged

by an American President,3 although the

media and general public had assumed their

existence for many years. Earth observation

satellites are used to perform several different

national security-related functions, including:

1. early warning of missile attack;

2. verification of compliance in related international arms-control agreements

such as nuclear testing and strategic missile deployment; and

3. surveillance of various areas of the

world to gather data required for U.S.

strategic and tactical planning.

Miiitary systems require degrees and kinds

of performance not required for civilian purposes. Many different kinds of satellites and

sensors are used to satisfy specific requirements. To the degree that military systems

JPresident Carter gave public recognition to the existence of intelligence satellites during an Oct. 1, 1978 speech at the Kennedy

Space Center.

●

73 74 75 76 T.Q.a 77 78 79 80 81 1982

are more specialized and provide advanced

performance, transfer of this technology to

the civilian sector will continue to be an

issue, especially as civilian needs become

more specialized in turn.4

Communications. –Although the bulk of

routine military messages are carried over

civilian-operated communication circuits,

both terrestrial and satellite, there is also a

variety of satellite communications systems

available for the exclusive use of the military

services and national command authorities.

These military satellites are crucial links in

the Nation’s command, control, and communications systems; approximately onethird of U.S. long-distance military traffic

goes by dedicated DOD satellites.

A continuing problem in national security communications via satellite is how to

4A Pionwring analysis of the use of space SYStETTIS for surveillance

and warning is Philip Klass, Secret Sentries in Space (Random House,

1971 ); see also, “Study on the Implications of Establishing an international Satellite Monitoring Agency,” prepared for the 2d U.N.

Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, Aug. 6, 1981, pp. 15-18.
150 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

combine various existing and future systems

into a coherent “architecture” which would

allow the integrated use of communications

capability by both civilian and military

authorities under various crisis and conflict

situations. At issue here is how dependent

the military should be on nonmilitary communications channels and how much investment the military should make to ensure

that civilian channels are survivable and ●

secure under various conditions. For example, there has been substantial attention

given to protecting the tracking and data

relay satellites so that they can be used for

defense as well as civilian purposes.

Navigation. –There has been a long tradition

in the United States of providing navigation

services for both military and civilian uses;

that tradition has been extended into the ●

joint use of operational Navy navigation satellites. DOD’s global positioning satellite

(GPS) system, now in an advanced stage of

development, will provide navigation assistance and position location for all military

services, and will also be available for civilian

use, albeit with somewhat degraded capabilities. Six Navstar satellites are now in orbit,

with a total of 18 envisaged for the complete

system.

Meteorology. —The military operates its own

weather satellites using technology rather

similar to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellites that

serve civilian needs. There have been several

analyses of the potential for combining civiiian and military meteorological satellite operations into a single system, but no such

merger has been approved.

Transportation. -The national security community has used the same launch vehicles,

Cooperation Between DOD and NASA in Meteorological Satellites

.

9

DOD (Air Force)

t

v

Common Technology Production

Exchange of Data

NOAA m-9 Air Weather w - -- 0 --- w

Navy

4 *

t L

v

Wll c

SOURCE: OffIce of Technology Assessment.

,
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 151

with certain variations, (except for the

Saturn-class boosters used exclusively for

manned Apollo launches) to boost its satellites into orbit as has the civilian space program (e.g., Atlas-Agena, Titan 11, Atlas-Centaur, Titan Ill). This pattern will continue with

the shuttle. However, the military has separate checkout and launch facilities, both at

Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force

Base, for expendable launch vehicles, and

is building a shuttle launch complex at

Vandenberg. joint use of the shuttle implies

joint use of mission control facilities at

Johnson Space Center, though the Air Force

is hoping to construct its own Consolidated

Space Operations Center in Colorado

Springs. There has been some suggestion of

two separate shuttle fleets, one for civilian

and one for national security use.

Future Developments

For the most part the systems discussed above

support ground-, sea-, and air-based military

operations and extend or enhance existing logistical capabilities. Under consideration now, however, are weapons systems that couId operate in

space. There is a vigorous science and technology

development program oriented toward a wide

range of future applications, including antisatellite

systems and directed energy weapons. If the

United States should decide to develop and deploy some sort of space-based, antisatellite or ballistic missile defense system, such an effort would

require a major expansion of our space infrastructure, including the development of space platforms, space power systems, and space construction facilities. Pursuing such a course would imply major changes in strategic thinking, and thus

a decision to develop space weapons systems is

as much an issue of national policy as it is of technological potentials

Another area of future development is manned

military space operations. Some see a need for

manned observation, inspection, command and

control, servicing, or other operations in Earth

orbit. Military use of the shuttle will provide expe5Rechtin, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

rience on which to base future decisions on the

military role of man in space.

Large-scale development and deployment of

manned and unmanned military systems in

space, beyond those currently required for support purposes, will be based on decisions, not

yet made, concerning military doctrine and national policy. The notion that space is a fourth

theater of war which can supplement or supplant

air, sea, and ground operations is not fully accepted by either the civilian or the military leadership of the national security community. Extensive manned military operations and/or weapons

in space are still very much in the exploratory

stage. In addition, current international treaties,

such as the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with

the Soviet Union, as well as hopes for future armscontrol agreements, may prevent or delay the deployment of space weaponry. There is a substantial degree of international concern, expressed

at the United Nations (U. N.) and elsewhere,

about any expansion of the arms race into outer

space.

Civilian-National Security

Relationships in Space: 1957-81

The decision to house defense-related space

operations and the R&D leading to them within

DOD and to create a new civilian agency for nondefense space research were made in the immediate wake of Sputnik, as the Eisenhower administration began to organize the U.S. space effort.

These decisions were controversial; individuals

both in and outside Government, particularly in

Congress, the defense industry, and the military

services, believed that the Nation should undertake a single integrated space program under military management.G However, President Eisenhower and the majority of Congress believed that

there were significant advantages for the country in separating the national space effort into

separate elements and in creating a separate man-

- —

bThe following account of the origins and early evolution of U.S.

space policy and institutions is drawn from a number of sources

including: John Logsdon, The Future of the U.S. Space Program

(Praeger Publishers, 1975); Robert L. RoshIt, An Administrative History of NASA, /953-1963, NASA, 1966, and Enid Bok Schoettle,

“The Establishment of NASA, ” in Know/edge of Power: Essays on

Science and Government, The Free Press, 1966.
152 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

agement and institutional structure for each

element.

Similarly, President Kennedy rejected the notion, raised early in his administration, of combining NASA and Air Force space programs under

military auspices. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy

viewed the national space effort as having distinct

civilian and military components, and decided

to use the civilian space program as one of the

major arenas for competition with the Soviet

Union.

Early Policy Choices

Several factors influenced the decision by the

Eisenhower administration and by Congress to

establish a separate civilian space agency. One

reason was the view of the scientific community

that the major objectives of the civilian space program should be scientific in character, and that

these objectives could best be met by a separate

agency not linked to DOD programs. A more telling concern was Eisenhower’s view that there

were specific and positive benefits for the United

States, in terms of both foreign policy and

domestic politics, in creating an open space program under civilian control. These benefits were

particularly evident, given that the Soviet space

program was closed. The United States could

claim that its civilian space program was an accurate reflection of the open, achievement-oriented

character of American society, while at the same

time developing whatever national security space

systems were deemed necessary through a second, much less open program. Cooperation with

other countries, desirable both to meet specific

needs for access to sites for tracking stations, and

to further general foreign policy goals, would be

greatly facilitated by such a separation.

At the policy level, Eisenhower and his top advisors did not deal with military and civilian space

efforts in isolation, but rather viewed them as

parts of a single national space program. Eisenhower authorized DOD to undertake whatever

military space efforts could be justified by existing

and future military requirements, but he did not

approve the futuristic plans generated within the

Air Force (such as a manned Moon-base) and the

Army. Nor did he approve ambitious NASA plans

for the 1960’s. There were attempts to develop

a comprehensive national space policy under

NSC auspices. The objective of such a policy was

the development and exploitation of U.S. outer

space capabilities to achieve scientific, military,

and political goals, and to establish the United

States as a recognized leader in this field. However, Eisenhower and his advisors did not believe

that the political returns from space achievement

were large enough to merit a major investment

of resources, and thus were unwilling to approve

an aggressive civilian space program aimed at political objectives.

President Kennedy was willing to approve such

a program, however, and, in Apollo, the United

States undertook an enterprise justified primarily by national prestige and political payoff.7 The

policy that Ied to the Apollo commitment was formulated in the context of developing an integrated national space policy. Apollo was the centerpiece of an across-the-board acceleration of

both civilian and military space programs, aimed

at achieving U.S. preeminence in all areas of

space technology. Kennedy was told that “the

nonmilitary, noncommercial, nonscientific but

civilian projects such as lunar and planetary exploration are . . . part of the battle along the fluid

front of the Cold War.”B

While Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy

both desired a national space program in consonance with overall national policy objectives,

one which maximized returns on both the civilian

and military investments of national resources,

coordination of the two programs was not a

straightforward matter. During the 1960’s the

civilian space program, and particularly its central activity, Apollo, developed in ways that made

close interactions with major defense space applications difficult. Although NASA did maintain

Earth-oriented science and applications programs, its major manned and unmanned efforts

such as Apollo and planetary exploration were

oriented outward, away from Earth. Though there

were attempts to undertake joint planning for

tracking stations, meteorological satellites, and

7A full account of the Apollo decision is contained in Logsdon,

op. cit.

Blbid., p. 126.
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 153

geodetic satellites, none of these resulted in closely integrated civilian-military activities. The exception was in the area of launch vehicles. NASA

used the Atlas, developed by the Air Force, for

its Mercury program and the Air Force developed

Titan for the Gemini program. In fact, with the

exception of Saturn, which was used only for

NASA’s Apollo program, launch vehicles for all

these manned satellites were shared; DOD had

no use for such a large and expensive launch

vehicle as Saturn. As DOD requirements for some

launch vechicles, such as the Thor and Atlas,

decreased, these were transferred to NASA.

In particular, the decision to accomplish Apollo

by means of lunar-orbit rendezvous (LOR) was

a watershed in separating civilian and military

manned space flight programs for almost a decade.9 There was extensive controversy preceding

the decision for LOR. Many argued that if Earthorbit rendezvous were used to accomplish

Apollo, the knowledge gained from rendezvous

of spacecraft and assembly of structurs in lowEarth orbit would be valuable not only for the

lunar program, but also for national security activities. However, NASA, driven by a desire to meet

the lunar landing goal before 1970, chose LOR

as the method most likely to make this achievement possible. This choice, in addition to NASA’s

emphasis on planetary exploration in its unmanned scientific programs, to a large degree

separated the central element of the NASA program from national security space efforts during

the 1960’s and early 1970’s.

Program Relationships in the Early Years

The NAS Act, which provided for separate civilian and national security space programs, also

called for “close cooperation among all interested

agencies of the United States in order to avoid

unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and

equipment. ” As this directive was carried out,

there were substantial interactions between civilian and national security space efforts during the

first decade of the national space program, even

gjohn M. Logsdon, “Selecting the Way to the Moon: the Choice

of the Lunar Orbital Rendezvous Mode, ” Aerospace Historian, June

1971, contains an account of this decision.

though NASA had set its sights on the Moon. At

the project and program levels, these interactions

were on balance cooperative and productive.

However, at the policy and institutional level

there were, perhaps inevitably, stresses between

separate programs in the same technological

arena. It is beyond the scope of this assessment

to detail these interactions, but the following brief

summary may provide some sense of their character. 1°

MANNED SPACE FLIGHT

It was the armed services that during the 1950’s

did the first detailed planning for manned space

flight, but NASA was assigned the U.S. manned

mission in 1958. Project Mercury was based on

Air Force plans, and the Air Force was left with

only a modest, and never fully funded, space

glider program (Dyna-Soar), which was eventually canceled. At one point the Air Force contemplated a “Blue Gemini” program using NASA’s

Gemini vehicles; when NASA balked, DOD settled for a modest series of experiments on Gemini

flights. Late in 1963, Defense Secretary McNamara approved the Manned Orbital Laboratory program for the Air Force. This program was

terminated in 1969 because foreseeable military

requirements were inadequate to justify it, despite

the $1.3 billion already spent. Since that time

NASA has had complete responsibility for the

manned flight portion of the national space program, although this situation will change when

the shuttle begins to fly missions dedicated to national security.

LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT

Immediately after the acceleration of the U.S.

space program in 1961, there was an intensive

attempt to integrate future launch vehicle developments. This attempt was not successful, and

NASA went on to develop Saturn boosters for

Apollo missions while DOD added the Titan Ill

as the heavy-duty launcher for military and

intelligence programs. When it came time to consider whether to continue to use Saturn as the

workhorse for the post-Apollo civilian space proIOAn account of early INA!jA-DOD relationships is contained in

W. Fred Boone, NASA Office of Defense Affairs: The First Five Years,

NASA Historical Note HHR-32, 1970.
154 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

gram or to develop a new type of reusable launch

vehicle, the policy was made in an explicit context of joint civilian-national security requirements, although the development task was assigned to NASA. That the shuttle would be a multiuse launch vehicle with its design suited to meet

defense and intelligence requirements as well as

civilian needs was essential to the program’s

approval. ’ 1 

,

COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES

Originally, NASA was assigned responsibility for

developing passive communications satellite

technology (e.g., Echo), whereas DOD developed active communications satellites. There was

an early shift in this division of labor, and NASA

by 1960 had begun to develop active communications satellites for civilian use. With the cancellation of the Army’s ADVENT geosynchronous

satellite program due to technical and management problems, it was left to NASA to develop

geosynchronous communications satellites,

which have proved to be the key to both civilian

and military satellite communications efforts. During the 1960’s and 1970’s both NASA and DOD

had active R&D programs investigating communications satellite technology appropriate to differing civilian and military requirements.

lljerw Grey, Enterprise (Morrow, 1979), PP. 66-68.

METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES

DOD sponsored the initial research on meteorological satellites; this work led to the TIROS program, which was transferred to NASA and then

became the basis for the first operational civilian

weather satellite. DOD used the same contractor to develop weather satellites dedicated to

military uses. The result has been the existence

of two systems which, while using the same

“bus” contain different sensors and fly in different

orbits, and a continuing controversy over the

need for separate weather satellite systems.

EARTH OBSERVATION PROGRAMS

The advantages of the view from outer space

for strategic surveillance were obvious from the

beginning, and DOD and various intelligence

agencies began highly classified Earth observation programs. As the sensors developed for these

early national security programs (e.g., the Return

Beam Vidicon) were supplanted by more advanced models, some of them were declassified

and became part of NASA’s civilian remote sensing experiments in the late 1960’s. There has

been a continuing tension between the desire to

maintain maximum secrecy about the capabilities

of U.S. surveillance systems and the desire to use

both the products of those systems and the components developed for them for operational civilian applications systems.

CURRENT POLICY AND POLICY REVIEW PROCESS

Policy Formulation and Program

Stresses in the Post-Apollo Period

Carrying out the Apollo commitment kept

NASA fully occupied during the 1960’s, and for

the most part relations between the civilian and

national security space programs were conducted

on a case-by-case basis, mainly at the project and

technology level. Only occasionally, as in the

controversy over control of Gemini and postApollo manned programs, did the tensions rise

to the policy and institutional level. The major

channel for interaction was the Aeronautics and

Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), a joint

NASA-DOD body. NASA also established an

Office of Defense Affairs, which was active in

maintaining liaison with defense and intelligence

space efforts. Tensions rarely escalated to a level

at which White House policy offices such as the

National Aeronautics and Space Council and the

Office of Science and Technology got involved

in their resolution.

During the past decade, however, there have

been several Presidential-level policy reviews of

the national space effort that have dealt with

civilian and national security programs in a common framework. Perhaps the basic point to be

made about these reviews is that each examined

and revalidated the policy that civilian, military,
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs . 155

and intelligence programs should be carried out

in separate institutional frameworks, although

each review also recognized opportunities for

closer cooperation and coordination among

these separate programs.

The first such comprehensive review was carried out during the summer of 1969 under the

auspices of a Space Task Group (STG), created

ad hoc and chaired by the Vice President. (The

deliberations of the STG are described in some

detail inch. 5.) President Nixon charged STG with

providing him a “definitive recommendation on

the direction the national space program should

take in the post-Apollo period. ”12 The review

considered future directions of both the civilian

and military space programs, but its focus was

on the future for the civilian manned program.

A major and lasting result of STG’S review was

the concept of a reusable space shuttle to serve

almost all national launch vehicle requirements,

from commercial uses to intelligence missions.

To realize this concept, technical characteristics,

as well as managerial and funding patterns, were

negotiated by NASA and DOD (represented primarily by the Air Force). As has become evident

since the 1969-72 period, the interagency planning did not resolve all of the program issues that

have subsequently caused continuing NASADOD tension over the shuttle program.13

By 1977, enough stresses had built up among

the civilian, military, and intelligence space programs that president Carter authorized a Presidential-level space policy review. The stated purpose of the review was “to resolve potential conflicts among the various space program sectors

and to recommend coherent space principles and

national space policy.”14

Recent Policy Reviews

The Carter administration adopted the NSC policy review process as the primary mechanism for

considering and developing space policy, both

IZTlle space TaSk Group was established by a Feb. 13, 1969,

memorandum from the President.

1 JEdgar U Isamer, “Space Shuttle Mired in Bureaucratic Feud,”

Air Force, September 1980.

14The unclassified version of the results of the review of SPace

policy was issued in the form of a White House press release on

June 20, 1978.

civilian and military. The initial review was carried out under the guidance of Presidential Review Memorandum 23, which considered questions about civilian-military relationships and

resulted in Presidential Directive 37 (PD/NSC-37).

This review was followed by further interagency

review requested by the president in June 1978,

which led to a second Presidential Directive

(PD/NSC-42) and a public announcement on U.S.

civilian space policy in October 1978. In this

statement, President Carter identified decisions

that were designed to set the direction of U.S.

efforts in space over the next decade. Among

other things, the announced civilian space policy

was to promote a balance of applications, science, and technology development that would

“increase benefits for resources expended

through better integration and technology transfer among the national space programs and by

using more joint projects when appropriate. ”

As part of the Presidential review several decisions were made in specific applications areas,

either as program guidance or for the conduct

of further studies.

●

●

●

NASA was to chair an interagency task force

to examine options for incorporating current

and future remote-sensing systems into an

integrated national system, with emphasis on

defining and meeting user requirements.

The Defense community, NASA, and NOAA

were to conduct a review of meteorological

programs to determine the degree to which

these programs might be consolidated in the

1980’s and the extent to which separate programs supporting specialized defense needs

should be maintained. The possibility for integrated systems for ocean observations from

space was also to be examined.

With respect to technology sharing, steps

were to “be taken to facilitate technology

transfer between the space sectors. The objective was to maximize efficient utilization

of the technologies while maintaining necessary security and management relationships.

In November 1979, president Carter approved

further civilian space policy that amplified the

policies established in PDs 37 and 42. The new
156 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

policies were contained in Presidential Directive/NSC-54.

The policy decisions in PD-54 were the result

of extended interagency debate, and were based,

in part, on the results of the various studies and

reviews mandated by PD-42.

PD-54 directed that DOD and the Department

of Commerce (DOC) maintain and coordinate

dual polar-orbiting meteorological programs, with

each continuing to procure systems and operate

separate satellites to meet the differing needs of

the military and civilian sectors. When new polarorbiting satellites became justifiable they were to

be jointly developed and procured by DOD,

DOC, and NASA in order to maximize technology sharing and minimize cost. An “appropriate” coordination mechanism was to be

established to assure effective cooperation and

to prevent duplication.

For oceanic programs, PD-54 further stated that

if oceanographic satellites were to be developed,

DOD, DOC, and NASA were to pursue joint development, acquisition, and management. A

committee was to be established with expanded

representation to forward recommendations on

policy issues to the policy review committees in

NSC for consideration and actions.

The classified character of the basic documents,

accentuated by the use of NSC as the forum for

discussion, has made congressional and public

discussion difficult. This has been a continuing

problem in raising and resolving many issues of

civilian-military relationships.

Current Administration Policy Review

The various policy reviews of the 1977-79

period continue to provide the formal underpinning and guidance that govern today’s programs

in both civilian and military applications. However, the Reagan administration has initiated a

broad examination of the extant policy. Although

strongly driven by the administration’s perceived

need to constrain the Federal budget, the review

is intended to be comprehensive, and will include

an examination of the provisions of the NAS Act.

The review will focus on the use of the space

transportation system for civilian and national

security purposes and on commercialization of

civilian Earth observation systems.

The President’s science adviser has undertaken

the review, which will be coordinated via a “Cabinet Council” mechanism. The Policy Review

Committee (Space) of the Carter administration

has now been disbanded. There are new pressures on several fronts. The administration’s

budget cuts have necessitated a wholesale reevaluation of many planned civilian space program

initiatives in applications and also in space sciences. In addition, the success of the shuttle has

introduced the need to focus on civilian-military

relationships at a new level of detail.

CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTERISTICS

OF CIVILIAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE EFFORTS

The possibility and desirability of closer civiliannational security relationships in space depend

on the strengths and weaknesses of the current

structure and the differences and similarities between the two areas of space activity. Although

the two programs have certain common interests

and a history of cooperating to solve common

problems, their different goals and consequent

divergence in evolution have resulted in different

institutional and program characteristics. These

are reviewed below.

Mission Differences

NASA is an R&D agency with its primary mission the development and demonstration of

space and aeronautics systems and associated

technology, the provision of launch services, and

the operation of research and scientific satellites.

NASA has a tradition of evaluating the potential

of space technology in a broad societal context

with a long time horizon. NASA’s R&D efforts are

linked to the requirements of various users, but
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 157

its strongest tendency is towards development of

new technologies rather than meeting short-term

needs of users. Civilian missions require the collaboration of the widest possible body of users

to help share and justify the very large front-end

costs of space systems. For example, the design

of civilian remote sensing systems has been affected by the need to resolve the data requirements of a multitude of civilian missions and to

determine a fair allocation of costs. Conflicts

among agencies over instrument selection, system characteristics, and technical tradeoffs will

continue to plague the Government-sponsored

growth of operational systems.

DOD’s space activities, by contrast, have some

characteristics of technology push, but they are

primarily responsive to the requirements of military operations. DOD has a clear and vital mission, national defense, and space technology is

seen as one means, among others, for accomplishing it. The military users of space technology

are within DOD, and the problems of transfer

from developer to user are fewer than if the two

were in separate organizations. DOD has been

considering possible changes in management that

would reflect the military’s increased dependence

on space systems and allow for efficient use of

the space shuttle. These include establishing a

separate Space Command, either in the Air Force,

or as a fourth service.

In congressional testimony early in 1981, the

Secretary of the Air Force identified an order of

priority for the various program activities that the

Air Force conducts in space.

● First priority was given to the maintenance

and development of a reliable and satisfactory launch vehicle capability. Employing the

shuttle to maximum advantage for missions

related to national security and protecting

against possible delays and failures in the

shuttle program were considered vital.

● Second priority was given to surveillance and

warning satellites. These functions generally cannot be performed by alternate groundbased facilities.

● Third priority was assigned to satellites

related to communications. Though communications satellites are important, alternate

ground-based means of communications

(undersea cables, short-wave) are usually

available.

Fourth priority went to weather observation

and navigation. Because other means exist

to carry out their tasks, they are lower in

priority than other satellite systems.

Openness v. Need for Secrecy

The NAS Act mandates, among other things,

that NASA provide for the “ . . . widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its activities and the results thereof. ” The specific provision to make information

available to the public contrasts sharply with the

information policies governing classified military

and intelligence programs, which operate under

stringent requirements to protect information, including even the fact that some of the programs

exist.

The differences in orientation between the civilian and military programs have been maintained

from the beginning of the programs to the present and are fundamental to consideration of

policies on technology sharing and other interjector relationships.

●

●

There are inherent conflicts between the

need for secrecy in national security programs, and the free exchange of data characteristic of the civilian space program.

These conflicts extend into the project office,

where secrecy requirements imposed on

sensitive national security projects are a continuing fact-of-life, though they are essentially nonexistent on the civilian side.

For technology sharing, these differences

generate a basically asymmetrical relationship. Activities or technology in the civilian

sector are examined in detail for potential

national security uses. The reverse does not

hold except through specific interagency

mechanisms that have been formed to promote information exchange. Even with information exchange, the civilian community rarely has an opportunity to affect national

security planning. The reverse is less true.

National security planning may often affect

civilian programs.
158 ● Civilan Space Policy and Applications

● Military and intelligence missions normally

enjoy a high relative priority within the

Government. This is reinforced by the

secrecy surrounding such programs, making

it dificult for most members of the Executive,

of Congress, and the public to criticize them

effectively or to bargain for increased attention to and funding for civilian activities. The

result is that the military or national security program can seek out or develop new

technology to aid in accomplishing their missions, using the full range of classified and

unclassified experience, whereas civilian

programs have definite limits set on use of

sensitive or classified technology.

● in some cases, not only technical details of

military or intelligence space systems, but

even the fact that such a system exists may

be classified. This creates a special burden

upon the program managers and the contractor teams, and makes it very difficult to

carry out technology-sharing activities with

other programs. The precautions that may

be necessary to protect the “fact of” a certain system would act as a significant deterrent to the ability of the classified program

team to volunteer its assistance.

Differences in the Institutional

Support Base

At NASA’s founding, it incorporated the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, its

technical centers, and a number of DOD activities such as the Army Ballistic Missile Group in

Huntsville, Ala., and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in pasadena, Calif. Thus, NASA inherited an

infrastructure of Government-owned facilities and

supporting technical staffs that were already familiar with all phases of the agency’s projects, from

early definition to the production and test of flight

hardware. When NASA expanded to meet the

demands of Apollo and other new program activities in the early 1960’s, it elaborated the pattern

of relatively autonomous technical centers (see

ch. 9). NASA’s technical personnel and specialized facilities represent a unique national

resource, developed at great cost and representing over 20 years of experience in designing and

operating successful space systems.

DOD’s role in operating the military and national security programs, on the other hand,

evolved very differently. Although encompassing

an extensively laboratory structure, DOD moved

away from the “arsenal approach” of in-house

technical laboratories in the years following

World War Il. The process of developing ballistic

missiles, the prototype for DOD’s space effort,

followed a pattern in which a Government project team of civilian and military personnel acted

as overall managers for a private contractor team;

one major contractor acted as system integrator.

This pattern persists today. Technical assistance

for specific parts of the system is often obtained

from government laboratories, but the laboratories typically do not undertake management.

Practically the entire DOD space program management is vested in the Air Force Space Division, a part of the Air Force Systems Command.

This Space Division is supported by the Aerospace Corp. as system engineers. Thus, whereas

NASA development management activities are

done largely at separate centers, DOD activities

are centralized. The Space Division has responsibilities equivalent to those of NASA in that it is

responsible for all procurement, launch, and onorbit control and recovery. Generally, when a satellite system becomes operational, the mission

aspects of the satellite system come under the

control of a user command, say Strategic Air

Command or Defense Communications Agency,

while the Space DiviSion maintains control of

other aspects of the satellite system including

replacements. The Space Division can and does

call on other DOD agencies and laboratories. The

Space Division has direct control of the launch

facilities at the Eastern Test Range at Cape Canaveral and the Western Test Range at Vandenberg

AFB.

Thus, in both the civilian and military space

programs, a great deal of the national capability

resides in the contractors, and to the extent that

a single contractor may support both programs,

significant technology transfer occurs, without

documentation and without the need for specific

efforts. Within NASA, programs are largely developed and managed by the centers, and any consideration of technology sharing or closer institutional relations between NASA and DOD needs

to take into account these differences in the two

programs.
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 159

International Aspects

International cooperation was one of the objectives set for NASA in 1958, and the United States

has pursued an extensive cooperative program

with technical, economic, and political benefits.

Although certain foreign countries participate in

some DOD space activities, their participation is

based on joint defense objectives; its character

is quite different, from NASA’s international

activities.

There would likely be tension between security

requirements and any extensive interaction between other countries and the United States in

civilian space efforts if there were a much closer

civilian-military relationship. Some of these tensions are already evident as the military and nonU.S. users both plan to use the shuttle. Scientists

in foreign countries might also be less willing to

deal with a U.S. space program closely linked to

national security activities.

The relationship between the civilian and military space programs is affected by the presence

or absence of treaties, laws, and rules of conduct

governing activities in the “international commons” of outer space—i.e., by the entire international legal framework. During the 1960’s precedents were set that strengthened the U.S. position that governments could carry on nonthreatening activities constrained only by the prohibition in the 1967 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration

and Use of Outer Space” on weapons of mass

destruction. The SALT I agreements in 1972 further recognized that there were “national

technical means of verification” (presumably

overhead reconnaissance by spacecraft) and that

such collection devices should not be interfered

with. Civilian remote sensing systems such as

Landsat and meteorological satellites have also

operated on a global basis without restriction;

partly to forestall criticism, the United States has

made data from these systems available to all

countries. The emergence of significant programs

by France, Japan, and others during the 1980’s

may complicate the existing ground rules and put

additional pressure on the United States to maintain open programs conducted in cooperation

with other nations, particularly with less

developed countries. Current discussion in the

U.N. and elsewhere about restricting the gathering and dissemination of civilian data should not

be expected to affect U.S. military satellites.

An additional factor that may drive the U.S.

space program to emphasize international visibility and accessibility would be the need to respond, for practical political considerations, to

a newly emerging Soviet presence in peaceful

space applications. The Soviets are known to

have carried out an ambitious program of launching and recovering film camera satellites with

high-resolution data. The lag by the U.S.S.R. in

critical areas of technology, particularly computers, has until recently caused the Soviets to

say little about their space applications programs

while playing up manned space flight activities.

However, the Soviets recently issued an important paper to the U. N.* that describes their applications programs in greater detail than previously

available (described in detail in ch. 7). In particular, the Soviets claimed to be planning a “quickIook” sensing system with several types of multispectral sensors. Mindful of the tremendous impact of Sputnik, 25 years ago, forums such as the

upcoming U.N. conference, UN ISPACE ’82, to

be held in Vienna in August 1982, may well provide the occasion for the Soviets to announce

plans to make their data available to other

countries.

Common Civilian-National Security

Needs and Cooperative Activities

Many of the problems faced by both civilian

and national security space programs have common roots in the inescapable realities of the harsh

space environment and the stringent requirements associated with launching payloads into

space. In the early stages both the civilian and

military space programs depended on using the

most suitable military systems. Improving their

reliability was an early and important common

task for both civilian and military authorities. As

a result, a wide range of basic system details were

shared. They included rocket engine design,

*“National Paper: U. S. S.R.,” prepared for the Second U.S. Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,

A/Conf. 101/N P/30, Sept. 2, 1981.
160 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

structures, electronics, guidance, control systems,

and a variety of subsystems.

Both programs have common needs for ground

launch complexes with adequate instrumentation

for prelaunch, launch, and postlaunch monitoring and control of satellites and vehicles, and

launch safety and tracking. These common needs

have resulted in highly integrated operations at

both Vandenberg AFB (polar orbit and high inclination launches) and at Kennedy Space Center

(low inclination, deep space, and synchronous

orbit launches).

There is also a continuing common need for

better understanding of outer space. This includes

scientific observations of electromagnetic radiation at all wavelengths, the characteristics of solar

radiation, studies of the Earth’s atmosphere and

its attenuation, propagation and reflection characteristics, and variations in gravitational effects.

Beyond these basic common needs, some civilian

and national security programs, such as those for

meteorology and communications, have very

similar technical characteristics.

Combining programs that provide specific types

of information, such as the weather data, has

been an attractive but difficult goal. Meteorological data is valuable principally if it is put in the

hands of users as rapidly as possible, and conflicting demands for data between customers may

mean that one set of users will be slighted if the

system is less than sufficient for total coverage.

Military needs for aircraft operations, for example, may constrain the satellite’s orbital timing

and type of data gathered in ways incompatible

with civilian weather forecasting.

In collecting observational data of the Earth,

the civilian community has information needs

that are both identical to and quite separate from

those of the military. Both communities have

quite similar requirements for medium-scale

maps. However, the military need for intelligence

requires high resolutions not needed for most

civilian programs. As civilian programs have matured, additional resolution and spectrum needs

have caused some convergence of technical requirements, which further complicates the task

of preserving the security of the DOD-operated

systems while improving the capability of systems

used for civilian operations. An example of the

difficulties encountered in implementing joint systems is the National Oceanographic Satellite System (NOSS) (for description see pp. 50-51).

ISSUES AND POLICY OPTIONS

Technology Transfer

Inherent in the establishment of separate national space programs has been concern for effective “technology transfer” among different

activities and agencies. In many cases costly technologies developed to meet the objectives of one

space program may have direct utility for other

programs. Sharing hardware and expertise can

avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, save

scarce financial, technical, and human resources,

and enhance program capabilities.

In considering technology transfer, one must

distinguish space-related technology (launch

vehicles and facilities for guidance, command,

and control of launchers and satellites) from applications-related technology (sensor systems, communication equipment, data collection, and processing technologies). A special result of applications technology is the data themselves (e.g.,

remote-sensing images), which can be shared

without transferring the technology used to gather or process them. in general, space-related

technology has been more easily transferred,

because it is less sensitive and less specialized

than applications technologies.

Technology can be transferred either from civilian to military/national-security (MNS) programs,

or vice versa. Substantially different issues arise

depending on the direction and type of technology involved. In general there are few if any

restrictions placed on the transfer of civilian or

NASA-developed technology to MNS programs.

Problems arise when classified technology or data

appears to be of use to the civilian sector.
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 161

● Transfers to the civiIian sector of spacerelated technology developed for the military

are relatively direct and open for unclassified

programs and technology, but involve additional controls and supervision when there

are classification considerations that affect

the MNS programs. In practice, there is considerable sharing of military space-related

technology between the sectors.

● By far the most complex and difficult relationships to manage are those involving the

transfer of applications-related technology

from the military/national security sector to

the civilian sector. Since the national security

applications are highly sensitive, there are

necessarily strict limitations on access to

technical information, even to evaluate its

potential usefulness for civilian purposes.

The key to effective transfer is to combine

awareness of different programs at the policy and

administrative level, to exchange information at

the technical level, and to agree on joint responsibilities:

● The easiest transfers to implement are those

that involve the direct use by a private contractor of technology developed in a classified program to meet similar needs in another. This situation allows a lower bid to be

made, and enables the contractor to assure

adherence to costs and schedules. Since

contractors cannot themselves approve the

transfer of classified technology, the Government must take the lead in facilitating such

actions, even though the same personnel

and facilities may be used by the firm involved,

. Procedures for transfer are most complex

when a classified technology is suitable for

a civilian program but no channels have

been established for the two programs to interact. Frequently, no direct interface between classified and unclassified programs,

or even between separate classified activities,

is allowed at many technical and managerial

levels.

The objective of technology sharing or transfer

arrangements is to ensure that the broadest use

is made of available technology and that national

resources are not wasted through unnecessary

duplication of effort. The condition governing

such transfers is that disclosure of the technology

not reduce the effectiveness of a program or project, or harm national security.

There are several factors that impede the technology transfer process at the program-management level. There are few internal incentives to

transfer technology to other programs; from the

point of view of national security program managers, transfer to civilians may compromise security and tie up valuable time, money, and manpower in conducting and supervising the transfer.

Unless there is a clear quid pro quo in the form

of additional resources or the prospect of future

aid from the civilian program, technology transfer

will have low internal priority.

The competitiveness of the aerospace industry

in part offsets the reluctance to share information and expertise. Competitiveness works in two

major ways. In the first place, it causes new proprietary technology to be developed to improve

products and sales potential across the space sectors. In the second place, the competitive bidding for Government work promotes technology

sharing because using an existing technology is

less costly in time and resources than developing a new one. These factors provide an incentive for both Government and industry to consider existing technology and hardware in the

development of system requirements, specifications, and design approaches. Additionally, even

if a complete system such as a space vehicle may

be classified, technology sharing of many unclassified subsystems or component technologies

may be possible.

In practice, there is a continuing exchange of

data and viewpoints between programs in the

several sectors at both formal and informal levels.

in many instances informal exchanges and discussions are preferred over formal, because of lower

visibility and the greater flexibility afforded by the

absence of formal arrangements and their related

institutional/bureaucratic implications. Without

access to classified information it is impossible

to evaluate the overall efficiency of these relationships.

Technology transfer is further enhanced in

those situations when a common contractor base
162 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

is involved across sectors, or when personnel

from one sector and technology are able to move

to similar or related functions in other sectors.

A good example of the latter has been active or

retired military personnel working with NASA.

In addition to various informal and intra-industry mechanisms for technology transfer or sharing, there is a formal body to coordinate between

NASA, DOD, and AACB. AACB is the highest

level formal coordinating mechanism between

DOD and NASA. By a 1960 interagency agreement, the responsibilities of AACB included:

● planning of NASA and DOD activities to

avoid undesirable duplication and to achieve

efficient utilization of resources;

● coordination of activities of common

interest;

● identification of problems requiring solution

by either NASA or DOD; and

● exchange of information between NASA and

DOD.

AACB is cochaired by the Deputy Administrator

of NASA and the Director of Defense Research

and Engineering (DDR&E) of DOD. Both of these

are policy-level officials. AACB has panels to deal

with issues that arise in several main areas. AACB

is concerned primarily with defining broad policies rather than working out detailed arrangements for cooperative activities. Technical details

have generally been coordinated by special interagency committees or working groups organized

for those purposes. Many joint NASA/DOD subpanels and committees, which report to AACB

panels, have been established to assist interaction. There are also many individually negotiated

agreements and understandings.

Security Classification Barriers

Civilian access to classified technology is inevitably limited. As defined in executive orders that

establish the rules for security classification, there

are specified levels of potential damage to the national security that must exist before security classification and controls can be imposed. When

such conditions exist, the relevant information

is classified at its appropriate level and restricted

to those individuals possessing the requisite clearances and “need-to-know.”

Because the effectiveness of a national security program may depend on the security protection of key attributes, there are many legitimate

incentives for managers of classified programs severely to limit knowledge or access by personnel

who have secondary, as opposed to primary, reasons for program involvement. Technology sharing inevitably falls in the “secondary” category.

On the civilian side there are incentives to remain

free from the restrictions and encumbrances that

classification and security controls require. Sharing classified sector technology with programs in

the civilian sector, therefore, has disincentives on

both sides. It is warranted only when it can be

established that there are sufficient benefits and

savings to civilian programs to justify the transfer,

given additional program costs and potential

security risk.

Interagency Government mechanisms have

been established that provide for selected civilian

personnel to be cleared in order to have access

to sensitive programs and related technology.

Because of the security considerations and “need

to know” criteria, the number of such personnel is kept as low as is judged feasible, to discharge technology transfer or other coordination

objectives. The few cleared civilian agency personnel are responsible for knowing the entire

range of civilian interests in their field and for

identifying the potential match between civilian

program needs and the classified system technology. When the civilian need occurs, an evaluation is made of the potential benefit in relation

to the security risk of release. Though in practice there is wide variation, the relationship between classified and unclassified programs cannot fail to be unbalanced. Personnel working in

classified programs can readily learn about technologies under development in unclassified programs, but the reverse does not hold. A security

concern at the margin will almost always outweigh an otherwise equivalent civilian benefit.

There are long-standing controversies concerning the security classification programs of the

Government. The issues have not been whether

there should be classification, but how to provide appropriate levels of security protection for

necessary programs without abuses and without

undue shielding of Government activities from

public scrutiny. Because determinations of
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 163

whether given entities are to be classified and if

so, to what degree, are necessarily made by

members of the national security community

(under guidelines established by the President as

Commander-in-Chief), whose primary responsibility is to protect national security, not to foster

civilian applications, there is an inevitable tendency to “play it safe” by stringently classifying all

sensitive materials.

Persons who have had experience in both civilian and national security programs acknowledge

that there are instances of failure, but also note

successes in technology transfer; given the inherent difficulties, they generally argue that the processes are as good as it is reasonable to expect

within current policy guidelines.

The uneven relationship between national

security and civilian interests is frustrating, primarily to personnel in the civilian sector. They

distrust the capabilities and incentives of classified program managers to evaluate the potential

for civilian uses of technology developed in classified programs. Civilian sector personnel are not

in a position to “browse” through classified technology, or to pursue ideas or insights generated

in the normal course of engineering or scientific

endeavors. Civilian frustration is particularly acute

when independent civilian investigation leads to,

or stumbles onto, technology that has already

been classified or is then placed under security

restrictions.

Within the executive branch, interagency

boards and mechanisms charged with exchanging information and coordinating implementation

of policy guidelines provide oversight of transfer

processes. Congressional oversight is provided

through the Select Committees on Intelligence

and the various committees that oversee the civilian and other military space programs. An entirely

new dimension will be brought into being if significant operational space systems are developed

and operated by private commercial firms.

Additional problems arise from the existence

of various levels of security controls within the

classification scheme, whereby those privy to certain kinds of information may not have access to

other parts or to the whole. Internal Government

reviews have been carried out periodically to reexamine: 1 ) the need to provide continuing protection for specific classified systems, technology,

and data, and 2) the degree of protection that

may be required. Oversight is provided by properly cleared congressional committees and staff.

Because the congressional oversight function extends to many other aspects of the DOD-operated space program, there is need for continuing review of security classifications in order to

ease barriers to technology transfer and to the

broader use of data from DOD-operated systems.

Interagency Review Mechanisms

The current practice of permitting access to a

limited number of key individual from NASA and

other civilian agencies with a need to know

about the nature and capabilities of classified systems provides an initial indication of what is available and what is possible. The subsequent steps,

leading to detailed understanding of the classified

system and its components, and relating this understanding to the possible civilian setting in

which the technology might be used, are all dependent on this initial, survey-type exposure to

the classified systems. Therefore, it is incumbent

on DOD (and other national security entities) to

continue the practice of clearing individuals at

various levels in the civilian user agencies and

to provide them with periodic briefings on classified systems and technologies. it is equally necessary for agencies with a need for such information to select individuals for access to highly

classified information who are capable of making broad judgments about the desirability of

technology transfer. Individuals at the policy

level as well as at the technical and managerial

levels are needed in order to cover the various

aspects of the agencies’ needs.

The next steps in the transfer process call for

more detailed knowledge of the technology and

a degree of individual specialization that will vary

greatly depending on the nature of the technology. At this level, quite often an expanded set

of cleared people is required from the civilian

agency, with a very narrow focus on the specifics of the system or subsystem involved. This

degree of access will depend on a determination

that the technology in question can be transferred
764 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

without compromise. This determination inevitably is made by DOD or another national security agency. If a decision is made that a technology

(or piece of hardware) may not be transferred,

an appeal may be made up to the management

level at AACB. Further appeal would require referral to an interagency forum at the White House

level, usually via the NSC mechanism. Because

of the special clearances required for the discussions in such a’forum, the NSC mechanism is well

suited for this purpose. Alternatively, the “mechanisms for consensus” discussed in this report

could also serve as the interagency forum, with

properly cleared representatives from the agencies involved.

It should be emphasized that there is no indication that there has been arbitrary or capricious

application of the security barriers to preclude

civilian use of military technology. The central

fact is that national security authorities have little incentive to press for greater access or use of

their technology, systems, or data. Such broadened access is potentially threatening because of

the loss of control it implies—the prospect that

more information is being released than is desirable. These legitimate concerns are not readily

dismissed, nor can they be easily tested by the

civilian agencies. Thus, the interagency mechanism needs a “third party” such as the NSC staff,

the Science Adviser, or perhaps the Vice President, to ensure that such questions receive balanced consideration. Congress can play an important role through hearings, oversight, and explicit incentives, both in uncovering the scope

of the problems and in resolving them.

Future of the Space Shuttle System

The shuttle program represents the largest current area of interaction between the civilian and

military space sectors, and it will be the continuing focus for many of the civilian-military policy

issues in the period immediately ahead. The shuttle will be central to both the civilian and military

space programs.

From the beginning of consideration of the

shuttle, the Air Force worked closely with NASA

to incorporate defense requirements into the

vehicle. Formal coordinating mechanisms were

established, with AACB serving continuously as

the mechanism for coordinating formal policy at

the highest level. The Presidential decision on

the shuitle in 1972 directed it to serve all users,

civilian and military. This decision entailed

development of a vehicle that would integrate

civilian and military requirements, and military

requirements had a significant bearing on many

of its design specifications.

NASA has borne most of the development

funding for the shuttle, rather than sharing this

responsibility with DOD. The initial plan was to

limit the Air Force to building and operating the

Vandenberg shuttle launch and landing facility,

and to paying for operating costs for DOD missions. The Air Force later assumed development

responsibility for the inertial upper stage.

The rationale for NASA’s lead role in funding

and management has been that sharing between

the two organizations would complicate the management of an already difficult and challenging

program and drive up the program’s total costs,

and that NASA was better equipped to design and

oversee manned systems than DOD. A formal

NASA/DOD memorandum of understanding

(MOU) on management of the space transportation system was signed in early 1977, and revised

in early 1980. The basic MOU establishes the

broad policies; there are additional agreements

and MOUS on specific aspects of the program.

A major problem with this arrangement is that

NASA has had to cut other programs to pay for

shuttle overruns. Given DOD’s much larger

budget, it has been argued that the Air Force

should shoulder some of the shuttle costs; the Air

Foce has resisted in order to avoid being put in

a budget situation similar to NASA’S. An arrangement to “fence off” the shuttle budget so that

it competes with other national programs, and

not with either agency’s continuing projects,

would help to alleviate many tensions between

NASA and DOD.

At the present time, interaction between NASA

and DOD elements proceeds at all management

levels, with active coordination on a daily basis.

Inevitably, there has been a continuing series of

strains and issues that stem from differences in

basic mission and outlook between the two organizations. Many decisions must be made by
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 165

NASA without the opportunity for total coordination with all parties of interest, including DOD.

Operations of the space shuttle bring civilian

and DOD-operated payloads into the same

stream of activities, from prelaunch preparations

through recovery and postlaunch processing,

with the result that special provisions must be

made to ensure that adequate protection is provided to sensitive information and systems. When

examined in detail, the transportation system cannot be divorced from its payloads. Every payload

entails specific operating characteristics that then

become subject to some of the same controls that

exist for the compartmented classified systems.

Given this added complexity, many have suggested that separate shuttle orbiters uniquely configured for DOD launches would be preferable

to joint facilities, and that DOD ought to operate

a separate shuttle fleet altogether. In the future,

maintaining payload-shuttle compatibility for

civilian and DOD payloads will be difficult unless

this common-use principle is strongly supported

at the highest levels in the Government, because

each agency desires to maintain direct control

over all aspects of their programs.

There have been suggestions that it might be

appropriate to have DOD assume funding and

management responsibility for the entire shuttle

system after it becomes operational, for it appears

that among the users DOD would have the largest number of missions. This role for DOD would

have several advantages:

●

●

●

as the major user, DOD could ensure compatible scheduling for its high-priority

launches;

under current budget constraints, operations

costs and engineering refinements for the

shuttle could more easily be funded by

DOD; NASA could concentrate on science,

applications and man-in-space programs;

and

security requirements for DOD payloads

could more easily be accommodated ‘under

DOD shuttle management.

The disadvantages of such approaches are considerable, however:

●

●

●

●

NASA, as the development authority, has a

detailed understanding of the shuttle and its

complexities; this knowledge base is shared

between the NASA centers and their con

tractors and cannot be easily shifted to DOD

(or to any other organization);

there are several non-U.S. payloads currently

scheduled for launch by U.S. vehicles; these

and future launches will be more difficult to

accommodate under DOD management.

There is likely to be some foreign resistance

to cooperative programs dependent on

DOD launches;

the major technical support base for the

shuttle—the NASA centers—would be in a

different agency and would be less easily accessible to the operational manager (unless

centers were transferred to DOD); this situation would create difficulties in implementing changes and improvements to the shuttle system; and

the image of the U.S. space program would

be altered; although still conducted for

“peaceful purposes, “ it would be controlled

by the military.

Man-in-Space

One of the features of the shuttle is that man

is an integral part of the system, required for its

successful operation and available to operate experiments, to deploy payloads, and to recover

them in order to return them to Earth or to repair

and refurbish them in orbit, as appropriate. For

launch of DOD-operated systems, the astronaut

crew will need to be aware of the system’s operating characteristics and may be able to contribute to improved operation by using man’s unique

attributes. These may be DOD personnel or

selected non-DOD astronauts. Clearly, foreign

astronauts or experimenters could not be employed on such missions. Beyond this limitation,

there is a great deal of commonality between

civilian and DOD-operated missions, and significant advantage can be taken of this fact, with consequent net economies.

The next major step in advancing the capability

of man-in-space is expected to be an extended
166 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

lifetime manned space station in LEO. Experiments in such a station are likely to address

civilian and DOD objectives, and the lessons

Iearned will have significance for both civilian and

national security purposes. Certain DOD missions, such as the possible launch of large space

platforms with directed energy weapons, could

require a significant role for men in orbit. A space

station is likely to be of broad value for both

civilian and national security purposes, and require continued DOD-NASA coordination for

manned space flight. The current policy calls for

such coordination, but the mechanisms are largely informal.

If a decision is made to proceed with space station development, it will likely be designed to satisfy broad national needs including those of the

national security community. In order to satisfy

this objective, the national security community

will need to be brought into the space station

program at an early phase, and should have a

formal and significant presence in the planning

process leading to program approval, when and

if this occurs. The history of the shuttle demonstrates that such large-scale, long-term, and highly

complex developments can be successfully pursued and be responsive to the needs of several

agencies. The shuttle has also demonstrated that

such programs are not easy to execute. Many of

the problems with the shuttle concerning international perceptions, separating classified and

unclassified systems and personnel, and devising a joint management structure, would recur

with a space station. Given our experience with

the shuttle, special attention should be given to

providing adequate long-term funding from both

the civilian and the military agencies.

Common-Use Systems (Unmanned)

The U.S. space effort has derived considerable

benefit from its ability to use civilian and DOD

technology almost interchangeably wherever

such technology was most appropriate to mission

needs (with the highly classified and sensitive

DOD-operated systems a partial exception). Perhaps the earliest example was the use of DOD

missile propulsion and guidance systems as space

launchers. This joint use has continued, as the

basic Thor, Atlas, and Titan missiles form the core

of a modified and improved family of expendable

space launch vehicles. Even the shuttle uses solid-fuel strap-on rocket technology with its roots

in DOD missile experience and DOD space

launches.

in spacecraft design, detailed characteristics of

DOD-operated payloads are not generally revealed, but as described in earlier sections, there

have been significant common uses in this area.

Beyond detailed design features such as solar cell

arrays, radioisotope power supplies, pointing and

stabilization instruments, thermal coatings, temperature control devices (such as the heat pipe),

fuel cells, small thrusters, and a host of other subsystems, there are several major systems that can

meet both civilian and DOD needs.

One of the potential common-use areas is in

navigation. The Department of Transportation is

the lead agency for the civilian national navigation plan and is responsible for coordination of

navigation system planning, with the Coast Guard

and the Federal Aviation Administration as major participants. In space, however, DOD has

taken the lead in the development of global navigation systems. In the earlier transit system and

more recently in the new GPS system, DOD’s

needs are being addressed; civilian users are also

being accommodated, though not with the same

positioning accuracy as is available to DOD users.

In general, civilian use has been considered in

making GPS decisions, but non-DOD agencies

have responded inadequately, leaving the entire

burden of justification to the military rather than

viewing GPS as a joint national system like the

shuttle.

In telecommunications, the military makes use

of civilian systems by leasing transponders from

INTELSAT and from U.S. suppliers. The Navy, for

example, uses maritime communications links

provided by COMSAT’S MARlSAT satellites. Present-generation communications satellites dedicated to DOD are not, however, normally shared

with civilian users. As the technology continues

to mature, and advance concepts such as the

Large Communications Platform (LCP) become

realistic possibilities, joint DOD-civilian LCPS may

evolve. There are numerous issues surrounding

the concept of LCPS that need to be resolved
Ch. 6—Relationship.s Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 167

(discussed inch. 3), and the questions that result

fro DOD involvement would add a further degree

of complexity to ownership, management, funding, and use of such systems. There appear to

be no insurmountable barriers to DOD involvement in an LCP, and there may be significant

benefits from use of such a system. These factors

suggest a general guideline that should be followed for DOD programs as well as for those in

the civilian sector: proposed DOD research,

development, and demonstration programs in

areas where there is significant civilian interest

and technology base should be reviewed to

determine if there is technology available from

the civilian or commercial sector that can be applied to the DOD requirement.

In other applications areas, such as meteorology and Earth (and ocean) observations, there is

a degree of common use: DOD uses data collected from platforms primarily supplying civilian

users. The executive branch has initiated periodic

reviews of meteorological satellites (metsats) to

ensure: 1 ) that maximum use is made of common systems, and 2) that if there are separate

civilian and DOD platforms (as in the case of the

medium-altitude metsats), there is a clear and persuasive justification for separate programs. For

ocean observations, the concept of a NOSS was

proposed as a common-use system to satisfy the

needs of three agencies—NASA, NOAA, and

DOD. Contributions to the program were to

come from the three agencies, and the sensor systems and platform characteristics were to be determined by common agreement. Data were to

flow into the two user agencies, NOAA and

DOD; NASA was to be the principal space R&D

agency. The planned multiagency sponsorship

broke down, however, when DOD funding support did not materialize because of concern that

the attempt to meet multiple needs would raise

the cost beyond what the Navy was willing to

pay.

The experience with NOSS indicates that

shared or common use of space systems—although desirable from the standpoint of efficient

use of national resources—does not occur, and

cannot be sustained, without careful attention

to management and funding channels and to approaches that reduce interagency stresses. It

should be possible for the United States to carry

out such multiagency programs, but the record

to date has not been particularly promising. A

similar situation exists in the land remote-sensing

arena. There are multiple agency interests, both

for civilian and national security purposes, in data

from Landsat-type systems, but no single agency can justify the investment in a satellite platform. A cooperative agreement among agencies

would appear to be one approach that could

move the U.S. program from experimental to

operational status. But long-term Cooperative

funding of a common project such as this appears

to be beyond our current capabilities.

Civilian Use of Data From

DOD-Operated Systems

One of the delicate subjects in the relationships

between civilian and DOD-operated space program activities is the use of remote-sensing data

derived from classified systems for civilian purposes. There are presumably two security concerns related to the dissemination of data products from classified programs: sensitive technology and sensitive information content.

●

●

The question of whether classified sensor or

applications characteristics (e.g., sensor

acuteness) are reflected in the data products

of a classified system generally can be determined in advance for an entire class of products. Such products, in theory, could then

become eligible or not, on the basis of technology, for direct utilization outside of

classified controls and established need to

know. Data might be modified so as to conceal the characteristics of the instruments

used. In general, too, the sensitivity of technology declines steadily with the passage of

time.

The question of whether sensitive information content is contained in the products of

a classified system, generally can be determined only on a case-by-case basis and even

then may be very difficult to evaluate. For

example, the possibilities of disclosing potentially embarrassing information about a foreign country are almost impossible to disprove, particularly in “worst-case” analyses,

if the original sources of data were classified.
168 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Information content, therefore, may have

longer-lasting sensitivity than the technology

involved.

The unyielding complexities and uncertainties of

attempting to identify and weigh these two types

of sensitivities have effectively limited civilian uses

of the data products from systems that have primary national security-related missions. It is infeasible in an unclassified report to present a

rounded evaluation of the mechanisms that are

employed to declassify and disseminate information initially obtained from classified space

systems. There are, however, some aspects that

are appropriate for open discussion, and illuminate the types of issues that are involved:

 Executive orders that have defined the criteria for classification also provide for the

orderly downgrading and ultimate declassification of data as their original sensitivity

declines with age. Sensitive intelligence information is eligible for exemption from

automatic downgrading at specified intervals, but not from the requirement for periodic review. As a result of these overall provisions, there are mechanisms and procedures within all national security related

departments and agencies that regularly effect the release of data that were once

classified. However, the delay often amounts

to a decade or more.

. Information itself, even when derived from

currently classified sources, is released occasionally to sharpen public understanding of

issues or programs. DOD and the Department of State, for example, regularly report

on the strategic-military capabilities and programs of the U.S.S.R. or other foreign countries. In such cases there is no reference or

attribution to the specific source of the information. Such decisions inevitably turn on

the judgment of the responsible officials,

who weigh the potential benefits and risks.

One problem is that many civilian agencies

often do not have highly placed officials with

the proper security clearances to deal directly with their opposite numbers in the military

and intelligence agencies. This leaves key

decisions entirely in the hands of national

security authorities.

Any DOD/civilian program interaction in the

use of classified data products, even through

screening mechanisms controlled by national

security interests, inevitably increases the exposure of the national security programs. At the

same time, such joint activity imposes some national security controls or considerations on the

civilian activities. While these relationships can

be balanced within the context of Federal Government activities and operations, there are no

mechanisms in place to handle such interaction

with the private sector, State and local governments, or academia. To make broad and routine

civilian use of data products generated by classified systems it would be necessary to effect

fundamental changes in policy at the national

level.

An important option, therefore, would be to

conduct an interagency review and/or a congressional inquiry of: 1) the degree to which national

security systems can satisfy civilian user needs,

and 2) the funds, personnel, and hardware required to satisfy appropriate needs. In the planning of next-generation DOD and intelligence

systems, the possibility of accommodating welldefined civilian needs should be explicitly considered. It may also be appropriate to articulate

a general policy in this area, in order to overcome the obvious reluctance of national security

authorities to be burdened by considerations of

civilian utility. Such a policy directive might include the following points:

DOD-operated systems will be designed to

respond to national security needs and are

consistent with the overall principles of

“peaceful purposes,” as stated in the NAS

Act, and relevant treaty obligations such as

the Outer Space Treaty;

to the extent that such systems can satisfy

civilian user needs, they will be planned and

operated to do so, subject to the provision

that acceptable performance of the primary

missions be a priority;

cost of incremental additional operations,

hardware, personnel and supplies, to the extent these can be explicitly identified, will

be borne by the civilian user or users; and

there will bean interagency mechanism for

coordinating the activities required to carry

out the above tasks.
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 169

Institutional Change

Introduction

The world is a much different place in 1981

than it was in 1958, when the current policy and

institutional framework for the national space program was developed. The United States and other

leading countries have had almost 25 years to

assess the ways in which space achievement

might, as President Kennedy suggested in 1961,

“hold the key to our future on Earth.”

In carrying out the ApolIo mission, NASA grew

into a capable organization, one which became

larger than anyone anticipated in 1958. On the

basis of its over two decades of experience, NASA

has also developed into a particular kind of institution in the eyes of the world, of the U.S. public,

and of its own staff. Any consideration of changes

in the overall structure of the U.S. space program

cannot ignore the results of these past 23 years

of activity. In particular, it must recognize that

the political environment, especially the nature

and scope of foreign competition and the degree

of U.S. domestic support, has altered a great deal

since 1958.

One major change is that the U.S. national

security space program is larger and more vital

to our defense posture than anyone except a few

visionaries expected in 1958. As DOD and the

intelligence community exploit existing space

capabilities and explore the potential of future

space systems, they have given an ever more important role to space technology in U.S. security planning. The national security space program

has also evolved with particular institutional characteristics, and two decades have demonstrated

that there are substantial differences in organizational style and methods between the civilian and

military space programs.

As discussed previously, there have been

repeated interactions between the separate space

programs, and those interactions reflect a mixed

record of cooperation and conflict. periodic assessments of this record and of the reasons for

maintaining separate program structures have all

concluded that the existing relationships are fundamentally sound, What the following discussion

examines is whether this conclusion remains valid

in the 1980’s.

The Original Rationale Reconsidered

The reasons for establishing separate space program structures in 1958 were discussed previously. Briefly restated, they included: 1 ) that there

were clear defense and intelligence applications

of space technology, and that those applications,

including the R&D supporting them, were best

carried out under the management of national

security agencies; 2) that there were also scientific, economic, and political justifications, not

tied to national security applications, for space

activities, and that these required a sizable nonmilitary space program; 3) that the national interest was best served by keeping these “other”

space activities outside the national security

framework, because:

●

●

they were not relevant to DOD’s mission and

might even interfere with high-priority security-oriented space projects by, for example,

competing for resources and technical talent

or by making it harder to keep the securityrelated efforts classified; and

the existence of a separate civilian space program meant that the United States could

make use of that program as a tool of domestic and foreign policy by openly engaging in

both cooperative and competitive international space efforts of a nonmilitary character, and could more easily transfer the results

of the Government’s space research efforts

into the civilian economy.

This analysis will present the implications and

alternatives that flow from differing assumptions

about the civilian and military programs and their

proper relationships. The issue is whether the advantages of maintaining the current separation

outweigh the benefits of closer policy, institutional, and programmatic relationships among the

various Government space programs. If it appears

that there is no longer adequate justification for

a large, institutionally distinct civilian space effort on the current scale of NASA, then the issue

becomes how best to reduce or redeploy the existing capabilities (facilities and personnel) of the
170 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

civilian space effort to meet current priorities and

needs.

Options for Future Civilian-National

Security Relationships

At this time the United States has a civilian

space program which, despite past accomplishments and a high degree of technical and managerial expertise, is having difficulty gathering

political and budgetary support for new programs. On the other hand, the national security

uses of space technology are receiving high priority. From the national perspective, what would

be the implications of a closer NASA-DOD relationship including even the possibility of merging the civilian, defense, and/or intelligence programs into a common structure?

There are three distinct kinds of relationships

the two programs can have, depending on the

status of the two sectors:

● Option 1: Separate Civilian and National

Security Programs:

A. Separate projects with provisions for

technology transfer (status quo).

B. Single project, with designated lead

agency (space shuttle, metsats).

C. Ad hoc joint management/funding for

specific projects.

● Option 2: independent Space R&D Agency

for both civilian and national security projects (with operations conducted separately).

● Option 3: Absorption of elements of NASA

by DOD and other Federal agencies.

The following will present the advantages and

disadvantages of the three options.

Option 1:

Separate civilian and military programs.

The general rationale for this approach was

presented in the previous section. In addition,

there are specific pluses and minuses depending

on how relations are handled:

A. Separate projects with provisions for technology transfer. —This is the current practice for most projects:

1. Benefits:

●

●

●

●

Allows defense and intelligence

space programs to be managed in

the context of their particular goals,

without slighting civilian programs.

Preserves high degree of security for

DOD/intelligence programs.

Maintains well-established management patterns for all sectors.

Stimulates beneficial competition

between projects.

20 costs:

●

●

●

●

May lead to overemphasis within

NASA on developing new technology rather than meeting national

needs and satisfying potential users.

Accepts some duplication and inefficiencies.

Increases difficulty of planning and

funding national programs of interest

to civilian and military/intelligence

sectors.

May lead to premature commitment

to a major civilian post-shuttle development program to maintain vitality

of independent civilian sector.

B. Single project with designated lead agency.—This has been the procedure adopted

for the space shuttle (and attempted for

NOSS), where both sectors are able to

agree on the need for a common capability. One agency (in this case, NASA) is

chosen as the lead agenc:y and designs and

develops the technology according to its

own management procedures, in consultation with other users. In the case of the shuttle, the current plan is that operations will

also be managed by one agency:

1. Benefits:

● Avoids duplication of effort and associated costs.

● Increases political and financial support for long-term projects.

● Facilitates coordination between developer and user.

2. costs:

 Leads public and international community to confuse civilian and military programs.

. In the case of the shuttle, has absorbed a disproportionate amount of
Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 171

C. Joint

NASA budget and personnel, without direct support from DOD; lead

agency tends to be left “holding the

bag.”

management/funding for selected

projects.–This has not been the practice,

but might be useful to avoid some of the

problems associated with separate programs and lead agency responsibilities:

1. Benefits:

● As for the previous case; in addition, joint management and funding

would ensure careful attention by

both parties and ease the strains on

the lead agency.

2. costs:

● As above; however, joint management might complicate decisionmaking.

Given the underlying separation of the civilian

and national security programs, any of the above

three approaches can be used for specific projects. This gives management considerable leeway

in establishing patterns for cooperation and funding; in the case of joint civilian-military projects,

congressional oversight would have to involve

several subcommittees.

Option 2:

Independent space R&D agency for all Federal

space projects, civilian and military.

In this case, an essentially new agency would

be created to manage all U.S. space-related R&D.

Based primarily on existing NASA and Air Force

capabilities, the new agency would be oriented

toward serving a variety of national needs, including those of DOD and the civilian agencies

(Departments of the Interior and Agriculture,

etc.). The operation and maintenance of systems,

once developed, would be the responsibility of

the mission agencies.

1. Benefits:

 Links NASA’s technical capabilities

in areas such as manned space flight

and space propulsion to high-priority national security objectives.

● Provides political support and policy

rationale required to preserve the

●

●

●

●

major part of NASA’s facilities and

personnel.

Allows for budgetary and programmatic coordination of entire U.S.

space R&D effort, civilian and military, including what are now distinct

DOD programs; better balance between technology push and user pull

in what are now NASA programs.

Permits total Federal space budget to

be adjusted to policy priorities and

allows the new agency to be reimbursed from other Government

agencies and private sector for its

R&D work in direct support of their

requirements.

Routine links to users would facilitate

transition from R&D to operations for

programs now in NASA.

Facilitates joint programs in areas

such as space transportation of interest to entire space community.

2. costs:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Inverse of most benefits of option 1;

puts the space agency in a less public

support role and makes it difficult to

use for political and foreign policy

purposes.

Likely, in current context, to result

in unbalanced R&D program with

national security requirements predominant (this might also be considered a benefit).

Disrupts established DOD-contractor relationships.

Does not answer question of what

to do with space science programs

such as planetary exploration, because agency emphasis would be on

user-oriented applications; likely to

lead to reemphasis of space science.

Potential loss of NASA’s role as innovator and developer of new technologies relevant to the civilian economy.

Some highly classified national security programs will still remain offIimits.

3. Requirements:

● Establishing extensive pattern of
172 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

mutual trust and cooperation be- ●

tween new agency and various users

of its R&D services. ●

● Requires some means for resolving

conflicts between different users

over how to employ the new agen- ●

cy’s technical capabilities and over

Minimizes problems of transition

from R&D to operations.

Provides opportunity to trim or eliminate nonessential parts of NASA institutional base.

May facilitate transfer of space systems to the private sector.

priority to be given to different pro- 2. costs:

gram activities. ●

● Change in congressional oversight of

civilian space activities, with more ●

emphasis on mission-agency oriented committees (Armed Services,

Agriculture, Natural Resources, etc.). ●

Option 3:

Absorption of NASA by DOD and other Federal

●

agencies.

In this case, NASA would be dissolved with key ●

elements, such as the centers, being taken over

by DOD, other Federal agencies, and private

firms or universities:

1. Benefits: ●

May reduce costs.

Links technical and institutional

capabilities relevant to national security objectives directly to users within DOD and intelligence agencies.

Loses the benefits posited for option 1.

Gives up an established and successful institution for uncertain efficiencies and budget savings.

Not clear that NASA centers could

easily be absorbed within DOD and

other mission agencies.

No single locus for space R&D in

support of civilian mission agencies

and U.S. private sector.

Public and congressional reaction

likely to be mixed, but predominantly negative; same for overseas reaction.

Makes ambitious civilian programs

such as Apollo or permanent

manned stations much more difficult

to consider.
Chapter 7

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN SPACE
Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

European Space Agency and joint European

Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Policy and Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Current and Projected Applications

Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Remote Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Materials Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Launch Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Future Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Cooperation/Competition With the

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

European National Programs . . . . . . . . . . 187

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Current Applications Programs . . . . . . 188

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

Applications Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

Organization and Funding . . . . . . . . . 195

Current Applications Programs . . . . . . 195

Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196.

Other European Programs . . . . . . . . . . . 196

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Organization and Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Current and Projected Applications

Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

Remote Sensing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

Materials Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

Launch Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

‘Cooperation/Competition With the

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Non-Western Space Programs: Soviet Union,

People’s Republic of China, India . . . 204

Soviet Union... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Remote Sensing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Materials Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Launch Vehicles and Manned

Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Cooperation and Competition With

Other Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

People’s Republic of China . . . . . . . . . . 209

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

Other Space programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

Canada . . . . . . .

Brazil . . . . . . . . .

Domestic/Regional

Systems . . . .

Remote Sensing in

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Communications

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Developing Countries 214

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page

17. Contributions of Member States to the

Principai ESA Programsin 1981 . . . . . 178

18. Capacity ofAriane and U.S. Launch

Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19. Total Successful Orbital Launches

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No.

11. Organizational Structure of the

European Space Agency . . . . . . . . .

. . . 181

. . . 204

Page

. . . 176

12. Schematic Chart of National Organization

for Space Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

13. Japanese Budget for Space Activities. 200

14. Current and Probable Landsat

Ground Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Chapter 7

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN SPACE

INTRODUCTION

The shape, direction, and very existence of the

U.S. civilian space program owe much to international competition. The basic events are well

known: the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the

sudden public discovery of the “space age;” the

continuing series of Soviet space “firsts” in unmanned and then manned satellites; and the

sometimes desperate attempts by the United

States to catch up, culminating in President

Kennedy’s 1961 commitment to a manned lunar

landing by 1970, ahead of the Russians. (For a

more detailed description of the early phases of

Soviet-American rivalry in space, see app. G.)

During these years of competition the United

States and the Soviet Union had a virtual monopoly on space systems and technologies: boosters;

tracking systems; communications, remote sensing, and weather satellites; and manned spacecraft. Other countries, lacking the military and

political motivation, did not at first choose to expend the resources needed to develop independent space capabilities.

We will not attempt hereto describe the course

of these developments during the 1960’s; the

main elements of the current Soviet space program will be presented later (see pp. 204-209).

Suffice it to say that the U.S. program had, by the

end of the decade, succeeded in demonstrating

its superiority in virtually every area—without,

however, forcing the Soviets to abandon their

own efforts or to concede permanent U.S. preeminence.

The important point is that, beginning in the

1960’s but accelerating rapidly in the 1970’s,

other countries began to enter the field. Political

motivations, as will be seen, played and continue

to play a crucial role; to a large extent these were

identified with maintaining economic competitiveness vis-a-vis commercial rivals, particularly

the United States. As the U.S. post-Apollo space

activities, both public and private, have come to

concentrate more on potential economic payoffs

rather than on large prestige projects, and the

Soviet program has turned toward the long-term

goal of permanent manned orbital platforms, the

commercial competition in space applications

technologies and systems from Europe and Japan

has become increasingly important. The significance of competition between nations has also

altered, due to the expanded global use of space

technology rising largely out of the successes of

the U.S. space program. International organizations for global communications, such as

INTELSAT and INMARSAT, have continued to

grow and now include most of the world’s users

of telecommunications. Through the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

and the U.S. Agency for International Development, many developing countries have gained

first-hand experience in the ways satellite communications and remote-sensing systems can

supply services crucial for economic growth. As

one result, the laws and regulations governing the

use of outer space have been widely discussed

by international bodies such as the International

Telecommunication Union and the U.N.’S Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

Space technology has become an important political resource whose effective use by the United

States will be affected by the development of international competition. In what follows we will

outline, for each major foreign program, its organization and goals, its main efforts in the four

applications areas (communications, remote sensing, materials processing, and transportation), and

the prospects for cooperation and/or competition

with the United States.

175
176 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

. —— ——— . -

EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AND JOINT EUROPEAN EFFORTS

Since the early 1960’s Europe has attempted

to mount a coordinated space program to compete with the United States and Soviet programs

in key areas and to ensure European participation in the economic, scientific, and political

benefits of space activities. The latest and most

successful organization to attempt this task is the

European Space Agency (ESA), made up of 11 full

members—Belgiu m, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain,

Sweden, Switzerland, and the united Kingdom–

and two associate members—Austria and Norway. ESA is involved in space science, applications, and launch vehicle development, as well

as the formulation of policy for European cooperative ventures (see fig. 1 1).

At the beginning of the space age, individual

European states recognized that they could not

mount space programs on the scale of those in

the United States or U.S.S.R, unless there was extensive cooperation among interested parties.

Even so, there was no attempt to match the

manned capabilities being competitively developed by the superpowers. European interest has

been focused on basic science, on applications

satellites for regional use, and on supporting an

industrial/technical infrastructure that could contribute to high-technology enterprises. Despite

these shared interests, however, there have been

continuing difficulties caused by: 1 ) differences

between members about what programs to support and general policies to follow, 2) problems

Figure Il.—Organizational Structure of the European Space Agency
Ch. 7—Internationa/ Efforts in Space • 177

in allocating contracts between industries in

various countries, 3) disagreement about the appropriate degree of cooperation with, and dependence on, the United States, and 4) competition between ESA and national programs.

Policy and Budget ?

ESA was founded in May 1975 following several

years of negotiations and compromises among

the major participants. ESA inherited the programs and facilities of its predecessor organizations, the European Space Research Organization

(ESRO), the European Launcher Development

Organization (ELDO), and the European Space

Conference (ESC). (For a description of Europe’s

pre-ESA activities, see app. G.) An important point

is that, unlike NASA, ESA is specifically allowed

to operate applications systems, once developed,

with the costs being borne by the users of the

system.1 A second difference, one which partially

offsets the first, is that ESA is responsible for

carrying out an “industrial policy” designed to

“improve the worldwide competitiveness of

European industry,” while ensuring that member

states participate equitably and, in particular, that

the return to any member state—i.e., the value

of the contracts let by ESA—is approximately proportionate to the members’ contributions (the

principle of “juste retour” or fair return). The ESA

convention explicitly states that it shall “exploit

the advantages of free competitive bidding in all

cases, except when this would be incompatible

with other defined objectives of industrial policy. ”z Hence considerations of cost or efficiency may have to take a back seat to the principle

of fair return, with predictable results for timeliness and cost effectiveness. This is one of the

inevitable shortcomings of a mu Itinational agency, and a prime reason why operational systems

have generally been handled outside of ESA.

The ESA members contribute to the organization in two ways: mandatory activities, which include the scientific programs and basic organizational expenditures; and optional activities,

which are specific programs for satellite design

I “Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency,” done at Paris May 30, 1975, art. V.

“’Convention,” art. VI], par. 1 sec. d.

and operations, launch facilities, and space transportation. 3 The major programs, such as Ariane

and Spacelab, are optional, which means that

members can request to be specifically excluded.

Mandatory contributions are based on each

state’s national income; however, no one state

can contribute more than 25 percent of the total

budget. For optional projects, interested participants pay a variable percentage which is negotiated between the participants. The degree of

national support for various programs in 1981 is

given in table 17.

ESA’S budget for its first full year of operation

(1976) was approximately $600 million, of which

one-third went for mandatory and two-thirds for

optional programs. This compares with NASA’s

fiscal 1976 appropriation (for space) of $3.22

billion. In 1980, ESA’S budget had risen to $846

million, while NASA’s was $4.68 billion. In both

years, the ESA budget was between one-fifth and

one-sixth NASA’S. (These figures do not constitute

a complete comparison of United States and

European civilian space expenditures, since they

fail to include non-NASA programs in the United

States, both Government and private sector, as

well as the space budgets of individual European

countries). Since ESA’S two most expensive projects, Ariane and Spacelab, are largely complete

and are not likely to be soon replaced by comparable programs, ESA’S budget is not expected

to increase over the coming years.4

Current and Projected

Applications Programs5

Communications

European communications needs and programs have been defined largely by the national

PTTs (postal, telephone, and telegraph agencies)

acting through CEPT (Conference Europeene de

Postes et Telecommunications and the European

3“Convention,” art. V.

4As a multinational organization, ESA has had to develop an accounting system to provide for changes in exchange rates between

member states. ESA accounts are kept in ESA Accounting Units (AU)

rather than any single national currency. The value of the AU visa-vis other currencies is reevaluated annually; in 1981, one

AU =!$1 .4.

‘Unless otherwise indicated, figures and information in this section are taken from Europe’s P/ace in Space, ESA, Paris, January

1981.
178 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 17.–Contributions of Member States to the Principal ESA Programs in 1981

Meteosat ECS Ariane

General expioita- phase Marecs Marecs developbudget Science tion Sirio-2 OTS ECS 3 bis A B Spacelab ment

Member states:

Belgium . . . . . . . . . 4.71

Denmark. . . . . . . . . 2.63

France . . . . . . . . . . 22.45

Germany. . . . . . . . . 26.82

Ireland . . . . . . . . . . 0.54

Italy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.51

Netherlands. . . . . . 6.29

Spain . . . . . . . . . . . 5.29

Sweden. , ., ... , . . 4.16

Switzerland . . . . . . 4.19

United Kingdom . . 14.42

Other participants:

Austria . . . . . . . . . . 0.68

Canada. . . . . . . . . . 2.23

Norway. . . . . . . . . . 0.08

Other income. . . . . —

4.49

2.51

21.40

25.57

0.54

12.46

6.00

5.04

4.25

3.99

13.75

—

—

—

—

4.06

2.41

23.70

25.66

—

15.07

—

—

3

-

48

20.60

—

—

—

5.02

3.30

—

7.50

9.00

—

72.39

0:50

1.50

3.50

1.83

0.48

—

—

—

5.17

2.90

24.69

25.00

—

14.38

2.50

—

4.91

4.59

15.86

—

—

—

—

3.27

0.33

25.93

30.68

—

14.78

0.94

0.17

1,62

2.13

20.15

—

—

—

—

3.19

0.74

26.52

30.42

—

13.85

1.77

0.53

3.97

0.55

18.46

—

—

—

—

0.95

—

11.92

19.08

—

2.20

4.63

0.95

2.96

—

55.81

—

—

1.50

—

SOURCE: From Europe’s Place in Spacer p,9.

Broadcasting Union (EBU). More recently, forecasting and coordination have been done within

the Interim Eutelsat Organization, set up within

CEPT in 1977 to establish a European satellite

communications system.

OTS (Orbital Test Sate//ite).–The OTS project

was approved by ESRO in 1971 and launched

into geosynchronous orbit in 1978 (aboard a U.S.

Delta 3914) after development by British Aerospace Dynamics Group. With a capacity of 3,000

telephone circuits, it has been used for various

experimental purposes including high-speed scientific data transmission and television broadcasting. Current projections are that it may be

able to provide useful services for up to 5 more

years. Program cost has been $365.4 million.

ECS (European Communications Satellites).–

The OTS was designed to prove the usefulness

of an operational European telecommunications

system. In 1978, ESA approved a five-satellite

system, based on the OTS design, to provide regional communications needs for 10 years. interim Eutelsat will pay user fees for international

trunk telephone services and for television transmission between members of the European

Broadcasting Union. High-speed data transmission and communication with off-shore oil and

gas platforms may also be provided. British

Aerospace Dynamics Group is the prime contrac0.14

—

5.74

13.29

—

1,28

1.49

0.34

6.61

—

69.89

—

—

1.22

—

5.07

1.81

12.07

64.78

—

1.00

2.53

3.38

—

1.00

7.60

0.76

—

—

—

1.92

0.40

79.34

5.31

—

5.31

0.34

4.18

0.63

0.08

2.49

.

—

—

— — —

tor for the estimated $632.8 million program (not

including ground terminals); the first satellite is

scheduled for an Ariane launch in 1982.

Marecs.–Marecs is a direct descendant of

Great Britain’s Marots program for ocean communications, but its design is based, like ECS, on

the experimental OTS. Two satellites will be

placed in geostationary orbit over the Atlantic (the

Atlantic satellite may eventually be relocated over

the Indian Ocean) and Pacific to provide shipto-ship communications. The international maritime satellite organization, inmarsat, is leasing the

satellites for its mission. The British Aerospace

Dynamics Group is prime contractor, and Britain

has put up most of the development funding,

some 55 percent of Marecs A and almost 70 percent of Marecs B. (In the OTS and ECS programs,

by contrast, Great Britain contributed a more

usual 15 to 20 percent.) Marecs A was launched

on the fourth Ariane test flight December 20,

1981, and Marecs B is scheduled for the first

operational flight in September 1982. Program

cost is $359.8 million.

L-Sat (large-satellite). –The L-Sat is a descendant

of an earlier program, H-Sat, which was abandoned by France and Germany in favor of going

ahead with more rapid deployment of their own

joint (non-ESA) operational communications and

television direct broadcast system (see descrip-
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 179

tion, p. 188). As presently envisioned, L-Sat would

be a very large, advanced experimental communications satellite to test the feasibility of direct

TV broadcasting and specialized/business communications using small roof-top size terminals.

In addition, it would include equipment for experiments with the as-yet unexploited 30/20 GHz

band. The British have been most enthusiastic

about L-Sat development, which is seen as competitive with U.S. technology for future INTELSAT

satellites, and British Aerospace has been

awarded the prime contract. Still in the design

definition stage, its estimated launch (either on

the space shuttle or an advanced Ariane), is set

for 1986. The estimated development cost is $520

million (1 980 price Ievels).b

One of the striking facts in looking at ESA’S

communications program is the leading role

played by Great Britain and British industry. Since

there are national and bilateral European projects

being conducted outside ESA, Britain is not the

only European country fostering satellite telecommunications expertise, but it has one of the

broadest and most forward-looking programs (see

pp. 40-41 for further discussion).

Remote Sensing

ESA has been active in both meteorological and

remote-sensing development, though with primary emphasis on the former,

Meteosat 7 and 2.—The Meteosat program was

approved by ESRO in 1972; Meteosat 1 was

launched (by Thor-Delta) in 1977, and placed in

a geostationary orbit allowing it to survey Europe,

Africa, and the Mediterranean. It provides raw

imagery to central European ground-processing

stations for short-term weather forecasting, as well

as relaying the processed data to users and transmitting imagery from U.S. weather satellites stationed over the Western Hemisphere. Meteosat

1 has also contributed to global programs set up

by the World Meteorological Organization. in

1979, Meteosat 1 suffered a partial failure of its

power system; Meteosat 2 was launched in June

1981 on the third Ariane test flight. The prime

GESA News Release, “New European Telecommunication Satellite, Program is Approved,” Dec. 22, 1981. ESA News Release, “ESA

Microgravity Programme Gets Underway, ” Jan. 18, 1982.

contractor for the $301 million program was

Aerospatiale of France.

Sirio 2.—Sirio 1 was an experimental Italian

communications satellite; the spare, Sirio 2, will

be launched by ESA in 1982 to provide meteorological data transmission to African ground

centers, as well as to conduct scientific experiments. Cost for the Italian-built satellite will

be $40.6 million.

Earthnet. -A mandatory ESA program, Earth net

consists of four receiving stations and two processing centers which receive remote-sensing and

meteorological data from U.S. satellites: Landsat,

Nimbus-7, the Heat Capacity Mapping Mission,

and (formerly) Seasat. The data are available to

all ESA members as well as to outside requesters.

Spacelab Remote-Sensing Programs. –The first

Spacelab flight, scheduled for 1983, will carry two

European remote-sensing experiments. One will

use a very high resolution camera for 1:100,000-

scale mapping. The second involves the development of a microwave remote sensor to collect

data through cloud cover.

ERS 1 (European Remote-Sensing Satellite).–

The Earthnet and Spacelab projects, along with

other activities, are designed to prepare for an

advanced remote-sensing satellite, ERS 1. ERS 1

will be used to monitor icepacks and to sense

coastal and ocean regions; its instruments include

a synthetic aperture radar, a radar altimeter, and

wind and wave scatterometers. Tentative launch

date is mid-1987. (It should be noted that a major

civilian operational/commercial remote sensing

system, SPOT, is being undertaken by France,

Sweden, and Belgium as a national project; the

proposed ERS will use the SPOT bus but contain

different instruments. For a description of SPOT,

see pp. 25-29.) ERS-1 is considered to be one element i n a continuing program of Earth observation satellites. Studies are underway for further

satellites, including one for land remote sensing.

Materials Processing

ESA does not yet consider materials processing to be an applications area per se, but rather

an area in which to do basic research that may

someday lead to useful products or processes.
180 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The term “materials science” is used instead of

materials processing; experiments in both biology

and materials science will be carried out as part

of an approved 4-year “microgravity programme” budgeted at $52.4 million.7

ESA’S main contribution to materials science

will be through Spacelab, although sounding

rockets are also being used. Spacelab will be the

major facility for space-based experimentation in

the physical and biological sciences during the

next decade. Spacelab consists of a pressurized

module capable of being carried in the payload

bay of the space shuttle and allowing experimenters to work at a variety of projects in a shirt-sleeve

environment. There are also pallets that allow

equipment to be exposed directly to vacuum and

radiation (see artist’s rendition). Equipment for

conducting processing experiments will include

furnaces and remote manipulators.

Spacelab is ESA’S largest cooperative project

with NASA. ESA is responsible for designing and

delivering, free of charge, an engineering model

and a first flight unit (delivered in December

1981 ), which NASA is scheduled to launch in

mid-l983. The first flight program will involve a

joint European-American crew conducting a va7ESA News Release, “ESA Microgravity Programme Gets Underway,” Jan. 18, 1982.

riety of test projects. In 1980, NASA contracted

to purchase a second spacelab, including a pressurized module and five instrumentation pallets,

for $183.9 million from the prime contractor, the

German firm ERN0.8

Spacelab is Europe’s first attempt at constructing a manned system; partly for this reason, and

also because of internal management problems

compounded by continuing changes in the requirements for integration with the shuttle orbiter,

the project has cost considerably more than initially estimated, and has also been subject to

delay. The 1973 agreement between NASA and

ESA called for delivery of the first unit by 1979;

however, since the shuttle program has also been

behind schedule, these delays have had little effect. The increase in costs, however, has caused

problems among the ESA supporters. According

to the ESA agreement, if costs rose above 120 percent of original estimates, the supporters could

withdraw or renegotiate the terms. In 1979,

estimated costs to completion (approximately

$860 million; dollar amounts are inexact because

of built-in inflation escalators and exchange-rate

fluctuations)9 were 140 percent of the original

a“Europe Competes With U.S. Programs, ” A W&ST, Mar. 3, 1980,

p. 89.

“’Sweeping Changes Spur Spacelab Pace, ” AW&ST, Feb. 11,

1980).
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 181

estimates. Italy in particular felt it could not continue to fund Spacelab at its original level of 18

percent and threatened to block the project

(largely because its share of Spacelab’s industrial

participation had fallen to 11 to 12 percent) unless

its contribution was reduced. As a result, Italy’s

contribution dropped from 18 percent in 1979

to 1 percent in 1981, with the shortfall being

taken up by other contributors in proportion to

their level of participation.

There have also been various tensions between

NASA and ESA over secondary issues. One problem has been the flight schedule for Spacelab missions, especially since the number of shuttle

flights for the first several years has recently been

cut back. ESA is also concerned that changing

specifications for shuttle payloads will lead to expensive redesign of Spacelab components. ”

Some European scientists think that NASA requirements for documentation and prior consultation on Spacelab experiments are overly

stringent and reflect a desire to restrict European

participation .12 NASA counters that preparations

for manned missions are of necessity more

rigorous than for other types of flights. Some

Americans think that, despite the money saved

by cooperative development, an American

SpaceJab program would have been faster and

would have produced a design better suited to

U.S. needs and to the shuttle’s capabilities, and

that the (politically motivated) inclusion of the

Europeans has resulted in a less-than-optimal

technology.

It is difficult to evaluate these charges and

countercharges objectively; in large part, they

stem from the inevitable problems of conducting

any major cooperative program in advanced

technology, especially one with significant potential economic effects. Since, for budgetary

reasons, the alternative to a European Spacelab

was not a U.S. Spacelab, but no Spacelab at all,

many U.S. criticisms are strictly hypothetical. The

question of who will exploit Spacelab’s capabil-

‘Khris Bulloch, “Spacelab Status: Some Action at Last, ” /rtteravia,

November 1981, p. 1,168.

11 Eric Quistgaa~d, DirectoF General of ESA, statement before

Senate Commerce Committee, Mar. 25, 1981, p. 7.

‘

z

’’ U.S.-Europe Collaboration Variable, ” A W&ST, Sept. 1, 1980,

p. 275.

ities most effectively-the United States, the Europeans, or perhaps the Japanese—remains open.

Launch Vehicles

The Ariane I launcher, ESA’S most expensive

single program, has recently completed a fourflight test program; the first operational flight will

take place in September 1982.

Ariane I is a three-stage expendable vehicle,

including an advanced liquid oxygen/liquid

hydrogen third stage. For a comparison with U.S.

launch vehicles, see table 18.

The current design of Ariane is only the first

in a series of as many as five models; successive

designs are planned to improve payload capacity and performance through the 1980’s. The ESA

member states have already approved a program

to develop Ariane 2, 3, and 4. Ariane 2 will be

able to place 4,4oo lb in a transfer orbit, and

Ariane 3,5,280 Ib.ls Ariane 4, under study by ESA

and CNES, will more than double the performance of Ariane 1; its further development was approved in January 1982, and first launch is scheduled for 1985. An even more ambitious improvement, a fifth Ariane version having a liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen second stage and able to

launch 12,100 lb into transfer orbit, is also under

consideration for potential development by the

end of the decade.

1 Jjeffrey Lenorovitz, “Arianespace Completing Payload Plans, ”

AW&ST, JUly 6, 1981, pp. 19-20.

Table 18.—Capacity of Ariane and U.S. (Commercial)

Launch Vehicles (in lb)

Transfer

LEO orbit

Ariane 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,500 3,700a

Space shuttle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65,000 —- -

Space shuttle with Delta upper

stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 2,750

Space shuttle with internal upper

stage (under development) . . . . . . — 5,000

Thor-Delta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,490 2,420

Atlas-Centaur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,200 4,510

aThe~e flgure~ ~~~ume the Ariane IS launched from the Kourou launch ‘ite ‘ear

the Equater, while U.S. launches are from Kennedy Space Center In Florida.

The equatorial site gwes any geostatlonary payload an approximately 15 per.

cent performance improvement over KSC

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment
182 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Photo credit European Space Agency

First launch of Ariane /

Utilizing a dual launch system (SYLDA), each

Ariane is capable of carrying two separate payloads on each flight. Launches will be made from

the French-owned, ESA-funded Kourou spaceport

in French Guiana, South America. Located close

to the Equator, Kourou is well placed for launching stationary satellites (which orbit over the

Equator). With only one pad, it is currently capable of launching five to six flights per year, but

construction of a second pad has been approved

for operation in 1984 or 1985, allowing for 10 annual launches and providing redundancy.

When the Ariane was first proposed, there was

considerable skepticism as to whether it could

be competitive with the space shuttle and the

various U.S. expendable vehicles. There were

strong political reasons why several European

countries, especially France, desired an independent launch capability (see app. G); in addition, it appears that, as a result of several considerations, the Ariane will be able to compete

with the shuttle for many kinds of payloads

through the 1980’s. First of all, the shuttle itself

is 2 years behind schedule, and has not yet been

flown sufficiently to convince users of its reliability. Second, U.S. production of expendable was

slowed down and in some cases virtually halted,

in expectation that the shuttle would replace all

of them during the early 1980’s. As a result, the

cost of the Thor-Deltas and Atlas-Centaurs has

risen sharply over the last several years. Third,

the commercial demand by a number of likely

users, especially for communications satellites,

is projected to be much larger in the coming

decade than was previously thought. Even with

the shuttle operating at its initially projected pace,

there would be demand for additional launch

services.ld However, because of recent and projected budget cutbacks there will be fewer shuttle flights than previously scheduled, another circumstance forcing users to turn to alternate

launch vehicles. Fourth, Arianespace is offering

customers highly attractive terms, including

below-market financing through European banks,

and an extended period in whic:h to make repayment. For these reasons, the Ariane is likely to

“Jerry Grey, “Case for a 5th Shuttle and More Expendable Launch

Vehicles,” Astronautics and Aeronautics, March 1981.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 183

have a full manifest for the foreseeable future,

despite the superior capabilities of the shuttle.

Frederic D’ Al lest, chairman of Arianespace, projects continued use of Ariane for at least 20 years

despite competition from reusable spacecraft.15

The Ariane is now scheduled for a series of ESA

and INTELSAT launchings (under ESA auspices)

in 1982. As of january 1982, there were approximately $350 million worth of firm orders for

Arianespace, which will take over Ariane operations in 1983.16 There were also a large number

of reservations, which may be turned into firm

orders in the future. These include non-European

customers such as Colombia, Australia, and the

Arabian Satellite Corporation .17 Recently, Arianespace received its first firm order from an American company, General Telephone & Electronics,

to launch two domestic communications satellites

in 1984.18 Other orders have followed from Western Union and Southern Pacific Communications.

Ariane is being marketed in the United States

through an arrangement with Grumman Aerospace Inc. Arianespace policy is to sell its services

to “any customer whose payload is designed for

peaceful use;” this includes payloads from the

French military, NATO, and a British Defence

Communications Satellite.19 Control over the

political aspects of launch policy is retained, according to ESA’S agreement with Arianespace, by

the ESA Council.

The development and subsequent operation of

Ariane have been marked by a number of peculiarities. We have seen the dominant role that

France played in proposing and developing the

project. The prime contractor has been not a

private firm or industrial consortium, as for other

ESA programs, but CNES (Centre National

d’Etudes Spatiales or National Center for Space

Research), the French Government equivalent of

NASA. CNES in turn has let contracts primarily

to French firms, in particular Aerospatiale, the

I sj~ffrey Lenorovitz, “Arianespace Completing Payload Plans, ”

AW&ST, jU!y 6, 1981, p. 19.

“’’Why NASA’s Shuttle May be Left in the Dust, ” Business Week,

Jan. 18, 1982, p. 38. .

‘

7

’’ Arianespace Press Kit, ” at 34th International Airshow, Paris,

June 1981, pp. 10-13.

‘

a

’’ Europeans Win Orders to Launch 2 GTE Satellites,” Wa// Street

)ourna/, Nov. 25, 1981.

lgArianespace Press Kit, p. 13.

prime contractor, and SEP (Societe Europeenne

de Propulsion), which is building the propulsion

system. Overall, France has funded over 60 percent of the project, rising to 79 percent in 1981.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the

Ariane program is the arrangement for commercial operation. Instead of leaving it to ESA or

CNES, a quasi-private corporation called Arianespace has been established to produce, finance,

market, and launch Ariane vehicles. ESA and

CNES remain responsible for further development

of Ariane 2-5, and for operation of the Guiana

spaceport.

Arianespace is incorporated in France and

owned by firms from the states that funded

Ariane’s development, by CNES, and by European banks. French investors (including CNES

itself, which is the largest single shareholder with

34 percent), will own 60 percent; German ones

20 percent; and the remainder is split up into

smaller portions. Its initial capitalization was approximately $20 million. The first chairman of

Arianespace, Frederic D’Allest, is the former

CNES project director for Ariane, and the production and launching teams will be transferred

directly from CNES in 1982.20 Clearly, the new

firm will be dominated by the French, and it is

not surprising that France was the prime mover

behind Arianespace’s emergence. The idea of a

private firm was first suggested in 1979, with the

original proposal by CNES calling for 70 percent

French ownership. The basic rationale was that

only a commercially oriented operation could

manage Ariane so as to compete effectively with

the shuttle; trying to operate in a framework re- ,

quiring the unanimous consent of 11 sovereign

nations would be far too inefficient. 21 In subsequent negotiations with ESA and the potential

partners, the French percentage was reduced to

approximately 60 percent. The most difficult part

was getting the agreement of other ESA members

to turn over the technology and facilities, including future developments, to Arianespace;

Germany was particularly opposed. In 1980,

France withheld support for Spacelab funding for

2 months until Germany signed a political deczOArianeSPaCe Press Kit.

2)’’ Europeans Organize Commercial Ariane Satellite Launch Company,” AW&ST, July 9 1979, p. 18.
184 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Advertisement from AW&ST, May 1982
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 185

Iaration agreeing to the transfer to Arianespace.22

Arianespace is currently scheduled to assume responsibility in 1983 following a series of seven

ESA flights in 1982 and early 1983.

with

largest

Ariane,

is likely

Future Plans

the imminent completion of ESA’S two

applications programs, Spacelab and

the level of ESA activities in the 1980’s

to diminish, For the immediate future the

valuable industrial and technical teams organized

for these projects will remain occupied building

the second Spacelab and designing Ariane 2-5.

No comparable applications projects have yet

been approved to take their place (though there

has been consideration of a plan to develop

Spacelab into a free-flying platform as part of a

cooperative program with the United States). A

reduction in ESA activity may reflect the preference of several member nations for national or

bilateral programs, especially for commercial applications systems, where the cumbersome ESA

apparatus can impede timely decisions. It also

reflects a general worsening of the major European economies over the past several years,

especially those of West Germany and Great Britain. Under its recently elected Director General,

Eric Quistgaard, ESA has been preparing a 10-year

plan for the future which is likely to emphasize

basic science within an overall reduced budget.

The proposed plan estimates a reduction to an

annual budget of $532 million to $598 million,

compared with a 1980 level of $845.8 million .23

in establishing future programs, it will be

necessary for the major partners to compromise

as they did in the past. The British interest in LSat development remains high, while the Germans are more interested in exploiting Spacelab

by conducting scientific and materials processing missions, and expanding Spacelab’s capabilities. France would like to see aggressive development of the Ariane, including a possible automated processing station (Solaris) or a manned

reusable vehicle. 24 If a successful compromise is

ZZ’’New Commercial Organization to Take Arial~e Responsibility,” AW&ST, Apr. 7, 1980, p. 45.

ZIJeffrey Lenorovitz, “Europeans Making Plans to Meet Long-term

Goals?” AW&ST, Mar. 9, 1981, p. 88.

ZQpeter Marsh, “what Shou Id Europe Do in Space, ” New SCientist, Jan. 29, 1981, pp. 290-292.

not reached, many of these programs may become exclusively national efforts.

According to an address given by Dr. Massimo

Trella, Technical Director of ESA, at the Paris Air

Show in June of 1981, overall European space

activities will continue to grow in the 1980’s at

least as rapidly as in the 1970’s, but the division

of responsibility between ESA and national efforts

can be expected to change. ESA and the various

national programs will cooperate in defining and

coordinating a European program, while ESA

itself “will build up, more than before, its identity as an R&D organization devoted mainly to

large projects. More clearly we believe that commercially exploitable systems should be more the

responsibility of other initiators in Europe. ” Dr.

Trella specifically mentioned development of an

advanced remote-sensing system .25 However, on

the same occasion Michel Bignier, ESA’S Director of Space Transportation Systems, outlined a

future program which emphasized materials

processing, development of Ariane 3 and 4, and

building and maintaining large space stations.2b

Clearly ESA’S future mix of programs and overall

emphasis remain to be determined.

Cooperation/Competition With

the United States

Cooperation:

The bulk of European cooperative efforts with

NASA have been scientific. With one major exception (to be discussed below) these have

worked out well. A large number of cooperative

missions, in which NASA provided free launch

services in exchange for scientific experiments

and data, have been conducted with ESRO and

ESA.27 In general, scientific cooperation is arranged directly between ESA and NASA; only

Spacelab has required a formal intergovernmental

agreement. (Lower level agreements, called

ZSMaSSirnO Trella, “EsA Policy Directions—Collective VETSUS National Programmed,” paper delivered at International Aerospace

Symposium, Le Bourget, France, June 2-3, 1981.

2bMichel Bignier, “Expectations for the Future,” International

Aerospace Symposium, Le Bourget, France, June 2-3, 1981.

zzFor details, see United States C’ki/;an Space programs, 1958-78,

report by Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research

Service, for the House Committee on Science and Technology,

January 1981, pp. 839-841.
186 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

memoranda of understanding, are made with

U.S. Department of State (DOS) concurrence,

while letter agreements require no DOS action

whatever.)

In the field of applications the cooperative

record is somewhat more mixed. Serious strains

arose when, in 1972, the United States withdrew

a previous offer for the Europeans to produce a

“Space Tug” as part of the Space Transportation

System (see app. G). Further mistrust was aroused

when the United States backed out of the Aerosat

program in 1977. Aerosat was a combined ESA/

U.S./Canadian project to develop an experimental air traffic control satellite system. Beginning

in 1974, ESA and other partners invested considerable time and money only to have the Federal Aviation Administration (the U.S. participant)

withdraw because of its inability to fund further

development.

A third example is the recent deletion of the

U.S. spacecraft from the joint International Solar

Polar Mission (ISPM). Though ISPM is a scientific,

not an applications project, this withdrawal has

reinforced European doubts about general U.S.

reliability. ISPM was to have involved two spacecraft, one United States and one European, which

would simultaneously fly over the Sun’s “north”

and “south” poles. Without U.S. participation,

much of ESA’S projected $150 million investment

will have been wasted; nevertheless, the U.S.

spacecraft was eliminated in Reagan administration cuts implemented in February 1981. Though

ESA objected vigorously and member states protested at the ambassadorial level, additional funds

were not appropriated.28 These U.S. actions have

raised questions about whether ESA can afford

to trust future U.S. commitments, given the

vagaries of annual executive and congressional

budget decisions and the dependent position of

ESA in most projected cooperative projects.

Despite these problems, preliminary talks have

begun on possibie major areas of future cooperation, including joint processing experiments,

possible expansion of Spacelab into a modular

free-flying platform, and joint development of a

Zejeffrey Lenorovitz, “ESA Seeks Reinstatement of NASA SolarPolar Effort, ” AW&ST, Mar. 2, 1981, pp. 22-23; statement of Eric

Quistgaard, Senate Commerce Committee hearing, Mar. 25, 1981,

pp. 1-5.

manned space station based on Spacelab modules. 29

In general, the advantages of cooperation tend

to diminish when the project requires much

direct contact on a day-to-day level; it is

preferable for work to be done as independently as possible, to avoid time-consuming joint decisions. A second difficulty with cooperation in

space applications is that the prospect of eventual commercial competition between partners

can cause suspicion and reduce its attractiveness

to industrial participants.JO

Despite these difficulties, international cooperation was strongly stressed in Massimo Trella’s June

address, particularly for high-risk, high-expense

programs: “ESA intends to take the initiative in

this direction in order to explore with all interested partners how a wider and more ambitious international cooperation could be defined

and implemented in a strategic R&D program me

in space in the next decade.”31 It should be noted

that the United States is not specifically mentioned; ESA has so far not engaged in cooperative

programs with the Soviet Union, though some

tentative offers were once made without success.

Other European countries, notably France, have

done so and it cannot be ruled out that ESA, partly out of frustration with U.S. unpredictability,

may seek out the Soviets despite the difficulties

involved in collaborating across the iron Curtain,

Competition

Although the total European civilian space

budget is only a fraction of either U.S. or Soviet

expenditures (Europe spends only 0.04 percent

of its gross national product (GNP) on space to

the United States’ 0.2 percent), the areas in which

European technology is commercially competitive with the United States are significant and

growing. The competition from Ariane is perhaps

most striking, insofar as launch vehicles are the

true symbols of space capabilities and were for

so long a U.S.-Soviet monopoly. Perhaps equal29’’ Coming Next–A European Base in Space, ” New Scientist,

Nov. 51981, p. 356; see also Craig Covault, “NASA Mulls international Effort on Space Station, ” A W&S7; Mar. 1, 1982, p. 20.

30’’ U.S.-Europe Collaboration Variable, ” AW&ST, Sept. 1, 1980,

p. 275.

3

1 Trella, “ESA Policy Directions, ” p. 7.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space Ž 187

equally significant, however, are European successes in gaining contracts from INMARSAT and

Arabsat for communications satellites, and plans

to bid for future generations of INTELSAT satellites

as well. The French SPOT remote-sensing system

(discussed below), is scheduled to offer an alternative to U.S. Landsat data beginning in 1984.

Though it can be argued that some of the European success may be attributed, not to superior

technology, but to the desire of international

organizations and non-U. S. purchasers to decrease their dependence on the United States,

it is clear that European systems are in many cases

equivalent, if not superior, in capabilities and cost

effectiveness. However, U.S. objections that

European space technologies, in particular

Ariane, benefit from unfair financial practices,

such as government-subsidized below-market

financing for users, are likely to lead to strains

between the U.S. and European agencies,

European success, despite lower expenditures,

is related to several factors:

●

●

●

●

focus on relatively few high-opportunity

areas;

assimilation of U.S. technology in key areas,

avoiding unnecessary duplication;

sustained support by the major countries,

particularly France and West Germany; and

the ability to compromise when necessary,

founded on a strong perception that building

and maintaining an industrial base in space

technology is necessary for Europe’s longterm economic vitality.

Though decisions made through ESA may take

more compromise and negotiation than comparable U.S. program choices, they are less likely to be precipitously changed or canceled; the

government-to-government character of agreements gives them considerable weight. As long

as these conditions remain in effect, the United

States can expect a high level of competition from

ESA and its member states.

EUROPEAN NATIONAL PROGRAMS

In addition to their participation in ESA, which

for most countries constitutes the bulk of their

space spending, several European states have

substantial separate national or bilateral programs. The activities of France, West Germany,

Britain, and Italy are of particular interest.

France

The French space program is the largest and

most comprehensive in Europe and the third

largest in the world, after the United States and

Soviet Union. The French have major programs

in space science, applications, and launch vehicles. Activities are carried out in several ways: on

a national basis; bilaterally with West Germany,

other European countries, the Soviet Union, the

United States and several third world countries;

and multilaterally through ESA.

The French program has been characterized

by: 1) an ongoing commitment to developing a

comprehensive and independent space program

while avoiding dependence on the United States

or U. S. S. R., particularly for launch services; 2) extensive cooperation between government agencies and industry; and 3) the development of

military capabilities associated with France’s independent nuclear deterrent, including ongoing

relationships between civilian and military

programs.

The decision to cooperate with both the United

States and the Soviet Union is indicative of

France’s longstanding desire to mediate between

East and West and to avoid exclusive dependence

on either superpower. The idea of France as a

“third Force,” separate from the United States

and NATO (which France partially withdrew from

in 1959), was strongly promoted by DeGaulle,

who came to power in 1958. DeGaulle saw

France as the natural leader of a resurgent

Europe, and hence encouraged the formation of

(presumably French-dominated) European multilateral associations. Space was an arena in which

the French felt Europe needed to compete;
188 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

France was a major supporter of ESRO and ELDO

(particularly the latter) and, eventually, of ESA.

(For a description of France’s initial space activities, see app. G.) In 1964, out of a total civilian

space budget of $76.8 million, France spent $29.6

million on ELDO, and $1 million on ESRO. In

1975, the first year of ESA’S existence, $133 million out of a total of $254 million, or better than

50 percent, went to ESA,32 and in 1981 France

was ESA’S largest contributor with approximately $211.5 million, or 25.06 percent of ESA’S total

budget (largely for the Ariane).

However, the percentage of CNES’S budget going to ESA, as opposed to national and bilateral

programs, has dropped in recent years as ESA

spending has slowed and a number of bilateral

and national projects have begun to take shape.

The total 1981 budget is Ffr 2,617 million, 37.2

percent larger than in 1980; national programs,

however, are up 107 percent at 344.82 million,

and bilateral expenditures increased by four times

to Ffr 487.52 million.33 In 1982, CNES plans to

spend 82 percent more on national programs,

within an overall budget that will increase by 18

percent.

The CNES budget comes primarily from the

Ministry of industry and other civilian ministries;

in 1981 Ffr 192.8 million came from the Ministry

of Defense, while Ffr 596 million came from

CNES’S own resources.34

Current Applications Programs

COMMUNICATIONS

France is currently involved in three major satellite communications programs. The first is a

longstanding experimental bilateral effort with

West Germany called “Symphonic,” the two satellites of which, launched in 1974 and 1975, are

still partially active. Each Symphonic is a geosynchronous satellite with a capacity of 200 telephone or 2 TV plus 18 telephone channels. Symphonic 1 and 2 were built by a consortium

(CIFAS) made up of French and German companies and launched by the United States (after

JZWor/d-W;de Space Programs, p. 168.

33’’ Space Still a Growth Industry in France,” /nterav;a, May 1981,

p. 406.

34’’ Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981,” CNES, p. 3.

some objections regarding possible conflict with

INTELSAT–see app. G).35

France and West Germany are currently engaged in another joint project for direct television broadcasting, with each country operating

its own 3-channel satellite for domestic purposes.

The satellites, designated TDF-1 for France and

TV-Sat for Germany, are being developed by the

Munich-based Eurosatellite Corp., made up of

two French firms, Aerospatiale and ThomsonCSF, and two German ones, MesserschmittBlohm-Bolkow and AEG-Telefunken. The French

contribution for development (divided between

CNES and government communications agencies) is estimated at Ffr 980 million; the satellites

are scheduled for Ariane launch in late 1984 and

eariy 1985.36

The DBS joint effort was an outgrowth of a previously described ESA experimental communications project, H-Sat, which was initially backed

by France, West Germany, and Italy. However,

in 1978 France and Germany withdrew because

of concern over the slow pace of H-Sat development. In particular, the two countries wished to

compete in the foreseen European and global

market for DBS satellites and groundstations,

which they saw as expanding rapidly in the

1980’s. An operational system was felt to provide

greater economic opportunities than another experimental system. The agreement to develop

TDF-l /TV-Sat was signed in 1979.37 In addition

to allowing it to enter foreign markets, French national television estimated that direct broadcast

would enable it to provide 100 percent coverage

of the entire country for less than half the cost

of building additional terrestrial relays.

Another cooperative venture is the SARGOS

project, part of a joint U.S./Canadian program

called SARSAT designed to provide emergency

search and rescue for ships and planes. France

is supplying three SARGOS units to fly on the U.S.

NOAA E, F and G satellites. SARGOS is an outgrowth of another project, ARGOS, for collectJsworid.w;de Space Activities, p. 161.

3G’’Space Still a Growth Industry in France, ” p. 406.

qzsee “The French Space Effort, ” /rrteravia, june 1979, p. 51 O;

also Roberto Grandi and Giuseppe Richeri, “Western Europe: The

Development of DBS Systems,” Journa/ of Communication, v. 30,

spring 1980, p. 176.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space Ž 189

ing and processing meteorological data from

remote platforms, i.e., ballons, buoys, etc. The

total French contribution in 1981 to both programs was Ffr 24.7 million.38

France is also engaged in a major national communications satellite program called Telecom 1

which is being funded by the Direction Generale

de Telecommunications, with CNES project leadership, for a projected 1983 launch. Telecom 1

will provide domestic telephone and telex services within France as well as between France and

its overseas territories, including some military

traffic. A major use will be in providing internal

business communications similar to those

planned for the U.S. Satellite Business Systems

Corporation .39

REMOTE SENSING

Since 1978, CNES has been engaged in a national program (with some support from Belgium

and Sweden) to develop an operational land

remote-sensing system called SPOT (Systeme

Probatoire d’ Observation de la Terre). Through

the prime contractor, Matra, CNES is designing

a two part satellite consisting of a multipurpose

bus with power-supply and stationkeeping systems, and a sensor payload that can be altered

as the system develops. The SPOT satellites will

be placed in Sun-synchronous 832 km orbits designed to provide 26-day repetitive coverage of

the entire Earth. The initial design calls for two

types of coverage: 1 ) multispectral observation

with 20 m resolution, and 2) black and white observation with 10 m resolution. (This compares

with Landsat 3’s multispectral resolution of 80 m,

and Return-Beam-Vidicon of approximately 30

m). Both of SPOT’s instruments can be pointed

by remote control so as to cover any area of interest within a path 950 km wide; each individual

swath is 60 km in width. This pointing capability

makes it possible to provide semistereoscopic images, i.e., successive views of the same area from

different angles, which are particularly useful for

mapmaking and geological interpretation. It also

allows for viewing a particular region more often

than once every 26 days; such frequent coverage

is necessary for agricultural purposes.

3a’’ Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981 ,“ p. 23.

39’’ Space Still a Growth Industry in France, ” p. 406.

The SPOT images are produced by a linear array “push-broom” scanner that produces a continuous picture 60 km wide on the ground. The

images are transmitted digitally from the satellite

to ground receivers or they can be stored on tape

recorders for delayed transmission. The central

receiving and control station is located at

Toulouse in southern France. Other countries will

be able to build their own stations, subject to

agreements directly with CNES; or, data and processed data products will be purchasable through

Spotimage, a joint government-industry organization being set up to market SPOT services. In

many respects Spotimage will be similar to the

previously described Arianespace; CNES will hold

34 percent of the company’s shares, with the remainder split between various French firms and

government agencies.40 SPOT transmissions are

designed to be compatible with the U.S. Landsat and Landsat-D receiving stations, so that countries that already possess receivers for Landsat will

be able to receive SPOT, with some adaptation,

Though each SPOT satellite has a design life

of only 2 years, the system is planned to operate

for at least 10 years, so that users can count on

continuity of data for long-term remote-sensing

programs. After the initial launch, scheduled for

April 1984, additional satellites will be orbited to

ensure continuous service. These satellites will

be financed partly by Spotimage, and partly by

CNES through its revenues from foreign receiving stations.41

The basic reasons for France’s decision to build

its own remote-sensing system are similar to those

for its other space applications projects. These

include: 1 ) to encourage national high-technology enterprises; 2) to gain independence from

the U.S. civil remote-sensing system, Landsat, and

to demonstrate French equivalence to U.S. and

Soviet capabilities; 3) to reap the economic and

political benefits of providing global coverage to

other countries; and 4) to develop an indigenous

remote-sensing capability for military purposes.

@“FrenCh Marl@lng services of Spot Satellite Network, ” AWLLST,

Jan. 11, 1982, p. 99,

41see ~~SpoT-Satel[ite.Ba~ Remote Sensing System, ” CNES brochure, 1980; jean-Pierre Fouquet, “The SPOT Satellite, ” paper presented at 19th Goddard Symposium, Washington, D. C., Mar. 26,

1981.
190 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

In line with this last motivation, a military reconnaissance version of SPOT, known as SAMRO,

is already being evaluated. SAMRO would use

the SPOT bus, but with higher resolution optics

and secure communications links. Such a satellite

would give France the ability to monitor military

activities around the world on a continuous

basis. 42

The success of SPOT in gaining a large share

of the global market will depend on several factors. First, how advantageous will users view

SPOT’s 10 to 20 m resolution, as opposed to

Landsat-D’s 80 m (MSS) and 30 m (TM)? Some

users, particularly agricultural ones, will find the

increased resolution helpful, while others may

find it unnecessarily precise. One of the often

mentioned reasons for SPOT’s high resolution is

to make it attractive to European agricultural

observors, since European farms are typically

smaller than U.S. or Soviet ones.43 However,

some countries may be concerned that SPOT’s

high resolution will provide foreign users with too

much information. Political agreements on restricting dissemination of SPOT data may be required to avoid opposition from a number of

states, and Spotimage has announced that it will

abide by agreed-on international regulations regarding data dissemination.

The second and probably most important question is the status of competition from other

remote-sensing systems, particularly the U.S.

Landsat D and proposed D’ satellites, which are

planned to be operating at approximately the

same time (see ch. 3).

SPOT remains unproven both technically and

institutionally. However, the commitment to a

long-term operational status through a private

corporation, Spotimage, will help greatly in giving SPOT the credibility it needs to attract customers. In particular, worries about the continuity

of the system (which are evident among Landsat

users on account of Landsat’s currently unresolved budgetary and institutional problems)

should be much less than with Landsat. Spotimage plans to provide an across-the-board range

42’’ France Studies Reconnaissance Version of SPOT Spacecraft,”

AW&ST, Aug. 10, 1981.

qJSee “The French Space Effort, ” /nteravia, June 1979, P. 508.

of services, including the provision of baseline

data for further processing; processed data products for specialized purposes; and aid, advice,

and equipment for potential customers. As with

Landsat, users can arrange directly with CNES to

receive, archive, and distribute SPOT data

through national or regional receiving stations.

A smoothly functioning corporate entity, especially one heavily backed by the French Government, would provide strong competition to any

future U.S. system.

A key question will be the prices charged by

both SPOT and Landsat D-D’. Landsat prices are

currently government subsidized and in no way

reflect the true costs of developing, constructing,

and operating either the ground or space segments. If Landsat or any equivalent is run by a

private firm, the prices for clata would have to

rise to reflect these costs. Spotimage prices,

though not yet established, will also be substantially higher than those paid by today’s users;

however, it is not likely that either the U.S. or

French governments, having invested heavily to

build a prestigious remote-sensing system, would

allow the other to substantially undercut its prices

for equivalent service. To maintain a market share

of commercial buyers, as well as the political

gains of supplying data to third world and other

countries, each operator will need to keep prices

competitive with the other. Whether these prices

will be heavily subsidized for political and publicservice reasons, as at present, or come closer to

reflecting the true costs of land remote sensing

remains to be seen; all such decisions will depend

at least as much on political as economic factors,

including possible competition from future Soviet

and Japanese systems.

MATERIALS PROCESSING

French MPS activities, at this time, are modest

in scope, with a budget of approximately $1 million to $2 million per year. Bilateral materials

processing experimentation agreements are in effect with Germany and the U.S.S.R. A FrancoSoviet crystal growth and solidification experiment was carried out aboard the Soviet manned

laboratory, Salyut-6, and future cooperative MPS

research is anticipated. In addition, French ex-
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space • 191

periments on crystal growth and the dynamics

of metal alloy solidification are planned for

Spacelab 1 and 3.

In general, the French effort is smaller and more

research directed than German activities. CNES

has funded a major study, however, on an ambitious program called “Solaris,” an unmanned

orbital space station which would be able to conduct MPS experiments and could be made available during the 1990’s. Solaris would be orbited

by an Ariane-4 launcher, operating for a lifetime

of up to 15 years. Among its many purposes, the

Solaris could serve as an automated orbital materials processing station, handling up to 2 tons

of materials in its furnaces. Feedstock would be

transported to the station by Ariane-launched unmanned spacecraft. Modules containing processed materials would be returned to Earth from

Solaris via unpowered reentry vehicles. The project is still in the conceptual stage and no cost

figures are currently available. It is conceivable

that Solaris might be accepted as a major project for ESA during the 1980’s, thereby spreading

the costs and stimulating MPS research activities

in a number of member countries not presently

pursuing such investigation. Solaris not only

represents a major potential French initiative

utilizing the Ariane launcher, but is a direct

challenge to the U. S./ESA and Soviet manned laboratories (Spacelab and Salyut, respectively)

which currently plan materials-processing activities. CNES plans to study manned facilities

before deciding on a space-station concept.

LAUNCHERS

The Ariane and its future development have

been discussed previously. Among additional

possibilities mention should be made of the

Hermes manned reusable shuttle, a proposed

22,000-lb, 5-man vehicle that might be launched

by the advanced Ariane V. Though only in a very

preliminary design stage, the Hermes plan shows

that the French have by no means resigned themselves to a completely unmanned role in future

space activities .44

44’’The French Space Effort,” /nteravia, June 1979, pp. 508-509;

“Solaris: France Proposes Large Unmanned Space-Processing Platform,” /nteravia, May 1981, p. 822.

FOREIGN COOPERATION/COMPETITION

Aside from ESA, France has major bilateral cooperative programs with West Germany, the

Soviet Union, and the United States; it is the only

country besides India to deal extensively with

both the major space powers. In 1981, France

budgeted Ffr 379.8 million for German projects,

almost all for joint TDF-1 /TV-Sat development.

Thirty-seven million francs were spent with the

United States, largely for the ARGOS/

SARGOS project described above, and for upcoming experiments on Spacelab.

Of the 56 million francs earmarked for projects

with the Soviet Union, none are for applications

projects per se.45 However, the fact and extent

of cooperative projects are politically significant

in themselves. Furthermore, in light of the historical problems with U.S. commitments, it is

clear that the French see access to Soviet launchers and facilities as a potential hedge against U.S.

delays and vacillation. The most visible of upcoming France-Soviet ventures will be the scheduled

1982 visit of a French astronaut to the Soviet’s

Salyut 7 (or a reactivated Salyut 6) space station.

Two French candidates have been training in the

Soviet Union since September 1980.% The Soviets

have made a practice of launching non-Soviets

for brief orbital stays; to date, however, all such

visitors have been from “fraternal Socialist countries,” and the flight of an astronaut from a major

Western power can be expected to provide the

Soviets with a great deal of favorable publicity.

The French national space program, working

closely with French industry, will be a major

source of commercial competition for the United

States in the 1980’s. French competitiveness is

result of several factors:

technically advanced programs in commercial areas such as DBS, land remote sensing,

and launch vehicles;

establishment of institutions (Arianespace,

Spotimage) to market systems aggressively

on a global basis;

4s’’Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981 ,“ CNES, p. 23.

46~~French Cosmonauts Training for Mission With sOVklS,”

AW&ST, Dec. 21, 1981, pp. 55-56)
192 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

close government-industry collaboration as

an accepted feature of French commercial

practice;

long-standing government commitment to

building space capabilities on a par with the

United States and Soviet Union; and

support received through agreements with

ESA and bilateral partners.

West Germany

The bulk of West Germany’s space efforts are

conducted in association with ESA or bilaterally

with other countries. Germany is one of ESA’S

major supporters, supplying almost one-fourth of

its annual budget. The Ministry for Research and

Technology (BMFT) coordinates and funds most

German R&D efforts; projects are managed by

the German Research and Test Establishment for

Aeronautics and Space Flight (DFVLR), which

manages Government engineering and test

centers, and by the German Research Association (DFG), a self-governing organization that

allocates funds from various public and private

sources to universities and scientific societies.45

Space-related expenditures in fiscal 1981

amounted to $371 million, of which $82 million

went to DFVLR. Total funding from 1978 to 1982

is projected to be $1.7 billion .48

Germany’s major aerospace firms also play a

key role in initiating and funding research projects; these include Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm

(MBB) and VFW-Fokker, which recently merged,

and several large electronics firms such as

Siemens and AEG-Telefunken.

Unlike France, Germany has never aimed at

achieving an across-the-board set of space

capabilities, but rather at encouraging an indigenous aerospace industry, promoting potentially valuable scientific and industrial research,

and supporting European efforts in various applications areas. Compared with France there has

been greater emphasis on industrial and university initiatives and participation, with Government

47’’ Review of National and Co-operative International Space Activities for the Calendar Year 1980,” UNCOPUOS, A/AC.105/286/

Add. 1, Feb. 19, 1981, pp. 34-35.

4“Foreign Materials Processing Expenditures,” internal NASA staff

paper, May 1, 1981, p. 1.

coordination through the Research Ministry. Despite—or perhaps on account of—the extensive

German experience acquired during World War

II, there have been no attempts to produce a German launcher, although Germany has been a

major contributor to Ariane. Instead, Germany

has launched numerous orbital and suborbital

payloads on U. S., French, Swedish, and British

rockets. The first German scientific satellite, called

Azur, was launched by the United States in November 1969.

Applications Programs

Almost all of Germany’s efforts in communications and remote sensing are being conducted

through ESA or bilateral projects with France,

described previously. In 1981, West Germany will

provide the largest single share of ESA’S expenditures for Meteosat, OTS, ECS, and Spacelab.Ag

In addition to communications, Germany’s

strongest emphasis has been placed on materials

science and processing. Since the German firm

ERNO (a subsidiary of VFW-Fokker) is the prime

contractor for Spacelab, and Germany is the

major financial contributor (64.78 percent in

1981 ), German interest in Spacelab exploitation

has been high. In addition, chemicals and materials processing have traditionally been areas of

German technical and industrial leadership. The

Ministry of Science and Technology provided approximately $57 million for MPS work from 1978

to 1980 and is authorized to spend $50 million

more between 1982 to 1985. Additional funds are

available from non-Federal sources. so

The German MPS program is intended to meet

the as yet largely undefined needs of the user

community. The ultimate goal of Government

support is substantial involvement of German industry in such areas as chemistry, process technology, metals, composite materials, and

crystals .51

Early West German experiments were carried

on the 1975 Apollo/Soyuz manned mission. A

49Europe’s Place in Space, ESA, January 1981, P. 9.

‘“’’ Foreign Materials Expenditures, ” p. 2.

SICommercja/jzation of Materials Processing and Manufacturing

in Space, position paper prepared for OTA by TRW, Inc., Apr. 14,

1981, p. 25.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 193

variety of methods are now being followed, using

suborbital sounding rockets, small self-contained

payload packages (so-called “Getaway Specials”)

attached to the space shuttle, and full-scale

Spacelab missions. Future flight opportunities

using “free-flying” automatic experimental units

for longer periods of time than can be attained

with the present shuttle/spacelab system are also

being examined. Primary elements of the German MPS Program are:52

● TEXUS (technological experiments under

microgravity): Using British-built Skylark

sounding rockets, certain experiments are

being flight tested in advance of future

Spacelab missions. Five TEXUS flights have

been accomplished since 1977, and two

launches per year are planned starting in

1981. TEXUS flight results to date indicate

this approach is scientifically and technologically useful. West German experiments

have also flown on U. S. SPAR sounding

rockets.

● MAUS (materials science autonomous experiments under zero-G conditions) program: Instruments partially based on TEXUS

program findings are to be carried in 25 German-purchased getaway special canisters.

These autonomous packages provide experiments with much longer microgravity

duration than attainable with sounding

rockets.

● Spacelab: Germany is supporting major experiments on Spacelab, including a materials

processing laboratory to be flown on SpaceIab 1 in mid-1983. Materials science experiments will be conducted in the materials

science double rack, a largely German contribution to the first Spacelab mission. The

facilities include the following: 1) hightemperature thermostat, 2) mirror heating

facility, 3) isothermal heating facility,

4) capillarity measurement equipment,

5) cryostat, 6) fluid physics module, 7) gradient heating facility, 8) UHV chamber, and

9) common support equipment.

‘*See G. Greger, “Science and Technology of the German MPS

Missions, ” paper presented at 1980 AAS Annual meeting, Boston,

Mass., Oct. 20-23, 1980.

A wholly German Spacelab mission, the

D-1, is now scheduled for September 1984.

The D-1 will carry the Biorack for investigations of cell and molecular biology, and an

advanced fluid physics module. These will

perform a mixture of open experiments, for

which data will be freely disseminated, plus

a number of closed experiments with potential commercial benefit. For these latter, Germany has proposed to pay a pro rata share

of the normal Spacelab users’ fee; the exact

financial arrangements have not been concluded. Prime objectives for the mission are

experiments in the fields of metals, monocrystals and materials for electronic applications, boundary layer and transport phenomena problems, and physical chemistry and

processing.

The German program stresses involvement

with the industrial sector in addition to purely

scientific exploration. The Ministry of Science and

Technology is working closely with both MAN,

Inc., and Volkswagen. The work at MAN involves

“skin technology”; this is a process by which

complex refractory metal alloys used for turbine

blades can be melted and resolidified in space

with an oxide skin, which is a plasma sprayed

on the surface of the container. New immiscible

metal alloys for potential use as bearing materials

are of interest to Volkswagen. sq

Although the German Government has not

supported any launcher-related programs, aside

from Ariane, mention should be made of a private

German firm called OTRAG (Orbital Transportund-Raketen Aktiengesellschaft), which has spent

$65 miliion to $70 million since 1974 trying to

develop a mass-produced expendable rocket for

inexpensive satellite launches. To date, OTRAG

has claimed four successful test flights and until

recently planned to launch its first orbital flight

in 1982.54 OTRAG hopes to attract private firms

and third world countries by providing relatively simple services at prices that Ariane and, the

space shuttle cannot match. The rockets would

use off-the-shelf components and an extremely

cheap fuel made of diesel oil and nitric acid.

S3TRW paper, op. cit, pp. 25-26.

54’’ German Company Testing Launch Vehicle in Libya,” AlW&ST,

Mar. 23, 1981, p. 25.
194 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The political controversy surrounding OTRAG

has been intense, largely as a result of the location of its test facilities. Until 1979, OTRAG

operated out of a 39,000 mi2 area in Zaire, where

it had agreed to pay the Mobutu government $50

million per year or 10 percent of gross revenues,

whichever was greater, once commercial operations commenced.55 However there were numerous protests, not only from Zaire’s neighbors,

who feared the rockets might have military uses,

but also from the Soviet Union, which was intensely concerned at any evidence of German

development of an independent launch capability. The German Government was embarrassed

and tried various means to put OTRAG out of

business, including passage in 1978 of the socalled “Lex OTRAG” prohibiting the export of

OTRAG rockets or components. Eventually international pressure forced Zaire to expel

OTRAG; however, the company soon relocated

its test facilities in Libya, partly, according to

OTRAG president Frank Wukasch, because

Libya’s ruler Muammar Qaddafi “cannot be

blackmailed” into expelling the company. 56

OTRAG’S presence in Libya reinforced fears that

its missiles might be used for military purposes,

perhaps against Israel. Recently, it was reported

that OTRAG had withdrawn from Libya and

would seek new facilities, perhaps in India or

South America. 57

COOPERATION/COMPETITION WITH THE

UNITED STATES

The German attitude towards cooperative ventures with the United States has generally been

more positive than the French, as shown by German willingness to take the lead in building

Spacelab. A large number of cooperative space

science projects are also underway. Cooperation

with the Soviet Union has been negligible for

political reasons.

Though there are few major areas where German projects will directly compete with the

United States, German aerospace and electronics

firms have been strong competitors for compo55A w&sT, Sept. 12, 1977, p. 42.

5bBradley Graham, “Rocket Firm’s Third World Ties Test Bonn’s

Patience,” Washington Post, Aug. 14, 1981, p. 17.

57’’Otrag Ends Libyan Launch Work,” A W&ST, December 1981.

nent and subsystem contracts on INTELSAT and

other communications satellites. The Research

Ministry is particularly interested in expanding

German capabilities in this area.58 The experience

gained in ESA communications projects and particularly through joint TV-Sat development with

France will give German industries the ability to

compete for complete systems in the emerging

DBS market.

Great Britain

During the 1970’s British civilian space spending has been done almost exclusively as part of

ESA projects. (For a brief description of early

British space activities, see app. G). Even within

ESA, Great Britain has chosen to concentrate on

communications and general science, and has

contributed relatively little to ESA’S two largest

projects, Spacelab and Ariane. British choosiness

has been a function in part of budget restrictions

caused by generally poor economic performance

compared with its continental partners, and to

a fundamental historical uncertainty as to whether to opt for close ties with the United States, with

Europe, or with the Commonwealth, Largely because of its traditionally close relationship with

the United States, Britain has not favored development of a European launcher, whether the

Europa or Ariane, considering it uncompetitive

and unnecessary. With a strong university research base and relatively weak industries, Britain has preferred to concentrate on basic science

and on a few areas, especially communications,

in which British firms such as Marconi and British

Aerospace could hope to become internationally competitive. In general, the above constraints

have made the formulation and implementation

of any coherent space policy very difficult. There

is little public or political consensus as to Britain’s

proper role in space activities, and the major

political parties often fail to follow through on initiatives begun by their predecessors. A September 1980 memorandum by the British Royal

Society, which proposed establishing a National

Council for Space, pointed out that: “The present U.K. efforts in space science and technology

are fragmented and there is a serious lack of

Se’’West German Space Program, ” /nteravia, April 1980, p. 312.
Ch. 7—lnternational Efforts in Space ● 195

cohesion to such an extent that there appears to

be no overall domestic space policy.”59

Organization and Funding

Government responsibility for space has been

split between several organizations. The Department of Trade and industry has funded civilian

programs, while the Space Research Council, part

of the Department of Education and Science, has

supported scientific projects, including cooperative ventures with ESRO and NASA. The Post

Office (now British Telecom) has operated communications networks including INTELSAT receiving stations.

In 1972, the total budget was $55.1 million, of

which $15.5 million went to ELDO and ESRO.

By 1976, the budget had risen to $80,2 million,

all of which was spent within ESA.60 In 1981,

Great Britain was ESA’S third-largest contributor

with 14.88 percent of the total budget, amounting to $125.6 million, and was the majority contributor to the Marecs ocean communication satellite program. 61 Present plans call for a substantial increase in space spending, with emphasis on

nationally funded communications satellites. 62

Current Applications Programs

The area in which the British have been most

active over the past several years is communications satellites. Within ESA, British Aerospace

(BAe) has been the consortium leader for the

OTS, ECS, and Marecs systems, and Britain was

the prime mover behind ESA’S decision to develop the experimental L-Sat multipurpose communications platform. In addition, there has been

considerable activity by British agencies and

private firms, spurred by the Thatcher government’s recent decision to open up private competition in telecommunications by removing

British Telecom’s monopoly over network operations. 63 I n June 1981, BAe announced formasqsP~ce~l;g~~, BritiSh ! nterplanetary Society, Feb. 2, 1981 t P. 33;

see also Johnny Hawkes (former Director of space Dept. Of industry), “Britain in Space: Time to Consolidate, ” New Scientist,

Jan. 14, 1982.

b~world-wide space Activities, P. 222.

61E”~ope’splacein space, ESA, Paris, January 1981 t P 9.

62peter Marsh, “Britain Plans Big Boost for Space Budget, ” New

Scientist, Feb. 23, 1982.

63 Peter Marsh,“communicationsin the1980’s—Satellites or Fibre

Optics?” New Scientist, July 23, 1981.

tion of a company called Satellite Broadcasting

Co., Ltd., to provide common carrier DBS services. Two satellites plus a ground spare would be

required at an estimated cost of L100 million;

services would be leased to British broadcasters

such as the BBC and Granada television.

Another possible venture would involve BAe

and IBM in a business communications service,

similar to the newly created U.S. Satellite Business

Systems, of which IBM is a major partner. It is

not clear whether such a plan could succeed

within Britain alone, and expansion into the European market, with the attendant difficulties of

operating across national boundaries, may be

envision ed. 64

In a somewhat different field, BAe and Marconi

have joined forces, after pressure from the

Defense Ministry, to build the British Ministry of

Defence’s proposed communications satellite,

Skynet IV/Satcom. Although both BAe and Marconi had initially sought out U.S. industrial

cooperation, an all-British program was deemed

preferable. Launch is estimated to be in early

1985. 65 British Telecom (formerly the Post Office)

is planning its own Europeanwide business satellite system which will make use of nine transponders; two each placed on all four ECSs, and

one leased from France’s Telecom 1. The eight

ECS transponders will cost approximately $150

million. Users will purchase ground stations that

will provide access to any point in Europe; the

system will be operated through an agreement

with Interim Eutelsat.66

it is clear that British industry is eager to move

into the potentially lucrative areas of DBS and

satellite business communications, if necessary

in conjunction with foreign partners who can provide financial and/or marketing support. A major

question remains as to whether European operations will be possible given prospective competition from Eurosatellite (the manufacturer of

TDF-l /TV-Sat) backed by national PTTs. In addition there are numerous regulatory pitfalls, as well

b4’’BAe Aiming To Become Major Satellite Operator?” /ntera via,

August 1981, pp. 754-755.

bS’!Sky net IV-NOVV an AJ1-British Military Satcom s)@f21Tl,” /flteravia, September 1981, p. 859.

bK’’Satellite Business Communication Comes to Britai n,” F/ight

/nternationa/, Feb. 7, 1981, p. 342.
196 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

as possible challenges from INTELSAT, if the new

services threaten to take business away from the

Intelsat system.67 It is still early enough in the

evolution of satellite systems for any number of

developments to occur, including joint ventures

between British and European companies. BAe

recently formed a partnership with the French

firm Matra, called Satcom International, to bid

on satellite hardware, and similar agreements

may be made for services.

Italy

Italy has been a consistent supporter of European space activities and in 1981 contributed

9.94 percent of ESA’S budget, or around $82.9

million. Italy has not taken the lead in any major

applications projects, but has chosen to support

a variety of programs that would provide Italy’s

aerospace and electronics industries with contracts for advanced technologies. Difficulties in

meeting its financial obligations to the Spacelab

program in the face of large cost overruns led Italy

to reduce its contribution from 18 percent of

Spacelab funding in 1979 to 1 percent in 1981.

The recent decision to use Italy’s Sirio 2 communications satellite for ESA communications has

given Italy the lead role in that project.

Aside from its European multilateral contributions, Italy has maintained a small national program centered around its unique off-shore launch

platform, located on the Equator off the shore of

Kenya in the Indian Ocean. The San Marcos platform has been the site of numerous small satellite

and sounding rocket launches, mostly by U.S.

rockets but including British and European ones

as well, which have taken advantage of its equatorial position for experimental flights. The first

Italian satellite, San Marcos 1, was launched by

a U.S. Scout in 1964; subsequent San Marcos

series satellites were launched from the San Mar

cos platform, also by Scout.

In 1977, Italy orbited an experimental geostationary communications satellite, Sirio 1, on a

U.S. Thor-Delta. The ground spare for that project, Sirio 2, will be launched in April 1982 by ESA

to disseminate meteorological data; the Italian

‘7’’Communications in the 1980’ s,” New Scientist, July 23, 1981.

Compagnia Nazionale Satelliti di Telecomunicazioni is prime contractor on the project.

Unlike all other European states except Portugal, Italy’s participation in INTELSAT is done

through a private firm, Telespazio, rather than a

national PTT. Since 1976, Telespazio has also operated a Landsat receiving station at Fucino.

The Italian space program has suffered from

lack of central coordination and public support,

as well as the strains of Italy’s turbulent economic

and political situation. Space activities have been

coordinated and funded by the National Research Council (CNR), which began to fund

space-related activities in 1960. Other ministries

and agencies, such as the Post Office and the

Defense Ministry, also play a role. In 1972, Italy

spent $19.4 million on space, $9.8 million of

which went to ELDO and ESRO; in 1976 this had

risen to $60.5 million, almost all in ESA.68 Recently, the government approved a plan to double

Italy’s space expenditures over the next 2 years;

most of the increase will go to fund national programs. These may include a national communications satellite (Italsat) and a television DBS system,

as well as several cooperative ventures with

NASA: IRIS, a small booster for the shuttle

payload bay; and the so-called “tethered

satellite,” which is designed to be attached to the

shuttle in orbit by a long umbilical cord.69 Italy

has been a strong supporter of ESA’S experimental

L-Sat communications platform, and will use one

of the first satellite’s 2 TV-channels for direct

television broadcasting.

Recently the Italian Defense Ministry has proposed a domestic military communications system, SICRAL, for secure voice and data transmission and for use in civil emergencies. The satellite

hardware will be designed and manufactured by

Italian firms for eventual launch on either the

shuttle or Ariane.70

Other European Programs

The space efforts of other countries in Europe

have taken place almost entirely within the EuroG8Wor/d. Wide Space Activities, p. 176.

Ggpeter Marsh, “Italy Joins the New European Space Race, ” New

Scientist, Apr. 1, 1982.

70Andrea Lorenzoni, “SICRAL: A Proposed Italian Defence Satellite System,” /nteravia, August 1981, p, 793.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 197

pean agencies, ESRO, ElDO, and now ESA. A few

non-ESA projects, however, deserve mention,

particularly the proposed Nordsat regional communications system to provide television and

radio broadcasting between Sweden, Norway,

Denmark, and Finland. Under discussion since

1972, the system is designed to promote Scandinavian cultural unity–the details, which have

been understandably difficult to arrange considering the many countries involved, are not as yet

determined. 71 In connection with this proposal,

Sweden is developing a satellite, known as Viking, for 1984 Ariane launch; it will investigate

magnetospheric conditions preparatory to a possible communications satellite program. SaabScania is building the payload, while Boeing provides the satellite bus; Viking will provide Sweden

with crucial experience in satellite communications operation, and will also further the Swedish

goal of encouraging an indigenous commercial

space systems industry. Studies have also been

done for a second Swedish satellite, Tele-X, for

71see R, Grandj, and G. Richeri, “Western Europe: The Development of DBS Systems, ” )ourna/ of Communication, spring 1980,

pp. 175-176.

a variety of experimental communications activities .72

Another potentially interesting development is

Compagnie Luxembourgeosie de Telediffusion’s

(CLT) plan to provide multinational direct television programing via satellite by 1985. The company’s potential difficulties illustrate the problems

faced when operating across European boundaries. CLT is Europe’s largest commercial (i. e.,

nongovernment) broadcaster, covering large portions of France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark,

and the Netherlands. Since it is in direct competition with national broadcasters, foreign

governments, particularly Germany, have opposed ClT’s expansion plans, in part by trying

to discourage investment in CLT stock. CLT is proposing a three-channel $250-million satellite that

could broadcast simultaneously in French, German, and Dutch, reaching a potential 100 million

viewers. Launch reservations have already been

made on both Ariane and the Shuttle.73

72’’ Sweden Moves Ahead on Research Satellite,” A W&ST, Sept.

1, 1980, p. 49.

73’’The No. 1 Broadcaster Fights Back From Space, ” Business

Week, May 4, 1981, pp. 66-67.

Organization and Policy

Japanese interest in space science and technology began in the mid-l 950’s, when mukilateral planning was underway for the International

Geophysical Year (1957). Alone among the major

space-capable countries, Japan’s space efforts

were not initially prompted by military concerns.

The postwar Japanese constitution specifically

prohibited the buildup of large military forces,

and public opinion has been consistently opposed to any signs of militarism and to large expenditures for military purposes. Because of the

worldwide association of space programs with

military capabilities, Japan carefully placed its first

space establishment at the University of Tokyo,

the country’s foremost educational institution.

The Institute of Space and Aeronautical Sciences

(ISAS) was founded in 1954, and (though it recently became an independent institute) is still

responsible today for Japan’s scientific programs.

Beginning in the late ]9s0’s and through the

1960’s ISAS developed the Kappa and Lambda

series of solid-fuel sounding rockets, which

formed the basis for Japanese scientific and applications experiments. The difficulties of rocket

development were enhanced by inadequate

guidance and stabilization technology, which was

in turn due partly to a self-imposed reluctance

to fund technologies that might give the rockets

enough accuracy to be perceived as having military capability.TA ISAS went on to develop orbital

rockets; the first successful 24-kg test satellite was

launched by an advanced Lambda, after several

years of failure, in February 1970. The Mu-class

orbital launcher achieved its first success in 1971

and has been operated by ISAS since then from

its Kagosh ima test range.

TAworjd.wide Space Activ/t/es, p. 185.
198 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

In 1960, the National Space Activities Commission (NSAC, later SAC) was established in the

Prime Minister’s office to give advice on Japan’s

overall space program. It operates today as a

major source of high-level planning, along with

the Science and Technology Agency (STA). In

1964, the STA created the National Space Development Center to conduct rocket tests; this

was due in part to dissatisfaction with ISAS’S purely scientific orientation. In 1969, this became the

National Space Development Agency (NASDA),

which is today the principal agency for civilian

applications and test programs, launcher development, and tracking facilities.75 NASDA operates

the Tsukuba Space Center near Tokyo, Japan’s

main satellite test facility, as well as the

Tanegashima launch site, located on an island in

the south of Japan.

Other space-related activities are conducted by

the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications in

satellite communications, and the Transport Ministry, which operates the weather service, in meteorological satellites. A private firm, Kokusai

Denshin Denwa Ltd., is responsible for relations

with INTELSAT. NASDA cooperates with other

ministries and agencies in the research and design

of applications programs, as well as conducting

launches (see fig. 12).

The Japanese budget for space research was

very small, though growing, through the 1960’s.76

With the establishment of NASDA annual funding

has increased rapidly, from a total of $23.5 million

in 1968 to almost $477 million in 1981. Of this

the bulk, almost 80 percent, goes to NASDA, with

the remainder split between ISAS and other government programs (see fig. 1 3).

The budget is drawn up by the SAC on a yearly basis. In addition, the SAC prepares long-range

comprehensive plans. The latest 15-year proposal, drawn up in 1978, calls for a total 15-year

expenditure of$14 billion to fund an across-theboard program in space science, applications,

and launch-vehicle development. ” The SAC

stressed that “Japan should develop the necessary

— — technical capabilities to carry out her comprehen- — Tssee world-wide space Programs, p. 186; also NASDA 80-81,

National Space Development Agency of Japan, pp. 3-4.

Tbsee Wor/d-W;de space Activities, p. 204.

77’’Japanese Commission Proposes Ambitious 15-Year Space

Plan,” AW&ST, Mar. 27, 1978, p. 23.

sive space program, although it is not necessary

to produce everything domestically."78 Active international cooperation and peaceful development were emphasized as guiding principles,

Current and Projected

Applications Programs 79

Communications

In December 1977, the Japanese orbited an experimental geostationary communications satellite, the CS-Sakura, aboard a U.S. Delta rocket.

The Sakura has been used by the Radio Research

Labs of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications for experiments in 30/20 GHz propagation

(the first country in the world to do so), and to

gain experience in the control and operation of

communications satellites. An operational system

consisting of two satellites, the CS-2a and CS-2b,

is planned for launch in early and mid-l983, respectively (CS-2b will be an orbital spare); the

recently developed N-11 launch vehicle will be

used. The satellites themselves were built by a

group led by Mitsubishi Electric and Ford Aerospace.

80 The operational system will provide

emergency communications as well as links with

remote islands; the signals will be receivable by

small transportable Earth stations in either K or

C band, and will represent the first operational

use of 30/20 GHz technology, The satellites will

be managed by the Telecommunications Satellite

Corp. of Japan, established in 1979.

A parallel program in direct television broadcasting is also being conductecl, with the BSE-Yuri

satellite launched in April 1978 by a U.S. Delta

for geostationary experiments in audiovisual

transmission. The operational system, with two

satellites, BS-2a and BS-2b, is planned for N-11

launch in early 1984 and mid-1985. The Ministry

of Posts and Telecommunications has funded the

system, which will enable it to transmit images

to mountainous and outlying areas. al

zsMaSaO yoshiki, Acting Chairman, SAC, “Japan’s Space program, ” paper delivered at International Aerospace Symposium,

Paris, France, June 2-3, 1981, pp. 1-2.

~lnformation in this section, unless otherwise noted, is taken from

NASDA 80-81, NASDA 1980.

“’Japan Gaining Maturity in Satellite Technology,” A W&ST, Mar.

3, 1980, p, 92.

8’ “Japanese Gain Capabilities in Advanced”Space Effort,” A W&ST,

Mar. 9, 1981, p. 109.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 199

Figure 12.—Schematic Chart of National Organization for Space Activities

r Space Activities Commission

I

Prime Minister’s Office

L 1

HNational Police Agency I

i

Ministry of Foreign Affairs I

i

I

.-i. { \ &&~

- Ministry of Education

..+

.

.

I

Ministry of Agriculture,

- Fisheries Agency 8

Forestry and Fisheries

f

Ministry of International Agency of Industrial I Mechanical Engineering -

Trade and Industry Science and Technology

I

Laboratory

+ o

9

1 Japan Meteorological - 1

Agency Meteorological Satellite Center

I

Ministry of Construction Geographical Survey Institute I

I

I ? ?

Ministry of Home Affairs Fire Defense Agency

,

Keidanren

(Federation of Space Activities Member Companies and k 1 I 1

Economic Organizations) Promotion Council Trade Associations

SOURCE Nat,ional Space Development Agency of Japan
200 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Figure 13.—Japanese Budget for Space Activitiesa

Unit: + 100 million

Y I n

Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ln-

“48.0 stitute of Space and Aeronautical Science, University

of Tokyo, until FY1980)

m ;153. 5

n National Space Development Agency of Japan (NAS

*

959.6

z

a

1020.1

1050 d .:: “

. “

:

DA)

.0

NOTES: 1. The upper figure in each fiscal year shows the total budget for space actwlties,

2. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage (o/o) as against the total budget for each fiscal year

a“Space in Japan 1981 -1982,” Keldanren, Tokyo, 1981, p. 4 (One dollar = approximately 225 yen, 100 million yen = 444,444 dollars at January 1982 exchange rate,)

SOURCE National Space Agency of Japan

The impetus toward operational development

of these systems has come from a desire to

develop expertise in the design and operation of

communications satellites for commercial/industrial exploitation. Satellite broadcasting is particularly useful for communicating within Japan’s

mountainous and far-flung territory, which includes many small islands. They were preceded

by extensive ground-based R&D during the

1960’s, including cooperative experiments with

NASA on signals propagation, and the assumption of control over NASA’s advanced experimental communication satellite, ATS-1, in 1974.82

In connection with Japan’s communications

program mention should be made of a failed experimental program, the Ayame and Ayame 2 satellites. Designed to further test satellite control

and communications facilities, both failed to

BIWor/d. w/jde Space Activities, p. 200.

achieve geostationary orbit when launched in

1979 and 1980 by the Japanese N-1 rocket. The

first failure was due to a collision with the third

stage motor after separation, the second to an apparent misfiring of the apogee engine. The repercussions from these consecutive mishaps, which

cost the Japanese an estimated $100 million, have

been great; not only was the chairman of NASDA

forced to resign83 but, more importantly, the

Japanese were moved to accelerate their efforts

to achieve independence from the United States

in space capabilities. Both failures were traced

to probable malfunctions of U.S.-supplied equipment. Though in the past the Japanese have relied

heavily on the United States, dissatisfaction with

U.S. technology can only mean fewer contracts

for U.S. firms and more emphasis on indigenous

>

83’’Tw0 Mission Failures Force Space Official’s Resignation, ”

AW&ST, june 3, 1980, p. 26.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 201

development and/or deals with European companics. 84

In the area of ground stations for communications satellites, Japanese firms have long been

leaders in the manufacture and sale of INTELSAT

compatible stations and subsystems to developing countries. Both Mitsubishi and Nippon Electric have made extensive sales abroad; in addition, Japanese firms have obtained subcontracts

from Hughes and other U.S. companies for work

on INTELSAT payloads.

Remote Sensing

Japan has the world’s largest fishing fleet and

depends on the oceans not only for food, but for

the transportation of vital raw materials and exports, to a greater extent than any other developed country. In addition, Japan is a frequent victim of typhoons formed in the Central Pacific,

where meteorological facilities are poor and thinly scattered. Hence there is a special interest in

the development of ocean-monitoring satellites,

both for weather prediction and for exploitation

of ocean-based resources.

Many of the early sounding rockets were used

for meteorological experiments. The first dedicated Geostationary Meteorological Satellite,

GMS-Himawari, was launched in July 1977 by a

U.S. Delta. Still in operation, it has provided the

Japan Meteorological Agency with cloud-images

for public dissemination, along with infrared

temperature information, and has disseminated

data to other countries in the region. Himawari

was also Japan’s contribution to the World Meteorological Organization’s Global Atmospheric

Research Program (GARP). A second satellite,

GMS-2, was launched in August 1981 on an N-l!

vehicle; it was developed by a group led by

Nihon Electric and Hughes Aerospace.85 The

GMS-3 is scheduled for launch in the summer of

1984.

Under development is a geodetic survey satellite, GS-1, for a possible launch in 1985. The

GS-1 will be designed to be highly reflective, allowing ground stations to bounce lasers off it for

measurement purposes.

The most ambitious current program is the

Maritime Observation Satellite, MOS-1, which

will be Japan’s first satellite to provide continuous

global Earth observation. It is designed to observe

ocean surface phenomena and will include visible, infrared, and microwave scanning radiometers. The primary sensor will be the multispectral self-scanning radiometer, a chargecoupled device (CCD) providing 50-m resolution

imagery. Hence MOS will provide operational experience with land remote-sensing data collection and data-processing, comparable to Landsat and Spot. It is currently scheduled for an N-11

launch in August or September 1986.

A proposed follow-onto MOS is the Earth Resources Survey Satellite, ERS-1, a 2,700-lb remotesensing spacecraft currently in preliminary design.

ERS-1 would be launched in 1988 aboard the new

large-capacity H-1A launcher. Possible instrumentation includes synthetic aperture radar,

stereo camera, and visible infrared measurement

systems.86 The ERS-1 would eliminate Japanese

dependence on outside systems such as Landsat and SPOT, and could be used to further the

search for foreign sources of energy and other

raw materials. In addition, it would allow Japan

to compete with these systems for the sale of

remote-sensing data and data products. B’

Materials Processing

Japan is cultivating an on-going MPS program

as an element of its 15-year space development

policy. MPS work in developing alloys, compound materials, electronic materials, and medicines, as well as the life sciences, is going forward with experiments on both the U.S. Space

Shuttle and the TT-500-A, a Japanese suborbital

rocket:

● TT-500-A; This small two-stage suborbital

rocket with recoverable payload sections

provides approximately 7 minutes of microgravity (under 1o-4 G), comparable to

U.S. SPAR and German TEXUS. NASDA

the

has

“’japanese Gain Capabilities in Advanced Space Effort,” AW&ST,

Mar. 9, 1981, p. 108.

as’’japan Gaining Maturity in Satellite Technology,” p. 92.

sG’’japanese Gain Capabilities, ” p. 107.

87’’japan Gaining Maturity,” p. 92.
202 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

●

established a space experiment schedule for

the IT-500-A of two flights per year. An early

1981 launch carried a metallic compound

processing experiment, while an August

flight evaluated semiconductor processing

techniques.

Space Shuttle: NASDA anticipates funding

annual missions with Spacelab, inaugurating

its use with a first material processing test

(FMPT) in fiscal year 1985. The FMPT will

make use of half or one-third of the available

space in the shuttle-carried Spacelab. A

Japanese payload specialist will join shuttle

crews to conduct the FMPT and later shuttlebased experiments.88

Though the Japanese hope for major potential

gains from MPS investments, they do not expect

them in the near future. MPS experimentation is

seen as a way of insuring a competitive position

10 or 15 years from now.

Launch Vehicles

The Japanese have not had an easy time developing their own launch vehicles. During the

1960’s, ISAS was responsible for designing an

orbital launcher; after several years of failure a

Lambda sounding rocket was able, with the addition of a fourth stage, to launch Japan’s first

satellite in 1970. The Mu series of solid-fuel

rockets was more successful, and the first orbit

was achieved in 1971. The Mu launchers have

been improved with radio guidance and are used

by ISAS for scientific flights. Nissan Motors is currently designing an advanced version, the

M-3-kai-l, which will be used for Japan’s 1st

planetary exploration flights in the mid-1980’s,

including a planned Halley/Venus mission in

1985.

in 1969, NASDA assumed primary responsibility for launcher development for applications satellites. Instead of attempting to develop further

versions of the Mu launcher, NASDA decided to

approach the United States for access to technology for the Thor-Delta launcher and licensing arrangements to manufacture parts of the Delta in

Japan. The U.S.-Japanese Agreement on Space

Activities, signed on July 31, 1969, gave Japan

86’’japan’s Space Program,” p. 16.

Delta technology, subject to an agreement not

to transfer it to any third party. The first flight of

the new N-1 launcher took place in September

1975, when an 85-kg test satellite, Kiku ETS-1, was

placed in a 1,000-km circular orbit. Basically the

N-1 consists of a Thor first stage, built under

license in Japan by Mitsubishi Industries; a

Japanese developed liquid-fuel second stage; and

a U.S. Thiokol third stage. In all, approximately

67 percent of the N-1 is supplied by Japanese

firms. The N-1 can lift 130 kg into geostationary

orbit; in February 1977, it launched Japan’s first

geostationary satellite, making Japan the third

country in the world, after the United States and

Soviet Union, to do so.

An uprated version, the N-11, had its first successful test flight in February 1981. The N-ii can

carry 350 kg, or over twice the N-l’s payload, to

geosynchronous orbit. Mitsubishi Industries is the

prime contractor; the major differences from the

N-1 are the use of additional solid-fuel strap-on

boosters and the replacement of the Japanese-designed second stage by an improved version of

the U.S. Aerojet second stage used on the Delta.

As a result the Japanese contribution to the N-11

is only 56 percent, less than for the N-1.89 The N-11

will replace the N-1 by 1983 and is planned for

use through the mid-l 980’s.

For the latter 1980’s and 1990’s a new booster

design, the H-1A, is under development. The

major innovation is a planned liquid oxygen/

liquid hydrogen second stage, to be built by Mitsubishi. The initial version of the H-1A will be able

to place 550 kg into geosynchronous orbit; a proposed follow-on version would be able to launch

800 kg. The H-1A will also use an inertial-guidance

system instead of the radio guidance of the N-1

series. Projected development costs are $755 million; the first operational flight of the full threestage rocket is scheduled for 1987.90 The H-1A

is necessary for the launch of advanced heavy

satellites such as the proposed ERS-1, and will

give Japan a launcher roughly equivalent to ESA’S

Ariane 1. However, there are currently no plans

to market any projected launchers on a commercial basis.

89’’japanese Gain Capabilities,” p. 109; “Japan Gaining A4aturity, ” p. 96.

90’’japanese Gain Capabilities,” p. 109.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 203 ——

Japan’s launch capabilities have been severely restricted by agreements with the Japanese

fishing industry that allow missiles to be fired only

at two times of the year, January-February and

August-Se ptember.91

To date the Japanese have no firm plans for

developing a manned launched capability; Japanese payload specialists will fly on space shuttle missions during the 1980’s, with the first

Japanese astronaut scheduled to fly in fiscal year

1985. However, there have been very preliminary

designs for a “mini-shuttle” capable of carrying

a four-man crew plus 1,100 lb of cargo. Such a

vehicle is seen as eventually necessary for full exploitation of the scientific and applications programs currently under way.92

Cooperation/Competition With

the United States

As is clear from the preceding description of

its major applications programs, Japan has in the

past worked closely with NASA and with U.S. industry. The transfer of Thor- Delta technology has

been the largest single result of that cooperation;

in addition there have been numerous scientific

exchanges. Many of Japan’s applications satellites

have been designed in part by U.S. firms engaged

in joint ventures with Japanese companies. The

Japanese plan to use Spacelab extensively.

At the same time it is clear that the Japanese

intend to use the technology and expertise gained

through cooperation to build up their own independent government and private sector capabilities. The immediately resulting systems have

been developed to meet national and public

needs in communications, meteorology, and remote sensing; the major commercial effect has

been to begin to remove Japan as a market for

U.S. systems and launch vehicles. Eventually,

however, there is no doubt that Japan will attempt to export its equipment and services. There

is a long and well-known pattern of rapid Japanese entry into foreign markets, following on

successful assimilation of imported technology,

9’ “Japan Space Effort Moves Into Operational Phase,” A W&ST,

Mar. 8, 1982, p. 107.

glMasayoshi Kanabay ashi, “japan Sets Mini-Entry in Space Race, ’

Wa// Street Jourrra/, July 20, 1981.

development of domestic markets, and the mastery of techniques for mass production and marketing. Though most of these successes, as in consumer electronics and automobiles, have not

been in advanced-technology areas, the government and industry have recently been emphasizing technically sophisticated products in the belief

that Japan must compete there to sustain economic growth through the end of the century.

Space technology is definitely a major area of interest, and government and industry have been

working closely together to prepare for Japanese

entry into world markets.

A recent study undertaken by Japan’s influential Ministry of International Trade and Investment

(MITI) predicts that by the mid-1 990’s space will

be a $4.5 billion per year industry (current sales

of Japanese companies are $480 million, almost

entirely to the government). The study emphasizes not only export potential but technological

spinoffs; an indigenous space industry is vital

since: “As unilateral introduction of technologies

from foreign countries is getting more difficult,

it is necesary to strengthen Japan’s own bargaining power through accumulation of necessary

technological know-how, ” Recognizing that

Japan is some 5 to 10 years behind the United

States and Europeans in key areas, especially

launch vehicles, there is emphasis on taking advantage of Japanese strengths in quality control,

mass production, and marketing. 93

Despite the disadvantages of a smaller economic and technical base to draw on than either

the United States, Europe, or the Soviet Union,

and the lack of major military programs to ensure political and financial support, Japan has succeeded in achieving a position of high technical

and industrial competence in the entire range of

space activities. Though not yet able to offer fullscale commercial products or services (with the

exception of ground stations), the development

of this capability is only a matter of time. Japanese

success has been the result of a number of factors, including:

● a sustained commitment to civilian space

development by government and industry

93//epofl of the Deliberation Council on Basic Problems in the

Space /ndustry, MITI, Apr. 20, 1981.
204 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

●

●

●

●

as an integral part of overall plans to keep

Japan competitive in advanced technology;

careful borrowing of technology, mostly

from the United States, and assimilation of

that technology by Japanese industry;

close cooperation between government and

industry, with general coordination by the

Space Advisory Council;

strong economic performance over the past

two decades, together with a rapid maturation of national scientific and industrial skills;

and

willingness by both government and industry to make and adhere to long-range

plans.

Competition from the Japanese appears assured

during the coming decade and is likely to be particularly strong in Third World countries, where

Japan’s proven ability to provide high-quality

products at low cost may give them an edge over

less reliable European and American competitors.

In addition, it cannot be ruled out that growing

pressure on Japan to increase its military budget

and regional defense responsibilities may bring

about attempts to make use of its expertise in

space technology for military purposes, with the

additional boost that such a decision would give

to indigenous aerospace and electronics industries. Recently, it was reported that Japan was

considering the deployment of a military reconnaissance satellite system, which might be built

alone or with U.S. cooperation .94

94’’japan Reported Making Plans for Reconnaissance Satellite,”

Aerospace Dai/y, Jan. 11, 1982, p. 45.

NON-WESTERN SPACE PROGRAMS: SOVIET UNION,

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INDIA

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union has for many years maintained a space program approximately equivalent

to, and in some areas considerably ahead of, that

of the United States both in terms of total

resources allocated and the kinds of missions carried out. During the 15 years since it became

clear that they would not win the race to land

a man on the Moon, the Soviets have made incremental and continuing improvements to their

launcher and manned-vehicle systems, as well as

developing operational capabilities in domestic

and international communications, meteorology,

and remote sensing. Over the past several years

the Soviets have launched many more satellites

than the United States (see table 19).

Table 19.—Total (Civilian and Military) Successful

Orbital Launches

United States U.S.S.R.

1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 88

1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 87

1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 89

SOURCE: Charles Sheldon 11, “United States and Soviet Progress in Space:

Summary Data through 1980 and a Forward Look,” Congressional

Research Service Report #81-27 S, Jan. 15, 1981, p, 49.

Unfortunately, the extreme secrecy with which

the Soviets have surrounded their programs

makes it difficult to accurately evaluate their present capabilities and future plans. This secrecy is

due to an unwillingness to acknowledge failures

and/or technical backwardness for fear of damage

to Soviet prestige; to concern that foreign countries might steal or imitate Soviet technology; and

to the military nature of most of the Soviet space

program and the lack of separation between civilian and military space institutions. It is

estimated that 70 percent of Soviet space efforts

are purely military, 15 percent are dual military/civilian, and the remaining 15 percent purely

civil. gs All launches are conducted by the Strategic Rocket Forces; the Soviet Air Force operates

the Star City cosmonaut training center. Details

of the internal organization are not generally

available and are subject to controversy. important planning and advisory roles are played by

the State Committee on Science and Technology

and the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

‘sSoviet ~j/;taV power, U.S. Department of Defense, September

1981, p. 79.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 205

For these reasons, and because the Soviet program is not oriented towards commercial systems

that would be competitive with U.S. or other

space technologies, we will not examine the

Soviet program in as much detail as the European

and Japanese. Brief descriptions of major operational applications systems will be given, with emphasis on potential international implications.

Communications

Soviet satellite communications development

initially took a different path than that of the

United States. The U.S. satellite communications

industry, after initial experiments in the early

1960’s with low-orbit satellites and passive reflectors (such as the Echo series), soon turned to active geosynchronous satellites. Because of the

relatively well-developed U.S. domestic communication network, satellites were at first aimed

primarily at the rapidly expanding overseas market; the United States took the initiative in forming INTELSAT and designating the newly created

COMSAT organization to provide the technology

and management expertise to make INTELSAT

function. In the Soviet Union, however, improving domestic communications, particularly to the

less-developed central Asian and Siberian regions, was a high priority, while international traffic was minuscule. The Soviet Molniya 1 system

began operations in 1965, using large satellites

placed in elliptical 1 2-hour orbits. Such orbits are

easier to attain than geosynchronous ones, allowing heavier satellites to be used; they also provide better coverage to areas far north of the

Equator, though they require relatively expensive

tracking antennas. Similar orbits have been used

for the Molniya 2 and 3 series, first launched in

1971 and 1974 respectively. The Molniyas have

provided domestic telephone and television services, including color TV transmissions; as more

advanced Molniyas have become available, the

Molniya 1 series appears to have been reserved

for military requirements.9G

For a number of reasons the Soviet Union and

its allies were reluctant to join INTELSAT when

it was founded in 1964. The Soviets objected to

U. S./COMSAT management, to the use of U.S.

96’’U.S. and Soviet Progress in Space, ” p. 52.

technology, and to the system of weighted voting

whereby influence was determined by a country’s overall use of the system; the Soviets used

only 2 to 3 percent of global international traffic, compared with the United States’ s 50 to 60

percent. Instead, in 1968 the Soviet Union and

eight other socialist states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania,

Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Cuba) proposed an alternative system, which in 1971 was formally agreed

to and called Intersputnik. Although it is open

to any state, few other countries (Syria, Vietnam,

and Laos), have joined, for both political and

technical reasons. There is relatively little commercial/private traffic between most Intersputnik

members and the rest of the world; in addition,

since the intersputnik network was initially based

on use of the Molniya satellites, it was difficult

and expensive for INTELSAT Earth stations, which

are designed to work with fixed geosynchronous

satellites, to make use of the moving Molniyas.

in recent years, however, the Soviet Union has

begun to orbit geosynchronous Statsionar satellites which are designed to be more acceptable

to global users. In addition, as their international

communications needs have grown the Soviet

Union, Cuba, and Rumania, (to be followed soon

by Poland) have begun to use INTELSAT through

Earth stations on their own territories. Increasing

de facto integration of global satellite communications appears to be occurring, even in the absence of formal agreements.97

The Soviets’ first geostationary communications

satellite was launched in 1974. A large system of

geostationary satellites, called Statsionar, has

been established to serve the Soviet Union and

East Europe with a number of different kinds of

satellites: the Raduga series, six satellites of which

had been launched through 1980, for domestic

TV and telephone relay; the Ekran series, with

six satellites, for domestic television; and the Gorizont series of four satellites for international and

domestic television transmission. The current lntersputnik system relies heavily on the Statsionar

gTSee Nicholas Matte, Aerospace Law: Telecommunications Sate//ites, prepared by the Centre for Research of Air and Space Law,

McGill University, for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research

Council of Canada, 1980, pp. 118-123.
206 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

satellites, and more are expected to be launched

in the near future; the Soviets are currently several

years behind in their projections for overall system deployment.98

The Soviets have also announced plans for several new global communications systems designed to compete with western ones. The Loutch

series of eight satellites is intended to provide

services comparable to INTELSAT, using 14/11

GHz frequencies; the Volna mobile communications system of seven satellites plans to offer services to ships and planes similar to those of Marisat

and Aerosat. To date none of these planned satellites have been flown.99

It would appear that the Soviets, after many

years of concentrating on domestic and regional

capabilities, are hoping to compete on a more

global scale. Such an effort stems from: 1) increasing confidence in their technology, based in part

on military experience gained in communicating

with a rapidly expanding number of naval vessals

and foreign bases and 2) an increase in international civilian communications with Western and

third world states, due largely to expanded trade

relations. Not enough is known about the critical

factors to estimate whether Soviet competition

will be effective: these include the system’s

technical characteristics and reliability, its compatibility with other global and regional systems,

how the prices charged for services compare with

Intelsat and other alternatives, the institutional

characteristics of any potential user group, and

political considerations.

Remote Sensing

The Soviets have no specifically designated

civilian land remote-sensing system. Large

numbers of short-term film-return Cosmos missions have been flown for military purposes, and

some of these have undoubtedly provided civilian

data. Ocean surveillance for the military has been

carried out using nuclear-powered active radar

satellites; two specialized nonnuclear oceanographic satellites are reported to be in opera98’’ Soviets Continue Aggressive Space Drive, ” AW&ST, Mar. 9,

1981.

99’’ Soviets Increasing Space Activities, ” AlV&ST, Mar. 3, 1980,

p. 83.

tion. The latest such satellite, Cosmos 1151, was

launched in January 1980.100

Perhaps the most ambitious civilian-oriented

remote-sensing work has been done on manned

missions, particularly the Salyut 6. Some 50,000

photographs have been taken using a large

MKF-6m multispectral camera built by Carl Zeiss

Jena in East Germany, and some of the data obtained has been shared with allied and developing countries, such as Cuba, Vietnam, Morocco,

and Angola.l O1

The Soviets have been distributing weather

photos from their Meteor series meteorological

satellites since 1966; their first retrograde Sunsynchronous launch, capable of providing daily

coverage of a particular area at the same time of

day, was made in 1977. Meteor satellites have

carried a variety of experimental sensors including, recently, advanced Earth resources instrumentation.1°2 In July 1980, the Soviet Union

launched a prototype remote-sensing satellite

with three experimental multispectral sensors

providing ground resolution up to 30 m, with data

to be relayed to the ground via radio. It is planned

to extend this to a full-scale operational system

with 50-m visible-band resolution .los

In the U. N., the Soviets have proposed since

1979 that distribution of “local,” i.e., 50 m or less,

remote-sensing data be subject to the prior consent of the state being viewed; this does not affect Landsat 3 MSS imagery but would apply to

TM data from Landsat D, as well as France’s proposed SPOT system. The Soviet proposal is designed to restrict the usefulness of U.S. and other

Western remote-sensing systems, as well as to

limit the dissemination of potentially damaging

information about the Soviet Union and its allies

(e.g., agricultural data that might give foreign

lm’’Review of National and Co-Operative Space Activities for the

Calendar Year 1980,” UNCOPUOS, A/AC’. 105/286/Add. 3, May

1, 1981, p. 11.

1°’ “The Salyut 6 Mission, ” /nteravia, November 1978, p. 1,084;

“Relevance of Space Activities to Monitorifig of Earth Resources

and the Environment, ” prepared for 2d U.N. Conference on the

Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf. 101/BP/3,

Apr. 28, 1981, p. 8.

‘02’’Craig Covault, “Soviets Initiating Program on Modular Space

Station,” AW&ST,. July 21, 1981; “Review of Space Activities,” p. 10.

1°3’’ National Paper: USSR, ” prepared fcjr 2d U.N. Conference

on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf. 101/

NP/30, Sept. 2, 1981, p. 19.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 207

firms a better bargaining position with Soviet purchasers). The United States opposes such a restriction. 104

There are presently no known Soviet plans to

distribute remote-sensing information outside the

U. S. S. R.; entry of the Soviets into the global

market, even on a selective basis, could have a

significant effect on future Western commercial

systems. The Soviets would be likely to sell/

distribute data for political purposes, which could

mean undercutting global prices while criticizing Western systems (especially those run as

private commercial enterprises) for being too expensive for and/or violating the sovereignty of

developing countries.

Materials Processing

Processing experiments have had a high priority

on recent Soviet space flights, especially aboard

the Salyut 6 orbiting laboratory.l05o~ Two separate

furnaces, the Splav-01 and Kristall, have been

used to conduct experiments on semiconductors,

crystal growth, alloys, glasses and metal oxides;

samples have been taken to the ground for detailed analysis. Approximately 300 to 350 Soviet

scientists are reported to be actively engaged in

materials research related to space processing.l06

As usual, details of Soviet results are not publicly available; activities appear to be at the basic

science level, and can be expected to continue

with future Soviet manned flights. Soviet spokesmen are characteristically optimistic about space

manufacturing; a typical observation is cosmonaut Konstantin Feoktistov’s recent claim that

there will eventually be “whole plants for manufacturing products in zero-g. ’’107

Launch Vehicles and Manned Operations

The Soviets have developed a number of expendable launch vehicles; the most commonly

‘wJames Kay, “The Legal Implications of Remote Sensing by Satellite, ” prepared by Centre for Research of Air and Space Law,

McGill University, for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research

Council of Canada, March 1981, p. 73.

IOSB. BeIitsky, “Soviet Manned Space Flight 20 Years on, ” @aCe-

//ight, vol. 23, No. 5, May 1981, pp. 154-155.

IWWS. MUSt spend More to Maintain Lead in Space 7-echnology,

GAO Report FGMSD-80- 32, Washington, D. C., Jan. 31, 1980, p. 8.

‘

07’ ’Soviets Show Assembly of Space Station Units,” AkV&ST, June

29, 1981, p. 21.

used is the Sapwood (A) launcher, a derivative

of the original ICBM design dating back to the

mid-l950s, which in present modified versions

can launch Soyuz manned vehicles up to 6,575

kg. The larger Proton (D) launcher can carry

20,000 kg to LEO and has been used to launch

the Salyut space stations; it is not considered

reliable enough for manned launches. 108

The Soviets have so far failed to produce advanced ELVS comparable to the U.S. Saturn V,

which could lift 136,000 kg to LEO, or a reusable

vehicle such as the space shuttle. This has been

due in part to their inability to develop highenergy liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen propulsion

systems, without which launching heavy payloads requires a very large number of stages and

strap-ens. The Soviets apparently attempted to

launch a Saturn-size vehicle on at least three occasions from 1969 to 1972 as part of their manned

lunar program, but were unsuccessful. There are

currently unconfirmed reports that the Soviets are

once again seeking to launch a very large ELV,

as well as to develop a reusable vehicle somewhat smaller than the shuttle. Both advances

would be useful in implementing the Soviet aim

of developing large permanently manned orbiting

Space stations.l09

In recent years the main emphasis of the Soviet

space program has been on developing and using

the Salyut series of manned orbiting laboratories.

The first Salyut prototype was launched in 1971;

since then five more have been orbited, four successfully. Several (Salyuts 2, 3, and 5) have apparently been military in nature, mainly for highresolution reconnaissance; Salyuts 4 and 6 have

been civilian.ll0 Salyut 6, still in orbit, has been

by far the most successful. Weighing 42,000 lb,

it has been visited by 13 separate 2- and 3-man

Soyuz crews, including a large number of nonSoviet nationals. The Salyut 6 has also rendezvoused with unmanned Progress tankers, which

can dock automatically to resupply the men

aboard. This has enabled the Soviets to conduct

long-duration missions, including the world

1°8’’ U.S. and Soviet Progress in Space, ” pp. 23-25.

1°9Craig Covau It, “Soviets Developing 12-Man Space Station, ”

AW&ST, June 16, 1980, pp. 26-29.

11ONicholas johnson, “The Military and Civilian Salyut Space Programmed,” Spacef/ight, August-September 1979, p. 364.
208 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

record of 185 days in orbit recorded by Valery

Ryumin and L. Popov in 1980. Numerous experiments and studies have been conducted to test

the spacecraft themselves as well as the effects

of weightlessness on human beings, other plant

and animal life, and inorganic materials. Salyut

cosmonauts have succeeded in working outside

the spacecraft to make repairs and to deploy instruments, such as a 33-ft radio telescope. 111

In June 1981 Salyut 6 was visited by a new large

(30,000 lb) unmanned craft, designated Cosmos

1267, which is twice as large as the Progress/Soyuz vehicles. The automatic docking performed by the two vehicles appears to point the

way to the construction of large modular space

stations with many times the interior room of the

current Salyuts.112 The Soviets have consistently

pointed to the establishment of such stations as

the central goal of their space program and as

a necessary step in conducting further space activities, including eventual manned missions to

the Moon and planets. In March 1982 the Soviets

launched a new station, Salyut 7.

Cooperation and Competition With

Other Countries

The bulk of Soviet joint and cooperative projects have been conducted with allied socialist

states. In 1967, the Interkosmos program was

founded to coordinate activities between the

Soviet Union, its East European allies, and other

communist states such as Mongolia, Cuba, and

more recently Vietnam. A number of scientific

satellites have been flown using instruments,

designed by member-states, under the overall

direction of the Soviet Union. Instruments and

experiments, such as East Germany’s multispectral camera, have also flown on the Salyut series;

many of these were associated with the flight of

guest cosmonauts from participating states. To

date, cosmonauts from Czechoslovakia, Poland,

East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania,

Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cuba have been trained

in the Soviet Union and spent time on board

Salyut 6. These missions have helped give the

Soviet program a politically valuable international

image; further such flights, including cosmonauts

from non-l nterkosmos nations, such as France

and possibly India, are being planned.

Soviet-U.S. space relations have had several

ups and downs, generally mirroring the overall

political climate. The period of initial rivalry from

1957 through the Apollo program was characterized by extreme competition and mutual claims

of superiority, often made difficult to verify on

account of the secrecy with which the Soviet program was conducted. The Apollo success was

typically downplayed by the Soviets, who stressed

the superiority of their unmanned Lunokhod

lunar explorers and the “wastefulness” of the

U.S. manned program, implying that the Soviets

had never intended to send men to the Moon.113

However, even during this period the two countries found it necessary to cooperate in establishing legal and regulatory principles for space activities. In the early 1970’s, as the end of the Vietnam War allowed closer relations to develop and

“detente” became the official policy of both the

U.S. and Soviet leadership, planning began for

a cooperative manned mission, the Apollo-Soyuz

test project (ASTP). In May 1972, a comprehensive agreement was signed in Moscow as part of

the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit. The agreement covered a variety of mutual scientific and technical

exchanges in addition to ASTP.11A The ostensible

rationale for the mission was to develop a joint

docking system so that, in case of emergencies,

spacecraft from either of the two states could

rendezvous with those of the other. However,

the joining together of the two spacecraft became

symbolic of the then current “thaw” in relations,

and was seen by proponents as leading towards

extended cooperation in future space (and nonspace) activities. Critics saw it as an expensive

political stunt which was likely to give the Soviet

Union greater benefits than the United States, in-

] 1 ‘Craig Covault, “Radio Telescope Erected on Salyut 6,” AW&ST,

Aug. 13, 1979, pp. 54-55.

I \z)ames oberg, “The Soviet Aim: a permanent base in sPace, ”

New Scientist, Oct. 1, 1981.

11 Jjames Oberg, “The Moon Race Cover-Up,” Reason, August

1979, pp. 34-37.

1 ldsoviet space Programs 1971-75, Staff Report for Senate committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Aug. 30, 1976, vol.

11, p. 105.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space • 209

sofar as the perceived technical parity between

the two systems would tend to elevate the public

image of the Soviet Union as no longer “behind”

in space technology. For various reasons the Jul y

1975 rendezvous of Apollo and Soyuz 19, though

spectacular, did not lead to further major cooperative activities; this was largely due to the different directions the two programs took in the

second half of the 1970’s, as well as to increasing political tensions. Some of the cooperative

projects, such as U.S. biological experiments carried on Cosmos flights in 1975, 1977, and 1979,

and exchanges of data from each country’s planetary missions have continued, but there are no

plans for a resumption of major scientific or applications exchanges. In 1977, a second agreement was concluded between NASA and the

Soviet Academy of Science outlining cooperation

in the development of a compatible sea searchand-rescue system, along with further cooperation in manned space flight. Although preliminary

meetings were held, the studies were never completed; the Soviets blame the United States for

not fulfilling this latter part of the agreement. 115

The Soviets and United States are at odds in

the U.N. over a variety of space issues, such as

the proper restrictions to be placed on DBS and

land remote-sensing systems. More importantly,

the growing military importance of space technologies for surveillance, communications and

navigation has made each side more concerned

about the other’s capabilities, and less prone to

cooperate directly with the other. The Soviets

have consistently criticized the shuttle as a space

weapon while carrying out active tests of an antisatellite system.

Despite extensive publicity for space exploits,

the Soviets have made only minor attempts to actively disseminate either space technology or its

benefits to third-world countries, as the United

States has done through NASA cooperative agreements and the Agency for International Development (Al D). Outside of allied socialist countries

and the United States, significant cooperation has

been pursued with only three countries–France,

India, and to a lesser extent, Sweden. India’s first

satellite, called Aryabhata, was launched by the

‘l’’’ National Paper: U. S. S. R,” p. 110.

Soviet Union in 1975; in 1979 an Earth-observation satellite, Bhaskara-1, was launched, and

Bhaskara-11 was orbited in November 1981. Cooperation with France, outlined earlier in the section on the French space program, has been pursued in materials processing, space biology, and

manned flight.

The Soviet space effort is large and varied and

the above has done no more than sketch their

major programs. As opposed to the U.S. space

effort, it seems fair to say that over the past

decade, the Soviet program has been characterized by steady growth and extension of their capabilities. Despite slowness in meeting certain

goals for communications services, ambitious

programs in communications, remote sensing,

and especially the construction and operation of

orbital stations have been successfully implemented. However, it is still an open question

whether increased Soviet capabilities, and increased confidence in their technology, will induce the Soviets to offer applications services to

a broader range of global customers. Space technology is one of the few areas in which the

Soviets could be competitive with the West, and

the political and economic gains of supplying

hardware and services would be attractive.

However, Soviet inexperience at operating in a

competitive business environment may prove, in

this as in other fields, to be a major barrier. In

addition, the marketing of services—as opposed

to simple hardware—which require close cooperation between supplier and customer would

run counter to the Soviets’ long-cherished practice of maintaining maximum secrecy about their

technical capabilities, especially in areas where

the military is so closely involved. For these

reasons it is likely that the Soviets will choose to

compete selectively, for discrete political aims,

rather than enter into general competition for satellite communications, remote-sensing, or launch

service markets.

People’s Republic of China (PRC)

The PRC’S launch technology has been derived

from the Soviet Union, primarily the SS-4 (Sandal)

medium-range liquid-fueled missile, designs for

which were given to the Chinese in the late
210 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

1950’s before relations between the two countries broke down. The central impetus for the

development of further launchers and satellites

has been to meet security needs: to carry nuclear

warheads to the population centers of the Soviet

Union, and to provide military reconnaissance

and communications.

The first Chinese satellite, the 173 kg China 1,

was launched in April 1970 by a CSL-I (Long

March 1 ) launcher. Since then 10 more satellites

have been launched (including a recent threein-one payload of scientific satellites). Little is

known about their characteristics, though some

were clearly for military reconnaissance and communications. Starting with China 3 in 1975,

launches were made with the FB-1 (Storm) vehicle, a version of their CSS-X-4 ICBM, approximately equivalent in size to the U.S. Atlas. The

FB-1 can launch a satellite of up to 2 tons into

LEO.1l6

The Chinese are known to be working on a

new launcher, the Long March 3, which would

use the two stages of the FB-1 plus a liquid

oxygen/liquid hydrogen upper stage. If successful,

this would make them third in the world, after

the United States and ESA (perhaps fourth if the

Japanese succeed first), to use high-energy

cryogenic fuels. The Chinese recently announced

that the Long March 3 would be launched in 1983

or 1984 and would probably carry China’s first

experimental geosynchronous communications

satellite. 117

To date the PRC has no operational communications, meteorological or remote-sensing

satellites, but plans are under way to develop all

three technologies. Since 1972 and the United

States-Chinese rapprochement, China has received significant data and know-how from the

United States. INTELSAT-compatible receiving

stations have been bought and established near

Peking and Shanghai. An experimental COMSAT,

the STW-2, is scheduled for a 1983 or 1984

launch over the Pacific, and indigenous Earth stations and transmitters have been built.118 Trans1 IGEdelson Haas et al., “Eyewitness Report on Chinese Satellite

Work,” Aeronautics and Astronautics, February 1980, p. 44.

“z’’ China Launches Three-in-One Satellite Payload, ” Aerospace

Dai/y, Sept. 22, 1981, pp. 113-114.

118

’’ Eyewitness Report,” p. 41.

mission tests using the France-German Symphonic have included video teleconferencing and

high-resolution facsimile transmission. According

to terms of the “1979 Understanding on Cooperation in Space Technology” (part of the United

States-China Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology), the Chinese Communications Satellite Corporation indicated a desire to

purchase a U.S. communications satellite (to be

launched by NASA) including ground equipment,

but plans have been postponed indefinitely due

to financial constraints. Discussions also took

place in 1979 and 1980 with non-U.S. partners

such as West Germany’s Messerschmitt-BolkowBlohm.119

PRC currently receives meteorological data

from the U.S. Tires-N and NOAA- 6, and the

Japanese GMS-1 satellites through indigenous

receiving stations. The Central Meteorological

Bureau had planned to launch a Sun-synchronous weather satellite in 1982, and a complementary geosynchronous satellite in 1985. The

1982 satellite’s radiometer was to have a 4-km

resolution (compared with the U.S. ITOS’ resolution of 1 km). Due to cutbacks in Chinese R&D

expenditures, the status of these plans is

uncertain.

In remote sensing, the Chinese plan to use

Landsat and SPOT data extensively before developing their own system; the “1979 Understanding” indicates China’s intention to purchase a

Landsat ground station from U.S. industry, and

procurement activities are continuing. The

Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics is reported

to be working on various sensors including a

multispectral scanner.l20 In January 1980, NASA

and the Chinese Academy of Sciences concluded

a memorandum of understanding giving the PRC

direct access to Landsat data.

There have been several reports that the

Chinese are planning seriously for eventual

manned flights and have begun to train astronauts

for future missions.l2l However, China’s recent

reassessment of internal economic and scientific

119’’MBB, Chinese Discuss TV Satellite,” AlV&ST,, Mar. 31, 1980,

p. 63.

1

20’’ Eyewitness Report, ” p. 43.

‘

z

’ See David Ritchie, “Dragon in the Sky: China’s Space Program, ” Technology Review, October 1981, pp. 53-54.
Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space • 211

priorities has apparently resulted in a postponement of plans for manned flights in the 1980’s.’22

Until recently China’s space capabilities were

barely known. Since the death of Mao and the

determination of China’s new leadership to

modernize the country by increasing foreign

trade and educational/scientific exchanges with

the West, a number of official and unofficial

foreign delegations have been allowed to visit

Chinese space facilities. In turn, large numbers

of Chinese have visited U. S., European, and Japanese facilities, and many Chinese students are

now attending Western engineering and graduate

programs in the sciences. Up to now, except for

initial aid from the Soviet Union, Chinese efforts

have been almost exclusively home-grown. Military requirements have been paramount, but

there has also been recognition that satellites

could play a large role in upgrading China’s internal communications and television networks,

in locating and managing mineral and energy resources, and in agricultural planning. Given the

previous lack of access to outside technology,

Chinese capabilities are impressive, and are likely

to expand rapidly in the near future if outside

contacts increase and internal constraints are

relaxed. The major difficulties are likely to be a

shortage of trained scientists and technicians, due

to the educational disruptions of the cultural

revolution; lack of capital and other strains

caused by ambitious plans for rapid modernization of the entire economy; and lack of foreign

exchange for the purchase of outside technology.

Though Mao’s absolute insistence on domestic

self-reliance has been relaxed, China is likely to

be interested in such purchases primarily as a way

of gaining access to technology to be copied or

otherwise appropriated; hence, although China

will not in the near future be competing with

foreign firms or governments for commercial contracts, it is also not likely to be a major buyer of

space systems.

India

India has had a formal space program since the

formation of the Indian National Committee for

Space Research (l NCOSPAR) in 1962. In 1969,

1 Zzsee ‘Jchinese Astronauts Train in Simu Iators, ’ A W&ST, Jan.

26, 1981, p. 63.

INCOSPAR was absorbed by the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), which in 1972

became the central body of the newly created

Department of Space.

Unlike China’s, India’s space activities have not

been motivated by military concerns (the military

has a separate interest in antitank and antiaircraft

missiles). Although India is an underdeveloped

country, it has, because of its size and longstanding contacts with the West, a considerable

pool of scientific and administrative talent. The

space program is designed to use these resources

to encourage development, to foster technical

and scientific leadership, and to serve as an example (in accord with India’s overall position of

neutrality between East and West and a leader

of the nonaligned movement) of indigenous Third

World achievements in areas usually considered

the preserve of advanced developed countries.

Hence there is an emphasis on developing a comprehensive space capability, and especially systems for rural communications, land management, and weather forecasting. Foreign assistance

has been welcomed from a number of countries,

largely for demonstration projects and joint programs, with the intention of building on the experience gained to provide similar services with

indigenous resources. Through 1979, India’s total

investment had amounted to some $230 million,

with somewhat higher expenditures anticipated

in fulfilling the latest 10-year plan. 123

India has built and launched a large number

of Rohini sounding rockets, in addition to providing a launch platform for U.S. and Soviet

sounding rocket experiments.124 In July 1980,

India successfully tested its four-stage solid fuel

SLV-3 launcher, orbiting the 76-lb Rohini I

research satellite; in 1981, it launched a second

Rohini, which failed to achieve orbit. Plans are

under way to produce an augmented SLV, using

strap-on boosters, that could place 330 lb into

LEO, as well as to develop a new launcher capable of orbiting a 600-lb remote-sensing satellite

by the mid-1980 ’s. Though strongly denied by

India, there are fears, especially in Pakistan, that

’23H, P. Mama, “India’s Space Program: Across the Board on a

Shoe String,” /nteravia, January 1980, p. 60.

‘Z4’’ World-Wide Space Activities, ” p. 119.
212 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

India’s launchers may be used as, or be the precursor to, a delivery system for nuclear weapons.

India’s first satellite, the Aryabhata, was

launched by the Soviet Union in 1975; it was

largely Indian-built and designed, with Soviet

assistance. In 1979, the Soviets launched India’s

Bhaskara I remote-sensing satellite, which suffered a partial power failure. The Bhaskara 11, containing two television cameras and three microwave radiometers~, was launched in November

1981, and has provided television pictures of the

sub-continent.

Another cooperative venture was the June 1981

launch of an experimental communications satellite, the Apple (Ariane Passenger Payload Experiment), on ESA’S third Ariane test vehicle. The

satellite suffered a partial failure of its solarpowered electrical system but has continued to

function with reduced capability.l25

India plans to establish an operational communications system, called Insat, using two

satellites purchased from Ford Aerospace and

launched by the U.S. Insat-1 was launched in

April 1982, and will relay messages and data between approximately 32 proposed ground stations, as well as provide direct television service

to rural communities via several thousand inexpensive antennas.126 Insat will also carry a VHRR

to provide’ meteorological information. Eventually, ISRO plans to produce its own follow-on

system, building on experience gained with Apple and Insat.

India’s commitment to Insat has been due

largely to the positive experience gained with two

1

25’’ Apple Satellite Operational Despite Panel Failure,” AlV&ST,

Sept. 14, 1981, p. 19.

12bBen jamin Elson, “U.S. to Launch Insat Satellite for India,”

AW&ST, Apr. 5, 1982, pp. 56-63.

major cooperative communications satellite projects, one with the United States and the other

with Europe. The Satellite Instructional Television

Experiment (SITE), which lasted for 1 year from

August 1, 1975, to July 31, 1976, was a joint program with NASA using the ATS-6 large communications satellite to broadcast educational television programs to 5,000 Indian villages. India was

responsible for maintenance of the ground equipment and for developing the programs; the overall reaction proved highly favorable and enabled

the Government to disseminate important information on health care, agricultural techniques,

and birth control to previously inaccessible

areas. Additional experiments, including teleconferencing and emergency communications, were

conducted through the Symphonic Telecommunications Experimental Project (STEP) from July

1977 to mid-l 979, using the French-German experimental Symphonic communications satellite.

In remote sensing, India is one of 11 foreign

countries to have a Landsat receiving station.

Located at Hyderabad, it is operated by the National Remote Sensing Agency. Current plans call

for a remote-sensing satellite to be developed and

launched sometime in the mid-1980’s, building

on experience with the Bhaskara series.

India has amassed a large amount of experience in designing, building and operating a variety of applications systems. The commitment to

achieving an independent capability to use space

technology is longstanding and based on the beneficial results of past usage. Though direct competition with Western or Japanese systems is not

likely in the near future, Indian experience in

adapting space capabilities to developing country needs could eventually give them an advantage in providing services and/or hardware to

Third World countries.

OTHER SPACE PROGRAMS

Canada ipated in a large number of joint scientific projects with the United States, including the

Canada’s space activities are coordinated by Canadian-built Alouette and ISIS ionospheric

the Interdepartmental Committee on Space (ICS), research satellites, launched by NASA. The

with overall responsibility in the Minister of State Department of Communications cooperated with

for Science and Technology. Canada has partic- NASA and ESA in operating the experimental
Ch. 7—lnternational Efforts in Space ● 213

Communications Technology Satellite (CTS) from

1976 to 1979, which pioneered operational use

of the 14/12 GHz band. Spurred by the difficulties

of communicating with remote regions in the

North, Canada in 1972 became the first Western

country to initiate operational domestic communications via satellite; the Anik A series of three

comsats were built by Hughes and launched by

the United States. In 1978, Telesat Canada began

using RCA’s Anik B for voice, data, and television transmissions. Three Hughes-built Anik C

spacecraft are scheduled for launch beginning in

November 1981.

Canada is also engaged in a major bilateral program with NASA to develop a remote manipulator arm for the U.S. space shuttle. Spar Aerospace Ltd. is developer for the $100 million project. The first arm flew on the second shuttle flight

in November 1981. As with ESA’S Spacelab, Canada has agreed to pay for development of the arm

and the first prototype, in return for a NASA commitment to purchase additional arms from

Spar.127

Brazil

Brazil has had an active interest in space activities since 1961, especially satellite communications and remote sensing to manage its far-flung

territories and to assist in the development of the

Amazon Basin. The Centro Tecnico Aerospecial

(CTA) has been responsible for developing the

Sonda series of sounding rockets, which are

launched from Brazil’s launch facility at Natal in

the northeast part of the country. The United

States, Germany, and other countries have also

used Brazil’s facilities; a new launch center is now

being prepared closer to the Equator.

In 1975, Brazil and NASA conducted the SACI

(Advanced Satellite for Interdisciplinary Communications) experiment, using NASA’s ATS-6

satellite to transmit television programs to remote

primary schools. Brazil currently leases four

transponders from INTELSAT for domestic use

(with plans to increase this to 81/2 transponders

by 1986), and plans to purchase its own comsat

(with provision for technology transfer), to be

launched in 1985.

Brazil is, after the United States, the largest user

of Landsat data, and has operated a Landsat

ground station since 1973, along with processing facilities. There are currently plans to design

and build four remote-sensing and meteorological satellites, with the first one to be launched

in 1988.128

‘27Craig Covault, “Remote Arm Aids Shuttle Capability,” A W&ST,

Sept. 7, 1981, pp. 57-58.

lzBjim Brooke, “Brazil’s Space Program Prepared to Launch 4 Satellites by 1993, ” Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1981, p, A22.

DOMESTIC/REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

In addition to the national programs outlined

previously, there are a number of regional satellite communications systems that are either

already in operation or in various stages of

planning,

Indonesia has had the two Hughes-built satellites of its Palapa A system operating since 1976

to link its widespread island area. Spare channels

have been leased by other countries in the

region. The first Palapa B satellite is scheduled

for launch in 1983 and will be used by the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. The Arabsat

system, with 21 Middle Eastern countries as participants, is scheduled for a first flight in December 1983. France’s Aerospatiale is the prime contractor, with Ford Aerospace the major U.S. participate. Australia’s Australsat is planned for the

mid-l 980s. Regional systems have been discussed

for Southern Africa and South America, particularly the Andean region, prompted by Colombia’s well-developed plans for its Satcol

telephone and TV system.12g Currently, a large

number of countries lease spare transponders

from INTELSAT satellites and purchase ground

stations for domestic use. This activity, along with

the national and regional systems mentioned, inlz%ee Theo Pirard, “Space Systems Operated and Prepared by

Developing Countries, ” Spacef/ight, May 1981, pp. 137-139.
214 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

dicates the scale of global interest in satellite services. This is important, first because of the implications for the current international communications system, i.e., for INTELSAT; and also

because, given the stakes, competition for sales

of satellites, ground equipment, and launch services between U. S., European, and Japanese firms”

is likely to be fierce. The proliferation of satellites

for local and regional use threatens to take

business away from INTELSAT, damaging its financial viability. As communications needs

become greater and more specialized, and as it

becomes progesssively more difficult to allocate

scarce orbital slots and frequencies, many countries are determined to have their own system,

or a share of a local system, regardless of whether

such a move is warranted by local demand or

by financial considerations. Such decisions are

supported by increasingly competitive private

and national suppliers of telecommunications

equipment, who encourage the purchase of specialized services. The long-term effects on

INTELSAT are unclear but may lead to higher

prices or reduced service, which would be

especially harmful to those countries that are too

small or poor to purchase their own system.130

A possible solution would bean expansion of the

INTELSAT system to provide local and regional

services. This would require a satellite-groundstation system designed to operate in low-density

rural areas, perhaps including direct-broadcast

capabilities.

130See john McLucas, “Global Cooperation in Satellite Communications in a Decade of Policy Divergence, ” paper presented at

International Aerospace Symposium, Paris, France, June 2, 1981.

REMOTE SENSING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

In the field of land remote sensing, the anaIogue to INTELSAT has been the U.S. Landsat

system, which has provided black-and-white and

multispectral photographs on a global basis for

the cost of reproduction. U.S. policy was established in 1969, when President Nixon stated at

the 24th U.N. General Assembly that “this program will be dedicated to produce information

not only for the United States but also for the

world community. ” Foreign nations and agencies can either purchase data from the EROS Data

Center, or receive it directly by establishing their

own receiving station, which can (with the current Landsat satellites) provide images over a

2,700-km radius (see map). Especially in developing countries where maps are often incomplete

and outdated, and information about land use,

forest cover, drainage patterns, mineral deposits

and the like is difficult and expensive to obtain,

satellite imagery has been used extensively to aid

in economic development.’s’ Over the years,

substantial assistance has been provided, largely by the U.S. Agency for International Develop131 For an outline of some of these uses, see “Relevance of Space

Activities to Monitoring of Earth Resources and the Environment, ”

background paper for second U.N. Conference on the Exploration

and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf. 101/BP/3, Apr. 28, 1981.

ment and also by other developed countries and

international organizations, to enable various

countries to use Landsat. Effective use requires

skilled technicians and equipment to process the

data, as well as integration of satellite information with many other information resources. Multilaterally funded training centers to encourage

these capabilities are being established in Upper

Volta, Kenya, and Thailand.

As was discussed above, other global land

remote-sensing systems besides Landsat are

planned for the mid-l 980’s. Though such competition may eventually improve the quality of

services available, much depends on whether the

competition is political or commercial in nature.

Private-sector operation of !-andsat, which could

put remote sensing on a more commercial basis,

is of concern to many developing countries who

see such a move leading to higher prices as well

as possible violations of their sovereignty by

private companies outside effective government

control. On the other hand, a “price war” between, say, politically motivated Landsat, SPOT,

MOS, and possible Soviet systems might prove

beneficial to users but might also undermine the

willingness of the sponsoring governments to

continue their operation. The multiplication of
Ch. 7—lnternational Efforts in Space ● 215

L

1 I 1 I 1 I 1 1 1 1 1

e

SOURCE” National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Globesat section in chapter 10 of this report. At

the present, however, no country or organization has taken the lead in proposing such a system

or in establishing the institutional and financial

framework that would be needed. Discussion of

ways to better use and integrate remote-sensing

data, along with other issues of concern to

developing countries, will be on the agenda at

the upcoming second U.N. Conference on the

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 1982)

to be held at Vienna this coming August. A

number of proposals to establish new U.N.

bodies dealing with space activities and/or to expand the scope of existing ones will be proposed

at the Conference and passed on by the General

Assembly in the fall of 1982.
Chapter 8

COMMERCIALIZATION OF

SPACE TECHNOLOGY
Contents

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Process of lndustrial Innovation in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Product, Process, and Service Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Satellite Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Remote Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Space Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Materials Processing in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Government Encouragement of Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aeronautics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Communications Satellites . . . . . . . . . . .

The Joint Endeavor Agreement . . . . . . .

Other Space-Related Commercial Activities

Financing Space Ventures. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hardware Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Aerospace In

New Markets . .

Ground Support

dustry . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Services. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 8

COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

A commercial activity is generally understood

to be one undertaken for profit in the public marketplace; “commercialization” then implies the

transfer of technology from a research and development (R&D) and/or federally supported operations stage to a for-profit stage, usually under

private sector ownership and control. It is difficult

to give a precise definition for commercialization

because the term assumes a variety of specific

meanings depending on the context in which it

is used. For example, aerospace companies earn

a profit on the aircraft they manufacture for the

military, but military aircraft are generally not considered to be commercial products, except insofar as they are sold to other countries. Civilian

aircraft, on the other hand, are considered thoroughly commercial, in that they are designed,

developed, and sold to make a profit in a competitive marketplace. Nonetheless, such aircraft

depend partly on technology developed by the

Federal Government, either for military use, or

in a Government research program.

Though the desired result of all efforts toward

commercialization may be similar (i. e., to earn

a profit in a competitive environment), the processes necessary to achieve this result and the

sources of the technologies involved are often

quite different. Such differences become significant in a context such as the U.S. space program,

in which commercialization of space technology

is encouraged as a matter of policy. The purposes

of this chapter will be to: 1 ) identify some of the

problems involved in trying to commercialize

specific space technologies; 2) examine private

sector attitudes towards commercialization; and

3) describe some of the current Government programs implemented to encourage commercialization.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the special factors that space introduces to the process

of industrial innovation. New product, process,

and service innovations are analyzed along with

the barriers and inducements to their commercialization. The remainder of this chapter discusses several of the current space-related, profitmaking activities and indicates areas in which

the private sector may invest in the future.

PROCESS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION IN SPACE

Overview

In most areas of business opportunity, Federal

R&D funds support or supplement larger private

R&D investment. Public funds are generally

thought to be justified for basic research into highrisk pursuits with long payback times, or for technologies having obvious social benefits. With respect to space, and with the notable exception

of some communications applications, the private

sector has invested relatively little in R&D exploring new business possibilities. This puts the Federal Government in the position of pushing technological opportunities in an area without substantial business interest beyond the aerospace

community or an established or integrated market. The purpose of this section will be to explore

the Government’s recent emphasis on commercializing space technology and the reasons

behind the reluctance of the private sector to invest capital in space research.

Although the basic characteristics of the innovative process (see app. H) can be applied to any

industry, innovation in space technology raises

several unique problems. Among the special

characteristics of space-based innovation, the

following stand out:

● Entry costs are extremely high. No form of

ground-based research, development, and

demonstration can do away with the require219
220 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ment for testing of systems in space before

a new business using space-based technology can apply it commercially. Access to

orbit is very expensive, and will continue to

be expensive even in the shuttle era, particularly if compared with the costs required to

develop and demonstrate the commercial

viability of most Earth-based innovations.

Even with the less stringent design requirements of the shuttle payload bay, space

systems are more expensive to design than

their Earth-bound equivalents. The cost of

using the shuttle as a laboratory to verify or

develop potential innovations may discourage many potential developers. This additional expenditure, incurred well before

commercial feasibility has been established,

is a radical departure from normal product

development on Earth.

Ž Government controls the means ot access

to space. Until some entrepreneur is capable

of operating a reliable space launch system,

access to space will be through launchers developed and operated by the Government,

In few other business sectors is an essential

element of the innovative process totally

under Government control. Access to

launches, launch assurances,. availability of

support facilities, and the cost of space

transportation may all be influenced by nonbusiness considerations such as changes in

an administration’s space policy, national

security constraints, or fluctuations in congressional and public support. If the necessary space facilities are not available when

needed, the resulting costly delays could be

fatal to a new commercial program.

● The markets for space industrialization are

undeveloped. Unlike innovations that

emerge from an existing or clearly possible

market opportunity, some space-based businesses will be based on totally new capabilities that will have to create new markets.

Communications satellites, the often cited

example of successfully commercialized

space technology, were a more efficient

substitute for existing means of long-distance

communication. This interchangeability of

technologies is not characteristic of many of

the other space-based business opportunities

which have been identified to date.

● Public interests dominate space activities.

There are few areas of space applications in

which one or more of the following public

concerns—national security, international

economic competition, return to the public

from the investment of Government funds,

improving the quality of public services provided by Government—are not influential.

As a result, it is difficult to disentangle space

applications from their public-sector origins.

For the foreseeable future, it is difficult to

understand how space systems will be developed and operated as totally private ventures

without some form of Government oversight

or involvement.

Product, Process, and Service Innovation

Much of the current discussion concerning

space industrialization has focused on the unique

characteristics of the space environment and the

new product, process, and service innovations

that may result from the use of this environment.

There is a tendency in such discussions to regard

space industrialization as an undifferentiated set

of activities, each offering equal opportunities for

investment and commercialization. Important

distinctions concerning the sophistication and

reliability of the relevant technologies and the

presence or absence of a market for the proposed

innovation are often overlooked. Consequently,

space activities that have pregent commercial potential are often confused with those that merely offer productive avenues for basic research.

It is important to review a few of the current and

proposed space activities in order to understand

how their many individual differences affect their

potential for successful commercialization. The

following section will take a brief look at satellite

communications, remote sensing and space transpiration, with a more detailed examination of the

commercial prospects for materials processing in

space.

Satellite Communications

To understand how communications satellites

fit into the overall scheme of space industrializa-
Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology Ž 221

tion, it is necessary to view this technology in an

historical perspective and to disregard for the

moment its present complex manifestations. I n

the late 1950’s in the United States there was a

great deal of Government and private interest in

satellite communications. The private sector, notably AT&T, was keenly aware of the commercial

potential of such systems and was proceeding

with its-own research while keeping a close watch

on the progress of both the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense. The research of AT&T eventually resulted in the design and construction of

Telstar, the U.S. first civilian active repeater

satellite. 1

The fact that AT&T initiated and funded its own

satellite research program without first obtaining

from NASA a guarantee for financial or technical

assistance is a point that deserves some scrutiny.

Corporate investment in new product development is generally undertaken only after a

critical appraisal of the relevant technology, the

anticipated development cost and anticipated

return, and the market demand. AT&T’s decision

to extend its communications network into space

was no exception to this general rule.

From the technological point of view, communications satellites had three distinct advantages

over many of the space projects that are presently

under consideration. First, a communications satellite is, or rather can be, a very simple device.

All that is required is the proper placement above

a specific Earth point and the ability to reflect

either radio or microwaves to another Earth

point.2

Secondly, much of the research and testing of

a communications satellite could be done on the

ground. This meant that development time would

be faster and research costs would be lower and

more predictable.

Finally, corporate developers had the assurance

of knowing that when their product was finished

1 D. Smith, Communications Via Sate//ife, 1976, p. 82.

‘Using this basic concept, the U.S. Army Signal Corp, in 1945,

undertook project Diana, which was an attempt to use the Moon

as a passive reflector of radio signals. This research led to the development, in 1959, of a two-way transmission system between Washington and Hawaii. Ibid., p. 30.

it would provide them with three distinct advantages over ground-based communication systems. These advantages are insensitivity to

distance, broadcast ability, and flexible routing.

Distance insensitivity means that the cost of communicating between two points remains the same

no matter how far they are apart. This must

be contrasted with communications by cable,

where the cost is nearly proportional to the length

of the cable. A satellite is also capable of broadcasting simultaneously to several Earth points,

whereas a cable can carry communications only

between two specific locations. Flexible routing

means that a satellite’s circuits can be switched

to different routes as traffic patterns change. Terrestrial circuits, on the other hand, must be plentiful enough to meet peak demands on specific

fixed routes,

Another important factor that went into AT&T’s

decision to invest in satellite communications was

its dominant market position. In addition to its

large domestic telephone market, by the time

Early Bird was launched in 1965, AT&T owned

a majority interest in all the transatlantic cables

connecting North America and Europe. Unlike

the firms which today may be considering some

type of enterprise in space, AT&T had a strong

hold over the market it was about to enter. In

a similar vein, Western Union’s development of

“Westar,” the first domestic satellite system,

should be viewed in light of Western Union’s

position as the sole domestic telegraph carrier.

Its decision to offer domestic satellite service proceeded in large part from its evaluation that a

market for this specialized service existed.

In the early 1960’s, communications satellites

were also attractive from a financial point of view.

A Rand Corp. report published at this time had

estimated that a low-altitude satellite system

would cost approximately $8,500 a year per

channel, compared with $27,000 for a new underwater cable system.4 Though these projections

were not entirely accurate, the commercial results of the use of communications satellites are

reflected in the history of transatlantic telephone

charges. In 1966, immediately after the first com3h4. Kins]ey, Outer Space and /nner Sanctums, 1976, P. 131.

4D. Smith, op. cit., p. 67.
222 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

munications satellite went into operation, monthly charges for transatlantic phone circuits

dropped sharply and have continued to fall since

that times This reduction in price reflects the fact

that satellites are a cheaper, more efficient means

by which to accomplish long-distance terrestrial

communications.

Remote Sensing

Remote sensing of the Earth from space is the

second of the space applications with near-term

commercial potential. (For a more detailed discussion of this subject see ch. 3.) When Landsat

1 was launched in July of 1972, the U.S. Government owned and operated, through NASA, both

the space and ground segments of the system.6

Recently, responsibility for the operation of a

civilian remote sensing system has been assigned to the Commerce Department’s National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA). Eventually NOAA will take over the

operation of the Landsat spacecraft now operated

by NASA with the ultimate goal of transferring

both the space and ground segments of the system to the private sector.

Though there is a considerable amount of interest in remote sensing, it is unclear whether the

private sector can accept the full responsibility

for a complete Earth resource system. There are

three main reasons for this reluctance.7 The first

is that, unlike satellite communications, the market for remote sensing is quite new. Though it

is potentially strong, it is now too undefined to

allow accurate projections of return on investment. The second problem is that the Government is now and will probably remain the largest

user of remotely sensed data. The success of private enterprise in this area will depend on whether or not the Government decides to satisfy its

civilian remote sensing data requirements from

a private operator, the price it will pay for such

services and whether the Government will agree

not to compete with the private sector. The third

Sj. E. Schnee, “inventory of Space Activities (Economic), ” presented at the Symposium on Space Activities and Implications, institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, October 1980.

bFor a brief history of the Landsat program and technology see:

National Academy of Sciences, Resource Sensing From Space, 1977.

7See generally: An Interagency Task Force “Private Sector involvement in Civil Remote Sensing, ” June 15, 1979.

problem is that the prices now charged for data

will not support systems costs. Up until this time

the costs of data have reflected only the marginal

cost of reproduction. This has been possible because NASA, during the R&D phase of its remote

sensing program, subsidized all of the operational costs. In the near future the French and Japanese may be operating government-subsidized

remote sensing satellites. If this is the case, U.S.

firms, whose price structures must reflect the total

costs of operations, may not be able to compete

in the world market.

As a result of these factors, it is unlikely that

the private sector will be interested in owning the

remote sensing system as presently configured

until investors perceive that the probable return

on investment is at least comparable to that

available from other risk-investment opportunities. It should be noted that Landsat may not be

an appropriate model by which to gage the costs

of a commercial remote sensing system. Because

Landsat is an R&D system, it is encumbered with

many costs and inefficiencies that could be eliminated in a commercial system developed to meet

specific user needs with appropriate and costeffective technology.

At this time corporations are involved only indirectly in remote sensing from space. In addition

to the products and services developed and manufactured by the aerospace industry for the various Federal programs, the private sector has also

developed and provided analytical hardware,

software and services to private and Government

users.

presently, there are over 50 organizations in the

United States involved in the analysis of remotely sensed data on a commercial basis. These organizations use the imagery acquired from space

to evaluate areas of the Earth’s surface for such

varied purposes as hydrocarbon resource potential, estimating crop production and land use

surveys. Several firms are also selling hardware

designed to process remotely sensed data.

[n the near future, it would appear that private

involvement in remote sensing will be limited to

providing the above mentioned hardware sales

and “value-added” services. Only when the markets are sufficiently large, with data prices reflect-
,

Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology Ž 223

ing the true costs of acquisition, can the private

sector be expected to own and operate remote

sensing systems.

Space Transportation

Recently there has been considerable discussion concerning the possibility of establishing privately owned launch systems. This discussion has

focused on three alternatives: 1) commercialization of the U.S. present expendable launch vehicles; 2) transfer of shuttle ownership and/or

operation to the private sector; and 3) private

development of a new generation of low-cost expendable launch vehicles. At present, the

absence of a comprehensive Government policy

which favors and encourages the participation of

the private sector in launch system ownership has

inhibited such developments.

The present expendable launch vehicles (ELVS),

such as the McDonnell Douglas Delta and the

General Dynamics Atlas-Centaur, are already

operated on a quasi-commercial basis. These

vehicles are commonly purchased through NASA

by communications companies for communications satellite launches. Although the vehicle is

launched by the Government, its cost and and

those related ground services are borne by the

private sector purchaser. The transition from the

quasi-commercial provision of launch services to

a purely commercial system may be difficult to

accomplish. Because the Government has historically developed and operated launch vehicles

and presently owns all of the sophisticated U.S.

launch facilities, some form of Government-industry cooperation would seem to be a necessity. This, in itself, should not be a cause of concern because, as the aeronautics industry proves,

Government and industry can work together to

the mutual benefit of each. The problem that

does arise, however, is that in certain instances

the goals of the Government are not those of

industry.

For example, the present Government commitment to the shuttle entails several costs which

NASA, at present, does not intend to recover

from shuttle users. This type of subsidy allows the

shuttle (and likewise the Ariane launch vehicle

of the European Space Agency (ESA)) to be priced

in a manner that does not reflect the true costs

of operations. From NASA’s standpoint as an

R&D agency this subsidy may be desirable because it encourages the use of a newly developed

system. However, the shuttle price then becomes

the price the private sector must match in order

to compete for commercial payloads. Because

a commercial operation must not only meet its

costs but also generate a profit, it is questionable

whether proven technology such as the U.S. ELVS

can be commercially competitive in the absence

of some form of Government assistance. Such

assistance couId come in the form of a promise

of a certain number of government launches, access to government launch facilities or more traditional incentives such as tax breaks. However,

given this country’s long-term commitment to the

shuttle, it seems unlikely that such assistance will

be forthcoming.

There has been some discussion concerning

the possibility of converting surplus military

rockets, such as the Polaris or Minuteman, to

commercial launch vehicles. Given that the Government would support such a plan, the main advantage to using these vehicles would be their

extremely low cost. There would, however, be

a number of disadvantages. Because these vehicles do not have the power to carry large payloads to geostationary orbit, they could not be

used to launch many of the newest communications satellites. Furthermore, the fact that these

launch vehicles would be surplus equipment operated by nongovernment personnel would make

it difficult, at least initially, to obtain launch contracts from companies accustomed to the security

of dealing with NASA. It would be unlikely that

customers would be willing to entrust valuable

payloads to an unproved private company particularly if adequate launch insurance were not

available.

Transfer of the shuttle to the private sector has

also been considered. Such a decision would involve a major policy shift on the part of the Government, with substantial institutional and financial reprecussions. Important questions would

have to be examined: 1) what part, if any, of the

shuttle development costs should the Government attempt to recoup; 2) could the national
224 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

security needs of the United States be met by a

privately owned shuttle; and 3) could a private

shuttle compete in the international arena with

foreign, subsidized launch systems? None of

these problems necessarily prevents the shuttle

from being owned and operated by the private

sector; however, the resolution of any of these

problems requires a substantial degree of Government involvement.

Several private firms have also consitiered the

possibility of developing a new generation of lowcost launch vehicles. However, even using

proved ELV technology, the high cost and long

development time associated with such an endeavor have so far prevented the successful development of such a vehicle. Were such a firm

to be technologically successful, commercial success would still depend on a positive Government

attitude toward such an enterprise. Questions

such as launch safety, payload regulation, acquisition of new launch facilities, and launch agreements with foreign governments would still require resolution. The time and expense involved

in developing a private launch system combined

with government delays and regulatory complications may well create too heavy a burden for the

private sector to carry alone.

Materials Processing in Space (MPS)

As indicated earlier in this report (see ch. 3),

the unique properties of outer space, most notably microgravity, are amenable to a number of

industrial processes. Some of the organic and inorganic materials that may in the future be processed in space have already been mentioned

above. it should be noted, however, that the nascent state of MPS technology and the lack of

clearly defined markets place materials processing in a long-term, high-cost, high-risk category

that is generally beyond the interest and financial capabilities of most private commercial concerns. It is unrealistic to expect any major financial commitments from the private sector until

the technical capability and economic feasibility of new space processing techniques have been

demonstrated. At least for the near future, the

responsibility for proving the technical and economic feasibility of new space technologies will

rest on the Government acting, either alone or

in joint ventures with the private sector. Because

of the emphasis NASA placed on commercializing MPS technology, it is useful to examine this

space application in some detail.

BARRIERS TO COMMERCIALIZATION

OF MPS TECHNOLOGY

Most of the products and processes presently

being considered for development in space are,

at best, in the basic research stage of the innovative process. Though it would be correct to say

that the private sector will begin to invest in space

industry only after achieving a more sophisticated

understanding of how materials and processes

behave in space, such an analysis identifies only

one aspect of its reluctance. A number of commercial, legal, and organizational factors must

also be considered.

Few attractive investments.—of all the barriers

to process innovation in space, the most important is that the ideas for new products and processes that have been suggested simply are not

very attractive investments. Industrial R&D projects are a discretionary expenditure, and therefore must compete for corporate capital with

other investment opportunities. A project’s ability

to compete is a function of the amount of risk

it involves, its estimated front-end costs, and its

foreseeable rate of return.

The risks involved in space innovation are considerable. For example, several pharmaceutical

products have been identified that may be produced either more cheaply or with greater ease

in outer space. However, before any of these

products could reach the market a number of significant problems would face the manufacturer.

First, there would have to be a period of groundbased R&D where the techniques to be employed

in space would be developed. Next, the process

would have to be verified in space. This problem depends on the availability of NASA test facilities, such as the shuttle, which in turn depends

on how the current political and economic environment affects NASA funding. Because the Government has the right to terminate contracts

unilaterally, a company that has spent millions

of dollars on R&D could find itself without access to shuttle flights. Though the Government

might have to reimburse a client’s costs on a con-
Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology ● 225

tract it canceled, such reimbursement would not

include the opportunity costs—that is, the costs

of devoting resources to a space processing program in place of some other business opportunity. If the process were verified in space, Food and

Drug Administration (FDA) approval would still

be necessary before the new pharmaceutical

product could be marketed, and–depending on

the complexity of the manufacturing process—

new legal and regulatory agencies might be

necessary.

Even if all of these R&D hurdles could be

cleared, the economic success of a drug manufactured in space would still depend on the company’s ability to produce and sell large enough

specific annual quantities of a new product. It is

unlikely that the shuttle, as it is presently configured, could guarantee such a requirement.

Long-term MPS facilities based in space and dedicated to commercial space processing neither

exist nor are planned for the near future.

It is by no means certain that a firm wishing

to manufacture a product in space would have

to face all of the complications enumerated

above. The results of MPS experiments undertaken over the next 2 to 5 years may reveal many

commercially attractive opportunities for products or services that can be performed on the

shuttle as presently configured. Nonetheless, the

risks involved in space-based product research

do create a substantial barrier to investment.

In addition to the technical and institutional

risks involved in utilizing the space environment,

there are also uncertainties regarding cost and

development time. The present shuttle pricing

schedule does not reflect the true costs of operations. A recent General Accounting Office report

has suggested that NASA should void its pricing

policy (except for those launches that have legally

binding agreements) and charge “substantially

higher prices for future Iaunches."8 Uncertainties as to the price of future shuttle missions make

it difficult for business planners to estimate the

cost of space-based product development.

Firms interested in investing in a new product

must estimate that product’s potential rate of

“’NASA Pricing Policy on the Space Transportation System,” GAO

Report to Congress, Feb. 23, 1982.

return. When considering the rate of return that

a space-based industry might generate, one must

take into account the development time of such

a project. Because a dollar held today has greater

buying power than a dollar held in the future,

the dollar that is anticipated in the future must

be “discounted” to reflect its actual value in

today’s dollars. This means that the longer any

project takes from its R&D phase to commercialization, the greater the profit must be when

the project begins to make money. This is particularly true during times of high inflation and

high interest rates. The combination of technical

uncertainties and potential problems in obtaining the shuttle flights necessary for project

verification makes it difficult to predict the

development time for space-based projects. The

combination of high-cost, high-risk, long-payback

time and uncertain rate of return makes it difficult

for space-based projects to compete for internally

generated corporate capital with other, more

traditional, investment opportunities. Similarly,

conventional methods of financing such as equity

capital or borrowing may not be available, and

the degree of risk involved here may also discourage the flow of venture capital into this area. g

Uncertainties as to value of space environrnent.-ln addition to the view that there is little

to be done in space, there is a tendency in the

business community to believe that whatever can

be done in space can also be done on Earth.

Though it is often stated that the microgravity of

space is fundamentally different from Earth gravity and cannot be duplicated, new technologies

have been developed which do minimize the effects of gravity on Earth. Examples of this fact can

be seen in recent developments in containerless

processing and in the manufacture of latex polymers.

It is believed that one of the advantages to inspace manufacturing will be that materials can

be processed without picking up impurities from

the wall of the container that holds them. Recently a U.S. firm working with NASA developed a

containerless processing system for making special glass products on Earth. 1o in this system the

gThe space industrialization Act of 1979: statement Of Russell Carson at hearings on H.R. 2337, before the Subcommittee on Space

Science and Applications, 96th Cong, 1st sess., p. 1767.

!Olndustry Week, Mar. 3, 1980, P. 90.
226 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

glass is suspended within a chamber by sound

beams in a process called acoustic levitation.

Another example of an Earth-based advance that

has a space counterpart is the manufacture of

latex polymers. It is believed that, in space, latex

polymers could be enlarged to as much as 40 microns. Although it had been assumed that the

gravity on Earth would limit the expansion of

these materials to 2 microns, Norwegian scientists using new chemical techniques have increased the size of latex polymers to 10 microns. 

11 Though neither process functions as efficiently as would similar space-based processes,

they are accomplished without the enormous expense and administrative complexity of spacebased manufacturing. Industry will be hesitant to

invest in space as long as there is at least some

hope that Earth-based manufacturing techniques

can accomplish similiar results.

Prior investment in Earth technology.–Even if

industry could be sure of the commercial viability

of some of the projects that have been proposed,

its prior investment in Earth-based technology

may make it reluctant to pursue new innovations

in space. Radical innovation, whether in space

or on the Earth, usually means discarding expensive equipment before a company has had time

fully to depreciate it. For example, it has been

suggested that the U.S. auto industry’s enormous

investment in automating the manufacture of cast

iron brake drums probably delayed by more than

5 years its transition to disc brakes.12 Some companies prefer safer methods of maximizing profit, such as advertising, market research, and

automation, rather than risking investment in new

products and processes. The majority of industrial

product and process development is directed at

reducing costs and increasing profits in the short

run. For this reason it is more common for industry to seek new methods of making existing

products more cheaply or marketing them more

effectively than to develop new products.

This is not the first time that this conflict

between old technology and new has been an

issue in the space debate. In the early 1960’s,

‘ 1 Ibid.

IZRobert H. Hayes and William j. Abernathy, “Managing Our WaY

to Economic Decline” Harvard Business Review, july and August

1980, p. 70.

when Congress was trying to fashion an institutional structure and a method of ownership

for the Communications Satellite Corporation

(COMSAT), there were serious reservations about

allowing the existing international communications carriers to invest in the corporation. It was

assumed that companies with large investments

in existing facilities would be reluctant to take

speedy action to implement new satellite systems

that would make their existing facilities obsolete.

To some extent, a similar concern may be raised

regarding companies that could benefit from

space-based manufacturing techniques. Even if

the product that could be produced in space is

better or more efficient than its Earth-manufactured equivalent, a corporation’s prior investments may prohibit it from pursuing this new

technology.

Intellectual property. -Another potential barrier to process innovation in space is the fact that

a large portion of the private sector has no experience in dealing with the Federal Government

other than as an occasional vendor of supplies

and materials. In the normal course of events, a

firm working for the Government is required to

submit periodic reports detailing the progress of

its work. Such requirements are at odds with the

usual desire of industry to protect its investments

in R&D by refusing to disclose details or results

of current research. Industry is also concerned

that a business relationship with the Government

could result in the loss of certain intellectual property rights.

The Freedom of Information Act13 raises a number of problems concerning the protection of data

and proprietary rights. It requires the disclosure

of “Government records” upon request, unless

the records fit into one of the narrow exceptions

to the act. Information obtained under a guarantee of confidentiality may be protected and

“trade secrets” are a recognized exception to the

act. A company working with NASA must carefully screen that which may become a “Government record” and be sure that if sensitive information becomes “Government record” it qualifies as one of the exceptions to the disclosure

requirements.

135 us. 552.
Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology . 227

Several legal issues may inhibit the private sector’s involvement in the innovative process in

space. The first concerns the question of ownership of the patent rights to new products and

processes discovered during the course of a joint

endeavor with NASA. Section 305 of the 1958

NAS Act states that “whenever any invention is

made in the performance of any work under any

contract of [NASA], such invention becomes the

exclusive property of the United States unless

[NASA] waives rights thereto . . . "14 A strict

reading of this section would vest in NASA the

ownership of all inventions discovered while

working for, or in a joint venture with NASA.

Over the last two decades NASA has limited the

application of section 305 to activities performed

for NASA which have as their main purpose the

development of some new product or process.

With regard to joint ventures, it has been NASA’s

position that neither party assumes any obligation to perform inventive work for the other, and

accordingly each party retains the rights to any

invention that may be made in the course of the

venture. 15

International Law. –I n the area of international

law, the private sector seems to be troubled by

the growing use in international treaties of “common interest” clauses such as the Common Heritage of Mankind principle which has been discussed at the Law of the Sea Convention and appears in the proposed Moon Treaty.l6 Simply

stated, these clauses assert that certain resources,

such as the minerals on the ocean floor and on

the Moon and the “slots” in geostationary orbit,

are presently under the jurisdiction and control

of no sovereign power; these resources, being

finite and exhaustible, should not be allocated

to the developed countries on a first-come, firstserved basis, but rather, should be made to benefit all nations. Although these “common interest”

clauses have found their way into all the major

space treaties, there is considerable uncertainty

as to their status within the body of international

T 442 u .s, c. 2451, et. seq.

I Jspace Industrializatio n Act of 1979: statement of Robert A.

Frosch at hearings on H.R. 2337, before the Subcommittee on Space

Science and Applications of the House Committee on Science and

Technology, 96 Cong. 1st sess., 1979. 16Agreement coverning the Activities of States on the Moon and

Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. doc. A1341664.

law. Some writers have suggested that these

clauses are merely pragmatic principles without

legal force.l7 Others regard them as binding principles which obligate states to be responsive in

some form to the interests of developing countries.l8

The use of “common interest” clauses in international treaties has brought about strong opposition from the private sector. The most common

argument heard in this regard is that the concept

of equitable sharing is inconsistent with the concept of profit, and in the absence of the profit

motive private enterprise cannot be expected to

risk capital on space investments. At this stage

of space industrialization such considerations

have had only a minimal effect on the private

decisions whether or not to invest in space.

INDUCEMENTS TO PROCESS INNOVATION

IN SPACE

Profit potential. –Though there are substantial

physical, economic, and psychological barriers

to process innovation in space, certain inducements do exist which may encourage private

sector participation in this area. Probably the

most important incentive to the private sector is

the potential for making a profit. At the present

time only two product areas seem to offer the

combination of technical feasibility and market

potential that are necessary for a profitable venture. The first of these product areas is pharmaceuticals.

McDonnell Douglas together with Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. has investigated the commercial

cial potential of several pharmaceutical products,

which could be processed by electrophoresis in

space, and has entered into a joint agreement

with NASA to test this technology. This project

has been described by McDonnell Douglas as an

“aggressive, well-ordered commercial business

venture” in which the combined investment of

the pat-ties will be measured in terms of millions

of dollars. Clearly McDonnell Douglas and Ortho

1 ZC. Q. Christol, “The Legal Common Heritage of Mankind: Capturing an Illusive Concept and Applying It to World Needs, ” XVIII,

Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1976, p. 42.

15. Gorove, “Limitations on the Principle of Freedom of Exploration and Use of Outer Space,” X111, Colloquium on the Law of Outer

Space, 1973, p. 74, et. seq.
228 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

believe that there is a profit to be made in developing this technology.

Other potentially profitable products that can

be manufactured in space are the starting material

for electronic devices such as large-diameter crystals. Like pharmaceuticals, these crystals have a

high market value per unit mass. The facilities

needed to manufacture the basic materials are

also small, so that the total orbital mass is low,

even for very high production rates. The economic advantage of manufacturing the starting materials for electronic devices in space is less sure

than for pharmaceuticals and no one has made

a major investment in this technology.l9 It should

be noted that the Earth-manufactured electronic

devices presently enjoy a sales level of about $16

billion per year with an estimated growth rate of

10 to 15 percent annually for the next 10 years.

Such a healthy market is conducive to innovation and may eventually provide the incentive for

the private sector to invest in space-based manufacturing techniques.

In addition to products, it is possible that the

private sector may find it profitable to offer certain space-based services. The GTI Joint Endeavor

Agreement with NASA (discussed below) is based

on this assumption. GTI is developing a metallurgical furnace which it hopes to rent to parties

interested in the effects of solidification in microgravity. As experience is gained in MPS research,

it is likely that other space-based services will be

offered by the private sector.

Scientific knowdedge. –Another reason that the

private sector may wish to invest in process innovation in space is to gain a better understanding

of present Earth-based manufacturing techniques.

For example, methods now used for the commercial growth of large crystals have been developed

empirically with little theoretical understanding

of what occurs at the microlevel during growth.

It is possible that significant improvements in

Earth-based crystal growth could result if lowgravity experiments were to provide a better theoretical understanding of the growth process. In

a similar vein, the John Deere Corp. has entered

lgMaterials processing in Space, report of the Committee on Scientific and Technological Aspects of Materials Processing in Space,

National Research Council, 1978, p. 40.

into an agreement with NASA to study the solidification of cast iron. The purpose of this research

will be to gain a better understanding of how the

graphite formation of cast iron influences the

metal’s properties. It is expected that low-gravity

experiments will provide insights into this question which, though obtained in space, will have

practical use on Earth.

Institutional incentives. — In order to encourage

private involvement, NASA has established the

Commercial Applications Office in its MPS program. This office forms a bridge between NASA

and the private sector which provides assistance

to the industrial user and suggestions to NASA

on how the commercial growth of MPS might be

advanced. Joint projects between industry and

NASA are “no exchange of funds” agreements

to cooperate in a given area with each party

assigned specific tasks to accomplish. The Commercial Applications Office has developed three

basic levels of working relationships with private

organ izations:

Technical exchange agreement (TEA) .–For

companies interested in applying microgravity

technology, but not ready to commit to a specific

space flight experiment or venture, NASA has

developed TEA. Under a TEA, NASA and a company agree to exchange technical information

and cooperate in the conduct and analysis of

ground-based research programs. In this agreement, a firm can become familiar with microgravity technology and its applicability to the company product line at minimal expense. Under

TEA, the private company funds its own participation, and derives direct access to and results from

NASA facilities and research, with NASA gaining

the support and expertise of the private company’s industrial research capability.

Industrial guest investigators (lGl).–ln an IGI

agreement, NASA and industry share sufficient

mutual scientific interest that a company arranges

for one of its scientists to collaborate (at company

expense) with a NASA-sponsored principal investigator on a space flight MPS experiment. Once

the parties agree to the contribution to be made

to the objectives of the experiment, the IGI

becomes a member of the investigation team,

thus adding industrial expertise and insight to the

experiment.
.

Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology ● 229

Joint endeavor agreement (JEA)-JEA is a cooperative arrangement in which private participants and NASA share common program objectives, program responsibilities, and financial risk.

The objective of a JEA is to encourage early space

ventures and demonstrate the usefulness of space

technology to meet marketplace needs. A JEA is

a legal agreement between equal partners, and

is not a procurement action; no funds are exchanged between NASA and the industrial partner. A private participant selects an experiment

and/or technology demonstration for a joint

endeavor which complies with MPS program objectives, conducts the necessary ground investigation, and develops flight hardware at company

expense. As incentive for this investment, NASA

agrees to provide free shuttle flights for projects

which meet certain basic criteria, such as technical merit, contribution to innovation, and acceptable business arrangements. As further incentive, the participant is allowed to retain certain

proprietary rights to the results, particularly the

non patentable information that yields a competitive edge in marketing products based on MPS

results. However, NASA receives sufficient data

to evaluate the significance of the results, and requires that any promising technologies be applied

commercially on a timely basis, or published.

NASA has developed these three types of working relationships in order to attract private-sector

interest at varying investment levels. It hopes that

firms with limited funds and cautious R&D policies may start out with a TEA or an IGI and, if

in-space experimentation appears valuable,

upgrade their cooperative efforts to a JEA.

Another interesting method for attracting and

maintaining the interest of private enterprise in

space-based manufacturing is the proposed Space

Industrialization Corporation (SIC) .20

The bill which proposed SIC declares that

it is a finding of Congress that “space activities

have matured to the point where the attributes

of space are generally understood” and a “number of potential uses of the properties of the space

environment are already known to have commercial applications. ” In light of these findings, the

‘“’’ The Space Industrialization Act of 1979,” H.R. 2337.

bill proposed the creation of a mixed-ownership

corporation funded initially by Congress to “promote, encourage, and assist in the development

of new products, processes, services, and industries using the properties of the space environmerit. ”

As a mixed-ownership corporation, SIC would

be managed by a Board of Directors appointed

by the President, consisting of a chairman, three

qualified members of the executive branch, and

eight members from the private sector. The

financing of SIC would take the form of a “Space

Industrialization Trust Fund.” Congress would

provide this fund with $50 million per year for

the first 2 fiscal years and then additional sums

as might be necessary.

When the Board of Directors determined that

the corporation was operating “successfully, effectively, and profitably,” then it would take

steps to transfer SIC from a mixed-ownership corporation to pure public ownership. As a publicly held corporation, the financing for SIC would

derive from issuing capital stock and selling nonvoting securities and bonds.

One would assume, in light of the financial difficulties involved in private sector participation in

materials processing in space, that a proposal

such as SIC would meet with general approval.

This, however, has not been the case. Many have

hastened to point out that though the proposed

SIC is a step in the right direction, the idea in its

present form contains some serious problems.

The problems most often cited by those opposing SIC in its present form are: 1 ) that such a proposal is premature in that the attributes of space

are not generally understood; and 2) that it may

interfere with the activities of NASA, particularly its MPS program.21

Government Encouragement

of Innovation

Government involvement in the process of innovation raises important questions as to the appropriate roles of the public and private sectors

21The Space Industrialization Act of 1979, op. cit., P. 64.
230 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

in the development and operation of new technology. Ordinarily, the private sector bears the

total responsibility for funding R&D intended to

be incorporated into commercial systems. However, over the past several decades the Government has provided significant support, not only

for basic research but also for applied research,

technology and systems development, and even

demonstration projects in the aerospace industry.

In each of these instances, the Government role

in the process of innovation was determined by

the complex interaction of such variables as: the

sophistication of the technology involved, its

perceived importance to national goals, the structure of the market to which the technology is addressed, the level of industry interest, and the

ability of the private sector to develop the relevant technology without Government support.

The following section presents three different

examples of how Government intervention has

been used to direct and encourage technological

innovation.

Aeronautics

An often-cited example of Government success

in moving new technology out of its own control and into the private sector, is NASA’s aeronautical research program. This effort began as

a direct outgrowth of the program of the National

Advisory Council on Aeronautics (NACA), initiated in the mid-1920’s and formalized in March

1946 by the National Aeronautical Research Policy. This policy, promulgated to clarify the relationship of NACA with other R&D agencies,

charged NACA with the responsibility for conducting “research in the aeronautical sciences.”

By comparison, the policy assigned to industry

the responsibility for the “application of research

results in the design and development of improved aircraft equipment.” In other words, the

Government agreed to assume the responsibility of early applied research but product development would remain the responsibility of the private sector. This approach seems to have worked

rather well, inasmuch as the history of U.S. civilian aviation is crowded with examples of technology which found its way into commercial use

after initial, early research at government expense. For example, super critical airfoils, the

high bypass tubofan jet engine, the microwave

Landing system, the turboprop engine, and many

others were all introduced for commercial exploitation in the American market after years of

fundamental R&D work by NACA and later by

NASA.22

In its generally successful efforts to launch government-developed aviation technology into the

private sector, NASA exploys two concepts for

identifying at what point the development of a

given technology should become the responsibility of the private sector. These two concepts are

“technology validation” and its logical followup,

“technology readiness. "23 The former describes

the state of a technique, still under investigation,

when its essential performance characteristics

have been proved but before there is confidence

in the level of costs associated with fabrication

of that device or technique under investigation.

The latter term, “technology readiness” is employed to describe a technology that has been

demonstrated to have a reasonably high probability of resulting in a commercially manageable

fabrication process. Note that NASA does not actually design a fabrication process, but only “certifies” in an informal way that the road seems

clear for a private firm to do so. In this sense the

technology is “ready” for the private sector.

NASA has performed the generic R&D that is necessary to prove the worth of a new application

of engineering science to aviation technology. It

does this both for the particular technology in

question and also, if the success of the first stages

warrants, for the fabrication or manufacturing

technology necessary to produce the innovation.

If at this point industry wishes to shoulder the risk

of further specific R&D (which is usually much

more expensive than the preliminary, generic

R&D) based on its judgment of level of expected

return on its investment, it may do so with a much

greater degree of confidence than if it were to

start a technology validating process from scratch.

Essentially, this process is one of lowering the

threshold of risk for private investment in a new

and promising technical development. Doing so

at public expense is justifiable so long as there

ZZNMW, The High Speed Frontier: Case Histories of Four NACA

Programs (1980).

20f%ce of Technology Assessment, Impact of Advanced Air Transport Tmhno/ogy, Part 1; pp. 10, 34, 1979.
Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology ● 231

are significant public as well as private benefits

to be exploited in the innovative product, service, or process. It should be pointed out, in

respect to this last notion, that in order for NASA

to be confident of the existence of a “significant

public benefit” to be had from its generic technology development efforts, a well-developed

market for civilian aviation services was an important given condition. The importance of a

well-developed market and its effect on Government R&D is examined in greater detail in the

following discussion of communications satellites

and materials processing in space.

Communications Satellites

Communications satellite technology from its

inception was pursued with enthusiasm by the

private sector. The initial Government position

articulated during the Eisenhower administration

was that NASA should “take the lead within the

executive branch both to advance the needed research and development and to encourage private industry to apply its resources toward the

earliest practicable utilization of space technology

for commercial civil communications requirements . . . "

24 At this time AT&T’s position as the

sole U.S. international telephone carrier and its

financial ability and willingness to commit funds

to the development of communication satellites

made it the obvious industry partner for NASA

efforts. By September 1960, AT&T was ready to

request that NASA clarify its policies concerning

aid to companies working to develop communications satellites25 and had already contacted the

Governments of France, Britain, and Germany

about plans for low-altitude satellites to provide

transatlantic telephone and television service.26

Hughes Aircraft had also contacted NASA to express its interest in, and ideas for, communications satellites.

Had the Eisenhower administration’s policy

been continued, it is almost certain that the private sector would have undertaken the commercialization of satellite communications. With

NASA supplying technical assistance and FCC

regulating such communication under traditional

Z4D. Smith, p. 70.

Zslbid. at 70.

Z61bid.

guidelines, it is probable that the development

of this technology would have proceeded without

the creation of an organization such as COMSAT.

COMSAT was the product of public policy considerations and not of the marketplace. With the

Kennedy administration came a strong commitment to the space program as a means to enhance U.S. prestige and security. It was felt that

satellite communications could be one area of

early U.S. competence. As a result an additional

$10 million was added to the 1961 NASA budget

for communications development.

The addition of these funds had several effects

on the communications satellite innovative process. The most obvious effect was that NASA had

the funds and the mandate to “push” communications technology to maintain U.S. leadership in this field. A peripheral, though seemingly intended result was a postponement of private

sector investment in this technology. This development reflected the decision of the Kennedy administration to assess the policy implications

before placing the development of communications satellites in private hands. It was also consistent with the administration’s desire to keep satellite communications responsive to Government

policy and its cautious approach to what seemed

an imminent AT&T monopoly in international

communications.

In a curious inversion of the normal chain of

events, the Government used its ability to subsidize innovation to retard the process of commercialization rather than to speed it. The Government wished to ensure that any transfer of

technology occurred under conditions that would

be responsive to foreign policy considerations.

This desire was accomplished by the statutory

creation of the unique public/private COMSAT.27

COMSAT is a private corporation with a monopoly in the business of international satellite

communications. The Communication Satellite

Act of 1962 provided that ownership and financing of the corporation would be accomplished

through the issuance of capital stock. The act originally reserved 50 percent of the stock for purchase by communications common carriers auZzcommunication satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S. C. 721.
232 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

thorized by FCC. The act also initially provided

that the Board of Directors was to be composed

of six members elected by the common carrier

stockholders, six elected by the rest of the stockholders, and three appointed by the President

with the advice and consent of the Senate. 28 In

this manner Congress sought to insure that the

Government retained some degree of internal

control over the organization.

The COMSAT Act also provides certain external controls which allow the Government to regulate and direct COMSAT’S activities. Section

201 (a) of the act grants the President the authority to undertake such activities as aiding the planning and development of the system, reviewing

all phases of development and operation, supervising the relationship of the corporation with foreign governments, and insuring foreign participation in the system. Further, the act gives FCC the

power, among other things, to ensure competition in the procurement of equipment and service, to regulate technical compatibility between

satellites and ground stations, to set ratemaking

procedures, and to approve technical characteristics of the system.

The Government’s support of innovation in

communications satellite technology benefited

COMSAT in two ways. First, the technology eventually transferred to the new corporation was

more advanced than that which would otherwise

have been available for commercialization in the

early 1960’s; second, this technology was developed at the public expense. The complicating factor is that because COMSAT was not solely a

commercial venture founded in response to market demands but rather a hybrid organization

designed to implement public policy, the responsibility for innovation in satellite technology has

never been clear. After COMSAT was established,

there was considerable disagreement as to what

role NASA should play in further communications

satellite research and development. Many felt that

COMSAT, as a private entity, should take the inizeThe Communication Satellite Act was amended in 1969. Sec.

303 (a) now states that if the shares of voting stock held by the communications common carriers is less than 8 percent, the common

carriers are not allowed to elect directors separately (47 U.S.C. 73

3(a)), Presently, the common carriers hold less than one-fourth of

1 percent of the total shares outstanding.

tiative and the risks associated with the evolution

of the communications satellite. Others believed

that NASA should continue its R&D role because

the NAS Act of 1958 mandated it to ensure U.S.

leadership in space technology. NASA’s position

in the mid-1 960’s was that it should be allowed

to continue research in advanced technology,

whereas COMSAT’S R&D would be directed to

establishing the initial operating systems.

Using this and similar arguments, NASA continued to receive funding and to do communications satellite R&D until January 1973. At this

time, the combination of NASA budget limitations

and the success of commercial satellites for both

international and domestic service led NASA to

phase out its work on advanced communication

systems.

The Joint Endeavor Agreement

The primary method by which the Government

is seeking to encourage private sector participation in MPS research is through innovative NASA/

industry relationships such as the Technical Exchange Agreement (TEA), the Industrial Guest investigation Agreement (IGIA) and the joint Endeavor Agreement (JEA). Since JEA requires the

greatest commitment on the part of NASA and

the private sector participant, it is useful to examine this arrangement, its problems, and its

potential for success.

As of January 31, 1982, there were two jEAs

in effect. The first of these agreements, referred

to earlier, was with McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. (MDAC) and the second is with the

GTI Corp.

The subject matter of MDAC/JEA is a process

called continuous flow electrophoresis (C-F-E).

This process separates materials in solution by

subjecting them to an electrical field as they flow

continuously through a chamber. The McDonnell Douglas C-F-E experiment will use the shuttle, at NASA’s expense, to develop and demonstrate the applicability of that process to the creation of marketable quantities of pharmaceutical

products. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. has been

selected by McDonnell Douglas as a partner in

its materials processing business venture. Ortho

has completed a detailed market analysis on the

first C-F-E candidate product to be produced in
Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology ● 233

space. The corporation is now developing a detailed animal test program for the product, to be

followed by a clinical test program. “Substantial

sums of money” (in the tens of millions of dollars)

have been and will continue to be invested by

both parties in the venture. According to MDAC,

optimization of C-F-E ground units has been completed, and fabrication of apparatus for space

flight demonstration onboard the shuttle in 1982

is now under way.

In addition, the conceptual design of a precommercial space flight pilot plant has been initiated.

Present plans call for pilot plant demonstration

in 1985/1 986, and maintaining this schedule

should result in commercial operation by 1986

or 1987.

The subject of the JEA with GTI Corp. is a

metallurgical furnace. GTI’s furnace is a 200-lb

computer-controlled chamber that will be flown

in the cargo bay of the shuttle. The furnace will

have 37 compartments for the melting and resolidification of some 220 alloy samples. Should this

JEA prove the technical and commercial feasibility

of this furnace, GTI will market its ability to

manage metallurgical experiments in microgravity

to interested public and private sector research

organizations.

The JEA requires GTI to develop this furnace

and NASA to test it on four shuttle flights. The

first flight is presently scheduled for the third

quarter of 1984.

Because MDAC/JEA has, and probably will continue to serve as a model for future JEAs, and

since the industry/Government relationship established in this agreement differs drastically from

the Government’s relationship to COMSAT, it is

useful to scrutinize the structure and purpose of

this agreement.

To create a climate suitable for commercialization in the MDAC case, the first JEA had to address the following issues:

 ● ExcLusivity. — I n return for MDAC’s prom i se

to make results of the work available to the

U.S. public on reasonable terms and conditions, NASA agrees to refrain from entering

into similar joint endeavors or international

cooperative agreements directly related to

●

●

●

It

the development of processes that would

compete with those resulting from the

MDAC endeavor. NASA is not precluded,

however, from selling flight time on the shuttle to any other organizations wanting to

conduct the same or similar experiments.

Patent and data rights.–NASA will not acquire rights in inventions made by MDAC or

its associates in the course of the joint endeavor, unless MDAC fails to exploit the inventions or terminates the agreement, or unless the NASA Administrator determines that

a national emergency exists involving a serious threat to the public health.

In the event that inventions or improvements are made during the joint endeavor,

MDAC need not report these to the Government. Records will be retained by MDAC

and, if requested by NASA, the company will

provide a brief description of the invention.

Such description is protected as data or a

trade secret if appropriate.

Confidentiality. –The JEA requires that data

supplied by MDAC shall not be related outside the Government, except after notice to

the originator and agreement by the recipient to protect it from unauthorized use and

disclosure.

Recoupment. —Lastly, to provide the financial incentive for MDAC’S investment, the

jEA explicitly recognizes MDAC’S right to a

“fair return on investment.” Coupled with

patent and data rights provisions of the JEA,

a “fair return on investment” is to be

measured by what is obtained in the appropriate industry, including such factors as the

high-risk, long-term nature of the investment.

is apparent from this brief review that the

Government role in MPS is significantly different

from its role in the development of aviation and

communications satellite technologies. In part

this can be attributed to the fact that the markets

and technology for MPS are still in an embryonic

stage. In addition, research in communications

satellites and civilian aviation can be conducted

with only minimal recourse to Government facilities and the commercial operation of these

technologies can be accomplished with little
234 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Government oversight. MPS research and prod- tions could proceed without close Government

uct development, on the other hand, are still cooperation. For the near future, the JEA appears

highly dependent on Government facilities. to bean important tool for continuing the unique

Should such research result in a marketable prod- Government/industry relationship which is essenuct, it is unclear how commercial MPS opera- tial to the development of a mature MPS industry.

OTHER SPACE-RELATED COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

Although this chapter has focused primarily on

the private sector’s involvement in fields of communications and materials processing, with a less

detailed look at remote sensing and space transportation, it should be noted that the private sector has several other opportunities for space-oriented, profitmaking activities. Some of the more

important of these activities are discussed below.

Financing Space Ventures

Private banking institutions may have a role to

play in the future financing of both governmental and nongovernmental space programs. Because the Government has played the lead role

in developing space systems, the involvement of

private financial institutions has been rather limited. This is particularly true in the United States,

and it seems unlikely that any significant changes

will occur in the near future. The situation in

Europe is slightly different, in that, though the

space projects are primarily funded by the governments, European banks have been involved

in these projects as shareholders and as a source

of loan capital .29

Financial institutions have generally been reluctant to invest large sums of money in high-risk,

long-term space projects of the private sector. As

new products are refined and their value as investments proved, financing of private space activities will become more common. Recently, for

example, financial institutions have been willing

to fund the purchase of satellite transponders because communications satellites have come to be

regarded as relatively safe and attractive investments. The cost of transponders (approximately $10 million to $15 million) is a relatively

29G. Mazowita, “Space Industrialization, Programs, Policy, and

Private Enterprise, ” Center for Research of Air and Space Law,

McGill University, June 1981, p. 60.

small part of the cost of the satellite, and insurance covering both interruption of service and

business loss can be purchased to protect this investment. In addition, by using sale/leaseback

arrangements, the tax benefits that accrue from

transponder ownership can be sold to a third

party.

Presumably, other space technologies will follow the path that communications satellites have

followed over the last two decades. As these

technologies become more reliable and new financial arrangements allow the burden of their

cost to be spread out among more investors, it

is certain that the role that private financial institutions play in the commercialization of these

technologies will increase.

Though private financial institutions have been

reluctant to participate in space ventures, it is

possible that innovative financial arrangements

such as the R&D limited partnership may provide

funds in this area.30 Basically stated, an R&D

limited partnership is a partnership formed for a

specific purpose, such as the development of a

new product. This arrangement provides important tax advantages, in particular that participants

may offset their investment in the R&D limited

partnership against their current income, even if

the latter was derived from an unrelated source.

GTI intends to rely heavily on this mechanism to

finance its JEA with NASA. Should the GTI experience be favorable, there is no reason why the

R&D limited partnership could not be used to

finance other private space ventures.

.

30’’ Limited Partnerships: Protits and Danger, ” cornm~ities, Vll

(March/April 1978), 46; “Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships,”

/-/arvarc/ Law Review XC (1975), 745-762; “Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards the Tax Shelter, ” New York

University Law Review Lll, 2, May 1977, 408-441.
Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology Ž 235

Insurance

The industrialization of space will open up a

new market for the insurance industry. As the

number and variety of space activities increase,

new methods of insuring against unforeseen

losses will be needed. If such developments are

forthcoming, they will help to make investment

in space more predictable and therefore more attractive to the private sector.31

Presently, there are four basic categories of satellite insurance available:

●

●

●

●

Ground insurance covers the satellite,

launch vehicle, and related launch equipment until launch attempt or lift-off.

Launch failure insurance commences immediately after lift-off and remains in effect until the satellite achieves a successful orbit.

Satellite life insurance commences when

launch failure insurance coverage terminates. Satellite life insurance protects against

financial damage caused by loss of orbit or

power, or by some technical malfunction.

This insurance can be used to cover the replacement costs of the satellite and for economic losses arising from disruption of service.

Liability insurance is used to compensate

third parties for bodily injury or property

damage caused by the satellite or the launch

vehicle.

The types of insurance mentioned above were

developed primarily with expendable launch

vehicles in mind. The introduction of the shuttle

as an operational launch vehicle will present

substantial challenges to the insurance industry.

On the one hand, the shuttle should increase the

number of insurable payloads launched per year,

thereby providing a wider base over which to

spread risk. This should result in lower insurance

costs and increased participation by U.S. and foreign underwriters. On the other hand, the fact

that the shuttle can carry several payloads on one

flight raises serious questions about the effect that

the loss of an entire shuttle might have on underwriters and insurance premiums. Potential liability

3’Satellite Communications, “Condo Satellites: Can We Insure

Them?” August 1981, p. 45.

in such a situation could be as high as $100 million to payload owner and an additional $500 million for third-party claimants.32 The shuttle, therefore, introduces costs at a level and of a complexity unprecedented in the era of single payloads

flown on ELVs. Whether the relatively small

group of underwriters who insure ELVs will be

able to handle the entire liability for space shuttle operations is an open question.

Hardware sales

Aerospace Industry

The aerospace industry has been the principal

private sector participant in commercial space activities. The reasons for this are rather simple. The

aerospace industry has the most complete understanding of the advantages and limitations of the

space environment and employs large numbers

of people who are knowledgeable in space-related technology. Industries that may profit considerably from space technology, such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, and metallurgy, are

reluctant to invest in R&D projects that require

knowledge, personnel, and support facilities that

they do not have.

Another major advantage held by the aerospace industry is its traditionally close relationship with Government. This relationship has had

two important consequences. The first, which

was mentioned above, is that the industry, often

working under Government contract, has been

able to develop the expertise to deal with the

space environment. The second is that the Government, particularly the military, and the aerospace industry are accustomed to cooperating

and relying on one another. Most other industries, however, have little contact with the Government, except in its role as regulator and taxer.

Furthermore, normal Government procurement

practices, in which the aerospace industry is wellversed, are complex and raise numerous problems regarding the retention of intellectual

property.

The structure of the aerospace industry also

provides some substantive advantages for develqZAViatiOn week and Space Technology, Apr. 30, 1979, P. 148;

Contact, “Insurance Coverage in Outer Space, ” December 1977,

p. 5.
236 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

oping technologies such as MPS. This industry is

composed of a few large and essentially nondiversified companies. This structure is a consequence of an environment where competition is

limited and funds are available to engage in large

but uncertain research projects. The aerospace

industry has frequently been involved in longterm projects starting with basic scientific research

and resulting ’in innovative new products. This

“long-range” perspective which will be necessary

for MPS development is not characteristic of

many other industries.

New Markets

Until recently, the efforts of the private sector

have been directed primarily to supplying the

Government’s needs for launch vehicles, satellites, and related space hardware. As the user

community for such hardware gradually broadens, it can be assumed that an increasingly greater

proportion of industry revenues will be derived

from nongovernment sales.

The first nongovernment aerospace market to

be developed was that of communications satellites. The private sector revenues from this market

are on the order of billions of dollars, and estimates for future demand suggest even greater returns. Other opportunities for private sector aerospace sales will flow from the development of the

Boeing inertial upper stage and the McDonnell

Douglas spinning solid upper stage. These two

upper stages will be used to transfer private-sector

payloads from the shuttle to the geostationary

orbit. Yet another area of potential private-sector

revenue will be the sale and lease of multiuser

instrumentation designed for MPS research on the

shuttle (discussed above in ch. 4). Examples of

such instrumentation include the materials experiment assembly (MEA), developed by NASA, and

the metallurgical furnace being developed by GTI

Corp. in a JEA with NASA. This last type of private-sector involvement may prove to be quite

significant. When NASA began the development

of the MEA, it anticipated that private institutions

might wish to lease this device to conduct their

own experiments. Similarly, GTI’s development

efforts are predicated on the assumption that a

substantial market exists for relatively inexpensive space-based research facilities.

A recent marketing strategy report, written

under contract for NASA, found that most firms

are unwilling to undertake alone the substantial

expense involved in the product identification,

financing, hardware development and marketing

necessary to commercialize space technology .33

The report suggested that NASA should attempt

to disaggregate this process in order to facilitate

private sector participation in MPS. There is some

indication that this process of disaggregation will

occur as a matter of course, as experience with

MPS grows. The JEA entered into between NASA

and GTI tends to support this assumption. GTI’s

willingness to accept the financial responsibility

for one aspect of the commercialization process

(in this instance, the provision of a valuable

research tool), may provide the incentive for

other firms to invest research dollars in this area.

Small firms, universities, and research organizations generally do not have the capital necessary

to undertake independent research in space.

However, if the facilities were available at a

relatively low cost, then a broad range of otherwise unaffordable research might be undertaken.

Ground Support Services

Space technology requires a rather elaborate

network of ground support services and facilities.

As this industry continues to expand, the private

sector will almost certainly play a disproportionately large part in the provision of such services. A few early examples of this trend have already begun to appear.

The initial placement and subsequent maintenance of a satellite in its proper orbit requires an

elaborate tracking, telemetry, and control network. NASA has previously provided these services, but as space activities become more common, commercial firms could provide them.

COMSAT has already begun to do so. In 1979,

COMSAT established the first commercial facility for satellite tracking, telemetry, and control

services. 34 The COMSAT Launch Control Center

(LCC) takes control of the spacecraft after lift-off

JJPrepared by students of the “Creative Marketing Strategy”

course, Harvard Business School, “Materials Processing in Space:

A Marketing Strategy,” June 1981.

Jdcommunications Satellite Corp. Magazine, No. 1, 1980, PP. 26

and 33; No. 5, 1981, pp. 9 and 38.
Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology ● 237

and injection into the transfer orbit, oversees the

insertion of the satellite into its proper orbital slot,

and then performs the functional checkout. Following verification of proper operation, control

of the satellite is then handed over to the owner/

operator for further verification, testing, and ultimately, operations. The LCC was used for the first

time with the launch of SBS-1 in November 1980.

Another area in which the private sector will

certainly play an increasingly important role will

be in the provision of postflight processing of the

shuttle. Currently, NASA, using more than 25 individual contractors, is responsible for shuttle

processing; it has, however, recently invited industry to bid on a contract to perform this function.35 The company chosen would be responsiJSAViatlOn week ancf Space Technology, “Shuttle Contracts TO

Be Let to Industry,” Nov. 2, 1981, p. 51; Aviation Week and Space

Technology, “Processing Efficiencies of Shuttle Studied,” Nov. 30,

1981, p. 18.

ble for refurbishment of orbiters after flight for

subsequent missions, checkout and assembly of

the solid rocket boosters, external tanks, and

other shuttle elements, and for support operations and materials, including maintenance and

facilities operations.

The transfer of shuttle processing to the private

sector is an important step toward commercializing the entire space shuttle program. As has been

mentioned many times before, industry is reluctant to invest in the shuttle, or any new space

technology, because it cannot accurately assess

the risks and the potential return. As industry

becomes familiar with the shuttle, or other new

space technologies, it will be in a better position

to make the kind of financial assessments which

must precede any major commercial investment.
Chapter 9

INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Contents

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

Current Institutional Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

Current NASA Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

Department of Commerce Space Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Other Federal Space Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Differing Goals, Differing Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

An Expanded National Space Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Continuation of the Status Quo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

A Tightly Constrained Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

institutions for Space Applications R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

Institutional Issues and Demonstration Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

institutions for Space Applications Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

Private Benefits, Private Operators, Government Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

Public Benefits, Public Operators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

Organizational Alternatives When the Benefits Are Mixed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

Transition From Development to Operations: Institutional Aspects . . . . . . . . . . 254

Transition to Government Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

Transition From Government R&D to Private Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

institutions for Supporting Space Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

Space Applications in an International Context: Institutional Aspects . . . . . . . . 257

Institutional Aspects of Specific Applications . . . . .

Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Remote Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Materials Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES

Table No.

20. Federal Agencies Active in the National Space

21. NASA and Its Contractor Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22. NASA Institutional Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE

Figure No.

15. Management Structure of NODS . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Page

Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Chapter 9

INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

National civilian space policy is implemented

in a specific institutional framework, one which

has evolved over the almost 25 years of U.S.

space activity. (The evolution of that framework

is described in app. A.) This framework is the

means for accomplishing policy objectives, and

it must be evaluated by how well it has done so

and, more importantly, can be expected to do

so in the future. Is the current institutional framework, which was largely established in the early

years of the civilian space program, still appropriate, given the options for future national space

policy? This chapter will examine this question

and suggest the characteristics of alternate institutional frameworks for the U.S. space applications

effort.

Policy

policy formulation includes, first, the identification and evaluation of alternative objectives and

ways of achieving them, and second, the choice

of a particular set of objectives and courses of

action (i.e., policies). Policy implementation is the

application of policies to achieve particular goals.

Although policy choice and policy execution are

closely intertwined, this chapter focuses on the

institutional framework for implementing policy, not on the mechanisms for policy formulation and choice, which are discussed in chapter

10. What receives attention, rather, are the links

between policy objectives and institutions, and

the difficulties of establishing any one framework

to meet significantly differing or changing objectives.

One qualification to this distinction is immediately necessary. If the activities of a particular institution are not tied to some set of externally

determined needs or goals, then the internal

needs and objectives of the institution itself—

growth, maintenance, or, at a minimum, survival

—can emerge as dominant influences on policy.

The U.S. space program has not been immune

to this tendency. For example, in 1969 the proposals for a future space program built around

orbiting space stations and a space transportation system operating in the region between the

Earth and the Moon, with an eventual goal of

manned planetary exploration, emerged from

within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’S) manned space flight organization, not in response to some externally imposed goal or objective.

overall, this assessment explicitly recognizes

that the private sector can play an increasingly

important role in space. The present chapter, in

treating Government institutions and public policy mechanisms, provides some guidelines for

determining the appropriate division between

public and private sector roles in space, and it

considers various methods and incentives to stimulate and support private sector activity, including

potential mechanisms for Government/industry

cooperation or collaboration in space applications.

In summary, this chapter analyzes issues related

to alternative institutional frameworks for organizing the Government’s share of the national

civilian space applications program. It does not

attempt to identify a single “best” framework; the

choice of an institutional arrangement is a derivative issue, one dependent

question, “Best for what?”

CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

—

on answering the

Before alternative institutions are examined, it ernment actor for civilian programs is still NASA,

is important to characterize the current structure although other Federal agencies are becoming

within the Federal Government. The major Gov- increasingly involved in space. Table 20 lists the

241
242 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 20.—Federal Agencies Active in the National Space Effortn

Budget for

space activities

(FY 1982 estimate Significant

Agency in millions) space-related work

Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . $5,916.3 Communications, command and

cent rol.

Navigation, environmental

forecasting.

Surveillance R&D related to

future military applications.

NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $5,617.3 R&D related to science and

applications; transportation

Department of Commerce . . . . . . . . $126.3 Environmental monitoring.

Remote sensing (in 1983).

Weather satellites.

Department of Energy. . . . . . . . . . . . $38.0 Space nuclear power systems.

Department of Agriculture . . . . . . . . $17.2 Crop assessment.

Monitoring of soil, water, and

vegetation.

Department of the Interior . . . . . . . . $12.6 Surveillance and monitoring of

natural resources.

Mapping.

alt is not ~O~~ibla t. ~r~vlde a separate budget estimate for irltelllgence-related space activities, some of which are included

in DOD figures.

SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget.

Government agencies with significant space-related activities.

Current NASA Structure

The institution with primary responsibility for

the civilian space program is NASA, created in

1958 in response to Sputnik and mobilized in

1961 to achieve a goal of preeminence in all areas

of space activity, particularly the development of

the (large) technological systems required for the

Apollo program. It is essential to emphasize that

NASA was not designed to conduct routine

operation of space systems that provide services

to public and private users. Instead, operational

responsibilities have been assigned ad hoc:

1. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) National Environmental Satellite Services (formerly the

Weather Bureau) operates meteorological

satellites, while NASA continues to do relevant research and development (R&D);

NOAA is also scheduled to assume management of the Landsat remote-sensing system

in early 1983.

2.

3.

COMSAT was chartered to be the initial operator of communications satellites used for

international traffic; later, the domestic communications satellite market was opened to

any firm that could meet regulatory requirements.

NASA operates space launch systems as well

as conducting R&D on space transportation.

NASA’s internal structure has remained basically unchanged during the past two decades. NASA

headquarters in Washington is responsible for

overall management and technical direction of

the various activities carried out by NASA field

centers (many of which were inherited from the

National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics),

and outside contractors. it is also the focal point

for relations with the Executive Office of the President, Congress, and other Federal agencies. The

various NASA field centers are in charge of specific projects; most of the actual R&D work is performed by private contractors. The Federal Government initiates programs and projects, monitors

technical performance of contractors, and (to

date) has been the primary user of the spacecraft

and launch systems incorporating the results of
Ch. 9—institutional Considerations ● 243

R&D. Some 80 to 90 percent of NASA’s annual

budget goes to external grants and contracts; this

pattern has remained relatively constant over the

years. Though NASA has maintained a substantial in-house research capability, the bulk of its

expenditures have gone to establish an extensive

network of research organizations in industry,

universities, and nonprofit organizations. Table

21 shows the past and present size of NASA and

its support base.

The set of NASA field centers today is the same

as it was during the early 1960’s, except that a

recent reorganization has led to a reduction in

the number of centers reporting directly to NASA

headquarters. Table 22 gives information on the

current NASA field center structure. Because

NASA is responsible for different kinds of space

activities (as well as experimental aeronautical

work), including science, applications, and development of technical capability, and because responsibility for each of those missions and its

associated projects is rather closely tied to one

or more field centers, one of NASA headquarters’

major responsibilities is allocating priorities and

resources. Decisions on policy and program priorities thus directly affect the associated field

centers, and the current structure fosters competition among the centers within NASA’s overall program. In this competition, for reasons to

be examined, technology development and

space science and exploration have traditionally been more successful than space applications.

NASA’s institutional base constitutes an impressive national resource for space R&D. NASA’s

personnel, facilities, and contractor support base

provide the means for carrying out challenging

and significant efforts, as Apollo, the space shuttle, and Voyager (among many other accomplishments), have demonstrated. As Congress and the

Nation consider future objectives for the U.S.

space program, the resources NASA has already

developed must be considered. If these resources

are not used wisely and well, they will disperse

and will be difficult to reassemble.

Department of Commerce

Space Activities

The Department of Commerce’s (DOC’S) involvement in space dates to 1961, when Congress

directed DOC to establish and operate a meteorological satellite system to observe worldwide environmental conditions and to report, process,

and apply data obtained by this system. This

responsibility is now borne by NOAA. More specifically, NOAA’s meteorological satellite programs are lodged in the National Earth Satellite

Service (NESS) (until recently the National Environmental Satellite Service). I n November 1979,

NOAA was also assigned responsibility for operating the U.S. land remote-sensing satellite systems,

beginning with Landsat-D, in 1983.

Through the years NASA and NOAA have

worked closely together to improve the Nation’s

ability to observe Earth from space: NASA conducts R&D, and NOAA operates the satellite systems once they have been proved. This relationship dates back to the initial TIROS weather satellites and will continue i n the Landsat program.

Table 21 .—NASA and Its Contractor Base

NASA Personnel Personnel at Funds provided to

budget at NASA NASA grantees and contractors,

in NASA field in millions

Year millions headquarters centers a

Industry University and nonprofit

1962 $1,825.3 1,641 26,938 $1,030 $50

1966 $5,175.0 2,152 35,903 $4,087 $178

1971 $3,312.6 1,894 31,805 $2,279 $162

1981 $5,537.2 1,658 25,755 $3,746 $361

aJet propulsion Laborato~ is included, although formally it is part of the California Institute of Technology

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and SDace Administration.
244 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 22.—NASA Institutional Structure

FY 1980

R&D

funding

FY 1980

research and program

management funding

FY 1980

personnel

complement

1,658

Name of center

Headquarters (Washington, D. C.) . . . . . . . $ 133.8 $89.5

Johnson Space Center—manned flight

(Houston, Tex.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,347.3 164.1 3,616

Ames Research Center (Mountain View,

Calif.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159.7 87.8 2,212

Goddard Space Flight Center—remote

sensing (Greenbelt, Md.). . . . . . . . . . . . . 548.3 151.2 3,941

Kennedy Space Center—launch services

(Cocoa Beach, Fla.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277.1 133,2 2,291

Langley Research Center

(Hampton, Va.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169.8 114.0 3,094

Lewis Research Center—aeronautical

research (Cleveland, Ohio) . . . . . . . . . . . 168.1 94.8 2,901

Marshall Space Flight Center—space

propulsion (Huntsville, Ala.) ., . . . . . . . . 846.8 155.9 3,646

National Space Technologies Laboratory

(Bay St. Louis, Miss.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 4.9 111

Jet Propulsion Laboratorya-space

science (Pasadena, Calif.) . . . . . . . . . . . 276.5 — — —

$3,936.6 $995.4 23,470

aJpL is f~eraliy funded but is operated by the California Institute Of Technology.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Technology Assessment.

Satellites currently operated by NOAA/NESS include: 1) polar orbiting satellites with day and

night global coverage and 2) geostationary satellites that provide continuous viewing of cloud and

storm patterns in the Western Hemisphere. In addition, NOAA was to have been a participant,

together with NASA and the Department of the

Navy, in a proposed National Oceanic Satellite

System; (NOSS) the project, however, has been

indefinitely deferred.

NESS disseminates its data and products within

a few hours of acquisition to a wide variety of

users, the most prominent of which are the National Weather Service and the Department of

Defense (DOD). The data are also recorded and

archived by NOAA’s Environmental Data and information Services. The data from the geostationary satellites are distributed in real-time to

seven satellite field services stations, which further distribute them to a number of users. Meteorological data from NOAA satellites are also

widely disseminated and used by foreign countries.

NOAA integrates satellite-derived data with

data derived from other sources in preparing

weather forecasts and warnings about disturbances on the Sun, in space, in the upper atmosphere, and in the Earth’s magnetic field; integrated data are used in various resource management tasks as well. In addition to using

satellite-derived data for operations, NOAA conducts a variety of R&D programs which make use

of these data or directly support its space-related

activities.

Other DOC organizations involved in spacerelated activities include the Maritime Administration, which uses satellites to improve the efficiency of ship communication, navigation, and operations, and the National Telecommunications and
Ch. 9—institutional Considerations ● 245

Information Administration, which is the Federal

agency responsible for policy on the use of the

frequency spectrum and geostationary orbit and

for exploring new applications of telecommunications technology.

Other Federal Space Efforts

The largest Government space program, at least

as measured by budget outlays, is conducted by

DOD. This chapter focuses on civilian space activities; for a description of DOD programs, see

chapter 6. The space programs of other agencies

are as follows:

1. The Department of Energy (DOE) carries out

technology development and production efforts for nuclear-powered electric generators

to be used on long-duration spacecraft suitable for planetary missions. DOE has studied space systems to dispose of nuclear

waste, and makes use of remote sensing data

in support of its responsibilities to seek

energy sources and to site facilities for nuclear waste disposal. and other energy-related

needs.

2.

3.

The Department of the Interior (DOI) uses

space-derived data in executing its responsibilities in resource management. The U.S.

Geological Survey, part of DOI, manages the

Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS)

program, which develops, demonstrates,

and encourages applications of remotely

sensed data acquired from both aircraft and

spacecraft (see app. B on the Bureau of Land

Management).

Other agencies of the Government, particularly the-Department of Agriculture, but also

organizations such as the Environmental Protection Agency, make routine use of spacederived data (particularly from Landsat) in

carrying out their missions. They do not,

however, participate in space-related hardware development. The Department of Agriculture has been a major participant in such

R&D efforts as LACIE (large area crop inventory experiment) and AgRISTARS, and integrates Earth observation data in its crop assessment and forecasting operations (see

app. C on Foreign Agricultural Service),

DIFFERING GOALS, DIFFERING STRUCTURES

There is no single institutional framework that

is “best” for the civilian space program. Rather,

different national objectives in space can best be

accomplished by different institutional structures;

goals and the means to achieve them should be

matched. The three scenarios below suggest the

wide variety of institutional frameworks possible,

and how they are related to various futures for

An Expanded National Space Program

One possibility for the national space effort is

setting another Apollo-like goal, i.e., a large and

challenging enterprise to be achieved on a pressing schedule. Several such enterprises have been

suggested over the past few years; most involve

the development of capabilities for routine

the civilian space program: manned operations in low-Earth orbit, now that

●

●

●

. -

an expanded program, focusing either on a

new goal comparable to Apollo or the shuttle, or on a variety of advanced applications

projects;

continuation of the status quo; and

further reductions in the Government share

of the civilian space program.

the shuttle has made this location more accessible for a variety of purposes. Other proposed objectives include: 1) a large structure in geosynchronous orbit, and development of reusable

transportation to GSO, and 2) solar power satellites. NASA’s current leadership has endorsed the

concept of some form of low-orbit, manned,

space operations center as NASA’s next major
246 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

project, and congressional space committees

have, in general, supported such proposals.1 Like

the shuttle, an orbiting operations center would

be a means to carry out a variety of space applications and science missions, not an end in itself.

Such a high-technology development project

would require the kind of engineering effort

which current NASA development centers are

best able to provide. NASA’s present institutional

structure is largely a product of the 1961 commitments to preeminence in space, particularly the

Apollo program. One consideration is that the

ability of NASA and its contractors to undertake

a substantial engineering effort will erode without a commitment to such an enterprise. Scientific and engineering talent of the highest quality is in short supply in the United States. Given

the current shortage of manpower available to

support military and private sector space activities, NASA’s personnel will be lured away to

more challenging work elsewhere if NASA does

not soon undertake a major new effort. Some

have suggested that NASA and its technical and

managerial capabilities should be mobilized for

nonspace R&D projects, particularly in energy.

Whether NASA’s technical expertise, problem-solving approach, and institutional characteristics are relevant to meeting other national

goals requires further analysis, and is outside the

scope of this assessment.

Another scenario would be based on a judgment that the current and potential benefits of

applying space technology justify increased Government investment in applications R&D, particularly in the face of international competition and

foreign government support for applications programs. Included in this scenario would be Federal

commitments: 1 ) to take the policy and institutional initiatives needed to move from development to operations in the public sector, and 2)

to introduce innovative methods to bring the private sector into full partnership. There would be

no overriding Apollo-like project to key the national effort; rather, the program would become

‘Administrator lames Beggs has repeated Iy made this point, and

there is currently a top-level study underway within NASA related

to future space station plans. See, for example, Aviation Week and

Space Technology, July 27, 1981, pp. 23-25.

more pluralistic. Several mission agencies and private firms could participate substantially.

Continuation of the Status Quo

Development and testing of the space shuttle

have been the major components of NASA’s

budget over the past few years, and they are likely

to dominate for the next three or four. Partly as

a consequence, there have been few “new

starts” in any program area—science, exploration, applications, or technology development.

Continuation of this situation would reflect a

policy decision that NASA’s major role should be

developing space transportation capabilities for

other users, such as DOD, the private sector, and

other civilian agencies. Activities in space science

and applications would continue, but at relatively

low levels.

The United States probably could not afford to

maintain NASA’s entire institutional base under

this scenario. Although it may be in the national

interest to maintain NASA’s capacity to undertake a major technology program, NASA as it currently exists would eventually become outdated.

Certain applications activities, and their associated centers, might be “spun-off” to the private

sector or the military.

A Tightly Constrained Program

A variation of the preceding scenario with

somewhat the same institutional implications is

one in which no compelling rationale for a largescale civilian space program gains acceptance.

In this case, NASA’s size, scope, and mission

would be reduced to a continued but restricted

investigation of potential space applications. Aggressive pursuit of other promising opportunities

would be postponed until the potential payoffs

can justify investment of substantial public resources. One possibility is the gradual retrenchment of NASA toward a research and early technology development organization with close links

to the users of R&D. This restricted range of

responsibilities would be similar to that of NASA’s

predecessor, the National Advisory Committee

on Aeronautics (NACA).2

IFOr a discussionof NACA, see Arthur L. Levine, The future of

U.S. Space Program (New York: Praeger, 1975), ch. 2.
Ch. 9—institutional Considerations ● 247

A key issue in all the above scenarios would

be the division of roles and responsibilities between public and private sectors, and between

NASA and other agencies within the Federal

structure. There are two possible basic alternatives, and the remainder of this chapter provides criteria for evaluating them. These alternatives are:

1. NASA could become the civilian space agency, not just the space R&D agency. In addition to continuing to do R&D, NASA would

operate space transportation services, the

space segment and initial data processing for

Earth observation systems (weather, land remote sensing, ocean remote sensing), public

service communications satellites, and other

space systems pro bono publico. NASA

would also develop common “in-orbit infrastructure, “ i.e., platforms, power supplies,

communications and telemetry systems,

construction and servicing capabilities, etc.,

which public and private organizations

could use on a reimbursable basis. In this

scheme, NASA would assist firms in transforming new space applications into profitable commercial ventures.

2. NASA could remain limited to an R&D role,

and other Government agencies, such as

NOAA, or private or quasi-private sector entities, such as COMSAT, would undertake

various operational activities. NASA, in this

option, could either: a) conduct an R&D applications program to advance technology

without regard for its immediate commercial potential, b) concentrate on public good

applications of space technology, leaving it

to the private sector to invest in developing

commercial applications, or c) focus on supporting public and private users. One issue

related to this scenario is the allocation of

responsibility for operating “space utilities”

such as transportation, power, communications, construction facilities, etc.

In either alternative, more effective instruments

would be required to link private and public sector users of space technology with NASA, the

central R&D space agency. A tradition of collaboration between NASA as an R&D agency,

operators of space systems, and the user communities has not yet developed, but is a necessity if this alternative is to be viable. NACA, NASA’s

predecessor, had a mixed public-private governing board representing all interests involved in

aeronautics, both civilian and military. While not

necessarily a relevant model for a “new NASA, ”

this pattern of developer-user linkage proved very

successful in advancing the U.S. position in

aeronaut ics.3

Much of the remainder of this chapter is a

detailed analysis of the institutional issues involved in operating space technologies and in

strengthening coordination between governmental and nongovernmental developers, operators, and users of space technology.

As the issues relating to commercialization are

discussed in chapter 8, the following will concentrate on Government operations, though many

of the issues involved are similar. For the purpose

of this analysis, it is possible to separate the process of applying space technology into five distinct

phases, each of which has different institutional

implications. The following sections discuss generic institutional implications.

1. research and development;

2. demonstration;

3. transition to operational status;

4. operational status; and

5. support of operational systems, including

continuing R&D in an applications area.

After this general discussion, and after analysis

of the international institutional aspects of space

applications in the next section, the last section

discusses the institutional issues specific to each

applications area,

Jlbid.
248 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

INSTITUTIONS FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS R&D

NASA was assigned Government responsibility for civilian space R&D by the National

Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act of 1958. However the act was not specific about NASA’s (or

anyone else’s) role in using or operating the

results of that R&D. In space applications, almost

by definition, R&D is conducted not as an end

in itself but as a necessary step in reducing uncertainties and developing methods for the use of

space systems to provide public or private benefits. Since applications are meant to be used,

the key institutional question is how to create a

productive relationship between performers of

R&D and the ultimate users.

There are crucial differences between R&D

conducted for systems to be operated by the

Government and R&D for those to be operated

by private firms. In particular, R&D for commercial applications must be influenced by considerations of eventual profitability.4 However, there

are also important common elements, particularly

with respect to the relationship between user and

developer. In the space sector, NASA has from

the start (with the exception of launch services)

been confined to R&D. This limitation, reinforced

by the fact that NASA attracted in its early years

engineers oriented towards advancing the frontiers of knowledge and technological capability,

and the institutional culture derived from missions

such as Apollo and planetary exploration, have

certainly influenced NASA’s applications efforts.

NASA has developed an orientation towards

“technology push” efforts. This orientation

militates against being responsive to potential

operators and users of space technology, who exercise “demand pull” on the directions of space

applications development.

NASA, particularly in its early years, inevitably

put more stress on advancing the technological

frontier than on developing technology in response to user demands (which were virtually

nonexistent) or in anticipation of the kinds of

demands likely to arise. As the practical uses of

the new technologies began to take shape, how4

This distinction is well-made in Peter House and David Jones,

Geftirrg It tithe She/f (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1977), chs.

3-5.

ever, NASA continued to emphasize the development of more sophisticated applications technology rather than bringing adequate applications

systems into early operation. This is in part a

reflection of the reality that, once NASA completes R&D for an applications program, it must

transfer it to some user outside of the agency.

Consequently, the organization tends to hold on

to programs, even if that means prolonging the

R&D phase beyond the optimum point. The

Landsat program, which many users have been

treating as if it were already operational, is a case

in point.

In recent years, NASA has put a higher priority on developing closer relationships with potential operators and users of space technology, particularly in remote sensing and advanced satellite

communications. The management structure

which had been adopted for the now-canceled

NOSS gave NASA a central R&D role in bringing

the demonstration system into being, but involved users, particularly from other Federal

agencies, in management committees at three different levels of program operation. Figure 15 illustrates the NOSS management structure; it

seems that a similar structure might be appropriate in other applications areas.

Such a structure links R&D managers with users

and provides a setting for resolving differences

in priorities, technical requirements, and budgetary commitments among involved participants.

Few space applications R&D projects serve a

single set of user requirements, and few will involve only NASA in their conduct. Thus a management structure for future application programs

in which developers, operators, and users are

linked from the start appears an improvement

over past management practices in, for example,

the Landsat program.

There is an unavoidable tension between the

developers of a new technological capability and

those who hope to use it. The most frequent failure in Federal R&D programs is inadequate attention to the realities and needs of eventual users

in the planning and earliest research phases of
Ch. 9—lnstitutional Considerations . 249

Figure 15.–Management Structure of NOSS

I

a programs Engineers prefer to work in an environment where the only constraints are technological. In addition, the resources provided for

planning an R&D project, as opposed to conducting it, are often inadequate. As R&D is being

planned, users should participate in identifying

specific applications, the environment in which

they must operate, and the economic factors that

will constrain an operational system. None of

these factors has been given priority in NASA’s

applications programs until recently; rather, new

technological opportunities have been the driving force in R&D planning.

Space activities are justified by a variety of rationales. But to the degree that space applications

are justified by their potential benefits, there

‘Norman McEachron, et ● l., Management of Federal R&D for

Commercialization, report from SRI International to Experimental

Technology Incentives Program, Department of Commerce, 1978,

p. IV-28.

should be careful attention to the costs of operating a system. R&D serves in large part as a

means of reducing uncertainty, but reducing cost

and performance uncertainties may be just as

crucial as reducing technical uncertainties. Certainly the benefit calculus will be different for

public and private applications, since Government is not concerned with showing a profit. [f

a service can never be profitable, but society

needs it, then it is Government that propwly provides such a service. Even for public services,

however, operating costs must be a continuing

focus of concern throughout an R&D effort.

The LACIE program provides an example of

such problems in the space applications area.6

These problems can be avoided if developers

work closely with users in guiding an R&D projWt.

%eneral Accounting Office, Crop Forecasting by Satellite: Progms and Pro6&ms, GAO Report, PSAD-78-52, Apr. 7, 1978.
250 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

If the R&D is in an area intended for eventual

commercialization, then market analysis needs

to be incorporated even at early stages in the R&D

effort. The total range of users, their current patterns of operation, and the ways in which a new

application might modify those patterns need to

be identified. The likelihood that services or products can be produced at a cost acceptable to private purchasers needs to be estimated, and these

estimates refined during the life history of the

R&D effort. In this way, R&D intended for commercial application will be guided by private sector considerations from its inception.

In summary, then, the R&D phase of space applications activities needs to incorporate substantially more planning for eventual application

than has been the case with NASA’s past applications programs. Users must be significantly involved, without stultifying the creativity of researchers. Some means of resolving inconsistencies among user needs is required. Cost performance as well as technical performance must be

borne in mind throughout the R&D process. In

areas of new applications, the R&D project

should be designed to give early and concrete

evidence of specific benefits and the ways in

which they will assist various classes of users. The

kind of management structure which had been

planned for the NOSS program might provide

many of these features for public sector uses;

commercial activities require market analysis and

private sector involvement.

INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

The primary goal of an R&D program is to reduce uncertainties about the technical characteristics of an application opportunity. By contrast, a demonstration project is intended to illustrate the performance of a new technological

capability in a realistic operating environment,

in order to provide the information which potential operators need to bring that new technology

on line. When an R&D program provides evidence that a new technology is likely to be commercially viable, potential private sector operators

can undertake their own demonstration. But

when the R&D program does not provide clear

evidence, or when the benefits have a mixed

public/private character, then the Government

must subsidize at least part of the demonstration

phase.

Failure to recognize and adjust to the differences between the R&D and demonstration

stages is a likely source of difficulty in bringing

new applications into being; it is very difficult to

combine R&D and demonstration efforts in one

undertaking.

It is possible to specify characteristics linked to

the success of a demonstration project in providing the information to decide whether to take

a new technology to operational status.7 Those

characteristics include:

1. A technology we//in hand. Demonstration

projects are not laboratories for resolving

technological problems; rather, a successful

demonstration project concentrates on providing information on the nontechnology-reIated characteristics of a new capability.

Thus, demonstration projects should not be

initiated prematurely, while major technological uncertainties remain.

2. Cost and risk sharing between developer and

potential operator. If the demonstration project is a marketing tool to demonstrate to potential users the operating characteristics of

a new technology, but these users are not

included in planning or, where feasible, in

sharing the costs and risks of the demonstration project, it is unlikely that the project will

be responsive to the users’ need for information.

3. Congruence with technology delivery system. In order to bring a new technology into *

7Walter Baer, Leland Johnson, and Edward Merrow, Ana/ysis of

Federa//y-Funded Demonstration Projects, report from Rand Corporation to Experimental Technology Incentives Program, Department of Commerce, 1976, p. v,
Ch. 9—lnstitutional Considerations Ž 251

4.

5.

being there must exist some way to translate

a technological possibility into an operating

reality. The demonstration project should be

organized to reflect the specific characteristics of such a “technology delivery systern. ” When the technological capability

does not match existing manufacturing or

utilization patterns, particular care is needed

to consider how those patterns might be

affected.

Inclusion of all elements needed for operation. Successful demonstration projects

should include in their planning and execution: potential operating organizations, potential users of a new technological capability, manufacturers of the systems in which the

R&D result will be embedded, potential regulators, and other target audiences.

Absence of tight time constraints. Demonstration projects which face tight time and

budget constraints are less likely to provide

the necessary information needed for an operation decision.

The demonstration phase has proven to be a

crucial step in translating R&D work into successful operating systems; experience in the

defense sector (“fly before you buy”), for example, confirms this observation. The role of a separate demonstration phase is an area of both

policy and program uncertainty in recent space

applications efforts, and this uncertainty needs

INSTITUTIONS FOR SPACE

Properly speaking, the next topic should be the

institutional issues related to making the transition from demonstration of a new application to

its incorporation in operational systems. However, it makes little sense to discuss institutional

alternatives for this transition phase without some

prior discussion of “transition to what?” In addition, there are important differences between

a space application operated by Government,

and one in the private sector. Therefore, this secto be resolved in order to make the Federal R&D

effort in applications more likely to pay off. In particular, NASA has not been able to secure the

budgetary resources or political support required

to conduct a demonstration, as defined here, of

remote-sensing systems; rather, NASA has attempted to combine R&D and demonstration efforts in the Landsat program. Earlier communications satellites such as the Syncom project in the

1960’s and the ATS applications technology satellite projects in the 1970’s approximated some

of the requirements of a successful demonstration project, although even in these cases R&D

and demonstration goals were combined. Experience suggests that operators and users,

whether private or public, are not willing to invest in a demonstration effort because of the particular characteristics of space activity, such as

high front-end cost and technical uncertainties.

As is implied by the definition of demonstration project as concerned primarily with nontechnical aspects of a new technology, the design and

execution of a successful demonstration project

requires people trained in marketing, manufacturing processes, and other aspects of system operation in addition to individuals concerned with

the technical aspects. Planning of a demonstration project should insure that these capabilities

are included in the project teams. Demonstration projects managed and staffed by engineers

alone are unlikely to be successful.

APPLICATIONS OPERATIONS

tion will discuss the institutional framework for

making space applications technologies operational.

Private Benefits, Private Operators,

Government Regulation

If the benefit to be delivered is primarily or

purely private in character, such as point-to-point

telephone or television relay, then private sec-
252 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

tor operators are the appropriate entities for that

application. The Government role in this situation, once the transition from a Federal R&D program is complete, is regulatory in character.

Public Benefits, Public Operators

When a service has an overwhelmingly publicgood character, it is often (though not always)

the case that Government itself operates the

system that provides that service. The social

security program, the census, and military forces

are examples of systems managed under public

auspices. In the space applications area, meteorological data closely approximates a pure

public good, and the national Government has

not only developed but operated weather satellites through NOAA.

The major institutional issue related to Government operation of a space applications system is whether NASA or some other Government agency should operate space systems. The

NAS Act has been interpreted to limit NASA to

an R&D role, but reviews over the past decade

have noted that it is possible, even without legislative revision, to assign more of an operational

responsibility to NASA. Certainly, it would be

possible to modify the 1958 act specifically to permit or mandate NASA to assume an operational

responsibility.

The question of whether NASA or some other

agency should operate Government-owned

space systems depends on whether it is more

desirable to link development and operation in

a single organization, or to separate development

from operation so that each organization has its

own management structure. The major argument

for separating development and operation is the

likelihood that the conflicts between them will

interfere with the ultimate objective of establishing the optimum applications system. The

characteristics of a particular organization will

determine whether user requirements or engineering desiderata predominate. Users tend to

be conservative, to prefer only incremental

changes from current practice, and to be driven

more by consideration of cost and ease of operation than by the potential of a new technology.

Alternatively, engineers tend to stress technological advancement and the development of

new equipment, which may yield an impractical

system.

New technological capabilities are, after all,

only means to accomplishing some set of broader

ends; in the organization of the Federal Government, most agencies are assigned a specific mission, rather than being organized around the

means needed to provide the services they offer. According to this model, space application

systems should not be managed by a “space”

agency but by those who make ultimate use of

the technology, i.e., the mission agencies. An example is NOAA’s operation of weather satellites,

which are developed and built by NASA, according to NOAA specifications. NOAA in effect

serves as a middleman between the developer,

NASA, and the end users, domestic and international. A major problem arises when space systems, particularly remote sensing, serve a number

of functions and a variety of users. This diversity

makes it difficult to relate these applications to

a single mission agency such as Commerce, interior, or Agriculture.

Arguments supporting a single organization for

development and operations are to a large degree

the converse of those just stated. R&D can best

be made responsible to the requirements of both

ultimate operators and users if a single chain of

command deals with both phases of a project.

Organizations with heavy investment in existing

systems are likely to be unresponsive to new technologies and associated ways of doing business

developed by “outsiders.” If a technology is

transferred from one organization to another, difficult problems of changes in organizational loyalty, and disruption of prior relationships with suppliers, contractors, and users, are likely to occur.

The management of applications systems on the

basis of their technological character rather than

the function they perform makes sense, it is

argued, because of the multiplicity of users with

different requirements, and because continuing

R&D can be more effectively incorporated into

existing systems if both are carried out in the same

organizational structure.
Ch. 9—institutional Considerations ● 253

The ideal framework for bringing a new application into operation is an effective and

meaningful partnership between developing and

using organizations. In some cases, particularly

where the new technology provides a service that

is not presently provided by established agencies,

and where extensive technical and managerial

expertise is required to operate the system, it is

preferable to retain close ties between developer

and operator. This is clearly the case for launch

vehicles. In land remote sensing, too, it can be

argued that NASA is the appropriate agency both

to develop and to operate a Federal system,

rather than transferring operations either to

another Federal agency (i. e., NOAA) or to a

private firm. (Commercialization of remote sensing would eliminate NASA’s operational role.)

Transferring responsibility to NOAA, as is presently being done, may not be desirable. For managing weather satellites, on the other hand, NOAA

has the past experience, service orientation, and

close ties to users required for effective operation. NASA can be of service by acting as “prime

contractor” in meeting specifications set largely

by the user agency.

Organizational Alternatives When

the Benefits Are Mixed

When both Government and the private sector are major users of a new service, there is a

variety of institutional options. Which alternative

is preferred depends on the characteristics of the

application and of existing organizations, and on

the likelihood that the new application will be

integrated smoothly into the existing institutional

framework. Thus, general guidelines are difficult

to state. The organizational alternatives in this

situation are several. They include:

1. Government-owned and Government-operated system in which private users of the

system purchase services or products from

Government at a cost which is determined

by Federal policy rather than market forces;

2. Government-owned, but contractor-operated system in which the Government uses

a large portion of the system’s products but

where the contractor is also free, within

some set of Federal restrictions, to offer serv3.

4.

ice to nongovernmental users and to make

a profit on those services;

single privately owned and operated system

with guaranteed Government purchases and

some protection from competition. The

owners of such a system would have the

responsibility for developing and servicing

the private market for the system’s products;

and

privately owned and operated system or systems (depending on the demand) with open

competition for sales to both public and

private markets and with the prices of its product or service determined by market forces.

The criteria for selecting among these alternatives are specific to particular applications areas

and thus are discussed in detail in section X11. In

general, the Government-owned alternatives

would be preferable if the Government were, at

least for the foreseeable future, the dominant

user, or if major noneconomic factors, such as

foreign policy or national security concerns, constrained the use of the application. Private sector operation would be preferable when it offers

greater efficiency, more flexibility, more effective

linkages to various user communities, and where

the economic incentives for a private operator

are strong enough to ensure that the new application gets a fair test as an operational system, Any

choice among these alternatives is likely to be

controversial, and dependent in large part on political philosophy and the specifics of a particular

situation.

A comparison of prior efforts to establish operational systems is important in analyzing institutional alternatives. (This comparison is limited to

domestic entities at this point; section Xl contains

analysis of the experience of international entities

such as INTELSAT and INMARSAT.) In the space

area, the most significant institution created so

far has been COMSAT; this experience is analyzed in some detail in chapter 8. What is relevant here is to recognize that COMSAT was created for a combination of political as well as

economic reasons. One strong motivation was

to avoid granting a monopoly in international

sateliite communications to AT&T. However,

there was a recognition that satellite communica-
254 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

tions could be a private profit-making venture.

Thus, the majority of Congress in 1962 thought

it inappropriate to create a Government-owned

entry in the communications business, and preferred to establish a private alternative. COMSAT

originated out of a desire to move quickly to an

international communication system based on

satellites; it is only in the past decade that

COMSAT General, a subsidiary of the basic

COMSAT organization, has begun to seek domestic market opportunities in other areas of space

applications. COMSAT General can be seen as

a typical private sector firm seeking to maximizing return on its investor’s funds, rather than an

organization with its origin in Government policy.

There was substantial organizational innovation

in establishing a private nuclear industry, and

some of this experience may be relevant to space

applications. A number of major facilities, requiring large amounts of capital investment, were

created; an example is uranium enrichment

plants. These multibillion-dol lar facilities were developed by the Government, and now are Government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO)

entities that sell enriched uranium to private

nuclear operators while also providing fuel for

the Government’s atomic programs. In addition,

a number of the major energy laboratories in the

United States, such as Oak Ridge National

Laboratory and Los Alamos Laboratory, are

operated under Government contract by private

entities as diverse as Union Carbide and the

University of California. This kind of organizational flexibility in the energy sector may be appropriate in space applications as well.

A major argument for getting space applications

operations away from Government- owned and

operated structures is that the bureaucratic

rigidities of the public sector are a major hindrance to systems which are servicing both public

and private markets. In addition, the character

of the civil service system, the need for annual

or frequent authorizations and appropriations to

cover operating expenses, and the desire to keep

the direct Federal payroll as small as possible all

lead to the frequent selection of a private sector

operator to provide a service with mixed public/private characteristics.

Apparently, other countries find that the flexibility needed for developing markets for space

applications is likely to be found outside of the

formal government framework. For example, the

European Space Agency has created a quasiprivate entity called Arianespace to be the

marketer and operator of space Iaunch services

using the recently developed Ariane booster.

There are 50 investors, ranging from major banks

and aerospace firms to various European governments, particularly the French; formally, Arianespace is a French corporation. While Arianespace

is charged with operating and marketing space

launch services, the European Space Agency, an

intergovernmental organization, remains in

charge of further development of the Ariane

launch system. The French are organizing a similar quasi-private organization called Spotimage

to market the products of the French remotesensing satellite SPOT. The major point is that the

Europeans perceive that the competitive activities

needed to make their launch vehicle and remotesensing programs successful are better performed

outside of government, though closely linked to

government programs. It should be noted that

both Arianespace and Spotimage will be heavily

subsidized by their government sponsors; thus

it will be very difficult to get an accurate evaluation of their economic viability. (For detailed discussion see ch. 7.)

TRANSITION FROM DEVELOPMENT TO OPERATIONS:

INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

The transition from R&D to operations is per- see immediate returns on the investment in space

haps the most difficult policy/institutional chal- technology which the United States has made

Ienge for space applications. Understandably, over the past two decades. Policy makers are

both Congress and the executive branch wish to aware of the extensive benefits predicted for
Ch. 9—institutional Considerations Ž 255

space technology, and they exert pressure on the

Federal space community to accelerate the delivery of those benefits. NASA, desiring to continue its applications R&D program, is strongly

motivated to emphasize the great potential of

space applications and to suggest that continued

R&D is required to investigate current and future

applications fully. The impression that space applications benefits are “just around the corner”

is enhanced by the apparent (in retrospect) ease

with which the transition from R&D to operations

was made in satellite communications. The outlook for other technologies is more complex,

however.

Communications satellites provided more efficient means of performing a well-established

function. Once the advantages of communications satellites were demonstrated for a few countries already linked by other means of long

distance communication, it was relatively straightforward to expand satellite communications to

other countries and to other related activities.

Other space applications, however, such as land

remote sensing, are not substitutes for existing

technological systems; rather they offer new opportunities for which established users and operational entities do not exist. Thus, a key to a successful transition is to identify and aggregate

users; Government institutions to perform this

task are not well developed.

Another important consideration is to initiate

the operational system at a time when the user

community is ready for it, not prematurely. A willingness to make investments with long-term paybacks and careful policy and program design is

crucial to a successful transition from development to operations.

institutional issues are different when the operator is to be a Government agency or an entity operating under Government contract, and

when the intended operator is a private-sector,

profit-oriented organization. Each of these categories will be treated separately in the discussion

which follows.

Transition to Government Operations

Ideally, the eventual operator would be identified when the R&D project aimed at investigating a particular application was initiated. In this

way a partnership between the developer and the

eventual operator could evolve throughout the

project. The developer should pay careful attention to operator and user concerns such as cost,

operating requirements, and reliability. An organization which is a candidate for operating a new

applications system should have the technical capabilities needed to understand technological options, to assist in translating user and operational

requirements into technical specifications, and

to consult with R&D project managers as problems arise.

These desirable characteristics are more likely

to emerge if the operating entity is identified early

on; if development and operation were combined in a single organization, they would be

more likely to be present. in addition, early identification of the eventual operator could minimize

bureaucratic conflict over the assignment of responsibility for operations. Such has not been the

case in past applications efforts, particularly in

the remote-sensing area.

Though it would be desirable, in some respect,

to designate the eventual operator at the outset

of an applications R&D effort, it may not be possible to do so, particularly if the current policy of

limiting NASA to an R&D role is maintained. The

likelihood of choosing the appropriate operator

is diminished when the application produces

benefits of value to multiple users. In this situation, it is tempting to wait until the R&D project

is further along to assign responsibilities for operations, in the hope that the appropriate operator

will become more evident. The history of the

remote-sensing program suggests the problems

in deferring the designation of a lead agency (see

app. A).

By identifying an operating agency early on,

policy makers avoid the problem of having the
256 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

transition plan developed totally within the

development organization; such a transition plan

is unlikely to reflect the concerns of a useroriented organization.

Transition From Government R&D to

Private Operation

An important issue in commercializing federally

sponsored research is what Federal actions

beyond R&D, if any, are required to make this

transition. Several Federal incentives are discussed in chapters 8 and 10 of this report. The

question regarding institutions centers around

whether NASA, or any other Federal agency, currently has the authority or capabilities to provide

such potentially desirable incentives. Though

there has been substantial cooperation between

NASA and the private sector, this has generally

taken the form of a contract specified by NASA

and bid on by private firms. The new Joint Endeavor Agreement is a significant move in developing new patterns of partnership aimed at encouraging private sector investment. The Federal

Government, and particularly NASA, is still learning how to collaborate effectively with business

in fostering commercial opportunities based on

Government-developed technology in all sectors,

not just space. This has happened slowly, given

the traditional adversary relationship between

public and private sectors.

space-based innovation; these include a new investment authority called a Space Bank or a more

broadly chartered development organization

called a Space Industrialization Corporation. The

provision by Government of investment capital

or other substantial forms of quasi-commercial

support would represent a significant departure

from past Federal actions. Although other countries (most notably Japan and some European

countries) have provided this kind of support to

their private sectors, it seems likely that given the

strong U.S. tradition of separating the public and

private sectors, and the current trend towards

restricting the Federal Government, that there

would be strong opposition to creating new Government institutions of this sort. On the other

hand, concern for declining American industrial

productivity and the increasing threat of foreign

competition in advanced technology areas could

make such innovations politically attractive.

In bringing the first commercial application of

space technology, communications satellites, into

being, the Federal Government did take a substantial institutional initiative in creating a

semiprivate designated entity, COMSAT, to manage the satellite system. An important issue is

whether similar kinds of institutional innovations

are required in other applications areas. This

question is addressed later in this chapter, particularly in the following section, which deals with

providing broad-based infrastructure to support

space applications.

There have been a number of suggestions for

creating new Federal institutions to encourage

INSTITUTIONS FOR SUPPORTING SPACE OPERATIONS

An important institutional question concerns

the provision of routine support operations for

public and private industrial activities in space.

Such operations would include reliable and affordable transportation from the surface of the

Earth to low-Earth orbit, and between low-Earth

orbit and other desired orbital locations; construction and maintenance of orbital platforms;

and providing in-orbit power and communications. it is possible to conceive of some form of

“space utility” providing these common services

to a variety of users, not only industrial but also

scientific and perhaps military.

Should such space utilities be operated by a

private or public entity? Almost certainly, given

the multiple users of in-orbit facilities and of space

transportation, it will be Government that provides the initial investments to develop these

capabilities. NASA’s plans for a space platform
Ch. 9—institutional Considerations • 257

or operations center are driven by the eventual

need for routine in-orbit capabilities such as those

just discussed.

The period during which this kind of “infrastructure” for supporting space operations will

be required is a decade or more in the future.

Thus, it is somewhat premature to carry out a detailed analysis of institutional alternatives. However, many of these issues will arise in the course

of arriving at an institutional framework for operating the space shuttle, and the approach taken

to shuttle operations is likely to set a precedent

for other forms of support services. Thus, the following analysis of institutional options for shuttle operations is also relevant to other support

systems for space.

There are essentially two ways an operational

space transportation service using the space shuttle might be organized. One is to create a designated private firm, or use an existing firm or consortium, to own and operate space transportation services for all users (with the possible exception of the military and intelligence services). The

second is to have the Government operate the

shuttle fleet and sell launch services on a reimbursable basis to private sector users, as is the

current practice with expendable launch systems.

Of course, either alternative could face competition in providing launch services from a U.S. private organization or Arianespace.

While routine launches of payloads into nearEarth or high-Earth orbit now seems like an exceedingly complex and risky undertaking, there

is no technological reason why these services

could not be provided by a private operator with

sufficient resources and experience. The current

shuttle development and demonstration program

will provide information on costs and experience

with operating characteristics, allowing potential

private operators to evaluate the possibility of

profitable commercial operation. NASA is currently contracting out large segments of shuttle

management and maintenance to private firms,

and recently invited aerospace companies and

airlines to bid on the provision of a complete

package of services for processing the shuttle for

launch.

The argument that a Government entity should

provide space transportation services is based on

several beliefs. One is that the use of launch vehicles for military and intelligence missions makes

it desirable to keep launch technology under

Government control. Others are that the principal

user of launch services in the foreseeable future

will continue to be Government, and that no private sector firm without extensive Government

subsidy would be able to provide the launch services Government will require. Another is that further Federal development of space launch capability is desirable and R&D toward this capability should be carried out in close conjunction

with current operations in space transportation.

Private ownership and operation of space systems would give rise to a need for Federal oversight and regulation. For a discussion of the issues

involved, see chapter 8.

Another option for providing space transportation services or orbital support services is international ownership and management of a space

utility or a common space platform. The analysis

below of international dimensions of space applications raises this subject briefly.

SPACE APPLICATIONS IN AN INTERNATIONAL

CONTEXT: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

international cooperation in sharing data from of internationalization. A touchstone for any analmeteorological systems and in operating interna- ysis of such suggestions is the successful experitional and communications satellites has proved ence of the International Telecommunications

successful for almost two decades, and thus it is Satellite Organization (I NTELSAT). The United

not surprising that other space applications are States took the lead in 1964 in helping to found

frequently suggested as candidates for some form a multinational entity for using communications
258 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

satellites for video and voice transmissions among

various countries; the original 19 signatories of

the INTELSAT interim agreement have grown to

106 owners of a unique international organization. The most striking feature of INTELSAT is

that it combines policy management by government representatives (for the most part) with the

operation of a successful commercial enterprise

returning 14 percent annually on its owner’s investment. Thus, INTELSAT provides a seductive

model for other areas of space applications. The

question is whether this kind of international organization can, or should, be duplicated in other

applications areas.

A brief review of various applications areas suggests the limitations of the INTELSAT model. Certainly materials processing is in much too early

a stage of development to consider any permanent institutional arrangements, much less a possible multinational one. This is particularly so

since the most likely path for developing materials

processing applications is through private enterprises. Space transportation at this point is an area

of international competition, not collaboration,

and there is no indication that the current developers of space launch systems will want to operate them as anything but national public or private enterprises. There are some potential new

international dimensions to advanced communications satellites, such as navigation and search

and rescue systems, but in general, most advances in communications satellites are likely to

be incorporated in INTELSAT or INMARSAT. It

is only in remote sensing that the issue of international institutions is currently relevant, and

most of this section devotes its attention to this

issue. There is also some discussion of the potential for internationalizing space support services,

particularly large orbital platforms in low or geosynchronous orbit.

it has been the policy of the United States since

1969 to make the benefits of the U.S. remotesensing program available to all peoples of the

world. At issue now is how best to implement

that policy: through a U.S.-owned and operated

system which makes its own arrangements for international participation, or through some form

of internationally owned and operated system in

which ownership is proportional to investment

and/or usage.

The institutional choice is between some form

of international consortium, a la INTELSAT, or

continuation and expansion of the current U.S.

national system. A variation of this latter alternative would be if the U.S. system were privately

owned and operated, since foreign governments

have a number of concerns related to private control over remote-sensing operations. Any private

sector operator of remote-sensing systems would

have to operate, with respect to non-U.S. imaging, under a specific set of Government policy

guidelines.

The most important benefit from a successful

international remote-sensing system may well be

political, rather than technical or economic. An

international system could allow participating

countries to have a say in system management;

this feature would be especially attractive to a nation that receives substantial benefits from remote

sensing but cannot afford to carry out such activities by itself. Other benefits to the United States

of an internationally owned and operated system

would include some degree of cost sharing, some

ability to limit the development of other national

systems and the resultant competition for remotesensing markets, and less suspicion that the

United States was appropriating information for

its own purposes, It is also likely that limits on

resolution could be more easily agreed on if there

were a single international system rather than

competing national systems. Finally, effective international cooperation for the common good is

desirable in itself, transcending the direct benefits to be achieved from remote-sensing technology.

Creating this kind of international institution for

remote-sensing operations would not be straightforward. It is sometimes forgotten that it took

from 1964, when the interim INTELSAT agreement was concluded, to 1971, when the definitive INTELSAT agreements were signed, to make

the transition from a U.S.-dominated communications satellite system to a more equitable arrangement.
Ch. 9—institutional Considerations • 259

Because there are conflicting national interests

related to remote sensing activities, and because

there are private sector as well as public sector

concerns involved, negotiations preceding the

founding of an international institution would of

necessity be lengthy. In addition, the kinds of

problems which have arisen at the domestic level

in the process of establishing an operational structure for remote sensing are likely to be repeated

at the international level. For example, organizations as diverse as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Meteorological Organization,

and other, more politically motivated, U.N. organizations are likely to make a claim for some

share in the control of any new international organization for remote sensing.

The history of INTELSAT also suggests that the

ability of the United States to influence the direction and policies of a similar organization for

remote sensing would diminish over time, as the

organization itself matured. In addition, if the new

international organization is successful the economic benefits will flow not only to the United

States but to other countries owning and using

the system; the U.S. aerospace industry could

lose its dominant position in remote-sensing technology as the institution awards contracts on the

basis of international competition. On the other

hand, competition for U.S. systems will arise even

in the absence of any INTELSAT-type organization; such an institution could serve to regulate

or forestall the establishment of competitive

systems such as SPOT. Here again, the INTELSAT

experience is relevant; INTELSAT contracts have

been important in the development of non-U.S.

communications satellite technology and launch

system capabilities.

Unlike COMSAT, which is essentially a private

sector organization, most nation-states’ representatives in INTELSAT are publicly owned communications organizations. Thus, INTELSAT demonstrates that it is possible to combine privately and

publicly owned organizations in the same institutional framework. However, a number of issues

related to remote sensing did not arise in the case

of communications. In particular, if an international entity were initially based on a U.S. system

owned and operated by a private firm, it is not

clear how the current policy of open access to

data could be maintained, while at the same time

the economic interests of the private entity were

protected. There are clearly tensions between the

current policy goal of commercializing U.S. remote-sensing operations and the preceding argument that international institutions might well

operate a remote-sensing system.

Previously there was discussion of a possible

space utility to provide common services required

by a variety of operations in space. This space

utility would be an international entity, where investment and ownership would be distributed

among a set of regional, allied, or global partners.

Although internationalization of an emerging

space operations utility is not fully explored here,

this possibility deserves continued attention as application programs and their supporting infrastructure mature.

INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS

The discussion of generic institutional issues Communications

previously discussed provides a basis for identifying institutional concerns for each of the applica- The primary issue in communications satellites

tion areas treated in this assessment and for sug- is not institutional. As has been discussed in

gesting ways to deal with these concerns. Each chapters 3 and 8, NASA’s major thrust in this area

application area—communications, remote sens- is a proposed research, development, and deming, materials processing, and transportation-is onstration effort in the 30/20 GHz range. This

examined below from this perspective. assessment has suggested that it may not be nec-
260 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

essary for the Government to provide most of the

funding for the flight demonstration of a satellite

embodying this technology; the private sector

could use the results of related R&D conducted

under the sponsorship of national security agencies as a starting place to mount a demonstration

effort funded primarily from its own resources.

If, however, a decision to continue a NASA

communications R&D effort in the 30/20 GHz

region were made, then this program should be

conducted in close cooperation with both satellite manufacturers and communications satellite

users. In both its R&D and its demonstration

phases, this program might be amenable to institutional experiments such as public-private costsharing and risk-sharing and to joint planning and

management structures. It may be possible to

move quickly to a demonstration of a 30/20 GHz

system, but care should be taken not to undertake such a demonstration if R&D is not essentially complete. As has been discussed earlier in

this chapter, attempting to combine the R&D and

demonstration phases is not usually a successful

approach.

If the proposed NASA 30/20 GHz RD&D program is initiated, and if it is planned and managed according to the principles discussed previously, then no additional Federal actions should

be required in order to make the transition from

R&D to operations. If this new capability proves

to be technically and economically viable, private firms will incorporate it in planning them for

the next generation of communications satellites.

Remote Sensing

Many of the problems related to the Nation’s

R&D program in land remote sensing result from

the different perspectives of developers and users.

NASA views this effort as one of developing a new

and experimental capability; the various users see

the results of the program as immediately beneficial and have attempted to treat the system as

if it were already operational. NASA has been

caught between carrying out its R&D mission and

responding to users who want to make immediate operational use of the Landsat system. To

date, users of the remote-sensing system have not

participated significantly in decisions regarding

its status and future. The transfer of Landsat management to NOAA is designed to alleviate this

shortcoming.

The division of responsibilities between any

future R&D program in remote sensing and the

operations of a working land remote-sensing system will have to be negotiated. If, as is suggested

below, NASA is assigned the operational role, this

issue becomes less problematic. If the operator

is another Government agency, or a private firm,

it may be desirable for NASA to perform some

or all of continuing R&D.

Though Landsat has succeeded in providing the

information needed to understand the kinds of

public and private benefits that can be gained

from remote-sensing technology, it has not been

able to provide sufficient information on costs

and on the potential market for remote-sensing

data. Again, this is largely because the program

has been run as an R&D, rather than a demonstration, effort. One heritage of the “Apollo-era”

NASA is a desire to control most or all of a system

development process, emphasizing its research

and engineering aspects, rather than to share control with other entities, including other Federal

agencies. This tendency has been noted for the

initial Landsat and Seasat programs, and it seems

characteristic of the Landsat-D effort as well.

Landsat-D involves the first use in orbit of an advanced sensor called the thematic mapper, the

characteristics of which are not well enough

known to consider it an operational system.

The prospects for successfully achieving the

quite different objectives of a NASA R&D program and a NOAA demonstration program within

this single flight effort seem limited. Most of the

principles for a successful demonstration effort

presented previously have been violated in putting together the plans for Landsat-D. Users have

not been closely involved in planning the program; there is a poor match between the characteristics of the advanced sensors to be flown on

Landsat-D and the needs of the existing or potential user community for remote-sensing data; and

a fair degree of tension exists between NASA and

NOAA on account of their differing objectives for
Ch. 9—institutional Considerations ● 261

the program. In addition, technical problems with

the thematic mapper have made the effort even

more of a development rather than demonstration undertaking.

Undoubtedly there is a tradeoff between separating the development and demonstration

phases, and the high cost of flying a fully qualified

space system at least twice, but the increased

assurance of accomplishing program objectives

makes such an investment worthwhile. The Landsat program has not been planned with a clear

understanding of the requirements of bringing an

innovative new technology into operation. In addition to the problems of incorporating a new

way of doing things into existing patterns, Landsat has exacerbated rather than minimized institutional conflicts and differences of perspective affecting operator and user acceptance of the new

technology.

It is probably too late to remedy some of the

basic flaws in the design of the Landsat effort.

Rather, there should be an attempt to recognize

the institutional, funding, and programmatic constraints under which the Landsat-D effort now

operates, and to determine whether those constraints can be modified in order to reflect a more

balanced approach to development and demonstration of a new technology. The issue of the institutional framework for an operational remotesensing system has been controversial for almost

a decade now. There has been extensive analysis

both by the executive branch and by Congress;

the full range of that analysis will not be reviewed

here. This discussion will be limited to applying

general principles provided previously to current

proposals for operational remote-sensing systems.

The key policy issue in choosing an institutional

framework is whether the benefits derived from

remote sensing are primarily public or private;

the available evidence suggests that they are a

mixture of both. Because Landsat has been run

as an R&D program, and because the prices of

Landsat data have been heavily subsidized, the

market for data from an operational but more expensive system is not well defined.

The process of moving remote sensing from

R&D to commercial operations has been underway for 3 years now. The current transition planning has been plagued by external and internal

difficulties. NOAA, the Government agency responsible for the transition, has not been given

the resources to acquire the technical and economic capabilities needed to deal effectively with

NASA, the present operator, or with eventual

operators and users, public and private. The lack

of budgetary and institutional commitment to the

commercialization of remote sensing has prevented potential private sector operators from

taking the Government’s efforts very seriously.

Recently, COMSAT General proposed to assume ownership and operation of NOAA’s meteorological and remote-sensing satellites.8 The

prospects for such takeover depend on the baiance between public and private markets for

Earth observation data. Certainly the established

market for meteorological data is governmental

in character, and presumably the Government

would contract to buy those data from the privately operated system and to make it available

as a public good, if the COMSAT proposal were

adopted. There is also a large public sector market for remote-sensing data at the Federal, State,

local, and international level, and presumably the

Federal Government would also purchase the

data needed to serve the public market from

COMSAT. If these two public markets turn out

to form an overwhelming share of the total demand for Earth observation data, then the

COMSAT proposal should be approved if it

would provide significant efficiencies in operating

performance and cost. An alternative to the

COMSAT proposal would be that a Government

agency operate remote-sensing systems and

make their outputs available to the private sector at a cost reflecting, for example, the marginal

cost of obtaining and reproducing the data or

some attempt to recoup system development expenses,

If, however, the Government market for meteorological and/or remote-sensing data were relatively soon to become a minor share of the total

demand, then the COMSAT proposal would be

better understood as an innovative and aggressive

institutional initiative on the part of a private firm,

8Klaus Heiss, “New Economic Structures for Space in the

Eighties,” Astronautics artd Aeronautics, january 1981, pp. 19-21.
262 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

whose risks are minimized by guaranteed public

purchases, but not totally eliminated. A major

issue would be whether the Government should

attempt to recoup any of the R&D and system

development costs that made a private venture

in remote sensing possible. The alternative is to

view the sunk costs as an appropriate Federal

stimulus to private sector activity. Access to

remote-sensing products by non-U.S. users would

be another area of concern. Provision would

have to be made to ensure that private, profit-oriented operation (whether by COMSAT or in some

other form) is compatible with the current U.S.

policy of unrestricted access to all available data.

In addition, a national remote-sensing system

which is privately operated may not be compatible with eventual internationalization of remotesensing efforts.

If the current policy of early commercialization

of remote sensing were modified or reversed, it

might be preferable to have either NOAA or

NASA operate remote-sensing systems. The analysis in this chapter suggests that NASA would be

a better choice than NOAA as an operating agency, since remote-sensing technology is still evolving rapidly and the existing relationships between

the users and NASA form a basis for continuation and expansion.

Materials Processing

The research effort that might lead to widespread use of space for processing or manufacturing is still in its early stages. Much more basic

and applied science is required before a wide

range of specific applications can be tested. Thus

the materials processing program provides the

best opportunity within the current program of

space applications R&D for applying the principles identified above. Materials processing in

space is an example of a technological opportunity where the conditions which call for Federal

involvement exist—high risk, high cost, long time

to pay back. It is clear that materials processing

makes sense only as a commercial activity, and

thus any federally funded R&D should be planned

with considerations of market and cost in mind.

Innovative policy instruments such as the joint

Endeavor Agreement (discussed in ch. 8) may be

appropriate ways of accomplishing this. What is

crucial is designing the materials processing R&D

effort in ways that consider the likely future operating environment of commercial activities, rather

than exploring exciting technological possibilities,

while paying no attention to the commercial

potential.

The demonstration phase for most kinds of

materials processing activity is still some years in

the future. However, the McDonnell Douglas/

Ortho Pharmaceutical joint venture experiment

is planning for a flight demonstration in the

mid-l 980’s. The basic technology will be tested

in orbit first; if successful, a separate effort will

to demonstrate that technology in an operating

environment.

This approach to developing and demonstrating materials processing capabilities seems appropriate for other projects as well. Given that

materials processing must ultimately be commercialized in order to be successful, there should

be continuing strong, emphasis on the involvement of private industy in MPS activity, especially as the transition from R&D to the demonstration phase is planned. The kind of risk- and costsharing that currently characterizes the joint Endeavor Agreement (and is discussed above for

demonstration efforts in the communications satellite area) should also characterize any further

demonstration of materials processing technology.

A great deal of attention has been given to the

general question of possible Government initiatives to stimulate the transition from the demonstration phase to private operations. Two sets of

congressional hearings have been held, and a

proposal to establish a Space Industrialization

Corporation, as a source of investment and other

policy stimuli, has received extensive analysis.g

While this attention to transition planning for

materials processing is laudable, the relatively

early stage of the materials processing program

suggests that it would be premature to select any

particular form of government subsidy for the

post-demonstration transition phase. Much more

9House of Representatives, Committee on Science and

Technology, hearings on Space Industrialization Act, 1979 and 1980.
Ch. 9—lnstitutional Considerations • 263

needs to be learned from the experience of, for

example, the joint endeavor experiment before

an efficient and equitable mode of Governmentindustry cooperation can be identified for materials processing or other new space technologies.

Transportation

Continuing improvement and upgrading of the

space shuttle and development of a truly reusable

orbit-to-orbit transfer stage appear to be crucial

elements of the Federal R&D effort in space transportation. Given its strong institutional capabilities

in space propulsion and vehicle design, NASA

is the appropriate focus for further R&D in this

field. Essential to an R&D effort that serves space

transportation users will be stability and predictability, so that users can expect to have new

launch capabilities available on schedule and at

predictable prices.

The initial flights of the space shuttle are billed,

correctly, as development rather than demonstration efforts. However, there is no separate demonstration phase as part of the STS program; after

the initial four flights, the system will be declared

operational and begin to fly payloads regularly.

In reality, demonstration of the operating characteristics of the space transportation system, and

particularly those of the shuttle, will come over

time as the costs of each incremental shuttle

flight, and the potentials and constraints of the

shuttle as a launch system become better known.

It should be recognized, therefore, that the actual demonstration phase of the shuttle program

is likely to extend beyond 1985, and the information needed for private-sector operators to

make an accurate assessment of the potential returns from shuttle operations is unlikely to result

from the early years of the shuttle effort.

The transition to an operational system will require that, whoever the eventual operator may

be, policies with respect to patent and proprietary information protection, launch assurances,

Government preemption rights, and costs must

be developed. A variety of institutions will have

to evolve, especially those for marketing, insuring, and financing operational launches. The

competition from potential privately developed

expendable launch systems with lower performance but also lower costs than the shuttle may

play an important role in future private sector

operations. The transition phase is particularly

complicated by the mixture of military, intelligence, and civilian Government requirements,

together with private sector requirements for

space transportation services. Institutions for

resolving these conflicting demands will be

requ i red.

Providing routine space transportation services

is different from operating the three applications

discussed above: transportation services support

operations in space, rather than being integral to

a particular applications system. The issues related to the operational form for space transportation services have been discussed previously.

94-915 - - 82 - 1 B
Chapter 10

POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND

THEIR ASSESSMENT
Contents

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Policy Guidance: Categories and Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

National Aeronautics and Space Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

COMSAT Act and Related Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

Other Legislative Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

Summary of lssues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

Need for Consistent High-Level Attention to Space Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

The Executive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

The Legislative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

Institutional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

Policy Synthesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

Need for High-Level Attention to Space Policy in the Executive Branch . . . . 276

Reestablish the National Aeronautics and Space Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

Committee of the National Security Council or a Subset of a “Cabinet

Council’s” Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

Presidential or National Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

Establish a New Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

Institutional Changes-Clarifying the Public-Private Sector Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

Space Telecommunications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

Clarifying the R&D Role of Government in Space Communications . . . . . . 282

R&D to Support Regulatory Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

Earth Observation From Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

Space Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288

Applications R&D-Strengthening the NASA Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

International Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

Telecommunications Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

Land Remote Sensing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

Economic Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300

Space Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

Tax Incentives, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

Integrated Policy Options for Space Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

Continuing the Current Policy Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

Increasing the International Emphasis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

increasing the National Private Sector Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

Increased High-Level Policy Focus.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304

FIGURE

Figure No. Page

16. Civilian Space Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

17. NASA Funding for Communications Satellite Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Chapter 10

POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter brings together the background,

technologies, and specific issues that are needed

to formulate and analyze policy options. It establishes a range of policies that maybe considered

i n the light of the analysis in the earlier chapters

of this report and current congressional practice

and suggests a specific policy formulation. It also

assesses the policy options with respect to their

potential effect on existing and future programs.

Frequently, “space policy” is confused with

“space program, ” and a review of “space policy” might be expected to provide recommendations for new projects. As understood in this

assessment, space policy is the set of guidelines

which establishes the goals and the institutional

framework for the civilian space applications program and broadly defines its implementation. This

definition of space policy includes the types of

measures that are within the domain of legislative action. Specific program elements or space

systems are not, strictly speaking, “policy” and

are only treated to illustrate the options discussed.

POLICY GUIDANCE: CATEGORIES AND CRITERIA

A number of general categories and criteria

guide the process of formulating policy. This section summarizes some of the policies that now

exist and from them develops the categories and

criteria to be employed in selecting possible

future policy options.

National Aeronautics and Space Act

(NAS Act)’

The principal guidance may be derived from

the 1958 NAS Act, the existing legislative authority for the civilian space program, where there is

a declaration of policy and purpose and where

the functions assigned to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) are specified. This legislation sets forth the following

general categories of policy guidance:

● Guiding principles or philosophy.—Such

phrases as “ . . . peaceful purposes for the

benefit of all mankind” and “ . . . a civilian

agency exercising control over aeronautical

and space activities sponsored by the United

States, except . . . defense . . . “ provide

broad philosophical guidelines for the conduct of the national space program.

INationa/ Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, and

related legislation. Public Law 85-568 (see app. i).

●

●

Goals or objectives. —The specific areas

defined in the NAS Act include a very general guide to the scope of the U.S. space program, e.g., “expansion of human knowledge . . . , “ “improvement of . . . aeronautical and space vehicles,” “development

and operation of vehicles capable of carrying instruments . . . and living organisms

through space, “ “long-range studies of the

potential benefits of . . . aeronautical and

space activities, “ “preservation of the role

of the United States as a leader . . . ,“

“making available to agencies . . . concerned with defense . . . discoveries (by

NASA, and vice versa),” “cooperation . . .

with other nations, ” “ground propulsion

systems R& D,” “ . . . development of advanced automobile propulsion systems, ”

and “ . . . research . . . to alleviate and

minimize the effects of disability. ”

Organization.–The act specified formation

of a new agency, NASA, and a new coordinating body, the National Aeronautics and

Space Council (which no longer exists–see

ch. 3 and 9). It did not specify the internal

organization of NASA, but did name the

members of the Council. Several executive

level positions were specified for NASA, including an Administrator, a Deputy Ad267
268 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ministrator, and seven Associate Administrators.

● Functions.—Both the Space Council and

NASA were given specific functional responsibilities. The Council was charged with: developing a comprehensive program of aeronautical and space activities; responsibility

for the direction of major aeronautical and

space activities; providing for cooperation

between agencies; and resolving differences

on aeronautical and space matters. In addition, the act specified that NASA would

plan, direct and conduct aeronautical and

space activities, use the scientific community, disseminate widely the knowledge it

gained, and conduct R&D in specific areas.

● Budgets or resources. —An annual authorization and appropriations process was required, with no special multiyear features

for longer term programs and no guidance

about appropriate levels of support.

COMSAT Act and Related Legislation

The “Communications Satellite Act of 1962”

(Public Law 87-624)2 was an innovative policy

step that recognized the rapidly growing potential of space platforms for communications services as well as the need to clarify the institutional

setting for providing these services. it created a

new, for-profit corporation, the Communications

Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), to act for the

United States in establishing an international,

commercial, communications satellite system. It

also clearly affirmed that NASA would cooperate

with COMSAT in research and development

(R&D) and provide reimbursable launch and associated services.

The intent of the legislation, inter alia, was to

move rapidly toward establishing such a system

and to remove some of the ambiguities and uncertainties about the possible role of other firms,

especially AT&T, that could have entered the international satellite communications picture.

There was a clear intent to have a single global

system. This was largely for technical reasons: at

the time the most likely system involved large

‘Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Public Law 87-624, 87th

Cong., H.R. 11040, Aug. 31, 1962.

numbers of medium-altitude satellites that, as

they moved in their orbits, would periodically

enter and leave the fields of view of the many

ground antennas sending and receiving signals

through the system. The difficulties of managing

multiple systems, each involving many moving

satellite repeaters and the consequent high probability of overlapping and interfering signals,

made a single system appear a necessity. However, experiments with synchronous-orbit platforms soon demonstrated the desirability of using

high-altitude repeaters for the system, making

multiple systems technically more feasible. There

were also strong political reasons to favor a single

multinational system dominated by the United

States. In addition, the financial and managerial

efficiencies of a single system were significant.

Hence, the momentum for a single global system

was sufficient to preserve the initial international

organization that was established, INTELSAT, and

more recently, to extend the concept to marine

communications via a similar structure,

INMARSAT. 3 Congress again acted to designate

COMSAT to act as the U.S. participant in the

INMARSAT system.

Other Legislative Measures

When the NAS Act was enacted in 1958, the

nature and scope of the Nation’s future space activities were only dimly visible. In more recent

legislation, such as in the energy field (where the

technologies are better known and Congress is

very familiar with the institutions), the relevant

legislation has been significantly more detailed

and broader in scope. While the wisdom of a detailed specification of internal agency structure

and specific programs is open to considerable debate, this recent practice suggests that similar

measures may properly be considered in this

analysis. For example:

● Technology-specific goals or objectives. —

In the energy field, Congress has mandated

that certain particular technologies be developed:A electric vehicles, ocean thermal

acommunjcatjons Sate//jte Act of 1%2, Amendment: International

Maritime Satellite Communications Act, Title V, Public Law 95-564,

approved Nov. 1, 1978.

qExamples include: Solar Energy Research, Development and

Demonstration Act of 1974, Public Law 93-473, Oct. 26, 1974; Geo-
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment Ž 269

electric Conversion (OTEC) systems, photovoltaic systems, and magnetic-confinement

fusion (using Tokamak devices). A comparable action in the space field might be to

specify the development of a solar-electric

propulsion system or a synchronous-orbit

storm warning system. These examples of

congressional “policy” setting come very

close to being program definitions. At the

beginning of this chapter, it was stated that

such program definition would not be considered except as part of a larger policy

framework. It must be recognized, however,

that there may often be pressures to include

specific technological directions in new

space policy measures, and that such action

is not inconsistent with the pattern set in

other high-technology areas. At the very

least, it is essential to consider the policy implications of mandating particular projects,

including the effects on institutional structures, public-private relations, and the balance between scientific and applications

programs.

Tax and other incentives; loan guarantees. –

Among the policy tools that have been used

to achieve specific goals by affecting the

behavior of individuals and private firms, the

economic incentive has been the most typical. Such incentives have been enacted by

various methods: 1 ) by adding a tax levy to

discourage, or reducing a tax to encourage,

specific activities; 2) through direct subsidy

(e.g., food stamps); or 3) through loans and

loan guarantees (to students, homebuyers,

etc.). A recent example of this practice in

the energy area combined all three of these

incentives in the Windfall Profits/Synfuels

Corp. packages

One additional example of an economic

incentive deserves further mention—i. e., a

guaranteed price for delivery of a product

at some future time. In some instances,

thermal Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act

of 1974, Public Law 93-410, Sept. 3, 1974; Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1976, Public

Law 94-413, Sept. 17, 1976; and Magnetic Fusion Energy Engineering Act of 1980, Public Law 96-386, Oct. 7, 1980.

Scrude Oi/ Wjndfa// Profits Tax Act of 1979, Public Law 96-223;

approved Apr. 2, 1980 and Energy Security Act of 1979, Public Law

96-294, approved June 30, 1980.

●

where there are several potential strategies

for producing a desirable product, a policy

option is for the Government to guarantee

to purchase a given quantity of the product

at a set price, high enough to provide an attractive rate of return to the risk-taker. In

such a case, the private supplier is responsible for detailed management of the project, for the technical choices that are made,

and for the ultimate delivery of the product.

There is limited experience with this approach, but it does appear to be applicable

to Earth observations, and possibly to other

space applications services.

Regulatory measures. –Economic regulation

(as contrasted with regulation to protect the

public health, interest and safety) has been

employed where the public interest requires

a mechanism to control pricing, entry into

a market, service delivery, and industry

structure. A typical example is the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC) operating under the Communications Act of

1934.6 In addition to carrying out its regulatory functions, FCC has recently been instrumental in allowing limited multiple entry into certain parts of the telecommunications market. h is necessary to institute some

form of regulatory authority when the nature

of a service makes a monopoly supplier necessary, as was originally true for the Nation’s

long-distance telephone system. In the early

years of the system, the technology that was

available required a single switched system

for long-distance service. As technology advanced, at first with broad-band microwave

repeater systems, and then with satellites

having broad-band capabilities, the necessity for maintaining a long-distance monopoly

largely disappeared. Consequently, akernative commercial systems have been allowed

to compete with AT&T; many of these rely

on satellites. Thus, an advancing technology

that brings about changes in the market

characteristics of the service system may obviate the monopolistic entity. When such a

change does occur, there needs to be suffi6communjcatjonsAct of 1934, as amended, 48 Stat. 1064, 47

USC 609.
270 • Civilian Space Policy and Applications

cient flexibility in the regulatory framework

to permit both open entry and movement

toward expanded competition.

Exemption from other /aws.—ln many cases,

the process of setting public policy requires

that a balance be struck between competing

constituencies, or that different incentives

be offered to achieve similar objectives.

When the circumstances do call for such a

balance, the measures available to the lawmaker include relief from provisions of competing laws. For example, antitrust laws intended to increase competition, and thereby

to provide better products and services at

lower prices to the consuming public, restrict monopolistic activities of corporations.

However, in some instances where the public interest seemed better served by collective action than by competition, Congress

has granted statutory exemption from the

antitrust laws. Examples of such exemptions

include the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922,

which allows agricultural cooperatives to

market jointly and to set uniform prices for

their products; the Norris-LaGuardia Act of

1932, which allows collective bargaining by

organized labor; and the Defense Production Act of 1950, which grants a limited exemption to contractors who, at the request

of the President, enter cooperative agreements related to national defense. It may be

desirable to grant a similar exemption to industries that would agree to combine their

resources to develop new space applications

technologies.

Reporting and other special requirements.–

Perhaps the most used policy requirement

that has been adopted by Congress in recent

times is the mandated report. One reason

for these often cumbersome reporting requirements is to oblige the executive branch

to attend to planning in a way that does not

involve significant amounts of appropriated

funds. For example, construction of a specific system such as a new strategic bomber

is subject to extensive reporting and review

in connection with the large annual appropriation required. A more general issue,

such as the strategic posture of the United

States or the tradeoffs among various new

strategic weapons systems, would not necessarily be given detailed attention if a mandated report were not required. No mandate

can ensure that the response will be of high

quality, that attention will be paid to the

issues specified, or that the deadline for the

report will be met. In fact, congressional

mandates have been increasingly ignored or

given such cursory attention that their original intent has been negated. With the pressures of the congressional calendar making

it difficult for members to oversee the tremendous volume of laws already enacted,

there are many cases of missed deadlines,

inadequate responses, or complete lack of

attention which go without significant congressional objection. This causes the process

to break down even further. Nevertheless,

a mandated report, if properly followed up

and if the necessary resources and time exist to complete it, can be a useful policy

tool—particularly if it is part of a larger policy

initiative, or if the leadership for ensuring its

preparation is clearly specified.

In addition to mandated reports, there are

several other requirements that may be included to encourage greater attention to

overall policy: 1 ) establishing an advisory

mechanism that utilizes relevant expertise

outside of the particular agency or department involved; 2) specifying project milestones or “sunset” provisions to be met

before additional authority or budget is provided by Congress; 3) requiring coordination with other agencies or with specific international bodies.

Additional Considerations

These general areas of policy development provide wide latitude for responding to the issues

facing the civilian space program today, and for

generating innovative approaches to emerging

questions and future problems. In evaluating specific options that fall within the general types of

policy, the following questions need to be considered:

● Is it feasible?—l n this assessment, the term

“feasibility” will be used to imply that pro-
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 271

●

spective policies are consistent with an accepted understanding of the appropriate

roles of Government and the private sector,

the separation of powers between Congress

and the executive branch, etc.; in other

words, that the option does not require a

revolutionary change in current practice.

The assumption is that changes that are less

disruptive and evolutionary in character will

have a greater likelihood of serious consideration and possible adoption than more

revolutionary measures, and that the benefits of the civilian space program, however

great, do not justify radical changes in

American institutions and practices.

Is it in the public interest?—The motivation

for making changes to space policy is to

serve the public interest and not just to promote a particular constituency or industrial

sector. Hence, an additional test for acceptable policy changes would be (among other

factors): does this change promise greater

public benefit, in lower net costs, better services, more rapid introduction of new services, a favorable distribution of expected

●

In

benefits, an improved competitive position

abroad, or enhanced national security?

Can it be implemented?–This again is largely a question of judgment in determining (on

the basis of experience or other data) that

a desirable policy change may or may not

be capable of being implemented in the

“real world, ” given practical questions of

timing, cost, depth and extent of previous

commitments, institutional inertia, or an inability to dictate a course of action to other

nations. In such judgments, there will always

be room for debate. Therefore, wherever it

is appropriate in the policy synthesis, questions of U.S. ability to implement a policy

will be highlighted.

summary, the foregoing discussion has focused on the major questions that should be considered in order to evaluate possible policy options. It has also identified the general classes of

policy initiatives that appear to be relevant to

space applications. The next section will review

the major issues and problems with our current

situation that prompt the search for new policies

and solutions.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

The search for new policy options is stimulated

by the belief that significant new services, and

consequent public and private benefits, could

result from a vigorous exploitation of current and

future innovations in space. The Government

may promote such new systems through policies

that will, inter alia, lower barriers that may exist;

provide new mechanisms for interested parties

to cooperate; and, in general, encourage public

and private investment in space applications

commensurate with the prospective benefits to

society.

In this analysis, we proceed from a basic premise—that the existing policy framework, which

has served to organize the Nation’s initial efforts

in space, should be reviewed for possible changes

in the light of current and emerging technology,

as well as the more than 20 years experience in

space operations that the Nation has acquired

since Explorer 1. The following factors make the

present a particularly appropriate time for review:

the advent of the shuttle and the conditions of

fiscal stringency that may lead to a reduced effort in large-scale engineering development for

NASA; the appearance for the first time of significant economic competition from foreign countries; the rapid development of military space systems; and the prospect of new commercial opportunities in remote sensing and materials

processing.

The flaws in our existing policy cannot be attributed to a single overriding cause. In a number

of ways, it fails to provide the kind of stimulus

and guidance to our national space efforts to ensure that the country’s public and private resources are used in the most beneficial fashion.

This shortcoming is highlighted by the fact that

several foreign countries intend to develop their
272 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

own space applications systems, some of which

will be more advanced, and more suited for applications, than are comparable U.S. systems. The

growing domestic interest in space is evident in

industry initiatives and congressional hearings on

space policy,7 recently introduced legislation,8

the growing number of voluntary space associations (see ch. 5); and efforts by individual entrepreneurs to develop private launch systems and

satellites. All of these varying developments

reflect the remarkable maturation of space technology over the past decade, as well as the great

but unfulfilled promise that further development

offers for delivering useful services, gaining international prestige, and satisfying the human spirit

of adventure.

Implicit in the concerns of the constituencies

mentioned above is the claim that, compared

with the potential benefits to be achieved, U.S.

investment in civilian space applications may be

misdirected or too low. This claim raises two important questions: 1) What is the relative importance of increased public or private investment

in space applications as compared with alternative investments (in defense, social programs,

new pIant and machinery, etc.)? 2) What are the

possible benefits or returns, and to what degree

can one ascertain their extent and magnitude?

These issues be will be implicit through the sections that follow; briefly, we can respond thus.

First, the claim that we are investing too little in

space applications does not imply that we are also

investing too much in other worthwhile areas.

Furthermore, opportunity costs in the public policy arena cannot be rigorously compared. The

resolution of the annual conflict among alternative allocations of public resources is necessarily

political, subject to all the vagaries of human judgment, prejudice, and intuition. Much depends on

7Un@d States Civilian Space Poiicy, hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on

Science and Technology, U.S. H. R., 96th Congress, 2d sess., July

23, 24, 1980, No, 152, USGPO, Washington, 1980.

BFor example: The Space /nciustriaiization Act of 1979; hearings

before the Subcommittee on Space, Science and Applications, of

the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. H. R., 96th Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 2337, May 22,23, and june 26,27, 1979,

No. 47.

9For example: CarlSagan’s“planeta~ Society, ” which has an

active, informed and rapidly growing membership.

the overall resources available, and hence, on the

state of the national economy and the Federal

budget. To require that investments in space applications be explicitly compared with other alternatives is to apply a constraint that is inappropriate to public policy issues. Nevertheless, in a period of fiscal restraint and intense scrutiny of all

Government expenditures, the space program

can expect to have to defend its claim to a share

of Federal revenues, and to justify its programs

by arguing that they contribute to national goals

such as defense or increased industrial productivity.

This situation is made difficult insofar as many

of the societal benefits are not immediately realizable or are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. They include such abstract notions as international prestige, national self-image, and incentives

to individual achievements; a single mission or

project is often not easily identified with a specific

set of benefits. For example, the successful flight

of a meteorological satellite does not generate

public attention in the United States. However,

not only do large segments of the U.S. economy

depend on the accurate data such satellites provide, but other nations around the world are

eager subscribers to this information and see the

United States in a more positive light because of

this service. It is the accumulation of many such

small but significant positive effects that constitutes the sum of intangible benefits from the

national space effort.

Because of the effects of space investments are

derived primarily from many small, though by no

means insignificant programs, it is difficult to sustain public investment at a level and scope appropriate to the potential of the consequent benefits.

Partly for this reason it is important to consider

public policy incentives for private sector space

investments that could complement or substitute

for direct public expenditures. Private investment

will occur only if the benefits (usually in the form

of direct profits) to the private investor are relatively assured (i.e., low risk), and are of sufficient

magnitude to be attractive in comparison with

other alternatives. Policy incentives must promote

these conditions while ensuring that the public

and national interest are also served.
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment • 273

The issues discussed in this chapter derive from,

among other sources, a series of workshops held

at OTA for the purpose of identifying the major

issues or concerns facing the U.S. space program

(table 1, in ch. 3) and suggesting policies that

might be adopted to resolve those issues.

Need for Consistent High-Level

Attention to Space Policy

Current space policy does not translate easily

into a set of specific goals, program areas, or mission opportunities. Hence, during periods when

there is a national preoccupation with social, defense, or economic issues that bear no direct relation to the civilian space program, the process

of planning and budgeting for specific missions

may fall victim to lack of high-level attention and

focus. Because there is no current long-term commitment to specific goals (after space shuttle development is complete), and because the most

recent presidential statement on space program

goals (by President Carter in 1978)1° was vague

with respect to the content and timing of future

objectives (beyond “utilization of the shuttle”),

annual budget and program decisions have

tended to be made ad hoc. When decisions are

made in the context of annual budget preparations, they unfortunately are biased by the restricted nature of the forum (primarily discussions

between the agencies with space allocations in

their budgets and the Office of Management and

Budget), and by the tendency to look for shortterm economies, to shrink or limit programs and

future-year costs, to refine and improve management, and to fit the program into a budget target.

While these are necessary and important management considerations, they are not suited to

developing and identifying a creative program or

a national commitment to long-term space program goals. For consistent, long-term policy objectives to be developed and carried out, the

budget process must necessarily follow policy

guidance, and not the reverse. Without such policy commitments, the annual budget process will

result in mission deferrals, stretched schedules,

and even cancellation of well-developed projects,

Io’’white House Fact sheet, U.S. Civil Space Policy, office of the

White House Press Secretary, ” Oct. 11, 1978.

adding up to a waste of scarce resources. All of

these have already occurred in recent NASA

budgets.

The Executive

In the Carter administration, several major interagency reviews of space policy were carried

out under the aegis of the National Security

Council, and in the process a Policy Review Committee (PRC) for space was established with the

Director of the Office of Science and Technology

Policy (OSTP) as the chairman. The issues reviewed during this period involved principally

space applications and the civilian/military interface, and led to three (classified) Presidential directives and several public statements concernFigure 16.-Civilian Space Budget

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 198

Fiscal year

3
274 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ing: 1 ) assignment of responsibility for operational

satellite Earth-sensing systems to NOAA; 2) transition to commercial operation for Landsat; and

3) general civilian space policy .11 In the Reagan

administration, the PRC (Space) has been abandoned and an independent review of the Carter

administration decisions and other space program

questions is underway (see ch. 6 for a description of the review). One of the principal participants in this review is the Director of OSTP. In

the 1976 legislation establishing OSTP, the Director is given a broad assignment that includes providing the President with analyses of major policies, plans, and programs involving science and

technology. Among the priority goals delineated

for science and technology is “advancing the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space.”lz

OSTP can act as a focus for space policy development, provided: 1 ) the President determines that

he wants OSTP to play such a role, and 2) there

are enough personnel and funds available for the

Office in addition to its other responsibilities for

science and technology policy. Currently, OSTP’S

limited budget and staff resources (approximately

$1.5 million in fiscal year 1982 and 11 permanent positions) make it difficult for the Office to

assume a major continuing role in evaluating

space policy.

Despite the efforts of the Carter administration,

two major problems with Executive direction of

the space program have arisen in recent years:

1 ) failure to identify and commit to major new

goals, and 2) failure to implement programs to

accomplish goals already announced or identified. These problems suggest that the Executive

has been ineffective in focusing its attention on

the space program, because of pressure from the

external environment (such as budget constraints

and an emphasis on national issues that are not

clearly addressed by the civilian space program)

and because of internal difficulties (such as the

administrative structure of NASA, and the determination to complete current large programs

such as the shuttle). Better procedures are needed

periodically to focus high-level attention on space

program needs, procedures that will fix a conI I Ibid.

IZNationa/ Science and Technology Policy, Organization and priorities Act of 1976, Public Law 94-282, May 11, 1976.

tinuing defined responsibility for developing

space program goals and objectives, reviewing

the plans to achieve the objectives, and identifying the resources that may be required. This

responsibility would include periodic public presentation of the goals and objectives developed

by the executive branch to Congress for debate

and ratification. A forum for implementing these

procedures could have a broad scope, defined

in detail by Congress, or its responsibilities might

be described by Congress in general terms, with

its detailed structure to be determined by the executive branch.

It should be noted that, in its original form, the

legislation establishing NASA also created a coordinating mechanism, the National Aeronautics

and Space Council (NASC), whose responsibilities

included civilian/military coordination and, more

significantly, development of “a comprehensive

program of aeronautical and space activities to

be conducted by departments and agencies of

the United States. ” The Council was abolished

by President Nixon in 1973 at the same time that

the Science Adviser’s Office was removed from

the Executive Office of the President. The President’s Science Advisory Committee was also

abolished. This now defunct NASC is one example of an executive branch mechanism that could

satisfy the needs identified above. NASC’S original

functions and composition should be reviewed

in the light of developments in current technology and changes in agency relationships. The

scope of its responsibilities would have to be clarified: would it be limited to civilian programs only? to the civilian/military relationship? or extended to include both civilian and military programs, and private sector activities?

The Legislative

Congress, insofar as it oversees and reviews executive branch agencies and programs and initiates and passes on legislation, is an essential part

of the policy process. Committee hearings bring

forth critical issues for public airing and debate,

and staff papers, investigations and congressional

IJReorganization plan No. 1 of 1973, 38 Federal Register 9579,

Apr. 18, 1973, 87 Stat. 1089, abolished the National Aeronautics

and Space Council together with its functions, and the Office of

Science and Technology, efective July 1, 1973.
Ch. 10–Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 275

agency reports all contribute to the review framework. In addition, major policy initiatives frequently originate in Congress. The COMSAT

Act, 14 for instance, had its origins largely in Congress, though it was well supported at the time

by the president and his advisers.

Congress’ watchdog role, primarily determined

by the yearly budget cycle, often leaves congressional committees at a disadvantage with regard

to setting policy. They can be so caught up responding to initiatives from the president, that

they are unable to take the time to formulate policy or to form a long-term vision of national

programs.

In addition, the present committee structure,

in which several different committees have jurisdiction over different parts of the space program,

makes it difficult to consider the program as a

whole. In recent years, there has been no central focus in Congress for space matters. The Congressional Space Caucus recently formed in the

House of Representatives may provide an informal forum for discussion of space program priorities and direction within Congress. Its formation

reflects the concern of some members about the

uncertain direction of the U.S. space program.

Neither it nor policy studies can substitute for a

broader, sustained debate on the place of the

space program in the totality of national objectives, in which all the major actors are represented.

Institutional

In developing space telecommunications, the

U.S. founded new national entities and international structures that would design and procure

satellites, operate the systems, and provide services to international users. These measures enabled private capital to flow into the system,

resolved Government/private sector relationships, and started the commercialization process

that led to a larger array of services. Many of the

national and international problems confronting

the united States at the time COMSAT and

INTELSAT were established have analogs in the

current situation in remote sensing and in other

140p. cit., Communications !%tellite Act of 1962.

applications areas. For example, there is no clear

guidance regarding the nature of commercial involvement in operational systems, whether existing or new entities should play a role, whether

Government will purchase services or fly its own

systems, or whether the United States will favor

international competition or a cooperative framework. It should also be noted that today’s circumstances have characteristics that are quite different from those encountered in the early 1960’s.

Then, there were no reliable vehicles to launch

competitive communications satellites beyond

those controlled by the United States and the

Soviet Union; there were no real alternatives to

cooperation. The character of the market was

also very different, International communications

was a well-developed business involving long-distance underwater and subsurface cables, high-frequency radio, and microwave links for short distances. Government agencies or private concerns

were engaged in supplying services, so that adding a satellite repeater was a relatively straightforward step in extending and improving this existing business base. Customers were identified

and demand was already established, factors

which provided a solid base for the rapid development of the space segments—particularly with

the better quality service that was provided.

A major issue therefore is: Are there alternative

institutional frameworks that would facilitate development of desirable new space applications

services and overcome barriers that exist, whether from lack of a clear national policy, underdeveloped markets, or other uncertainties? An

associated issue is: Can the private and public sector roles be more clearly defined to assist in more

effective and timely exploitation of space applications opportunities? A further question of importance is: Should NASA be given responsibility to

operate space applications systems?

International

Space activities (outside of short-duration vertical sounding rocket flights), unlike many other

areas of national endeavor, cannot be confined

to the region over a given nation’s territory. Orbital flight inevitably brings the space vehicle over

other nations. In the 1967 Treaty on Principles

Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
276 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon

and Other Celestial Bodies, “outer space” was

recognized as a nonappropriable area analogous

to the high seas, and hence open to use by all

nations. Policy regarding the well recognized international character of space activities was established in the NAS Act, where the guideline of

“peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind” was fundamental to the U.S. program. In

addition, U.S. activities were to be conducted so

as to contribute materially to the following objective (among others): “Cooperation by the United

States with other nations and groups of nations

in work done pursuant to this Act and in the

peaceful application of the results thereof.”ls

in applications, there are several national concerns that may limit our ability to obtain international agreements on the development and use

of space systems. The United States has traditionally advocated open access to outer space

and free commercial competition, but this posiI soP+ cit., NatiOna/ Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.

tion has been increasingly challenged by Communist and Third World countries which favor

restrictions on space activities. In pursuing new

opportunities for applying technology to space,

the United States must weigh the national benefits

accruing from aggressive competition against the

need for, and benefits from, broader cooperation

in the international arena.

The issues to be addressed include: 1) What

benefits has the United States received from its

cooperative programs? 2) How is the desire for

cooperation to be reconciled with maintaining

U.S. preeminence? 3) How should the United

States respond to the growth of competitive space

applications programs in Europe and japan?

4) Are there benefits to be gained by internationalizing civilian Earth observations satellite

systems? How can they be realized? 5) What

framework would enable systems to be established which would gather global information on

topics of broad common interest, such as ozone

concentrations, carbon dioxide levels, and biomass inventory?

POLICY SYNTHESIS

The kinds of legislative and policy options, the

categories and criteria for their evaluation, and

the major issues involved, have now been identified. This background enables us to outline a

number of specific policy options available to

Congress for more detailed consideration. In the

next section, we integrate selected options into

compatible and coherent packages. The various

options are organized by the issues which suggest them.

Need for High-Level Attention to Space

Policy in the Executive Branch

The range of responses to deal with this issue

is very broad. Possible actions by Congress include the following:

Ž Reestablish the National Aeronautics and

Space Council (NASC).

● Form a Presidential or National Commission

● Establish a new department.

Reestablish the National Aeronautics

and Space Council (NASC)

The NASC was disbanded in 1973 together with

the Office of Science and Technology (OST) and

the President’s Science Advisory Committee

(PSAC), as part of a move to reduce the size of

the Executive Office and remove so-called “advocacy” groups from immediate proximity to the

President. l6 OST was reestablished by legislation

(as OSTP) in 197617 but no strong constituency

emerged to press for the reestablishment of NASC

at that time. The original charter for NASC in the

1958 NAS Act implied a strong need for conflict

resolution and better coordination among agencies engaged in space activities. At present, the

160p. Cit., Reorganization pbtl No. 1 of 1973.

170p3 Cit.,NatiOnd/ Science and Technology pdkY, %an;z+

tion and Priorities Act of 1976.
Ch. 10–Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment .277

needs for high-level coordination as well as for

“a comprehensive program of aeronautical and

space activities . . . ,“ as stated in the original

NASC legislation are of critical importance.18 A

reestablished NASC might provide a suitable

forum to focus attention on space program goals

and objectives, problems of program coordination, competing claims of different interest

groups, and a variety of other matters. Whereas

the old NASC was composed of members from

NASA, the Departments of Defense, Transportation, State, and the Atomic Energy Commission,

membership in a new NASC should be broadened to include Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce (NOAA). The original NASC was chaired

by the Vice President, who was considered a

neutral arbitrator with access to the President;

with the addition of observers from the Office of

Management and Budget and the President’s

Science and Technology Adviser, a new NASC

would bring together all the major Government

space interests. It could serve to generate the

needed commitment to specific program content,

aid in preparation of annual budget proposals,

and give the space program higher visibility with

the President. The Council probably should have

a central staff working for an Executive Secretary,

although the staff could be primarily composed

of detailees from the agencies involved. Only a

few professionals would be needed on the staff

in order to perform the basic Council tasks.

However, adding the requirement of an annual

report would increase staff size appreciably. Occasional reports to the public on space program

goals, plans, or achievements could be part of

the output of a core staff.

The Reagan Administration does not appear to

favor new entities in the Executive Office, although topical committees of the Cabinet have

been formed for specific policy areas. The NASA

Administrator does not have Cabinet status and

therefore is not represented at this level. An exception has been the appointment of vice President Bush as chairman of a committee for regulatory review, demonstrating that it is possible to

have the administration accept a new entity in

the Executive Office under the chairmanship of

lop. cit., Nationa/ Aeronautics Space Act of /9S8, title 11, p. 4,

sec 201, d-2.

the Vice President; however, the space program

does not appear to have high enough priority in

the administration for this sort of treatment.

Therefore, it may be difficult for Congress to

establish any new mechanisms for defining and

coordinating space policy, whether it is a new

NASC or another option.

The existence of an NASC would enable agencies to focus their policy concerns at a high level,

with the prospect of influencing critical decisions.

{t would remove overall program content and

strategy decisions from a strictly budget-oriented

setting, as is the case today. This would greatly

enhance the likelihood that long-term programs

and goals can be agreed upon and effectively pursued. By having the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) represented as an observer on the

Council, deliberations would have the benefit of

a realistic view of the budget situation. It should

be understood that the deliberations of a reconstituted NASC would not receive adequate attention from either the agencies or OMB, unless

there were direct Vice Presidential interest and

involvement. This would carry with it the prospect of direct contact with the President, and

would make the difference between a Council

with little or no power and a Council with an important role in the policy process.

Annual expenditures by the Federal Government for civilian and military space activities exceed $10 billion, all of which is “discretionary,”

i.e., not subject to a mandated formula or specified service. A body such as the NASC would

enable these expenditures to receive the highlevel review and attention appropriate to their national significance.

Committee of the National Security Council

(NSC) or a Subset of a “Cabinet

Council’s” Responsibilities

Because it concerns the internal management

of the Executive Office, this option is not amenable to congressional action. It has been included

here for the sake of completeness.

In the Carter administration, the lack of a highIevel policy focus in the executive branch was

recognized as a problem, and the solution was

the formation of a Policy Review Committee for
278 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Space (PRC-Space) within the structure of the

NSC. (In the Carter administration, there were

various PRC’S dealing with specific national security areas). The chairman of the PRC-Space was

the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). By contrast, the Reagan administration has favored routing space issues

through a new “Cabinet Council” managed by

White House staff, with advice from the Director of OSTP and the Special Assistant for National

Security Affairs (see ch. 6).

By using the NSC structure for space policy

review there is a rather strong orientation toward

national security and military affairs. The civilian

space program, while sometimes having a strong

international impact, has traditionally been separated from specific military and national security programs. NSC is managed by a foreign-policy

oriented staff with little of the necessary background in dealing with commercial or technological concerns.

While the OSTP Director is a relatively neutral

figure, the stature of his office vis-a-vis the White

House has varied considerably and does not

compare with that of the Vice President. On the

positive side, NSC has typically been a very important focal point for setting policy in recent administrations, so that issues raised in this forum

usually reach the President for decision. This provides a degree of access not easily matched except by OMB and the key White House staff.

Whether this situation will continue in the Reagan

administration is not clear. In addition, NSC is

equipped to consider issues dealing with the highly classified military and intelligence space programs, by individuals fully cleared for access to

the classified aspects. This is particularly important for such common systems as the space shuttle and tracking and data relay systems, and in

connection with the transfer of technology from

the classified to the civilian programs.

Use of the new “Cabinet Council” method of

reviewing space policy forces these issues to compete with a much larger array of other policy concerns for the very limited staff time available to

support the councils. Without a dedicated staff,

adequate attention is not likely to be given to

understanding the issues and to the development

of viable options. On the positive side, the Cabinet Council may allow for significant high-level

attention to whatever proposals reach its agenda.

Presidential or National Commission

A device that is occasionally employed to investigate a broad area of national interest is a presidential or National (implying congressional and

private involvement) commission, board, committee, or council. Examples are:

The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. A 26-member bipartisan permanent

body with State and National Government

representatives, from both the legislative and

executive branches, and members from the

general public whose purpose is to review

and recommend improvements in the Federal system.

Water Resources Council. Established to

maintain a continuing study of national water

requirements. The Council reviews plans of

river basin commissions, assembles these

plans and submits them to Congress via the

President. It also administers a program of

Federal grants for water and land resource

planning.

Procurement Commission. An ad hoc group

for reviewing Federal procurement policy,

with public and private membership and a

limited lifetime (it has completed its work).

It prepared a comprehensive set of policy

recommendations and procedural changes.

One possibility for space is to charter for a specified term, a “National Space Commission” with

membership from the general public, State and

local governments, industry (particularly aerospace and electronics firms), academia, Congress,

and the executive branch—NASA, State, DOD,

Interior, Commerce, and Agriculture. The Commission would be charged with reviewing and

assessing the civilian space program and its benefits, and recommending long- and short-term objectives, and a time frame for their achievement.

The product of the Commission would be a major

report, recommending short- and long-term goals

for the U.S. space program. The Commission

would be publicly supported; following its report,

congressional hearings could be held on its
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 279

recommendations, and legislation prepared for

consideration by congress.

Such a forum enables participation from a

broad set of interests in developing program

goals; it operates in a manner that is outside normal channels and hence would be less threatening to the annual budget preparation process; it

would be public and could solicit public input

as appropriate; and it would serve as an expression of broad national and bipartisan support for

the civilian space program. In order to provide

a specific objective for such a group, a major

report should probably be specified, with annual

updates for the life of the Commission.

A National Space Commission, because of its

public, short-term nature, could not substitute for

a means within the administration to resolve issues, develop policy proposals, review goals, and

set strategy for the space program. The Commission therefore is complementary to the previous

two options, although it would deal with many

of the same issues. The Commission would have

the advantage of being able to evaluate public

response and support, and to focus that support

on specific goals. It also provides a device for full

discussion of congressional, executive branch,

and private sector views in a constructive setting.

Establish a New Department

This concept would place NASA in a larger

Cabinet-level structure, perhaps one that incorporated a group of science and technology agencies. The principal focus for space policy would

be a Cabinet officer responsible for setting space

goals, as well as integrating these goals into a

larger science and technology policy framework.

The following choice of functions to be grouped

together is largely illustrative–a considerably

more detailed discussion would be required to

treat this subject adequately than is appropriate

to this report.19 If, for the purposes of this assessment, we designated it the Department of Basic

and Applied Sciences, it might have a Research

Administration with components from the NSF,

NASA, and DOE; a Space Operations Administration with responsibility for launch vehicle

19FOr example, see reports of the U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Science and Technology in 1967, 1972, and 1977.

development and operation, manned flight,

satellite integration, tracking and data acquisition;

an Environment and Natural Resources Administration with land, atmosphere, and ocean activities from NASA, NOAA, DOE and possibly the

U.S. Geological Survey from Interior; an Industrial

Technology Administration with the National Bureau of Standards, Patent Office, and applied

technology programs from NSF; and an Energy

R&D Administration with the core DOE programs

such as solar, conservation, fossil, nuclear, and

fusion. The department could have a special projects office for interdisciplinary issues that require

broad contributions such as communications and

information, science and technology, or for limited-life projects such as robotics development

(to assist in accelerating commercialization of this

new technology). In such a department, responsibility for leadership in generating space program

goals and objectives would lie with an Administrator for Space Operations, assisted by others—

Research, Environment and National Resources,

Energy, Industrial Technology, and Special Projects. These components would be responsible for

generating programs in space science, weather

and meteorology, Earth observations, space manufacturing, and telecommunications. Together,

they would constitute the civilian space program.

Coordination with DOD and national intelligence

space programs would still be required, and for

this purpose a Cabinet-level Space Council might

also be desirable to resolve issues that arise, to

provide a forum for program coordination and

to enable consideration of other aspects, such as

foreign policy considerations (which would be

supplied by the Secretary of State).

This option would be extremely difficult to implement, since it would involve many congressional jurisdictions and appear to threaten existing

agency constituencies. On the other hand, the

Reagan administration has indicated that it plans

to dismantle the Department of Energy, and this

could provide the stimulus for giving serious consideration to formation of a new department by

grouping together high-technology agencies, including the R&D elements from the present DOE.

Many foreign countries, including Japan and most

of Western Europe, have ministerial-level departments dealing with science and technology.
280 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

A new, high-technology R&D department to

deal with space policy issues would facilitate access to the President. It could also strengthen bargaining with OMB in the budget process, and

might even (depending on the other agencies and

functions that were included in the new department) result in economies in areas where common support functions can be combined (procurement, administration, facilities, personnel,

etc.). It is also possible that better use of supporting laboratories would result from incorporating

them into a larger departmental structure.

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

In the future, Congress could take a much

stronger hand in formulating space policy and coordinating the different national space programs.

Congress played a major role in the initial stages

of the U.S. space program by drawing up the NAS

Act, and Members of Congress were leaders in

helping to focus national attention on space exploration. Other critical policy decisions, such as

the COMSAT Act in 1962, were also initiated by

Congress. Both the House and Senate formed full

committees to oversee civilian space activities,

while assigning responsibility for military space

programs to their respective Armed Services

Committees.

During the Apollo years, Congress supported

major programs proposed by the executive

branch and voted increasing annual budgets for

NASA. However, in the late 1960’s and early

1970’s, NASA budgets and program proposals

came under increasing attack as being too ambitious for a period when domestic social programs

and the Vietnam war required ever-larger national commitments. Despite a strong core of

congressional supporters, congressional critics on

the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on

HUD and Independent Agencies succeeded in

reducing NASA plans for major post-Apollo programs. NASA’s space budget reached a low of

$2,758.5 billion in 1974, down from a 1965 high

of $5,137.6 billion (in current dollars; if inflation

is taken into account, the differences are much

greater).

In the mid -l 970’s, both the House and Senate

restructured their authorizing committees for

space activities. In the House, responsibility for

most of the civilian space program authorization

and oversight shifted from several subcommittees

of the Committee on Science and Technology to

only one, the eight-member Subcommittee on

Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology; in the Senate the

Committee on Space was disbanded and responsibility for space matters was assumed by the

nine-member Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology. In addition to,

the military responsibilities of the Armed Services

Committees, space activities in Commerce, Interior, Agriculture, and Energy Departments are

overseen by different committees.

In recent years, Congress has addressed many

of the policy issues discussed in this report; in particular, it has dealt with the uses of the space shuttle, the transition to an operational remotesensing system, international competition, and

commercialization of space technology. The

absence of a coherent and comprehensive national civilian policy has surfaced as a recurrent

concern, and hearings on this subject were held

by both Houses in 1979z0 and 1980.21 In the Senate, S. 212, the “National Space and Aeronautics

Policy Act of 1979,” and S. 244 “to establish national space policy and program direction” were

introduced. Both bills proposed establishing longterm programs in accord with explicit policy principles, with S. 212 specifying particular projects

as well.

In the House, hearings were held in May and

June 1979 on H.R. 2337, the Space industrialization Act of 1979,22 which called for establishment

of a national Space Industrialization Corporation

to encourage public-private exploitation of commercial opportunities in space. In both 1979 and

1980, the House passed H.R. 2335, the Solar

‘“’’U.S. Civilian Space Policy,” hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Jan. 25 and 31

and Feb. 1, 1979.

‘l’’ United States Civilian Space Policy,” hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee

on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, july

23 and 24, 1980.

zz “The Space industrialization Act of 1979, ” hearings before the

Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives,

May 22 and 23; june 26 and 27, 1979.
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment • 281

Power Satellite Research, Development, and Evaluation Program Act of 1979,23 which would have

authorized $25 million for R&D on solar power

satellites. In 1981, the Space Policy Act of 1981

was introduced (H. R. 371 2), and general hearings on civilian space policy were held in

September.

The problems of coordinating policy and establishing long-term goals are mirrored in Congress’

own activities. To a much greater extent than in

the executive branch, Congress’ ability to deal

with these problems depends on informal and

personal responses, rather than institutional or

legislative changes. The problems facing sustained and broad-based congressional attention

to space policy are:

● Not a high national or regional priority. —

Space programs and policy have not recently

been high on the national agenda as compared with questions of social, economic,

and foreign policy. In addition, constituent

interests force relatively few Representatives

or Senators to consider space (a number of

Congressmen, including former astronauts,

have strong personal interests in this area and

have contributed to the increased attention

to space policy in recent years).

● Staff size and experience. —The change from

full committee to subcommittee oversight,

coupled with recent Senate staff cutbacks,

may make it more difficult for Congress to

deal with the many issues involved.

ZJ’’Solar Power Satellite,” hearings for the Subcommittee on Space

Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Mar. 28, 29, and 30, 1979.

● Jurisdictional overlap and committee relations. –The different committees and subcommittees with responsibilities for various

civilian programs create a need for coordination, if oversight of national programs and

integration of national policy is to be accomplished. Relations between civilian and military programs are particularly sensitive. In

previous years, Congressmen sitting on both

the Space and Armed Services Committees

provided informal coordination. Today, only

one Senator and one Representative belong

to both the space subcommittees and Armed

Services Committees or Intelligence Committees.

Given strong enough leadership and sufficiently

widespread perception of the importance of the

issue, institutional or jurisdictional barriers to a

comprehensive consideration of space policy are

not insurmountable. joint hearings, multiple referrals of legislation, and ad hoc committees or additions to committees are several ways to cut across

established territories.

In recent years both the House and the Senate

have criticized many specific administration actions as well as the lack of an overall policy. So

far, none of the proposed reforms of space policy

or initiatives for major program changes have

been adopted. However, the continued absence

of executive leadership guarantees that Congress

is more and more likely to take the initiative in

setting long-range goals for exploiting the shuttle, commercializing space technologies, and

meeting international competition.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES—CLARIFYING

THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR ROLES

In space applications, the services and products

involve both Government and private firms and

institutions. The multitude of interests and players

has raised questions concerning the appropriate

role of each in developing and operating applications systems. In one area, weather and atmospheric observations, the Federal Government has

traditionally collected the data and made it freely available as a public service. A similar pattern

has been established in oceanographic observations. In communications, Government performed much of the early research and demonstration, but industry and regulated entities have

developed the platforms and supplied the services—subject to regulation by FCC and consistent

with agreements under the International Tele-
282 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

———.———— -— —

communication Union (ITU). In satellite Earth

observations the Government has performed

much of the research, developed and demonstrated the platforms and distributed the data.

Private industry has supplied users with value-

-added services. (By contrast, aircraft surveys are

normally done by private industry without Government involvement in any phase of their work.)

in space manufacturing and space transportation,

Government has taken the lead, but private sector involvement is growing. An important issue

therefore ,is to clarify ways in which the private

and public sectors might work with one another.

Space Telecommunications

Initially, international satellite communications

were established as a Government-regulated monopoly through INTELSAT and the U.S. representative, COMSAT (see ch. 8). As the technology

has advanced and new customers for it have

been identified, domestic satellite services have

been established and competition for domestic

services has been allowed. Maritime communications are being developed along the lines of

INTELSAT, through the international maritime satellite organization (l NMARSAT), in which

COMSAT is also the designated U.S. participant.

INMARSAT came into existence in 1979 in recognition of the desirability of instituting a single

(monopoly) system for maritime services while

encouraging competition for certain other communications satellite applications.

In the future, it appears that lower costs, more

demand for capacity, and greater diversity of services will characterize the domestic communications industry. Direct broadcast satellites for

television signals to the home are likely in the

mid-l 980’s. Business services are expanding, especially for data communications and specialized

functions. The industrial firms that can act as suppliers are available, and the existing service

markets provide an important revenue base for

future new ventures. The principal areas of concern are the availability of the electromagnetic

frequency spectrum in the light of competing

demands for services, international control of

assigned orbital positions for satellites (through

ITU), and domestic regulation of technical and

commercial characteristics.

Clarifying the R&D Role of Government

in Space Communications.

An important policy option is to clarify and

make more explicit the role of NASA in supporting R&D needs for space communications. In

order to accomplish this, it may be desirable to

legislate NASA’s responsibilities in R&D for advanced communications satellites. The NASA

program in communications was cut back for

most of the decade of the 1970’s (despite the general guidance of the NAS Act and COMSAT legislation) (see fig. 16), However, NASA had earlier

contributed significantly to progress in space

telecommunications, providing much of the technology and systems in use today. NASA could

contribute to the solution of current and future

problems, such as utilization of the 30/20 GHz

frequency (see ch. 3). A continuing telecommunications technology program would include

fundamental work at higher frequencies and

demonstrations of technology and systems.

It will be very important for industry and NASA

to cooperate in defining the appropriate high-risk

areas for Government support and the boundary

between Government and industry for development of specific systems. Industry can and should

work with NASA to sponsor cooperative communications technology demonstrations. To ensure

adequate consultation between NASA (as a lead

agency for this work) and industry, an industryGovernment consultative committee could be

Figure 17.—NASA Funding for Communications

Satellite Technology (In constant year 1983 dollars,

i.e., adjusted for inflation)

175 r Communications

25

v phasedown decision

D

Communications

.

reentry decl$lon

Fiscal year 1$83 dollars

.

i I i i

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Year

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Adminlstratlon
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 283

specified that would consider space communications research and technology needs. On such

a committee, in addition to NASA, Government

would be represented by DOD, NTIA (Commerce), State, and FCC, while the industry representatives would include aerospace contractors, the common carriers, COMSAT and other

space services suppliers. The deliberations of this

committee could be submitted to the Congress

as part of the annual budget. A committee with

a similar function already exists in high-energy

physics, called the High Energy Physics Advisory

Panel (HEPAP). It includes all the interested parties in the field and is sponsored by the principal

agency responsible, DOE. HEPAP serves to resolve the various independent views of what is

needed and periodically presents an integrated

plan for new facilities and research needs.

Open-ended assignment of a space communications R&D role to NASA might be difficult to

sustain for several reasons: 1 ) uncertain and possibly larger budget needs would be resisted by

OMB and the administration; 2) users might have

little role in NASA demonstrations, with the result

that unnecessary and uneconomic technologies

might be pursued (i.e., there is the danger that

it would become a technological “hobby shop”);

and 3) NASA might create unrealistic expectations by demonstrating sophisticated new technology not ready for commercial introduction.

On the other hand, remaining silent regarding the

NASA role invites the type of decision that was

made in the early 1970’s, when the NASA communications satellite platform and technology

demonstration program were terminated. The

consequences of this decision are covered in

chapter 4.

By specifying that NASA should perform communications satellite R&D, including demonstration of technologies and platforms, and also specifying that there will be formal user and industry involvement in identifying the extent and

nature of the program, the open-ended nature

of the assignment can be modified. Such a consultative process can serve as a forum for bringing out independent views and ensuring the relevance of the NASA program. One danger of such

a mechanism is that industry may press for too

large a role for NASA, since their incentive is to

minimize risk and to push NASA to carry out tasks

that industry might otherwise be expected to do.

Given NASA’s desire to maintain its budget and

institutional structure, it can be expected to

acquiesce. The example of the HEPAP is instructive in this regard. For it the incentives are very

similar: have the Government do more, expand,

press forward faster, etc. The counterbalance is

the competition and rivalry among the various

research groups, and the pressures of other agency demands, OMB, and eventually Congress.

Within a communications committee, such pressures can be counterbalanced by competition between companies, Federal agencies, OMB and

Congress. DOD’s role would bean additional factor. By including DOD in the consultative group,

the technology base that is being supported for

military purposes would be represented directly. Not all of the developments could be discussed, but general knowledge of classified programs could be a valuable asset in discussions

of technology needs.

If in addition to acting as consultants, the industry also took a more active role in financially

supporting demonstrations of new satellite systems (see Communications Issue, ch. 3), its own

stake in the type and direction of work that is

done would be greater. Because industry had a

strong financial interest, the development work

done would be more likely to reflect the genuine

needs of industry. in sum, the above suggestions

could lead to a role for NASA that represents a

balance between technology push and demand

pull.

R&D to Support Regulatory Decisions

Regulation is always the product of balancing

among the affected interests. In the balancing

process, it is important that the regulatory

authorities have the best possible technical information available. The ultimate decisions will reflect their grasp of the technology as well as political and economic constraints, the biases of the

people involved, and the effectiveness of the various lobbying groups. The regulatory body for

communications, FCC, has an R&D section and

a technical staff to interpret the impact of new

technology on regulations, and vice versa. But

the exploding telecommunications and informa-
284 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

tion technologies have created serious overloading of this staff and their limited budget. It would

be unrealistic to consider space communications

experiments and demonstrations to be within

their capability. However, both nationally and internationally, regulations are being made that

control the numbers of satellites that will be permitted (by controlling synchronous orbital slots),

their power levels and signal characteristics, the

frequencies used, and a variety of other technical

details. Information for these decisions comes

from a variety of sources–some private (like Bell

Labs and COMSAT Labs) and some Government

(e.g., DOD, NBS, NOAA, and NASA), but there

is no lead agency for space communications R&D

to support regulation. This suggests the following policy option:

Modify NASA’s legislative charter to direct the

Agency to pursue communications R&D to support the needs of prospective regulatory actions,

both nationally and via ITU, internationally. internationally, the United States has much at stake

in the allocation of orbital slots for satellites, the

assignment of frequencies, and the technical

characteristics of allowable signals and signal

strengths. The United States should also be prepared to take stronger action to ensure more realistic decisions in ITU. These decisions are often

driven by unwarranted fears of smaller nations,

based on poor technical information, and by

political objectives. Both of these aspects should

be addressed, the first by better dissemination of

technical information, perhaps by a traveling

team of experts with equipment capable of demonstrating essential data, and the second through

stronger leverage from the State Department. A

high-level space policy mechanism such as the

NASC could provide the proper exposure at the

White House for these international political

measures, and a separate subgroup for international space communications may be desirable.

Clarifying the NASA role would enable better

planning of space communications research and

demonstration programs by the agency and help

to provide a more competent and predictable set

of regulations for public and private users to deal

with. By giving more attention to the preparation

and technical backup for international negotiations, the United States would be in a better position to identify and defend its interests. In some

cases, better technical information is likely to

yield better international agreements, by removing misunderstandings about the effects of new

technologies.

Earth Observations From Space

Civilian Earth observations from space encompasses a variety of space platforms, sensors and

mission objectives, ranging from weather observations made by NOAA, to ocean observations

and Landsat-type systems. The technology for

weather observations via satellite has developed

from the limited capability of the early experimental systems to a relatively mature technology.

The relationship between NASA as the R&D and

launching agency, and NOAA as the operational ~

authority has also developed and matured over

time. In general, this relationship now demonstrates how NOAA, as a lead agency with a clear

mission to perform, can interact with an R&D

agency, NASA, to stimulate and take advantage

of advanced technology and adapt it to operational use (see ch. 9). The major areas of concern today are the Landsat and future oceanographic satellite programs.

For land remote sensing, the relationships between public and private interests are currently

perhaps the most difficult areas to treat. The

Carter administration, and now the Reagan administration as well, favored turning over this activity to private ownership and management,

while the private sector, for the most pat-t, does

not yet see a sufficient market to be able to respond. Caught up in the present uncertainty are

the users of the data; a private industry of value-

-added companies that has grown up to process

and interpret the raw sensed data, and the aerospace contractors capable of designing and building the satellites and other hardware. Complicating the scene are international pressures from a

large number of other countries interested in

using Landsat data (some with dedicated receiving stations); from a few countries planning the

development of competitive systems; and from

a number of countries with national concerns

about the collection and use of remotely sensed

data gathered about their territory.
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment . 285

policy options to resolve some of these issues

include the folIowing:

FOR THE SPACE SEGMENT

Laissez-faire or open entry. The Government

would agree to operate space platforms through

Landsat D and possibly D’. Further satellite systems would then become the responsibility of private industry. Government users would purchase

data from private suppliers under commercial

terms and conditions. Private suppliers would sell

data to international users on a nondiscriminatory

basis. Any private supplier or consortium (domestic or foreign) could purchase launch services and

fly a land remote-sensing satellite. If the market

did not support the service, it would terminate

after Landsat D or D’, except for possible DOD

or foreign collection platforms.

With the current cost of launch services and

satellites, there is only a very limited prospect that

private sector suppliers would enter the field for

the space segment. An important indicator is the

nature of the current COMSAT suggestion that

it assume responsibility for all operational remotesensing systems.24 They feel that the market is sufficiently marginal that transfer of all current operational remote sensing would (including meteorological satellites) be required, and the Government would have to commit to purchase its data

from the COMSAT systems. Such marginal economics indicate very strongly that competition

would not exist (beyond subsidized foreign systems) if COMSAT were allowed to proceed with

its proposal. This would create a de facto monopoly, although in principle the prospect of

open entry would be available. The de facto

monopoly would continue until technology advanced to the point that reliable, low-cost access

to space and low-cost platforms was available,

thus allowing competitors to enter without the

massive capital investments required today.

If the COMSAT initiative is not pursued, and

other approaches are entertained through open

solicitation of the industry, it is uncertain whether

Z4C;v;/[and~e~ote Sensing Systems, joint hearings before the

Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, House Committee on Science and Technology; Subcommittee on Science,

Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation, July 22 and 23, 1981.

a single supplier (or even a consortium) would

come forward to propose a data collection system

without data purchase guarantees similar to those

proposed by COMSAT. Thus, the likelihood is

that a truly open entry policy would result in no

entry.

Single designated entity. Whenever the service

to be provided is such that the necessary capital

investments are very large in relation to the industry base, and the technology and character

of the system makes competitive suppliers either

impractical or highly wasteful of resources, the

conditions may warrant designating a monopoly supplier. A typical example was the designation of AT&T as the long-distance carrier for

domestic telephone communications. With a

monopoly supplier, however, regulatory mechanisms are required to control pricing and to insure continued service by the supplier. FCC carries out this function, as well as a variety of other

important roles in communications. An important characteristic of the regulatory process must

be the ability to change the monopoly situation

to respond to new technological advances that

modify the monopoly characteristics of the system. FCC has responded to such changes in the

domestic telecommunications industry, although

there has been criticism that it acted much too

slowly.

On the premise that conditions may exist in

land remote sensing for a monopoly supplier, one

policy option would be to give a single private

sector entity the role of developer and operator

of the space segment. Since the revenue base for

sale of the raw data does not appear adequate

to support a positive return on the investment,

the Government would also guarantee purchase

of a minimum amount of the output, perhaps at

subsidized prices, until costs and markets have

developed to permit Government to decrease its

role gradually. Because a monopoly position

implies some regulatory control in order to protect the public interest, a new institution would

probably be required to regulate prices, entry into

the field, quality of services, and to control the

amount and extent of Government subsidy.

The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) is a good

example of such a regulatory agency. It originally regulated entry, controlled routes, reviewed
286 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

fares and revenues, and provided significant direct cash subsidies to the airline operators while

the airline industry built its market and its ability

to sustain profitable operations. The Government

also guaranteed the purchase of services, in the

early days with subsidized airmail contracts to the

airlines, and later with Government cargo and

passenger traffic. The rationale for treating this

industry in such a special way is similar to the

rationale that applies to land remote sensing, viz.,

there is a service to be supplied which would be

highly beneficial to the public, and which could

eventually become an independent and profitable private enterprise given initial subsidy.

Because it is normal practice in our free enterprise system for the Government to use commercial suppliers, the Government should be prepared to act in a way that ensures continuation

of the services while building toward a selfsustaining capability in industry. With the passage

of time and growing industry maturity, the

regulatory authority can decrease and eventually cease–as is the plan for the CAB.

This suggests establishing a new entity, which

for purposes of this analysis will be called the

Space Development Authority (SDA). SDA would

have a role for new and emerging space applications very similar to CAB in air transportation.

Since there are more opportunities than simply

land remote sensing, SDA could function in all

applications areas. It would control entry into

data collection operations, initially establishing

criteria for the monopoly supplier, and later permit greater competition as the market develops.

It would review pricing of services and establish

a fair rate of return using guidelines derived from

other, similar regulatory situations. SDA might

support this rate of return by adding a direct subsidy from appropriated funds. It would review

proposed satellite configurations and establish,

with the aid of the user community, minimum

desired performance characteristics for proposed

systems. The choice of technology, specific design characteristics, and award of contracts for

hardware would be the responsibility of the

monopoly supplier.

An important further consideration is the responsibility for advancing technology in order to

continue improving the services provided and to

improve the cost v. revenue relationship for these

services. Here, the analogy with civilian aviation

again illustrates a Government policy option. In

aviation, the Government established the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics

(NACA) and its supporting laboratory structure

over 65 years ago to improve aeronautic technology in the United States. The Federal Government still continues to support advances in aeronautics through NASA. The users of this technology are the military and civilian aircraft manufacturers, and the beneficiaries are the American

public. Thus, a similar technology development

role by Government might be appropriate in support of SDA, and desirable in terms of long-term

benefits to the public.

Thus, the NASA role as a technology “push”

agency would continue, including definition and

development of new sensors, platforms and associated subsystems, and supporting technologies

such as launch vehicles, on-orbit control, tracking and data recovery. This would be very close

to the current situation with respect to R&D for

meteorological satellites and the previous NASA

role in the communications satellite area.

Establishing a regulated monopoly in remote

sensing, although less desirable than true competition, can result in high-quality services and significant public benefit (e.g., AT&T and long-distance telephone service). A key characteristic of

effective regulation is that it be as little as necessary in order to protect the public interest. In addition, the boundary between regulated functions

and unregulated functions needs to be flexible

in order to respond to changing industry dynamics and the effects of new technology. Therefore,

SDA should operate under guidelines that specify

minimal regulation and responsiveness to any

changes that would allow for more open competition.

Adoption of the COMSAT initiative or one similar to it from another corporation or consortium

would appear to require establishing a mechanism such as SDA. If not, the control over pricing would be difficult, and quality of service

would be continually open to negotiation, with

little in the way of alternatives open to the Government except canceling the agreement. There
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 287

are additional questions regarding responsibility

for performing R&D on advanced sensors (NASA

or COMSAT, or both?), distribution of data by private companies and international access to the

data, that would need to be resolved. These are

not insurmountable, but they do raise doubts

about the ability to anticipate and spell out all

of the conditions for a transfer to a single designated entity that would protect the interests of

Government and the public. Creation of an oversight and regulatory authority such as SDA would

enable these issues to be addressed as they arise

and would appear to be a wise precaution to accompany a policy decision to establish a

monopoly supplier.

Government as the Operator. An alternative

approach to the space segment, (consistent with

the conclusion that a monopoly position is required, would be to retain the Government as

operator instead of a regulated, private sector entity. In this alternative, procurement of the satellites, their operation and control, and the initial

reception and distribution of the data stream

would remain a Government function. Selection

of system characteristics (sensors, orbits, number

of satellites, type of coverage, and other parameters) should be done through consultation with

the user community, and for this a formal structure is probably desirable. A Remote Sensing

Users Group such as NOAA is now in the process of setting up would help ensure that users

have an opportunity to participate in the planning of new systems and in the operation of existing platforms.

In this case the operator could be either the

R&D and launching agency, NASA; an agency

closer to a user community such as NOAA,

USDA, or Interior; or a new Government entity

established for this purpose that brought together

several existing roles. NOAA will be responsible

for overseeing the operation of the Landsat system after Landsat D is launched.

However, if a new agency were set up, for example, a Space Applications Services Administration (SASA) it could be responsible for defining,

procuring, and operating satellites and ground

stations and providing an assured flow of data

from space applications systems. This agency

would be independent of NASA and NOAA, but

probably would include a portion of the existing

space applications staff of both of these agencies.

While publicly funded and hence accountable

to Congress, it would collect user charges (like

the recently disestablished Panama Canal Co., a

former Government entity that was initially publicly funded but eventually became self-supporting). It would not conduct R&D, but would identify targets for NASA attention, and serve to channel to concerns of data users such as NOAA,

USDA, and Interior in Governments; State and

local governments; and private users (including

private companies that process and interpret the

data) to NASA. SASA would be organized to provide a valuable service at the lowest cost. SASA

might assume responsibility for a variety of other

space-related applications functions, such as

meteorological and ocean-sensing data, storm

warning, emergency communications, search

and rescue identification and location, public

navigation, and other noncommercial services.

in this role it would be much like a private

monopoly supplier, except for: 1 ) its status as a

Government entity, 2) the fact that a separate

regulatory entity would not be required, and

3) the periodic review of its operation that would

occur through the annual budget process.

If NASA were given the role of space segment

operator, the advantages would be: good integration with the present launch authority, assured

technical competence, and substantial agency interest in the technology and its successful employment. On the negative side, NASA is prone to

push the technology rather than its uses, and

tends to continue experimentation rather than

allow a system to become operational.

If it were a single established user agency, the

problems would be somewhat reversed. The

technical aspects become more difficult to manage and to integrate into the user’s normal way

of doing business; the format of satellite data is

likely to conflict with previous ways of obtaining similar information, while the agency as a

whole will not have much stake in the successful

outcome of a satellite program that is only a small

part of their total mission. On the other hand,

there would be greater sensitivity to user needs

and better contact with the user community
288 • Civilian Space Policy and Applications

(though quite likely not with all of the users in

the case of multipurpose satellite systems). The

satellite system would more rapidly become

standardized and operational in this mode; once

accomplished, new technology would probably

be resisted unless “proven” and reliable.

In the case of a new Government entity created

to assume responsibility for satellite applications

systems, many of the above characteristics would

be favorably modified, but other problems would

be increased.

NASA would undoubtedly promote its mission

by looking for, and attempting to satisfy demand

for, new applications services. This would depend

in part on obtaining support from NASA for technology development. By operating meteorological systems and Landsat, NASA might begin with

a sufficient base to provide a critical mass for continuing operations.

GROUND SEGMENT

There are three areas to consider: 1 ) operation

and control of the space segment; 2) reception

and processing of returned data; and 3) distribution and interpretative processing of returned

data. For the space segment it appears that use

of NASA facilities on a reimbursable basis would

be a sensible beginning. Independent control

centers would be established as the business

increased.

To receive and distribute satellite-derived information, current technology requires an array of

unique and expensive equipment to convert raw

returned data to images or other coherent forms.

Since many users, such as agricultural analysts,

require quick distribution of recently acquired

data, there is a need for high throughput for the

processing center and redundant equipment to

allow for breakdowns or other system problems.

Thus, for this segment, the potential exists for having a regulated monopoly supplier. This could

quite logically be the same entity that was responsible for the space segment, in order to ensure

compatibility of equipment and processing capacity as satellite designs and instruments change.

For the interpretive processing of returned data,

on the other hand, an embryonic industry is

already established, and continued open entry

seems appropriate. Access to the initial processed

data stream should remain open to all customers

but at a realistic fee schedule, reviewed and approved by SDA. In order to protect the initial position of the monopoly supplier, it would probably

be necessary to restrict competitive entry into the

field of reception and initial processing of the satellite data stream.

As far as the space segment is concerned, a U.S.

monopoly supplier appears to be necessary, at

least for the foreseeable future. Competition is

likely to be provided by one or more international

systems capable of supplying similar data. (A

more detailed discussion of international aspects,

and policy options that respond to the growing

capabilities of other nations, is found later in this

chapter.)

The ground segment is as important to the total

effectiveness of a remote-sensing system as the

space platforms. The point is that providing adequate capacity for data handling and processing,

compatible equipment, and common data formats should receive the same careful attention

as the more glamorous and visible spacecraft. For

this reason, it is important that the processing

system be at least as responsive to user needs as

to the R&D agency. If NASA were to assume responsibility for an operational remote-sensing

system, there would need to be a stronger involvement by the users in determining the characteristics of the data processing system than is

presently the case.

Space Transportation

Throughout this analysis the implied assumption has been that launch vehicles and their supporting systems such as launch complexes, tracking, and control facilities would continue to be

available through customary channels. However,

space transportation systems themselves may also

be considered subject to possible new policy initiatives as defined in the beginning of this chapter.

For the most part, launching payloads into

space has been sufficiently costly and complex

that Government sponsorship has been required

to develop and operate all but the most limited

systems. As the cost and importance of payloads,

civilian and military, have increased, it has also
Ch. 10–Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment Ž 289

become particularly important to ensure that

there is a high degree of reliability and a low probability of catastrophic failure. These concerns

reach a peak when manned vehicles are involved; only the two space superpowers, the

United States and the U. S. S. R., have devoted the

resources and effort to carry out such operations.

In considering policy options for space transportation, therefore, it is useful to distinguish between the type and scale of operations involved,

e.g., manned systems; large, unmanned systems

to synchronous, interplanetary or low-Earth trajectories; small, low-altitude unmanned systems.

MANNED SYSTEMS

The presence of man in space has captured the

imagination of people throughout the world, and

has given national space efforts some of their

most memorable moments. When astronauts are

involved, there is always the possibility of a

catastrophic failure leading to death or injury;

such a disaster can have widespread effects on

public opinion and hence on the future of the

space program. The fire in the Apollo 204 capsule in 1967, which killed three astronauts,

though it occurred on the ground, caused a

lengthy delay in the Apollo flight schedule. The

death of Soviet cosmonauts on reentry in 2

separate incidents in 1967 and 1971 had similar

consequences. The result is that great care is

given to the safety, reliability and resistance to

single-point failures of manned systems. This also

includes launch vehicles, which go through

special procedures in order to make them “mandated. ” These special procedures are reflected in

increased costs and in a sizeable support establishment for manned flight, both of which have

been sufficiently large that only government has

had the resources to conduct manned space operations. Only the United States and the Soviet

Union have been willing to make the investments

required to engage in manned flight, and this has

resulted in a form of symbolic East-West competition, centered around such space endeavors, that

rarely applies to the popular perceptions of unmanned space activities.

The development of the space shuttle has given

the United States a launch vehicle that is simultaneously a manned system and a form of transportation for manned and unmanned payloads.

The presence of man has focused public attention on its operations; it is viewed as another step

in the continuing East-West competition in space,

Recently there has been considerable discussion

about the possibility of private ownership and

operation of the shuttle system. For a number of

reasons, this does not appear to be a likely prospect for the near term. One reason is the special

political significance of manned spaceflight, as

mentioned above. Although the frequency of operations envisioned for the shuttle—about one

launch every 10 days–will result in the public

devoting less attention to individual shuttle

launches, and accepting man in space as relatively routine, it still appears likely that the loss

of astronauts in space would be a major blow to

national prestige. Given the cost of maintaining

adequate launch, recovery, and refurbishment

crews and facilities for the shuttle system, continued Government control and overall management seems likely.

A second factor is that, although each shuttle

orbiter is projected to have a lifetime of about

100 launches, there will be a continuing need for

system modifications and rework that are part of

the standard experience associated with any new

and complex system such as the shuttle. For these

changes and continuing engineering support of

the system, the resources of the Federal Government are likely to be needed—as well as the expertise of the major NASA Centers, Johnson (JSC)

and Marshall (MSFC).

Third, the shuttle is planned to be the “delivery

truck” for most low-altitude payloads, whether

manned or unmanned, including national security as well as civilian or commercial payloads.

The contributions of space systems to national

security are significant and appear to be increasing; so it is not likely that the Government will

wish to forego control over, and assurance of the

availability of, adequate transportation to orbit.

Direct Government operation of the shuttle and

technical support for the shuttle system would

be needed in order to provide the necessary

assurances to national security authorities.

Fourth, there is the question of liability. The

shuttle, in its launch configuration, represents a
290 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

very high and concentrated amount of energy

which, if it were to crash in a populated area,

could have widespread detrimental economic

consequences. Other forms of system failure

could also be very costly from the standpoint of

liability. Government is the institution most

capable of handling such contingencies; although

private insurance may be available to private

shuttle operators, it would be another cost factor that would tend to limit private sector operation of the shuttle system.

There is currently a proposal by an investment

group

25 for private-sector purchase of an additional shuttle orbiter. The proposal calls for this

orbiter to join the Government fleet of shuttle systems, in return for which the consortium providing the funds would act as the sole shuttle payload marketing agents. The needs for continued

Government control outlined above would not

prevent such an arrangement, nor other innovative mixes of public and private investment. Such

proposals should be viewed on their merits. It

does not seem profitable to attempt to construct

policies in advance that would adequately foresee

all of the nuances of such proposed arrangements.

LARGE UNMANNED SYSTEMS

The transportation systems for a wide variety

of sizeable unmanned payloads either to low- or

high-Earth orbit or on trajectories beyond Earth

orbit comprise the bulk of space launch vehicles

for all nations and have been the source of greatest interest by nations that wish to enter the space

business. As the basic technology that is needed

for such launch vehicles is now quite widespread,

the early near-monopoly by the United States and

the Soviet Union is rapidly breaking down. The

Japanese, the Europeans, the People’s Republic

of China, and India have all demonstrated their

abilities to develop launchers, and other nations

could produce launchers if they decided to make

such a commitment.

For reasons described earlier, the United States

has chosen to develop a manned system to

launch large unmanned payloads. In the interim,

25Craig Covault, “Firm Sets Down-Payment for Buy of Space Shuttle,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Jan. 18, 1982.

work toward improvement of unmanned expendable launch vehicles has been minimal and there

has been no new unmanned launch vehicle development. For a number of reasons, the cost of

shuttle launches will be higher, and their availability less frequent, than was originally anticipated. All current U.S. expendable have also

risen sharply in price, in large part because of the

decision to develop the shuttle and phase out the

use of ELVs. This appears to leave several “windows” in the potential marketplace for such

systems. The major gaps are in the area of lowcost, relatively uncomplicated launches to lowEarth orbit and low-cost synchronous orbit

emplacement of modest-sized payloads. It is to

the second of these that the Japanese and European developments seem particularly well suited.

In the United States, private investors are sponsoring work toward the former “win dow" 26 Lowcost space transportation, however, cannot attract much of a market if it does not provide

reasonably high reliability, because the cost of

payloads continues to be high. Hence, the willingness of a customer to entrust launch of a $30

million to $50 million communications satellite

to a low-cost launcher will depend more on

launcher reliability than on a small difference in

launch cost.

Given the trend in alternative unmanned systems the United States could consider, as an optjon, developing a complementary, simple, reliable, and low-cost expendable booster that

would serve to test the state-of-the-art in such

systems and would act as a companion to the

shuttle. Such a development could be carried out

after a broadly based competition for the best

ideas that would contribute to the dual objectives

of low cost and adequate reliability. Such a program would be far more amenable to private operation, under appropriate safeguards, than

would the shuttle. The launch vehicle options for

the U.S. and international users would be expanded, and the U.S. would keep a valuable part

of future space transportation alive and developing through this mechanism. “Competition” with

26see statement of David Hannah in “Future Space programs:

1981, ” hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and

Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, Sept.

21, 22, and 23, 1981.
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 291

\

~ ,+ $ *

Photo credit: RCA Corp.

RCA Saturn launch aboard a Delta launcher

the shuttle would be allowed, recognizing that

the shuttle need not be used for all such launches.

SMALL UNMANNED SYSTEMS

There is a family of small sounding rockets and

derivative systems that provide invaluable access

to space for scientists with small-scale research

payloads. These may be extended in capability

for modest cost, and it would appear that open

entry into this field should be permitted. However, here, as in the case of private launchers for

low-Earth orbit, there is no policy in place for

regulating such launches. Nor is it clear which

Federal agency or agencies will be responsible

Photo credit: McDonald-Douglas Corp.

Payload Assist Module for use in boosting shuttle

payloads to higher orbits

for generating and enforcing the necessary regulations. In order to support industry’s efforts to develop and launch its own vehicles it will be essential to designate a lead agency to coordinate these

efforts.

Applications R&D—Strengthening

the NASA Role

As pointed out earlier, existing space policy

identifies NASA as a performer of R&D for space

systems, while remaining silent on operational

responsibilities for the agency. The original NAS

legislation says nothing about specific applications, and beyond maintaining U.S. leadership

in space science and technology, there are few

indicators of the pace of programs that might be

generated. Thus, when the Nixon administration

decided that the communications R&D programs

of NASA were unnecessary and terminated the
292 • Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) series,

there was little basis for challenging that decision.

NASA does not lack the internal staff support

for a more vigorous role in space applications.

Such support could range from fundamental research to demonstration of sensors and integrated

systems. However, there are other important internal claimants on NASA’s resources, particularly

the manned programs (shuttle, Spacelab) and

space science programs (including planetary exploration). Consequently, the annual budget request for NASA is a compromise among the various opportunities for new starts (if any), the

demands of each of the major agency programs

for continuing baseline support, and the costs of

prior-year commitments. The relative priority accorded space applications R&D may vary considerably in this setting, depending on NASA’s

management attitudes, the effectiveness of the

internal advocates for applications R&D, and the

urgency asociated with the applications areas involved.

The policy responses to these situations involve

relatively minor adjustments to the existing framework, but despite their limited nature, they may

be significant over time in generating additional

attention to space applications needs.

The first deals with NASA’s assigned responsibilities for space applications. One option is that

space policy legislation recognize explicitly the

continuing need for a program of fundamental

research and demonstration activities in support

of space applications. This would include advancement of technology in areas where the ultimate user is in the private sector as well as in

Government. The rationale for such a posture is

very similar to the argument used for Government funding of basic research and demonstration in fields such as aeronautics. Specifically,

Government support may be appropriate when

the risk is high, many of the benefits are nonappropriable, the time for potential benefits to accrue is long, and there are extensive potential

public benefits. As such technology becomes suitable for incorporation in an operational system,

the future operators should become responsible

for the planning and engineering to utilize the

new technology. judgments on where the boundary between Government support and private or

user support lies must be made on a case-by-case

basis, for each technology is different in regard

to its operational adaptability and use. This issue,

i.e., what it is appropriate for NASA to support,

will therefore continue to be raised in the context of the annual budget preparations. The effect of a policy statement clarifying the existence

of a NASA role will still result in debate on the

extent to which that role requires, for example,

a demonstration of a new technology on a satellite platform. Such demonstrations may be specifically allowed in the policy, but they would not

be required. There will continue to be a need for

considered judgment, discussion, and debate on

such questions. This suggests a second policy initiative.

One of the important aspects of any space application is the user community. This community may be small and poorly defined for a newly

identified or emerging application, or it may be

very large and amorphous as in the the case of

users of satellite weather data. Whatever its stage

of development, it should always be possible to

seek out and identify users and to have representatives become involved in a review of the NASA

program in their area of interest (see ch. 9 for a

discussion). Approval of particular applications

demonstration systems could then be made with

the aid of informed advice from the community

affected by this work. NASA could be required

by legislation to convene and support such user

advisory groups and to include their reports as

part of the justifications for the applications efforts proposed by the Agency. NASA has had

such groups, but their role has been primarily internal to NASA. What is suggested here is a requirement that such groups report publicly to the

Congress as well as to OMB. It should be noted

that such user advisory groups would include

other Federal Government agencies and State

and local governments, as well as private members.

One additional policy option may be considered. In order to highlight the stature and importance of NASA’s applications R&D efforts within

the agency, and their prominence in dealings

with OMB, it may be desirable to legislate an

. .
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 293

organizational change within NASA. Specifically,

the applications programs could be made the

responsibility of a Deputy Administrator of Applications, who would be in parallel with a Deputy Administrator of Operations and would have

overall responsibility for planning, coordinating

and implementing space applications research,

as well as selected satellite demonstrations. This

individual would support user advisory groups

and—given the appropriate policy changes—

could be responsible for operational systems

within NASA’s purview.

NASA’s role in support of space applications

R&D will continue to be uncertain, and funding

levels will remain unpredictable, without more

specific assignment of responsibility. NASA must

take care to solicit and respond to the views of

potential systems users; however, in cases where

prospective users fail to recognize the potential

of a new technology, or resist its introduction,

NASA may need to promote the new technology

actively.

International Aspects

part of the existing space policy of the United

States is that activities in space will be conducted

“for the benefit of all man kind,” and one of the

objectives of the U.S. space program is “Cooperation . . . with other nations and groups of the nations in work done . . . and in peaceful application of the results thereof.” In international law,

outer space is recognized as a nonappropriable

area, analogous to the high seas, that is open to

use by any state. From its very beginning, the

space program has been directed toward foreign

policy concerns and has recognized the inherently global nature of much that is done in space.

This is particularly true for many space applications areas. Satellite systems that receive or transmit information have the capacity to serve a wide

range of international users and to provide data

about any part of the globe. Other systems, such

as those for materials processing in space, depend

upon the uniqueness of the space environment

(e.g. microgravity) and are not inherently global

in nature; nevertheless, since they would take

place in space, outside the territory of any State,

they would be affected by international laws and

regulations. They have attracted the interest of

several users other than the United States.

In the international arena, two major forces are

at work—competition and cooperation (see ch.

7). In the early years of the development and evolution of space technology, the virtual monopoly on space technology of the two major powers

made it both desirable and necessary for other

nations to cooperate in order to gain access to

space for scientific and applications purposes. As

the technical sophistication of other nations has

increased, some have developed an independent

capability for designing and constructing satellites

and launchers.

Though the United States as a matter of national

policy has favored international competition as

a device for improving goods and services and

lowering their costs, there are circumstances

under which this policy is modified, e.g., when

a regulated monopoly supplier, such as

INTELSAT, is established as described in earlier

sections. Participants are required to plan national

and regional satellite communications systems so

as not to damage INTELSAT’S technical and financial integrity. The U.S. approach to international

competition has been subject to additional constraints. For example, national security considerations would force the United States to restrict entry of foreign steel at the point where U.S. industrial capacity was being threatened. U.S. industry is also protected, in principle, against

predatory pricing, “dumping,” and other noncompetitive practices, in space, the U.S. policy

toward satellite and satellite subsystem development, provision of services via space systems, and

development of space launching capability has

tended to favor, respectively, open competition,

single systems, and nonproliferation of launch

capability.

U.S. policy must recognize the competitive

capabilities that already exist overseas, and the

plans of several nations to initiate and continue

the development of competitive systems. Where

conditions warrant (such as when there are limited markets or problems with signal interference

from competitive systems), U.S. policy may favor

limiting competition by fostering a single global

system, In other circumstances, such as meteoro-
294 ● Civilian Space PolicY and Applications

logical observations, the united States has cooperated with other nations in the use of satellites

for data collection, and the coordination of separately funded national systems. The exchange

of information permits all participants to derive

benefits that exceed the returns from a solely national system and at much less cost for each individual participant.

Telecommunications Services

In telecommunications, the United States supported single cooperative global systems for specific services and helped to establish INTELSAT

and later INMARSAT. The U.S. position is based

on the fact that economies of scale, the size of

the international market, and the requirement for

compatible reception and transmission of signals

favor a highly integrated network with a single

management structure. The situation becomes

more complex, however, for proposed direct

broadcast satellite (DBS) systems, in which the

satellite distributes signals directly to individual

receivers. The technical and political feasibility

of such a system was demonstrated almost a decade ago with the United States- India experimental

program (SITE) for providing educational television materials to remote villages using one of the

U.S. ATS series. Such systems, which have been

proposed by a number of U.S. and European entities, may threaten the existing structure of terrestrial broadcast stations and cable television

distribution, and hence have been approached

with great caution by the United States and

foreign regulatory and communications authorities.

Direct broadcasting raises both domestic and

international concerns about regulation of program content and competition with local programs. One of the principal worries is the transmission of signals beyond national boundaries,

either because of unintentional “spillover” or intentional beaming of signals across international

borders. These concerns have been debated at

the U.N. and other international bodies for many

years, without agreement on regulations for DBS

systems. The United States has opposed restrictions on the international flow of information including those proposed for DBS. Severe limitations on spillover could create serious problems

for the satellite system designer, for the shaping

of ground patterns for signals broadcast from

satellites is not a mature technology. Restrictions

on transmitting across borders could affect the

economic prospects for proposed DBS networks,

especially in Europe.

For direct broadcast systems, many of these political and economic concerns are reflected in

discussions of technical requirements, limitations

on orbital spacing for geosynchronous satellites,

and the allocation of frequencies. The major

forum has been the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and its periodic global and

regional Administrative Radio Conferences. As in

many other international bodies, the majority of

the participating countries are not highly developed technologically, and this fact often makes

it difficult to gain acceptance for new space services. It is also often the case that the technology

associated with such services is ahead of the other

necessary infrastructure to make use of the system, particularly trained technical and managerial

personnel. Often, the resolution of ostensibly

technical issues revolves around political conflicts

between developed and less developed countries, Soviet bloc and Western states, and other

such divisions. in such situations, the international regulatory process may require considerable clarification and debate about the industry

structure, the sociological impacts, economics,

and other key features of new service.

All nations, especially in the third world, share

legitimate concerns about the availability of adequate electromagnetic spectrum for current and

future services and, as pointed out earlier, information content and use of the spectrum for DBS

systems. The space applications policy options

that are to be considered should reflect these concerns, as well as U.S. public interest as a leading

user and producer of telecommunications technology. The options tend to fall into two general

categories, aggressive competition and broadened cooperation.

AGGRESSIVE COMPETITION

Many of the possible initiatives have been pioneered in this area by the long-standing practices

that the united States has followed in helping to
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment • 295

organize and extend the role of INTELSAT. Aggressive competition by the United States in this

growing marketplace has been tempered by the

necessity of gaining broad acceptance of and

adherence to the INTELSAT agreements, and by

the fact that, until now, the United States has

been the sole supplier of most of INTELSAT’S

hardware and managerial expertise. Political

forces have necessitated more sharing of procurements and technology than might be the case in

a highly competitive environment. Future developments under the broad umbrellas of INTELSAT

and INMARSAT can be expected to be similarly

constrained; competition for I NTELSAT contracts

is likely to be more intense than in the past. However, there are new services that do not fall under

these umbrellas and are being pursued by U.S.

suppliers. These services involve purchases of

ground or space hardware that are needed for

a foreign system, via a solicitation that is open

to any qualified supplier.

One principal area of concern has been the difference between U.S. practice–which calls for

the rigorous application of antitrust provisions to

any U.S. firms intending to bid—and that of our

overseas competitors, where there is often a high

degree of collaboration among Government and

various industry suppliers. Hence, if we were to

adopt a policy of “aggressive competition” in this

area, it would imply that U.S. policy on antitrust

restrictions and restrictions on other forms of information exchange for space communications

would be relaxed in order to encourage joint ventures by industry the better to exploit the U.S.

technology base. This plan could be accomplished by encouraging industry to take advantage of a procedure already available in the

Justice Department Antitrust Division to render

prompt advisory opinions in response to industry

requests to work together on such projects. This

would have the effect of strengthening the U.S.

position vis-a-vis our overseas competitors.

Another possibility is expanded collaboration

with overseas firms. One issue that results from

such collaboration is: How to guard against the

possibility that technology transfer between the

United States and foreign partners may enable

them to become more competitive on subsequent contracts? U.S. suppliers have a great deal

of technological know-how as a result of a broad

set of space and telecommunications developments, both publicly and privately funded, over

the past 20 to 40 years. Other nations have highly

skilled scientists and engineers similarly engaged,

although generally not with the same level of

space systems experience. For specific technologies, e.g., reliable, long-life, high-power traveling wave tubes, U.S. suppliers may find that they

can benefit from technology that exists overseas.

[n other areas, such as total systems design, the

reverse may be true. In some cases, cooperative

ventures with overseas firms may be desirable for

political reasons; for instance, in negotiating the

contracts for the recent sale of equipment and

services to Arabsat, a communications satellite

consortium consisting of a number of Middle Eastern countries, Ford Aerospace could not be the

prime contractor because of its position on the

“Arab blacklist” for having dealt with Israel. Ford

then became a subcontractor (although receiving a majority of the value of the contract) to a

French firm, Aerospatiale, which took the lead

in negotiations.

For a number of reasons, U.S. policy has favored limited duplicative launch vehicle developments, but this policy has not been strongly pursued. Both technology transfer from the United

States, as in the case of the sale of Thor-Delta

technology to Japan, and indigenous developments such as the European Ariane vehicle, have

resulted in the imminent availability of capable,

yet relatively low-cost foreign launch vehicles for

applications payloads that are competitive with

United States and Soviet systems. Thus, we are

at the threshold of a period in which “aggressive

competition’ will probably be practiced by

others, whether or not the U.S. policy favors such

a posture.

BROADENED COOPERATION

The growth in foreign technical capabilities,

their aspirations for a greater market share for

their industry, and their desire to have more independent control over development and deployment of space systems for their own use have

changed the space applications outlook. The existence of an independent launch capability is

particularly significant in this regard, because it
 296 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

permits a great deal of flexibility in placing

competitive national or regional systems into orbit

and in providing a variety of specialized services.

In the communications realm there would appear to be little prospect of a near-term threat to

INTELSAT’S long-distance and overseas markets

from independent launch of satellites for general

purpose communications because of the size and

sophistication of the INTELSAT system and its expected ability to keep pace with technology. For

INTELSAT and also for INMARSAT, it appears that

no U.S. policy change is needed. With regard to

a foreign nation’s internal communications systems, current U.S. policy recognizes that this is

an internal question for the specific nation, and—

given that it constitutes no violation of other international agreements—would launch or otherwise

support such a system in accord with established

principles regarding foreign cooperation.

A possible future problem for INTELSAT may

come from the proliferation of regional systems

such as Arabsat, Nordsat, and others. A policy

of “broadened cooperation” would entail a

strong U.S. effort to bring such systems under a

cooperative umbrella. The basis for this policy

would be both economic and technical. Economically, it would be advantageous to use the

larger-scale requirements already embodied in

INTELSAT to provide additional service extensions for those nations able to use the largecapacity ground stations currently needed for

system compatibility. For nations with limited internal communications infrastructure, satellite

systems designed to operate with smaller and

much less costly ground stations are attractive.

The technology for these systems has been demonstrated and several such systems are planned

or in operation, and U.S. policy might be to help

extend this type of service to a much wider

number of potential users. The mechanism for

this could be a separate subdivision within

INTELSAT (for specialized services) or a new

cooperative international/ enterprise. In both

cases, the basic objective would be to provide

multiple small users access to high-quality communications services that are more compatible

with a limited local infrastructure, and with a

limited ability to invest in ground station capacity. The system would be optimized for low-capacity ground stations and would make maximum use of the spectrum through multiple spot

beams, “on-call” service, and other techniques

appropriate for low-volume users. In principle,

any nation should be able to obtain satellite communications that are matched to its particular

stage of development, economic needs, and the

density of local communications infrastructure.

By providing leadership in identifying the specialized needs of smaller nations and translating

these into technical specifications for communications services, the United States can accelerate

the process whereby space communications can

be readily provided to all nations. By bringing

these multiple small users together, the aggregated market should be capable of supporting appropriate satellites. This would tend to reduce or

eliminate the need for ad hoc groups of nations

to organize independent regional systems. Consequently, greater technical compatibility would be

ensured, and there would be greater likelihood

of continuing technological advances to improve

and broaden the services provided. The proposed

entity would be analogous to a local telephone

system, connected through a switching system

to a larger network, but providing individual lines

to many small subscribers at the local level.

Land Remote Sensing

Remote sensing from space has inherent international ramifications because the vantage point

provided by the orbiting space platform provides

broad synoptic coverage that is not limited to national boundaries. In contrast to the international

cooperation that is essential for a successful global

communications system, remote sensing does not

require direct cooperation to be successfully pursued—although cooperation in providing

“ground truth” information is very useful, and

foreign ground stations collect data that would

otherwise be unavailable. The fact that cooperation is not essential has allowed Earth remote

sensing to develop without a clear, international

framework that would deal with such questions

as rights to data, maximum resolution limits, technical characteristics of the sensors and platforms,

data format, orbits and repetition rates, and a host

of other policy and operational questions.
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment • 297

In approaching the international aspects of

remote sensing, the United States has been

guided by several principles: 1) overflight of a nation by an orbiting satellite should not be prohibited, assuming other treaty obligations are fulfilled; 2) the civilian remote-sensing program

should not give rise to negative reactions that

might constrain military and intelligence uses of

space platforms; 3) cooperation with other nations is encouraged; and 4) data collected are to

be made available to any interested party on a

nondiscriminatory basis, for a fee. The early flights

of the Landsat series of satellites resulted from

unilateral decisions of the United States; international aspects were incorporated largely as byproducts of the effort to generate users and

develop a better understanding of user requirements. Consistent with the principles listed

above, the data have been been made available

widely on a nondiscriminatory basis, Earth stations have been sold to enable other nations to

collect data directly, and careful choice of resolution limits and sensor performance characteristics

has caused many of the early concerns about

Landsat as a spy in the sky to dissipate. in the interim, the United States officially revealed its

military reconnaissance satellite program—confirming what most observers already believed–so

that, at least publicly, the role of Landsat and its

follow-on systems could be more clearly addressed in the international arena.

The United States clearly had a significant lead

in civilian remote sensing—almost a decade

ahead of Soviet and emerging European and Japanese systems. With the passage of time and the

lack of a clear U.S. commitment to maintaining

an operational Landsat, the development of competitive systems such as the French SPOT was a

logical consequence. Some policy options available to the United States before the French decided to proceed with SPOT may now be foreclosed by its existence; they will at least be

significantly modified. In general, the policy options fall into three categories: aggressive competition, laissez faire, and expanded cooperation.

AGGRESSIVE COMPETITION

It may be assumed that U.S. technology, including what is available from national security

systems, would permit significant improvements

in ground resolution, and that multispectral sensing could be provided at adequate resolutions

and at appropriate wave lengths, on a timely

basis, for international as well as national use.

Therefore, it is likely that anything other nations

may choose to provide via an Earth-sensing system, could be matched or improved upon by the

United States if there were adequate budget support and commitment. It should be kept in mind

that any U.S. system will have to compete with

SPOT and its derivatives, whose products are not

likely to be priced to reflect their true cost. Political considerations of national prestige and advancement of high-technology enterprises may

transcend questions of cost recovery. In short,

aggressive competition is not likely to cause systems like SPOT to be discontinued, although it

may make such investments less profitable.

The implications of aggressive competition appear to favor a continued role for Government

as the operator of the space segment, but with

a clear commitment to operational status for the

system. This commitment would assure continuity of data, adequate processing capacity to insure timely availability of data to international as

well as national users, and an active R&D program to support system improvements.

Pricing of products would be competitive with

alternative systems. The premise would be that

the overall global and national benefits, particularly the nonmonetary ones, would justify the

subsidy to this system. Examples of the latter include the goodwill that would accrue to the

United States from use of data forewarning crop

failures, severe storms, or other hazards; postdisaster monitoring; monitoring the global biomass inventory; monitoring the status of the

ozone layer and other worldwide environmental phenomena.

LAISSEZ FAIRE

As an alternative, the united States could also

turn over responsibility for operational systems,

if any, to the private sector and buy the data it

needs from whatever source was most appropriate—including foreign systems. Government

users might be able to obtain appropriately
298 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

screened data from classified systems, but the

principal sources of remotely sensed data would

be commercial suppliers. The market would determine pricing and availability, and Government

would be precluded from direct competition with

the private sector. This posture would not foreclose a continuing R&D role for NASA, but would

require that any operational system be developed

in the private sector. Satellites that serve to demonstrate a sensor or system could be Government

funded or might be jointly supported. Pricing of

products would be set by the private supplier,

perhaps with Government participation. Because

it can be expected that foreign systems will be

subsidized, a private U.S. operator may have difficulty competing unless the Federal Government

provides equivalent support. if industry did not

see an adequate market for remotely sensed

products and did not purchase a satellite, there

would be no operational U.S. system, and U.S.

users would have to seek other means of obtaining their data.

BROADENED COOPERATION

Alternatively, the United States could seek to

extend the arena of formal cooperative arrangements to include ocean and land remote sensing. Under such broadened cooperation, the pattern established under INTELSAT would be

adapted to the remote-sensing field, For example, it should be possible to define a single management authority that would assume responsibility for global operational systems, establish technical specifications, procure satellites, and operate the satellites and the initial data reception and

processing facilities.

In order to make such a new international entity possible, participating nations would be expected to forego launch and operation of national

systems for civilian purposes. This would not preclude national R&D on sensors or platforms; but

such systems could not substitute for commitments to the global consortium. Successful R&D

could be integrated into the global system under

a negotiated arrangement. Basically, the United

States would be proposing to join together with

other nations in launching and operating a common set of data collection platforms, with revenue to be obtained from the sale of raw or processed data. The returned data stream from the

common operational platforms would be encoded so that only consortium members would

have direct access to the data. Others would be

able to purchase data from the central organization at established prices. The rationale for this

approach is based on the following.

●

●

●

●

●

●

Market. -the current limited and uncertain

market for these data makes competitive systems redundant, and is not adequate to support a commercial operator.

Interest.—There is broad international interest in such systems.

Competition. –It is too late for the United

States successfully to preempt foreign competition by offering greater or more favorable

access to future Landsat data.

Cooperation.— By joining together, large and

small nations can participate in the benefits

from a common global system with less fear

of exploitation by particular nations or private firms.

Globa/ systems. –This approach would facilitate global monitoring systems for critical environmental factors such as forest inventory,

biomass, carbon dioxide and ozone concentrations, which could be operated as joint

projects by the consortium.

Economies of sca/e.–Economies of scale

could be achieved by common use of Earth

facilities and data processing facilities to

serve multiple customers, and lower cost satellites. These advantages are similar to those

that INTELSAT enjoys in its multiple-satellite

purchases.

The initial startup period for the consortium

could be handled in a way very similar to the

INTELSAT model, with interim agreements in

force for a fixed period during which the detailed

operating practices would be negotiated. Some

of the current practices that are followed in the

communications area could be expected to carry

over to the global satellite consortium, including

procedures for procuring operational satellites,

contracting for launch services, and establishing

satellite control facilities. The ground processing

of data is sufficiently complex and sensitive (particularly control of decoding) that the initial stages

should probably be a consortium responsibility,
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 299

rather than being handled by individual governments, with subsequent interpretation made by

other entities, either government or private sector. For the purposes of this assessment, such a

consortium will be called “Globesat.”

The differences between communications and

remote sensing need additional comment. Communications requires active cooperation, remote

sensing does not. Any alternatives to a global cooperative entity such as INTELSAT still require

agreement and compatibility between separate

states. The alternative to Globesat, however, is

completely independent national collection platforms. Communications involves a shared benefit

between the linked points, while the sensed data

from an observation satellite are primarily of value

to the controlling authority or to entities who use

the data for specific purposes.

Privately owned international communications

have, for the most part, minimal national security implications. Conversely, increasing resolution

for satellite observations leads inevitably to national sensitivities regarding the detection of military installations, troop or equipment deployment, and other sensitive information. Globesat

would provide a forum for reaching common

agreement on system specifications and could

serve to alleviate sensitivities on the part of participating nations regarding the nature of civilian

remote-sensing data that would be available regarding their country. Using encoded data

streams would allow selective processing so that

it would be possible to limit access to high-resolution data from a particular nation if that nation

required imposition of such limitations. It can be

expected that most nations would avail themselves of this privilege, charging a fee for foreign

or private sector access to high-resolution data.

Alternatively, it could be Globesat policy that a

nation could restrict access to high-resolution

data for a fixed maximum period of time, say 6

or 12 months. This would reduce sensitivity about

military movements and would enable national

interests to have the first opportunity to use the

data. As pointed out earlier, U.S. policy has been

to gain acceptance of “open skies” and “open

data” policies; restrictive actions carried out

under Globesat might appear to undermine these

positions. However, the basic concern of U.S.

policy, that is, the principle that there shall be

open access via satellite systems to co//ect such

data, is not infringed by the Globesat practices

suggested above. It is simply the civilian use that

is being controlled, if specified by a participating

country, and this use would reflect legitimate economic interests that the United States also shares.

Thus, it appears that Globesat could operate in

a fashion that is both consistent with longstanding principles of U.S. policy and yet respect the

valid concerns of other participating nations.

Is it possible for Globesat to function under the

auspices of the United Nations? There are organizations, such as the World Health Organization

(WHO) and World Meteorological Organization

(WMO), that have successfully overcome some

of the inhibiting characteristics of such broad

sponsorship. However, it would appear that

Globesat is not suitable to a U.N. format, at least

in its formative stages. The large number of competing interests, coupled with fears of exploitation, would likely make reaching agreement on

a system very difficult. The overwhelming difficulties that the Law of the Sea Treaty has faced

are a case in point. Transition to a U .N. relationship would be an issue for consideration at some

future time. In 1978 France proposed, at the

U. N., that a remote-sensing agency be established to monitor worldwide military activities

and disseminate information to all countries,

thereby forestalling aggression. If such a plan

were agreed upon, Globesat could be the appropriate entity to operate the system.

A major concern in a system with multiple

owners and users is the adequacy of data collection to serve user needs. Telephone, television,

and digital data are the principal components of

international communications traffic, and common systems can be designed to fit a variety of

such users. For Earth observations, however, satisfying user needs is not as simple; the users are

not well organized, and their data needs are not

standardized or well understood. In addition, the

most desirable observation times, frequency of

observation, and spectral bands differ from user

to user. Hence a difficult set of compromises

would be required to establish the satellite system

specifications. Combining several sensors on a

single platform would be traded off against the
300 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

advantages of multiple platforms with fewer sensors. Presumably sensors such as those planned

for SPOT and Landsat would be candidates, as

well as others that may originate elsewhere. In

Globesat, the united States would have no guarantee that the compromises would satisfy U.S.

needs; however, because the united States

would be a major user and source of revenue,

it is likely that these needs would be given some

priority. There is also no guarantee of continuity

of data, but there is no guarantee of data continuity for strictly national systems, either. It seems

probable that an international consortium such

as Globesat, with broad user and national support, would have a greater commitment to continuity than would be the case for a single U.S.

supplier.

The adoption of the Globesat option would imply that several policy options defined earlier

would become impractical. For example, creation of a single national regulated satellite

operator for U.S. remote sensing would be counter to the principles upon which Globesat would

be based; Globesat would substitute for the U.S.

operating entity. However, there would be a

need for a U.S. representative to Globesat that

would reflect the views of various U.S. users. This

representative could be a designated Government agency, and existing group, or a new entity that would have responsibility for distribution

of U.S. data, as well as coordination of the various

user community needs.

An important unknown in considering Globesat

would be the position of the Soviet Union. The

Soviet Union has operated remote-sensing satellites for many years, and recently announced its

intention to provide a “continuous-look” system

similar to Western satellites. The Soviets could use

such a system to compete with Globesat; alternatively, if they were to join, the difficulties of agreeing on system specifications and operating details

might be much greater.

In summary, many of the international concerns about remote sensing could be suitably accommodated within a global consortium that

could also fulfill U.S. needs. At this point, it may

not be possible to obtain international agreement

on such a structure because of the prolonged period of U.S. indecision regarding remote sensing

and the resulting efforts by other nations to satisfy their needs through independent systems. It

would take a strong U.S. commitment to Globesat for such an entity to be initiated and established.

Economic Measures

One of the common characteristics of space

applications systems is the high entry cost associated with the development and institution of

new systems. The principal hurdle has been the

high cost and difficulty of transporting the satellite

to its proper orbit. A large additional cost results

from the absolute necessity for extremely high

reliability for the payload, which must function

for long periods of time without maintenance or

repairs. Complicating factors are the environmental stresses: the shock and vibration of launch,

and the vacuum, low gravity, alternating heat and

cold, electromagnetic radiation, and solar wind

of space. The net result, given the small numbers

of satellites actually flown, has been that virtually each satellite has been a new and delicate

design requiring its own set of tests.

[t is possible that routine and reliable access

to space via the shuttle and the availability of

astronauts to perform tasks such as replacement

of wornout parts, repairs, or fueling could lead

to an era of less costly satellite platforms. As part

of the shuttle program, many of these concepts

will be explored, including developing a common

spacecraft bus that would provide standardized

housekeeping functions needed for all satellites,

such as command and data links, power, attitude

control and station keeping. In addition, NASA

has offered small amounts of shuttle payload bay

space at very low cost, the so-called getaway

specials, for small experimental packages. But

these are only the first steps along the road toward lower cost access to space, and it is not likely that significant change will occur, at least in

the next decade or so. Satellite maintenance is

severely limited by our inability (even with the

shuttle) to transport men into geosynchronous

orbit, where most communications satellites are

located. Thus, although steps are being taken that

could lower the high cost of satellites, this will
Ch. 10–Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment . 301

remain a significant barrier to commercial entry

into space applications service areas.

Beyond the direct cost of the satellite, there are

additional costs for the construction and operation of ground facilities to link with the satellite.

Communications and remote sensing require extensive satellite control facilities, ground receiving stations, and data processing systems. Materials processing in space is relatively free of such

costs.

With such significant entry costs, private sector involvement in space applications has been

limited (see ch. 8). Government policy has served

as a primary stimulus for such involvement, primarily in communications, through regulation,

joint Endeavor Agreements, and congressional

actions such as the COMSAT Act, the National

Aeronautics and Space Act (for R&D), and

INMARSAT legislation. If there is to be a new

thrust to open space applications for commercial exploitation, the economic barriers to entry

need to be addressed. Several approaches appear

feasible.

Space Development Bank

Government has used the device of a development bank or system of loan guarantees to

finance socially desirable objectives in a wide

variety of settings, from international development (World Bank, Interamerican Development

Bank) to sale of U.S. products (Export-import

Bank) and U.S. housing (Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration loans, Federal National Mortgage Association, Farm Credit

Administration, Federal Home Loan Bank System). More recently, loans or loan guarantees

have been used to make a college education

more accessible, to prevent the collapse of major

corporations (Lockheed and Chrysler), and to

provide incentives to small business. Thus, a

determination by the Congress that the growth

of space applications was socially and nationally desirable and that the preferred approach was

to keep such growth as much as possible in the

private commercial sector, would open the possibility of establishing a Space Development Bank

(SDB). A similar concept, the Space industrialization Corporation (H. R. 2337), has been the subject of recent congressional hearings. (A more

detailed discussion of this specific piece of legislation can be found in chapter 8.)

The role of SDB would be to: 1 ) receive proposals for space applications investments;

2) evaluate these applications; 3) if acceptable,

provide funds at preferential loan rates and

establish a deferred payback schedule; and

4) monitor the progress of the business plans on

the basis of which loans have been made. SDB

would require initial authority for drawing rights

upon Treasury funds appropriated for this purpose, but in the long term the SDB would be selfsustaining and pay back the initial appropriations.

SDB would provide an initial subsidy to qualified

entrepreneurs, with the amounts and areas to be

determined by negotiation and the developing

marketplace.

SDB could also provide incentives for private

entities to form joint ventures for specific services for which a single supplier was not available

or appropriate. As such, SDB could act as a quasiregulatory body, controlling entry into space applications fields to maximize social benefit. (It

should be recognized that there are limitations

to this role. For corporations like COMSAT, with

a continuing statutory role in space applications

and a large and growing revenue base, entry into

new space applications services would not depend on incentives such as SDB would provide.

An expansion of COMSAT into other areas, particularly remote sensing, would create—defacto–a commercial space applications monopoly. As explained earlier, the public interest would

likely require that such a monopoly be accompanied by a Federal regulatory authority.)

SDB, on the other hand, would be associated

with more open entry. The provision of capital

at low rates would serve to attract a broad array

of potential suppliers, and a separate regulatory

body may, therefore, not be needed.

Tax Incentives

The tax incentive is another governmental

device used to promote socially beneficial actions. It is currently being employed to encourage

R&D generally, to stimulate energy conservation
302 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

and use of solar energy, and to encourage invest- is almost completely free from Government manment in new plant and equipment. The advan- agement and, therefore, more nearly reflects the

tage of the tax incentive is that very little addi- realities of the marketplace as it is understood by

tional Government manpower is needed to ad- the private firms.

minister its provisions—and the decision making

INTEGRATED POLICY OPTIONS FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS

The previous section outlined a number of individual policy options to address specific issues.

In this section, the policy options will be grouped

into larger patterns or themes to give a more integrated picture of the range of options available.

It should be recognized that the grouping of

policy options presented in the following material

is illustrative and may be modified by the addition or deletion of specific elements. The options

are not necessarily exclusive of one another. They

are presented in this integrated fashion to give

a better understanding of the types of actions that

may be contemplated and the relationships

among the various policy elements.

Continuing the Current

Policy Framework

Current policy, as expressed by the existing legislation, permits a great deal of flexibility to organize and conduct a strong space applications program and gives implicit authority to Government,

not only to conduct R&D but also to operate systems. There is, in addition, wide latitude to assign

specific tasks to agencies and to permit privatesector participation in essentially any phase of activity. Thus, the role of the private sector in remote sensing could be expanded to include operation of space and ground segments simply by

Administrative action. (Transfer of ownership of

existing satellites systems, which are Government

property, would require separate congressional

action. ) The policy framework for space communications is also flexible and permits both Government and private sector roles in a wide range of

services, subject to FCC and ITU regulations. The

specialized position of COMSAT is defined in legislation and therefore restricts the choices in this

area. In transportation and materials processing,

there is similar flexibility with respect to the institutional structure and the extent of the private

role.

Continuation of the current legislative framework permits policies ranging from strong Government leadership and participation to a laissez

faire approach in which Government stands aside

and explicitly invites private groups to assume a

larger role, without emphasizing or requiring any

one approach.

While there is a wide latitude permitted by the

current policies, there are no clear goals, no

timetable and no overall direction for space applications. As a result, it is difficult for the Government to identify and pursue the benefits of space

applications.

If nothing is proposed beyond current policy

and practice, neither the U.S. private sector, the

Government, nor the public at large will benefit

fully from the country’s large space investments

over the past 24 years. U.S. leadership in many

areas will be lost. Viewed in an historical perspective, such a course would raise serious questions

about our ability as a nation to pursue long-term

objectives when faced with short-term problems.

Increasing the International Emphasis

A number of policy options hinge upon the approach that is adopted toward international competition and cooperation. This approach suggests

a strategy that may be termed “international emphasis.” Under this approach, the United States

could adopt a general guideline; i.e., “all inherently international civilian space applications

should be carried out on a cooperative international basis, and be the subject of an agreed institutional framework. ” If this approach were

followed, we would pursue the establishment of

an entity like Globesat for remote sensing and
Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 303

a new communications satellite structure that

would vigorously develop the market for small,

low-volume users. U.S. needs would be met by

these entities, as appropriate; as a consequence,

questions of private-sector entry and foreign competition would become moot–given that the necessary international entities were successfully

established. The United States could designate

COMSAT and/or other entities to represent it in

these new international bodies. Other applications such as transportation and materials processing are not inherently international and would

therefore be treated separately. NASA would continue to do R&D on new technology, but on a

much more limited basis. It might also do some

development work under contract with international organizations. The requirements of U.S.

users would need to be identified systematically

and formally in order to provide adequate, timely

specifications for Globesat and other entities.

Responsibility for convening such groups and incorporating their needs into U.S. positions in the

appropriate international bodies would reside

with the chosen U.S. representative.

A policy with an international empahsis is attractive because it tends to clarify so many other

related aspects of the policy picture. It has the

effect of moving operational responsibilities out

of the U.S. Government, via an international

quasi-private entity, and thereby reducing direct

Government expenditures for such systems. It is

consistent with U.S. policy in communications,

in which we have strongly supported a single

global system via INTELSAT and INMARSAT. [t

clarifies the issue of international competition in

remote sensing by creating a strong incentive to

participate in the common, i.e., Globesat, system.

This option also carries with it a number of risks

or limitations. The outcome of such a U.S. initiative on the international front is problematic.

Sovereign nations will tend to protect their interests and seek advantages in this area as in many

others. It would therefore require considerable

care in outlining the advantages of a common system (or systems, e.g., using SPOT as well as Landsat technology) and in creating strong incentives

for the principal initial partners to join with the

United States. Though the optimal moment for

this proposal has probably passed, there is still

an opportunity to create a common entity—if the

United States moves promptly and decisively.

Another aspect of this approach is that it implies

some loss of independent action on the part of

the United States. We would be (as in INTELSAT)

foregoing our own independent systems in favor

of a cooperative international effort. Arriving at

an agreement among the international participants regarding the number of satellites, their sensors, data formats, and other operating characteristics, as well as the procurement guidelines

for equipment and services, may be a difficult and

prolonged task. The procurement guidelines can

be expected to result in mandatory sharing of the

development and production tasks among the

participants and, hence, a possible reduction in

U.S. contracts as well as sharing of U.S.-developed technology with overseas firms.

Finally, the reality of the growing independent

space capabilities of other nations means that

they will eventually be able to carry out such a

plan without U.S. participation, if they choose.

Although such a prospect is not likely in the near

future, other data collection systems will be

launched, if Globesat is not established, each of

which will compete for a limited market. The

alternative of a common system has strong economic and political advantages.

Increasing the National

Private Sector Role

The approach here would be to extend the current U.S. practice of maintaining an independent

data collection system, but one that gives the private sector a stronger role in specifying the system

and the method of operation on. The basic principle would be: “/t is U.S. policy that the private

sector own and operate space systems. ” There

are several basic approaches:

● Open entry. —This would involve encouraging multiple suppliers to provide services. Incentives would be offered via tax breaks,

loans, and other financial aid via an SDB; in

addition there might be guarantees of Government data purchase, no Government

competition, and measures to preclude a

monopoly supplier. In communications, the
304 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

●

●

conditions for regulated, open entry have already been established.

Private monopoly. —This alternative applies

principally to remote sensing. In this case,

the entity could be an already established

corporation, or a new public-private company. Ground-segment ownership would

follow the choice for ownership of the space

segment, as explained in an earlier section.

The choice of a private-sector monopoly

supplier would be accompanied by establishing a regulatory body.

Government rnonopoly. -Continuation of

the current Government monopoly for the

space segment would be possible, with increased private-sector participation in the

ownership and operation of all the ground

data reception and processing stations. This

recognizes the currently limited marketplace

and the need for continued Government

support of operations to ensure maximum

public benefit from space applications, particularly remote-sensing systems.

Because this approach is principally an extension of current policies, though increased emphasis is given to the role of the private sector—a

point of view strongly supported by the Reagan

administration—it probably would be the easiest

on which to develop a consensus between Congress and the executive branch. But a national

consensus does not necessarily lead to a satisfactory resolution of all the issues, particularly in

view of the degree of sophistication and independence found in other nations today. The

United States can attempt to meet this competition and continue its own independent developments, including increased private-sector involvement, or it can seek a collaborative and cooperative framework as outlined in the previous section. If we choose an independent course, additional policy questions arise, such as whether U.S.

private firms and/or the Government will buy

data from foreign systems. The approach outlined

here is consistent with a policy that would permit purchase of data from a foreign system by private users without restriction, but subject Government users to whatever purchase agreements had

been negotiated with a private U.S. supplier (or

suppliers).

Increased High-Level Policy Focus

Spanning the range of all of the above approaches, there is the suggestion that both current and continuing developments in space policy

would profit from increased high-level attention

in the executive branch and Congress. There are

several approaches that may be taken to accomplish this increased high-level review and decision on national space policy. They are all compatible with the various policy options discussed

in the preceding sections. The premise on which

they are based is that space policy is sufficiently

important to warrant greater attention from both

the executive and legislative branches of the Government.

The policy directions set by the different approaches above would require attention by the

administration and Congress in the form of implementing guidelines, program direction, and budget decisions—in short, of continuing followup

over a number of years. International initiatives,

if adopted, must receive high-level endorsement

and be integrated into the overall foreign policy

stance of the United States: the responsibility to

implement such initiatives cannot be left to a

single agency. Thus, whatever new approaches

are taken, they should be matched by suitable

steps to strengthen the process of developing

space policy. Without such a step, the other

measures are likely to be less than adequate in

meeting the many needs identified in this assessment.
APPENDIXES
Appendix A

INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF

THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM

Introduction

This section focuses on the relationship between

space policy and the institutions of the space program.

It traces the origin and evolution of the institutional

structure of the U.S. Government for civilian space

activities, and it asks whether that structure, as it exists today, is appropriate to the kind of civilian space

program the United States has today and will have in

the near future. Institutional effectiveness is a means

to the success of certain policies, not an end in itself.

On the other hand, a mismatch between policy and

structure is likely to be a major barrier to such success, and thus an issue deserving of detailed attention.

Not infrequently in Government programs, particular policies reflect the requirements of a particular institutional structure. As the subsequent discussion will

suggest, there is not much evidence of this being the

case with respect to the civilian space effort. It seems,

rather, that for space, the relationship is as most

students of public administration would have it: that

is, structure follows strategy. In the U.S. space programs, institutions to a large degree have been based

on and designed to implement agreed-on policies and

carry out particular programs, rather than the reverse

relationship.

What follow attempts to demonstrate how the basic

policy principles were translated into a particular institutional structure, and how that structure has

evolved since its inception. It does not purport to be

a definitive description of the institutional structure

of the U.S. space program or of its evolution over the

last two decades. Rather, it highlights those characteristics of and relationships among structures that appear relevant to any evaluation of the current and

future organization of the national space effort.

Separate Programs, Separate Structures

The policy decision with the most direct impact on

the structure of the U.S. space program was that calling for the institutional separation within the Government of the civilian and military space activities (see

ch. 6). In the immediate post-Sputnik period, when

it was evident that some accelerated response to the

Soviet space accomplishments by the United States

was required, there were a number of contenders for

the job of managing the national space effort. they

included:

a single agency for all Government space programs managed by the military, either at the level

of the Secretary of Defense or by one of the

armed services, most likely the Air Force;

a new Cabinet-level Department of Science and

Technology which, among its other responsibilities, would have charge of the civilian space

effort;

adding space to the responsibilities of the Atomic

Energy Commission;

expanding the responsibility of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) to include a substantial component of space activities;

and

creating a new civilian agency with a responsibility for Government space activities, except those

primarily associated with defense applications

(which would be managed by the Department of

Defense (DOD)).

Once the decision to separate civil and military

space activities was made, the claims by DOD and

by the armed services that they were the appropriate

managers of the national space program found limited

political support either within Congress or in the

public (outside of those constituencies with close connections to the military). The idea that the U.S. space

program in its civilian aspects should be an open,

unclassified effort was widely accepted among those

concerned with shaping national space policy.

As the Government agency concerned with aeronautics research, NACA mounted a campaign to have

space added to its activities. However, NACA was an

introspective, research-oriented agency with little

orientation toward major technological enterprises.

Further, it was an agency managed by a committee,

not by a single executive; this was an administrative

arrangement strongly preferred by the scientific community as a means of insulating Government activities

with strong scientific components from “politics. ” A

similar form of organization had been accepted for

the Atomic Energy Commission and had been proposed, but vetoed by President Truman, for the National Science Foundation. What Eisenhower’s administrative, budgetary, and policy advisers wanted was

an agency responsive to the policy directions of the

President, headed by a single individual responsible

for implementing those policy directives, and with the

capabilities for carrying out potentially major research

307
308 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

and development (R&D) activities. Those activities, it

was thought, would be pursued within the aerospace

industry under Government contract rather than “inhouse” with Federal laboratories. They thus concluded that the creation of an essentially new Federal

structure for space, but one built around the NACA

core of technical capability and research institutions,

was the appropriate route to go.

In the National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act

of 1958, the primacy of civilian objectives in space

was stated: “it is the policy of the United States that

activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind;” and the responsibility for those activities was given to a civilian agency: “Such activities shall “be the responsibility of and

shall be directed by a civilian agency exercising control over aeronautical and space activities sponsored

by the United States.”

One area of controversy in the development of the

1958 NAS Act was whether the new space agency

should be responsible for all space R&D, including that

ultimately to be used by the military for defense applications. The decision was to make explicit from the

start the total separation of these two major categories

of space activities, with the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration (NASA) having no direct involvement in military work. Thus, the NAS Act also declared

that DOD should have responsibility for “activities

peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the

defense of the United States (including the research

and development necessary to make effective provisions for the defense of the United States).”

The formal separation of the civilian and military

space activities into different institutional frameworks

meant transferring to the new civilian space agency

functions related to its mission but under military control and, particularly after NASA had been assigned

the lunar landing mission, developing new capabilities required to carry out an active space R&D effort.

Within DOD there was a desire to develop a space

R&D and a space operations structure, and to determine the division of responsibility at the Secretary of

Defense level between the various military services.

Both the NASA buildup and the development of the

initial military structure for space were accomplished

by the early 1960’s.

Within the first 2 years of its existence, NASA had

transferred to it a number of facilities, programs, and

personnel that had formerly been operating under

military auspices. These included, from the Army, the

Von Braun rocket development team at Huntsville,

Ala. (which became the core of the Marshall Space

Flight Center), and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at

the California Institute of Technology. NASA was authorized to develop several new field centers related

to its mission, including the Goddard Space Flight

Center for science and applications programs and the

Manned Spacecraft Center (later the Johnson Space

Center) for manned programs, and to develop a civilian launch facility at Cape Canaveral, Fla. (later the

Kennedy Space Center).1 These were added to the

three former NACA centers: Langley, Lewis, and

Ames; in addition smaller NACA facilities at Wallops

Island, Va., and Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., came

under NASA control. By 1962, NASA had in place an

impressive institutional capability, one fully mobilized

for meeting a broad set of national objectives in space.

This Government institutional base for civilian space

programs was reinforced by the development of an

elaborate external network of organizations—industries, universities, and nonprofits—involved in carrying out the civilian space program under NASA contracts or grants. In addition, as space activities

matured, other Government agencies, including the

Departments of Agriculture; Commerce; Energy;

Health, Education, and Welfare; and Interior also

became involved in space-related activities. At the

peak of the Apollo program in fiscal year 1965, fully

94 percent of NASA’s budget obligations went to external grants and contracts, and NASA’s prime contractors in turn created a wide base of more specialized subcontractors. Of direct NASA procurements in

that year, 79 percent went to business firms, 8 percent to educational institutions, 12 percent to other

Government agencies, and 1 percent to nonprofit

organizations. This pattern has remained consistent

over the years; in fiscal 1978, the same percentage

(94 percent) of NASA’s budget went to extramural procurement, and the distribution among performers was

rather similiar—business (81 percent); educational institutions (12 percent); nonprofits (1 percent); and

other Government agencies (6 percent).

As the development of Government space activities

during the 1960’s and 1970’s continued, the separation between the civilian and military (including intelligence) communities became quite pronounced.

The Government developed and maintained separate

and distinct institutional structures for both functions,

not only in terms of line agencies within the executive

branch, but also in terms of policy review, budget development and review, and congressional oversight.

The elements of the Government space program coordinated their work but in a limited way compared to

the separate efforts developed by each element of the

Government space effort.

I There was already a military launch facility at the Cape.
Appendix A—institutional Evolution of the U.S. Space Program . 309

The NASA structure created under the direction of

its first two administrators, Keith Glennan and James

Webb, has remained basically unchanged during the

past two decades. NASA headquarters in Washington

is responsible for policy development and overall

management and technical direction of the various

components of the civilian space research program.

Technical management of those specific projects is

assigned to one of the various NASA field centers.

NASA has adopted the “Air Force model” of agencycontractor relationships, in which most R&D work is

performed outside the Government by the aerospace

industry. The Government role is that of program and

project initiator, technical monitor of contractor performance, and user of the results of the R&D efforts.

The set of field centers under NASA authority today is the same as it was during the early 1960’s.2

Because NASA is responsible for civilian space activities aimed at a number of different purposes, including science, applications, and development of technological capability, and because the responsibility for

each of those missions is lodged in a different field

center, one of NASA headquarters’ major responsibilities is allocating priorities and resources across the

NASA institutional complex. The vitality of various

field centers is closely related to the priority assigned

to particular types of space activities under that

center’s control, and thus there is strong institutional

motivation to compete for particular emphases within

the overall NASA program.

Congress dealt with the need to establish a firm policy foundation for space by creating two temporary

select committees in early 1958. Later that year it

established two new standing committees to deal with

civilian space matters. In the Senate this responsibility was given to the Committee on Aeronautical and

Space Sciences; in the House, to the Committee on

Science and Astronautics. Both of these committees

derived their visibility and status within Congress from

the importance of program oversight and their authorization authority over those programs. As long as the

civilian space program was a matter of high national

priority with major budgetary support there was a corresponding degree of status in being involved with

these two congressional committees. However, as the

resources allocated to civilian space activity declined

after Apollo, Congress viewed space activities as just

one among various science and technology programs

of Government, and during the 1970’s committee jurisdictions and names were modified to reflect this

reality. Now the programs of NASA and the National

Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration are

reviewed in the Senate by the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Committee on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation; there is no

separate Senate Space Committee. In the House, the

Committee on Science and Astronautics in 1974 was

renamed the Committee on Science and Technology

and its jurisdiction was broadened to cover most civilian science and technology activities, rather than

being focused primarily on NASA efforts.

This institutional base offers the potential for rapid

mobilization if the Nation decided to accelerate the

pace of its civilian space effort; the consequences of

allowing the NASA and contractor institutional bases

to shrink are unclear. It may be a sound national investment to maintain a strong institutional capability

within the Government for civilian space development, even though that capability is not always being fully utilized. On the other hand, as this report has

argued throughout, it may also be appropriate, as U.S.

activities in space mature, to shift more of the responsibility for program and project planning and development for space applications and transportation to the

private sector, with a parallel diminution of Government’s institutional involvement.

In 1977-78, a National Security Council Policy

Review Committee reviewed the structure of the national space program. The report validated the fundamental principle of separating civilian and military

space activities. It concluded that “our current direction set forth in the Space Act in 1958 is well-founded”

and that “the United States will maintain current

responsibility and management among the various

space programs. ”3

Policy and Program Coordination

The decision to separate civilian and military space

activities led naturally to the requirement for policy

and program coordination between the programs. The

type of policy coordination needed and mechanisms

for coordination have been, and continue to be, controversial issues (see ch. 6). The nature of coordination at the program level has been less problematic

and working-level cooperation between civilian and

military space efforts has been the rule. However, occasional disputes have arisen over, for example, proposed civilian uses of technology developed for national security purposes.

During the 1958 debate on space policy, a major

congressional concern was the relationship between

military and civilian objectives in space and some

broader set of national interests. Senate Majority

2Except for the brief period during which NASA also had an Electronics

Research Center in Cambridge, Mass.

3The only public announcement of the results of this review was in the

form of a June 20, 1978, press release from the White House,
310 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Leader Lyndon Johnson, in particular, was convinced

that space policy ought to be the subject of Presidential attention; the Eisenhower administration was far

less convinced that space policy deserved such high

priority. Johnson wanted to coordinate policy at a high

level by creating an Executive Office group modeled

on the National Security Council but dedicated specifically to aeronautical and space activities. The

Eisenhower adminstration reluctantly accepted Johnson’s notion as a price of getting the space legislation

through Congress, and a National Aeronautics and

Space Council was established by the NAS Act. The

Space Council was to be a high-level advisory body,

chaired by the President and consiting of the heads

of other agencies concerned with space activities and

several nongovernmental members.4 It was to assist

and advise the President in developing a comprehensive program of aeronautical and space activities, in

assigning specific space missions to various agencies,

and i n resolving differences among agencies over

space policy and program.

Although the Eisenhower adminstration agreed to

the inclusion of the Space Council in the legislation

setting up the national space effort, it never used the

Council. Rather, space policy under Eisenhower was

developed through the channels of the National Security Council and Bureau of the Budget. Eisenhower

believed that civilian and military functions in space

development were “separate responsibilities requiring no coordinating body. ” Thus, in 1960 he asked

Congress to abolish the Space Council.

This proposal was sidetracked by Lyndon Johnson.

When Kennedy won the 1960 election, with Johnson

as his Vice President, the new President was convinced to keep the Space Council but to change the

legislation so it would be chaired by the Vice President. During the Kennedy administration, the Space

Council hired its first staff members and played an active role in developing the national policies that led

to the Apollo project and to the administration’s position on communications satellites. In the rest of the

1960’s, under the Johnson and Nixon administration,

the Space Council continued to exist, but stood at the

margins of most space policy debates. it developed

a relatively large (for the Executive Office) staff under

the leadership of Vice Presidents Hubert Humphrey

and Spiro Agnew. However, as the priority assigned

to the civilian space program continued to decrease

in the President’s agenda and as the separate space

activities of the Government became governed increasingly from within the separate agencies, the

Space Council became rather a moribund institution,

4

These nongovernmental members were never appointed and the positions were eliminated when the space council was reorganized in 1961.

and in 1973 President Nixon proposed its dissolution.

Congress raised no objection and the Space Council

went out of existence.

Without a central policy coordinating structure during the 1970’s, stresses among various Government

space activities developed. Several of these were the

results of disagreements between NASA and DOD

over the appropriate national security constraints to

be applied to civilian space efforts, particularly for

Earth observations. NASA-DOD relationships with

respect to the space shuttle program have been

another area of controversy. It was these stresses that

were the primary cause of the Carter administration

review of national space policy that began in 1977.

A major result of that review was the reestablishment of a Presidential-level policy review process for

space. The process existed in the form of a Policy

Review Committee (Space), operating under National

Security Council auspices but chaired by the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

This committee provided a forum for all involved Federal agencies (including Departments such as Interior

and Agriculture) to air their views on space policy, to

advise the President on proposed changes in national

space policy, to resolve disputes among agencies, and

to provide for rapid referral of space policy issues to

the President for decision when required. Unlike the

Space Council, the Policy Review Committee (Space)

did not have a standing professional staff structure.

Rather, it served as recognition of the need to formalize the channels of interaction among the various

components of Government space activity rather than

have policy and program disputes settled through the

budgetary review process or other means of interagency coordination.

The structures for coordination among military and

civilian space efforts at the program level have had

a rather different history than those for policy-level

coordination. The 1958 NAS Act created an institution for coordination at this level, the Civilian Military

Liaison Committee (CMLC), but that statutory committee, like the Space Council, was a congressionally

imposed structure and was seldom used. Rather,

NASA and DOD set up a number of working-level

groups on issues of interest to both agencies as the

early years of the space program passed. CMLC was

eventually abolished and replaced by a nonstatutory

Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board

(AACB), which formalized the contacts between

NASA and DOD at the working level. AACB was established by NASA-DOD agreement in 1960 and was

given responsibility for coordinating NASA and DOD

activities so as to “avoid undesirable duplication . . .

achieve efficient utilization of available resources” and

undertake” the coordination of activities in areas of
Appendix A—lnstitutional Evolution of the U.S. Space Program ● 311

common interest. The early years of AACB were quite

productive in terms of data exchanges and creating

an awareness of what the other agency’s plans were;

AACB continues to exist today as the primary mechanism for addressing major program issues of interest

to DOD and NASA in space. However, as the separate

NASA and defense programs became more institutionalized in the 1960’s and 1970’s there has been a

tendency for coordination between the programs to

be defensive in character, i.e., aimed at protecting

each agency’s own programs and “turf.”

From Research to Operation

In the 1958 debate over space activities the notion

of operating civilian space systems did not receive

much attention. The NAS Act gave NASA the responsibility for most aeronautical and space activities but

defined those activities as: 1 ) research into problems

of flight within and outside the Earth’s atmosphere;

2) the development, the construction, testing and operation for research purposes of aeronautical and

space vehicles; and 3) such other activities as may be

required for the exploration of space. This language

seemed to limit NASA to R&D activities, and that was

the general understanding of the agency’s mission at

the time.

By providing launch services to a variety of customers, including other Government agencies, the

Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and

other private sector firms, and other countries, NASA

has gone beyond R&D to a clearly operational role

in one area. Restriction to R&D has had little impact

on NASA’s efforts in space science and exploration

or technology development, but it has had a definite

impact for space applications.

Limiting NASA to the R&D part of the job of bringing space applications into being means that other

users of space technology are necessarily involved in

the total applications effort. NASA has developed an

orientation toward “technology push” efforts rather

than a tradition of close coupling with potential users

of space technology who would exercise “demand

pull” on the development of space applications.

While NASA has almost from its start included “technology transfer” functions in its organization, many

observers think that NASA has so far done an inadequate job of marketing its technological capabilities

to potential users of space application systems.

While an emphasis on developing and demonstrating new technical capabilities is often necessary to

convince potential users of their value, especially in

situations where no preexisting user community exists, most observers believe that NASA, particularly in

its early years, put more stress on pushing the technological frontier in space applications than on developing technology either in response to user demand or in anticipation of the kinds of demands likely

to arise as new capabilities became known. In addition, NASA has developed a history of emphasizing

the development of constantly more sophisticated

technology in its application programs rather than

concentrating on bringing an adequate application

system into early operation. This is at least in some

measure a reflection of the institutional reality that,

once NASA completes R&D for an applications program, it must transfer that program to some user outside of the agency. There is an organizational tendency to attempt to hold onto programs, even if that

means prolonging the R&D phase beyond the socially optimum points Since the early 1970’s, NASA has

placed a high priority on developing closer relationships with potential users of space technology, particularly in remote sensing and advanced satellite communications.

The first test of NASA’s bias toward continuing R&D

in applications was in weather satellites. in the early

1960’s NASA’s initial meteorological satellite program,

which had been transferred from DOD, was called

TIROS. As the agency in charge of space R&D, NASA

regarded TIROS as only the first step in weather satellite development and wanted to go immediately to the

creation of an advanced meteorological satellite called

NIMBUS. The Weather Bureau within the Department

of Commerce, a potential user agency, had another

point of view. TIROS would markedly improve its services, and the Weather Bureau wanted NASA to focus

on it rather than initiate a new weather satellite program. However, it took several years and substantial

bureaucratic conflict before NASA was willing to shift

its emphasis away from the advanced NIMBUS development program back to completing TIROS and bringing it to an operational state.6 Eventually, NASA

worked out an effective agreement with the Weather

Bureau both to support on-going meteorological satellite activities and to continue R&D on advanced sensors relevant to meteorological applications.

The complex history of the use of satellites for

remote sensing of land and ocean areas demonstrates

the institutional problems stemming from, among

other sources, NASA’s focus on R&D and its lack of

close links with potential users of operational space

systems. The debate over the appropriate develop5

There may be technical and managerial as well as I nstltutlonal reasons

why the development of a space application may take longer than onglnally

hoped for. Some also suggest that there have been instances of premature

shdts from R&D to operational status In space applications.

bFor a detailed account of the NASA/Weather Bureau dispute, see Richard

Chapman, TIROS-NIMBUS: Administrative, Political, and Technological Prob-

/ems of Developing Weather Sate//ites (Syracuse, N. Y,: Interuniverslty Case

Program, Inc., 1972).

94-915 0 - 82 - 21
312 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ment pace and management structure for the Landsat system has extended over a decade.

A major issue as arrangements for operational land

remote sensing have been debated is whether NASA’s

charter ought to be revised to extend its authority to

the operation of space applications sytems. The Presidential directive of November 1979 ended this debate

with the decision to keep NASA as an R&D agency

in remote sensing and to assign civilian Earth observation operations within the Government to NOAA,

even though there were other claimants to a share of

the operational remote-sensing role such as the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture. Throughout the Landsat program, NASA has

emphasized the experimental nature of the early

remote-sensing satelites. While it has worked with

potential users to make them aware of possible applications of Landsat data to their programs, it has also

proposed more advanced sensors for orbital evaluation in later Landsat satellites, but it has not given

priority attention to developing the ground segment,

including associated data management and information processing and dissemination systems, required

for early deployment of a first generation operational

remote-sensing system.

Public-Private Sector Relations

NASA’s relationships as an R&D agency for space

with other potential users of space applications are

relatively underdeveloped; this is particularly the case

when those users are not other Government agencies,

but rather private sector, profit-oriented firms. The appropriate division of responsibility between public and

private organizations for research and development

oriented toward commercial applications for space

technology has been problematic since the start of the

space age.7

This issue initially surfaced in communications satellite research. The Eisenhower adminsitration recognized that communication via satellite was an area of

potential major economic payoff and decided, in

keeping with its general pro-business orientation, that

communication satellite research should be left to

those interested in making a profit in it. Others, however, feared that allowing only private entitites to develop the technology of space communications meant

in effect giving a virtual monopoly in that area to the

corporation with the most resources available to invest in communications satellite research, American

Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T). From the perspective

of those interested in preventing monopoly power in

new areas of human activity, such a development was

not desirable. The situation was further clouded by

the recognition that, even if AT&T or another private

entity developed a communications satellite using its

own funds, it would have to depend on launchers

developed with public money to place that satellite

into orbit. Thus the Kennedy administration reversed

the Eisenhower policy of leaving communications satellite research to the private sector; Kennedy authorized NASA to conduct a vigorous program of research

in the communications satellite area.

There were some in 1961 and 1962, as space communications approached reality, who thought that the

Government should not only be involved in communications satellite R&D and make the results of that

research available to a variety of potential private sector firms for commercialization, but also that the Government itself should take advantage of that research

and undertake the operational satellite communications role, returning the eventual profits to the Treasury. The advocates of this position were not able to

gather majority support in the 1962 debate over communications satellite policy. With the creation of a

new institution, COMSAT, which had some aspects

of public control but was fundamentally a new private

enterprise, the notion that the Government should go

into the communications satellite business itself disappeared.s

The precedent established during the communications satellite debate was that developing new applications of space technology with commercial potential

and nurturing them to operational status is a mixed

private sector-public sector responsibility, with the appropriate division of roles to be determined on an ad

hoc basis for each area of applications; the goal, however, is eventual private sector operation of civilian

space application systems. In each area in which a

space application has reached or approached maturity, such as point-to-point communications and some

applications of satellite remote sensing, business structures have emerged that operate as commercial enterprises related to that application. The Government has

continued to fund research in other areas of space applications with potential commercial utility, including

space transportation, materials processing, and other

aspects of remote sensing, with the hope of discovering whether there are indeed profitable opportunities

for private sector involvement in those areas, and

demonstrating to potential operators what those opportunities are. It maybe that continued Government

This problem is not limited to the space sector. The issue of Federal policies affecting private sector innovation, including direct support of civilian

R&D, has been a subject of much recent discussion within both the executive

branch and Congress.

‘For a full discussion, see Jonathan F. Galloway, The Po/itics arrd

Technology of Sate//ite Communications (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath &

Co., 1972).
Appendix A—institutional Evolution of the U.S. Space Program ● 313

willingness to push the applications of space technology and to bear the costs and risks of the research,

development, and demonstration phases of commercializing those applications is the only way for some

of them to become reality, at least in the short to

midterm.

Advanced communications was one area of policy

and institutional controversy during the Nixon and

Ford administrations. NASA was ordered in 1973 to

end its communications R&D efforts, on the grounds

that the space communications business was far

enough advanced so that it should be totally a private

sector responsibility. The consequence of this decision was that the U.S. private sector concentrated on

only those aspects of space communications which

had the promise of early commercial payoff; other

governments, most notably France and Japan, have

provided R&D support for advanced space communications development, leading to increasing international competition with U.S. firms for sales of advanced communications satellites. This situation led

the Carter administration in 1978 to decide that the

potential economic and social benefits of communications satellites were not being adequately tended to

by private sector R&D. The Carter administration reestablished a NASA research effort in advanced space

communications and Information Administration of

the Department of Commerce with assisting in market

aggregation and possible development of domestic

and international public satellite communication

services.

From “Preeminence” to “Leadership”

President Kennedy in 1961 committed the United

States to a policy of “preeminence” in all areas of

space activity. The notion that the United States

should maintain a position of “leadership” in space

activity has been repeated by each Chief Executive

since Kennedy,

As other countries in Europe, Asia, and South America develop independent space capabilities and as the

Soviet Union continues an extremely active space effort, how the United States will continue policies of

“leadership” and “preeminence” is unclear (see chs.

3, 9, and 10). One possibility is for the United States

to compete across the board with other nations in all

areas of space activity, from the development of large,

permanent manned structures in orbit, through various types of space applications, to exploration of the

cosmos. Another option is to focus U.S. space priorities in areas of high national payoff (which would include international leadership in those areas). Another

option is to view application activities in space as competitors with Earth-bound enterprises, and to undertake them only when they are the most efficient means

of meeting broader national objectives.

The initial result of the commitment to across-theboard preeminence was to create in NASA an agency with the structure, institutional relationships, and

organizational culture needed to carry out a high-priority, nationally mobilized effort to developing a largescale technology. NASA, at least in formal terms, remains today an organization designed for such purposes, but the terms of a national commitment to Leadership in space activities are much less clear than they

were during the peak of the Apollo program in the

mid-l 960’s. As space activities have matured, and as

they promise to grow and become even more routine

over the coming decade, a major institutional issue

is whether a single central space agency with the

desire and structure for carrying out an integrated,

high-priority national space effort in the civilian sector is an anomaly.

The International Context:

Cooperation and Competition

During the 1960’s, NASA developed international

cooperative programs that were clearly secondary in

priority to using space technology as a demonstration

of national technical resources. Almost all of NASA’s

international activities were scientific in character and

were carried out under policy guidelines that kept

them limited in scope, including the restrictions that

cooperation had to be based on mutual scientific benefit and that there would be no exchange of funds between the United States and its partners in international space activities. This limited concept of international cooperation was broadened during the

1970’s to the applications area, as a number of nations become interested in the Landsat program, building their own ground stations or otherwise receiving

Landsat data, and for the first time paying NASA a fee

for access to the remote-sensing satellites. Other application efforts also had international dimensions; for

example, the Application Technology Satellite and

Communications Technology Satellite programs demonstrated some of the uses of communications satellites for education and health care in both developing and industrialized countries (see ch. 7).

Also during the 1970’s, there was limited use of international cooperation in space technology to serve

what were explicitly foreign policy goals. The leading

9A major exception was the set of international agreements required to

establish a global tracking network,

IOFor the fou ndatlons of U.S. policy toward intern atlona( cooperation, see

Arnold Frutkin, /nternationa/ Space Cooperation (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prenttce Hall, 1965); for criticism, see Don Kash, The Po/itics of Space Cooperation (West Lafayette, Ind,: Purdue University Studies, 1967),
314 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

example was U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation in the ApolloSoyuz test project. Increasingly, the potential of space

as a tool of our foreign assistance program and as a

means of demonstrating our concern for the developing countries has led to assistance programs in a variety of third- and fourth-world countries that use Landsat data.

Cooperation with our major industrial partners and

potential competitors in space technology development began during the same time period. The European Space Agency assumed the responsibility for developing the Spacelab, which is to be flown on the

shuttle as a base for orbital scientific experiments requiring the presence of human experimenters. The

U.S. stance toward cooperative programs that would

develop commercially useful space technology is

however, somewhat ambivalent, because of possible

economic returns from these activities and because

of the desire of the United States either to maintain

or establish a competitive advantage.

‘As other major nations develop advanced space

technology, the mixture between international competition and international collaboration in space

should be a dynamic one. Competition between U.S.

and European launch vehicles for payloads in the

1980’s is just one example. A number of issues being

debated in international forums could affect U.S. civilian space activities in the coming decades. Examples

are the actions of the World Adminsitrative Radio Conferences in allocating frequencies (and potentially slots

in geosynchronous orbit) and the debate in the United

Nations on a Moon treaty. The United Nations has

also scheduled a Conference on Space Applications

for 1982.

The Soviet Union, West Germany, France, Japan,

Brazil—and indeed a number of other countries—are

allocating significant resources to space R&D. In coming years, the U.S. civilian space program will function in an international context quite different than has

been the case. The institutional implications of this

changed context—for example, how to relate space

activities to foreign policy objectives and how to carry

out the diplomacy required to support our space

objectives— require examination.

.
Appendix B

USE OF LANDSAT DATA BY THE BUREAU OF

LAND MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF THE INTERIOR

Introduction tion range from very basic and efficient visual interpretations of Landsat photographs to highly technical and

This case study was prepared by the Bureau of Land complex digital image processing of digital tapes.

Management (BLM) of the Department of the Interior Table B-1 lists some examples of past and current proto illustrate its use of Landsat data. It shows that Land- grams conducted in BLM that have made use of Landsat data have become an integral part of BLM’s strat- sat data. BLM views Landsat and any other remoteegy for managing the land and resources under its sensing technologies as basic tools. The products of

care. these tools are integrated and are then used within

BLM utilizes Landsat data in numerous programs. the frameworks of various programs to improve their

These programs use both photographs and digital tape quality and efficiency as well as to reduce program

products. Interpreted Landsat data are used to assist costs. Thus, Landsat data aid BLM in inventory and

in mapping basic vegetation, soils, geology, and ener- planning primarily by streamlining and structuring

gy and mineral resources. The processes of interpreta- these activities.

Table 6.1 .—Examples of Past and Current Programs Utilizing Landsat Data

Size

(acres in Status

f_andsat-aided program Location millions) Complete Current Task/purpose

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Denali Project

AVRI Project

IVRI Project

California Desert Plan

Northwest Tier Pipeline

Taos Project

Havasu Project

Jarbidge Project

Mining Disturbance

Fuels Mapping

Phoenix Project

Coeur d’Alene

Alaska 3.5 x

Arizona 2.1 x

Idaho 3.7 x

California

Oregon

New Mexico

Arizona

Idaho

Missouri

Alaska

Arizona

Idaho

25 x

3.0 x

5.8

1.0

1.3

3.0

5.0

6.3

1.0

Test and evaluate Landsat aided

resource mapping in northern spruce

tundra biome.

Test and evaluate Landsat.aided

resource mapping in the Southwest

desert community.

Test and evaluate Landsat-aided

resource mapping in sagebrush

grassland community.

Fulfill requirements of Federal Land

Policy and Management Act.

Provide information for environmental

statement.

x Provide information for Planning

System.

x Provide basic soils prestratification.

x Provide information for Planning

System.

x Detect and map mining trespass.

x Map fuels loading in areas in high

wildfire potential.

x Provide information for Planning

System.

x Update existing forest inventory.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

315
316 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Two Activities of Importance to BLM

For the purpose of this report, two activities in BLM

have been selected for detailed analysis. Both are encountered daily in BLM State and district offices and

both share the common thread of requiring inventory

information for application to resource management.

The first application is known as the planning system

and requires a more generalized level of inventory

data than the second program. This second program,

the soil vegetation inventory method (SVIM), is a fieldintensive effort that requires a detailed inventory data

set. These data are used for such tasks as allocating

grazing lands. For the details of the programs, the

reader is referred to the manuals that are listed in the

bibliography at the end of this report.

The Planning System

The BLM planning system provides a systematic approach to gathering, analyzing, and integrating multiple resource data into an overall management plan.

The system permits informed and objective multipleuse decisions through identifying and reconciling conflicting land and resource uses. It is an internal management tool that helps blend diverse authorities and

land use opportunities. It is also a managerial system

through which the BLM Director, State directors, and

district managers develop and manage the various

BLM program activities. Each of these activities has

a primary mission or purpose for which objectives and

standards are defined. This system provides for a multiple resource program consisting of: lands, minerals,

recreation, wildlife, watershed, forestry, and range.

The system consists of three basic steps. These–unit

resource analysis (URA), managment framework plan

(MFP), activity plan–are briefly described below.

Components of the Planning System

● Unit resource analysis (URA).—URA provides a

comprehensive analysis of inventory data,

resource problems, conditions, users, production,

quality, capabilities, and management potential

for use in preparing a management framework

plan. In other words, URA provides resource information pertinent to decisions about land use

resources management in a unit of land. It also

provides continuity in retaining and maintaining

resource data. URA supports the multiple-use

concept and is prepared by individual resource

specialists.

● Management framework plan (MFP). —M FP reconciles conflicts in land and resource use. Planning decisions are made for specific areas so that

the unique characteristics of each area are fully

considered. MFP indicates what is to be done

with each resource within each unit.

Activity plan.–The activity plan is prepared for

each individual resource unit to define the manner in which the resultant activities shall achieve

the objective and constraints of the MFP. The activity plan is specific to the users and special interests involved. An allotment management plan is

an example of an activity plan.

Since its development and adoption by the entire

BLM in 1969, the planning system has been a major

factor in BLM program activities. All BLM offices, including the Outer Continental Shelf Program, employ

the technique. Its primary strength is that it has systematized the planning process, and enhanced the quality of BLM management. However, it is labor intensive. During the last 5 years, approximately $60 million

have been budgeted for planning system applications,

with an estimated workforce of 450 positions.

A variety of products are required in the planning

system. Figure B-1 is an example of the basic unit

resource analysis map depicting current vegetation.

Figure B-2 is an example of a wildlife habitat overlay

showing areas of Desert Tortoise habitat. Table B-2

is an example of tabular data utilized within the process. Although BLM is the primary user of the information, numerous other individuals, organizations, and

private concerns have access to the data, e.g., local

ranchers, environmental societies, and Federal and

State Government agencies.

Soil Vegetation Inventory Method

SVIM is the BLM method for conducting basic soil

and vegetation inventories. SVIM supports the planning system as well as other activities such as environmental statements. The process provides a uniform

and systematic method of detailed inventory. It does

not inventory all renewable resources. However, it

does provide a framework for inventories of the numbers and kinds of wildlife species, and also gathers

basic data for use in other resource inventories.

SVIM evolved from a number of requirements, but

the primary catalyst was the need to acquire high-quality resource data for use in developing environmental statements concerning grazing. Since its inception

in 1978, it has been applied in a variety of forms

throughout BLM. The major strengths of this procedure are: 1) the high-quality data that are available as

a result of data collection in the field; 2) ability to

integrate soils and vegetation information in the mapping process; and 3) the vast wealth of data that are

available for use once the inventory is completed. The
Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior ● 317

Figure B-f .—Vegetation and Soii Associations
318 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

— —

Figure B.2.— Desert Tortoise Habitat

d’— ‘( -

I

. . .

. .

I (-’[ 7 %4

I f,

LEGEND

J

I

. . \

- — . O12J4 S

SHIVWITS ES AREA %.1.. ” tile,
Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior ● 319

Table B-2.—Tabular Data Used in the Planning Process

Vegetation composition cornposition Full stocking condition No action Elimination

Wolf hole Lake

Wolf hole Canyon

Mine Valley

SOURCE: Bureau of Land Management

process also has a few weak points. For example, the

detail that is listed as a strength is also a weakness

because of the labor-intensive nature of detailed field

work. Similarly, without a means of automatically handling the data, the voluminous amount of data available are not readily usable. Another related weakness

is the cost of these inventories. Recently programs

have been developed on the mainframe computer system at Denver Service Center to store and manipulate

the tabular data collected in SVIM. In addition, a linear

optimization model has been developed to allocate

vegetation production among the competing uses. To

date, this tabular data has not been tied to a digitized

mapping process.

In the 3 years since the SVIM inventories were established, an estimated $14 million have been spent on

them. They have covered about 32 million acres and

have required 7,200 work-months. A skill mix of vegetation, soil, forestry, wildlife, and range conservation

Same as current species composition

T

—

8

4

—

2

—

38

42

—

9

14

9

23

23

—

56

16

T

14

T

64

5

T

T

12

13

64

49

64

39

specialists, wildlife specialists, etc. have been involved

in these inventories.

Transition to the Use of Landsat Data

BLM has followed an organized approach in the test,

evaluation, and implementation of Landsat data. A

complete description of that approach can be found

in several reports (see bibliography). In 1977, BLM,

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), and the U.S. Geological Survey EROS Program agreed on a phased program to implement this

technology in BLM. The program was designed to provide BLM an opportunity to test the technology in an

operational manner, to evaluate the results of the tests,

and finally to implement those aspects of the technology most suited to assist BLM data collection and resource management needs. During this transfer of remote-sensing technology to BLM, BLM assimilated the
320 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

procedures and equipment into a small core staff

housed within an existing research and development

(R&D) organization at the Denver Service Center.

From this core staff of three persons, the present

Branch of Remote Sensing (BRS) grew. A continuing

process of reporting and reviewing the status of the

program was followed that resulted in many changes

to the program. These changes were implemented on

a test site basis. Since the project was structured to

test the technology in three diverse areas, changes in

program orientation were made at the onset of activities in each subsequent test site. This procedure provided BLM: 1 ) time to plan carefully and implement

the changes, 2) ability to build upon each test site in

a systematic fashion, and 3) prevention of unnecessary

and costly changes within each phase of the program.

At this time, the program has been incorporated in

the operations of BLM; and Landsat-assisted programs

are currently being conducted in several areas.

In addition to the program just described, a number

of other factors have caused the BLM to use Landsat

data. For example, the congressionally mandated California Desert Plan (CDP) utilized Landsat imagery

because of tight schedules and funding. in this study

Landsat data were used to view the unit at a broad

scale from which areas for intensive study were chosen. These areas were then sampled with finer scale

methods appropriate to the resource requirement,

e.g., aerial photography. Vegetation, soil geology,

energy, and mineral resources were included in the

effort. Without Landsat, it is questionable that CDP

would have been accomplished within the time and

cost constraints. In addition, there is the natural process whereby technology is used by personnel in the

field because of the acute needs for data that exist at

the working level. That is, if a technology can be utilized to acquire information needed at the field level

then it is often used without prior knowledge of management. There is no doubt that the methodology

would have gained use and acceptance in BLM, but

the major program described in the preceding paragraph caused a more organized and Bureau-wide

adoption.

Transition to Space Data

It is of paramount importance that the reader keep

in mind the closing words of the first paragraph of this

report: “Landsat data aid the BLM in inventory and

planning by streamlining and structuring these activities.” Landsat data are used to improve inventory

quality, to enhance data retention and renewal, and

to reduce inventory costs. The use of Landsat data has

not led to replacing programs. Thus, Landsat is primarily a new tool that is available to the resource specialist

to enhance his product. BLM is currently developing

guidelines to the field offices for the use of this new

tool and is becoming increasingly dependent on it to

effect required operating economics.

USER ACCEPTANCE

Whether field people will accept and utilize new

approaches and whether management will believe

results obtained through these new concepts, are major factors in the transition, In any organization, the

“field type” is notoriously concerned that any change

may adversely affect his ability to do the field work

that is so necessary for good management practices.

Similarly, management personnel are reluctant to

change something that heretofore has worked well.

These are valid concerns that were recognized in the

project planning stages of this program. In order to

combat these fears an extensive educational program

was incorporated as an integral part of the study. Since

the beginning of the program, training courses in

remote sensing have been a mainstay of each phase

of the project. The sessions have covered basic photo

interpretation procedures as well as advanced digital

image processing. In addition, they have addressed

a variety of subjects—vegetation, geology, soils, etc.

To date, over 750 BLM resource specialists have received training through these programs. This training

is continuing on an annual basis, and in the near

future, special sessions specifically oriented to managers are planned.

Program Continuity

In the last 5 years BLM has made a substantial commitment to the use of Landsat data. This commitment

represents a major investment of labor and equipment. Thus, the continuation and improvement of the

Landsat system is of vital interest to BLM. At this time,

it is understood that Landsat D’ is the last satellite

authorized for the program. The prospect of terminating the Landsat program will greatly affect the future

decisions of BLM toward continued use of Landsat

data. Reluctance to adopt a full-scale program can be

expected. Managers must have a guarantee that data

will continue to be available before they can be asked

to embrace the technology. BLM is willing to consider

other alternatives, such as using data from the proposed Japanese and European satellites. However,

these satellites are not in orbit and can only be considered as potential alternatives. In addition, there

doesn’t appear to be any assurance that the desired

private sector takeover of Landsat is likely. Thus, to

a user organization like BLM, the picture is confusing

and bleak. In the face of continued increasing costs
Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior . 321

for all services, BLM shall seek to make its limited inventory dollars stretch even further. Present policies

do not seem to guarantee the continuity of Landsat/

Earth Resource Satellite data needed for BLM to make

a complete switch to reliance on satellite data.

For the immediate future, the continuing availability of Landsat MSS data is required for programs that

are under way or planned. In addition, BLM has a

longer term requirement for data of greater spectral

and spatial resolution. At present, the available Landsat data barely meet some BLM requirements. In order

to realize the full potential of such capability, data of

increased resolution are mandatory. At present, we

can only streamline and economize by utilizing Landsat as a sampling frame. in the future, we must provide increasingly detailed data or face a stagnation of

the program and a consequent halt in transition to

these powerful tools. Thus, both the current multispectral scanner and the future thematic mapper data are

of great interest to BLM.

Acquisition of Hardware and Software

As an integral part of the joint BLM-NASA-EROS

program, BLM acquired and installed a digital image

processing system at the Denver Service Center. This

system is currently being used to support inventory

projects in BLM. The system includes a complete

Earth resources data processing software package.

It is projected to have a lo-year lifespan, but is modular in nature to allow for both software and hardware

improvements. As the need for Landsat data increase,

additional processing capability in terms of other

systems or approaches must be considered. For example, BLM anticipates inventorying 30 million acres

annually on the single system currently in operation

at the Denver Service Center. Depending upon support requirements for BLM inventories this figure will

fall far short of the total requirements of BLM. Thus,

further acquisition of hardware and software may be

necessitated by the transition to Landsat-aided inventories.

Applications of Landsat in

the Planning System

The BLM-NASA-EROS wildland vegetation resource

inventory project was specifically designed to test and

evaluate the use of Landsat data for application in the

planning system. BLM conducted a test program in

three test sites in Alaska, Arizona, and Idaho, which

are representative of the lands managed by BLM. The

program was conducted in phases, in which each

phase had increasing complexity. In this manner, it

was possible to answer basic questions concerning the

technology prior to expending funds on subsequent

phases, The results of this program were extremely

successful, and portions of the technology have been

used in BLM. Table B-3 illustrates some of the management opportunity map overlays that are currently

being used in the planning system. These particular

overlays resulted from the Landsat-aided analysis in

the Arizona project and are typical of the requirements

of the planning system. Table B-4 illustrates the tabular

data that are available as a result of this program. This

information is also applicable to the planning system.

The true utility of this technology lies in the flexibility

of the data base that is developed as part of the analysis. Joining Landsat data with ancillary data in a

geographic data base provides a previously unheardof dimension to the planning system. A typical database may consiste of the following elements.

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

computer classes representing land cover from

Landsat data;

slope, aspect, elevation;

photo interpretation data;

sources of water;

road net;

production for forest, woodland, and rangeland

resources;

ground data;

administrative units; and

soil information.

Although Landsat is only one aspect of this broad

data base, it is in fact the foundation underpinning

other data. From this data base, the types of products

listed in table B-3 can be produced. Figure B-3 illustrates a basic map of current vegetation produced

from this technology for use in URA. An example of

another product of the data base is shown in figure

B-4. Depicted here is its use to delineate areas of high

potential for Desert Big Horn Sheep habitation. The

digital nature of this data base provides a great deal

of flexibility. Products can be made at extremely low

cost, and they can also be revised in an economical

and efficient manner. The data base is also very easily revised as new information becomes available,

Benefits, Budget, and Personnel

The costs of developing the data base from Landsat

data are very attractive. By contrast, the process of producing necessary map overlays by hand is labor inten- -

sive, time consuming, and is by nature subjective. The

study project maintained detailed records of costs,

both recurring and nonrecurring. The costs associated
322 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table B-3.—Management Opportunity (Arizona Strip District)

Management products Scale Management parameters Current use Potential use

Potential juniper—pinyon

cutting/burning areas

Potential blackbrush treatment

areas

Potential antelope habitat

ESL overlay sagebrush

treatment areas

ESL overlay rangeland

suitability

Potential mule deer summer

range

Potential mule deer

intermediate range

Potential mule deer winter

range

Potential burning areas

1 :126,720

1 :126,710

1:126,720

.

1:126,720

1 :126,720

1 :126,710

1 :126,720

1 :126,720

1 :126,720

. , . . . -- Two areas identified “” ‘ ‘ -

- 

- “”-

for tree use permits

vegetallon: ua percent

juniper—pinyon

Elevation: 5,000-6,000 ft

Slope: 0-15 percent

Aspect: within % mile

of a road.

Vegetation: high

component blackbrush

with grass understory

Elevation: 4,500-5,000 ft

Slope: variable

Aspect: north, northeast.

Vegetation: Great Basin

desert shrub, plains

grassland

Elevation: 4,000-6,000 ft

Slope: 0-20 percent

Aspect: variable.

Vegetation: 50 percent

sagebrush with

perennial grass

understory

Elevation: variable

Slope: less than 15

percent

Aspect: variable

10-acre minimum.

Current production of

usable forage above

20 lbs/acre

Located within 4 miles

of water

Elevation: variable

Slope: less than 51

percent

Aspect: variable.

Vegetation: juniperpinyon, ponderosa

pine

Elevation: above 6,000 ft

Slope: variable

Aspect: variable.

Vegetation: variable

Elevation: 5,000-6,000 ft

Slope: 0-100 percent

Aspect: variable.

Vegetation: variable

Elevation: 3,000-5,000 ft

Slope: 0-100 percent

Aspect: variable.

Vegetation: sufficient

grass understory for

natural reseeding

Elevation: 4,250-6,240 ft

Slope: variable

Aspect: variable.

Used in programmatic

blackbrush -

sagebrush

burning EA

Being used for HMP

Available for office

use

Available for office

use

Available for office

use

Available for office

use

Available for office

use

Available for office

use

Hlgn lor tA, AMP,

HMP.

High for EA, AMP,

HMP, EIS.

High for HMP, URA,

and MFP.

High for EIS

implementation

EA’s, and AMP’s,

HMP.

To prove suitability

of allotment.

High for HMP, URA,

and MFP.

High for HMP, URA,

and MFP.

High for HMP, URA,

and MFP.

High for EA, AMP,

HMP.
Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior Ž 323

Table B“3.—Management Opportunity (Arizona Strip District) (Continued)

Management products Scale Management parameters Current use Potential use

Potential juniper. pinyon 1:126,710 Vegetation: juniper- Available for office High for EA, AMP,

burning areas pinyon, 35 to 50 use HMP.

percent, mountain

shrub, 7 percent,

Mojave Desert shrub,

7 percent

Elevation: 5,000-6,000 ft

Slope: 0-15 percent

Aspect: variable.

Potential burning areas 1:126,710 Vegetation: sufficient Available for office High for EA, AMP,

grass understory for use HMP.

natural reseeding

Elevation: 3,250-5,750 ft

Slope: variable

Aspect: variable.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment,

Table B-4.-Grand Planning Unit

Area: 31,688 acres; 12,777 hectares; 2 percent of planning unit

Elevation Slope Aspecty

Class (ft.) Acres Percent area Class percent Acres Percent area Class Acres Percent area

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

5,500

6,000

6,500

402

771

3,101

3,975

11,487

11,249

681

22

1

2

10

13

36

35

2

1

0-5 22,759 72 NW

6-10 3,443 11 N

11-20 2,650 8 NE

21-50 2,364 7 E

51-100 439 1 SE

100 33 1 s

S w

w

2,646

4,510

5,857

7,406

2,434

2,703

3,420

2,712

8

14

18

23

:

11

9

Cover type description based on photo data, 212 photo plots

Evergreen Mohave Great Basin Mountain Plains

woodland desert shrub desert shrub shrub grassland

Juniper-pinyon Mixed desert Big sagebrush . . . . . . . . . ........1 Mixed chaparral .. ..1 Grama-galleta-shrubshrub. .. .22 shrub. . . . .1 Big sagebrush-perennial grass. ...7 Turbinella oak .. ...3 steppe . . . ........1

Big sagebrush-mixed shrub .. ...17 Cheatgrass shrub. ...1

Big sagebrush-tree. . . . . . ........8

Fourwing saltbush . . . . . . ........1

Blackbrush . . . . . . . . . . . . ........3

Blackbrush-tree . . . . . . . . ........2

Blackbrush-other desert shrub. ..14

Snakeweed . . . . . . . . . . . . .......14

Little rabbitbrush . . . . . . . ........4

Total,

percent 22 1 71 4 2

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
324 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

-. — —

Figure B-3.–Current Vegetation Map

with producing the detailed maps in the project were

$0.07 per acre. This includes establishing the data

base, which includes Landsat classification results, digital terrain data (elevation, slope, and aspect), photo

interpretation results, ground data collection results,

and digitized ownership boundaries. The geographically referenced data base allows extraction of subsequent information by coordinates of any scale and in

any practical form. The cost associated with this secondary data extraction is $0.0006 per acre. These costs

are in 1980 dollars and are subject to a number of considerations. For example, it is possible to study larger

areas without increase in the unit cost per acre. Similarly, the complexity of the

crease in the unit cost.

area could cause an inPotential Applications of Landsat to SVIM

The BLM-NASA-EROS wildland vegetation resource

inventory project concluded that using Landsat data

has the potential to reduce the cost of SVIM inventories. Consequently, a program was conducted in fiscal year 1981 to test and evaluate the feasibility of this

concept. The objective of the study was to determine

the utility of Landsat and ancillary data when combined with soils data in generating site writeup area
Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior Ž 325

Figure B.4.—Potential Desert Bighorn Sheep Habitat

240000 Mocao

\

A

ARIZONA STRIP DISTRICT, ARIZONA

SOURCE DATA AUGUST 26, 1977

SCENE I.D. 2947-17074

MAPPING UNIT 10 ACRES (4 HECTARES)

r

I

I

20%

t

(WA) maps for SVIM inventories. A test site in Wyom- in two phases. Part one tested and evaluated the hying where SVIM data collected by traditional means pothesis on a site that is covered by a SVIM invenis available for quality and cost comparison has been tory. The results of this test are not yet available. Howidentified for this program. The project was conducted ever, once feasibility is demonstrated, the process will
326 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

be defined in detail and implemented in a new area.

Careful cost records will be maintained so that a definite conclusion can be reached on cost savings.

Initial studies indicate a potential for significant savings in field work and product preparation. Savings

in personnel in the form of time and work efficiency

are possible. Once again, a new mix of personnel

(technologists/resource specialists) will be required,

but these will be persons already involved in these

programs. The budget appropriated for the test phase

of this program is approximately $100,000.

Technical

The

Effects of Programs

Utilizing Landsat Data

Impact s

ost substantial technical byproduct of this program has been the acquisition by BLM of a complete

off-the-shelf remote-sensing digital image processing

system and associated software. The acquisition of this

equipment at a cost of approximately $500,000 (cost

of equipment and facilities) represented a sharp departure from previous philosophies in the organization,

It was a recognition by management of the need to

bring space age technology to bear upon the problems

associated with resources management.

As the program has evolved, it has also become obvious that there is a growing potential requirement for

a distributed system. BLM field offices will also need

to be capable of conducting routine analysis of Landsat data. This will be a function of schedules, availability of resources, and the individual field office technological capabilities. In addition, the field offices will

need to reach and revise their Landsat data base, It

may also be useful for BLM offices to use the processing capability at the EROS Data Center (EDC). Similarly, BLM Alaska will use the EDC Field Office system

in Anchorage.

Preliminary tests of the system have been very positive. Its products have been determined to have direct

application in management activities. They have also

been found to be as accurate, and in some instances

more accurate, than those that are produced by more

conventional means. Furthermore, the products are

more easily produced and, as a result, more readily

available to field personnel. The geographically

referenced digital data base containing Landsat data

and anciIlary information has proved to be an extremely valuable management tool.

The importance of the geographically referenced

data base that results from this technology is just beginning to be realized. The accuracy of the information,

the timeliness with which products can be produced

and revised, the ease with which the data base can

be revised, and the low cost to use the data base as

well as its low initial cost are all factors which will

generate increased use of this technology.

Different Personnel Requirements

As a result of this program, BLM has experienced

an influx of technical specialists who have complemented the existing BLM expertise. These individuals

consist of foresters, botanists, range conservationists,

geologists, systems analysts, physicists, etc., who by

virture of formal education or work-related experience

have become specialists in the field of remote sensing. Table B-5 provides a list of individual technical

skills now found in BRS (new organization resulting

from this program) at the Denver Service Center

(DSC). Table B-6 is a list of individual skills supporting the BLM remote-sensing R&D programs. An

unusual skill mix exists in these groups. Such a skill

mix is mandatory in order to: 1 ) be responsive to BLM

resource management requirements, and 2) implement successfully a technical program at the field

level. The advent of this technology has also affected

operations and personnel at the field level. Most BLM

offices that become involved in the program appoint

remote-sensing coordinators who are normally persons within the existing organization such as soil scientists, foresters, and range conservationists. Once

selected, these persons receive intensive training in

the technology and then work in concert with their

BLM counterparts at DSC for the duration of the project.

Economic Effects

To compare overall planning system costs with

Landsat costs is not realistic. Since Landsat data are

Table B=5.—lndividual Skills Supporting

BLM Remote-Sensing R&D Programs

Remote Sensing Skills—Branch of Remote Sensing.

Forestry

Geology

Wildlife Biology

Botany

Remote-Sensing Skills—TGS Contractor

Forestry

Earth Resources

Biometrics

Range Science

Environmental Monitoring

Wildlife Biology

System Analyst

Programing

SOURCE: Bureau of Land Management.
Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior . 327

Table B-6.—Remote-Sensing Skills—Division of

Scientific Systems Development

Remote-Sensing Skills—Division of Scientific Systems Development

Geology

Remote-Sensing Science

Statistics

Cartography

Computer Systems

Physics

SOURCE: Bureau of Land Management

utilized to support the planning system, only those

parts of the latter which are replaced by methods using

Landsat data may be considered. A small example that

illustrates potential savings is the generation of a habitat map involving vegetation, slope, aspect, elevation,

disturbance corridors, and sources of water at a scale

of 1:1 26,720 (1/2 inch = 1 mile) for a 2 million acre

area. This would cost on the order of $500, if the Landsat geographic data base were used, The same product produced by hand in the traditional manner would

typically cost at least $2,500. To produce the map by

traditional means would take a matter of weeks, while

the Landsat-derived map could be produced in a matter of hours (from an established data base). The former would be subject to the bias of the analyst, while

the latter would be objective within the criteria specified. In addition, the traditional map would be difficult,

costly, and time consuming to revise, but the Landsat

map could be quickly modified and regenerated, The

Landsat map would also be inherently more accurate

and could be legally defended if required.

In another example, BLM proposes to streamline the

process of SVIM inventory by incorporating Landsat

data with SVIM. Such action is expected to reduce

costs by approximately 20 percent.

Institutional Effects

BLM Landsat remote-sensing program has produced

some institutional benefits, It has caused exchange of

information and cooperative projects that are still in

progress between BLM and other Federal, State, and

local governments. Such exchanges are also occurring between BLM and industry and BLM and the academic community. Examples of some of these are:

Geological Survey, National Park Service, NASA,

Forest Service, Corps of Engineers, Soil Conservation Service, and Bureau of Indian Affairs.

University of California–Berkeley, Riverside;

University of Arizona, and University of Alaska.

Raytheon, IBM, Geospectra Corp., ESL, Inc., and

Technicolor Graphic Services.

It is estimated that 3 work years have been dedicated to coordinating and managing these efforts in

the last 5 years.

International Effects

The current programs have not affected world trade,

prices, or the competitive position of the United States.

Nor have they affected the current system on international land use policy formulation. However, they

have led to some international cooperation between

BLM and Mexico and BLM and Australia. In a recent

project, BLM provided extensive support and cooperation to Australia. An Australian scientist worked at the

BLM facility in Denver to do a Landsat analysis on the

BLM image processing system. BLM is also supporting

a project between the United States and Mexico to

map desertification indicators in two test sites i n Mexico and one in the United States.

Bibliography

Bonner, K. G., “Mapping Rangeland Vegetation in Arizona

from Color Infrared Aerial Photographs and Landsat imagery, ” in abstracts of papers, 32d annual meeting,

Society of Range Management, Casper, Wyo., February

1979.

Bonner, K. G., “Mapping Rangeland Vegetation in Northwestern Arizona From Landsat Image, ” Journal of

Range Management, 1980 (in press).

Bonner, W. J., Jr., “Information Requirements of Natural

Resource Inventories,” in proceedings, vol. 47, National Computer Conferences, American Federation of

Processing Societies, Anaheim, Calif., June 1978, pp.

87-91.

“Wildland Vegetation Resource Inventory-interim

St;tus Report for Management, BLM Office of Scientific Systems Development, Denver Service Center, February 1979.

“Wildland Vegetation Resource Inventory–Second

Int’erim Status Report for Management,” BLM Office

of Scientific Systems Development, Denver Service

Center, September 1979.

94-915 c - 82 - 2‘2
328 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

, “Utilization of Landsat for Natural Resource inventories, ” presented at the Utilization of Space Data on

Forestry and Range Resource Seminar, National Defense University, Industrial College of the Armed Forces,

Washington, D. C., September 1979.

“Applications of Remote Sensing: Aspects of the

BL’M Wildland Vegetation Resource Inventory Project,”

BLM Office of Scientific Systems Development, Denver

Service Center, March 1980.

Bonner, W. J., Jr., and J. Morgart, “How to Use Landsat as

a Sampling Frame for Inventories in Arid Climates, ” in

Proceedings of Arid Land Resource Inventory Conference, La Paz, Mexico, December 1980 (in press).

Bonner, W. J., Jr., W. G. Rohde, and W. A. Miller, “Mapping of Rangeland Vegetation With Digital Landsat and

Terrain Data, “ in Proceedings of Remote Sensing for

Resource Management Symposium, Soil Conservation

Society of America, Ankeny, Iowa, 1980 (in press).

Gialdini, M., NASA/BLM APT, phase II, final report, ESL, Inc.,

NASA contract NAS 9-16014, 1981.

Johnson, G. R., and W. G. Rohde, “Landsat Digital Analysis

Techniques Required for Wildland Resource Classification, “ in Proceedings of Arid Land Resource Inventory

Conference, La Paz, Mexico, December 1980 (in press).

Linden, D. S., W. G. Rohde, and K, G. Bonner, “Estimating

the Area of Vegetation Types with Landsat and Ancillary

Data, ” in Proceedings of Arid Land Resource inventory Conference, La Paz; Mexico, December 1980 (in

press).

Miller, W. A., G. E. Johnson, and W. G. Rohde, “Role of

Aerial Photographs in Classification of Landsat Data, ”

in Proceedings of 6th Canadian Symposium of Remote

Sensing, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, May 1980 (in

press).

Miller, W. A., et al., “Digital Landsat and Terrain Data Applied to an Arid Land Resource Inventory” in proceedings of Arid Land Resource Inventory Conference, La

Paz, Mexico, December 1980 (in press).

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Compilers,

Department of the Interior–Land Inventories, in Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1980 Activities, Washington, D. C., 1980 (in press).

Rohde, W. G., et al,, “A Stratified-Cluster Sampling Procedure Applied to a Wildland Vegetation Inventory Using

Remote Sensing: Xlll International Symposium on Remote Sensing, ” of the environment, in proceedings of

Environmental Research Institute of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1979, pp. 167-179.

Rohde, W. G., E. Hertz, and W. A. Miller, “Integration of

Digital Landsat Data and Terrain Data for Mapping

Wildland Resources” (abs.), in proceedings of Remote

Sensing for Natural Resources Symposium, University

of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho; September 1979, pp. 393-

394.

Rohde, W. G., and W. A. Miller, AVRI, project final report,

USGS, EROS office internal report to BLM-Denver,

EROS Data Center, Sioux Falls, S. Dak., 1980.

U.S. Geological Survey, the AVRI Project–Arizona Vegetation Resource Inventory: in Landsat Data Users Notes,

Issue No. 14, EROS Data Center, Sioux Falls, S. Dak.,

September 1980, pp. 6-7.
Appendix C

FOREIGN AGRICULTURE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE, CROP CONDITION ASSESSMENT*

Introduction

The Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) is one of two

Federal agencies that can be said to be utilizing remote-sensing satellite data in a daily operational format. Its unique qualities as an operational program

have been and are that, although like many other Government users, it acquires, processes, and analyzes

repetitive Landsat data, FAS is the only agency routinely having a requirement to produce a product in near

real time.

FAS has been notably successful in managing the

transition from limited use of data derived from a

research and development (R&D) system to full integration of data from an operational system. If the R&D

system is built and tested by one agency, but the operational system is to be managed by another, then appropriate cross-agency responsibilities for managing

the transition must be devised. In addition, the hardware and software incorporated in the R&D system

are usually more advanced than what the user agency requires or can even use. The success of FAS in

effecting this transition provides a model that the Federal Government, as well as State and municipal governments, might follow.

The FAS Mission

The primary FAS mission is to develop, maintain,

and expand foreign markets for U.S. agricultural commodities. To accomplish this mission, FAS maintains

a worldwide agricultural intelligence and reporting

system to provide timely and accurate information on

world agricultural production and trade. The information provided by FAS enables U.S. farmers and traders

to adjust to changes in world demand for U.S.

agricultural products. The information is also used by

the Department of Agriculture (USDA), other Federal

agencies, the Congress, and others in the formulation

of foreign market development and export sales policies, and in developing strategies for negotiating international trade agreements.

Product

Current information covering principal agricultural

commodities that has been developed by USDA ana-

*This report is a condensation of a larger report submitted to OTA

as a case study. The aid of FAS in contributing to this assessment

is gratefully acknowledged.

Iysts is made available to the public through the following kinds of publications:

FAS circulars for major commodities (scheduled

and unscheduled). These circulars contain as a

minimum the current official USDA acreage,

yield, and production estimates.

Weekly roundups that provide interim updates

between the release of the scheduled circulars,

particularly with regard to unusual or unexpected

events which may impact production.

Foreign Agriculture Magazine (monthly) that publishes articles on foreign agricultural matters of

general interest.

The scheduled “circulars” and the “Weekly Roundup” reports are released on a predetermined schedule

to provide equal access by all users. The current FAS

remote-sensing program was initiated in 1973 with the

conception of the large area crop inventory experiment (LACIE). LACIE was a joint cooperative effort

among USDA, the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA), and the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The goal of

LACIE was to develop, test, and evaluate a system for

predicting foreign wheat production through the use

of Landsat satellite data, weather and agricultural data,

and advanced data processing technology. LACIE

began with the signing of an interagency memorandum of understanding in 1974, and ended in 1978.

Each participating agency contributed funds and personnel to the project.

The project was directed by a three-agency, highlevel, executive steering group, with LACIE project

management assigned to a project management team

(PMT) made up of senior technical managers from

each of the agencies. The NASA technical manager

was responsible for day-to-day operations, but management decisions were made by the joint PMT.

The LACIE approach was to: 1 ) develop wheat area

measurements from analysis of randomly selected

Landsat sample segments; 2) estimate yield through

use of weather-related regression yield models; and

3) multiply area by yield to develop regional and country production estimates.

The USDA LACIE project team developed a set of

USDA user requirements based on 1 ) interviews with

FAS commodity analysts, embassy attaches and management, 2) reviews of the FAS operational forecasting

systems, and 3) discussion with users of FAS global

crop information. These requirements were evaluated

329
330 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

for accuracy and timeliness and presented to the executive steering group. However, because the thencurrent Landsat technology (ERTS 1 ) would not fully

meet USDA user requirements, the requirements were

modified, at the insistence of one of the technical

agencies, to a level thought to be achievable.

Results

During its lifetime, LACIE produced wheat production estimates as follows: U.S. Great Plains in 1975,

1976, and 1977; Canada in 1976; two Soviet Union

indicator regions in 1976; and the entire Soviet Union

in 1977 and 1978. Generally, all of the winter wheat

and the Soviet spring wheat estimates were acceptably

close to official USDA figures. However, the U.S. and

Canada spring wheat estimates failed to meet the

LACIE accuracy objectives. The poor performance on

spring wheat was largely due to the compressed growing season for spring wheat and the presence of other

“confusion crops.” The results of LACIE were reported

at a symposium that was held at the Johnson Space

Center in October 1978.

Hardware and Software Considerations

Technology transfer in any environment carries a

certain element of risk. The relative novelty of space

data collection and analysis for foreign agricultural applications significantly increased this risk factor.

Therefore, a policy was adopted that was calculated

to minimize financial risk to USDA while retaining

maximum flexibility to deal with technological contingencies. The three major elements of this policy were:

1.

2.

3.

All hardware and software procured to support

the design would be commercially available “offthe-shelf” and vendor-maintained.

Discrete functions were designed to operate on

a single mini computer, yet retain the capability

for interfunction communications.

All application programing was to be modular

and would conformto Federal and Department

standards for information processing.

Management Approach

FAS applied management by objective and structured decisionmaking to the transition from R&D to

a user test and subsequently to full operation. The professional staff was involved in the technology transfer

process, starting with the initial planning process.

Without this involvement, successful transfer of technology would not have occurred.

Long-Range Planning

The long-range (5-year) management plan guided

all activities in the transition to operational application of space-acquired data. Commencing in 1978, a

series of yearly management plans were initiated.

These plans contain, on a year-by-year basis, the next

level of resource detail and task description.

Major problerns.-The problems encountered in the

transition to space-aided data collection were not just

technical in nature, but encompassed the entire scope

of institutional reactions toward implementing a new

technology:

External:

. timely receipt of Landsat data from NASA

● timely receipt of meteorological data from the Air

Force; and

. lack of R&D assistance to transfer activities

Internal:

● education of end user; and

● establishment of means to provide FAS

meteorological data from the World Food and

Agricultural Situation Board within 24 hours.

Continuing problems. –R&D support to technology

transfer activities, and physical separation of analytical

functions from the end user of a product. The data

base generally available to the FAS analysts is:

. Landsat—3 days to 3 weeks after acquisition;

. weather station reports-24 hours after receipt by

NOAA; and

● environmental satellites—34/48 hours after acquisition.

These data are further supplemented, where and

when available, from on-ground observations (ground

truth) for areas of interest, but these inputs are limited

and in some cases unavailable, Examples of the analytical products derived from this variety data sources

are:

Narrative assessments of:

● crop and pasture conditions and probable impacts on production;

Ž outlook for water for irrigation; and

• planting and/or harvest conditions.

Maps that show:

● crop stress lines;

● plots of vegetative index numbers, including comparison to baseline years;

● snow cover, temperature, and potential winterkill

lines; and

● precipitation and soil moisture, and deviation

from baseline years.

Color displays:

These use several media, including photographs,

color graphics terminals, video tape recorders, and

overhead projectors. Examples of color products are:
Appendix C—Foreign Agriculture service, Department of Agriculture, Crop Condition Assessment Ž 331

● analyzed Landsat data;

● current and historical soil moisture;

● current and average crop calendars;

• soiIs information; and

Ž daily precipitation for selected 10-day periods,

FAS management by objective requires the development of long-range objectives as a basis for defining

longer term goals, which in turn form the basis for the

planning documents described.

Management Planning

This activity builds on the long-range planning for

the transition from R&D to an operational system. The

5-year management plan, originally developed to

guide the transition, is reviewed annually in light of

FAS objectives and requirements, revised as necessary, and presented to management for approval.

Short-term. -An annual management plan translates

the appropriate portions of the 5-year plan into a plan

for the coming fiscal year that contains tasking

schedules and resource requirements.

Contingency Planning

This process identifies potential barriers to the orderly progress of crop estimation and estimates the probability of their occurrence. Plans are then developed

to avert or minimize the consequences.

An appropriate example of such a situation is the

anticipated lack of multispectral scanner (MSS) data

between the demise of Landsat-3 and the operational

readiness of Landsat-D. In anticipation of such an

event, a contingency plan was developed which involves the use of the NOAA-6 and NOAA-7 satellite

sensors as alternate data sources. Correlations between the Landsat and NOAA-6 data, and a hardware

system to accept, process, and analyze the data are

currently under development.

Budget Planning

In addition to management and operations planning, the Crop Condition Assessment Division (CCAD)

had developed a long-range financial plan that projects CCAD’S operations and systems replacement

costs for the next 5 years. This 5-year financial plan

is updated annually. The plan is used to prepare realistic CCAD cost estimates as input to the FAS and USDA

budget process, and to develop procurement strategies for replacing computer systems as they become

obsolete.

Problems

The problems encountered in developing and implementing the operational system are essentially the

same as those encountered during the transition from

R&D to operational status. However, their effect is

even greater, given the requirement to provide short

turnaround data analysis and reporting. Again, problems can be divided into those internal to FAS and

those that are external:

Negotiating arrangements with NASA to:

• Furnish Landsat data within 48 hours after collection. (To date, NASA has been unable to meet

FAS timing requirements.)

● Accept and process FAS orders for repetitive and

one-time Landsat data collection.

Unanticipated changes in Landsat data format. Originally, NASA announced that the data would be delivered in a high-density digital product tape (HDDT),

on which radiometric and geometric corrections and

resampling had already been accomplished. Then,

NASA and the U.S. Department of the Interior (USDI)

jointly announced that the standard tape format would

be changed to HDDT archival tape, on which only

the radiometric corrections had been made. As a

result, FAS was forced to divert approximately

$250,000 from its planned system enhancement to

modify the scene processing unit to accommodate the

new format.

Inability of Landsat-D to provide full geographic coverage. The proposed Landsat- D, with its dependence

on the tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS)

will not provide timely (24-hour) coverage for India,

Pakistan, and a major portion of the U.S.S.R. spring

wheat region. These areas are critical to FAS. USDA

repeatedly requested installation of wide-band tape

recorders on Landsat-D and D’ to ensure full geographic coverage. However, the tape recorders are

not included in the planned system configuration.

Strong probability of a lengthy Landsat MSS data gap

between the end of Landsat-3 and the operational

readiness of Landsat-D (this has already occurred). FAS

and USDA were unable to alter NASA’s schedule,

which seemed to be dictated more by a preoccupation with technical problems with the Thematic Mapper than by the pressing need of users for continuity

of MSS data.

The uncertainty about MSS data continuity required

the diversion of analytical resources to development

of techniques to use NOAA’s environmental satellites

as an alternative data source.

Lack of rapid turnaround R&D assistance in developing, testing, and implementing techniques to processs

and analyze environmental satellite data. This slowness seemed to stem from the R&D community’s perception that its role was to carry out basic and longterm research as opposed to applied research to solve

pressing problems.
332 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Internal:

● establishing system credibility with FAS commodity analysts and others.

issues outstanding:

delays in delivery of Landsat data;

probability of an extended break in Landsat data

continuity;

lack of timely data for India, Pakistan, and part

of Soviet Union through the 1980’s; and

lack of R&D support to resolve near-term operational problems.

Improvement in Information

For the past 2 years, the project has been analyzing

space-acquired meteorological data and providing

condition assessments to FAS commodity analysts.

These reports are not used by the agency as “stand

alone” reports, but are used as additional input in formulating the agency’s country-by-country production

and demand forecasts. Because the reports have only

been available for 2 years and because they are integrated into multisource reports, it is impossible at this

time to quantify improvements to the FAS information

system. However, qualitative improvements through

enhancements to the FAS analytical process are evident. Examples of services that improve the analysis

and

●

●

●

increase confidence are as follows:

early warnings of situations that may affect agricultural commodity production and assessments

of probable impact;

continuous monitoring of conditions in foreign

high-risk/high-priority regions throughout the entire crop production cycle, and issuance of periodic assessment reports; and

confirmation (or denial) of reported situations affecting foreign crops.

Availability to analysts and embassy attaches of information in gridded data base relative to:

moisture available to plants at planting time and

throughout the growth cycle and deviation from

baseline years;

crop growth stage at any specified time, and deviations from baseline;

daily temperature/precipitation, and deviations;

soils/climate information for areas of interest; and

agricultural acreage, yield and production statistics at subcountry/province level.

Landsat and Successor Systems Requirements

Ground Data Handling.-This function is the cornerstone of any operational use of data acquired from

space. The FAS technical requirements relative to this

function were first stated in the Department’s user requirements document, which was developed during

LACIE and subsequently reaffirmed in informal correspondence between USDA and NASA/NOAA. Additionally, the requirements were also documented as

input to the recent Integrated Remote Sensing Systems

Study (IRS3), These requirements are as follows:

Data Delivery

Data delivery requirements in support of FAS operations are as follows:

HDDT in Product (“P”) format with radiometric

and geometric corrections applied. Nearest

neighbor resampling is preferred.;

delivery systems should not introduce data errors

over and above those inherent in the collector;

and

pass-to-pass registration of frame data is a

minimum requirement. Header data for registration to a given cartographic base is also considered a requirement.

Data Timeliness

Timeliness of data is a critical technical requirement

for FAS. The quantification of this requirement is specified below:

Ž All data collected by the 4-band MSS are to be

made available for processing by FAS within 48

hours after acquisition by the satellite.

All special FAS requests to activate the collector over

areas routinely scheduled for coverge must be scheduled within 24 hours after receipt of the request.

Data retransmission required because of errors or

omissions must occur within a 12-hour period regardless of error source.

Data Continuity

The requirement for data continuity has two discrete

elements: day-by-day processing and delivery to the

user; and data coverage comparability between space

platforms, with no gap in time between operational

readiness of successive collection platforms. Each of

these FAS requirements is summarized as follows:

Day-by-Day Data Receipt (reliability)

● total daily data collection must be processed and

delivered to FAS within the timeliness criterion;

and

● data backlogs cannot be tolerated within the

scheduled operations and resource base of FAS.

Data Gap

The data gap potential is the most worrisome situation a user of satellite data can face. In this context

FAS has initiated and supported the following requirements:
Appendix C—Foreign Agriculture Service, Department of Agriculture, Crop Condition Assessment ● 333

A space platform with fully operational MSS to

be in orbit at all times;

the 4-band MSS with on-board wide-band tape

recorders to be continuously operated through

the 1980’s;

a single satellite (collector) operational with a

backup available for launch to assure data continuity; and

total world coverage capability with no “black

holes,” or data gaps due to other priorities as are

expected to occur with Landsat-D and TDRSS.

Experience during the past 2 years of operation have

reinforced these technical requirements. Current FAS

analytical capabiIities are facing serious degradation

because the minimum requirements defined in this

section have not been satisfied, and apparently will

not be satisfied during the Landsat-D system lifetime.

Personnel Impact

No FAS functions or positions will be eliminated as

a result of the current system. However, automation

and the integration of new data sources into the analytical and decisionmaking process will relieve senior

analysts to concentrate on additional tasks that have

been levied upon commodity programs by Congress

and the executive branch without a compensating increase in personnel.

International Impact

It is not possible at this time accurately to determine

the dollar value that changes in the system will have

on the dollar value of U.S. exports, world prices, U.S.

competitive position and economic policy. However,

over the next 4 to 6 years, given a “free market” environment, the real value to the United States of current foreign crop information will increase dramatically. The magnitude of this value will depend in a large

measure upon the U.S. policy concerning export of

space-related technology to nations who compete for

U.S. foreign markets. A policy of open and equal access to agricultural data collected by U.S. space platform and related technology could tend to reduce the

U.S. competitive advantage in the world market and

perhaps “stagnate” our level of exports. It could also

permit other nations to compete in markets that have

been traditionally dominated by the United States.

This situation may not be acceptable given the need

for expanded U.S. markets to offset the increasing

dollar flow for oil imports. This is a national policy

question that FAS and USDA cannot resolve. However, national policy on the international availability

of U.S. space technology and/or data collected from

space will have a significant impact on the value to

the United States of improved agricultural information.

International Cooperation

The current system and the preceding R&D have

stimulated interest in bilateral cooperation in the exchange of technology. The following will serve as an

example:

In early 1977, the President of Mexico received an

in-depth briefing by FAS of LACIE results and USDA

application of remote-sensing technology. This briefing led to agreements in principle between the Secretary of Agriculture and the Mexican Minister of Agriculture later to exchange mutually beneficial technology. FAS and Mexican technical managers developed

a plan for an exchange of technical staff between the

Ministry of Agriculture and FAS (CCAD).

NASA’s International Affairs office was represented

at all meetings in Washington and Mexico City. One

problem encountered in these planning sessions was

NASA’s insistence that Mexico purchase a ground receiving station even though all areas of interest to the

Mexican Government were routinely collected to

meet U.S. data requirements and processed through

NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. This problem

could have been resolved, but factors external to

USDA and NASA halted further communications toward negotiations of a working bilateral agreement.

Given the increasing awareness of the need for

closer ties between the United States and Mexico, it

would seem to be in the U.S. interest to reopen negotiations that would lead to a bilateral agreement regarding agricultural applications of space technology.
Appendix D

MATERIALS SCIENCE AND

ENGINEERING IN MICROGRAVITY*

Introduction

Two hundred miles above Earth, unfiltered solar

radiation, a near-perfect vacuum, and temperature extremes ranging from –200° to +200° F exist in an

environment almost free of gravitational force. The recent interest in materials processing in space (MPS)

has its origin in the belief that the unique attributes

of this environment may have important scientific and

commercial applications.

With the exception of microgravity, the attributes

of the space environment can be duplicated on Earth

in sufficient quantities and duration to investigate their

extended effect on processes and materials. Though

microgravity can be simulated by using airplanes,

sounding rockets, and in some instances magnetic

fields, such simulations are generally of short duration,

involve only limited quantities of test material, and

often introduce complicating factors such as vibration

and impurities. The long-term microgravity environment of space introduces a new dimension in controlling process variables such as temperature, composition, and fluid flow. Through this experimentation,

new opportunities for understanding and improving

ground-based production methods will be created,

and, where practical and economical, select materials

may be produced in space.

Scientific Status of Materials

Processing in Space

Microgravity Alterations of

Processing Phenomena

By using the long-duration, microgravity environment of an orbiting spacecraft, new manufacturing

processes can be designed. On Earth the theoretical

performance characteristics of materials are inhibited

by such gravity-induced phenomena as convection,

segregation, buoyancy, and sedimentation. These

phenomena function in the following manner:1

Convection. The spontaneous stirring and mixing

that occurs as currents flow between temperature gra-

*McDonnell Douglas, the Materials Processing in Space Projects Office

of NASA, and TRW each provided a case study for this appendix. Their aid

is gratefully acknowledged.

‘See generally: L. K. Zoner, “Materials Science and Engineering in Space, ”

in Commercial Operations in Space, 1980-2MXI, 18th Goddard Symposium,

AAS, vol. 51, Science and Technology Series, 1981, pp. 20-26; K. Moritz,

“In the Realm of ZercG,” T/WSystems and Energy, winter 1978, pp. 16-24.

clients in a liquid or gas are unpredictable and chaotic,

and can lead to unwanted structural and compositional differences in solid material. Both crystal growth and

solidification processes are enhanced if convective disturbances are suppressed. The microgravity of space

should provide a means to suppress convective phenomena.

Sedimentation/Buoyancy. On Earth, gravity causes

heavier components to settle in a mixture while lessdense materials rise. Sedimentation and buoyancy

complicate manufacturing techniques for alloys of different density elements and for composite materials.

In microgravity, lighter density materials will remain

in suspension for indefinite periods of time, thereby

allowing the processing of homogeneous composites

and alloys where the constituents have large density

differences.

Hydrostatic Pressure. Hydrostatic pressure puts a

strain on materials during solidification. Certain crystals are sufficiently dense and delicate that they are

susceptible to strain under their own weight at growth

temperatures. Such strain-induced deformations in

crystals degrade their electro-optical performance. In

microgravity, heat-treated, melted, or resolidified

alloys might be developed free of deformation by coating the machined shape with a thin oxide skin, serving as a mold.

Container Effects. Containerless processing eliminates problems of container contamination and wall

effects, often the greatest source of impurities and imperfections while forming molten material. In microgravity, a material may be melted, manipulated, and

shaped, free of contact with a container or crucible

by using acoustic, electromagnetic, or electrostatic

fields. Surface tension would hold the material together in mass, a force overpowered hereon Earth by gravity.

MPS Product Applications

In general, the MPS program is interested in studies

of process parameters to enhance control and productivity in Earth manufacturing, to prepare limited quantities of precursor materials to provide baseline or reference data, and to develop methods unique to the

space environment by which materials can be prepared. All these research tasks rely upon the range of

process parameters being extended through the reduction of gravity.

334
Appendix D—Materials Science and Engineering in Microgravity . 335

Examples of potential applications derived from MPS

research are as follows.

Crystal Growth2

Melt growth is the most widely exploited technique

to produce high-technology, single-crystal materials

for semiconductor chips used in large-scale integrated

circuits for communications and computers. Chemical

homogeneity, which will maximize electrical performance, is believed possible through microgravity processing. Commercially valuable crystals for sensitive infrared sensors, most difficult to grow on Earth, may

be enhanced by melt growth in a microgravity environment.

As a variation of melt growth, float-zone growth

techniques are widely used to produce crystals such

as doped silicon for semiconductors and solar cells.

Although large, efficient crystals are grown commercially with this process on Earth, gravity does limit the

size and type of crystals that can be produced and

introduces growth rate fluctuations that cause chemical inhomogeneities that necessitate cutting the

crystal into smalI chips for high-performance applications.

Solution growth of crystals in the MPS program emphasizes creation of room-temperature, infrared detector materials, and gallium-arsenide (GaAs) semi-conductors for a wide range of applications from microwave devices to computers and solid-state lasers. Infrared defectivity of current available material is constrained to about 20 percent of the theoretical limit

because of gravity-influenced growth defects. GaAs

semiconductors can be readily grown on Earth, but

with considerable imperfections,

The absence of gravity opens new possibilities for

the growth of large, flat, pure crystals by vapor technique; therefore, the MPS program includes the investigation of Hg12 nuclear detector crystals that can be

used at ambient temperature. Because the crystal has

a layered structure, self-deformation during growth in

sizes under 1 g is believed to be an important factor

i n producing dislocations that degrade the performance of the crystal as a nuclear-energy detector. The

growth of such a crystal in microgravity could eliminate such strains at the growth temperature.

Solidification3

Control of the solidification of metals and alloys is

the key element in the field of metallurgy. Gravitational effects, such as buoyancy-driven convection of

2S. Waters, ‘‘Tapping the Resources of a New Continent, ” Part 1—Materials

Processing, Mechanical Engineering, June 1981, pp. 26-39.

3S. Solomon, “Factories in Space,” Science Digest Special, September/

C)ctober 1980, pp. 58-61, 114,

the melt or sedimentation, can greatly influence the

structure of metals and alloys. Directional solidification in microgravity allows complicated shapes, such

as turbine blades, to be melted and directionally resolidified to increase axial strength while using a thin

oxide skin to maintain the shape. Additional interest

is based on the potential of approaching the theoretical maximum magnetic strength of materials that are

10 times higher than currently realized on Earth.

Another group of potential candidates for in-space

production is that of miscibility gap alloys. These alloys

defy preparation on Earth in bulk quantities because

of gravity-driven effects that cause the materials to

segregate upon solidification. There are some 500

such combinations of materials that have a liquidphase miscibility gap. Processed in microgravity, these

materials might have such diverse applications as electrical contacts (as replacements for silver and gold) and

self-lubricating bearings.

Solidification kinetics in the casting of alloys under

nonterrestrial conditions can produce fine-grained

structure in the interior of a casting. This phenomenon

could have application in common products such as

iron engine castings.

Undercooked solidification is the rapid quenching

of molten materials at temperatures well below their

freezing points. By containedess processing in microgravity, a vast array of materials is expected to be processed in the amorphous state, thus extending the

materials properties available to mechanical and optical designers. Enhanced glasses manufactured by

means of this process could improve their energytransfer efficiency for applications such as laser hosts.

In addition, such studies may shed light on methods

for obtaining superconductors that work at higher

temperatures.

Containerless Processing

Containerless processing may permit the creation

of amorphous (glass) materials that cannot be made

on Earth, and may allow the analysis of molten materials at temperatures that would exceed the melting

point of crucibles on Earth. By elimination of nucleation associated with container walls, it should be possible to extend the glass-forming range of many materials, including some metals, resulting in new and

unique glasses with exotic properties. An application

of this process is in the production of ultrapure glass

used in optical waveguides for high-frequency communications. Other possible applications are fusionenergy lasers, fiber optics communications, cable networks, and self-focusing lenses.

4N. j. Barter , “Materials Processing in Space, ” Impact for the

1980’s–Conference on Selected Technology for Business and Industry, May

14-15, 1980, pp. 11-16,
336 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Fluids and Chemical Processess

On Earth, fluid and chemical processes are affected

by gravity-driven convection or sedimentation. Microgravity eliminates these effects, thereby allowing components to be isolated for study with a degree of freedom not otherwise possible.

A potential application of this technique would be

the production of monodisperse latex spheres in

space. These spheres are too large to be grown by

polymerization and too small to be sized by microsieving on Earth. Because of the absence of sedimentation in microgravity, these latex spheres might be mass

produced from a polymerization process while in suspension. These spheres, available only in research

quantities, are used in calibrating electron microscopes, light-scattering devices and filters, in the

measurement of pore size in membranes, and in serological tests for a multitude of diseases.

The biomedical applications of microgravity such

as electrophoresis, isoelectric focusing, phase partitioning, suspension cell culturing, crystallization of

macromolecules, and blood flow (rheology) processes

will also be evaluated in the MPS program. Application of these techniques in biomedical sciences could

lead to production of human insulin; purification of

hemopoietic stem cells for treatment of certain types

of leukemia; or production of collagen, used for artificial corneas, artificial skin for wound and burn treatments, and for membranes to aid i n cardiovascular

and orthopedic surgery.

Status of MPS Technology

History of the MPS Program

The space processing program presently sponsored

by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) germinated in the mid-to-late 1960’s,6 fostered by the need to master propellant characteristics,

fire control, and the assembly of structures in space–

elements all essential to manned spaceflight. Propellant requirements of the Apollo lunar landing program

stimulated research on the effects of surface tensions

and inertia in partially filled containers. Similarly, interest in on-orbit repair and assembly required engineer5N. j. Barter and D. M. Waltz, Materials Processing in Space: A Weightless

Proposition, AIAA-80-0878, presented at AlAA International Annual Meeting

and Technical Display, Baltimore, Md., May 6-11, 1980, pp. 3-4; E. C.

McKannan, Survey of U.S. Materials Processing and Manufacturing in Space

Programs, NASA TM-82427, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center,

Alabama, July 1981, p. 1.

‘j. H. Bredt, “Status of NASA Space-Processing Research,” in Processing

and Manufacturing in Space, proceedings of a symposium held at Frascati,

Italy, by European Space Research Organization, Mar, 25-27, 1974., p. 76;

Op. Cit., L.K. Zoner, 1981, pp. 19-20.

ing studies of brazing and welding phenomena under

microgravity conditions.

In the course of these investigations, it was found

that unrestrained liquid masses would form large freeflying globules, that vapor bubbles could grow virtually without limit in boiling liquids, and that flames

quickly become blanketed with their own combustion products. These effects of weightlessness were first

treated as problems in the engineering of spacecraft

systems, only later to be recognized as exploitable

phenomena useful in creating novel processes and

products in space.

In 1966, personnel from NASA’s Marshall Space

Flight Center embarked on a series of visits to manufacturing companies to explore possible industrial interest in space applications. In 1969, NASA initiated

its first formal space processing activities under the

program title: “Materials Science and Manufacturing

in Space.” This program was jointly sponsored by the

agency’s Office of Manned Spaceflight and Office of

Aeronautics and Space Technology. To date, in-space

MPS research has been pursued on the Apollo, Skylab,

and Apollo/Soyuz manned spaceflight programs.

Apollo7

An MPS flight experiment program was inaugurated

in 1971 when three “demonstration” experiments

were performed on the Apollo 14 lunar mission. These

simple science demonstrations consisted of heat flow

and convection, electrophoretic separation, and composite casting experiments. On Apollo 16 in early

1972, a more ambitious electrophoresis experiment

was conducted, and in 1972 Apollo 17 carried a heatflow and convection demonstration.

Skylab8

The 100-ton Skylab space laboratory station, flown

1973-74, offered the first opportunity for extensive experimentation in the microgravity environment of

space. A total of 15 MPS experiments and nine science

demonstrations were conducted on Skylab. The complement of MPS experiments included: crystal growth,

metal composites, eutectics (a combination of two

materials that has a lower melting point than either

material alone), welding and brazing, fluid effects, and

combustion processes.

A materials processing facility (MPF) was an integral

part of Skylab and was designed to accommodate all

7j. H. Bredt, op. cit., 1974, p. 77.

5kylab, Our First Space Station, Leland F. Belew (cd.), NASA SP-400, Washington, D.C. 1977, pp. 148-1 51; Sky/ab Experiments, Materia/s Science, Vo/.

3, NASA EP-1 12, May 1973; Proceedings of Third Space Processing Symposium—Sky/ab Resu/ts, vol. 1 and 2, Alabama, june 1974.
Appendix D—Materials Science and Engineering in Microgravity . 337

Skylab space processing experiments involving the

melting and resolidification of materials. This facility

was capable of venting into space, thus providing an

evacuated environment for the experiments desired.

A multipurpose electric furnace, capable of reaching

1,000° C, was fitted within MPF allowing eight metals

experiments to be conducted.

A pOllO/ SOyU Z

g

The joint Soviet-American Apollo/Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), which flew in 1975, carried 12 space processing experiments and three demonstrations. Among

them: crystal growth of semiconductors, zero-gravity

processing of magnets, surface tension-induced convection, density separation during solidification of two

alloys, and halide eutectic growth, In addition, two

electrophoresis experiments were conducted on

ASTP, one of which was developed and funded by

the Federal Republic of Germany.

A modified Skylab furnace, capable of reaching

1,150°C with increased control of temperature

ranges, was carried aboard the ASTP. ASTP allowed

several investigators to confirm Skylab results and

make additional tests of previously observed phenomena.

The Apollo, Skylab, and ASTP experiments were

conceptually simple and limited in scope. The hardware was designed on the basis of equipment used

on the ground and the experiments were supported

by limited Earth-based research. Consequently, the experiments were basically reproductions of current

techniques of processing materials carried out under

low gravity conditions. With the close of the Apollo

program in 1975, no further MPS spaceflight opportunities were available.

The STAMPS Report

A special study to provide guidance for NASA’s program for materials processing space was published in

1978 by the Committee on Scientific and Technological Aspects of Materials Processing in Space

(STAMPS), 10 an ad hoc committee of the Space Applications Board under the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Drawing on comments and advice from

more than 100 experts in materials science and technology, the NAS study concluded that the prospects

for economical space manufacturing are limited and

need to be better defined on a case-by-case basis. Further, the STAMPS report stated that no examples of

9Apollo-Soyuz Pamphlet No, 8: Zero-G Technology, NASA EP-140, Washington, D.C. October 1977.

IOMater/a/s prWe55;ng in Space, report of the Committee on Scientific and

Technological Aspects of Materials Processing Space, National Academy of

Sciences, Washington, D. C,. 1978.

economically justifiable processes for producing materials in space could be found.

The STAMPS committee stressed two points that

emerged from the testimony of its advisors and from

previous materials experimentation in space:11

First, the space environment usually contributes at

least as many problems as it solves. In sophistication,

reliability, convenience, and cost, terrestrial experimentation is generally superior to what can be expected in space. Second, space experimentation will

have little value unless its planning is founded on substantial Earth-based information and unless the results

are coupled to those of complementary terrestrial programs. ”

The STAMPS report indicated that some space environment parameters, such as the level of vacuum,

temperature, or high-energy radiation can be better

realized on Earth. Even long periods of low gravity,

achieved only through orbital flight, may be jeopardized by several factors. Among these are: gas venting,

fluid dumps, use of evaporators, crew motions, and

perturbations of the shuttle orbit itself. These factors

could induce accelerations, creating small forces of

gravity (G-jitter), which in turn might affect the lowgravity requirement of space processing.

Singled out in the report were commercial space

processing of vaccines using electrophoresis (the separation of particles of different mass/charge ratios in an

electric field) and growing silicon crystals for use in

electronics. The STAMPS study found no clearcut advantage in either case over terrestrial processes, In the

case of electrophoresis, use of the technique on Earth

has not yet been optimized.

The study group commented that low gravity appears to offer certain capabilities in studying the properties of boiling, combustion and melting, processes

that are not now well understood. It was also felt that

the ability of containerless processing to avoid contamination and increase purity may hold great promise. But even these possibilities must be subject to

critical evaluation of comparative costs and likelihood

of success. The NAS study group indicated that the

commercial utilization of such understanding lacks

promise.

The STAMPS committee suggested that the organization and management of future space processing

should include the use of the space shuttle as a national facility. This would include use of the Spacelab

by scientists and engineers working in universities,

government laboratories, or industrial concerns. User

rates should be established, but not designed to cover

the total real cost of operating the facility.

1 I Ibid.
338 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

In concluding its findings, the STAMPS study suggested the demonstration and development of significant materials processing in space techniques should

be paid for by NASA. To this end, the committee suggested certain technical and management changes to

improve the effectiveness of the NASA MPS effort. The

STAMPS report noted that NASA’s MPS efforts had

“suffered from poorly conceived and designed experiments, often done in crude apparatus, from which

weak conclusions were drawn and, in some cases,

overpublicized.”

In consonance with the recommendations of the

STAMPS committee, a scientific advisory committee

has been formed, responsive to the MPS Division Director, to aid in future program planning and policymaking relative to scientific aspects of the program.

Peer groups have been empaneled to assist in the

selection and periodic review of scientific experimentation and the periodic review of plans and policies. 12

Terrestrial Facilities

In the absence of spaceflight opportunities for MPS

experiment, NASA began using drop tubes and drop

towers, aircraft, and sounding rockets to simulate the

microgravity environmental J Using such ground-based

research technologies, prospective MPS investigators

could acquire microgravity test data to: 1) establish

experiment parameters, 2) establish proof of concept,

and 3) provide specimens for laboratory research.

Drop tubes and towers

To provide a low-cost, flexible and readily available

low-g test facility, the Marshall Space Flight Center

operates two drop tubes (one of 100-ft length and one

of 300-ft length). These drop tubes provide 2 to 4 seconds of microgravity.

In drop tubes, molten droplets are released into a

column of vacuum and are solidified during 2.6 seconds of vertical free fall, thus experiencing an effective force of 10-7 g. Typical experiments utilizing this

facility include studies in high-temperature calorimetry, and in liquid densities, surface tensions, and

volume changes due to solidification,

In using the drop tower, an experiment package is

placed in a canister thrusted by small rocket motors

to overcome air resistance and guide-rail friction. Experiment-laden canisters as heavy as 204 kg can experience an effective force of as little as 10-5 g during a 4-second drop tower test. Drop towers proved

invaluable in verifying apparatus and experimental

12E, c, Mc~annan, op. cit., July 1981, P. 18.

I lMaterla15 processing in Space Program: Handbook for Participants, Prepared for NASA by ORI, Inc., February 1980, pp. III-5 to III-19.

concepts flown on Skylab. Typical experiments are

similar to those performed in a drop tube.

Research aircraft

NASA employs KC-1 35 and F-1046 aircraft, flying

on parabolic trajectories, to provide 10 to 60 seconds

of microgravity. Experiment packages flown in the

KC-1 35, because of the size of the aircraft, can be

larger in size than in the small F-104B, although

approximately twice the microgravity environment

can be obtained (30 to 60 seconds) by the jet fighter.

Minimum gravity level obtainable is approximately

10-2 g. However, this value is unsteady, and therefore

these means are unsuitable for precise experiments.

Although the data obtained from research aircraft are

limited, such flights do allow for valuable crew training, experiment hardware development, and verification tests.

Sounding rockets

The space-processing application rocket (SPAR) program has been instituted to provide some continuity

in flight experimentation between the ASTP flight and

the space shuttle MPS opportunities.14 The SPAR

rocket is a Black Brant sounding rocket equipped with

recoverable payload system. SPAR was introduced in

1975 and has accomplished nine flights to date. Typically, SPAR can attain between 4 to 7 minutes of lowgravity phenomena, providing levels of 1O-5 to 10-6g

for payloads up to 300 kg. Because of the severe

launch environment as measured by acceleration,

vibration and spin rate of SPAR at liftoff, and later spin

down, MPS experiment design is an arduous undertaking. The short flight times of SPAR are not conducive to crystal growth or biological separation.

However, they can be used for certain fluid and solidification experiments. The SPAR program has led

to an inventory of low-cost hardware, suitable for

longer duration experimentation during shuttle operation. A materials experiment assembly (MEA) designed

to be compatible with the shuttle/Spacelab has been

developed by using SPAR technology.

Shuttle/Spacelab Programs

An operational space shuttle will further the evolution of materials processing in space. MPS experimentation on planned shuttle flights of up to 1 month will

make use of the following shuttle facilities:15

14j. H. Bredt, “NASA Plans for Space Processing Experiments on Sounding

Rockets,” in Processing and Manufacturing in Space, proceedings of a symposium held at Frascati, Italy, Mar. 25-27, 1974, pp. 71-73; R. j. Naumann

and H. W. Herring, op. cit., 1980, pp. 99-103.

ISE, C. McKannan, op. cit., jUly 1981, P. 41.
Appendix D—Materials Science and Engineering in Microgravity • 339

Small Self-Contained Payloads

These containers are available for rent by companies, universities, and private citizens for a cost dependent upon the size and weight of the experiment

package. Containers with a maximum weight of 200

lb and measuring 5 ft3 can be rented for $10,000 (in

1975 dollars). They are accommodated on a spaceavailable basis and must contain their own power and

internal data recording systems. Though limited by

size and the absence of in-space manipulation, the

small self-contained payloads may provide data useful

in larger Spacelab experimentation or in joint endeavors between industry and NASA.

Materials Experiment Assembly

The first article of new materials processing hardware to be flown i n the shuttle is the MEA, a self-contained package attached to a Spacelab pallet. MEA has

been developed to be compatible with SPAR technology and reconditioned SPAR equipment. MEA operates under its own power, containing a control computer, heat rejection system, and data recorders, and

can accommodate up to four experiments in its separately sealed subenclosures. It is anticipated that private institutions may wish to lease MEA from NASA

to conduct experiments of a proprietary nature, although legal and financial aspects of this possibility

have yet to be clarified.16

Spacelab Modules and Pallets

Shuttle MPS systems can be divided into two groups:

1 ) those located in the pressurized Spacelab module,

and 2) those positioned on the Spacelab pallet. ’

Spacelab is a habitable module providing a shirt-sleeve

laboratory for scientists and engineers to work in

space. Carried into orbit in the shuttle cargo bay,

Spacelab remains attached to the orbiter for flight

durations of up to 1 month. The interior of the module

is fitted with racks arranged in single and double assemblies to house experiments.

Unpressurized, u-shapted segmented pallets can

also be attached in the orbiter cargo bay. These pallets

form an open porch, exposing instruments directly to

space and accommodating experiments controlled

from Spacelab, the orbiter flight deck, or the Earth.

Up to five pallets can be fitted in the cargo bay and

combinations of moducles and pallets can be flown.

The major “facility-class, multiuser instruments”

presently under development in the shuttle/MPS program consist of:18

160P, Clt note 17, pp. I II-52-III-53.

17J. R. Carruthers and L. K. Zoner, “Materials Processing Studies in Space, ”

NASA (unnumbered) Apr. 10, 1979, pp. 20-23.

IBN, ). Bafler and D, M, Waltz, op. cit., May 1980, PP. 4-5.

Fluid Experiment System (FES): Mounted in a double rack aboard Spacelab, the FES experiment

uses Schlieren photography and holography to

study fluid behavior under microgravity.

Vapor Crystal Growth (VCG) System: Crystals are

to be grown from fluids, vapors, or from melts

of solid materials, recorded by holographic and

video recording in common use with the FES.

Acoustic Contain Containerless Positioning Module

(ACPM): The ACPM is located on a pallet and

uses 3-axis acoustic positioning to control the

position and rotation of a sample heated radiantly to temperatures up to 1,600° C.

Solidification Experiment System (SES): A modular

furnace facility ”that can accommodate up to 16

samples per flight that are automatically loaded

and unloaded on command. These samples can

be processed with uniform heating and cooling

or with a temperature gradient and directionally

solidified. SES is to be located on a Spacelab pallet.

As funding permits, additional MPS/shuttle activity

is expected to include the following systems:19

Floating Zone System: Used to determine how far

the zone refining technique can be carried in

space, and to what degree crystal size and purity

can be increased. Attached to a pallet.

Electromagnetic Containerless Processing System:

A processing module for heating and cooling control independent of positioning control. Attached

to a pallet.

Bioseparation System: Designed to enhance understanding of electrophoresis and its variations.

Contained in Spacelab.

Electrostatic Contain Processing System:

Used for processing and shaping larger, complex

materials. Contained in Spacelab.

Future MPS Efforts

Three types of materials processing experiments

have been selected for future shuttle missions. These

are:

Group 1. Experiments that take advantage of the greatly reduced convective flow to provide quiescent

growth or solidification conditions with precise control of temperature, growth rate and composition.

Experiments in this category include:

Ž growth of solid-solution single crystals;

. semiconductor materials growth in low-g environment;

19D. Dooling, “The Space Factory” in the ///ustrated Encyclopedia of Space

Techrro/ogy, pp. 21 9-220; R. ). Naumann, “U.S. National Report on Materials

Processing in Space, ” presentation to Working Group 8, Materials Science

in Space, COSPAR meeting (No. 78-1 15), Innsbruck, Austria, june 1978, pp.

20-22.
340 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

vapor growth of alloy-type semiconductor crystals;

Hgl2 crystal growth for nuclear detectors;

solution growth of crystals in zero gravity; and

alined magnetic composites.

Group 2. Experiments involving glasses or glass processes. These experiments take advantage of the containerless aspects of space processing as well as the

absence of Stokes bubble rise to investigate

phenomena that cannot be unambiguously studied

on Earth. Experiments in this category include:

● refining of glasses in space;

Ž physical phenomena in containerless glass processing; and

• containerless preparation of advanced optical

glasses.

Group 3. The remaining experiments depend primarily on the absence of sedimentation to keep a

material of different density in suspension during

a process. Experiments in this category include:

Ž solid electrolytes containing dispersed particles;

• liquid miscibility gap materials; and

● production of large particle size monodisperse

latexes in microgravity.

It is anticipated that the projected needs of MPS,

as measured by numbers of samples, processing time,

and power required to support sustained, systematic

MPS activity, will surpass present shuttle capabilities.

Use of a 2S-kW power system has been advocated

to extend shuttle stay-time in orbit (from a maximum

30 days to 90 days) and to provide greater levels of

power supportive of MPS payloads. Longer duration

shuttle flights, coupled with increased power to conduct experiments, would reduce the net cost of experimentation.

Eventually, a materials experiment carrier (MEC)

could serve as a transition between exploratory MPS

research and prepilot manufacturing plants. MEC

would carry several second-generation MPS modules

and, attached to the 25-kW power system, would contain its own heat-rejection equipment, control and

data systems. As a total unit, MEC and power system

would fly freely, utilizing the shuttle only to deliver

raw materials and to extract finished products for

return to Earth, 2o

It is conceivable that the MEC activity will require

increased human attention, necessitating habitable,

Spacelab-type modules, which could lead to a

manned space station. This station may well serve as

a national space facility for large-scale, commercial

space processing.21

Conclusions

The scientific basis for manufacturing commercial

products in space is limited, resting on a total of 8

hours of in-space research. The economic rationale

for fabricating materials in space, therefore, can be

assessed only when a suitable reservoir of knowledge

has been established. The result from sounding

rockets, aircraft, and ground facilities as well as from

the limited experimentation aboard spacecraft suggest,

however, that space processing techniques which

yield products of high value and low volume may be

commercially feasible.

It must be recognized that even if a material is identified that is sufficiently unique, useful, and valuable

to be manufactured or processed in space, the high

inherent cost of space processing will be a strong incentive for industry to find means of duplicating the

process on the ground or to find a cheaper substitute

for the material. For this reason it may be desirable

for the Government to subsidize the initial phases of

MPS research and product development. The continued and orderly development of space-based manufacturing techniques will depend heavily upon the

establishment of a firm national commitment to maintain and enhance U.S. space capabilities.

ZOR, j. NaUnlarlrl and H. W. Herring, op. cit., 1980, pp. 107-108.

21 D. M. Waltz and R. L. Hammel, “Space Factories, ” (77-56), presented

to the 28th International Astronautical Federation (IAF), Prague, Sept. 25-Oct.

1, 1977.
Appendix E

World Climate, the Oceans, and

Early Indications of Climatic Change

Definition. -’’Climate” is how one characterizes

the weather at a particular place as it occurs over periods of weeks, years, centuries, or millenia. The modern notion of climate includes its variation and extreme occurrences as well as its average conditions.

At the present time, there is accuracy in the detailed

3-to 5-day weather forecasts. For periods longer than

that, one begins to speak in less detailed terms, to

describe more general features such as mean conditions and the likelihood of various departures from the

mean. Over these longer periods of time (weeks,

months, seasons), the climate at a particular place

seems to be influenced by progressively more distant

forces, such as ocean conditions, solar radiation, and

polar ice variations. Thus, we speak of an interactive

climate system which includes atmospheric, oceanic,

cryospheric and solar influences among other factors.

Historical Perspective

Recent dramatic advances in meteorology and climatology are due to three concurrent streams of

development. First, the basic scientific understanding

of atmospheric (and oceanic) behavior has grown.

Physical and mathematical models have been constructed which duplicate rather well the overall

behavior of the atmosphere. Detailed numerical

models as used in weather forecasts show reasonable

predictive skill. Climate models, though much less

precise in time and space resolution, successfully

duplicate the large features of the observed climate.

Second, and more recently, electronic computers

have enabled the development of more detailed and

complex models and the solution of their associated

mathematical equations. The large computing machines also enable the inclusion and effective treatment of vast amounts of actual data rather than summarized data or proxy parameters.

Third, and most recent, observations from space

provide truly global data to describe global-scale

climate. A pair of polar-orbiting satellites can view

each point on Earth four times a day. A satellite in

geosynchronous orbit can continuously monitor conditions over almost a whole hemisphere.

These advances Ied to the Global Atmosphere Research Program (CARP) conducted during the last decade. The objective of this program was to observe the

atmosphere and produce the most comprehensive set

of data ever compiled. These data were then to be

used to increase understanding of the behavior of the

atmosphere, to improve models, and to assess our

ability to predict future behavior of the atmosphere.

A second major objective was to improve our understanding of the Earth’s climate.

The data from the Global Weather Experiment

(GWE)–the ultimate phase of GARP–are still being

analyzed, but already dramatic results are coming to

light. For instance, through a combination of surface

drifting buoys and satellite-borne data collection systems, measurements taken during the GWE revealed

a previously unobserved complexity in the atmospheric conditions over the Southern oceans. These vast,

remote areas had been largely unmonitored prior to

the GWE. In addition, satellite-acquired cloud image

data have revealed important interhemispheric flows

which influence atmospheric conditions in the Northern Hemisphere. These findings are important

because the large-scale aspects of climate are truly

global in nature. This has become progressively clear

over the years, as scientists such as Hadley, Rossby,

Walker, Bjerknes, and many others, have described

the overall features of the planetary atmospheric flow

about the Earth. Now means are becoming available

that demonstrate directly, through observations, the

global nature of climate.

Over the last decade, we have become increasingly aware of our vulnerability to extreme climate

events. The “Dust Bowl” conditions of the 1930’s and

their attendant impacts on agriculture and the

economy have been well documented. During 1972,

unanticipated drought and adverse growing conditions led to severe shortages in the world-wide supply of grains. This led to adverse domestic economic

impacts including the U.S. sale of wheat to the Soviet

Union at prices lower than the world prices. The effect of the 1973 Middle East oil embargo was heightened when fuel shortages occurred while there was

very cold weather in New England and the Midwest.

The California drought of 1976 and 1977 would have

had very adverse effects had it persisted any longer.

Because modern society is vulnerable to climate occurrences, important benefits could also result from

knowing climate variations in advance. jack Thomson, a noted meteorologist, has estimated that the total .

annual monetary loss due to poor weather conditions

was approximately $13 billion (in 1971 ). Of that

amount, about $418 million could have been saved

341
342 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

if reliable 30- and 90-day forecasts had been available.

The larger part of the “protectable” loss required

shorter forecasts, 5 days or less. Thompson found the

sectors most benefiting from climate forecasts to be:

agriculture, energy, public safety, construction, communications, and electric power. Given the large increase in energy costs since 1972, the potential savings from reliable climate forecasts should today be

much greater than estimated by Thompson.

Just as the value of reliable climate forecasts is being

defined, the research community is developing promising techniques for providing reliable seasonal

forecasts as much as 6 months in advance. These

results have come from diagnostic studies of the

“Southern Oscillation.” This phenomenon involves

a family of climate fluctuations around the globe—

including links between atmosphere and ocean conditions in the tropical Pacific and subsequent climate

behavior over North America. Warming of central

equatorial Pacific water typically leads to displacement

of the North American jet stream northward over the

West and southward over the East. This causes below

normal surface temperatures in the populous eastern

United States and warm temperature in the West. The

severe winter of 1976-77 (following the 1976 El Nino

ocean warming) was typical of this pattern.

The hope for seasonal forecasts lies in the recognition that ocean conditions oflen persist for several

months. Thus, when appropriate ocean conditions develop (usually during our spring and summer) they will

indicate the likelihood of subsequent anomalous

winter conditions occurring in the United States.

In a more recent study, Brown-Weiss confirmed that

3-to 4-month forecasts would be very useful to public

utilities for planning natural gas purchases and in planning the mix of petroleum products (e.g., the relative

amounts of gasoline versus heating oil).

In addition to forecasts, there are many important

uses of climate information falling under the general

heading “Applied Climatology.” This refers to the statistical characterization of the climate based on the

data record. Examples are: the estimation of fuel and

electric power demand based upon heating and cooling degree days; planting crops based on the latest

data of a killing frost; designing dams based on maximum probable precipitation. Many of these statistical

application techniques have been developed because

reliable forecasts have not been possible. others, for

instance those associated with the design of structures,

would probably continue even if forecasts were available because the life of the structure is so long.

Finally, there are important applications which require “current climate” information. For example, in

monitoring growing conditions in areas important to

worldwide commodity trading, it is important to analyze current conditions in relation to the climate norm.

Crop yield models require not only the current

weather data but also the climatology for the regions.

To be useful, these data must be gathered, processed

and disseminated to users very quickly.

Mindful of our vulnerability to climate, our opportunities to improve our knowledge of climate, and the

opportunities to make beneficial use of improved

climate information, the Congress passed and the

President enacted the National Climate Program Act

(Public Law 95-367, dated Sept. 17, 1978).

The National Climate Program

The purpose of the National Climate Program is “to

understand and respond to natural and man-induced

climate processes. ” In establishing the national program, the act set up mechanisms for coordinating and

integrating the climate activities of the Federal agencies. In particular, the act established a National

Climate Program Office as lead entity for administering the program and required the preparation of a

5-year plan to state the goals and priorities of the program and the roles of the Federal agencies in conducting the program.

The current (and first) 5-year plan emphasizes the

production of useful climate information based on existing knowledge while simultaneously expanding our

understanding of climate and its impact on society.

The priority programs (and associated lead agencies)

in each of these activity areas are as follows:

Activity category

1. Providing climate

products

Il. Responding to

impacts and policy

implications of

climate

III. Understanding climate

Principal thrust Lead agency

Generation and NOA A

dissemination of

climate information

Climate prediction NOA A

Carbon dioxide, DOE

environment, and

society

Climate and world USDA

food production

Solar and Earth NASA

radiation

Ocean heat transport NSF

and storage

Potential Contributions From

Space Capabilities

Direct satellite measurements and satellite relay of

data will make important contributions to all of the

above tasks. Considering the continuing elements of

the National Climate Program, space contributions
Appendix E—World Climate, the Oceans, and Early Indications of Climatic Change Ž 343 —

and requirements on space systems are likely to be

as follows:

Impact Assessment: Effects of climate on processes

and natural resources. —This area of the program concerns direct climate effects such as the development

of crop yield models and energy demand models in

terms of climate variables. Demonstration programs

such as the Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment

(LACIE), and the snowmelt runoff project in California have provided important tests of the uses of spaceacquired data. It is recommended that such activities

continue with even greater end-user involvement.

These demonstration projects provide for development of effective user application models.

Climate System Research: a) Developrnent of climate simulation and prediction models.—The main

contribution to this area is likely to be from improved

computer power and computation techniques. Space

systems will provide better global data both as input

to the models and as a check on model outputs. This

will remove input data as a source for model errors

and permit selection of the best modeling approaches.

b) Studies of physical climate processes.–ln order

progressively to extend our knowledge of the overall

climate system, certain key processes are selected for

detailed study. There is, for instance, a good deal of

interest currently in ocean-heat transport, air-sea interactions, the oceans’ role in the global carbon cycle,

and stratospheric processes. Space systems, in conjunction with other measurement techniques, will

contribute significantly to these process studies.

Data, Information, and Services: a) Observation.–

The object here is to compile an accurate, objective

record of climate behavior for both applications and

research. It is in this area that space capabilities will

make the most important contributions to climate activities. The observation programs are subdivided

along climate regimes: atmosphere, oceans, cryosphere, stratosphere, and solar. The contributions are

likely to be as follows:

1 ) Atmosphere: Data from the operational weather

satellites are first used for weather purposes. These

data are then archived and become a major contribution to the climate record. They include atmospheric

temperature, moisture, cloud imagery, and sea-surface

temperature.

2) Oceans: As the oceans cover three-fourths of the

Earth’s surface, they have a profound effect on the

climate. Because the areas are so vast, satellites, in

combination with in situ devices, provide an effective

approach to measurements. Plans are now being formulated for progams extending into the next decade

to understand the oceans’ role in climate. A key aspect

is how the oceans store, transport, and redistribute

heat globally. These problems will be addressed

through a progressive series of studies culminating in

a global ocean circulation experiment. A typical interim experiment is the CAGE experiment to measure

the fluxes of heat, mass, and momentum through

“fixed” ocean and atmospheric boundaries. Satellites

will be needed to give the heat balance at the top of

the atmosphere and provide other supporting data

(e.g., data collected from drifting buoys).

A key satellite experiment in ocean climate studies

will be the TOPEX mission. As currently planned, the

mission will use a satellite altimeter and radar scatterometer to measure sea-surface topography and

wind fields. The aim is to provide information on surface currents and wind stress, The mission may include a microwave radiometer to provide improved

sea-surface temperature data. These data, especially

on a global scale, are very important to the understanding of the transport of energy from lower to

higher latitudes and the exchange of energy between

the ocean and the atmosphere. The TOPEX mission

derives from the GOES, SEASAT family of altimetric

satellites. It is planned for flight in the mid- 1980’s.

3) Cryosphere; The expansion and recession of the

polar ice packs are thought to be important indicators

of climate. The annual variations in the extent of continental snow packs may also be an indicator. Certainly the extent of continental and polar ice cover influences the radiation balance of the planet. The ICES

satellite mission is an experiment to give detailed data

on the great Greenland and Antarctic ice packs.

One recent study indicates that the rise in sea level

since 1940 may be related to the melting of the polar

ice caps as a result of atmospheric warming due to

increased CO2 in the atmosphere. The melted ice

would tend to cool the oceans and thereby the atmosphere, masking a direct thermal signal of increased C02

. Satellite data on the oceans, polar

regions and the stratosphere will be needed to gain

conclusive data on these questions.

4) Stratosphere: Important progress has been made

in developing satellite-borne stratospheric composition measurement techniques. Much of this effort has

been stimulated by concern over changes in the stratospheric ozone layer. An ozone monitoring sensor is

being developed for incorporation onto the operational weather satellite system to enable ozone

monitoring.

At the present time, the precision in satellite ozone

measurements is about that of Earth-based measurements. But satellite data provide a global view difficult

(if not impossible) to infer from the sparse ground

measurement network.

94-915 0 - 82 - 23
344 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

5) Solar: The Sun provides the energy which gives

rise to atmospheric and oceanic movements. There

are attempts under way to measure variations in solar

energy arriving at and leaving the Earth (the radiation

budget) and to relate such variations to climate

variability. The Earth radiation budget experiment is

part of this effort. Because of the complex nature of

atmospheric absorption, it is necessary to monitor the

radiation above the atmosphere. Spacecraft provide

the only means for continuous solar and Earth radiation monitoring.

6) Diagnosis and Projection: Climate diagnosis is

the detailed analytical and statistical study of climatic

events to try to relate climate observations (temperature, pressure, winds, etc.) with the inner workings

of the climate system. Diagnostic studies associated

with the Southern Oscillation (SO) and other atmospheric and oceanic phenomena hold potential for

developing new techniques for seasonal climate

prediction.

Because ocean conditions tend to persist over several months, it may be possible to predict several

months in advance when certain abnormally cold winters are likely to occur over the populous eastern

United States.

However, in order to verify these hypotheses and

assess the reliability of resulting predictions, much better sea-surface temperature (SST) data will be needed.

The most reliable data are probably provided by ocean

buoys. But these data leave wide ocean areas uncovered. Reliable satellite-acquired data, because of

wide area coverage, will be a great improvement. Existing satellite-measured SST data are not sufficiently

precise to meet climate requirements; improved SST

sensors are required.

Requirements From the National

Climate Program

Now that the program components have been introduced, it is of interest to discuss certain requirements inherent to climate monitoring. The overriding requirement is for a continuous, intercomparable data record for a span of time that is

climatologically significant. In most instances, this is

several years. More generally, the longer the record

the more valuable it is in determining the likelihood

of “extreme” occurrences. Yet, even a period of few

years exceeds the life of most satellite sensors. Thus,

in the planning for monitoring from space, account

must be taken of the need for continuity of data, requiring intercalibration of instruments, documentation

of data handling techniques, and so forth. This is referred to as the development of climatically significant

data sets.

Secondly, because of the nature of the climate system and the resulting central tendencies of the data,

monitoring for climate is likely to require greater preciiion than short-term monitoring (e.g., weather). That

is, where one is measuring diurnal variations in temperature there are likely to be greater fluctuations

than, say, in the annual mean temperature from year

to year.

Thirdly, there must be a commitment to acquire and

prepare new and existing data for climate uses. This

may involve some risk. At this stage, one is not always

certain that the “best” parameters are being measured. Nevertheless, in order to make useful tests,

analyzable data sets covering significant time periods

must be available, For example, it was planned that

the Earth radiation budget should be monitored over

at least one solar activity cycle (1 1 years). Yet, because

of severe budget constraints, there is no activity under

way to sustain the measurements beyond the initial

system to be launched in 1984.

Because of the vast and remote areas involved, and

because of the general hostility of the environment

for measurement equipment, satellite systems (in conjunction with in-situ platforms) offer a reliable, costeffective way to collect important ocean-climate data.

This was demonstrated during the global weather experiment. During this and the next decade, efforts

must be made to gain further knowledge of the processes by which the oceans transport and store heat.

New satellite techniques (for measuring surface currents, wind stress, and surface temperature, interalia)

have promise for playing major roles in those efforts.

Stratospheric monitoring and polar ice monitoring will

also contribute to early detection of climate change.

The Climate Program Impact Upon

National Space Policy

OTA has outlined six principles and associated

issues underlying U.S. civil space activities. The impact of the National Climate Program is analyzed in

relation to each of these principles quoted below:

1. “Space activities maybe justified by political,

as well as by social, economic, scientific, technological, or other benefits.”

In the early years of the space program, national

space goals were primarily engineering-oriented. The

cutting edge of space technology was in learning how

to successfully launch and recover space vehicles, to

“put a man on the Moon by 1970.” Now that much
Appendix E—World Climate, the oceans, and Early Indications of Climatic Change ● 345

of the engineering capability is secured, it would appear that any new national space goals are more likely to be oriented toward application of space technology. Indeed, the national governmental policy challenge for the 1980’s seems to be shaping up to be to

make the economy stronger, in which case all programs, including space activities, will be evaluated in

terms of their economic contribution.

The long-term goals of the national climate program

are primarily economic—to be able to routinely predict climatic variations (weekly to seasonal) for

economic payoffs in energy conservation, agricultural

productivity, water resources management, and resort

management as well as long-term climatic change

potentially associated with, say, atmospheric COZ

buildup. The near-term objectives of the climate programs are primarily in research aimed at improved

understanding of climate on which to build climate

prediction skills. Therefore, the climate program applications of space technology can be seen as economic in the long run and mainly research or scientific in the short term.

There are certain characteristics of the climate program’s space requirements that must be taken into account i n the formulation of any comprehensive national space policy:

a) Remote sensing from space is essential to

climate research and forecasting, For obtaining certain climatic parameters, e.g., measuring the Earth

radiation budget, there are no alternatives to spaceborne sensors.

b) Climate studies require long periods (often

measurable in decades) of data continuity. This is

different from most other space applications (e.g.,

weather). Consequently, the accuracy and precision

of data useful for short-term purposes may be wholly

inadequate for climate.

c) Climate studies require truly global coverage.

Present coverage is inadequate because data from

the tropical oceans and the Southern Hemisphere,

which are crucial to climate forecasts, are most

sparse. Future coverage may be even less complete

if the number of meteorological satellites is reduced

in response to fiscal constraints.

d) Overall, U.S. climate program activities are

more reliant upon multipurpose satellites, especially

meteorological satellites, than on climate satellites.

There is an open question whether this trend will

be continued into the future because climate research requirements and the evolving climate forecasting skill will necessitate:

—monitoring climate-unique parameters potentially requiring unique satellite orbits or unique

sensors;

—improved long-term data continuity; and

—increased data volume, possibly demanding the

total payload of a given satellite.

On the other hand, if these capabilities can be obtained through reliance upon multipurpose satellites, it would seem potentially more efficient. A

system of multipurpose Earth remote-sensing satellites could result in fewer space platforms carrying

the same same sensing capacity.

2. “The United States should be ‘a leader’ (cf.

Space Act of 1958) in ‘aeronautical and space science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities . . . “

Climate research and climate forecasting are inherently global, Climate activities, following the precedent set in meteorology, are characterized by a high

degree of international cooperation and sharing, e.g.,

GARP. However, in practice most of the remote sensing in support of climate studies around the world has

been done by U.S. satellites.

While the U.S. commitment to climate studies and

forecasting will serve to maintain U.S. visibility in

world climate activities, the objectives of U.S. climate

activities are primarily economic and scientific. It is

in the best interest of the U.S. climate program to

maintain an atmosphere of international cooperation

and participation so as to gain scientific and engineering support from other nations in the interests of efficient and rapid cooperative progress in climatology.

3. “Civilian and military space activities will be

conducted in separate (and independent) institutional structures. ”

Since the climate program will, for the foreseeable

future, procure much data from space platforms justified primarily for other purposes, ownership of those

platforms whether by military or civilian institutions

will make no difference so long as data quality, quantity, and timeliness are adequate. Conversely, if the

climate program requirements evolve in such a way

as to necessitate dedicated climate satellites, the integration of U.S. military and civilian satellite systems

under a common institutional structure could affect

climate data acquisition, but that effect cannot now

be projected.

4. “The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, established by the Space Act of 1958,

is authorized to conduct research, development,

construction, testing, and operation for research

purposes of (aeronautical and) space vehicles. It

is not authorized to have operational responsibility for space systems. ”

The national climate program, as a user of multipurpose satellites owned and operated by nonclimate
346 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

program entities, would be neutral on the question

of the identity of the U.S. civil space system operator.

However, to the degree that the climate program’s

data requirements necessitate a dedicated climate

satellite system, the operational responsibility question will be acute.

5. “Commercialization of space technology and

applications should be promoted. ”

From the point of view of the potential commercial

supplier of climate remote-sensing data, the climate

program with its requirement for long-term data continuity would appear a promising market.

From the point of view of Government climate program managers, commercialization of the satellites

that supply climate observations is of concern primarily in terms of cost but also in terms of data quality

and timeliness. If a large, diversified (many firms)

satellite remote-sensing industry were to develop,

inter-firm competition could be expected to work in

the interests of the climate programs to keep data

prices low and data quality, quantity and timeliness

high. If, on the other hand, the private remote sensing industry were to be essentially monopolistic, the

climate program managers’ concerns would be justified.

On a broader commercialization question, if the entire climate program were to be commercialized, it

seems obvious that the satellites supplying the climate

data would also be commercial. Commercialization

of the entire climate program is a possibility only in

the long run after climate forecasting has been proven,

and even then total commercialization seems improbable.

The evidence is strong that the core of the climate

program will remain a public function for the foreseeable future and that no more than the value-added

components will be commercialized. Climate forecasts, the long-term objective of the climate program,

are certain to be, in part, public goods. Certain major

public policy decisions, such as those potentially

associated with CO1

, acid rain, or ozone, will be

heavily dependent upon climate forecasts. The forecasts themselves and the capability to produce them

will almost certainly be a government responsibility

because the market for such global climate predictions

will not be commercially viable. Hence, a core climate

program capability will be governmental for the foreseeable future.

6. “The United States will engage in cooperative, international activities involving peaceful

uses of outer space. ”

As discussed under issue B, climatology is global in

nature, U.S. climate activities are rooted in international cooperation, and remotely sensed climate data

are openly shared in the international community.

Nonetheless, it is an open question whether the U.S.

would feel comfortable being reliant upon foreign

owned/operated satelites for our core climate observations.
Appendix

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIM

F

E

OF OUTER SPACE

Introduction

Few human endeavors have occasioned the degree

of international legal scrutiny given to the development of space technology. Because space activities

generally involve technologies that do not respect national boundaries, new stresses have been placed on

traditional international legal principles. These principles, based on the rights and powers of territorial sovereignty, are often in conflict with the most efficient

utilization of new space systems. In order to resolve

the complex legal problems that have arisen in the

space age, nations, both technologically advanced

and developing, have been forced to rely increasingly on international cooperation.

The purpose of this appendix is to discuss the important legal principles and international organizations

that have been developed to regulate the use of outer

space. Additionally, it describes the possible effects

that these principles and organizations may have on

private sector interest and investment in specific space

systems. It should be noted that since this discussion

focuses exclusively on the international legal regime

of outer space, the many complex issues involved in

the domestic regulation of private investment in space

technology are not discussed.

International Organizations

This appendix only discusses the activities of the

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

(COPUOS), the International Telecommunication

Union (ITU), and the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Though

there are numerous other international organizations

whose activites involve outer space to some degree,

most are not involved in formulating of international

law and policy.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

COPUOS has been, and continues to be, the chief

architect of the international legal regime of outer

space. COPUOS was established by resolution of the

General Assembly of the United Nations (U. N.) in

1958 to study the problems brought into existence by

the advent of the space age,l COPUOS is composed

‘ U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1348 (X111) “QuestIon of the Peaceful

Use of Outer Space, ” Dec. 13, 1958.

of two subcommittees, one of which studies the scientific and technical, and the other the legal aspects of

space activities. Since its inception, the Legal Subcommittee has been responsible for the formulation of five

major treaties:

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,

Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

(1 967)2

Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the

Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects

Launched into Outer Space (1968)3

Convention on International Liability for Damage

Caused by Space Objects (1 972)4

Convention on Registration of Objects Launched

into Outer Space (1 974)5

.

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on

the Moon and Other-Celestial Bodies (1979)6

With the exception of the 1979 Moon agreement, the

United States has signed and ratified each of these international agreements.

COPOUS is currently conducting negotiations in the

following areas:

●

●

Remote sensing. COPUOS has been negotiating

a statement of principles on remote sensing since

1979. Considerable disagreement still exists between states on this subject and it is unlikely that

a consensus will be reached in the near future.

Direct broadcast satellites. COPUOS has been involved in trying to reach agreement on a set of

principles for direct broadcast satellites since

1968. However, there seems to be no easy solution to the debate betweeen states advocating

21

8 UST 241 O; TIAS 6347; Senate Report No. 8, 90th Cong. 1 st sess., April

17, 1967; Senate CommKtee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 90th Cong.,

1st sess., staff report on “Treaty on Prlnclpies Governing the Actlwtles of

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, ” committee print, 1967.

‘19 UST 7570; TIAS 6599; “Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the

Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched Into Space: Analysis and Background Data;” Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space Science, 90th Cong. 2d sess., committee print, July 16, 1968.

4

24 UST 2389; TIAS 7762; Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space

Sciences, 92d Cong., 2d sess., staff report on “Convention on international

Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob)ects, ” committee print, 1972.

5TIAS 848(I; Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences; 94th

Cong., 1st sess,, staff report on “ConventIon on Registration of Objects

Launched into Outer Space, ” committee print, 1975.

6U. N. General Assembly Resolution A/34/68, Dec. 14, 1979; Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology, 96th Cong., 2d sess., “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestlal

Bodies, ” committee print, 1980

347
348 . Civilian space Policy and Applications

free flow of information and those advocating a

regime of prior consent.

Ž Nuclear power sources in space. Since the Cosmos 954 accident in 1978, in which radioactive

debris from a Soviet satellite fell on northern

Canada, there has been increased international

concern over use of nuclear energy to power satellites. COPUOS has focused its attention on four

major issues: safety, prior notification, emergency assistance, and liability for damages. To date,

no international consensus has been reached.

Ž Delimitation of outer space. The question of

where air space ends and outer space begins has

troubled international legal theorists since the

beginning of the space age. The Soviets have

recently proposed that outer space should be

considered to begin in the area of 100 to 110 km

above sea level, The United States has consistently maintained that no decision should be taken

until a more complete understanding of the scientific and technical characteristics of low-orbit satellites is obtained.

● Military activities in space. COPUOS has periodically addressed issues relating to militarization;

current treaties ban nuclear weapons and other

weapons of “mass destruction. ” Discussions of

military activities have increased lately, now that

both the United States and the Soviet Union are

developing anti-satellite devices and other weapons. A number of developing countries have objected to militarization, and in 1981 the Soviet

Union proposed that the General Assembly discuss a draft treaty prohibiting the stationing of all

weapons in outer space, with special reference

to the U.S. space shuttle. The U.S. has objected

to attempts by COPUOS to take up this issue.

International Telecommunication Union

ITU is an international, intergovernmental organization and the U.N.S’ specialized agency for telecommunications.7 The purpose of ITU is to coordinate and

regulate international activities in the field of communications. Since radio communication is essential

to all outer space activities, it was logical that ITU be

charged with the task of allocating radiofrequencies

for space as well as terrestrial communications. To this

end, a World Administrative Radio Conference

(WARC) was held in 1959 that resulted in the first international agreements applicable to space activities.

The basic governing documents of ITU are its Constitution and its Administrative Regulations. The Con7

For a detailed look at ITU, see, Radiofrequerrcy Use and Management:

Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979, Office

of Technolorw Assessment, 1982. .

stitution is revised by the Plenipotentiary Conference

when technological (and recently, political) changes

reduce the effectiveness of existing provisions. The Administrative Regulations are updated more frequently

through WARCS and Regional Administrative Radio

Conferences (RARCS) and are the means by which the

technical coordination and regulation of international

communications is actually accomplished. Membership is open to all countries and currently ITU has 154

members. The formal results of RARCS and WARCS

are reached by each country exercising one vote and,

when ratified by the member states, they have the

force of international treaties.

The primary function of ITU is to allocate the

radiofrequency spectrum among competing services

(e.g., fixed, mobile, aeronautical, maritime, and space)

and to register the frequency assignments of its member states in order to avoid interference. The international Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) of ITU performs many of these important technical functions.

IFRB records the frequency assignments made by different countries in accordance with WARC and RARC

regulations and furnishes advice to ITU members on

technical matters (e.g., the maximim practicable

number of radio channels in those portions of the

spectrum where harmful interference may occur). In

1973, the duties of ITU were enlarged by a modification of its Convention. This modification provided that

IFRB was “to effect . . . an orderly recording of the

positions assigned by countries to geostationary satellites. ”9

ITU has been the major forum in the recent debates

regarding the a priori grant of portions of the radio

spectrum and the geostationary orbit to countries presently lacking space technology. This subject is discussed in greater detail in section IV.

UNESCO

Though UNESCO does not have a technical or regulatory role such as ITU nor a broad mandate similar

to that of COPUOS to address international space

issues, it has been active in the discussion of spacerelated problems. Some of its more important activities

include:

● Convention on satellite signal piracy. UNESCO,

together with the World Intellectual Property

Organization, sponsored an international conference in 1974 which adopted the “Conventionr

Relating to the Distribution of Program me-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite’’.l O States party

‘International Telecommunications Convention (Geneva), Dec. 21, 1959;

TIAS 4892, 12 UST 1761.

glnternational Telecommunication Convention, 1973, article 10(3); TIAS

8572.

10N .M. Matte, Aerospace Law, 1977, PP. 39-40.
Appendix F—The International Legal Regime of Outer Space Ž 349

to the Convention agree to “take adequate measures” to prevent the distribution of “program ecarrying signals” by unauthorized personnel.

● Satellite broadcasting and the free flow of information. UNESCO has also been working on a

“Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of

Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange”. ’ 11 Strong objections have been

voiced against this declaration on the grounds

that instead of encouraging the free-flow of information, it encourages censorship. Many believe that this Declaration of Principles was used

by its authors as a means to attract international

attention to the “New World Information Order”

(discussed infra, sec. Ill (c)(3)).

● Technical assistance to member states. UNESCO

has worked with a number of African, Asian, and

Latin American states, helping them to assess their

general communication needs. UNESCO is presently conducting several long-range studies to

determine the practicality of using regional satellite systems to supply educational and cultural

development programs to certain developing

countries.

The Status of Nongovernmental Entities

As the role of private industry varies within each of

the nations of the world, and as it is those nations and

not their private industries that enter into international

space agreements, it is understandable that some confusion exists as to the legal status of private industry

in outer space. This section will examine some of the

practical and theoretical problems that arise when trying to fit the activities of private enterprise into a

framework designed primarily to regulate the actions

of states.

In the United States, it has been consistent government policy to encourage the involvement of private

enterprise in its space programs. When President

Eisenhower announced his administration’s space policy in 1960, he stated:

(T)o achieve the early establishment of a communication satellite system which can be used on a commercial basis is a national objective which will require the

concerted capabilities and funds of both Government

and private enterprise . . . With regard to communication satellites, I have directed the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration to take the lead within the

Executive Branch both to advance the needed research

and development and to encourage private enterprise

to apply its resources toward the earliest practical

11 u ,N, Document A/AC, 105/1 04, Jllly 2S, 1972.

utilization of space technology for commercial civil

communications requirements (emphasis added).

This enthusiasm for private enterprise was not

shared by all nations. In 1962, the Soviet Union submitted to COPUOS a “Draft Declaration of the Basic

Principles Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. ” It was

suggested in the draft that, “All activities of any kind

pertaining to the exploration of outer space shall be

carried out solely and exclusively by States . . . “13 The

United States responded to this position by pointing

out that pursuant to U.S. policy, as reflected in the

Communications Satellite Act of 1962, private firms

had already been given the right to engage in space

activity. In order to reconcile this conflict, the United

States proposed that states bear the responsibility for

the launching of space vehicles, whether such vehicles

be the property of the state or its nationals.14 In this

manner, the United States hoped to reassure other

states that private activity could be controlled, albeit

indirectly, through international regulation.

The principle of state responsibility for the actions

of its nationals is incorporated in both articles Vi and

IX of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.15 Although the

1967 Principles Treaty does not specifically grant

private industry the right to undertake activities in

outer space, the U.N. debates on this subject make

it clear that such activities were contemplated by the

drafters.

A few authors have suggested that though the 1967

Principles Treaty may sanction the presence of

nongovernmental entities in space, article I can be

read to prevent the commercial use of outer space. ’ 16

Article I states, in relevant part:

The exploration and use of outer space, including the

Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out

for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific

development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

It is argued that commercial use would be contradictory to article 1, in that its drafters intended the benefits

of outer space exploration and use to flow to all mankind, and not to private investors. This somewhat technical argument finds little support in either the specific

language of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or its legislative history.

1 ZWhite House Press Release, Dec. 30, 1960; see also, D. D, Smi[h, Communication wa Satellite, 1976, p. 72.

I JU N. Document A/AC. 105/L.2; U. N. Document A/5/81 Annex 3.

14u “N , DOcu ment A/AC. 105/L.5 U, N. Document A/5/81, Annex 3.

I Ssee Aflicle VI of the Outer Space Treaty.

16see, for example, Marcuff, Traite’ de Droit International Public de 1’

Espace, 1973, p. 671.
350 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

State Responsibility for Nongovernment Entities

Given that private enterprise may conduct activities

in space for profit if the appropriate state will take

responsibility for such actions, it becomes necessary

to examine the nature of this responsibility. Some

authors, in analyzing article VI of the 1967 Principles

Treaty, have suggested that a state’s responsibilities

are extensive:

(While no one would doubt the need for government

control over space activity at its present stage, the second sentence of article VI would prohibit, as a matter

of treaty obligation, strictly private, unregulated activity in space or on celestial bodies even at a time when

such private activity becomes most commonplace. Although the terms “authorization” and “continuing

supervision” are open to different interpretations, it

would appear that Article VI requires a certain minimum of licensing and enforced adherence to government-imposed regulations. ’ 7

In addition to article Vi’s general statement of responsibility, article IX of the Principles Treaty requires

that if a state or its nationals are going to undertake

any activity in space which “would cause potentially

harmful interference with activities of other states,”

then the state planning the activity “shall undertake

appropriate international consultation before proceeding with any such activity. ”18 Article IX’S requirement that the international consultation shall precede

the proposed activity is quite significant, in that it imposes an active duty to regulate rather than a merely

passive duty to supervise. Under article IX a state has

a duty to interfere with or prohibit altogether potentially harmful activities by its nationals at least until

such time as the effects of the proposed activity are

made known to the international community.

The Outer Space Treaty does not attempt to direct

states as to how these responsibilities should be carried out. This is appropriate since a state’s control over

its nationals involves complex questions of domestic

law. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, on the other hand,

was not written to supply an exhaustive set of rules

to regulate the conduct of states, but rather to sketch

the rough outline of a new international regime.

One of the more important attempts to delineate the

responsibilities of states in outer space occurred in

1972 with the adoption by COPUOS of the “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by

Space Objects.” This treaty extends the concept of

state responsibility to include the concept of liability

for damage caused by space objects. Article II of the

Liability Treaty establishes the principle that a launching state is absolutely liable for “damage caused by

1 Zjaserltuleyarla and Lee, Manual Of Space Law, VOI. 1, 1‘379, P. 17.

lasee Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty.

its space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight. ”19

Two points should be mentioned here. First, the

1972 Liability Convention does not grant either rights

or responsibilities to nongovernmental entities. If the

nationals of a launching state cause damage, it is the

state damaged, under article Vlll, which “may present to a launching state a claim for compensation. ”20

This somewhat formalistic approach to compensation

is sufficient at this time since states exercise almost

complete control over launch and tracking facilities

and there is no “pure” private enterprise in outer

space. However, as the activities of private enterprise

increase in frequency and scope, new and more efficient procedures will have to be developed to handle the claims for compensation which are certain to

arise.

A second point of interest concerning the Liability

Convention is the fact that it applies, by its terms, only

to “launching states” which are defined in article I as:

● a state that launches or procures the launching

of a space object; and

● a state from whose territory or facility a space object is launched.

Under this scheme, if state A launches a space object for the nationals of state B, both states are considered launching states and have joint liability for

damage under article V of the Liability Convention.

This is the case even though under the language of

article IX of the 1967 Principles Treaty it is state B that

bears the international responsibility for the “potentially harmful” activities of its nationals. This problem

is somewhat alleviated by article V of the Liability Convention that allows a state that has paid compensation for damages “to present a claim for indemnification to other participants in the joint launching. ”

These rather complex international remedies are

presently workable only because it is the activity of

states and not individuals that predominates in space.

As this situation changes a new legal regime, which

more fully comprehends the role of the individual in

space activities, will have to be developed.

Limitations on Nongovernmental Entities

Having discussed the status of private activity in

space and the methods of control over such activity,

it is important now to examine the limitations that the

present legal regime of outer space places on the activities of the private sector. To answer this question

requires an analysis of several recently articulated principles. These are the Principle of Nonappropriation

Igsee Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.

%ee Article Vlll of the Outer Space Treaty.
Appendix F—The International Legal Regime of Outer Space ● 351

of Space Resources, the Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM), and the New World Information Order.

PRINCIPLE OF NONAPPROPRIATION

The 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles included

the statement that, “Outer space and celestial bodies

are not subject to national appropriation by claim of

sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any

other means. ”2l With minor changes, this language

is repeated in article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty

and article Xl (2) of the proposed Moon Treaty. The

legislative history of these instruments and the subsequent activities of states has revealed little controversy concerning the prohibition against appropriation

by claim of sovereignty. However, this harmony of

opinion has not recently been shared with regard to

the prohibition against appropriation by means of use

or occupation.

The issue of appropriation by “use and occupation”

involves a number of complex considerations. Most

ventures into space involve some degree of appropriation, since the placement of a satellite into orbit

precludes the use by other states of that same orbit,

Any alteration of the present “first come, first served”

use of the geostationary orbit or in the rights of priority

now recognized as applying to currently operating systems could have serious repercussions on the U.S.

communications industry. Some third world countries

have suggested that radiofrequency assignments and

the incidental use of the geostationary orbit should

be limited to the life of the satellite. This suggestion

is contrary to the current practice in the United States.

In the United States, the Federal Communications

Commission licenses communication common carriers to provide a continuous service to the public.

Some third world countries have argued that this

method of continuous use is tantamount to an appropriation. As a result they advocate the a priori

allocation of radiofrequencies and orbit positions (see

sec. IV infra).

The proposed Moon Treaty recognizes the problems

inherent in a “first come, first served” method of

allocating resources and attempts to limit the effects

of de facto appropriation on the exploration and exploitation of the Moon and other celestial bodies.22

The recognition of the problem appears in article Vlll

where it is stated that states parties “shall not interfere

with the activities of other states parties, ” This section clearly grants an important right to “first users”

of Moon resources. This right is then qualified by arZI u ,fQ. General Assembly Resolution 1962, article XVIII, par. 3.

22LJ ,N. General Assembly Resolution 34/68, “Agreement Governing the

Actlvltles of States on the Moon and Other Celestlal Bodies, ” Dec. 14, 1979.

ticle IX’S statement that a “station shall use only that

area which is required for the needs of the station”

and article Xl (3)’s statement that such stations “shall

not create a right of ownership over the surface or subsurface of the Moon or any areas thereof. ”

THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND (CHM)

Though the CHM principle is complex in its application, in theory it is quite simple. Basically stated, the

principle maintains that there are certain resources,

such as the minerals on the ocean floor and on the

Moon, that are presently under the jurisdiction and

control of no sovereign power. These resources, being

finite and exhaustible, should not be allocated to the

developed countries on a first come, first served basis,

but rather, should be used for the benefit of all nations. Though this principle has recently received its

greatest attention in relation to the Law of the Sea Convention, it has frequently appeared in discussions concerning the exploration and use of outer space.23

In 1958, when President Eisenhower announced his

administration’s space policy, he called upon states

“to promote the peaceful use of space and to utilize

the new knowledge obtained from space science and

technology for the benefit of mankind.”24 Subsequent

to this statement, the concept that space activities

should be undertaken for the benefit of mankind appeared in the NAS Act of 1958,25 in important General

Assembly resolutions on space and as article I of the

1967 Principles Treaty. Although these “common interest” clauses found their way into the major space

treaties, there was considerable uncertainty as to their

status within the body of international law. Some

authors have suggested that these “common interest”

clauses were merely pragmatic principles without legal

force. Others believe that the placement of the “common interest” clauses within the operational part of

treaties, as opposed to a mere statement of intentions

in the preamble, indicated that such provisions must

be regarded as binding.2G As a binding principle it

ZJR. B, Owens, statement at hearings on the Moon Treaty, “Agreement

Govern~ng the Activkies of States on the Moon and Other Celestlal Bodies, ”

before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d sess.,

1980. Ambassador M C. W. Pinto of Srl Lanka has Interpreted the CHM principle to apply to the law of the sea In this manner: “Thts (Common Heritage

of Mankind) means that those (seabed) minerals cannot be freely mined. They

are not there, so to speak, for the taking. The common heritage of mankind

is the common property of mankind. . If you touch the nodules at the

bottom of the sea, you touch my propefly. If you take them away, you take

away my property. ”

Z4’’lntroductton to Outer Space,” an explanatory statement by the President’s Science Adwsory Commmee, 1958, p. 1.

25C. Q. Christol, “The Legal Common Heritage of Mankind: Capturing an

Illusive Concept and Applylng it to World Needs, ” XVIII the Co//oqutum on

the Law of Outer Space, 1976, p. 42.

2bN. M. Matte, “Aerospace Law: Telecommunications SatellNes, ” Center

for Research of Air and Space Law, McGIII University, p. 38.
352 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

created an obligation among states “to be in some

form responsive to the interest of developing countries, and to provide for some form of distribution of

benefits derived from such (space) activities.”27

The principle of CHM has generally been opposed

by the private sector. The most common argument

heard in this regard is that any attempt at international

regulation of the profits derived from space will inhibit private enterprise from making the necessary investments in space technology. Advocates of this position often point to article Xl (7) of the proposed Moon

Treaty’s statement that one of the purposes of the international regime is to assure “an equitable sharing”

of resources.28 It is argued that the concept of

equitable sharing is inconsistent with the concept of

profit, and in the absence of the profit motive private

enterprise cannot be expected to risk capital on space

investments.

The most repeated criticism of the CHM principle

is that it lacks proper definition. It is argued that its

“novelty, generality, philosophical underpinnings—

as opposed to legal—and uncertain historical pedigree” render it far too vague to act as a tool in the

regulation of international conduct.29 These criticisms

are valid at least to the extent that they regard the principle’s uncertainty, for except for article Xl of the

Moon Treaty’s suggestion of an international regime,

nowhere are a state’s duties under the CHM principle defined.

THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER

The New World Information Order is a principle espoused by the Soviet Union and certain third world

countries that maintains that there is an imbalance in

both the amount and kind of news emanating from

the information and communication systems controlled by the Western industrialized nations. These

countries allege that as a result of this imbalance the

third world and communist countries have been portrayed in a distorted manner to the populations of the

developed countries, while the populations of the deZTlbid., p. 39.

Z8Article XI (7) of the Moon Treaty states: “7. The main purposes of the

international regime to be established shall include:

(a) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the

Moon;

(b) The rational management of those resources;

(c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources;

(d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from

those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countires as well as the efforts of those countries which have

contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the

Moon shall be given special consideration.

%. Q. Christol, “The Common Heritage of Mankind in the Moon Treaty,”

paper submitted to symposium on “Space Activities and Implications, ”

Center for Research of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Oct. 16-17,

1980.

veloping countries have been subjected to the “cultural imperialism” of a capitalist, consumer-oriented

society. The New World Information Order seeks to

remedy this situation by: 1 ) encouraging the development of a third world information infrastructure; 2)

controlling the West’s access to developing countries;

and 3) limiting the Western media’s ability to disseminate information in developing countries. so

The long-term effects of this principle on the free

flow of information throughout the world are, for the

most part, beyond the scope of this report. However,

the continued adherence to the New World information Order by a substantial number of Communist and

third world countries could have important near-term

effects in the field of satellite communications. Most

notably, the Western developed nations can expect

to encounter strong opposition to the previously used

“first come, first served” method of allocating the electromagnetic spectrum and the orbital positions in the

geostationary arc (discussed in greater detail below).

In addition, private communications firms may encounter new tariffs and regulations designed to slow

the flow of information and communications services

to the third world. New tax laws have also been proposed which would require the payment of a portion

of the assessed value of information flowing into or

through a country. Future restrictions can also be expected on the establishment of ground stations and

on access to the foreign transmission lines necessary

for the terrestrial transmission of satellite data.

Communications Satellites

Not long after ITU began to regulate satellite communications certain international tensions arose concerning its methods of allocating what many believed

to be scarce space resources.Jl Radiofrequencies that

have been duly registered with ITU receive international recognition and protection. Therefore, early

registration of a radiofrequency is given priority over

later requests for the registration of the same frequency. Many developing nations have voiced opposition

to this principle of priority on the basis that future

access to the radio spectrum and positions in geostationary orbit, which are necessary for effective satellite communication, will be limited by the present

activities of the developed nations.

Reflecting this concern, the ITU convention was

modified in 1973 to state:

‘OB. Cowlan, “internationally Organizing for Space, ” paper submitted to

International Conference on Doing Business in Space, Nov. 12-14, 1981,

reprinted in ALI-ABA Conference Materials.

31 rd. M. Matte, op. cit.
Appendix F—The International Legal Regime of Outer Space ● 353

In using frequency bands for space radio services,

Members shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and

the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural

resources, that they must be used efficiently and economically so that countries may have equitable access

to both in conformity with the provisions of the Radio

Regulations according to their needs and the technical

facilities at their disposal .32

There is considerable confusion in the international

community as to what is meant by the “efficient and

economical” use of radiofrequencies and the geostationary orbit. The developing states have argued that

because these resources are limited, an a priori allocation should be made to assure that countries which

presently do not utilize space may be able to do so

in the future. The states with substantial space

resources have generally taken the position that attempts to reduce space to an “international condominium” are neither efficient and economical nor

sanctioned by international law.

It has been argued by the United States that the

allocation of space resources on any basis other than

use is inefficient because it reduces the incentive to

adopt spectrum and orbit conserving technologies and

patterns of use.33 The United States and other developed countries maintain that through the creative use

of the frequency spectrum, as seen in the adoption

of 30/20 G Hz for communications, and the development of new space systems, such as large space platforms, the future needs of the developing countries

can be easily met. However, some third world countries feel that it is not in their best interest to continue

to rely on the developed countries to supply their

communication needs. Several of these countries,

notably India and Brazil, are in the process of developing an indigenous satellite communication capability.

In the near future, the communication systems developed by these countries will be less sophisticated and

therefore less efficient than those designed by nations

already well versed in space technology. A priori allocation plans are attractive because the satellites they

will be developing may require the type of orbital

spacing presently utilized. The developing countries

may argue that it is in their best interest to resist an

international regime predicated on the development

of advanced, resource-efficient technology because

such a regime would render their indigenous technology obsolete.

There is some question as to whether a priori allocation plans might not be contrary to the letter and the

spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Article 2 of the

treaty states:

J~lnternat(ona/ Te[ecornmuntcation COflveflttOfl, OP. c;t

]Qffice of Technology Assessment, Op. cit., P. 30

Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial

bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim

of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by

any other means.

The developed countries have taken the position that

the assignment of orbital positions to states would constitute an appropriation and therefore is forbidden by

the Outer Space Treaty. The third world has generally argued that since the geostationary orbit is only

useful in connection with communication satellites,

and since ITU regulates the latter, it should also have

jurisdiction over the former. The United States has opposed this extension of the power of ITU.

The subject of a priori allocation of radiofrequencies and geostationary orbit positions was addressed

but not resolved at the latest WARC in 1979. This subject will be debated again at the 1983 RARC and the

1984 WARC where, it is hoped, a reasoned and practical solution can be found that will accommodate the

needs of both the developing and the developed

nations.

Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS)

DBS are a new generation of communications satellites capable of transmitting signals strong enough to

be picked up by individuals utilizing small (less than

1 m in diameter), home receiving dishes.J4 This is to

be contrasted with the currently operating communications satellites that transmit weak signals to large,

fixed Earth stations that must then rebroadcast the

signal to the public using terrestrial facilities.

The major advantage of DBS technology is that it

does away with the need for an elaborate terrestrial

distribution system, thereby making possible the transmission of programs to widely dispersed populations,

remote areas, or to countries without a sophisticated

communications infrastructure. The research and development necessary to realize DBS technology was

undertaken by the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration and proven in both the U.S. ATS-6 and

the Canadian/U. S. CTS satellites. Presently, France,

Germany, Luxembourg, and groupings of Arab and

Scandinavian countries are planning for DBS systems

or for multipurpose communications satellites able to

directly broadcast.Js Some of these systems are planned for operational status by the mid-] 980’s.

Though DBS technology offers the potential for

large-scale educational, health and public service

programing–a fact that was amply proven by the

Wee generally: “Policies for Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellites,”

Federal Communication Commission staff report, September 1980.

JSBarbara Luxenberg, “Preliminary OK for Direct Broadcast Satellites, ”

Aeronautics and Astronautics, September 1981, p. 20.
354 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

U.S./India ATS-6 experiments–some have raised

serious questions concerning the international regulation of this technology. The Soviet Union has expressed concern that DBS maybe used to spread propaganda or misinformation designed to create social

unrest. Several third world countries have expressed

the fear that this technology will be used by the

Western, developed nations as a tool of cultural or

economic imperialism. It is feared that commercial

advertising by the developed countries might disrupt

the social fabric of developing nations by creating a

demand for consumer goods that is not consonant

with national plans for social and economic development.

The Soviet Union, France, and numerous Third

World countries have argued that the sovereign rights

of a country prohibit broadcasting across national

boundaries in the absence of a prior agreement with

the receiving state. The United States has opposed this

view and has advocated a policy of free flow of information. The opposition of the United States to the doctrine of prior consent has centered around four major

themes that can be summarized as follows:qb

1.

2.

There has been insufficient experience with

broadcast satellites to determine what, if any,

political constraints should be placed on their

use. In the DBS debates of the early 1970’s the

United States argued that it was unwise to fashion

regulations without knowing the specific problems that would be caused by this technology.

The ATS-6 experiments in India were frequently

used as an example of the fact that the control

over programing and distribution of DBS services

could remain firmly within the local government

of the receiving country, thereby obviating the

need for international regulation. The United

States still maintains that as experience with

transborder DBS service grows, the fears of

“cultural imperialism” presently harbored by

many nations will diminish.

Enactment of a set of political principles for D B S

could inhibit the development of technology

valuable to the third world countries. Most of the

technical problems with DBS have been, or are

in the process of being solved. The two major

questions from a domestic U.S. perspective are

how to configure DBS satellites to respond to

specific markets and whether DBS offers a significant economic advantage over conventional

means of broadcasting. Restrictive international

regulations may make economically unjustifiable

JbThe following four themes derived from: Wilson P. Dizard, ‘‘The U.S.

Position: DBS and Free Flow,” )ourna/ of Communication, vol. 30, spring

1980, pp. 157-168.

3.

4.

the expenditures necessary to adapt DBS technology to the particular needs of developing

countries. This is particularly true if the private

sector is to play a significant role in this development.

ITU regulations constitute a sufficient safeguard

against unauthorized DBS transmissions. Some

U.S. experts argue that the need for technical coordination has obviated the need for political regulation. In addition to providing working definitions for the various types of DBS service and allocating frequencies to DBS, the ITU, in 1971,

adopted Radio Regulation 428 A which provides:

In devising the characteristics of a space station

in the broadcasting-satellite service, all technical

means available shall be used to reduce, to the

maximum extent practicable, the radiation over

the territory of other countries unless an agreement has been previously reached with such

countries.

In the view of the United States, the ITU procedures are a sufficient safeguard against the misuse of DBS technology and are, in fact, a form

of prior consent. The countries that do not accept this position argue that the ITU decisions

deal only with the physical transmission of a satellite signal and do not address the right of countries to regulate the message content of foreign

broadcasts.

The prior consent principle undermines the concept of international free flow of information. The

United States has taken the position that the free

exchange of ideas and information, as affirmed

in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and other U.N. resolutions, should

not be inhibited.q7 Many U.S. experts believe that

acquiescence in a prior consent regime for DBS

would be an undesirable precedent that could

be applied to other means of communication or

dissemination of information. The DBS issue can

be viewed as one aspect of a growing pattern of

restraints being promoted under the umbrella of

the New World Information Order.

In addition to the positions held by those advocating

prior consent and the United States, a third, compromise position has been put forward in a joint proposal by the Canadian and Swedish Governments.38

This proposal suggests that advance agreement would

be necessary concerning the basic issue of broadcasts

by the satellites of one country into the territory of

another country. However, the content of the trans37U, N. General Assembly Resolution 217 (Ill), Dec. 10, 1948.

Js’’Draft Principles Governing Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellite,”

U.N. Document A/AC, 105/1 17, 1973.
Appendix F—The International Legal Regime of Outer Space Ž 355

missions would be left to the discretion of the broadcasting country. To date, this proposal has not gained

substantial support of either the United States or the

countries which advocate a prior consent regime.

Remote Sensing

The term remote sensing refers to the use of satellites

capable of detecting reflected or emitted electromagnetic radiation for the purpose of gathering information about the Earth .39 Presently, the only civilian

remote-sensing system is the Landsat system of the

United States. Though this system is operated by the

Government, there is considerable indication that the

private sector may have a significant role to play in

remote sensing in the near future. (For a more complete discussion of the private sector’s role in remote

sensing, see ch. 2) If the policy decision is made in

the United States to encourage the private sector to

take as active a role in remote sensing as it has taken

in communications satellites, the Government must

ensure the existence of a receptive economic and legal

environment. The existence of a restrictive international regime could limit the private sector’s ability

to invest in this new technology.

There has been considerable discussion in the international community concerning what restrictions,

if any, should be placed on the use and distribution

of remotely sensed data. Some of the major principles

being discussed are:

Prior consent. Some states have argued that countries planning to engage in remote-sensing activities

should be required first to obtain the permission of

the countries they intend to sense.

Restricted data dissemination. A recent joint proposal by the French and the Soviets has suggested that

information gathered by remote sensing should not

be transferred to third-party states without the prior

consent of the state sensed.

Limited resolution. Some states have evinced concern regarding advances in remote-sensing technology

that will allow extremely detailed observation. They

feel that if such data were freely available from a

civilian commercial system it might threaten the

security and economic interests of the sensed state.

Unrestricted sensing. The United States has generally opposed the placing of restrictions on remote-sensing activities and data dissemination. The United States

presently maintains a policy of free data disseminaJqs ee generally: National Academy of Sciences, Resource Serwng From

Outer Space, 1977; N. M. Matte, H. DeSaussure, Lega/ /mp/ications of

Remote Sensing From Outer Space, 1976,

tion and regularly supplies Landsat data to other

governments, international organizations, private sector businesses and individuals.

It is helpful to analyze some of the legal arguments

used to defend the positions that were articulated

above. Basically, arguments that favor limiting remotesensing activities are premised on the assumption that

the rights of territorial sovereignty allow a state to protect itself from information gathering activities directed

toward its own natural resources. There is very little

in either traditional international law or i n the treaties

which deal specifically with space that substantiates

this assumption.

It is generally accepted that a sovereign nation may

protect itself from information gathering activities

within its borders, either on the ground or from the

air. The legal basis for each of these manifestations

of sovereignty is not necessarily applicable to outer

space activities. Because traditional international law

recognizes that the laws of a sovereign state apply to

all within its borders, activities of foreign nationals may

be controlled while they are physically within that

state. Likewise, traditional international law, and article 2 of the Chicago Convention of 1944, recognize

that a state has absolute sovereignty over the air space

above its national boundaries,40 Control over the activities of foreign nationals in both cases is predicated

on the fact that such activities are accomplished within

the sovereign territory of a state.

Remote sensing is problematic from a legal perspective because, on the one hand, it is an activity undertaken in space, and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty guarantees that space shall be “free for exploration and

use by all States;” yet, on the other hand, the activity

is directed toward the observation of territories under

the control of separate sovereign states.

For this reason, many nations have argued that some

form of international control is necessary to protect

the interests of the sensed states and to prevent abuses

that may result from the dissemination of remotely

sensed data. The United States takes the position that

restrictions on remote sensing would result in data being available to only those states having the financial

and technical ability to provide their own space and

ground systems. Furthermore, even if a country had

the technology to fly a remote-sensing system, it would

not be inclined to do so if it knew in advance that it

would have to undertake the financially prohibitive

and scientifically disadvantageous exercise of separating the billions of bits of remotely sensed data

along political boundaries.

’61 Statistics 1180, 15 U .N.T. S. 295.
356 ● Civilian Space policy and Applications

OUTER SPACE TREATY

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in

the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Done at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967;

Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America

April 25, 1967; .

Ratified by the President of the United States of America May 24,

1967;

Ratification of the United States of America deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow October 10, 1967;

Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America October 10, 1967;

Entered into force October 10,1967.

BY THE P RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF A MERICA

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon

and Other Celestial Bodies, was signed at Washington, London, and

Moscow on January 27, 1967 in behalf of the United States of America,

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and was signed at one or more of

the three capitals in behalf of a number of other States;

WHERE.AS the text of the Treaty, in the English, Russian, French,

Spanish, and Chinese languages, as certified by the Department of

Stab of the United States of America, is word for word as follows:

(23)
ANNEX XIX

Article Z

Article 111
45s ANNEX XIX THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 459

Article IV . .

Article V

Article VI

Article VII

Article 1X

Article X
.4rtic/2 XI

Article Xll

Article X111

.4rticle XIV

Article XV

Article XV1

Article XV1l

I
Appendix G

BACKGROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS

Early United States/Soviet Competition

Prior to world War II, the leading centers of rocket

research had been Germany and the Soviet Union.

In both cases the primary impetus for research was

military, supported by extensive amateur and civilian

activities. The United States, by contrast, lacked a coordinated rocket program, though the work of isolated

individuals, notably Robert Goddard, helped give the

United States an important experimental base.

During the war many nations developed rockets for

various military uses, particularly tactical battlefield

support (the Soviets relied heavily on massed rocket

barrages); but by far the most advanced work was

done by the Germans. This culminated, late in the

war, in the first long-range unmanned vehicles: the

V-1, an air-breathing “cruise missile” used for shortrange attack on population centers such as London,

and the much more advanced and dangerous V-2, the

first operational ballistic missile.

At the end of the war two of the rival victors, the

United States and Soviet Union, divided up the majority of the German rocket assets. The Soviets, having

occupied the main German testing center at Peenemunde on the Baltic Sea, seized the bulk of the hardware, while the Americans (along with the British and

French) succeeded in capturing and employing many

of the most talented scientists and engineers, including

the most important, Wernher von Braun. In both the

United States and U. S. S. R., these resources formed

the basis for each country’s succeeding rocket programs.

The direction and pace of these programs were determined above all by the differing military requirements of the two nations. During the decade following World War 11, the United States relied for its security (and that of its allies) on its large fleet of long-range

bombers equipped with nuclear weapons. Stationed

in Europe and the Far East, these forces were capable

of directly attacking the Soviet Union and hence of

deterring any hypothetical Soviet conventional attack

in Europe. The Soviets, on the other hand, had no

comparable delivery system, for they lacked both the

bombers and, even more importantly, forward bases

within range of the continental United States. The

Soviets therefore saw long-range ballistic missiles as

the only way to counter U.S. nuclear superiority, and

placed a correspondingly high priority on their development. The type of missile they proceeded to build

was determined first of all by the extreme heaviness

of the first generations of Soviet weapons, as well as

by the inaccuracies of the missiles themselves. To be

effective at long ranges, even against large unprotected targets (i.e., cities), these missiles had to carry

very heavy, high-yield (multi megaton) warheads.

Hence, the missiles themselves had to be, above all,

large. The result was a series of large, inexpensive, inefficient (relatively low thrust) boosters capable of carrying thousands of pounds halfway around the world

—or into orbit. It is these early designs, first perfected

in the mid-l 9s0’s, that still today serve as the backbone of the Soviet missile fleet, both for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) and for orbital launchers.

The United States, in contrast, did not at first feel

a similar urgency to develop ICBMS, especially the

very heavy variety favored by the Soviets. However,

by the mid-l 950’s the United States had several rocket

development programs under way: the Army’s Jupiter

booster; the Thor and Atlas missiles (developed by the

Air Force); and a civilian booster, Vanguard, which

was, however, essentially managed by the Navy.

Contrary to popular belief, the Soviets were not reticent about their intention to launch an artificial satellite; as early as 19.ss, Soviet scientists were predicting

success within a few years, and the October 4, 19s7,

orbiting of Sputnik was foreshadowed by numerous

public statements. Nevertheless, the public and international surprise was intense, and there were widespread demands for the United States to match or surpass the Soviet challenge. There were several reasons.

The Soviet Union and United States each had grown

accustomed to seeing the other as rivals across a

whole range of political, economic, and cultural activities. Both saw themselves as representing social and

economic systems whose superiority would be demonstrated by whether they could outperform their

competitors. At stake for e,ach was the legitimacy of

its system in the eyes not only of its current adherents

but of billions of potential adherents throughout the

world. The United States was acknowledged to be the

leader in economic and scientific affairs, and although

the Soviets took pains to publicize the ever-growing

amounts of steel, concrete, oil, and foodstuffs produced annually, it was increasingly clear that competition in the nuclear age was more a matter of quality

than quantity. In no technical area had the Soviets

been able to outperform the West; Sputnik was a blow

to the West’s confidence in the superior quality of its

science and technology, and hence in the superiority

of the political/economic system that produced it.

With hindsight we can see that Sputnik represented

an exceptional case of temporary leadership brought
Appendix G—Background for International Programs c 361

about by the special emphasis on heavy missiles described above. The sophistication of the Soviet payloads and instrumentation, including their manned

capsules, was well below that of even the first U.S.

satellites. It did not indicate a comprehensive capability in advanced technologies on a par with the United

States; it did not even indicate, as many thought it

must, that the Soviets enjoyed a dangerous lead in military ICBMS. The “missile-gap” controversy, which

played an important role in the 1960 Presidential election, and which prompted a major commitment by

the United States to the deployment of U.S.-based

ICBMS and foreign-based MRBMs, as well as to civil

defense, was a chimera. There is no doubt that the

Soviets, upon seeing Sputnik’s effect on world opinion, did their best to foster the notion of across-theboard Soviet technical and military equivalence, if not

superiority, and that this effort, abetted by the extreme

secrecy with which the Soviet program was conducted, was largely successful, especially in the third

world. In particular, Premier Khrushchev asserted that

the Soviets, with their ICBMS, which could supposedly

“hit a fly in outer space,” had achieved strategic

nuclear parity with the United States.

That these claims were exaggerated became clear

in 1962 when Khrushchev, lacking the credible Sovietbased ICBM force he had earlier claimed, attempted

to redress the balance by placing MRBMs in Cuba,

with disastrous results. Soviet space successes, and the

Western reaction, played an important role in public

estimates of comparative military strength. The above

shows why it was the United States and the U.S.S.R.

that were the first to develop boosters capable of

launching substantial payloads into orbit. Other countries, lacking these military/competitive needs, did not

at first choose to expend the resources needed to develop an independent booster capability. It is instructive to note that France, the European nation historically most eager to have its own launcher, and the one

that has already built its own MRBM deterrent, is also

Western Europe’s largest nuclear power and the one

most determined to remain independent of the superpowers. Similarly, China’s launcher development program has been motivated by its determination to field

a nuclear delivery system.

Having developed missiles capable of launching

payloads into orbit, both the United States and the

U.S.S.R. began to construct a number of different satellites. Scientific instruments, remote-sensing cameras,

satellites for weather observation and military surveillance, communications satellites, and manned spacecraft were all flown within a few years of Sputnik. The

type and pace of development were determined by

a combination of scientific and technical curiosity, military requirements, prospective social and economic

benefit, and, especially for the manned programs,

prestige and competition. By the end of the decade,

the United States had developed manned and unmanned civilian systems demonstrably superior to

those of the Soviet Union. During the 1970’s, competition was reduced, due partly to d~tente and a general lowering of tensions between the two countries,

and also to the differing emphases of the respective

programs, While the United States focused on the

space shuttle, the Soviets orbited the Salyut series of

manned, resupplyable orbiting laboratories. increasingly, competition with the Soviets has changed from

open and highly publicized civilian space spectaculars, to secret military and intelligence systems. (For

further details see ch. 7.)1

Joint European Efforts

In 1960-61, three separate European agencies were

created to deal with different aspects of space. The

European Launcher Development Organization

(ELDO) aimed at creating a jointly funded launcher,

eventually named the “Europa. ” ELDO was basically

a coordinating body for separate national projects; the

eventual plans for Europa called for a British first stage

(the Blue Streak military IRBM), a French second stage,

a West German third stage, Italian test satellites, Belgian downrange guidance systems, and Dutch telemetry links. By 1968, the cost estimates for the Europa

had climbed from an initial $190 million to $71o million to $77o million, causing intense disagreements

among the participants. The military implications of

possessing a long-range missile complicated agreements even further.2 As a result of the problems

caused by inadequate coordination, none of the 11

test launches of the Europa, the last of which took

place in 1971, succeeded in placing a payload in

orbit.J Along the way the British, dismayed by rising

costs for what they saw as obsolescent technology,

decided in 1968 to reduce their financial commitment

and eventually withdrew altogether. This left France

as the project’s strongest backer. In 1973, the Europa

was finally cancel led in favor of a new project, the

Frenchdominated Ariane, which was eventually taken

up by the European Space Agency (ESA).

1 For information on the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet

Union, see Soviet Space Programs 1971-75, 2 VOIS., Congressional Research

Service Staff Repofi for Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Aug. 30, 1976; Jerry Grey, Enterprise (New York: William Morrow

& Co., 1979); and James Oberg, Red Star in Orbit, (New York: Random

House, 1981).

‘Mihiel Schwarz, “European Policies on Space Science and Technology

1960-1978,” Research Policy 8, 1979, p. 208.

3See World-Wide Space Activities, CRS Science Polic Research Division,

report done for House Committee on Science and TecK nology, September

1977, pp. 265-273.
362 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The second major agency was the European Space

Research Organization (ESRO) which was formally established in 1962. Loosely modeled on CERN, the cooperative European Nuclear Research Center, ESRO

intended to develop satellites and instruments for conducting scientific experiments in space, including

tracking and relay stations, and to procure launch services.4 ESRO (unlike ELDO) achieved a high degree of

credibility, and was able to cooperate successfully

with NASA and other countries. A major difficulty

ESRO faced, one which it shared with ELDO, was the

principle of “juste retour” (fair return). Participating

countries contributed to the agencies a certain assessment (for ESRO, an amount roughly in proportion to

their gross national product), and the agency contracts

were supposed to be let in the same ratios; i.e., if

France provided 20 percent of the budget, 20 percent

of the amount of ESRO’S contracts were supposed to

be with French firms (in fact, France’s share of the contracts was consistently higher than its budget contribution).s This resulted in many contracts being let on

political and partisan grounds rather than to the lowest or most qualified bidder.6 Eventually, to circumvent the destructive and time-consuming quarreling

over contracts, European aerospace and electronics

firms formed themselves into three formal multinational consortia-called COSMOS, MESH, and STAR–

to bid on European projects.

From 1967 to 1975 (when it merged into the ESA),

ESRO launched nine scientific satellites and 168

sounding rockets7 The most important development

over time was a growing interest in applications satellites; in 1968, ESRO was first given a mandate to study

applications, especially in communications and meteorology. By 1975, ESRO was engaged in four major

applications projects: 1 ) a maritime navigation satellite, Marots; 2) an experimental communications satellite, OTS; 3) Aerosat, a joint venture with the United

States for aeronautical communications; and 4) Meteosat, a regional meteorological satellite.

A third organization, the Conference Europeéne de

Telecommunications par Satellites (CETS), was formed

to discuss European participation in INTELSAT. It was

made up of national Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph

(PTT) agencies and played little role in formulating

space policy or programs.

In 1966, the members of ELDO, concerned about

lack of harmony between countries and programs,

established the 12-nation European Space Conference

4

1 bid., p. 237.

‘See Walter McDougall, “Space Age Europe 1957-1 980,” paper presented

at the Conference on the History of Space Activity, Yale University, Feb. 7

1981, p. 6.

%chwarz, op. cit., p. 211.

TWorld-Wide Space Activities, op. cit., pp. 254-256.

(ESC), which met for the next 9 years and provided

the forum for the founding of ESA in 1975.

There was first of alla consensus within the ESC that

there should be a single coordinated European program, but there was disagreement about the relative

weight to give the three program areas: science, applications, and launch vehicles. Basic science and

launcher development were already the province of

ESRO and ELDO, respectively, but applications activities were seen as increasingly important. For one

thing, U.S. and Soviet successes with communications

and weather satellites had shown the usefulness of

space applications. For another, there was increased

European awareness of the importance of advanced

technology in maintaining a competitive position in

international trade and influence vis-à-vis the superpowers, especially the United States. In 1967, J.

Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s book, “The American

Challenge, ” in which he predicted the decline of European industry faced with American technical and

managerial superiority, “polemicized the United

States economic invasion of Europe and aroused a

popular interest in technology comparable to the Sputnik aftermath in the United States.”8 At the same time,

however, there was increasing concern in both Europe

and the United States about reaping useful economic

and social benefits from space technologies; by the

end of the 1960’s, there was little enthusiasm on either

continent for large prestige projects such as Apollo.

To be publicly acceptable, investments had to be justified by concrete and relatively short-term payoffs,

The British skepticism about continuing the Europa

project, mentioned previously, reflected this shift; the

British saw Europa as an unnecessary and expensive

item being pursued to the detriment of more useful

and technically advanced applications satellites. The

British, along with the Italians and a few others,

thought U.S. launchers were perfectly adequate and

likely to be considerably cheaper than the inefficient

Europa. The prolauncher countries, however, led by

France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, thought that

the United States could not be counted on to launch

European applications satellites that might compete

with U.S. systems, especially in telecommunications.

The United States had launched ESRO’S scientific satellites without any problems, but there were no guarantees as to other types of payloads.

In 1969, the question of the American relationship

became a key issue. In making plans for the postApollo space program, U.S. policy makers placed

strong emphasis on soliciting European participation,

‘JHenry Nau, Nationa/ Po/ltm and /nternationa/ Technology (Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 55.
Appendix G—Background for lnternational Programs ● 363

partly to strengthen political and economic ties and

partly to lessen the costs. In October 1969, the United

States proposed that Europe undertake to build a

major segment of the proposed space transportation

system. Emphasis was placed on the “space tug, ” an

expendable orbit-to-orbit rocket, because the expertise accumulated in developing the Europa could be

used to develop the tug. The Europeans concurred,

and began extensive planning for eventual construction. However, in 1972 the United States withdrew

its offer, partly because the entire post-Apollo program

was being scaled back, because of doubts about European technical capabilities; and also because the Air

Force thought the military potential of the tug was too

great to permit dependence on outside sources.9 Instead, the United States “offered” the Europeans the

sortie lab (later known as Spacelab) or a number of

constituent parts of the space shuttle. Withdrawal of

the tug proposal angered the Europeans, not only

because of the considerable time and expense invested, but because some countries, particularly

France, were suspicious that the United States did not

want the Europeans to develop their own space

transportation capability, and wished instead to retain

a U.S. monopoly on launchers. One result was renewed commitment to a European rocket; another

was French consultation with the Soviet Union about

possible future use of Soviet launchers.

The question of U.S. guarantees to launch European

applications satellites was related to U.S.-European

collaboration, in that many Europeans were convinced that such guarantees were contingent on European willingness to build and fund part of the U.S.

post-Apollo program. In 1971, the United States promised to assist with Iaunches, provided they were “for

peaceful purposes and consistent with obligations

under relevant international arrangements’’.10 Similar

assurances were later granted to all “other countries

and international organizations on a nondiscriminatory, reimbursable basis.”11 The United States insisted

that this policy would be honored regardless of European participation: the qualification of consistency

with “relevant international arrangements” was, however, a potential stumbling block, especially to launching European communications satellites. The relevant

agreement was the “International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) Agreement, ”

signed August 20, 1971, which, in article XIV, required

9Schwarz, op. cit., p. 22o.

10Le~er from u, A, Johnson, U ,S. Under Secretary of State for PO[itica[ Affairs, to Mlntster Theo Lefevre, Cha~rrnan of the European Space Conference,

Sept. 1, 1971.

I I See ‘ ‘Launch ASSU rances pOllcy, ” White House Press Release of Oct. 9,

1972; in Space Law: Se/ectecf Basic Documents, 2d cd., committee print for

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, December

1978, p. 557.

signatories to consult with INTELSAT to ensure the

“technical compatibility” of any proposed operational

international telecommunications satellites, as well as

to avoid “significant economic harm” caused by regional competition. In fact, this issue did affect plans

to launch the French-German Symphonic communications satellite, which the United States agreed to do

(in 1971) only after it was declared an experimental

rather than an operational system, in part to avoid the

issue of whether the United States would launch an

operational satellite.12 This experience strengthened

French determination to develop an autonomous

launch capability.

Resolution of these issues made the negotiations in

ESC over establishing ESA prolonged and complicated.13 Essentially, the successful outcome involved

compromise among the three largest participants,

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, with each

agreeing to back the others’ preferred projects i n exchange for reciprocal support.

The French wanted to build a launcher, specifically the L3S or Ariane, which was first conceived in 1972

as a unilateral French project. In order to get ESA support, the French agreed to provide the bulk of the

funding for research and testing (approximately 60

percent), with Germany providing some 20 percent,

Belgium 5 percent, and various other participants the

remainder. The British reluctantly agreed to a 1 to 2

percent contribution. The Ariane would be launched

from France’s spaceport at Kourou in French Guiana,

and the main contractor would be a French firm,

Aerospatiale.

West Germany had been a strong backer of a European launcher and also of the proposed space tug.

When the tug offer was withdrawn, the Germans’ preferred project became Spacelab, which they saw as

a vehicle for conducting scientific and commercial experiments as well as for improving German industrial

and technical skills. More so than the French, the Germans believed that U.S. launch guarantees could be

trusted. Following high-level talks between President

Pompidou of France and Chancellor Brandt of Germany in 1973, the two countries agreed to a quid pro

quo: the Germans would fund approximately 60 percent of Spacelab, and the French 20 percent, in return

for similar but reversed support for Ariane.14

The United Kingdom had less enthusiasm for supporting a wide range of major space projects than

either France or Germany, preferring to concentrate

on applications satellites and on cooperative scientific

12wor/d. wjc/e Space Activities, Op. Cit., P. 1961.

I ~For detail discussion see World-Wide Space Activities, Op. cit., PP.

293-303.

)aWor/d. W;de Space Activities, op. Cit., P. 286.

94-9: 5 n - B 2 - 25
364 • Civilian Space Policy and Applications

programs. Though Britain strongly favored the establishment of a single European space agency, British

support for ESA hinged on the potential competition

between its Geostationary Technology Satellite (GTS)

and ESRO’S proposed Marots maritime communications satellite. Eventually, Britain agreed to drop its

GTS in favor of becoming the Marots project leader

and providing some 56 percent of the funding. It also

agreed to support the Ariane and Spacelab programs,

though at fairly low levels. These compromises (the

so-called “Second Package Deal”) were essentially

worked out by July 1973, paving the way for the drafting of an ESA charter and the founding of ESA in May

1975.

France

In 1960, France announced plans to build an IRBM

designed to carry nuclear weapons, and an industrial

consortium called SEREB was formed to build military

missiles. SEREB eventually became active in civilian

developments as well. In 1961, a civilian agency, the

Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), was

formed under the Ministry of State for Scientific

Research, Atomic and Space Affairs.

At first the French hoped for close cooperation with

the United States, but the United States was reluctant

to transfer its newly acquired missile technology

abroad.15 After considerable effort, the first operational

French IRBM, the S-2, was deployed in 1971, and the

first submarine-launched missile in 1972.

Meanwhile, CNES began work on a series of civilian

launchers, the so-called “precious stones” series. The

only successful launcher was the Diamant version,

which in November 1965 orbited the first French satellite, the 42-kg Asterix, from the French testing grounds

in Saharan Algeria. France was also a major participant in ELDO, whose ill-fated Europa was to have used

a Diamant as its second stage. The Diamant in various

versions made successful orbital flights from Algeria

and later from the Kourou spaceport in French Guiana

~Swor\d.wide s~ce Activities, op. cit., p. 148.

until 1973, A large number of the satellites launched

were used for military-related geodetic work; others

were for experiments in communications and atmospheric research.

The French also built satellites for launch on U.S.

and Soviet vehicles; the first U.S.-launched French

satellite went upon December 6, 1965 (oniy 10 days

after the Asterix, suggesting that the French were

understandably eager to have the first French satellite

placed in orbit by a national launcher). In 1971, the

Soviet Union launched a French scientific satellite,

Aureole. Talks with the Soviets began in 1965 and a

number of cooperative projects, including the training of two French astronauts for an upcoming Salyut

mission, have taken place.

Great Britain

The British initiated a two-stage military rocket program in 1956. In 1960, the program was canceled due

to a conviction that it was militarily obsolete; the “Blue

Streak” first stage was then proposed as part of ELDO’S

Europa launcher, of which Great Britain was initially

a strong supporter.

During the 1960’s Great Britain developed a number of scientific satellites known as the Ariel series,

the first of which was launched by the United States

in 1964. Great Britain was an active supporter of both

ELDO and ESRO; in addition, it embarked in 1964 on

a major launch development program known as Black

Arrow. In 1971, the Black Arrow succeeded in orbiting

a single 66-kg satellite, called Prospero, from the

Australian test range at Woomera, following which the

program was canceled. Despite the L1 1.5 million

spent, the government determined that using U.S.

launchers would be significantly less expensive–unIike the French, the British had no concern that the

United States would balk at launching commercially

competitive or military payloads. In 1969, the United

States orbited the first of two Skynet geosynchronous

military communications satellites.l G

lbWOr/~wi& s~ce Activities, op. cit., pp. 217-234.
Appendix H

INDUSTRIAL INNOVATIVE PROCESS

Innovation

If the United States is to remain a leader in the development and use of space technology, it will be necessary to enlist a greater share of private resources to

augment the contributions of the Federal Government. In each of the four technologies dealt with in

this report, the opportunities for private investment

have increased dramatically in very recent times. In

its attempts to encourage industrial participation, the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) has not only identified many potential commercial applications for space technology, but has developed new institutional mechanisms for increasing

the flow of Government expertise and resources to

the private sector. With a few exceptions, however,

the private sector has remained unenthusiastic about

the prospects of investing in space.

The purpose of this appendix will be to take a brief

look at the process of innovation in order to establish

a framework within which to discuss the issue of commercializing space technology. Because the subject

of industrial innovation is complex, and highly dependent on subtle factors such as the willingness to

take risks and the acuity of technical and business

judgments, generalizations in this area can be deceptive. Nevertheless, it is useful to identify some of the

key factors that motivate the private sector to allocate

resources to the pursuit of product development and

improvement.

Innovation is generally defined by economists to be

the first commercial application of a new or improved

product or production process. The process by which

innovations are developed can be viewed as a sequence of three interdependent events. ’

Ž Generation of an idea, involving the synthesis of

a market need and the recognition of a technical

capability for meeting that need.

● Problern solving including the setting of specific

technical goals and the search for alternate methods

of meeting those goals.

● Irnplernentation or commercialization, consisting of

engineering design, tooling for production, plant

construction, production and marketing start-up,

and first commercial introduction.

Analyzing these three stages, it becomes apparent

that the management of technical innovation requires

much more than the maintenance of a productive

research and development (R&D) laboratory. It is a

‘James M. Utterback, “Innovation in Industry and the Diffusion of Technology,” Science, vol. 183, Feb. 15, 1974, p. 621.

corporation-wide task that involves the skills and personalities of everyone from the scientists and engineers

in the lab to the top legal and financial management.

Because of this wide spectrum of interested parties,

the process of project selection is highly dependent

on the flow of information within the firm. The object of scientists and engineers is generally new knowledge, and they tend to focus on the problem of technical success.

Managers, on the other hand, are concerned with

marketing a profitable product and therefore focus on

development time, risk, and potential return on investment. This marked difference in interests and goals

may result in a communication gap that prevents management from getting the technical information that

it needs to assess projects accurately.2

This problem is particularly significant in the context of NASA’s desire to involve the private sector in

the commercialization of space technology. The process of project selection within a firm is already complex. When the administrative problem of coordinating NASA’s management structure and technical expertise with that of the firm is added, such a project

may appear unattractive. NASA’S Joint Endeavor

Agreements (discussed in ch. 8) and related institutional arrangements are designed, in part, to address

this problem.

The Decision to Innovate

Innovation is one means used by firms to stimulate

growth and to compete with other firms within an industry. Improvements in a product or process can lead

to a reduction in the costs of production or improvements in performance or quality. In this manner, innovation can increase a firm’s market share, profits, or

both. Innovation may also be directed to the development of new products targeted for existing or potential markets.

Innovation is not the only way, and often not the

best way for individual firms to stimulate growth and

to compete. These goals can also be accomplished

by noninnovative methods designed to maximize

sales, such as advertising or new marketing strategies,

or to minimize cost, as by standardizing production

techniques. A firm is also not limited to internal

development, but can pursue growth and a competitive edge through merger, acquisitions, and diversification.3

‘Edwin Mansfield, The Economics of Technical Change, 1968, pp. 59-61.

‘Attilio Bisio and Lawrence Gastwirt, Turning Research and Development

Into Profit, 1979, p. 37.

365
366 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Within the industrial sector a small number of specific industries make a disproportionate contribution to

the total annual amount of R&D expenditures. Table

H-1 demonstrates that five industrial categories–aircraft and missiles, electrical equipment, machinery,

motor vehicles, and chemical products—accounted

for over 75 percent of total industrial spending in 1978.

The large interindustry differences in R&D expenditures illustrate the fact that different firms and different

industries do not attach the same importance to R&D

investment.

The decision by a firm to allocate resources to the

pursuit of innovation can be viewed as a function of

two major factors. The first is the firm’s potential for

innovation as dictated by external considerations such

as the structure and maturity of the industry, the industry relationship with Government and the overall

state of the economy. The second factor is the firm’s

willingness to innovate as dictated by internal financial, technical and human resources and the particular

corporate strategy, or “personality,” of the firm.

Potential for Innovation

Federal Government programs, incentives, and regulations have a significant role to play in the creation

of an industry’s operating environment, Federal Government support of the electrical equipment and aerospace industries is largely responsible for the fact that

these two industries combined constitute almost half

of the entire R&D expenditures in 1978 (table H-1).

By supplying the funds or the financial incentive to

conduct research, and by guaranteeing a market for

new product and process innovations, the Government can encourage a level of R&D activity that would

not otherwise be maintained. (This subject is discussed

in greater detail later).

Of course, this is not to say that Government financial support is the main factor in stimulating industrial

innovation in all industries. Certain industries, notably

pharmaceuticals and chemicals, maintain very high

R&D to sales ratios and receive very little Government

support. 4 This is the result of the fact that competition in these industries is primarily based on new product development and improved product performance.

Another factor that affects the level of R&D spending is the structure of a particular industry. Whether

or not it is profitable for a firm to invest in innovative

activities is to some degree dictated by the number

of potential rivals and the overall market profit potential. in an industry composed of many small sellers,

such as home construction or brick manufacturing,

the rate of innovation has been traditionally very low.

4D. Schwartzman, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry.

This results in part from the fact that no single firm

controls a significant enough portion of the market to

make a sustained research endeavor profitable. Since

market share directly affects revenue flow and the return that a firm may anticipate on a particular investment, firms with a small share of a particular market

cannot afford to make large investments in R&D. S

Innovative activity tends to be greater in new industries and industries characterized by rapid growth

and expanding markets.6 Initially, competition in these

industries is based on product quality and performance and a second-best product may have little value.

However, as such industries begin to mature, competition starts to become based on price and the production process, and therefore the product becomes relatively standardized. Innovations that are pursued after

this time tend to be incremental process innovations

that will lower the unit costs of production. Eventually, as large investments are made in plant and equipment, manufacturers are less inclined to pursue radical

innovations in either the product or the manufacturing process, as this could render their existing capital

base obsolete.7

An interesting example of this can be seen in the

U.S. satellite communications industry. Until 1973,

NASA played the leading role in the development of

advanced communications satellite technology. When

the NASA program was phased down, it was assumed

that the private sector would continue to finance and

develop the communications systems necessary to

meet future needs. Though the communications industry did continue to fund R&D programs, most of

the research was dedicated to improving the operational capabilities and the reliability of existing

systems. As a result, the U.S. satellite communications

industry may face strong competition from the Japanese and the Europeans, both of whom have begun

to develop the high-frequency satellite systems that

may be necessary to meet the future demand for satellite communication services.

Industrial innovation is also affected by the overall

health of the economy. An economy characterized

by a high rate of inflation and generally volatile financial markets has an adverse effect on all types of investment but is particularly damaging to investment

in innovation. Under such conditions firms show a

preference for short-term, low-risk investments.

Radical innovations, which by their nature are risky

and often require long periods of time between concept identification and eventual commercialization,

do not compete well for corporate resources.

SMansfield, op. cit.

Wtterback, op. cit.

7Christopher T. Hill and James H. Utterback, Techno/ogica/ Innovation for

a Dynamic Economy, 1979, p. 53.
Appendix H—Industrial Innovative Process ● 367

I

co

.

0

0300JC7

NComm

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

“In
368 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The stimulus to innovate may also stem from critical shortages or a sharp rise in cost of the resources

necessary for production. For example, intensive

research on synthetic rubber was only undertaken

after certain cartel agreements caused the price of

natural rubber to increase dramatically.8 A more recent example is the aerospace industry’s attempts to

design jet engines with greater fuel efficiency. This

decision was undertaken in response to rising fuel

costs and the threat of temporary fuel shortages. Rising labor costs have also contributed significantly to

innovations in robotics and industrial automation.g

Willingness to Innovate

At the broad level of R&D strategy, individual firms

must assess the relative advantages of innovation v.

imitation. Innovation is attractive if being first yields

a strong market position and if barriers to entry (e.g.,

patent protection, capital requirements, control over

distribution) can be erected which limit the ability of

other firms to copy or improve upon a product.10 On

the other hand, the risk assumed by the imitator is

much lower, and if the innovator is very successful

he may create a market large enough to accommodate

the imitator. The R&D strategy of a firm can have many

different orientations to the market:11

Ž First to market—based on strong R&D, technical

leadership, and risk taking.

. Follow the leader—based on strong development

resources and the ability to act quickly as the market starts its growth phase.

. Applications engineering—based on product

modifications to fit the needs of particular customers in mature markets.

For each new product or service being sought or

considered, the firm must also assess the effects of that

product or service on the firm’s present manufacturing, distribution, and office facilities. New product

development can be sought to enhance an existing

area of competence such as a distribution system, a

production capability, or promotional skills. Such

development may also be primarily defensive in character, as when a firm pursues a product in order to

spread the risks of its involvement in a highly cyclical

industry.

The decision of a firm to allocate resources to innovation is a subjective determination on the part of

management that takes into consideration the need

to innovate, the probability that a given project will

%. W. Stocking and M. W. Watkins, Cartels in Action, 1964, p. 73.

gjohn D. Fisk, /ndustria/ Robs in the U. S.: /ssues and Perspectives, Congressional Research Service, March 1981.

IOBisio, op. cit., p. 37.

II Bisio, op. cit., p. 38.

be a technical and commercial success, and the financial ability of a firm to undertake the project. Although

formal, quantitative project selection techniques can

be used to project such factors as rates of return and

pay-out periods, in the final analysis the decision to

innovate is a strategic choice that depends upon a corporate manager’s business and technical acumen.

Some analysts have charged that U.S. corporate

managers have underestimated the need for innovation. They contend that this has resulted in the decline

in innovation and productivity growth and deficits in

the balance of trade. A recent article charged that

By their preference for servicing existing markets

rather than creating new ones and by their devotion

to short-term returns and “management by numbers,”

many (American managers) have effectively forsworn

long-term technological superiority as a competitive

weapon.

Because of the existence of other factors such as inflation, tax laws, labor costs, Government regulation,

fear of capital shortages, or the price of imported oil

it is difficult to gauge the truth of this assessment. It

is important to note, however, that to the extent that

corporate managers do rely on quantitative project

selection techniques, there is some evidence that such

techniques tend to be biased against ambitious projects with potentially large payoffs.13 These techniques

often utilize formal market surveys to compare the estimated returns on investment for alternative projects.

Reliance on such surveys can be misleading in that

consumers are often unable to appreciate the value

of major innovations before they are commercialized. 14 A Though major innovations may have a much

greater profit potential than modest product improvements, they are more difficult to justify using formal

market surveys.

This fact has important ramifications for potentially

commercializable space applications. Because such

projects involve both technical and market uncertainties, industry has viewed them as unattractive investment. It is difficult to assess, at this point, whether industry’s cautious view of space is the result of myopic

management techniques or insight based on experience in dealing with complex investment decisions.

IZRobert H. Hayes and William J. Abernathy, “Managing OUr Way to ECOnomic Decline,” Harvard Business Review, july-August 1980, p. 70.

IJEdwin Mansfield, et al., The I?oduction and Application of New Industrial

Technology, 1977, p. 43.

14Hayes, op. cit., p. 71; Hayes and Abernathy point out that: “The ar6ument that consumer analyses and formal market surveys should dominate

other considerations when allocating resources to product development is

untenable. It may be useful to remember that the initial market estimate for

computers in 1945 projected total worldwide sales of only 10 units. Similarly, even the most carefully researched analysis of consumer preferences for

gas-guzzling cars in an era of gasoline abundance offers little useful guidance

to today’s automobile manufacture in making wise product investment decisions. Customers may know what their needs are, but they often define those

needs in terms of existing products, processes, markets, and prices. ”
Appendix H—industrial Innovative Process ● 369

The answers to such questions may be forthcoming

as Europe and Japan target specific space technologies

for commercial application.

In space applications, as well as other high-technology industries, the Government has played, and continues to play, a major role in product identification

and development. It is important therefore to examine

the nature of this role and Some of the methods by

which it is accomplished.

Government Role in Innovation

The Government plays an extremely important role

in the innovative process, particularly in the area of

basic research. The impact of such financial support

has been particularly significant in the aerospace, electronics and computer industries, where expensive

basic research has been essential to product development. Government can provide financial support of

R&D both directly and indirectly, through a variety

of mechanisms. Such support does, however, raise important questions as to the appropriate roles of the

public and private sectors in the development and

operation of new technology. One way to address this

problem is to identify the kind of benefit–public good

or private good—that a new technology will provide.

A public good is one that cannot profitably be divided, priced, and sold to the individual members of

a collectivity (i.e., a city, State or country). Governments traditionally have existed to provide public

goods such as highways, sea and air navigation aids,

and national defense. A private good, by contrast, is

one that can be provided through a market transaction to those who desire it and are willing to pay the

price set by the provider, Of course, it is often the case

that a particular product or service produces mixed

benefits, making it difficult for a private sector supplier to justify the cost of providing the benefit. In this

situation, some argue that the Government should intervene to correct this lack of market incentive by

using public funds to invest in technology intended

for eventual use in the private sector.

Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally in the context of Government funding, the definitions of public

good and private good are highly political in character.

It is important to recognize that when discussing technologies that may benefit large segments of society,

it is a matter of judgment and philosophy, not an issue

for analytical resolution, which should be provided

through Government programs and which through

private activity.

The most controversial area with respect to R&D

funding by the Government is that in which eventual

commercialization is a major objective in the development program. Ordinarily, the private sector bears the

total responsibility for funding R&D intended to be incorporated into commercial systems. However, over

the past decade the Government has provided significant support, not only for basic research but also for

applied research, technology and systems development, and even demonstration projects in such areas

as space and energy technology.

A policy decision to support R&D in an area intended for eventual commercialization is a decision

to augment or override market forces as a determinant of R&D investment. In the United States, the scientific and technological sectors that have advanced

most rapidly in the 20th century, including space, are

those that have received substantial assistance from

the Federal Government.15 This assistance has taken

the form, among others, of direct financial support for

R&D and of the creation of Government organizations

to manage the research programs carried out with

such support.

The establishment of NASA, and this organization’s

early work on communications satellites, are examples

of substantial Government involvement in a commercially viable technology. Another example can be

found in the development of electronic component

technology. The reason for early U.S. domination of

this industry is directly related to the R&D support provided by the Government. In the early 1950’s, the military services, desiring to make their equipment more

portable and to increase its reliability in the field,

began to finance semiconductor R&Don a large scale.

Between 1955 and 1961, the Government spent approximately $66 million on semiconductor R&D and

production refinements.

Purchase Guarantees

In addition to direct financial support the Government may encourage innovation and the commercialization of new technologies in a number of ways, such

as guarantees, technology transfers, and favorable tax

treatment. One example of the influence of market

guarantees can be seen in the integrated circuit industry. Though the basic inventions in this industry resulted from work done under Government contract,

the technical breakthrough that allowed mass production was accomplished by Fairchild Industries without

any Federal support.16 The fact that there was a clear

Government demand for these products and processes was an important factor in the firm’s decision

to undertake this research in the first place. Future

15J. Schnee, “Government Programs and the Growth of High-Technology

Industries,” Research Policy, vol. 7 no. 2 (1978), p. 4.

lbOECD, Gaps in Technology: Electronic Components, 1968, p. 59.
370 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

developments in remote sensing may provide another

example of the importance of a Government-guaranteed market. Several plans have been proposed that

envision the transfer of the Landsat system to a private

sector organization. All of these plans are contingent

on the Government’s agreement to purchase its remotely sensed data from such an organization,

thereby guaranteeing that such a venture would have

a stable financial base.

Technology Transfer

In addition to providing assured product demand,

it is also significant that the Government develops

technologies that have either a director indirect usage

in the private sector. An example of this can be seen

in the computer industry. Because of Government

sales in this industry companies were able to fund their

R&D programs at very high Ievels.17 This resulted in

a rate of technological progress that exceeded that

which could have occurred in a normal commercial

environment. In addition, military requirements with

respect to computer size, speed, and reliability far exceeded what would have been requested by the business community. As a result, the technology that was

transfered to the private sector was far more sophisticated than it would have been without Government

involvement. Finally, because of the military’s extensive use of this new technology, the computer industry

was able to overcome the natural skepticism that

would have existed in the business community toward

an untried product. There are many examples of technology transfers in the aerospace industry that have

resulted or may result in important commercial products. The obvious examples that have been mentioned

above are advanced communication systems and remote-sensing technology.

Government Regulation

Though the effects of Government regulation on innovation are not completely understood, many are of

the opinion that regulation is a factor in the recent

decline of innovation in the United States. A recent

report by the National Research Council tended, with

certain reservations, to agree with this opinion.18 It

stated that though the reasons for the decline in U.S.

innovation are varied and complex, there are a number of cases (such as new pesticides, certain chemical

compounds and railroad shipping services), where solid documentation existed to prove that regulation contributed to this decline. *

I Zschnw, op. cit., p. 10.

locational Research Council, The Impact of Regulation on Industrial Inn*

vation, 1979, p. 9.

● The NRC report does point out, however, that in certain instances Government regulation may act to stimulate innovation. For example, though it apGovernment regulation can also delay the introduction of new and useful products and processes. An

example of this fact can be seen in the history of the

use of satellites for domestic communications. In 1963,

when NASA began launching its Syncom series of satellites utilizing the geosynchronous orbit, it became

apparent that the use of this orbit would have important applications for domestic communications. Yet,

it was not until 1974 that commercial domestic satellite service was available in the United States. This long

period between the technical realization and the commercial application of the technology was marked by

scores of legal and organizational battles over systems

ownerships involving the Federal Communication

Commission (FCC), the Justice Department, the White

House and the numerous segments of private industry

who wished to use the technology. The result of nearly

a decade of struggling was that FCC, in 1972, announced its multientry decision which held that any

qualified entity, subject to certain conditions, could

own and operate a commercial satellite system. Meanwhile, Canada had been enjoying for years a domestic

satellite system built by a U.S. company and launched

by NASA.19

In the near future, Government regulation will have

a significant role to play in the development of privately owned launch systems. At present, several different

agencies, each with uncertain authority, are issuing

regulations that have an effect on private launches.

No lead agency has been designated to address critical

issues such as aerial and maritime clearance, the development of new commercial launch sites, the need

for a comprehensive indemnification scheme, and

methods by which to authorize and license payloads.

Because of the importance of these issues both domestically and internationally, it is certain that some form

of regulation will be necessary. Whether or not such

regulation will encourage or hinder the flow of private

capital into this infant industry is yet to be seen.

Tax Incentives

The Government may also stimulate R&D expenditures by allowing industries to use the tax system to

reduce the cost of such endeavors. Three of the main

incentives in the present tax system are depreciation

allowances, investment tax credits, and the deductibility of R&D outlays. Depreciation allows a firm to deduct as a business expense the cost of certain assets

over the period of their useful life. Investment tax

credits allow firms to take a certain percentage of new

pears that regulation has caused R&D capital funds to be used to meet regulations, it has also had the effect of stimulating the development of new socially

desirable products such as pollution-control equipment and technology.

T9M. Kinsley, Outer Space and /nner Sanctums, 1976, p. 131.
Appendix H—industrial Innovative Process • 371

investment purchases as a credit against their tax liability. Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code permits

firms to deduct total R&D outlays in the year that the

expenditures are incurred.

Though the intricacies of the corporate tax system

are beyond the scope of this report, a simple example is helpful to illustrate some of the ways that

changes in the tax structure can create the incentive

to innovate .20

Figure H-1 depicts an R&D project with a 20-year

development time and a 15-year market life. It

assumes a research expenditure of $1 million per year,

an investment of $50 million spread over 4 years to

build the manufacturing facility, and a venture success rate of 100 percent. It also assumes that the tax

regulations allow a 100-percent deduction for R&D

——— .—. .—

~~john s Benjarnln, stdternerlt on the Space Industrlallzatlon Act of 1979

(H. R, 2337), hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Appllcatlons of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 96th Cong.

1st sess , 1979.

outlays, an investment tax credit of 10 percent, and

a depreciable life of plant and equipment of 14 years.

Taking these factors into consideration, if a firm wants

to earn a 15-percent return on investment, taking into

account the time value or money, it must anticipate

pre-tax earnings of over $90 million. If the tax regulations in this example are altered to allow a 150-percent

deduction on R&D outlays, an investment tax credit

of 25 percent, and a 5-year depreciation on the plant

and equipment, the required pre-tax earnings to

achieve a 15-percent return on investment would be

cut in half. Figure 5 demonstrates the effect of these

changes.

Although models set forth in figures H-1 and H-2

are in many ways overly simplistic, they do point out

how the tax system can be used to help firms recover

the cost of their R&D efforts. By making R&D expenditures easier to recover, firms will have the incentive

to invest in more and longer research and development projects.

Figure H-1.— Results of Project Model for 20-Year Development Time

(millions) Time (years) +

Figure H.2.—Effect of Tax Law Modifications on Project Model

SOURCE The Space Industrialization Act of 1979: hearings on H.R. 2337 before the Subcommittee on Space Science and

Applications, 96th Cong., Ist sess. 45 (statement of Dr. John S. Benjamin).
Appendix I

National Aeronautics and Space

Act of 1958, as Amended

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACT OF

195& AS AMENDED

(499)

372
500 501

TITLE II-COORDINATION OF AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE ACTIVITIES
502 503

FUNCTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION
Acquisition,

construction,

maintenance,

etc., of

property.

Cafeterias and

other facilities

for employees.

Gifts.

504 505

5 A ut nrrjzatlon to r’1~ at rate not to e~ceed $100 per diem for ln -

“~ Authorl:v tn lea~e hulldlassIn the District of Columbla was ridded

to sec. 202(h) (3), T-? Stnt. 430. bv Pllbllc L-IW R6-20. Mav 13. 1959

dividunls mm. unended by Public Law 9.3-316, June 22, 197A, section 6 (88 Stat. 2A3). ( ?S Stnt. 2 1). The erect of 40 U. S.C. 24 has been modified by Public

Lnw 90-S30 Octcber 4. 1969 (82 Stat. 944).
506 507
508 509

I

I

I m3

0.
510

Reports to

Congress.
512

Investigations.

Referral to

F.B.I.

Penalty.

Inventions

made {n

performance of

work tinder

contract.
514 515
516

Application.
518

IT mr re@rement of prior authorizing legialatioo, a= A ~dk &

Publlc Law 86-IS, June 15.1959 (73 Stat 75 42 U.S.C. 2480 ?.

= !3ubaee. (C) of ace. 307, added by aec 6 of ~bllc tiW 88-113. SqMember 6.1968 (77 StaL 144).

519

“TITLE IV—IJPPER ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH

%URF’OSE AND FOLEY

“SIX. 401. (a) The purpose of this title is to authorize and direct

th;mA~#nistrstion to develop and carry out a comprehensive pro5

research tihnology, and monitoring of the henomena of

t e upper atmosp~em so as to rovide for an understan ing of and to a

maintain the chemical and p 1!ysical integrity of the Earth’s upper

atmos he=

1

“(b The Congress deelaree that it is the policy of the United States

to un ertake an Immediate and appropriate research, technolo , and

monitoring program that will provide for understanding the p Tysics

and chemistry of the Eafi’s upper atmosphe~

.

%EP’INITIONS

“SEC 402. For the purpose of this title the t.enn ‘up r atmosphere’

meana that portion of the Earth’s sensible atmoepr em above the

troposphere

“~RAX AUTHO~

“SEC 403. (a) In order to -my out the purposes of this title the

Administration in cooperation with other Fedemd agenciq shaU

initiate and carry out a pro- o! resemwh, technology, mcuntonng,

and other appro ride activities d!mct.ed to undemtamd the physica

and chemistry o the up r /’ atmesphem.

. .

“(b) In carrying out reprovisions ofthistitle the Adxnix&t~m

shall-

‘(l) arrange for artici ationby theech+lcand engines -

community, of bed the 5.ation’s induatrml or~~–~~~- an‘%

instituting of higher education in planning and awgout

appropriate research, in developing necesaaxy technology and m

milting n

v

ob3ervation8 im&mea3urernent8; ‘-

‘(2) promdq y way of gran~ cont~ scholarship or other

arrangements, to the maximum extent practicable an consistent r

with other lam for the widest practicable and ap~ro@ate participation of -tie scientific and engineering commuruty m the pm

~aufioti by thia title; and

H

3 make all results of the program aut.horiaed by this title

avai a le to the ap ropriata regulatory agencies and provide for

the widest practica\le dissemination of such results.

42 USC 2-

42 Usc 2482

42 USC ~

%NTERNAllONAL IYX)IZRATION

%= 404. In car .m oti the provisions of this titlq the Adminis- 42 USC2~

tratio~, subject to Zfe irection of the President and after consultation with the secretary of State+ shall make every effort to enlist thel

su P@ ~d. Cqw.qatlon of ap ropriate acientista and engineera of;

Otler countnea and Memationa? organizations.n

. I

SEU 9. This Act may be cited as the “National Aeronautics andl xtitIG

Space Administration Authorization A% 1976”.

Approved June 19, 1975.
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and

Glossary
Abbreviations and Acronyms

AACB

AlAA

AID

APPLE

A-sat

ASTP

ATS

BLM

6SS

CCAD

CCD

CCIR

CC ITT

CCT

CEPT

CFE

CIFASA

CLT

CNES

COMSAT

COPUOS

CTA

CTS

DBS

dBw

DDR&E

DNS

DOC

DOD

DOE

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Aeronautics and Astronautics

Coordinating Board

American Institute of Aeronautics

and Astronautics

Agency for International

Development

Ariane Passenger Payload

Experiment

antisatellite

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project

Applications Technology Satellite

Bureau of Land Management (DOI)

broadcasting-satellite services

Crop Condition Assessment

Division

charge coupled device

International Radio Consultative

Committee of the International

Telecommunication Union

International Telegraph and

Telephone Consultative

Committee of the International

Telecommunication Union

computer-compatible tape

Magnetic tape containing digit

data in appropriate format.

DOI

DOMSAT

DSCS

EBU

ECS

EIRP

ELDO

ELV

EROS

ERS

ESA

ESRO

FAS

FCC

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Conference Europeene de Postes

et Telecommunications

continuous flow electrophoresis

French German Consortium

Campagnie Luxembourgeosie de

Telediffusion

Centre National D’Etudes

Spatiales, National Center for

Space Research–French

equivalent of NASA

Communications Satellite

Corporation

Committee on the Peaceful Uses

of Outer Space (United Nations)

Centro Tecnico Aerospecial

(Brazil)

Communications Technology

Satellite

Direct Broadcast Satellite

a measure of power, decibels

referenced to 1 watt

Director of Defense Research

and Engineering

The Department of Defense

Navigation Satellite System

Department of Commerce

Department of Defense

Department of Energy

I

FLTSATCOM –

FM

FSS

GARP

GEO

GHz

GMS

GNP

GPS

HDD T

HDT-A

HF

HLLV

Hz

IAF

ICBM

Ics

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Department of Interior

Domestic Communications

Satellites

Defense Satellite Communication

System

European Broadcasting Union

European Communication

Satellites (ESA)

effective isotropically radiated

power (measured in watts)

European Space Vehicle

Launcher Development

Organization

expendable launch vehicle

Earth Resources Observation

Systems

European Remote-Sensing

Satellite

European Space Agency

European Space Research

Organization

Foreign Agricultural Service

(of the DOA)

Federal Communications

Commission

Fleet Satellite Communication

System (Navy)

frequency modulation

fixed satellite service

Global Atmospheric Research

Program (of the World

Meteorological Organization)

geostationary orbit

gigahertz (91 billion cycles

per second)

Geostationary Meteorological

Satellite (Japan)

gross national product

global positioning satellite

(sometimes NAVSTAR/GPS-DOD)

high-density digital tape

high-density digital tapes of

either MSS or RBV data that

have been radiometrically but

not geometrically corrected.

high frequency

heavy-lift launch vehicle

hertz; a unit of frequency equal

to one cycle per second

International Astronautical

Federation

intercontinental ballistic missile

Interdepartmental Committee on

Space (Canada)

385
386 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

IEEE

IFOV

IFRB

IGI

INMARSAT

INTELSAT

IRAC

IRS

ISAS

ISPM

ISRO

I TU

JEA

kHz

KSC

LACIE

Landsat

Landsat D

LASS

LCP

LEO

LOS

—

—

—

.

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Institute of Electrical and

Electronics Engineers

instantaneous field of view

International Frequency

Registration Board

Industrial Guest Investigator

International Maritime Satellite

Organization

International Telecommunication

Satellite Organization, with 106

member-nations that own and

operate the satellites in the

Global Communication Satellite

System

Interdepartment Radio Advisory

Committee

Indian Remote-Sensing Satellite

Proposed by Indian Space

Research Organization

Institute for Space and

Aeronautical Sciences Japanese

(established in 1954 at the

University of Tokyo)

International Solar Polar Mission

Indian Space Research

Organization

International Telecommunication

Union

Joint Endeavor Agreement

kilohertz (1 ,000 cycles

per second)

Kennedy Space Center

Large Area Crop Inventory

Experiment

Land remote-sensing satellites

(formerly ERTS; Earth Resources

Technology Satellites) of the

series currently operated

by NASA

The next generation of NASA’s

land remote-sensing satellites

Follow-on spacecraft of this

series will be sequentially

designated Landsat D’,

Landsat D“, etc.

The Land Applications Satellite

System under consideration by

ESA for a 1987/88 launch

Large Communications Platform

low-Earth orbit (up to

approximately 500 km)

Land Observations Satellites

being considered by Japan for

1987 launch

MHz

MLA

MOS

MOU

MPS

MPTS

MSS

MW

NACA

NAS

NASA

NASDA

NATO

NESS

NOAA

NOSS

NSF

NTIA

OMB

OTA

OTRAG

OTS

PRC

PRC (Space)

P T T

RARC

RBV

R&D

Slc

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

megahertz (1 Ob cycles

per second)

multi-linear array—solid state

technology for remote-sensing

Maritime Observation Satellite

(Japan)

Memorandum of Understanding

materials processing space

microwave power transmission

system

multispectral scanner

megawatt (1 OG watts)

National Advisory Committee

for Aeronautics

National Academy of Sciences

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

National Space Development

Agency (Japan)

North Atlantic Treaty

Organization

National Environmental Satellite

Service

National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration

National Oceanic Satellite

System

National Science Foundation

National Telecommunications

and Information Agency (DOC)

Office of Management

and Budget

Office of Technology Assessment

Orbital Transport and Raketen

Aktiengesellschaft (German

private firm)

Orbital Test Satellite (European)

People’s Republic of China

Policy Review Committee on

Space established by Presidential

directive in May 1978, to

provide a forum for discussion cf

proposed changes to national

space policy and for rapid

referral of issues to the President

for decision

Postal Telephone & Telegraph

Agencies

Regional Administrative Radio

Conference

return beam vidicon

research and development

Space Industrialization

Corporation
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Glossary ● 387

SITE

SLAR

Solaris

SPS

SSTO

STEP

STS

TDRSS

TEA

T M

USDA

USGS

—

—

—

—

—

.

—

—

—

—

—

—

Satellite Instructional Television VHF —

Experiment (India) WARC –

side looking airborne radar

proposed French free-flying, WARC-77 –

automated, industrial processing

station

solar power satellite

single stage to orbit

space vehicle

Symphonic Telecommunications WARC-79 –

Experimental Project (India)

space transportation system

Tracking. and Data Relay

Satellite System

Technical Exchange Agreement WBTR –

thematic mapper WMO –

U.S. Department of Agricukure

U.S. Geological Survey (DOI)

very high frequency

World Administrative Radio

Conference (conducted by ITU)

A specialized World

Administrative Radio Conference

that met in Geneva in the winter

of 1977 to plan for the broadcasting-satellite service in the

band 11.7 to 12.5 GHz

A General World Administrative

Radio Conference that met in

Geneva in the Fall of 1979 to

revise the international radio

regulations of ITU.

wide-band tape recorder

World Meteorological

Organization (U. N. Agency)
Glossary

A priori planning of radiofrequencies-procedure by

which frequencies and orbital locations are allotted

to individual countries according to a plan negotiated by member nations and implemented by ITU.

Access fee–the charge paid by operators of ground

stations for the right to receive the data transmitted

from land remote-sensing satellites.

AgRISTARS–Agriculture and Resources Inventory

Surveys Through Aerospace Remote Sensing. Large,

cooperative, multiyear development program of the

Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Commerce,

NASA, and AID. Will develop, test, and evaluate

ways to use remotely sensed data to produce early

warnings of crop stress, crop assessments and forecasts, small-area land cover and water evaluation,

and renewable and nonrenewable resource inventories.

Allocation (of frequency band) –entry in the table of

frequency allocations of a given frequency band for

the purpose of its use by one or more terrestrial or

space radiocommunication services or the radio astronomy service under specified conditions. This

term shall also be applied to the frequency band

concerned.

Assigned frequency–the center of the frequency

band assigned to a station.

Assigned frequency band–the frequency band within

which the emission of a station is authorized; the

width of the band equals the necessary bandwidth

plus twice the absolute value of the frequency tolerance. Where space stations are concerned, the

assigned frequency band includes twice the maximum Doppler shift that may occur in relation to

any point of the Earth’s surface.

Band–in radio, frequencies that are within two definite limits and are allocated for a definite purpose

or service, e.g., the standard AM broadcast band.

Broadcasting-satellite service-a radio-communication service in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended for direct reception by the general public.

Broadcasting sewice-a radio-communication service

in which the transmissions are intended for direct

reception by the general public. This service may

include sound transmission, television transmissions, or other types of transmission.

Containerless processing–a technique by which materials may be processed without a supporting container; this may be accomplished by using the microgravity environment of space or by employing

such methods as ultrasonic levitation on Earth.

Data–in this document, “data” is used to specify the

sensor voltage readings that are transmitted in digital

format and received at the ground station. These

readings must be interpreted and converted to other

dimensions for most applications purposes.

Decibel–a unit for expressing the ratio of two

amounts of electric or acoustics signal power equal

to 10 times the common logarithm of this ratio, A

ratio of 10 is 10 dB, a ratio of 100 is 20 dB, a ratio

of 1,000 is 30 dB, etc.

Digital transmission—a technique that transmits the

signal in the form of one of a discrete number of

codes. The information content of the signal is concerned with discrete states of the signal, such as

the presence or absence of a voltage, a contact in

the open or closed position, or a hole or no hole

in certain positions on a card.

Direct readout–the capability that allows ground stations to collect and interpret the data messages that

are transmitted from satellites.

EROS Data Center—a facility that collects, processes,

archives, and distributes data obtained from satellite, aircraft, and other systems, operated by the

U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of interior, at Sioux Falls, S. Dak.

Earth exploration-satellite service-a radio-communication service between Earth stations and one or

more space stations, which may include links between space stations, in which: 1 ) information relating to the characteristics of the Earth and its

natural phenomena is obtained from active sensors or passive sensors on Earth satellites; 2) similar

information is collected from airborne or Earthbased platforms; 3) such information may be

distributed to Earth stations within the system concerned; and 4) platform interrogation may be included. This service may also include feeder links

necessary for its operation.

Emission–radiation produced, or the production of

radiation, by a radio transmitting station.

Fixed-satellite service-a radio-communication service between Earth stations at specified fixed points

when one or more satellites are used; in some

cases this service includes satellite-to-satellite links,

which may also be effected in the intersatellite service; the fixed-satellite service may also include

feeder links for other space radio-communication

services.

Fixed service-a radio-communication service between specified fixed points.

Frequency—the number of complete oscillations per

second of an electromagnetic wave, measured in

hertz (Hz). One hertz equals one cycle per second.

Frequency allocation table (national)–a table in the

FCC Rules and Regulations allocating bands of fre-
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Glossary ● 389

quencies, in the usable portion of the radio spectrum, to radio-communication services.

Frequency of obsewation-the normal period, usually

measured in days, elapsing between two sequential times at which a point on the Earth falls within

the field of view of one of the spacecraft of the

system.

Geostationary satellite–a geosynchronous satellite

whose circular and direct orbit lies in the plane of

the Earth’s Equator and which thus remains fixed

relative to the Earth; by extension, a satellite whose

position remains approximately fixed relative to the

Earth.

Geostationary satellite orbit–the orbit in which a satellite must be placed to be a geostationary satellite.

Geosynchronous satellite–an Earth satellite whose

period of revolution is equal to the period of rotation of the Earth about its axis.

GSFC–Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA)

Harmful interference-interference that endangers

the functioning of a radionavigation service or of

other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radio-communication service operating in accordance with these

regulations.

Illuminance–irradiance; rate of energy per solid angle

measured at a given point.

Infrared (l R)–that part of the spectrum from the red

end of visible light to the microwave region; that

is, from about 0.7 m to 1 mm.

Instantaneous field of view (l FOV)-the field of view

of a scanning instrument with the scan motor

stopped.

Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC)

—a body of 20 Federal agencies and departments

that assists NTIA in the development of the National

Table of Frequency Allocations, the assignment of

frequencies to stations operated by the Federal Government, and other spectrum management functions.

Interference-the effect of unwanted energy due to

one or a combination of emissions, radiations, or

inductions upon reception in a radio-communication system, manifested by any performance degration, misinterpretation, or loss of information that

could be extracted in the absence of such unwanted

energy.

International Frequency Registration Board (lFRB)–a

permanent organ of ITU with five officials elected

by the plenipotentiary conference, examines notifications of frequency assignments from membernations for conformity with the radio regulations.

International Telecommunication Union (lTU)–the

U. N.-related organization with responsibilities in the

field of international telecommunications including

spectrum management. Present membership is 155

nations.

ITU Convention–the governing instrument of ITU

that sets forth the structure and activities of the

Union; only the plenipotentiary conference of ITU

can amend or revise the Convention; it last met in

Malaga-Torremoiinos in 1973, and will meet again

in September 1982.

Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE)–a

demonstration program (1974-1977) that used Landsat and weather data to provide estimates of wheat

production.

Kourou–Ariane’s South American Launch Site.

Maritime radio-navigation satellite service–a radionavigation satellite service in which Earth stations

are located onboard ships.

Micron–unit of length equal to one-millionth (1 O-b)

of a meter.

Microwave—a comparatively short electromagnetic

wave, especially one between 100 cm and 1 cm in

wavelength or, equivalently, between 0.3 and 30

GHz in frequency.

Multispectral scanner (MSS)–an instrument which

provides data in four bands of the visible and nearinfrared portions of the spectrum. The MSS scans

a swath 185 km wide and has an instantaneous field

of view (I FOV) of 80 meters.

Orbit–the path, relative to a specified frame of reference, described by the center of mass of a satellite

or other object in space subjected primarily to natural forces, mainly the force of gravity.

Outer Space Treaty–the abbreviated name for the

multilateral Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer

Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which established in 17 articles general principles governing the activities in outer space of State

parties to the Treaty in support of the use of outer

space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of

all peoples. The United States is a party to the Outer

Space Treaty, which entered into force October 10,

1967.

Permissible interference-interference at a higher

level than that defined as permissible interference,

and which has been agreed upon between two or

more administrations without prejudice to other administrations.

Polarization–the electric (E) and magnetic (H) fields

that comprise a propagating electromagnetic wave

may be fixed in relation to Earth’s horizon, or they

may rotate. By convention, the vector of the E field

is related to Earth’s horizon: if the two are perpendicular, the wave is said to be vertically polarized;
390 . civilian Space Policy and Applications

if parallel, horizontally polarized. When the E and

H fields are continuously rotating with respect to

the horizon, the wave is said to be elliptically

polarized.

Power density—the quantity of electromagnetic

energy that flows through a given area per unit of

time. Formally, power density is specified in watts

per square meter (W/mz), but by tradition in biological effects studies it is usually expressed in

milliwats per square centimeter (mW/cmz

).

Power flux density–a measure of the power radiated

by a transmitter, used as a constraint on certain services to protect other services in a shared band.

Primary service-a class of allocation. Stations in a primary service may not cause harmful interference

to stations in the same, or another primary service,

and can claim protection from interference from stations in primary, permitted, and secondary services.

Printed in solid capitals in the ITU table of allocations.

Propagation–the transmission of electromagnetic

wave energy from one point to another.

Radar–a radio-determination system based on the

comparison of reference signals with radio signals

reflected, or retransmitted, from the position to be

determined.

Regions of ITU–for the allocation of frequencies, the

world has been divided into three regions by ITU.

Exact boundaries of the regions are given in the

radio regulations; a general description follows:

region 1–Europe, Africa, the U. S. S. R., Turkey, the

Territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic, and

areas to the north of the U. S. S. R.; region 2—North,

Central, and South Americas, the Caribbean, and

Greenland; and region 3–Asia, Oceania, Australia,

and New Zealand.

Return beam vidicon (RBV)-cameras which essentially provide black and white TV images. Each RBV

image from Landsat 3 covers an area 90 km on a

side (180 km total swath) and has an equivalent

IFOV of 40 m.

S-Band–a frequency band over which MSS data are

transmitted to foreign ground station operators on

the reproduction or resale of Landsat standard data

products.

Satellite–a body that revolves around another body

of preponderant mass and that has a motion primarily and permanently determined by the force

of attraction of that other body.

Satellite link–a radio link between a transmitting

Earth station and a receiving Earth station through

one satellite.

Satellite system–a space system using one or more

artificial Earth satellites.

Side lobe–refers to power radiated from an antenna

in a direction other than the desired direction of

transmission.

Space system-any group of cooperating Earth stations

and/or space stations employing space-radio communication for specific purposes.

Spectral bands–portions of the electromagnetic spectrum of energy radiated or reflected by the Earth

to which spacecraft sensors are sensitive.

SPOT–Satellite Probatoire d’Observation de la Terre.

This system is scheduled for launch by France in

1984 and is to contain two 3-channel multispectral/

panchromatic multilineal visible spectrum array

sensors. lts objectives are to develop satellite renewable and nonrenewable resource observation techniques and to develop a stereo and cartographic

data archive.

Standard data products-data in prescribed form that

are put through additional computer processes at

the satellite ground processing facility. Two classes

of standard data products are currently available—

film imagery, which is convenient for those accustomed to working with maps and photographs,

and computer-compatible tapes. The tape form is

suitable for input to standard computers and lends

itself to automated or specialized data handling and

analysis.

Stereo coverage–refers to the availability of data from

which the variation in the height of the surface

being viewed can be determined.

Telecommunications-any transmission, emission, or

reception of signals, wiring, images, and sounds or

intelligences of any nature by wire, radio, optical,

or other electromagnetic systems.

Thematic mapper (TM)–an instrument containing

seven spectral bands, including three in the infrared

region, with an IFOV of 30 m for all but the thermal infrared band which has an IFOV of 120 m.

Timeliness—the length of time between the observation itself and the delivery of suitable processed data

to users or to the archive.

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)–a

communications system to be used for the relay of

data direct from Landsat to a single U.S. ground station at White Sands, N.M.

Transmission fee–a fee that could be paid by foreign

ground station operators for data transmitted and

received.

Value-added products-are products derived from

standard data as a result of manipulation by computers
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Glossary . 391

and/or interpreted in various ways to provide infor- Zone of exclusion–an area over the Indian subconmation about the surface of the Earth. tinent and south-central U.S.S.R. where direct satWave guide–a device for transmitting and guiding ellite transmission to the TDRSS is physically imposradiofrequency waves. sible.

X-band—a frequency band over which a combination

signal of MSS and TM data from Landsat D will be

transmitted directly to foreign ground stations.