Africa Tomorrow: Issues in Technology,

Agriculture, and U.S. Foreign Aid

December 1984

NTIS order #PB85-238624
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600503

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D C 20402
Preface

The United States has a stake in the agricultural development of sub-Saharan Africa.

Alleviating hunger and malnutrition, expanding stable markets for U.S. products, and

maintaining the availability of critical and strategic materials provide humanitarian,

economic, and political reasons for a continuing American interest in Africa. Most African

countries are predominantly agricultural and their well-being and future development

are tied closely to that sector. Therefore, agricultural assistance probably will continue

to be a major area of U.S. involvement.

Food problems in Africa are substantial: in no other region of the world has per

capita food production declined steadily for over two decades. The Congress expressed

its concern for these problems in 1984 with a major supplemental appropriations bill

and the creation of a Select Committee on Hunger. This technical memorandum on

agricultural technology and U.S. foreign assistance in sub-Saharan Africa was requested

by the Select Committee, with support from the Africa Subcommittee, House Foreign

Affairs Committee. OTA was asked to investigate several topics relating to current and

future African agriculture: technological needs, successful technology development and

transfer, and the roles of public and private foreign assistance.

This paper is the result of 6 months’ work, including: 1) a 2-day workshop with

14 invited experts on African agriculture, 2) a visit by an OTA contractor to the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture in Nigeria, and 3) additional OTA staff research. We do not pretend that this is a definitive work on specific types of agricultural

technologies. Instead the paper outlines major issues constraining the development and

transfer of sustainable technologies for low-resource food producers. Our findings reflect broad consensus on which potential congressional action can be based. The problems of food production in sub-Saharan Africa are acute. Opportunities for improving

the situation abound, however, and many are available to Congress.

This paper was prepared by Scott McCormick, Ted MacDonald, Phyllis Windle,

and Chris Elf ring, OTA wishes to thank the workshop participants and additional reviewers for their substantial contributions as well as the many others who generously

provided information.

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JOHN H. GIBBONS

Director

. . . ///
.

OTA Workshop Participants, Sept. 12=13, 1984

George Burrill

Associates in Rural Development

Burlington, VT

Charles Francis

Rodale Research Center

Emmaus, PA

Elon Gilbert

Center for Research on Economic

Development

University of Michigan

Ann Arbor, MI

Thomas Hayden

CODEL

New York, NY

James Henson

International Program Development Office

Washington State University

Pullman, WA

Marilyn Hoskins

Department of Sociology

Virginia Polytechnic Institute

Blacksburg, VA

Shelly Kessler

Urban Resource Systems, Inc.

San Francisco, CA

Carl Lindblad

Volunteers in Technical Assistance

Arlington, VA

Sauveur Mahotiere

Plant Science Department

Fort Valley State College

Fort Valley, GA

Gerald Matlock

Department of Soils, Water, and Engineering

University of Arizona

Tucson, AZ

Robert McDowell

Department of Animal Science

Cornell University

Ithaca, NY

Uzo Mokwunye

International Fertilizer Development Center

Muscle Shoals, AL

Anita Spring

Department of Anthropology

University of Florida

Gainesville, FL

OTA Staff

Barbara Lausche

Edward F. MacDonald

Scott McCormick

Walter Parham

Phyllis N. Windle

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iv
OTA Staff on Africa Tomorrow: Technology and Agriculture

Roger Herdman, Assistant Director, OTA

Health and Life Sciences Division

Wa ter E. Parham, Fo

Phyl

od and Renewable Resources Program Manager

Analytical Staff

is N. Windle, Project Director

Scott McCormick, Analyst

Edward F. MacDonald, Research Analyst

Barbara Lausche, Senior Analystl

Chris Elfring, Editor 2

George Scharffenberger, Contractor

Administrative Staff

Phyllis Balanl and Patty Durana,4 Administrative Assistant

Nellie Hammond, Secretary

Carolyn Swarm, Secretary

‘Until Aug. 31, 1984

‘November 1984.

‘July 1984.

‘From Sept. 24, 1984.
Contents

Chapter Page

l. Summary and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2 .

3.

4.

5.

6.

Summary . . . . ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Role of Foreign Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Limitations of U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Recipients of Foreign Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

The Responsibility of African Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Africa Tomorrow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

On the Right Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

New Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Food Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Agricultural Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

U.S. Interests in Assisting Developing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Issues in Technology Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Issues in Technology Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Issues in Technical Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Issues for the African Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Appendix A: List of Additional Reviewers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Appendix B: The CGIAR in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Appendix C: “Rural Africa: Modernization, Equity, and Long-Term Development,” by Uma Lele; and

“Facing Up to Africa’s Food Crisis,’’ by Carl K. Eicher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Appendix D: List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

List of Tables

Table No Page

I. Population Growth Rates in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2. Food and Agriculture in Selected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3. Centers Supported by the CGIAR, 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

4. The 1890 Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

5. The Role of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs): Articles of Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

List of Figures

Figure No. Page

1.

2 .

3.

4.

5 .

6 .

7.

8.

9

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Sub-Saharan Africa... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America Population Growth Rates, 1950-2000 . . . . . . . . . . 18

Index of Per Capita Food Production, 1961-65 to 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America Yields for Staple Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Population Projections for Sub-Saharan Africa:, 1985-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Urban Population Projections for Sub-Saharan Africa: 1985-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

AID-Financed University Contracts and Grants for Technical Assistance to Host Countries—In

Millions, Fiscal Years 1970-1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

AID-Financed University Contracts and Grants for Technical Assistance to Host Countries In

Numbers of Contracts and Institutions, Fiscal Years 1970-1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Integrating Farming Systems Research and Agricultural Extension for Technology Transfer . . . . . . . 54

Ecological Areas of Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

vii
Chapter 1

Summary and Options
Chapter 1

Summary and Options

SUMMARY

Africa’s* problems in the immediate future will

almost surely worsen. In no other region of the

world has food production per capita declined

steadily for the last two decades. Population

growth is the highest in the world and little expectation exists that this situation will change

quickly. Food production simply is not keeping

pace with population growth and each year there

are more hungry. The current drought has aggravated the suffering and increased stresses on natural resources.

Africa’s declining per capita food production

has been blamed on many factors: environmental

limitations, inadequate incentives for farmers, a

lack of appropriate research on food crops, poorly

developed extension and management systems,

general insensitivity to cultural and environmental

conditions, local governments’ failures to deliver

physical and economic inputs on time, lack of infrastructure, and an inability to identify the problems facing producers. All of these factors, in addition to large population growth, play a part in

the problem.

Foreign assistance is one mechanism used by

the United States to help solve these problems.

The American people traditionally are generous

with their public and private assistance. Since

foreign aid was first initiated after World War II,

the United States has supplied funds, food, and

expertise throughout the world, and since 1950

it has directed special attention to developing

countries. Foreign assistance programs have

grown to reflect our understanding of the humanitarian, economic, political, and security benefits

they produce. What is apparent now, however,

is that many opportunities exist to improve assistance programs, especially in sub-Saharan Africa,

and to encourage constructive activities within the

developing nations themselves,

*Africa, as used in this report, refers to Sub-Saharan Africa (see

fig. 1).

The Role of Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance has the obvious goal of helping to improve recipients’ lives. Agricultural assistance, whether direct food aid or technological assistance to improve food production, aims to

alleviate hunger and malnutrition. But in Africa

and other parts of the world, the United States

also has economic and political rationales for its

foreign assistance policies. Foreign aid is a mechanism to promote U.S. interests. Developing

countries currently receive 40 percent of all U.S.

exports and are the fastest growing market, by

value, for U.S. goods and services. Twenty percent of U.S. farm acreage grows crops destined

for developing countries. Foreign aid is also used

as a nonmilitary tool to further numerous foreign

policy objectives such as promoting regional and

economic stability, securing access to strategic facilities, and encouraging cooperation with the

U.S. on international issues.

Agriculture is the central focus of much American aid to sub-Saharan Africa. The Agency for

International Development (AID) allocates about

60 percent of its African assistance to agriculture,

or approximately $150 million for fiscal year 1985.

Foreign aid can be used to meet short- and longterm goals. Short-term aid, for example, includes

emergency food supplies for crises such as the current devastating famines in Ethiopia, Chad, and

Mozambique. Such aid serves a critical purpose.

Long-term aid is aimed at helping the developing

countries become more self-sufficient in food production. For example, such aid includes support

for research on improved livestock and crop varieties. Long-term aid includes technology transfer,

research, education, and other actions to promote

future well-being.

In the face of famine or other crises, long-term

agricultural goals are sometimes neglected. But

this is extremely short-sighted. Short-term aid

alone is not a viable way to improve conditions

in Africa. What is needed is a blend of both shortand long-term aid, shaped by long-term goals.

3
4

Three major weaknesses are seen by many observers to limit the effectiveness of U.S. foreign

aid: it is too shortsighted and crisis-oriented, too

political, and suffers from unclear and inconsistent goals. Critics argue that American foreign assistance policy erroneously strives for a “quick

fix’’ —development projects are generally too short

in duration (3 to 6 years), with limited attention

to follow-up. This is particularly disadvantageous

to research projects, which generally require

longer durations to show results. It will take longterm commitments to make lasting improvements

in the difficult agricultural problems faced by subSaharan Africa.

Similarly, American foreign assistance sometimes seems preoccupied with new ideas, changing focus from year to year so programs do not

have time to chart real progress. Irrigation, education, mechanization, fuelwood, and others have

each had a moment in the limelight. The U.S.

Government lacks a stable, long-term political

commitment to foreign assistance; development

policy shifts every decade or so, with mixed

results, and public support waivers greatly.

Development assistance policies are shaped

more by political considerations than the actual

needs of developing countries. Priorities and initiatives shift with administrations as foreign policy goals change, and administration’s policies

sometimes conflict with legislated goals. This may

further some American economic and political objectives but can be detrimental to immediate humanitarian goals and long-term hopes for international cooperation and development.

America’s foreign assistance goals not only are

unclear they seem at times inconsistent. How, for

instance, does the country reconcile its efforts to

help developing countries become more self-sufficient in food production when our agricultural

sector relies on those nations as essential markets?

Limitations of U.S. Assistance

Sub-Saharan Africa is over twice the size of the

United States and is made up of 45 different countries (fig. 1). The area contains a wide range of

climates and environments and a diversity of

cultural, economic, and political characteristics.

About 70 percent of Africa’s 400 million people

live in rural areas. They are predominantly farmers and herders—subsistence level producers who

work with few economic and natural resources.

Yet these “low resource” farmers and herders provide most of Africa’s food. Much of the region

is also characterized by the major role women

play in food production.

Sometimes foreign assistance donors lose sight

of these vast cultural and environmental differences. U.S. assistance, for example, can result in

major failures if it is based

ditions: a high-technology,

largely on western tracapital-intensive, profPhoto credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

Low-resource producers raise the overwhelming majority

of food in Africa. These producers are those who face

major constraints in their access to economic, natural,

and technological resources. Low-resource farmers,

such as these from Senegal, generally use hand tools

and family labor, till 2 to 10 acres of land, and

have little capital.
5

Figure1 .—Sub-Saharan Africa

* &\\ \\\Ym . . P .’” . &\Mr :“”” %~\\\\\\\\\\~\\\\\\m\\’ ,=. ,

— SOURCE: General Accounting Office, “Africa’s Agricultural Policies: A More Concerted Effort Will Be Needed If Reform Is Expected, ” GAO/NSlAD-83-36,

Sept. 8, 1983 (Adapted from map by Martin Greenwald Associates, Inc.)
——————. —.

6

it-maximizing orientation. A consensus is emerging that the technology most needed in subSaharan Africa should be:

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✎

low-risk,

resource-conserving,

small-scale,

affordable (not capital intensive),

locally produced and repaired,

adapted to local labor availability, and

consistent with traditional agricultural

methods.

in essence, technologies* must be appropriate

for the local setting. To be appropriate, the natural limitations of the African environment must

be considered in the design of the technology. To

be appropriate, livestock, cropping, and forestry

technologies must be integrated with each other

and with nonagricultural sectors. In addition,

local producers need increased involvement in the

agricultural development process. Foreign assistance agencies need to solicit the input of local producers when identifying agricultural problems,

planning, and implementing projects or research.

Local people have an intimate knowledge of their

needs and environment, and they are likely to be

more receptive to projects that are partly their

own. The challenge, then, is to devise systems that

involve local people and that integrate on-farm

work into the larger framework of established national programs and international assistance.

The Recipients of Foreign Assistance

It seems an easy question: “Who needs assistance?” But identifying, let alone reaching, appropriate recipients can be difficult, especially if the

objectives of the aid are unclear. If America’s

overall goal is to help Africa increase food production, assistance needs to be focused on lowresource producers because they are the backbone

of Africa’s food system. If America’s goal is meeting the basic needs of the poorest, assistance

should take a different bent because the poorest

people include not only farmers but also landless

and urban populations.

*Technologies include implements, management systems, and

other processes for applying knowledge.

In the past, assistance strategies largely have

neglected the important role played by women in

African agriculture. Women in Africa contribute

up to 80 percent of all farm labor, they manage

one-third of the region’s farms, and they tend virtually all the kitchen gardens. Yet, directly and

indirectly, women are excluded from community

meetings, extension services, and access to credit.

Few women have entered the ranks of agricultural

professionals working for donor agencies or developing country ministries.

Directing special attention toward women may

seem to be one solution to this problem. Disregarding the crucial role of African women in agriculture is unwise, yet specifically aiming projects

at women’s needs also may be inappropriate. A

more realistic approach is to recognize that women need to be integrated into development planning as partners. Extension services, in particular, need improvement in this area. To date, the

track record for attempts to integrate women into

agricultural assistance programs has been poor.

Targeting any specific group—e.g., the poorest—can be difficult. First, can the group be

defined explicitly—who are they—and how can

they be reached effectively through donor assistance? Is key information about the group available? Does the group remain constant from year

to year? How can sustainable, replicable programs

be designed that will reach that group? Realistic

approaches account for the special constraints certain groups face and ensure that these groups are

included in development assistance.

The Responsibility of

African Governments

The primary responsibility for improving food

production in sub-Saharan Africa lies with the

African governments themselves. Foreign assistance is just that—assistance. But in most of Africa,

a variety of obstacles inhibit the design and management of sound national agricultural strategies.

Some government institutions face unmanageable

tasks trying to coordinate large numbers of donors. When levels of support are erratic, the problem is compounded and host countries have few

incentives to plan comprehensive programs to

meet their actual needs.
7

Despite limitations, African governments have

significant opportunities to improve food production. One way is to increase incentives for rural

producers. Another task is to provide more adequate reward and support for government extension workers in rural areas. They can also encourage integration of women producers into agricultural planning. In all, what is needed is a more

active and long-term commitment to food production. But it must be remembered that food production is only one part of the agricultural sector and that agriculture is only one part of an

overall development strategy. While changes must

be made by African governments, donors will

have a special responsibility to provide appropriate support.

Africa Tomorrow

Despite the magnitude of its problems, Africa

has reasons for optimism. Ten years ago, India

faced a similar plight and many feared that the

enormity of the problems could not be overcome.

Yet today India feeds itself. Africa’s problems, of

course, are unique and require unique solutions.

But evidence exists that Africans and donors are

beginning to address key questions and find some

answers, Since the problems are severe and complex, their solution will require greater commitment than now exists.

OPTIONS

On the Right Track

In recent years, Congress has taken a number

of actions that have confirmed America’s commitment to increasing Africa’s food production

in equitable and sustainable ways. Legislation has

resulted in initiatives that address many of the

findings of this report. OTA finds that each of

the initiatives remains relevant and important.

Their direction is, for the most part, consistent

with recent information on technology and food

production in Africa.

This section reviews some of this report’s major conclusions and the existing legislation that

OTA feels is both relevant and appropriate to reThe United States can continue to play an important role in improving food production and

alleviating hunger and malnutrition in ,subSaharan Africa. The best hope of increasing food

production lies with improving opportunities for

the low-resource producers—they provide an

overwhelming proportion of the region’s food

supplies and yet they have been largely ignored.

The United States can contribute appropriate assistance with agricultural education, research, and

technologies.

Today, Africa is a continent in trouble. The

United States could make certain choices that increase the likelihood that Africa’s future will be

a hungry one—facing the possibility of social and

environmental problems of global dimensions. Or

the United States could strengthen its leadership

in foreign assistance, examining the part that this

country can play in alleviating Africa’s dilemma

and coordinating with other nations to help Africa

reach a future chosen by its people.

For some substantial number of the world’s

poor, the United States still holds out the future

to which they aspire. What they require from us

is not advice . . . but action alongside them in the

task of hastening their economic development. Belonging to the same world population, we have

as large a stake in the outcome as they do.

–Gerard Pie], 1984 President-elect, AAAS

Chairman of the Board, Scientific American

solving some of the problems presented. Unless

otherwise noted, the provisions cited refer to the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (U.S.

Congress, Feb. 1984).

●

●

Emphasis should be placed on low-resource

producers: The Congress finds that the greatest potential for significantly expanding food

production lies in increasing the productivity

of small farmers who constitute a majority

of agricultural producers in developing countries [sec. 103(c)].

Greater emphasis is needed on research for

low-resource producers: Agricultural research

shall: 1) consider the special needs of small
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farmers; 2) include research on the interrelationships among technology, institutions,

and economic, social, environmental, and

cultural factors affecting small-farm agriculture; and 3) make extensive use of field testing to adapt basic research to local conditions

[sec. 103A].

Technologies should account for the particular needs and constraints of the low-resource

producer: Emphasis shall be placed on use

of relatively smaller, cost-saving, labor-using

technologies most appropriate for small

farms, small businesses, and small incomes

of the poor [sec. 107].

Greater emphasis is needed on the role of

women in development: U.S. assistance

should promote the participation of women

in national economies of developing countries and the improvement of women’s status

as an important means of promoting the total

development effort [sec. 102(b)(6) and sec.

113(a) cf.].

The Congress declares that the principal purpose of U.S. bilateral development assistance

is to help the poor majority of people in developing countries to participate in a process of equitable growth through productive

work and to influence decisions that shape

their lives, with the goal of increasing their

incomes and their access to public services

which will enable them to satisfy their basic

needs and lead lives of decency, dignity, and

hope [sec. 102].

Assistance efforts are more efficient and effective if donors coordinate: U.S. assistance

efforts shall be planned in coordination and

cooperation with assistance efforts of other

countries, including the planning and implementation of programs and projects on a

multilateral and multidonor basis [sec. 102(b)

(11)].

More effective evaluation is needed for projects and programs undertaken by AID: The

International Development Cooperation

Agency (IDCA) is directed to improve the assessment and evaluation of the programs and

projects carried out [sec. 125].

Private and voluntary organizations have a

major role to play in assisting the poor in

meeting their basic needs and in increasing

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public awareness of hunger and poverty in

developing countries: Congress finds that development can be assisted and accelerated

through an increase in activities planned and

carried out by private and voluntary organizations and cooperatives. Their financial

resources should be supplemented by contributions of public funds without compromising their private and independent nature [sec.

123],

To increase public awareness of the political, economic, technical, and social factors

relating to hunger and poverty and to ensure

the effectiveness of private and voluntary organizations in dealing with world hunger

abroad, AID is urged to assist private and

voluntary organizations [International Security and Development Cooperation Act of

1980, Title III, sec. 316].

To help increase food production in Africa,

the Federal Government should support and

encourage appropriate research by U.S. universities, national and regional research facilities in Africa, and international agricultural research centers: This support should

be provided on a long-term and continuing

basis. The United States should improve U.S.

land grant and other eligible universities’ participation in international efforts to apply

more effective agricultural sciences to the

goal of increasing world food production,

and should provide increased and longer

term support to the application of science to

solving food and nutrition problems of the

developing countries [sec. 296(a)].

To prevent famine and establish freedom

from hunger, various components must be

brought together in order to increase food

production including:

1.

2.

3. international agricultural research centers

strengthening the capabilities of universities to assist in increasing agricultural production in developing countries,

institution-building programs for development of national and regional agricultural

research and extension capacities in developing countries that need assistance,

[sec. 296(b)].

● Development is primarily the responsibility

of African governments: Development plan-
9

ning must be the responsibility of each sovereign country. U.S. assistance should be administered in a collaborative style to support

the development goals chosen by each country receiving assistance [sec. 102(b)(2)].

● Further efforts to prevent degradation of natural resources are vital to sustained agricultural development: The President is authorized to furnish assistance for developing and

strengthening the capacity of developing

countries to protect and manage their environment and natural resources, Special efforts shall be made to maintain and restore

the land, vegetation, water, wildlife, and

other resources upon which depend economic

growth and human well being, especially of

the poor [sec. 118(b)].

While this legislation is consistent with the findings of this report and suggests that the United

States has taken steps in the right direction, Congress has a continuing role to play in monitoring

the progress of these efforts and correcting any

unexpected adverse effects of its original legislation or amendments, OTA’s preliminary analysis suggests that Congress could continue to encourage the executive branch to demonstrate that

specific legislative instructions are being carried

out. Requests for reports from the executive

branch and holding congressional hearings are

two methods for doing this.

New Initiatives

Another way the Congress could enhance the

effectiveness of U.S. assistance to Africa is by

undertaking certain new initiatives. OTA finds

that important changes in the U.S. approach could

substantially improve food production.

A Commitment Measured in Decades

Finding: U.S. assistance needs to be longterm and consistent over time if the

United States is committed to increasing

food production in Africa. Currently, the

United States supports hundreds of shortterm projects designed to encourage

long-term development. The goals and

objectives of these activities are often

unclear and inconsistent and their effectiveness is hampered by political considerations.

Many experts are coming to agree that longterm improvements in food production require

commitments—for projects and agricultural research—of at least 10 to 20 years. AID-sponsored

projects seldom last this long, although AID contends that the trend in project length is upward.

Most programs face annual scrutiny, and political and fiscal considerations determine their continuation. While monitoring project effectiveness

is appropriate, certain types of projects, particularly research efforts, are not likely to show immediate results and will require long-term continued support.

The inclusion of political factors in designating

recipients of U.S. assistance is always controversial. Evidence exists that frequent shifts in both

development approaches and countries designated

as acceptable recipients reduce the effectiveness

of U.S. assistance. Much U.S. assistance is channeled through private and voluntary organizations. Some of these groups, especially those with

long-term programs in Africa, are particularly affected by U.S. policy changes.

In addition, the United States sponsors some

programs that have seemingly conflicting goals—

e.g., attempts to increase local food production

while simultaneously providing aid to dispose of

U.S. agricultural surpluses or expand markets for

U.S. food products. The Food for Peace Program

(Public Law 480) is often cited as an example of

America’s unclear and conflicting foreign assistance goals.

These factors—the short-term, political, and

unclear nature of U.S. foreign aid—are major

limits to its effectiveness. Congress could begin

to resolve these issues by severaI means.

Option: Congress could examine the soundness

of AID’s major operational method—the design

and support of individual local projects—as a

means of providing long-term, well coordinated

assistance. Alternatives that might provide less

fragmentary aid with fewer administrative burdens could be examined—e.g., supplying funds

in lump sums for large program areas such as institutional development, training, and university

post-graduate program development. The need

for such “program” assistance in research funding

could be evaluated in detail. Other alternatives

might include adopting the most effective provi38-856 0 - 85 - 2 : QL 3
10

sions used by other bilateral donors or integrating

all types of aid into individual country programs.

Option: Congress could reemphasize its commitment to coordination among public and private donors by exploring new ways to encourage

this coordination, such as: a) hear testimony from

donors on their needs, b) investigate the need to

bring additional donors into existing donor coordination groups, and c) explore other means to

strengthen coalitions of public and private donors.

Option: Congress could evaluate whether AID’s

cooperation with private and voluntary organizations is meeting the congressional intent in Section 123 of the Foreign Assistance Act. This evaluation could include: thoroughly examining the

effectiveness of these organizations’ work versus

government funding; clarifying whether Congress

intended that their programs be confined to certain countries designated by AID as acceptable

recipients of U.S. assistance; and assessing whether AID should model the scale of its programs

after some private and voluntary organizations’

small-scale efforts, which many experts regard as

a particularly effective approach.

Option: Congress could require that AID increase the average duration of individual assistance projects/programs designed to increase longterm development of African food production.

For example, Congress could stipulate that the

average length of such projects should increase

to 10 to 15 years by a given target date.

Option: Congress could request that the General Accounting Office (GAO) conduct a major

evaluation of Public Law 480’s effects on African

food production and synthesize its considerable

body of past Public Law 480 work. Such a study

would capitalize on GAO’s a) ability to conduct

local investigations in Africa, b) expertise in

accounting, and c) extensive record of Public Law

480 analysis. Important issues include the alleged

displacement of local farmers and technologies,

shifts in diet, and disincentives for local food production.

Reaching Those Most in Need

Finding: The possibility of successfully directing agricultural assistance to meet

the needs of specific target groups remains debatable.

The Foreign Assistance Act, section 128, requires that 40 percent of AID’s funding be directed

toward the poorest residents. And the spirit of this

legislation is important in ensuring that AID meets

its responsibilities to assist the poorest people of

Africa.

However, many questions have arisen regarding the best method to accomplish this goal, AID’s

relative success in meeting it, and whether agricultural assistance is the most effective way to

meet the poorest people’s needs. Some of the poorest people may be those with little or no access

to land or livestock, female heads of households,

the chronically underemployed in urban areas, or

refugees. Projects designed to stimulate employment and other income-generating activities or to

meet basic needs may be more appropriate uses

of funds for assisting these poor. At the same time,

aid to increase food production could be directed

toward alleviating the constraints of low-resource

producers, who are usually poor themselves but

maybe not the “poorest. ”

Reliable data on the heterogeneous group called

“the poor” are scarce. Therefore, much remains

to be done to understand the poor who face severe

economic, social, technical, or environmental constraints on their attempts to increase food production. More information is needed on the types,

proportions, and magnitude of their problems as

well as the constraints faced by other poor people such as the landless and unemployed.

Congress could assist in this effort by determining the beneficiaries of agricultural versus incomegenerating projects and examining the need for

special attention to low-resource producers.

Option: Congress could reiterate its commitment to Section 128 of the Foreign Assistance Act
by holding hearings to determine strategies and

funding levels necessary to meet the needs of the

poorest rural residents. Witnesses could include

representatives from: a) African governments at

the national and regional levels—e.g., national

ministers of health, water resources, agriculture,

and women’s affairs, and representatives of the

Organization of African Unity; b) international

food agencies such as the United Nations’ Food

and Agriculture Organization (FAO); c) private

and voluntary organizations with expertise in rural land reform and community development; and

d) the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Option: Congress could consider new legislation and funding that would be specifically aimed

at reducing constraints which inhibit the majority

of low-resource producers from increasing food

production.

Option: Congress could require AID to provide

information on: a) how the Agency could increase

its effectiveness in evaluating its own programs

and incorporate this information into future project design and implementation, and b) the level

of funding necessary to fulfill this task. Congress

could also help make evaluation a project design

tool by encouraging AID to: establish an evaluation staff officer for each mission and regional

AID office; collect improved baseline demographic data in host countries—e.g., data disaggregated

by sex and economic class; and include the proposed beneficiaries (especially women and lowresource producers) in the design and evaluation

phases of project development.

Option: Congress could investigate the relative

merits of the “grass roots” development strategy

represented by the African Development Foundation (ADF). Congress could support the ADF

by: carrying over the Foundation’s unallocated

fiscal year 1984 funds into 1985, funding ADF past

fiscal year 1986, supporting ADF’s forums on

“grass roots” development, and strengthening the

organization’s management and technical capacity.

Women: The Invisible Producers

Finding: Women contribute significantly to

the production of food crops but have

limited access to extension services,

credit, and training.

Women contribute up to four-fifths of the labor and management for the production of food

crops in Africa. They receive few services to help

them increase food production despite the fact that

their important role has been recognized internationally for over 10 years. Women represent some

of the most overworked and undersupported and,

in most cases, some of the poorest of the rural

population. Therefore, providing assistance to

women farmers and herders is crucial to increasing African food production.

Many ways exist that African women producers can be assisted by donors such as the United

States and by African governments. Primarily,

women need greater access to extension services,

affordable credit, reliable land rights, and training in food production technologies that are generally more available to men. Women development experts and agricultural professionals will

be better able to provide these services in many

countries due to cultural constraints. Congress

could assist African food producers by helping to

make more women agricultural experts available.

Option: Congress could direct AID to give priority to hiring women agricultural professionals

as project officers. Over the last several years,

AID appears to be recruiting more female International Development Interns. Increased emphasis

could be placed on increasing women staff in AID

Africa missions, given the importance of women

in agricultural development in Africa. It is also

important that the women recruited have training in agriculture and environmental science as

well as health, nutrition, and social science.

Option: Congress could direct AID to expand

the selection of African women for overseas training courses. Over the past 7 years, only 16 to 18

percent of all the African participants were women. Congress could consider imposing standards

on AID for the selection of more women so that

equal numbers of men and women are trained.

Option: Congress could direct AID to upgrade

the Women in Development (WID) position in its

African missions to ensure that the WID officer

is involved in all phases of project identification,

development, implementation, and evaluation

and that WID officers are people with technical

expertise and developing-country field experience.

Congress could request periodic reports on AID
12

progress on these activities as well as AID’s progress in implementing its Women in Development

Policy Paper.

Option: Congress could direct AID to encourage host countries to recruit additional female

agricultural extension staff. Also, Congress could

request that AID develop training courses for

African male and female extension agents that

would provide methods for them to reach women

food producers.

Technology Types: The Right Stuff

Finding: Farmers and herders with little access to economic and natural resources

hold the key to increasing food production in Africa. Technologies to help these

low-resource producers are largely lacking, especially in developed countries

such as the United States.

A consensus exists that low-resource producers

are the group most likely to increase food production enough to feed a significantly greater

number of Africa’s population. A consensus also

exists regarding the types of technologies these

producers need: low risk, resource-conserving,

small-scale, adapted to local labor conditions,

consistent with traditional agricultural methods,

affordable, and locally produced and repaired.

Some of these technologies can be adapted from

current traditional practices. A need also exists

for new types of technologies, especially given the

large projected increases in total and urban African populations.

U.S. agricultural technologies—both equipment

and management systems—generally do not exhibit the characteristics most needed by lowresource producers. Therefore, many attempts to

use U.S. agricultural technology directly in African food production have been unsuccessful.

Many feel that America’s considerable agricultural

expertise has much to offer Africans, but care will

need to be taken if it is to be brought to bear effectively.

The Congress directed that special attention be

given to “appropriate technology” in section 107

of the Foreign Assistance Act. OTA finds that

such attention is justified and that methods could

be devised to make relevant information developed in the United States more available to African researchers and producers.

Option: Congress could reaffirm its commitment to section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act

by holding hearings on AID’s implementation of

this legislation and the institution created to do

so (ATI—Appropriate Technology International).

These hearings could consider whether section 107

should be amended to alter its language calling

for “labor-using” technology. Recent recognition

exists that low-resource producers face periodic

labor shortages; thus sometimes “labor-using”

technology can be inappropriate to their needs.

Option: Congress could design a program to

link U.S. experts in technology for low-resource

producers to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s

(USDA) international training activities in order

to increase their relevance to African conditions.

This would require that USDA involve nonUSDA staff such as returned Peace Corps volunteers, field representatives of private and voluntary organizations, and researchers in “alternative” agriculture.

A Worldwide Network for Agricultural Research

Finding: The United States is in a unique

position to encourage strong national

and international agricultural research facilities in Africa. The inclusion of farmers

and herders in this work, as well as the

widespread dissemination of its results,

is vital to making research effective.

The United States has played a major role in

supporting agricultural research in Africa, both

via the international agricultural research centers

and via programs coordinated by U.S. universities. The United States supplies approximately 20

percent of the core budget for the Consultative

Group on International Agricultural Research

(CGIAR), which sponsors the international centers, and also supports staff and students. Some

universities have a long history of international

activity but their programs have shifted according to changing African and American views of

the most appropriate U.S. assistance.

Congress is involved directly in determining

how U.S. scientists take part in African research.

Many U.S. university programs, for example,
13

were instigated after Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act made special AID programs available to them. Experts suggest that past approaches

to support African research need to be supplemented with new programs. These should give increased attention to developing national research

centers in Africa and providing additional training for African agricultural scientists at home,

rather than in the United States, Such efforts

would benefit agricultural research while building local institutions and management capacity,

another vital African need.

A consensus exists that alleviating two key

problems could increase the effectiveness of agricultural research. First, low-resource producers

need to be incorporated into the process of designing, planning, and evaluating research. And,

second, research results should be disseminated

widely and effectively.

Option: Congress could direct increased resources into national research centers and universities in Africa by: helping to develop expanded

African graduate programs in food production;

encouraging U.S. universities to increase cooperative programs with national universities; providing funds for USDA and State Agricultural Experiment Stations to work with African national

centers on problems of common interest— e.g.,

sorghum breeding or dairy production; making

American researchers available to help African

countries develop agricultural training programs

for Africans in Africa or other appropriate developing countries.

Option: Congress could establish a way for U.S.

technology to be used to disseminate agricultural

information in Africa. This might include: increasing the availability and interpretation of satellite

imagery on natural resources for African governments; encouraging microcomputer manufacturers to provide agricultural services that are suitable for African conditions; ensuring that all U.S.

support for international, regional, and national

research centers provides adequate funds for international travel, documentation and distribution of findings, and purchase of relevant publications.

Option: Congress could highlight the current

and potential benefits, both to Africa and the

United States, of farmer/researcher cooperation

by holding hearings on farming systems research

as it is conducted in the United States and in

Africa.

Agricultural Extension Services:

Delivering the Goods

Finding: Agricultural extension systems in

Africa generally are ineffective at either

identifying food producers’ constraints

or disseminating information on technology, credit, or inputs.

Despite having formal extension systems in

place, most African countries’ extension services

generally are ineffective in transferring information and inputs. Most: a) lack clear goals and objectives; b) provide little support for or few incentives to staff working with low-resource

producers, especially women; c) coordinate poorly with research institutes in identifying the major constraints of low-resource producers; and d)

may promote technologies that primarily benefit

the wealthy rural producers.

Numerous attempts have been made to provide

alternative extension models, improve infrastructure and supervision for staff, and increase the

frequency of in-service training courses. Congress

has provided support for development of African

extension systems by both AID and USDA. Congress could act to strengthen existing African systems further.

Option: Congress could investigate the problems facing African extension systems and the

most effective U.S. role to meet the needs of lowresource producers in increasing food production.

This could include input from AID, USDA, the

World Bank, and others.

Option: Congress could direct AID to identify

extension problems unique to each country. AID

mission staff could interview agriculture officials

and local university staff and hold workshops to

solicit the views of local leaders and low-resource

producers.

The Pressure for Reform

Finding: African governments, though facing increasing external pressure for
14

change, generally support economic policies that favor urban consumers at the

expense of incentives for low-resource

food producers.

During the last two decades, African governments generally have opted for economic policies

that favor urban consumers. Prices paid to producers for food crops have been artificially low,

while inflated currencies and increased international borrowing allowed relatively inexpensive

food and consumer goods to be imported.

Now, African governments face several conflicting forces that threaten their economic independence. The International Monetary Fund

(IMF) and the World Bank are increasing the restrictions on foreign assistance and rescheduling

loans. Many governments find it difficult to fulfill

these strict conditions while simultaneously pursuing their own national priorities.

Option: Congress could assist African governments, via U.S. participation in policymaking at

the IMF and the World Bank, by encouraging

greater cooperation between these organizations

and African governments. Congress could examine the feasibility and desirability of monetary policies advocated by African countries such as more

gradual currency devaluation, longer loan repayment periods, and appropriate conditions for further loans.

Option: Congress could require that AID report

on uses of the Economic Support Fund (ESF) to

alleviate international debts in African developing nations, including the role of the ESF to absorb the effects of rapid increases in the price of

food and consumer goods in urban areas,

The Resource Base: Keeping

Renewable Resources Renewable

Finding: African governments and international donors exhibit a limited commitment to controlling the degradation of

Africa’s natural resource base.

Deforestation, loss of soil fertility, and other

types of land degradation are major problems in

Africa. They are caused by increasing pressure on

a finite natural resource base and unsustainable

agricultural development.

Sustainable food production requires the integration of sound environmental policies into agricultural programs. Experts in developing countries note the continuing need for increased

amounts of information on the environmental impacts of technologies that are part of U.S. development projects. Congress could assist this process in several ways.

Option: Congress could require that AID report

on efforts agencywide and within the Africa Bureau in particular to fulfill the requirements of section 118 (c)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act that

the environmental consequences of development

projects and programs be considered.

Option: Congress could investigate the status

of AID’s environmental profiles for African countries and mandate that the profiles be integrated

into the agricultural development strategies.

Option: Congress could provide funds for a significant increase in the number of appropriately

trained environmental field officers for AID field

missions and regional offices.
Chapter 2

Introduction
Chapter 2

Introduction

In November 1974 the World Food Conference

was convened to address grave concerns over the

future world supply of food. The conference declared that:

[A]ll governments should accept the removal

of the scourge of hunger and malnutrition . . . as

the objective of the international community as

a whole, and accept the goal that within a decade no child will go to bed hungry, that no family

will fear for its next day’s bread, and that no human being’s future and capacities will be stunted

by malnutrition (U.S. Congress, Oct. 1984).

A decade has passed since this declaration was

made but much of Africa is once again facing a

famine of enormous proportions. The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

estimates that during the past year 150 million

people were living in countries that suffered severe

food shortages as a consequence of the drought

(Levy, 1984). Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the

private organization with major responsibility for

distributing emergency food aid in Ethiopia (the

country hardest hit by the drought), estimates that

in that country alone, 6 million to 10 million people are facing starvation. This crisis has prompted

massive emergency food assistance from numerous donors, including the United States. While

these deliveries are essential to avoid massive starvation, the long-term resolution of African food

problems must entail efforts to increase Africa’s

ability to feed itself.

It is this goal of increased food production in

Africa that this report addresses. In particular, this

report examines what technologies are needed and

how they may best be made available. The report

defines various issues in technology development,

technology transfer, and technical assistance that

could be considered by the U.S. Congress in forging an effective strategy to assist African countries to enhance their food production. The report also addresses problems African governments

face in increasing food production, given that the

responsibility for achieving this goal lies primarily with them.

FOOD PROBLEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa is facing its second severe

food crisis in a little over a decade. Chronic food

deficits have reached a point where, according to

the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),

nearly 5 million tons of food aid will be required

during 1984-85 just to maintain current per capita consumption levels. Some 10 million tons

would be required to reach minimum acceptable

nutritional levels, according to dietary standards

established by the World Health Organization

(WHO) and FAO. These figures represent 40 percent of the requirements for all developing regions

of North Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin

America (USDA, July 1984b).

In examining the total food aid needs of all developing countries, a recent report suggested that:

In 1984-85, it is estimated that total food aid

in cereal from OECD donor countries will be approximately 9 million tons. Of this total, the

United States will contribute approximately 5 million tons. When compared to the 12 million tons

needed to sustain current consumption levels and

higher quantities to improve diets, it appears that

donor countries must greatly increase the quantity of food assistance in the short term and

heighten efforts to assist developing countries improve their own agricultural production in the

long term (Andreas Task Force, 1984).

The current African drought, which began in

the southern region in 1981 and spread through

the Sahel in 1982, continues to have a major impact on crops and livestock in many countries.

About 30 countries are suffering from abnormal

food shortages according to recent FAO figures.

The FAO World Food Program Task Force identified 10 sub-Saharan African countries as “crisis

countries for the 1984-85 crop year” and others

may be added to the list (U.N. FAO, Sept. 1984).

17
18

While the drought has focused international attention on the region, its effects represent only

“the most extreme and distressing aspects of the

more pervasive economic crisis in Africa” (World

Bank, 1984a). The prevailing conditions simply

highlight the long-term unfavorable trends that

have been developing in Africa for the last two

decades.

A unique combination of constraints characterizes this region and helps to explain, in part,

why the “Green Revolution,” which dramatically

raised food production in other developing regions

has, to date, bypassed sub-Saharan Africa.

● Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the

world where the rate of population growth

will continue to rise during the 1980s (fig. 2;

table 1). The 1980 population of 359 million

probably will double by the turn of the century and more than triple by 2020 (World

Bank, 1984a).

● Generally speaking, the region suffers from

considerable political instability. One in 200

Africans is a refugee. With only one-tenth of

the world’s population, Africa contains at

Figure 2.—Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin

America Population Growth Rates, 1950-2000

3,0

s k&.4w?iwwwm’

j 2.8

1,8 i 4 t * 1 k I i I

1950 1955-60 1965-70 1975-80 1985-90 1995-2000

Years

SOURCE: U.N. Population Trends and Policies. vol. 1, /n: US. Department of

●

Table 1 .—Population Growth Rates

Agriculture, “Food Problems and Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa,”

Development Digest, vol. XIX, No. 4, Oct. 1981.

least one-quarter of the world’s refugees

(World Bank, 1984a).

Low and erratic rainfall, short growing seasons, low soil productivity, and continuing

soil degradation and deforestation due to

human activities make raising agricultural

productivity in many parts of sub-Saharan

Africa more difficult than in most developing regions. Much of the potential grazing

in Sub-Saharan Africa

Region and country 1970-75 1985-90 Region and country 1970-75 1965-90

Percent Percent

The Sahel:

Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 2.16

Gambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.92 2.13

Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.42 2.74

Mauritania . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.99 2.35

Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.68 2.97

Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.37 2.55

Upper Volta. . . . . . . . . . . . 2.27 2.49

West Africa:

Benin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Guinea-Bissau . . . . . . . . .

Ivory Coast . . . . . . . . . . . .

Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . .

Togo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.70

1.84

2.70

2.38

1.51

2.51

2.29

2.67

2.41

2.74

2.80

2.45

3.19

2.68

1.94

2.79

2.57

3.09

2.65

2.49

Central Africa:

Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.27 2.73

Central African

Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.09 2.59

Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Equatorial Guinea . . . . . .

Gabon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zaire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

East Africa:

Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ethiopia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kenya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sudan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Southern Africa:

Botswana . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lesotho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . .

Namibia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Swaziland . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zambia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . .

2.44

1.71

1.00

2.47

2.60

2.39

3.38

3.04

2.65

2.56

3.02

2.93

2.27

1.92

2.52

2.32

2.84

2.73

3,13

3.35

2.42

2.84

1.96

.90

2.85

2.72

2.60

3.45

3.14

3.00

2.94

3.20

3.09

2.99

2.32

2.74

2.64

3.07

2.92

3.38

3.60

2.79

SOURCE: United Nations, World Population Trends and Policies 1977 Monitoting Report, In: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Problems and Prospects in SubSaharan Africa, Foreign Agricultural Research Report No. 188, August 1981, p. 38.
19

land is unusable because of tsetse fly infestation.

● The colonial legacy in Africa left fewer

trained people and institutions than in other

developing regions. Despite impressive gains

in levels of education since independence,

sub-Saharan Africa still has proportionately

fewer skilled people than other developing

regions. African countries in general also

have poorly developed infrastructures.

● Government policies in most African countries have adversely affected food production, including: an urban bias in development

strategies, a lack of attention to low-resource

farmers (the base of the food production system), a lack of price incentives for farmers

to grow food crops, often inappropriate and

inefficient government involvement in the

marketing and distribution of agricultural inputs and outputs, and often inappropriate

import and fiscal policies (U.S. AID, 1983;

World Bank, 1981).

● Projects directed at increasing agricultural

production by donors and African governments have often been poorly conceived and

managed. In some cases the result has been

a worsening of the situation because of major damages to the resource base.

This combination of demographic pressures,

environmental constraints, political impediments,

limited trained personnel, and inadequate institutional and management capacity has resulted in

a variety of symptoms that currently plague the

region and threaten to worsen in the future:

● Africa’s population growth rate, about 3 percent per year, is outpacing growth in food

production, which is about 1.8 percent per

year (World Bank, 1984a; USDA, 1981). The

result has been a steady decline in per capita

food production over the last two decades

(fig. 3; table 2).

● Consequently, Africa, which was essentially

self-sufficient in food production 20 years

ago, now imports 20 percent of its cereal reFigure 3.— Index of Per Capita Food Production,

1961-65 to 1983 (1961-65 Average = 100)

125

120 -

Latin America 115 -

110 ~ ‘ .-

105 * :

u

1961-65 1970 1975 1980 1983

average Year

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, In. World Bank, Toward Sustained

Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1984

●

●

quirements. Between 1970 and 1980 cereal

imports tripled while the cost of those imports increased 600 percent, further straining limited financial resources (Christensen

and Witucki, 1982; Huddleston, 1984).

Sub-Saharan Africa is the only developing

region in the world where levels of nutrition

have declined in recent years. Despite major increases in food imports and food aid,

it is estimated that 20 percent of the population of Africa consumes below-minimum caloric levels for maintaining good health

(World Bank, 1984a).

The rate of urban growth, at 5 to 7 percent

per year (a 7 percent growth rate results in

a doubling of population in about 10 years),

is the highest in the world, although the level

of urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa is relatively low compared with other developing

regions. Immigrants to Africa’s cities often

come from impoverished rural areas and

their movements add to the destabilizing effects of rapid urbanization.

The region has shown a declining per capita

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accompanied

by fiscal and balance-of-payment problems,

oppressive debt burdens, dwindling reserves

of foreign exchange, and deteriorating terms

of trade (World Bank, 1983).
20

Table 2.—Food and Agriculture in Selected Countries

Average index of food

Volume of food imports Food aid in cereals production per capita,

(000 metric tons) (000 metric tons) 1979-81

1974 1981 1970 1980 1969 – 1971 = 100

Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Benin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cameroon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

lvory Coast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lesotho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mauritania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Niger, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Togo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Upper Volta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

149

8

7

81

7

50

34

118

177

63

172

15

49

42

114

17

281

115

62

155

389

3

341

72

42

127

125

431

6

37

99

343

93

56

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,880 9,099 876 2,213 91a

(+134%) (+153%)

aAverage (mean), weighted by population.

SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Report, 1983, ln: U..S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Feeding the World’s Population: Developments in

theDectdeFollwing the World Food Conference of 1974 (Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 76.

AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa is at least twice the size of

the entire U.S. and is made up of 45 countries (fig.

1, ch. l) with diverse climatic, environmental cultural, socioeconomic, and political characteristics. To understand the limitations and possibilities of increasing food production in Africa, it is

essential to examine African agricultural systems

carefully. Varying soils and climatic and ecological factors define a multitude of ecological systems ranging from the hot, humid rainforests of

the Congo River Basin, to the highlands of Kenya

and Uganda, to the tall and short grass savannas

that grade into the Sahara Desert to the north and

the Kalahari and Namib Deserts to the southwest.

For a more in-depth analysis of African agricultural systems, see Moran (1979) and Ruthenberg

(1980).

Despite the considerable diversity of agricultural systems in Africa, some broad generalizetions can be made regarding ’’typical” characteristics and general trends.
21

Of the approximately 400 million people in

Africa, at least 70 percent live in rural areas. The

vast majority of these represent subsistence farmers and pastoralists. While production generally

is geared toward subsistence levels, these lowresource producers also provide the major source

of food for the rural and urban sectors, and raw

materials for export and domestic manufacturing

(Lele, 1981). With 30 to 60 percent of GNP being

derived from agriculture, the need for a healthy

agricultural sector is evident.

Africa is often misleadingly characterized as

having low population densities and abundant

availability of land (Moran, 1979). While these

factors might suggest favorable conditions, in

large measure they simply reflect the poor environmental condition of much of the continent:

low, unreliable rainfall and poor soils. In fact,

human populations in Africa tend to be strongly

clustered around water supplies, roads, and areas

with better soil. Even where populations are low

in absolute terms, they are high relative to the

limited carrying capacity of the land. Large areas

of land are not available for settlement because

of rock outcrops, tsetse flies, river blindness, or

other similar causes. On most of the remaining

land, once one takes into account carrying capacity, the population is sufficient to stress the environment (Moris, 1984).

Fourteen sub-Saharan countries have inadequate amounts of land “to support on a sustainable basis populations as large as those already

reached in 1975” assuming subsistence food levels

(World Bank, 1984b). These countries represent

one half of the 1981 populations and approximately one-third of the region’s land area.

Land tenure patterns, though changing, are relatively egalitarian. Farms are generally small, with

2 to 10 acres under cultivation at any one time

(Eicher and Baker, 1982). Labor comes from the

entire family with women playing a major role

in food production and contributing significant

labor to cash crop production and animal rearing. Land preparation traditionally has been accomplished through slash and burn techniques

and planting has been rotated with long fallow

periods, usually at least 8 years. Because of increased population pressure on land, however,

these practices are becoming less and less

prevalent.

Farmers often engage in intercropping—the

staggered planting of several varieties of crops in

the same field. Although often not recognized as

such by outsiders, these complex cropping patterns are adaptations to the delicate environment

in recognition of the soil’s susceptibility to leaching and erosion. Intercropping also is less risky

and better suited for subsistence farming to provide family food supplies. For similar reasons,

farmers sometimes cultivate several separate fields

simultaneously. Intercropping has the particular

benefits of providing extended soil cover for moisture retention, making better use of soil and water,

and decreasing weed growth.

Farmers in Africa make relatively little use of

systematic irrigation or commercial inputs such

as fertilizers. Yields per hectare of staple crops are

lower in Africa than in other developing regions

(fig. 4).

Availability of arable land, until relatively recently, was sufficient in most countries to sustain

the traditional (land extensive, low input, rotational, long fallow period) agricultural systems

without presenting major problems. Today, however, increased population pressure has resulted

in increasing pressure on the land. The need for

increased production has led to expanded use of

marginal land with low and unreliable productivity. In addition, fallow periods have been reduced leading to even further declines in yields.

Savannas, which traditionally have been used for

herding, are now being converted to permanent

cultivation. These factors contribute to serious

degradation of the natural resources.

Cattle and other livestock play a critical role

in the total economy of many African countries,

particularly in arid and semiarid areas where agricultural production is more uncertain. In evaluating agricultural development schemes and

evolving agricultural systems, particularly mixed

crop-livestock systems, it is important to understand the role livestock play and can play as a

source of food and investment (see Box A). Practically all producers maintain some form of livestock. In some circumstances livestock can use

available resources more effectively than crops
22

8 0 0

700

600

500

400

1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977

Years

SOURCES: Latin America and Asia—Food Production Yearbook, Sub-Saharan

Africa-ESCS estimates, In: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Problems and Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa, Foreign Agricultural

Research Report No. 166, August 1981.

amining strategies for enhancing yields that require the farmer to purchase inputs (Brumby,

1984).

Photo credit: Emment George, U.S. Agency for International Development

Livestock products supplement the protein supplies,

income, and prestige of many African households, in

addition to contributing foreign exchange as exports.

In mixed farming systems, livestock also are used for

plowing. Here, two Maasai herders watch over

cattle in Tanzania.

U.S. INTERESTS IN ASSISTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The United States is in a real sense the creation

of European foreign aid, received in relatively

small amounts at critical points in our history, applied with energy and ingenuity by Americans to

American resources . . . . The early experience of

the United States demonstrates the value of foreign aid for the military security and economic

development of a young, threatened, and relatively poor nation. With the help of foreign grants,

military assistance, loans and other capital investments, the national independence of the United

States was secured, our essential economic foundations established, and our own economic development begun (U.S. AID, n.d. ).

The United States began its own foreign aid

programs with the Marshall Plan, the massive

U.S. assistance program to rebuild Europe after

the devastation of World War II. Aid to developing countries officially began in 1950 when

Congress passed the Act for International Development. Despite the proliferation of U.S. foreign

aid legislation and changes in strategy and focus,

the reasoning for U.S. interest has remained fairly

constant.

In general terms, foreign aid is seen as a mechanism to promote U.S. economic and national se-
23

Box A.—Trends in Livestock Development

The Sahelian drought of 1968-74 focused international attention on African pastoral societies. The

overgrazing and famine that followed the absence of rains convinced some environmentalists (Hardin,

1968; UNCOD, 1977) and economists (Monod, 1975; Konzacki, 1978) that traditional pastoral societies

failed to manage their resources effectively.

Based on this assumption, range management interventions were supported by both the Agency

for International Development (AID) and the World Bark. The early projects either attempted to settle

the pastoralists within western style ranches (to introduce range management techniques for the increased

marketing of the animaIs) or to “expand" grazing opportunities into seasonal rangeland by drilling deep

wells. However, these interventions generally caused severe deterioration of the range and adversely

affected socioeconomic conditions. Proliferation of wells in the Sahel introduced additional livestock

into seasonally grazed areas and caused severe overgrazing (Clark, 1977; Glantz, 1976). Ranches introduced in East Africa and Botswana have shown disastrous results, in some cases, completely degrading

both the vegetation and soils of the area (Horowitz, 1979; Banks, 1981).

Now a growing awareness exists of the complexity of livestock systems in Africa. ‘They differ strikingly on the degree of movement involved, from highly mobile nomadic systems to relatively sedentary

ones . . . . In some of the intermediate rainfall areas, livestock production is integrated with cropping

and farmers take care of their own animals . . . “or in other areas” . . . crop producers consign animal

care to specialized herder groups” (Institute for Development Anthropology, 1982). Within livestock

production systems, livestock serve many purposes. They serve as a source of milk, meat, social prestige, capital, savings, draft power for plowing, and insurance against drought (Hjort and Dahl, 1976;

Institute for Development Anthropology, 1982).

Several national and international research centers now generally agree on the types of research

that can appropriately benefit livestock producers (Horowitz, l@). The systems approach used to integrate livestock and cropping systems shows promise in providing solutions to problems of low-resource

producers. One organization, the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA), views poor animal

health and nutrition during dry seasons as the main constraint to increased production. ILCA emphasizes

research on mixed farming systems as its main objective, providing a forage-legume link between cropping and livestock enterprises and increasing yields in both. Alleycropping, for-ample, can increase

crop yields and provide browsing for small ruminants by itercropping trees such as leucaena with cereal

crops. In the semiarid zones, intercropping millet and Cowpeas can increase yields and improve the value

of forage (ILCA, 1984). - % ,.. . ~ ,,

ILCA and others are conducting zone on the control of the tsetse-transmitted trypanosomiasis, the people with few livestock, range management for communal livestock _. However, much needs

to be done in improving feeds, and decreasing

calf mortality rates. -

-. :

:%, ,,, ~ ~7 . , . . -

. . .+.

curity interests. More specifically, the economic

argument is made that assisting the developing

countries helps “convert the threat of economic

chaos into long-range opportunities: the building

of new trading partners, and new free societies

of private enterprise” (Andreas Task Force, 1984).

Developing countries represent 40 percent of U.S.

export markets and are the fastest growing market, by value, for U.S. goods and services. A large

part of U.S. assistance spending comes back in

the form of demands for American goods and

services. It has been estimated that about 70 percent of bilateral U.S. assistance disbursements and

50 percent of our contributions to multilateral development banks are spent on U.S. goods and

services (U.S. Department of State, 1983). Developing countries are particularly important markets for agricultural products, with 20 percent of
2 4

U.S. farm acreage devoted to producing for them

(U.S. Department of State, 1983). Every billion

dollars of farm exports generates another 25,000

to 30,000 jobs in the United States (Andreas Task

Force, 1984).

In terms of security interests, aid is seen as a

non-military tool to achieve numerous foreign

policy objectives including:

●

●

●

●

●

promoting regional and economic stability,

encouraging democracy,

securing or maintaining access to strategic facilities,

countering Soviet influence,

encouraging cooperation with the U.S. on international-issue (U.S. GAO, 1983).

The plight of the developing world poses a

threat to our own security. A contented United

States cannot live unscathed in a world of hunger

and famine. Nor can the United States live unharmed in a world of seething unrest and unstable

governments that hunger and famine creates (Andreas Task Force, 1984).

The United States depends on developing countries for a number of important commodities and

Africa possesses a significant share of many of

these. For example, the United States imports over

90 percent of its cobalt, bauxite, and manganese.

Zaire and Zambia are the world’s leading producers of cobalt and together provide about sO percent of U.S. import requirements. Guinea has

more than a quarter of the world’s bauxite reserves and provides some 30 percent of U.S. imports. Gabon provides 26 percent of total U.S.

import requirements of manganese, which in 1983

reached 99 percent (Kamarck, 1982; U.S. Department of the Interior, 1984a, b).

Each of these materials has vital industrial and

military applications. Concern exists that strategic materials from Africa are particularly susceptible to interruption due to instability in many

supplier countries. The argument is made that

economic assistance acts as a stabilizing factor and

cements U.S.-supplier country ties, thereby reducing the threat of supply disruptions.

Beyond the arguments related to U.S. economic

and security interests, more altruistic motivations

historically have played a large part in development assistance. The arguments of humanitarian

or moral obligations to alleviate suffering in the

world have been used effectively to generate considerable support, particularly during periods of

crisis such as drought, famine, and other natural

disasters.

Conflicts may arise between U.S. interests in

assisting sub-Saharan African countries and

broader domestic and foreign policy goals. In particular, the objective of making Africa more foodself-sufficient may conflict with United States desires to expand international markets for its agricultural products. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Federal agency

created to mobilize and facilitate “the participation of U.S. capital and skills in the economic and

social development of less developed countries, ”

places high priority on export development. However, the General Accounting Office (GAO) notes

that OPIC should “explore possible conflicts

which might arise between country development

objectives and U.S. export interests” (U.S. GAO,

Feb. 1981).

The objective of greater agricultural development in the Third World quickly confronts the

question of competition with U.S. exports for existing markets. Short-run competitive relationships will, of course, arise. However, the real interest of American agriculture is in expanding the

total world market . . . rather than obtaining

slightly larger shares of a stagnant or shrinking

market (Andreas Task Force, 1984).

The divergence of interests, however, threatens

to widen, especially given U.S. efforts to expand

its agricultural exports significantly in the short

term as a means of reducing its overall trade deficits. This issue raises a number of issues relating

to agriculture, technology, and assistance for subSaharan Africa which the Congress should

address.

Agricultural surpluses traded on new international markets transformed the United States into

the prime world agricultural exporter. This provoked a continuing debate regarding the appropriate U.S. role in world agriculture: Should the

United States be the “breadbasket of the world”

(with potential long-run depletion of its natural

resources)? Or should the United States act as

technical assistance provider to help less developed countries strengthen their own agricultural

systems (with long-term prospects of LDCs reducing their need for American agricultural imports

and eventually even competing with U.S. imports

in world markets)? (USDA, 1984c).
Chapter 3

Issues in

Technology Development
Chapter 3

Issues in Technology Development

The best hope for increasing food supplies in

Africa lies with the low-resource farmers and

herders who provide an overwhelming proportion of the region’s food. Yet can these people be

helped to increase their production enough to feed

today’s populations, let alone the additional

millions who will be added as Africa’s population

grows?

American expertise can have a role in this effort. This section explores the types of technology needed to face this future growth, including

the role agricultural research plays in developing

suitable technologies. In particular, it looks at

what types of technology are suitable for African

cultures and environments. Later sections of this

report focus on issues in technology transfer, technical assistance, and the responsibilities of the

African governments themselves.

The issues examined here include the suitability

of existing technologies and their appropriateness

for conditions likely in Africa’s future, the indirect

role that nonagricultural technologies can serve

to increase food production, how the United

States and other nations can best share their scientific and research expertise, how current research

information can be shared most effectively, and

the need for food producers to have an expanded

role in planning and implementing agricultural research.

Issue 1: Many technical solutions introduced into

sub-Saharan Africa for food production are not

suitable for present conditions nor for conditions likely to prevail in the near future.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

Increased food production requires increased

use of well adapted existing technologies and

new ones. The most suitable technologies probably will be consistent with traditional African

agricultural methods, reflect local conditions,

be affordable, locally produced and repairable,

and involve low risks and low inputs.

Large demographic changes are under way in

Africa, and innovative agricultural technologies

●

●

●

●

●

●

relevant to these changes—e.g., urban agriculture—are needed but largely unexplored.

Few technologies have been designed for lowresource food producers who generally seek to

minimize risk rather than maximize production.

A growing consensus is emerging that developing these technologies deserves high priority.

Technology development should consider the

status of the natural resource base, its inherent

capabilities, and the potential impacts of new

technologies, but often this is not done. Resources are degraded or susceptible to degradation in many parts of Africa. Important differences exist between the African and U.S.

resource base.

An integrated or “systems” approach to technology development is promising but seldom

taken. Too often technologies are developed

piecemeal with little regard for long-term sustainability. For example, work on crops and

trees is not integrated with animal production

systems even though many producers combine

them.

The social and cultural situations into which

technologies are introduced are vital but often

overlooked—e.g., often women’s unique roles

in African agriculture, pastoralism, and forestry

are underemphasized.

Conditions in the United States are significantly

different, ecologically and socially, for most

agricultural technology developed in the United

States to be transferred directly to sub-Saharan

Africa. Much U.S. technology requires levels

of technical and managerial support that now

cannot be met in Africa.

Expanded agricultural research is needed on

traditional staple food crops and small-scale

food production instead of continued emphasis on cash crops.

Discussion

The decline in per capita food production in

Africa has stimulated a reexamination of the types

27
—

28

of agricultural technology chosen for development

and transfer. Hindsight has shown that introduction of Western technologies into peasant communities often has proved inappropriate (Altieri,

1984; Harwood, 1979). Some agricultural technology has worked against the natural resource

base, further undermining food production (Commins, 1984; Twose, 1984). Also, population distribution between inland/coastal and rural/urban

areas is shifting and total population is increasing rapidly (figs. 5 and 6). As such, specialized

technologies may be needed to produce sufficient

food. Large demographic shifts, continuing environmental degradation, as well as numerous project failures, suggest that some changes in technology development are needed.

A consensus is emerging on the kinds of technology most needed to meet Africa’s future food

needs. Participants in OTA’s workshop described

these technologies as: low risk, resource-conserving, small-scale, locally produced, affordable,

easily repaired, and based on traditional methods. Also, technologies must be suited to labor

conditions because “production cycles alternate

short periods of intense work, requiring a seasonally effort-saving form of investment and input, with long periods of ‘underemployment’ “

Figure 5.— Population Projections for Sub-Saharan

Africa: 1985-2025

1 91

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020

Years

Key:

+ Mid-Africa

0 East Africa

SOURCE: United Nations Population Projections, Medium Variant, 1980.

(Lipton, 1977c). Participants also noted, however,

that many technologies must be tailored to the

particular site of application and the expected

users. Therefore, generalizations cannot be made

about the best technology for all types of production, regions, and countries because of the varied conditions and varied agricultural production

systems.

The adaptation and use of traditional agricultural methods is expected to be an essential starting point (U.N. FAO, April 1984; Wad, 1984).

Traditional agricultural systems include: agroforestry, multiple cropping, minimum tillage, cover

cropping, living mulches, small-scale irrigation,

and large and small livestock management. Commonly, traditional technologies have been overlooked by researchers, governments, and donors

despite their prevalence and advantages. For example, 98 percent of cowpeas grown in Africa are

interplanted with other crops (Francis, et al.,

1976). Yet intercropping has received little research attention. This is a traditional technology

to:

. . . promote diversity of diet and income source,

stability of production, minimization of risk, reduced insect and disease incidence, efficient use

of labor, intensification of production with limited

Figure 6.—Urban Population Projections for

700

600

$ 500

.-0

~ 4 0 0

c

o

“: 300

7

Q

: 200

100

i

of

.

Sub-Saharan Africa: 1985-2025

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020

Years

Key:

+ Mid-Africa

● West Africa

SOURCE: United Nations Population Projections, Medium Variant, 1980.
29

Photo credit” George Scharffenberger, OTA

Traditional agricultural methods are appropriate starting points for developing improved agricultural technologies. IITA

is researching the traditional risk-reducing, yet efficient, practice of intercropping (e. g., cowpeas and cassava).

resources and maximization of returns under low

levels of technology (Altieri, 1983).

Kitchen gardening, an agricultural activity performed almost exclusively by African women, is

another largely neglected traditional technology.

These gardens often contribute to household income, show higher per-acre yields than field

crops, and are the places where producers experiment with new seeds, new inputs, and new planting technology. Yet often they are perceived by

donors and researchers as women’s hobbies and

usually do not receive funding, inputs, technical

assistance, nor research in proportion to their importance (Tendler, 1982).

Urban agriculture is another use of traditional

technologies that may be of increasing importance. Almost all African countries are urbanizing more rapidly than other low- and middleincome countries while overall development is

slower; most growth is occurring in each country’s largest city (PADCO, 1982). Many urban

residents face problems obtaining affordable and

reliable food supplies, although food prices have

been kept artificially low in many urban areas.

Urban Resource Systems, Inc., estimates that the

incidence of malnutrition is accelerating more

rapidly in cities than rural areas of developing

countries and that the urban poor consume fewer

food calories than their rural counterparts.

“Meanwhile, for millions of the urban poor, the

potential capacity of the urban system to produce

food may be a factor on which their survival may

hinge” (Boyden and Celecia, 1981; Nelson and

Mandl, 1978). Methods such as intensive cultivation, rooftop gardening, comporting, urban forestry, irrigation using renewable energy for pumping, aviculture, and aquiculture can be used to

increase urban food supplies.

Urban agriculture projects exist in some African

countries, their contribution to nutrition is documented, and their special importance during food

shortages is easily observed (see Urban Resource

Systems, Inc., 1984). For example, open lands are

used by the unemployed to grow vegetables and

fuelwood in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (OXFAM,

1983; Wade, 1983). The City Council in Lusaka,

Zambia, began an Urban Agriculture and Nutrition Project in 1977 (Wade, 1983), receiving some

assistance from UNICEF and an American PVO.
.

30

This program maintains demonstration vegetable

gardens in several squatter settlements and on urban fringe lands. Lusaka planned a special urban

agriculture and nutrition service to promote urban food production (Ledogar, 1978). Home food

production also is part of a local development plan

for areas near Douala, Cameroon (Barbedette,

1978).

Steady use of many kinds of existing technologies during the 1980s and 1990s could increase

food production substantially. First, however,

African countries would need to determine and

eliminate non-technological constraints, such as

pricing policies. Africa also faces a number of

special technical problems requiring new technological approaches. Important research areas

include: plant breeding for unfavorable environments,

mental

soil and water conservation, environmonitoring, mechanization, fodder crops,

livestock immunization, fisheries estimates, and

livestock management. The aim should be:

. . . small scale but highly productive and ecologically sound permanent farming systems that

not only take advantage of such modern inputs

as better varieties, mineral fertilizers and mechanical equipment, but also make full use of crop

residues for animal feedings, and of crop and animal residues and nitrogen-fixing crops to maintain fertility. These are likely to be increasingly

based on the close integration of crop, livestock

and forestry production, and in some cases fish

production as well (U.N. FAO, April 1984).

Research to help develop such technologies

seems to be scarce. As much as 98 percent of the
31

world’s modern technological capacity is concentrated in the industrialized countries (Singer,

1977). An estimated 90 percent of all scientific research conducted worldwide takes place in developed countries and is directed specifically to their

own needs (Perez, 1978).

Trends in American agriculture make it unlikely

that most U.S. technologies will be appropriate

for Africa. U.S. research on small farms, for example, comprises only a fraction of the annual

Federal research budget. Plant breeders in the

United States generally have not sought to adapt

crops to unfavorable environmental conditions

(Boyer, 1982) and research on technologies to limit

farm and ranch inputs such as water, fertilizers,

and pesticides has not received much attention.

A few notable exceptions exist, however, such as

research conducted at the Rodale Research Center in Pennsylvania (U.S. Congress, OTA, Oct.

1983). Some experts contend, though, that the

technical feasibility of developing “low-input”

technology for agriculturally marginal areas is unknown (Ruttan, 1982).

Much American agricultural technology has

been described as “high tech. ” It involves complex and expensive machinery, integration of large

amounts of information from distant sources, and

high managerial skills. These features significantly

limit its applicability in Africa. In addition, U.S.

climate, soils, natural vegetation, and domesticated animals are different in important ways

from those in Africa. Therefore, American technology commonly is not suitable for direct transfer overseas, and care must be taken to evaluate

its suitability before introduction.

Some argue, however, that much developedcountry research is adaptable or transferable to

developing countries. Authors of the 1971 U.N.

World Plan of Action called for developed countries to divert a specified part of their domestic

research efforts toward technology appropriate

for developing countries (Singer, 1977). Basic research on plant and animal physiology is one example. If U.S. universities conducted research on

important African crops, the results would be expected to be useful in Africa.

In fact, however, Africa’s staple food crops

have not received major research worldwide

(U.N. FAO, April 1984) and different uses of the

same crops in different countries may limit widespread use of research results. Sorghum, for example, is used in the United States for livestock

feed and syrup. In Africa, it is used for human

food and brewing beer. These uses require different crop research strategies. Research programs

for millet, cassava, yams, cowpeas, and openpollinated corn have begun only recently, and “the

scale of worldwide research effort on individual

staple food crops has been in inverse ratio to their

importance in Africa” (U.N. FAO, April 1984).

U.S. technology, in its broadest definition, is

used extensively to train many African agricultural students in the United States. Such training

is often inappropriate for the conditions to which

the students will return. Thus the need to provide

education and training in Africa is stressed increasingly. U.S. training is likely to remain necessary in the short term until African educational

institutions can fully develop. Indigenous institutions, American faculty, and foreign students

in the U.S. could benefit if foreign graduate

students at American universities conducted research in their own country or in countries having similar environments.

Congress has attempted to encourage a new

generation of technologies for developing countries. In 1975, the Agency for International Development (AID) was directed to support the development and dissemination of “capital-saving

technology” in section 107 of the International

Development and Food and Assistance Act. AID

defined this as technology that: requires little capital per worker, is small-scale, easily replicable,

easily serviced and operated by untrained users,

and involves local people and resources. AID

responded by establishing a private nonprofit

group, Appropriate Technology International

(ATI), providing policy directives to missions, and

designing two systems to make technological information available to project staff.

Despite this encouragement, problems in developing, introducing, and using such technologies

continue. An analysis conducted by the General

Accounting Office (U.S. GAO, 1984) found that

AID’s management does not encourage use of capital-saving technology, that the information sys-
32

terns have severe weaknesses, and that ATI is used

little by AID country missions. Another analysis

found that capital saving technology projects

compared favorably with “appropriate technology” projects in the United States but almost all

were plagued by planning and/or implementation

problems (Associates in Rural Development,

1982). AID evaluated ATI’s worldwide work in

1982 and found that it seems to have had little

impact in the four African countries studied, but

the potential is growing in Kenya (Samper, 1982).

Issue 2: The development of some types of nonagricultural technologies is important to enable women farmers and herders to increase

food production as well as to ensure that

foreign assistance reaches the poorest rural

residents.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

Poor rural residents without land may benefit

more from nonagricultural assistance and technologies—e.g., income-generating projects such

as soap-making or crafts.

Certain labor-saving household technologies

could allow women producers to devote more

time to agriculture. These include improved

water systems, more accessible fuelwood supplies, and improved methods for processing,

storing, and preserving foods.

Improved human and animal health also are

important factors in increasing food production.

Discussion

With the New Directions legislation of 1973,

the goal of helping those most in need in developing countries became an explicit part of U.S.

foreign assistance. The results of this directive are

far from clear, however, and questions remain

about the size and structure of the poorest populations in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere (Tendler,

1982). These unanswered questions have important implications for technology development. A

large part of the income of the poorest farm households may be earned in nonagricultural activities

(Chuta and Liedholm, 1984). For these people,

activities such as small-scale trading, crafts, fishing, and peddling, may be important (Tendler,

1982). Only some of these activities require agricultural technology.

Time to devote to agriculture can be a limiting

factor for women producers in Africa. Increasing agricultural production may depend, therefore, as much on developing improved technology to save them time in other activities and at

crucial periods during the growing season as it

does on improved agricultural technology.

Most rural African women work 9 to 10 hours

a day in the fields, then spend as many as 7 or

8 more hours fetching water, collecting and carrying fuelwood, looking after children and the

Photo credit: World Bank Photo by Ray Witlin

A woman in Burkina Faso roasting groundnuts while

watching her child. Nonagricultural technologies that

reduce some of the labor constraints that women face

in fuelwood and water collection could allow them

more time for agricultural activities.
33

elderly, cooking and preserving food, and helping to store and market crops (Carr, 1978). Also,

they may grow vegetables or make soap to earn

cash for school fees and food items such as salt

and sugar. And they take part in community projects such as building roads.

Technologies intended to provide lighting and

increase the efficiency of cooking have attracted

much attention as ways to lighten women’s burdens. Planners felt that improved stoves, for example, could decrease alarming deforestation and

reduce time spent on fuelwood collection. Many

of these projects have been less successful than

was hoped, however. It seems that the time

women spent collecting fuelwood and the magnitude of deforestation attributed to their activities were overestimated (Tinker, 1982). In addition, sometimes the perceived needs of women

differed from what projects offered. More recent

efforts—e.g., to introduce solar ovens and make

simple adjustments to currently used stoves—are

more successful (Tinker, 1982).

African women themselves have identified the

need for new water technology to ease the burdens of carrying water daily for drinking, cooking, washing, and irrigation:

Evidence shows that life for the rural woman

has been getting harder over recent years. Worsening drought conditions in many African countries mean that women have to walk further distance and for more months during the year to

collect water. A recent study in Ethiopia revealed

that in 75 percent of the households under survey,

the women spent 3 hours or more on a single

journey to collect water. Women in many villages

in Upper Volta set out to collect water at dawn

and rarely return with their daily supply before

noon (Carr, 1978).

Evidence exists that food production may increase when water technology improves. In Kenya,

for example, the installation of tin roofs for rainwater collection saved 2 to 10 hours per day per

household. Women expanded their gardens and

raised more chickens and pigs for urban markets

as a result (Tinker, 1981).

African women also have noted the need for

technologies suited for transporting small loads

of fuelwood, water, and produce, and improved

technologies for food processing. The latter include grinding mills for producing flour from

corn, millet, sorghum, and rice, a task that can

take 1 to 2 hours each day (Carr, 1978). Some

estimates suggest that food processing and preparation take more time and energy than either collecting firewood or water (Tinker, 1982).

Considerable evidence exists that disease is an

impediment to agricultural development and thus

food production in some parts of Africa (Ruttan,

May 1984). Agriculture is impossible due to onchocerciasis (river blindness) in some fertile river

valleys in West Africa. It appears that disease

vectors increase as cultivation increases, eventually causing abandonment of the cleared land.

Trypanosomiasis, carried by the tsetse fly, is a

serious public health problem, and it makes livestock production impossible on approximately 6

million square miles of land. Technologies are

available to prevent or cure some tropical diseases

but often their application is costly. Research in

biotechnology may make new low-cost technologies available but its application is, in some

cases, decades away (U.S. Congress, OTA, 1985).

Issue 3: Disagreement exists regarding the optimal way for the United States to support

scientists and provide funds for research on

African food production.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

●

An integrated system of national and regional

agricultural research institutions in developed

and developing countries tied to the international research network has great potential but

has yet to be achieved.

U.S. contributions of personnel and funds to

the International Agricultural Research Centers

have been vital to their substantial successes.

National agricultural research centers in Africa

need strengthening and this could require a major U.S. commitment.

American institutions have played and continue

to play important roles in educating African

scientists. The tailoring of certain programs

could be improved to fit the situations students

face at home—e.g., by providing in-country
34

●

●

●

●

training or training in comparable developing

countries.

Few U.S. universities can sustain the long-term

commitment required for African technology

development and transfer because: 1) funding

is tied to short-term contracts and assignments,

2) the number of American scientists with training and experience under conditions different

from the U.S. temperate zone is limited, and

3) few U.S. universities and colleges provide incentives for faculty to conduct overseas agricultural research.

Arguments exist regarding the best roles for

American scientists and universities to play in

African development. Some universities are attempting to “internationalize” their charters and

to increase their involvement in development.

At the same time, some developing countries

seek to decrease the role of expatriates, limiting

opportunities for U.S. personnel.

Non-land grant universities and smaller land

grant institutions have not played a large part

in international agricultural development efforts.

The 1890 colleges have conducted research for

small, low-resource farmers in the U.S. Their

expertise may prove to be relevant to developing countries. Long-term overseas work may

jeopardize their local programs, however, because their scientific staff usually is small.

Discussion

Many experts acknowledge that the global agricultural research system has weaknesses that need

to be improved (Eklund, 1983; World Bank,

1984a). However, they have not agreed on the

best way to achieve this nor the optimal roles of

the different institutions that comprise the system:

the international agricultural research centers, national and regional agricultural research institutions in Africa, and developed-country research

facilities, especially universities.

Most American assistance for multilateral agricultural research is channeled through the global

network of international agricultural research

centers funded by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Thirteen centers exist; four are located in Africa and

most of the others have significant programs there

(table 3; app. A). The United States has provided

19 to 28 percent of the annual core funding for

CGIAR since 1972 (CGIAR, 1983).

The Centers have contributed to increases in

food production in developing countries and generally are regarded as successful innovations

(Schultz, 1984). Their greatest impact has been

in breeding high-yielding varieties of wheat and

rice (Plucknett and Smith, 1982). The perception

exists that they have made the “easy” research

gains, though, and are beginning to lag in using

recent biological advances (Ruttan, 1983), Funding is expected to remain relatively constant after

spectacular increases in the 1970s.

Debate continues regarding the proper level and

form of U.S. support for CGIAR. Some note the

increase in U.S. bilateral assistance and fear that

the longstanding U.S. commitment to CGIAR is

waning (Scharffenberger, 1984). On the other

hand, some U.S. university officials contend that

AID allocates money to the international centers

at the expense of support for American institutions (Campbell, 1983).

Most experts, however, recognize the need for

a cooperative, not competitive, global agricultural

research system. Also, a consensus exists that national and regional facilities in Africa deserve increased support in order to make the entire system most effective (Lele, 1981; World Bank,

1984a). Links between the international and national centers are important as well as links among

national institutions (Ruttan, Sept. 1984).

National agricultural research centers in developing countries expanded greatly in the last decades. Most of the growth occurred in a few countries, however, and Nigeria is the only African

nation among them. Ruttan (Sept. 1984) lists several concerns regarding these national efforts in

Asia, Latin America, and Africa:

●

●

●

●

investment in facilities appears to exceed that

in scientific staff development,

administrative burdens stifle research,

frequently locations are chosen without adequate regard for factors that contribute to

success,

often research budgets do not reflect the economic importance of particular commodities,
35

Table 3.-Centers Supported by the CGIAR, 1984

1984 budgeta

Acronym Research Geographic (millions of

(year established) Center Location programs focus dollars)

IRRI (1960) International Rice Research Institute

CIMMYT (1966) Centro International de Mejoramiento

Maiz y Trigo

IITA (1967) International Institute of Tropical

Agriculture

CIAT (1968 ) Centro International de Agricultural

Tropical

CIP (1971) Centro International de la Papa

WARDA (1971) . West African Rice Development

Association

ICRISAT (1972) International Crops Research Institute

for the Semi-Arid Tropics

ILRAD (1973 ) International Laboratory for Research

on Animal Diseases

IBPGR (1974 ) International Board for Plant Genetic

Resources

ILCA (1974) ., International Livestock Center for

Africa

IFPRI (1975) International Food Policy Research

Institute

ICARDA (1976) International Center for Agricultural

Research in the Dry Areas

ISNAR (1980) International Service for National

Agricultural Research

Los Banes, Phillipines Rice

Rice based cropping

systems

Mexico City, Mexico Maize

Bread wheat

Durum wheat

Barley

Triticale

Ibadan, Nigeria Farming systems

Maize

Rice

Sweet potato, yams

Cassava, cowpea,

lima bean, soybean

Cali, Colombia Cassava

Field beans

Rice

Tropical pastures

Lima, Peru Potato

Monrovia, Liberia Rice

Hyderabad, India Chickpea

Pigeonpea

Pearl millet

Sorghum

Groundnut

Farming systems

Nairobi, Kenya Trypanosomiasis

Theileriosis

Rome, Italy Plant genetic sources

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Livestock production

systems

Washington, DC, U.S.A. Food policy

Aleppo, Syria Farming systems

Wheat, barley,

triticale, broad

bean, lentil,

chickpea, forage

crops

The Hague, Netherlands National agricultural

research

.

Global 2 2 5

Asia

Global 21,0

Global

Global

Global

Global

Tropical Africa 21 2

Global

Tropical Africa

Global

Global

Latin America

Latin America

Global

West Africa

Global

Global

Global

Global

Global

Semi-Arid tropics

Global

Global

Global

Tropical Africa

Global

Dry areas of West

Asia and North

Africa

23,1

109

2 9

221

9.7

3 7

12,7

4 2

20.4

Global 35

aCGIAR Supported core budget, net of capital, at the bottom of the bracket (from 1983 Integrative Report)

SOURCE: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research ‘The CGIAR in Africa “ Washington, DC 1984

●

●

●

analysis of research priorities is not well- ities. Most smaller countries, with populations

informed, ranging from 2 million to 10 million, have the releaders of some research systems appear to sources to develop their own research systems in

presume that research can be done without 10 to 20 years. National research systems in

scientists, smaller developing countries, such as Sierra Lea number of national systems are vulnerable one, may require a generation to reach their

to cycles of donors’ development policies. ultimate size—little larger than a branch station

in Texas. They will remain dependent on the inRuttan notes further that both African govern- ternational agricultural research centers, multinaments and donors will face critical questions as tional firms, and developed countries for much

they develop national agricultural research facil- agricultural technology. But they need the scien-
36

tific capacity to draw on the global research

system.

U.S. universities are an important part of that

global system and have been involved in international work for decades. Massachusetts State

College worked with Japan in 1876; other universities followed in the early 1900s. The pace accelerated after 1949, when President Truman

dedicated the United States to helping developing countries. Large numbers of U.S. university

faculty work in developing countries now. Washington State University, for example, has formal

exchange agreements with 17 countries, and more

than 120 faculty had foreign assignments in 1983

(Yates, 1984).

The type of international work that universities

conducted has shifted with time. In the 1950s

many universities attempted to transfer American agricultural technology directly. By the 1960s

their attention shifted to institution-building.

These activities decreased and research efforts increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s when

AID funding for universities peaked (figs. 7 and

8). More recently, universities and individual

American scientists have worked with the global

network of international agricultural research

centers and contracted for AID mission-oriented

work (Perez, 1978).

Figure 7.—AlD-Financed University Contracts and

Grants for Technical Assistance to Host

Countries–In Millions, Fiscal Years 1970-8@

$200 ~ I 1

$150

0

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1977 1978 19791980

Fiscal years b

aData do not include AID grants and loans involving host country contracts with

U.S. universities.

bData for fiscal year 1975 are not available.

SOURCE: General Accounting Office, AID and Universities Have Yet to Forge

an Effective Partnership to Combat World Food Problems, ID-82-3,

Oct. 16, 1981.

Many evaluations of universities’ involvement

in international activities were completed in the

1960s and 1970s. U.S. personnel made a large contribution to overseas successes, but some common

problems were noted. These included: lack of

long-term planning, difficulties in the AID/university relationship; lack of social, cultural, and political sensitivity on the part of the U.S. personnel;

lack of planning and coordination by funders,

universities, and developing country institutions;

and inappropriate education for developingcountry students in the United States (Perez,

1978). Some of these evaluations recommended

new American institutions to remedy these problems. The Gardner Report (1964), for example,

suggested forming a National Institute for Education and Technical Cooperation to take over

U.S. development-related research and mobilize

university involvement in developing countries.

The Federal Government provides substantial

assistance to U.S. universities for international

agricultural development. Few State governments

have supplied the charter or the funds for similar

efforts. Citizens in some States feel that their

universities should work on State problems and

that international work leads to increased competition for markets between local farmers and

ranchers and their developing country counterFigure 8.—AlD-Financed University Contracts and

Grants for Technical Assistance to Host Countries—

In Numbers of Contracts and Institutions,

Fiscal Years 1970-80a

120

100

20

n

Title X11 legislation

passed December 1975

❑ llnnr i

I

I 9 1 1 1 I 1 1 I Ill I I I 1 I 1 I I 1

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

Fiscal years b

aData do not include AID grants and loans involving host country contracts with

U.S. universities.

bData for fiscal year 1975 are not available.

SOURCE: General Accounting Office, AID and Universities Have Yet to Forge

an Effective Partnership to Combat World Food Problems, ID-82-3,

Oct. 16, 1961.
37

parts. A few State universities, however, have

changed their original charters to reflect their view

of more global responsibilities, and Federal programs have increased universities’ interest and

ability to fulfill them.

The university must provide educational opportunities that will enable the citizens of our state

and nation to make sound decisions based on an

awareness of the global environment in which we

live and work , . . .Our students and clientele

[must be] able to see the relationships that will

continue to bind this country more closely to the

global community . . . this 1 believe to be one of

the premier responsibilities of the global university (Yates, Executive Vice President and Provost,

Washington State University, 1984).

Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act, passed

in 1975, provides the rationale and means by

which universities have become more involved in

international agricultural research and development. It committed U.S. universities and colleges

to help soIve food problems in developing countries. The General Accounting Office reports that

“Title XII has been instrumental in bringing new

vigor and awareness to international work in the

U, S.-university community” (U.S. GAO, 1981).

But GAO also notes that U.S. universities have

limited capacity to take part effectively in these

AID programs due to deterrents to faculty overseas assignments, sporadic funding from AID, income tax burdens on faculty, and cumbersome

AID contracting procedures. AID faces similar

constraints due to skepticism in AID missions

about the relevance of involving U.S. universities

as “partners in development” and some experiences with poor university performance.

Some universities have not been drawn into this

international work extensively, and concerns exist that Title XII contracts are awarded on the basis

of geographic politics more than expertise. In addition, some technologies—e.g., biotechnologies

—are being developed largely outside of the landgrant system in private universities and research

firms. This raises questions whether certain technologies may be unavailable to developing countries because of the funding structure for international agricultural work in the United States.

Similarly, some experts contend that the 1890

Land Grant Colleges (table 4) have not participated in overseas research in proportion to their

potential. Since their creation, the 1890 institutions have been involved extensively in domestic

community development under conditions that

parallel those in developing countries (Williams,

1979). Shortage of qualified personnel, however,

has led them, like some other universities, sometimes to substitute outside contractors on AID

Table 4.—The 1890 Institutions Were Added to the Land-Grant System to

Compensate for Exclusion of Blacks From the 1862 Land-Grant Universities

Institutio n Locatio n

Alabama A&M University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Alcorn State University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

University of Arkansas—Pine Bluff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Delaware State College. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Florida A&M University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fort Valley State University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kentucky State University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Langston University. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lincoln University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

University of Maryland-Eastern Shores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

North Carolina A&T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prairie View A&M University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

South Carolina State College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Southern University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tennessee State University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tuskegee Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Normal, AL

Lorman, MS

Pine Bluff, AR

Dover, DE

Tallahassee, FL

Fort Valley, GA

Frankfort, KY

Langston, OK

Jefferson City, MO

Princess Anne, MD

Greensboro, NC

Prairie View, TX

Orangeburg, SC

Baton Rouge, LA

Nashville, TN

Tuskegee, AL

Virginia State College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Petersburg, VA

SOURCES B D May berry, “Mechanisms for the Delivery of Appropriate Technology —Extension,” The Unique Resources of

the 1890 Land-Grant Institutions and Implications for International Development, Thomas T. Williams (ed ) (Baton

Rouge, LA: Southern University Unemployment-Underemployment Institute, 1979), p 42; Southeastern Consortium

for International Development, Washington, DC
38

projects and has resulted in an uneven achievement record.

U.S. agricultural colleges are in transition, with

more women, minority, and urban students entering. The effect of these trends on the conduct and

content of domestic and international research and

development activities is unknown.

Issue 4: Research information on science, technology, and development is less effective than

it could be because it is not adequately coordinated, shared, or disseminated.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

●

Limits to the flow of research information result in needless duplication of effort and slower

progress.

Research findings sometimes are not disseminated across national boundaries and institutional affiliations.

Advancing information technologies, such as

communication satellites and microcomputers,

have the potential to make large amounts of

information available at low cost to users scattered around the world.

This potential remains largely unrealized in developing countries because many lack the infrastructure to provide adequate power or to

repair programming.

Discussion

Leaders in developing countries called upon the

U.N. Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for a “new world information order. ” One of their concerns was ensuring

access to information technology. Evidence exists that problems with sharing information continue and that some of the thornier policy issues

remain. For example, problems are expected to

arise from different national philosophies and laws

regarding flow of data and from connecting information systems across national boundaries

(U.S. Congress, OTA, 1981).

Traditional methods of sharing agricultural

information exist and some contend that international cooperation in agricultural research is

increasing. Today, some 100 international agricultural networks exist worldwide, ranging from

international nurseries to teams working on specific problems (Plucknett and Smith, 1984). Communication problems affect these groups, although

most publish newsletters and hold workshops to

disseminate their findings. Feedback within the

network may be slow and links between networks

and outside scientists may be weak.

Information dissemination on small-scale technologies is considered critical. Both Volunteers in

Technical Assistance (VITA) and Volunteers in

Asia organize data bases on these technologies

(U.S. AID, 1981). The nature, scope, and level

of information needed by various recipients varies

as widely as the sources of information. “To build

reliable, comprehensive, and up-to-date services

is obviously a major undertaking and will be quite

costly” (Singer, 1977).

Groups such as the United Nations Industrial

Development Organization (UNIDO) and the International Development Centre in Ottawa, Canada, also stress the need for information technologies as development tools. In March, UNIDO

suggested that developing countries build indigenous capabilities for information management. One concept it endorsed was a low earth

orbit satellite as a low-cost communication tool

for a variety of uses by widely scattered people

(VITA, 1984). Uses might include broadcasting

messages and transmitting documents, thus circumventing cumbersome international mails.

Satellite systems, like many contemporary communication technologies, rely on computers.

While some developing countries have computer

systems that are reliable, stories abound of computers idled because no one can use them or because simple repairs cannot be made locally. Agricultural problems in sub-Saharan Africa often

result from the lack of basic infrastructure: services and facilities such as roads, tools, and repair

and storage facilities may be missing. The role for

elaborate technology such as computers and satellites and their actual costs must be evaluated

carefully if they are to compete for funds with infrastructural development.

Generally, the United States has well-developed

services for sharing agricultural research information via mail systems, telephones, libraries, and
39

publishing houses, and the United States is a

leader in advanced electronic communications.

These systems are being used to benefit African

countries, but problems remain. For example,

computer use in the United States by government

donors and private voluntary organizations (PVOs)

is accelerating. Many PVOs face “significant problems in the selection of hardware and design of

software” (Biddle, 1984). The Agency for International Development has a computerized system

to make project descriptions and other information available. It is beset by problems, however,

including lack of completeness, definitional inconsistency, and incompatibility with other data sets.

The holdings of American libraries related to

Africa are relatively weak. The Library of Congress, for example, does not have an extensive collection of African national documents (Moris,

1984).

Issue 5: Food producers have a limited role in

agricultural research and this decreases the

effectiveness of the research.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

●

●

Experts increasingly call for greater producer

involvement in identifying problems for research and in developing and testing new technologies.

Examples suggest that this approach better ensures that research meets the needs of its users

and increases the likelihood of a project’s

success.

Methods of conducting and evaluating on-farm

research are not well-developed.

Many institutions working with subsistence

producers are not structured to encourage involvement of farmers and herders.

Participatory research and planning requires

formal coordination among food producers, extension workers, and researchers.

Discussion

Experts in agricultural development have a

growing belief that the present organizational

framework of agricultural research and development does not serve the interests of many developing countries. This has prompted a search for

new structures that will reach more rural people.

It is generally accepted that farmers and herders

must be involved in later stages of technology

transfer such as technology evaluation and extension. Studies of technology transfer in the last 30

years show that failure often resulted because

clients were not involved effectively (Jedlicka,

1977).

Recent evidence indicates that producers’ involvement in earlier stages—i.e., in identifying

agricultural problems for investigation and planning and participating in research—is crucial also.

Subsistence farmers have been effective in planning and designing research, especially in identifying important environmental features (Jedlicka,

1981). Also, farmers have carried out their own

experiments, sometimes making agronomic breakthroughs before researchers (Howes and Chambers,

1979) and integrating biological, economic, environmental, and social factors in their decisions

(Francis, 1981).

The challenge is to devise a system of research

that involves small producers and integrates onfarm work with established national programs

(Whyte, 1981). Some research of this type combines: 1) research on multiple cropping systems

instead of monoculture, 2) research on the role

of animals in farming systems, 3) on-farm testing

in addition to experiment station work, 4) an emphasis on interdisciplinary collaboration, and 5)

the participation of people responsible for extension and economic development.

This type of research has had some notable successes. The value of involving farmers in all stages

of project work in Ethiopia, Egypt, Pakistan, and

India has been noted (Lowdermilk and Lattimore,

1981). The unique vitality of Israeli agricultural

research in which farmers are also researchers was

identified recently (U.S. Congress, OTA, May

1983).

Numerous factors make such research difficult.

These include nonsupportive research organizations and government agencies and the complexities of conducting on-farm research. Participatory

research is a more complex form of interdisciplinary research and requires high levels of com-
40

petence and experience. Few successful models of

interdisciplinary research exist (Rhoades and

Booth, 1983). Also, lack of political and administrative continuity among local groups and international donors is a major problem. Economic

and cultural gaps between producers and researchers also may hinder cooperation.

In the United States, farmers and ranchers are

involved in setting research priorities through government agency users’ groups and through their

representatives in farm, ranch, and commodity

organizations. Attempts to involve the rural poor

by developing similar organizations in Africa generally have not succeeded. Some attribute these

failures to the imposition of organizations by “outsiders. ” They contend that meaningful participation must come about through the emergence of

local people’s own organizational choices, but few

examples exist yet (Oakley and Marsden, 1984).
Chapter 4

Issues in Technology Transfer
Chapter 4

Issues in Technology Transfer

Developing technologies suitable for Africa is

only one step in helping increase food production.

Those technologies also must be adapted and

disseminated among the African people. This calls

for successful technology transfer—another area

where the United States has expertise to share.

U.S. agriculture is vastly different from African

agriculture, so U.S. involvement must be considered carefully. The technologies used will need to

be different, as will the extension systems used

to distribute them. The most effective technology

transfer will be based on unique African social

and agronomic conditions.

This chapter examines a number of important

issues in the realm of technology transfer. For instance, should certain groups of people be identified for special assistance? How can women, the

critical labor force in African food production,

be integrated more effectively into the technology transfer process—including improved access

to extension services and credit? And how can extension services in Africa be improved to meet

producers current needs while preparing them for

the future’s even greater food demands?

Issue 6: The possibility of directing agricultural

project assistance to meet the needs of specific target groups continues to be debated.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

It is difficult to define explicitly and to divide

the “poorest of the poor” into categories such

as smallholders, landless, and urban or rural

un/underemployed.

Directing project assistance to specific target

groups may alienate those other groups excluded and the national staff and donor representatives responsible for implementing

projects.

However, if women and other disadvantaged

producers are not identified as groups that require additional technological assistance, project planning and implementation may ignore

their problems and benefit them little.

●

●

●

Both donors and African governments need improved definitions for low-resource producers

and other categories of the poor.

A low-resource producer is one who lacks access to natural resource, economic, and/or technological inputs to overcome constraints to increased food production.

National development plans do not necessarily

indicate African- governments’ commitment to

low-resource producers.

Discussion

The magnitude of the problem seems overwhelming; substantial numbers of poor people exist in the developing countries. However, determining the number of people who lack sufficient

income for adequate subsistence remains difficult.

For example, the U.N. Food and Agriculture

Organization and the World Bank provide different estimates of 450 million and 1.3 billion, respectively, as the number of people living below

subsistence level in all developing countries (Eicher,

Mar. 1984).

There is no question that Africa contains some

of the world’s most impoverished countries and

people.

A few statistics provide stark evidence that

Africans are the poorest of the world’s poor.

Three out of five are chronically malnourished.

Twenty-two of the world’s 36 poorest countries

are in Africa. For every 1000 African children

born, 120 will die before their first birthday.

Eighty percent of the continent’s population have

no access to adequate health services and only one

in four has safe water to drink. Africans die

sooner (average age 49) and are less literate (only

36 percent) than in any other part of the world

(Swift, 1984).

Other figures are equally disturbing. For example, Kenya and Ethiopia had 55 and 68 percent,

respectively, of their 1975 populations below an

income level sufficient to provide adequate nutrition (Chenery, 1979). The total number of poor

is difficult to estimate, as are the relative num43
44

bers between countries. Compared with Tanzania,

which has an annual per capita GNP of $280,

Chad, with only $80 per capita, seems dismally

poor. But Tanzania has an official inflation rate

of 13 to 30 percent and scarce foreign exchange.

Both of these factors severely affect the poorest

20 percent of the population. Zimbabwe, on the

other hand, is classified as a middle income country with an average per capita GNP of $850. But

the country experiences large differences in income

distribution. How can the poor of Zimbabwe be

compared with those of Chad and Tanzania?

Economic development has many definitions

and models. Concern about beneficiaries is common. “Trickle down” or “over” or “up” indicate

perceived mechanisms for ensuring distribution

of the returns from agricultural production. Some

technological developments have been relatively

class neutral. In Zimbabwe, introduction of the

maize hybrid SR 52 was adopted by a large majority of small farmers (Eicher, 1984). Generally,

however, research, economic, and extension institutions have developed and transferred technology, information, and benefits to relatively few

farmers. Development assistance has not been

directed toward the poorest of the African countries, either in total assistance (Lappé, 1980), or

as agriculture, nutrition, and rural development

assistance (U.S. AID, 1984). Some of the more

disadvantaged smallholders lack reliable access to

affordable land, credit, and labor and receive less

development assistance than “progressive” farmers

(Wortman and Cummings, 1978).

U.S. development assistance, since 1973, has

been mandated to help the poorer segments of the

rural population. However, given the present

levels of development assistance and the project

approach used by AID, difficult problems exist

in assisting target groups. The problems include

lack of target group definitions, unreliable data

on these groups, and lack of sustainable and

replicable agricultural development programs that

will reach them (Tendler, 1982; Esman, 1978). In

rural areas, for example, how do the “poorest of

the poor” differ from smallholders or subsistence

farmers? Are the “poorest of the poor” actually

farmers or are they the landless rural inhabitants

or migrants to the satellite communities of the

larger urban areas? Are they seasonal farm laborers who supplement their income with other

sources of income? Are they men or women or

both? Are other strategies necessary for meeting

the needs of the poor without natural resources

versus the poor without money?

Differing opinions exist on the best methods for

effectively reaching the poorer smallholders. Some

specialists propose that development assistance

directed towards the poor should be replaced with

a more general production approach accepting the

. . . necessity and the desirability of working

with existing power structures and the most progressive and dynamic elements in the rural areas,

hoping that over the long term, questions of income inequalities and other problems can be addressed as they emerge” (Morss and Morss, 1982).

Attempts to target specific groups for development assistance may irritate donors and recipient governments and possibly lead to impractical

projects with few long-term benefits (Morss and

Morss, 1982). Another view assumes the failure

of the target approach has been the inability to

consider adequately the different categories of impoverished groups, the impacts of technology on

them, and the suitable assistance programs that

meet their articulated needs.

Commonly, agricultural development projects

have implicitly assumed the existence of an economically homogeneous “peasantry,” overlooking the class and income divisions which divide

most rural populations.

The rural poor, while sharing a common poverty, are comprised of many social groups, differing in occupation, location, sex, status, and religion (Uphoff, et al., 1979).

It seems important that donors and host governments together determine the needs of various

poor rural groups. Some groups of rural poor may

not even be reached through agricultural development projects and may require other assistance

approaches. Uphoff, Cohen, and Goldsmith (1979)

and Esman (1978) identify five distinct groups of

people in this category who have marginal or no

access to land.

1. Agricultural workers: landless people who

seasonally sell their labor to work on farms.
—

45

2. Non-agricultural workers: landless who are

marginally in the formal economic sector or

engage in informal economic activities.

3. Marginal tenant farmers: those landless or

marginally landless who gain access to kind through

contractual agreement with other farmers.

4. Marginal farmers: those who have title or

customary rights to small or marginal farms.

These farmers face production constraints due to

a lack of water, credit, technology, markets, and

good quality land.

5. Non-sedentary rural households: nomadic or

semi-nomadic pastoralists and other migratory

groups who lack recognition of their legitimate

land rights and who face increasing natural and

economic degradation of their land and water resources. Within this group there are several subgroups characterized by their access to and control of livestock,

Clearly, certain groups face special constraints

because of their perceived social status. Women

and ethnic minority groups of some countries

especially face more severe problems with access

to land, credit, suitable technology, and political forums.

Data on the number of landless in Africa are

scarce. However, one study provides information

which questions the assumption that there is abundant underused land of decent quality. Average

figures indicate that 8 to 10 percent of rural Africa

is landless and up to 30 percent of the rural

population is near-landless (Esman, 1978).

Among the landless, refugees represent probably the poorest class of people in Africa. The exact number of people in this group is very difficult to determine because of their mobility and

because famine and civil strife cause constantly

shifting environmental, social, and political conditions. Refugee populations in several countries

(e.g., Botswana and Somalia) have been settled

and are involved in integrated rural development

projects. Some settled populations have produced

high agricultural returns. In Botswana, for example, two refugee communities have per hectare

yields that are higher than contiguous areas (District Agricultural Officer, 1982). However, most

refugee populations are composed of pastoralists

who are being forced to settle in refugee camps

in marginally productive areas and to adapt to

a new way of food production. It is unlikely that

these groups will be able immediately to produce

sufficient food for their own subsistence or for

surplus.

Alternative approaches to project assistance

might include increased emphasis on integrated

rural development, increased levels of funding

allocated to “grass roots” organizations, and increased program funding for research. Participants at the OTA workshop were concerned that

a target approach toward groups of poor, outside the existing administrative structure, could

not alleviate poor people’s problems. Therefore,

they advocated the more integrated approach to

development. Concern exists, though, that the

poor will be left out if there are no attempts to

integrate them into national, regional, and local

planning efforts.

Addressing common constraints of low-resource producers seems necessary. Eicher and

Baker (1982) and others have defined “smallholders” to be those farmers who produce on 2

to 10 acres of land, use mostly family labor, till

their land with mostly hand tools, and maintain

a small capital stock. Esman (1978) adds that these

marginal producers face severe constraints to increased food production. OTA’s definition of lowresource producers incorporates the above characteristics of Eicher and Baker but adds that lowresource producers are those smallholders and

herders who often face major constraints in their

access to economic, natural, and technological resources. The farmer must face constraints such

as access to reliable productive land, affordable

credit, timely inputs, extension advice, draft

power, agricultural training, decent producer

prices, and seasonable labor. Migratory and seminomadic herders face constraints in access to livestock, reliably productive range, veterinary and

extension services and management advice, reliable dry season watering points, and technologies

on forage crops that will decrease dry season nutritional stress.

The consensus of the OTA workshop was that

both African governments and donor agencies

need to improve definitions for the target group
46

of low-resource producers, which represents the

majority of constrained rural producers; determine the constraints that these producers face and

reasonable interventions to overcome them; and

ensure that this group is integrated into development program planning. Equally important remains the goal of meeting the needs of those poor

who can only marginally be assisted by improved

agricultural technologies, identifying ways to generate income and provide basic needs.

Issue 7: Women contribute significantly to food

production in Africa, but have limited access

to extension services, credit, and training.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

●

●

●

The prevailing model of African agriculture

contends that men are the farm managers.

However, up to 33 percent of farm managers

south of the Sahara are women, and in the remaining households, women do significant

farm work.

Women contribute substantial amounts of labor, capital, and management toward the production of Africa’s food. Estimates of women’s

contribution range from 60 to 80 percent, although regional differences exist.

In addition to their agricultural contribution,

women also do most household chores, such

as collecting firewood and water, cooking,

repairing and maintaining the compounds,

childcare, and marketing surplus garden crops.

Women are as innovative as their male counterparts in adopting new technologies, yet they

receive only a fraction of the services and have

fewer contacts with extension staff.

Women represent only a minute portion of the

agricultural extension staffs. Because of cultural

norms, male extension workers generally will

not consult with women farmers in the household without the presence of an adult male

family member, even if the woman is the farm

manager.

Most agricultural training programs for women

do not stress agricultural production but tend

to be oriented toward home extension.

●

●

●

●

Women have little access to formal institutional

credit because they usually lack the access to

land, livestock, and other forms of collateral.

Women hold few policy and managerial positions within agricultural ministries, especially

those positions relating to animal and crop production, research, and field services.

Community meetings are traditionally seen as

a forum for men to discuss issues affecting the

community and for government extension staff

to discuss new agricultural strategies and project proposals. Women are almost always excluded from these meetings or are too busy to

attend.

Women ususally are not included in planning projects intended to increase food production.

Discussion

This one they call ‘farmer’; send in teachers to

teach him to farm (while I’m out growing the

food); lend him money for tractors and tillers

(while I’m out growing the food); promise him

fortunes if he’d only raise cotton (while I’m out

growing the food); buy our land from him to add

to your ranches (while I’m out growing the food)

. . . No, I daren’t stop working . . . and I won’t

abandon that thing I was born for: to make sure

my children have food in their bellies (Taylor,

1984).

African women play a major role in food production. Women’s labor and management contribute significantly to food production, with estimates ranging from 60 to 80 percent in many

places (Boserup, 1970; Tinker, 1981). These figures may not include women’s sizable livestock

activities (McDowell, 1984. Furthermore, in most

agricultural systems, it is difficult to distinguish

between food and cash crops, since many cereal

crops qualify as both. Women are expected to

contribute work toward the production of cash

crops, and their labor provides a significant proportion of the total agricultural component of

Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Men, however,

are generally the recipients of the income generated. Because of the extremely important role

women play in agriculture, a more complete
47

Photo credit. World Bank Photo by Ray Witlin

African women contribute a substantial amount of the total labor to the production of food crops.

Here, Senegalese women harvest sorghum.

knowledge of the constraints women face in agri- model. It can not automatically be assumed that

cultural production is necessary. Therefore, it is each household is a self-contained unit with all

necessary to understand not only the agricultural the household members cooperating and sharing

responsibilities of women but also the intra- responsibilities and management functions. More

household dynamics. appropriately, a woman’s role in food production

In farming, men and women traditionally assume responsibilities for certain tasks. Social,

cultural, economic, and environmental conditions

usually are factors in the labor patterns of both

rural men and women. Men generally clear, prepare, and plow the land, and women plant, weed,

harvest, process, and store the food crops. However, there are many regional variations in this

could be considered as semi-autonomous with

levels of cooperation among household members

differing with each household (Gladwin, et al.,

1984).

Cultural differences, demographic and socioeconomic conditions, and labor availability all

produce variations in the general model. Some of

these include situations where:
48

1.

2.

3.

4.

Some farm operations are shared by the

members of the household. The division of

labor might be dependent on such factors as

seasonal availability and the value of cash

crops relative to food crops. The pattern

might follow that described above, but women

might have to do some of the typically

“male” tasks.

Women and men of the same household

share the responsibility for a common field

on which cash crops are grown, but the

women produce food crops on separate

fields. Presumably, the labor patterns will

be similar to the general model, but the man

probably will have control of the woman’s

labor and the cash returns from the crops.

The woman usually will provide separate labor and management for the food crop field.

Women and men grow separate crops, either

on common or on separate fields. For example, groundnuts and beans might be viewed

as a woman’s crop, while maize is a man’s.

Women are the household heads and responsible for all the management and most of the

labor (Spring, 1984).

The most typical model in pastoral and mixed

agricultural systems has men responsible for the

care of larger livestock (e.g., cattle) and women

responsible for smaller ruminants (goats and

sheep). Men are usually entitled to the returns

from the sale of cattle and women are responsible for milking and allocation of the milk between

the needs of the family and the herd (Hjort and

Ostberg, 1978; Spencer, 1973). However, other

patterns developed out of expediency include

women sharing all livestock responsibilities with

men, caring for different types of livestock (e.g.,

goats and sheep), doing different tasks than men

with all the livestock, or taking care of all the livestock (Spring, 1984). Women, generally, cultivate

the food crops for family consumption, especially

in situations where the men are mostly absent

tending herds (Spencer, 1965; Spencer, 1973;

Gulliver, 1955).

Women usually handle most of the domestic

chores, including the collection of firewood (for

cooking) and water often from distant sources,

cooking, cleaning, and childcare. A typical rural

women’s day averages 13 to 15 hours and it is not

unusual to see women hoeing with babies strapped

to their backs.

Male migration to urban areas in search of employment adds to the burden imposed upon rural African women. With the male absent from

the household the women must organize labor for

land clearing and plowing and the management

of cattle. Women also become de facto heads of

household and farm managers. As Tinker notes:

Today between 25 and 33 percent of all households are de facto headed by a woman due to divorce, death, desertion, long-term migration, or

because she never married. These female headed

households constitute the poorest group in every

country (Tinker, 1981).

In several countries, the figures are even higher:

e.g., Botswana: 40-45 percent (Bond, 1974), Lesotho: 67 percent (Spring, 1984). However, this

managerial role has not been recognized and

women still are excluded from institutional involvement in agricultural planning, credit for production, access to de facto or de jure title to land,

extension services, and farm production training.

Instead, women generally receive traditional training in nutrition, health, home extension, and

handicraft production.

Access to extension services is extremely important, but these systems frequently fail to contact

women. For many social and political reasons,

large amounts of agricultural information and

services are directed toward the “progressive”

male farmer (Berger, et al., 1984; Roling, et al.,

1981). Extension agents are restricted by cultural

norms from approaching female heads of household without a man present. They also receive few

incentives for approaching women and poorer

farmers who lack access to sufficient land and income to purchase agricultural inputs. The assumption is that this information will be disseminated

from the “progressive” male farmers to household

members and other farmers in the community, but

quite often this is not the case (Fortmann, 1978).

In summary, the problems that women face regarding access to agricultural services are:

1. Male planners and extension staff view

women as the domestic labor force in the
49

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

household who also provide agricultural labor; women are seen as “farmers’ wives”

(Spring, et al., 1983).

Women have few channels for communicating their problems to local leaders or to government agricultural staff.

Most research information transferred by

agricultural extension staff is aimed at those

farmers who have capital for such practices

as land clearing and plowing and introduction of mechanical planters, fertilizer, and

grain-milling equipment. Usually only men

are able to take advantage of these innovations. As a consequence, increased land

under cultivation exacerbates the labor burden on women or eliminates some of women’s extra income-earning activities.

Limited research exists on methods to alleviate the production labor constraints of

women (in hoeing, planting, weeding, harvesting, and processing), and few attempts

have been made to disseminate information

useful to women by institutionalized agricultural extension programs. Women receive

fewer visits from extension agents than men

do (Fortmann, 1978; Staudt, 1975; Spring,

et al., 1983).

Women farmers are less likely than men to

have sufficient income to purchase necessary

agricultural inputs (Berger, et al., 1984).

Access to land is necessary for agricultural

credit and for membership in most agricultural societies that distribute inputs, information, or technical assistance (Berger, et al.,

1984; Moris, 1981; Schumacher, 1981).

Even though women tend to be as innovative

as men (Fortmann, 1981; Staudt, 1975),

seldom are they selected for farmer training

courses. When they are, they are often too

busy to attend or cannot organize childcare,

or attend to find that only home economic

courses in nutrition and family welfare are

offered.

The OTA workshop participants and other experts find it is extremely important that the constraints rural African women face are addressed.

The problems in reaching women are partly political and partly institutional. Political problems

such as access to land and participation in the

decisionmaking process at the local, district, and

national levels could be addressed by African

governments if increasing the food contribution

of female headed households is a priority. Several possible changes have been proposed that

would contribute to assessing the needs of women

farmers and provide services that they could use:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Recruitment of additional female extension

staff. Extension staffs in most African countries are predominantly male. Men make up

between 94 and 99.7 percent of the staff in

those countries with more than 20 extension

agents (Berger, et al., 1984). It is assumed

that female extension staff will contact women

more frequently than male staff. Therefore,

priority could be placed on recruiting more

female extension staff.

Training courses for all extension staff that

explain the role of women in agriculture and

that develop techniques designed to encourage the participation of women farmers in

the delivery of extension services.

Introduction of village level women paraprofessionals to work with women farmers

(Ministry of Agriculture, 1983).

Incentive systems for extension staff that encourage working with low-resource producers, especially women.

Ensure that women have access to credit, either by developing appropriate credit institutions or expanding indigenous credit societies.

Design village based programs aimed where

women gather—e.g., at village water points.

Include women as beneficiaries of land reform or allocate them rights of use to land

in traditional systems.

Ensure that farmer training courses stressing food production techniques are available

to women on an equal basis with men.

Emphasize the use of farming systems research

(FSR) to investigate the intrahousehold dynamics within farms. For each situation and

condition, it is important to identify goals,

decision criteria, and the context of the decisions for women (Gladwin, et al., 1984;

Spring, 1984).
50

Photo credit: US. Agency for International Development

Many organizations have called for changes in agricultural extension systems to meet the needs of low-resource producers,

especially women. One suggestion is to work with groups of people where they normally gather. Village water supplies,

like this one in Niger, offer opportunities to reach women without disrupting their work activities.

Issue 8: Extension systems in Africa lack clear

objectives and adequate structure for increasing food production.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

●

Extension systems are in place in most African

countries, but generally seem to be ineffective

in transferring information between farmers

and researchers.

The objectives of extension programs commonly are confusing to the field staff or the

farmers.

Farmers often have inappropriate expectations

of extension.

African extension systems frequently have few

technical innovations to propose to farmers as

options to current technology because research-

●

●

●

ers and the extension service are in different

ministries (or divisions) and usually coordinate

poorly.

Extension services generally have few subject

specialists who can communicate effectively

with both researchers and extension staff.

Agricultural research and extension services

commonly do not take into account the needs

of low-resource farmers. Most planning and

implementation have been centralized and the

innovations introduced tend to be directed

toward more “progressive” farmers.

The U.S. research and extension model assumes

that the existing technological base is underproductive and that technological innovations

can increase farm productivity.
51

● The U.S. land grant model of agent/farmer interaction, which uses applied research, could

be modified to suit specific country conditions

in Africa.

Discussion

One institution directly involved in technology

transfer is the agricultural extension service. On

a day to day basis, staffs attempt to transfer information on available technologies and farming

practices to farmers. The United States and many

other donors have spent several billions of dollars

on developing and strengthening extension systems (Watts and Claar, 1983). But these attempts

have failed to contribute significantly to increases

in food production or to reach the poorer segments of agricultural societies (Moris, 1981; Anthony, et al., 1979; Richardson, 1983), Some

problems of African extension systems most frequently mentioned are inappropriate models,

poorly defined goals and objectives, poor organization, inadequate human and financial resources, lack of suitable technology to extend, failure of agricultural ministries to identify target

groups, loss of skilled field staff due to promotion, predominantly male staffs ignoring women

producers, and the lack of remuneration, transportation, and respect for the field agents (Kellogg,

1983; McDowell, 1984; Moris, 1981; Spring,

1984).

The historical development of Africa determined the evolution of most extension systems.

In Francophone Africa, the French extension

model (sometimes combined with the U.S. land

grant system) was based on a cash crop economy.

The British introduced an extension system in East

Africa and parts of West Africa designed to stimulate production of food and cash crops for the

British market, even though the domestic British

model for extension was based on food production (Watts and Claar, 1983). In each of these

areas fragments of these models still remain and

affect the objectives of the systems.

The model that the United States has been promoting in many areas of Africa is based on the

U.S. land grant system of research, education, and

outreach. Using this system, attempts have been

made to transfer both international and national

research to “progressive” farmers and herders,

assuming that the adoption of innovative agricultural techniques will be passed on to other lowresource producers. However, “[developing countries] have systems oriented to serving governmental needs. They stress things, not people. They

are not client-centered and not well set up to reach

small farmers, to create credibility or to transfer

knowledge” (Watts and Claar, 1983).

Five general approaches to agricultural extension exist in Africa. They are: 1) the conventional

or innovation-centered approach, based on a

package of innovations to be distributed to individual farmers, usually the more “progressive”

ones; 2) the commodity-focused approach, based

on the promotion of a single cash crop and the

inputs necessary for a timely harvest and a suitable remuneration for the producers; 3) community development-cum-extension approach, which

integrates agricultural extension with other community development activities; 4) the “animation

rurale” or extension techniques used to organize

groups of producers to solicit needs and provide

information relevant to those needs; and 5) the

farmer-focused or the Training and Visit System

approach, which emphasizes providing recommendations based on the circumstances of the

farmer, regular in-service training for the extension agents, tightly scheduled visits to the farmers,

and close supervision (Pickering, 1984).

Problems exist with each of these approaches.

The conventional approach generally involves the

introduction of relatively expensive technical

packages of inputs. Because of the risk involved

with the expense of the complete package, it is

difficult for low-resource producers to adopt any

of these innovations. Consequently, frustrated

agents work mostly with the more “progressive”

farmers who have the financial means to purchase

the packages, and the majority of low-resource

producers are excluded. Since the agents work

almost exclusively with wealthier farmers or

herders, perceived problems that require further

attention of research institutes do not represent

the problems of low-resource producers (Stavis,

1979).

The commodity approach obviously does little to promote the increased production of food
52

crops as it deals exclusively with the production

of a single cash crop. It can be directed toward

small holders, but as with the conventional system, the tendency generally requires expensive

packages of innovations.

The “animation rurale” approach, by working

with groups of producers, has the advantage of

reaching more farmers and herders with limited

staff. Not only does this allow the extension system to reduce costs but the technique provides a

structure for optimizing economies of scale in

some farm operations and gives them some control over the extension system (Stavis, 1979). The

disadvantage some see is that local groups are difficult to form (Pickering, 1984). However, this

problem often can be overcome by working with

indigenous groups instead of introducing new

ones.

The community development-cum-extension

approach is criticized because it diffuses the extension efforts among too many activities and

diminishes the impact that extension agents can

have on introduction of agricultural technologies

(Pickering, 1984). However, enough concern was

expressed at the OTA workshop about agricultural development proceeding in a manner isolated from rural development to justify examining this approach.

Finally, the Training and Visit System (TVS)

approach represents the World Bank’s attempt to

strengthen conventional extension systems. Extension agents are being supported with in-service

training, closer supervision, and infrastructural

support. Also, they are relieved of many of their

non-agricultural responsibilities. The system also

is designed to ensure that extension supervisors

work with a limited number of agents and that

the agent/farmer contacts are regularly scheduled

(Benor and Harrison, 1977). The system generally uses contact with individual producers but

can be used for group extension activities. The

advantage of the approach is that it strengthens

existing systems and provides regular in-service

training. The disadvantages are: 1) it requires a

high level of recurrent costs that most African

governments cannot afford and 2) by reinforcing

existing systems, it may affect little the information flow to low-resource producers, may ignore

indigenous production techniques, and may continue to promote technological packages that are

inappropriate to local social, environmental, and

economic conditions.

OTA has developed several conditions for the

successful transfer of technology (Box B). One

necessary condition requires that both users and

transfer agents be involved in the choosing, planning, and implementation of the technology so

that it meets the actual needs of the user. This ensures a two-way educational process; the agent

relating technical and institutional support information, and the farmer identifying constraints and

needs. Generally, extension agents deliver the

message or physical inputs to the community and

measure the outputs. This organizational structure allows no opportunity for feedback from

farmers to reach the researchers and assumes that

the government agricultural hierarchy knows

what is best for the farmers (Nobe, 1983; Moris,

1981).

Another equally important condition is that the

technology be adapted to the users’ local biophysical and socioeconomic situations. This implies that extension systems not only have to introduce technologies that fit the local conditions

but also must be sensitive to the existing farming

systems and indigenous technologies. The extension system should be able to transfer information in both directions. The farmers’ problems

need to be presented to agricultural researchers

and policy staff, while the researchers need to

present suggested improvements back to the

farmers.

To reach low-resource producers effectively and

increase food production, African governments

and donor agencies must establish clear objectives

for agricultural development, target group(s), and

alternative structures for agricultural extension

systems that assist in meeting objectives. An effective extension system should: 1) provide mechanisms for research/extension coordination, 2)

establish clear terms of reference that rural people understand and support, 3) develop methods

for understanding the constraints of and providing opportunities for low-resource producers, 4)

identify indigenous agricultural technologies and

determine their effectiveness, and 5) function on

the premise that client participation is crucial.
53

Box B.—Conditions Necessary for Successful Technology Transfer

The OTA assessment on technologies to sustain tropical forest resources identified a number of necessary conditions for successful technology transfer. For most technologies, the lack of these conditions

seems to be constraining wider adaptation and adoption:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Technology is transferred most effectively by direct people-to-people actions. People who are to

adapt and apply the technology need to learn it directly from people who have experience applying it.

The technology needs to be adapted at the user’s end to local biophysical and socioeconomic conditions.

Well-qualified people with knowledge about the technology are needed on the source end of the

transfer, and receptive, capable people are needed on the receiving end. These people maybe local

transfer agents or they may be the end users.

Another type of actor, the “facilitator, “ is also necessary. Facilitators understand the technology

transfer process, including the market for the technology and its products and the political, social,

and economic constraints and opportunities that affect all the other actors.

Users and transfer agents should be involved in choosing the technologies and in planning and implementing the transfer process so that the technology and the transfer meet actual needs and are

appropriate for the local situation.

All parties involved-source, transfer agents, facilitators, and end users-must feel that they are

winners and must, in-fact, be winners. Each actor’s self interests should be identified at the start

of the technology transfer process so that they can be addressed.

Each participant must be aware of subsequent steps in the transfer process so his or her actions

are appropriate to the late steps. This requires early definition of roles for each person involved.

The environment for technology demonstrations should be similar to the environment that will exist during subsequent steps of the transfer process. Pilot transfer projects should not be unrealistically

easy.

The initial commitment of resources to the process should be sufficient to carry the technology transfer

until it is self-supporting.

The transfer process must include mechanisms through which all participants can contribute effectively to interim evaluations and improvements.

SOURCE U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies to Sustain Tropical Forest Resources, Summary (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, March 1984).

[T]he fundamental problem lies not, as is commonly assumed, between researchers and extensionists . . . much more serious was a failure by

both research and extension to perceive farmers’

problems from the farmer’s own perspective . . . .

If research and extension are to offer useful recommendations to farmers, they must look at the

whole farming system (Collinson, 1984).

A farming systems research (FSR) approach

provides a methodology that has promise. Farming systems research is “an approach to agricultural research and development [of technology]

that views the whole farm as a system” (Shaner,

et al., 1982). The primary goal of FSR is to increase the productivity of the farming system

given the complete range of societal goals and the

constraints of the farming systems (Gilbert, et al.,

1980). Characteristics of FSR include: 1) locationspecific research, 2) development of improved

technologies for a target group of farmers, 3) an

interdisciplinary nature, 4) an iterative approach

to technology development, 5) using the house-
54

hold as the management unit, and 6) farmer participation in the research development (CIMMYT

Economics Staff, 1984; Shaner, 1983).

Figure 9 indicates this step-wise technological

transfer process with sufficient feedback provisions to ensure the development of technologies

appropriate to farmers’ needs. OTA workshop

participants felt that FSR could be a very useful

method for determining farmers’ constraints and

developing technologies with the farmers (on their

fields) instead of for them. However, since AID

is questioning the cost-effectiveness of the approach, the OTA workshop participants felt that

the approach needs to be simplified and needs to

incorporate conventional extension systems in the

process.

Agricultural extension remains ineffective in the

identification of farmers’ constraints and in supplying useful technology in response to these constraints. African governments could develop concise objectives that stress the need for farmer

participation, coordination between researchers

and extension, and alternative approaches for

dealing with low-resource producers. However,

even with more effective extension systems, one

thing should be emphasized.

Figure 9.—integrating Farming Systems Research

and Agricultural Extension for Technology Transfer

On-farm research activities

SOURCE: Willis W. Shaner, “Linking Extension with Farming Systems Research,”

In: Knowledge Transfer in Developing Countries, J. B. Claar and L. H.

Watts (eds.), Proceedings of a Conference on International Extension,

Steamboat Springs, CO, July 1983.

[Extension programs by themselves in the

absence of land tenure reforms and vigorous,

egalitarian input supply programs, should not be

expected to reverse the trend toward concentration of assets in the rural society, or to save the

small, poor, or inefficient farmer. They can, however, assure that the small farmer is not disadvantaged with regard to information (Stavis, 1979).

Issue 9: The lack of training and back-up support

for extension field staff contributes to inadequate information transfer.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Physical constraints affecting extension agents

have been lack of transportation, decent housing, in-service training, access to information,

and remuneration/incentives for working in rural areas with few services.

Extension agents sometimes act as input distributors instead of information disseminators.

Field agents have been burdened with a substantial number of nonagriculturally related

activities that limit extension work.

The agent/farmer ratio remains low in most

countries, which encourages a “progressive”

farmer approach instead of a broader group approach.

Inadequate numbers of well-trained field staff

is a problem. The recruitment of field staff usually is biased toward urban residents with little farm experience. Excellent staff are promoted

out of the field; no incentives are offered to continue working in rural areas.

Overemphasis is placed on paper work instead

of field accomplishments.

Agricultural training institutes generally have

taught extension staff individual farmer intervention techniques. Group extension activities

usually are given low priority.

In-service training is limited and does not provide opportunities for staff to provide feedback

to trainers.

Discussion

Extension services, as with most institutions in

Africa, suffer from weak human resources devel-
55

opment. Depending on the area, a typical extension agent is expected to communicate with between 100 and 800 farm families (Anthony, et al.,

1979; Pickering, 1984). In addition, the agent also

will have several nonagriculturally related tasks

to accomplish. These include attending monthly

agricultural meetings that may require several

days of travel time, distributing agricultural inputs, monitoring credit collection, settling local

disputes between farmers, and serving as a local

government agricultural representative (Watts and

Claar, 1983). These impositions on the staff serve

to limit motivation. Most extension agents live

in fairly remote areas, lack adequate housing and

transportation, receive low salaries compared

with urban counterparts, are given inadequate

technical information and moral support, receive

little in-service training, and perceive limited potential for career advancement (Moris, 1981;

Hyden, 1983; Watts and Claar, 1983).

As a result of the extended network and lack

of support, an extension agent generally responds

in at least two detrimental ways. One is that the

Photo credit. Ray Witlin of the World Bank

Agricultural extension systems are generally weak and offer few incentives for staff to work in the more remote areas

with low-resource producers, especially women. Here, an agricultural demonstrator shows male farmers of the Casamance

region of Senegal how to use a single-furrow plow.
56

agent realizes the physical constraints (and the

lack of incentives to operate otherwise) and limits

the number of field visits to those farmers who

are either immediately accessible or “progressive”

enough to more readily accept government advice and/or inputs. The agent will also attend

community meetings where contact with a larger

body of farmers is possible. The other response

is that a growing emphasis is placed on quantification of inputs and outputs to justify the extension

agent’s existence. The agent then becomes a distributor of inputs, not an extension agent. Neither one of these responses results in an extension

agent who communicates with target groups of

farmers or who is an active disseminator of technology based on perceived and/or articulated

farmers’ problems.

In the past several years, the World Bank initiated an extension support program that was designed to eliminate some of these problems. The

program, called the Training and Visit System

(TVS), strengthens the extension system by separating it from other conflicting responsibilities

and through credibility-building support programs. Moris (1981) identifies other reform measures of the TVS as: assignment of a reasonable

number of farm families to each agent, providing reasonable supervisor/agent ratios, identification of innovations that will have an immediate

impact, intensive in-service training on a scheduled basis, provision of methods for the improvement of farm management before encouraging

purchased inputs, developing contact links with

research bodies, and providing sufficient transport and incentives for the contact staff.

The TVS deals with the credibility, institutional

weakness, and incentive issues. Criticisms of the

system are that: 1) it is based on the false assumption that exogenous technologies exist that are

suitable for local ecological, social, and economical conditions, 2) it requires large recurrent budgets to operate, and 3) it does little to eliminate

the male bias in extension systems. However, as

others have indicated, the TVS does a great deal

to strengthen the inadequate human resources

component of extension systems. It could be

evaluated further to determine its role in upgrading existing extension systems, especially with respect to FSR.
Chapter 5

Issues in Technical Assistance
Chapter 5

Issues in Technical Assistance

Technology development and technology transfer are of course key to American efforts to increase food production in Africa. But the effectiveness of these efforts depends in large part on

the effectiveness of technical assistance programs.

That leaves a major question: is it possible to determine if assistance—whether through public or

private channels—is working?

This section discusses issues relating to the effectiveness of technical assistance, some directed

at U.S. Government policies and others at nongovernmental organizations and private businesses. For instance, how are assistance efforts

hindered by the lack of clear U.S. goals and lack

of long-term U.S. commitment to development?

Are the impacts of large amounts of aid proportionately effective? How can assistance programs

be evaluated to determine if they were successful?

And what roles can private businesses and nongovernmental organizations be expected to play

in increasing food production?

Issue 10: U.S. foreign aid to Africa operates without clear goals and objectives and without a

long-term commitment to development.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

●

Foreign aid benefits the United States substantially, both economically and politically, but

this has not been made clear to the American

public. Therefore, development assistance remains controversial, with little constituency for

reform.

Increasing agricultural production, as well as

food security, in sub-Saharan Africa requires

a long-term commitment to development with

continued technical support and assured funding.

Long-term technical assistance is difficult to

provide under the short-term political conditions common to American foreign assistance.

Development priorities and initiatives shift from

administration to administration as foreign policy goals and AID staff change.

Countries’ eligibility for technical assistance

changes, sometimes frequently, as a result of

internal and external political changes.

Administration policies may conflict with previously legislated goals; competition between

old and new initiatives and thus staff confusion

may result.

Foreign aid projects usually are too short to

have long-term, positive impacts on the difficult agricultural problems in sub-Saharan

Africa.

The trend in length of projects conducted by

AID cannot be determined because of problems

with the data base.

Discussion

American foreign aid provides substantial benefits to the United States. For this reason, it has

received the strong support of every administration since World War II.

Congress has been less steadfast in its support

of U.S. foreign aid. Historically, U.S. security and

political benefits have been regarded as the most

important ones. Some Members recognize that

large amounts of U.S. foreign aid money return

to the United States as purchases of U.S. goods

and services. In fact, procurement policies ensure

that most foreign aid funds are spent in the United

States. Therefore, foreign aid has economic benefits at home and overseas. Other Members of

Congress have advocated foreign aid on humanitarian grounds.

Still other Members of Congress can be described as:

advocates of particular development strategies—e. g., women in development;

supporters of new approaches—e.g., the

African Development Foundation;

uninterested parties because the foreign aid

budget item is relatively small; and

committed adversaries on the grounds that

foreign aid is a bad investment, harming the

59
—

60

United States and the recipients (Morss and

Morss, 1982).

The American public, as a whole, is not an enthusiastic or reliable supporter of foreign aid. Less

support exists for foreign aid than any other type

of Federal spending according to recent Louis Harris surveys (Morss and Morss, 1982).

The diversity of congressional interests, the lack

of a strong public constituency, and most Presidents’ disinterest in the specifics of foreign aid bills

have led to “grab-bag” legislation. Currently, AID

development projects must meet some 75 legislative and statutory requirements before approval

(Commission on Security and Economic Assistance, 1983). In addition, Congress has demonstrated a wide array of concerns during reviews

of U.S. foreign aid, “concerns that frequently have

little to do with the congressional intent reflected

in its own aid legislation” (Morss and Morss,

1982). In recent years so little congressional interest has existed that it was difficult to enact

foreign aid authorization and appropriation bills

(Newels, 1984).

U.S. foreign assistance programs that have

emerged from these considerations are designed

to: 1) promote support for humanitarian relief efforts, 2) foster export expansion, 3) enhance a

stable international economy, 4) expand support

from other Western donors through multilateral

institutions, 5) support regional peace initiatives,

6) provide security for friendly governments, and

7) counter Soviet and Soviet-supported influence.

These goals sometimes are not compatible nor are

they generally translated into measurable objectives in set time frames. In addition, their relative priorities and relative effectiveness are open

to varying interpretations (Wilhelm, 1983).

U.S. foreign aid is now near an all-time-low level as measured in percentage of gross national

product and constant dollars. The proportion of

bilateral development funding aimed at Africa has

decreased recently, but other programs for Africa

have increased due to larger emergency food deliveries under Public Law 480 and proposals for

new programs (Newels, 1984). In 1983, the Secretary of State established a bipartisan commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the

goals and objectives of American programs and

to identify ways to increase support for them. The

Carlucci Commission concluded that:

In Africa there is an economic crisis of major

dimensions that will call for a serious long-term

response by the U. S., the donor, and the recipient countries. Failure to deal with these problems

can have serious security implications (Commission on Security and Economic Assistance, 1983).

The Commission also suggested that the United

States:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

increase foreign aid funding;

expand support for foreign aid among Federal leaders and the public;

use aid to support economic policy reforms

and promote the private sector;

increase concessionality of military aid;

increase flexibility in aid;

establish a new Federal agency to coordinate

and administer foreign aid programs;

adopt a country approach to aid;

increase emphasis on science and technology,

human resources development, and institution-building;

support development objectives of the Food

for Peace Program;

ensure integrated programs for sub-Saharan

Africa and the Caribbean Region; and

improve evaluation of bilateral and multilateral programs (Commission on Security and

Economic Assistance, 1983).

The proposed Federal agency was the Commission’s recommendation for dealing with the fragmented nature of foreign assistance programs. It

reflects Commission members’ perceptions that all

forms of foreign assistance need to be integrated

into programs in which funding levels, related activities, and degree of concessionality are based

on both the recipients’ needs and U.S. objectives

(Wilhelm, 1983). This proposed agency has not

been established, although some of the Commission’s other recommendations have been implemented.

The Agency for International Development

(AID) is charged with implementing most U.S. bilateral foreign aid policies. The congressional

mandates in 1973 known as “New Directions” introduced new concerns into the design of AID

programs (Morss and Morss, 1982). Interpreta-
61

tion of the legislation has been difficult, with AID

favoring projects with visible short-term effects

rather than long-term projects with less immediate benefits (Stokeld, 1982). In addition, shortterm shifts in the proportion of assistance designated for military, economic security, and development programs occur and are controversial

(Newels, 1984; Commission on Security and Economic Assistance, 1983).

The eligibility of particular countries for foreign

assistance changes with political changes in the

United States and in the host country. For example, assistance to Tanzania and Ethiopia was affected by shifts to socialist policies in these countries, despite the avowed humanitarian purposes

of some assistance. This problem is likely to increase as the U.S. Government funds larger portions of the private and voluntary organizations’

budgets. Their ability to respond to humanitarian

needs for agricultural assistance may be decreased

by their closer ties to U.S. foreign policy.

The effects of such policy shifts on technology

can sometimes be direct. For example, Congress

enacted section 107 of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, authorizing AID to expand its efforts with capital-saving

technology. AID has emphasized private sector

initiatives since that time and some AID staff

perceive that the two efforts conflict (U.S. GAO,

1984).

Agriculture is the central focus of much American aid to Africa, reflecting a wide consensus inside and outside of the American Government that

agricultural development is the most important

long-term concern for the entire African continent

(Whitaker, 1984). AID allocates about 60 percent

of its African assistance to agriculture, or approximately $150 million in fiscal year 1985 (U.S. Congress, Committee on Appropriations, 1984). Debate continues whether development assistance to

Africa remains too low or is poorly balanced with

other types of assistance.

The U.S. Government has struggled to determine the most effective type of rural development

aid for decades (Ruttan, 1982; 1983). Community

development was emphasized in the 1950s. In the

1960s, donors supported narrower agricultural

production programs and institution-building.

“Integrated rural development” was popular in the

early 1970s, only to be replaced by the “basic

needs” approach in 1973. Now the “basic needs”

approach is being severely questioned. The number of families whose most basic needs are not

met continues to grow (Ruttan, World Development 12(4), 1984) and, especially in Africa, reliable food surpluses do not exist (Eicher and Baker,

1982).

Finding an appropriate niche for American involvement is essential, given a limited foreign aid

budget and continuing severe food problems (Falcon, 1984). The Carlucci Commission notes that

the United States is virtually alone among bilateral

donors in supporting projects developed by resident staff. Critics claim that this approach leads

to fragmentation. For example, AID supports approximately 1,000 projects in Africa now (Eicher,

October 1984). Suggestions for new approaches

include:

greater multilateral coordination with individual donors assuming responsibility for aid

to certain regions of the world or sectors of

activity; and

greater emphasis on general long-term program aid instead of specific project aid, especially in agricultural research.

Issue 11: The evaluation process used by AID

does not enable a consistent determination of

the effectiveness of the Agency in providing

technologies to low-resource producers.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

AID evaluations prior to 1980 measured project inputs and outputs and were weak on any

kind of qualitative or quantitative information

regarding other types of positive outcomes of

the AID projects.

AID’s Africa Bureau developed guidelines in

1982 for evaluating the rate of technology adoption for its projects. The guidelines have not

been used consistently and AID plans to discontinue them.

Too much attention is paid to starting new projects and not enough to implementing and evaluating existing ones.
62

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

The problem at AID missions is part attitudinal

and part staffing; most missions have too many

obligations for the size of their staffs.

Evaluation reports commonly are not taken seriously by the mission directors. They apparently consider evaluation a peripheral activity,

do not have full-time evaluation officers, and

see little value in using evaluations in the design stage of new projects.

Host country counterparts usually do not participate in the evaluation process because the

process is seen as being negative and they do

not wish to be involved in a process that may

influence their own standing in the government.

Intended beneficiaries of projects are seldom included in the evaluation process. This participation could assist project implementors in determining socioeconomic impacts.

Duration of projects is too short to measure

results effectively and establish continuity; feedback is needed during the life of the project.

AID handbooks require that AID missions use

past project experience in designing new projects. However, this guidance is not consistently

followed or enforced by AID.

African ministry planners and beneficiaries are

seldom involved in the evaluation and design

phases of AID projects.

In-service training of AID mission staff may not

include guideline; on evaluation procedures and

the importance of feedback planning.

Discussion

AID’s effectiveness in transferring technology

appropriate to increasing food production by lowresource producers in Africa can be measured by

its own project evaluations. Any agency involved

in project design and implementation must be able

to learn constructive lessons from past performance to improve ongoing and future project design. Through interviews and other research,

OTA examined the AID evaluation process.

Stressing field autonomy, the AID missions determine which projects in their respective portfolios require mid-term and final evaluations. The

projects selected represent the development emphasis of the mission’s Country Development

Strategy Statement (CDSS). For example, a mission concentrating a substantial portion of its

budget on FSR would presumably want to identify a larger number of its FSR projects for evaluation.

The Africa Bureau of AID/Washington receives

2-year evaluation plans of each mission. The Bureau identifies larger issue areas for evaluation and

determines if the composite evaluation plans from

each mission will gather the necessary information. If not, the Bureau requests additional information or conducts its own evaluation to gather

the necessary information. The Bureau then approves the respective mission plans for the review

of the Center for Development Information and

Evaluation (CDIE).

The CDIE oversees AID’s evaluation process.

This center reviews mission evaluation plans and

the Africa Bureau, conducts assessments (impact

evaluations on selected topics), and provides information on development theory, past AID projects, and technical data through its development

information system.

In 1979, AID re-established its Africa Bureau

evaluation unit. Its evaluation officer requested

a study by the U.S. Department of Commerce

Census Bureau on the effectiveness of the AID

evaluation process regarding its appropriate technology projects. The Census Bureau concluded

that AID missions did not use project evaluations

because the evaluations contained little information for subsequent project design. Specifically,

“technology transfer for the purpose of the project was not defined, adoption was not defined,

the variables needed for monitoring adoption

were not identified and the degree to which technology existed prior to project implementation

had not been measured” (U.S. Department of

Commerce, 1983). A separate report also concluded that the AID evaluation process produced

no comparative or consistent data with which to

compare projects within the AID portfolio (Associates in Rural Development, 1982). Finally, an

AID-commissioned impact assessment concluded

that the absence of information on project characteristics makes a comparative analysis of AID’s
63

projects difficult (Crawford and Barclay, 1982).

However, a more fundamental question remains

on the value of the original project goals and objectives. Crawford and Barclay (1982) identified

some of the major problems with evaluating the

effectiveness and goals of AID in conducting research for small farmers.

[T]here [is no] guarantee that the original project objectives are realistic and can themselves

serve as an adequate basis for evaluating project

performance. Project goals and purposes are

sometimes written to guide the authorization of

project funds rather than to guide project evaluation. The majority of sample projects, at least

nominally, concentrated on research whose ultimate goal was to benefit small farmers. Generally, the projects concentrated on crops that small

farmers grew or worked in resource poor areas

where small farmers and the rural poor comprise

most of the population. Except to note that this

was the project goal, however, evaluations gave

little attention to measuring the success of such

efforts or evaluating alternative methods of reaching the smallscale farmer (Crawford and Barclay,

1982),

In an attempt to develop procedures that AID

could use to collect uniform data for project comparison, the Census Bureau proposed 11 guidelines that all evaluations were to address. The

guidelines contained categories for the measurement of those constraints the project attempted

to overcome, technologies introduced and replaced, justification for the assumptions that the

beneficiaries would adopt the technologies, postproject adoption rates, the type of technology

transfer system, and the impact on the intended

beneficiaries. The guidelines were approved for

use by the Africa Bureau in March 1982.

Recent OTA interviews with AID officials indicate that AID has not consistently used the

guidelines and feels that the guidelines should be

discontinued. In their place, AID will propose that

evaluations outline some general problems so that

common concerns and experiences can be compiled for use by project design personnel. However, this approach may not provide comparative

data to determine the impacts of projects upon

intended beneficiaries or excluded groups, especially women.

OTA finds that sufficient evidence exists to indicate that at present the AID evaluation process

serves little purpose in assisting project design officers and certainly gives little comparative information of the impact of AID’s projects upon the

rural poor. AID’s efforts to strenghten its evaluation capacity could be strongly supported. Within

Congress, AID, and host country ministries, the

evaluation process could be seen in a more positive perspective. An audit process is less effective

than one that encourages the use of qualitative

and quantitative information for improved project design. However, AID could do much more

to ensure that the beneficial or adverse impacts

upon groups of rural poor are measured. The

most beneficial change would be to involve host

country planners and project beneficiaries in the

evaluation process in a manner that allows objective criticism of projects without punitive responses from the government or AID.

Issue 12: The results of recipient countries receiving large quantities of confessional food

aid are not clear.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

●

Food aid is an important type of development

assistance. The need for food aid in Africa will

persist because of constraints on agricultural

production in drought-prone and other areas.

The impacts of confessional food aid sometimes

are negative; food aid can displace indigenous

farmers from the marketplace, shift dietary

preferences, decrease incentives for increasing

local food production, and discourage recipient governments from undertaking needed agricultural reform.

Goals of donor and recipient countries, and

long-term versus short-term interests of each,

may conflict when donors provide large

amounts of food aid regularly. For example,

arguments exist whether commodity benefits

have been achieved along with development

benefits in the Public Law 480 programs.

Development programs may be forced to compete with food aid programs, given the downward trend in overall foreign assistance.
64

Certain U.S. States benefit substantially from

sales of Public Law 480 commodities. Experts

disagree regarding the current and future importance of Public Law 480 in disposal of U.S.

surpluses.

Discussion

In 1984, the U.S. celebrated the 30th anniversary of its primary food aid program, Food for

Peace (the Agricultural Trade Development and

Assistance Act of 1954, Public Law 480). Amendments during its three decades have shifted the

program from local currencies to dollars, deleted

references to the use of American surpluses, and

tied food aid to development assistance and policy reform in recipient countries.

Public Law 480 has three components as a result of these amendments. Title I provides favorable terms for financing private sales of commodities to “friendly” countries. Title II authorizes

emergency donations handled by international

agencies and U.S. private and voluntary groups.

Title III provides food for resale and then local

use of the proceeds for approved projects or policy initiatives (USDA, July 1984a).

The total African Public Law 480 program in

fiscal year 1984 was estimated at $258.9 million

with about one-fifth of that amount supplied as

emergency food aid. AID proposed that the program for fiscal year 1985 be funded at $234.7 million, without including estimates of emergency

needs (U.S. Congress, Committee on Appropriations, 1984). The current famine has accelerated

shipments of Public Law 480 commodities; allocations approved in the first month of fiscal year

1985 are approximately 75 percent of total shipments in fiscal year 1984 (Cook, 1984). Food aid

is expected to be a continuing need in Africa, especially in the areas where climate fluctuates widely

and more droughts are probable.

This program has been an important source of

emergency food aid for African countries. Also,

Public Law 480 benefits the United States substantially: 12 American States each sell approximately

$50 million of agricultural products annually;

most other States sell smaller amounts (USDA,

July 1984a). Doubts exist, however, about its

long-term effects on agricultural development and

whether it is the best method to achieve sometimes conflicting goals. Despite repeated attempts

to evaluate Public Law 480’s effects on individual countries, the program continues to face

charges that:

Public Law 480’s main beneficiaries are American farmers and the U.S. merchant marine. Public Law 480 has bankrupted poor farmers, encouraged the welfare ethic in recipient countries and

squandered billions of tax dollars (Bovard, 1984).

Food aid never constitutes a lasting solution to

problems of hunger and food production. It may

save lives in emergencies but even then donors

might not anticipate needs or make deliveries in

a timely fashion. Large quantities may strain the

capacity of recipient countries to store and distribute products efficiently (Matzke, 1984; Okigbo, 1982).

Other fundamental questions about food aid

are asked. Critics charge that food aid prolongs

dependence and hampers efforts to increase food

production in recipient countries. The main dangers are:

●

●

●

●

encouraging postponement of overdue agricultural reforms in recipient countries, thus

creating artificial food “emergencies” and detracting from the effectiveness of agricultural

development assistance;

making domestic markets unpredictable and

discouraging local producers from increasing production;

shifting dietary preferences to wheat accelerates demands for that grain. Many African countries cannot produce wheat for climatic reasons and thus may become permanently dependent on imports; and

not reaching the people in most need nutritionally (Clay and Singer, 1982; Matzke,

1984).

No consensus exists on these broad questions.

But Clay and Singer (1982) note that widespread

criticism of Public Law 480 has been replaced by

more ambivalent views of its potential positive

and negative effects.

The General Accounting Office has investigated

many aspects of this program, publishing 28 reports from 1976 to early 1984. Their findings

include:
65

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, . ,- - . .

s .,, . .

-“ v

-# .

. .

. . -

., ‘1

.,. * .

.,

Photo credit: F. Botts of United Nations/FAO

The role of food aid continues to be controversial. As an emergency measure, it is crucial during times of drought and

famine. However, the long-term effects may produce disincentives to increased food production. Here, Burkina Faso

villagers collect emergency food aid during the Sahelian drought of 1973.

●

●

●

●

U.S. costs could be cut by more timely collection of local currencies, altering cargo preference laws, and shipping with long-term

country and regional requirements in mind;

limited attempts to use Title III for agricultural reform are unsuccessful and constrained

by U.S. and recipient country administrative

problems;

Public Law 480 funds could be used in innovative ways—e.g., for developing irrigation

projects;

closer watch should be kept on equitable distribution of aid to refugees, monitoring and

auditing of commodity transport, and the

programs in certain countries; and

AID needs to document that food aid does

not increase disincentives to local food production and that sales under Title I help the

poor.

Title III, the Food for Development section, is

intended to contribute to long-term agricultural

gains in sub-Saharan Africa. Its multi-year agreements are unique in Public Law 480 programs.

To the extent that these funds are used for agricultural projects, agricultural technology will play

an important role in the program. The role of

projects versus policy planning has been the subject of considerable debate within the program,

however. The Office of Management and Budget has been a major advocate of decreasing project spending, sometimes at odds with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. AID (Garzon,

1984). Criticisms are made that projects are poorly
66

formulated. They are not commonly oriented to

technologies suitable for low-resource producers.

The number of countries that take part in Title III programs is small: only six agreements were

signed in its first 4 years; two of these were in subSaharan Africa (Senegal and Sudan). Other potential recipients in Africa “are unable to sign

agreements because of internal instability, political differences with the USA or reasons of political ideology” (Garzon, 1984). Since 1981 when

Garzon completed his analysis, the number of

countries signing Title III agreements has declined

and GAO questions the merits of continuing the

program.

Issue 13: Private voluntary and nongovernmental organizations (PVOs) may have particularly

useful roles in African agricultural development, but these are neither clear nor constant.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

●

PVOs have played a major part in U.S. development assistance, first by providing humanitarian, then social and economic development

aid.

Often their work with technology has been limited due to lack of interest and expertise and

a low level of technical back-up, but this is

changing.

The roles of PVOs are shifting as government

funds supplement private contributions.

These shifts may require that more attention

be paid to identifying PVOs’ particular strengths

and to designing, managing, and evaluating

projects with these strengths in mind.

Discussion

Many PVOs played an important historical role

in Africa. The provision of social services, including emergency food relief, new schools, roads,

and irrigation facilities, has been an important and

successful role for many. For example, “a study

covering the 1969 to 1973 period found that

church organizations provided about 20 percent

of the total hospital and maternity beds in all

Africa” (Tendler, 1982). These programs may

have had small overall impacts on development

but their local impacts appear to be significant

(Sommer, 1977).

In the past 20 years many PVOs shifted their

work from disaster and food relief toward development assistance. This shift can be attributed

both to the PVOs’ assessments of the roots of poverty and to AID’s congressionally mandated

attempts to bring PVOs into the development

process. Now AID provides PVOs with several

hundred million dollars annually. Twelve to sixteen percent of AID’s development and disaster

assistance funding is available to PVOs due to

1981 congressional action (U.S. AID, May 1982a).

Private voluntary organizations are diverse.

They vary in size, budget, ideology, degree of specialization and expertise, use of volunteers, age,

program content, structure, and style of operation. The large disaster and development groups,

such as CARE and Catholic Relief Services, generally have large budgets and close ties to the U.S.

Government. Often the religious PVOs generally

are smaller, but have large numbers of people located in villages. For example, about 8,450 American missionaries work in Africa (Hayden, 1984).

Humanitarian groups, like religious PVOs, mainly rely on private contributions. A distinct set of

these organizations focuses specifically on technical assistance—e.g., Volunteers in Technical

Assistance (VITA) and Technoserve. In addition,

individual PVOs are joined in various permanent

and temporary coalitions.

While these differences make generalization difficult, PVOs commonly perceive themselves as a

community with common characteristics. One set

of features that many American PVOs claim to

share is: the lack of public appreciation for their

work in developing countries and consequent

problems with fund-raising, the predominance of

U.S. Government influence, the nature of their

leadership, and the difficulties inherent in operating overseas programs (Biddle, 1984).

Another set of characteristics allegedly describes

the way PVOs work. These features are accepted

inside and outside of the community to such an

extent that Tendler (1982) describes them as “articles of faith” (table 5; see also Hyden, 1983). The

people who accept these articles advocate an expanded role for PVOs in American development
67

Table 5.—The Role of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs): Articles of Faith

Theme Assumptions of PVOs

Reaching the poor . . . . . . . . . . ●

Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ●

Process v. outcome . . . . . . . . . ●

●

●

The public sector . . . . . . . . . . . ●

●

Flexibility, experimentation . . ●

Local institutions . . . . . . . . . . . ●

cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ●

long experience working with the poor

include poor beneficiaries in decisionmaking process

interested in long-term process, not execution of specific

tasks

function to establish process for poor people to gain

control of lives

not interested in output measures of traditional

evaluations

deal “people-to-people,” not government-to-government

do not channel money through the public sector

can be flexible and experimental because they are small,

not in the public sector, and do not have to show fast

results

have special ability to work with and strengthen local,

private institutions

can benefit the poor at lesser cost than large public

sector organizations

SOURCE: Adapted from: Judith Tendler, Turning Private Voluntary Organizations into Development Agencies: Questions for

Evaluation, U.S. AID Program Evaluation Paper No. 12 (Washington, DC U.S. AID, April 1982)

assistance. Most aid recipients appear to agree that

PVO aid is flexible, honest, prompt, coordinated

with other efforts, available to needy and remote

areas, and open to experimentation (Sommer,

1977). Critics note, however, that PVOs do not

necessarily exhibit such features as flexibility and

continuity. Therefore, the degree to which these

features are accurate is important in considering

the future role of PVOs in development assistance.

Problems in evaluation have hindered a clear

understanding of what PVOs do well and what

they do uniquely. Evaluations of PVO work have

been a continuing concern of donors, and the cohesiveness of the PVO community is illustrated

by its collective lack of enthusiasm in responding to these concerns. Often external evaluations

are feared because of their potential for diverting

efforts from “important” activities, because they

represent an outside intrusion, because they may

affect the organization negatively, or because they

are perceived to be highly political (Tendler,

1982). The 1973 Foreign Assistance Act began the

trend to regular evaluation. As AID made more

money available to PVOs, it also required greater

accountability. Difficulties persist in measuring

project significance versus operational performance and in including intended beneficiaries in the

evaluation process (Sommer, 1977).

Relations between governments and PVOs have

changed as governments have come to rely more

upon them. PVOs often maintain an adversarial

rhetoric about their advantages over government

assistance and their need for independence. In

fact, however, the operations of many groups

have become closely tied to government aid in

various ways. Some of the larger relief organizations receive nearly 80 percent of their funds from

the U.S. Government (Sommer, 1977).

Government/PVO relations also take other

forms. In some cases, PVOs serve as innovators

from which governments learn and replicate projects. This role seems less common than PVOs contend, however, and perhaps is limited to new

PVOs in early stages of growth. In other cases,

PVOs serve as precursors to governments, filling

a need until governments are able or willing to

address the same problems. PVO/government relations can be categorized more generally and

completely as complementary, filling unoccupied

territory, competitive, brokering, replicating, or

government takeover (Tendler, 1982).

Many of these relations are replete with ambivalence. Some PVOs refuse all government

funds to avoid: 1) compromising their programs,

2) appearing to be linked to official U.S. Government policy, and 3) accepting government planning and evaluation methods.

PVO involvement in agriculture has increased

recently. For example, several groups made particular contributions in bringing “Green Revolution” technology to the poor (Sommer, 1977).
68

However, Tendler’s (1982) analysis suggests that

agricultural assistance has certain characteristics

that may make PVO success in this area difficult.

Many agricultural projects require a high degree

of expertise. This is not compatible necessarily

with the more generalist nature of many PVOs.

It appears that the benefits of-agricultural projects

are especially vulnerable to monopoly by the rich

and, while PVOs are generally regarded as particularly sensitive to reaching the poor, sometimes

this cannot be documented. Many within the PVO

community dispute Tendler’s findings. They argue

that limited agricultural expertise is required for

work with simple technology for low-resource

food producers and that professionalism is rising

among PVO staff.

Good relations and frequent interactions with

large government donors are particularly important in relation to technical areas such as agricultural research. The smallness of most PVOs means

that they must rely on the large donors for stateof-the-art information on effective development

methods. In most cases, PVOs have limited support systems to provide technical information to

volunteers in the field. Therefore, cooperation,
69

not competition, is likely to benefit large donors

and PVOs.

Some assert that “governments stand to benefit tremendously by allowing private and voluntary efforts to take root in society and thereby

provide effective entry points for public sector inputs” (Hyden, 1983). How best to accomplish this

is not clear. Certain trends in PVO aid exist: 1)

greater attention to long-term development, 2) accepting professional consulting roles, and 3) greater recognition that development education in the

United States is important. If PVOs continue

along this route, they would continue to supplement government aid programs but perhaps lose

their pioneering role (Sommer, 1977). Their consulting role is likely to bring them into greater conflict with for-profit firms engaged in similar work.

Sommer urges that American PVOs seek new

roles, cooperating with other PVOs worldwide.

Such cooperation, especially with local African

PVOs, is an explicit objective of some groups.

American PVO leaders, however, note the difficulties of coordinating international and local efforts (Biddle, 1984). Special considerations apply

to working with African PVOs. Generally, local

PVOs are not strong. They have received little

recognition in their own countries and are weaker

than those in other developing countries. They

may offer an important way to compensate for

government failures and complement more appropriate government efforts, but they will need outside assistance for some time in order to develop

a stronger local base (Hyden, 1983).

Issue 14: The extent to which American businesses will provide technical assistance to

low-resource food producers is limited.

Preliminary Findings

● The U.S. Government is beginning a major initiative to bring American private enterprise into

development assistance, but it appears that

most investment will be outside of the agricultural sector.

. Technology developed by multinational firms

for poor countries often emphasizes capital intensive inputs rather than technologies more

appropriate to the needs of the low-resource

producers.

●

●

●

●

●

Private investment generally goes to more

wealthy developing countries with more developed infrastructures, more developed markets,

and greater political stability.

Problems of accessibility, limited capital, and

needs for varied packaging make low-resource

producer markets unattractive to agribusinesses.

Incompatibility exists between the profit-maximizing strategies of agribusiness and risk-aversion practices of low-resource producers.

U.S. private sector involvement in agricultural

technology for low-resource farmers in subSaharan Africa is primarily in the form of

development assistance programs financed

through the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Certain critical components of agricultural development assistance probably will not and

cannot be provided by the private sector.

Therefore, a unique obligation remains for the

Federal Government.

Discussion

The Federal Government is encouraging the

U.S. private sector to invest in low-income developing countries. It has established such bodies

as the Bureau of Private Enterprise within the

U.S. Agency for International Development and

the Overseas Private Investment Corporation

(OPIC). The objective of encouraging U.S. private sector investment in developing countries is

to boost trade, create jobs, nurture indigenous entrepreneurial activity, develop management skills,

and provide increased capital flows into countries.

Private enterprise is seen as “the engine that

makes growth occur most quickly” (U.S. AID,

May 1982b). The focus of these initiatives will be

on those developing countries with more developed infrastructures and markets and which display sociopolitical atmospheres conducive to free

market initiatives. As a result, the primary beneficiaries will likely be the relatively wealthy countries in the developing world, despite efforts to

encourage investments in the poorest countries.

While the goals mentioned above would benefit an African country’s overall economy, the abil-
70

ity of U.S. private enterprise to benefit the agricultural sector directly, and in particular assist

low-resource producers in increasing food productivity, is uncertain.

Direct private investment in agriculture in Africa historically has been in large plantation-type

agriculture emphasizing export crops. Even in this

area, however, investments have been limited in

recent years largely due to concerns over nationalization or other government interventions.

Rather, most transactions have been sales of inputs and purchases of outputs for processing (Lipton, 1977a).

While up to 90 percent of farming in Africa is

done by the traditional sector, this group remains

a “peripheral” market for agribusiness products

such as seeds, fertilizer, agricultural chemicals,

mechanical motive power, and processing equipment (Turner, 1984). Only about 10 percent of

purchased farm inputs in Third World countries

go to farmers cultivating under 10 acres of land

(Lipton, 1977b).

While the low-resource producer markets for

agricultural inputs are potentially very large, they

are not spectacularly lucrative. Western-based

suppliers face a variety of problems including:

1. Problems of accessibility, both physical and

mental: Poorly developed infrastructures

and the remoteness of many producers result in high transportation costs. Making

low-resource producers aware of available

products and encouraging them to use them

can cause further problems with inappropriate scale of use.

2. Possible unsuitability of available technologies: Most technology is designed around

Western (capital intensive) agricultural systems and is not suitable for low-resource producers in developing countries.

3. The pattern of government policies and priorities in poor countries: In many countries

there is a reliance on quasi-governmental

bodies to handle distribution and purchases.

There are also inadequate incentives for food

production in the rural sector in most countries (Lipton, 1977b).

The great bulk of world trade in agricultural

inputs is between developed countries. As such,

the products of agribusiness are designed to meet

the needs of developed country commercial agriculture rather than those of the peasant farmer.

The technologies developed are most often inappropriate for the rural sector in sub-Saharan

Africa and can cause serious problems. “The increased use of agricultural inputs [tends] to modify and, in some cases, distort the farm structure

in these countries to accommodate the new inputs” (Clayton, 1977).

Western manufacturers, in general, have difficulty adapting to low-resource producer markets.

In particular, conflicts arise between the industries’ desire to exploit economies of scale in research, design, transport, and storage, and their

need to adapt to low-resource producers’ input

requirements and local circumstances (Mackintosh, 1977). Low-resource producers require a

multitude of package types, chemical formulations, languages, soil conditions, and active ingredients. Providing safety instruction and followup monitoring, particularly on potentially toxic

inputs, present further problems (Lipton, 1977d).

Limited liquidity and difficulties in obtaining

credit cause serious problems for businesses trying to expand markets to low-resource producers.

Perhaps more difficult to overcome, however, is

the divergence between profit-maximizing strategies of agribusiness firms and the risk-aversion

practices of low-resource producers.

[A]gribusiness has been conditioned by and has

responded to the capitalistic, profit maximizing

agriculture of the developed world. The operating environment of the peasant farmer is very different from this. [They] often operate within a

vicious cycle of poverty which limits [their] farming objectives and opportunities for farm inputs.

[Their] energies are constrained by limited knowledge, inadequate land and capital resources, a

risky physical economic environment and inadequate infrastructure (Clayton, 1977).

To take advantage of the potential traditional

sector market, it is essential to account for the

needs of the low-resource producer, Clayton

(1977) suggests some steps that should be taken:

1. adapt farm inputs to match the scale of peasant farming,
71

2. improve the marketing and distribution of

inputs to the advantage of small farmers, and

3. temper straight commercial objectives to

take account of the real development needs

of poor countries.

In emphasizing the role of private enterprise as

an agent for development in Africa, some people

believe that the U.S. comparative advantage in

agriculture and the major importance of agriculture to African economies make this sector an appropriate focus for U.S. agribusiness involvement

(Andreas Task Force, 1984). However, the technologies and agricultural system that have enabled

the United States to become the “breadbasket of

the world” are not necessarily transferable to

Africa. Thus the idea of comparative advantage,

at least in terms of technology transfer, loses

validity, Witness OPIC’s efforts to expand its insurance and lending for agricultural projects but

its difficulty in finding suitable projects (Andreas

Task Force, 1984). OPIC’s 1983 annual report suggests that of 104 projects supported, only 9 were

located in sub-Saharan Africa, and of these none

were directly related to agriculture.

The current development agency focus on rural development projects has provided a boom to

those businesses who produce for low-resource

producers, the so-called “appropriate technology”

firms. Indications are, however, that most of these

exporting firms lie outside the United States.

Many operate in countries that have historic colonial ties to their markets, although India and

China present serious competition because of their

large domestic markets that support export sales

(Turner, 1984).

The United States also seems to be disadvantaged due to a more contentious factor—the practice of certain countries (e.g., France and Japan)

to heavily link their foreign aid policies to their

industrial policies in an effort to expand their markets into developing countries. The result has been

a frustration on the part of American firms who

think they are losing ground in developing-country markets as a result. This has prompted increased pressure on the U.S. Government to

practice a similar strategy (U.S. Congress, Joint

Economic Committee, 1982; Commission on

Security and Economic Assistance, 1983). For the

most part, the United States has refrained from

linking its foreign aid policies and industrial policies because it recognizes the need to “press hard

for free markets, open access to markets, and for

the overall benefits of comparative economic

advantage in producing and distributing the free

world’s products and services” (Andreas Task

Force, 1984).

The vast majority of agricultural equipment

sales to African countries come from Western

manufacturers. United Nations figures indicate

that of the estimated $1 billion of agricultural

equipment sold to Africa (most representing tractors and tractor-drawn implements for the commercial agricultural sector), local manufacturers

account for only $150 million (Turner, 1984).

There is a growing sense, however, that “largescale imports of basic equipment can only be a

short- to medium-term solution to supplying the

African farmer. If programs to improve productivity are to be sustained, equipment will have to

be supplied from within Africa itself for foreign

exchange consideration if nothing else” (Turner,

1984),

While it is unlikely that most African countries

will be able to develop indigenous industries to

produce large equipment in the near future, the

potential for further development of smaller scale

industries, especially those that could meet the

needs of low-resource producers (e.g., small-scale

machinery, implements, and fertilizers) can be

seen as a realistic short-term goal. However, problems have been encountered by such businesses

currently operating in Africa. A 1983 U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) report

states that the approximately 70 companies in

Africa producing for the traditional sector were

“in crisis, with nearly all facing financial and structural difficulties and many in danger of going

bankrupt or being forced to diversify out of agricultural machinery supply. ”

Many of the problems these companies face are

common to much of African industry: shortage

of spare parts and raw materials, and a lack of

technical and management skills. These latter constraints provide an area where U.S. private sector involvement could prove very useful, such as

the International Executive Service Corps (IESC).
72

Other problems exist that are particular to producing for the low-resource producer: general insolvency of the clients and consequent limited

market size. In addition, government policies have

sometimes exacerbated problems (Turner, 1984).

These problems would also be encountered by

U.S. investments and are, in large part, responsible for the limited investment in African countries. Sub-Saharan Africa represents a mere 2

percent of total U.S. direct investment abroad

(Stokeld, 1982).

The above analysis provides a rather skeptical

view of any extensive U.S. private industry involvement in Africa. Perhaps it should be clarified

that this skepticism is focused on the ability of

U.S. agribusiness to assist directly with the traditional African agricultural sector. There are areas

of agricultural sector development where U.S. private investment may prove much more effective

and profitable, particularly in such areas as food

processing and marketing infrastructure. However, in developing mechanized food processing

operations, consideration should be given to the

impact on the low-resource producers, particularly potential adverse impacts on income generation through their own processing activities.

The creation of a free enterprise environment

may result in a greater shift of low-resource producers away from a largely subsistence economy

toward a market economy, The greater liquidity

and market structure this creates would likely provide increased incentives for private sector investment in low-resource producers. In the meantime,

however, profitability in such investments is limited, particularly in the poorer countries in subSaharan Africa. As such, increasing productivity

in this sector will continue to rely predominantly

on investments from the public sector.
Chapter 6

Issues for the

African Governments
Chapter 6

Issues for the African Governments

Technology development, technology transfer,

and technical assistance each have an important

function to perform if food production in Africa

is to be increased. The primary responsibility for

improving food production, however, lies with

the African governments themselves. What is

needed is a continuing, active commitment to food

production—an ability to translate rhetoric into

action.

This chapter examines the many, sometimes

complicated, issues for which the African governments themselves are responsible. One critical issue facing African governments is their inadequate

institutional foundation, which makes it difficult

to plan and manage far-reaching development

strategies. African governments also face increasing pressure to reform economic policies. An issue

often neglected in the face of more visible or immediate problems is the status of the natural resource base; a firm commitment to sustain their

natural resources is essential to long-term agricultural development in Africa.

Issue 15: The commitment of African governments to sustaining the natural resource base

is critical to long-term agricultural development.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

Research on soil erosion and conservation in

Africa is weak or non-existent. Few countries

have conservation programs capable of dealing with the magnitude of the problems they

are facing.

Conflicts exist at the national level between

short-term objectives of meeting immediate

needs and long-term objectives of maintaining

natural resources.

The combination of increased population pressure on the land and the degree of land degradation that continues to occur in many parts

of Africa suggest that the resource base may

no longer be able to support a continuation of

many traditional agricultural practices.

●

●

●

●

●

An urgent need exists in many countries to reduce the rate of land degradation, reclaim land

already degraded, and introduce or adapt production methods that fit the constraints of the

natural resource base.

In examining strategies for reducing land degradation, an integrated approach should be

taken that looks at the entire production

system.

For conservation programs to be effective,

support and involvement are needed from the

rural population. It is unlikely that simply

legislating programs will work.

Problems of environmental degradation in Africa are quite different from those in industrialized countries. In Africa, environmental

problems stem predominantly from poverty.

Development and industrialization are perceived as cures for, rather than causes of, environmental degradation.

Environmental awareness by African governments is a relatively recent phenomenon and,

unlike in most developed countries, it has been

stimulated from outside the country. There is

some suspicion and apprehension by many

African governments that outside emphasis on

environmental issues represents efforts to stem

industrial development in Africa.

Discussion

The magnitude of problems facing most countries in sub-Saharan Africa is enormous. These

problems are due not only to food shortages but

also are a result of economic woes resulting from

stagnant economic growth and an inability to generate adequate foreign exchange. In addition, several countries are facing civil strife or are engaged

in war. In light of the immediacy of these problems, it is understandable why countries have

been unable or reluctant to address the longer

term questions of degradation of their natural resources.

75
— —

76

Compounding the problem is the difficulty of

the task at hand. Hudson (1983) takes the perspective of relating the problems facing Third World

countries’ efforts at soil conservation to those in

the United States:

If you think you have problems in making soil

conservation work in the United States, spare the

thought for countries in the Third World, where

the problems are much worse and the difficulties

of applying solutions are much greater. [If] soil

conservation cannot be made to work effectively

in the United States, with all the advantages of

research, extension, and conservation services,

plus wealthy, educated farmers on good land with

gentle climates—if with all these benefits conservation is not successful—then what hope is there

for struggling countries that have few, if none,

of these advantages.

Land degradation is caused by a variety of often

interrelated processes: soil erosion, deforestation,

overgrazing, waterlogging and salinization, damage by sedimentation, inefficient cultivation practices, shortened fallow periods, and spreading deserts (McPherson, 1984). In terms of its impact on

Africa’s agriculture, the implications are alarming. Estimates suggest that with the current rate

of soil loss, Africa could experience a decline in

its potential rain-fed crop production of about 15

percent during the next two decades (McPherson,

1984).

The problems stem largely from the poor quality of African soils. The continent did not experience the glaciation that created the more robust

soils in other continents. In general, African soils

tend to be highly weathered, with a low humus

content (which is important for providing nutrients and retaining moisture) and are very susceptible to damaging processes such as erosion and

leaching (Lofchie and Commins, 1984). Some soils

that are rich in nutrients and capable of supporting relatively intensive agriculture do exist in the

region, however, such as the volcanic soils of the

Kenyan Highlands.

Ecological variability (fig. 10) presents problems in itself as it adds complexity to the task of

formulating “environmentally conscious agricultural planning” (Lofchie and Commins, 1984).

Adding further complexity is the variability of

social and cultural factors that play a large role

in land use patterns.

In formulating strategies to combat land degradation, it is important to look at the full array

of human activity that contributes to the problem in a given region. The diversity and interrelationships of these anthropogenic modifications of

the environment were examined for the West African Sahel (National Research Council, 1984). Nine

major activities were defined that contributed to

the decline in the region’s ability to support human

populations: bush fires, trans-Saharan trade, site

preferences for settlements, gum arabic trade,

agricultural expansion, proliferation of cattle, introduction of advanced firearms, development of

modern transportation networks, and urbanization.

Most tropical forests in Africa also are severely

threatened as a result of stress on the system. In

Ivory Coast, for instance, timber cutting for export has resulted in a shrinking of the forest to

one-third of its size only 25 years ago (Lofchie and

Commins, 1984).

Most likely peasant farmers and pastoralists are

aware that some of their activities damage their

resources. But few alternatives exist because they

are striving to meet the most basic needs (Hudson, 1983). This is particularly true regarding subsistence producers faced with the need to move

into marginal lands (see Box D). The responsibility

falls on the governments to address the problem.

In describing the solutions needed for one form

of environmental degradation, Erik Eckholm

wrote that “desertification is seldom a technical

problem that can be solved with an injection of

knowledge and money alone. It is a socio-economic and developmental problem linked to basic

patterns of national life . . . (solutions) require

difficult political, cultural and bureaucratic reform”

(Cross, 1983). It is unlikely, however, that simply

legislating programs of land use would be effective. To succeed, conservation efforts must have

support “from below, ” as they will have to do the

work. Full involvement of the rural sector is required (Hudson, 1983).

Research on soil erosion and conservation is

weak or nonexistent in Africa. Some basic theory
77

40”

30“

20”

10°

0°

10°

20”

30 G

40 G

Figure 10.— Ecological Areas of Africa

30” 20° 10° 0° 10° 20° 30” 40” 50° 60°

/ / l x / / I \ \ \ \

●

Tropical forests

Tall grass savanna

Short grass savanna

Desert

Mediterranean

Humid subtropical

Highlands

Temperate prairie

or grassland

0 400 800 ml

0 600 1200 km

40°

30°

20°

10°

o“

10°

20°

30°

400

20° 10° 0° 10° 20° 30° 40” 50° 60”

SOURCE Adapted from P. O’Meara and P Martin (eds.), Africa, Indiana University Press, In: E. F. Moran (cd.), “Changing Agricultural

Systems in Africa,” Studies in Third World Societies, No. 8, July 1979.

can be applied generally but site specific data is scientists, since this is not a priority field in most

required. Some regions can make use of interna- African countries (Hudson, 1983).

tional or national research centers, but many cannot. In addition, national research organizations Fundamental differences exist in how environhave difficulty obtaining information. There are mental problems are viewed in Africa and in dea limited number of experienced soil conservation veloped countries. In Africa, environmental prob-
78
79

ures alone might not be enough. According to FAO’s calculations, seven sub-Saharan countries-Burundi,

Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, and Somalia-would not achieve self-sufficiency in food

in the year 2000 (when their combined population is expected to reach about 80 million) even if their

agricultural techniques were to match those now found on commercial farms in Asia and Latin America.

Spanish S a

Morocco

/

L

Algeria

L

Chad ) Sudan

Ratio of populationL

Gabon supporting capacity to Cong

actual Modulation (

denisty, 1975

I

Less than 1.0

1.0-5.0

5.1 and above 7

Data not available 1

lems are predominantly related to poverty. In

developed countries environmental problems are

often related to industrialization. In Africa, therefore, development and industrialization are seen

as cures, rather than causes, of environmental

problems (Howard-Clinton, 1984).

A further problem exists in how certain African

governments perceive developed countries’ emphasis on African environmental problems. Some

African governments view this concern as a means

of retarding African industrialization. HowardClinton (1984) sees this related to the evolution

of environmental awareness among African governments. Unlike the experience of most developed countries, concerns over environmental issues were addressed to governments from outside

their borders (many starting with 1972, U.N. Con-
80

ference on the Human Environment in Stockholm), rather than by national scientists or environmentalists and the general public (HowardClinton, 1984). It is in this North-South context

that this apprehension exists.

In examining the benefits of conservation efforts, a long time-frame is required. This presents

serious problems for both African governments

and African farmers and pastoralists.

. . . [T]he managers of . . . national land resources are also . . . political leaders. Their time

scale seldom extends beyond the date of the next

election. On the whole, they are not interested in

long-term conservation. The farmer’s [and herder’s] economic cycle is even shorter. [They are]

probably working on cash flows over 12 months,

so it is unreasonable to expect [them] to pay now

for preserving the land for posterity. That is a luxury [they] cannot afford (Hudson, 1983).

In examining who should pay for conservation

programs, in wealthier countries it makes sense

to have this cost borne by those who use or degrade resources. In developing countries, however, the poor farmers and herders simply cannot afford this; therefore, the burden falls on the

government. A financial commitment of this level

is a major undertaking for any government.

United Nations figures suggest that to rehabilitate

all damaged irrigated land, half the affected

rangelands, and 70 percent of rain-fed farmland

over the next 20 years would cost $48 billion

(Cross, 1983).

Some encouraging signs exist that some governments, supported by the rural sector, are taking

action. Most notable is Kenya, which mobilized

its national institution “Harambee” (meaning “selfhelp”) and, with strong support from President

Daniel Arap Moi, has developed a major soil conservation program. In addition, in 1982, FAO

published a “world soil charter” as a means of encouraging government support for soil conservation efforts. Without such efforts, the charter

predicts, productive capacity of land could decrease 20 percent by the end of the century (Cross,

1983).

While it is apparent that successful efforts to

reduce land degradation will require firm commitments by national governments, there are

ways U.S. assistance could be effective. One is

obviously through financial support, such as

through World Bank conservation projects. In addition, the United States could take better account

of the particular environmental constraints in assisting African governments plan agricultural development strategies. “The relationship between

environmental deterioration and agricultural stagnation is still too often ignored in the formulation of strategies” (Lofchie and Commins, 1984).

The United States could also assist African governments in compiling an inventory of resources

and assist in the development of baseline data on

resource degradation in order to identify areas

most seriously affected.

An integrated approach to solving land degradation, and development problems in general,

should be taken. There is a “need to look at the

entire production system and to understand interrelationships between people and such components as food crops, livestock and feed supplies,

trees, soil fertility, water quality and quantity, and

housing supplies” (McPherson, 1984). Recent research efforts show promising results in addressing certain aspects of land degradation through

strategies using an integration of crops, animals,

and trees (Brumby, 1984).

Issue 16: Institutional and human resource development in Africa is inadequate, thus making improved indigenous management systems critical.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

●

Institutions, especially those engaged in research and training, are less developed in Africa

than in Latin America or Asia.

Some government institutions face major problems trying to coordinate the large amounts of

project aid supplied by many donors.

Proliferation of donor projects allows little institutional continuity; few incentives exist for

host countries to plan programs that they truly

need.

Many projects fail because of administrative

weaknesses and incompetence.
81

●

●

●

●

●

Indigenous institutions are subject to the same

development shifts as donor agencies.

Countries have different approaches to management, and Western models, based on industrial societies, may be inappropriate.

Human resource development is inadequate. International and national training programs

commonly are insufficient to fill the number of

needed research and planning positions. National in-service training courses are usually

weak in disseminating new information.

Training Africans too often is done in the

United States when local and third country locations may be more appropriate.

African universities generally are undersupported and underused in research activities. Fe-w

have any or adequate graduate level programs.

Discussion

The successful transfer of technologies depends

on the availability of institutions that can effectively manage development programs. Problems

exist at different levels with African institutions

that deal with both program and project development. Some of the problems are inherent in

bureaucracies everywhere but some raise questions about the assumptions and structure of efficient African management systems. Some problems relate to individual human factors and some

are due to inefficient levels of financial and human

resources. Government institutions in most African countries have been inundated with donor

project assistance for rural development. The proliferation of aid renders many ministries incapable

of coordinating donors’ projects and interests. The

Ministry of Agriculture in Malawi, for example,

reported 44 donor-financed projects in 1981

(Morss, 1984). Coordination of this number of

projects requires inter- and intra-ministerial coordination that can strain existing staff levels. Coordination is also hampered by power struggles

between various ministries. Delegation of responsibility is then transferred to local government

units with few human and financial resources

available to implement rural development projects

(Morss and Morss, 1982).

Donors have attempted to strengthen institutions through infrastructural support and overseas

training. Buildings have been constructed for

schools, research stations, and ministry and local

government office space. Staff members from central ministry levels have attended U.S. universities, but they usually obtain undergraduate and

graduate degrees in technical areas. Technical staff

sometimes acquire limited management and organizational skills through short courses on rural development and management planning given

by organizations like the USDA graduate school.

With this limited managerial training, technicians

frequently become ineffective managers.

The options normally available to correct weak

institutional development imply more donor assistance for graduate level technical and management training. There have been calls for additional

funding from several sources (Lele, 1981; World

Bank, 1981). However, an increasing number of

people recognize that human resource development through overseas training may not improve

management skills significantly. Organizational

and social realities in Africa may necessitate alternative management strategies—ones that may not

seem as efficient initially but which fit into the

cultural setting. Until then, project implementation and technology transfer will continue to be

difficult and non-replicable once donor agency

representatives leave. African management systems share similarities that may be contrary to

Western management ideals. Some of these are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

flexible attitudes that regard “contracts” as

conditional based on the outcome of unspecified events.

policy that is not dependent on precedent.

Decisions are spontaneous and usually have

little institutional memory.

flexible attitude toward time management

due to high levels of uncertainty in most

African developing countries.

bureaucracies that are structurally overdeveloped and hierarchically complex.

limited opportunities for advancement creating competitive struggles. Therefore, few

alternative policy suggestions are made for

fear of alienating superiors (Moris, 1981; Hyden, 1983).
82

Management systems could develop according

to African desires and expectations so that incentives exist for project implementation and maintenance. African governments could “identify new

management training methods that enable managers to become more effective in the African

environment” (Hyden, 1983). Donors, on the

other hand, could relinquish some control over

the use of their funds to ensure that recipient

governments have some interest in maintaining

and replicating beneficial projects. Donors could

consider the possibility of providing program support instead of project support as a means of

allowing governments more autonomy (Morss,

1984).

By far the most unquestionable though unquantifiable benefit of education to Africa would be

that of learning by doing, which is now lost to

that ever growing and changing expatriate community. It is ironic that most African countries

do not have the capacity to propose alternative

plans to those presented by donors for using donor funds to reflect their own long-term needs for

higher education (Lele, 1981).

Issue 17: Though facing increasing external pressure to change, African governments maintain

economic policies that generally favor urban

consumers instead of providing incentives for

low-resource producers.

Preliminary Findings

●

●

●

●

●

Keeping the urban prices of food, goods, and

services low is important to African governments.

Agricultural policies in most African countries

apparently provide little incentive for increasing smallholder production.

Several African governments provide quasigovernmental marketing outlets for agricultural

produce, which may set prices, supply inputs,

and market produce.

Official market grain prices are set artificially

low to ensure subsidized food prices for the urban populace and thus political stability,

Many feel that little indigenous pressure exists

for agricultural policy reform; thus many external financial institutions and some donors

are taking measures to influence African policies by providing conditional assistance.

International financial institutions and AID

generally support a package of macroeconomic

measures intended to stimulate export trade, reduce spending, and increase incentives for increased agricultural production.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) usually recommends devaluation of local currency

to stimulate export trade. This measure, however, raises the cost of all imported farm inputs

(e.g., fertilizer and implements) and imported

food.

Both of these internal economic adjustments affect the ability of the low-resource producers

to invest in increased food production technologies and diminish the internal purchasing power of the poor.

Numerous factors affect the productivity of

food crops, and increases in production prices

without other policy changes may not increase

the production of food crops.

Pressure for policy reforms is a very sensitive

issue because-it involves the question of national sovereignty.

Discussion

The long-term decline in food production in

Africa has been blamed on many factors: lack of

incentives for producers, lack of appropriate research on food crops, poorly developed extension

and management systems, general insensitivity to

cultural and environmental conditions, failure of

governments to deliver physical and economic inputs on time, and inability to identify the problems facing low-resource producers. Another factor receiving major attention is the impact of

macroeconomic policy upon agricultural production,

During the past two decades, African governments generally opted for economic policies that

favor urban consumers. Up until 1979, prices paid

to farmers in most countries were set below world

market commodity levels so that urban food

prices could be kept low (Christensen and Witucki, 1982). Trade policies and official currency
83

overvaluation also allowed the importation of relatively inexpensive food and consumer goods

(Christensen, et al., 1984),

African governments now face several conflicting forces that threaten to undermine their own

economic independence. During the early 1970s,

the commercial banks offered relatively low-interest loans and because many African governments depend on external sources of capital for

development, these loans were attractive. This

borrowing, and that necessitated to meet late

1970s balance of payments deficits, left sub-Saharan Africa with projected average annual commercial amortization payments of $8 billion, exclusive of International Monetary Fund (IMF)

obligations of $1.6 billion (Browne, 1984).

In response to growing debt, they have turned

to the IMF to reschedule some of their loans.

However, the IMF loans require the fulfillment

of certain conditions including:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

devaluation of local overvalued currencies

to match internal rates of inflation;

limitations on the level of domestic spending,

including wage ceiling levels and the elimination of subsidies on consumer goods;

elimination of unprofitable government enterprises (e.g., marketing parastatals);

relaxation of price controls;

increase in interest rates; and

expansion of exports and reduction of imports (Browne, 1984).

Several countries (e.g., Tanzania and Nigeria)

have resisted the IMF measures and maintain that

they are too severe, especially in the short run.

Most developing countries rely on one or two major export crops (e.g., cocoa, coffee, tea, or cotton) for foreign currency, and devaluation of local

currency theoretically makes exports more attractive to other countries. But levels of demand for

the exports is fairly inelastic for many of these

commodities because of consumer preferences

within developed countries. Devaluation conversely causes increasing prices for imported consumer goods, and shifting demands affect the

prices of other domestic goods. Therefore, to developing countries, raising the ceiling of price controls and devaluation of local currencies probably

mean increasing costs for imported food to urban consumers, a restriction in the availability of

basic goods and services, and increasing costs for

imported agricultural inputs (especially fertilizers),

while not necessarily increasing export revenue

to compensate for the costs of such policy

changes. In the short-run, African governments

express concern over the possibility of political

instability, substantial protests, or food riots.

The World Bank and AID, among others, also

stress the importance of governments developing

agricultural policies that encourage small producers to increase production of food and cash crops

(World Bank 1981; U.S. AID, 1982). Although

the World Bank argued that price incentives were

most important in 1981, more recently they have

suggested that improving the performance of the

agricultural sector means more than “getting your

prices right” (World Bank, 1984a). However, they

appear to require that several conditions similar

to those of the IMF be met to receive continued

development assistance (Stokeld, 1982). Agricultural policy adjustment includes support for infrastructural research, extension, and human resource development but primarily stresses the

need for macro- and micro-economic reforms. For

example, AID considers an appropriate policy

framework as one that:

. . . relies largely on free markets, the provision

of production incentives [which] are affected by

direct attempts by government to influence the

prices of food or agricultural products and inputs,

but in many countries macro-economic policies

affecting exchange rates, interest and wage rates

and tariffs and taxes have an even more powerful impact on incentives to produce, employ, consume, save, and invest (U.S. AID, 1982).

Increasing producer prices paid to agriculturalists and herders may exacerbate the problem for

African governments. Without subsidies, the

prices of domestic agricultural products will increase along with those of imported food stuffs.

Evidence exists suggesting that increases in producer prices for a specific crop will stimulate more

land to come under cultivation and higher total

yields for that crop (Christensen and Witucki,

1982), But it is not clear who would benefit. With

no new technologies available, production increases will require more inputs of fertilizers and

purchased inputs. Therefore, the farmers most
— — .

84

likely to benefit are those who can afford to purchase the necessary inputs, not the overwhelming number of subsistence farmers who may not

be engaged in agriculture as a full time occupation (Christensen, et al., 1984; Christensen and

Witucki, 1982; Eicher and Baker, 1982).

Price incentives for one crop (e.g., maize) may

also cause producers to shift their emphasis between crops, not increase production (Eicher and

Baker, 1982). A number of non-price factors may

instead affect the level of productivity substantially compared with the effects of producer price

increases. Lack of reliable rainfall, timely delivery of agricultural inputs, seasonal labor, extension advice, suitable technologies, and marketing infrastructure remain serious constraints.

For the African herder, livestock may represent

more than an economic good. The number of

stock accumulated depends on many complex social, environmental, and political decisions in addition to economic responses. Increased prices will

not necessarily bring more cattle into the marketplace (Horowitz, 1979).

The calls for more reasonable macroeconomic

policies and appropriate incentives to rural producers seem valid. It appears that the rural sectors of many African countries require some incentives and support for increasing production.

However, the conditions for IMF loans and continuing multilateral and bilateral development

assistance could be more palatable politically to

African governments. Donors could do more to

recognize the constraints that African governments face. A recent study indicates that only 20

percent of the African countries following the IMF

economic adjustment programs met the proposed

economic growth targets. In light of this, there

are several ways that the IMF could assist African

developing countries without stripping them of

their autonomy. The IMF could show more flexibility in working with the African governments

in working out longer term devaluation and cost

reduction measures. Further, the political and economic realities of African countries have to be

considered by the IMF when negotiating, for it

continues to be the responsibility of the African

governments themselves to readjust their economies (Mtei, 1984).

It should be understood that for any program

to be successful, it must be supported by the people of the country implementing the program, and

the atmosphere of peace and social stability must

prevail (Mtei, 1984).
Appendixes
Appendix A

List of Additional Reviewers

These persons, in addition to participants in OTA’s September workshop, reviewed the draft Technical

Memorandum:

Claudia Carr

Department of Conservation and Resource Studies

University of California

Berkeley, CA

Kay Davies

Women in Development

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Carl Eicher

Department of Agricultural Economics

Michigan State University

East Lansing, MI

Louise Fortmann

Department of Forestry and Resource Management

University of California

Berkeley, CA

Cal Martin

Africa Bureau AFR/TR

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Jon Moris

Department of Sociology, Social Work,

and Anthropology

Utah State University

Logan, UT

Haven North

Evaluation Branch PPC/DCIE

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Vernon Ruttan

Department of Agricultural and

Applied Economics

University of Minnesota

St. Paul, MN

George Scharffenberger

U.S. Peace Corps

Washington, DC

87
Appendix B

The CGIAR in Africa

Considerable interest exists in the work of the international agricultural research centers that are part

of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). This short description of the

CGIAR’s work in Africa was prepared by the CGIAR

office in Washington, DC, and appears with permission.

Introduction

1. This paper presents a brief overview of the role

and activities in Africa of the 13 international agricultural research centers (IARCs) funded by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research

(CGIAR). Four of the centers are located in Africa and

most of the other centers have significant programs

in Africa.

2. The CGIAR was organized in May 1971 to bring

together countries, public and private institutions, international and regional organizations, and representatives from developing countries in support of a network of international agricultural research centers and

programs. The basic objective of this effort was then,

and is now, to conduct research to produce technologies or technology components that will lead to an increase in the quantity and improve the quality of food

production in the developing countries, The research

supported by the Group concentrates on those critical transferable aspects of food production in the developing countries that are not adequately covered by

other research facilities, and which are of wide usefulness, regionally or globally. Currently, the CGIAR

network is involved in research on nearly all of the

major food crops and many of the farming systems

in the major ecological zones of the developing world

(table B-l).

3. The international center’s research and training

activities deal with crops and livestock that encompass three-quarters of the food supply of the developing countries. These centers have already made

significant contributions toward increasing food production in the developing countries. The total system

is small, however, with expenditures of less than $200

million in 1984, compared to an estimated $2.6 billion spent by developing countries in 1980, and project loans/credits for agricultural research by the World

Bank and IDA of $1.0 billion since 1980.

Current Activities

4. Africa figures very prominently in the current

work programs of the international agricultural re88

search centers funded through the CGIAR. Four of the

13 centers have their headquarters in African countries, and all the others have outreach activities that

involve African countries in various ways. Table B-2

shows there were 291 IARC staff stationed in West,

East, and Southern Africa in 1983 and that 122 of them

were outside the four countries hosting Centers, mostly

in outreach or “country programs. ” Outreach activities usually take the form of cooperative research

programs in conjunction with national or regional

institutions, or with other international institutions

operating in Africa.

5. IARCs headquartered in Africa. The four centers

that have their headquarters in Africa are the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), the

International Livestock Center for Africa (ILCA), the

International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases (ILRAD), and the West Africa Rice Development

Association (WARDA).

6. IITA (the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture), located in Ibadan, Nigeria, was the first international agricultural research center on the African

continent. In the CGIAR system, IITA has worldwide

responsibility for the improvement of cowpea, yam,

cocoyam, and sweet potato, and regional responsibility for cassava, rice, maize, and soybean. Another important program is devoted to improving traditional

farming systems. The object of the farming systems

program is the development of more productive and

ecologically sound alternatives to traditional systems

of bush fallow and shifting cultivation. IITA works

in a number of African countries, usually with funding specially provided for work in specific countries,

on programs relating to one or more of the crops for

which it is responsible or on farming systems, From

its inception, IITA has been strongly identified with

research on important food crops of the humid tropical

areas of Africa.

7. ILCA (the International Livestock Center for Africa), located at Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, was established in 1974 to assist national efforts in tropical

Africa by carrying out research and development on

improved livestock production and marketing systems,

by training livestock specialists in their region, and by

gathering documentation useful to the African livestock industry. ILCA is one of the two CGIAR centers

in Africa devoted to livestock research. ILCA is primarily concerned with the improvement of livestock

production systems. Dealing with livestock in the context of deeply traditional, complex and diverse farm-
—

89

Table B-1 .–Centers Supported by the CGIAR, 1984

1984 budgeta

Acronym Research Geographic (millions of

(year established) Center Location programs focus dollars)

IRRI (1960) International Rice Research Institute

CIMMYT (1966) Centro International de Mejoramiento

Maiz y Trigo

Los Banes, Phillipines

Mexico City, Mexico

IITA (1967) International Institute of Tropical Ibadan, Nigeria

Agriculture

CIAT (1968) Centro International de Agricultura

Tropical

CIP (1971) Centro International de la Papa

WARDA (1971) West African Rice Development

Association

ICRISAT (1972) International Crops Research Institute

for the Semi-Arid Tropics

ILRAD (1973) International Laboratory for Research

on Animal Diseases

IBPGR (1974) International Board for Plant Genetic

Resources

ILCA (1974) International Livestock Center for

Africa

IFPRI (1975) International Food Policy Research

Institute

ICARDA (1976) International Center for Agricultural

Research in the Dry Areas

ISNAR (1980) International Service for National

Agricultural Research

Cali, Colombia

Lima, Peru

Monrovia, Liberia

Hyderabad, India

Nairobi, Kenya

Rome, Italy

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Washington, DC, U.S.A.

Aleppo, Syria

The Hague, Netherlands

Rice

Rice based cropping

systems

Maize

Bread wheat

Durum wheat

Barley

Triticale

Farming systems

Maize

Rice

Sweet potato, yams

Cassava, cowpea,

lima bean, soybean

Cassava

Field beans

Rice

Tropical pastures

Potato

Rice

Chickpea

Pigeonpea

Pearl millet

Sorghum

Groundnut

Farming systems

Trypanosomiasis

Theileriosis

Plant genetic sources

Livestock production

systems

Food policy

Farming systems

Wheat, barley,

triticale, broad

bean, lentil,

chickpea, forage

crops

National agricultural

research

Global 2 2 5

Asia

Global 21 0

Global

Global

Global

Global

Tropical Africa 21 2

Global

Tropical Africa

Global

Global

Latin America

Latin America

Global

West Africa

23.1

Global

Global

Global

Global

Global

Semi-Arid tropics

Global 9 7

Global

Global 3.7

109

29

221

Tropical Africa 127

Global 4 2

Dry areas of West 20.4

Asia and North

Africa

Global 35

aCGIAR supported core budget net of capital at the bottom of the bracket (from 1983 lntegrative Report )

SOURCE: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research ‘The CGIAR in Africa," Washington, D.C. 1984

ing systems, ILCA is more concerned with systems

analysis and management approaches and techniques

than with individual commodities. Although cattle

have received much research attention from ILCA,

sheep and goats have also received considerable attention. ILCA focuses its research efforts on four ecological zones—arid, subhumid, humid, and highlands.

ILCA’s Humid Zone Program is based at IITA and the

two centers cooperate in farming systems research in

which animals do or may play an important role.

8. ILRAD (the International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases) was established in 1974

in Nairobi, Kenya, to assist in the development of effective controls for two major African livestock diseases: trypanosomiasis and theileriosis (East Coast Fever). Together these two diseases prevent livestock

production in vast areas of a number of developing

countries in Africa. The total foregone production—

not only in milk and meat production, but also in production of leather, wool, fertilizer, animal power and

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92

animal by-products—is incalculable. Both diseases are

caused by parasites that are transmitted by insect vectors; the tsetse fly carries trypanosomes while ticks

transmit theileriosis. In both cases, the relationships

among parasites, hosts and vectors are subtle and

complex; intervention is difficult. ILRAD’s emphasis

is to identify and exploit disease control methods that

rely on the immunological responses of the host

animals. ILRAD works with other institutions to pool

animal disease and production skills toward the solution of livestock problems in Africa. For example,

ILCA and ILRAD work together with ICIPE (the International Center for Insect Physiology and Ecology)

in a Trypanotolerance Network to study relationships

of the parasite, the vector, the animal, and animal

management in livestock that have some tolerance to

trypanosomiasis. ILRAD hosts staff of several other

CGIAR centers, including ILCA, at its headquarters

in Nairobi.

9. WARDA (the West Africa Rice Development Association), located in Monrovia, Liberia, is a regional

organization to promote self-sufficiency in rice in 15

countries of West Africa. The CGIAR helps to support the research activities of WARDA. WARDA

seeks to develop improved rice varieties adapted to the

region’s agroclimatic and social conditions, and to develop improved farming systems that are appropriate

to improved rice varieties and to socio-economic and

agricultural conditions of the region. The WARDA

program concentrates on four systems of rice production—mangrove swamp rice (somewhat saline conditions), irrigated rice, upland (rainfed) rice, and deep

water rice.

10. IARCs With Programs Located in Africa. In addition to the four centers whose headquarters are in

African countries, seven other centers have staff stationed in Africa engaged in a variety of activities in

cooperation with national research institutions. The

seven are the Centro International de Agricultural

Tropical (CIAT), the International Maize and Wheat

Improvement Center (CIMMYT), the International

Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR), the

International Potato Center (CIP), the International

Rice Research Institute (IRRI), and the International

Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas

(ICARDA). All of these centers are working on a range

of crops that are important staple foods throughout

Africa.

11. CIAT (the International Center for Tropical

Agriculture) with headquarters in Colombia, has responsibility for the world germplasm collection of

cassava and, in cooperation with IITA, is involved in

supplying germplasm for cassava improvement programs in Africa. It carries on similar work for the common bean in East Africa and is now building up a nine

member team to work on bean improvement there.

CIAT has a large tropical pastures program in Latin

America and is working to develop relationships between it and forage research efforts in humid and subhumid zones of Africa, particularly with ILCA.

12. CIMMYT (the International Maize and Wheat

Improvement Center) is headquartered in Mexico, but

the center has a number of ongoing programs in Africa. Some of these programs are supported by bilateral

donors, and most are run on a cooperative basis with

national institutions. The CIMMYT Maize Program

has had staff working in national programs in three

African countries—Ghana, Tanzania, and Zaire. The

oldest of these programs began in 1973. CIMMYT also

has a joint African maize program with IITA, located

at Ibadan, Nigeria. The Wheat Program has staff members assigned to the East Africa regional program

which includes 17 countries, from Ethiopia in the north

to Lesotho in the south. In addition, the Economics

Program has a regional economist headquartered at

ILRAD in Nairobi who works with national research

programs in Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia.

Training is an important part of CIMMYT’s contribution to African agriculture; during the period 1971-

83, 187 trainees from tropical Africa were involved in

the maize in-service training course, while from 1966-

83, 96 trainees were involved in wheat in-service training. CIMMYT also provides at its headquarters and

field research sites in Mexico training opportunities for

visiting scientists from Africa.

13. IBPGR (the International Board for Plant Genetic Resources), located in Rome, was established to

promote an international network of genetic resources

centers to further the collection, conservation, documentation, and use of plant germplasm. Although

IBPGR provides services to national and international

organizations, it also supports and encourages research

in genetic resources by other IARCs and national programs. It works closely with other centers in the

CGIAR system. The IBPGR has sponsored a number

of collecting missions in various African countries, notably in West Africa, and, from time to time, has stationed staff in Africa over extended periods of time.

14. ICRISAT (the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics) has its headquarters

in Hyderabad, India, but much of its work is applicable to, designed for, and takes place in, semi-arid areas

of Africa. The two major cereal crops for which it is

responsible, sorghum and millet, are major staples

especially in West Africa, and groundnut is a major

crop in many parts of the continent. In 1983 ICRISAT

had scientists posted to Bukina (sic) Faso (Upper

Volta), Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and the Sudan.
93

ICRISAT’s work in West Africa has, in the past, taken

place within the national research programs and has

been largely designed to facilitate transfer of technology from India. It has become apparent that the types

of sorghum and pearl millet varieties that gained substantial acceptance in India were not adapted to the

ecological conditions and farm family needs in West

Africa. As a result ICRISAT has decided to establish

a research subcenter for the difficult environment of

the Sahel in which it would have the facilities and capability to carry out the complete range of research

activities needed. The ICRISAT Sahelian Center, being located near Niamey, Niger, should serve the longer term needs of the region. ICRISAT is in the process

of establishing a regional team at Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, to meet the needs of Southern Africa and a regional team in Kenya to meet the needs of Eastern

Africa. Discussions are underway on the Center’s involvement in a regional grain legume program for

Southern and Eastern Africa. Between 1974 and 1983

ICRISAT provided in-service training to 210 researchers from West Africa, 103 from Eastern Africa, and

51 from Southern Africa; another 31 researchers from

Africa were Research Fellows or Research Scholars.

15. CIP (the International Potato Center), located

in Peru, maintains several staff members in East Africa. Potatoes are not very widely grown in most African countries, but are of increasing importance. A regional scientist is located at ILRAD in Nairobi. This

scientist oversees the cooperative research and training activities in the area. Two staff members reside in

Rwanda and one lives in Burundi; their responsibilities

include research on potato in those countries. Other

regional representatives are stationed in Egypt and

Tunisia. CIP also supports work of local scientists in

Ethiopia and Kenya. A country network, PRAPAC

(Programme Regional d’Amélioration de la Culture de

Pomme de Terre en Afrique Centrale), which includes

Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire was established in 1982.

The network carries out research and training activities.

16. IRRI (the International Rice Research Institute),

located in the Philippines, has a liaison scientist for

the African region who is based at IITA in Nigeria and

who works closely with WARDA and with national

institutions. Because within the CGIAR system IITA

has responsibility for research on rice in Africa, IRRI

does not have a major direct presence in Africa but,

through its International Rice Testing Program (IRTP),

IRRI makes advanced rice materials available to

WARDA and to various interested national institutions. IRRI has recently engaged in discussions of the

feasibility of contracting for an outreach program in

Madagascar which has rice production systems quite

similar to those of Asia. Two scientists are in Egypt

on a similar arrangement.

17. ICARDA (the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas), located in Syria, has

a program on faba beans (also known as broad or

horse beans) in Egypt and the Sudan, and has stationed

staff in those countries to help carry out the research.

More recently, a research team has been stationed in

Tunisia to work on barley and legume improvement

with national research institutions in North Africa.

ICARDA is developing working relations with ILCA

in areas of livestock/crop production integration.

18. Other IARCs That Work in Africa But Do Not

Have Resident Staff in the Continent. The remaining

two centers do not have resident staff in Africa, but

their work includes activities directly or indirectly related to Africa. The centers concerned are the International Service for National Agricultural Research

(ISNAR), and the International Food Policy Research

Institute (IFPRI).

19. ISNAR (the International Service for National

Agricultural Research), located in The Hague, was organized in 1980 to assist developing nations to improve

their national agricultural research capability. ISNAR

has already been invited to assess the strengths and

weaknesses of several national research systems in

Africa, and has completed assessments of Bukina [sic]

Faso (Upper Volta), Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar,

Malawi, Rwanda, and Somalia. ISNAR is deeply involved in a large project under the Cooperative Development for Africa Group to help upgrade agricultural research training.

20. IFPRI (the International Food Policy Research

Institute), located in Washington, DC, works on policy issues relating to food and agriculture. IFPRI is devoting about 30 percent of its research to projects related to Africa, compared to about 18 percent during

the past ten years. Published IFPRI Research Reports

include studies on Food Security in the Sahel, Agricultural Research Policy in Nigeria and growth linkages in Nigeria (sic) and Kenyan agricultural exports.

Proceedings of a major policy conference on accelerating growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is in the process

of being published.

Impact of the CGIAR in Africa

21. A great deal of attention is being given by the

CGIAR to the various African countries. As already

mentioned, four of the centers are located in Africa,

the largest number in any continent, and most of the

others have stationed senior scientific staff to reside

and work in various African countries. Research by

the IARCs has already shown its relevance and use-
94

fulness for African agriculture, but adoption has been

slowed by the general anti-agricultural policies of

many African countries, the low level of infrastructure development, and the lack of inputs.

22. Improved maize lines from CIMMYT have

helped to raise yields in Zaire and Tanzania, while

IITA has developed maize lines with resistance to the

devastating streak virus, and efforts are currently

under way by a joint CIMMYT/IITA program to

transfer streak resistance to local African maize

cultivars. This will enable farmers to grow their accustomed local varieties while ensuring protection against

the damaging streak virus disease.

23. CIP, in cooperation with national research institutions, has released potato varieties that yield well

under farm conditions in Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya,

and Rwanda. In cooperative work with ILCA, CIP has

obtained yields of 80 tons per hectare in the Ethiopian

highlands; such yields could increase farm incomes

dramatically.

24. WARDA has tested and released a number of

improved rice varieties for its West African member

countries. Significant potential improvements exist for

irrigated and deep-water rice.

25. IITA has made significant progress in developing high-yielding cassava varieties that are resistant to

the destructive complex of diseases and insects that attack cassava in Central and West Africa. Some of this

work was done in cooperation with the national program in Zaire. IITA has also made major progress in

biological control of damaging cassava pests, particularly the cassava mealybug. The IITA cassava improvement program is a good example of the need for

long-term research in Africa on major intractable problems. IITA uses germplasm from CIAT’s major cassava

germplasm collection in its improvement work.

26. IITA has developed sweet potato lines that are

very resistant to attack by the sweet potato weevil,

a major cause of post-harvest losses in that crop. These

resistant lines are protected naturally from such insect

attack, and spraying of insecticides is not required.

27. IITA and ILCA have worked to develop and improve alley-cropping, a form of agroforestry in which

arable crops are grown between rows of perennial tree

crops that can be used for several purposes such as fodder, wood fuel, and green manure.

28. ILCA, working with ILRAD and ICIPE (the International Center of Insect Physiology and Ecology),

has developed a network to improve research and the

development of information on trypanotolerant livestock in Africa. The network, which concentrates not

only on trypanotolerant cattle but also on tolerant

sheep and goats, places major emphasis on improving research and development activities in national institutions, and will help to provide guidance and financial support for participating scientists and

institutions. ILCA has also been successful in using

milk cows for animal traction in the Ethiopian highlands, thus providing a potential for the dual use of

these cows by small farmers.

29. The above are but a few of the activities and

accomplishments of the IARCs in their work relating

to Africa. Many other opportunities exist; to capitalize

on them will require commitment to agricultural development by African governments and improved research and extension services.

Issues and Options

30. It is generally agreed by agricultural research

authorities and development experts that African

countries should devote more attention and give higher

priority to agriculture. Production must be increased

and productivity improved. Much needs to be done,

including reinforcement of policies that provide better incentives for farmers and the development of more

productive agricultural systems. Each African country needs to build up a strong technology through research, and effective extension and information services that can assist farmers to increase productivity.

The IARCs can be a good resource for national institutions in meeting such needs. However, in most circumstances, the services provided by IARCs can be

of good use only where effective national programs

exist. The IARCs can and do play a role in strengthening national institutions, but other international and

bilateral organizations must provide financial support

and technical assistance. In recent years the World

Bank has identified national agricultural research as

an area that requires more investment in most developing countries. Other multilateral and bilateral organizations have reached similar conclusions and are also

giving increased attention to this need.

31. It is clear that the IARCs are generating, and will

continue to generate, improved agricultural technology for Africa. Such technology can be adopted more

quickly and effectively by nations that themselves possess an effective agricultural support capability. Broad

cooperation by national, regional and international ororganizations will be required to strengthen African

institutions to the level needed, and at the pace required.

—CGIAR Secretariat

October 1984
Appendix C

“Rural Africa: Modernization, Equity, and

Long-Term Development,” by Uma Lele;

and “Facing Up to Africa’s Food Crisis,”

by Carl K. Eicher

The preceding OTA report is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of all the issues

related to food production and agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa. Other authors

have addressed different sets of issues from their own perspectives.

Two important analyses of the problems faced by Africa follow. Uma Lele’s article reflects

her perspective as chief of development strategy for the World Bank and as an African. The

article by Carl K. Eicher represents the thinking of an American academic with extensive experience in Africa.

Both articles were published in their present form in Agricultural Development in the Third

World1 in 1984. Lele’s article first appeared in Science in 1981. Eicher’s paper was originally

published in Foreign Affairs, also in 1981. Both articles appear with the permission of the authors

and publishers.

1Carl K. Eicher and John M. Staatz (eds. ), Agricultural Development in the Third World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1984), pp. 436-479.

95
Rural

Eq

Africa: Modernization,

uity, and Long-Term

Development

UMA LELE

INTRODUCTION

Within less than a decade Africa is facing a second severe food

crisis. The poor crop can yet again be explained as a result of

drought. But the continent’s growing vulnerability to crop failures

is by no means unexpected. In most African countries it appears to

be part of a long-term trend. Data on African countries, especially for subsistence production, are too poor to permit precise estimates, ’ but annual rates of

increase of major staple food crops in sub-Saharan African seem to have been

about 2 percent during the 1960s and early 1970s, compared with almost 3

percent in Asia and over 3 percent in Latin America.2 Productivity increases in

hybrid maize in some selected areas, such as the highlands of Kenya, have been

impressive. However, on the whole, increases in the production of major cereals

and root crops—maize, sorghum, millets, and cassava-have come about

through increases in the area under cultivation rather than through gains in

productivity per unit of input. This is in sharp contrast to even South Asia, which

is generally perceived as laggard in development but where substantial productivity gains were experienced in food crop production in the 1970s. Per acre

yields of many subsistence food crops appear to have stagnated or even declined

in many African countries, as, for instance, in Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Sudan.

Because of higher population growth, the annual rates of increase in production required to meet consumption needs by 1990 are also estimated to be higher

for sub-Saharan Africa-about 4.4 percent, compared with 4 percent for Asia.3

If present trends continue, Africa will increase its dependence on food imports

both over time and relative to other developing continents. Undernourishment is

expected to become far more widespread, even though alternatives to cereals and

staples, such as bananas and other fruit, fish, and animal products, have been far

more important sources of calories in many parts of Africa than in South Asia,

which has a similar per capita income. Indices of ill health and infant mortality in

Africa are already among the highest in the developing world and are not expected to decline significantly in the next decade.

UMA LELE is division chief, Development Strategy Division, Economics and Research Staff, The

World Bank, Washington, D.C.

Reprinted from Science, 6 February 1981, pp. 547-53, with omissions and revisions, by permission of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the author. Copyright © 1981

by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
97

Compared with the poor performance of food production, export crop production has been more varied among African countries since independence. Production of cotton, tobacco, cocoa, and coffee rose significantly in some countries

until the 1960s, but during the 1970s and early 1980s production of major export

crops has either stagnated or declined in many countries.4 Nigeria, for instance,

became a substantial net importer of edible oils, of which it was previously a net

exporter. Groundnuts in Mali, cocoa in Ghana, cotton in Sudan, and cotton,

sisal, coffee, and cashews in Tanzania all provide examples of stagnancy or

decline in production.

Rural-urban income disparities are already high in Africa, the ratios typically

ranging between 1:4 and 1:9, compared with many countries in Asia, with ratios

between I:2 and 1:2.5. But because agricultural sectors have been stagnant or

slow-growing even relative to the poorly performing industry and services sectors, these disparities are worsening in many cases. Kenya, Malawi, and Ivory

Coast are the few exceptions where until recently economic growth has been

impressive, but the distribution of benefits between agriculture and industry and

within agriculture in these countries has been particularly unequal. The World

Bank’s World Development Report 1981 estimates that per capita incomes in

low-income African countries—countries where the annual per capita income is

less than three hundred dollars—decreased 0.4 percent per year on the average

during the 1970s, compared with a 1. I percent annual increase in low-income

Asia, Even the middle-income African countries experienced per capita income

growth rates of only 0.4 percent per annum, compared with 5.7 percent in the

corresponding countries in East Asia and the Pacific.5

Worse yet, prospects for overall economic growth in low-income Africa appear much poorer than in the rest of the developing world. The World Development Report projects the likely average annual growth rates of per capita income

for the high case in low-income Africa during the 1980s to be only 0.1 percent,

compared with 2.1 percent for low-income Asia. To reverse these long-term

trends requires a clear understanding of the causes of poor past performance.

This chapter argues that most African countries are not giving priority to the

development of peasant agriculture. There is not even much understanding of

what is required to develop it. As a result, the domestic resources that are spent

on agruculturc go largely to pay for the growing wage bill of an inadequately

equipped and inadequtitely operating public sector or to ineffectivc subsidies.

The fragmented donor community has focused largcly on project financing,

mainly of capital expenditure and technical assistance. Project financing has

been rapidly increasing over time, directed mainly toward the rural poor. Current

and past donor investments are having little impact, however, not only in the

short run but in laying the foundations for long-term development as well. The

project approach often results in poor policies, a shortage of maintenance and

operating funds, and a shortage of qualified staff, hence often a major depletion

of capital.

The Asian experience suggests that agricultural development requires large

amounts of resources. Donors should give special attention to broadening their

support of education substantially and supporting not just primary but middleand high-level of training of nationals in technical fields to develop a sciencebased peasant agriculture. This not only would help to create national policy,

planning, and implementing capacity but would support a diverse network of

institutions required for development, in addition to those operated by govern-
98

ments. Major investments are also needed in transport and communications,

many of which will have to be highly capital-intensive. With such a reoriented

emphasis, and guaranteed long-term assistance tied to concrete indications of

national commitment, at least long-term prospects could improve significantly.

THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF PEASANT AGRICULTURE

As in many parts of low-income Asia, such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, India,

Bangladesh, and Thailand, in Africa concern for economic development is primarily a concern about agricultural and rural development. Between 80 and 90

percent of the nearly 400 million people in sub-Saharan Africa live in rural areas.

Most derive their subsistence from meager crop and livestock production and

survive on annual per capita incomes of less than U.S. $150. Although production is geared largely to subsistence, the rural sector is also the major source of

food for urban consumption and of raw materials for exports and for domestic

manufacturing. Except in a few mineral-producing countries such as Zaire, Zambia, and Nigeria, agriculture constitutes the largest income-generating sector,

contributing up to 40 percent of the gross national product of many African

countries. Between 70 and 80 percent of the annual export earnings of many

countries is derived from three to six agricultural commodities, Direct and indirect taxes on agriculture are the most important source of government revenues.

Although the estate sector is an important producer of marketed surpluses of

certain crops in certain countries, a major share of the total production and

marketed surplus nevertheless comes from the smallholder sector. Not only is

broad-based agricultural development thus crucial for increasing incomes, employment, and export earnings, but raising the incomes of the rural poor is

essential for raising government revenues and creating a domestic market for the

goods and services produced in a growing urban manufacturing sector.

POLICIES AND STRATEGIES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

T HE “ MODERNIZATION Now” APPROAC H

Rhetoric and plan documents in almost all African countries make reference to

the key role of the agricultural and rural sector in Africa’s modernization. Since

the disastrous drought of 1973–74 self-sufficiency in food has become a major

objective, often supported by donor-financed projects. The need for increasing

export earnings is also being recognized more urgently, the balance of payments

difficulties having grown with the rising cost of imported energy and manufactured goods. Despite the growing awareness and the increased number of projects, however, unlike in Asia, there is not yet the basic conviction among many

African policy makers that the smallholder agricultural sector can and will have

to be the engine of broad-based economic development and eventual

modernization.

Modernization is taken to mean mainly industrialization and the commercialization of agriculture, largely through mechanized, large-scale farming. The

fluctuating prices of primary exports explain the desire to industrialize, as does

the relative ease of setting up factories and state farms compared with the organizationally far more demanding development of peasant agriculture. In its broad-
99

est sense the objective of modernization is, of course, shared extensively

throughout the developing world. It is the short time perspective of the African

expectations that poses a problem, especially given the much poorer institutional

and trained manpower base that Africa inherited at independence. Goren Hyden

aptly contrasts the eloquent Tanzanian President Nyerere’s slogan ‘‘We must run

while others walk’ with China’s strategy of modernization by the year 2000.6

The frequently noted perception of peasant agriculture as a “holding sector’ is,

however, by no means unique to Africa. At an earlier stage, India’s first

five-year plan ( 195 I -56) incorporated community development and promotion

of cottage and small-scale industry essentially as stopgap arrangements to ensure

rural welfare and employment until industrialization could absorb the growing

pool of surplus agricultural labor. 7 The more dynamic development strategy,

oriented toward small-farmer productivity, which is now being implemented

successfully in many parts of India came into ascendancy only in the mid- 1960s,

with technological change made possible by the new high-yield cereals. As is

argued below, in Africa the view of agriculture as a holding sector and the

‘ ‘Modernization Now’ strategy have had many of the same consequences for the

development of peasant agriculture in more free-enterprise, growth-oriented

Nigeria and Zambia as in Ethiopia and Tanzania, which show greater concern

about income distribution and class formation.

GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE

Planning the use of government finances for agricultural development is, of

course, not easy for most African countries becausc of great fluctuatons in their

export earnings. Their bureaucracies are less experienced than those of their

Asian counterparts, which experience similar fluctuations in earnings. Lately

their ability to plan has been further eroded, as has that of other developing

countries, by the declining purchasing power of their export earnings, as import

prices of oil and industrial goods have soared. In constant dollars, the purchasing

“power of exports from fourteen principal countries in Africa fell try about 40

percent from 1973 to 1980.8

Even within these all too obvious constraints, however, far fewer resources are

plowed back into agriculture by most African countries than would seem justified. lntrrcountry comparisons are exceedingly difficult, owing to definitional,

data, and other measurement problems, but in the 1970s around 10 percent or

less of the planned development expenditure was allocated to the agricultural

sectors in Kenya and Mali, compared with 31 percent in India during its first

five-year plan in 195 I and 20 percent of the much larger absolute investment in

the subsequent three plans. In Zambia the total agricultural budget may have

decreased in real terms by an annual average of slightly over 9 percent in the late

1970s, reflecting general budgetary cuts. Malawi is one of the few exceptions in

Africa; it appears to have allocated close to 30 percent of the known planned

public expenditures to agriculture. However, even there, because of the more

favorable tax, wage, and pricing policies toward the estate sector, large-scale

production has grown at an annual rate of close to 17 percent since 1968, with 70

percent of the share in exports. The corresponding production increase in the

smallholder sector has been only 3 percent a year, even though services to

peasant agriculture generally operate far more effectively in Malawi than in

several neighboring African countries.
100

Large-scale farming per se is far less important a portion of total production or

exports in Tanzania than in Malawi. However, government policies of “villagization ” of peasant producers, combined with pronouncements of the need for

cooperative cultivation and actual haphazard attempts (o introduce it, have had

an adverse effect on smallholder incentives and production. Several other seemingly well-motivated government initiatives to raise peasant productivity have

ended up being poorly implemented. These have led, for instance, to unrealistically high production and input-use targets, the consequent indiscriminate

promotion of fertilizer use, and discouragement of interplanting of crops (which

is traditionally done by peasants to reduce risks of crop failure) as not being

‘‘modem. ” These government initiatives, combined with unreliable provision of

agricultural extension, credit, and output marketing, rather than enabling producers to raise overall agricultural productivity, have resulted in producers’

responding mainly to changing relative prices of food and export crops. The

failed government initiatives have in turn led to an increased official tendency to

look toward large-scale mechanized and irrigated production to guarantee food

and export surpluses. Like Tanzania, many other countries have already invested

or have plans to invest substantial resources in large-scale state farms, but the

record of public-sector farming is very poor throughout Africa, and large subsidies are required for these operations.

Irrigation will have to become important ultimately, as the vast, less costly

possibilities of increasing production under rain-fed conditions begin to be exhausted. For the short run, however, in most of Africa there is not the complex

institutional and managerial capacity to operate irrigation systems indigenously.

The frequently costly rehabilitation (at five thousand to fifteen thousand dollars

per hectare) being undertaken in many of the existing schemes illustrates the

problem.

INCENTIVES TO PEASANT PRODUCERS

Peasant agriculture is highly taxed by fixing low prices for its products and by

overvaluing the national currencies vis-à-vis those of importing countries. Agricultural taxation helps keep urban food prices low and finances modernization

through many capital-intensive investments, such as construction of new capital

cities, stadiums, manufacturing and processing plants, and airports. Agriculture

is, of course, the most important sector and hence has to be the major source of

revenue. However, traditionally it was taxed because peasants were perceived as

irrational, lazy, and unresponsive to price incentives. The resulting tax practices

were inherited by independent governments from colonial administrations. Evidence of producer response has mounted, however. In turn, relative official

producer prices of food and export crops have been changed in many countries in

the last decade, first in order to achieve food self-sufficiency and more recently

to promote exports. Relative prices have in fact been easier for governments to

influence than technology or quality of services. Thus, while the composition of

food and export crops has changed, overall productivity has stagnated. The

producer’s share in the total net market value of the output has frequently remained very low. In Sudan, the rate of taxation on cotton farmers reached 35

percent in the late 1970s; in Mali it ranged from 36 to 69 percent on cotton, 52 to

65 percent on groundnuts, and 23 to 63 percent on sorghum and millets. Even

after allowance is made for the subsidies received by farmers on fertilizer and
101

credit, the effective rate of taxation amounted to 24–61 percent for cotton and

48-65 percent for groundnuts in Mali.

Again, the inadequate recognition of producer incentives is by no means

confined to Africa. Theodore W. Schultz’s Transforming Tradiliona/ Agriculture, which included examination of the peasant irrationality hypothesis, was

prompted by similar observations in developing Asia in the early post-independence period. 9 In Asia these attitudes, trends, and perceptions have been muted,

however. In fact, an articulate pro-agriculture lobby has been created within

most governments in Asia. What accounts for these differences? In comparison

with Africa (with a few exceptions, such as Kenya), in most of Asia there has

been greater overt discussion of policy issues, both domestically and between

domestic and outside scholars. More widespread formal education and training

of policy makers and administrators in Asia has been helpful, as has their greater

exposure to the farming communities through Ionger practical work experience.10 New technological possibilities and increased use of purchased inputs

have also changed the’perspective on price incentives. Now several rural development projects in Africa have gradually begun to produce a similar cadre of

knowledgeable Africans in several countries, but their numbers arc small because of government and donor policies to be described later.

A large part of the agricultural budget in many countries is spent on subsidies-over 70 percent in Zambia. But contrary to general opinion, many of the

subsidies provided in the agricultural sectors in the hope of increasing overall

peasant production do not compensate effectively for high rates of taxation. For

instance, fertilizer subsidies frequently only help alleviate the high cost of production of inefficient domestic fertilizer plants or the high cost of their local

distribution. General subsidies on interest rates and inputs largely benefit the

already better-off commercial farmers. 11 A policy followed in many African

countries of uniform pricing of output, involving complex cross-subsidies of

transport and other handling costs across regions, has achieved regional equity,

especially where few attractive enterprises exist, but has discouraged crop specialization to exploit different natural resources among regions.

INPUT AND OUTPUT MARKETING

Input and output marketing and processing facilities are almost always operated by semiautonomous government or parastatal agencies or by largely government-initiated cooperatives on a monopoly basis. Public marketing agencies tend

to be high-cost operations because of overstaffing, poor financial control and

accountability, and inexperienced management. If an informal traditional market

operates, it is only tolerated rather than helped to improve. 12 Frequently it is

actively discouraged. The eviction of largely Asian-dominated trade through

Operation Maduka in Tanzania and the massive expulsion of Asians in Uganda

illustrate the point. A strong desire to abolish exploitation of nationals by other

races is understandable, even if such exploitation is imputed rather than real. But

even Nigeria, which has a buoyant, largely indigenous small-scale traditional

trading sector, adopted a policy of public-sector monopoly of the distribution of

fertilizer. Tanzania has similarly discouraged its own enterprising tribes from

trading, among other things by instituting some four hundred parastatals and over

eight thousand village cooperatives, which are expected to provide most of the

public services.
102

Some of these same policies are followed for almost the same political and

bureaucratic reasons in most Asian countries, but the consequences there are far

less severe. The degree of government control is more limited, there is greater

administrative capacity to exercise it, and there has been more development of

private institutions and transport and communication networks. In Africa, inputs

are more frequently late, inadequately labeled and packaged, and in wrong

combinations. Marketed surpluses are often not picked upon time, first payments

to farmers are inordinately late, promised second payments rarely materialize, and

damages to crops in storage and handling are extensive. Discouragement of

private retail trade has affected rural supply of even the most basic day-to-day

necessities in some countries, thus further reducing incentives for producers to

consume, save, or invest. Institutional pluralism needs to be given major consideration as an element of development strategy in Africa.

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH, EXTENSION, TRAINING,

AND SOCIAL SERVICES

Whereas there is indiscriminate government intervention in some areas of

policy, there is neglect of others, for instance, agricultural research, extension,

and development of trained manpower. This neglect is due partly to inadequate

recognition of the importance of these services and of the time required to

establish effective institutions and delivery systems and partly to preoccupation

with politically more expeditious short-run objectives. The role of donors in this

regard should not be underrated and is discussed later. The diversion of scarce

financial and manpower resources to purposes that the private sector could well

be allowed to serve is also a handicap.

Because of the inadequate provision of recurrent resources, the research,

extension, and training facilities that do exist are frequently underfinanced and

poorly maintained. As President Nyerere observed in his famous speech “The

Arusha Declaration: Ten Years After, ” the pressure to maintain and even expand

public-sector employment is so high that the wage bill is difficult to control. 13

Consequently, there are not enough public funds for transport allowances for

field staff to carry out research trials and extension demonstrations nor for spare

parts, maintenance and operation of stores, processing facilities, research stations, vehicles, and roads. The general situation is one of ill-trained, unmotivated, unsupervised, and demoralized field staff in many sectors. Of course there

are notable exceptions, such as the Kenya Tea Development Authority and the

Agricultural Marketing Corporation in Malawi. Inadequacy and depletion of

capital and government services over time are far more severe in areas where

donor projects do not exist, inasmuch as these areas do not benefit from priority

budgetary allocations. But the implementation of budgets also needs to be improved, as frequently even the resources allocated are not spent.

Social services suffer from many of the same problems. For example, lack or

poor quality of water supply in many rural areas of Africa leads to ill health.

Time spent in fetching water reduces time available for agricultural activities.

lack of health facilities similarly reduces labor productivity in agriculture. Absence of primary education results in limited access to services and employment

opportunities in towns. Demand for social services is therefore widespread

throughout Africa. On the other hand, public resources to pay the recurrent costs

of providing social services are generally too limited to permit blanket coverage.
103

Either a high degree of selectivity or greater direct cost recovery is therefore

required in the provision of such services. AS many harambee("self-help")

schemes in Kenya illustrate, rural people are glad to contribute their own resources, provided the services are responsive to precise local demands and reliable, lOW-COSt delivery is assured. Tanzania’s example indicates, however, that

for a combination of welfare and political reasons, governments refrain from cost

recovery and genuine local involvement in planning and implementation. Tanzania’s policy of universal provision of services through central financing has

undoubtedly achieved results in some areas. According to official data, the

proportion of the eligible population enrolled in primary schools went up from 28

percent in 1960 to over 90 percent in the late 1970s. The ratio of population with

access to safe water has gone up from 13 percent in 1960 to about 40 percent in

the 1970s. To a lesser extent, most African countries have expanded coverage of

social services in a similar way, but the overall result is still inadequately financed services, with substantial demands on government resources.

Government objectives of modernization also exacerbate manpower shortages

in the traditional sector. The low status of the traditional rural sector and the

unattractive living conditions and facilities, in contrast to the urban or the largescale agricultural sector, often deter qualified nationals from serving the needs of

peasant agriculture. On the other hand, demand for education in Africa is one of

the strongest in the developing world. The governments have allocated substantial portions of their own resources to education, with different emphases on

primary and higher education, depending on their ideology. Because Tanzania

has largely emphasized primary education, the enrollment ratio in secondary

schools in Tanzania only went up from 2 percent at independence to 4 percent by

the late 1970s, and from nearly zero to 0.3 percent in higher education. The

shortage of middle- and higher-level technical and administrative manpower is

consequently extremely severe. In Kenya, budgetary allocations to secondary

and higher education have been expanding more rapidly, and private-sector

expansion is permitted more liberally. As a result, 18 percent of the eligible

population is enrolled in secondary schools and 1 percent is in higher education.

Even then, middle- and higher-level manpower shortages are considerable, especially in technical fields such as accountancy, financial aid and physical resources management, agronomy, plant breeding, and mechanical and civil engineering. On a unit basis, skilled labor in African countries typically costs

between three and ten times as much as in many Asian countries. The average

annual salary of a research scientist in the 1970s was below ten thousand dollars

in Asia, compared with thirty-four thousand dollars in East Africa. 14 And, of

course, not nearly enough scientists are available even to rehabilitate, let alone to

expand, the national research systems in Africa.

To summarize, the “Modernization Now” objective and the consequent national policies, investment priorities, and attitudes toward smallholder agriculture explain the poor performance of the agricultural and rural sectors in many

African countries. In contrast, the Asian and, to a very limited extent, the

African experience indicate that greater trained manpower, combined with longer developmental experience by nationals, leads to a better time perspective on

modernization and, more support of peasant agriculture.
104

AFRICA’S SPECIAL CHALLENGES

The frequent comparisons with low-income Asia in the previous discussion

should not lead one to overlook the problems peculiar to Africa. Low rainfall,

poor soils, and the highly diverse ecological conditions within individual countries make raising agricultural productivity much more difficult in many parts of

sub-Saharan Africa than in Asia, with its extensive scope for small- and mediumscale irrigation and its more fertile soils.

Several seemingly favorable natural features of Africa, such as the low density

of population, pose difficult rural development problems in the short run. In the

late 1970s, population densities ranged from 6 persons per square kilometer in

Somalia and Sudan to 90 in Nigeria. This is in contrast to a density of 155 in the

Philippines, 200 in India, and 620 in Bangladesh. Farms are considerably larger

and landlessness is less prevalent in Africa than in most Asian countries. However, extensive land use is itself a result of the unreliable and low rainfall and poor

soils referred to above, which lead to shifting cultivation and widespread nomadism in many parts of Africa. Low density also makes for much higher per capita

costs of providing roads, schools, and agricultural services in Africa than in

Asia.

There are also apparent contradictions. In the African farming system seasonal

labor shortages are a far more limiting factor in increasing productivity than in

Asia, especially in view of the low level of African agricultural technology.

Thus, selective use of mechanization in the private sector may be economically

justifiable. And yet unemployment and underemployment of rural labor are also

increasing, particularly where population pressure on land is rising rapidly. With

rising fuel costs, mechanization—now often operated through the public sector—is frequently highly uneconomical. The more intermediate forms of technology that are used extensively in Asia, such as the ox plow, would be far more

efficient where the tsetse fly has been controlled. 1 5

Cattle are an important element of Africa’s agriculture. The tradition of individual ownership of cattle, combined with communal grazing rights, has resulted

in overgrazing and declining productivity. For decades technicians have stressed

the need for restocking and pasture improvement, but these have proved elusive

because of the complex sociocultural and environmental factors that operate in

nomadic social systems and the absence of more profitable and less risky ways of

investing the surplus resources of cattle owners.

Low population density also explains the extreme inadequacy of roads, railways, and waterways, although even in this respect there is considerable diversity. Small countries with greater population density, such as Kenya and Malawi,

are less hampered by inadequate transport than are large countries such as Sudan,

Somalia, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. And yet investments in the road system have

also been greater in Kenya and Mulawi than in many other African countries.

Road mileage per square mile of land area is only 0.02 in Sudan, 0.1 in Zambia,

and 0.15 in Zaire, compared with 0.23 in Kenya and 0.31 in Malawi.

Limited growth of sedenary cultivation has also meant more limited evolution

of- indigenous technology and skills in blacksmithing, carpentry, crafts, manufacturing, and trading than is typical of most Asian countries, though there are

distinct differences between the more developed West African societies and

those of East Africa. The range of farm implements, ox plows, and animal -

driven modes of transport used extensively in other parts of the developing world
105

are not prevalent even today in much of traditional rural Africa. on the contrary,

with the advent of colonialism there was a ‘‘technological leap’ toward tractors,

combine harvesters, and modern means of transport, so that at independence

Africa was left with greater technological dualism than was prevalent in most of

colonial Asia.

For these various reasons, the challenges to agricultural research systems in

Africa are by far the greatest in the world, combining constraints posed by

ecological, demographic, technical, and institutional factors. 16 International agricultural research institutes such as the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture in Nigeria and several others, financed by the Consultative Group on

International Agricultural Research, have already begun to address some of these

problems. However, substantial additional investment is required in scientific

research at the national and regional levels to develop profitable technological

packages to suit the highly diverse conditions and reduce the risks now encountered in their adoption by low-income farmers. In some extremely marginal

areas, such as parts of the Sahel in the north and Lesotho in the south, it may not

be possible to increase productivity in present subsistence crops enough to make

them a primary source of livelihood. Alternatives, including migration to more

productive areas where labor-intensive, high-value horticultural crops can be

produced, may have to be examined. These are costly options demanding considerable organization.

The situation with respect to trained manpower can be best appreciated by

some comparisons with Asia at the time of independence. In 1960 even the

educationally most advanced African countries, Ghana and Nigeria, had only 4

percent of the population of secondary-school age enrolled in school, compared

with 8 percent in Bangladesh, 10 percent in Burma, 20 percent in India, and 26

percent in the Philippines. By the late 1970s the percentage in Nigeria had gone

up to 13; by then it was 23 for Bangladesh, 22 for Burma, 28 for India, and 56

for the Philippines.

However, as may be seen in Ghana, Uganda, and Ethiopia, which have been

better endowed with trained manpower than other African countries, without a

conducive political environment little development is possible even with trained

manpower. Many African countries have not yet fully achieved national unity or

gained domestic political stability, the colonial powers having established national borders without regard to traditional land rights and tribal cohesion. Resources and attention sorely needed for rural development have often been diverted to internal conflicts, border wars, and maintenance of domestic political

control.

Development of administrative capability will also take a long time. At independence, often there was a virtual absence of strong national, regional, and

local government administrations of the types that existed in South Asia. Colonial agricultural development policies were geared almost exclusively to the

expansion of export crop production for the metropolitan countries. Research

was largely concentrated on export crops. 17 Agricultural extension, input supply, credit, and marketing and processing facilities were also highly fragmented.

Recent efforts-for example, in Tanzania and Kenya-to decentralize administrative systems to make them more responsive to rural people’s needs, while

justified in the long run, have only exacerbated administrative weaknesses in the

short run because the existing administrative manpower has had to be spread

38-85(, o

- 85 - 8 : ~1, 3
106

thinly between the central ministries of agriculture and transport and [he provincial administration.

Africa thus starts with considerable odds against development. And yet there

is immense potential for productivity increases, not simply in Sudan and the

highlands of eastern and southern Africa, where it is commonly recognized, but

in much of the rest of Africa, in the humid and semihumid tropics and the parts of

the savanna that receive adequate rainfall.

THE DONOR’S ROLE

The experience of Asian countries indicates that in addition to providing direct

financial support, international assistance can play an important role in the long

run by increasing national consciousness about peasant agricultural development, by improving the rationale for policies, by making the effect of alternative

policy options on different sectors or income groups more explicit, and by

gradually strengthening those national forces that can lobby for policy changes.

Changing the distribution of basic assets or political power so that, for instance,

cooperatives will effectively include the poor and subsidies will not go to the rich

is far more difficult to achieve from outside. National will and capacity are

needed to this end.

Concern and debate about the equity issue in the international donor community have been extensive since the “green revolution’ and the perceived failure of

the trickle-down approach to reach the poor.

18 Since the world food crisis of

1973-74 the objective of national self-sufficiency in food, and subsequently a

broader set of issues such as assurance of basic needs, environmental protection,

and women’s rights, have begun to receive international attention. The seemingly long time required to achieve the green revolution in Asia has created impatience in the donor community to achieve results, and with the widening scope of

the development debate, the areas for achieving results have broadened.

Aid in the form of grants and low-interest loans has increased substantially

over time in Africa. For the late 1970s, aid ranged between $20 and $40 a year

per capita in Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Ivory Coast. Mali, Cameroon,

Zambia. and Malawi to as high as $50 to $120 in the smaller countries of

Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. In many countries it constitutes a quarter

or more of the total annual investment and over half the investment in agriculture

and rural development. Even Bangladesh, which is one of the largest recipients

of aid in Asia, received only about $10 of concession] aid a year per capita in

the late 1970s.

Large numbers of aid agencies are involved in assistance to Africa, with

relatively little coordination as to objectives, strategy, degree of continuity, and

areas of assistance. Coping with the complex and differing procedures and large

flows of aid is exceedingly difficult for the inadequately staffed bureaucracies of

most African countries. 20

Apart from targeting more donor-financed projects toward the rural poor, there

has been much evolution in the concept of project assistance in recent years, 21

Projects no longer focus solely on export crops, but are increasingly concerned

with development of food crops for domestic consumption. They are more

strongly geared to institution building, such as strengthening the project-planning

and implementing capacity of the national ministries of agriculture, of the
107

provincial, regional, district, and local administrations, and of the financing and

marketing entities that provide field services. This is in contrast (o the earlier

approach of "enclave" projects, which were implemented mainly through separate autonomous entities created for the purpose. The new projects also show

greater concern for employment, training of local staff, and the use of local

materials and techniques. They also anticipate more explicitly the need for recurrent financing and for financing of several time phases . They are also more likely

now to include support for policy units and monitoring and evaluating to ensure

greater flexibility and learning by doing.

Despite these major improvements, donor-financed projects are having a very

limited impact, especially in light of the resources expended. This holds irrespective of whether their achievements are judged by inputs, such as numbers of local

and expatriate staff recruited, research trials carried out, amounts of fertilizer and

other inputs distributed, vehicles purchased, buildings and roads constructed or

maintained, or amount of data collected or analyzed by evaluation units; or by

the end results, such as increases in yields, numbers of staff trained, or administrative and financial procedures instituted.

What explains the limited impact’? The gulf between the donors’ largely equity-oriented objectives and the national government’s goal of modernization has

remained wide in Africa. Instead of examining the actual policies, strategies, and

institutional frameworks of national governments and assessing the extent to

which they are conducive to rural development, donors have largely taken government rhetoric and plan documents as indications of national commitment and

priorities. Donors have concentrated on project aid as a way of influencing these

priorities; in so doing, they frequently have exacerbated the problems of Africa's

rural development in a variety of ways.

First, the simultaneous shift by much of the international community to the

alleviation of rural poverty, in the face of obvious shortages of national manpower, resources, and institutional capacity, has led to underutilization and poor

maintenance of donor investments. For a variety of reasons, donors have generally preferred to finance mainly capital expenditures, that is, equipment and civil

works, rather than the recurrent expenditures required to maintain or operate

these and other related investments.

Second, despite much evolution in the right direction, the need for assistance

in increasing national capacity for policy development has been underrated. In

addition, a number of questionable showpiece investments by governments have

been made possible by generous financial support from the donor community.

There are a number of reasons for such assistance: a wish to respond to national

desires; an expectation of quick, visible results; the promotion of exports from

donor countries; the vying among donor agencies to finance projects likely to

appeal to their own domestic constituencies; the donors’ need to meet their own

quotas of assistance; and some understandable errors in judgment. However,

there are other factors: the first relates to the provision of technical assistance in

the short run, the second to the expansion of secondary and higher-level education to help broaden the capacities of nationals over the long run.

According to some estimates. as much as 75 percent of the technical assistance

used in the developing world is used in Africa. In the short run. technical

assistance has permitted the planning and implementation of development projects on a scale that would not have been possible otherwise. However, expatriates are becoming less acceptable in sensitive managerial or policy-making posi-
108

tions in most African countries. Their numbers have been growing for more than

a decade since independence, mainly in technical and advisory Positions. Their

high salaries and benefits create resentment among nationals. Even when highly

qualified in their specialties, they are not generally effective in working in an

alien environment.

Increasing high-level education and training of nationals is therefore critical

for augmenting Africa’s managerial and policy-making capacity, even though

the results will take a long time to achieve. Expansion of basic, primary, vocational, and adult education has been supported strongly by donors as a way of

increasing the supply of field staff, meeting the basic-needs objectives, and

increasing the receptivity of rural populations to agricultural and other innovations. Some high-level technical training of Africans is also being undertaken by

several bilateral donors, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development

and the British Overseas Development Ministry, which have traditionally supported this activity. But on the whole, expansion of secondary and higher education has not received the priority it requires from donors. Frequently the shortage

of people with the necessary educational qualifications is so great that even those

funds that are provided by donors for higher-level on-the-job training remain

unused.

The gains to be had from basic, adult, and primary education are undoubtedly

considerable, as evidence from Asia indicates. It is also clear, however, that in

Africa at present the shortage of educatcd and technically trained cadres of

nationals who can devise effective national strategies and policies is a far greater

constraint to the alleviation of rural poverty than is the illiteracy or lack of

receptivity of the rural population. Once again, the question is one of balance and

priorities at a given stage of development. Evidence, mainly from Asia and Latin

America, has also led to anxiety about increasing the ranks of the educated

unemployed in developing countries. The perceived indifference of some of the

educated urbanites to the largely rural needs of their own countries has led the

international community to a general disenchantment with higher education.

Perhaps implicit in this is the feeling that in comparison with the need to train

lower-level staff, expanding the supply of high-level educated personnel is unnecessary or antithetical to the egalitarian objectives of rural poverty alleviation.

Contrary to these perceptions, an increase in the supply of educated personnel

would not only improve national systems but also reduce salaries of the educated, including those of teachers, thus reducing income inequalities as well as

the cost of further investment in education and a range of other development

activities. By far the most unquestionable though unquantifiable benefit of higher

education to Africa would be that of learning by doing, which is now lost to the

ever-growing and changing expatriate technical community. It is ironic that most

African countries do not have the capacity to propose alternative plans to those

presented by donors for using aid funds—plans that would reflect the countries’

own long-term needs for higher education.

The need for substantial investment in physical infrastructure in larger countries such as Sudan and Tanzania and in landlocked countries such as Zambia

also requires critical examination by donors. Maintenance of past infrastructure

has frequently been neglected, and not enough resources have been devoted to

development of trunk roads, railways, and waterways by national governments

and donors. Feeder-road development has received considerably more support,

but the lack of an effective national transport network makes investment in feeder
109

roads ineffective. Again, some of [he same reasons that apply to education and

training explain this neglect, in particular the perception that capital-intensive

infrastructure is not so necessary for reaching the poor, especially in the short

run. A more appropriate balance between the objectives of immediate alleviation

of poverty and the long-term development needs of more resource-intensive

investments is required.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT

The problem of Africa’s rural development is not one of not knowing in broad

terms what needs to be done to support peasant agriculture. The prospects for

turning the present gloomy trends around are considerable. At the national level,

the most fundamental problems are attitudes and vested interests. The subsistence rural sector must be seen as critical for economic development and must be

given the priority that it urgently requires. At the international level, it is evident

that current donor approaches of project aid, although perhaps far more essential

in Africa than in many countries in Asia, are by themselves not enough to deal

with Africa’s complex developmental needs. A major reconsideration of the

balance of assistance, including the donors’ role in education, infrastructure, and

long-term policy planning and implementation, is required. Only then can there

be a useful discussion of development priorities with nationals. The question of

reordering priorities will require a major review by the donor community as a

whole, and even if the question is resolved adequately, the reordering of priorities will take at least a decade to show major results. But the prospects for the

1990s will then be considerably better than those for the 1980s. It is also the only

way to reduce Africa’s growing dependence on outside aid.

NOTES

I thank H. S. Bienen, W. V. Candler, J, M. Cohen, S. D. Eccles, A. O. Falusi, L. S. Hardin, G.

Hyden, N. Islam, W. A. Lewis, J. W. Mellor, M. Mensa, T. W. Schultz, and two unknown

reviewers for Science for comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed in the article are my own

and do not necessarily represent those of The World Bank.

1. Uma Lele and Wilfred Candler, “Food Security in Developing Countries: National Issues, ”

chapter 14 in this book; International Food Policy Research Institute, A Comparative Study of FAO

and USDA Data on Production, Area, and Trade of Major Food Staples, Research Report no. 19

(Washington, D. C., October 1980).

2. International Food Policy Research Institute, Food Needs of Developing Countries: Projections

of Production and Consumption to 1990, Research Report no. 3 (Washington, DC., December

1977), table 3, p. 33.

3. Ibid., table 1, p. 22.

4. K. Anthony; B. F. Johnston; W. O. Jones; and V. Uchendu, Agricultural Change in Tropical

Africa (Ithaca: Come]] University Press, 1979).

5. World Bank, World Development Report 1981 (New York: Oxford University Press for the

World Bank, 1981), table 1.1, p. 3.

6. Goren Hyden, in Papers on the Political Economy of Tanzania, ed. K. S. Kim, M. Mabele,

and M. J. Schultheis (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1979), 5-14.

7. See Holdcroft, chapter 3 in this volume.-ED.

8. The countries are World Bank members with populations over two million, plus Mauritius.

9. T. W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1964). [See also the discussion of Schultz’s work in chapter 1 of this book.-ED. 1
110

10. Journals such as the Economic and Political Weekly have provided an irr,poflant forum for a

vigorous domestic discussion of planned priorities in India in which innumerable external analysts

have participated.

11. Uma Lele, “Cooperatives and the Poor: A Comparative Perspective, ” World Development 9

( 1981): 55-72. [See also Adams and Graham, chapter 21, and Gonzalez-Vega, chapter 22, in this

volume .-E~. ]

12. “There is no official policy towards the unofficial market, ” a comment of a senior official of

one of the African ministries of agriculture, states the problem well.

13. Goren Hyden, Beyond Ujamuu in Tanzania: Underde\’elopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 133; Uma ble, The Design oj

Rura/ Devek~pmenf: Lessons\rom Africa. 2d ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

14. P, Oram, Currenl and Projected ARriculturul Research li’xRendlfure.v and S[aflin Developing

Counwm. Intcma(wnd l;~x~ policy R~~~r~h ln~ll(u(~ w~)rkln~ P~Pcr. nO Jo (Washington, D.c.,

1978), 6.

15. The tsetse fly IS the vector of trypanosornidsi~, or sl~cping slckncss! Which is endemic in my

pans of sub-Saharan Afrwa. -Er>.

16 H. Ruthenberg, Farming S.vsfems in fhe Tropi(s (oxford: cl~rcndon. 1976). See also Schultz,

chapter 23; Evenson, chapter 24; and CIMMYT Ekonomlcs Staff. chapter 25. in this volume.

17 See Evenson, chapter 24 in this volume .—l%.

18. See chapter I in this volume .—E[>.

]9. World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Afrl~u: An &v~afor Action (Washmg[on, D. C., 198 I )

20. See Eicher, chaplcr 31 in this volume .—E[~.

21. Lele, The Design of Rural Development
111

Facing Up

Food

to Africa’s

Crisis

CARL K EICHER

The most intractable food problem facing the world in the 1980s is

the food and hunger crisis in the forty-five states in sub-Saharan

Africa—the poorest part of the world. Although the crisis follows

by less than a decade the prolonged drought of the early 1970s in

the Sahelian states of West Africa, weather is not the main cause of the current

dilemma. 2 Nor is the chief problem imminent famine, mass starvation, or the

feeding and resettling of refugees. Improved international disaster assistance

programs can avert mass starvation and famine and assist with refugee resettlement. Rather, Africa’s current food crisis is long-term in nature, and it has been

building up for two decades; blanketing the entire subcontinent are its two

interrelated components—a food production gap and hunger. The food production gap results from an alarming deterioration in food production in the face of a

steady increase in the rate of growth of population over the past two decades. The

hunger and malnutrition problem is caused by poverty: even in areas where per

capita food production is not declining, the poor do not have the income or

resources to cope with hunger and malnutrition.

Twenty of the thirty-three poorest countries in the world are African (World

Bank 1982).3 After more than two decades of rising commercial food imports

and food aid, the region is now experiencing a deep economic malaise, with

growing balance-of-payment deficits and external public debts. The world economic recession has imposed a severe constraint on Africa’s export-oriented

economies. Prospects for meeting Africa’s food production deficit through expanded commercial food imports thus appear dismal. Donors have responded to

these difficult problems by increasing aid flows to the point where African

countries now lead the list of the world’s aid recipients in per capita terms.4

Furthermore, the World Bank report Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan

Africa ( 1981)5 advocates a doubling of aid to Africa in real terms by the end of

the 1980s. But the crisis cannot be solved through crash food production projects

or a doubling of aid. Sincc the food and hunger crisis has been in the making for

ten to twenty years, solutions to the crisis cannot be found without facing up to a

number of difficult political, structural, and technical problems over the next

several decades.

Key questions and policies that must be examined include: What is the record

of agrarian capitalism and socialism? Why did the green revolution by-pass

Africa’? What lessons have been learned from crash food production projects in
—

112

the Sahel and the development strategies of the 1970s—integrated rural development, helping the poorest of the poor, and the basic needs approach? Are technical packages available for small farmers to step up food production in the 1980s?

Can foreign aid assist in the alleviation of the food production crisis and economic stagnation?

OVERVIEW OF AFRICA’S ECONOMY

Despite the fact that Africa is an extremely diverse region, several common

features frame the boundaries for addressing its food crisis. First, population

densities in Africa are extremely low relative to those in Asia. The Sudan, for

example, is two-thirds the size of India, but it has only 18 million people as

compared with 670 million in India. Zaire is five times the size of France and has

only a small percentage of its arable land under cultivation. But some countries

are near their maximum sustainable population densities, given present agricultural technology and available expertise on soil fertility. Much of the arable

land in Africa is not farmed because of natural constraints such as low rainfall

and tsetse flies, which cause human sleeping sickness and virtually preclude the

use of approximately one-third of the continent, including some of the bestwatered and most fertile land.6

Second, most of the economies are open, heavily dependent on international

trade, and small: twenty-four of the forty-five countries have fewer than 5 million people, and only Nigeria has a gross domestic product larger than that of

Hong Kong (World Bank 1981, 2). Small countries have special problems in

assembling a critical mass of scientific talent and in financing colleges of agriculture and national agricultural research systems,

Third, all but two African states—Ethiopia and Liberia-are former colonies.7

The colonial legacy is embedded in the top-down orientation of agricultural

institutions and the priority given to medicine, law, and the arts rather than

agriculture in African universities and partially explains the low priority that

African states have assigned to agriculture and to increasing food production

over the past twenty-five years.

Fourth, Africa is an agrarian-dominated continent where at least three out of

five people work in agriculture and rural off-farm activities. Moreover, since

agricultural output accounts for 30–60 percent of the gross domestic product in

most countries, the poor performance of the agricultural sector over the past two

decades has been a major cause of poverty and economic stagnation.

Fifth, Africa’s human resource base is extremely weak relative to those of

Asia and Latin America. In most countries, even after twenty years of independence, there are still only small pools of agricultural scientists and managers

because of the token priority that colonial governments gave to educating

Africans.

PROFILE OF AFRICAN AGRICULTURE

Although there are more than one thousand different ethnic groups in Africa

and wide differences in farming and livestock systems by agroecological zones,

the following overview pinpoints the major features of African agriculture and

some of the d inferences between it and agriculture in Asia and Latin America. 8
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For the most part, land ownership in Africa is remarkably egalitarian as contrasted with that in Latin America. The uniform agrarian structure is partially a

function of colonial policies that prohibited foreigners from gaining access to

land in some parts of the continent, such as West Africa. But in Zambia and

Zimbabwe, colonial policies promoted a dual structure of large and small farms

(Blackie 1981).

Empirical research has shown that African farmers, migrants, and traders are

responsive to economic opportunities. Although custom, local suspicions, jealousies, ignorance, and fatalism can play a role in inhibiting the introduction of

change in a particular situation, these variables do not serve as a general explanation of rural poverty (Jones 1960).

Africa is a region of family-operated small farms, in contrast to Latin America, where land ownership is highly concentrated. The typical smallholder has

five to fifteen acres under cultivation in any one year and frequently has as much

or more land in fallow in order that soil fertility can be gradually restored. Thus,

it is more accurate to describe most African farming systems as land-extensive

farming systems rather than land-surplus systems. The typical smallholder gives

first priority in terms of land preparation, planting, and weeding to growing

staple foods (such as millet, sorghum, yams, cassava, white maize, and beans) to

feed his family and second priority to producing cash crops such as coffee,

cotton, and groundnuts for the market.

Family labor supplies the bulk of the energy in farming, unlike in Asia, where

the main energy source is oxen. The short-handle hoe and the machete are the

main implements used in land preparation and weeding. Rural nonfarm activities

account for 25–50 percent of the total time worked by male adults in farm

households over the course of a year in Africa. Unlike in Asia, there is no

landless labor class in most African countries because of the presence of idle

land.

Land tenure in Africa can be characterized as a communal tenure system of

public ownership and private use rights of land (Cohen 1980). The combination

of private use rights and communal control over access to land allows families

(u) to continue to farm and graze the same land over time and to transfer these

use rights to their descendants and (b) to have the right to buy and sell rights to

trees (such as oil palm and cocoa) through a system of pledging. There is no

active rural land market in most countries. Land tenure and lurid use policy issues

will be of strategic importance in the 1980s and 1990s as the frontier phase is

exhausted, land markets emerge, irrigation is expanded, and herders shift from

nomadic to semi nomadic herding and sedentary farming systems that integrate

crops and livestock.

Unlike in Asia, where two or three crops are grown sequentially over a twelvemonth period, most African farmers produce only one crop during the rainy

season and engage in some form of off-farm work during the dry season. irrigation is a footnote in most countries because farmers can produce food and cash

crops more cheaply in rainfed farming systems.

Rural Africa is at a crossroads. Farming and livestock systems are complex,

heterogeneous, and changing. African villages are experiencing major changes

in response to the penetration of (he market economy, drought, explosive rates of

population growth, and the oil boom in countries such as Nigeria and Gabon. For

example, the oil boom in Nigeria has escalated rural wage rates, induced migra-
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tion from northern Cameroon and Niger, and provided a market for livestock and

food crops from neighboring countries.

The subsistence farmer producing entirely for his family’s consumption is hard

to find in Africa today except in special cases where inadequate transport, rebellion, or political unrest have forced farmers to withdraw from the market and

produce for their subsistence needs (such as in Uganda and Guinea in the 1970s

and in Tanzania in the early 1980s). In the 1980s and 1990s, village institutions

will be under pressure as rural Africa shifts from extensive to intensive farming

and livestock systems in response to the decline in the ratio of land to labor.

Inequality between countries—for example, Upper Volta and the Ivory Coast—

and within countries-for example, southern and northern Sudan—will likely

increase in the coming decades.

UNDERDEVELOPED DATA BASE

Africa has a weak and uneven data base, and there is a need to interpret official

statistics with caution. For example, accurate data on acreage under cultivation

and yields are available for only a handful of counties. Estimates of land under

irrigation vary from 1 percent to 5 percent. Estimates of the size of national

livestock herds are notoriously suspect because of cattle tax evasion. Even trade

data must be carefully examined. For example, official data on cocoa exports

from Togo in the 1970s included a large volume of cocoa from Ghana which was

smuggled into Togo. Data on rural income distribution are available for only a

few countries. Agricultural statistical agents in most countries rely heavily on

guesstimates from extension agents, and they have been known to revise their

figures to bring them into line with published estimates from international agencies. The combination of underdeveloped data and the case study nature (village

studies, for example) of much of the research in the past decade makes it difficult

to generalize about the sources of agricultural output and the causes of poverty,

malnutrition, and lagging food production.

There is also a need to beware of the pitfalls of studies [hat present the results

of survey research, such as farm management and nutrition surveys, in terms of

averages. For example, data showing that farmers produce enough food to feed

each family member an average of two thousand calories a day during a given

year are meaningless if some family members do not have enough food to

survive during the ‘‘hungry season. Moreover, the use of averages promotes

the view that there is a homogeneous or classless rural society and that interventions designed to improve the average incomes in an area will automatically

improve the incomes of all people, including those on the lower end of the

income scale. Numerous researchers have shown that rural inequality is an

integral part of Africa’s history, that inequality may increase as a result of

technical change, and that assistance to particular groups of people will have to

be carefully targeted.

In summary, although a few scholars talk glibly about average sorghum yields

for a country, the “African case, ” and uncritically use Africa-wide figures (for

example, that women produce at least 80 percent of the food in Africa), serious

scholars wisely eschew generalizing about even a subregion such as West Africa-an area as large as the continental United States.
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FOOD AND POPULATION TRENDS

Looking at Africa’s food production trends, population growth, food imports,

and poverty, the overriding pattern emerges clearly: since independence Africa’s

historical position of self-sufficiency in staple foods has slowly dissipated (FAO

1978). Over the 1960-80 period, aggregate food production in Africa grew very

slowly—by about 1.8 percent per year, a rate below the aggregate growth rate of

Asia or Latin America. However, the critical numbers are not statistics on total

food production but per capita figures. The U.S. Department of Agriculture

(1981) statistics show that sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the world

where per capita food production declined in the 1960-78 period, In addition,

the average per capita calorie intake was below minimum nutritional levels in

most countries. g

The per capita figures reflect the fact that Africa is the only region of the world

where the rate of growth of population actually increased in the 1970s. The

annual population growth rate in Africa was 2.1 percent in the mid 1950s and 2.7

percent in the late 1970s and is projected to increase throughout the 1980s until it

levels off at about 3 percent by the 1990s (United Nations 1981 ). Underlying the

upward population trend is a young age structure. The average African woman

produces six living children in her reproductive years.

There is little hope for reducing fertility levels in the 1980s because of a

complex set of factors, including the economic contribution of children to farming and rural household activities, the pro-fertility cultural environment, the

failure of family planning programs to date, the pro-natal policies of some states,

such as Mauritania, and the indifference of most African heads of state and

intellectuals to population growth in what they consider to be a land-surplus

continent. But explosive rates of population growth cannot be ignored much

longer. For example, Kenya’s annual rate of population growth of more than 4

percent implies a doubling of population in about seventeen years (Kenya 1981).

In Senegal, where 95 percent of the population is Muslim and the Muslim leaders

have great political power, the government is moving gradually on population

intervention as it expands demographic research and quietly opens child and

maternal health clinics in urban areas. In sum, for a variety of reasons, it is

almost certain that most states will move slowly on population-control policies

during this decade. As a result, population growth will press hard on food

supplies, forestry reserves, and livestock and wildlife grazing areas throughout

the 1980s and beyond.

Food imports are another important dimension of the critical food situation.

Many countries that were formerly self-sufficient in food significantly increased

their ratio of food imports to total food consumption in the 1960s and 1970s.

According to USDA figures, food imports are dominated by grain importsespecially wheat and rice-which have increased from 1.2 million tons a year in

1961 –63 to 8 million tons in 1980, at a total cost of $2.1 billion. Significantly,

commercial imports of food grain grew more than three times as fast as population over the 1969–79 period. Rising food imports are attributed to many factors:

lagging domestic production; structural and sectoral shifts arising from such

factors as the oil boom in Nigeria and the increase in minimum wages in Zimbabwe following independence; increasing urbanization; the accompanying shift

of consumer tastes from cassava, yams, millet, and sorghum to rice and wheat;

availability of food aid on easy terms; and overvalued foreign exchange rates,
—

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which often make imported cereals cheaper than domestic supplies. Although

data on food aid are imprecise, food aid represented about 20 percent of Africa’s

total food imports in 1982. Wheat, wheat flour, and rice dominate overall

imports.

Given the intimate linkage of hunger and malnutrition to poverty, economists,

nutritionists, and food production specialists are coming to agree that food and

poverty problems should be tackled together. For if rural and urban incomes are

increased, a large increment of the increased income of poor people (50–80

percent) will be spent on food. 10 Unless food production is stepped up, an

increase in rural and urban incomes will simply lead to increased food prices and

food imports and a hardship on families in absolute poverty. Conversely, while

expanded food production should be the centerpiece of food policy in Africa in

the 1980s, food policy strategies must go beyond crash food production campaigns to deal with poverty itself because expanded food production by itself will

not solve the basic problem of poverty.

Africa’s food and poverty problems should not be allowed to overshadow

some impressive achievements of the continent over the past twenty-five years.

Foremost is the increase in average life expectancy-from an estimated thirtyeight years in 1950 to almost fifty years in 1980. This 30 percent increase is often

overlooked by those who are mesmerized by rates of economic growth. Moreover, the achievements in education have been impressive in some countries, and

there has been a vast improvement in the capacity of countries such as Nigeria,

Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Malawi to organize, plan, and manage

their economies.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF POVERTY AND THE NEGLECT OF

AGRICULTURE

From this overview, one can see that while most Africans are farmers and

Africa has enormous physical potential to feed itself, there are substantial barriers to tapping this potential. Experts from academia, donor organizations, and

consulting firms emphasize post-independence corruption, mismanagement, repressive pricing of farm commodities, and the urban bias in development strategies. Year after year, African heads of state point to unfavorable weather in

their appeal for food aid. In fact, the food production crisis stems from a seamless web of political, technical, and structural constraints which are a product of

colonial surplus extraction strategies, misguided development plans and priorities of African states since independence, and faulty advice from many expatriate planning advisers. These complex, deep-rooted constraints can only be

understood in historical perspective starting with the precolonial and colonial

periods (Eicher and Baker 1982).

The colonial period formally began when the colonial powers met at the Berlin

Congress in 1884 and decided how Africa should be partitioned among the main

European powers. Until the past decade, much of the literature by economists on

the colonial period has been pro-colonial. For example, Bauer boldly asserts that

“far from the West having caused the poverty in the Third World, contact with

the West has been the principal agent of material progress there” (Bauer 1981,

70). But empirical research over the past two decades has shown that colonial

approaches to development created a dual structure of land ownership in some

countries and facilitated the production and extraction of surpluses--copper,
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gold, cocoa, coffee, and so on—for external markets while paying little attention

to investments in human capital, research on food crops, and strengthening of

internal market linkages. For example, colonial governments gave little attention

to the training of agricultural scientists and managers. By the time of independence in the early 1960s, there was only one faculty of agriculture in Frenchspeaking tropical Africa. Between 1952 and 1963, only 4 university graduates in

agriculture were trained in Francophone Africa, and 150 in English-speaking

Africa (McKelvey 1965). In 1964, 3 African scientists were working in research

stations in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania (Johnston 1964).

Many colonial regimes focused their research and development programs on

export crops and the needs of commercial farmers and managers of plantations.

In fact, Evenson ( 1981 ) points out that in 1971 cotton was the only crop that

enjoyed as much research emphasis in the Third World as in industrial countries. 11 The mosest investment in research on fOO d crops could be defended

during the colonial period because the rate of population growth was low—l

percent to 2 percent per annum-and surplus land could be “automatically”

brought under cultivation by smallholders. But with annual rates of population

growth now approaching 3–4 percent in some countries, researchers must devote

more attention to food crops and the needs of smallholders and herders. Although

the debate on colonialism will continue for decades, we have established the

simple but important point that contemporary agricultural problems can only be

understood by serious analysis of colonial policies and strategies.

FIVE DEBATES ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN THE POSTINDEPENDENCE PERIOD

Africa’s food and poverty problems are also a product of misguided policies,

strategies, and priorities over the past two decades. In the post-independence

period since 1960, African states have engaged in five key debates on food and

agriculture. The first was over the priority to be given to industry and agriculture

in development plans and budget allocations, As African nations became independent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, most of them pursued mixed economies with a heavy emphasis on foreign aid, industrial development, education,

and economic diversification. For example, the late President Kenyatta promoted

capitalism and encouraged investors "to bring prosperity" to Kenya. A small

number of countries such as Mali, Ghana, and Guinea shifted abruptly to revolutionary socialism in the early 1960s. But whether political leaders were espousing capitalism or socialism, they generally gave low priority to agriculture.

African leaders, like former colonial rulers, thought agricultural development

would simply reinforce dependency. They tended to view agriculture as a backward sector that could provide surpluses-in the form of taxes and labor-to

finance industrial and urban development. Agricultural policies in many capitalist and socialist countries supported plantations, state farms, land settlement

schemes, and the replacement of private traders and moneylenders with government trading corporations, grain boards, and credit agencies. The effects of these

policies on agricultural production were typically inhibiting, in some cases highly so.

The second debate was over the relevance of Western neoclassical models

versus the “political economy” (stressing dependency and class structure) and

radical models of development. As Western economists assumed important roles
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in helping to prepare development plans and served as policy advisers in the early

1960s, Western modernization and macroeconomic models were introduced into

Africa. The dominant neoclassical models emphasized the industrial sector as the

driving force of development and the need to transfer rural people to the industrial sector. These models had three major shortcomings. First, they assumed that

one discipline—economics — could provide answers on how to slay the dragons

of poverty, inequality, and malnutrition. As Hirschman ( 1981 ) reminds us, development is a historical, social, political, technical, and organizational process

which cannot be understood by means of a single discipline. Second, the cities

were unable to provide jobs for the rural exodus because of trade union pressure

that elevated minimum wages in government and in industry and capital-intensive techniques in the industrial sector (Byerlee et al. 1983). Third, the neoclassical growth models were unable to provide a convincing micro understanding of

the complexity of the agricultural sector—the sector that employs 50–95 percent

of the labor force in African states. Although these models were technically

elegant. they seem remarkably naive today because they assigned a passive role

to the agricultural sector.

The vacuity of the Western neoclassical models of development and their

failure to come to grips with the broad social, political, and structural issues, as

well as the complexities of the agricultural sector, opened the door for the

political economy and dependency models to emerge in the 1960s and gain a

large following among African intellectuals. 12 The models that emerged in Africa were greatly influenced by Latin American dependency writers. Samir

Amin, an Egyptian economist, has been the preeminent proponent of the dependency and underdevelopment paradigm of development in Africa over the past

two decades. 13 The political economy literature attempts to link rural poverty

and underdevelopment to historical forces, world capitalism, and surplus extraction. The political economy models have made a valuable contribution in

stressing the need to understand development as a long-term historical process,

the need to consider the linkages between national economies and the world

economic system, and the importance of structural barriers (for example, land

tenure in Zimbabwe and Zambia) to development. But there is little empirical

support for many of the assertions made by some of the political economy

scholars.

The question remains, Can political economy and dependency scholars move

beyond their abstract models to develop models based on studies of the behavior

of African farmers and herders, on African institutions, and on micro/macro

linkages in order to provide policy guidance in a continent in which the majority

of the people are farmers?

The third debate---over agrarian capitalism versus socialism-has been one of

the most emotional topics over the past thirty years; it will continue to dominate

discussions on politics, development strategies, and foreign aid in the 1980s.

Even though it is difficult to define African socialism, about one-fourth of the

states now espouse socialism as their official ideology. The experiences of

Ghana and Tanzania are well documented. Four years after Ghana became independent, President Nkrumah abruptly shifted from capitalism to a socialist strategy that equated modernization with industritilization and large-scale farming

and state control over agricultural marketing. Ghana was unable to assemble the

technical and managerial skills and incentive structure to operate its vast system

of state farms, parastatals, and trading corporations. The failure of agrarian
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socialism has imposed a heavy toll on the people of Ghana (Nweke 1978; and

Killick 1978).

Tanzania’s shift to socialism in 1967 produced a voluminous literature, international press coverage, massive financial support from international donorsespecially Scandinavian countries and the World Bank—and attention from political leaders and intellectuals throughout Africa. 14 The vision of agrarian socialism is set forth in President Nyerere’s essay “Socialism and Rural Development. But after seventeen years of experimentation, it seems fair to examine

the balance sheet on socialism in a country where 80 percent of the population

live in rural areas. The Tanzanian experiment is floundering in part because of

the quantum jump in oil prices in the mid 1970s and the conflict in Uganda but

basically because of the sharp decline of peasant crop production15 and production on government-managed coffee, tea, and sisal estates. one cannot overlook

Tanzania’s gains in literacy and social services, but one may legitimately worry

about their sustainability over the longer term without increased rural incomes or

exceptionally heavy foreign aid flows. There are many unanswered questions

about Tanzania’s experiment with agrarian socialism, such as why President

Nyerere authorized the use of coercion to round up farmers living in scattered

farmsteads and forced them to live in villages. Many pro-Tanzania scholars

avoid this topic. But the failure of Tanzania to feed its people explains why

Tanzania is no longer taken seriously as a model which other African countries

want to emulate. 16

Agrarian socialism is now under fire throughout Africa: after twenty years of

experimentation, presently no African models are performing well. Even Benin,

Mozambique, and Guinea are silently retreating from some of the rigid

orthodoxy of socialism. What are the reasons for the failure of agrarian socialism

to date’? First, and most important, socialist agricultural production requires a

vast amount of information and managerial and administrative skills in order to

cope with the vagaries of weather, seasonal labor bottlenecks, and the need for

on-the-spot decision-making authority. In most African countries. the critical

shortage of skills and information is the biggest enemy of agrarian socialism. No

amount of socialist ideology can substitute for the lack of soil scientists, managers, bookkeepers, mechanics, and an efficient communication system. Second,

many parastatals, state farms, and government-operated grain boards have been

plagued with overstaffing, corruption, mismanagement, and high operating

costs. Because these constraints cannot be easily overcome, it is unlikely that

Africa will make much progress with socialist agriculture in this century.

As the pendulum swings from socialism to private farming and private traders

in the 1980s, it is important to stress that to put all or most of the weight on

ideology— capitalism or socialism—is to ignore an important lesson learned over

the past thirty years in the Third World, namely, that ideology is but one variable

influencing the outcome of agricultural development projects. The ‘‘correct’

choice of ideology cannot in and of itself assure successful development. Examples of failure under both capitalist and socialist models are too numerous to

conclude otherwise.

The fourth debate was over the use of pricing and taxation policies to achieve

agricultural and food policy objectives. The first issue here is whether Africans

are responsive to economic incentives. Empirical research has produced a consensus that African farmers do respond to economic incentives as do farmers in

high-income countries but that Africans give priority to producing enough food
120

for their families for the coming one to two years (Helleiner 1975). The next

question is whether African states have pursued positive or negative pricing and

taxation policies for agriculture.

17 Numerous empirical studies across the continent have provided conclusive evidence that many countries (both capitalist and

socialist) are maintaining low official prices for food and livestock in order to

placate urban consumers. The impact of these negative policies dampens incentives to produce food and livestock for domestic markets and encourages black

market operations and smuggling across borders.

For example, starting in the mid 1960s Tanzania paid farmers throughout the

country a uniform price for maize in order to achieve equity objectives. But this

policy discouraged regional specialization, increased transportation costs, and

encouraged smuggling across borders. In Mali, the government pricing policy

for small farmers in a large irrigated rice production scheme in 1979/80 could be

labeled “extortion.” A meticulous two-year study has shown that it cost farmers

83 Malian francs to produce a kilo of rice but that the government paid farmers

only 60 Malian francs per kilo (Kamuanga 1982), Does it seem irrational that

farmers smuggled rice across the border into Senegal, Niger, and Upper Volta,

where they secured 108–28 Malian francs per kilo?

Not only food crops are subjected to negative pricing policies; export crops are

also heavily taxed. In an analysis of pricing and taxation policies for major crops

in thirteen countries over the 197 1–80 period, the World Bank concluded that,

taking the net tax burden and the effect of overvalued currency into account,

producers in the thirteen countries received less than half of the real value of their

export crops (World Bank 1981, 55). These examples and other studies carried

out over the past two decades provide solid evidence that African states are using

negative pricing and taxation policies to pump the economic surplus out of

agriculture. 18 A simple but powerful conclusion emerges from this experience:

African states should overhaul the incentive structure for farmers and livestock

owners and adopt increased farm income as an important goal of social policy in

the 1980s. Moreover, increasing incentives to farmers and herders is a strategic

policy lever for attacking poverty and promoting rural employment,

The fifth debate—about the green revolution and the African farmer+ oncerns what can be done to increase the low cereal yields in Africa. A dominant

cause of rural poverty is the fact that 60-80 percent of the agricultural labor force

is producing staple foods at very low levels of productivity. While foodgrain

yields in Latin America and Asia have increased since 1965, those of Africa have

remained stagnant. Over the past twenty years, the green revolution debate has

focused on whether African states could import high-yielding foodgrain varieties

directly from International Agricultural Research Centers in Mexico, the Philippines, and other parts of the world or whether improved cereal varieties could be

more efficiently developed through investments in regional and national research

programs in Africa.

Twenty years ago, foreign advisers were optimistic about transferring green

revolution technology to Africa, but after two decades of experimentation the

results are disappointing. In fact, the green revolution has barely touched Africa.

For example, ICRISAT's transfer of hybrid sorghum varieties from India in the

late 1970s to Upper Volta, Niger, and Mali was unsuccessful because of unforeseen problems with disease, variability of rainfall, and poor soils. 19 Moreover,

the green revolution crops—wheat and rice-that produced 40–50 percent increases in yields in Asia are not staple foods in most of Africa .*” Knowledgeable
121

observers agree that African farming systems are extremely complex and that the

development of suitable technical packages requires location-specific research by

multidisciplinary research teams supported by strong national research programs

on the staple foods of each country (Norman 1980).

These five debates illustrate the complex set of problems that have preoccupied African states over the past two decades as they have tried to find a

meaningful role for their agricultural sector in national development strategies.

Throughout much of the post-independence period, most states have viewed

agriculture as a backward and low-priority sector, have perpetuated colonial

policies of pumping the economic surplus out of agriculture, and have failed to

give priority to achieving a reliable food surplus (food security) as a prerequisite

for achieving social and economic goals. The failure of most African states to

develop an effective set of agricultural policies to deal with the technical, structural, institutional, and human resource constraints is at the heart of the present

food crisis. Part of the failure must be attributed to the colonial legacy and part to

the hundreds of foreign economic advisers who have imported inappropriate

models and theories of development from the United States, Europe, Asia, and

Latin America. In the final analysis, agricultural stagnation in capitalist Zaire

and Senegal, socialist Tanzania and Guinea, and many other countries must also

be placed before heads of state and planners who have promoted premature

industrialization, built government hotels, airlines, and large dams with negative

internal rates of return, 21 and spent tens of millions of dollars building villas for

heads of state for the annual meetings of the OAU. Moreover, most African

political leaders have also exhibited a fundamental misunderstanding of the role

of agriculture in national development when 60-80 percent of the people are in

farming. Unfortunately, these mistakes in dealing with agriculture over the past

twenty years cannot easily be overcome through crash production projects and

doubling of aid over the 1980-90 period.

POLICY DIRECTION FOR THE 1980s AND 1990s

Africa’s inability to feed itself amid vast amounts of unused land and record

levels of foreign aid is, on the surface, one of the major paradoxes in Third

World development. What should be done? While the several notable recent

reports on Africa’s food and economic problems agree on the severity of the food

and hunger crisis, each of these assessments underemphasizes the mistakes of

African states and in a somewhat self-serving fashion overstresses the need for

more foreign aid. Almost all of the reports implicitly assume that capital, rather

than human resources, is the most pressing constraint in rural Africa. This

preoccupation with capital is understandable because foreign aid institutions such

as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World

Bank have a fixation on capital transfers. Moreover, Third World countries have

focused on capital transfers and the need to increase aid in the north/south

dialogues, and many donors and African heads of state equate a doubling of aid

with an attack on poverty in Africa. The Lagos Plan of Action, which was

adopted by the heads of state and government in Lagos in April 1980, has little

new to say about agricultural development except that food production should be

accelerated with the aim of achieving self-sufficiency (OAU 1980). The World

Bank’s report Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (1981) correctly

38-856 0 - 85 - 9 , QL 3
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singles out domestic policy issues as the heart of the crisis, but it also advances

an unsupported appeal for donors to double aid to Africa over the 1980-90

period. Further, while the World Bank report criticizes large-scale irrigation

projects, it does not report the Bank’s own difficulties (and those of most of the

other donors) in designing sound livestock projects. The World Food Council’s

(1982a) report on the African food problem correctly notes the overemphasis on

project-type aid, the excessive number of foreign missions (for example, Upper

Volta received 340 official donor missions in 1981), and the small percentage of

aid funds for food production projects, but it skirts many of the political and

structural barriers to change. The World Food Council’s (1982b) report by the

African ministers of agriculture avoids the topic of population growth, the empirical record of agrarian socialism, and the disastrous performance of state grain

boards. New approaches are needed. The following discussion spells out a comprehensive approach for the 1980s and 1990s.

S TEPS TO M EET THE C RISI S

Solutions to Africa’s food and poverty problems must, first of all, be longterm. Second, they require a redirection in thinking about agriculture’s role in

development at this stage of Africa’s economic history and about the need for a

reliable food surplus as a precondition for national development. Third, there is a

need for both African states and donors to admit that the present crisis is not

caused by a lack of foreign aid. In fact, in many countries current aid flows

cannot bec absorbed with integrity. Hence, donors are part of both the problem

and the solution. The Berg report underplays these issues in its unsupported case

for doubling aid to Africa by the end of the 1980s (World Bank 1981). Fourth,

there is a riced to recognize that the lack of human resources is an overriding

constraint on rural change in Africa. In fact, the human resource constraint

severely limits the amount of aid that can be effectively absorbed in the short run.

In order to buy time to lay a foundation for long-range solutions, it will be

necessary to rely on a number of holding actions. Examples include expanded

commercial food imports, food aid, and promoting seasonal and international

migration until more land is brought under irrigation and higher rainfall areas can

be cleared of tsetse flies and river blindness. But these holding actions must not

be allowed to substitute for efforts towards long-range solutions.

Three steps should be taken now to start the process of formulating longerterm approaches. First, African states, donors, and economic advisers should

jettison the ambiguous slogans such as “National Food Self-Sufficiency, ”

‘‘Food First, ’ and “Basic Needs."22 Although these have a powerful emotional

and political appeal, they offer little help in answering the key question: What

blend of food production, food imports, and export crops should be pursued to

achieve both growth and equity objectives’? The concept of national food selfsufficiency should be scrapped as a rigid target because it promotes autarchy and

ignores the historical and the potential role of trade in food and livestock products between African states. In summary, there is a need to return to the basics of

agricultural development: investments in human resources and agricultural research, policy and structural reforms that will help small farmers and herders,

revamping the incentive structure, changing the role of the state,23 and strengthening the administrative capacity to design and implement projects and

programs.
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The second immediate step should be the phasing out or restructuring of some

of the crash food production projects—that is, seed multiplication, irrigated

wheat schemes, livestock schemes, and integrated rural development projects—

that are floundering. Many of these crash projects were hastily assembled over

the past decade without a sound technical package and without being tested in a

pilot phase. These unproductive projects consume scarce high-level manpower,

perpetuate recurrent cost problems, and create a credibility problem for both

African policy makers and international donors. Particularly important is the

reassessment of integrated rural development IlRD) projects. The weakness of

most IRD projects—their lack of emphasis on food production and incomegenerating activities-can be corrected by restructuring some of the projects

rather than phasing them out. Other projects that have been implemented in

advance of a sound knowledge base, like those in livestock, should be either

phased out or scaled down and continued as pilot projects for a five-to-ten-year

period. A five-to-ten-year pilot phase is unheard of in Africa, but in projects like

those in livestock it is a necessary period for solving technical problems and

developing appropriate local institutions to solve such key issues as overstocking.

The third immediate step is to scale down the state bureaucracy, the state

payroll, and state control over private farmers and private traders. After twenty

years of experience with parastatals, the record is clear: parastatals (public enterprises) are ineffective in producing food, are no more efficient than private

traders in foodgrain marketing, are almost all overstaffed,24 and serve as a

sponge for foreign aid. As the number of parastatal employees increases, the

pressure intensifies for donors commensurately to increase their contributions to

meet the payroll of the expanded bureaucracy. The parastatal disease is well

known, but it is not given much attention in the reports cited above, except in the

World Bank’s Accelerated Development report, which should be applauded for

its candor on this topic.

The fourth step is to realize that a food policy strategy cannot be pursued in

isolation from livestock and export crop policies nor in isolation from policies to

deal with rural poverty. A food policy strategy should not rule out the expansion

of export crops, because expanded farm income, through food sales, export

crops, and off-farm income, and productive rural employment are prerequisites

for solving rural poverty problems. Moreover, although food aid can help the

rural poor in the short run, the expansion of productive rural employment is

fundamental to coping with rural poverty in the long run.

FOOD POLICY STRATEGIES

The starting point for food policy analysis in each country should be the

development of a food policy strategy with two goals in mind: achieving a

reliable food surplus (based on domestic production, grain storage, and international trade) and reducing rural poverty by focusing on measures to help small

farmers produce more food for home consumption and more food, cash crops,

and livestock for the market so that they can purchase a better diet.25 But a word

of caution is in order: food policy analysis is every bit as complex and as delicate

as family planning. 26 The rice riots in Monrovia, which left more than one

hundred dead in 1979, and the sugar riots in Khartoum and other major cities in
124

the Sudan following the doubling of sugar prices in 1981 are reminders of the

narrow range of options for policy makers on food policy issues. Consequently,

as experiences from the Sudan, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Kenya (outlined below)

illustrate, most countries will move very slowly on policy reforms unless spurred

by famine, a reduction in foreign-exchange earnings from petroleum, or coordinated donor leverage to link long-term food aid with policy reforms.

The Sudan provides a conspicuous example of the difficulty of mobilizing the

agricultural sector as an engine of growth and expanded food production. In the

mid 1970s the international press frequently asserted that the Sudan could become the ‘‘breadbasket of the MiddIe East’ by drawing on several billion dollars

of OPEC loans and gifts to develop its vast reserve of idle land. The issue today,

however, is not one of exporting food to the Middle East but one of the Sudan’s

inability to feed its 18 million people. The Sudan was forced to rely heavily on

food aid in the early 1980s in order to cope with severe balance-of-payment

problems and inflation. Although the Sudan has historically excelled in cotton

research, it has devoted only token attention to research on food crops. As long

as the Sudan continues to receive food aid and has hopes of striking oil in the

southern part of the country, there is little likelihood of policy reforms.

In Zimbabwe, the legacy of the colonial policy of promoting a dual structure

of large farms for white farmers and small farms for Africans in poor natural

resource regions presents a classic efficiency/equity dilemma for the Mugabe

government (Zimbabwe 1981 ). In the early 1980s Zimbabwe was a significant

maize exporter based largely on the surpluses produced by its thirty-five hundred

large farmers. But the maize exports were heavily subsidized, and in 1982 the

government reconsidered its role as a food security safety net for the southern

African region. In 1982 Zimbabwe increased price incentives for soybean oil

relative to maize in order to meet the domestic shortage of cooking oil. Although

Zimbabwe gains political prestige by exporting maize to black Africa, it realizes

that it cannot continue to subsidize maize exports at a time when it is facing large

budget deficits.

On the eve of independence in 1960, Nigeria was a net exporter of food,

mainly oil palm and groundnuts. But during the 1960s Nigeria pursued importsubstituting industrialization, taxed its farmers heavily through export marketing

boards, experimented with land settlements, and promoted government plantations. In 1970, ten years after independence, Nigeria was importing food, and by

1981 food imports from the United States alone totaled more than $1 billion.

Petroleum exports have enabled Nigeria to pay for food imports and buy time.

Although Nigeria is far ahead of most Francophone African countries in trained

agricultural manpower, Idachaba (1980) reported that more than 40 percent of

the positions for senior agricultural researchers in the eight major research stations were vacant in 1978. The government recently concluded that it will take

ten to fifteen years to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. Nigeria has

now formed a high-level Green Revolution Committee to address its food problem (Abalu 1982).

Although Kenya is widely regarded as an agricultural success story of the

1960s and 1970s, Kenya was confronted with food shortages in 1980 and 1981

and was forced to import maize, wheat, and milk powder. Although adverse

growing conditions contributed to the food shortages of the early 1980s, the

National Food Policy paper (Kenya 1981) reveals that other factors were undermining Kenya’s capacity to feed itself. These included the unprecedented 4
125

percent rate of growth of population, the decline in wheat production following

the transfer of large farms to smallholders, and a smallholder credit repayment

rate of 20 percent. The message of the National Food Policy paper is clear:

Kenya has a major food production constraint that cannot be overcome except

through large investments in agricultural research, irrigation, and land reclamation in the 1980s and 1990s. But one wonders why the National Food Policy

paper paid lip service to population growth.

These case studies illustrate the complexity of Africa’s food problems and the

need to analyze each country’s problems on a case-by-case basis. Moreover,

food policy analysis requires more than the preparation of a National Food Policy

strategy paper over a two-to-six-month period. Food policy analysis is an ongoing process that will undoubtedly occupy the attention of policy makers and

researchers throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

FOOD AID LEVERAGE

A major issue in achieving policy reforms is whether donor agencies and

countries can or should use food aid leverage to promote the required changes. In

existence for almost thirty years, food aid is now a topic of growing interest in

Africa. Although there is unanimity on using food aid for humanitarian purposes-for example, feeding refugees-food aid for development is more controversial. The opposition to this sort of food aid-where food is sold at concessional terms and extended as grants for food-for-work programs-comes from

evidence that food aid ( 1 ) can reduce the pressure on recipient countries to carry

out policy reforms; (2) can depress farm prices; (3) is unreliable;27 and (4) can

promote an undesirable shift in consumption patterns that will increase rather

than reduce dependency or require subsidies (such as wheat production in West

Africa) to maintain the Western-acquired consumption pattern.28

Food aid programs are firmly institutionalized with donors. Food aid accounted for approximately 40 percent of all U.S. economic assistance to Africa

over the 1970–80 period. Even Japan started to dispose of some of its surplus

rice in Africa in the early 1980s. To date, there has been little solid academic

research on the role of food aid for development purposes in Africa. Moreover,

the evaluation of food aid is usually assigned to junior officers in many bilateral

agencies. Hence, evaluation studies of food aid by donors should be taken with a

grain of salt. The food aid experience in Asia and Latin America, however,

shows that the availability of food aid can take the pressure off recipient nations

to carry out internal policy reforms.

A compelling case can be made for linking food aid with policy reforms in

major food-deficit countries in Africa through the development of food policy

reform packages. These reform packages will be useless, however, unless there

is an agreement by donors to make three- to five-year forward food aid commitments in exchange for internal policy reforms. Countries such as Mali and the

Sudan would be good test cases for linking food aid to tough domestic policy

reforms. But unless donors agree to meet minimum forward food aid levels,

African states can easily postpone policy reforms and continue to rely on a

patchwork of bilateral food aid programs.
126

Beyond policy reforms, a long-range solution to food and hunger problems

will depend, to a large degree, on achievements in agricultural research. Authorities on food production and livestock projects in the field now commonly

bemoan the lack of proven technical packages for small farmers in dry-land

farming systems throughout Africa and the uniformly unfavorable technical conditions (low rates of growth, disease) for livestock production. Significant increases are needed over the next twenty years in research expenditures on dryland farming systems with emphasis on food crops (white maize, yams, cassava,

millet, and sorghum) and on livestock.

An expanded research program on food and livestock should be viewed in a

twenty-year time frame because problems such as low soil fertility and livestock

diseases cannot be resolved through a series of short-term, ad hoc research

projects. The U.S. experience, wherein forty years ( 1880– 1920) were spent

developing a productive system of federal and state research programs, should be

heeded by donors who are likely to expect major results in three to five years

from new research projects in Africa.

Research on irrigation is particularly important and should be accelerated in

the coming decades. The knowledge base for irrigation in Africa is meager.

Irrigation has played a minor role in Africa except in large-scale projects in the

Sudan and in Madagascar, where there is a history of irrigation by small farmers.

The cultivated land under irrigation is probably less than 5 percent in most other

countries (as compared with an estimated 30 percent in India). Following the

1968–74 drought in the Sahel, there was considerable optimism about the role of

irrigated farming in “drought-proofing” the region. Due to numerous technical

and administrative problems and human resource constraints, however, the projected expansion of irrigation in the Sahel is behind schedule, and it is certain

that irrigation will not play a significant role in the Sahelian states until early in

the next century.

Although research on the economics of irrigation is fragmentary, the limited

results provide support for a smallholder irrigation strategy in the 1980s, with

priority given to ground-water development with small pumps, land reclamation

through drainage and water control, and an increase in small-scale projects that

are developed and maintained by groups of farmers with their own family labor.

A small-scale irrigation strategy is advocated because the cost of bringing more

rainfed land under cultivation is substantially less than the cost of leveling and

preparing land for large-scale irrigation. For example, recent irrigation projects

in Niger, Mauritania, and northern Nigeria each had costs of more than ten

thousand dollars per hectare at 1980 prices (World Bank 1981, 79). On the other

hand, farmers in Senegal have cleared and prepared their own land for irrigation,

expending several hundred hours of family labor per hectare. Although irrigation

will not be a panacea for the recovery of the Sahel nor for feeding Africa in the

1980s and 1990s, a long-term research program on the human, technical, and

institutional dimensions of irrigation should be initiated in the immediate future.

It remains to be seen whether donors will have the courage to view research

and graduate training within Africa as a long-term investment and whether they

will provide guaranteed funding for a minimum of ten years. Another important

issue is whether country priorities of bilateral donors will remain stable enough

to assure African countries of continuity in funding over a ten-year period. A rule
127

of thumb is that an African country should never embark on a long-term program

to upgrade its national agricultural research system with major support from only

one bilateral donor. But as we point out below, co-financing by six to eight

donors can create as many problems as it solves.

I NVESTMENT IN H UMAN R ESOURCE S

A third essential component of a long-range strategy is massive investments in

human capital formation, including graduate training of several thousand agricultural scientists and managers. This is necessary to replace the foreign advisers, researchers, managers, and teachers in African universities and to meet

the needs of a science-based agriculture in the next century. Since it takes ten to

fifteen years of training and experience beyond high school to develop a research

scientist, the investments in human capital will not produce payoffs for Africa

until the 1990s.

Building graduate agricultural training programs within Africa necessitates a

reexamination of the role of the African university in national development and

the relevance of some of the present undergraduate degree programs. For example, in 1982 the Faculty of Law and Economics in the University of Yaounde in

Cameroon was turning out graduates with degrees in law and economics who

ended up on the unemployment lines in Yaoundé. The time is propitious for

African universities to move from undergraduate to graduate training programs

in science and agriculture. Before graduate education is expanded, however,

some questions should be raised about priorities in undergraduate education and

the relevance of the curriculum. Undergraduate degree programs in agriculture in

many universities are still embarrassingly undervalued and underfunded when

compared with programs in law, medicine, and history. For example, the University of Dakar in Senegal was formally established in 1957, and in 1960 the

Senegalese assumed its administration. In 1982 there were approximately twelve

thousand students in the University of Dakar, of whom several thousand specialized in law and economics. Not until 1979 was a National School of Agriculture established at Thies, near Dakar, to offer undergraduate training in agriculture. That university-level teaching of agriculture was not initiated until nineteen

years after Senegal’s independence reflects an enduring colonial legacy as well

as the government’s ambivalence about agriculture’s role in national development.

Although the structural reforms entailed in redesigning African universities to

serve rural Africa will require decades to resolve, it is time for donors to stop

merely paying lip service to African universities. Whereas donors embraced

African universities in the 1960s, they generally withdrew their support in the

1970s as they promoted crash food production and IRD projects and invested

heavily in international agricultural research centers. Money saved ($ 100 million

to $200 million) from phasing out the floundering crash projects cited above can

be reallocated to selected African universities with emphasis on faculties of

agriculture. Donors should press for long-term structural reform of the curriculum in universities in exchange for long-term aid commitments of ten to twenty

years.

In 1982 graduate-level education for African students in the United States cost

$1,850 per month, or $39,000-$55,000 for a Master’s degree over a twenty- to

thirty-month period. Donors should gradually phase out Master’ s-level training
—

128

programs in agriculture and related fields in

faculty members should be sent to Africa to

excellence in graduate training in eight to ten

the United States. Instead, U.S.

help develop regional centers of

African universities over the next

ten to fifteen years. In order to achieve this goal, donors will have to give greatly

increased priority to aiding African universities, including ten-year authorizations to foreign universities to provide teachers for graduate instruction and

research. In the final analysis, the initiative for this second phase—graduate

training in agriculture in African universities—will have to come from within

Africa.

D EALING WITH R URAL P OVERT Y

The fourth component of a long-range solution to Africa’s food crisis will be

an ongoing effort to address the hunger/malnutrition/poverty problem. Rural

poverty is potentially a much more difficult problem to solve than the food

production gap, but self-sufficiency in food production will be a bogus achievement if the poor do not have access to a decent diet. A society cannot expect to

move from a low- to a middle-income stage of development if two-thirds of its

population are producing millet, sorghum, maize, and yams at stagnant levels of

output. Agricultural research on foodgrain production is a prerequisite to increasing food production. Moreover, since jobs cannot be created in urban areas for

all the unemployed, a rural investment strategy should also facilitate the expansion of rural small-scale industries that are labor-intensive and can provide

jobs .29

IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN AID

The implications of all this for the foreign assistance community flow quite

clearly from the foregoing analysis. Currently, forty donors are moving funds

and technical assistance through a patchwork of several thousand uncoordinated

projects in support of agricultural and rural development throughout Africa. In

turn, African states are allocating a high percentage of a scarce resource—trained

agricultural professionals—to meet the project reporting requirements of donors,

and African governments are asking donors to pay the recurrent costs—salaries,

petrol—of the aid-funded projects. In short, both donors and recipients are

prisoners of projects and slogans, and they are caught in a vicious circle. Should

aid to Africa be doubled in real terms during this decade? The answer depends on

whether donors and African states can replace the short-term approaches with

long-term investments and address the following in a consistent manner:

1. Food security policies and strategies. Donors should urge African policy

makers to focus on policies and strategies to achieve a reliable food surplus

(food security) based on local production, storage, and international trade.

Despite the pleas of international journalists who urge donors to increase

the number of food production projects, a single food policy reform in

Mali—raising official farm prices-may be more effective than twenty

new food production projects. Donors should concentrate their resources

on helping-local professionals develop an improved micro foundation for

food policy analysis that addresses the constraints on achieving a reliable
129—

2.

3.

4.

food surplus, with emphasis on food production, storage, and international

trade.

Long-term investments. Emphasis should be placed on reducing the number of tiny projects (such as producing visual aids for the livestock service

in a Sahelian country), increasing the lifetime of aid projects, and increasing the volume of aid in program grants that are tied to policy reforms.

Long-term investment programs like ten-year research projects, five-toten-year pilot livestock projects, twenty-year programs to develop colleges

of agriculture, and five-year food aid/policy reform packages should be

perceived not as luxuries but rather as prerequisites to solving Africa’s

technical, structural, and human capital constraints.

Technology generation within Africa. Professional agriculturalists in most

donor agencies privately concede that there is currently an excess of donor

funds in search of agricultural production projects supported by agricultural

research findings that have been tested and proven on farmers’ fields. In

short, the international technology transfer model has failed in the direct

transfer of foodgrain varieties from Mexico or India to Ghana, Lesotho,

and Upper Volta. What can be done? In my judgment, donors should (a)

admit that the international technology transfer model is not producing the

expected results, (b) maintain but not increase investments (in real terms)

in the four International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) in Africa,

and (c) increase the level of financial assistance to national agricultural

research systems and to faculties of agriculture in African universities.

Although the U. S., Mexican, and Indian foodgrain varieties are not

directly transferable to Africa, some of the processes these countries used

to generate technology appropriate to the needs of their farmers in dry-land

areas are applicable in helping to strengthen faculties of agriculture in

African universities and national agricultural research services. For example, the U.S. dust bowl crisis in Kansas and Oklahoma in the 1930s gave

rise to the U.S. Soil Conservation Service, research on new varieties,

irrigation, and other techniques which transformed the dust bowl into a

highly productive area of American agriculture over a thirty-year period. In

this process, U.S. colleges of agriculture played a strategic role, in cooperation with local and state organizations and with the U.S. Department of

Agriculture.

Co-financing. Co-financing of aid projects by donors is a growing problem

in Africa because typically six to eight donors each underwrite a piece of an

agricultural project. Co-financing is attractive because it spreads the risk

for donors and reduces the dependency of African states on one donor. But

co-financing is proving to be a liability for institution-building projects

such as research institutes and extension schools. The recipient institutions

are caught in a cross fire of imported perspectives from technical advisers,

a hodgepodge of buildings. and dubious gifts of equipment from around the

world. Moreover, the administrators of these Iocal institutions are overwhelmed by the administrative and reporting requirements of the donors.

At most, two donors--me for infrastructure and one for technical assistance and training—should be allowed to assist any one institution. But

African states will have trouble getting weaned away from co-financing

because they are using this device to pay for part of their recurrent budget

deficits and the payroll of the state bureaucracy. so
5. Foreign private investment. A major topic of debate is whether foreign

private investment, especially multinational firms, can contribute to the

resolution of Africa’s food and poverty problem. A related question is

whether bilateral aid should assist foreign private firms in establishing

fertilizer plants, processing plants, and in some cases large-scale food

production projects. Just as the roles of women in African development

cannot be analyzed in isolation from those of men, the role of the private

sector can only be analyzed in relation to public investments. The poor

record of food and livestock production projects throughout Africa over the

past ten years provides ample proof that many of these projects fail because

public-sector investments were not made in agricultural research to develop

profitable packages for rainfed farming, prevention and control of animal

disease, rural roads, and schools to train agricultural managers. Publicsector investments can either facilitate or destroy the conditions for capitalists to function in a market-oriented economy.

In general, inadequate infrastructure, local managerial skills, and technical constraints severely limit the scope for foreign private investment in

food production projects and in agroindustries in Africa. Although some

foreign firms prospered in colonial periods, when they were given choice

land and protected markets, since independence there have been many

failures, including the recent efforts of U.S. firms to produce food in

Ghana, Liberia, and Senegal. As a rule of thumb, if foreign private firms

engaged in food production projects do not receive special subsidies, they

cannot compete with African smallholders who have a knowledge of local

climate, pests, and soils and are willing to produce food on their own land

at rates of return of seventy-five cents to three dollars per day for family

labor. Moreover, the large capital-intensive plantations and ranches emphasized by foreign private firms should be questioned on social grounds

because they do not produce the badly needed jobs in an area of the world

where seasonal unemployment is widespread. Foreign private enterprise,

however, can contribute to Africa’s food system in countries such as Cameroon, Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and Zimbabwe, which have a good infrastructure and need international managerial skills and capital for investments in food processing plants and in fertilizer and agricultural input

industries. But in the final analysis, the focus of foreign aid should be on

making public investments in roads, universities, and research stations to

help African capitalists—small farmers and herders-produce food for

their families and for urban and rural people.

Aid flows to Africa have grown dramatically in recent years: net official aid in

1980 was $13.70 per capita in Africa, compared with an average of $9.60 for all

developing countries. In the Sahelian region of West Africa per capita aid was

running from $35 to $50 per person in 1982. In many circles in Africa there is a

feeling that the continent is already’ too heavily dependent on aid and foreign

transactions relative to the scarcity of African professionals to implement the

projects. In fact, in many countries the critical constraint is not land or capital but

human resources. This simple fact is overlooked by many donors-including the

World Bank. The World Bank, under Robert McNamara, dramatically increased

lending in the 1970s, and it has appealed to donors to double lending to Africa in

the 1980s. The unsupported case for doubling aid to Africa in the 1980s, in the
131

light of the acute lack of human resources, is, in my judgment, a major flaw in

the Berg report (World Bank 1981). If, however, donors take a broad view of the

need for massive, long-term public investments in agricultural research, roads,

faculties of agriculture in African universities, and land transfer funds (for example, for Zimbabwe) and if African countries change their agricultural development strategies and priorities and introduce policy

desirable for donors to double aid to Africa in real

period.

SUMMARY

reforms, then it may be

terms over the 1980–90

To sum up, agricultural development is a slow and evolutionary process, and it

is up to African states and donor agencies to jettison the crash project approach

and start now to lay the foundation for long-term investments to solve the food

production and poverty problems over a ten-to-twenty-year period. Unless steps

are taken in the 1980s to overcome these basic technical, political, structural, and

policy constraints, many African states may end up in the 1990s as permanent

food-aid clients of the United States, the European Economic Community, and

Japan,

NOTES

1. Africa is defined here to include all states in sub-Saharan Africa except the Republic of South

Africa

2. Low and unstable rainfall is a common problem in the Sahelian region of West Africa, parts of

the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Botswana But erratic rainfall, like

any other single factor, cannot explain the steady erosion in Africa’s capacity to feed itself.

3. Per capita GDP ranges from $120 in Chad to $1,150 in the Ivory Coas(. Although per capita

tncome is an imperfect measure that is not well suited to international comparisons, there is no

question that rural poverty is a major problem throughout Africa. But because of access to land and

the absence of a landless labor class, one does not witness in Africa the grinding poverty that is so

pervasive in Haiti, Bangladesh, and India,

4. The average aid flows in the eight Sahelian countries was abeut $50 per capita in 1982 (USAID

t982, 5). Kenya received $450 million of foreign assistance in 1982, or about $25 per person.

5. Commonly known as the Berg report because Elliot Berg was the study coordinator.

6. Tsetse con;rol is a long-term and costly activity that includes clearing of vegetation that harbors

flies, spraying, release of sterile male flies, and human settlement.

7. But Ethiopia was under Italian occupation from 1936 to 1941.

8. For more information see Ruthenberg 1980; and Eicher and Baker 1982.

9. The USDA figures on per capita food production trends in Africa over the past two decades

(USDA 198i ) should be treated as rough estimates because population and production data for two of

the large countries-Nigeria and Ethiopia-m open to question. Since Nigeria and Ethiopia together

have about one-third the population of Africa, data distortions in these countries could affect the

overall averages for Africa.

10. See Mellor, chapter 10 in this volume.

t 1. See Evenson, chapter 24 in this volume.

12. For an ass&sment of the modernization, dependency, and political economy models see

Young 1982 and Leys 1982.

13. See the discussion of Amin’s work in chapter 1 of this volume.

14. Tanzania received $2.7 billion of Official Development Assistance—a record in Africa--+ver

the ten-year period 1973-82.

15. The sharp decline in real producer prices in the 1970s was undoubtedly an important contributor to the decline in output, Ellis ( t982) reports a 35 percent decline in the price- and income-terms of

trade of peasant crop producers over the 1970–80 period.
132

16. Tanzania is slowly dismantling its state control over agriculture following the 1982 Task Force

Report (Tanzania 1982) and pressure from donors. lle new agricultural policy (Tanzania 1983) has

reintroduced cooperatives, turned some government estates over to village cooperatives. and encouraged foreign private investment in tea and sisal production.

17. Positive and negative pricing and taxation policies are shotihand references to the internal

terms of trade between agricultural and nonagricultural products. Negative pricing and taxation

policies mean that the terms of trade of agriculture are deliberately depressed by government policies

(see Krishna, chapter 11 in this volume).

18. The following political constraints are partially responsible for the negative policies towards

export crops: need for foreign exchange, politically powerful trade unions and urban groups, the

demands of the military, and the absence of alternative ways to tax agriculture when land is not

registered and the government does not have enough skilled people to collect land or incomes taxes.

The net result of these constraints is that African political leaders have little room to maneuver on

pricing policies for export crops. Hence, the neoclassical economist who argues that “getting prices

right’ is the core of the development problem is overlooking the imper#ive of political survival in

Africa.

19. The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (lCRISAT) has its

headquarters in Hyderabad, India. Recently, ICRISAT made a major policy decision to reemphasize

the direct transfer of cereal varieties from Asia to the Sahelian countries and to constmct a Sahelian

research center on a five-hundred-hectare site near Niarney, Niger. The scientific staff of the Sahelian

center will cany out long-term (ten-to-twenty-year) research on meal production in the Sahel. This

is further evidence that agricultural development is a slow and evolutionary process.

20. But wheat and rice consumption are increasing in urban areas throughout Africa.

21. For example, the $900 million Diama and Manantelli dams aloog the Senegal River are

projected to have negative internal rates of return.

22. Although the World Bank was a staunch advocate of basic needs stntegies in the late 1970s, it

has recently abandoned its support for this dubious concept. Still the International Labour Office

continues to confuse African states with recent basic needs missions to Zambia, Tanzania, and

Nigeria (ILO 1981).

23. The state should play a less direct role in agricultural production and marketing and emphasize

indirect approaches such as agricultural research, extension. credit, and educational programs to help

small farmers and herders.

24. Although the government of Senegal dissolved its grain board-ONCALin 1980, a large

percentage of the employees were transferred to other government agencies.

25. See Timmer, chapter 8 in this volume.

26. Food policy analysis requires a large amount of micro information on production, consump

tion, nutrition, and the functioning of markets, but this information is not ● vailable in most African

countries. Although the World Food Council reported that nineteen African countries were preparing

national food strategies in 1981, many of these exercises wem pqamd in capital cities in three to six

months, and many of them are likely to be forgotten in three to six months.

27. For example, U.S. food aid to Mozambique was cut off for six mooths in 1981 (see Anderson

1981).

28. The bulk of U.S. food aid-60 percent to 70 percmtt-is in the form of wheat and wheat flour

even though wheat is not a staple food in most of rural Africa.

29. For empirical support showing that a mral investment strategy for Srnallholdem and smallscale industry can achieve both growth and employment objectives see the results of a nationwide

sumey in Sierra Leone (Byerlee et al. 1983).

30. For example, the government agency responsible for the development of the Senegal River

Valley—SAE&was assisted by thirteen donors in 1982. SAED employed one thousand workers

and encountered an $8.5 million recurrent budget deficit in 1982. SAED asked the thirteen donors to

pay two-thirds of the cost of the deficit.

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Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

—. 1970. “Development and Structural Change: The African Experience, 1950- 1970. ” Journal of International Aflairs 24:203-23.
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—, 1971. L’Afriquc de l’ouest bloqut+: I’kconomie politique de la coionisation (1880-1970).

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Appendix D

List of Acronyms

AAAS

ADF

AID

ATI

CDIE

CDSS

CGIAR

ESF

FAO

FSR

GAO

GDP

GNP

ICRW

IITA

ILCA

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

.

—

—

American Association for the

Advancement of Science

African Development Foundation

U.S. Agency for International

Development

Appropriate Technology International

Center for Development Information

and Evaluation (AID)

Country Development Strategy

Statement

Consultative Group on International

Agricultural Research

Economic Support Fund

U.N. Food and Agricultural

Organization

Farming Systems Research

U.S. General Accounting Office

Gross Domestic Product

Gross National Product

International Center for Research on

Women

International Institute of Tropical

Agriculture (CGIAR)

International Livestock Center for

Africa (CGIAR)

ILO –

IMF –

OECD –

OPIC –

OTA –

P.L. 480 –

PVO –

TVS –

U.N. –

UNCOD –

UNESCO –

UNICEF –

UNIDO –

USDA –

VITA –

WHO –

WID –

International

International

Organization

Labor Organization

Monetary Fund

for Economic

Cooperation and Development

U.S. Overseas Private Investment

Corporation

Office of Technology Assessment,

U.S. Congress

Public Law 83-480 (Agricultural

Trade Development and Assistance

Act)

Private Voluntary Organization

Training and Visit System

United Nations

U.N. Conference on Desertification

U.N. Education, Scientific, and

Cultural Organization

U.N. International Children’s Fund

U.N. Industrial Development

Organization

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Volunteers in Technical Assistance

U.N. World Health Organization

Women in Development Office (AID)

135
1 -

.

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