SOUTH ASIA IN 2020: FUTURE STRATEGIC 

BALANCES AND ALLIANCES 

Edited by 

Michael R. Chambers 

November 2002 
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ISBN 1-58487-108-3 

ii 
CONTENTS 

1. Introduction 

 Michael R. Chambers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

I. SETTING THE SCENE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 

2. Policy Paths in South Asia: Intersections between 

Global and Local 

 Sir John Thomson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 

3. Thoughts on the Current Crisis 

 Thomas W. Simons, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 

II. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND 

DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 

4. A Changing India 

 Teresita C. Schaffer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 

5. South Asia in 2020: Economic Outlook 

 Vijay L. Kelkar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 

6. Demographic Forces in South Asia through 2050: 

Population, Economy, and Health 

 Shripad Tuljapurkar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 

III. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND REGIONAL 

SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 

7. Bombs in Search of a Mission: Indiaí s Uncertain 

Nuclear Future 

 Rajesh M. Basrur and Stephen Philip Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 

8. Pakistaní s Nuclear Future 

 Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 

9. The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia 

 Scott D. Sagan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 

iii 
IV. U.S. MILITARY PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 

10. U.S. Military Perspectives on Regional Security 

in South Asia 

 Compiled by Michael R. Chambers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 231 

V. STRATEGIC CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 

11. Indian Strategic Culture 

 Kanti Bajpai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 

12. Pakistaní s Strategic Culture 

 Hasan-Askari Rizvi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 

13. ìCult of Defenseî and ìGreat Power Dreamsî: 

The Influence Strategic Culture on Chinaís 

Relationship with India 

 Andrew Scobell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 

VI. ALLIANCE POLITICS IN ASIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 

14. Indiaí s Alliances 2020 

 Sumit Ganguly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363 

15. The Future of the Sino-Pakistani Entente Cordiale 

 John W. Garver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385 

16. The Struggle for Mastery in Asia 

 Aaron L. Friedberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449 

17. Conclusion: Strategic Balances and Alliances 

in South Asia in 2020 

 Michael R. Chambers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473 

About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493 

iv 
1 

CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

Michael R. Chambers 

 Whither South Asia? This is not a question that has troubled 

many Americans, although the number has been growing over the 

last few years. The nuclear weapons tests of 1998 and the Kargil 

crisis of 1999 helped to increase that number. But as this is written in 

June 2002, perhaps more Americans than ever are concerned about 

the future of South Asia. This, of course, is a result of the attacks on 

the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11 as it is often referred 

to) and the resulting war on terrorism that has been conducted in 

part through Pakistan. It is also a result of the December 13, 2001, 

attack on the Indian Parliament by Islamic militants out of Kashmir, 

and the escalation of tensions that followed between India and 

Pakistan. By June 2002, these two nuclear-armed neighbors seemed 

on the threshold of war. 

 In an attempt to answer this increasingly pressing question, the 

Asia/Pacific Research Center and the Center for International 

Security and Cooperation of Stanford University joined the U.S. 

Army War Collegeís Strategic Studies Institute to cosponsor a 

conference on January 4-5, 2002. This volume consists of revised 

versions of papers presented at that conference. While there are 

numerous ways to approach the question of ìwhither South Asia?î 

the conference organizers decided to focus on the future of strategic 

balances and alliances in the region, with 2020 as the target date. 

This choice of topic allowed the conference participants to talk not 

only about the patterns of amity and enmity within the region, but 

also about the role of extra regional powers and issues such as social 

and economic trends, domestic political conditions, strategic culture, 
2 

and the role of nuclear weapons. These factors can affect the relative 

power of countries as well as their relations of friendship and 

hostility. 

The Effects of 9/11 

 The attacks of September 11 had a very profound effect on this 

conference. First of all, the conference was originally scheduled for 

September 14-15, 2001, but had to be postponed in light of the 

events. Second, and more substantively, the attacks and the resulting 

war on terrorism led to important changes in the South Asian region 

and in U.S. policy toward the region that affected the discussions. 

Possibly most significantly, it ended Americaís relative isolation of 

Pakistan and its tilt towards India in the regional system. Because of 

the need to conduct the war against the Taliban regime and the al 

Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan at least in part through 

Pakistani territory and airspace, the United States quickly 

reestablished military relations that it had severed a decade earlier. 

Moreover, the United States was not merely more intensely engaged 

again in South Asia, it was seeking good, cooperative relations with 

both India and Pakistan at the same timeósomething it had not 

done previously. 

 Besides this new American engagement in South Asia, the events 

of September 11 also forced changes in Pakistan, albeit changes that 

may have already been in the works in the few months previous to 

September. The Pakistani governmentóor at least the Inter-Services 

Intelligence agency (ISI)óhad helped to create the Taliban regime in 

Kabul and maintained close relations with it. Islamabad had also 

colluded with Islamic militants in Kashmir to keep pressure on India 

to end its rule in this disputed territory. When asked on September 

12 whether Pakistan would be with the United States or against it in 

the war on terrorism, President Pervez Musharraf chose to side with 

the United States, severing Pakistanís relations with the Taliban and 

cracking down on Islamic militancy within his country. Following 
3 

the December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament, and under 

pressure from the United States and the international community, he 

cracked down on Islamic militant groups in Pakistanóincluding a 

ban on the two groups that allegedly carried out the December 13 

attack and the arrest of their leaders. Subsequently, in June 2002 

Musharraf pledged to ìpermanentlyî end the infiltration of Islamic 

militants into Indian-controlled Kashmir.1 The combination of these 

developmentsóthe new policies in Islamabad and the new 

involvement of the U.S. in the regionóled many conference 

participants to express optimism that perhaps the situation in South 

Asia could finally be turned from one of conflict and animosity 

between India and Pakistan to one of more cooperation. 

Common Themes 

 This cautious optimism, that relations between India and 

Pakistan might finally be put onto a more cooperative path and that 

several of the outstanding issues between them might be resolved, 

was enunciated by several participants, including Sir John Thomson 

and Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan. Both of these participants 

discussed a scenario of the future based on such assumptions and 

argued that this would be the best path for the region. But this was 

just one possible scenario for both participants, and they each 

included a scenario in which the pre-September 11 dynamics 

returned to the fore, with continuing tensions as the result. 

 A second common theme was the difficulty in making 

predictions about the future of South Asia. This caveat was claimed 

by, among others, Rajesh Basrur and Stephen Cohen, Aaron 

Friedberg, Sumit Ganguly and Teresita Schaffer. As several of these 

participants noted, there are too many variablesópolitical, 

economic, and social, and at both the domestic and international 

levelsóto confidently state what India will look like politically in 18 

years (never mind Pakistan), or what the nuclear weapons posture of 

these countries might be, or even what shape Indiaís patterns of 
4 

alignment might take. Nevertheless, by focusing on the set of 

variables and factors that each thought to be most important, they 

were able to lay out for the other participants a range of scenarios 

that they believed to be the most likely. 

 A third common theme was the importance of the region to the 

United States. An economically prosperous and politically stable 

South Asia is very much in the U.S. interests. For some participants, 

such as Shripad Tuljapurkar and Vijay Kelkar, this importance is 

based on the fact that South Asia is home to one-sixth of the worldís 

population and that there is great economic potential in the region, 

particularly in India if it can capitalize on favorable demographic 

trends and follow through on the next generation of economic 

reforms. For others, including the three flag officers who presented 

U.S. military perspectives on South Asia as well as Scott Sagan, the 

effects of South Asia on U.S. and global security demand such 

importance. As was demonstrated again during spring 2002, India 

and Pakistan have too regularly found themselves in crises, and with 

both possessing nuclear arms, there is great apprehension about a 

conventional war escalating to the point of a nuclear exchange. 

Moreover, any negative behavior by these two countries could have 

demonstration effects in other countries that would undermine the 

global efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Finally, 

several participants, among them Thomson and Thomas Simons, 

noted the important role that Pakistan could play in providing a role 

model for Muslim states in the Middle East. Since it is an explicitly 

Islamic state, yet one that is secular and seeks to modernize, the 

United States should help Pakistan achieve this goal so that it can 

demonstrate to other Muslim states a path that leads into the future 

rather than back into the past, with all of the repression and troubles 

that path has demonstrated in countries such as Afghanistan. 

 The converse of this theme is the importance of the U.S. to South 

Asia, and this was also stressed by several participants. A number of 

participants, civilian and military, noted that the U.S. abandonment 
5 

of Pakistan in 1990 contributed to a sequence of events that led in the 

end to the creation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its 

cooperation with Osama bin Ladenís terrorist network, including the 

attacks of September 11. The U.S. should consider this history and 

not precipitously withdraw from the region again when our 

objectives are achieved in Afghanistan. In particular, as emphasized 

by all three flag officers participating as panelists, Washington 

should maintain the military-to-military relations that have been 

growing in the case of India and reestablished in the case of 

Pakistan. The United States can also play a role in stabilizing the 

nuclear balance between India and Pakistan. As noted by both Khan 

and Sagan, the United States can provide expertise as well as 

technologies that would strengthen Islamabadís and New Delhiís 

command and control over their nuclear arsenal to prevent 

accidental launchings without giving one side an advantage over the 

other. Finally, Washington can use its influence with the leaderships 

in both countries to contribute to a resolution of their political 

differences. In the new triangular relationship that was formed last 

September, the United States is in the pivot position, having better 

relations with both India and Pakistan than they have with each 

other. It can use this leverage to promote the resolution of political 

conflict in the region. American influence, exemplified in the June 

visits of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and of Secretary 

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, along with the diplomatic efforts of 

countries such as Britain, China, Japan, and Russia, appears to have 

contributed to the reduction of tensions between India and Pakistan 

in early-mid June.2 

Organization of the Volume 

 As will be discussed in greater detail in the conclusion, strategic 

balances and alliances are relations of cooperation between countries 

that are directed (implicitly or explicitly) against real or potential 

adversaries. These axes of amity and enmity are based on past 

relationships with other countries, on current assessments of relative 
6 

power and threat, and on the expectation that others will threaten 

the security of your country in the future. The chapters that follow 

shed light on various components of national power in India and 

Pakistan, on these countriesí perceptions of threat, and on their 

relations of amity and enmity that will shape the strategic balances 

and alliances of South Asia in 2020. 

 Part I of this volume contains two ìscene settingî presentations, 

delivered by Sir John Thomson and Thomas Simons, which were 

intended to provoke thought and discussion. Thomsonís 

presentation (Chapter 2) was delivered at the opening of the 

conference as a way to get the participants thinking about the future. 

In this presentation, he sketches three scenarios of the future with 

varying degrees of optimistic divergence from a path based on the 

status quo in South Asia on September 10, 2001. Simonsí 

presentation ( Chapter 3), offered before dinner on the first night of 

the conference, provides an overview of the changes in South Asia 

based on the nuclear tests of 1998 and the events of September and 

December 2001. These papers have different orientations, one more 

forward-looking while the other tries to draw more on the past. 

Nevertheless, they reach two similar conclusions. First, the United 

States needs to remain engaged in South Asia if the region is to have 

any hope of rising above the tensions and conflict which have 

plagued it these last 50 years. Second, Pakistan represents a potential 

model of a modern Islamic state for other Muslim countries, and the 

United States should do all that it can to assist this enterprise. 

 Part II considers the political, economic, and demographic factors 

that will affect the relative power capabilities of India and Pakistan 

over the next 18 years. In Chapter 4, Teresita Schaffer examines some 

of the changes taking place in Indiaís domestic political system, such 

as the growing importance of coalitional politics and the coming 

leadership changes in both the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the 

Congress Party, as well as demographic changes and potential 

economic performance to suggest what future Indian foreign policy 
7 

might look like. Deriving three basic scenarios from these factors and 

speculating on Indian foreign policy in each, Schaffer concludes that 

it is too early to tell which of the scenarios is most likely, due to the 

contradictory evidence as of spring 2002. 

 The economic prospects of South Asia, and of India in particular, 

are the focus of Chapter 5 by Vijay Kelkar. Surveying the progress 

that has been made in the region so far, particularly in the 1990s as 

India liberalized its economy and launched economic reforms, 

Kelkar notes that the region still has far to go in comparison to the 

economies of East and Southeast Asia, and proposes a multilayered 

second-generation reform effort to point India in the right direction. 

 Chapter 6 by Shripad Tuljapurkar discusses the demographic 

trends in South Asia that could help to fuel continued economic 

growth. Comparing India and Pakistan to China, Tuljapurkar also 

notes the significant improvements in South Asia, particularly in 

terms of declining fertility and infant mortality, and increasing life 

expectancy and literacy. However, significant differentials continue 

to exist based on gender, region, and the urban-rural divide. If these 

differentials are not addressed, they could lead to political instability 

in either India or Pakistan. 

 Part III takes up the role of nuclear weapons and regional 

security. The chapters by Rajesh Basrur and Stephen Cohen and 

Feroz Hassan Khan consider the nuclear futures of India and 

Pakistan, respectively. Noting the multiplicity off actors affecting 

Indiaís future nuclear posture, Basrur and Cohen propose three basic 

scenarios and then consider how variations in ten of the most 

important factorsóincluding Indiaís relations with Pakistan and 

China, the role of the United States, and the number and types of 

nuclear weaponsócould shape which of the three ideal-type 

scenarios India will most closely approximate. In Chapter 8, Khan 

points to the importance of the Indian nuclear weapons program in 

generating the push for Pakistan to develop such weapons itself. He 
8 

also proposes a restraint regime for India and Pakistan that could 

prevent a damaging nuclear arms race between the two neighbors. 

 Such a restraint regime may well be crucial. In Chapter 9, Scott 

Sagan argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia 

could be very dangerous. Challenging the arguments of 

ìproliferation optimistsî who posit that nuclear deterrence will 

reduce the chances for war in the region, Sagan draws on 

organization theory to show that deterrence may fail, and provides 

evidence of several of the expected pathologies already emerging 

within the Indian and Pakistani bureaucracies that control the 

nuclear weapons. 

 Part IV begins to move us away from power resources to the 

realm of perceptions. Chapter 10 relates U.S. military perspectives on 

South Asian security. This is a summary of the views expressed by 

the three flag officers serving on the panel, Rear Admiral Jay 

Campbell (ret.), Major General Kevin Chilton, and Brigadier General 

Karl Eikenberry. All three emphasize the importance this region has 

for U.S. national interestsóand not just security interests. The three 

panelists also agree on the need to maintain the military-to-military 

relations that the U.S. has established with the region because they 

promote American interests. 

 Part V examines the role of strategic culture in shaping threat 

perceptions in the regionóincluding China, because of its role in the 

patterns of amity and enmity in the region. In Chapter 11, Kanti 

Bajpai discusses the three competing strands of strategic culture in 

post-Cold War IndiaóNehruvianism, neoliberalism and 

hyperrealismófocusing in particular on the elements of grand 

strategy in each. Indian grand strategic thinking has moved away 

from Nehruvianism during the 1990s, and Bajpai concludes that it 

has moved toward hyperrealism in the aftermath of the terrorist 

attacks of September 11 and December 13. Such a shift could lead to 

a harder-line Indian foreign policy. 
9 

 Hasan-Askari Rizvi assesses Pakistani strategic culture in 

Chapter 12, noting the deep insecurity and strong distrust of India 

that are major components of this mind-set. Rizvi also discusses the 

relationship of Islamic beliefs to Pakistani strategic culture, and how 

many Pakistani security policymakers have come to favorably view 

the use of Islamic militants to put pressure on India in Kashmir. 

 In Chapter 13, Andrew Scobell argues that Chinese strategic 

culture is driven by a ìcult of defenseî in which China is prone 

toward using force but always sees itself as acting in self-defense. 

Moreover, Scobell warns that Chinese strategic thinkers see India as 

an expansionist, hegemonistic power that seems to have designs on 

Tibet. Such views seem at odds with the warming of Sino-Indian 

relations over the last several years, leading Scobell to conclude that 

tensions continue to simmer below the surface, with the possibility 

that the Sino-Indian rapprochement could yet collapse. 

 Part VI considers alliance politics in Asia, focusing on India and 

Pakistan but also considering the broader Asian context. In Chapter 

14, Sumit Ganguly surveys the potential alliances India may form by 

2020, including those with the United States, or Russia, or even with 

Russia and China against the United States. Ganguly finds that, 

based on external threats to Indian security, an alliance or a less 

formal alignment with the United States is the most likely 

relationship, although domestic factors might prevent this from 

taking place. 

 If a U.S.-India alignment remains only a potential, John Garver 

finds in Chapter 15 that the current Sino-Pakistani entente is nearly 

certain to continue to 2020. Garver notes that, despite the forces at 

work since the end of the Cold War, including the Sino-Indian 

rapprochement, China has not significantly reduced its strategic 

commitment to Pakistan. Moreover, its continuing interests in a 

balance of power in South Asia, along with Pakistanís continuing 
10 

desire for assistance in balancing against India, should sustain the 

Sino-Pakistani partnership. 

 Looking at Asia more broadly, Aaron Friedberg suggests in 

Chapter 16 that we are likely to see a Sino-American rivalry for 

predominance in Asia. This rivalry will have economic, military and 

political-diplomatic aspects. While this rivalry will be focused 

especially in East Asia, Friedberg warns that it could have spill-over 

effects into other parts of Asia, including South Asia. In particular, 

the threat of rising Chinese power coupled with Beijingís efforts to 

maintain the Sino-Pakistani entente could lead India to balance with 

the U.S. against China. 

 Chapter 17 tries to tie these various pieces together to arrive at 

some conclusions about the prospects for strategic balances and 

alliances in South Asia in 2020. Drawing on alliance theory and the 

analyses of domestic and international trends that have been 

discussed in the preceding chapters, it will be suggested that we are 

likely to see at least a loose configuration of the United States and 

India against China and Pakistan. The conclusion will also suggest 

some policy recommendations for the United Statesóas well as 

India and Pakistanódrawn from the analyses in the previous 

chapters. 

ENDNOTES 

 1. Erik Eckholm, ìPakistan Pledges to Bar Any Groups Linked to Terror, ì 

New York Times, January 13, 2002, p. 1; Glenn Kessler, ìA Defining Moment in 

Islamabad,î Washington Post, June 22, 2002, p. A1. 

 2. For example, see John Lancaster, ìIndia to Recall Warships, Name Pakistan 

Envoy,î Washington Post, June 11, 2002; and Thom Shanker with Seth Mydans, 

ìRumsfeld Says Threat of War Over Kashmir is Receding, ì New York Times, June 

14, 2002.
11 

Part I 

SETTING THE SCENE
13 

CHAPTER 2 

POLICY PATHS IN SOUTH ASIA: 

INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN GLOBAL AND LOCAL 

Sir John Thomson 

The events of September 11 have severely shaken the South 

Asian kaleidoscope. As we peer into it, trying to discern the patterns 

of the next twenty years, we see a region in motion: the pieces 

remain much as they were before 9/11, but their relationships are 

altering. If the war against terrorism is prolonged, as it may be, the 

chances increase that September 11 will turn out to be one of the 

three or four major influences shaping the patterns of international 

relations in the early twenty-first century. Its chief influence will be, 

presumably, on U.S. policies, and this will be a principal theme of 

my presentation. 

 Naturally, South Asian patterns will be pushed and pulled by 

additional external influences, by the forces of globalization, for 

instance, and by Chinese policies. But it is beyond my present scope 

to consider all possibilities. Here I must single out merely a handful 

of local and global influences and judge the effect of their 

intersections. 

 That said, September 11 is the appropriate place to begin, for it is 

having a huge effect on South Asia. While it has resolved some 

issues, it leaves others more unsettled than before. This arena for the 

first major action in President Bushís global war against terrorism 

and for the first-ever invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic 

Treaty contains material for more conflict.1 If the only superpower 

sees military action in South Asia as its top priority and puts 

together a world coalition to support it, there is no gainsaying the 
14 

global significance of South Asia. 

 Yet South Asia did not seek it. Importance was thrust upon it by 

forces more or less beyond its control. That the headquarters of al 

Qaeda, a movement with cells in at least sixty countries, should have 

been in Afghanistan, verges on the accidental. Bin Laden might well 

have taken refuge in Sudan, Somalia, or even Saudi Arabia. After all, 

it was not Afghans but Arabs who struck at New York and 

Washington. So, at one level, South Asia appears unlucky in being 

caught up in a war to which it was not an original party. However, 

at a deeper level, local conditions in South Asia bear significant 

responsibility for this fate. 

 What wereóand to some extent still areóthe conditions in South 

Asia that attracted first the terrorists and then the U.S. lightning? 

 Afghanistan in the mid-1990s was a ruined state given over to 

warlords, drugs and poverty. The depth of its degradation can be 

measured by the welcome given to the harsh, obscurantist Taliban. 

People knew where they stood under the Taliban. Order, it was felt, 

even by the women robbed of freedom and dignity, was preferable 

to chaos. Afghanistan provides a vivid illustration of the conditions 

that support an organization like al-Qaeda. 

 If the Taliban rule, despite its brutality, was tolerable in already 

ruined Afghanistan, the same was far from true in Pakistan. That 

country, still not fully consolidated after fifty years of alternating 

civilian and military rule, was struggling to avoid ruin and to find a 

future to which all its citizens could rally. The founding fathers 

intended Pakistan to be at least as modern and progressive as 

Ataturkís Turkey. They correctly perceived that many varied shades 

of Christianity could be successful; so, they supposed, Islam too 

could adopt forms suitable to the needs and culture of the people 

concerned. History justifies this supposition, and if Muslim countries 

are to become successful in the modern world, adaptation is needed. 
15 

Islamic countries must not isolate themselves as the West goes from 

strength to strength. To ìcatch up, ì Pakistanis need help and 

favorable circumstances, whereas in reality they have scant natural 

resources, a feudal society, a country deeply and unevenly divided 

by ethnic groups, enormous poverty, and hugely mounting debts. 

Unfortunately, a passionately felt quarrel with India causes them to 

skew their priorities. Resources that should go to health, modern 

education, and economic development go instead to military 

expenditure and debt servicing. The Army has become the only 

modern institution in which the whole nation takes pride. Thus, after 

fifty years of disappointing failure to meet their objectives, some 

Pakistanis wondered whether the ìTalibanizationî of their society 

might be inevitable or even desirable. And the Islamic mercenaries, 

mainly Arabs, who flocked to enlist in anti-Western terrorism had 

everything to gain by venting their fury in somebody elseí s country. 

In their own Middle Eastern countries, they had failed to overthrow 

the poverty, elitism and Western customs they found humiliating. 

Another lesson here is that while it is too soon to be certain, it looks 

as if firm action by the global coalition against terrorism may be 

helping the Pakistani regime to prevent the Talibanization of their 

society. 

 While it may be an accident that the global war against terrorism 

began in Afghanistan, we can be certain that it will continue 

wherever grinding poverty, disappointment, ignorance, illiteracy, 

and resentment exist. Our struggle cannot succeed for long if it is 

restricted to fighting armed terrorists: we must also overcome the 

conditions that breed terrorism. Otherwise, the war may deteriorate 

into skirmishes between the West and developing peoples in many 

parts of the world. We are fortunate, in a way, that this struggle 

concerns terrorism, for terrorists are criminals, and all societies 

oppose criminals. More nationalistic, more culturally specific issues 

could make it harder to mobilize a broad coalition. 

 Professional observers in the West blame themselves and their 
16 

political masters for failing to deter and prevent September 11. We 

did not put enough resources into understanding conditions in 

South Asia and the Middle East, and we did not pay enough 

attention to what we could see was going wrong. Evidently, the 

West cannot afford a hands-off policy. But it takes two to reach 

understandings. If the West is blameworthy, so are some South 

Asians and also many Middle Easterners. Their level of understanding of the West is dangerously low. Of course, I am not talking 

about their knowledge of say, medicine or engineering: professionally, they are well versed. But the typical Indian politicians, for 

instance, underestimate the damage their actions cause to Western 

interests. I am thinking, for instance, of nuclear non-proliferation and 

nuclear safety, of failures to deal with AIDS and drugs and illiteracy, 

of offenses against human rights, of arms exports, and of quarrels 

over Kashmir. Naturally, there will be Western reactions. 

 I began by saying that September 11 had settled some issues and 

unsettled others. Nothing better exemplifies this dictum or is more 

important for the next 20 years than U.S. foreign policy. Change 

there certainly is, but what does it mean? President Bush is fond of 

saying ìeverything has changed.î That assessmentóor should I say 

sentimentóis widely shared. It is easy to believe when Mr. Putin has 

become one of the Presidentí s best friends and when Mr. Jiang 

Zemin is an ally, not a competitor. But so far, I have not found 

anyone who will tell me authoritatively what ìeverythingî means. 

 Hence, we confront a paradox. We are supposed to come up with 

comments that will help to guide U.S. foreign policy on South Asiaó

and by extension the policies of many other governmentsóbut the 

most important input, U.S. global policy, is highly uncertain. That 

uncertainty necessarily shadows all my speculations and prescriptions. 

 Yet the paradox itself imposes certain conclusions which I would 

like you to bear in mind throughout my description of three 
17 

scenarios. 

 My first conclusion is that the U.S. will enormously influence its 

policy towards South Asia by the way it shapes its global policies. 

This is bound to happen in the long run, but the sooner left 

hand/right hand coordination is achieved, the better. 

 My second conclusion I state tentatively, and will return to later. 

It is that U.S. policy toward South Asia will have some reciprocal 

influence on U.S. global policies. 

 Third, the present uncertainty in the global line-up brings with it 

exceptional opportunities for shaping the longer-term future of 

South Asia. The explosion of evil and bitterness on September 11, 

together with the worldwide response to it, has produced such a 

moment as occurs not more than four or five times in a century. The 

world situation currently has a fluidity that comes, usually, only at 

the conclusion of a major war. Things that were politically 

impossible or at least very unlikely on September 10 are within our 

grasp today, if we stretch for them. I have in mind particularly the 

relationships between the Great Powers, as well as the future of 

Indo-Pakistani relations. I will come back to that, but at present, I 

want to stress not only the fluidity of the world situation but also its 

fleetingness. Even as we speak, government actions are forming 

patterns that will mold international relations for decades to come. 

What we do and don't do in 2002 may be decisive for 2020. 

 I would like to add a fourth conclusion, though it is not drawn 

directly from the paradox. The geographical definition of South Asia 

has expanded. If we had any doubt before, September 11 has made it 

clear that we have to take into account Afghanistan and its 

neighbors: Iran to the west, all the former Soviet republics to the 

north, and China to the east. The geographical context for South Asia 

may be even wider. We in the West sayósincerely, I believeóthat 

we are not against Islam, but many Muslims do not believe it. So, to 
18 

a greater or lesser extent, our relations with Arab countries can be 

connected with our South Asian policies. And this potential 

extension of our area of concern is being reinforced, unfortunately, 

by the spiraling disaster in Israel-Palestine. 

 I ask you to bear these thoughts in mind as I take you through 

three scenarios. 

 The first assumes that the world reverts as much as it can to pre9/11 conditions. This means that for one reason or another the 

present coalition comes to an end or becomes dormant, that U.S. 

foreign policy returns to that proclaimed by President Bush during 

the presidential campaign and his first months in office, and that 

trends in South Asia settle down approximately on the tracks they 

were following before September 11. The heart of the problem as 

always is Indo-Pakistani relations, a subject that preoccupies most 

Pakistanis most of the time. By contrast, few Indians outside the 

northwest are bothered about Pakistan except in moments of 

dramaófor example, an attack on Parliament or a hijacking. Indeed, 

many are more concerned with the continuing Tamil insurrection in 

Sri Lanka coupled with political instability in Colombo, or with the 

Maoist insurgency in Nepal, or with the spillover of Bangladeshis 

into Assam and the northeast. This imbalance of concern reflects not 

only different geographies but also different views of time. 

 Most Indians feel that time is on their side. So long as they 

continue to hold what they have in Kashmir, they can continue 

indefinitely on the present course. True, they suffer some discomfort 

both at home and abroad from brutal events in Kashmir and on the 

Siachin Glacier, but not enough to change course. The Pakistanis, on 

the other hand, aware that for most people possession is nine-tenths 

of the law and conscious also that they have failed to garner 

significant international support, are facing an increasing erosion of 

their position. 
19 

 There are other reasons, too, why time favors India. Virtually all 

economic trends look better for India than for Pakistan. Before the 

December 2001 meeting of the Paris Club and the earlier promises 

from the IMF, Pakistan was on the verge of bankruptcy, whereas 

India has good reserves and relatively low debt. In recent years, 

Indiaís growth rates have been superior to Pakistanís. And with a 

fertility rate a shade below 3%, compared to Pakistanís 4% or above, 

India has not had to spread its growth as thinly. Besides, in the last 

few years India has had considerable success with rates for literacy, 

infant mortality and life expectancy, while Pakistan has not. 

 Moreover, several factors have led to a definite U.S. tilt toward 

India accompanied by neglect of Pakistan: Indian restraint over 

Kargil; U.S. suspicion of China; and the burgeoning recognition by 

Westernóespecially Americanóbusiness that India offers huge 

potential markets while Pakistan does not. Since September 11, India 

has sought to disguise its dismay at the crucial role Pakistan has 

played in American and coalition plans and operations. But this first 

scenario assumes that for one reason or another Pakistani 

prominence fades quickly and that her only real gain is in greatly 

improved debt arrangements. 

 On this basis, Indiaí s pre-September 11 complacency is likely to 

return, together with Pakistanís sense that only dramatic events will 

shake the Indians out of this complacency or engage Western 

concern. Timings are unpredictable, but I believe that sooner rather 

than later, there is significant risk of an Indo-Pakistani clash. The 

root cause might be Kashmir, or perhaps a renewal of serious 

economic weakness in Pakistan or, in the longer term, major political 

instability in Pakistan, possibly aggravated by a new wave of Islamic 

militancy. It may also be some combination of these influences, 

together with tensions arising from the growing gap between the 

privileged and the poor. 

 Whatever the causes, the outcome of a clash could be disastrous 
20 

now that both sides have nuclear weapons. I have the impression 

that the Pakistanis have thought through how to deploy and to use 

them, whereas the Indians are dangerously vague. I am not saying 

that a clash will inevitably lead to the explosion of a nuclear weapon, 

but I do think that the risks for the rest of the world are too great to 

dismiss. 

 Apart from the appalling physical consequences of the use of a 

nuclear weaponóor more than oneóthere is no telling what the 

ramifications might be. They could severely jolt the relationships of 

the Great Powers, they could inflict a mortal wound on nonproliferation policies, they could severely complicate relations with 

the Islamic world, and so on. 

 My analysis has led me, somewhat to my own surprise, to the 

conclusion that the first scenario is the most dangerous, and 

unacceptably so. I therefore suggest we should rule out a return to 

the pre-September 11 conditions and policies. 

 Unfortunately, such a reversion is all too realistic. It is hard to 

escape from old attitudes and assumptions, even while declaring 

that ìeverything has changed.î Unless we make conscious decisions, 

reversion, for a time at least, to pre-September 11 conditions is 

possible. In that case, we risk major sadness before 2020. 

 My second scenario sounds more risky than the first, but actually 

is less so. It postulates a classical balance of power in Asia. The big 

players are China, Japan, Russia, India, probably Pakistan and, of 

course, the United States. The key assumption is that American 

policy is neither the hands-off, letís-not-get-involved attitude of 

President Bush prior to September 11, nor the buddy-buddy 

relationship with Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin of October and 

November. It would be half way betweenóa sort of pax Americana, 

intervening actively and forcefully but intermittently in accordance 

with the doctrine that Washington knows best. So there would be no 
21 

permanent commitments and no permanent consultations. 

 The main theme in this scenario would probably be tension 

between China and the United States, with Taiwan as the principal 

flashpoint. Russia will probably spend most of the next 20 years 

seeking to establish and maintain a cooperative role with the United 

States and especially with Europe, overwhelmingly its largest 

trading partner and best customer. Japan will wish to avoid 

unnecessary engagement in a power struggle, having much to lose 

both with the United States and China, but like Russia it will feel 

obliged, from time to time, to show support for the United States. 

India, on the other hand, is likely to become a reliable friend of the 

United States though maintaining the prickliness for which the 

Ministry of External Affairs is famous. Faced with a fairly consistent 

U.S.-India-Russia axis, China is likely to support Pakistan. 

 As with many classical balances of power, over a 20-year period 

there will be instabilities and sudden emergencies. Since all the 

parties, except perhaps Japan, will possess nuclear weapons, misunderstandings and crises that get out of control could be 

exceedingly dangerous. Remembering Austria-Hungary in 1913-14, 

one cannot exclude the possibility of a weaker player trying to drag a 

stronger partner into its quarrels. But it does not seem likely that a 

crisis would get totally out of hand. China would restrain Pakistan, 

and the United States and Russia would restrain India. That is why, 

essentially, the second scenario is less dangerous than the first. 

 A subsidiary reason lies in the economic assistance that Pakistan 

and India would in all likelihood receive from their allies. This 

would bind them politically and give them incentives for avoiding 

crippling defense expenditures. Economic growth would help, 

particularly in Pakistan, to avoid internal instabilities. 

 Following this line of reasoning, it is quite possible that in 

periods of relative harmony, their respective allies would strongly 
22 

urge India and Pakistan to resolve their differences on Kashmir. 

Such periods could recur fairly frequently, given that the future of 

Taiwan is the only clearly defined issue that could plausibly lead to 

Great Power military conflict. Even if America were to play its hand 

badly, that would not seriously affect the position of the United 

States as the number one global power. Conversely, even in relative 

weakness, Chinaís position is secure. No one is going to try to 

conquer it or take it over. Chinaís main risks are internal ones, 

scarcely touched by the balance of power internationally. 

 As I have said, the only really big threat to stability is Taiwan ( 

and to a lesser extent the South China Seas) and there is no 

convincing reason to suppose that Taiwan, which has been managed 

successfully for fifty years, cannot continue to be managed. Maybe 

that is a mite optimistic, given certain tendencies both within the 

PRC and Taiwan, but at least the risks look lower than those 

associated with Kashmir. 

 My third scenario is the most benevolent for all parties, but until 

September 11, most people would have described it as the least 

probable. Now it must be taken seriously. Its basis is the present 

coalition against terrorism. Provided the United States will take the 

lead, the coalition could be given an enlarged mandate, refined and 

made more systematic. Specifically, I suggest that the United States 

invite a few Great Powers to engage in a daily diplomatic dialogue 

with a view toward reaching consensus on international affairs 

whenever they can. No new institutions would be required, nor 

would any, such as the Security Council, be altered. No formal commitments would be required, merely mutual undertakings to discuss 

international problems and where possible to reconcile positions. 

Each Power involved would retain freedom of action, and even 

when acting as the result of a consensus, would act individually. 

 Which Powers? There is no magic number and one could argue 

at the margins. My choice would be the United States plus eight, 
23 

namely Russia, China, Japan, India, Brazil, and the three Europeans 

óGermany, France and Britainówho by 2020 might instead appoint 

the European Union. 

 Together these nine countries represent a shade over half of the 

worldís population and contain a good mix of developed and 

developing nations. None, I believe, would reject an invitation from 

the United States. So, the crucial point becomes the U.S. attitude. I 

leave that to you, but I would point out that with those states 

working together, it would be foolhardy for any nation to think of 

attacking one of them whether openly or indirectly via terrorism, 

whether conventionally or with weapons of mass destruction. 

Besides, discussion amongst the Nine would be an effective way of 

getting at the big problems of development: the provision of capital, 

lowering fertility rates, coping with AIDS and drugs, conserving 

water and protecting the environment, raising standards in education and health, dealing with debt, protecting human rights and 

other measures to increase economic activity and reduce poverty. 

The cooperation of the Nine would be handsomely justified if it 

produced effective action on even half of these problems. 

 To make the Nine work, big bilateral problems would have to be 

resolved. But as I have already said, apart from Taiwan there are few 

of these in Asia. And Taiwan, I suggest, is neither so dangerous nor 

so difficult as is sometimes made out. With the incentive of joining 

the Nine, it should be possible for China and India to resolve their 

boundary differences and for Japan and Russia to settle the fate of 

the four islands.2

 To join the Nine, India would also need to resolve its dispute 

with Pakistan. India would then be involved in politics on a global 

scale and so could give up its preoccupation with dominating its 

neighbors. Defense expenditures could be reduced, and terrorism 

suppressed. All the countries of the area could benefit from 

improved developmental programs. 
24 

 Consensus among the Nine would not always exist, and even 

when it did, it would not necessarily solve all problems or prevent 

new ones from arising. The cost of funding development would 

probably be greater than in scenarios one or two, but there could be 

offsets, for example, in security and probably via improved market 

access. Constant consultation would reduce misunderstandings and 

promote a common outlook. So although not a panacea, I judge 

scenario three to be preferable to one and two. 

 In conclusion, I return as promised to two or three points I 

mentioned earlier. 

 I suggested tentatively that U.S. policy towards South Asia will 

have some reciprocal influence on U.S. global policies. I believe the 

analysis in the three scenarios shows this is correct. If the IndianPakistani differences are too dangerous to be viewed with indifference, international cooperation to resolve them is required. Such 

cooperation can be effective only if the United States exercises 

leadership. Probably it also requires the involvement of Russia, 

China and Japan, as well as Europe. Provided the action is kept 

confidential and heeds the susceptibilities of the South Asian 

countries, it can forward the true interests of both India and 

Pakistan. Each now has as strong a government as can be reasonably 

expected over the next decade or more, and yet they have repeatedly 

failed to reach an agreement on their own. Even if there were no 

nuclear issues involved, this failure makes it irresponsible to assume 

that time is a healer. Lesser governments would find it even harder 

to establish a permanent international boundary and acknowledge 

the special status of the Kashmiris. 

 Another point to which I promised to return has a bearing on the 

Kashmir issue as well as importance on its own terms. I refer to the 

problem of confrontations between the West and Islamic countries. 

This will continue to plague us as long as the central issues between 
25 

Israel and Palestine remain unresolved. Action here is as necessary 

as over the Kashmir issue. It would help in both cases if a major 

Muslim country became modern and efficient. Hopefully, in due 

course they all will. The prospects for Bangladesh and Malaysia have 

recently improved. The same cannot be said of Indonesia, but that 

country is so rich that all it needs is honest, efficient government and 

a low fertility rate. However, these countries east of India will have 

relatively little influence on the Islamic heartlands to the west. 

Within a generation, Iran and one or two of the Arab countries may 

look successful, modern and still Islamic. But at present, only two 

major Muslim countries west of India seem to have realistic though 

still doubtful prospects for success in the next decade. The two, of 

course, are Turkey and Pakistan. The West should make a big effort 

to help both. 

 Finally, I return to the most crucial point: the fleetingness of our 

present opportunities and the question of what U.S. global policy 

will be in, say, six months or a year. Tell me that, and I will tell you 

how South Asia will fare in 2020. 

ENDNOTES 

1. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that an armed attack on one 

member of the alliance shall be considered an attack on all, and that the other 

members shall join with the attacked member in collective defense. 

 2. Referred to by Japan as the Northern Territories, these islands consist of 

Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islets. 
27

CHAPTER 3 

THOUGHTS ON THE CURRENT CRISIS 

Thomas W. Simons, Jr. 

The Basics 

Our discussions so far have underlined how much events over 

the next weeks and months will determine projections for South Asia 

in 2020, how critical the India-Pakistan relationship is for everything 

that happens in the subcontinent, and how many variables there are 

in the current situation. Yet it seems to me possible to identify a 

number of basic features of the India-Pakistan situation over the past 

half-century that can serve as a baseline for some thoughts on what 

changed and what did not change with the nuclear explosions of 

1998, and what has changed and not changed with September 11. 

Briefly put, these basic features are the following. These two 

countries have much in common, but more divides them. They 

began their national existences in 1947 with different self-definitions. 

India emerged as a necessarily secular democracy, inheriting much 

of the apparatus and some of the ethos of the British Raj. Pakistan 

was the worldís first intentional Islamic state, basically a refuge for 

Indian Muslims from second-class citizenship in a free but Hindumajority Indian Union. Their experiences have not given their elites 

persuasive or compelling reasons to change these definitions or 

narrow these differences. On the contrary, the differences have been 

sustained by the persistent hostility of the two countries, especially 

by the differences in size and power between them, and most 

especially by their dispute over the former princely state of Jammu 

and Kashmir. 
28

In fact, since independence India and Pakistan have actually 

grown further apart in basic structural terms, and that fact cannot be 

masked by rhetoric about 5, 000 years of common culture or their 

shared need to put aside conflict in order to concentrate on development. As time has gone on, they have become more and more 

different countries. And there is also nothing inevitable about their 

convergence on any common denominator in the future. 

That said, it is also true that India and Pakistan have gone in 

roughly the same directions in terms of economic and social 

development: economic growth, urbanization, literacy, absorption of 

technology. These imply proliferating linkages within their societies: 

more and more, previously isolated and disconnected people now 

connect with others on a continuous basis. And as new connections 

become new dependencies, opportunities multiply both for greater 

harmony and for greater frictionóeconomic, social, cultural and 

political. 

These processes do not supersede politics. In particular, even if 

India were to perform more successfully against these criteria 

compared to its neighbors, Indian regional dominance would not 

automatically follow. These processes do not guarantee outcomes 

independent of politics. In fact, they can give politics new salience in 

the life of the region. The reason is that they are producing growing 

middle classes, both property-based and state-dependent, and the 

makings of ìnew masses.î As more and more people and groups 

enter ìthe system,î they develop stakes in the system. They awaken 

to new hopes of gaining, to new fears of losing. And they have new 

meansótechnical and conceptual as well as economicóto mobilize 

for action to advance those hopes and/or to allay those fears. Joining 

different kinds of people for common purposes in society becomes 

more conceivable, and modern mass communications provide ways 

to make it happen. 

These processes cut in contrary directions when it comes to social 
29

and political results: they can exacerbate distinctions of caste, ethnic 

origin, and communal affiliation; but they can also supersede these 

distinctions with more modern nationalisms. That is why in India we 

are seeing the emergence both of regional and caste-based parties and 

of a powerful new nationalism. And it helps explain the nationalism 

of Indiaís new private media, which one of our speakers alluded to. 

Yet nationalism is a problem as well as a solution, as the history 

of 20th century Europe attests. It is an ideology like any other, 

existing in time, expressing and responding to human needs, with 

many variants. There is nothing ìgivenî about it. In todayí s 

subcontinent, the chief variant, a kind of middle ground between the 

narrow self-definitions of the past and the broader communities of 

the future, is of course modern nationalism with a religious 

component. We are seeing it in both countries. In Pakistan, an 

Islamic component has been built into national feeling from the 

beginning. Islamic piety and Islamist revivalism have appeal not just 

in the civil and military bureaucracies that have always been the 

backbone of the Pakistani state and the core of its middle classes, but 

beyond them. The largest Islamic organization in Pakistan is not 

Jamaíat-I-Islami or any other political party, but Tablighi Jamaíat, 

which promotes individual and family piety and renewal, something 

like Moral Rearmament in our early 20th century. In an almost allMuslim country, it has proved easier to mobilize Muslims for 

reconversion to a purer and more disciplined ìIslamicî personal and 

family life than for ìIslamistî politics, at least up to now. (Of course, 

if Pakistan ever embarks on a path of rapid development which 

pushes millions of peasants quickly into the outskirts of cities with 

collapsing infrastructure, that could change.) In India the religious 

component has taken more muscular political forms, in the Hindu 

radicalism of core elements of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and 

its constituencies. 

It is true that there is no guarantee of peaceful development in 

these trends. On the contrary: highly destructive nationalism may 
30

now be part of Irelandís past, but it is almost certainly part of the 

subcontinentís future. Yet it is also true that in both countries you 

find a growing consciousness that joining the world is not just 

necessary but desirable. 

In India, new global aspirations are setting new standards of 

conduct. Being what Pervez Musharraf has called a ìresponsible and 

dignifiedî member of the world communityóas both countries 

desire to beómeans you cannot treat your neighbors or your own 

people as arbitrarily or brutally as you did when you lived in 

subcontinental isolation. Pakistan has always wanted to draw the 

world into the subcontinent as a counterweight to India, but there 

too the new global standards are now sharpening the countryís 

original dilemma. The original Pakistan movement of the 1930s and 

1940s was a coalition of three different kinds of Indian Muslims: 

Western-educated professionals, for whom Quaid-I-Azam 

Muhammad Ali Jinnah may stand as the exemplar; East Bengalis 

who wished to rid themselves of their Hindu landlords and 

moneylenders; and (latest of all, beginning only in the mid-1940s), 

powerful feudal and tribal leaders in Indiaís Northwest and their 

religious allies, mainly the shaikhs and pirs of the Sufi traditions. All 

wanted an Islamic country that would protect Indian Muslims from 

Hindu domination, but they had no common vision or definition of 

what it meant to be an ìIslamicî country. And although the actors 

have changed, in 54 years of independent existence no such common 

vision or definition has ever emerged. Pakistan has stayed locked 

into its point of departure: it is a refuge for Indian Muslims that 

needs to be defended, but its positive Islamic identity remains 

contentious and poorly defined. 

What Changed and Did Not Change in 1998 

It may be useful to sketch out the impact of the crises of 1998 and 

2001 on these basic features. Let us begin with the nuclear explosions 

of May 1998. 
31

In India, going overtly nuclear sharpened the discourse already 

underway on the countryís proper global role. Some who promoted 

overt nuclearization had high hopes that once the deed was done the 

doors of the worldís top club would simply swing open for India. 

But at least in the first months after the explosion, the sounds of 

doors slamming shut against her reverberated in Indian ears. And 

Pakistan somehow remained attached to her destiny like a tin can 

tied on by a naughty deity. In Pakistan, going overtly nuclear 

sharpened the perennial discourse on the countryís original 

dilemma: was the Islamic Republic now more secure from Indian 

domination, or did it needóand could it affordóto strike out with 

new vigor? The result was Pakistani oscillation between the horns of 

that dilemma. Being an overt nuclear power gave Pakistan the 

confidence to be wiseóto negotiate with India at Lahore in February 

1999óand then the confidence to be stupidóto put regulars as well 

as irregulars across the Line of Control (LOC) at Kargil a few months 

later. 

A s was the case with going overtly nuclear, the Kargil crisis of 

spring and summer 1999 also had contradictory results. If India 

believed after May 1998 that being nuclear would make it immune to 

Pakistaní s low-intensity warfare in Kashmir, the incursion put paid 

to the thought. But if Pakistan thought that being nuclear would 

neutralize Indiaí s conventional superiority and make the world safe 

for low-intensity conflict in Kashmir, the Indian reactionóthe threat 

to cross the LOC in forceóat least put that in question. 

Nevertheless, neither lesson was clear. Politically, the lessons of 

Kargil were muffled by the fact that India had not crossed the LOC 

and by the stab-in-the-back theory that spread in Pakistan, the myth 

that politicians had stolen a victory from the military. Kargil should 

have shown both countries that in contemporary South Asia, the 

really dangerous threshold of conflict, the line beyond which conflict 

enters a new and more dangerous stage, is not between conventional 
32

and nuclear war but between low-intensity and conventional war. 

But even after Kargil, the focus for actors and onlookers alike has 

continued to be the point at which one side in a conventional conflict 

uses nuclear weapons. So Kargil did not change the basics. 

What Changed and Did Not Change in 2001? 

It seems to me that September 11, the attacks on the World Trade 

Center and the Pentagon, and December 13, the attack on the Indian 

Parliament, should, taken as a sequence, finally demonstrate to both 

India and Pakistan that the critical threshold in their region is the 

one between low-intensity and conventional conflict. That seems to 

be the direction in which events and thinking are taking us. 

Much of what we have seen and heard over the month since 

December 13 has been traditional: high-decibel rhetoric and 

invective; ultimata and conditionalities that can be very dangerous if 

taken literally, as they often are in politics; a lot of grandstanding for 

the outside world. As one contributor has pointed out, both 

countries are in fact giving peeks at their nuclear card for political 

advantage. Nevertheless, it also seems clear that Pakistanís decision 

to join the world and the worldís decision to join Pakistan in 

September have laid the basis for a non-traditional outcome to the 

phase of the crisis that opened on December 13. Pressure from India 

and the world have been moving Pakistan along a path that its 

leadership had already chosen in September and stuck to through 

three hard months. This path was toward a definition of what it 

means for Pakistan to be Islamic that derives from the countryís 

founding fathers, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, and the 

other professionals from India who did so much to establish the 

Pakistani state, rather than the definitions offered by Islamist radicalismóeither the home-grown, North Indian variety associated with 

the Deoband school or the imported variety that has surged onto the 

world scene out of the Middle East since 1970. 
33

And India, meanwhile, appears to be realizing that the issues 

involved in the current crisis are not black-and-white, not zero-sum, 

not all-or-nothing: because the world cannot do and will not do 

without a viable Pakistan. Using force to eliminate the problems 

caused by Pakistan, or even just making Pakistan a pariah, are not 

realistic options for India. 

In fact, when it comes to India, the most striking change that the 

crisis has wrought up to now (January 2002) has been Indiaís new 

willingness to entertain a close relationship with the United States 

and strong U.S. involvement in the subcontinent. 

Obviously much depends on the durability of the worldís 

engagement in the region. Right now both India and Pakistan are 

making decisions that assume sustained international engagement in 

the subcontinent. If they begin to make decisions once more on the 

assumption that the United States and others will once again leave, 

both are likely to revert to their bad old impulses and policies, and 

probably to cruder, even more dangerous versions of them. 

Just as obviously, much also depends on whether the threshold 

from low-intensity unconventional warfare to conventional warfare 

can be recognized as the potential trigger for nuclear use (at one 

remove) that it really is. Pakistaní s low-intensity warfare against 

India is rooted after all in political disputes of which Kashmir is 

simply the most salient example. If the key threshold between 

unconventional and conventional warfare is to be raised and 

(especially) stabilized, the two countries and their friends must begin 

to deal with those disputes. If they cannot do so, the original 

dilemmas are likely to reemerge. 
35

Part II 

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND 

DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
37

CHAPTER 4 

A CHANGING INDIA 

Teresita C. Schaffer 

About ten years ago, I went for lunch to the home of an Indian 

friend. His neighborhood, in trans-Jamuna Delhi, had few cars but 

plenty of motorcycles, scooters and three-wheelers. Leafy trees 

shaded neighborhood shops. I had not been there in many years, and 

was utterly taken aback at the billboard that loomed over the main 

shopping street. It advertised an automatic washing machine. The 

makers of an expensive, power-eating machine evidently thought 

they could find buyers in a neighborhood I would have considered a 

far better market for traditional laundrymen. This was the moment 

when I realized how much middle-class India had changed. 

In the decade since this mini-moment of discovery, India has 

begun major transformations in its politics, economy, foreign policy, 

and security outlook. These may not manifest themselves in similar 

ìlight bulb moments,î but they will profoundly affect Indiaís future. 

Their impact will be affected as well by whether they are joined by a 

fifth transformationóin governance, in the transparency and effectiveness of Indiaís judicial, administrative and civic institutions. 

This essay analyzes the likely changes in Indiaís politics and its 

foreign policy over the next decade. These will be driven, however, 

not just by strictly political factors but also by Indiaís economic 

progress. Coalition politics, leadership transitions within India, and 

economic change will profoundly affect both Indiaís internal 

dynamics and its behavior on the international scene. The analysis 

begins with a brief look at where India is now, including the 

demographic changes that are likely during the next ten years. Next, 
38

it presents three possible scenarios for Indiaí s evolution, and finally 

the policy lessons we should learn. 

WHERE IS INDIA NOW? 

Changing Political Landscape 

The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its Hindu 

nationalist ideology, the weakening of the once dominant Congress 

Party and its moderate socialist and secular philosophy, the 

increasing power of regional parties, and the rising profile of castebased parties represent a major reshaping of the Indian political 

landscape. 

The Congress Party and the BJP remain at center stage of Indian 

politics, but their ability to stay there is not assured. They are 

currently the only two parties with national reach and ambition. The 

BJPís support across a wide range of demographic groups appears to 

be strengthening. The only populations where the Congress and its 

allies outpolled the BJP and its associates in 1999 were illiterate 

voters, scheduled castes, and Muslims. The number of illiterates is 

shrinking rapidly, and Congressís lead in these traditional ìvotebanksî is shrinking. The BJP coalitionís lead was particularly strong 

among voters under age 25, urban voters, well-educated voters, and 

upper-caste voters. 

More importantly, Congress and the BJP together still poll only 

about half of the votes in Indiaí s national elections. Votes for the BJP 

as an individual party actually fell in 1999 compared with 1998, and 

its aggregate votes as a party fell below those of Congress (24% to 

Congressís 28%).1 The BJP is vulnerable at the state level: its own 

geographic base is narrow and its record in state government 

unimpressive. Moreover, the power of incumbency is much weaker 

in India than, for example, in the United States. Out of 545 members 

of parliament elected in 1999, 183 were new, and this in an election 
39

that did not make major changes in the parliamentary numbers.2

The two biggest systemic questions facing the Indian political 

system in the next decade are the impact of coalition politics, 

including the role of state-based parties, and the issue of leadership 

change within parties. 

Coalitions. The last three Indian governments have been 

coalitions, and in all likelihood this pattern will continue at least over 

the next ten years. Indiaís elections increasingly revolve around local 

or regional concerns and power dynamics between social groups, 

and partly as a result, parties based in only one state have become 

increasingly important. Taken together, such parties polled almost as 

much as the combined votes of the BJP and Congress. Their 

increasing power has also increased the bargaining strength of the 

states with the center, with an impact on national economic and 

foreign policy as well. 

This change in Indiaís political center of gravity affects Indiaí s 

two large parties differently. Thus far, the BJP has had an easier time 

making alliances with the regional parties. At least for now, it is 

counting on these alliances, and has given upon establishing itself 

more firmly in the states of the south and east, where it is weak. 

Congress has difficulty making alliances with regional parties, since 

it often has to compete with them for power at the state level. It seeks 

allies instead among Indiaís ìleftistî parties. At present, this gives 

the BJP a structural advantage in building coalitions, but the 

Congress has a persistent advantage in projecting an all-India 

appeal. 

Coalition building means that even parties with a strong 

ideology, such as the BJP, need to govern from the center. This has 

not been an easy transition for the BJP. However, in one important 

areaóeconomic policyóthe ideological differences between the 

major parties have almost vanished. As a result, the key factor in 
40

determining how a government deals with economic policies is not 

so much its party profile as its stability. A government that expects 

to last four or five years will make more reform-oriented policy than 

one whose cohesion is under threat and whose members may be 

interested in using economic is sues for demagogic purposes. The 

coalition strains that followed the March 2002 communal violence in 

the state of Gujarat illustrate the problem. Several of the coalitionís 

members voted against the government on a censure motion regarding the governmentís handling of the violence. The scramble for 

enough votes to survive completely preoccupied the government for 

two months, and was a major factor in the governmentís decision to 

cancel some of the rather modest austerity measures proposed in its 

budget. 

Leadership. In the coming decade both the BJP and the Congress 

will undergo a transition in leadership. The BJP has a fairly deep 

bench, but it consists largely of older men, less flexible by reputation 

than Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee. Unless they change their style, 

they may have difficulty holding on to power or forming new types 

of coalitions. The Congress, on the other hand, is likely to have great 

difficulty moving outside the Nehru-Gandhi family for leadership, 

or dealing with the demonstrated weakness as a national standardbearer of Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born daughter-in-law of former 

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and widow of Rajiv. The Congress 

will be a very different party depending on whether it is able to 

grow new leadership outside the Nehru-Gandhi family or whether it 

waits for Sonia Gandhiís daughter, Priyanka, to join the political 

race. 

Regional politics could be the key arena for developing a new 

generation of politicians. Some of their leaders, such as Chief 

Minister Chandrababu Naidu of Andhra Pradesh, are progressive 

and dynamic. Others have perfected the art of patronage. The combination of low economic growth, huge populations, and patronageoriented politicians gives states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP) 
41

considerable power to disrupt national economic reform policies 

they find painful. 

Thus far, however, the state party leaders have primarily acted 

as spoilers on the national scene. To make a real play for national 

power, they would have to allow someone else to run their state 

power bases, and they have been reluctant to make this move. They 

would also face the challenge of extending their own geographic 

reach, either by working with a national party that would have a 

larger parliamentary presence to start with, or by starting their own 

political party, with all the challenges that implies. 

Foreign Policy and Security: India in a Changing World 

Indiaís foreign policy has moved away from its ideologically 

grounded Nehruvian roots. It still rests on a strong consensus that 

India must remain an autonomous actor in the world, one that no 

larger power can take for granted, and that it prefers a multipolar to 

a unipolar international political and security structure. Leadership 

in the Non-Aligned Movement once was the principal means of 

gaining international status, and Russia was the primary extraregional friend. Now, India has joined the ìnuclear club,î and seeks 

a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. The United 

States has emerged as its key extra-regional relationship. Indiaís 

preoccupation with Pakistan remains, as does its desire for 

unchallenged dominance in South Asia. But far more than in the past 

couple of decades, India finds South Asia too small a stage. 

Three big question marks hover over Indiaí s foreign policy 

orientation in the next decade. First, to what extent will it accept the 

U.S. global leadership role, or to put it another way, how 

assiduously or successfully will it seek out partners in creating a 

more multipolar order? Second, how will the future evolution of 

China and Russia affect Indiaís strategic goals? And finally, and 

most importantly, will India be able to resolve its differences with 
42

Pakistan, or will it remain tethered to its past and to a static position 

in the region by a continuing dispute across its western frontier? 

Relations with the United States. The India-U.S. relationship is 

central to the new Indian foreign policy. For the United States, 

changes in East Asiaóthe rise of China, the changing dynamics of 

the Korean peninsula, the prolonged slump in Japan, the dislocation 

in Indonesiaóand Indiaís own rapid growth in the past decade have 

awakened the U.S. government to India as a major factor in the 

larger Asian regional picture. For India, the increasing importance of 

economics in their foreign policy, the end of the Cold War, and a 

series of governments with pragmatic foreign policies have raised 

the priority accorded to ties with Washington. Both countries 

acknowledge a growing overlap in their strategic interests in the 

Middle East, Central Asia and increasingly Southeast Asia, in 

contrast to Indiaís traditional misgivings about the U.S. military 

presence in Asia. Both countries oppose having a single power 

dominate Asia, and both are carefully watching a rising China. Even 

in the contentious nuclear area, they are quietly discovering a 

common interest in stemming further proliferation of weapons 

technology, and Indiaís strategists see in the Bush administrationís 

disenchantment with international nonproliferation agreements an 

opportunity to sidestep some of the traditional U.S.-Indian nuclear 

disputes. 

The U.S. decision to reengage Pakistan after the attacks of 

September 11 raised questions in India about whether the ìbad old 

daysî of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance were returning. Since that time, a 

steady parade of high-level visitors between New Delhi and 

Washington have made it clear that despite the new U.S.-Pakistan 

ties, the United States and India are far more productively and 

intensely engaged than at any time in the past half century. How 

both countries manage that relationshipóboth the common interests 

and the inevitable continuing disagreementsówill to a large extent 

shape the role that India plays in the region and the world. 
43

W hither Russia? Despite the reduction in its international role, 

Russia remains Indiaís largest foreign source of military supply, and 

will remain so at least for the next decade. It is a significant trading 

partner, and if Russiaís economy revives, trade is also likely to grow. 

But perhaps its greatest importance for Indian policymakers is as a 

potential power center in the multipolar world Indians would prefer 

to see develop in the next decade or two. A revived Russia is 

unlikely to accept continued U.S. dominance without making some 

effort to push back. Russian leaders have encouraged India to think 

of itself as an important power center as wellósomething that 

hardly needs encouragement in Delhi. Whether the India-Russia 

connection fits peacefully into the network of relationships the 

United States is now trying to build or whether it instead becomes a 

thorn in the side of the United States and a threat to American ties 

with India depends in large measure on how valuable both India 

and Russia find their respective relations with the United States. 

A Rising China. India-China relations have changed less with the 

end of the Cold War. The two countries share the longest disputed 

border in the world and fought a war over it in 1962. Indiaís loss in 

that war left a chronic sense of insecurity vis-‡-vis China. More 

recently, Indians resent the discrepancy in the way the world 

regards Indiaís and Chinaís nuclear programs. Their position as two 

rising states next to one another is likely to sustain their rivalry 

despite both countriesí efforts to manage their disputes peacefully. 

China and India both have troubled and vulnerable peripheries: 

Tibet and Xinjiang for China, Kashmir and the Northeast for India. 

Chinaís continuing nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan suggests that 

China wants to keep India somewhat concerned about its western 

frontier. Its failure to support Pakistanís Kargil incursion in 1999, 

however, indicates that China does not want to see its two nuclear 

neighbors go to war. On the other side of the ledger, India has 

caused China angst by allowing the Dalai Lama to live in 
44

Dharamsala since he fled Tibet in 1959, and more recently by taking 

in the Karmappa Lama. Although the Tibetansí activities are 

restricted in India, their presence there is nonetheless a source of 

irritation to China. 

Future Sino-Indian relations will be influenced by both countriesí 

leadership changes, by their overall economic health and potential 

for an outward-looking foreign policy, and by their success in 

tackling internal instability. At present, China is far more important 

to Indiaís security than the reverse. India may narrow the gap 

between its and Chinaís economic performance and regional profile 

in the next ten years, but is not likely to overtake China, barring a 

major economic disaster in China. Both will carefully watch the 

Indian Ocean sea routes through which their oil is imported. An 

Indian naval build-up and closer ties between India and the United 

States, or India and the ASEAN states, which form Chinaís strategic 

periphery, could arouse concerns in China. 

The “Pakistan Trap.” The hardy perennial in Indiaís foreign 

relations is its unresolved dispute with Pakistan, which keeps both 

countries trapped in the past. This ìPakistan Trapî is one of the 

principal impediments to Indiaís fulfilling its ambitions for a higher 

profile international role. For both countries, Kashmir embodies 

basic questions of identity, symbolizing for Pakistan the Muslim 

majority area that it was deprived of, and for India the demonstration of its secular character. Besides this central issue, the two 

countries dispute a laundry list of ìnormalization problemsîóvisas, 

trade problems, and the like. These specific problems are magnified 

by Pakistanís and Indiaís asymmetrical views of their place in the 

world. Pakistan suffers from chronic insecurity and a 50-year quest 

to move out of the shadow of Indiaís superior size and strength. 

India, on the other hand, resents being equated with Pakistan and 

seeks recognition as a world power. With nuclear weapons in both 

countries, the volatility of India-Pakistan relations takes on greater 

international importance. 
45

 At present, the India-Pakistan relationship remains at more or 

less the same impasse where it has festered for the past 10 years. If 

this continues for another 10 years, it will severely depress Indiaís 

chances of making good on its economic and international potential. 

Escaping the trap will require strong leadership in both 

countries. The big danger for India remains the institutional weakness and threat of fragmentation in Pakistan. Following the attacks 

on the United States and especially following the attack on the 

Indian parliament in December 2001, Pakistan has reversed its 

Afghanistan policy and banned several militant groups active in 

Kashmir and within Pakistan. If this policy change is seriously 

implemented and sustained, it will represent an opportunity to put 

both Pakistan and its relations with India on a different course. In 

the short run, however, the impact of the attack on the Indian 

parliament has been a dangerous increase in tensions between these 

two nuclear-armed countries. 

In looking at scenarios for Indiaís future, I have tried to identify 

the opportunities and assets India could mobilize in solving this 

stubborn problem, but this remains the biggest drag on Indiaís 

potential development. 

Demographic Change by 2010: Building Blocks for the Future 

Indiaís 2001 census records remarkable demographic changes in 

the past ten years, changes that are likely to herald even more 

dramatic ones in the next decade. A few trends are likely to have 

particular political importance: 

ï Population: Population growth has slowed dramatically. 

Indiaís population is projected at 1.18 billion in 2010óonly 18 

percent above its current level.3 Population growth may 

stabilize in three of Indiaís states in the next 20 yearsóKerala, 
46

Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. On the other hand, 

population growth has been accelerating in Uttar Pradesh, 

Bihar and the normally more progressive Haryana and 

Gujarat.4 

ï Literacy: Literacy has grown rapidly in the past ten years, and 

primary school enrollment figures suggest that it will continue 

to do so. The census shows male literacy at 76 percent. The 

growth of female literacy is even more dramaticóup by 15 

percentage points to 54% nationwide. Male literacy could be 

nearly universal in ten years. Regional variations in literacy 

rates are even more striking, with some of the most 

economically and socially laggard statesóRajasthan and 

Madhya Pradeshóhaving nearly doubled literacy.5 This has 

the makings of a social revolution. Less heralded is the 

increase in secondary school enrollment. United Nations (UN) 

data for 1996 show 59 percent of boys and 39 percent of girls 

enrolled in secondary school. While primary education starts 

the social revolution, secondary education provides the 

potential economic boom. 

ï Urbanization: Cities continue to grow faster than the 

countryside. Todayís urban population accounts for about 25 

percent of Indiaís population. The Indian census projects urban 

population at 32 percent of the national total by 2011. Literacy 

is markedly higher in cities than in the country as a whole; 

even states with literacy rates well below the national average 

have solid majorities that are literate in the cities.6 Cities 

incubate both a rootless working class population and the new 

middle class. Their political allegiances follow different 

patterns. A larger and more volatile urban population may 

also magnify the political reaction to potential future political 

or security setbacks. 

ï Inequality: Economic growth has been unevenly distributed 
47

among Indiaís states. Growth rates in the 1990s ranged from 

over 8 percent (Gujarat) to 2.7 percent (Bihar).7 The fastest 

growing populations have the slowest growing economies. 

Some of todayís laggardsónotably UP and Biharóare 

showing few signs of progress, and their large size means they 

can extract a considerable political price on the nationís 

economic reform efforts. On the other hand, the acceleration of 

literacy in some of the traditionally backward states shows that 

these trends cannot be taken for granted. They also argue that 

decentralization may be a good remedy for some of the social 

ills that have resisted progress thus far. 

ï The Wild CardñAIDS: The growth of AIDS is the biggest 

demographic wild cardóand the one where statistics are least 

reliable. According to an estimate calculated by the National 

AIDS Control Program in India, in 2000 there were close to 

four million people infected with HIV in India. Many experts 

believe that the disease is massively under-reported; estimates 

of the real incidence run as high as 10 million. The rate of 

increase could be as large as one to two million per year, with 

the total number of infected doubling every 2-3 years. These 

figures could result in as many as 100 million infected people 

by 2010.8

The scenarios given below do not factor in the rate of HIV/AIDS 

infection. But if it reaches anything like this faster pace, it will have 

devastating economic and social consequences. Based on the experience of the most heavily infected countries, when infection reaches 5 

percent of a countryís population, economic growth is affected, and 

at 10 percent, growth can be halted altogether.9 Due to the weak 

health infrastructure in India, life expectancy after infection is likely 

to be only 4-5 years. Success in containing AIDS and caring for the 

infected depends critically on governance. 
48

THREE POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS 

These political trends and demographic changes may combine in 

any number of ways in the next 10 to 20 years. I would like to 

discuss three possible scenarios, focused on the next 10 years. The 

first two are largely driven by different economic growth rates; the 

third is driven by major changes in the political leadership and 

structure. They tell very different stories about how India may look 

in the future, and how it will manage not only its domestic problems 

but its foreign policy and security as well. Scenario building is of 

course speculative, but I will try to distill some useful lessons from it 

at the end. 

Scenario I: The ìWell-Fed Tiger.î 

In this first scenario, India continues to enjoy high economic 

growth, reaching 7 to 8 percent per year by the end of the decade. By 

2010, its per capita income has doubled, reaching roughly the level of 

todayís Peru. This is accompanied by significant improvements in 

the efficiency and integrity of governance; indeed, it is almost 

impossible to expect this kind of sustained growth without a major 

push for good governance. The more dynamic and successful states 

surge ahead; in the process, they expand their political margin for 

maneuver vis-‡-vis the center, and the result is greater 

decentralization without any formal constitutional change. 

The economic success of the BJP is mirrored at the polls. The 

parliamentary elections of 2004 return a BJP government, with a 

stronger coalition, still based heavily on parties based in the more 

economically successful states. The next generation of BJP leaders 

takes over, its hard-line instincts somewhat tempered by the need to 

keep a coalition together and win votes outside of the BJPís home 

territory. 

But this political and economic success comes at a price. The 
49

politics of northern India, largely left out of the economic boom, 

become increasingly dysfunctional. The large parliamentary delegations from Uttar Pradesh (UP), Bihar and some of the other large 

states of the north become increasingly resistant to decreases in subsidies and insistent on increasing their share of the resources redistributed by the central government. Dealing with their demands 

becomes an increasingly time-consuming chore for the government, 

and strengthens the sense that there are at least two Indias 

developing in different ways. 

Both the growing economy and the strong defense orientation of 

the government result in a steady increase in defense budgets, 

especially in the first half of the decade. The first focus of this 

defense buildup is power projection capability. The missile program 

accelerates, with the Agni being deployed in 2006, and the navy 

benefits from a surge in procurement. The second key area is stateof-the-art border monitoring and control, including Phalcon aircraft 

from Israel and sensor technology. A growing number of Indiaís 

military supply contracts are with Western or Israeli suppliers, 

reinforcing the importance India attaches to those political 

relationships. 

A government of this sort will take a fairly tough line toward 

Pakistan. It will respond harshly to cross-border incidents, though a 

combination of monitoring equipment and a decision to allow 

international monitors have resulted in a significant decrease in 

infiltration. However, if the government becomes convinced the 

dispute with Pakistan is interfering with its broader goals, it would 

have an opportunity to change the relationship with Pakistan. The 

de facto decentralization of the political system could make it easier 

to bring in real autonomy in Kashmir, and this could become part of 

an expanded compromise agreement with Pakistan. An economically successful BJP government would be well placed to face down 

domestic critics of its peace overtures. The big obstacles to such a 

happy outcome would be the new BJP leadersí own hard-line 
50

instincts and the difficulty for a still fragile Pakistan to reduce its 

goals in Kashmir. 

The booming economy will also make energy diplomacy an 

important priority for India. Here, the governmentís nationalist 

instincts might conflict with the kind of sensitive handling needed to 

negotiate gas and hydroelectric supply agreements with Bangladesh 

and Nepal. 

Outside the region, Indiaís policy under this scenario will be 

pragmatic. Relations with the United States will remain key, and will 

prosper. Indiaís economic success will expand both trade and 

investment with the United States, a central ingredient in any really 

significant U.S. relationship. In addition, the security dialogue begun 

after the Clinton visit in 2000 is likely to grow, with special emphasis 

on Indian Ocean security and on the broader Asian security picture. 

In the nuclear field, India will work pragmatically with the United 

States to find ways of participating in international efforts to reduce 

the further spread of nuclear weapons. 

The India-China rivalry will remain, but will be driven primarily 

by the stability of the Chinese and the Indian periphery and by 

Chinese internal stability. A Sino-Indian breakthrough is unlikely. 

Internal trouble in China would lead to a more brittle Chinese 

approach to India. China will maintain a strong relationship with 

Pakistan, but will not seek to provoke an India-Pakistan crisis. 

Indications that China is meddling in Indiaís troubled northeast 

would spark a crisis in India-China relations; the same would be true 

of any indication that India was involved in Tibet or Xinjiang. 

In general, economic ties will be a more important feature of 

Indiaís foreign policy outlook. This means that India will give 

heightened priority to its relations with Southeast Asia, with its oil 

suppliers in the Middle East, and with potential new suppliers in 

Central Asia. This could lead to disagreements with the United 
51

States over how to deal with Iraq and Iran, though that will also 

depend a great deal on how U.S. policies develop. 

Scenario II: The ìHungry Tiger.î 

In this scenario, Indiaís rapid economic growth of the past 

decade falters, and a series of cautious budgets leave India at middecade with slightly reduced growth (4 to 5 percent). The governmentís fiscal problems have severely constrained investment in 

public infrastructure, the more so since parliamentary log-rolling has 

prevented any significant reduction in subsidies. The result is far 

from disastrous, but certainly does not represent a breakthrough in 

reducing Indiaís poverty. Nor can one point to any significant 

improvement in governance. There is little change in the relationship 

between the center and the states. This helps various state-level 

coalition governments avoid trouble, but also depresses growth in 

more dynamic states. 

The BJP is re-elected in 2004, but its weak economic performance 

contributes to a reduction in both the BJPís individual showing and 

the strength of the coalition. Within a year, political polarization in 

the states of UP and Bihar coupled with a backlash from 

ìprogressiveî states leads to a successful Congress move to unseat 

the new government on a motion of no-confidence. 

A weak and fractious Congress coalition takes over, dependent 

on mutually antagonistic coalition partners. Its new leader, Priyanka 

Gandhi, excites the popular imagination, but has little experience 

and inherits many of the ìold guardî advisers that had remained 

close to her mother. They are reluctant to undertake more vigorous 

economic reforms, given the fragility of their political base and the 

importance to it of the traditional leftist parties. They are also eager 

to show that their foreign policy is more nationalistic than that of the 

outgoing BJP. By the end of the decade, Priyanka is beginning to 

shift to a new group of advisers, but she never expands her working 
52

majority in parliament enough to make possible a bold approach to 

policy. 

The BJP in opposition reverts to its more militant tradition, 

demanding stronger policies vis-‡-vis the neighbors, and pressuring 

the government to continue its expensive military build-up. They 

also resurrect aspects of their cultural and communal agenda that 

had been put aside during the years they ran the government. 

The new government maintains a tough stand on Pakistan. In 

contrast to the previous scenario, however, Indiaís lackluster 

economic performance and highly visible political squabbling leads 

the Pakistan leadership to conclude that Indiaís strength is waning in 

very fundamental ways, and that it can afford a more aggressive 

stance on supporting the militancy in Kashmir. India-Pakistan 

relations become even more crisis-prone as a result. The possibilities 

for a misunderstanding or faulty intelligence leading to a nuclear 

face-off are significantly higher under this scenario than under the 

previous ones. 

The governmentís defense build-up is constrained by its 

economic woes. It focuses on a few high-profile items. The missile 

program is a high priority. Procurement from the West does not 

increase, largely because of the cost of Western equipment. India 

extends its nationalistic approach to policy beyond the region as 

well. Relations with the United States stagnate, partly because of an 

increasingly contentious Indian posture in multilateral negotiations 

and partly because the private economic relationship is going nowhere. Trade remains at about the same level; investment falls, with 

a couple of contentious investment disputes and the unfavorable 

economic policy climate scaring away new investors. 

India makes a major bid to revive its relations with Russia. The 

impact of this effort depends to a large extent on what happens in 

Russia during the next decade. If Russiaís economy has revived and 
53

its foreign policy has become more active, it would find in the 

ìHungry Tigerî India a partner interested in scoring points against 

the United States on a variety of global issues. 

Relations with China, on the other hand, do not change very 

much. China essentially ignores India, reinforced in its view that 

India is not in the same league. Indiaís relations with Southeast Asia 

also stagnate, lacking the economic stimulus the relations thrive on. 

Scenario III: ìThe Tiger Regroups.î 

This is the most speculative of the scenarios, and unlike the other 

two is driven by changes in the political structure rather than 

economic growth. As the 2004 elections approach, splits in Congress 

and the BJP shake up the political system. Two groups could gain 

from such a scenario. 

The most interesting potential ìwinnersî are the state-based 

parties. Those in southern India have been a source of pragmatic and 

savvy political leaders. However, taking advantage of this type of 

opportunity would require wrenching change in those leadersí 

modus operandi: if they made a bid for national political office, they 

would probably have to leave their state Chief Minister position to 

someone else. Moreover, they cannot run the country without the 

north, and would therefore have to find allies among parties with a 

base there. 

The other potential winner is the Congress, or more precisely 

parts of the Congress. The present weakness in Congress leaves a 

vacuum at the center-left of the Indian political spectrum that might 

attract a new combination of Congress and non-Congress politicians 

looking for a new political base. 

In the short-term, political regrouping would be a recipe for 

inward-looking politics. Forming and maintaining coalitions would 
54

become the overwhelming preoccupation of political parties. This 

creates an environment that is bad for economic growth, bad for 

foreign policy, and bad for relations with the U.S. in the short term. 

The question is whether it can be an opportunity in the long term, by 

bringing some new faces on to the national scene. A shakeup of this 

sort could also encourage de facto decentralization and be a turning 

point in center-state relations, especially if the new leadership were 

drawn from state-based parties. 

While a messy scenario like this one is not a good backdrop for 

peace initiatives, it is interesting to speculate on how a peace 

initiative might arise. Perhaps a leader from outside the north comes 

to power determined to reach a settlement with Pakistan so as to 

position India better to pursue its international agenda. Not 

beholden to Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah and the 

Kashmiri politicians with whom India has worked over the years, 

he/she succeeds in bringing a broader range of Kashmiris into 

discussions and eventually into the electoral process. This opening to 

the Kashmiris is matched by a serious offer of discussions with 

Pakistan, starting with an equally dramatic gestureóperhaps a 

proposal to resolve the Siachen Glacier problem, long a bone in 

Pakistanís throat. 

Another element in this hypothetical peace initiative could be a 

vigorous effort at energy diplomacy. Energy trade represents the 

greatest untapped economic benefit for the South Asian region. India 

is one of the two fastest-growing energy markets in the world; 

Bangladeshi gas, Nepali and Bhutanese hydropower, and oil and gas 

transported from Central Asia and Iran through Pakistan could all 

help meet Indiaís demand provided the political obstacles can be 

overcome. Here too, new leadership in India might be able to shed 

some of the historical baggage Indian governments have accumulated by cultivating a more supple and less overbearing approach to 

Indiaís smaller neighbors. On the Pakistan front, provided India and 

Pakistan first make some political progress on their larger dispute, 
55

an energy transit agreement could strengthen the peace constituencies in both countries. 

The fundamental question in trying to assess the prospects for a 

peace initiative is how Pakistan would react. Would it take a 

similarly bold approach, or would it try to take advantage of Indiaís 

internal ìmessinessî? The answer depends in part on Pakistanís own 

internal coherence, and in part on its leadersí willingness to redefine 

the position on Kashmir they have maintained for half a century. 

Predicting Pakistanís future goes well beyond the scope of this 

paper. The policy changes President Musharraf undertook after the 

attacks on New York and Washington, and especially after the attack 

on the Indian parliament, could provide a chance that Pakistan will 

start the kind of revival that would make possible a constructive 

policy toward India. The signs since then are mixed. 

SIGNPOSTS AND IMPLICATIONS 

Which of these scenarios is most likely? At present, the indicators 

are not clear. The economic performance of the 1990s would be 

consistent with the ìWell-Fed Tiger,î but the past year has seen 

economic activity slump. Turmoil in the BJP-led coalition following 

the communal riots of March 2002 suggests that India could be 

headed toward ìThe Tiger Regroups.î Perhaps the most concrete 

indicator over the next few years of the direction in which India is 

headed will be whether the government is able to tackle the 

multilayered problems of the electric power industry. This can be 

taken as a proxy for economic reform, governance, and the vitality of 

decentralization efforts.10 On the political side, one important indicator will be the ability of the two major parties to bring in new blood. 

Another is the concentration or fragmentation of votes at the state 

level in Indiaís major states: will the BJP and the Congress revitalize 

themselves in the major states, or will parties based in one state or 

drawing from one caste group continue to proliferate and to expand 

their collective role in national life? 
56

On one point, the prognosis is more discouraging. Nothing in 

current trends provides much optimism that India and Pakistan will 

make real progress toward a settlement. This should be a major 

priority for both. The scenarios as well as more conventional projections make it clear that the continuing dispute extracts a heavy price. 

For India, it stands in the way of a much-prized greater role on the 

world stage, and tends to pull down both economic growth and 

national integration. For Pakistan, the impact is much more severe: 

the domestic strains that have come close to tearing the country 

apart as well as its international isolation during the 1990s are both 

traceable to the countryís involvement in the Kashmir insurgency. 

Predicting which scenario will come to pass, however, is less 

important than assessing the policy conclusions that arise out of all 

three. Four lessons are particularly important. 

Lesson 1: The Economy is Key. 

High growth is likely to produce greater political stability and 

more constructive international policies than stagnation. It fosters 

trade and investment and encourages outward-looking policies. It is 

particularly beneficial to India-U.S. ties. Indiaís emerging relationship with Southeast Asia (Indiaís ìLook Eastî policy) was a result of 

its new economic policies and the foreign policy that flows from this 

economic diplomacy. Politics in India will always be messy, and 

inequality between states will cause some backlash. But the 

problems of success are preferable to those of economic stagnation. 

Low growth leads to confrontational and poisonous politics. The 

ìHungry Tigerî scenario, with a combination of low economic 

growth and attempts at military expansion, is the most dangerous, 

and is a recipe for India-Pakistan miscalculation. Low growth in the 

ìTiger Regroupsî scenario compounds the political upheavals built 

into the scenario. 
57

Lesson 2: Political Leadership is Essential. 

In trying to assess what backdrop is most favorable to dynamic 

economic reform and statesmanlike stewardship of India-Pakistan 

relations, one cannot escape political leadership. Prosperity may be 

the most promising condition, but it cannot do the job by itself. That 

is why we should focus on the coming leadership and generational 

transition in the big parties. It will have an impact on national policy 

as well as on the character of the parties themselves. Leaders of state 

parties will become more powerful at the center, and will seek a 

national role. Their success and scope will depend in large part on 

the alliances they build, as well as their ability to deal with the large 

and backward states like Bihar and UP, whose high populations give 

them enormous electoral power. 

To provide leadership in the next decade and beyond, the 

political system needs to develop new talent. And it may beóas 

illustrated by the ìTiger Regroupsî scenarioóthat the price of 

developing long-term leadership is short-term instability. 

Lesson 3: The Mismatch Between Indiaís Policy Goals and Its 

Capabilities Will Continue. 

Indiaís foreign and military policies show a curious imbalance 

between ambitions and capabilities. Published policy documents and 

private conversations, for example, both suggest that India is much 

more dedicated to the goal of achieving permanent membership on 

the United Nations Security Council, for example, than it is 

committed to any particular course of action once it gets there. Its 

military plans in the past few years have involved ambitious 

procurement and technology upgrade goals, but the link between 

these and its immediate operational requirements has sometimes 

been weak. 
58

This disconnect is most dangerous in the low-growth scenario, 

where it can contribute to disastrous miscalculations (for example, 

between India and Pakistan) . A high-growth scenario would make it 

easier for India to fill some of these gaps in the next decade. In the 

meantime, it is worth thinking about whether a more operationally 

savvy defense policy could increase Indiaís power, as well as save it 

money. It is also worth reflecting on the mismatch between military 

plans and Indiaís diplomacy. A continued high defense build-up will 

backfire without a deft foreign policy outreach in the Indian Ocean 

region. 

Lesson 4: The External Dimension: Deal with Pakistan. 

While Indiaís basic orientation will be based chiefly on what 

happens inside India, the unresolved dispute with Pakistan is the 

biggest sea anchor on Indiaís international ambitions. These 

scenarios suggest that dealing with it will probably get harder with 

time. If India is successful in this effort, it will be able to focus more 

of its attention on its relations with the worldís major powers; if not, 

it is likely to be pulled back toward its preoccupation with Pakistan 

at regular intervals. 

The scenarios discuss the opportunities and constraints for India. 

The obstacles to a vigorous and effective Indian peace policy become 

more severe if India goes through a messy political leadership 

change. An extended period of lagging economic growth also makes 

it more difficult for India to make a serious move toward peace, 

partly because it will make the Indian government more concerned 

about being driven from off ice, and partly because it could lead to 

miscalculation by Pakistan of where India really stands. None of 

these conditions is likely to improve with time. If there is a moment 

of opportunity, in other words, it is now. 

But prospects for a successful peace effort also depend on 

Pakistan. Indeed, some observers have gone so far as to say that the 
59

prospects for international stability in South Asia depend chiefly on 

Pakistan. The sources of instability in Pakistan are many and 

complex: an anemic economy, weak political institutions made 

weaker by persistent military intervention in politics, divisions 

among provinces and religious communities, and policies in 

Afghanistan and Kashmir that have encouraged the growth of 

militant organizations that operate with little respect for the state. 

This last point is probably the most fundamental issue. 

Since September 11, President Musharraf has reversed his 

governmentís Afghan policy and announced action against the 

militant groupsí activities within Pakistan. Will the logic of this 

action extend as well to cutting off the infiltration of militants into 

Kashmir? The policy changes have been well received in many parts 

of the Pakistani electorate, but have provoked a vocal and violent 

challenge from some of the militants. How will this play out? The 

April 30 referendum on President Musharrafís continued tenure as 

president left a sour taste in many Pakistani mouths and weakened 

Pakistanís already troubled political institutions. What will be the 

impact of the parliamentary elections expected later in 2002, and will 

they provide the political legitimacy the current government lacks? If 

the answer to these questions is positive, then Pakistan will 

gradually become a steadier and more coherent country, and a better 

bet for a serious peace effortóprovided its leadership is prepared to 

go down that road. 

A successful effort to take advantage of todayís opportunities 

will require imagination, forbearance and steady nerves in India, 

and even more so in Pakistan, where a 50-year sense of grievance 

and insecurity and the reality that its ambitions are unlikely to be 

met will make the peace effort more painful. It will require an 

extended effort, a process that can be sustained through the 

inevitable interruptions, and leaders willing to keep the effort going. 

It will also, I believe, require active, sophisticated and discreet 

encouragement from a third party, and since its reengagement with 
60

Pakistan, the United States is for the first time in decades uniquely 

placed to play a constructive role. But the first step out of that trap is 

to recognize that this is something important for India, not a favor to 

Pakistan or the rest of the world, and that there is a problem that 

needs solving even during periods when the violence in Kashmir 

ebbs. 

ENDNOTES 

1. Swapan Dasgupta, ìStill for Vajpayee,î India Today, October 4, 1999. 

2. Parliamentary profile at http://alfa.nic.in/lok13/list/alpha/first/13lsfalpha.htm. 

3. Web site of India Census bureau, http://www.censusindia.net/, accessed 

August 29, 2001. 

4. Jairam Ramesh, ìLight from the Census,î India Today, April 23, 2001. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Web site of Indian Census Bureau, http://www.censusindia.net/, accessed 

August 29, 2001. 

7. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, ìState Level Performance Under Economic 

Reforms in India, ì paper presented at the conference on Indian Economic 

Prospects, Stanford, May 2000. 

8. UNAIDS/WHO, Epidemiological Fact Sheet on India, 2000 Update, New York: 

United Nations, 2000. 

9. Estimate from unpublished working paper by the HIV/AIDS Task Force, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, January 2002. 

10. Indiaís electricity sector is the responsibility of State Electricity Boards 

(SEBs) in each state. Without exception, these boards are in financial trouble. The 

system as a whole has uncollected bills exceeding 25 percent of total billings. In 

most states, farmers receive free or dramatically subsidized power, but because of 

maintenance, financial and management problems, the power is extremely 

unreliable. Private sector operators have been licensed to produce electricity, but 

several of these investments have foundered in a very public way, typically when 

the SEB that was supposed to buy their entire output was unable to pay for it. (The 
61

Enron investment at Dabhol, in Maharashtra, is a particularly conspicuous 

example.) The central government, acutely conscious that the power sector is 

responsible for a major portion of the combined massive and growing fiscal deficit 

of the center and the states, has tried to implement a package of policy reforms 

that would give states a positive incentive to address the problems of their 

respective power sectors. In the final analysis, however, corrective action depends 

on the hard work of each of the state SEBs and state governments. 
63

CHAPTER 5 

SOUTH ASIA IN 2020: ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 

Vijay L. Kelkar1

Rapid economic growth and successful poverty reduction in 

South Asia, the home for the largest number of poor people in the 

world, is of strategic importance to the global community, as a 

prosperous South Asia would vitally contribute to global peace. This 

paper deals with the challenges in achieving accelerated economic 

growth in South Asia in this age of globalization. The first part 

covers long-term economic trends in South Asia in general and in 

India in particular. The second part develops a growth scenario for 

the South Asian region for the year 2020, focusing on the challenges 

faced by Indiaóthe predominant economy in the regionóin 

accelerating growth as well as discussing the reform prospects of 

other major countries of the region such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and 

Sri Lanka. 

PART I: SOUTH ASIA: A PROFILE 

The countries of South Asia vary in size and complexity, 

particularly in terms of social stratification. The seven countries of 

the regionóBangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan 

and Sri Lankaóare spread over an area of half a million square 

kilometers (sq. km.). Presently about 1.34 billion people live in South 

Asia, accounting for 22 percent of the worldís population. About one 

billion of these live in India, making it the worldís second most 

populous country after China. The estimated gross domestic product 

(GDP) generated by all the South Asian countries in the year 1999 

was about US$593 billion, accounting for less than two percent of the 
64

global GDP, with Indiaís contribution being US$449 billion (about 76 

percent of the regional total).2 

Demographic Profile. 

The size and structure of the South Asian population have been 

changing. From 1960 to 2000, the regional population increased from 

about 562 million to an estimated 1.34 billion, making its combined 

size larger than that of China (data for this section is presented in 

Table 1). The four countries of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri 

Lanka together constitute 96 percent of that population. As the most 

populous among these four countries, India has more than 75 

percent of the regionís population. The annual population growth 

rate in South Asia has come down from 2.30 percent in 1961 to 1.89 

percent in 1999. And in the next two decades, as can be seen from 

Table 1F, the annual population growth rate is projected to gradually 

slow to 1.1 percent in South Asia and 1 percent in India. Though the 

demographic transition of the past four decades has led to a 

reduction in the dependency ratio (number of dependents per 100 

working-age population) from 78 to 67 and brought about a 

substantial increase in the size of the labor force in all of the 

countries in the region, its late arrival, to some extent, has worked 

against fast economic growth in South Asia. However, with reduced 

birth rates and consequent demographic changes, the dependency 

ratio by the year 2020 is projected to come down to about 49 in South 

Asia and to about 47 in India. Such a low dependency ratio would 

imply that the economically active population in the South Asia 

region would increase from about 800 million in 1999 to about 1.2 

billion by 2020 and bring in its wake associated advantages of 

demographic transition. What this means is that over the next few 

decades, the South Asian region will have the worldís largest 

economically active population. These trends have profound 

implications for the increased potential for achieving a miracle of 

rapid economic growth through higher savings and investment. 
65

Table 1A 

Trends in Population, 1960-99 (in millions)

1960 1970 1980 1990 1999 

Bangladesh 51 67 87 110 128 

India 435 548 687 850 998 

Pakistan 46 61 83 108 135 

Sri Lanka 10 13 15 17 19 

South Asia 562 712 903 1122 1329 

World 3019 3676 4430 5252 5978 

Korea, Rep. 25 32 38 43 47 

Malaysia 8 11 14 18 23 

China 667 818 981 1135 1254 

Table 1B 

Dependency Ratio (No. of dependents to 100 working-age population) 

 1960 1970 1980 1990 1999 

Bangladesh 80.8 95.7 97.9 90.3 72.9 

India 76.1 78.8 74.2 68.8 63.8 

Pakistan 92.3 97.9 89.6 84.7 82.7 

Sri Lanka 84.0 83.6 65.5 60.8 49.6 

South Asia 78.1 82.2 78.1 73.0 67.2 

World 73.9 76.6 71.2 64.2 60.0 

Korea, Rep. 82.7 83.0 60.8 44.6 39.6 

Malaysia 94.9 92.3 75.4 67.2 62.5 

China 77.8 78.7 67.4 49.8 47.9 

Table 1C 

Population Growth (annual %) 

1960 1970 1980 1990 1999 

Bangladesh 2.45 2.73 2.46 1.99 1.61 

India 1.85 2.31 2.25 2.02 1.80 

Pakistan 2.43 3.01 2.91 2.54 2.41 

Sri Lanka 2.51 2.12 1.83 1.11 1.10 

South Asia 2.30 2.43 2.34 2.09 1.89 

World 1.25 2.17 1.73 1.77 1.36 

Korea, Rep. 3.09 2.13 1.56 1.15 0.92 

Malaysia 3.02 2.54 2.35 2.97 2.36 

China 1.83 2.76 1.25 1.47 0.91 

Note: Population growth data of South Asia and the World are for the year 1961. 

Table 1. Population Statistics of Selected Countries. 
66

Table 1D 

 Population Projections (in millions)

2005 2010 2015 2020

Bangladesh 142 155 166 176

India 1,091 1,160 1,222 1,281

Pakistan 156 174 193 210

Sri Lanka 20 21 23 24

South Asia 1,467 1,576 1,676 1,772

World 6,418 6,758 7,086 7,403

Table 1E 

Dependency Ratio Projections (No. of dependents to 100 working-age population)

2005 2010 2015 2020

Bangladesh 59.1 57.5 54.4 49.5

India 57.2 52.7 49.2 46.9

Pakistan 73.7 66.9 61.4 56.9

Sri Lanka 46.2 46.7 48.6 49.6

South Asia 59.8 55.6 51.9 49.2

World 54.4 51.8 50.5 50.5

Table 1F 

 Population Growth Rate Projections (annual %)

 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 2015-20 

Bangladesh 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.2

India 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0

Pakistan 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.7

Sri Lanka 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9

South Asia 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1

World 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9

Table 1G 

Projected Life Expectancy at Birth (in years)

 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 2015-20

Bangladesh 62.1 63.6 65.2 66.7

India 62.9 63.2 64.7 66.0

Pakistan 63.9 65.1 66.8 68.3

Sri Lanka 74.1 75.2 76.2 77.2

South Asia 62.7 63.2 64.7 66.1

World 66.7 67.2 68.4 69.4

Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001 (CD-Rom) 

Table 1. Population Statistics of Selected Countries. (concluded) 

Natural Resources. 

Unlike other regions, such as Africa, West Asia or Latin America, 

South Asia is not well endowed with critical natural resources such 
67

as land, water, minerals and hydrocarbons. For instance, presently 

the per capita arable land in South Asia is 0.16 hectares, much lower 

than the worldís average of 0.24 hectares. Similarly, the South Asian 

region accounts for just 2 percent of the worldís forest cover, which 

is essential to maintain ecological balance and biodiversity, despite 

having 3.8 percent of the worldís total surface area.3 Presently 

782,000 sq. km. of forest area in this region account for only 15 

percent of its total land area, as compared to 29 percent of land area 

covered by forests in the world. Further, the rate of forest depletion 

in South Asia has been the highest in the world.4 

With respect to fresh water, although three large watersheds (the 

Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Indus) serve the region, the per 

capita availability of fresh water is much lower compared to other 

watersheds in the world. The per capita fresh water availability is 

estimated to be only 2,854 cubic meters (m3), as compared to the 

world average which exceeds 8,000 m3.5 With increasing 

urbanization, the most critical challenge for the region will be that of 

water. Further, if no significant changes in the environmental 

protection policies are made in the next 10-15 years, the devastating 

consequences of environmental degradation will pose the most 

serious challenge to the economy of the region. 

With respect to energy, which is so essential for industrialization 

and economic growth, South Asia fares poorly. The estimated 

reserves position, particularly that of oil and gas in the region, is not 

very encouraging. For instance, crude oil reserves are estimated to be 

just six billion barrels of the worldís 1,009 billion barrels (0.6 

percent). In per capita terms this comes to 4.6 barrels compared to 

169 barrels per capita in the world. The region has only 85 trillion 

cubic feet of natural gas reserves out of the worldís 5,016 trillion 

cubic feet of total gas reserves (1.69 percent). The coal reserves in the 

region, amounting to 195 billion metric tons out of the worldís 1,427 

billion metric tons (13 percent), give its people 147 metric tons per 

capita in contrast to the world average of 235 metric tons.6
68

Consequently, in the energy sector as a whole, South Asia is a major 

energy-importing region. The growth in population, urbanization 

and incomes will lead to further increase in energy imports, with 

greater dependence on the Persian Gulf region. This will have a 

considerable influence on the politics of the region. The relative 

scarcity of critical natural resources in South Asia has profound 

implications for regional growth strategies, calling for much greater 

participation in international trade as well as deeper integration with 

the world economy. 

Economic Performance. 

The four populous countries of the region, viz. Bangladesh, 

India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, share a common legacy of British rule. 

Soon after attaining independence around the middle of the 20th 

century, the South Asian countries adopted a strikingly similar 

planned approach to development by as signing a major role to the 

public sector and focusing on self-reliance and import substitution. 

They succeeded in achieving considerable economic progress 

compared to the period of colonial stagnation. Over the last 40 years, 

the GDP of the region as a whole increased from US$105 billion in 

1960 to US$593 billion in 1999óan increase of 5.6 times.7 However, 

as can be seen from Table 2, the overall growth rate of only 4 percent 

over the 3 decades between 1961 and 1989 is much lower in 

comparison to the generally observed growth rates of the countries 

of East Asiaóincluding China. During the pre-reform period of 

1961-89, the per capita gross national product (GNP) in the South 

Asia region grew at an average annual rate of 2.25 percent. However 

in the subsequent period, i.e., 1990-99, the per capita GNP grew at 

the rate of 3.44 percent per annum. In a comparatively brief period of 

10 years, when economic reforms were underway, the increase in 

percentage terms was almost equal to half of what had been 

achieved in the first 40 years. In sum, for more than 3 decades 

following independence, the output growth in the regionóespecially 

that of Indiaówas lower than that of global growth. However 
69

during the past 20-year period (1980-99), output growth has been 

out-performing the global growth rate. Further, during the latter 

period, economic performance remained more stable than in the 

preceding 30 years, confirming the belief that the economy has 

reached a qualitatively new phase. 

Table 2A: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 

1961-89 1990-99 

Bangladesh 3.10 4.87

India 4.23 5.62

Pakistan 6.14 4.01

Sri Lanka 4.33 5.26

South Asia 4.32 5.34

 

Table 2B: Per Capita Gross National Product (GNP) 

1961-89 1990-99

Bangladesh 0.76 3.71

India 2.36 3.77

Pakistan 3.07 1.63

Sri Lanka 2.50 3.99

South Asia 2.25 3.44

Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001 (CD-Rom) 

Table 2. Average Annual Growth Rates of Selected Countries 

of South Asia, 1961-99.

Trends in Trade. 

The countries in South Asia began opening up their economies in 

the late 1980s and early 1990s, much later than the East Asian 

countries which followed an export-led industrialization strategy 

from as early as the 1960s. Even China initiated such reforms in the 

late seventies. Among the South Asian countries India was a 

latecomer, initiating reforms only in 1991. The economies of South 

Asia were relatively closed until the late 1980s. In the year 1980, as 

shown in Table 3, the trade-to-GDP ratio of the South Asian region 
70

was 21 percent, while for India it was only about 16 percent.8 By 

comparison, the ratio was 74 percent for South Korea and 45 percent 

for the East Asia and Pacific region as a whole. At that time South 

Asiaís share of world exports was at the very insignificant level of 

0.7 percent. Generally the countries in South Asia not only followed 

a high tariff regime but also resorted to comprehensive quantitative 

restrictions. Even until the 1990s, the average tariff rate of 80 percent 

was almost four times higher than the rates prevalent in East Asia 

and twice that of China. The reasons for the slow growth of trade 

were rooted in the trade policies pursued by the South Asian 

countries. 

In the 1990s, the boom in world trade and reduced protectionist 

policies helped to increase South Asiaís trade growth to a rate of 

about eight percent per annum as compared to six percent for the 

world. During the 1990s, the value of trade (exports plus imports) in 

South Asia increased from US$84 billion in 1990 to US$162 billion in 

1999.9 In almost all the countries of the region, tariff barriers and 

import restrictions were reduced. For instance, the mean tariff rate in 

Bangladesh came down from 110 percent in 1989 to 22 percent in 

1999; the Indian tariff rate came down from 80 percent in 1990 to 32 

percent in 1999; and in Sri Lanka it came down from 28 percent in 

1990 to 19 percent in 1999. Nevertheless, the countries across the 

region experienced greater divergence in their trade performance 

(see Table 3). Smaller economies had a larger share of trade as a 

 1970 1980 1990 1999

Bangladesh 17 20 20 32 

India 8 16 17 27 

Nepal 13 30 32 53 

Pakistan 22 37 39 35 

Sri Lanka 54 87 68 78 

Korea, Rep. 37 74 59 77 

South Asia 12 21 22 30

Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001 (CD-Rom) 

Table 3. Share of Trade as Percentage of GDP―Selected Countries. 
71

percentage of GDP. For instance in 1999, Sri Lankaís trade as a 

percentage of GDP was as high as 78 percent whereas the 

corresponding figure for India, which accounts for three-fourths of 

the regional economy, was only 27 percent. For the region as a 

whole, trade as a percentage of GDP went up from 21 percent in 1989 

to 30 percent in 1999, signifying increased openness. Despite this 

increase, the share of South Asiaís exports in the world increased 

only marginally from 0.8 percent in 1990 to one percent in 1999. By 

comparison, the countries that form the Association of South East 

Asian Nations (ASEAN) increased their share of world trade from 

4.3 percent to 6.5 percent during the same period.10

 As for trade within the South Asia region, India was the 

dominant exporter, accounting for 75 percent of total exports. In 1990 

the South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation (SAARC) 

countries generated exports of only US$863 million among 

themselves, constituting a mere 3.2 percent of their total exports. In 

the subsequent 10 years there was some improvement. The exports 

within the SAARC countries went up to US$2.68 billion in 1999, 

constituting 4.7 percent of their total exports.11 However, compared 

to the countries of ASEAN, the South Asian region has yet to make 

any significant progress toward increasing trade within the region. 

The intra-regional exports among the ASEAN countries even in 1990 

totaled US$28.7 billion, constituting 19.8 percent of their total 

exports. By 1999, these figures were US$82 billion and 22.2 percent, 

respectively.12 

 As the countries in the South Asia region generally opted for 

state-led industrialization for the major part of their 40 years of 

development, relying primarily on domestic resources and markets, 

their attitude toward foreign investment was lukewarm and their 

policies were restrictive. Consequently the flow of foreign direct 

investment (FDI) of US$464 million in 1990 constituted a mere 0.23 

percent of total FDI in the world. Subsequently, in 1999 the FDI 

inflows into South Asia went up to US$3.1 billion, i.e., an increase of 
72

6.7 times. However, this still constituted a mere 0.34 percent of the 

worldís total FDI and remained much smaller than the FDI flows 

into China or other East Asian countries. For instance, the FDI into 

China went up from US$3.49 billion in 1990 to US$38.7 billion in 

1999. This resulted in an increase of its share of the worldís total FDI 

from 1.7 percent in 1990 to 4.4 percent in 1999. In contrast the FDI 

inflows into India increased from US$162 million in 1990 to US$2.17 

billion in 1999.13 The success of China in attracting FDI was, inter alia, 

attributed to its liberal regulatory regime and the expansion of the 

special economic zones (SEZs). The SEZs offered attractive 

incentives such as preferential tax and administrative treatment of 

foreign enterprises, more advanced infrastructure and a liberal 

business environment, and consequently the direct contribution of 

FDI to GDP growth in China has been the highest in these provinces. 

In fact, China has emerged as the most favored destination for FDI 

flows. The success of the SEZs was evident from the fact that 40 

percent of all FDI flow into China during 1990-97 was accounted for 

by the three provinces (Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan) with SEZs. 

A recent IMF study shows the considerable contribution of FDI to 

the dynamics of growth in China. It is estimated that FDI has led to 

an increase of 3 percent in the GDP growth rate of China. This 

successful example of China harnessing FDI to accelerate economic 

growth merits emulation by the countries of South Asia.14

Human Development Indicators. 

The regionís human development indicators are improving, but 

at a relatively slow pace.15 Over a period of three decades the 

combined adult literacy rate increased from 32 percent in 1970 to 51 

percent in 1997, which is rather depressing when compared to the 

achievements of developing countries as a group (from 43 percent to 

71 percent during the same period). A comparison with China (91 

percent) and other East Asian countries like Korea (99 percent) and 

Thailand (97 percent) is even more striking. The health indicators 

show some improvement but also highlight the gaps. For instance, 
73

the infant mortality rate (IMR) has declined from 128 in 1970 to 69 

per 1000 live births in 1999, but it is still very high when compared to 

East Asian countries (32/1000). During the last 30 years the life 

expectancy of South Asians has risen from 50 years to 62 years, but it 

is still short of the world average of 66.4 years. 

 On the whole range of social indicatorsósuch as life expectancy, 

access to safe drinking water and sanitation, infant mortality, and 

child malnutritionóthe countries of South Asia (except for Sri 

Lanka) are far behind most of the East Asian countries. The picture 

looks even more disturbing when one moves away from the social 

indicators to a broader range of indicators. For example, in 1999 

India had only 75 TV sets per one thousand people, compared to 292 

in China, 289 in Thailand, and 361 in Korea. In terms of telephone 

lines per thousand people, there were only 27 in India as compared 

with 86 each in China and Thailand, and 438 in Korea. In the same 

year, there were only two mobile phones per thousand people in 

India while China, Thailand and Korea had 34,38 and 500 

respectively. If we take the case of internet hosts, India had only 32 

internet hosts per one million people in 1999 as compared with 69 in 

China, 884 in Thailand and as many as 10, 065 in Korea. While India 

and other countries in South Asia are in the lowest 20 percent of all 

countries in terms of the Human Development Index, the East Asian 

countries are among the highest 20 percent. 

Poverty Reduction. 

Despite the fact that South Asiaís GDP grew at a rate of over 4 

percent per year on average in 1961-89 and of over 5 percent in the 

1990s, and that GDP increased more than five-f old from US$105 

billion in 1960 to US$593 billion in 1999, the countries of South 

Asiaóexcept Indiaóhave witnessed increasing poverty. In fact, the 

number of absolute poor in the region has increased from 270 million 

in 1960 to approximately 515 million in 1995. This trend is 

particularly disheartening because in the 1960s, all of the countries of 
74

South Asia (save Sri Lanka, with a poverty rate of only 37 percent in 

1963) had over half of their population living in poverty. As the lone 

exception to the trend, India reduced its poverty rate from 53 percent 

in 1973-74 to 36 percent in 1993-94.16 

Again, South Asiaís performance stands in contrast to East 

Asiaís. Like their South Asian neighbors, the countries of East Asia 

had poverty rates of over 50 percent in the 1960s. However, within a 

span of 15-20 years (starting from 1965) these East Asian countries 

experienced a remarkable decline in poverty. Estimates indicate that 

Korea had just 5 percent (1984) of its people living in poverty, while 

Indonesia had 17 percent (1987) and Malaysia had 15 percent 

(1984).17 In subsequent years there was a further reduction in 

poverty in these countries. For instance, in 1993 Korea had just 2 

percent of its population surviving on less than a dollar a day, while 

the corresponding number in 1999 for Indonesia was 7.7 percent.18

With their earlier integration into the global economy, the East Asian 

economies have reaped the advantages of growth and eliminated 

poverty in the long run. 

While South Asia has not made as much progress in reducing 

poverty as East Asia, it does not suffer from the higher levels of 

inequalities in the distribution of wealth affecting these neighbors. 

For instance, if we consider the Gini index, which summarizes the 

distribution of income or consumption in an economy, the four 

major countries of South Asia had a lower index than China and the 

other East Asian countries, with the exception of South Korea.19 The 

World Bankís World Development Report 2001 shows an index of 40.3 

for China, 49.2 for Malaysia, and 41.4 for Thailand. By contrast, 

Bangladesh has an index of 33.6, India has 37.8, Pakistan has 31.2 

and Sri Lanka has 34.4. Based on these data, South Asia has 

experienced a lower level of inequalities than the countries of East 

Asia, and lower even than many developed countries including the 

United States.20 
75

The most noticeable features in Indiaís poverty profile are that 

poverty remains predominantly rural and there is a wide disparity 

across Indian states, with uneven progress in poverty reduction. 

Since the mid-1970s, the growth rate has risen, poverty has declined 

and social indicators have improved. India has reduced the 

percentage of its population living in poverty mainly through faster 

economic growth (particularly that of agriculture), a rise in 

agricultural wages, lower inflation, and human resource 

development. In a recently published paper by Prof . S. R. Hashim, 

who was a member of the Indian Planning Commission, the Gini 

index was found to be improving during the pre-reform period (i.e., 

prior to 1990), albeit marginally.21 This implies that the reasons for a 

large number of people remaining in poverty are embedded in the 

slower growth of the economy as well as of productivity, rather than 

in income inequalities. The faster pace of poverty alleviation with 

high economic growth in the countries of East Asia shows that high 

economic growth facilitates a more rapid progress towards poverty 

alleviation. The dramatic reduction of poverty levels in India in the 

reform period of the 1990s, a period associated with higher growth 

rates, further reinforces this conclusion. 

India and South Asia. 

The relative size of the Indian economy and its population 

implies that the changes taking place in South Asia reflect the 

changes in the Indian economy to a large extent. Further, the growth 

profile and the structure of the Indian economy is also identical to 

that of the region. During the past 40 years per capita income in 

India and South Asia increased more or less uniformly. The 

correlation coefficient between the average annual growth rate of 

GDP per capita for India and that of the region as a whole is very 

high. During the long history of the pre-reform period (1961-89) as 

well as in the relatively short reform period (1990-99), the changes in 

the GDP growth rate in India and South Asia were strikingly similar. 

We also notice similarities in the changes in the structure of output, 
76

such as the relative shares of agriculture, industry and the service 

sector in GDP.22 These trends show that developments in India 

parallel those in the other countries of the South Asia region. 

Accordingly, the projections for India are taken as a base for future 

projections of economic performance in South Asia as a region. 

PART II: INDIA: ECONOMIC TRANSITION AND POLICY 

CHALLENGES 

Reform in the 1990s and Economic Trends. 

The mixed economy model of development adopted by India, 

with the state at the commanding heights, was successful in many 

respects during the first four decades. Until the 1980s India had 

combined a highly dirigisme approach to economic development 

with conservative macroeconomic policies. The development 

strategy was aimed at building a largely public-owned heavy 

industry sector, leaving the production of consumer goods and 

agriculture to the private sector in a highly regulated regime. As the 

initial massive investment in import substituting industries 

subsided, the pace of economic activity was dominated by low 

productivity and inefficient public enterprises leading to slow 

economic growth. The key assumption in this choice of postindependence development strategy was the generation of public 

savings, which could be used for higher and higher levels of 

investment. However, during the last two decades the public sector 

became a consumer of community savings instead of being a 

generator of savings. Compared to the successful economies of East 

Asia, the growth rate remained slow, the productivity level was low, 

and progress toward poverty reduction remained rather limited. 

Thus low productivity rather than inadequate savings explains the 

weak growth performance of the decades until the 1990s.23 During 

the second half of the 1980s the macroeconomic situation was 

characterized by growth reversal and a fiscal deficit financed by 
77

borrowings, both external and internal, that reached unsustainable 

levels. 

By 1991, India suffered macroeconomic weaknesses, with the 

central governmentís revenue deficit reaching 3.5 percent of GDP, a 

combined fiscal deficit of the states and the center that exceeded 10 

percent of GDP, a current account balance that ran into a deficit of 

3.2 percent of GDP, and a steadily increasing rate of inflation that 

exceeded 16.7 percent by August 1991. Further, by 1991-92 the 

outstanding liabilities of the central government exceeded 69 percent 

of GDP. The interest payments on the public debt represented nearly 

70 percent of the centerís fiscal deficit. At the heart of these macroeconomic imbalances were the rising public sector deficit in the late 

1970s and the subsequent sharp rise in public debt and consequent 

increase in interest payments in the 1980s.24 These adverse 

developments in the economy were further compounded by two 

unexpected external shocks: the collapse of the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Gulf War that caused an increase 

in oil prices. The collapse of the USSR brought uncertainty to the 

export market, since until then it had been providing an assured 

export market. The war in the Persian Gulf had almost frozen 

remittances from Indian workers in the Gulf region and also caused 

a run on Non-Resident Indian (NRI) deposits held in Indian banks. 

The high price of oil and the loss of workersí remittances weakened 

Indiaís current account position by US$1.5 billion, and the external 

current account deficit widened to 3.5 percent of GDP. Despite 

purchasing US$1.8 billion from the International Monetary Fund 

(IMF) in early 1991, official reserves declined to US$2.8 billion. By 

March 1991 the import cover of foreign exchange reserves reached 

just 1.3 months of imports. For the first time, the foreign exchange 

reserves touched the extreme lowest level of less than one billion 

U.S. dollars, not even sufficient to cover Indiaís import requirements 

for 2 weeks.25 The deteriorating fiscal situation and mounting 

current account deficit precipitated an unprecedented macroeconomic crisis in 1991. 
78

The Indian authorities responded to the 1991 crisis by launching 

a bold program of macroeconomic stabilization and structural 

adjustment buttressed with assistance from the IMF. The firstgeneration reforms that began in 1991 were a historic turning point. 

Though the reforms started as a response to the prevailing crisis, 

they went beyond conventional macroeconomic stabilization 

measures. The reforms aimed at reorienting the economy from a 

statist and highly controlled economy to a market-friendly one, ìrelinkedî to the international economy through freer international 

trade. Consequently, the Indian economy moved to a distinctly 

higher growth path. 

Over the decade since the reforms were first implemented, the 

real GDP averaged 6.4 percent growth per year, placing India among 

the top ten growth performers in the world. Excluding the growth of 

1991-92, the average annual GDP growth rate during the subsequent 

5-year period (1992-97) was 6.7 percent. This started decelerating in 

subsequent years, with an average annual growth rate of 5.8 percent. 

The higher growth profile emanated from a sustained improvement 

in total factor productivityóa clear break from the past trend. 

Coupled with a slowdown in the population growth rate, per capita 

income also registered an impressive increase with an average 

annual growth rate of 4.4 percent during the 1992-97 period. 

Moreover, the improved growth performance has been accompanied 

by distinctly lower inflation rates, e.g., less than five percent in 

recent years compared to an average inflation rate near double digits 

for the period 1970-1990. 

The 1990s witnessed important strides in relinking Indiaís 

economy with the world economy as it saw Indiaís share in world 

trade increasingóonce again a trend reversal from the experience of 

earlier decades. The share of trade in gross domestic product also 

increased steadily, and this share for the merchandise sector now 

exceeds 30 percent. During this decade, the peak tariff levels were 
79

reduced from 270 percent to 35 percent and all quantitative 

restrictions (QRs) on imports were abolished. These developments 

are of fundamental importance for sustaining productivity growth. 

The decade of the 1990s also witnessed a very significant 

acceleration in financial sector reformsñcovering the banking sector 

and the capital markets, as well as the insurance sector. Most 

importantly, the 1990s were marked by a virtual elimination of 

financial repression, leading to the removal of the implicit taxation of 

financial intermediaries. From a long-term perspective, the 

cumulative transformation of the Indian economy has been 

substantial. Indeed, the Indian economy in the year 2001 was a very 

different one from that of the year 1991. 

Further, the first generation of reforms in the 1990s has had a 

perceptible impact in placing the development process on a 

distinctly resilient footing. There are several indicators to this effect. 

First, the variability in the growth rate and the volatility of inflation 

rates, as measured by the relevant coefficients of variation (CV), 

have been much lower in the 1990s compared with the earlier period. 

Second, the traditional dependence on the vagaries of the monsoon 

has come down significantly, with the dramatic decline in the share 

of agriculture and allied activities from as much as 55 percent of 

GDP in 1950-51 to only 25 percent in 1999-2000. 26 The share of the 

service sector has pari passu shot up from 32 percent to 53 percent 

during the same period with information technology (IT) being a 

leading engine of growth for exports, employment and GNP. The 

remittances in the year 1999 went up to US$12 billion or about onefifth of total export earnings. The conventional external vulnerability 

indicators show a decisive improvement over the decade of 1990s. It 

is not a coincidence that the Indian economy could withstand the 

recent oil price rise and the resulting significant terms of trade losses 

without precipitating a crisis. In the 1970s and 1980s, oil crises 

invariably led to macroeconomic crises in India. This time was an 

exception. The oil import bill shot up from US$6.4 billion in 1998-99 
80

to US$12.6 billion in 1999-2000 and further to US$15.6 billion in 2000-

01, signifying a cumulative terms of trade loss in excess of two 

percent of GDP. But this loss was effectively financed through higher 

exports and innovative financing instruments. Flexible exchange rate 

policies coupled with a cautious approach towards short-term 

borrowings insulated the Indian economy from the effects of the 

Asian crisis in 1997, the Brazilian crisis in 1998, and the Russian crisis 

in 1999. 

During the 1990s India made remarkable progress toward social 

development and poverty reduction. The poverty ratioóthe 

proportion of the population below the poverty lineóhas declined 

significantly in the 1990s under the impact of the first generation of 

reforms. Poverty estimates released by the Government of India 

indicate that the poverty ratio has declined from 36 percent in 1993-

94 to 26 percent in 1999-2000, implying that more than 120 million 

people have moved up over the poverty line. However, double that 

number are still estimated to be below the poverty line.27 This means 

there remains a long way to go to fully overcome the challenges of 

poverty. 

The 1991 crisis has compelled India to deregulate industry and 

liberalize trade and investment. The macroeconomic reforms, 

outward oriented policies and improved performance opened up 

new opportunities for the integration of the Indian economy into the 

global economy. There is no doubt the overall economic reforms 

have generated positive results by increasing opportunities. 

However, the ìgreat questionî remains: Are these trends of 

accelerated growth sustainable so that India can meet its strategic 

objectives of removing poverty and playing its rightful role in the 

world by becoming a source of growth and stability for the global 

economy? Recent setbacks to Indiaís growth performance make the 

question relevant and urgent. For example, the real GDP growth rate 

has shown a steady decline since 1997-98, with the annual average 

growth rate during the last three years being less than six percent. 
81

The growth estimates for 2002 have already been scaled down to five 

percent.28 A quick glance into the basic data sources on the Indian 

economy reveal that the industrial production growth rate, which 

peaked at 12 percent in 1995-96, started decelerating and remained 

sluggish during 1997-98 and 1998-99, and was estimated to grow at 

merely 2.1 percent during the year 2001-2002. The gross domestic 

investment rate, which was 26.8 percent of GDP in 1995-96, declined 

to 23 percent in 1999-2000. The capital markets, an important source 

for mobilizing investment, witnessed a slump during the second half 

of the 1990s. For instance, the total number of primary issues (shares 

and debentures) by non-government public limited companies has 

declined from a maximum of 1,678 in 1994-95 to 79 issues in the year 

1999-2000. The growth rate of exports, in U.S. dollar terms, fell from 

22.6 percent during 2000-2001 to 1.9 percent during 2001-02. The 

performance of the agriculture sector is much more alarming with 

respect to its annual growth, which peaked at 9.3 percent in 1996-97, 

and is projected to be negative in 2001-02 due to a fall in the 

production of food grains from 209 million tons in 1999-2000 to 196 

million tons. On the fiscal front, the combined fiscal deficit of the 

center and the states in 1999-2000 has already exceeded 10 percent of 

GDPóalmost reaching the level of 1990-91. In fact the average fiscal 

deficit of 9.2 percent during the period 1997-2000 is considerably 

higher than the average of 7.5 percent of GDP during the period 

1991-97. Similarly, the combined revenue deficit has reached 6.2 

percent of GDP, exceeding the deficit level of 4.2 percent recorded in 

1990-91. The ratio of central and state government debt stands at a 

significantly higher level of almost 70 percent of GDP. The external 

debt as a percentage of GDP has declined from 30.9 percent in 1994-

95 to about 21 percent in 2001. However, external debt exceeding the 

US$100 billion mark and declining export receipts are going to take 

the debt-to-export ratio to the levels that prevailed in 1991. All these 

indices point to the main problems confronting the economy and the 

likely challenges India has to face in the medium term. Thus the 

economy, which is entering into a decelerating phase, needs urgent 
82

steps to restore its growth momentum in an adverse environment 

due to the current slowdown in the world economy. 

In these circumstances, if India continues with the ìbusiness-asusualî approach in the management of the economy, ignoring the 

need for an accelerated investment in infrastructure, the present 

economic slowdown may not only lower the growth rates to 

politically unacceptable levels but also lead the economy into a 

domestic debt trap. A recent IMF study shows the likely serious 

implications of this trend in the absence of fiscal adjustments.29 In 

the absence of fiscal adjustments, the scenario projected for the year 

2020 shows an exploding debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 140 percent; a current account deficit of six percent of GDP; and an overall 

public sector deficit of over 24 percent of GDP. In such a scenario the 

public debt burden would explode, leading to macroeconomic 

instability. Further, with the increasing size of the labor force and in 

the absence of investments, unemployment problems would be 

grave, and the resulting social tensions would undermine political 

stability. Clearly, therefore, the business -as-usual approach is not a 

sustainable growth path at all. This has to change. 

Fortunately, there is a growing public awareness about the need 

to accelerate GDP growth. The elaborate menu of policy reforms 

suggested by the Prime Ministerís Economic Advisory Council in 

February 2001 and the Planning Commissionís ìApproach Paper for 

the Tenth Five Year Planî are indicative of this trend.30 Moreover, at 

the political level the National Development Council (NDC) in India, 

consisting of leaders from different political parties, approved the 

objective of reducing poverty by 20 percent during the Tenth Five 

Year Plan period (2002-07) and doubling per capita income in the 

next ten years; it also implicitly recognized the need for accelerated 

reforms to achieve the growth level required to meet such 

objectives.31 Real GDP growth rates in the range of eight to ten 

percent are contemplated as part of the strategy, with emphasis on 

measures for increasing openness, enhancing productivity and 
83

implementing a viable plan to reduce poverty. Consequently, the 

strategy of a reform-led high-growth path based on secondgeneration reforms is receiving increasing attention. 

Second-Generation Reforms and ìReform-ledî Growth. 

Economic growth and poverty reduction require increases in 

investments as well as factor productivity. In order to overcome the 

problems of low productivity and the consequent poverty, and to 

achieve and sustain a double-digit growth rate, the reform process 

needs to be widened and intensified. Today, India is at a crossroads, 

with a choice to proceed either on a ìbusiness-as-usualî path or the 

ìreform-led growthî path. The second-generation reforms will need 

to consist of comprehensive measures which complement each other. 

I will now discuss what should be the contents of these reforms. 

Macro-, Meso-, and Microeconomic Reforms. The policy measures to 

be undertaken in such a reform-led growth strategy can be broadly 

identified as follows: 

ï Macroeconomic reforms that ensure increased transparency 

and fiscal consolidation at the central and state levels, and 

acceleration of the privatization process that includes redefining the 

role of the government in the economy. These measures will lead to 

the reduction of real interest rates, spur investment, and also lead to 

an exchange rate regime that supports trade reforms. 

ï Mesoeconomic reforms that raise efficiency, productivity, and 

private investment in infrastructure industries such as energy, 

transport, telecom, and higher education and put in place a new 

institutional architecture for the improved governance of the 

economy. 
84

ï Microeconomic reforms that promote competition in product 

markets, factor markets, and the services sector, by allowing free 

entry and freer international trade and by providing a ìlevel playing 

fieldî to all entities. 

Macroeconomic Reforms: Improving Fiscal Health. In the process of 

transforming the economy, the most important reform is improving 

the fiscal health of the state. In this regard the Fiscal Responsibility 

Bill, which is currently under consideration in the Parliament (spring 

2002), provides the legal and institutional framework to ensure 

intergenerational equity in fiscal management and long-term 

macroeconomic stability. It also provides corrective measures to 

eliminate the revenue deficit and to reduce the fiscal deficit to not 

more than two percent of GDP over a period of 5 years. Thus, the bill 

is set to reduce the growth of public debt, prescribe a limit on debt 

stock, and stabilize debt as a proportion of GDP in a set timeframe. 

Such fiscal legislation needs to be designed so that the governmentís 

ability to undertake counter-cyclical measures through fiscal policies 

is not restricted. Further, in order to bring about fiscal discipline, it is 

necessary to impose obligations to increase transparency in fiscal 

operations, reduce secrecy in budget preparation, and regularly 

review trends in receipts and expenditures every three monthsóand 

to place the outcome of such reviews before both Houses of 

Parliament. In this context the need for fiscal discipline in the state 

governments, whose combined expenditure is as much as that of the 

central government, is of equal importance. By 2000 the combined 

deficit of the center and the states had exceeded 10 percent of GDP, 

and the public debt by 70 percent of GDP. Almost 40 percent of the 

fiscal deficit is due to the poor condition of state finances, which 

needs to be rectified. Therefore the legislative initiative taken by the 

center needs to be followed at the level of the states as well. The 

outcome of such a fiscal correction would be the reduction of longterm real interest rates from the current high level of six to eight 

percent to three to four percent, which would reduce the cost of 

capital, promote investment and technological innovations, and thus 
85

trigger a spectacular growth boom throughout the economy. Such a 

reduced interest rate regime would also enable an exchange rate 

regime that is supportive of trade liberalization. 

An important area to focus on for promoting fiscal health is 

related to a reduction in expenditures and an increase in revenues. 

Both the center and the states are showering subsidies through direct 

budgetary expenditures or through foregone revenues. The growth 

in subsidies has been very high. In 1971, the total explicit subsidy 

provided in the budget amounted to three percent of GDP, and 

within three decades this share has increased four-fold, exceeding 12 

percent. The merit subsidiesóyielding more social benefits than 

social costsóare estimated to be less than one-third of total 

subsidies. Further, there are implicit subsidies in the form of the 

under-performing public sector as well as indirect subsidies through 

cross-subsidization. For in stance, by 1998-99 the central government 

investment in the public sector reached about US$63 billion. The 

post-tax rate of return on the investment was below three percent. If 

these enterprises had achieved returns comparable to efficient 

private enterprises, the rate of return would have been at least two 

or three times higher. Therefore, to reduce the subsidy to inefficient 

enterprises and also to release investment locked up in such 

enterprises, India needs to pursue privatization vigorously. Further, 

increasing user charges for services provided by the public sector 

enterprises, such as power and water, would enable the states to 

recover their costs, make their operations sustainable and in the long 

run attract private investment and release government funds. These 

measures would enlarge the supplies of needed infrastructural 

inputs and reduce their costs to the economy, thereby spurring 

growth in industry and agriculture. 

On the revenue front, there is a need to increase the tax-GDP 

ratio, which is presently very low. Indiaís tax-GDP ratio (center and 

states) at 14 percent in 1999-2000 was lower than other Asian 

countries like Korea (17 percent), Indonesia (15 percent), and 
86

Malaysia (19 percent) . This ratio needs to be increased so as to 

reduce the revenue and fiscal deficits. The tax-GDP ratio needs to be 

increased through 1) improved tax administration by using 

information technology; 2) drastically pruning the tax exemptions, 

e.g., small-scale sector exemptions from excise taxes; 3) bringing the 

services sector into the value added (VAT) system of taxation; and 4) 

widening the tax base. An improvement of four to five percent in the 

tax-GDP ratio is needed. 

Now let me turn to the size of the government. One of the 

biggest drags on Indiaís development is increasing government 

expenditure, particularly the ever-increasing wage burden. Therefore, another important policy initiative would be to redefine the role 

of the government, reduce its size, and reduce the structure of 

employeesí compensation. With the implementation of the recent 

Pay Commission decision, the public sector wage bill (government 

employees plus public sector employees) has increased by two 

percent of GDP. Besides bringing down the wage bill, a downsizing 

of government would also mean privatization of nonstrategic public 

sector enterprises, including the banking sector. Only those public 

sector enterprises which are strategic in nature, such as atomic 

energy, space and defense production, should not be permitted in 

the private sector. All other enterprises should be privatized. 

Privatizing the existing public sector enterprises by selling them 

to strategic investors whether domestic or foreign can be one 

possible route. But this has a very limited role at least in the near 

future, as the political economy of India requires a somewhat 

different strategy for privatization from those adopted by the 

countries of Latin America, East Asia or Central Europe. Therefore, 

the process of privatization would have to be transparent and lead to 

an industrial structure that becomes more competitive and less 

concentrated. Hence the privatization process would need to ensure 

that major public sector undertakings such as oil companies, telecom 

companies and steel companies become widely held. They would 
87

also need to be professionally managed by organizations observing 

the best standards of corporate governance, maximizing value for 

shareholders, and protecting the interest of all stakeholders 

(including employees, suppliers and purchasers). Such aggressive 

privatization will not only reduce fiscal stress but also considerably 

increase efficiency in the economy. 

Mesoeconomic Reforms: Infrastructure Sector. The next wave of 

reforms that will be of crucial importance are the mesoeconomic 

reforms, i.e., sectoral reforms covering major infrastructural sectors 

such as energy, communications, transportation and financial 

sectors. Currently, all these are under the public sector and in some 

cases these are monopolies. Poor infrastructure is a major contributory factor to the lower competitiveness of India. The poor 

performance of most of these enterprises is due to managerial 

inefficiency and the poor realization of user charges. For instance, 

the massive losses of the state electricity boards are attributed to a 

combination of low prices for certain categories of users, like 

farmers, and massive leakages in distribution due to inefficiency and 

corruption. State road transport corporations also incur losses due to 

setting uneconomic prices. These have become a drain on fiscal 

resources, defeating the very purpose for which they have been 

established: capital accumulation. India requires a mammoth level of 

investment if it is to achieve higher growth rates in the next twenty 

years. The estimated cumulative investment needs in the infrastructure sector by 2022 could be in the region of US$1.6 trillion to 

US$3.6 trillion. If privatization and competition are introduced in 

these sectors, it would not only facilitate rationalization of prices and 

pave the way for efficient use of resources, but also promote 

investments from the private sector. Consequently, the gains to the 

economy are likely to be quite spectacular. Even in advanced 

economies such as the United States, which liberalized the transport 

and energy sectors over the last 20 years, efficiency gains have been 

as high as 10 to 15 percent of the sectoral GDP. Some studies suggest 

that the benefits of these mesoeconomic reforms to the Indian 
88

economy could be as high as three to four percent of GDP per 

annum.32 In this regard, Chinese policy that successfully leveraged 

infrastructure to induce foreign direct investment is an example to 

emulate. 

Mesoeconomic Reforms: Regulatory Institutions. The next wave of 

reforms should reach the factor marketsóe.g., land markets and 

natural resource markets such as wateróas well as institutions that 

nurture and regulate various markets. The ìmother of all marketsî 

óthe financial marketsóare still vulnerable to the actions of 

individuals and/or small operators. The recent developments in the 

Indian stock markets have shown the deleterious impact of the 

actions of one private bank, one cooperative bank or the management of a major stock exchange.33 Such impacts can be avoided only 

by a strong regulatory regime. In a rapidly integrating world, the 

risks to the stability of the financial markets get amplified if regulatory regimes are weak. To cope with such problems, reform 

measures must involve the banking sector, securities markets, the 

foreign exchange market, and the insurance sector. Such a new 

institutional architecture should include an independent monetary 

authorityóindependent along the lines of authority enjoyed by the 

U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of England in the United 

Kingdomóand a council of financial regulators consisting of the 

Central Bank, the Securities and Exchanges Board of India, and the 

Insurance Regulatory Authority for coordination and supervision of 

all financial markets. 

The institutional reforms should also include state and quasistate institutions as well as the judiciary and civil society. The 

reforms in this sector would strengthen the social capital base as well 

as the physical and human capital bases of the economy. Pushing 

policy reforms further to strengthen the physical and human capital 

bases of the economy requires consensus among the major players in 

the economyópoliticians, businessmen, labor unions, social organizations, etc. Therefore, introducing measures to strengthen the social 
89

capital base will facilitate this process. Although many leading 

economists are skeptical of ìsocial capital,î coming from India, I find 

the concept as elaborated by Francis Fukayama quite appealing.34

Mesoeconomic Reforms: Reforms in Education. In addition to its 

intrinsic value, education is also valued for what it can do in terms of 

human resource capabilities. It is this sector that could make or break 

India. Compared to 1951, when more than four-fifths of its adults 

were illiterate, India reached a remarkable level of achievement by 

1997, when almost two-thirds of its adult population had attained 

literacy. Compared to China, however, the gap is huge: with an 

equally large population and similar size of illiterate population in 

the 1950s, the PRC has now virtually eliminated illiteracy among its 

younger population and raised adult literacy to 80 percent. To 

reduce such a gap requires an enormous effort with resources on a 

matching scale. It is estimated that an additional amount equal to 1.9 

percent of GDP would be required annually to provide schooling to 

those who are not currently in school.35 Thus, demand for state 

support is going to mount pressure on the fiscal resources. 

University-level education, currently funded by the state, is 

another area that will require huge amounts of investment in a 

growing economy. Currently the barriers for investment in higher 

education are many. These institutions face enormous constraints in 

terms of financial resources and operational freedom. Reforms that 

can attract private investment into universities and institutions of 

higher learning would reduce the funding burden of the state and 

improve the quality of their output. With these reforms and a 

supportive public policy on science and technology, Indian 

universities would have the potential to become part of a coherent 

framework in advancing technological innovations for economic 

growth. Such innovations could also contribute to the global pool of 

knowledge and technological progress. 
90

Mesoeconomic Reforms: Quality of Governance. So far, I have 

discussed the need for policy reforms for economic growth, which 

obviously have to be promoted by the government. A critical issue 

that is intertwined with sustainable growth is the quality of 

governance. Governance encompasses a whole range of issuesó

from the formation of the institutions of government to the quality of 

the checks and balances in the relationship between such institutions 

on the one hand and the citizens on the other. The quality of 

governance directly and indirectly affects factor productivity, the 

general quality of life and the liberty of the people. Weak governance 

leads to poor service delivery and excessive bureaucratic control, 

thereby impeding development. It leads to the centralization of 

bureaucratic systems, distortions in public expenditure, the 

deterioration of physical infrastructure, the reduction of public 

revenues and increases in the parallel economy.36 The state 

apparatus, such as the legal system and the police, come under the 

influence of a few people with vested interests. In India, while the 

role of the state has increased, its capacity to deliver has declined. 

There is an increasing recognition that successful implementation of 

reforms needs efficient institutions of governance that can deliver 

public services and promote policies to mitigate the negative impact 

of a market economy. Consequently, many states in India have 

initiated reforms to improve the quality of governance and 

introduced measures for the empowerment of the people. States like 

Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, and Rajashtan have introduced innovations in the fields of education and health services. Information 

technology is being put to intensive use to empower the people and 

increase quality in the delivery of services; it is also being used in the 

monitoring of development works. The state of Andhra Pradesh has 

been doing pioneering work in this regard. In some states like 

Rajasthan, people are empowered with the right to seek and the 

means to get information on public works. In states like Kerala, 

people are becoming involved in the local-level planning, thus 

increasing the stakeholdersí participation in allocation decisions. A 

number of states are now competing to provide improved services. 
91

This trend needs to be extended further across India. Improving 

governance is a key challenge to Indiaís political system. 

Microeconomic Reforms. Microeconomic reforms would promote 

competition in product markets and services. Allowing free entry 

into these markets and freer international trade are central for 

achieving sustained productivity growth. To achieve this, one of the 

foremost policy measures would be to reduce the tariff and 

investment barriers, and let the winds of international competition 

blow freely. Today, with a 34 percent tariff rate, India continues to 

have one of the highest tariff barriers in the world. India needs to 

accelerate its program of tariff reduction to reach East Asian levels 

by 2010, and the levels of the Organization of Economic Cooperation 

and Development (OECD) members by 2020. By that time India 

could also achieve tariff-free intra-regional trade in South Asia. If the 

quantitative trade barriers are reduced by 50 percent, it has been 

estimated that the gains would be 1.5 percent of Indiaís GDP.37 The 

complete elimination of non-tariff barriers and the reduction of 

tariffs will lead to even greater welfare gains. These gains could be 

achieved through increased allocative efficiency and would not 

require any new physical investment or new capital. 

In the legal arena, the laws relating to competition policy, the 

provisions governing bankruptcy and liquidation under the 

Companies Act, and the provisions in the Sick Industrial Companies 

Act are fundamentally flawed, as these sustain systems that restrict 

competition and make the revival of sick companies extremely 

difficult. Therefore, in order to correct such a situation, India needs 

new competition as well as comprehensive laws on bankruptcy. The 

combined effect of these reforms will provide the springboard 

needed for further dynamic gains, particularly by attracting new 

investments and associated productivity growth. 

The role played by the small-scale industries (SSI) sector is of 

vital importance due to its potential to increase employment and 
92

reduce regional imbalances, especially in rural areas and in the nonfarm sector. This sector acts as a valuable entry point for 

entrepreneurs who start small and grow big.38 Indiaís unique policy 

of reservations of certain small industrial activities and investment 

limits to the SSI sector prevents this sector from becoming strong, 

viable and able to successfully face international competition. This 

policy of reservations needs to be reconsidered, as many expert 

studies have found them to be irrational in the face of competition 

from imports, and concluded that such reservations have hurt export 

capability in many areas.39 Although the SSI reservations issue is 

sensitive, the ambitious recommendations suggested by the Abid 

Hussain Committee need to be implemented in a phased manner, 

initially abolishing reservations for select products in which India 

has a strong export potential.40 A reformed SSI sector, with the 

flexibility to increase investments, can opt for efficient technologies 

and grow larger networks of units that assure international buyers of 

quality products, adequate quantities, and timely supplies. In the 

background of dismantling the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) 

regime in textiles by 2005, the recent decision to dereserve garments 

is timely as it removes the garment exports from textile quota 

protection and prepares them to face competition. This logic should 

apply to other products too. 

In India, a major shift in attracting foreign direct investment 

(FDI) started with the changes in the regulatory framework of FDI in 

1991. India opened up sectors previously closed to foreign investors, 

including power generation, followed by other sectors such as 

telecommunications, cable networks, etc. As a result of the changing 

investment climate, the net inflow of FDI shot up from US$74 million 

in 1991 to US$3.6 billion in 1997óthe year in which India benefited 

from its highest level of FDI. However, in comparison, China also 

experienced a peak inflow of FDI during 1997, attracting US$44 

billionói.e., twelve times that of India. Chinaís share of FDI that 

year constituted about ten percent of the total FDI in the world. In 

Indiaís case it was less than one percent. The FDI flows have a 
93

positive impact in accelerating GDP growth in China as FDI brought 

in new technologies, managerial know-how and indirectly enhanced 

its impact by augmenting total factor productivity.41 Similarly, India 

should tap the advantages of globalization by reducing barriers to 

investment through a better handling of challenges related to the 

investment climate. These challenges include improving the quality 

of infrastructure, providing sound regulation of industry, removing 

entry and exit barriers for the firms, and addressing the inefficiency 

and corruption that cause delays. Thus, if overall gains from internal 

liberalization, privatization of public sector monopolies and 

improved investment climate are also included, the benefits referred 

to earlier would be even more substantial. The technology 

revolution, based on all-purpose information technology, is going to 

yield manifold macroeconomic benefits through its contribution to 

productivity growth, followed by falling prices that encourage 

capital deepening and the reorganization of production around 

capital goods.42 Therefore, if you take into account the dynamic 

efficiency gains arising from new investments and new technologies, 

supported by investment promotion policies, the gains would be 

truly spectacular. 

In the factor markets, reforms in the labor market are very 

important. Although Indiaís present labor welfare legislation for 

organized labor appears to have served the laudable objective of 

protecting employment, the actual effect has been quite the opposite 

as it discourages labor-intensive industries. Some of the legislative 

provisions discourage foreign direct investment, especially in laborintensive industries, and put the Indian industry at a disadvantage 

in the era of globalization. Some of the strategies adopted by 

entrepreneurs make industry less competitive. Reforms in this sector 

are needed to balance labor interests with the need to increase the 

performance of enterprises. Therefore, legislative reforms that are 

underway should encourage labor productivity and provide 

employers with sufficient flexibility to reduce the volume of 

employment or restructure their units to reflect changes in market 
94

conditions. They should also encourage employers to continuously 

update technology. These reforms would provide growth 

momentum to the Indian economy on the basis of increased factor 

productivity and capital accumulation. While the first-generation 

reforms focused essentially on macroeconomic policies, the secondgeneration reforms, with the synergetic effects of macro-, meso- and 

microeconomic reforms, would accelerate overall economic growth 

through sustained growth in total factor productivity, and thereby 

achieve the goal of eradicating poverty. 

One may recall that the miracle economies in East Asia and 

China achieved high growth when their proportions of the 

population working were the highest, resulting in increased labor 

supply, increased savings and investment, and accelerated 

productivity growth.43 In India, with a higher share of the population working, the changing demographics offer a similar opportunity 

now. The policy reforms in Korea and China during the last 20 years 

were almost synchronized with their demographic transition, and 

the present state of the Indian demographic transition offers a 

similar conjunction. Just as China and South Korea brought their 

dependency ratios down from over 60 percent in 1980 to the 40-48 

percent range by 1999, it is feasible for India to reduce its current 

dependency ration of about 62 percent to about 47 percent by 2020. 

This could help achieve higher rates of savings, investment and 

economic growth. What India needs is high-velocity reforms to make 

use of this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. 

The Growth Scenario: South Asia in 2020. 

The synergetic effect of macro-, meso-, and micro-economic 

reforms with favorable demographic dynamics would enable India 

over the next two decades to achieve a GDP growth rate of eight to 

ten percentósimilar to the one achieved by the miracle economies of 

East Asia and Chinaóand raise its GDP to US$3 trillion by 2020.44

Such growth would lead to increased per capita income at least 3.5 
95

times that of the present level. The second-generation reforms 

involving concerted action and radical departures from present 

practices would also result in the enhancement of human well-being 

through improved access to basic social services, especially in 

education, health, availability of drinking water and basic sanitation. 

In such a scenario the poverty ratio would likely decrease to ten 

percent by 2012, leading to the removal of absolute poverty by 2020. 

The reform-led growth would also bring Indiaís share in world trade 

to a much higher level. The experience of economies like China and 

South Korea over the past 20 years indicates that successful 

economic reforms and consequent accelerated growth led to export 

growth of 14ñ15 percent every year. With intensified reforms and 

increased openness, the South Asian region could also attain a 

similar growth in its exports. Thus, the reform-led growth would 

likely boost Indiaís exports from the present level of US$51 billion to 

about US$800 billion by 2020. 

In the energy sector the countries in the region rely on a 

significant level of imports. These fuel imports constitute about 18 

percent of the total value of imports into the South Asia region. The 

import of fuel by India and Pakistan is now in the range of 20-21 

percent of the value of their respective imports. With the accelerated 

economic growth, there would be a corresponding increase in the 

demand for energy. In this regard, the International Energy Agency 

projections on ìoil balanceî indicate that Indiaís reliance on 

imported oil from the Middle East is bound to grow significantly. By 

the year 2020 it is estimated that more than 90 percent of Indiaís oil 

requirements will be met through imports that would be equivalent 

to more than 60 percent of Saudi Arabiaís present production.45 With 

such an increase in hydrocarbon imports, India would become a 

major player in the world oil market and consequently would need 

to develop strategic, economic and political relationships with 

countries in the Persian Gulf region. 
96

In the service sector, in the 1990s Indiaís share in the global 

services trade doubled from 0.6 percent to 1.2 percent, pointing to 

the emergence of India as an influential player in global services, 

perhaps similar to what China has become in manufacturing exports. 

We have already seen an enormous increase in Indiaís export 

earnings associated with the Information Technology (IT) sector, 

which has grown at more than 60 percent per annum during 1992-99. 

The Taskforce on Information Technology has stated that ìwith a 

potential US$2 trillion global IT industry by the year 2008, policy 

ambiance will be created for the Indian IT industry to target for a $50 

billion annual export of IT software and IT services by this year. ...î46

Although such a goal in the IT action plan sounds ambitious, the 

recent performance of the IT industry proves the potential of this 

sector. For instance, the Indian software industry, which employed 

400, 000 professionals by the end of 2000, has zoomed from a mere 

US$20 million 10 years ago to US$8.7 billion in 1999-2000. It is 

estimated that this sector is likely to employ over 2 million people by 

2008.47 Keeping in line with the trends in software exports, the 

remittances from the Indian diaspora are estimated to have increased 

from about US$1.7 billion in 1991 to about US$11.5 billion in 1999, 

constituting about 2.5 percent of Indian GDP. Already in the 1990s, 

Indiaís share in global services trade doubled from 0.6 to 1.2 percent, 

while that of goods exports barely increased from 0.6 to 0.7 percent.48

Thus, with the increasing contribution of the service sector, led by 

engineers and professionals from institutions of higher learning, on 

the one hand and the increased competitiveness that will follow 

second-generation reforms on the other, attaining sustained growth 

in exports is well within Indiaís reach. 

At the regional level, the need for increasing regional trade has 

been recognized by the countries in South Asia. The South Asian 

Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA), which started in 1993, was 

very cautious in tariff reduction. Under SAPTA, Bangladesh, India, 

Pakistan and Sri Lanka committed to establish preferential trade 

arrangements among themselves with respect to 300 commodities. 
97

The constraints in its implementation are complex and numerous, 

ranging from the existence of poor communications and 

infrastructure to security concerns. But once the SAPTA is fully 

operational, the gains in the entire region would be substantial. 

Further, with the changes in the structure of the Indian economy that 

follow second-generation reforms, exports would be competitive due 

to an increase in productivity. This would help to diversify the 

composition of Indiaís merchandise. For instance, exports would 

shift to more capital-intensive products such as textiles, software, 

machinery and equipment, light manufacturing, and heavy 

manufactures.49 On the strength of increased openness associated 

with all these reforms and by virtue of the implementation of 

SAPTA, as well as other measures proposed by the countries in the 

region, the intra-regional trade share is expected to increase. Even if 

it achieves only 50 percent of the levels achieved by other regional 

trade arrangements in Asia such as ASEAN, whose intra-regional 

trade constitutes about one fifth of their total trade, the intra-South 

Asian trade in 2020 will be as much as US$120 billion. 

In recent years other major countries in the region such as 

Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have also embarked upon 

reform programs. With assistance from international financial 

institutions including the IMF, Sri Lanka has initiated economic 

reforms to restore macroeconomic stability and develop a poverty 

reduction program.50 Under the aegis of a new IMF facility (the 

Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility), Pakistan adopted an 

economic program in 2001 to increase growth through sound 

macroeconomic policies and structural reforms.51 Similarly, the new 

government in Bangladesh is taking steps to improve governance 

and implement decisive reforms on the basis of a Poverty Reduction 

Strategy Paper (PRSP). The development partners supporting 

Bangladesh are prepared to increase assistance to the country in its 

pursuit of a broad-based program of macroeconomic stabilization 

and structural reforms.52 Thus, with all the major countries in the 

region pursuing reforms at the same pace, if not faster than India, an 
98

increasingly open and more integrated South Asian economy would 

be able to increase the regionís GDP from the present level of US$593 

billion to as much as US$4 trillion by the year 2020, and 

consequently also substantially improve the regionís overall human 

development index score. If the world economy continues to grow at 

an annual rate of three percent, as witnessed during the 1990s, South 

Asiaís regional share in world GDP would increase from the present 

level of only one percent to more than five percent.53 

Thus by 2020, the South Asian region, with India leading on the 

reform front, has the potential to become one among the top four 

economic giants. At this juncture, given the large size of its 

population and its current stage of demographic transition with the 

consequent advantage of a low dependency ratio, the resource-poor 

South Asian region is uniquely positioned to promote policies for 

accelerated growth. These policies would build on the success of the 

reforms that began in the 1990s and make up for the delay of the last 

four decades. The South Asian countries, the latecomers in the 

ìgameî of reform-led growth, would also be in a position to tame 

the challenge of poverty in the coming two decades. The journey of 

miracle growth, which began in the late 19th century in Japan and 

spread to the East Asian countries and China in the second half of 

20th century on a ìflying geeseî pattern, would now cross the Indian 

Ocean to make South Asia a ìnew growth miracle.î This would 

make the South Asian region more prosperous, with intensified 

intraregional interdependence from increased levels of trade and 

investment flows. It would also provide the region a durable peace. 

Only then could South Asia play its rightful role in the world 

economy and global affairs. 

ENDNOTES 

1. The views expressed in this paper are the personal views of the author and 

need not reflect the views of the organization with which he is associated. The 

author wishes to thank Mr. P. R. Devi Prasad, his colleague in the IMF, for his 

assistance in preparing this paper. 
99

2. The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001, Washington, D C: 

World Bank, 2001. Hereafter WDI 2001. 

3. The surface area of the world is 133,567,000 sq. km.; of that, South Asia is 

5,140,000 sq. km. The forest area of the world is 38,609,000 sq. km., with 782,000 sq. 

km. in South Asia. (Source: WDI 2001). 

4. In 1999, the forest depletion as a ratio of GDP was 1.8 percent in South Asia, 

1.1 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 0.1 percent in the world (Source: WDI 2001) . 

5. See WDI 2001. 

6. Per capita energy figures are calculated on the basis of data from Energy 

Indicators of Developing Member Countries of Asian Development Bank, Manila: Asian 

Development Bank, 1994. 

7. In 1995 constant U.S. dollars. 

8. Data in this paragraph come from W DI 2001. 

9. Trade data in this paragraph are sourced from WDI 2001. 

10. ASEAN member countries are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao 

Peopleís Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 

Thailand, and Vietnam. 

11. See WDI 2001. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Ibid. 

14. Wanda S. Tseng and Harm H. Zebregs, ìForeign Direct Investment in 

China: Lessons for Other Countries,î Washington, DC: International Monetary 

Fund, Policy Discussion Paper 02/3, March 1, 2002. 

15. The data in this section are taken from W DI 2001; and United Nations 

Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report, New York and 

Oxford: Oxford University Press, various years. 
100

16. The Mahabub ul Haq Human Development Centre, Human Development In 

South Asia 2000, Karachi and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; and Moazzem 

Hossain, Iyanatul Islam, and Reza Kibria, South Asian Economic Development: 

Transformation, Opportunities and Challenges, London and New York: Routledge, 

1999. 

17. Hossain, Islam, and Kibria, South Asian Economic Development. 

18. WDI 2001; and The World Bank, India: Policies to Reduce Poverty and 

Accelerate Sustainable Development, World Bank Report No. 19471-IN, 2000. 

19. The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income 

(or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households 

within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 

zero represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. 

See WDI 2001. 

20. The Gini index for Korea was 31.6. It is based on the survey of 1993. For 

other countries, the survey period is as follows: Bangladesh: 1995-96; China: 1998; 

India: 1997; Pakistan: 1996-97; Malaysia: 1997; Sri Lanka: 1995; and Thailand: 1998. 

21. S. R. Hashim, ìTrends in Poverty and Inequality in India, “ New Delhi: 

Planning Commission, Government of India, 1997. 

22. WDI 2001. 

23. Zoubida Allaoua, India: Five Years of Stabilization and Reform and the 

Challenges Ahead, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1996. 

24. Shankar N. Acharya, India’s Macroeconomic Management in the Nineties, 

New Delhi: Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, 

2001. 

25. Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, New Delhi: Government of India, 

various issues; Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, Mumbai: Reserve Bank 

of India, various issues. See also the statistics available on the website of the 

Reserve Bank, available at http://www.rbiorg.in. 

26. Data in this paragraph are taken from Ministry of Finance, Economic 

Survey, various issues; Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on the Indian 

Economy, various issues. See also the statistics available on the website of the 

Reserve Bank, available at http:/www.rbi.org.in. 
101

27. Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2001-2002, chapter 10 (Tables 10.4 

and 10.5). 

28. The data in this paragraph are taken from Ministry of Finance, Economic 

Survey, various issues; Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on the Indian 

Economy, various issues. 

29. Tim Callen, ed., India at the Crossroads: Sustaining Growth and Reducing 

Poverty, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2001. 

30. Planning Commission, ìApproach Paper to the Tenth Five Year Plan 

(2002-2007), ì New Delhi: Government of India, available at 

http://planningcommission.nic.in. 

31. The National Development Council (NDC) is a political body chaired by 

the Prime Minister, with the Chief Ministers of various states and other central 

ministers as members, that gives policy directions to the Planning Commission. 

32. Chadda Rajesh, Impact of Reduction in Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers in India, 

New Delhi : Tariff Commission, Government of India, 1998. 

33. Following the Central Government budget presentation in February 2001, 

a few stockbrokers of the Bombay Stock Exchange, armed with insider knowledge, 

manipulated the prices of ten favorite stocks. The President of the Exchange 

leveraged his position to obtain price-sensitive information, which led to a 

payment crisis. In this episode the Madhavpura Mercantile Co-operative Bank, 

Ltd. (MMCB) in Ahmedabad was used by the stockbrokers, causing it a loss of Rs. 

12.12 billion. The MMCB crossed its credit exposure limit, giving unsecured 

advances of about 68 percent of its total loans to 19 borrower accounts connected 

with the stockbrokers, violating the prohibition on such lending by the Reserve 

Bank of India. 

34. Francis Fukuyama, ìSocial Capital, Civil Society and Development, ì Third 

World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, February 2001, pp. 7-20. 

35. Kirit S. Parikh, India Development Report, 1999-2000, New Delhi and New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 

36. The parallel economy is somewhat similar to the underground economy in 

many countries. It popularly refers to operations of those persons/enterprises who 

conduct their business by employing various tax evading practices aimed at unjust 
102

enrichment. The parallel economy, while eating away revenue owed to the 

government, promotes conspicuous private consumption and leads to the 

diversion of investments or the purchase of assets that are often undervalued. 

37. Rajesh, Impact of Reduction in Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers in India. 

38. The evolution of policy for the development of small-scale industries 

stems from the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, which envisaged a crucial role 

to small-scale and village industries to generate employment, produce 

consumption goods and to promote regional development. The subsequent 

industrial policy statements have continued to lay emphasis on the development 

of small-scale and village industries. The main policy framework for the 

development of small-scale industries focused on the provision of preferential and 

low-cost credit from public sector banking institutions, adequate technical support 

for improvements in production processes, market support through preferential 

treatment in government purchases, the reservation of items for exclusive 

production in the small-scale sector, providing infrastructural facilities through 

industrial estates, and enhancing the managerial and technical skills through 

training programmes. It is estimated that there are about 3.2 million small-scale 

industrial units spread throughout the country, providing employment to about 

17.5 million persons. It has maintained a significant growth in employment even 

when there has been almost stagnant employment generation in the large-scale 

industrial sector. 

39. Planning Commission, ìApproach Paper to the Tenth Five Year Plan 

(2002-07) .î 

40. Abid Hussain, ìExpert Committee Report to Develop Small and Medium 

Enterprises, ì New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India, 1995. The 

committee was appointed by the Government of India to recommend policy 

options for development of small and medium scale enterprises to make them 

viable and efficient units in the light of technological changes and increased level 

of international competition. 

41. Tseng and Zebregs, ìForeign Direct Investment in China: Lessons for 

Other Countries.î 

42. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2001: Fiscal 

Policy and Macroeconomic Stability, Washington DC: IMF, 2001. 

43. In 1980 Korea had a dependency ratio of 61 and China of 67, which came 

down to 45 and 50 percent, respectively, in the year 1990. See Table 1B. 
103

44. Projections in the International Energy Agencyís (IEA) World Energy 

Outlook 2000, forecast Indiaís share to be 5.9 percent of the world GDP of US$67.3 

trillion in 2020 (in terms of US$1990 purchasing power parity, PPP) . In absolute 

terms, it works out to US$8.76 trillion. By the same year China is projected to 

achieve a 20.8 percent share of world GDP. The IEA assumes substantial progress 

in reforms, especially in the oil sector, attracting more foreign direct investment. 

International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2000, Paris: OECD and IEA, 

2000. 

45. Oil demand is currently rising at six to eight percent per year, and it will 

reach five million barrels per day in 2020. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2000. 

46. The National Task Force on Information Technology and Software 

Development (constituted under the authority of the Office of the Prime Minister) . 

Report available at http://it-taskforce.nic.in. 

47. Jeffrey D. Sachs, et al., India in the Era of Economic Reforms, New Delhi and 

New York: Oxford University Press; and IMF, India: Recent Economic Developments, 

Washington, DC: IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/155, available at 

http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2000/cr00155.pdf. 

48. Devesh Kapur, ìThe Role of Indiaís Institutions and Economic 

Performance,î conference paper, American Political Science Association annual 

meeting, San Francisco, August 2001. 

49. The World Bank, South Asia’s Integration into the World Economy, 

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997. 

50. International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 01/16, April 20, 2001, 

available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2001/PR0116.htm. 

51. The ìLetter of Intentî (LOI) of the Government of Pakistan, dated 

November 22, 2001, lists program components which, if implemented, would 

speed up the reform process. The program components focus on the following: tax 

reforms, streamlining civil services, trade liberalization, market liberalization in 

the agriculture and energy sectors, liberalization of the financial and foreign 

exchange regimes, and restructuring state-owned companies. The LOI is available 

at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2001/pak/04/index.htm. 

52. The World Bank Group, News Release No. 2002/242/SAR, March 15, 

2002. 
104

53. As indicated in note 38, the IEAís World Energy Outlook 2000 forecasts 

Indiaís share alone to be 5.9 percent of world GDP. 
105

CHAPTER 6 

DEMOGRAPHIC FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA THROUGH 2050: 

POPULATION, ECONOMY, AND HEALTH 

Shripad Tuljapurkar 

Introduction. 

This chapter surveys trends in demography and related aspects 

of human capital and economic change in China, India, and Pakistan 

centered on the start of the 21st century. Although this chapter is 

concerned with South Asia, it is motivated by questionsósecurity, 

strategic balance, alliancesóthat make it essential to include China 

in order to provide context and comparison. The first goal of this 

chapter is to describe the large demographic shifts that have 

occurred and continue in these three countries, and to describe their 

implications for policy. The second goal is to describe some changes 

in aspects of human capital and economic change, particularly 

literacy, employment, and infrastructure. This chapter does not 

directly address strategic questions but rather the backdrop against 

which those questions need to be examined. The chapter concludes 

with a summary of the factors and trends considered here and their 

likely impact on the future of India and Pakistan. 

The chapter begins with discussions of fertility and mortality 

change and their trends and forecasts. Mortality change is closely 

tied to health status, and this connection is briefly discussed. Given 

these changes, the chapter considers age structures today and their 

changes over the next 50 years. The focus is on features that are not 

commonly appreciated, including the certain prospect that the 

growth rates of important age segments will change dramatically 

over the coming decades. The chapter then turns to literacy and 
106

education, which are the important elements of human capital, and 

considers trends and projections of these and the differences to be 

expected across the region. Next, the chapter considers labor force, 

employment, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and some related 

indicators of economic capacity. The final section summarizes the 

overall outlook suggested by the factors that are discussed below. 

The discussion here relies on a range of sources but an effort is 

made to point out the limitations of the data and analyses where 

necessary. 

Fertility Decline. 

It is now commonplace to observe that in 2000 China and India 

together make up nearly a third of the global population, up from 

about one-fourth in 1950.1 This relative growth was the result of 

many decades of relatively high fertility in both countries. Yet the 

past three decades have seen a substantial and sustained decline in 

fertility in China and India, and Pakistan appears to have begun a 

fertility decline as well in the past few years. To indicate the trends, a 

useful summary measure of fertility in any year is the Total Fertility 

Rate (TFR), which is essentially the total number of children that an 

average woman would have in her lifetimeóif she were to live her 

life in the conditions of that year. It is obvious that fertility is at a 

ìreplacementî level if every woman has a TFR of about two, which 

will result in a population staying roughly constant in number. 

In all three countries, efforts have been made to reduce the TFR 

from a high value of about six in the early 1950s towards 

replacementóFigure 1 shows the trends and forecasts for all 

countries. In this and other cases, the forecasts used here are taken 

from the World Bank projections;2 these are largely similar to those 

of the United Nations (U.N.). Between 1970 and 1990, China made a 

remarkably quick transition to replacement TFR via the one-child 

policy, and its TFR has since fallen below replacement to near 1.8, 
107

according to the 2000 census and recent surveys.3 

Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) Past and Present. 

Indiaís TFR has fallen at a slow but steady pace since 1970, and is 

currently about 3.2. (In this chapter the word ìaboutî is used to 

qualify values that have margins of error of a few percent but where 

it is unwise to be more precise without a great deal of additional 

detail.) In Pakistan, fertility has been resistant to change: several past 

studies have declared that TFR is falling, only to be followed by 

subsequent measurements that show TFR to still be at a high level.4

It now seems fairly certain on the basis of several independent 

assessments that Pakistanís TFR, currently the highest of the three 

countries at about 5.7, has finally started to decline. 

Figure 1 also shows projections of future fertility, partly based on 

assumptions by the World Bank. China is shown at a TFR of 1.8 for 

the next 50 years, which is lower than World Bank estimates. 

William Lavely discusses the problems of correctly estimating 

current TFR from Chinese census data which are subject to ìadjustmentî for official purposes.5 A value of 1.8 or lower for TFR seems 

likely for several reasons: informal indications are that Chinaís TFR 

has fallen below replacement; Chinaís policy commitment to the one1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 1.5

2 

2.5

3 

3.5

4 

4.5 

5 

5.5

6 

6.5

5

7 

China 

Pakistan 

India 

Indi

Plan 
108

child policy has been firm in recent years; and urban TFR and rural 

TFR in the majority Han population are declining or steady. It is 

possible that TFR will be unstable over time as the last large cohorts 

of only children hit their childbearing years, and as China 

experiences economic cycles, but the level of TFR seems certain to 

stay low. Regional variation in Chinaís TFR is smaller than in the 

other countriesóthere is higher rural fertility than urban but only by 

half a child or so. The minority Chinese populations are permitted to 

have more than one child and often do, but their contribution is 

small and even their fertility is following the national trend.6 

Indiaís TFR has been declining for decades, accelerated by 

increases in literacy, educational attainment, and contraceptive use.7

The government now has a formal population policy that includes a 

commitment to reach replacement TFR by 2010. Uncertainty about 

this goal is due to the well-known problem of the ìBIMARUî (sick) 

states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, 

where high TFRs of well above four are coupled with low literacy 

and high mortality. The Planning Commission of India appointed an 

Expert Panel that made projections in 1996 which are based on 

excellent demographic analyses, and they predict that these problem 

states will not reach replacement until about 2030. But the remaining 

states should reach a TFR of 2.1 by 2015 or 2020óthis without any 

impetus from a national policy. An overall target of 2010 to 2015 is 

optimistic but may well be achievable with political consensus. 

Pakistanís TFR is now falling and analyses of fertility transitions 

in other countries suggest that rising literacy, declining mortality 

and increasing contraceptive use are likely to lock the trend into 

place.8 The rate of decline shown for Pakistan in Figure 1 is that 

assumed by the World Bank in their latest projections and is similar 

to what the U.N. Population Division assumes. It is clear that the 

assumptions for Pakistan parallel what happened in India but with 

decline accelerated by about a decade. However, there is substantial 

uncertainty about Pakistanís future TFR: the economic environment 
109

has had a definite effect in the past, and continued steady growth is 

probably necessary to achieve the projected TFR. Also, there is a 

great deal of variation between urban and rural populations, and 

between provinces. Of the forecasts in Figure 1, then, the one for 

Pakistan is most uncertain; the other two are well-supported but 

remain uncertain with regard to level and timing. In practice, it is 

best to visualize the uncertainty in projected TFR in terms of an 

uncertainty ìbandî around the projected values: over the period 

shown in Figure 1, we may rely on other analyses to argue that the 

width of such a band will be about 0.5 for China, 0.75 for India, and 

2.0 for Pakistan.9 

Mortality and Health. 

The three countries have also experienced mortality declines in 

the past three decades. Table 1 displays two standard measures of 

mortality: infant death rates per 1000 live births and life expectancy 

for each of the specified years. The values in Table 1 are for both 

sexes combined, and include the U.N. projection for 2050. For 

comparison, note that in the year 2000 the values for the United 

States are an infant mortality of seven and a life expectancy of 77.5 

years. 

It is clear from Table 1 that China has made rapid progress in 

reducing mortality in the past decade, that India and Pakistan have 

also made regular progress but at a slower rate. The numbers for 

Pakistan are probably close to those for India. It is worth noting that 

the projected values for India and Pakistan may be too pessimistic. 

Recent data from India (from a large national sample, the Sample 

Registration System10) indicate that declines in infant mortality were 

slow in the 1990s but have speeded up in the past few years. 

Experience with long-term analysis of mortality change in other 

countries suggests that long-run rates of mortality decline can 

provide a better assessment of prospects than short-run slowing 

down or speeding upóon this argument, the long-run prospects 
110

may be comparable in the three countries. 

 Infant Infant Infant 

 Death Life Death Life Death Life 

Year Rate Expectancy Rate Expectancy Rate Expectancy

 China India Pakistan 

1990 43 68.4 80 57.2 106 56.7 

1995 35 69.9 74 60.6 93 59.1 

2000 29 71.4 65 62.5 82 61.1 

2050 13 79.0 25 75.4 36 73.7 

Sources: World Bank, World Population Projections: Estimates and Projections with 

Related Demographic Statistics, Baltimore: published for the World Bank by Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1994; United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 

2000 Revision, New York: The UN, 2001. 

Table 1. Infant Mortality and Life Expectancy. 

In all these countries, the decline in infant mortality is a useful 

indicator of the effectiveness of health policy aimed at child health. 

Assessments of the health care systems in India and Pakistan by the 

World Bank show that poor nutrition remains a widespread problem 

for young children (under 5 years) in both countries, and also among 

low-income women and mothers.11 India has made substantial 

efforts to immunize children against communicable and infectious 

diseases, which probably accounts for the lower infant mortality rate 

as compared to Pakistan. But facilities such as safe drinking water 

and ready access to low-cost primary care remain a challenge. The 

public health sector in both countries is large but relatively inefficient, and the private health sector is focused on high-income 

groups. 

The other numbers in Table 1 are the expectation of life at birth 

as computed from the age-specific probabilities of death in a given 

year. These values are correlated with infant mortality, but they also 

depend strongly on mortality conditions of children between the 

ages of 1 and 15, and of older adults at ages 45 and up. Here, too, it is 
111

clear that China has much lower levels of mortality, with India and 

Pakistan showing much higher and similar mortality. For many 

years in India and Pakistan, female mortality at all ages was 

atypically higher than male mortality (relative to all industrialized 

countries). This differential was clearly related to the lower status, 

lower economic capacity, and poorer health conditions of women. 

But the differential has narrowed and female mortality has been 

falling faster than male mortality over time in both countries. 

A potentially large impact on mortality in all three countries will 

result from the spread of HIV through the sexually active population. In India, there is wide public and official recognition of the 

issue, and a reported 3.5 million infections exist in 2000. The Indian 

government has a policy to treat infected cases and reduce the 

spread of new infections. India is also in the unusual position of having a strong local pharmaceutical industry that is active in the 

production of antiviral drugs and other treatments. In Pakistan, 

there are few reported infections, but the country certainly is 

vulnerable to the spread of HIV. Given the experience of other 

societies, including India, there is reason to think that HIV may 

spread to a large number of people before it is officially recognized 

as a problem in Pakistan. In China and India, HIV will produce a 

sizeable lowering of the projected life expectancy, perhaps by about 

3 years by 2025. Much of this increased mortality will be felt among 

the younger male population, not overall. 

All three countries report unusually high male-biased sex ratios 

at birth. In a population without a strong bias towards male children 

and against female children, good data show that the sex ratio at 

birth is 105 males to 100 females. Natural (genetic, environmental) 

variation around this ratio is small. So a population in which this 

ratio is significantly different is almost certainly one where females 

are ìmissing.î They may simply be missing from official counts 

because people do not report them when they are very young, or 

really missing because of infanticide, sex-selective abortion, and so 
112

on. It is well known that the sex ratio at birth in China has been 

increasing rapidly since the advent of the one-child policy and is 

now about 122. In India the data are consistent with a ratio of about 

110.12 Pakistanís sex ratio is in the same range as Indiaís.13 

This sex-ratio bias is an indicator of the low status of women, 

and can be traced to higher female than male infant mortality rates 

and abortion rates. The implications of these unbalanced sex ratios 

for the condition of female infants are grave. Aside from that, there 

will be a shortage of females in the marriage markets in these 

countries over the next few decades. We may hope that the impact of 

this imbalance on female status and roles will be positive. 

Population Age Distributions. 

Fertility and mortality together determine population age 

structure, which can be summarized in a population pyramid 

showing how many (or what proportion of) people there are at 

different ages. In any given year, the population structure of a 

country is a summary and reflection of the history of fertility and 

mortality rates in past years. In some countries, like the United 

States, immigration is an added and important factor, but it is not 

important for the countries we discuss here. Figures 2 and 3 show 

population structures for the three countries in the 1990s. Chinaís 

structure shows dramatic variation with respect to age. There is a 

population ìbustî between ages 30 and 40óthis is the signature of 

the Great Leap Forward and famine of the late 1950s and early 1960s. 

A second ìbustî is centered at age 15 and reflects the one-child 

policy starting in the 1980s. The relative ìboomî just below age 10 

was generated by the ìbulgeî of people shown at age about 30ó

these were the cohorts sandwiched between the Leap and the onechild era. India shows just the one sizeable ìbustî at ages 5 and 

below, reflecting the sizeable decline in TFR in just the past decade. 

For Pakistan (Figure 3), where the TFR decline has barely begun, the 

age structure shows only a steep decline with age. The shape of the 
113

Figure 2. Age Structures Compared: China and India. 

Figure 3. Age Structures Compared: India and Pakistan. 
114

age structure in Pakistan reflects the classical pre-transition demography of high fertility and mortality. During a demographic transition, fertility declines result in baby ìbustsî that are inevitably 

followed some years later by ìechoî baby booms. Mortality decline 

is also a characteristic of demographic transition, and results in a 

longer-lived population so that the old-age tail of the population 

structure elongates. For populations in transition, the age structure 

will be noticeably variable with peaks and troughs at different ages. 

Projections. The World Bank projections (used below) and U.N. 

projections rely on the fertility and mortality projections discussed 

above. As fertility and mortality fall, the population structures will 

start to flatten at the younger ages (as birth rates decline) and display 

increased weight at the highest ages (from increasing life 

expectancy). The economic consequences of these trends are substantial. One way of assessing the trends is in terms of dependency 

ratiosóratios of the number of young (under 20) or old (over 65) 

people to the nominal labor force (people 20 to 65). Figure 4 shows 

the projected dependency ratios for all three countries, with the U.S. 

2000 values marked in for context. The dependency ratios are a good 

indicator of ìsupportî burdensóthe fraction of labor wages earned 

by the 20 to 65 age segment that is needed to support the young and 

the old. Economists use the term ìtransfersî to describe such expenditures from private and public sources. Clearly, lower transfers 

imply that a higher fraction of labor income is available for increased 

consumption or savings, and thus imply a higher contribution to 

economic growth. 

Figure 4 shows that the total dependency ratio (adding the 

displayed fractions in the two panels) should decline substantially 

over time in both India and Pakistan, by as much as 30 percent. This 

decline represents a major demographic window of opportunity 

during which effective government policy can stimulate savings 

rates and economic growth. Successful examples of such economic 

stimulus include many East Asian countries.14 
115

Figure 4. Young and Old Dependency Ratios 

Projected into the Future. 

A different perspective on the economic potential of demo-graphic change is 

obtained by examining projected rates of change in age segments. Consider just 

one example, the age group 15 to 20, which includes persons who are completing 

education and prepar-ing to enter the labor force. This age segment is an 

important focus for government policy in terms of education, occupational 

training, creation of jobs, and so on. Figure 5 shows projected annual percent-age 

changes for the 15 to 20 age segment in the three countries. Note that India and 

Pakistan will experience a substantial decline in the growth rate of this segment of 

the young population, with long periods when the growth rate will be zero or 

slightly negative. For governments, such declines represent both an opportunityó

because, for example, expenditures on education will not have to increase forever 

and may be freed up to spend on other prioritiesóand a challenge, because 

resources will need to be allocated in an efficient manner to anticipate changing 

needs. These structural shifts will be a serious preoccupation of government, 

education, and business over the coming decades. 
116

Figure 5. Projected Annual Percentage Change by Age Group: 

15 to 20 years. 

Human Capital and Labor. 

We now turn to a comparison across the three countries of some 

elements of human capital and labor. A useful basic index of human 

capital is literacy, which has been rising in all three countries 

especially in recent years. Table 2 displays the percentage of the 

population of each sex that is illiterate.15 Literacy is on the rise most 

rapidly in China, while India and Pakistan still have substantial 

percentages of the population illiterate. There is a substantial 

difference favoring males over females in all countries, but it is 

especially large in Pakistan. More detailed assessments show that in 

India literacy is rising far more rapidly at the youngest ages and in 

the past few years, whereas World Bank data show that Pakistan is 

still making only slow gains in this area.16 Both India and Pakistan 

are characterized by large rural-urban differentials in literacy, 

although the differences in India are declining somewhat. 
117

 Female 15+ Illiterate Percent 

 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

China 27 26 25 25 24 

India 58 58 57 56 55 

Pakistan 73 72 71 70 69 

 Male 15+ Illiterate Percent 

 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

China 10 10 9 9 8 

India 34 34 33 32 32 

Pakistan 44 43 42 41 40 

Source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 

(UNESCAP), information available online at http://www.unescap.org/stat/statdata/ 

apinfig.htm. 

Table 2. Illiteracy Percentages.

 Pre-Primary Primary Secondary Tertiary 

 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 

 

China 28 113* 123* 46 70 2 6 

India 5 83 100 30 49 5 7 

Pakistan 16 40 -- 14 -- 2 4 

*Note: percentages over 100 are possible because these percentages are relative 

to specific target ages, and can exceed 100 percent if children at older ages are 

enrolled in a given category. 

Sources: United Nations (UNICEF) data available online at http://www.unicef.org/ 

statis/; and Vinod Ahuja and Deon Filmer, ìEducational Attainment in Developing 

Countries: New Estimates and Projections Disaggregated by Gender,î Policy 

Research Working Paper No. 1489, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995. 

Table 3. Enrollment Percentages. 
118

Education per se at primary, secondary, and higher levels is also 

on the rise. Data in Table 3 show rapid increases in primary 

enrollments in China and India.17 Pakistan is moving much more 

slowly towards increased enrollmentsóthe sources above provide 

no estimate for Pakistan in 1997, but informal accounts suggest that 

there has been only modest change since 1980. Secondary enrolments 

are also rising rapidly in China and India, much more slowly in 

Pakistan. India is at about seven percent enrollment in higher 

education, compared to about six percent for China, reflecting a 

historical emphasis on higher education in India. Pakistan is at about 

four percent at the tertiary level. There are significant male-female 

differences in enrolment, and these are projected to persist by the 

World Bank and other agencies even though there are efforts 

underway to change this. 

The growth rate of the potentially employable labor force is a 

matter of the supply of people in different age segments. But actual 

employment remains dominated by agricultural employment in all 

three countries. Table 4 shows the numbers of persons employed in 

non-agricultural jobs (formal employment), the percentages 

employed in agriculture, and the percentages of females employed. 

Missing entries are reported as unknown by the UN. Sample surveys 

in India show that labor force participation rates (including 

agricultural work) are higher in rural males than urban males at ages 

through 25óthere are a rather large absolute number of young 

unemployed males in urban India.18 Socially this is and will remain a 

challenge. These studies also show that labor force participation 

remains high through age 60 yearsóhigher than is now typical in 

the rich industrialized countries. Historical data show that Indiaís 

overall participation rates have stayed roughly constant for nearly 20 

yearsóthis translates into the observation that India has successfully 

added work opportunities in proportion to the growth in its work 

force. 
119

China 1980 1990 1998 

Pop. employed, non- Thousands 19,930 63,350 40,719 

agricultural (entities 

with > 10 employees 

In agriculture Percentage 68.7 60.1 50.1 

Female Labor force Percentage 43.2 --- --- 

India 

Pop. employed, non- Thousands 241,534 315,152 360,713 

agricultural (entities 

with > 10 employees 

In agriculture Percentage 69.7 64.0 --- 

Female Labor force Percentage 27.2 --- --- 

Pakistan 

Pop. employed, non- Thousands 24,606 30,180 34,590 

agricultural (entities 

with > 10 employees 

In agriculture Percentage 52.7 46.79 47.25 

Female Labor force Percentage 10.4 11.39 13.92 

Source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 

and the Pacific (UNESCAP), information available online at 

http://www.unescap.org/stat/statdata/apinfig.htm. 

Table 4. Employment.

Employment data for China are varied and hard to interpret 

consistently.19 At an aggregate level, unemployment is about eight 

percent in urban China (an ìofficialî figure of about 3.5 percent is 

artificially low because it does not include laid-off workers). Rural 

unemployment in China is thought to be massiveóeven official 

reports say that there are 100 to 150 million unemployed in rural 
120

areas now, with a possible rise to two or even three times that 

number over the next two decades. Large numbers of the rural 

unemployed form a transient ìfloatingî population that finds 

occasional work in urban areas. Chinaís entry into the World Trade 

Organization (WTO) may exacerbate the problems of unemployment. 

Finally, we consider the economic status of workers in all three 

countries. Table 5, from a study by H. Dagdeviren et al., shows the 

per-capita income for all three countries in the 1990s.20 There is some 

trend information in the World Bankís Development Indices,21 but 

the essential comparisons have not changed. The third column of 

Table 5 displays the Gini coefficientóthis is given here on scale from 

0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality), and is estimated from 

a set of aggregate indicators and an assumed functional distribution. 

The last column of Table 5 gives the proportion of the population 

that is below the poverty line of US$1 per day. China has the highest 

Gini coefficient and thus the highest wage inequality, but lies 

between India and Pakistan on the percentage of poor. India and 

Pakistan have a similar level of inequality, but there are far more 

poor in India. 

 Percent 

 Gini Coefficient Population 

 Per Capita of Income Living on <1 

 Income US$ Inequality US$ Per Day

China 1995 972 41.5 22.7 

India 1992 460 32.0 47.9 

Pakistan 1991 850 31.2 11.8

Source: H. Dagdeviren, Rolph van der Hoeven, and John Weeks, ìRedistribution 

Matters: Growth for Poverty Reduction, î International Labor Organization 

Working Paper, Geneva: ILO, 2001. 

Table 5. Income and Inequality.
121

Conclusion. 

We have seen that demographic changes will reshape the 

population age distributions in South Asia and in China over the 

next few decades. Indiaís population structure already reflects the 

first major change, as the youngest age cohorts are the smallest that 

have been born for many decades. Pakistanís fertility has begun to 

fall but remains much higher than Indiaís. Mortality has improved in 

both countries and should continue to do so at roughly similar rates. 

It is clear that India can look forward to a demographic ìbonusî as 

the growth rate of its youngest members declines, freeing up 

resources for additional investments in literacy, education, and 

capital investment. If Pakistan stays on course with fertility decline, a 

similar change should occur there but delayed by a decade or two. 

Both India and Pakistan evince substantial differences between 

men and women in terms of mortality, literacy, educational 

enrollment and employment rates. These differences are much 

stronger in rural than urban segments of both countries. But in India 

they are also regionally concentrated. Reduction of these differences 

is going to remain a challenge for government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the coming decades. These 

differentials are also a source of political and social tension and 

potential instability. For example, a large unemployed population of 

young people is a segment of population susceptible to political 

manipulation. 

India has achieved relatively high rates of secondary and tertiary 

education that should enhance its labor force and economic performance in the coming years. Pakistan is clearly in need of stronger 

initiatives in these areas, because it lags far behind at all levels of 

education. Labor force participation rates for the population as a 

whole appear to be roughly comparable in the two countries. In both 

education and employment, women remain strongly disadvantaged 

relative to men in both countries. 
122

India and Pakistan have made progress in the economic welfare 

of their people. Pakistan enjoyed a period of rapid growth in the 

early 1990s, but this has slowed substantially in recent years. 

Economic progress is sensitive to the political instability that seems 

to have a more episodic nature in Pakistan. The absolute numbers of 

poor people have declined in both countries, and Pakistan has fewer 

truly poor people than India does, even though their income 

distributions appear to be similarly unequal. There is an ongoing 

debate about the relative importance of redistribution vis-‡-vis 

growth as a path to reducing poverty, but it is likely important to use 

both policies so as to increase the overall size of the economic pie 

while also trying to divide it in a reasonable way. 

ENDNOTES 

1. For the numbers, see e.g., United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 

2000 Revision, U.N. Publication ST/ESA/SER.A/198, 2001. 

2. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1996 and World Development 

Indicators, 2000, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996 and 2000, on-line and CDROM. 

3. William Lavely, ìFirst Impressions of the 2000 Census of China, î 

unpublished paper, University of Washington, 2001, available at 

http://csde.washington.edu/pubs/wps/01-13.pdf. 

4. Zeba A. Sathar and John B. Casterline, ìThe onset of fertility transition in 

Pakistan, ”Population and Development Review, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 1998, pp. 

773-96. 

5. Lavely, ìFirst Impressions of the 2000 Census of China.î 

6. Griffith Feeney, ìFertility in China: Past, Present, Prospects,î in Wolfgang 

Lutz, ed., The Future Population of the World: What Can We Assume Today? 

Laxenburg, Austria: Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1994; Gerhard Heilig, 

ìCan China feed itself?î electronic publication, International Institute for Applied 

Systems Analysis (IIASA), available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/China 

Food/about_1.htm; and Lavely, ìFirst Impressions of the 2000 Census of China.î 
123

7. P. N. Mari Bhat, ìIndiaís Changing Dates With Replacement Fertility: A 

Review Of Recent Fertility Trends And Future Prospects,î United Nations Expert 

Group Meeting On Completing The Fertility Transition, New York, March 11-14, 

2002, available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/completingfertility/ 

completingfertility.htm; and Tim Dyson, ìOn The Future Of Human Fertility In 

India,î United Nations Expert Group Meeting On Completing The Fertility 

Transition, New York, March 11-14, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/esa/ 

population/publications/completingfertility/completingfertility.htm. 

8. John Bongaarts and Susan C. Watkins, ìSocial interactions and 

contemporary fertility transitions,î Population and Development Review, Vol. 22, No. 

4, December 1996, pp. 639-82, 813, 815-6. 

9. Shripad Tuljapurkar, ìTaking the Measure of Uncertainty,î Nature, Vol. 387, 

1997, pp. 760ñ761. 

10. The Sample Registration System (SRS) is a large scale demographic survey 

conducted in India since 1970. Further information is available at the Census India 

website, http://www.censusIndia.net/srs21.html. 

11. The report is available on the web at http://lnweb8.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf. 

12. This is the assumption used by the Indian Planning Commissionís expert 

committee on demographic projections. See Planning Commission, ìPopulation 

projection for India and states, 1996-2016.î 

13. For further details, see Shripad Tuljapurkar, Nan Li, and Marcus W. 

Feldman, ìHigh sex ratios in Chinaís future,î Science, Vol. 267, 1995, pp. 874-876, 

and references therein; and Monica Das Gupta, Lee Sunhwa, Patricia Uberoi, 

Wang Danning, Wang Lihong, and Zhang Xiaodan, ìState policies and womenís 

autonomy in China, India, and the Republic of Korea, 1950-2000: lessons from 

contrasting experiences, î World Bank Policy Research working paper WPS 2497, 

2000, available online by search at http://www.wds.worldbank.org/. 

14. Andrew Mason, ìWill population change sustain the ëAsian economic 

miracleí?” AsiaPacific Issues No. 33, Honolulu: East-West Center, October 1997. 

15. Data in this section are based on UNESCAP tables, supplemented by 

World Bank estimates and some country studies as noted; the 2000 numbers are 

ESCAP projections and not very accurate. See World Bank, World Development 

Indicators; and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
124

Pacific (ESCAP), Statistics Division, available at: http://www.unescap.org/stat/ 

statdata/apinfig.htm. 

16. Government of India, National Literacy Mission, 2001, available at 

http://www.nic.in/vseducation/nlm/; and World Bank, World Development Indicators, 

2000. 

17. Data in Table 3 are from the United Nations (UNICEF) data available 

online at http://www.unicef.org/statis/; and from Vinod Ahuja and Deon Filmer, 

ìEducational Attainment in Developing Countries: New Estimates and Projections 

Disaggregated by Gender,î Policy Research Working Paper No. 1489, Washington, 

DC: World Bank, 1995. 

18. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 

(UNESCAP), data tables available online at http://www.unescap.org/stat/statdata/ 

apinfig.htm. 

19. Lavely, ìFirst Impressions of the 2000 Census of China.î 

20. H. Dagdeviren, Rolph van der Hoeven, and John Weeks, ìRedistribution 

Matters: Growth for Poverty Reduction,î International Labor Organization 

Working Paper, Geneva: ILO, 2001. 

21. World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
125

Part III 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND 

REGIONAL SECURITY 
127

CHAPTER 7 

BOMBS IN SEARCH OF A MISSION: 

INDIAíS UNCERTAIN NUCLEAR FUTURE 

Rajesh M. Basrur 

and 

Stephen Philip Cohen 

It is our contention that Indiaís nuclear future may be impossible 

to predict with any confidence. At best, it might be possible to set 

forth a range of futures and develop policy recommendations, but it 

would be unwise to assume that even a straight-line projection of the 

present will yield a reliable vision of the future.1 This conclusion has 

two important implications. The first is that policies made now on 

the basis of a fixed vision of the future are as likely to be proven 

irrelevant or misguided as they might be correct. The second is that 

the wide range of possible futures, and the uncertainty as to which 

will materialize, should lead to a degree of humility among analysts 

and policymakers. Low risk and low cost (if things should go wrong) 

policies should be favored. 

Our skepticism about the ability to foresee the future is based, in 

part, upon our understanding of past efforts. Outsiders and regional 

experts had been predicting the nuclearization of South Asia for 

decades, yet when it came, it was still a surprise. Then, it was widely 

assumed that having ìgone nuclear, î India and Pakistan could no 

longer engage in armed conflict. Indeed, some argued that the 

possession of nuclear weapons by both states would freeze their 

hostility, and that time would eventually lead to a reconciliation of 

their outstanding differences. These expectations have proven false: 

India and Pakistan did become embroiled in a military conflict of 

significant proportions in 1999, and despite their declared nuclear 
128

status, they seem to be no closer to a real accommodation now than 

they were before Kargil, or before the series of nuclear tests each 

conducted in 1998. The military buildup and confrontation that 

occurred after the attack on Indiaís parliament on December 13, 

2001, confirms this assessment. 

However, this analysis is also based upon our understanding of 

the complexity of the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad. It is unlike the 

Cold War nuclear standoff, or any other nuclear ìset.î Neither the 

European case, nor that of Israel, nor that of China provides many 

clues as to the future direction that India and Pakistan will take in 

their nuclear programs and how those programs will contribute to 

peace and war in South Asia. Nor is the India-China nuclear 

equation well-understood. Finally, we argue that the regionís two 

nuclear relationships may also be transformed if key variables at the 

global and regional levels change significantly. 

This chapter first presents a ìbaselineî projection of the current 

strategic status of the region, briefly examines ideal-type alternatives 

within which we might expect to locate Indiaís posture in 2020, and 

then shows how variations in each component of the baseline 

posture might shape actual outcomes. In these projections, we try to 

exhaust the likely (and unlikely, but important) alternative futures. 

A final section offers a few comments on the policy implications of 

our analysis. 

Baseline Projection: The ìExpectedî Future. 

Many expert observers of Indiaís nuclear trajectory would agree 

on the following projection: 

ï There will be no breakthrough in India-Pakistan relations, but 

no war either. The future will see frequent crises, but nuclear 

deterrence will remain robust and escalation to nuclear war 

inhibited. 
129

ï There will be no significant change in the course of the IndiaChina relationship. A nuclear dyad will gradually emerge, but 

it will be a stable one. China will continue to ìbalanceî India 

by providing nuclear support to Pakistan. 

ï The global balance of power and the strategic relationships 

among the major players will remain substantially the same. 

There will be no serious rivalry or tensions among the big 

threeñthe United States, Russia and China. In short, there will 

be no dramatic systemic impact on regional nuclear dynamics. 

ï Though the United States will retain an interest in cultivating 

long-term relationships with India and Pakistan, it will not 

intervene directly in the region, except during crises when 

Washington will play the role of crisis-manager. 

ï All of the regionís nuclear playersñIndia, China, and Pakistanñ

will remain internally stable. There will be no major change in 

the internal politics of any one of them that causes disequilibrium in the regional strategic relationships. 

ï There will be a gradual increase in the numbers of nuclear 

weapons possessed by India and Pakistan, and limited deployment of these weapons may occur. India and Pakistan may 

move to deploy mobile launchers. In 20 years, it is conceivable 

that India will have developed a sea-based deterrent, perhaps 

mounted on a surface vessel. China will have a relatively more 

robust arsenal, but it will not be seen as threatening by India. 

ï Indiaís and Pakistanís command and control arrangements will 

be somewhat better than they are now, presumably keeping up 

with the slow accretion of numbers and increased dispersion 

of their nuclear forces. 
130

ï There will be little likelihood of a preemptive attack by India 

against Pakistan or against India by Pakistan or China, in part 

because the numbers will make such an attack difficult, and in 

part because of mobile basing. In the India-Pakistan case, both 

sides will be worried about miscalculations. Also, as the 

numbers increase, the possibility of significant fallout on oneís 

own country from even a successful attack will increase. Both 

factors thus enhance self-deterrence. 

ï There will be continued uncertainty and ambiguity over 

different escalation scenarios. It will remain unclear to outside 

analysts as to where Pakistani (or Indian) ìred linesî are 

drawn, i.e., where a provocation crosses a certain threshold 

that triggers a nuclear response. Indeed, it is likely to remain 

unclear to Indian and Pakistani policymakers themselves, and 

both sides will continue to rely on ambiguity, coupled with 

verbal threats, to enhance deterrence. 

In brief, the future could look pretty much as it does today. In 

contrast with relatively stable India-China relations, India-Pakistan 

relations will regularly enter a crisis state. But the two countries are 

likely to move back again to long-standing ìcold warî positions 

through their own common sense or the intervention of friendly 

outsiders. There remains a small possibility that they will not move 

back, and that a crisis will ìgo all the way.î At the time of writing 

(early 2002), India and Pakistan are in the midst of their most 

extended crisis, with well over a million men facing each other along 

the international frontier and the Line of Control in Kashmir. This 

crisis, and likely future ones, will always have nuclear overtones, 

which is why concern will remain about the South Asian nuclear 

balance. Quantifying the risk of actual war is important, but beyond 

the scope of this chapter. It may be analogous to the risk of a nuclear 

exchange during the Cold War or, perhaps, of a North Korean 

nuclear weapon falling on Seoul. Even if one could measure the risk 

at a particular moment in time, is it likely to increase over the years 
131

as the Indian and Pakistani arsenals grow steadily? Or is the 

likelihood of a large-scale exchange of nuclear weapons balanced by 

an improvement in the quality of command and control structures, 

and, above all, by the enhanced deterrent effect of an increase in the 

destructiveness that such larger numbers would bring? 

Variations: Three Ideal-type Models. 

While it is tempting to assume that this baseline projection is 

accurate, if for no other reason than the lack of expectation that 

things will dramatically change, sharp divergence may occur. Some 

attempts have been made in the past to present alternative nuclear 

futures for the region. Most prominent among these is Ashley 

Tellisís set of five models, ranging from nuclear renunciation to the 

establishment of a ìreadyî arsenal.2 Our own models go beyond the 

operational focus of Tellisís models and are based on a wider set of 

criteria that integrate operational variations with changes in doctrine 

and arms control preferences. 

Table 1 presents three ideal-type models which Indiaís nuclear 

posture may approximate, given changes in the numerous variables 

that determine the expected future projection. (Needless to say, 

similar models could be developed for Pakistan.) 

The models are devised so as to reflect likely futures in terms of 

four criteria: conceptions of deterrence, the size and sophistication of 

the arsenal, the relationship between levels of armed conflict, and the 

status of arms control. The static model envisions a period of modest 

growth in Indiaís nuclear arsenal until operational capabilities are 

sufficient to convince political decisionmakers that no more 

expansion is necessary; this could occur at any time up to 2020. The 

model envisages a steady state in which deterrence is existential (i.e., 

the mere existence of undeployed weapons is considered as 

sufficient to deter by both sides); the arsenal remains relatively small 

and a sea-based subsurface capability is eschewed; only marginal 
132

subconventional conflict is considered feasible (and perhaps even 

that is eschewed); and a stable framework of arms control is in place. 

Table 1. Three Ideal-Type Models.

 In the creeping growth model, minimum deterrence is conceived of 

as having relatively larger numbers on the basis of some notion of 

redundancy against the event of a first strike; at least partial 

deployment is seen as perhaps necessary because ìcredibilityî is 

equated with visibility; a limited conventional war is thought 

possible under the nuclear shadow; and there is little or no 

significant development in arms control, though there may be an 
133

underlying stability based on tacit understandings. Both of these 

models are not far removed from the current trend, but the 

trajectories they represent diverge significantly over time. 

Finally, the robust expansion model represents a shift to MADoriented thinking (i.e., mutual assured destruction based on second 

strike capability) and a more ambitious conception of limited 

deterrenceña smaller arsenal cast in the image of the American and 

Russian onesñaccompanied by an open-ended acquisition and 

development process and a perception that a full-scale conventional 

war and a limited nuclear war are possible. In this model, there is 

limited interest in arms control because of doubts arising with 

respect to unilateral verification. On the vertical axis of Table 1, it is 

seen that the three ideal types are placed along a continuum from 

nonoffensive defense to offensive defense. 

Potential Changes Resulting from Shifts in Major Variables. 

The ten components of the baseline projection embody a number 

of variables that may shift in different directions, thereby altering the 

trajectory of the projection as a whole. Of the ten variables we 

consider, the first five are political, the next four are military, and the 

last is a combination of both. 

The India-Pakistan Relationship. The period from 1947 to 1971 was 

an era of war between India and Pakistan. Thereafter, following a 

relatively mild interregnum, the period from the mid-1980s has been 

one of repeated crises and constant border skirmishes, with tensions 

aggravated by the nuclearization of both countries. Recent 

developments have been less than encouraging. The matching 

nuclear tests of 1998 were followed by the short-lived bonhomie 

represented by the Lahore Declaration of 1999. However, the 

atmosphere was quickly vitiated by the Kargil conflict. The U.S. 

campaign in Afghanistan, ironically, has, for the first time in their 

troubled history, placed the two countries on the same side, but the 
134

tension has actually risen instead of subsiding, as each seeks to use 

its closer relationship to the United States to force Washington to 

pressure the other. Could things get worse? 

The terrorist attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative 

Assembly in October 2001 and on the Indian Parliament in 

December are indicators of the potential for further deterioration in 

the relationship. It is conceivable that the secessionist problem in 

India may not only persist over time, but become worse. Should this 

be the case, domestic pressures may impel the Indian government to 

retaliate by using some form of force, such as quick strikes against 

terrorist bases in Pakistan, or by a tit-for-tat game of fomenting 

trouble in the Pushtun community that straddles the PakistaniAfghan border. The result could be the ratcheting up of tensions and 

the beginnings of a nuclear arms race as hardliners on both sides 

gather support and press for stronger forces to counter the visible 

threat from the other. On the other hand, it may equally happen that, 

learning from the risks their confrontations create, Indian and 

Pakistani leaders bridge the gulf that prevented a dÈtente at the July 

2001 Agra summit. A really serious nuclear crisis, which is not 

inconceivable, could compel the two countries to seek a more stable 

relationship. One characteristic of India-Pakistan relations has been 

an increase in the number of crises and sub-war conflicts; another 

has been the series of high-level summits that have taken place, and 

the general acknowledgement, even by Indian and Pakistani leaders, 

that South Asia needsñand may actually haveña ìpeace process.î In 

brief, while there have been repeated crises, and both countries seem 

to be driven by a fear of losing that is even greater than the desire to 

win, there is also a powerful understanding among them that the 

present hostility over Kashmir is dangerous and damaging to their 

respective national interests. 

Therefore, we do not rule out the possibility of a general 

settlement on Kashmir, even if it is only an agreement to disagree. 

How would this affect the development of each countryís nuclear 
135

program? All things being equal, it is doubtful whether a settlement 

on Kashmir will lead to a reduction in weapons or anything but a 

slower pace in the development of new designs and delivery 

vehicles. However, a general peace might reduce pressure to resume 

testing and perfecting new kinds of weapons, especially if 

international pressure against testing were to continue. Without new 

designs, and with the prospect of a lessening of general tensions 

between them, both India and Pakistan might be content to freeze 

their systems qualitatively and quantitatively. 

The India-China Relationship. The India-China relationship is not 

entirely predictable in the long term. For a pessimist, there is plenty 

of reason to expect the deterioration of the relationship. The border 

dispute lingers, and is complicated by Chinaís refusal to recognize 

Indiaís sovereignty over its northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh 

as well as by the fact that Pakistan has allowed a part of Kashmir, 

where the Karakoram highway has been constructed, to come under 

Chinese control. Chinaís propensity to use force in resolving some of 

its international disputes (for instance, with Vietnam, Taiwan, and 

over the Spratly Islands) might still come into play. Both China and 

India have the potential to come under the control of more 

aggressive regimes in the event of domestic turbulence. Specific 

events could also aggravate the tension between them. If Tibet were 

to be inflamed by a burst of secessionism, a rightist Indian regime, 

irked by the sustained China-Pakistan nuclear missile nexus, might 

be tempted to exploit the situation to enhance its bargaining power, 

thus provoking an angry Chinese response. An India-China 

confrontation would likely have a nuclear dimension, with Indiañ

under a more direct threatñ motivated to seek a higher level of 

deterrent capability than the baseline projection envisages. That in 

turn would, of course, invite a similar response from Pakistan, 

though not necessarily so if the Indian nuclear upgrade is confined 

to the judicious deployment of intermediate-range missiles.3

Alternatively, an unstable success or regime in China might be 

tempted to consolidate its position by adopting an aggressive stance 
136

toward an insurgency-ridden north-eastern India or by assuming a 

hawkish posture in an India- Pakistan crisis, thereby precipitating 

the same result. 

From an optimistís perspective, the long-term trend in SinoIndian relations is distinctly positive and unlikely to be reversed. It 

may even be reinforced. Over the years, the two countries have 

agreed not to allow their border dispute to prevent steadily growing 

cooperation on trade, and they have reached a broad consensus on 

the desirability of a multipolar world. The possibility of a loose 

understanding among India, China, and Russia cannot be ruled out, 

particularly if the United States continues to exhibit its current 

proclivity toward unilateral decisionmaking on key international 

questions. In such a setting, China may prefer to assuage Indiaís 

anxieties by gradually reducing its support for Pakistan, pushing for 

a quick resolution of the border dispute and, reversing its current 

stand on Indiaís nuclearization, launching arms control talks. At a 

minimum, the rising trend of India-China cooperation would be 

sustained, and perhaps be placed on a steeper incline. Indian nuclear 

hawks would have one less argument for a more robust posture. 

The Global Strategic Environment. The post-Cold War global 

environment has been in flux, with conflict and cooperation 

coexisting. Different scenarios are conceivable that could impact 

significantly on Indiaís (and Pakistanís) nuclear posture. On the 

positive side, there is an accelerated integrative process of 

globalization that has brought more and more nations into a 

seamless web of information flows, investment, production and 

trade. The winding down of the Cold War has simultaneously 

reduced great power tensions and the threat of a global nuclear 

holocaust. As Russia seeks a stronger European identity, its relations 

with the United States and Europe are showing signs of 

improvement in spite of its dissatisfaction with the American 

abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the U.S. 

determination to proceed with its missile defense program. But there 
137

is a greater element of uncertainty with regard to Chinaís response 

over the long term. And worse still, the threat of terrorism has had a 

dramatic impact on global security following the events of 

September 11, 2001. 

One negative scenario for India involves growing U.S.-China 

rivalry and tension. Chinese leaders have shown a willingness to 

extend limited cooperation to the West on specific issues such as the 

hunt for Osama bin Laden and the campaign against the Taliban. But 

Chinaís overall objective is to become one of the worldís 

independent power centers, toward which end it is engaged in a 

major program of military modernization. There are important 

divergences of strategic interest between China and the United 

States over Taiwan, and over the U.S. missile defense programs. 

There are also significant differences over Chinaís treatment of 

political dissenters. Specific events, such as the 1989 Tiananmen 

Square incident, the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in 

Belgrade, and the collision between an American surveillance 

aircraft and a China fighter over the South China Sea in April 2001 

have created a lack of trust between these two states. To many 

Americans it appears that China sees itself as the successor to the 

Soviet Union, as the new challenger to American hegemony. Some 

have also argued that Chinaís strategic culture embodies a tendency 

to use force in its approach to difficult external disputes and that a 

future cold war cannot be ruled out.4 In that case, the U.S. might 

decide to resume nuclear testing, and pursue the fast-track 

development of missile defense, possibly providing Taiwan with a 

theater missile defense (TMD) umbrella. A crisis over Taiwan may 

occur. In such a deteriorating situation, China may expand its 

arsenal rapidly and assume a more aggressive posture. 

Chinaís direct responseñdeploying more inter-continental 

ballistic missiles (ICBMs), many or all with multiple warheadsñmay 

not directly threaten India, but the overall threat environment would 

encourage India to move toward a more robust posture, particularly 
138

if India-China relations are initiated by continuing Chinese nuclear 

and missile assistance to Pakistan. A Chinese perception that India is 

part of a U.S. strategy to contain China would raise Sino-Indian 

tensions several notches. A more aggressive and unstable nuclear 

relationship may emerge as a result. A strong Indian nuclear 

response to changes in its relationship with China would inevitably 

raise the strategic temperature between India and Pakistan. 

On the other hand, a cooperative global trend might also emerge. 

The present American tendency toward unilateralism may diminish 

over time as the United States adopts a multilateralist strategy, 

perhaps in a continuing effort to counter new terrorist threats, or in 

the event of the destabilization of the present Saudi regime. Growing 

costs and technical difficulties could well cause a moderation of the 

U.S. missile defense program. The United States, Russia, and China 

may draw closer together and pay more attention to economic issues 

while cooperating on common threats like terrorism and 

communitarian radicalism. A renewed interest in arms control could 

bring a new agreement on cuts, the beginnings of a multilateral 

framework on arms control and a new era of strategic stability. In 

that case, Indiaís own strategic environment would become 

generally more stable, even if regional conditions are not entirely 

congenial. In general, the existence or otherwise of global strategic 

equilibrium is likely to have a significant effect on regional strategic 

developments. 

An American Role? The United States has changed its South Asia 

policy a number of times over the past 50 years, siding weakly with 

India or Pakistan against the Soviet Union and/or China. This 

pattern could continue, but there are more radical possibilities. 

Washington could decide to side with India against Pakistan, 

providing technical and military assistance to the former, and even 

nuclear assistance, should the international nonproliferation regime 

break down. If Pakistan is viewed as a failing state, and if it is seen as 

part of the problem rather than as part of the solution so far as 
139

terrorism is concerned, the United States might think it is time to 

side entirely with India on the Kashmir problem, and undertake a 

containment strategy against an increasingly unstable and radical 

Pakistan. This would lead American strategists to the contemplation 

of different strategies for containing or transforming Pakistan, and 

could also lead to Indian-American discussions about still another 

alternative: the breakup of Pakistan into its constituent provinces. 

Should India and the United States draw close together, Pakistan 

would be under great pressure to adopt a more conciliatory posture 

toward India and negotiate a stable arms control regime with it. 

Though the probability is not great because of the difficulty it would 

have in resisting U.S. pressure, it is also possible that Pakistan would 

continue to maintain a hostile stance by drawing closer to China. 

What about the converse? Less likely, but conceivable, would be 

a return to a pro-Pakistan policy, especially if India were to decline 

the role of balancer against China. It seems improbable now, but one 

could imagine India undergoing enormous political change as a 

result of its many and simultaneous economic, cultural, political, and 

ideological transformations. This could conceivably be an India with 

a very large nuclear potential. Such changes might even alienate the 

large and increasingly influential Indian-American community, 

which has hitherto been a ìlobbyî for closer U.S.-Indian relations. 

If it were to transform its identity, become more politically 

unstable at home and more aggressive abroad, India might well 

undertake an extensive nuclear testing program and seek a close 

strategic relationship with other major powers, especially Russia, 

whose technology would be valuable. In such circumstances, the 

U.S. might view India as the state that needed containing, especially 

if China were to cease being a strategic threat in the minds of 

American strategists. Indiaís likely response would be a radical 

strategic shift to something like the Robust Expansion Model. 

Projections of nuclear technology and capabilities are constrained by 
140

physical and technical factors, but even these could be altered 

quickly were a major power to decide that it would assist India or 

Pakistan to enhance its nuclear arsenal and related delivery systems. 

Political Stability in India, China and Pakistan. India, China, and 

Pakistan have each undergone periods of profound political 

instability in the past. India underwent an ìemergencyî in the 1970s 

that turned it into a virtual dictatorship. China experienced a prolonged internal upheaval in the form of the Cultural Revolution in 

the 1960s and 1970s. Pakistan has oscillated between military rule 

(sometimes with martial law) and weak civilian governments for its 

entire history. Further, Pakistan was physically divided in 1971, and 

all three face several separatist threats, sometimes encouraged by 

each other. 

As a variable, political instability affects their nuclear futures in 

two ways. First, there is the question of control over nuclear 

weaponsóa state driven by political conflict may have problems in 

storing and safeguarding, let alone using, its nuclear weapons and 

fissile material stocks. Second, there is the question of perception: 

does political instability in one state raise the prospect in the mind of 

its adversary that a moment of great opportunity or danger is 

approaching? 

While in the short run it seems improbable that instability in 

India could be of a magnitude that would affect the nuclear balance, 

it is not unimaginable. It would be especially likely in the aftermath 

of armed conflict or serious economic crisis. India is metastable, but 

a chronically weak center, or disorder in states where there were 

significant nuclear assets, might raise questions concerning Indiaís 

ability to protect its nuclear assets and its vulnerability to nuclear 

blackmail. 

A similar argument may be made with respect to China. China is 

a country that has had its share of upheavals in the past. While we 
141

may have no expectation today of renewed internal turmoil, it is 

important to remember that closed authoritarian societies are subject 

to deep crisis in moments of sudden change. The breakups of the 

Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the turmoil that has ravaged 

many members of the former communist bloc, are examples of what 

could happen to China. A severe economic crisis, rebellions in Tibet 

and Xinjiang, a reborn democracy movement, and a party torn by 

factions could be the ingredients of an unstable situation. A 

vulnerable Chinese leadership, determined to bolster its shaky 

position by an aggressive policy toward India or the United States, 

or both, might become involved in a major crisis with India, and 

perhaps engage in nuclear saber-rattling. That would encourage 

India to adopt a stronger nuclear posture, possibly with American 

assistance. 

Pakistan today seems to present the most immediate problem. Its 

non-Punjabi provinces are deeply resentful, its economy is teetering 

on the edge of collapse, it has undergone a traumatic reversal of 

policy in Afghanistan, and its political parties seem to be stuck in 

their personalistic rut. There is no credible civilian leadership 

emerging among the younger generation of politicians, and the two 

civilian leaders of the 1990s, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, are 

distrusted by the military. 

One political development must be singled out as critically 

important. This is the coherence of the Pakistan army. For decades, 

the unwritten ìgolden ruleî of the officer corps has been that the 

army sticks together against the political order. This rule was acted 

upon when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto tried to assert control over the 

military, and more recently in 1999 when Nawaz Sharif tried to 

insert his own man as army chief . 

This pattern of army unity could be undone in one of two ways. 

First, the Pakistan army might suffer a military setback that created a 

division within the higher ranks of the officer corps. Second, a 
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politician might be successful in splitting the officer corps, perhaps 

along ideological rather than linguistic/ethnic lines. In either case, if 

the army lost its political coherence, there might be immediate 

consequences for Pakistanís nuclear program, and in turn, for Indian 

calculations of risk and gain. 

A politically divided Pakistani army might come under a 

military commander who is a demagogue or dictator. Wracked by 

domestic turbulence, Pakistan might worry less about the future of 

Kashmir than the future of the Punjab heartland. It would be 

obsessed with access to the sea, particularly with control over 

Karachi and Sindh, and would treasure its nuclear weapons as the 

ìlast resortî against an Indian intervention designed to create more 

Bangladeshes. However, would a Pakistani regime take this step? 

Even if it hesitated to unleash a massive nuclear attack on India 

would it be able to prevent some officers from acting without orders 

and using nuclear weapons against Indian cities in such a crisis? 

Here, the standard of command and control that might be sufficient 

for a whole, united Pakistan might not be adequate to prevent 

unauthorized use. 

For all the negative possibilities outlined above, actual developments may be far more positive and reassuring. All three countries 

may experience relatively stable development, including the growth 

of greater democracy. At the very least, more stable orders are 

conducive to less external tension. Translated into the realm of 

strategy, this could mean an overall picture of restraint, the absence 

of major crises and the adoption of more dove-like nuclear postures. 

Numbers and Types of Nuclear Weapons. Numbers do count, as do 

the kinds of weapons in the possession of nuclear weapons states. 

Given the fissile material production capabilities of each state, it is 

possible to predict the numbers of bombs in their arsenals 5 or 7 

years ahead, but this could change dramatically if new production 

facilities were created or India were to start ìminingî its spent fuel 
143

stocks. Further, the (presumably) first-generation designs tested by 

both countries could be perfected over the years, although this might 

require additional testing or assistance from states with more 

advanced nuclear programs. The expansion of Chinaís nuclear 

capability in itself is unlikely to affect the subcontinent. The Chinese 

modernization program has not elicited anxieties in India. But, in 

conjunction with other factors, such as the deterioration in bilateral 

relations outlined above, an enhanced and more alert Chinese 

posture could result in a chain reaction in India and Pakistan. 

Numbers and types of nuclear weapons matter in several ways. 

1) Larger numbers create command and control problems if more 

weapons are deployed. There are still greater problems if they are 

suddenly deployed during a crisis. 2) The greater the number and 

the larger their size, the more potential there is for massive civilian 

damage. At the higher levels expected over the next 20 years, a 

nuclear war would lead to the virtual destruction of Pakistan as a 

state and the permanent crippling of India. 3) At higher numbers 

and larger yields, with adequate delivery systems, either the Indian 

or the Pakistani systems or both could intersect strongly with nearby 

emerging nuclear sets. Paul Bracken has described the process by 

which a number of regional nuclear systems could be intertwined in 

a larger interactive nuclear web stretching from Israel to North 

Korea, and including China.5 At still farther ranges, the United States 

and Europe might be included in Indian or Pakistani nuclear 

targeting doctrines. At the very least, the nuclear politics of the two 

countries would have a new and complicating dimension. 

The Quality of Command and Control in Peacetime and Crisis. We 

draw a distinction between command and control in crisis and noncrisis periods. A system that is reliable in ordinary circumstances 

may not be so during a crisis, and a weak command and control 

system may generate the fear that a state is planning a first-strike 

attack. Further, the quality of command and control must also be 

considered in terms of changing technologies and strategies: a 
144

system that is adequate for five or fifty first-generation weapons may 

be inadequate for a hundred advanced, mobile systems that are 

widely dispersed. 

In times of peace, the nature of deployment has diverse 

implications for command and control. For instance, if bomb cores 

are separated from their casings and other components, the risk of 

sabotage is higher, whereas integrated weapon systems are relatively 

more vulnerable to unauthorized launch, thus putting command and 

control systems under pressure. In times of crisis, there would be a 

natural inclination to disperse weapons as widely as possible, which 

would mean delegating launch authority or accepting greater 

vulnerability to a first strike, each of which is associated with a 

higher level of risk. The conjunction of policymakersí decisions, 

operational decisions, and the actions of adversaries make for a 

range of possible outcomes―from the stable to the catastrophic―that 

are impossible to predict. 

This is a subject that has received a considerable amount of 

attention, and the possibility of assisting either the Indian or 

Pakistani governments to improve their command and control 

systems has been raised. A s many observers have noted, a 

distinction has to be made between assistance that increases the 

reliability and stability of a nuclear force and the ability of the 

government to maintain control over its use, and that which 

enhances its strategic choices. 

Strategic Warning Time and Robustness of Deterrence. Strategic 

warning time refers to the length of time a country has to prepare its 

forces for a response to an attack, or to ready them for a first strike, 

once that decision has been made. Strategic warning time can range 

from seconds―in the case of highly alerted, deployed and rapid 

response forces hooked up to a sophisticated detection system―to 

days, in the case of weapons that are disassembled and dispersed. If 

we combine this with deterrence robustness―the assurance that a 
145

response to a first strike will be effective, in that the right kind of the 

right number of weapons will be delivered to the right targets (and 

the other side knows this to be true) ―then essentially four different 

ìstatesî are created: 1) a very stable situation in which a long 

strategic warning time is combined with a robust nuclear force 

(deterrence is credible, but not provocative) ; 2) a very unstable 

situation in which a short strategic warning time is combined with a 

less-than-credible deterrent force; and two intermediate states, 3) one 

in which deterrence is robust but strategic warning time is short (and 

thus very sensitive to the shift from non-crisis to crisis); and 4) one in 

which deterrence is less credible, but strategic warning time is very 

long (and also sensitive to the movement from non-crisis to crisis) . 

Of course in all four cases, perceptions count, and hence some 

degree of transparency may be necessary to convey the robustness of 

deterrence and/or the ability to respond at leisure, as opposed to a 

hair-trigger response. Again, these diverse possibilities allow for a 

range of outcomes, particularly in crisis situations, and it is 

impossible to predict the decisions that will lead to one or another. 

Conceptions of Deterrence and the Intersection of Conventional and 

Nuclear Conflict. At present, there are areas of convergence as well as 

divergence in Indian and Pakistani thinking on deterrence. They 

have in common a conception of deterrence that involves relatively 

small arsenals, a pre-deployed posture, and a positive orientation 

toward arms control. However, they also differ on significant issues. 

One is the feasibility of covert military action under the shadow of 

nuclear weapons, which creates a ìstability-instability paradox.î6

The Kargil conflict was one manifestation of this, ratcheting up 

tensions sharply between the two countries and raising the prospect 

of uncontrollable escalation into nuclear war. Pakistanís overall 

experience in the Kargil conflict was not an encouraging one. On the 

one hand, it did not place India under sufficient pressure to 

compromise at the negotiating table in Agra. On the other, Pakistan 

was branded an irresponsible nuclear power by world opinion and 

compelled by U.S. pressure to call the venture off, which in turn 
146

brought domestic ignominy. However, Pakistan may have been a 

victim of its own initial success: a less glaring intrusion would have 

brought a smaller conflict, keeping the Kashmir issue alive without 

raising immediate fears of a nuclear denouement. In the future, a 

Pakistani decisionmaker will be tempted to use the interventionist 

strategy from time to time to keep the Kashmir issue on the table―a 

strategy that will mean constant tension, periodic crises, and the 

possibility of a nuclear confrontation. 

Second, the idea of a limited nuclear war is embedded in 

Pakistani nuclear thinking, whereas it is rejected by most Indian 

strategists. But the Indian position could change. The issue is not 

closed, particularly in view of the fact that some of the 1998 tests 

were evidently for low-yield counterforce weapons. A critical factor 

in nuclear decisionmaking in both states, especially Pakistan, is the 

relationship between the conventional military balance (or imbalance), and the nuclear balance. If sub-kiloton nuclear munitions are 

developed by India or Pakistan, they might be useable tactically in 

the plains, and even in mountainous terrain, where they could 

substitute for conventional forces. If nothing else, their presence 

would make it difficult for one side or the other to bunch up armor 

or mass large numbers of troops. Despite the obvious importance of 

this linkage, we know of no adequate study of the connection 

between the conventional and nuclear dimensions. At present, it is 

not clear what direction the conventional-nuclear linkage will lead 

the India-Pakistan relationship over time. There seems to be less 

likelihood, though, of a similar problem with respect to the IndiaChina relationship. Neither country has articulated the possibility of 

limited nuclear war or nuclear warfighting vis-‡-vis the other. 

Despite these differences in their conceptions of deterrence, as 

both India and Pakistan operationalize their respective arsenals, 

there will come into play a technical imperative toward a more 

expansionary, perhaps even MAD-oriented, posture than is evident 

now. These pressures will be backed by those who will ultimately 
147

operate the nuclear weaponsóthe armed forces. In both countries, 

the understanding of ìcredibleî deterrence tends to reflect some 

amount of MAD thinking about the adequacy of second strike 

capacity. 

None of the above is inevitable. On the contrary, it may be that 

the stability-instability paradox is put to rest by an appreciation of its 

counter-productiveness, or because the Pakistan leadership decides 

that all terrorism is a threat, or because there is movement toward 

compromise between the subcontinental rivals. The difference 

between the two countries on limited war may not, in practice, be 

more than conceptual. Finally, the political awareness of the risks 

and economic costs of an ever-expanding nuclear inventory may 

induce greater restraint. 

Surprise Events: A Nuclear Incident? In recent months, we have 

seen how a single incident can transform the behavior and 

perceptions of many states. A nuclear incident in South Asia might 

have a comparable impact on Indian and Pakistani behavior, and 

could influence the worldís perceptions of both the region and the 

dangers of nuclear weapons. A nuclear incident elsewhere in the 

world might also cause regional planners to rethink their nuclear 

strategies and capabilities. 

What is a nuclear incident? We define it as an event short of 

nuclear war in which a device is accidentally or deliberately 

detonated, or fissile material is used in such a way that it creates a 

radiation hazard for a large population. We do not regard a nuclear 

threat as an incidentóthese have been coming fast and furious from 

both sides for several years. However, a threat that was backed up 

by actions that indicated a high probability of use, which was 

publicized, and which was taken seriously by decisionmakers on 

both sides, would almost certainly have a significant impact on the 

future course of India-Pakistan nuclear planning. Such an event 

would be a South Asian equivalent of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It 
148

would also affect attitudes towards nuclear weapons elsewhere in 

the world. There is also the possibility that a significant nuclear 

event would be asymmetrically perceived, with one side viewing it 

as a crisis and the other ignoring the gravity of the event. IndiaPakistan relations are replete with such asymmetric crises, notably 

the 1962 India-China war―dismissed by Pakistanís leaders as an 

unimportant event caused by a provocative India―and the impact of 

the loss of Bangladesh on Pakistan, dismissed or forgotten by many 

Indians, but still a hurtful memory for the Pakistan military. 

What would be the most important and likely of these scenarios? 

Theft is a possibility, as is unauthorized use. Perhaps even more 

likely is the possibility of accidental or inadvertent use, followed by 

the realization that no war was intended. This use could take place 

on the territory of the state that owned the weapon, or across the 

border. More frightening and far-reaching would be the detonation 

of a device―or the release of significant radioactive material―in an 

Indian or Pakistani city. Mumbai and Karachi are not only 

vulnerable to a smuggled nuclear weapon, they have prime nuclear 

targets in the form of research and power reactors, and an attack 

along the lines of the World Trade Center and Pentagon airplane 

bombings is now farther from the realm of the inconceivable. The 

entire set of Pakistani and Indian nuclear facilities could also be the 

site of a significant accidental release of radiation caused by mismanagement or sabotage. In these cases, the governments involved 

would have to determine quickly whether the radiation release was 

accidental or deliberate. If such an incident took place at a moment 

of very high India-Pakistan tension, it could precipitate a chain of 

events leading to still more serious steps. Thus, it is possible to 

envision a cataclysmic war between India and Pakistan triggered off 

by an unrelated eventóor such an event might be caused by an 

individual or group that sought to precipitate such a war. 

Other surprises can be envisaged. Beyond five years from now, 

there may be new and inexpensive ways of producing fissile 
149

material, simpler and more effective weapons designs, and more 

sophisticated delivery systems available to India and―with 

assistance from others―Pakistan. There is likely to be a deployed 

Indian theater missile defense, probably with American, Russian, or 

Israeli technical assistance, and this might change the nuclear 

calculus between New Delhi and Islamabad in unknown ways. 

There might, for all we know, emerge a South Asian Gorbachev 

willing to take the kind of risk that will transform strategic relations 

dramatically. It is a sobering reminder that many of the most 

startling turns in global politics, such as Khomeiniís revolution in 

Iran, the end of the Cold War, and the events of September 11, have 

caught us napping. Prudence requires us to expect the unexpected. 

Implications for U.S. Policy. 

This analysis shows the large number of variables that can affect 

possible outcomes with regard to the nuclear future of India and its 

neighbors. Of these, only some are within the province of the United 

States to control. The variables we have considered are of two types: 

political and military. While the latter do have some autonomy, it 

would be fair to say that politics is the prime mover of strategic 

relationships. Ultimately, nuclear postures and interactions are 

shaped by perceptions of threat, and these are fundamentally 

political in character. That being said, the United States must 

distinguish between those variables over which it has little or no 

control and those it can hope to influence. It may be said at the 

outset that in no case is the United States likely to shape Chinese 

behavior or thinking except indirectly through the policies it follows 

directly toward China. 

The India-Pakistan relationship can be influenced to some degree 

if the United States is willing to invest the effort and resources. It 

could help rebuild Pakistanís floundering economy and, with the 

judicious use of loan conditionalities, its social and political 

structures (through deradicalization and democratization) ; exert 
150

pressure on Pakistan to eliminate terrorism as an instrument of state 

policy; and persuade India to come to the negotiating table. The 

India-China relationship, however, is unlikely to be influenced by 

the United States except to the extent that its future is determined by 

the altogether different dynamics of U.S.- China relations. The global 

environment, as we have seen, can have an important bearing on 

South Asia, but given its indeterminate effects, it is unlikely that the 

United States will shape its policies toward China and Russia, 

among other countries, on the basis of their eventual impact on the 

subcontinent. Nor is there much scope for ensuring the domestic 

stability of the three countries, with the exception, as noted earlier, of 

tied financial aid to Pakistan. 

Of the four military variables discussed in this chapter, the 

United States will have little or no direct influence over three: 

numbers and types of weapons, strategic warning time and 

robustness of deterrence, and conceptions of deterrence. Its own 

predilections are not in accord with the minimalist postures that it 

would prefer India and Pakistan to adopt. At best it can try persuasion, but if their determination to go ahead is sufficiently strong to 

override their own history of restraint in the construction of nuclear 

capability, then it is unlikely that American efforts will have much 

effect. As regards stability of command and control, the United 

States can play a significant role, working independently with India 

and Pakistan, extending advice and technical assistance to 

strengthen nuclear safety and security, and not waiting for them to 

reach a joint confidence-building agreement. Safety concerns are 

particularly strong in light of the terrorist threat in both countries. 

Here, the primary challenge for U.S. policymakers will be to 

convince the nonproliferation lobby at home that technical assistance 

will not constitute a reversal of constraints imposed on proliferators. 

Looking down the road 20 years, the possibilities are so diverse 

that it is hard to guess what will happen and harder still to devise 

appropriate policies to facilitate desired outcomes. We conclude by 
151

offering two ìgolden rulesî: the first is that the outside world, 

especially the United States, should stand ready to assist India and 

Pakistan in managing their inevitable crises and conflicts, and 

should not assume that the two states can, on their own, move down 

the road of a peace process. Second, the nuclear and strategic 

planners of these two states should avoid over-confidence, and not 

assume that they, or their successors, will be able to avoid a nuclear 

incident or nuclear war. Deterrence usually works, but the perceptual fog that hangs over the leadership of each state, especially 

regarding the motives and capabilities of the other, is quite thick. 

They must prepare for crisis management, but strive to keep their 

own nuclear arsenals as small and as reliable as possible, if only to 

reduce the scale of the catastrophe that would be a regional nuclear 

war. 

ENDNOTES 

1. There have been several attempts to project the future course of regional 

nuclear programs. For a projection of the consequences of nuclear war at different 

levels, see S. Rashid Naim, “Aadhi Raatke Baad (After Midnight)î in Stephen Philip 

Cohen, ed., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control, 

Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. For an attempt to apply different arms control 

strategies to different stages of proliferation, see Stephen Philip Cohen, ìPolicy 

Implications,î in idem, ed., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia. For a look at the 

publicís response to the growth of nuclear programs in India and Pakistan, see 

David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., India and the Bomb, Notre Dame, IN: 

University of Notre Dame Press, 1996; and Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, 

eds., Pakistan and The Bomb, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 

1998. 

2. Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

2001, pp. 117-249. 

3. If intermediate-range missiles are placed within a short-range radius vis-‡-

vis Pakistan, they are not likely to be threatening to that country, though 

technically, it is possible for such missiles to target Pakistan. 

4. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese 

History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
152

5. Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second 

Nuclear Age, New York: HarperCollins, 1999. 

6. Michael Krepon and Chris GagnÈ, eds., The Stability-Instability Paradox: 

Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia, Report No. 38, Henry L. Stimson 

Center, Washington, DC, June 2001. 
153

CHAPTER 8 

PAKISTANíS NUCLEAR FUTURE 

Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan 

INTRODUCTION 

Predicting anything about the future is a monumental challenge. 

The South Asian rivalry is unparalleled in both the distinct challenge 

and the complex conundrum that it poses to international security. 

The region has such a fragile stability that every reasonable expectation can go wrong. Two years ago, President Bill Clinton, based on a 

U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), described the region as 

ìthe most dangerous place in the world.î1 The NIE itself concluded 

that there was a “sharply increased chance of a non-nuclear military 

conflict between India and Pakistan, possibly erupting into a nuclear 

exchange.î2 The CIA Director again asserted this fear in February of 

2001, saying, “the regional situation remains volatile, making the risk of 

war between two nuclear-armed adversaries unacceptably high.î3 As the 

war on terrorism in Afghanistan rages on, India and Pakistan are 

locked eyeball-to-eyeball, having amassed an estimated one million 

soldiers on operational alert along their border. South Asia is a 

veritable tinderbox that could explode at any moment. 

The integrity of Pakistanís long-term future has been seen as 

suspect. Not too long ago, U.S. officials and academics were openly 

predicting Pakistanís inevitable march towards a failed state, citing 

internal chaotic breakdown and/or the probability of war with 

India. While the former prediction seems to have been outpaced by 

events, given the redirection by Pakistanís leadership and its 

renewed status as a pivotal regional actor, the probability of the 

latter, i.e., war with India, unfortunately cannot be ruled out.4 Since 
154

the September 11 crisis and the war on terrorism, the dynamics in 

South Asia have not changed for the better, and if anything have 

worsened. The hostility between India and Pakistan has been a 

cognitive construct with deep roots, and has grown especially strong 

during the leadership of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India.5

Overt nuclearization and nuclear deterrence have not assured crisis 

stability in the region. Despite U.S. engagement and involvement 

with both India and Pakistan, the two countries have not developed 

a ìsense of the region,î nor have they used this as an opportunity to 

eschew their zero-sum mentality. Instead, both have exploited each 

otherís vulnerability. Finally, for a host of reasons, no serious 

attempt has been made to establish the restraint measures that are so 

essential between the two nuclear neighbors. 

Pakistanís future will remain in the shadow of crisis instability (a 

state of constant tension and intermittent crisis) with India, teetering 

at the precipice of conventional war. The specter of nuclear war will 

also be ever-present. Security concerns limit Pakistanís policy 

options, but given a choice, it would focus internally on economic 

revival and national reintegration, aimed at realizing the vision of 

Pakistan as a ìliberal, tolerant, progressive, dynamic and strong 

Islamic state where theocracy has no place.î6 

At the core of President Pervez Musharrafís agenda is economic 

revival, through which he hopes to bring Pakistan back into the 

mainstream of regional and international politics. Nuclear weapons 

will also play an important role in this endeavor. Given the volatile 

neighborhood, and especially a hostile India, conditions in the region 

are likely to remain in a state of tension, if not war. Sudden 

eruptions, coming in the form of one crisis or another, are likely to 

continue as both sides have demonstrated a propensity to engage in 

dangerous practices that make the region unstable. Peace and 

tranquility will remain ephemeral, and joint security arrangements 

or cease-fires will be tenuous at best. Left on their own, India and 

Pakistan will likely continue this pattern of crisis instability. 
155

Paraphrasing Newtonís first law of motion, India and Pakistan will 

continue to be propelled by their own state of crisis unless and until 

acted upon by some external mitigating force.7 

Pakistanís nuclear future is therefore essentially tied to the 

pathway the region might take. Essentially there are two basic paths 

the region can now steer towards. The first is a confrontational path 

based on cognitive biases that will involve an unconstrained arms 

race, leading to dangerous practices and a deployment or ìhairtriggerî environment, resulting in increased security requirements. 

The second path relies on a cooperative security framework based on 

resolving issues, eschewing an arms race for controlled weapons 

development under restraints and regimes, creating an environment 

that improves the socioeconomic welfare of the citizens, and creating 

balance in the region. This model stresses management of nuclear 

capability and crisis prevention in the region. Should the region 

remain embroiled in the current intransigence towards resolution of 

the political conflict, it will likely proceed the way of the first path. 

This would mean the continuation of crises in various forms as well 

as perpetual tensions; neither country would be able to concentrate 

on urgent domestic issues or to invest in their own peopleís 

development. Moreover, neither would India attain its statusoriented objectives, nor would Pakistan achieve assured security. 

Meanwhile, the sufferings of the teeming millions would continue to 

multiply. The second path is more desirable but seems unlikely to be 

followed unless both states are compelled to seriously commence a 

sustained peace process and a formalized restraint arrangement. 

This paper proffers the second pathway as the only reasonable way 

forward. Following this path of peace and cooperation will entail 

frustration, and it will be protracted in nature. The process, however, 

must be started and hope must be kept alive. 

In the effort to consider Pakistanís nuclear future circa 2020, this 

chapter will be divided into three parts: 
156

1) Pakistanís Nuclear Journey: This section will discuss the 

backdrop of Pakistanís initial need for the nuclear program, past 

technical and political challenges, and the managerial basis of the 

nuclear program. 

2) Regional Dynamics: This section will examine the regional 

dynamics in South Asia, amplified by outside actors and mutual 

threat perceptions, which shape Pakistanís security policymaking. 

3) The Way Forward: This section will suggest a direction in 

which the region should go to maintain strategic stability, including 

roles that the United States can play. A technical framework for a 

restraint regime will be proposed. 

PAKISTANíS NUCLEAR JOURNEY 

Pakistan, the worldís sixth most populous country, has the 

worldís seventh largest armed forces and is in possession of an 

unspecified number of nuclear arms. It is also currently faced with a 

myriad of challenges stemming from economic mismanagement, 

competing political institutions, and multiple socioeconomic problems. With an extremely low yearly income of US$470 per capita, 

Pakistanís economy is at one of its lowest ebbs ever. Pakistan is at a 

crucial crossroads, needing to carefully balance economic viability 

and military security. 

Since 1999, following the Kargil crisis, India has increased its 

defense expenditures. In contrast, primarily due to its perilous 

economic situation, Pakistan has decreased its defense spending in 

real terms.8 While Indiaís steady economic growth allows it to 

increase defense spending annually, Pakistanís focus will likely 

remain on improving its economy, ailing from a decade of mismanagement.9 With an ìeconomic revival strategy,î10 Pakistan hopes 

to make a turn around within this next decade. The goal of this 

strategy will be to return to the economic performance of the 1980s, 
157

or even the 1960s, a decade that saw the highest Pakistani economic 

growth ever, prompting the Harvard Development Advisory Group 

to use Pakistan as a model developing country with gross domestic 

product (GDP) growth averaging 6 percent.11 This ìback to the 

futureî scenario hinges on the sustainability of a peace resulting 

from nuclear deterrence. With all this in mind, Pakistan will be 

inwardly focused, seeking to maintain its domestic balance rather 

than to confront India. In the process, Pakistan will address its 

socioeconomic ills through ìpoverty alleviation programs and 

political reforms that will bring about a ësilent revolutioní.î12

Nuclear capability will be an important factor guaranteeing external 

security as Pakistan proceeds toward reviving its economy and 

internal stability. 

The Pakistani Narrative: Strategic Compulsions and Challenges. 

The strategic culture imperatives of Pakistan are derived from its 

own historical experiences, primarily two events: the 1971 war with 

India and Indiaís 1974 nuclear test (Pokhran I) . Since it began its 

quest for a nuclear deterrent, Pakistan faced and overcame three 

major political and technical challenges and four strategic challenges 

in the form of crises and threats to its national security. Serious 

endeavors to develop a nuclear program began in response to overt 

Indian nuclearization of the region in 1974. For Pakistan, the nuclear 

dimension changed the strategic balance dramatically. Pakistanís 

basic deterrence rationale revolved around two elements. First was a 

belief that a nuclear threat warrants a nuclear response. Unlike some 

Middle Eastern countries, Pakistan eschewed the notion of seeking a 

ìpoor manís equalizerî through chemical and/or biological options. 

Second, nuclear weapons were seen as a force multiplier to deter 

aggression by conventional force. Nuclear capability would serve as 

the core of national security and help to compensate for Pakistanís 

limited resources and the strategic asymmetry with India. 

The first political-technical challenge for Pakistan was to develop 
158

a nuclear weapon. Unfortunately, the timing was not right for 

ìnuclear late-bloomers.î The early 1970s was the beginning of the 

era of nuclear nonproliferation. At the time, attaining a nuclear 

deterrent was not a question of a breakthrough in nuclear physics 

but of overcoming international political barriers. No other country 

faced the kind of difficulties that Pakistan did. India and Israel, the 

other two states holding out from the nonproliferation regime, had 

passed through the gestation period and surpassed the critical 

technology threshold well before proliferation became a serious 

question after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into 

force.13 The perception in Pakistan was that for every proliferation 

act committed by India, Pakistan would be (and was) punished as it 

was forced to respond, pursuing what was perceived by Pakistan is 

to be their critical national security requirement. Meanwhile, India 

would either escape punishment or get away with a slap on the 

wrist. 

In 1976, Pakistan laid the foundation of its nuclear program, 

based on enriching uranium through gas centrifuges after the United 

States pressured France not to transfer reprocessing plants to 

Pakistan, even though they would be under International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. By 1977, U.S. legislation, under 

the Symington-Glenn Act, sought to restrict the acquisition and 

testing of nuclear weaponsóa law that was essentially formulated in 

the wake of the 1974 Indian test. Subsequently, the U.S. Congress 

passed the Pressler Amendment, a Pakistan-specific law, in 1985; this 

made continued military and economic support to Pakistan 

contingent upon the U.S. Presidentís certification that Pakistan did 

not possess nuclear weapons. Over a period of time, India realized it 

had the advantage over Pakistan. Indian size and potential would 

allow it to weather the strictures of the Western-led nonproliferation 

regime, which India mitigated with diplomacy (especially using the 

ìChina rivalryî card that resonated well within certain anti-China 

and nonproliferation lobbies in the United States) and dependable 

Soviet/Russian support. The same was not true for Pakistan, which 
159

had little room to maneuver diplomatically and economically, and 

which was always facing hard choices and political/strategic tradeoffs due to its deleterious economy. 

India began to apply this comparative advantage as a calculated 

strategy. First, India would challenge the nonproliferation regime by 

calling for global disarmament according to article six of the NPT, 

and then, after the predictable silence of the United States, use this 

lack of response as a pretext to justify its own nuclear program. 

Second, India would predict Pakistanís reaction and provoke it into a 

ìtit-for-tatî response, simultaneously picking on China and Pakistan 

as the ìtwo villains.î Such claims not only provided the propaganda 

tool to justify Indiaís actions, but also engaged Pakistan in an arms 

race that would erode Pakistanís cumulative security. Initially 

Islamabad obliged, but it soon realized the trap. It therefore began 

calculating what was critical for its national security, and worked on 

a strategy to put India on the defensive, with Pakistan responding 

only after carefully weighing security, diplomatic and economic 

factors. 

By the mid-1980s, the U.S. Government believed Pakistan had 

developed sufficient capability to ìproduce enough weapons grade 

material to build several nuclear devices per year but was not 

believed to have assembled any nuclear explosive devices.î14

Pakistan might have deliberately kept its weaponization capability 

on the threshold, or only a ìscrew driverís turn away,î primarily to 

accommodate U.S. concerns. It was both politically prudent and 

made security sense for Pakistan to do so. At the time, Pakistan was 

a beneficiary of military and economic support from this superpower ally. But Islamabad could not afford to slow down on this 

policy course. By the end of 2000, Pakistan had an unspecified 

number of nuclear weapons, primarily highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) devices.15 

The second challenge for Pakistan after having developed 
160

nuclear weapons was to acquire and/or develop a means of 

delivery. India enjoyed a five-to-one advantage over Pakistan in 

aerial delivery means. In 1990, the dreaded Pressler Amendment was 

applied to Pakistan, leading to the immediate denial of the delivery 

of the already paid for F-16 aircraft. The application of the Pressler 

Amendment happened amid important geopolitical changes in the 

world and in the region (the end of the Cold War, the Soviet 

withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Kuwait/Gulf crisis) that had farreaching political implications: not only did these changes adversely 

affect U.S.-Pakistan relations, but they helped to create a security 

void in Afghanistan that would prove costly for the region and the 

world. In 1990, while Pakistan was denied an aerial means of 

delivery, India demonstrated the Agni and Prithvi missiles, the 

products of its integrated guided missile program (IGMP) 

established in 1983. The serial production of the missiles and their 

subsequent induction into the Indian armed forces caused further 

imbalance. With the end of the Cold War and visible signs of U.S. 

abandonment of the region, followed shortly by the collapse of the 

Soviet Union, Pakistan came to feel isolatedóthat it was being left 

on its own to face India as well as the socioeconomic fallout of the 

Afghan war, which was in the process of regressing into civil war. 

Confronted by such pressures, Pakistan felt compelled to develop a 

land-based delivery means for its nuclear weapons, namely, ballistic 

missiles. However, as with the NPT and its attendant supply-control 

regime,16 Pakistanís quest for a missile deterrent now faced several 

missile-related sanctions under the Missile Technology Control 

Regime (MTCR), a supply-control cartel established in 1987. Pakistan 

turned to its trusted ally, China, and other sources of supply. 

Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan and China (as well as North Korea) 

were slapped with MTCR sanctions, the latter for alleged supply of 

missile technology to the former. This pattern continued until the 

Clinton administration departed.17 Despite the sanctions, by 2000, 

Pakistan had several land-based solid- and liquid-fuelled missiles, 

ranging from 100 kilometers to 3,000 kilometers.18 
161

The third challenge for Pakistan was to validate the delivery 

means and the weapons designs through testing. This challenge had 

obvious political costs and unlike the situation of India, Pakistan 

could not openly challenge the global nonproliferation regime. 

Given the international environment in the wake of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations, Pakistan could not 

have contemplated nuclear tests on its own. Indian preparations in 

1995 and its intransigence during the CTBT debate made its 

intentions clear. In 1998 when India tested again, it was merely a 

tactical surprise rather than a strategic one. Pakistan was thus provided with an opportunity to validate its own designs by testing. 

Pakistan conducted fission tests that produced the desired results 

and thus gained confidence in its designs. 

Earlier in April 1998, after much deliberation, Pakistan 

conducted its first test of a liquid-fueled missile (the Ghauri), and in 

April of the next year, of a solid-fueled missile (the Shaheen). Again, 

Pakistan received MTCR sanctions, but protested that Indiaís 16 

Prithvi tests and at least four Agni tests conducted earlier were 

ignored under the pretext that Indiaís missiles were ìindigenousîóa 

claim Pakistan contested. Indiaís Prithvi and Agni were the result of a 

combination of reverse engineering and off -the-shelf technological 

acquisitions of Russian SA-2 missiles, U.S. Scout rockets and French 

rocket engines.19 Pakistan believed India never incurred the same 

scrutiny, even though both programs contained imported elements.20 

Thus, Pakistan overcame significant challenges to achieve 

national security. Not only was it under constant threat from India, 

but also from the strictures of the Westóparticularly in the form of 

the nonproliferation regimes for nuclear weapons and ballistic 

missiles. By the turn of the century, three generations had paid a 

steep price for achieving the nuclear deterrence that would ensure 

Pakistanís national survival and sovereignty. 

Strategic Challenges: Major Crises in Nuclearization. 
162

Throughout this period of nuclearization, Pakistan lived in 

dangerous circumstances. In the late 1970s, major political and 

regional security changes occurred in the neighborhood. With 

respect to India, Pakistanís principal threat and raison d’être for going 

nuclear, four major crises have taken place, and the fifth one is 

currently in progress (spring 2002), with the Indian armed forces 

fully deployed against Pakistan in a game of brinkmanship in the 

wake of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. 

The 1972 Simla treaty brought peace for over a decade. India and 

Pakistan maintained good relations, especially in the late 1970s when 

there was a regime change in India for the first time. While major 

changes occurred in Iran (the revolution in 1979) and Afghanistan 

(the Soviet occupation of December 1979) that directly affected 

Pakistanís western border, India underwent an internal crisis. The 

Sikh freedom struggle in the Punjab, adjacent to the Pakistani 

border, precipitated a military operation in Amritsar. At approximately the same time (1984), the Soviet-Afghan war was also at its 

peak and undergoing a critical phase. Pakistanís security forces and 

intelligence agencies focused on two frontsóon the Punjab border in 

the east and in the west towards Afghanistan. India commenced a 

surprise occupation of the Siachin Glacier that from Pakistanís 

perspective was a stab in the back.21 The ensuing crisis nearly 

brought the two countries to war in 1984. Also at that time, Pakistani 

intelligence learned that India had conceived plans to strike at 

Pakistanís nuclear enrichment facility at Kahuta in an apparent 

attempt to emulate Israelís attack on the Iraqi nuclear plant at 

Osirak.22 The crisis diffused after Indian Prime Minister Indira 

Gandhi was assassinated in October 1984. 

Two years later, India planned a major operation code-named 

ìBrasstacksî under the garb of a military exercise on the border of 

the two countries. This event was designed to trigger a conventional 

war with Pakistan. Once again, India contemplated executing plans 
163

to strike at Pakistanís nuclear installation. The operation would 

commence after the Indian air force faked an attack on its own 

installation at Trombay, providing the pretext for a ìcounterattackî 

on Pakistan. Again, the underlying notion was to destroy Pakistanís 

nascent nuclear capability before the enrichment process crossed 

critical thresholds. Pakistan responded by mobilizing its forces, and 

the standoff escalated to the brink of conventional war. This was the 

first conventional force assembly of its kind since the war in 1971.23 

In 1990, the Kashmir crisis once again brought Pakistan and 

India close to war. B y this time, the prospects of nuclear deployment 

were perceived to be real, prompting a mission by U.S. Deputy 

National Security Advisor Robert Gates to the region. In 1999, 

despite a much-trumpeted summit at Lahore, an incursion in the 

region of Kargil masterminded by Pakistan once again demonstrated 

that the India-Pakistan problems are deep rooted, requiring a 

sustained peace and conflict resolution process rather than ìflash in 

the panî peace initiatives. 

Such a demonstrated pattern of crisis instability naturally leads 

observers to express concern about the very real possibility of 

escalation into a nuclear exchange. Justas the nuclear threat to 

Pakistan calls for the nuclear deterrent, the new and dangerous 

capability demands deliberate and responsible management. Mankindís deadliest device, nuclear weapons, can be a double-edged 

sword where mismanagement of arsenals can lead to destruction as 

quickly as an incoming attack. Tampering, accidents, and unauthorized launches are all the specters of deterrence in stability. It is for 

these reasons that development of a comprehensive command and 

control apparatus is extremely important. 

Managing Nuclear Arsenals. 

During the nuclear age, the experience of the Cold War 

protagonists revealed that there was an imbalance in understanding 
164

nuclear security because the ìprocess of managing nuclear arsenals 

[was] less discussed and less familiar than either the weapons themselves or the doctrinal logic used to define it.î24 Strategic affairs have 

traditionally been dominated by the military. Until 1998, Pakistanís 

strategic development program was coordinated under the utmost 

secrecy by a small circle of the highest-level leaders. After the tests, 

the government had an obligation to the nation and the international 

community to delineate the roles and responsibilities of the various 

civilian and military organizations required for the management of 

the nuclear capability. In February 2000, Pakistan announced the 

creation of its Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) that would 

ensure civilian control. The ìhead of the governmentî (a civilian) is 

the chairman of both the ìEmployment Committeeî and the 

ìDevelopment Committee.î The former is the apex body responsible 

for policy formulation and direction, establishment of the hierarchy 

of command and control, and the delegation of authority, as well as 

being responsible for safeguards, monitoring, and accounting of the 

nuclear material. The latter is essentially a military-scientific 

committee that implements the policy guidelines to attain specific 

strategic force objectives. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) is the 

secretariat that plays the pivotal role of planning, coordinating, and 

guiding. At the services level, Strategic Force Commands are 

responsible for training, maintaining, and ensuring custodial safety 

of the as sets under close supervision of the SPD. Figure 1 represents 

a skeletal model of Pakistanís command and control hierarchy. 

Through this command and control, Pakistan has been able to set a 

strategic direction towards its ìminimum deterrent requirement.î 

The establishment of this command system in Pakistan 

institutionalizes the nuclear capability under a centralized forum 

and ensures the future size and shape of the nuclear force. The 

control apparatus oversees every aspect of the arsenal in the strategic 

and policy context, ensuring that the program remains affordable 

and within the constraints of the economy. 
165
166

The Always/Never Dilemma. 

Peter Feaver has described the central challenge of any strategic 

command and control system as an ìalways/never dilemma.î The 

always/never dilemma is one that faces every nuclear-capable state 

when it establishes the command systems to manage its nuclear 

forces.ì Leaders want a high assurance that the weapons will always 

work when directed and a similar assurance that they will never be 

used in the absence of authorized direction.î26 This factor is 

especially critical in a tense standoff like the one in South Asia. 

Normally such a system is based for peacetime operations; however, 

the dilemma here illustrates the trade-off between safety in the 

storage of nuclear weapons and the need for readiness if the 

deterrent threat is to be effective. The transition from peace to war is 

fraught with dangers. ìDeterrence rests on the credibility of the 

command system ability. While deterring aggression, which is 

paramount, a second goal is to avoid accidental war.î Military 

history and everyday operational experience affirm that the 

unexpected is to be expected in complex operationsóthe more so in 

nuclear operations.27 The propensity of South Asia to run into crisis 

makes the case for establishing a reliable command and control 

system all the more crucial. It stands to reason that centralized 

authority should be held exclusively by a commander who prefers 

never to actually use nuclear weapons, and who would therefore 

provide safeguards against their accidental or unauthorized launch, 

thereby making nuclear use exclusively contingent upon the central 

command authority. However, the vulnerability of the central 

command to a decapitating attack forces it to pre-delegate not the 

authority to launch nuclear weapons, but the ability to do so. While 

bolstering the deterrent threat, the diffusion of the ability to initiate 

nuclear use multiplies the difficulty of preventing three dangers: 

accidents, tampering, and un-authorized useóthus the 

always/never dilemma. This dilemma is even more trenchant for 

Pakistan, given the lack of strategic depth, technical asymmetry, and 

crisis instability vis-‡-vis India. 
167

REGIONAL DYNAMICS: STRATEGIC ASYMMETRIES AFFECTING PAKISTANíS SECURITY POLICYMAKING 

Factors Affecting Pakistanís Security Future. 

Pakistanís future security will be contingent upon four factors: 

nuclear deterrence, economic development, stability in Afghanistan, 

and relations with India (the Kashmir dispute is central here). The 

interplay and policy trade-offs involved in balancing these factors 

will determine Pakistanís security for the foreseeable future. 

Assuming that more resources will be consumed by the military 

in a state of war than in peace, nuclear deterrence of war therefore 

frees more capital for domestic investment. The whole idea of 

nuclear weapons development in Pakistan is predicated upon 

deterrence of aggression and prevention of war. The resultant peace, 

therefore, creates a window that must be used to optimize resources 

for economic reforms. Pakistanís future policy should therefore be to 

balance the symbiotic relationship between nuclear deterrence and 

economic revival, and handle the implicit trade-off. 

Peace and stability in Afghanistan are inextricably linked to 

Pakistanís security, therefore Pakistanís objectives in Afghanistan 

remain that of a friendly government in Kabul and a peaceful and 

settled border (based on the Durand Line). The historical, cultural, 

geographical, and demographic linkages are imperative, making the 

two states ìnaturally interdependent.î Afghanistanís ìlandlocked 

imperativeî (her need for access to the Indian Ocean and aid from 

Pakistan) and Pakistanís quest to reintegrate itself into the Central 

Asian network (e.g., via oil pipelines) will not only enhance 

Pakistanís security but help to stabilize the entire region.28 Pakistan 

may have learned from its mistake that her strategic interest does not 

warrant establishing a puppet regime in Kabul but is better served 

through a dependent and friendly regime that develops relations 
168

based on geopolitical and cultural affinity. The dividends for 

Pakistan from stability on its Afghani border are many, including the 

elimination of a thorn in its relationship with Iran and with other 

Central Asian countries. 

With India, the relationship is essentially complicated by the 

non-resolution of Kashmir and other disputes. In Pakistan, there are 

two distinct schools of thought regarding India. The first is the 

optimist school that believes that there are essentially no differences 

between India and Pakistan except those over specific issues. Once 

Kashmir and the other issues are resolved, South Asia will be 

ushered into an era of peace, amity, and prosperity. The second is 

the deterministic school of thought, which believes that hostility is a 

result of cognitive biases. Therefore, even if these issues are resolved, 

new issues will be created to keep the animus alive. While both of 

these schools of thought developed during the period of mutual 

mistrust between India and Pakistan, they lead to contradictory 

conclusions regarding the future if the outstanding issues can be 

resolved. Perhaps time will reveal which school is correct in its 

predictions. 

The Myth of a Triangular Security Construct. 

The South Asian subcontinent has traditionally consisted only of 

India and Pakistan. Given Indiaís perceptions about China, strategic 

analysts have long debated whether the security dynamics of South 

Asia can be complete without bringing in the China factor. A recent 

study done by the Henry Stimson Center concludes that should 

China be taken as part of the regional equation, a treaty-based 

triangular restraint arrangement would be ìvery difficult to 

negotiate since neither equality nor formalized inequality is likely to 

be acceptable to one or more parties.î29 Economic asymmetries also 

exacerbate the instability in the relationships between China and 

India and India and Pakistan. According to the World Bankís 2001 

development report, both Pakistan and India have close to 40 
169

percent of their population under the international poverty level 

(one dollar per day), while Chinese poverty is fewer than 5 percent 

of their population. Chinese growth rates are also projected to be 

higher at 7 percent than Indian rates (5.5 percent), which are in turn 

higher than Pakistani growth rates.30 Moreover, the fundamental 

military disparity between the regional rivals is not going to change 

in the next 20 years. Although India may reach the current Chinese 

stockpile of nuclear weapons numbering over four hundred, Chinese 

stockpiles will, by that time, have grown greater, especially with no 

bright prospects for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and 

the expected Chinese response to the U.S. deployment of a ballistic 

missile defense (BMD) system. Also, Indiaís nuclear and conventional advantage over Pakistan will likely remain, especially given 

Pakistanís current prostrate economy. 

Indiaís security perception nevertheless revolves around the 

ìtwin threatî from China and Pakistan.31 At one level, a Sino-Indian 

dÈtente seems possible, yet the rhetoric of the ìChina threatî is a 

constant Indian mantra.32 The propagation of the China threat is in 

part a deliberate Indian policy calculated for the ulterior motive of 

gaining political and security support from the West.33 As for the 

other threat, Pakistanís nuclear program is driven purely by security 

concerns specific to India; Pakistanís nuclear future hinges upon the 

perceived threat and ambitions of India. 

Pakistan believes Indian ambitions and aspirations are three-f 

old: 1)emerge as a global power (at least to be seen as Chinaís equal); 

2) eliminate the influence of outside powers in South Asia; and 3) 

develop regional security under Indian patronage and terms. To 

realize these objectives, Indiaís hopes are pinned on three key 

assumptions. One is that the United States, in its perceived cold war 

with China, would feed Indian ambitions by accepting her as a 

strategic partner. Second, China would be kept away from influence 

on and cooperation with Pakistan, and possibly be deterred from 

deploying a naval presence in the Indian Ocean (seen as Indiaís 
170

ìlakeî) . The third is Indiaís ability to maintain a weak, subservient, 

and semi-sovereign Pakistan (as a ìWest Bangladeshî) . Indian 

designs on China and Pakistan could be construed as the following: 

in the short term, engage China to buy time while maintaining the 

rivalry in order to receive Western support and to justify an arms 

build upóthus narrowing the developmental and technological gap 

between India and China. In the long term, force China to accept 

India as a peer competitor with global status. With regard to 

Pakistan, in the short term, New Delhi seeks to isolate Islamabad and 

force it to change its Kashmir policy and/or accept the status quo. In 

the long term, Indiaís objective is to erode Pakistanís military 

capacity and national will to sustain sovereignty in South Asia. 

While the China factor in South Asian dynamics cannot be 

dismissed, its inclusion in the regional construct skews regional 

dynamics and dims the prospect of a secure nuclear future for the 

region. China may view an emerging India as a potential rival, but 

the disposition of Chinese armed forces does not indicate any 

offensive design or capability that is India-specific. Contrary to the 

claims to date, it has never been shown conclusively that China has 

targeted or deployed strategic forces or missiles anywhere that could 

threaten India. Chinaís security focus is toward the East.34 Posing a 

real threat to India would obviously be counterproductive to 

Chinese aims, objectives and security interests.35 Indeed, the ChinaPakistan relationship has been very close and is likely to progress 

into economic and other fields since Pakistan considers ìChinaís role 

key to South Asian peace.î36 Pakistan will continue to rely on China, 

and this factor will affect the larger Asian power balance.37 Finally, 

the concept of deterrence is a key factor in each of the three actorsí 

perceptions of the others. In Kashmir, Pakistan supports a freedom 

struggle that India considers a sub-conventional war under the 

nuclear umbrella. India believes that asymmetrical assured destruction will provide an opportunity for limited conventional war by 

assuming that it possesses escalation control over Pakistan. Pakistan, 

therefore, has not foreclosed the use of nuclear weapons as a last 
171

resort (the Samson option) . India keeps the Chinese threat alive to 

justify its arms build-up while China supports Pakistan to maintain 

the regional balance. 

The Russian and Israeli Factors. 

Russian assistance to Indiaís strategic and nuclear programs is 

another cause of potential instability in the region. Soviet S-300 

missile sales with the possible transfer of Arrow missile technology 

from Israel and other Western countries may be helping India 

develop an anti-ballistic missile defense system of sorts. 

Furthermore, Russiaís cooperation and transfer of early warning and 

surveillance systems to India will boost New Delhiís space program. 

Such cooperation skews the balance in the region and would 

obviously affect Pakistanís response. Israel has also been known to 

sell rocket technology, remotely piloted vehicles, and other armaments to the region. The arms flow between Israel and India is 

especially troubling and destabilizing because it invites Pakistan to 

reciprocate by beginning a similar relationship with Israelís Arab 

neighbors. Although Pakistan has deliberately avoided technology 

transfers to Israelís neighbors, the specter of a two-way ìMiddle 

East-South Asia arms corridorî is a very destabilizing one, increasing the pressure in two already tense regions. 

U.S. Influence in South Asian Politics. 

Looking ahead, the emerging multipolarity of the international 

system and evolving U.S. policy on Asia (that may well engender a 

new cold war) will set the direction of the regionís future. In the 

wake of the events of fall 2001, the focus on international terrorism 

will likely overshadow all other policy choices in the short term. In 

the long run, however, the interplay of geopolitics and strategic 

policy (notably the issues of proliferation and missile defense) will 

resurface. This will have a profound impact in determining the 

contours of regional dynamics. For example, the United States has 
172

been seeking a ìstrategic partnershipî with India, while at the same 

time seeking ìstrategic cooperationî with Pakistan. More 

importantly, the war in Afghanistan saw the United States win back 

its old ally, and brought Pakistan an ìopportunity to come back from 

the precipice.î38 In normal times, the United States would want to 

steer clear of the India-Pakistan rivalry. However, at the time of this 

writing, the United States is passing through a critical point in its 

war; the stakes are extremely high and the outcome of the evolving 

situation remains to be seen. 

Both India and Pakistan are at odds with each other, but not with 

the United States. For the first time, Washington finds India allied to 

the United States and thus the United States has leverage to bring 

both parties to a negotiating table. Moreover, given the dynamics 

and dangers involved, the United States cannot afford to take the 

low road to South Asia. The apparent U.S. tilt in favor of India and 

concomitant abandonment of Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1990s 

led to a vacuum in the region. Since September 11, however, that has 

been corrected, although skepticism continues in Pakistan regarding 

the longevity of U.S. engagement. Also, the United States has shown 

nominal interest in restraining Indiaís pursuit of a nuclear arsenal,39

pulling out of various international treaties and protocols and clearly 

signaling to the world its disinterest in international treaties and 

regimes not having to do with Islamic terror. If this pattern 

continues, the next few years will likely see a continuation of the 

nuclear and conventional force build-ups in South Asia. 

Lastly, the staying power of the United States will be the driving 

force behind the direction of South Asian politics. This may run 

contrary to Indiaís professed policy of opposing the involvement of 

outside powers in South Asian affairs, but Pakistan believes that the 

United States will maintain a balanced relationship with both the 

countries. In the context of the nuclear and conventional balances of 

power in the subcontinent, the United States should develop a policy 

that appreciates the security concerns of all parties in realistic rather 
173

than idealistic terms. 

THE WAY FORWARD: TOWARDS A RESTRAINT REGIME 

In the first two decades after independence, despite two wars (in 

1948 and 1965) India and Pakistan took several steps towards peace 

and security in the region, including in Kashmir.40 The Karachi 

agreement of 1948 was the basis for the conduct of troops on the 

Ceasefire Line (CfL) that became the Line of Control (LOC) after the 

1971 War. Between 1972 and 1998, there were several bilateral 

agreements; most notable among them were three: an agreement not 

to attack the otherís nuclear installations; membership in the 

chemical weapons convention; and an agreement on the conduct of 

military exercises and the demarcation of airspace. 

Despite these agreements, tensions between the two countries 

continued, thereby eroding confidence in the agreements. India and 

Pakistan were discussing multiple issues, such as Jammu and 

Kashmir, the Siachin Glacier, Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, trade, 

security, etc. With the arrival of the BJP government in 1998, India 

adopted a more belligerent agenda toward Pakistan. The nuclear 

tests in 1998 generated heat between the protagonists, and gained 

the attention of the global community. The United States engaged 

both India and Pakistan separately in strategic dialogues, leading to 

bilateral dialogue between the two.41 

The talks between India and Pakistan resulted in the exchange of 

several restraint ideas. None of them ever resulted in a viable 

process for implementation as neither side was prepared to give up 

its advantage. For example, in the October 1998 talks between India 

and Pakistan on ìPeace, Security and Confidence Building Measures, 

îIndia offered an exclusive agreement on the nuclear aspect without 

any corresponding agreement on conventional force restraints. 

Further, they proposed not to engage in counter-value targeting 

(against cities and other civilian dwellings) while attempting to 
174

neutralize Pakistanís deterrent by keeping the option of counterforce targeting (against military troops and bases) open. Conversely, 

Pakistan proposed a strategic restraint regime that included a 

combination of nuclear, missile and conventional force restraint 

arrangements.42 Thus Pakistan called for no first use of forceó

conventional or nuclearóthereby curtailing Indiaís options to use its 

conventional force advantage. Two years later, Pakistan also 

suggested the concept of the non-deployment of missiles at the 

Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, in which four specific 

proposals were made: not to deploy ballistic missiles, not to 

operationally deploy nuclear capable missile systems, to formalize 

flight test notification, and to declare a moratorium on the 

development, acquisition and deployment of anti-ballistic missiles.43

India dismissed all of the proposals, and the world did not take 

interestóespecially the Bush administration, whose indifference was 

perhaps a result of its quest for support of the unpopular BMD 

system, which India had previously backed. 

Crafting a Restraint Regime. 

Based on these proposals and discussions, three distinct aspects 

of a restraint regime need to be considered. 

Regional Security Framework. There are two categories of arms 

control measures particularly applicable in the regional context. First 

are the traditional measures that aim at crisis avoidance and build on 

restraintsóessentially confidence-building measures (CBMs) and 

risk reduction measures. Second is the category of arms control that 

imposes limits on numbers and kinds of weapons, and is in the 

realm of imposing mutually acceptable developmental constraints 

that can be extended to disarmament. Past experience suggests that 

South Asia may not yet be amenable to this second category. At the 

same time, however, there is a desire for any agreement that could 

inspire a cautious rapprochement between India and Pakistan. 
175

One of the key reasons for the breakdown of negotiations has 

been the failure to integrate various factors into a framework that 

redresses not just the issues of concern but also the structural 

asymmetries in the region. A regional security framework would 

involve four major principles: 1) development of some basic rules of 

engagement to ameliorate the danger of war; 2) a fundamental 

change in the strategic and political climate from zero-sum to 

positive-sum; 3) an integrated approach to nuclear and conventional 

forces; and 4) involvement of the international community to ensure 

that commitments are honored. 

Integrated Arms Control Framework. Conventional arms control 

and restraint measures form an essential part of the equation, 

alongside nuclear missile restraint. The Conventional Forces in 

Europe (CfE) principles for asymmetrical and proportionate 

conventional arms control and restraint are the direction South Asia 

needs to travel. Both sides must mutually identify offensive and 

defensive forces. Buffers would be created to prevent the assembly 

of offensive forces in threatening areas (which would be designated 

as ìlow force zonesî), thereby avoiding another ìBrasstacksî-type of 

eventuality. Both India and Pakistan would voluntarily submit 

reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. In the same spirit, 

any increase in strength, equipment, or structure should be 

voluntarily and mutually made known as part of a CBM. 

Nuclear Missile Constraints. Determining the thresholds for 

nuclear restraint is very difficult, as ambiguity is seen as an essential 

aspect of effective deterrence. A smokescreen is kept over actual 

capabilities, deployment status, and the numbers of delivery means 

as well as the weapons in a deliberate strategy to keep the enemy 

guessing by mixing ambiguity and transparency. It is difficult to 

determine a base line for the current state of weaponization and 

deployment. For obvious security reasons, there can be little 

transparency in the state of operational preparedness. Letting 

specific nuclear thresholds be known invites aggression up until that 
176

point. Before the present crisis it was widely assumed that existing 

nuclear weapons were not fully deployed.44 At least the delivery 

vehicles were not mated with the nuclear warheads. However, there 

was ambiguity over whether the warheads were being stored with 

the nuclear cores placed inside the warheads. From a technical 

perspective, restraint measures can range from non-weaponization 

up to full deployment. Examples include: 

• The nuclear devices (cores) are kept separate from other 

warhead components and not co-located. 

• The nuclear devices and warheads are not assembled but are 

co-located for rapid assembly. 

• The nuclear warheads are assembled but not mated with the 

missile frames or aircraft. 

• The nuclear warheads are mated with the missile frames but 

are not co-located with the delivery means (transporter/ 

erector/launcher, TEL). 

• All components are co-located to be rapidly mated. 

In the India-Pakistan context, it is extremely difficult to verify the 

stage of weaponization and highly unlikely that transparency in the 

state of weaponization would be subjected to regime verification. 

However, if nuclear weapons are mounted with aircraft or missile 

delivery platforms and fully deployed, then it becomes technically 

possible to verify through various surveillance and other national 

technical means (NTMs). 

Nuclear Scenarios. 

At present, both armies appear to be in a state of mobilization 

and deployment in battlefield locations. Because of ambiguity 
177

surrounding nuclear weapons on both sides, if the situation 

continues to escalate, it cannot be construed that nuclear weapons 

are in the same state of weaponization as they were prior to 

December 13, 2001. Three scenarios of nuclear use could be 

visualized in South Asia between now and the future: preventive, 

accidental, and the escalation of limited war. 

Preventive Nuclear Strike. India may conduct a decapitating attack 

after careful calculation and consideration of force levels, 

redundancy, and vulnerability. Sudden strikes to cripple or 

eliminate Pakistanís assets or nerve center and infrastructure would 

certainly start a nuclear exchange.45 

Accidental Launch. In the absence of a treaty or formal restraint 

arrangement, and under conditions of non-verifiable CBMs and 

deliberate ambiguity (by informal consent of both parties), deployed 

nuclear forces area recipe for instability and misperceptions. Nuclear 

forces dispersed for reasons of survivability and invulnerability pose 

the necessity for early warning, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 

The biggest question would be how to address the dilemma of predelegation in the event of a decapitating attack. Further, the onus of 

physical security, protection, and reliability (human and technical) 

would now increase exponentially. The burden on command 

systems would be tremendous. Given the railroad conditions in the 

sub-continent, preventing an accident during the transportation of 

nuclear weapons, especially the paraphernalia involved with liquidfueled missiles, would be extremely hard. Accidents cannot be ruled 

out and therefore the methods of ensuring safety during the move 

will be a very important feature in the South Asian environment. 

Deception is a part of adversarial relationships, but misperceptions 

during crisis can lead to risks of false warnings and possible nuclear 

exchange. Creating doubts in the minds of the opponent is a 

deliberate act, and in a hostile environment and during a crisis, 

confusing the other side could have very dangerous consequences. 
178

Limited War. The belief of the Indian military that it could 

conduct a limited war under the nuclear umbrella has already been 

discussed. It is quite possible that the current situation could become 

a sequel to those previous crises. The strategic assembly and 

movement of conventional forces cannot remain concealed, and 

takes time to develop. However, nuclear weapons and forces can be 

assembled and deployed far more rapidly and secretly even though 

their use may not be contemplated. In such a scenario, nuclear forces 

may well be deployed preceding the conventional force build-up. 

The determination of redlines, or the nuclear threshold, may be very 

difficult to predict as conventional war escalates. The notion that 

India will keep escalation dominance may well prove wrong, if for 

no other reason than as a result of the sheer confusion generated in 

the fog of war. 

Elements of a Restraint Regime. 

The very real possibility of any one of these aforementioned 

contingencies necessitates concrete measures to promote safety and 

to lessen the likelihood of misperception leading to tragedy. It is for 

this reason that delays in response, early warning systems, and the 

establishment of a crisis center is recommended. 

Delay in Response. For crisis stability, restraint with respect to 

weaponization and deployment is critical, and that is reflected by a 

desire on both sides to have ìonly recessed or latent deterrence.î46

This should not be construed as stymieing either countryís ability to 

respond. In fact, a delay in response in normal circumstances makes 

security sense and provides assurance that arsenals and delivery 

means are not only safe but under the control of the NCA. Delay in 

response allows for the prevention of accidental nuclear warfare 

while still allowing each country to protect its national security. Key 

proposals to implement a viable delay in response program are: 

• Critical components are kept removed from the system; 
179

• Launcher and warhead separation to mutually agreed 

geographical limits; 

• Two-source warning system; 

• Two or more persons in control; and 

• A personnel reliability system. 

It is also important to improve the sensor and command 

networks of nuclear forces under such a program. When strategic 

forces are kept in delayed response modes, alerting systems can fail 

in two ways: either by signaling false alarms or by failing to signal 

an alarm during an actual attack. Respective national command 

authorities must take into account both of these issues when 

redundancy checks are added into the system. 

Cooperative Warning Arrangement. One of the key areas that need 

to be addressed is the surveillance and early warning disparity 

problems. Although generally both India and Pakistan lack reliable, 

up-to-date surveillance or warning systems, this is a major 

disadvantage for Pakistan. In a crisis, both leaderships would be 

working under blind spots, and they may well indulge in dangerous 

practices that could be misperceived by the other. Third parties, such 

as the United States, should help establish a cooperative warning 

arrangement between India and Pakistan and assist them in 

interpreting data provided by this warning system or provide the 

necessary information for the two parties to do so themselves. 

America should assist India and Pakistan in developing secure 

communications systems and in verifying accidental nuclear 

detonations or unannounced missile launches.47 In addition, if both 

countries have a restraint agreement that includes a non-deployment 

agreement, the United States could verify the absence of deployment 

to both parties in case of misperceptions. This cooperative warning 
180

system ìmight well be linked to the recently opened U.S.-Russia 

joint warning system, and could eventually include China. Indeed, it 

might be part of a larger Asian verification system.î48 In the long 

run, India and Pakistan must themselves accord a high priority to 

achieving a bilateral agreement on aerospace developments for 

surveillance and satellite monitoring. Such an agreement is not to 

justify spying but to be confident that there is nothing to hide and 

that no hidden strikes are being planned. This is a CBM critical to the 

nuclear future of both India and Pakistan, and would go a long way 

toward relieving tensions on both sides. 

Crisis Prevention Center. At this stage, both India and Pakistan are 

very sensitive to intrusive verification mechanisms. However, in the 

absence of verification, the strength of any arms control agreement is 

diluted. They might agree to establish central crisis prevention 

centers, patterned after the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), 

in their respective capitals that would deal with crises where shortterm, immediate communications are needed. The basic purpose of 

these centers is to support crisis management and crisis avoidance, 

and to substantiate implementation of CBMsóbasically, to prevent 

the crisis from escalating into a war that could lead to the use of 

nuclear force. They would also help both countries respond 

promptly to any unanticipated developments. Functional arrangements can be worked out if a basic code of engagement, like the one 

suggested above in the regional security framework, is already 

established. 

As an integral part of the crisis prevention centers, ìnuclear 

accident centersî should also be established. These centers would be 

staffed with specialists and observers. When a crisis occurs, they can 

confer with each other and report to their respective national 

command authority/head of state, providing critical information for 

decisions. To prepare a mutually acceptable blueprint of the centers, 

both sides should establish a ìconsultative commission,î comprised 

of scientists, technicians, diplomats and experts from the military, 
181

which could meet periodically to plan and oversee the centers, 

exchange concerns and discuss future modalities. 

U.S. Cooperation on Crisis Prevention. 

The United States is in a unique position with regard to India 

and Pakistan. It can play a vital role in encouraging nuclear and 

political CBMs. Politically, the United States could support an 

interim agreement to de-escalate the current situation by mutually 

withdrawing forces from the (unstable) deployed positions. The next 

obvious challenge for the United States would be to facilitate a peace 

process that includes Kashmir and other issues in which the crisis 

threshold could be raised, thereby fostering greater stability and 

predictability. Nuclear CBMs could be engendered by ìcarefully 

weighing the merits and pitfalls of sharing [its] expertise and, where 

possible, technology.î49 No matter how confident India and Pakistan 

are about their nuclear safeguards, the matter of nuclear safety 

should never be taken lightly. There are always human and technical 

errors, or a combination of the two, that can happen. To help 

ameliorate that risk, the United States can: 

• Help establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs). 

• Establish a cooperative warning arrangement that 

institutionalizes a method for exchanging information and 

that identifies areas where instant cooperation could help 

prevent crisis escalation. 

• Help introduce a personnel reliability program (PRP). 

• Co-develop systems akin to the Nuclear Emergency Search 

Teams (NEST), with specially trained teams that can react 

and take control in case of a hoax or an emergency.50

• Share experience with accident avoidance techniques to 
182

reduce technological errors, such as electromagnetic 

radiation, computer fallibility, etc., and such areas where the 

United States and others have experienced nuclear dangers. 

• Help design software for better electronic locks. 

• Suggest alternative means/measures for developing foolproof communications so as to obviate the possibilities of 

misinterpretation, especially in a crisis or war-like environment. 

• Identify factors that can check or recheck verification 

measures to prevent premature reactions to a false warningó

especially on radar screen, etc. 

• Provide generic physical protection and material accounting 

practices.51 

• Provide sophisticated vaults and access doors. 

• Provide portal command equipment. 

• Provide advanced circuitry to prevent accidental launch. 

CONCLUSION 

India and Pakistan need to coexist as sovereign neighbors. 

Because both are nuclear-capable states, they are required to exercise 

restraint and limit their actions. It is incumbent not only upon them 

but also the international community to seek early resolutions to 

their conflicts. It would be foolhardy to expect that arms control and 

restraint measures will work unless meaningful and substantive 

moves forward on core issues are pursued concurrently. 

Nevertheless, to prevent nuclear accidents and formal nuclear 

and/or conventional force deployments, there is an urgent need to 
183

establish a restraint regime in this regionóperhaps more critical 

than in any other place in the world. 

With an eye towards the next 20 years, two paths can be seen as 

possibilities for the region. One of those paths is the status quo, 

leading to a future determined by aggressive military policies that 

cause their mirror images in the rival stateís reactionary policies. 

This would no doubt spell an unrestricted arms race with less and 

less communication and fewer safety measures. The alternative to 

this path would be characterized by third party intervention leading 

to greater cooperation and the construction of a mutually acceptable 

framework for a restraint and stability regime, something along the 

lines described above. 

This chapter has proffered ideas where the West could help by 

sharing experience, expertise and technology. Such cooperation is 

not for the purpose of rewarding or enhancing capabilities but to 

ensure stability and peace and to avoid the risk of a nuclear war. 

Toward this end, it is time to take a fresh look at the current policy of 

denying technology and experience, and to distinguish between 

technologies that contribute toward stability and reducing the risk of 

nuclear war, and those that aid proliferation. South Asia stands at 

the crossroadsóon one hand the precipice of nuclear war and on the 

other a redefinition of nuclear history by developing a restraint 

regime model based not on mutually assured destruction, but on 

mutually assured accommodation. Which road is taken will impact us 

all. 

ENDNOTES 

1. Judith Miller and James Risen, ìA Nuclear War Feared over Kashmir,î New 

York Times, August 8, 2000, p. A8. 

2. Ibid (emphasis added). 

3. George J. Tenet, ìWorldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing 
184

World,î statement made before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 

February 7, 2001, available at: http://w w w.cia.gov/public_affairs/speeches/archives/ 

2001/UNCLASWWT_02072001.html (emphasis added). 

4. See, for example, the CIA study Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the 

Future with Nongovernment Experts, NIE 2000-02, December 2000, Washington, DC, 

available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/index.htm. 

5. Under the BJP, tensions between Hindu and Muslims within India as well 

as between India and Pakistan have been at their highest levels since partition. 

6. President Pervez Musharaff ,ìPakistan: A Vision for the Future,î address at 

the Woodrow Wilson International Center, Washington, DC, February 12, 2002. 

7. This analogy was used in the same context by Jairam Ramesh of the Indian 

National Congress in a talk on South Asia at The Brookings Institution, 

Washington, DC, and November 26, 2001. 

8. For details and comparison, see The Military Balance 2001/2002, Oxford: 

Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001, p. 

155. 

9. Ibid. See also The Military Balance 2000/2001, p. 160, for the previous year 

estimate. 

10. President Musharraf used this phrase in his address, ìPakistan: A Vision 

for the Future.î 

11. See Ahmed Faruqui, ìPakistanís Security Environment in the year 2015: 

Scenarios, Disruptive Events, and U.S. Policy Options,î paper presented at a workshop sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

Washington, DC, June 27, 2001. 

12. Term used by President Musharraf in his address at Woodrow Wilson 

Center to describe Pakistanís domestic political reform of establishing grassroots 

democracy at the local level. Musharraf, ìVision for the Future.î 

13. See George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, Berkeley: University of 

California Press, 1999. Indiaís unsafeguarded reactors, including a Canadian 

CIRUS that was commissioned in 1960 and U.S.-supplied heavy water, were 

principal contributors to Indiaís 1974 nuclear test. For Israelís program and 

clandestine assistance from the West, see Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option, 
185

New York: Vintage Books, 1993, pp. 242-243; and Elaine Davenport, Paul Eddy 

and Peter Gillman, The Lumbat Affair, London: AndrÈ Deutsch, 1978. 

14. See declassified documents, such as National Security Archives, ìUS 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: 1945-91,î document No. 02328.1992, cited in 

David Albright, et al., Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996: World 

Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies, Solana, Sweden, Oxford, and New York: SIPRI 

and Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 223. See also U.S. Department of State, ìThe 

Pakistani Nuclear Program,î Secret Memorandum dated June 23, 1983, 

declassified and available at the National Security Archive, and at http://www.gwu. 

edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/ipn22_1.htm. 

15. Pakistan does not have a major plutonium reprocessing plant and has only 

a pilot scale laboratory, the ìNew Labsî next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear 

Science and Technology. This facility can produce only a limited quantity of 

extracted plutonium. See David Albright,ì Indiaís and Pakistanís Fissile Material 

and Nuclear Weapons Inventories, end of 1999,î Institute for Science and 

International Security, October 11, 2000, at http://www.@isis-online.org/publications/ 

southasia/-stocks1000.html. 

16. Under Article 1 of the NPT, nuclear-weapon member states are prohibited 

from transferring nuclear-related technology to non-nuclear-weapon states. In that 

spirit, supply-control regimes were established, such as the Nuclear Supply Group 

(NSG) and the Zangger Committee, both having their respective trigger lists that 

specified the technologies not to be transferred, especially to non-NPT signatory 

statesónotably India, Pakistan and Israel. 

17. The last MTCR sanction was exclusive to Pakistan for alleged missilerelated technology transfers from China. The sanction was imposed in November 

2000, just two months before the Clinton administration departed. 

18. See the ìPakistanî chapter in Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough, et 

al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: 1998, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment For 

International Peace, pp. 131-143. 

19. Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, p. 114. 

20. Raju G. C. Thomas, ìIndiaís Nuclear and Missile Programs,î in idem and 

Amit Gupta, eds., India’s Nuclear Security, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp. 87-

122. See also Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, p. 114. 

21. The Siachin Glacier occupation was conducted in an operation code-
186

named ìMeghdoot.î Simultaneously, the Indian army was involved in another 

operation, code-named ìBluestar, îconducted at the Golden Temple in Amritsar, 

Punjab (the Sikhsí holiest shrine) to flush out Sikh extremists from the temple. 

22. Abdul Sattar, ìNuclear Stability In South Asia: Reducing Nuclear Dangers, 

îAugust 29, 1994, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, states that a 

file entitled ìAttack on Kahutaî was reported by Indiaís Hindustan Times to be 

missing from the Prime Ministerís office. 

23. Simultaneous with ìOperation Brasstacks,î India conducted another large 

military exercise code-named ìOperation Chequerboard,î in the Sumdorang Chu 

Valley in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) sector against the Chinese 

border (October 1986-March 1987) . See Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-Dong 

Yuan, Cooperative Monitoring for Confidence Building: A Case Study of the Sino-Indian 

Border Areas, Cooperative Monitoring Center, Occasional Paper No. 13, August 

1999. 

24. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. Zraket, 

ìIntroduction,î in idem, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations, Washington, DC: 

Brookings Institution, 1987, p. 1. 

25. This term is borrowed from Peter D. Feaver, ìCommand and Control in 

Emerging Nuclear Nations,î International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992-93, 

p. 163. 

26. Feaver as quoted by Scott D. Sagan, ìThe Origins of Military Doctrine and 

Command and Control Systems,î in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. 

Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, 

And Chemical Weapons, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 36. 

27. Carter, Steinbruner, and Zraket, ìIntroduction,î p. 7. 

28. Rashid Ahmed, Taliban, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, p. 215. 

See also the concluding chapter on ìpeace dividendsî for Pakistan and other 

actors, pp. 215-216. 

29. Michael Krepon, ìNuclear Risk Reduction: is Cold War Experience 

Applicable to South Asia?î in idem and Chris GagnÈ, eds., The Stabilty-Instabilty 

Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia, The Henry Stimson 

Center, Report No. 38, June 2001, p. 10. 

30. World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001, Washington, DC: World 
187

Bank, 2001. 

31. See John Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-India Rivalry in the Twentieth 

Century,î Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001. 

32. Ibid, pp. 336-337. 

33. Feroz Hassan Khan, ìNavigating the Crossroads,î The Monitor, Center for 

International Trade and Security, Fall 2001, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 10-14. 

34. Yunhua Zou, ìChinese Perspectives on the South Asian Nuclear Tests, î 

CISAC Working Paper, Center for International Security and Cooperation, 

Stanford University, January 1999. 

35. Ibid. India sees Chinese assistance to Pakistan as the connivance of two 

hostile neighbors, but itself seeks assistance from Russia and other countries. 

China perceives defense and economic assistance for Pakistan as a means of 

stabilizing Pakistani security, thereby balancing India and contributing toward 

stability in South Asia. 

36. Talat Hussain, The News (Islamabad), May 16, 2001, citing General 

Musharrafís speech at a seminar at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. 

37. For a discussion of the role that China might play in Asia, see Zbigniew 

Brzezinski, ìA Geostrategy for Asia,î Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5, 

September/October 1997, p. 58. 

38. Dennis Kux, as quoted in ìBuilding U.S.-Pakistan Relations,î in 

Centerpoint, newsletter of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 

January 2002. 

39. Traditionally, the United States had little leverage over Indiaís policy, 

which has been fiercely independent, suspicious of and reactive to any U.S. 

initiatives. 

40. In addition to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, both countries signed the 1960 

Indus Water Basin agreement, regulating water supply in the region, that was 

brokered by the World Bank. 

41. India and Pakistan held bilateral peace and security talks in October 1998 

that eventually led to the Lahore Resolution in February 1999. 
188

42. The two sides reached no conclusion on any concrete proposal, but 

subsequently at Lahore in February 1999, they agreed on an eight-point 

ìMemorandum of Understanding.î One of the points was that “[t]he two sides shall 

engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view 

to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, 

aimed at avoidance of conflict.” See Chris GagnÈ, ìNuclear Risk Reduction in South 

Asia: Building A Common Ground,î in Krepon and GagnÈ, eds., The StabilityInstability Paradox, p. 52 (emphasis added). 

43. Inam-ul-Haq, Pakistani Foreign Secretary, speech at Conference on 

Disarmament, Geneva, January 25, 2001. 

44. A fully deployed state of missiles would mean that the missiles, with 

operational warhead and processed fuel and guidance systems, were programmed 

and mated with a transporter/erector/launcher (TEL) in a ready-to-launch-onorders mode and just short of being enabled. 

45. This scenario may be unlikely if the rational actor principle is applied. 

However, given the geophysical differences between India and Pakistan as well as 

the air and naval power asymmetries, Pakistanís strategic planning parameters 

will always consider this hypothesis to be within Indiaís capability, and thus a 

possibleóeven if least likelyóscenario. In his comments during the conference at 

Stanford, Professor Sumit Ganguly presented the counterargument to the 

possibility of an Indian preventive attack. He contends that it would be 

ìpreposterousî to imagine that India would contemplate a decapitating attack, 

given its limited capability and the knowledge that Pakistan would disperse and 

camouflage its assets to ensure their survivability, as well as build in redundancy. 

46. See Neil Joeck, ìNuclear Relations In South Asia, î in Joseph Cirincione, 

ed., Repairing the Regime, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, 2000. 

47. Stephen P. Cohen, Moving Forward in South Asia, Policy Brief No. 81, 

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, May 2001. 

48. Ibid. 

49. Kurt M. Campbell, ìThe Future of Military Diplomacy in US-Soviet 

Relations,î in Alexander George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, 

Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 525. 

50. Pakistan expressed an interest in learning about the Personnel Reliability 
189

Program (PRP) and Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) from the United 

States. See Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, keynote address, Carnegie 

International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, DC: June 18, 2001. 

Available at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website: http//www.ceip. 

org/files/projects/npp/resources/conference%202001/sattar.htm. 

51. David Albright, ìSecuring Pakistanís Nuclear Weapons Complex: 

Thought-Piece for the South Asia Working Group,î paper presented at the Stanley 

Foundation conference on ìUS Strategies for Regional Security, î Airlie 

Conference Center, Warrenton, VA, October 25-27, 2001. 
191 

CHAPTER 9 

THE PERILS OF PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA1

Scott D. Sagan 

On May 11 and 13, 1998, India tested five nuclear weapons in the 

Rajasthan desert. By the end of the month, Pakistan had followed 

suit, claiming to have detonated six nuclear devicesófive to match 

New Delhiís tests and one in response to Indiaís 1974 peaceful 

nuclear explosive testóat an underground facility in the Chagai 

Hills. With these tests, the governments in Islamabad and New 

Delhiloudly announced to the world community, and especially to 

each other, that they both held the capability to retaliate with nuclear 

weapons in response to any attack. 

What will be the strategic effects of these nuclear weapons 

developments? Will the spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia 

bring stability to the region or lead to nuclear war? There are many 

scholars and defense analystsósome in the United States and many 

more in India and Pakistanówho argue that the spread of nuclear 

weapons to South Asia will significantly reduce, or even eliminate, 

the risk of future wars between India and Pakistan.2 Following the 

logic of rational deterrence theory, these ìproliferation optimistsî 

argue that statesmen and soldiers in Islamabad and New Delhi know 

that a nuclear exchange in South Asia will create devastating 

damage and therefore will be deterred from starting any military 

conflict in which there is a serious possibility of escalation to the use 

of nuclear weapons. 

Other scholars and defense analystsósome in India and 

Pakistan, and many more in the United Statesóargue the opposite: 

nuclear weapons proliferation in India and Pakistan will increase the 
192 

likelihood of crises, accidents, and nuclear war.3 These proliferation 

pessimists do not base their arguments on claims that Indian or 

Pakistani statesmen are irrational or that the Indian and Pakistani 

governments are weak. Instead, these scholars start their analysis by 

noting that nuclear weapons are controlled by military organizations 

and civilian bureaucracies, not by states or by statesmen. Organization theory, not just rational deterrence theory, should therefore be 

used to understand the problem and predict the future of security in 

the region. This organizational perspective leads the proliferation 

pessimists to focus on the pathways by which deterrence could fail, 

due to common organizational bias and errors, despite the unacceptable costs of any nuclear war. 

These two theoretical perspectives thus lead to different 

predictions about the consequences of nuclear proliferation in South 

Asia. Fortunately, a new history of nuclear India and nuclear 

Pakistan is emerging, a history by which scholars and policymakers 

alike can judge whether the predictions of the deterrence optimists 

or the organizational pessimists have been borne out. Unfortunately, 

the emerging evidence strongly supports the pessimistic predictions 

of organizational theorists. 

There are four requirements for stable nuclear deterrence: 

prevention of preventive war during periods of transition when one 

side has a temporary advantage; the development of survivable 

second-strike forces; the avoidance of accidental nuclear war; and 

finally the ability to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of 

terrorists. Each of these requirements will be examined in turn. I will 

first present the pessimistic predictions deduced from organization 

theory about difficulties governments will face in attempts to meet 

these nuclear stability requirements. I will then illustrate the 

resulting problems with historical examples concerning the United 

States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In each case, I will 

then show how very similar problems have already appeared or are 

emerging in India and Pakistan. Finally, the conclusions will then 
193 

briefly outline both the lessons for theory development and the 

policy implications of the argument. 

It should be acknowledged from the start that there are 

important differences between the nuclear relationship emerging 

between India and Pakistan and the Cold War system that 

developed over time between the United States and the Soviet 

Union. While the differences are clear, the significance of these 

differences is not. For example, the nuclear arsenals in South Asia 

are, and are likely to remain, much smaller and less sophisticated 

than was the case with the U.S. and Russian arsenals. This should 

make each arsenal both more vulnerable to a counterforce attack and 

less capable of mounting counterforce attacks, and thus the net effect 

is uncertain. 

There are also important differences in civil-military relations in 

the two cases, but these differences too are potentially both stabilizing and destabilizing. The Russians and the Americans both eventually developed an assertive command system with tight high-level 

civilian control over their nuclear weapons. In contrast, India has an 

extreme system of assertive civilian control of the military, with (at 

least until recently) little direct military influence on any aspect of 

nuclear weapons policy. Pakistan, however, is at the other end of the 

spectrum, with the military in complete control of the nuclear 

arsenal and only marginal influence from civilian political leaders, 

even during the periods when there is a civilian-led government in 

Islamabad. 

There are, finally, important differences in mutual understanding, proximity, and hostility. India and Pakistan share a common 

colonial and pre-colonial history, have some common cultural roots, 

and share a common border; they also have engaged in four wars 

against each other and are involved in a violent 50-year-long dispute 

about the status of Kashmir. In contrast, the Americans and Soviets 

were on opposite sides of the globe and viewed each other as 
194 

mysterious, often unpredictable, adversaries. The Cold War 

superpowers held a deep-seated ideological rivalry, but held no 

disputed territory between them and had no enduring history of 

armed violence against each other. 

There is also, however, a crucially important similarity between 

the nuclear conditions that existed in Cold War and those in South 

Asia today. In both cases, the parochial interests and routine 

behaviors of the organizations that manage nuclear weapons limit 

the stability of nuclear deterrence. In this chapter, I will demonstrate 

that serious organizational perils of proliferation, like those 

witnessed in the Cold War, are emerging in both India and Pakistan. 

The newest nuclear powers will not make exactly the same mistakes 

with nuclear weapons as did their superpower predecessors. They 

are, however, also not likely to meet with complete success in the 

difficult effort to control nuclear weapons and maintain stable 

deterrence. 

The Problem of Preventive War. 

From an organizational perspective, one can deduce three 

reasons why military officers have a bias in favor of preventive 

waródefined as a deliberate attack initiated during the period when 

one has a temporary military advantage over an adversary and 

believes that war is better now than later. First, military officers are 

more likely than civilians to believe that war is inevitable in the long 

term, a belief that stems from both their self -selection into the 

profession and their training once they join the armed forces. If war 

is deemed inevitable in the long run, it makes sense to strike an 

enemy state before it is able to strengthen its retaliatory capabilities. 

In addition, military officers have biases in favor of offensive 

doctrines. Offenses can bring decisive victories and glory and 

military officers often believe that offensive operations can take 

advantage of the principle of the initiative, enabling them to 
195 

implement their own complex war plans and forcing adversaries to 

improvise and react to these plans, rather than implement their own. 

Preventive wars are by definition offensive in character and military 

planners have the tactical advantage of deciding when to attack and 

how to execute their war plan. 

Finally, military officers are less likely than civilians to focus on 

domestic or international political disincentives against preventive 

war. By their training and their locus of responsibility, military 

officers focus primarily on military requirements of victory and not 

on allied statesí concerns, post-war reconstruction and recovery in 

enemy states, or domestic political constraints on the initiation of the 

use of force. 

American Preventive War Discussions. Considerable evidence from 

U.S. Cold War history supports these theoretical predictions. The 

Truman administration discussed the possibility of nuclear preventive war after the 1949 Soviet atomic bomb test, but rejected the idea 

in April 1950.4 In September 1950, however, Major General Orvil 

Anderson, the commandant of the Air University, publicly called for 

a preventive war against the USSR, telling a New York Times reporter: 

ìGive me the order to do it and I can break up Russiaís five A-bomb 

nests in a week. . . . And when I went up to ChristóI think I could 

explain to Him that I had saved civilization.î5 

Anderson was fired for this indiscretion. But when widespread 

organizational preferences are rejected, they do not vanish 

overnight. Indeed, many senior U.S. military officers continued to 

advocate preventive war as a way of coping with the emerging 

Soviet threat well into the mid-1950s. Perhaps the most dramatic 

example was Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining who 

recommended a preventive attack on the Russians in 1954 before 

they developed larger nuclear forces. General Twining is quoted as 

saying that: ì[W]e must recognize this time of decision, or we will 

continue blindly down a suicidal path and arrive at a situation in 
196 

which we will have entrusted our survival to the whims of a small 

group of proven barbarians.î6 

President Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected these recommendations in 1954, largely on grounds that even a successful nuclear first 

strike would lead to a long and costly conventional conflict with the 

Russians. Moreover, Eisenhower questioned whether war with the 

Russians was inevitable, given U.S. deterrent capabilities and the 

hope that containment would eventually lead to an overthrow of the 

Soviet system from within. Finally, although Eisenhower expected 

that the United States would win what he called a third world war, 

he also believed it would leave the United States with a dictatorial 

government and an isolationist public, ill-prepared to occupy the 

vast territories of enemy nations. 

In short, preventive war was advocated by senior leaders of the 

U.S. military for many years after the first Soviet nuclear test, but 

was eventually rejected by senior civilian authorities that held strong 

views of the broader costs of such an attack and held different beliefs 

about the inevitability of war with the Russians. 

Brasstacks and Preventive War in South Asia. Pakistan has been 

under direct military rule for almost half of its existence and some 

analysts have argued that that the organizational biases of its 

military leaders had strong effects on strategic decisions concerning 

the initiation and conduct of the 1965 and 1971 wars with India.7 In 

contrast, India has a sustained tradition of strict civilian control over 

the military since independence. 

These patterns of civil-military relations are highly influential in 

nuclear weapons doctrine and operations. In India, the military has 

traditionally not been involved in decisions concerning nuclear 

testing, designs, or even command and control. In Pakistan, the 

military largely runs the nuclear weapons program; even during the 

periods in which civilian prime ministers have held the reins of 
197 

government, they have not been told of the full details of the nuclear 

weapons program nor given direct control over the operational 

arsenal. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, for example, appears not to 

have been given full details of the status of the Pakistani nuclear 

weapons program before she visited Washington in June 1989 and 

has stated that she was not consulted before the Pakistani military 

ordered the assembly of Pakistanís first nuclear weapon during the 

1990 crisis over Kashmir. 

This organizational theory lens suggests that it is fortunate that it 

was India, not Pakistan, that developed nuclear weapons first in 

South Asia. Military rule in Islamabad (and military influence during 

periods of civilian rule) certainly has played an important role in 

Pakistani decision-making concerning the use of force (see the 

discussion of the Kargil conflict below) . But the Pakistani military 

did not possess nuclear weapons before India tested in 1974 and thus 

was not in a position to argue that preventive war now was better 

than war later as India developed a rudimentary arsenal. 

The preventive war problem in South Asia is not so simple, 

however, for new evidence suggests that military influence in India 

produced serious risks of preventive war in the 1980s, despite strong 

institutionalized civilian control. The government of Prime Minister 

Indira Gandhi considered, but then rejected, plans to attack 

Pakistanís Kahuta nuclear facility in the early 1980s, a preventive 

attack plan that was recommended by senior Indian military 

leaders.8 Yet as occurred in the United States, the preferences of 

senior officers did not suddenly change when civilian leaders ruled 

against preventive war. Instead, the beliefs went underground, only 

to resurface later in a potentially more dangerous form. 

The most important example of preventive war thinking 

influencing Indian nuclear policy can be seen in the 1986ñ87 

Brasstacks crisis.9 This serious crisis began in late 1986 when the 

Indian military initiated a massive military exercise in Rajasthan 
198 

involving an estimated 250,000 troops and 1, 500 tanks, including the 

issuance of live ammunition to troops, and concluding with a 

simulated counter-offensive attack, including Indian Air Force 

strikes, into Pakistan. The Pakistani military, fearing that the exercise 

might turn into a large-scale attack, alerted military forces and 

conducted exercises along the border, which led to Indian military 

counter-movements closer to the border and an operational Indian 

Air Force alert. The resulting crisis produced a flurry of diplomatic 

activity and was resolved only after direct intervention by the 

highest authorities, including an emergency telephone conversation 

between Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo and Prime 

Minister Rajiv Gandhi and special diplomatic missions to India by 

Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar and President Zia ul-Haq. 

The traditional explanation for the Brasstacks crisis has been that 

it was an accidental crisis, caused by Pakistanís misinterpretation of 

an inadvertently provocative Indian Army exercise. For example, 

Devin Hagertyís detailed examination of ìNew Delhiís intentions in 

conducting Brasstacksî concludes that ìIndiaís conduct of ënormalí 

exercises rang alarm bells in Pakistan; subsequently, the logic of the 

security dilemma structured both sidesí behavior, with each 

interpreting the otherís defensive moves as preparations for 

offensive action.î10 A stronger explanation, however, unpacks New 

Delhiís intentions to look at what different Indian decision-makers 

wanted to do before and during the crisis. 

The key to interpreting the crisis correctly is to understand the 

preventive war thinking of then-Indian chief of the army staff, 

General Krishnaswami Sundarji. Sundarji apparently felt that Indiaís 

security would be greatly eroded by Pakistani development of a 

usable nuclear arsenal and thus deliberately designed the Brasstacks 

exercise in hopes of provoking a Pakistani military response. This in 

turn could then provide India with an excuse to implement existing 

contingency plans to go on the offensive against Pakistan and take 

out the nuclear program in a preventive strike.11 This argument was 
199 

confirmed in the memoirs of Lt. General P. N. Hoon, the 

commander-in-chief of the Western Army during Brasstacks. He 

wrote: 

What had remained only a suspicion all along is now being 

revealed to be true. . . . Brasstacks was no military exercise. It was 

a plan to build up a situation for a fourth war with Pakistan. And 

what is even more shocking is that the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv 

Gandhi, was not aware of these plans for war.12 

The preventive war motivation behind Sundarjiís plans helps to 

explain why the Indian military did not provide full notification of 

the exercise to the Pakistan is and then failed to use the special 

hotline to explain their operations when information was requested 

by Pakistan during the crisis. A final piece of evidence confirms that 

Sundarji advocated a preventive strike against Pakistan during the 

crisis. Indeed, as George Perkovich reports, considerations of an 

attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities went all the way up to the most 

senior decision-makers in New Delhiin January 1987: 

[ Prime Minister] Rajiv [ Gandhi] now considered the possibility 

that Pakistan might initiate war with India. In a meeting with a 

handful of senior bureaucrats and General Sundarji, he 

contemplated beating Pakistan to the draw by launching a preemptive attack on the Army Reserve South. This would have 

included automatically an attack on Pakistanís nuclear facilities to 

remove the potential for a Pakistani nuclear riposte to Indiaís 

attack. Relevant government agencies were not asked to 

contribute analysis or views to the discussion. Sundarji argued 

that Indiaís cities could be protected from a Pakistani counterattack (perhaps a nuclear one), but, upon being probed, could not 

say how. One important advisor from the Ministry of Defense 

argued eloquently that ìIndia and Pakistan have already fought 

their last war, and there is too much to lose in contemplating 

another one.î This view ultimately prevailed.13 

The Kargil Conflict and Future Problems. Optimists could accept 

that the Brasstacks crisis may have been a deliberate attempt to spark 

a preventive attack, but they might be reassured by the final 
200 

outcome, as senior political leaders stepped in to stop further 

escalation. The power of nuclear deterrence to prevent war in South 

Asia, optimists insist, has been demonstrated in repeated crises, e.g., 

the Indian preventive attack discussions in 1984, the Brasstacks 

crisis, and the 1990 Kashmir crisis. ìThere is no more ironclad law in 

international relations theory than this, î Devin Hagertyís detailed 

study concludes, ìnuclear states do not fight wars with each 

other.î14 

In the spring and summer of 1999, however, India and Pakistan 

did fight a war in the mountains along the Line of Control (LOC), 

separating the portions of Kashmir controlled by each country, near 

the Indian town of Kargil. The conflict began in May, when the 

Indian intelligence services discovered what appeared to be 

Pakistani regular forces lodged into mountain redoubts on the 

Indian side of the LOC. For almost two months, Indian army units 

attacked the Pakistani forces and Indian Air Force jets bombed their 

bases in the high Himalayan peaks. Although the Indian forces 

carefully stayed on their side of the LOC in Kashmir, Indian Prime 

Minister Atal Vajpayee informed the U.S. government that he might 

have to order attacks into Pakistan and U.S. spy satellites revealed 

that Indian tanks and heavy artillery were being prepared for a 

counter-offensive in Rajasthan. 

The fighting ended in July, when Pakistani Prime Minister 

Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington and, after receiving political cover 

in the form of a statement that President Bill Clinton would ìtake a 

personal interestî in resolving the Kashmir problem, pledged to 

withdraw the forces to the Pakistani side of the LOC.15 That 

Clintonís statement on Kashmir was merely political cover for the 

withdrawal was later made clear when Clinton revealed that he had 

told Sharif that he could not come to Washington unless he was 

willing to withdraw the troops back across the LOC.16 

Over 1,000 Indian and Pakistan soldiers died in the conflict and 
201 

Sharifís decision to pull out was one of the major causes of the coup 

that overthrew his regime in October 1999. The 1999 Kargil conflict is 

also disturbing, not only because it demonstrates that nuclear-armed 

states can fight wars, but also because the organizational biases of 

the Pakistani military were a major cause of the conflict. Moreover, 

such biases continued to exist and could play a role in starting crises 

in the future. This will increase the dangers of both a preventive and 

preemptive strike if war is considered inevitable, as well as the 

danger of a deliberate but limited use of nuclear weapons on the 

battlefield. 

Three puzzling aspects of the Kargil conflict are understandable 

from an organizational perspective. First, in late 1998, the Pakistani 

military planned the Kargil operation paying much more attention, 

as organization theory would predict, to the tactical effects of the 

surprise military maneuver than to the broader strategic 

consequences. Ignoring the likely international reaction and the 

predictable domestic consequences of the military incursion in India, 

however, proved to be significant blind spots contributing to the 

ultimate failure of the Kargil operation. Second, the Pakistani Army 

also started the operation with the apparent beliefófollowing the 

logic of what has been called the stability/instability paradoxóthat 

a stable nuclear balance between India and Pakistan permitted more 

offensive actions to take place with impunity in Kashmir. It is 

important to note that this belief was more strongly held by senior 

military officers than by civilian leaders. For example, at the height 

of the fighting near Kargil, Pakistani Army leaders stated that ìthere 

is almost a red alert situation, îbut they nevertheless insisted îthere 

is no chance of the Kargil conflict leading to a full-fledged war 

between the two sides.î17 This leaked statement to the press 

apparently reflected what the Pakistani Army was privately advising 

the government and helps explain why senior officers opposed the 

withdrawal of the Pakistani forces from Kargil. 

Although Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif apparently approved of 
202 

the plan to move forces across the LOC, it is not clear that he was 

fully briefed on the nature, scope, or potential consequences of the 

operation. The prime ministerís statement that he was ìtrying to 

avoid nuclear warî and his suggestion that he feared ìthat India was 

getting ready to launch a full-scale military operation against 

Pakistanî provide a clear contrast to the confident military 

assessment that there were virtually no risks of an Indian counterattack or escalation to nuclear war.18 

Third, the current Pakistani military governmentís interpretation 

of the Kargil crisis, at least in public, is that Nawaz Sharif lost 

courage and backed down unnecessarily. This view is not widely 

shared among scholars or Pakistani journalists, but such a stab-inthe-back thesis does serve the parochial self-interests of the Pakistani 

armyówhich does not want to acknowledge its errorsóand those of 

the current Musharraf regime. The New Delhi governmentís 

interpretation, however, is that the Indian threats that military 

escalation, a counterattack across the international border, would be 

ordered if necessary forced Pakistan to retreat. These different 

lessons learned could produce ominous outcomes in future crises: 

each side believes that the Kargil conflict proved that the other will 

exhibit restraint and back away from the brink in the future if their 

government exhibits resolve and threatens to escalate to new levels 

of violence. 

Future military crises in South Asia are likely to be nuclear crises. 

Proliferation optimists are not concerned about this likelihood, 

however, since they argue that the danger of preventive war, if it 

ever existed at all, has been eliminated by the development of 

deliverable nuclear weapons in both countries after May 1998. The 

problem of preventive war during periods of transition in South Asia 

is only of historical interest now, optimists would insist. 

I am not convinced by this argument for two basic reasons. First, 

the Indian government has given strong support to the Bush 
203 

administration in its plans to develop missile defense technology 

and expressed interest in eventually procuring or developing its own 

missile defense capability in the future. The development of missile 

defenses in India, however, given the relatively small number of 

nuclear warheads and missiles in Pakistan, would inevitably reopen 

the window of opportunity for preventive war considerations. 

Military biases, under the preventive war logic of better now than 

later, could encourage precipitous action in either country if their 

government was seen to have a fleeting moment of superiority in 

this new kind of arms race, facing the dangerous possibility of the 

adversary catching up and surpassing it in the future. 

The second reason to be pessimistic is that preventive war biases 

can have a background influence on considerations of preemptive 

waróthat is, attacks based on the belief that an enemyís use of 

nuclear weapons is imminent and unavoidableóin serious crises. To 

the degree those decision-makers believe (or think that adversary 

decision-makers believe) that war is inevitable in the long term, it is 

likely to color the perceptions of the other sideís actions and plans at 

the brink of war. Here the lessons of Kargil are ominous. 

While it is clear that the existence of nuclear weapons in South 

Asia made both governments cautious in their use of conventional 

military force in 1999, it is also clear that Indian leaders were 

preparing to escalate the conflict if necessary. Pakistani political 

authorities, moreover, made nuclear threats during the crisis, 

suggesting that nuclear weapons would be used precisely under 

such conditions: Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad, for example, 

proclaimed in May that Pakistan ìwill not hesitate to use any 

weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity.î19 In 

addition, Indian military officials believe that Pakistan took initial 

steps to alert its nuclear forces during the conflict.20 

In future crises in South Asia, the likelihood of either a 

preventive or preemptive attack will be strongly influenced by a 
204 

complex mixture of perceptions of the adversaryís intent, estimates 

about its future offensive and defensive capabilities, and estimates of 

the vulnerability of its current nuclear arsenal. Organizational biases 

could encourage worst-case assumptions about the adversaryís 

intent and pessimistic beliefs about the prospects for successful 

strategic deterrence over the long term. Unfortunately, as will be 

seen below, organizational proclivities could also lead to destabilizing vulnerabilities to an enemy first strike in the immediate term. 

Organizational Problems Compromising Survivability. 

The fear of retaliation is central to successful deterrence, and the 

second requirement for stability with nuclear weapons is therefore 

the development of secure, second-strike forces. From an 

organizational theory perspective, however, there are many reasons 

to predict that military organizations might not deploy nuclear 

weapons in survivable basing modes despite the existence of a 

strong national security imperative to do so. Military leaders 

understandably favor development and deployment of more 

weaponry, and with limited budgets these interests often lead them 

to spend more on weapons production and skimp on expensive 

operational practices that increase survivability. Similarly, 

professional military officers have strong proclivities to engage in 

traditional operations and their interest in preserving traditions and 

organizational morale can lead them to oppose innovative weapons 

delivery systems and deployment operations. 

Even when their leaders do not consciously reject new military 

operations, organizations will tend to follow their past behaviors and 

may continue to practice specific deployments that make forces 

vulnerable to attacks when adversaries have developed new threats. 

To the degree that leaders of military organizations have offensive 

biases, they have increased incentives to rely upon first strike, 

preemptive, or launch-on-warning options that do not require force 

survivability. 
205 

Moreover, organizational learning tends to occur only after 

failures: military organizations, like other organizations, have few 

incentives to review and adjust operations when they believe they 

are successful. This can lead them to follow practices that appear to 

be working well, even though in reality they are not. At the same 

time, organizational routines often produce signatures to enemy 

intelligence agencies that inadvertently reveal secret information and 

the location of otherwise hidden military forces. 

Cold War Vulnerabilities. The history of the Cold War provides 

numerous examples of these kinds of organizational problems 

producing inadvertent military vulnerabilities. In the 1980s, for 

example, the U.S. Air Force leadership strongly supported the 

development of a larger and more powerful intercontinental ballistic 

missile (ICBM), but they cared far less about whether the planned 

MX missile was deployed in any of the expensive basing modesó

mobile racetrack configurations, railway basing, rotating them 

between empty silosóunder discussion. In the 1950s, the United 

States Navy leadership also opposed the creation of a ballistic missile 

submarine fleet, because they preferred traditional and more 

exciting attack submarines. By emphasizing tradition over 

innovation, this policy delayed the development of what eventually 

became the most survivable leg of the U.S. strategic triad. 

A dramatic example of how a military organizationís operational 

routines can produce serious strategic vulnerabilities is the U.S. 

secret penetration of the Soviet Navyís underwater communications 

system. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are widely considered 

to be the least vulnerable portion of a nuclear arsenal, providing a 

stabilizing, secure second-strike capability. In the early 1970s, 

however, the U.S. Navy initiated a secret intelligence operation 

against the Soviet SSBN fleet that enabled the United States to know 

the timing and locations of Soviet submarine patrols in the Pacific 

and maintain a U.S. attack submarine trailing behind each Soviet 
206 

SSBN. The organizational failures of the Russian military that led to 

this problem read more like the Keystone Kops than the KGB. First, 

the Soviets failed to encrypt many messages sent through an 

underwater communications cable in the Sea of Okhotsk to the 

missile submarine base at Petropavlovsk, figuring that such 

protected waters were safe from U.S. spying activities. Second, to 

make matters worse, they gave away the location of the secret 

communications cable by posting a sign on the beach telling local 

fisherman ìdo not anchor, cable here.î The crew of the U.S.S. Halibut 

thus easily located the line, tapped into the Soviet Navyís secret 

underwater communications, and received the operational plans and 

tactical patrol orders for the Russian SSBN fleet. It is important to 

note that the Soviet General Staff continued use of this vulnerable 

communication system, believing that their forces were secure unless 

proved otherwise, until an American spy revealed the secret 

operation to Moscow.21 

Soviet organizational routines also created vulnerabilities to their 

land-based nuclear missile forces during the Cold War. For example, 

the failure of the Soviet military to keep its 1962 missile deployment 

in Cuba secret, despite the strong desire for such secrecy by the 

Kremlin, was caused by construction crew routines that produced 

signatures leading American intelligence analysts to locate otherwise 

secret missiles. The Star of David pattern of air defense missile 

battery placements and the easily recognized slash marks on missile 

pads, practices developed and seen in the USSR, gave away the 

secret Cuban operation to American intelligence officers.22 Similarly, 

American photo-interpreters were able to locate the secret ICBM 

silos of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces because of the triple 

security fences built around the silo buildings and the distinctive 

wide radius curves in the entry roads, built to transport long missiles 

to the sites.23 These kinds of organizational problems are common in 

military history, as intelligence agents figure out how to understand 

enemy operations and make them vulnerable to attack. 
207 

Survivability of Nuclear Forces in South Asia. Will such organizational problems exist with nuclear weapons arsenals in South Asia? 

Before the 1998 nuclear tests, proliferation optimists used to assume 

that second-strike survivability would be easily maintained because 

India and Pakistan had a form of non-weaponized deterrence and 

thus could not target each other. It is by no means certain, however, 

that this condition of non-weaponized deterrence will continue as 

both India and Pakistan develop advanced missiles in the coming 

years. 

An organization perspective points to numerous reasons to be 

concerned about the ability of the Indian and Pakistani organizations 

that control nuclear weapons in South Asia to maintain survivable 

forces. Two organizational problems can already be seen to have 

reduced (at least temporarily) the survivability of nuclear forces in 

Pakistan. First, there is evidence that the Pakistani military, as was 

the case in the Cold War examples cited above, deployed its first 

missile forces, following standard operating procedures, in ways that 

produce signatures giving away their deployment locations. Indian 

intelligence officers thus identified the locations of planned Pakistani 

deployments of M-11 missiles by spotting the placement of defense 

communication terminals nearby.24 A second, and even more 

dramatic, example follows a Cold War precedent quite closely. Just 

as the road engineers in the Soviet Union inadvertently gave away 

the location of their ICBMs because construction crews built roads 

with extra wide-radius turns next to the missile silos, Pakistani road 

construction crews have inadvertently signaled the location of the 

secret M-11 missiles by placing wide-radius roads and roundabouts 

outside special garages at Sargodha Missile Base.25 

Military biases are also seen in conventional war plans in India. 

Indian military officers are clearly planning large-scale conventional 

force operations against Pakistani airbases, using U.S. Paveway II 

laser guidance bombs. These operations could present Pakistan with 

serious ìuse it or lose itî problems and with serious degradation in 
208 

their command and control of nuclear weapons, yet these are 

inadvertent escalation dangers that have not been discussed at all in 

the emerging Indian strategic writings on limited war in South Asia. 

Instead, these strategists simply assume that limited wars can be 

fought and won, without creating a risk of precipitating a desperate 

nuclear strike. 

Finally, analysts should also not ignore the possibility that Indian 

or Pakistani intelligence agencies could intercept messages revealing 

the secret locations of otherwise survivable military forces, an 

absolutely critical issue with small or opaque nuclear arsenals. 

Indeed, the history of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan 

demonstrates that both statesí intelligence agencies were able to 

intercept critical classified messages sent by and to the other side. 

For example, the Pakistan is learned immediately when the Indian 

Army commander issued operational orders to prepare for military 

intervention against East Pakistan; while before the war, Indian 

intelligence agencies acquired a copy of the critical message from 

Beijing to Rawalpindi informing the Pakistan is that China would 

not intervene militarily in any Pakistani-Indian war.26 Perhaps most 

dramatically, on December 12, 1971, the Indians intercepted a radio 

message scheduling a meeting of high-level Pakistani officials at 

Government House in Dacca, which led to an immediate air attack 

on the building in the middle of the meeting.27 

The Kargil conflict also provides evidence of the difficulty of 

keeping what are intended to be secret operations secret from oneís 

adversary. Throughout the conflict, the Pakistani government 

insisted that the forces fighting on the Indian side of the LOC were 

mujahideen (indigenous Islamic freedom fighters). This cover story 

was exposed, however, when some of the mujahideen failed to leave 

their Pakistani military identification cards at their base in Pakistan 

while others wrote about General Musharrafís involvement in the 

operationís planning process in a diary that was later captured.28

Finally, Indian intelligence organizations intercepted a critical secret 
209 

telephone conversation between General Musharraf and one of his 

senior military officers, which revealed the Pakistani Armyís central 

involvement in the Kargil intrusion.29 

The Risks of Accidental Nuclear War. 

Social science research on efforts to maintain safe operations in 

many modern technological systems suggests that serious accidents 

are likely over time if the system in question has two structural 

characteristics: high interactive complexity and tight-coupling. 

Complexity is problematic in hazardous systems because it 

decreases the likelihood that anyone can predict all potential failure 

modes and thereby fix them ahead of time. Moreover, the most 

common engineering strategy to make reliable systems out of 

inherently unreliable parts is to utilize redundancy in many forms 

such as multiple safety devices, backup systems, and extra personnel 

as signed to a problem. Redundancy, however, makes the system 

more complex and can therefore create hidden failure modes that no 

one wants or anticipates.30 

Tight-coupling simply means that there is little time to stop 

processes once begun, little slack in the system to permit pause and 

reflection. Incidents and individual accidents still occur in looselycoupled systems, but they do not cascade into catastrophic systems 

accidents. In tightly-coupled systems, however, one error leads to 

another and another and no one can intervene in time to stop the 

serious accidents from occurring. Highly complex and tightlycoupled organizational or technological systems may operate 

successfully for a while, but they are very accident-prone over the 

long term. In short, there are inherent limits to safety with such 

systems. 

The Limits of Cold War Safety. Two close calls to accidental nuclear 

war that occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrate the way 

in which complex and tightly-coupled systems can create serious 
210 

nuclear dangers that no one can anticipate ahead of time or fix easily 

on the spot.31 In October 1962, the U.S. Air Force had ten test missile 

silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB), in California, which it 

used for launching test missiles over the Pacific to Kwajalein Atoll. 

When the crisis alert began, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) put 

nuclear warheads on nine of the ten test missiles at the base and 

aimed them at the Sino-Soviet bloc. On October 26, without further 

communication with Washington political authorities, officers at 

Vandenberg launched the tenth missile on a previously scheduled 

test launch over the Pacific Ocean. No one thought through the 

possibility that the nuclear alert might be detected and that the 

subsequent missile launch might be misperceived. 

Another illustrative case occurred in the special Cuban Missile 

Early Warning System set up by the United States during the crisis. 

U.S. military personnel set up an emergency radar system facing 

Cuba, but no one anticipated that a technician would place a training 

tape (showing what an attack would look like) into the online system 

and that the radar operators would become confused and report that 

a Soviet missile had been launched from Cuba and was about to 

detonate near Tampa, Florida. Precisely such a set of unexpected 

interactions did occur on October 28 at the height of the crisis. These 

incidents are the kind of false warnings and near accidents that a 

normal accident theorist would predict are inevitable in a complex 

and tightly coupled nuclear command and control system. 

Normal Accidents in Nuclear South Asia. Will the Indian and 

Pakistani nuclear arsenals be more or less safe than were the U.S. 

and Soviet arsenals in the Cold War? It is clear that the emerging 

South Asian nuclear deterrence system is both smaller and less 

complex today than was the case in the United States or Soviet 

Union earlier. It is also clear, however, that the South Asian nuclear 

relationship is inherently more tightly coupled because of 

geographical proximity. 
211 

With inadequate warning systems in place and with weapons 

with short flight times emerging in the region, the timelines for 

decision making are highly compressed and the danger that one 

accident could lead to another and then lead to a catastrophic 

accidental war is high and growing. The proximity of New Delhi and 

Islamabad to the potential adversaryís border poses particular 

concerns about rapid decapitation attacks on national capitals. 

Moreover, there are legitimate concerns about social stability, 

especially in Pakistan, that could compromise nuclear weapons 

safety and security. These concerns have increased as a result of the 

potential for domestic strife in Pakistan that could follow the war 

against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 

Proliferation optimists will cite the small sizes of India and 

Pakistanís nuclear arsenals as a reason to be less worried about the 

problem. Yet the key from a normal accidents perspective is not the 

numbers, but rather the structure of the arsenal. Here there is good 

and bad news. The good news is that under normal peacetime 

conditions, India, and most likely Pakistan as well, do not regularly 

deploy nuclear forces mated with delivery systems in the field. The 

bad news is that, as noted earlier, the Indian military has stated that 

it received intelligence reports that Pakistan had begun initial 

nuclear alert operations during the Kargil conflict. 

From an organizational perspective, it is not surprising to find 

evidence of serious accidents emerging in the Indian nuclear and 

missile programs. The first example is disturbing, but predictable. 

On January 4, 2001, Indian Defense Secretary, Yogender Narain, led 

a special inspection of the Milan missile production facility in 

Hyderabad. The Milan missile, a short-range (two kilometer) missile 

normally armed with a large conventional warhead, had failed in 

test launches and during the Kargil war, and Narain was to discuss 

the matter with the plantís managers and technical personnel. For 

reasons that remain unclear, the electrical circuitry was not 

disconnected and the live conventional warhead was not capped on 
212 

the missile displayed for the visiting dignitary from New Delhi 

when the plant manager accidentally touched the start button. The 

missile launched, flew through the body of one official, killing him 

instantly and then nose-dived into the ground, catching on fire and 

injuring five other workers. The defense secretary was shocked but 

unharmed. The official killed was the quality control officer for the 

Milan missile program.32 

The false warning incident that occurred just prior to the 

Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998 is a second case demonstrating 

the dangers of accidental war in South Asia. During the crucial days 

just prior to Prime Minister Sharifís decision to order the tests of 

Pakistani nuclear weapons, senior military intelligence officers 

informed him that the Indian and Israeli air forces were about to 

launch a preventive strike on the test site.33 The incident is shrouded 

in mystery and neither the cause nor the consequences of this 

warning message are clear. Some press reports claim that Pakistani 

intelligence officers, fearing an Israeli raid like the attack on Osirak 

in 1981, misidentified an F-16 aircraft that strayed into or near 

Pakistani territory. Other reports state that an Israeli cargo plane 

carrying Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahuís armored Cadillacs 

triggered the warning system. A third possibility is that officials of 

Pakistanís Inter Services Intelligence agency did not believe there 

was any threat of an imminent Indian-Israeli attack in 1998, but 

deliberately concocted (or exaggerated) the warning of a preventive 

strike to force the prime minister, who was wavering under U.S. 

pressure, to test the weapons immediately. It is not clear which of 

these is the more worrisome interpretation of the incident: false 

warnings could be catastrophic in a crisis whether they are 

deliberate provocations by rogue intelligence officers, or genuinely 

believed, but inaccurate, reports of imminent or actual attack. 

It is important to note that the possibility of a false warning 

producing an accidental nuclear war is South Asia is reduced, but is 

by no means eliminated, by Indiaís adoption of a nuclear no-first use 
213 

policy. Not only might the Pakistani government respond, following 

its stated first-use doctrine, to intelligence (in this case false) that 

India was about to attack successfully a large portion of Pakistani 

nuclear forces, but either government could misidentify an 

accidental nuclear detonation, occurring during transport and alert 

activities at one of their own military bases, as the start of a 

counterforce attack by the other state. 

Pakistani officials should be particularly sensitive to this 

possibility because of the memory of the 1988 Ojheri incident, in 

which a massive conventional munitions explosion at a secret 

ammunition dump near Rawalpindi caused fears among some 

decisionmakers that an Indian attack had begun. The cause of the 

Ojheri explosion appears to have been a fire caused by an accidental 

rocket explosion during loading at the depot. It has also been 

claimed, however, that the accident was actually a deliberate act of 

sabotage against the munitions dump.34 This kind of accident 

producing a false warning of an attack cannot, however, be ruled out 

in India as well, as long as the government plans to alert forces or 

mate nuclear weapons to delivery vehicles during crises. 

In addition, there should be serious concern about whether both 

countries can maintain centralized authority over nuclear-use 

decisions. Although government policy in this regard is kept 

classified, for obvious reasons, serious analysts in both countries 

who are worried about decapitation of the government leadership in 

a nuclear strike on the capital recognize the need for some form of 

predelegation. Some Pakistani observers are aware of this issue and 

therefore have advocated predelegation of nuclear authority to lower 

level military officers. The Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine simply 

states that ìthe authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides 

in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated 

successor(s), îyet some Indian analysts also recognize that in crises 

or war, as one military officer put it, ìby design or defaultî nuclear 

weapons ìcontrol may pass to the professional military men and 
214 

women who serve the nation well.î35 

The risk of accidental war in South Asia is exacerbated by the 

fact that neither government has instituted a Personnel Reliability 

Program (PRP), the set of psychological screening tests, safety 

training, and drug use and mental health monitoring programs used 

in the United States to reduce the risk that an unstable civilian or 

military officer would be involved in critical nuclear weapons or 

command and control duties. Historically in the United States 

between 2.5 percent and 5 percent of previously PRP-certified 

individuals were decertified, that is, deemed unsuitable for nuclear 

weapons-related duties, each year. Presumably similar low but still 

significant percentages of officers, soldiers, and civilians in other 

countries would be of questionable reliability as guardians of the 

arsenal. This personnel reliability problem is serious in India, where 

civilian custodians maintain custody of the nuclear weapons. 

However, it is particularly worrisome in Pakistan, where the 

weapons are controlled by a professional military organization 

facing the difficult challenge of maintaining discipline in the midst a 

society facing a failing economy and problems of religious 

fundamentalism after the fall of the Taliban government. 

Finally, there is evidence that neither the Indian nor the Pakistani 

military has focused sufficiently on the danger that a missile test 

launch during a crisis could be misperceived as the start of a nuclear 

attack. There was an agreement, as part of the Lahore accords in 

January 1999, to provide missile test advance notification, but even 

such an agreement is not a foolproof solution, as the Russians 

discovered in January 199 5 when a bureaucratic snafu in Moscow 

led to a failure to pass on advance notification of a Norwegian 

weather rocket launch that resulted in a serious false warning of a 

missile attack. Moreover, both the Pakistan is and the Indians appear 

to be planning to use their missile test facilities for actual nuclear 

weapons launches in war. In India, Wheeler Island is reportedly 

being used like Vandenberg AFB, a test site in peacetime and crises, 
215 

and a launch site in war.36 During the Kargil crisis, according to the 

Indian army chief of staff, alert activities were also detected at ìsome 

of Pakistanís launch areasósome of the areas where they carried out 

tests earlier of one of their missiles.î37 

The New Challenge of Terrorism. 

Before September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden was quite open in 

stating his desire for nuclear weapons. Indeed, when he declared a 

jihad (holy war) against the United States in 1998, he was asked 

about reports that he wanted nuclear weapons and replied, ìto 

possess the weapons that could counter those of the infidels is a 

religious duty.î38 Bin Laden added in a May 1998 interview, ìwe do 

not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and 

civilians.î 

We must use such punishment to keep your evil away from 

Muslims, Muslim children, and women. American history does 

not distinguish between civilian sand military, and not even 

women and children. They are the ones who used the bombs 

against Nagasaki. Can these bombs distinguish between infants 

and military? . . . We believe that the biggest thieves in the world 

and the terrorists are the Americans. The only way for us to fend 

off these assaults is to use similar means.39 

Hatred and shame and a desire to punish Americans motivate 

such terrorist visions. But I also fear that there is considerable 

method in Osama bin Ladenís madness. Immediately after the 

September 11 attacks, many observers wondered how bin Laden 

could think that he could get away with killing six thousand 

American citizens. How could such an attack serve his political 

purpose of overthrowing conservative Muslim regimes in the 

Middle East and destroying Israel, given that a massive U.S. military 

response was inevitable? The answer is that there is a kind of 

strategic logic behind his use of mass murder, a logic that he also 

outlined in interviews. Two factors appear to be important: his belief 

that the U.S. public lacked the will to support a long war and his 
216 

hope that large-scale U.S. intervention in the Middle East would 

destabilize the regimes that he seeks to overthrow. 

In May 1998, bin Laden clearly expressed his views about the 

lack of U.S. willingness to fight: 

We have seen in the last decade the decline of the American 

government and the weakness of the American soldier who is 

ready to wage Cold Wars and unprepared to fight long wars. This 

was proven in Beirut when the Marines fled after two explosions. 

It also proves they can run in less than 24 hours, and this was also 

repeated in Somali a. We are ready for all occasions. We rely on 

Allah.40 

n addition, he argued that the Saudi government would 

eventually fall because of its support for the United States, just as the 

Shahís government fell in the Iranian revolution. U.S. military 

activities in the region could increase the likelihood of an uprising 

from the streets and mosques. ìWe predict that the Riyadh leader 

and those with him that stood with the Jews and the Christians . . . 

will disintegrate. They have left the Muslim nation.î Bin Laden 

concluded, ìthe Muslims are moving toward liberating the Muslim 

worlds. Allah willing, we will win.î41 

Any terrorist leader with this kind of strategic vision is not likely 

to be deterred from using nuclear weapons or radiological weapons 

against the United States. U.S. threats to use conventional military 

forces to kill or capture such a terrorist may not be believed since 

such an effort could require a long and drawn out military 

campaign. It is also possible that nuclear weapons could be delivered 

in a covert manner (by a commercial airline or ship, by a cruise 

missile, or by truck). In such cases, deterrence would fail since the 

perpetrator would believe that there was no return address against 

which to retaliate. Finally, even if the perpetrator of such an attack 

was known, Jihadi terrorists might welcome U.S. threats to retaliate 

in kind, since the U.S. use of nuclear weapons could hasten the 
217 

downfall of allied regimes in the Muslim world through protests in 

the mosques and riots in the streets. 

Because deterrence will not work, the best way, by far, to prevent 

Jihadi fundamentalist terrorists from ever using nuclear weapons is 

to prevent them from ever possessing such weapons. This antiterrorist imperative adds yet one more compelling reason why the 

spread of nuclear weapons to potential proliferate states is to be 

feared, not welcomed. For the best way, by far, to prevent Islamic 

terrorists from possessing nuclear weapons is to prevent unstable 

states, especially unstable Islamic states, from possessing nuclear 

weapons. 

Pakistan is clearly the most serious concern in the short run. 

Pakistani weapons lack the advanced Permissive Actions Link (PA 

Ls) locks that make it difficult for a terrorist or other unauthorized 

individual to use a stolen nuclear weapon.42 There are no specialized 

Pakistani teams trained to seize or dismantle a nuclear weapon if one 

was stolen. No dedicated personnel reliability program (PRP) is in 

place to ensure the psychological stability and reliability of the 

officers and guards of Pakistanís nuclear forces.43 Instead, Pakistani 

soldiers and scientists with nuclear responsibilities are reviewed and 

approved for duty if they are not suspected of being Indian agents 

by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. 

It was clear after September 11, however, that this organizational 

arrangement was an inadequate answer to the vexing question of 

who would guard the guardians. After Pakistani President 

Musharraf decided to support the U.S. war against bin Laden and 

the Taliban regime, he forced a number of senior and junior officers 

of the ISI to leave office because of their ties to the Taliban (and 

reportedly al Qaeda as well in some cases) and placed a smaller 

number of nuclear scientists from the Pakistani program under 

house arrest.44 This was certainly reassuring news, but it remains 

unknown how many secret Jihadi supporters still exist inside the 
218 

shadows of Pakistanís military intelligence agencies. Nor do we 

know how close those shadows fall to nuclear weapons storage sites. 

Prior to the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government had 

maintained that it would not assist new nuclear powers in making 

their arsenals safer and secure for fear that this would signal other 

potential nuclear powers that the United States was not serious 

about its nonproliferation policy. The terrorist attacks forced a 

reevaluation of this policy and led to an emergency U.S. government 

effort to assist in providing increased security for Pakistani nuclear 

weapons and nuclear materials storage sites.45 The fear among some 

policymakers in Islamabad also clearly increased. Despite the earlier 

assurances by the Pakistani Foreign Ministry that Pakistani 

ì(nuclear) assets are 100% secure,î Pakistani Foreign Minister Sattar 

quickly accepted at least some degree of U.S. technical assistance in 

nuclear security improvements in November 2001. When asked 

whether Pakistan would accept the new U.S. offer of assistance, 

Sattar answered, ìWho would refuse?î46 

Unfortunately, the Pakistani military government apparently did 

refuse to accept the kind of assistance that the United States offered, 

and on November 9 President Musharraf told ABCís Nightline that 

after September 11, ìI didnít take any particular precautions . . . We 

have strong custodial controls, and a command control system 

which is very effective. I did not issue any special orders as such.î 

When asked to assess the likelihood, on a scale of one to 100, that 

Pakistani nuclear weapons would fall into the hand of terrorists, 

Musharraf replied, ìI would certainly give it over 90.î47 

Hopefully, this emergency nuclear security assistance effort will 

be implemented and prove successful in meeting the severe counterterrorism challenge created by the ties between some Pakistanis and 

the al Qaeda terrorist group. This challenge will continue, however, 

well beyond the initial anti-terrorist military campaigns. 
219 

Kenneth Waltz and other proliferation optimists have assumed 

that the weapons of new nuclear states will remain in the hands of 

the central governments that built them. That assumption is not 

warranted. The risk of terrorist seizure of nuclear weapons or 

materials is yet one more reason why we should fear nuclear 

proliferation. 

Conclusions: Beyond Denial 

Nuclear South Asia will be a dangerous place. This will be the 

case, not because of ill will or irrationality among government 

leaders nor because of any unique cultural inhibitions against 

strategic thinking in both countries. India and Pakistan face a 

dangerous nuclear future because they have become like other 

nuclear powers. Their leaders seek perfect security through nuclear 

deterrence, but imperfect humans inside imperfect organizations 

control their nuclear weapons. If my theories are right, these 

organizations will someday fail to produce secure nuclear 

deterrence. Unfortunately, the evidence emerging from these first 

years of South Asiaís nuclear history suggests that this theoretical 

perspective is powerful and its pessimistic predictions are likely to 

come true, even though we cannot predict the precise organizational 

pathway by which deterrence will break down. 

This perspective on the consequences of nuclear proliferation in 

South Asia provides important and related lessons for both theory 

and for policy. Most Indian and Pakistani scholars and government 

analysts have followed on traditional pathways blazed by American 

nuclear strategists: they produce policy recommendations about 

arsenal structure and targeting plans based on the seductive and 

deductive logic of rational deterrence theory. Less common are 

studies focusing on the complex organizational and operational 

problems that nuclear weapons create for those who possess them. 

There is great need for more work in this area, however, since 
220 

nuclear weapons in South Asia present several new theoretical 

puzzles that have not been thoroughly analyzed. There are several 

questions that must be asked in future research. What important 

behavioral differences are likely to exist between organizations that 

manage nuclear weapons that are run primarily by civilians (India) 

and similar organizations run entirely by military officers (Pakistan)? 

Will organizational biases grow stronger during crises, when there is 

insufficient time for detailed civilian or even military leadersí 

intervention in detailed operational plans? How do common military 

biases change when a military officer assumes a senior political post: 

does where he sits determine how he stands on nuclear issues or 

does he carry the intellectual baggage of training in military 

organizations along with him to the new post? How broad a shadow 

do nuclear weapons cast in South Asia? Kargil demonstrated that 

they have not prevented all wars between nuclear states. But what 

kinds of limited wars are likely in the future? And how can they 

remain limited? 

The organizational perspective suggests that there are more 

similarities than differences between the nuclear powers and the 

way they manage, or at least try to manage, nuclear weapons 

operations. There is, however, one important structural difference 

between the new nuclear powers and their Cold War predecessors. 

Just as each new child is born into a different family, each new 

nuclear power is born into a different nuclear system since other 

nuclear states exist and influence their behavior. This phenomenon, 

however, is in theory likely to have contradictory effects on nuclear 

crisis behavior. On the one hand, the ability of other nuclear powers 

to intervene in future crises may be a major constraint on undesired 

escalation. On the other hand, this ability may encourage the 

governments of weaker states to engage in risky behavioróinitiating 

crises or making limited uses of forceóprecisely because they 

anticipate (correctly or incorrectly) that other nuclear powers may 

bail them out diplomatically if the going gets rough. 
221 

The possibility that other nuclear states can influence nuclear 

behavior in South Asia does lead to one final optimistic note. There 

are many potential unilateral steps and bilateral agreements that 

could be instituted to reduce the risks of nuclear war between India 

and Pakistan, and the U.S. government can play a useful role in 

helping to facilitate such agreements. Many, though not all, of the 

problems identified in this article can be reduced if nuclear weapons 

in both countries are maintained in a de-mated or dealerted state, 

with warheads removed from delivery vehicles, either through 

unilateral action or bilateral agreement. U.S. assistance could be 

helpful in providing the concepts and arms verification technology 

that could permit such dealerting (or non-alerting in this case) to 

take place within a cooperative framework. The United States could 

also be helpful in providing intelligence and warning information, 

on a case-by-case basis, in peacetime or in crises to reduce the danger 

of false alarms. In addition, safer management of nuclear weapons 

operations can be encouraged through discussions of organizational 

best practices in the area of nuclear weapons security and safety with 

other nuclear states. 

There will be no progress on any of these issues, however, unless 

Indians, Pakistanis, and Americans alike stop denying that serious 

problems exist. A basic awareness of nuclear command and control 

problems exists in New Delhi and Islamabad, but unfortunately 

Indian and Pakistani leaders too often minimize them. The August 

1999 Indian draft doctrine report, for example, claimed that ìnuclear 

weapons shall be tightly controlled,î that command systems ìshall 

be organized for very high survivability against surprise attacks, î 

and that ìsafety is an absolute requirement.î48 But it did not explain 

how such lofty goals could be confidently achieved. Government 

officials in New Delhi sometimes speak as if nuclear safety problems 

have been successfully addressed, as when Ministry of Defense 

officials told parliamentarians in July 1998 that the nuclear weapons 

safety procedures ìhave been revised and updated in keeping with 

requirements in this regard.î49 For their part, senior Pakistani 
222 

authorities have claimed that the problem of accidental nuclear war 

has already been solved. A. Q. Khan, for example, has claimed that 

ìPakistan has a flawless command and control systemî for nuclear 

arms, and former Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz insisted that there was 

ìno chanceî of an accidental nuclear war in South Asia.50 

The U.S. government refused to assist the Pakistanis in 

developing improved safety and security for their nuclear weapons 

until the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the war in Afghanistan 

highlighted the danger of al Qaeda members or Taliban supporters 

stealing a weapon or nuclear materials from a storage site. Prior to 

September 11, Washington officials argued that any assistance in this 

area would reward Islamabad for testing and signal other potential 

nuclear weapons states that the United States is not serious about its 

nonproliferation goals. An even more serious concern is that sharing 

specific technological devices and information could be counterproductive if it encourages Pakistan to mate warheads and bombs to 

delivery vehicles and to deploy weapons into the field in the belief 

that these operations would now be safe. Any future nuclear security 

assistance program should therefore focus on encouraging safe and 

secure storage, transport, and maintenance of nuclear materials, 

components, and warheads. It should not include technical 

assistance or studies of organizational best practices regarding 

nuclear alert operations such as mating warheads to missiles or 

transporting fully assembled weapons. The principle behind U.S. 

nuclear assistance should be to focus on organizational practices and 

technologies that would encourage Pakistan to maintain its nuclear 

components stored separately and not mated to delivery vehicles. 

Future programs with India should have the same focus. 

A first useful step for the United States is to accept that nuclear 

weapons will remain in Pakistan and India for the foreseeable future 

and that the problem of Kashmir will not be solved easily or quickly. 

The political problems between the two South Asia nuclear powers 

may someday be resolved. Until that day comes, the U.S. 
223 

government has a strong interest in doing whatever it can to reduce 

the risk that India and Pakistan will use nuclear weapons against 

each other. 

ENDNOTES 

1. Portions of this chapter were previously published in Asian Survey, Vol. 

XLI, No. 6, November/December 2001; and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz , 

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (forthcoming 2002). 

2. Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge, MA: 

MIT Press, 1998; David J. Karl, ìProliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear 

Powers,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 87-119; Kenneth 

N. Waltz, ìMore May Be Betterî in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The 

Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, New York: W. W. Norton, 1995, pp. 1-45; 

Brahma Chellaney, ìNaivetÈ and Hypocrisy: Why Antiproliferation Zealotry Does 

Not Make Sense,î Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, Summer 1995, pp. 779-786; K. 

Subrahmanyam, ìNuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategyî in 

Bharat Karnard, ed., Future Imperiled: India’s Security in the 1990s and Beyond, New 

Delhi: Viking Press, 1994, pp. 188-193; and Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ìPakistanís 

Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Controlî in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. 

Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable, Ithaca: Cornell University 

Press, 2000, pp. 158-181. 

3. Kanti Bajpai, ìThe Fallacy of an Indian Deterrentî in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., 

India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond, New Delhi: Har-Anand 

Publications, 1999, pp. 150-188; Samina Ahmed, ìSecurity Dilemmas of NuclearArmed Pakistan,î Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 5, September 2000, pp. 781-

793; Peter D. Feaver, ìProliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear 

Operations,î Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4, Spring/Summer 1993, pp. 159-191; 

and Scott D. Sagan, ìMore Will Be Worseî in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of 

Nuclear Weapons, pp. 47-91. 

4. NSC-68, in Foreign Relations of the U.S. (hereinafter FRUS followed by year 

and volume), 1950, Vol. 1, National Security Affairs, pp. 281-282. 

5. Austin Stevens, ìGeneral Removed over War Speech,î New York Times, 

September 2, 1950, p. 8. 

6. Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, to the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, ìThe Coming National Crisis,î August 21, 1953, Twining Papers, series 2, 
224 

Topical Series, Nuclear Weapons 1952-1961 folder, U.S. Air Force (USAF) 

Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado. 

7. See Julian Schofeld, ìMilitarized Decision-Making for War in Pakistan: 

1947-1971, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 27, No. 1, Fall 2000 ; Sagan, ìMore Will be 

Worse,î pp. 62-63; and Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia, Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 1986. 

8. Kanti P. Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and 

Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South 

Asia, New Delhi: Manohar, 1995, pp. 9-10; and Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, pp. 239-244. 

9. This interpretation of Brasstacks was first presented as a speculative 

argument based on organization theory predictions in Scott D. Sagan, 

ìCorrespondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,î 

International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 1997, p. 195. 

10. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 92, 106. 

11. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest To Be a 

Nuclear Power, New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000, pp. 322-323. 

12. P. N. Hoon, Unmasking Secrets of Turbulence, New Delhi: Manas 

Publications, 2000, p. 102. 

13. George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 280. 

14. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 184. 

15. Bradley Graham and Nathan Abse, ìU.S. Says Pakistan Will Withdraw,î 

Washington Post, July 5, 1999. 

16. See ìPak Troops Withdrew from Kargil at My Insistence,î Times of India, 

June 3, 2001, at http://www.timesofindia.com/030601/03worl6.htm. 

17. Ihtashamul Haque, ìPeace Linked to Kashmir Solution,î Dawn Wire 

Service, June 26, 1999. 

18. Pamela Constable, ìPakistan Aims to ëAvoid Nuclear Warí, " Washington 

Post, July 13, 1999; ìU.S. Involvement Essential: PM,î Dawn Wire Service, July 10, 

1999. 
225 

19. ìAny Weapon Will Be Used, Threatens Pak,î Hindu, June 1, 1999. 

20. Raj Chengappa, ìPakistan Tried Nuclear Blackmail,î The News paper Today, 

January 12, 2000. 

21. See Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold 

Story of American Submarine Espionage, New York: Public Affairs, 1998, pp. 158-230. 

22. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, New York: 

Longman, 1999, p. 208; and Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of 

the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: Random House, 1990, pp. 277-288. 

23. Dino A. Brugioni, ìThe Art and Science of Photo Reconnaissance,î 

Scientific American, Vol. 274, No. 3, March 1996, pp. 78-85. 

24. N. Prasannan, ìSpark of Hope,î The Week, September 28, 1997. 

25. John Diamond, ìSatellite Shows Pakistanís March Toward Nuclear 

Capability,î Chicago Tribune, March 16, 2000, p. 10. 

26. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the 

Creation of Banglades, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, pp. 199 and 

225. 

27. Asoka Raina, Inside RAW: The Story of India’s Secret Service, New Delhi : 

Vikas Publishing House, 1981, pp. 60-61. 

28. Shisher Gupta, ìMajorís Diary Exposes Pakís Involvement,î Hindustan 

Times, July 10, 1999, p. 1; and From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review 

Committee Report, New Delhi and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000, pp. 

21 and 97. 

29. The whole transcript is available at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 

home page at http://www .ipcs.org/documents /1999/2-apr-jul.htm#Tapes. 

30. Scott D. Sagan, ìToward a Political Theory of organizational Reliability,î 

Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 2, No. 4, December 1994, pp. 

228-240. 

31. Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear 

Weapons, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 78-80, 130-131. 
226 

32. ìDoubts over BDL Safety Norms,î Hindu, January 9, 2001; and ìOne Killed 

as Missile Misfires During Demonstration,î The Times of India, January 5, 2001. 

33. ìPakistan Probably a Stronger Country than Most Pakistanis Think - U.S. 

Ambassador,î Dawn Magazine, July 19, 1998; and Shahid-Ur-Rehman, Long Road to 

Chagai, Islamabad: Print Wise Publications, 1999, pp. 115-116. 

34. Muhammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold 

Story at http://www.afghanbooks.com/beartrap/; and Samina Ahmed and David C. 

Cortright, ìGoing Nuclear: The Weaponization Optionî in idem, eds., Pakistan and 

the Bomb, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998, p. 96. 

35. Colonel Gurmeet Kanwal, ìCommand and Control of Nuclear Weapons,î 

Strategic Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 10, January 2000, p. 1728. 

36. Raj Chengappa, ìMissiles: Boom for Boom,î India Today International, April 

26, 1999, pp. 28-30. 

37. Raj Chengappa, ìPakistan Tried Nuclear Blackmail,î The Newspaper Today, 

January 12, 2000. 

38. http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/transcript_bin-laden1_981228. 

html. 

39. http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/miller_ bin-laden_980609.html. 

40. Ibid. 

41. Ibid. 

42. See ìNuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,î 

The Landau Network, at http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf. 

43. Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, speech at the Carnegie 

International Non-Proliferation Center Conference 2001, Washington, DC, June 18, 

2001, available at http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Conference%202001/ 

sattar.htm. 

44. Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, ìLeader Purges Top Ranks Of Military, 

Spy Service, îWashington Post, October 8, 2001, p. 1; Sanjay Singh, ìIndian 

Intelligence Inputs Behind ISI Chiefs Exit,î Statesmen, October 9, 2001; John F. 
227 

Burns, ìPakistan Atom Experts Held Amid Fear Of Leaked Secrets,î New York 

Times, November 1, 2001, p. 1. 

45. See Greg Myre, ìUS Wants to Advise Pakistan on Nukes,î Associated 

Press, November 3, 2001. 

46. Ibid. The earlier quote comes from David Albright, ìSecuring Pakistanís 

Nuclear Weapons Complex,î October 2001, http://www .isis- online.org/publications/ 

terrorism-/stanleypaper.htm. 

47. Musharrafís interview with Ted Koppel is at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/ 

nightline/DailyNews/musharraf 011109. html. 

48. Draft Report of National Security Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, 

August 17, 1999, on the Embassy of India in the U.S. home page at 

http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_ doctrine_aug_17_1999.html. 

49. Raj Chengappa, ìWorrying Over Broken Arrows,î India Today, July 13, 

1998. 

50. ìPakistan Has Flawless Control for Nuclear Arms: Qadeer,î News 

(Islamabad), October 4, 1998, in Foreign Broadcast and Information Service-TAC-98-

277, October 4, 1998; and ìNo Chance of Accidental N-War: Pakistan Sets Up 

Effective Command System,î Dawn, November 30, 1998. 
229

Part IV. 

U.S. MILITARY PERSPECTIVES
231

CHAPTER 10 

U.S. MILITARY PERSPECTIVES ON 

REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA

Compiled by 

Michael R. Chambers 

Editorís Note: This chapter represents a summary compilation of 

the views and ideas expressed by the three military officers on this 

panel. Most, if not all, of the ideas and views in this chapter were 

presented by more than one member of the panel, and so no direct 

attribution is intended, nor should it be attempted by the reader. 

Regional security and stability in South Asia are important 

national security interests of the United States, and of our military 

forces. If anyone did not understand this fact prior to September 

2001, the events of that month and the succeeding months have 

made it abundantly clear. The possession of nuclear weapons by 

both India and Pakistan, coupled with their periodic crises, has for 

many years worried American military and security analysts. But the 

attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and on the 

Pentagon in Washington, DC, brought the concerns about regional 

security in South Asia to the fore. India, and especially Pakistan, is 

playing very important roles in the global war on terrorism, and yet 

tensions between these countries could complicate the efforts in that 

war. 

One of the most important ways for the U.S. military to promote 

regional security and stability in South Asia is through military-tomilitary relationships and exchanges. These ties can exist on 

numerous different levels, ranging from annual dialogues between 

defense secretaries/ministers to junior officers attending staff 

colleges in other countries. The United States benefits from these 
232

relationships by gaining insights into the thinking of other militaries, 

by training with these militaries and enhancing interoperability in 

case we need to join with them in coalition military operations, and 

by gaining access to military facilities in these countries in times of 

crises. These kinds of relationships have proven very important in 

the war on terrorism, just as they have in the past in other situations. 

And the lack of such relations with Pakistan during the 1990s also 

showed their consequences in the immediate aftermath of September 

11. Into the future, it is imperative that the United States builds and 

sustains these military-to-military relationships in South Asia. 

South Asia and U.S. National Interests. 

One of the most important enduring national interests of the 

United States is economic prosperity. The U.S. military plays an 

important role in the pursuit of this interest because one of the most 

important underlying conditions for economic growth and 

prosperity is security. As Secretary of State Colin Powell has noted, 

money is one of the biggest cowards in the world, running away 

from insecurity, as do investors and businessmen from instability in 

a country or region. American armed forces help to ensure global 

order and thus to maintain the global economic system. 

South Asia, and India in particular, has great potential 

economically. Helping South Asia to realize this potential will not 

only benefit the people of this region, but also all of us. A dynamic 

economy in the South Asian region will provide an impetus for 

continued global economic growth. Regional security and stability 

are necessary (but not sufficient)conditions for the economies of the 

South Asian countries to grow and achieve prosperity. If the United 

States hopes to promote regional security and stability in South Asia 

so that the region can continue on a path toward economic 

prosperity and thereby contribute to the world economy, it must be 

involved in the regionópolitically, economically, and militarily. 

Included as part of our military efforts to support regional security 
233

should be military cooperation programs. 

In addition to this economic rationale for supporting regional 

stability, the United States has an enduring interest in promoting 

regional security because it can affect security and stability beyond 

the region. This was made painfully obvious to the United States on 

September 11. Regional security and stability in South Asia is also a 

precondition for security and stability in Central Asia. Central Asia 

is a region of great potential: on the downside, as a continuing 

source of terrorism; on the upside, as a source of abundant energy 

resources that can help to fuel economic development in many Asian 

countries. Which way Central Asia goes will depend to a large extent 

on the security situation in South Asia. Instability and insecurity on 

the subcontinent will surely spill northward. 

A third enduring U.S. national interest, as well as a global 

interest, is in seeing the Muslim world move forward with modernization. Much of the Muslim world today is locked in a challenge 

where militant fundamentalist elements within their societies are 

atavistically pulling these nations back toward the past. Pakistan 

could play an important role here, serving as an example to other 

Muslim nations on how to advance into the 21st century and join the 

modern world. American involvement with Pakistan, including 

military cooperation, could facilitate this process. 

These national interests in South Asia should guide U.S. policy 

toward the region well into 2020 and beyond. The United States also 

has some more immediate security interests in the region that are 

guiding short- to medium-term policy. The first of these is access to 

and through the South Asian region for direct action operations in 

the global war on terrorism. In particular, this access was important 

for the ìtheater openingî process of the war. Theater opening refers 

to setting the stage for successful operations, and includes opening 

up bases for U.S. and coalition armed forces, putting logistics into 

place, putting medical support into place, and leveraging off host 
234

nation resources to achieve these goals. As long as the campaign 

against global terrorism continues in Afghanistan, access to and 

through India, and especially Pakistan, will remain vital. This access 

will also remain vital after the initial phases of the campaign are 

over, and we turn to stability operations and nation-building 

operations in Afghanistan. These operations will continue for 

sometime, and the efforts of Pakistan and India to provide access are 

critical. 

A second immediate security interest is in eliminating terrorism 

within the South Asian region. This is a broader problem than 

merely eliminating the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. This is 

a complex issue, and the terrorist networks within the region have 

tentacles that extend beyond South Asia. In fact, it needs to be 

remembered that some of the terrorists that struck the United States 

on September 11 received training in Western Europe and even in 

the United States. And in addressing this objective of eliminating 

terrorism from South Asia, the United States needs to do some 

introspection. To what extent did our policies, particularly the 

sanctions placed upon Pakistan since 1990, contribute to or exacerbate the conditions that led to Pakistanís support for the Taliban in 

Afghanistan, a Taliban regime that allowed Osama bin Ladenís al 

Qaeda terrorist network to operate from its territory? As we move 

forward, we need to ensure that any past mistakes are not repeated. 

A third immediate security interest in South Asia is to do all that 

we can to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction in this 

region, particularly nuclear weapons. If a conflict between India and 

Pakistan should escalate to the nuclear level, it would have 

catastrophic consequences for the people of the region. It would also 

have global repercussions. The attacks on the World Trade Center 

and the Pentagon, as well as the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania 

in a failed attack, lowered the bar for what could be attempted by 

terrorists in their attacks on innocent civilians. If India or Pakistan 

were to use nuclear weapons in a South Asian conflict, it would 
235

similarly lower the threshold for use of these weapons. This could 

have a demonstration effect that would be disastrous for the world 

and for global security. 

Thus, South Asia is an area of important U.S. national interests. 

This is true in the immediate period as we try to prosecute the war 

on terrorism against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and as 

we try to prevent a nuclear catastrophe in the region. Longer term, 

we have enduring interests in the region to help it grow 

economically and prosper, and to maintain regional security and 

stability since instability here could spill over into other regions of 

the world. Moreover, we need to encourage Pakistan to serve as an 

example to other Muslim countries of how to resist militant 

fundamentalism and move into the 21st century as a modern yet 

Muslim society. 

Military-to-Military Security Cooperation Programs. 

In order for the United States to successfully pursue these 

interests if it hopes to influence the events and developments in 

South Asia, then it needs to be involved in the region. This includes 

political, economic, and diplomatic engagement, and also military 

cooperation. There is a new paradigm of involvement with South 

Asia, and it is one that seeks military-to-military relations with both 

India and Pakistan. U.S. military relations with both countries have 

been hampered over the last 10-15 years by legislatively mandated 

sanctions. These were imposed in 1990 on Pakistan after President 

George Bush could no longer certify that Islamabad was not 

developing nuclear weapons, with the effect that we lost contact 

with a generation of junior and middle-ranking officers. These ties 

were only restarted since September 11. Relations were developing 

in the 1990s with India but were suspended in 1998 after its nuclear 

tests of that year. Fortunately, these relationships were slowly 

restarted in 1999-2000, and have been proceeding apace. 
236

Military cooperation programs are comprised of a broad scope of 

activities, ranging from coalition military operations in warfare, to 

peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations, to joint 

training exercises, to foreign arms sales and financial military aid, 

and to various types of dialogues and exchanges. These include 

regularized discussions between senior civilian and military defense 

officials, such as the recently revived Defense Planning Group with 

India; the exchange of visits by senior officers; and the educational 

exchanges under the International Military Education and Training 

(IMET) program. IMET programs are possibly the most important of 

the security cooperation programs, because they lead to insights and 

personal relationships that can be critical in the event of a crisis. 

Included under IMET are educational exchanges at the cadet level 

where foreign citizens can be educated at our service academies. 

Also included are exchanges of officers at intermediate service 

schools in which American officers are able to spend time learning 

about the military of other countries, and foreign officers are able to 

learn what American officers are taughtóand to be influenced by 

our philosophy and ideas on civilian control over the military. 

Cooperation programs serve a number of important objectives, 

several of which are relevant to the pursuit of U.S. immediate and 

enduring interests in South Asia. First, they can provide access to 

decisionmakers. This is more true in a country such as Pakistan 

where the military has a very strong role in the government than in 

India, but even in India the military leadership has a crucial voice in 

many national security issues, particularly regarding tensions with 

Pakistan and the potential use of nuclear weapons. Such access can 

be gained through senior-level contacts, but it is also possible that a 

junior officer who studied in the United States many years ago could 

become one of the senior officers today. Having a former classmate 

in such a position could prove valuable if a crisis erupts. 

Second, such security cooperation activities can provide access to 

bases and facilities for U.S. military operations if needed. Since the 
237

end of the Cold War, the United States no longer has an extensive 

global network of basesónor can it afford to have such a network. 

Instead, it must rely on access to bases and facilities of other 

countries near a theater of operation. Working with the military of 

other countries and building relationships with members of the 

military in those countries can assist the United States in gaining 

such access when it is needed. 

Third, security cooperation activities are intended to foster what 

Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander of the U.S. forces in the 

Pacific, has called ìsecurity communities, îto develop ìcoalition 

outlooksî within a specific region. Whether the U.S. military likes it 

or not, the political reality today is that we will have to operate in 

coalitions with militaries from other countries to pursue many of our 

goals. Such operations include not only warfareósuch as the global 

war on terrorism, or the Gulf Waróbut also peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance operations, disaster relief operations, 

and search-and-rescue operations. If we expect to function well with 

other militaries during armed conflict and other types of crises, we 

need to learn how to work with them during peacetime, to train and 

practice with them. Achieving interoperability and this level of 

cooperation requires a large investment in time and effort, and so we 

need to be engaging militaries from other countries prior to a crisis 

in order to work well with them in a time of crisis. Moreover, 

training together and setting patterns of cooperation between militaries can help to reduce mutual suspicions and even to develop 

outlooks that see security within a region as being held in common. 

Fourth, these activities can increase mutual understanding 

between militaries and provide important insights into the thinking 

of the security elites of other countries. Mutual understanding is 

built by various types of discussions and exchanges within militaryto-military relationships, but in particular by exchanges promoted 

under IMET. Having officers spend time learning in a service school 

of another military provides those officers with knowledge about the 
238

thinking and culture of that military. And spending time in that 

other country provides exposure to the broader values and cultures 

of the society that military is nested within. The insights gained by 

such involvement could facilitate the development of common views 

and approaches to solving a problem. Or more simply, they could 

provide important intelligence insights on other militaries. 

Finally, such activities enable the U.S. military to learn in a 

direct, functional way from the experiences and expertise of other 

militaries. The United States should not assume that it has a 

monopoly on knowledge or expertise. For example, there is much we 

could learn about high-altitude mountain warfare from the Indians 

and Pakistanis, who have more experience in this area than we do. 

Security cooperation activities, such as joint training exercises, can 

enable our military to draw on such expertise to improve our own 

capabilities. 

The Value of These Programs: Fall 2001. 

The value of these security cooperation activitiesóthe personal 

and institutional relationships that are created and sustained, the 

insights and understandings that are gainedówas made abundantly 

clear in September-October 2001 in our efforts to launch the global 

war on terrorism and the campaign in Afghanistan. The relationships with the Pakistani military established in the 1980s proved 

extremely important for reestablishing these ties last fall. Despite the 

lack of involvement over the last decade, these previous relationships smoothed our efforts to gain access to facilities in Pakistan, 

facilities necessary for staging some of our operations into 

Afghanistan. We also were able to operate across Pakistan to execute 

the initial strikes against the Taliban and al Qaeda. And most 

importantly, a relationship of many years standing existed between 

General Anthony Zinni, then the Commander of U.S. Central 

Command, and General Pervez Musharraf, who became leader of 

Pakistan. When General Tommy Franks succeeded Zinni, he 
239

adopted this relationship and persevered in sustaining it. This 

relationship probably contributed to Musharrafís decision to side 

with the United States in the war on terrorism and provide us access 

to the facilities we needed. 

Nevertheless, the decade without security cooperation and the 

loss of contact with a generation of Pakistani officers had its costs. 

First, we were unsure about the degree to which the junior and 

middle officer corps in Pakistan were fundamentalist, and therefore 

might side with the Taliban against us. We knew the character and 

leanings of the senior officers based on our contacts in the 1980s. 

This uncertainty about the affiliations of the lower ranking officers 

was one of the big, troubling questions on September 12. Second, 

once President Musharraf chose to side with us and allow us access 

to Pakistani facilities, we were unsure about whom to call to work 

out the details of coordination and access to the facilities. Because of 

the years with no military-to-military relationship, we did not have a 

good answer to this question at first. Having a military relationship 

in place prior to September 11 would have greatly assisted this 

process. 

Even a relationship that is still in its infancy can prove vital. The 

uncertainties experienced by the American military in reopening 

dialogue with Pakistan and in arranging the details of access to 

facilities there were noticeably absent in our discussions with 

Uzbekistan and even Tajikistan. We had an established security 

cooperation program with the Uzbek military, which greatly eased 

our discussions with them. And even in Tajikistan, where our 

relationship was still just getting off the ground, the fact that we had 

some level of security cooperationórather than noneóagain 

facilitated our ability to get access. The story was the same with 

Oman, where preexisting relationships with senior officers facilitated 

our gaining crucial access to bases there for the campaign in 

Afghanistan, even though Oman was at the time hosting a major 

joint exercise with the British. 
240

Military cooperation activities are intended to achieve important 

U.S. national interests, particularly security interests, as already 

discussed. They also provide important avenues of communication 

with senior military officers in other countries. For these reasons, 

such activities should not be used in carrot-and-stick fashion by U.S. 

political leaders to pursue varying diplomatic goals. The 

relationships created by these cooperation activities can have longterm value, if they are sustained. Moreover, we cannot expect that 

the relations will be easily restarted once they have been cancelled. 

Thus, security cooperation programs, particularly IMET, should be 

continued even if tensions or problems arise with a country, and 

should only be fully terminated if actual conflict breaks out. We 

cannot hope to influence or promote reform in the military of 

another country (for example, Indonesia) if we do not have a 

relationship with them. 

Moving Forward with Military Relations in South Asia: The 

Challenges to be Faced. 

It is important for the United States to move forward in 

developing military relations and security cooperation with India 

and Pakistan, for all of the reasons discussed above. This is an 

important region for U.S. security, in the present and into the future. 

Military cooperation programs can assist our government in 

achieving these interests, particularly by promoting mutual 

understanding between individuals and institutions, and building 

relationships that can someday provide access to important decisionmakers and military facilities. Nevertheless, we will face some 

challenges as we move forward. 

First of all, the revived relationships in South Asia are heavily 

influenced by the war on terrorism. This war involves, for the first 

time since World War II, the application of all of the U.S. elements of 

national power in a synchronized fashion on a global scale. This will 
241

require a high level of interagency discussion and coordination on 

our part. We are out of practice here, and this could complicate our 

efforts. 

Second, how should we conceptualize our military-to-military 

relationships today, especially in the context of the war on terrorism? 

Whereas in the past these relationships have been state-to-state, we 

are seeing the increased relevance of nonstate, transnational actors in 

al Qaeda, and their ability to operate from within various countries 

where the government does not have full authority. How should this 

be factored into our relationships? Also, is the war on terrorism truly 

a war in the conventional sense of the term, or is it more of a law 

enforcement operation? 

Third, we need to deal with the history of animosity between 

India and Pakistan in our military relations with these two countries. 

The U.S. approach has been one of balance, and we need to continue 

this. We need to ensure that our cooperation with one country does 

not give, or potentially give, it an advantage over the other, and we 

need to ensure that our cooperation is not perceived as giving one 

side the advantage over the other. Toward this end, we need to 

maintain complete transparency in our military relationships with 

both the Indian and Pakistani militaries. 

Finally, these military relations will remain vulnerable to 

manipulation by our political leaders due to the potential for 

tensions in the future between the United States and the countries of 

South Asia, particularly over the issue of nuclear weapons. Political 

leaders have used these relationships in the past in an attempt to 

gain political or diplomatic leverage, and the possibility of this will 

remain in the future. Hopefully, they will understand the value of 

these relationships, understand the possible costs when these are 

suspended or cancelled, and understand the difficulties involved 

when trying to restart them in a hurry to deal with an emerging 

crisis. 
243

Part V. 

STRATEGIC CULTURE
245

CHAPTER 11 

INDIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE 

Kanti Bajpai 

The future of South Asia will depend in large part on India. As 

the largest country in the region, its choices and actions will 

condition the policies of its neighbors and of the nonregional powers 

that have a stake in the subcontinent. Indiaís policies are likely to 

affect actors well beyond South Asia as well. Indiaís choices and 

actions will affect the life chances of over one billion Indians and 

perhaps another two billion people around its periphery from 

Afghanistan and Pakistan in the west, to Nepal and China in the 

north, to Bangladesh and Burma in the east, and a number of other 

countries in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean littoral. How will 

India behave in the years to come? Observers of India claim that 

Indian diplomatic rhetoric and moves have changed considerably 

since the end of the Cold War, but in what respects exactly? One way 

of answering that question is by understanding Indian strategic 

culture. What are the basic perceptions and precepts of Indiaís 

strategic community? What do they tell us about how India might 

behave over the next decade or so? 

This paper attempts to delineate Indian strategic culture in the 

post-Cold War period. Indian strategic culture, which was 

dominated by the worldview of its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal 

Nehru, is in ferment. With the end of the Cold War, at least three 

different streams of thinking are vying for dominance. These three 

schools may be called Nehruvianism, neoliberalism, and hyperrealism. 

To call them ìschoolsî is to overstate the case. Those who hold to the 

views associated with the three perspectives do not call themselves 

by the names I have used, although the usage of the term Nehruvian 
246

is common enough in Indian discourse. I claim, however, that these 

three viewpoints exist, and that if one abstracts from Indian security 

texts they can be assembled in the way that I have done here. 

Such a claim will be controversial even in India. It is a 

commonplace of the discourse on Indian security that India does not 

have a strategic culture and that Indians have historically not 

thought consistently and rigorously about strategy. At the very least, 

indians have not recorded their strategic thinking in written texts, 

the only exception being the ancient classic, Arthasastra.1 That India 

does not have a tradition of strategic thinking is not altogether 

incorrect. On the other hand, since the countryís independence in 

1947, it has had to deal with a number of security challenges, and the 

volume of writings on these issues is enormous. Newspaper and 

magazine commentary is probably the largest single source on 

Indian thinking. In addition, the strategic community has produced 

a corpus of scholarly writings on security. A number of journals 

publish regularly on security matters. Finally, there are the texts of 

Indian prime ministers and other leaders who have over the years 

written and spoken publicly on security policy. 

I argue that Indian strategic culture can be understood in terms 

of an identifiable set of basic assumptions about the nature of 

international relations, some of which are shared between the three 

schools and some of which are not. With Alastair Iain Johnston, we 

can refer to these assumptions as constituting the central strategic 

paradigms of the three perspectives. In addition, the three perspectives can, once again in terms of Johnstonís schema, be described by 

their grand strategic prescriptions on the means that should be used to 

make India secure. 

What is Strategic Culture? 

What is strategic culture? Johnston defines strategic culture in 

the following terms: 
247

Strategic culture is an integrated set of symbols (i.e. 

argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) 

that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic 

preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of 

force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these 

conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic 

preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.2 

Strategic culture consists of two parts. The first is the central 

strategic paradigmóthe basic assumptions about orderliness in the 

world. Included here are assumptions about the role of war in 

human affairs, about the nature of the adversary, and about the 

efficacy of the use of force. The second part is grand strategy, or the 

secondary assumptions about operational policy that follow from the 

prior assumptions.3 These may be gleaned from various texts written 

over time by statesmen, soldiers, scholars, commentators, and 

diplomats. 

Johnstonís conception of strategic culture will inform this inquiry 

into Indian strategic culture. For example, we will use his distinction 

between the central strategic paradigm and grand strategy to parse 

Indian strategic culture. We will also follow his lead in unearthing 

strategic culture by interpreting various written texts rather than by 

inferring cultural traits or constants from behavior. However, we 

will also depart from his schema in various ways. First, while 

Johnston could turn to a series of well-known ancient Chinese 

military classics for his work on China, this is not possible in the 

Indian case where there are no established canonical texts except for 

the Arthasastra. Instead, we will turn to the post-Cold War writings 

of some of the most important voices in the Indian strategic 

community. This is probably more appropriate in any case, given 

how difficult it is to establish the influence of ancient texts on 

contemporary thinking and choices. 
248

Second, Johnstonís conception of strategic culture and grand 

strategy places great emphasis on the role and deployment of force. 

The use of force is clearly the key issue in any conception of strategy, 

although it may be less important in grand strategy, which refers to 

the coordination of a nationís military, political, diplomatic, and 

even cultural resources for the purposes of security. Grand strategies 

vary not just by differences in how force is used but also by the 

extent to which other instruments are deployed. Johnston allows for 

this to some extent, but the issue of the efficacy and disposition of 

force is pervasive in his study.4 Since this paper will examine in 

particular Indian grand strategy as a component of its strategic 

culture, we will give due weight to economic, cultural and other 

nonmilitary instruments of grand strategy. 

Third, Johnstonís conception is overly preoccupied with external 

security threats whereas in most post-colonial societies, and indeed 

in much of the post-Cold War world, it is internal security that is 

increasingly at the fore of security concerns. Johnstonís basic grand 

strategic typology could be used to describe a stateís posture 

towards internal security threats as wellóaccommodation, 

defensiveness, and offensiveness. However, once again, his 

emphasis on coercion and force in these grand strategic formulations 

becomes problematic in the context of internal security where 

governments typically prefer to use other methods and instruments 

as far as possible. 

Fourth, Johnstonís work, at least implicitly, seems to assume that 

a stateís security is dominated by local, regional threats, mostly to 

territorial integrity. This is not incorrect. A countryís neighbors and 

near-neighbors on the whole are the most salient threats. However, 

in the modern world (i.e., the past 4 centuries), major threats to a 

society have often come from distant lands. The rise of great powers 

with global reach are a fact of life in the inter-national system and 

few regional states, particularly rising powers such as India, can 

afford to ignore the reach of nonregional powers who do not 
249

necessarily covet distant territory but can intervene in regional and 

domestic politics. How a country deals with distant or nearby great 

powers is a vital component of security policy. Grand strategies will 

differ on the means of dealing with these powerful states. 

We will also need to relax some of Johnstonís methodological 

principles in order to deal with the Indian case. Johnston grants that 

there may be different streams of strategic thinking, but he suggests 

that, in order to establish the existence of a strategic culture, it is 

necessary to show that there exists a set of strategic preferences that 

are consistently ranked above others in some canonical texts, that the 

different streams in effect can be ordered from the most to the least 

important. He also insists that the link to actual behavior must be 

established, by showing that the preferences of a strategic culture 

ìanchorî the thinking of decisionmakers and that their thinking then 

determines the course of government policy.5 While Johnston is 

correct to insist on such rigor, this is not possible at this stage of 

research on Indian strategic culture. For one thing, as noted earlier, 

in India there are no canonical texts across which one would test for 

consistency of preference ranking. The researcher on Indian strategic 

culture must therefore take a more college-like approach to 

textuality, fashioning a composite text out of scattered writings in 

the press, academic journals and volumes, think tank publications, 

biographies and autobiographies, and so on. Secondly, our research 

method will be to delineate the three dominant approaches culled 

out of this collage of materials and then to juxtapose the various 

grand strategic recommendations against the actual policies of the 

Indian government over the past decade or so. The paper will show 

that post-Cold War Indian policy correlates or is congruent with the 

neoliberal approach more than either the Nehruvian or hyperrealist 

approach. For now, the best that can be done is to show that there is 

at least a circumstantial link between strategic culture and strategic 

choice/behavior. 
250

Central Strategic Paradigms. 

According to Johnston, a core strategic paradigm provides 

answers to the following questions: 

• The role of war in international relations. 

• The nature of the adversaries and the threats they pose. 

• The utility of force. 

Indian strategic thought does not address these questions 

systematically and explicitly enough for a Johnstonian analysis. 

There are no ancient ìmilitaryî classics as far as we know apart from 

Kautilyaís Arthasastra. As for the Arthasastra, it does not have the 

status of the Western or Chinese military classics. It would be hard 

to show, for instance, that its tenets were widely known historically. 

Nor are there any modern classics of strategy and grand strategy, 

although Jawaharlal Nehruís writings on international affairs and 

Indian foreign policy do constitute a corpus of influential materials. 

More recently, the writings of K. Subrahmanyam and, in nuclear 

matters, of General K. Sundarji, have been influential. 

Subrahmanyamís views in particular, because of his extensive news 

paper writings, are widely known. 

In the Indian case, therefore, the central strategic paradigm 

cannot be delineated with the kind of textual richness and 

interpretive rigor that Johnston was able to bring to bear in the 

Chinese case. What this paper will do therefore in this section is to 

sketch out the broad approach to international relations that is 

embodied in the three Indian schools of thought. To do this it will be 

necessary to reconstruct that thought and then to extrapolate from it 

answers to the three questions located at the heart of a central 

strategic paradigm. 
251

Nehruvianism, Neoliberalism, and Hyperrealism. Before we proceed 

to reconstruct Nehruvian, neoliberal and hyperrealist approaches to 

international relations in terms of their differences, it is important to 

note their areas of agreement. For while they disagree in key 

respects, they also proceed from a core set of common assumptions 

and arguments. 

First of all, all three paradigms accept that at the heart of 

international relations is the notion of the sovereign state that 

recognizes no higher authority. In such a system, each state is 

responsible fundamentally for its own security and well-being. 

Above all, states strive to protect their territory and autonomy. 

Second, all three paradigms recognize that interests, power, and 

violence are staples of international relations. States cannot avoid the 

responsibility of pursuing the national interest, however that is 

defined. Nor can they be indifferent to the cultivation of poweró

their own and that of other states. States must in some measure 

accrue power in a competitive system. Finally, conflict and war are a 

constant shadow over interstate relations. While the three paradigms 

differ on the causes of conflict and war and on the ability of states to 

control and transcend these forces, all three accept that disputes and 

large-scale organized violence are a regular feature of international 

relations. Third, all three paradigms accept that power comprises 

both military and economic capabilities, at a minimum. States need 

both. While they differ on the optimum mix and use of these 

capabilities, proponents of the three views are in agreement that 

military and economic strength are vital for security. Beyond this 

common base, the three paradigms differ. 

Fundamental to Nehruvianism is the argument that states and 

peoples can come to understand each other better and thereby make 

and sustain peace. Nehruvians accept that in the international 

system, without a supranational authority, the threat of war to settle 

disputes and rivalries is in some measure inescapable. States must 

look after themselves in such a world, in which violence is a 
252

regrettable last resort.6 However, Nehruvians believe that this state 

of ìanarchyî can be mitigated, if not eventually supervened. 

International laws and institutions, military restraint, negotiations 

and compromise, cooperation, free intercourse between societies, 

and regard for the well-being of peoples everywhere and not just 

oneís own citizens, all these can overcome the rigors of the 

international system.7 Furthermore, to make preparations for war 

and a balance of power the central objectives of security and foreign 

policy is, for Nehruvians, both ruinous and futile: ruinous because 

arms spending can only impoverish societies materially and create 

the very conditions that sustain violence and war; futile because, 

ultimately, balances of power are fragile and do not prevent largescale violence (as the two world wars so catastrophically 

demonstrated).8 

Neoliberals also accept the general characterization of 

international relations as a state of war. That coercion plays an 

important role in such a world is not denied by neoliberals. 

However, the lure of mutual gain in any interaction is also a 

powerful conditioning factor among states, particularly as they 

become more interdependent. Neoliberals often express their distinct 

view of international relations by comparing the role of military and 

economic power. According to neoliberals, states pursue not just 

military power but also economic well-being. They do so in part 

because economic strength is ultimately the basis for military power. 

Economic strength can, in addition, substitute for military power: 

military domination is one way of achieving oneís ends; economic 

domination is another. Economic power can even be more effective 

than military power. Thus, in situations of ìcomplex interdependence,î force is unuseable or ineffective.9 

Most importantly, though, neoliberals believe that economic 

well-being is vital for national security in a broader sense. An 

economically deprived people cannot be a satisfied people, and a 

dissatisfied people cannot be secure.10 The key question then is: 
253

where does economic strength and well-being come from? In the 

neoliberal view, it can only come from free market policies. Free 

market policies at home imply, in addition, free trade abroad. Free 

trade is a relationship of mutual gain, even if asymmetric gain, and is 

therefore a factor in the relations between states. Indeed, where 

Nehruvians see communication and contact as the key to the 

transformation of international relations, neoliberals believe that 

trade and economic interactions can achieve this.11 

Hyperrealists harbor the most pessimistic view of international 

relations.12 Where Nehruvians and neoliberals believe that 

international relations can be transformedóeither by means of 

communication and contact or by free market economic reforms and 

the logic of comparative advantageóhyperrealists see an endless 

cycle of repetition in interstate interactions. The governing metaphor 

of hyperrealists is threat and counterthreat.13 In the absence of a 

supranational authority that can tell them how to behave and is 

capable of enforcing those commands, states are doomed to balance 

of power, deterrence and war. Conflict and rivalry between states 

cannot be transformed into peace and friendship (except temporarily 

as in an alliance against a common foe); they can only be managed 

by the threat and use of violence.14 

From this, hyperrealists conclude that the surest way of 

achieving peace and stability is through the accumulation of military 

power and the willingness to use force.15 Hyperrealists reject the 

Nehruvian and neoliberal concern over runaway military spending 

and preparedness, arguing that there is no good evidence that 

defense derogates from development.16 Indeed, defense spending 

may, in the Keynesian sense at least, boost economic growth and 

development. Hyperrealists are also skeptical about the role of 

institutions, laws, treaties, and agreements. For hyperrealists, what 

counts in international relations is power in the service of national 

interest; all the rest is illusion. The neoliberal faith in the power of 

economics is equally one that hyperrealists do not share. 
254

Hyperrealists invert the relationship between military and economic 

power. Historically, they argue, military power is more important 

than, and probably prior to, economic power. A state that can build 

its military power will safeguard its international interests and will 

build an economy and society that is strong.17 

War, the Nature of the Adversary, and the Utility of Force. What can 

we say from this reconstruction of Nehruvian, neoliberal, and 

hyperrealist approaches to international relations in relation to the 

role of war, the nature of the adversary, and the utility of force? 

For Nehruvians, war is a choice that states can and will make. 

While Nehruvians accept that the international system is anarchic 

and that states pursue their interests with vigor, violence is not 

inevitable.18 Wars, as Nehru affirmed, are made in the minds of men, 

and therefore it is in the minds of men that war must be eradicated. 

War is not a natural, inherent activity. It can therefore be avoided 

and limited even when it occurs. The state of waróthe fear, 

expectation, and preparation for warócan be overcome by wise, 

cooperative policies amongst states.19 

The adversary, in the Nehruvian view, therefore is not a 

permanent one. War arises from misperceptions and ideological 

systems that color the attitudes of states and societies and spread 

fear and hatred. The adversary either does not comprehend India or 

is misled about Indian goals and methods. Its leadership may be at 

fault. Ordinary citizens may support their governments out of 

ignorance or illusion created by government propaganda. The 

adversary therefore can be made into a friend by communication 

and contact with India and Indians, at both the official and 

nonofficial levels.20 

It is thisócommunication and contact between governments and 

peoplesórather than force that will end conflict and make India 

more secure. International organizations and interstate negotiations 
255

are ways of institutionalizing communication and contact. The threat 

or use of force, particularly in a coercive, offensive way, is 

counterproductive and will generally be reciprocated by the 

adversary, leaving the basic quarrel unchanged. Both parties can 

only be weakened and harmed by a relationship built on force. All 

issues are negotiable in the end. India must possess enough force to 

defend itself, but it should not have so much that it makes others 

fearful. Certainly, force must be absolutely the last resort, even if it is 

used coercively.21 

Neoliberals, too, admit that war is a possibility between 

sovereign states. However, it is not the only inherent condition in the 

international system. Given that societies have different comparative 

advantages and that there is a global division of labor, states cannot 

escape the logic of interdependence.22 Interdependence makes for 

more pragmatic international policies: states worry not just about 

war but also about trade, investment, and technology.23 

In the neoliberal conception, adversarial relations are produced 

by two factors. First, like Nehruvians, neoliberals believe 

misunderstanding and miscalculation are responsible for enmity. If 

governments and peoples were more clear-headed and did their 

cost-benefit calculations correctly, they would see that rivalry and 

violence is irrational and that the benefits of economic relations 

untrammeled by quarrels over territory are far greater than anything 

that may be gained from conflict. Second, military enmity is 

fundamentally an old-fashioned condition which cannot be 

sustained as economic globalization goes forward. India itself is 

guilty of seeing its relations with various countries in the old 

geopolitical way because it has not understood the logic and power 

of globalization.24 

Therefore, force is an instrument of declining utility. For 

neoliberals, force is an outmoded and blunt instrument unsuited to 

the new world order. States must have enough force to defend 
256

themselves, but it is economic power and the capacity to innovate in 

a global economy that eventually makes societies secure. Force in the 

service of expansionism is irrelevant. Territorial conquest and 

control, in a world where capital, in formation, and even skills flow 

across national boundaries, is anachronistic. States must be attentive 

to defense needs, but on the whole Indiaís economic growth and 

modernization, and its integration into a globalized world economy, 

are its greatest sources of strength.25 India would do better to use its 

increasing economic power as a way of influencing others than to 

use force in such a role.26 

Hyperrealists offer quite different perspectives on war, 

adversaries and force. War is a constant possibility in an anarchical 

system and, while it can be destructive and painful, is also the basis 

for a stateís autonomy and security. War is not therefore an 

aberration but a natural tendency of international relations. 

Preparing for war is not warmongering; it is responsible and wise 

statecraft. War comes when rival states calculate that the other side is 

either getting too powerful or is weakening.27 

In the hyperrealist view, the international system is a lonely 

place. States have no permanent friends. Anyone can be an 

adversary. The adversary, as much as India, must prepare for war in 

the service of its interests and survival. Other things being equal, 

neighboring states are more likely to be adversaries: conflicts over 

territory, status, and power are ever-present possibilities in intimate 

relationships. No amount of communication and contact or 

economic interaction will transform the relationship because it is 

zero-sum. Only a balance of power can regulate relations with 

nearby or distant rivals.28 

Force, in the hyperrealist view, is an indispensable instrument in 

international relations. It is the only means by which states can truly 

achieve their ends against rivals. States must accept that violence 

may be necessary in the national interest. Force may be deployed 
257

purely defensively, but the best defense is often offense. It may even 

save lives on both sides. Control of territory is not old fashioned but 

rather militarily imperative, especially in conflicts with neighbors. In 

the end, force may have to be used to destroy the adversaryís 

military formations and to control or wrest contested territory. No 

political or military leadership can responsibly avoid planning for 

the coercive use of force. Only ìidealistsî of various stripesó

Nehruvians or neoliberalsócould fool themselves into thinking that 

a more aggressive posture is always bad.29 

Grand Strategy. 

Grand strategic thought, as Johnston emphasizes, is focused on 

the issue of means rather than ends. How do the three schools of 

thought deal with the operational challenges of internal security, 

regional security, and relations with the great powers? The strategic 

paradigms have indicated the general predispositions of different 

streams of Indian thinking. What prescriptions do they offer more 

specifically on ethnic diversity and violence and Indiaís dealings 

with Pakistan, China and the United States? In addition, now that 

India is a nuclear power, how do the three schools view nuclear 

weapons? 

Ethnic Diversity. Nehruvians base internal security on a secular, 

democratic, and socialist order. The use of force to regulate internal 

order is in this view an absolute last resort. In a vast and diverse 

nation, peace at home requires enlightened social, political, and 

economic policies. Secularism, liberal democracy built along federal 

lines, and socialist economics constitute such policies. 

The Nehruvian formula for managing a large, heterogeneous 

country with religious, linguistic, caste, and regional differences 

consists of various elements: constitutionalism and civic nationalism; 

the devolution of power in a layered federalism; the granting of 

group rights (e.g., a differentiated civil code in practice, linguistically 
258

based states and the three-language arrangement, and reservations 

for backward castes); and the calibrated use of force when necessary. 

In addition, Nehruvianism relies on a mixed economy to deliver a 

measure of social justice so that disadvantaged social groups have a 

stake in being loyal to the Indian state. In sum, the Nehruvian view 

is that communitarian democracy and social resilience is the surest 

path to internal security.30 

Neoliberals agree with Nehruvians in large measure on the issue 

of internal security, but have two rather sharp differences. First, 

neoliberals think that the mixed economy in India went too far and 

became overly regulative. The claims of social justice were sadly not 

achieved by the ìlicense and permit raj.î What was achieved was 

corruption and stagnation. Without steady and high rates of growth, 

the economy did not have enough steam to pull the poor up and 

away from their destitution. Deprivation fuelled ethnic hostility and 

violence and will continue to do so. Only high rates of economic 

growth over several decades can reverse the trend. Secondly, 

neoliberals think that reservations for disadvantaged groups are 

destructive beyond a point. Reservations, they concede, serve the 

cause of social justice, but India has exceeded the sustainable limits 

of a quota system. The tensions generated by the new reservations 

policy (e.g., the backward classes or Mandal award) are doing more 

harm than any good that might have been achieved by the policy.31 

On internal security, the hyperrealists differ significantly from 

the Nehruvians and neoliberals. While they do not altogether reject 

the role of secularism and democracy, they are usually 

contemptuous of socialism. Secularism and democracy are necessary 

but not sufficient conditions of internal order and stability. 

Socialism, on the other hand, positively harms India by sapping its 

social and economic vitality.32 For hyperrealists, the hallmark of a 

responsible government faced with internal instability is the 

willingness to use force against those who are undermining peace 

and order. Secularism and democracy can only be kept alive by a 
259

strong hand. Hard, pre-emptive and dissuasive actions will promote 

lawful behavior; any delay in using force and excessive restraint in 

the application of violence will only increase the challenges to state 

authority and lead to greater disarray.33 

Some hyperrealists go further, though. As Hindu cultural 

nationalists, they regard secularism, democracy and socialism as part 

of the problem and not part of the solution. Secularism, for them, has 

become appeasement of Indiaís minorities at the expense of the 

Hindu majority.34 Democracy is often license. And socialism at its 

worst is the rejection of age-old virtues and methods, even 

godlessness, which can only lead to social decay and disintegration. 

What India needs is social and cultural coherence, not revolutionary 

socialism. This can only come from relying on the leadership of those 

who by tradition and merit lead society and by respecting traditional 

cultural norms and practices. Cultural nationalists argue that it is 

Hindu society that gives India its fundamental unity. Internal 

security is therefore achieved by promoting the idea of a Hindu 

realm in which minorities will be treated with tolerance and respect 

but in which Hindu leadership is at the political helm and Hindu 

preferences come first.35 

Pakistan. Nehruvians believe that India and its various neighbors, 

including Pakistan, can and will live in peace. With the smaller 

states, there is little or no prospect of violence. With Pakistan, on the 

other hand, there is a long history of violence. Nehruvians see 

Pakistan as an aggressive state, as do the neoliberals and 

hyperrealists. In the Nehruvian view, Pakistan is an artificial state, 

created on the basis of the erroneous ìtwo-nation theory.î36 A state 

based on Islamic precepts and on its difference with India cannot 

hold together. Compounding the problem is the absence of 

democracy. Feudal overlords and the military together control the 

country. They perpetuate their domination by casting India in the 

role of a mortal threat.37 Having demonized India, Pakistan must 

constantly enlist powerful protectors against its bigger neighbor. 
260

During the Cold War, this meant allying with the United States and 

China. Pakistanís alliances with Washington and Beijing gave 

Islamabad an inflated sense of its military and diplomatic strength. 

Backed by American and Chinese power, Pakistan became obdurate 

and aggressive.38 

In the Nehruvian view, Indiaís policy towards Pakistan must 

take account of these complexities. While relations with Pakistan are 

daunting, they are not hopeless. Given the intricacies of the 

relationship, Indiaís moves must be geared to patient, long-run 

diplomacy rather than dramatic breakthroughs. The Nehruvian 

diagnosis rests on the view that enmity and hostility towards India 

comes from misunderstanding and delusion. The original partition 

ideologyóthe two-nation theoryóis a mass delusion that was 

propagated by Jinnah and the Muslim League.39 The enemy image of 

India sustained and elaborated by the feudals and the military is also 

false. The primary aim of Indian policy is of course to defend the 

country from military aggression and subversion. In the longer term, 

though, it is to undermine the two-nation theory and to break down 

the image of India as a hostile state. Communication and contact 

between India and Pakistan is the only way of doing this.40 

Various lines of policy follow. First of all, an adequate defense 

against aggression is vital. India cannot afford to be surprised and 

overcome militarily. The accent in the Nehruvian program, though, 

is on the word ìadequate.î Nehruvians, we should remember, are 

skeptical of the use of force and of balance-of-power politics. India, 

they believe, should be able to defend itself against its enemies but 

should not dispose of so much force that it frightens others.41 In 

addition, Nehruvians believe in the efficacy of international 

institutions and rules in preventing and limiting violence among 

states: there are alternatives to responding to violence with violence. 

Thus, a second important line of policy is to use international law 

and institutions as well as bilateral treaties and agreements to tie 
261

Pakistan down. Not surprisingly, it was Jawaharlal Nehru and India 

that took the Kashmir issue to the United Nations (UN) in 1948. It is 

also India that has repeatedly sought to codify relations with 

Pakistan in treaties and agreementsómost importantly, the Simla 

Accord, and most recently, the Lahore Declaration. While 

Nehruvians no longer have much faith in the UN in the matter of 

Kashmir and more generally in dealing with Pakistan, they insist 

that bilateral agreements have an important place in resolving 

conflict. The Simla and other agreements, including the various 

cooperative and confidence-building accords, must be the 

touchstone of Indiaís Pakistan policy.42 

A third line of Nehruvian policy is to wean Pakistan away from 

its external backers and supporters and to discourage those powers 

from interfering in the region. Weaning Pakistan away from its 

external dependencies will require it to shed its hostile image of 

India and restructure its domestic politics. Discouraging external 

powers from meddling in regional affairs can be achieved by 

pursuing a policy of nonalignment. By adopting a principled stand 

on great power behavior and by refusing to permanently ally with 

one power or other, India can persuade those powers to leave it and 

the region alone. 

Finally, the core of the Nehruvian approach is to change 

Pakistani attitudes towards India. The only way of accomplishing 

this, in the end, is through communication and contact with both the 

Pakistani government and people. No matter what the provocation 

by Pakistan, Nehruvians argue, New Delhi must hold firmly to a 

policy of engagement and negotiation. Summitry is one way of 

keeping a conversation going with official Pakistan. Trade and the 

benefits from it can be instrumental in showing Pakistanis that 

diplomatic normalization with India is profitable. People-to-people 

interactions (sports, culture, intellectual exchanges) can serve to 

demystify India in the Pakistani imagination. In sum, only a 

multifaceted relationship with Pakistan can bring about lasting 
262

accommodation and a robust peace. 

When neoliberals think about India-Pakistan relations, they 

approach the issue differently from Nehruvians. Where Nehruvians 

emphasize a multifaceted process of communication and contact, 

neoliberals look essentially to strike bargains to the advantage of 

both sides. In this view, Pakistan is a threat to Indiaís security but 

can be brought around to a more pacific and accommodative view of 

the relationship if New Delhi uses an approach built on the promise 

of mutual gain, particularly economic gain.43 Neoliberals argue that, 

ultimately, Pakistanís leaders and people are not above the logic of 

costs and benefits. Whatever their sense of national identity and their 

fear of India, Pakistanis will eventually measure their policies 

toward their neighbor in terms of the advantages and disadvantages 

of alternative courses of action. In the end, economic well-being is 

paramount for any society, and Pakistan will come around to the 

view that it must cut a deal with India in order to give its people a 

better life.44 

Neoliberals do not reject the entire Nehruvian program. The 

Nehruvian insistence on an adequate but non-threatening defense 

posture and a multifaceted relationship with Pakistan is congenial to 

neoliberals who place great emphasis on economic well-being via 

free market policies. An overly ambitious defense posture, in their 

view, will channel government and private expenditures into nonproductive areas and cramp economic growth.45 In this respect, they 

do not differ greatly from the Nehruvians. Neoliberals also support 

the Nehruvian view of working toward a broad relationship with 

Pakistan and Pakistanis. The core of the neoliberal approach is based 

on the primacy of economics, and therefore anything that goes 

beyond the traditional focus on military and diplomatic interactions 

is helpful. However, neoliberals differ from Nehruvians in two key 

respects. 

First of all, neoliberals are not great believers in the effectiveness 
263

of international institutions and laws or bilateral treaties and 

agreements.46 The Nehruvian ìobsessionî with institutions, laws, 

treaties and agreements (e.g., in the UN, especially in the early years) 

and the various bilateral accords with Pakistan are, in their view, a 

negotiatory dead end. The Nehruvian way constitutes a formalistic, 

old-fashioned approach to diplomacy and statecraft and has been the 

bane of Indiaís foreign policy. UN resolutions are ineffective, even 

against the humblest states. And the bilateral accords with Pakistan 

are mere paper commitments, which Islamabad can ignoreóeven 

tear upóat will. New Delhi should be prepared to scrap any or all of 

these accords if and when it is necessary to do so; the Nehruvian 

insistence on sticking by them in rote fashion is unimaginative and 

unhelpful. Neoliberals do not necessarily reject these accords, but 

they want India to adopt a more flexible, nondogmatic approach.47 

The second difference with the Nehruvians is on the regional 

role of the great powersóthe United States, Russia, China, Japan and 

the Europeans. Neoliberals argue that keeping the great powers out 

of the region is futile and, worse still, positively harmful to the 

Indian cause. Great powers by definition are hard to keep out of 

strategic arenas and, in the case of the United States, virtually 

impossible. More importantly, great power involvement could be to 

Indiaís advantage.48 After the Cold War, the great powers perceive 

India and Pakistan quite differently. An India that is booming 

economically in the wake of economic reforms, that is a 

nonexpansionist power, and that is a stable multiethnic democracy is 

an asset. Pakistan, with its economic problems, its revisionist 

agenda in South Asia and its support of revolutionary Islamic 

groups, and its chaotic, Islamic polity, by contrast, is a potential 

failed state.49 In this new geopolitical situation, India should 

cultivate the great powers and encourage them to lean on Pakistan 

as a way of bringing Islamabad around to a deal. From the neoliberal 

perspective, what India therefore needs is omni-alignment, not 

nonalignment: an engagement and rapprochement with all the great 

powers, even China, in the service of a regional order that suits New 
264

Delhiís interests and that is not inimical to great power preferences.50 

For neoliberals, then, Pakistan policy must be geared to bringing 

Islamabad to the negotiating table. Whereas Nehruvians want to 

fundamentally change Pakistani thinking, neoliberals are more 

ìpragmaticî and ìworldly,î insisting that an economic logic will 

eventually engineer accommodation. Economic development in 

Pakistan will do more to transform elite and popular attitudes than 

anything India can do by way of political, social, and cultural 

engagement. But for Pakistan to come to the table, India must 

become an economic powerhouse. The example of Indiaís economic 

growth, the gap in capabilities that will open up as a result, and the 

potential opportunities for Pakistanis in an accelerating Indian 

economy will give New Delhi the power to make Pakistan an offer it 

cannot refuse. When the economic foundation for a new relationship 

is built, as it increasingly has been over the past decade of reforms, 

flexibility in Indiaís diplomatic stance will be crucial for encouraging 

Pakistan to reciprocate with its own brand of new thinking. Finally, 

the pressures exerted by the great powers on Indiaís behalf will put 

Pakistan in a mood to negotiate seriously. 

The hyperrealist prescription for dealing with Pakistan is not to 

worry overly about the intensity of communication and contact with 

that country, nor to rely on the imperatives of economic change, nor 

even to turn to others for help. Instead, hyperrealists argue, India 

must focus on the ìfundamentalsî and on policies that have stood 

the test of time in the international system. Ultimately, the only 

language that Pakistan understands and heeds, like any other 

country, is the language of power and violence. The core of Indiaís 

policy therefore is to build its military strength.51 Given that India is 

eight times Pakistanís size, it should be in a position to overawe 

Pakistan militarily. From a position of dominance, New Delhi should 

dictate terms to Pakistan. With military strength will come an array 

of options that can be used to raise the costs of Pakistanís 

intervention in Kashmir. These options should be exercised sooner 
265

rather than later. Taking the fight to Pakistan rather than reacting to 

Pakistani provocations is the essence of a workable, effective 

policy.52 

What does it mean to take the fight to Pakistan? Hyperrealists 

argue that India should repay Pakistan in the same coin militarily, 

but, in addition, politically and economically. Militarily, India 

should make Pakistan pay a much higher cost for the conflict in 

Kashmir. At the very least, Indian forces should be more aggressive 

in counterinsurgency operations, as they were in Punjab. Beyond 

this, Indian forces could begin to test the Line of Control or even the 

international boundary. Artillery fire, air strikes and ìhot pursuitî 

attacks into Pakistan-held Kashmir would serve notice that India 

was no longer willing to fight a purely defensive internal war. 

Finally, at the limit, India should be prepared to attack across the 

international boundary to threaten Pakistanís heartland. The fact that 

India and Pakistan are nuclear powers does not bother some 

hyperrealists who would seriously contemplate the possibility of 

ìlimited war under nuclear conditions,î arguing that Indiaís nuclear 

superiority will give it ìescalation dominance,î that is, the ability to 

control the pace and direction of military action. Politically, 

hyperrealists argue, there is no reason why India cannot do what the 

Pakistanis are doing in Kashmir. New Delhi could begin to fund and 

arm various dissident groups in Pakistan, including separatists or 

ethnic rebels in Baluchistan and Sindh as well as unhappy religious 

groups in Punjab. India could increasingly play host to prominent 

dissident leaders as well, especially Sindhis, but also those from the 

Pakistani side of Kashmir.53 Finally, India could resort to economic 

warfare to raise the costs of conflict. New Delhi could meddle with 

Pakistanís currency and stock market. It could increase its own 

defense spending, compelling Pakistan to raise its expenditures and 

driving its economy into a fiscal meltdown. As the United States 

drove the Soviet Union out of business, so India could spend 

Pakistan into oblivion. 
266

Hyperrealists, therefore, in effect imply that the collapse or 

destruction of Pakistan is the only truly viable solution. Pakistan is 

an implacable foe and, with every setback or defeat, it will only 

rebuild itself for the next round of conflict. After 1971, that should 

have been clear to India. Pakistanis see compromise and negotiation, 

restraint and cooperation assigns of weakness and incoherence in 

India. Unless Pakistan is reduced to a state of permanent chaos or 

debility, it will, phoenix-like, rise from the ashes to challenge India 

again and again. 

Nehruvians, neoliberals, and hyperrealists have quite different 

prescriptions for how to deal with Pakistan. Nehruvians trust in 

patient, long-term diplomacy that builds on existing treaties and 

obligations, defensive defense, society-to-society contact and 

communication, and nonalignment. Neoliberals prefer a pragmatic, 

flexible approach to Pakistan, a reliance on economic contacts and 

Indiaís growing economic strength to bring Pakistanis around, a 

restrained military posture, and alignment with the great powers 

(especially the United States) rather than nonalignment. 

Hyperrealists want India to rely on power and force rather than 

treaties and economic links to take the fight to Pakistan, to subvert it 

from within, and eventually to bring about its collapse. 

China. The Nehruvian belief that states and peoples can 

eventually be brought around to make peace with each other extends 

to relations with China. Notwithstanding the war of 1962 with 

China, Nehruvians do not see China as an imperial power trying to 

intimidate its neighbors. Rather, China is a backward country trying 

to improve the lives of its huge population, much like India. It is also 

trying to overcome the trauma of a semi-colonial occupation in the 

19th century. Its communist regime is repressive but has also played 

a progressive role for its people. The communists liberated and 

united China and incurred the wrath of the Western powers, and 

much of the ire against China in the international system continues 

to be Western inspired. Chinaís desire to reintegrate Hong Kong, 
267

Macao, and Taiwan is justified because these areas belonged to 

China historically. Chinaís claim to Tibet is more controversial, but 

there is little that can be done about the Tibetan situation except 

hope that eventually China will realize the folly of forcible 

occupation. While Chinese communism is distasteful, to mount a 

crusade against it internationally is counterproductive. 

Communication and dialogue with China, and giving China its due 

in the international order, will modify Chinese policies more than 

confrontation. 

Indiaís own difficulties with China, in the Nehruvian 

perspective, arose from Beijingís obduracy and its involvement in 

the Cold Waróand New Delhiís own mistakes. While China was 

ultimately responsible for the war of 1962, its aggressiveness was 

momentary and limited. China and India have historically never 

been enemies, in the Nehruvian view.54 They represent two ancient 

civilizations with a fair degree of contact with each other over two 

millennia and no record of hostilities. In the modern period, they 

generally have been friends and are, even now, central to the 

prospects of peace and security in Asia.55 India was supportive of 

Chinaís national liberation struggle and, after 1949, of its 

membership in international society. The war was an aberration and 

was due to a series of misunderstandings. A settlement over the 

border issue and long-term peace and friendship with China is made 

easier by these facts. 

Nehruvians broadly endorse the kinds of policies that the Indian 

government has pursued with China since 1962 in bringing Beijing 

around to a settlement. An adequate defense against China is vital. 

New Delhi must be able to defend its borders and cannot be caught 

napping if India-China relations should suddenly decay as they did 

in 1961-62. However, Indiaís posture along the border should not be 

provocative.56 Beyond this, India has to pursue a steady, patient 

course of diplomacy with China. Nehruvians are supportive of the 

general thrust of Indiaís diplomacy with China over the past decade. 
268

Before 1988, India insisted that there could be no real improvement 

in relations until the Chinese reverted to the military situation before 

1962 and handed back any territories taken from 1949 onwards. New 

Delhi insisted that a border settlement must be based on an 

acknowledged principle of demarcation rather than mere give-andtake. Since 1988, when Rajiv Gandhi became the first Indian prime 

minister to visit China after the 1962 war, India has changed its 

approach. The basic shift has been to broaden the relationship and to 

refuse to hold other areas of interaction hostage to a settlement of the 

border. Thus, in the 1990s, India signed a number of confidencebuilding agreements with China. Over a decade, the presidents, 

prime ministers, and foreign ministers of the two countries met over 

a dozen times, more than at any time since 1949. Before 1998, Indian 

and Chinese military leaders were meeting more frequently as well. 

In 2000, India and China began an official security dialogue which 

goes beyond border issues. Finally, India-China trade blossomed, 

from a mere $200 million to well over $2 billion in the course of a 

decade. India has also agreed to develop closer social links between 

the two societies in terms of cultural, scientific and sporting 

exchanges.57 

Beyond this bilateral engagement, Nehruvians believe that India 

and China have a broad geopolitical interest in common, namely, to 

ensure that Asia does not become either an arena of conflict between 

Asian countries themselves or an object of Western influence once 

again.58 As rising powers, India and China could come into conflict 

as they grow in capabilities and influence. A number of other Asian 

conflicts and rivalries exist. And without the Soviet Union to hold 

them in check, the Western states, particularly the United States, 

could begin to interfere in the affairs of Asia and exert pressures on 

Asian countries in the name of humanitarian concerns such as 

human rights. Nehruvians therefore see a future concert with China 

and other Asian powersóincluding Russiaóas a long-term goal. 

India, China, and the major Asian powers should come together to 

build confidence and cooperation amongst themselves in order to 
269

avoid mutual conflict and to keep the U.S. and other Westerners at 

bay. 59 

Neoliberals view China differently. India-China relations in the 

ancient past or even more recent past are largely irrelevant. It is the 

present and future of India and China that must be determinative. In 

a globalized world, where the barriers to trade, investment, and 

technology have loosened as never before, the past holds few 

lessons. Older quarrels, such as the border dispute, are anachronisms 

that have little bearing on contemporary choices; above all, these 

choices must be concerned with how states can manage the 

opportunities and threats of globalization.60 Solving the border 

quarrel is a relatively insignificant issue, though it will not be easy to 

dispose of. Looking at China through the lens of the border dispute 

is the wrong way to assess the relationship. It is Chinaís economic 

revolution and the effects of economic change on its foreign and 

security policies that are crucial. China is rapidly becoming a great 

power. Its economic power is giving it enormous leverage, even with 

rivals such as the United States. In the pursuit of great power status 

via rapid economic change, China is now committed to pragmatic 

policies toward Taiwan, Japan, and India, as well as toward the 

United States. 

For India, this has at least two implications. First, the primary 

goal of grand strategy in a globalizing world is economic strength. 

Economic strength is good in itself in terms of better living standards 

and a more resilient society, but it is also a source of influence in 

international affairs. India must emulate China to be secure against 

its neighbor in the decades to come, and more importantly, to 

manage its relations with other great powers as Beijing does.61

Second, with its eye on economic progress, China is likely to be a 

restrained power interested in managing and resolving conflict.62 

Neoliberals support the Nehruvians on an adequate rather than 

extravagant defense and on a multifaceted engagement with China. 
270

From the point of view of neoliberals, though, it is economics that 

should lead the way. China is interested in economic advancement 

through trade, investment, and technology transfers, as is India. 

Trade with China could be much larger than it is at present. India 

and China could in addition invest in each otherís economies. There 

are areas of technology where they could cooperate, especially in 

formation technology.63 Neoliberals argue that India will benefit 

from an economic relationship with China and in addition will gain 

diplomatic leverage: New Delhi should aim to ìdo a Chinaî on 

China. With a steadily deepening economic engagement, differences 

over the border and Beijingís relationship with Islamabad will be 

easier to resolve, and on terms that suit India. The problem, in the 

neoliberal view, is India, not China. India has not learned to be 

coldly calculative, to put economics center stage in its external 

relations, to shed its prejudices about market-driven economics and 

globalization, to marginalize old-fashioned disputes over territory, 

and to forsake old methods, policies, and agreements. Neoliberals 

are impatient with both Nehruvians and hyperrealists who they see 

as being old-fashioned about economics, security, and the conduct of 

diplomacy. 

Thus, in the neoliberal view, the Nehruvian interest in a concert 

with China and Russia and other Asian powers is unrealistic, even 

counterproductive.64 Older security problems and rivalries will 

gradually dissipate as economics comes center stage. A concert of 

Asians to regulate intra-Asian conflicts is an idea whose time has 

probably come and gone. An economic league in Asia would be 

more to the point. As for even a loose alliance against the United 

States and the West, this is highly improbable. China, Russia, and 

India individually have much greater stakes in a relationship with 

the United States and the West than with each other, for the most 

part. In any case, India, as a secular, modern democracy has much 

more in common with the Western countries than with China or 

even the new Russia. Flirting with China and Russia is tactically 

understandable: it is a signal to the United States not to take India 
271

for granted. But an Asian concert of powers that excludes the United 

States in particular is virtually impossible. 

While Nehruvians think that India and China can be friends and 

allies and while neoliberals argue that India and China can cut a 

strategic deal if they develop their economic relations, hyperrealists 

see China as the greatest military threat to India, far more so than 

Pakistan.65 The Nehruvians, in the hyperrealist view, failed in the 

1950s and 1960s to comprehend Chinese goals and methods, and to 

prepare to meet force with force. They are no wiser about China 40 

years later: communication and contacts with China will do little to 

change the basic expansionist and aggressive tenets of the 

authoritarian Chinese leadership, and it is absurd to think that the 

two countries can combine to manage Asian security.66 The 

neoliberals also are misguided about China. Their faith in the power 

of economics is exaggerated. For China, pragmatism in foreign and 

security policy and economic modernization is merely tactical and 

will be dispensed with when Beijing feels strong enough to use 

unilateral means. India must therefore prepare itself militarily to 

deal with China. Nuclear deterrence is vital if India is to be secure 

against China.67 In addition, Indiaís conventional military power 

must be augmented to defend Indian territory against the largest 

army in the world. 

Beyond military preparedness on Indiaís part, New Delhi must 

knit together an alliance of Asian countries that will contain China. It 

must do to China what China has done to India, namely, 

encirclement.68 In the 1950s, China took over Tibet. In the 1960s and 

1970s, it carefully cultivated Pakistan, diplomatically and militarily. 

Whenever possible, it has sought to increase its influence in South 

Asia among the smaller states, especially Bangladesh and Nepal. In 

the 1990s, it began to penetrate Burma. Hyperrealists argue that it is 

time for India to break out of this encirclement with its own counterencirclement of China. New Delhi must put together an alliance in 

Southeast and East Asia all along the Chinese periphery. This would 
272

involve strengthening relations with Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, 

and the ASEAN states including Vietnam and Burma, all of whom in 

the end must fear China more than anyone else.69 Hyperrealists 

favor an Indian naval presence in the South China Sea as much as 

the Chinese navy is a presence in the Indian Ocean. Some 

hyperrealists would go so far as to insist that India must reopen the 

Tibet question and help counter Chinaís rule.70 A counterencirclement will assume even greater importance as the U.S. 

position in Asia diminishes. Hyperrealists argue that the United 

States will eventually have to pull out of Asia, leaving the field open 

to China. At that point, Asians will have to face up to the 

responsibilities of containing China by themselves. 

In sum, as with Pakistan, hyperrealists envisage India taking the 

fight to China. They see India as being too complacent about China 

and merely reactive to Chinese diplomatic and strategic moves. The 

Chinese, in their view, only respect power. Indiaís own military 

strength, combined with an alliance system in Asia, would in the 

aggregate be powerful enough to replace the United States as the 

main check on Chinese ambitions. Hyperrealists see India as a 

potential pole of attraction in the international system, particularly 

so in Asia. India should be the linchpin of a system of alliances, from 

Israel at one end to Taiwan at the other, that combats both Islamic 

fundamentalism and Chinese expansionism. 

Nehruvians, neoliberals, and hyperrealists have quite different 

perspectives on China. China at one level is like Pakistanóa 

neighbor with whom India has a territorial dispute and with whom 

hostilities are possible. At another level, with its astonishing 

economic growth and size, China represents a rising power, a great 

power in the making at the very least. Nehruvians in the end believe 

that India can create the conditions for peace and cooperation with 

the giant to the north, much as it can with Pakistan. Neoliberals 

argue that economics can lead the way even with China, and that a 

pragmatic approach to the border can bring about a stable 
273

relationship. Hyperrealists see a rising China as aggressive and 

expansionist, and therefore argue that only Indian military power 

and a containment of China by a ring of Asian powers will hold 

Beijing in check. 

The United States. For most countries in the world, dealing with 

the great powers, whether they are nearby or distant, is a special 

challenge of grand strategy. Nehruvians, neoliberals, and 

hyperrealists differ as much on this issue as on internal security, 

relations with Pakistan and China, and nuclear weapons. All three 

groups recognize that the only great power of any significance for 

India is the United States, and that the United States is not a military 

threat in any foreseeable future. However, it is a diplomatic threat. 

Often, U.S. policies hurt Indian interests collaterally rather than 

intentionally. American regional and global policies run counter to 

Indian preferences in various ways, and managing both the intended 

and unintended effects of U.S. policies pose a special challenge given 

the American superiority over all other powers. 

The Nehruvian prescription for dealing with great powers is 

nonalignment. Nonalignment is not neutrality, and it is not 

amoralism. It is a policy built around three elements: first, a refusal 

to be permanently attached to any great power, and to judge 

international issues in the light of Indiaís interests and general 

principles of international security; second, the fashioning of a 

coalition of Third World countries against great power dominance; 

and third, mediating between rival great powers and the fostering of 

international institutions and law so that the international system as 

a whole is made safer and, in particular, weak Third World powers 

are afforded more protection. In short, autonomy, balancing, 

mediation, and institutionalism are at the heart of the Nehruvian 

system for managing relations with the great powers. These points 

deserve some elaboration. 

First of all, according to Nehruvians, nonalignment served to 
274

keep India outside the East-West fray for the most part. India was 

able to avoid being entangled in other peopleís quarrels and to 

preserve its freedom to choose one side or the other, or not to choose 

sides as it saw fit. Nonalignment served Indiaís domestic stability as 

well. If India had chosen one side in the Cold War, this may have 

encouraged the other side to meddle in its domestic politics to 

punish it. Also, given the ideological divide between left and right 

within India, alignment with either superpower would have been 

disruptive. 

Second, nonalignment helped to construct a Third World 

coalition. Nehru himself scorned the ìtrade unionismî of the Third 

World, but Nehruvians generally saw nonalignment as a form of 

collective resistance against the imperial powers. Over the years, in 

classical balance of power fashion, the nonaligned countries adopted 

a perceptible tilt towards the weaker superpower, the Soviet Union, 

in order to gain leverage with the more dominant superpower. 

Third, in the Nehruvian view, nonalignment is more than a 

rejection of alliance politics and resistance to the great powers. It is 

an insistence that the smaller powers can help to mediate the 

differences between the great powers. It is also an insistence that 

international institutions, organizations and law matter, and are 

particularly important for the protection of weaker powers. For 

Nehruvians, this is a vital and ultimately the most positive aspect of 

nonalignment. Nonaligned states, free from the constraints of 

alliance responsibilities, enjoy a vantage point from which they can 

not only judge the actions of the great powers but also from which 

they can help bridge differences. New Delhi might be in a position to 

offer in formation, i deas, and interpretations of events that would 

bring the two sides closer together. The mediatory function of nonalignment, Nehruvians argue, is vital for international peace and 

stability, especially for the security of the smaller countries because 

in any global confrontation their survival, independence, and 

development will be at risk.71 
275

Finally, Nehruvians argue that international institutions can play 

a role in checking the great powers. International organizations, 

international law, and international norms and conventions are ways 

of tethering the great powers. By promoting procedures, rules, and 

debate in international relations, the smaller powers might be able to 

slow down the great powers or, better still, get them to reconsider 

their goals and policies. The great powers may manipulate 

international procedures, rules, and debate to their advantage, but 

this is not certain. In any case, an international system with 

procedures, rules, and forums for debate must be better than one 

without. 

Nehruvians argue that nonalignment in this larger sense is 

relevant in the post Cold War world. With the United States 

rampant, preserving Indiaís autonomy is an even more challenging 

task. Nonalignment and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 

continue to be a refuge for countries that do not want to bandwagon 

with Washington.72 So also is balancing against U.S. power a vital 

interest. Strictly speaking, balancing against the U.S. is impossible. 

However, a coalition of Southern states could resist U.S. pressures on 

selected issues. The possibility of Indian leadership of a Southern 

coalition could well enlarge Indiaís bargaining power with 

Washington. 

Nehruvians in the post-Cold War period also regard an IndiaChina-Russia partnership as a response to U.S. hegemony. In the 

longer term, a concert of Asian powers could hold the United States 

at bay.73 Since Nehruvians worry about the polarizing effects of 

balance-of -power politics, they also support the view that India 

should continue to act as a mediator with the United States. Thus, 

some Nehruvians propose that India can represent Southern 

interests to the United States and act as a moderate go-between.74

Finally, in the post-Cold War period, a nonaligned posture that 

attempts to rally Southern countries around international 
276

institutions, rules, and norms can in some measure hope to subvert 

the U.S. hold on power. Since the United States is using international 

institutions, laws, and conventions for its own purposes, Indian 

diplomacy must be geared both to sustaining international 

organizations and to preventing their manipulation by the United 

States and its allies. 

It is on the issue of how India deals with the great powers that 

neoliberalism most clearly defines its differences with both the 

Nehruvians and hyperrealists. For the neoliberals, relations with the 

great powers represent opportunities as much as threats. India will 

become a full-fledged great power, in the neoliberal view. This is 

more or less inevitable. While Nehruvians do not disagree with the 

neoliberals on Indiaís destiny as a great power, for them Indiaís 

great power aspirations must be built on autarky, that is, on self -

reliance. Neoliberals argue by contrast that in the contemporary 

world this is not possible. India can only become a great power by 

raising its economic growth rates, and this is feasible if India works 

with rather than against the great powers as a way of increasing 

trade, technology transfers, and investment.75 

Nonalignment and everything it represents therefore seems 

dreadfully old-fashioned to neoliberals. In the neoliberal view, the 

great powers are no longer in fundamental conflict.76 With the end of 

the Cold War, there is no Manichean conflict animating international 

relations. One side won the Cold War, namely, the United States and 

the Western nations, and the other side lost. The victors are not in 

conflict: the United States and its Western partners and Japan remain 

allies. Those who lost the Cold War, moreover, have accepted the 

fundamental tenets of the victors. There are, therefore, no rival 

alliance blocs vying for Indiaís or anyone elseís membership. 

Choosing between two great blocs and two ideological systems is no 

longer a factor.77 Given that there are no great powers locked in 

conflict, the mediatory role of nonaligned states is also no longer a 

factor of any significance. 
277

Most importantly for neoliberals, the idea of resisting the great 

powers is anachronistic. For one thing, there is only one truly great 

power, the United States, and its power is so overwhelming that to 

conceive of resistance in any real sense is impractical. Since the 

United States leads a coalition of great powers, its preponderance is 

only magnified. Besides, resistance to the great powers implies that 

these powers are attempting to force countries to do something that 

they do not wish to do. Neoliberals argue that this is not the case. A 

liberal global economic order and even global nonproliferation, the 

two areas where the great powers do twist arms, are in the interest of 

most states. Even India, with some qualifications, gains from both. It 

is in Indiaís interest to promote an open trading and financial system 

worldwide. It is also in Indiaís interest to curb the spread of weapons 

of mass destruction (WMDs). Neoliberals want India to be a nuclear 

weapons power, albeit a restrained one, but they also want India to 

join the nonproliferation order as a way of curbing the spread of 

WMDs.78 

Neoliberals argue that after the Cold War, the United States, by 

and large, is no longer interested in the vast majority of smaller 

powers. The problem for most of the smaller powers is not pressures 

applied against them by the big powers, but rather their own 

economic backwardness, malgovernance, regional hostilities, and 

vulnerability to fundamentalism and various other nontraditional 

security threats (small arms, drugs, criminal mafias, etc.). The United 

States in particular is a potential resource in dealing with these 

challenges. For countries like India, the real problem posed by 

Washington is therefore not so much its desire to dominate as its 

unwillingness to help the weaker states deal with these challenges. 

From this vantage point, resistance to the United States is 

tantamount to cutting off oneís nose to spite oneís face. The 

challenge before the weaker powers, including India, is not how to 

resist the United States but rather how to cut a deal with it 

pragmatically and with dignity.79 
278

Whereas the Nehruvians want to stay aloof from great power 

entanglements, to mediate between the great powers, and to resist 

the domination of these powers, and the neoliberals want to cut a 

deal with the great powers, hyperrealists want India to break into 

the club of the great powers, to bust into the inner circle of the 

international order. Their view of Indiaís relations with the great 

powers does not completely reject the Nehruvian and neoliberal 

approaches. It does not reject the Nehruvian nonaligned view of 

Indiaís role visñ‡-vis the great powersóaloofness, mediation, and 

resistanceónor does it turn its back on cutting deals with other great 

powers, as advocated by the neoliberals. These are acceptable lines 

of policy when India is weak but they should not become the ends of 

policy per se. The hyperrealist view is that India has all the 

appurtenances of a great power and can, through an act of will, 

transform its potential into actuality. Ultimately, India must sit at the 

high table of international affairs as a complete and assertive equal, 

whether the other great powers like it or not. Sitting at the table, 

India will help shape the world order commensurate with its 

preferences. 

Hyperrealists regard the international system as an anarchical 

arena where power is the ultimate arbiter. In such a system, the only 

way of restraining the great powers is to make India strong enough 

to defend its interests. Hyperrealists argue that neither Nehruvians 

nor neoliberals understand the necessities of power. Nehruvians are 

idealistic in their view that nonalignment is a means of achieving 

autonomy. Nonalignment is the refuge of weak powers. It works as 

long as it suits the great powers. In the end, India itself was forced to 

play a balance of power game during the Cold War in order to 

safeguard its interests. As for the rest of the Nehruvian policyóof 

mediation and resistance to the great powersóthis also holds little 

appeal. Mediation does nothing for India, and a policy of resistance 

built on a coalition of weak Southern powers is futile. Nor do 

hyperrealists set much store by international organizations, law and 
279

regimes in restraining the great powers, arguing, like all realists, that 

these are creatures of states and exist at the pleasure of the greatest 

powers.80 Thus, procedures, rules, and debates are likely to be used 

by the strong against the weak and not the other way round. 

In the hyperrealist view, neoliberals are just as guilty of woollyheaded thinking. The neoliberal argument that economics is the key 

to power in the post-Cold War international system is, in the 

hyperrealist view, based on a very limited if not altogether false 

reading of international history. The post-Cold War period is not 

different from any other period of history: military power remains 

the sine qua non of international security and status just as it always 

has. Hyperrealists maintain that the neoliberal belief in ìeconomics 

over politicsî is profoundly mistaken: politics comes before 

economics. In international relations, this means that military power 

comes before economic power. States that are front-rank military 

powers become front-rank economic powers, not the other way 

round.81 A state that resolves to make itself into a major military 

power will solve the economic and technological problems that 

confront it. A state that goes around the world trying to beg and 

borrow economically and technologically cannot gird itself up for 

the challenges of social transformation and is therefore doomed to 

remain a secondary power. 

Relations with the United States must therefore be conducted in 

a quite different way. New Delhi must be assertive in its relations 

with Washington. This means, amongst other things, being clear and 

firm about vital Indian interests.82 On these, India must refuse to 

compromise. Thus, the nuclear program is non-negotiable with the 

United States. American decisionmakers must be told that India is a 

great-power-in-the-making and that nuclear weapons are essential in 

solidifying Indiaís status and security. Thus also, U.S. intervention in 

regional affairs is tolerable as long as it is supportive of Indian goals, 

but on the whole Washington is not welcome in South Asia and 

particularly not as a mediator on Kashmir.83 Beyond assertiveness, 
280

India should signal its desire for a partnership with the United 

States. When the United States begins to withdraw from Asia, it will 

be in its interest to see India become a confident and versatile 

military power. An India-U.S. alliance is possible, particularly 

against the common enemy, China.84 India and the United States also 

have a common interest in combating Islamic fundamentalism and 

terrorism.85 In the long term, however, given the logic of 

international politics, the United States will resist Indiaís rise to 

power as it will Chinaís. Indians must be prepared to tough it out 

against U.S. intimidation. The only way of dealing with the United 

States is for India to build its military power. India must be in a 

position eventually to deter the United States from intervening 

militarily in and around Indiaís sphere of influence in South Asia, 

the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and nearby Southeast Asiaóand 

of course in Indian domestic politics. While India can take the fight 

to Pakistan and China, it is not in a position to do so against the 

United States in any foreseeable future. India must therefore rely 

primarily on dissuasive power vis-‡-vis the United States. 

To summarize: every country in the world has to worry about 

how to deal with the United States. Nehruvians, neoliberals and 

hyperrealists propose three quite different ways of dealing with the 

United States. Nehruvians see the United States as an imperial 

power that cannot countenance any rivals, and that wants to 

preserve its preeminence at the expense of powers like India. The 

only way to deal with the United States is to resist American policies 

and power by building a coalition of Third World states and others 

who worry about Washingtonís dominance. Out of resistance may 

come ìconversionî of the United States to points of view that are 

more favorable to India and eventually to cooperation. Neoliberals 

take the opposite view. For them, the United States is the dominant 

power, one that can be supportive of Indian goals, and there is little 

option but to bandwagon with Washington. Hyperrealists differ 

from both Nehruvians and neoliberals in arguing that the only way 

of dealing with the United States is to build India into a military 
281

power of the first rank. 

Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Policy and the Nature of the Deterrent. 

Nehruvians, neoliberals, and hyperrealists differ on the broad 

outlines of Indiaís nuclear policy as well as the nature of the 

deterrent. They differ, first, on three basic issues: the utility of 

nuclear weapons; Indiaís relationship to the nonproliferation regime; 

and the feasibility and desirability of disarmament. They also differ 

on the nature of the deterrent: Nehruvians and neoliberals are 

nuclear moderates, while hyperrealists are nuclear maximalists. 

Nehruvians hold that nuclear weapons are necessary for Indiaís 

security as long as they cannot be abolished. Nuclear weapons are an 

abomination, but if others have them, particularly Indiaís rivals, then 

India must also have them for deterrence.86 Nuclear weapons are 

also necessary in a diplomatic sense. In a world of great and growing 

inequalities, nuclear weapons are not just a military but also a 

political equalizer. Indiaís capacity to resist great power pressures in 

particular will be enhanced by nuclear weapons. 

With respect to the nonproliferation regime, and in particular the 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a putative fissile 

material cutoff treaty (FMCT), Nehruvians argue that India should 

not sign either accord, even if joining the nonproliferation regime 

does not adversely affect the Indian deterrent. For Nehruvians, the 

nonproliferation regime is a leading part of the ìnew world orderî 

which is fundamentally unequal and hegemonistic and which must 

therefore be resisted.87 

Finally, Nehruvians insist that nuclear disarmament is both 

desirable and feasible. It is desirable because nuclear weapons could 

someday be used, which would be catastrophic not just for the 

countries involved but also for the rest of the international 

community.88 In addition, disarmament is desirable because nuclear 
282

weapons are ethically repugnant, if they are not illegal under 

international law.89 Finally, disarmament is desirable because 

nuclear weapons in the hands of a few is discriminatory, and 

discrimination fosters instability and violence.90 

According to Nehruvians, a multilateral, verifiable abolition of 

nuclear weapons, as proposed by India, is not only desirable, it is 

also feasible. Thus, they argue that if the international community 

could abolish biological and chemical weapons, then there is no 

reason that it cannot get rid of nuclear weapons as well.91 Abolition 

requires, in the first place, that the present nuclear weapons states 

commit themselves to its achievement in a time-bound and phased 

manner. Once they do so and take real steps to eliminate nuclear 

weapons, Nehruvians propose that India should join the process of 

abolition. 

Neoliberals are pragmatists in nuclear affairs.92 Like the 

Nehruvians, they also believe that nuclear weapons are vital for 

Indiaís security in a world which shows no signs of moving towards 

abolition and which is inhabited by regional nuclear powersóChina 

and Pakistanóthat threaten Indiaís security. Neoliberals, like 

Nehruvians and hyperrealists, note that the nuclear weapons states 

(NWSs) continue to reaffirm the fundamental importance of nuclear 

weapons in their security postures.93 

Where neoliberals part company with Nehruvians and 

hyperrealists is in respect to the nonproliferation regime. According 

to neoliberals, New Delhi should pragmatically reconsider its 

opposition to key elements of that regime in the wake of the May 

1998 tests. Indiaís scientists have certified the tests as being sufficient 

for the construction of a credible deterrent and a test ban could be in 

Indiaís interest.94 Neoliberals would cut a deal with the international 

community. The deal would have India join the CTBT, a possible 

FMCT, and the other nonproliferation regimes (such as the Missile 

Technology Control Regime or MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
283

etc.). In return, it would get de facto if not de jure recognition of its 

new nuclear status, and most importantly, the ban on dual-use and 

advanced conventional weapons technologies would be lifted.95 

While neoliberals urge India to strike a nuclear deal with the 

nuclear powers, they exclude from this compact the traditional 

Indian idea of phased disarmament. They insist that India should be 

ìrealisticî rather than ìnormativeî and ìmoralisticî about nuclear 

weapons. Thus, C. Raja Mohan argues that India should set aside its 

traditional posture of ìdisarmamentî and focus instead on ìarms 

control.î96 He even argues that India should positively oppose 

abolition on two grounds. First, the incipient ìrevolution in military 

affairsî (RMA) will give the United States and its Western allies an 

insurmountable lead in conventional weaponry which can only be 

ìbalancedî by nuclear weapons.97 Second, the terms of global power 

more broadly are shifting against India, and only nuclear weapons 

will serve to keep India in the great game of global politics. Thus, 

even if the United States and other nuclear weapons states agree to 

abolish nuclear weapons, India should keep them, at least until it can 

catch up in the conventional military and global power race.98 

It is worth noting that not all neoliberals are so skeptical about 

disarmament. Some strongly support the traditional Indian agenda 

on disarmament and are closer to the Nehruvians in this regard.99

This softer, pro-disarmament variant of nuclear pragmatism has 

substantial following and should not be discounted. Indian elite 

opinion has traditionally supported both nuclearization and an 

active stance on disarmament.100 Having said that, it is not clear 

whether support for a disarmament agenda is a ìtacticalî one 

intended to counter international criticism of Indiaís nuclearization, 

whether it is an article of faith which Indians find difficult to discard, 

or whether it is seen as a genuine, realizable, and practical policy 

option. On the whole, it is much more an article of faith for 

Nehruvians and much more tactical for neoliberals. 
284

For hyperrealists, nuclear weapons are principally for deterrence. 

Some hyperrealists also believe that India must be prepared to fight 

and not just deter nuclear war.101 Nuclear weapons have a political 

role as well. Where Nehruvians see nuclearization as a part of a 

strategy of resistance to a hegemonic world order and where 

neoliberals see it as a way of striking a bargain with the great 

powers, hyperrealists perceive the acquisition of nuclear weapons as 

fundamental to Indiaís status as a great power. Without nuclear 

weapons, India cannot be counted as a separate pole in the 

international system around which other states could cluster for 

protection and leadership. 

Hyperrealists, like Nehruvians, urge that India should refuse to 

join the nonproliferation regime, so that the CTBT and a future 

FMCT do not constrain the achievement of a credible nuclear 

force.102 India needs to continue testing in order to produce the full 

array of nuclear weapons, increase the reliability of warhead design, 

and miniaturize the device. It also needs to produce more fissile 

material in order to test and to build a sufficiently large arsenal.103 

Finally, for hyperrealists, nuclear disarmament is both 

undesirable and infeasible, on strategic and technical grounds, 

respectively.104 The abolition of nuclear weapons would create the 

conditions for great power conflict once again and could lead to 

world war. In addition, hyperrealists argues that nuclear 

disarmament is unattainable: ìThere is no empirical record that 

suggests that disarmament ever succeeded any time in history. . . . 

There is no record. It hasnít succeeded. . . . [ Therefore] what is the 

historical empirical basis on which disarmament is still conceived of 

as a foreign policy goal for India?î105 States are loath to give up any 

weapon system until a more fearsome instrument comes along. They 

must also worry that others will cheat and that those who disarm 

could become vulnerable to a ìbreak out.î 

On the nature of the deterrent, Nehruvians and neoliberals stand 
285

for a moderate posture whereas hyperrealists are maximalists. 

Nuclear moderates and maximalists differ on six issues: the nature of 

the nuclear threat; force size and force structure; negative security 

assurances; nuclear readiness; command and control; and the logic 

of deterrence. These are summarized in the following table. 

 Nuclear Moderates 

 (Nehruvians and Nuclear Maximalists 

 neoliberals) (hyperrealists) 

Nature of Nuclear Threat Pakistan, China, or both Pakistan, China, and the 

 U.S.: ìtous azimuthî 

Force Size and Force ï 60-140 ìHiroshima ï 300 warheads minimum 

Structure type including thermonuclear 

 ï No tactical weapons ï Tactical weapons 

 ï Triad ï Triad 

Negative Security ï ìNo first useî is cred- ï ìNo first useî is not 

Assurances ible and operationally credible and viable 

 viable ï Nonuse against non- 

 ï Categorical nonuse nuclear states is not 

 against non-nuclear sacrosanct 

Nuclear Readiness ï De-mated, de-alerted ï Full deployment of 

 nuclear posture is nuclear weapons; 

 stable de-mated/de-alert is 

 ï Retaliation can be vulnerable 

 delayed ï Retaliation should be 

 prompt 

Command and Control Small, modest C3I-- Extensive, ìclassicalî C31-- 

 consistent with a small, even small, restrained pro- 

 restrained nuclear grams need complex 

 program command and control 

Logic of Deterrence Uncertainty of retalia- Certainty of retaliation 

 tion deters deters 

Nuclear moderates see Pakistan and/or China as nuclear threats: 

some moderates rank Pakistan as the more serious nuclear threat, 

others rank China ahead, and some regard them as more or less 

coeval threats. Deterring either or both Pakistan and China is in their 

view achievable with no more than 60-140 simple, low-yield nuclear 
286

weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons, in the sense of battlefield 

devices, are unnecessary when a purely defensive deterrence is the 

objective. To enhance the survivability of Indiaís nuclear force, a 

triad of ground, air, and sea launched nuclear capabilities is vital. 

Negative security assurances are both credible and viable if India 

maintains a de-mated/de-alerted nuclear posture, that is, if the 

warheads and delivery vehicles are kept separate and under 

different jurisdictions (e.g. between scientists and armed forces) and 

retaliation is assured but at a time of Indiaís choosing rather than 

instantaneous. With a small arsenal and a de-mated/de-alerted 

posture, command and control can be a relatively simple, modest, 

and affordable undertaking. Nuclear moderation is possible, finally, 

because what suffices for deterrence is not the certainty of retaliation 

but rather the mere possibility of a second strike.106 

Maximalists estimate the nuclear threats to India to be more 

challenging, arguing that even the United States constitutes a 

concern and that India must therefore, over the long term, constitute 

a tous azimuth (all horizons) capability. Deterrence in such an 

environment requires a much larger arsenalóat least as large as that 

of the second-tier nuclear states, especially Chinaóand a more 

sophisticated array of devices including thermonuclear and tactical, 

with a triad to increase survivability. Negative security assurances, 

according to maximalists, are neither viable nor credible. No 

operational deployment of nuclear weapons can guarantee that a 

state will not use nuclear weapons first. De-mating and de-alerting 

and a slow-to-respond posture is inconsistent with deterrence 

stability, which requires the opponent to be sure that retaliation will 

be swift and deadly. Command and control must be extensive and 

sophisticated so as to ensure the safety and reliability of the arsenal, 

whether from unauthorized or accidental use, or during a nuclear 

war that may involve a ìsalvoî of exchanges. Underlying the 

contentions of the maximalists is their view that what deters is not 

the mere possibility of retaliation, but rather as close to the absolute 

certainty of retaliation as it is possible to engineer.107 
287

In sum, Nehruvians, neoliberals, and hyperrealists agree that 

India needs nuclear weapons for deterrence but they disagree on the 

nonproliferation regime and on disarmament: only the neoliberals 

would sign the CTBT and an eventual FMCT; and only Nehruvians 

regard the elimination of nuclear weapons as both desirable and 

feasible. In addition, Nehruvians and neoliberals favor a moderate 

nuclear posture whereas hyperrealists argue for a more maximalist 

position. 

Strategic Culture and Security Policy. 

Indian strategic thought for the most part is described by 

Nehruvianism, neoliberalism, and hyperrealism. How close are these 

streams of thought to the conduct of Indian security policy over the 

past decade? We must necessarily be schematic here, but our review 

of Indiaís internal ethnic management policies, its policies towards 

Pakistan and China, and its behavior towards the United States will 

show that actual policy is closest to the preferences of the 

neoliberals, notwithstanding the fact that since 1990 India has had 

three different kinds of governments in power in New Delhióa 

Congress government under Narasimha Rao (1991-96), a left-of -

center coalition government under Deve Gowda and Inder Gujral 

(1996-98), and a right-of -center coalition led by Atal Behari Vajpayee 

(since 1998). 

Internally, official policy is consonant with the Nehruvian and 

neoliberal consensus on constitutionalism, devolution of power, 

group rights, and the calibrated use of force against ethnic rebels. No 

changes have been made in government policies. The Bharatiya 

Janata Party (BJP), which leads the present National Democratic 

Alliance (NDA) coalition, has challenged parts of this consensus. For 

instance, it has suggested that the present constitution requires 

modification, and it has appointed a commission to recommend 

changes. There is concern that the party wants to bring in rather 
288

fundamental changes to the present order. The BJP has insisted that 

it will repeal Article 370 of the Constitution which gives Kashmir a 

special deal within the Union. It has also suggested that it will seek 

to produce a uniform civil code for India. While a common civil code 

for all religions is enshrined in the Constitution as a goal of policy, 

the position of successive governments has been to leave the matter 

alone until the minority communities are ready to engage the issue. 

From time to time, BJPs pokesmen or ministers have argued that 

India should be more ìproactiveî rather than ìreactiveî in situations 

such as Kashmir. Some have interpreted this to signal greater 

interest in the use of force. Having said that, the BJP has thus far not 

overturned the consensus in any of these areas. 

Indiaís Pakistan policy over the past decade has varied 

somewhat. However, the core of that policy is once again close to the 

Nehruvian/neoliberal view. The basics of the Nehruvian approach, 

which sees the need for a multifaceted engagement with Pakistan 

that tries to change Pakistani attitudes, is clearly visible: official 

policy continues to be that existing treaties and agreements must be 

honored and that trade, travel, people-to-people and cultural 

exchanges should be encouraged as a way of achieving peace and 

security. However, the neoliberal view that India needs to remain 

alert to new possibilities and that existing treaties and agreements 

are dispensable if a deal can be struck is gaining ground. For 

instance, since 1995, every Indian government has indicated that it 

will discuss Kashmir, among other issues.108 The summit between 

India and Pakistan at Agra in July 2001 showed that the Indian 

government is willing to break with the past if necessary. The 

Vajpayee government indicated that it would open the Kashmir 

issue for discussion, as no government has done in the previous 30 

years. During the summit and after, references to earlier 

agreementsóincluding the Vajpayee governmentís own Lahore 

agreementówere noticeably few and far between. 

Official policy toward China also is closer to the preferences of 
289

the Nehruvians and neoliberals. New Delhi continues to stress 

adequacy in defense along the border. It is careful not to be 

provocative militarily. The only exception to Indiaís general policy of 

restraint occurred after the nuclear tests of May 1998, when New 

Delhi sought to justify the tests in terms of the Chinese threat. While 

this caused a public diplomatic spat between the two countries, 

relations were carefully mended thereafter. Since 1988, Indian policy 

has been to widen the scope of relations with China and not to make 

everything hostage to a settlement of the border dispute. This is a 

hearkening back to the original Nehruvian policy prior to the 1962 

war. It is also consonant with neoliberal preferences. 

It is in respect to relations with the United States that Indian 

official policy is most neoliberal. Under three governments, New 

Delhi has drifted closer to the United States than at any time since 

1947. Nehruvian pronouncements about the need for nonalignment 

and a Third World coalition against the United States are gone from 

the official vocabulary. Indiaís involvement in the Non-Aligned 

Movement is a mere shadow of its earlier level of engagement. While 

Indian diplomats still tend to be the most opposed to U.S. policies in 

multilateral forums, actual Indian choices, particularly in the 

security realm, are far more pragmatic. Defense cooperation with the 

United States, support for American missile defense plans, 

unprecedented intelligence sharing between the two countries in the 

wake of 9/11, Indiaís prompt offer of cooperation in the fight against 

terrorism, and high-level political interactions with Washington (the 

two summits of 2000, the summit of 2001, the spate of Cabinet-level 

visits before the 1998 tests, the Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh 

dialogue, and the high-visibility diplomatic contacts after 9/11)óall 

these are signs of the Indian interest in a closer and more pragmatic 

relationship with the United States That the Indian Prime Minister 

can publicly call the United States ìa natural allyî is revealing. 

Flourishes such as these are of course not unknown in international 

politics, but for the leader of India to say this and to do so on several 

occasions is fairly momentous. 
290

Nuclear policy, too, is suggestive of neoliberal preferences. The 

Talbott-Singh dialogue was indicative of the Indian governmentís 

pragmatism even on this most contentious India-U.S. issue. Its public 

pronouncements since May 1998 also are suggestive of a neoliberal 

course. The government has emphasized that it wants a minimum 

credible deterrent, that it does not seek an arms race, and that it is 

not interested in matching the Chinese arsenal. Since May 1998, it 

has announced a moratorium on testing and, apart from two missile 

tests, it has apparently not moved forward on weaponization or 

deployment. On the CTBT, it has committed itself to developing a 

consensus on signing the Treaty. That this is no longer particularly 

relevant, given the U.S. rejection of the test ban, is another matter. 

New Delhi has also indicated that it would participate fully and 

seriously in the fissile material ban talks in Geneva. More 

importantly, it has engaged the United States and others on 

reviewing and tightening (where necessary) Indiaís nuclear export 

controls. Finally, it has shed the old Nehruvian preoccupation with 

disarmament as opposed to arms control. While the draft Indian 

nuclear doctrine does refer to the goal of nuclear disarmament, it is 

clear enough that New Delhi sees this as a utopian goal. Much more 

attractive to India are limits and controls on nuclear weapons and on 

military activities more generally: in sum, arms control and 

confidence building rather than abolition. 

Conclusion. 

Have the events of September 11, 2001, the war in Afghanistan, 

and the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, 

affected any of the assumptions and prescriptions of the Indian 

strategic community? Basic strategic assumptions about war, the 

adversary, and force change slowly. We will see fundamental 

changes at this level only over time, but there may well be the 

beginnings of change even here. At the level of grand strategic 

prescriptions, we should expect to see changes more quickly and 
291

perceptibly. Whether or not these changes will be lasting is unclear. 

Indian thinking has evolved in a more hyperrealist direction 

since September 11 and particularly after December 13. The biggest 

changes are in respect to the utility of force and relations with 

Pakistan and the United States. The strikes on the United States 

might have led Indians to conclude that the use of force was 

ultimately rather futile. If the most powerful country on earth, with 

its reputation for using force when necessary and its ability to 

defend and deter, can be struck such a terrible blow, then one might 

conclude that force is of limited value in protecting a society. This is 

at best a minority position in the strategic community. The U.S. 

response in Afghanistan and the unexpected speed with which the 

United States and the Northern Alliance dispatched the Taliban has 

suggested instead that overwhelming force can be efficacious. Many 

Indians are drawing parallels between the U.S. use of force in 

Afghanistan and the Israeli attacks on the Palestinians, and are 

asking why India cannot do the same against Pakistan. That Pakistan 

has nuclear weapons and that therefore there is a difference with the 

U.S. and Israeli situations is acknowledged to some extent, but it is 

being argued that there is still room for the coercive use of force by 

India. Limited war under nuclear conditions, in this view, is not an 

impossibility. Even if India does not eventually use force against 

Pakistan for its support of cross-border terrorism, the threat of force 

and of military escalation, so the argument goes, should be used to 

exert diplomatic pressures against Islamabad. 

Indian views of relations with Pakistan are also hardening, 

especially after the attack on Parliament on December 13. There is 

considerable support for the governmentís decision to take a series 

of diplomatic steps to indicate its anger with Pakistan, and its 

demand for action by Pakistan against terrorist groups across the 

border. The government has already withdrawn its High 

Commissioner from Islamabad, stopped bus and rail traffic between 

the two countries, ordered Pakistan to cut its embassy staff by 50 
292

percent, and banned overflights by Pakistani airlines. In the next 

phase, if Indian demands are not met, the government is threatening 

to go further, up to and including abrogating the Indus Rivers Treaty 

and revoking most favored nation (MFN) trade status for Pakistani 

goods. It has not ruled out the use of force, although it has repeated 

that it does not want to go to war. As of spring 2002, Indian troops 

have been mobilized and moved up to the front, the air force has 

been readied, and the navy has been put on high alert. The 

government insists that these are defensive measures but all these 

preparations are commensurate with gearing up for a military strike 

as well. Many argue that Pakistan is unregenerate and cannot be 

coaxed into better behavior either by summitry and agreements or 

by playing the economic card. Only diplomatic pressures, the threat 

of war or intermittent military strikes against militant camps and 

Pakistani facilities, and promoting internal subversion in Pakistan 

can exact the kinds of costs that will make Islamabad change its 

behavior. If it does not change its behavior, then India will have to 

work for the destruction of the Pakistani state. A growing view is 

that military escalation will be controllable and that, at the limit, an 

eyeball-to-eyeball nuclear confrontation may be avoidable. Two 

assumptions govern this view. The first is that that Indiaís escalation 

dominance at both the conventional and nuclear levels will hold 

Pakistan in check. The second is that in such a confrontation, the 

nuclear weapons states and particularly the United States will not 

allow Pakistan or India to unleash nuclear weapons. 

Indiaís relationship with the United States is a third area of 

grand strategy that has been affected by 9/11 and subsequent events. 

In the immediate aftermath of the strikes on New York and 

Washington, Indians were angry and alarmed over the recovery of 

Pakistan as a strategic partner for the United States. Indiaís offer of 

help seemingly was of little moment, whereas Pakistan overnight 

had regained all the ground it had lost over the past 5 years. The 

governmentís grand strategic plan of allying with the United States 

was in danger of collapse. India has recovered from that initial scare 
293

and has come around to seeing the U.S. fight in Afghanistan as more 

important for its own fight against terrorism than the new U.S.-

Pakistan relationship. The flurry of visits to and from India by highlevel U.S. and Indian decisionmakers has helped sustain the 

governmentís policy of linking up with the United States 

strategically. The strategic community also has come to see the 

United States more positively than at any time since 1947. There is 

awareness that there is no alternative to cooperating with the United 

States and allowing it to play an unprecedented role in South Asia. 

The next few weeks (spring 2002) will be pivotal, however. Secretary 

of State Colin Powellís December 2001 statements on President 

Pervez Musharraf, relations with Pakistan, and the need for restraint 

in South Asia did not please India.109 While the relationship with the 

United States is at an all-time high, Indians are watching the United 

States carefully for signs of a tilt toward Pakistan in the ongoing 

crisis. The United States is still thought to be somewhat hypocritical 

and equivocal on terrorism, seemingly more concerned with ìitsî 

terrorist struggle and less concerned about the terrorist challenges 

facing other countries. In short, India-U.S. relations have deepened 

since September 11. Whether that will be enough in the days and 

weeks to come is the question. 

In the end it may be worth essaying a thought on nuclear policy. 

If the crisis with Pakistan ends in a way that is judged to have been 

inconclusive for India or if it appears that the United States and the 

international community did not help India sufficiently, then we 

may well see a change from a moderate to a more maximalist 

nuclear position. India may well conclude that there can be no 

strategic autonomy and, ultimately, security in a post-9/11 world 

without formidable military power, a willingness to stare down 

oneís opponent, and the ability to go to war. A big, versatile nuclear 

force will be necessary, in this view, to back up usable conventional 

power and to hold at bay any great powers that may seek to 

intervene. Should such a view gain ground, it would probably mean 

the resumption of nuclear testing, the quicker development of long-
294

range missiles and nuclear weapons-capable submarines, and the 

full deployment of nuclear weaponsóall the things that the 

hyperrealists have been urging on India. 

ENDNOTES 

1. Kautilya, The Arthashastra, ed., L. N. Rangarajan, New Delhi: Penguin 

Books, 1987. 

2. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy 

in Chinese History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 36. 

3. Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 37. 

4. Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 112. 

5. For relevant discussions, see Johnston, Cultural Realism, pp. 32-39, 52-60, 

109-110. 

6. Gopal Krishna, ìIndia and International Order: Retreat from Idealism, î in 

Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society, Oxford: 

Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 270-71. 

7. Many of these themes are evident in Nehruís speeches. See, for instance, 

Nehruís thoughts on the importance of the Commonwealth and the United 

Nations in Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 

1946-April 1961, New Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information 

and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961, pp. 132-181. 

8. On the fragility of the balance of power approach, see Jawaharlal Nehru, 

The Discovery of India, New Delhi: The Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund and 

Oxford University Press, 1946, 1981, pp. 536-548. 

9. See C. Raja Mohan, ìTrade as Strategy: Chinese Lessons, î The Hindu, 

August 16, 2001, on how China, in contrast to India, has used trade and economic 

relations more generally to ìleverageî relations with the United States. Also see 

Sanjaya Baru, ìEconomic Diplomacy, î Seminar, No. 461, January 1998, pp. 66-67, 

on the influence of economics in statecraft. 

10. Sanjaya Baru, National Security in an Open Economy, A report of the Indian 

Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), downloaded 
295

from website http://www.icrier.com, pp. 4-5. 

11. On the importance of the economics and the market in strategy, see 

Shekhar Gupta, ìThe Real Battle Will be for the Market,î Indian Express, January 

13, 2001, available at http://www.expressIndia.com/ie/daily/20010003/shekhar.htm; 

Editorial, ìBusiness, Not Politics,î Indian Express, January 11, 2001, at http://www.

expressIndia.com/ie/daily/20000915/shekhar2.htm; Raja Mohan, ìTrade as Strategy,î 

and Jairam Ramesh, ì` Yankee Go Home, But Take Me With Youí: Yet Another 

Perspective on Indo-American Relations,î Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, 

No. 50, December 11, 1999, pp. 3532-3534. 

12. I use the term hyperrealist to signify that the proponents of these views 

value force and unilateral methods much more than a prudential realism would 

allow. 

13. Bharat Karnad, ìIntroduction,î in idem, ed., Future Imperiled: India’s 

Security in the 1990s and Beyond, New Delhi: Viking, 1994, p. 2. 

14. Brahma Chellaney, ìPreface,î in idem, ed., Securing India’s Future in the 

New Millennium, New Delhi: Orient Longman and the Centre for Policy Research, 

1999, p. xviii. 

15. Brahma Chellaney, ìChallenges to Indiaís National Security,î in idem, ed., 

Securing India’s Future in the New Millennium, p. 528. 

16. Chellaney, ìChallenges to Indiaís National Security,î p. 531. 

17. For this kind of view of military and economic power, see Karnad, ìIntroduction,î p. 2; and Chellaney, ìChallenges to Indiaís National Security,î pp. 529-

34. 

18. See Krishna, ìIndia and International Order,î pp. 270-271, on Nehruís use 

of the term anarchy in the context of international relations. On the pursuit of 

national interest and the necessity of defense, see Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, pp. 

45-46. 

19. Nehru, ìFuture Taking Shape,î in Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, pp. 1-3. 

This was the historic March 6, 1946, radio broadcast by Nehru on the occasion of 

the institution of an Interim Government leading up to Indian independence. 

20. See Muchkund Dubey, ìIndiaís Foreign Policy: Aims and Strategies,î in 

Nancy Jetly, ed., India’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Prospects, New Delhi: Vikas, 
296

1999, pp. 23-25, for this kind of view. Dubey notes that Indian attitudes and 

policies and Indian misperceptions in turn create the conditions for misunderstanding and fear amongst Indiaís neighbors. 

21. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 35 and pp. 45-46. 22. Baru, National 

Security, pp. 13-14. 

23. Sanjaya Baru, ìEconomic Diplomacy,î p. 67, and Sanjaya Baru, ìThe 

Economic Dimensions of Indiaís Foreign Policy,î World Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, AprilJune 1998, pp. 90-91. 

24. For this general approach, see Baru, ìEconomic Diplomacy,î pp. 66-70; 

Baru, ìEconomic Dimensions,î pp. 88-103; and Baru, National Security, pp. 14-17. 

See also K. Subrahmanyam, ìAsiaís Security Concerns in the 21st Century,î in 

Jasjit Singh, ed., Asian Security Concerns in the 21st Century, New Delhi: Knowledge 

World, 1999, p. 12, on globalization, interdependence and war avoidance. 

25. C. Raja Mohan, ìTrade as Strategy: Chinese Lessons,î The Hindu, August 

16, 2001, makes the point that integrating with the global economy not only brings 

prosperity but also status and influence, a point that India should learn from 

China. 

26. Baru, ìEconomic Diplomacy,î p. 67, which notes that ìeconomic policy 

can itself be an instrument of foreign policy if it enables a country to win friends 

and influence people.î 

27. On the importance of national power or strength, see Brahma Chellaney, 

ìPreface,î in idem, ed., Securing India’s Future in the New Millennium, p. xviii. 

28. Chellaney, ìChallenges to Indiaís National Security,î p. 558. 

29. See Chellaney,ì Challenges to Indiaís National Security,î p. 536 on why 

India needs to adopt a more ìpunitive,î less ìreactiveî posture vis-‡-vis Pakistan. 

30. See Kanti Bajpai, ìDiversity, Democracy, and Devolution in India,î in 

Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly, eds., Government Policies and Ethnic Relations 

in Asia and the Pacific, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997, pp. 33-81. 

31. At independence, India instituted a policy of ìreservationsîñin effect, a 

quotañfor the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. In 1990, these reservations were 

extended to the so-called Other Backward Classes (OBCs), a series of castes above 

the Scheduled Castes but below the upper castes. The new reservation policy came 
297

to be called the Mandal policy. 

32. On the limits of socialism, see Karnad, ìIntroduction,î pp. 2-3. 

33. K. P. S. Gill, ìThe Dangers Within: Internal Security Threats,î in Karnad, 

ed., Future Imperiled, pp. 128-29. 

34. M. S. Golwalker, Bunch of Thoughts, 3rd edn., Bangalore: Sahitya Sindhu 

Prakashana, 1996, pp. 106-107. 

35. M. S. Golwalker, We or Our Nationhood Defined, Nagpur: Bharat Publications, 1939, pp. 2-3. 

36. Rasheeduddin Khan, ìFundamentalism/Communalism in South Asia,î 

World Focus, Vol. 14, Nos. 11-12, November-December 1993, p. 23; P. N. Dhar, ìLet 

Us Not Bury the Future in Our Past,î The Telegraph, July 13, 2001. 

37. M. L. Kotru, ìIndo-Pak Dialogue,î News Time, June 23, 2001; and Brig. J. C. 

Nakra, ìIndo-Pak Relations and the J-K Problem,î National Herald, June 22, 2001. 

38. See the statement of Arundhati Ghose, quoted in N. Ram and Sukumar 

Muralidharan, ìIndia Must Say ë Noí to CTBT and FMCT,î Frontline, July 3, 1998, 

p. 31. 

39. Dhar, ìLet Us Not Bury the Future in Our Past.î 

40. Praful Bidwai, ìLessons from Pakistan,î Frontline, November 19, 1999, pp. 

110-111; J. N. Dixit, ìNo Euphoria Please,î The Hindustan Times, July 11, 2001; and 

Malini Parthasarathy, ìAgra, Just a Beginning,î The Hindu, July 12, 2001. 

41. Nehruvians in effect support what is called ìdefensiveî or ìnon-offensiveî 

defense. On these notions, see David Gates, Non-Offensive Defence: An Alternative 

Strategy for NATO? New York: St. Martinís Press, 1991; and Bjorn Moeller, Common 

Security and Non-Offensive Defense: A Neorealist Perspective, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 

1992. 

42. J. N. Dixit, ìBring Back Shimla Spirit,î Indian Express, June 22, 2001. 

43. Ashok Dattar, ìWill We Agree to Disagree One More Time?î Indian 

Express, July 13, 2001. 

44. C. Raja Mohan, ìPakistan as a Bridge State?î The Hindu, June 21, 2001. 
298

45. Amrita Abraham, ìMission Possible,î Indian Express, June 28, 2001; and K. 

Subrahmanyam, ìInvitation to Peace: Pakistan, Not Kashmir is the Issue,î Times of 

India, June 18, 2001. 

46. In this respect, Indian neoliberals are not the same as Western academic 

neoliberal institutionalists, who set great store by the possibility of rules, norms, 

and institutions. 

47. C. Raja Mohan made this point at a panel discussion on Indiaís relations 

with Nepalat the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, November 22, 2001. 

48. Shekhar Gupta, ìDonít Fear the K-Word,î Indian Express, March 18, 2000. 

49. Subrahmanyam, ìInvitation to Peace.î 

50. C. Raja Mohan, ìNuclear Balance in Asia,î The Hindu, June 11, 1998. 

51. For a general argument on the need to build military strength, see 

Chellaney, ìChallenges to Indiaís Security in the New Millennium,î pp. 527-595; 

and Karnad, ìIntroduction,î pp. 1-15. 

52. Chellaney, ìChallenges to Indiaís Security in the New Millennium,î p. 541. 

53. Ibid. 

54. Jay Bhattacharjee, ìHindi-Chini Saath-Saath: Can We Pull It Off?î The 

Pioneer, September 17, 1999; and C. V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, ìIndiaChina Relations-II,î National Herald, April 28, 2000. 

55. J. N. Dixit, ìChinese Checkers,î Telegraph, May 4, 1999. 

56. C. V. Ranganathan, ìIndia-China Relations: Retrospect and Prospects,î in 

Lalit Mansingh, et al., eds., India’s Foreign Policy: Agenda for the 21st Century, Vol. 2, 

Delhi: Konark Publishers and Foreign Service Institute, 1998, p. 254; and Dixit,ì 

Chinese Checkers.î 

57. V.P. Dutt, ìIndia-China: Promise and Limitation,î in Mansingh, et al., eds, 

India’s Foreign Policy, pp. 231-232. 

58. Bhattacharjee, ìHindi-Chini Saath-Saath: Can We Pull It Off?î; and J. N. 

Dixit, ìSigns of Revival,î Indian Express, May 28, 1998. 
299

59. V. P. Dutt, ìIndia, China Russia Syndrome: Is it Illusion or Reality?î 

Tribune, April 17, 1999. 

60. Swaran Singh, ìSino-Indian Relations: Scope for Expanding Ties,î World 

Focus, Vol. 19, Nos. 10-11-12, October-November-December 1998, p. 38. 

61. C. Raja Mohan, ìUS Shadow Over Sino-Indian talks,î The Hindu, May 30, 

2000. 

62. On Chinese pragmatism as a function of its modernization drive, see C. 

Raja Mohan, ìModesty and Grand Strategy,î The Hindu, September 28, 2000. Raja 

Mohan approvingly quotes Deng Xiaopingís maxim, ìMaintain a low profile, keep 

a cool head, and never take the lead.î 

63. Rajneesh Darshan, ìNo Need to get carried Away,î The Pioneer, June 22, 

2000; ìIT May Bridge Gap in Sino-Indian ties,î News Time, July 23, 2000. 

64. C. Raja Mohan, ìThe Asian Balance of Power,î at http://www.Indiaseminar.com/2000/487/487%20raja%20mohan.htm; and C. Raja Mohan, ìAgni and 

Sino-Indian Ties,î The Hindu, April 16, 1999. 

65. Brahma Chellaney, ìFall of Vajpayee,î Hindustan Times, April 21, 1999; 

Karnad, ìIntroduction,î p. 7; and Rakshat Puri, ìStooping Not to Conquer,î News 

Time, February 5, 2000. 

66. S. R. Nanda, ìBeyond Borders,î The Pioneer, April 20, 1999. 

67. Jasjit Singh, ìThe Challenges of Strategic Defence,î Frontline, April 24, 

1998, p. 14. 

68. Brahma Chellaney, ìThe Dragon Dance,î http://www.hindustantimes.com/ 

nonfram/230102/detide01.asp. 

69. Brahma Chellaney, ìTwo-Timing China,î Hindustan Times, January 14, 

2000; and J. K. Dutt, ìChina Muscle Building on Sea,î The Statesman, January 20, 

2000. 

70. Karnad, ìIntroduction,î p. 8; Brahma Chellaneyís comments, quoted in 

Tribune News Service, ìë Regard Tibet, Taiwan Disputed Territoriesí (TNS),î 

http://www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/2000/7/31_2.html; Brahma Chellaney, ìNo Syrupy 

Sentiment, Please,î Hindustan Times, May 17, 2000; and J. Mohan Malik, ìIndian 
300

Sun Should Follow the Chinese Sun,î The Pioneer, August 24, 2000. 

71. Praful Bidwai, ìAn Unequal Deal,î Frontline, September 11, 1998, p. 97. 

72. M. S. Rajan, ìIndia and the NAM,î World Focus, Vol. 12, Nos. 11-12, 

November-December 1991, p. 24; and D. R. Goyal, ìGulf War: NAMís Poor 

Response,î World Focus, Vol. 12, No. 8, August 1991, p. 23. 

73. V. P. Dutt, ìIndia, China Russia Syndrome: Is it Illusion or Reality?î 

Tribune, April 17, 1999. 

74. Bidwai,ì An Unequal Deal,î p. 97. 

75. Eric Gonsalves, ìIndia and the Bush Administration,î The Hindu, February 

16, 2001. 

76. C. Raja Mohan, ìThe US and the Kargil War,î World Focus, Vol. 20, Nos. 6-

7, June-July 1999, p. 31. 

77. Inder Malhotra, ìIndo-US Relations,î World Focus, Vol. 16, No. 8, August 

1995, p. 13; Surjit Mansingh, ìNeed for Broad-Based Relationship,î World Focus, 

Vol. 20, No. 2, February 1999, p. 8; and Raja Mohan, ìThe US and the Kargil War,î 

p. 31. 

78. C. Raja Mohan, ìNuclear Diplomacy: The Art of the Deal,î World Focus,

Vol. 20, Nos. 10-11-12, October-November-December 1999, pp. 38-39; and idem, 

ìThe Nuclear Commandments,î World Focus, Vol. 19, Nos. 10-11-12, OctoberNovember-December 1998, p. 44. 

79. C. Raja Mohan, ìThe US and the Kargil War,î pp. 31, 37; and Malhotra, 

ìIndo-US Relations,î p. 13. 

80. Chellaney, ìChallenges to Indiaís Security in the New Millennium,î p. 558. 

81. Chellaney, ìChallenges to Indiaís Security in the New Millennium,î pp. 

529-531; and Karnad, ìIntroduction,î p. 3. 

82. Bharat Karnad, ìPolicy on CTBT,î World Focus, Vol. 20, Nos. 10-11-12, 

October-November-December 1999, p. 40. 

83. Ramesh, ì` Yankee Go Home, But Take Me With You,í î p. 3538, urges the 

United States to encourage India and Pakistan to move forward in resuming a 
301

dialogue, but even as pragmatic a neoliberal as Ramesh does not welcome the 

possibility of U.S. mediation on Kashmir. 

84. Brahma Chellaney, ìBeating About the Bush,î The Hindu, March 8, 2001. 

85. Bharat Karnad, ìIndiaís Weak Geopolitics and What To Do About It,î in 

Karnad, ed., Future Imperiled, pp. 56-58. 

86. Arundhati Ghose, ìPost-Pokhran II: Arms Control and Disarmament 

Aspects,î in Post-Pokhran II: The National Way Ahead, New Delhi: India Habitat 

Centre, 1999, p. 94. 

87. Ghose, ìPost Pokhran II: Arms Control and Disarmament Aspects,î p. 86. 

For a similar point, see Muchkund Dubey, ìThe World Nuclear Order and India,î 

The Hindu, May 27, 2002. 

88. See Amitabh Mattoo, ìPost-Pokhran II: Arms Control and Disarmament 

Issues,î in Post-Pokhran II, p. 109. Like the neoliberals, Mattoo supports the signing 

of the CTBT and FMCT. But unlike the neoliberals, he does not reject the 

possibility of disarmament. 

89. Mattoo, ìPost-Pokhran II: Arms Control and Disarmament Issues,î p. 110, 

notes approvingly the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion ìthat 

the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of 

international law applicable in armed conflict, and particularly the principles and 

rules of humanitarian law.î He refers to the ICJ judgment in making his case for 

disarmament. 

90. For this argument, see Ghose, ìPost-Pokhran II: Arms Control and 

Disarmament Aspects,î p. 93. 

91. This was argued by Arundhati Ghose during the discussions at the 

seminar organized by the India Habitat Centre, September 19, 1999. See PostPokhran II: The National Way Ahead, p. 120. 

92. See C. Raja Mohan, ìPost-Pokhran II: Nuclear Defiance and 

Reconciliation,î in Post-Pokhran II: The National Way A head, pp. 20, 23; and K. 

Subrahmanyam, ìNature of CTBT in Pragmatistís View,î Economic Times, July 20, 

1998. 

93. K. Subrahmanyam, ìNuclear India in Global Politics,î Strategic Digest, Vol. 

28, No. 12, December 1998, p. 2007. See also Raja Mohan, ìPost-Pokhran II: 
302

Nuclear Defiance and Reconciliation,î pp. 21-22. 

94. K. Subrahmanyam, ìNuclear Tests: What Next?î IIC Quarterly, 

Summer/Monsoon 1998, p. 58. 

95. C. Raja Mohan, ìPost-Pokhran II: Nuclear Defiance and Reconciliation,î 

pp. 6, 12-13. 

96. C. Raja Mohan, ìPost-Pokhran II: Nuclear Defiance and Reconciliation,î 

pp. 23. His remarks in the discussion that followed his paper presentation return 

to this theme. See ìDiscussionñ I,î in Post-Pokhran II: The National Way Ahead, pp. 

78-79. 

97. See C. Raja Mohan, ìPost-Pokhran II: Nuclear Defiance and 

Reconciliation,î p. 22. 

98. Ibid. 

99. K. Subrahmanyam, writing days after the 1998 tests, contended that 

ìToday, we have the opportunity to take the initiative and campaign for a nuclear 

weapons convention. The rest of the world used to ask us what we had to offer on 

nuclear disarmament and we had nothing. Now we are in a position to say, we 

have something substantial to offer.î See Subrahmanyam, ìNuclear Tests: What 

Next?î p. 59. 

100. David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., India and the Bomb: Public 

Opinion and Nuclear Choices, Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1996, 

pp. 109-14 4. 

101. Bharat Karnad does appear to support the development and deployment 

of battlefield nuclear weapons, consistent with a kind of warfighting posture. See 

his ìA Thermonuclear Deterrent,î in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent 

After Pokhran II, New Delhi: Har Anand, 1998, p. 140. Brig. Vijai K. Nair, ìThe 

Structure of an Indian Nuclear Deterrent,î in Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent 

After Pokhran II, pp. 90-91, on the other hand opposes warfighting and tactical 

nuclear weapons. 

102. Karnad, îA Thermonuclear Deterrent,î p. 112; and for a more extended 

discussion on this point, see pp. 115-120. 

103. Bharat Karnad, ìA Suckerís Payoff,î Seminar, No. 485, January 2000, p. 45. 
303

104. Karnad,î A Thermonuclear Deterrent,î p. 114. 

105. Karnad made these remarks at the seminar held at the India Habitat 

Centre, New Delhi, September 19, 1999. See ìDiscussionñSession Iî in Post-Pokhran 

II: The National Way Ahead, p. 118. 

106. This characterization of the moderate posture relies on Kanti Bajpai, 

ìIndiaís Nuclear Posture After Pokhran II,î International Studies, New Delhi, Vol. 

37, No. 4, 2000, pp. 284-299. 

107. Bajpai, ìIndiaís Nuclear Posture After Pokhran II,î pp. 284-299. 

108. This is clear enough from reading the so-called non-papers exchanged 

with Pakistan in 1996, the six-plus-two framework that was subsequently evolved, 

and in the Lahore agreement of 1999. 

109. On Powellís comments, see ìPowell asks India to exercise restraint,î The 

Press trust of India, December 16, 2001, accessed via Lexis-Nexis. For an example of 

Indian reactions, see ìThe Jury Is Out!î The Statesman (India), December 19, 2001, 

accessed via Lexis-Nexis. 
305

CHAPTER 12 

PAKISTANís STRATEGIC CULTURE 

Hasan-Askari Rizvi 

Strategic culture is a collectivity of the beliefs, norms, values, and 

historical experiences of the dominant elite in a polity that influences 

their understanding and interpretation of security issues and 

environment, and shapes their responses to these. It is a perceptual 

framework of orientations, values, and beliefs that serves as a screen 

through which the policymakers observe the dynamics of the 

external security environment, interpret the available in formation 

and decide about the policy options in a given situation. 

Strategic culture establishes ìpervasive and long-lasting strategic 

preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of 

military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these 

conceptions with such an aura of actuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.î1 It comprises certain 

assumptions about the strategic environment, especially the nature 

of the adversary and the threat it poses. It also offers definite ideas 

about the ways to deal with an adversary or to cope with an adverse 

environment.2 

The advocates of strategic culture argue that security 

management decisions are shaped by ìdifferent cultural influences 

on the decisionmakers and not by the rational pursuit of similar 

national security or functional organizational interests.î3 The 

historical narratives created by the dominant elite, their notions of 

war and peace, the dynamics of power politics in a polity and the 

decisionmaking patterns have a profound impact on the defense and 

security-related disposition of a state. These norms, beliefs, and 
306

perceptions of history are often self -justifying and do not easily 

change. The information relating to security issues and problems is 

interpreted against the backdrop of strategic culture, which in turn 

influences the selection of options to cope with a situation. In other 

words, as Jack Snyder puts it, strategic culture represents ìthe sum 

total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of 

habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community 

have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each 

other.î4 It offers a better understanding of a stateís military and 

security strategies. Another perspective finds an analogy between 

the concept of political culture and strategic culture. The former is a 

ìshort-hand expression of a mind-set which has the effect of limiting 

attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems and solutions which are logically possible.î The latter has the 

same characteristics but it applies to security and defense policymakers. It includes ìthe beliefs and assumptions that frame their 

choices about international military behavior, particularly those 

concerning decisions to go war, preference for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare, and the levels of wartime 

casualties that would be acceptable.î5 

The underlying assumption is that the political-military 

policymakers do not always respond to reality. They do not make a 

dispassionate and realistic assessment of the options and are not 

invariably restrained by organizational dynamics. Their security 

disposition is shaped by ìtheir image of the situation.î Their 

behavior is determined by what they ìthink the world is like, not 

what it is really like.î6 

Historical narratives, perceptions of the adversaryís intentions 

and capabilities, and the beliefs, values, and norms of the policymakers are useful to understand the strategic disposition of a state 

and the choices the security managers make. However, it may be 

difficult to explain each and every decision only with reference to 

strategic culture. The role of careful analysis of the situation based 
307

on realism and the impact of organizational imperatives cannot be 

totally excluded. 

Historical experiences, perceptions of the adversary and a 

conception of selfóthe determinants of strategic cultureóare 

relatively permanent, but each crisis situation may be totally or 

partly different; this calls for a thorough review of the ìfactsî of a 

situation. Such a review is no doubt done against the backdrop of the 

relatively permanent strategic culture, but the new or unique 

features of a situation may compel the policymakers to look 

elsewhereóto the dynamics of international politics, the role of 

technology, and the constraints of diplomacy. At times, the strategic 

cultural perspective and the dictates of realism may lead to the same 

or similar policy measures. Pakistanís decision to seek U.S. military 

assistance in the mid-1950s and the early 1980s can be explained 

with reference to Pakistanís strategic culture as well as realism 

(keeping in view the regional power imbalance to the advantage of 

Indiaís and Pakistanís resource constraints). 

A professional and disciplined military supported by sufficiently 

advanced technology and trained human power (e.g., the Indian and 

Pakistani militaries) can override the impact of strategic culture in 

favor of other considerationsótechnological, scientific and power 

politicalóin a given situation. There may be a debate among the 

policymakers as to the weight to be given to different factors impinging on a security issue. Furthermore, if a military maintains distance 

from the society, its top brass have a greater probability of acting 

professionally, that is, going for a comprehensive review of a situation. Who makes the major input to security policy is also important 

in determining the role of societal factors and the ability of the 

policymakers to balance the impact of strategic culture and other 

considerations. Civilian leaders who are always concerned about 

popular support in order to sustain themselves in power may be 

motivated more by considerations of political gains than by professional defense imperatives. If the top brass make the major input, 
308

there is a greater probability of the professional and organizational 

considerations playing an important role in security-related decisions. 

Notwithstanding these comments, strategic culture is an 

important concept to understand the disposition, responses, and 

decisions of the security policymakers. It offers a better understanding of how the leaders are likely to react to a security situation 

and what type of options they are likely to go for. Knowledge of 

strategic culture helps us to understand the sensitivities of a state 

and how to meaningfully engage in a dialogue with its leaders in a 

given situation. Many of the policy options or behavior patterns can 

be understood with reference to strategic culture. For example, the 

role of mujahideen or jihadis in Afghanistan, Kashmir or Palestine cannot be fully understood without reference to their historical narratives, orientations, beliefs , and values. Similarly, reaction to killings 

in a war, insurgency, or the capacity to face hardships for a cause 

may not be appreciated by a rational choice approach. Ideological 

factors, historical narratives, and perception of the self as well as 

identification with the cause have better explanatory potential. 

The study of strategic culture focuses on the historical experiences and narratives of the policymakers, their perceptions of the 

adversaryís intentions and capabilities, and the challenges they 

encounter in their interaction with the rest of the world, especially 

the immediate neighbors. It takes into account the beliefs , values, 

and orientations of the policymakers concerning these security 

issues. 

The Prism of the Policymakers and Strategic Culture. 

The fact that Pakistan was a new state, carved out of India on the 

basis of Muslim separatism, has contributed to its insecurity. Most 

Indians, especially the policymakers, viewed the establishment of 

Pakistan as a negation of the principles they stood for during the 
309

struggle for independence. Their disposition towards Pakistan 

ranged from reluctant acceptance to a hope that the new state might 

collapse, making it possible for the separated territories to return to 

India. Pakistani leaders overemphasized their ìseparatenessî and 

ìdistinct identity,î reacting sharply to what they perceived as Indiaís 

attempts to strangle the new state in its infancy. Their greatest fear 

was the collapse of the state due to either internal disorder caused by 

the process of partition, killings, and mass migrations, or Indiaís 

noncooperative, if not hostile, attitude toward Pakistan in the early 

years of independence. 

It is interesting to note that the top leaders of the Muslim League 

who played a decisive role in the movement for the establishment of 

Pakistan expected cordial relations between independent India and 

independent Pakistan. As early as 1930, while proposing the idea of 

a Muslim state in India during his presidential address to the 

Muslim League session, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal said that the establishment of a ìconsolidated Muslim stateî meant peace and security 

for India ìresulting from an internal balance of power.î7 In the early 

1940s, Mohammed Ali Jinnah argued that a separate Muslim state 

would ensure security in the northwestern zone, and India would 

guard the southern and western India. He continued, ìWe join 

together as good friends and neighbors and say to the world, ëHands 

off Indiaí.î In October 1944 and November 1946, Jinnah said that 

India and Pakistan would ìproclaim a ëMonroe Doctrineí of their 

own for the defense of the subcontinent against all outsiders.î8 The 

leaders of India and Pakistan toyed with the idea of common defense 

immediately before and after independence in August 1947.9

However, the situation changed rapidly soon after independence, 

although the echo of joint defense or shared security was heard 

occasionally thereafter. 

In security and a Hostile India. Three major developments changed 

the perspective of Pakistani leaders towards India and caused 

serious security problems for them. First, the communal riots that 

accompanied the partition of India and the massive influx of 
310

refugees shocked them. Hardly any part of Pakistan escaped the 

adverse impact of the refugee problem or the killings. A large 

number of civil servants and military personnel found their family 

members trapped in communal riots and mass migrations. Second, 

the disputes over the distribution of assets of the government of 

British India (civil and military) also caused much bitterness. 

Pakistan was more in need of resources for establishing the administrative and military structures of the new state, but it did not receive 

its due share, especially of military stores, weapons, and equipment. 

Pakistan had to set up a new federal government in Karachi and a 

new provincial administration in Dhaka. Both cities, especially 

Dhaka, lacked physical resources and other requirements for 

creating the infrastructure of the administration, not to speak of the 

shortage of experienced civil servants and military officers. Third, 

the dispute on the accession of the princely states of Junagadh and 

especially Jammu and Kashmir caused much bitterness. On top of all 

this was the first Kashmir war, in 1947-48, that brought the two 

armies face to face with each other at a time when the Pakistani military, the smaller of the two armies, was in the process of reorganization. These three factors shaped Pakistanís perception of India as 

an adversary. 

It was not difficult to evolve a historical narrative to justify what 

Pakistanís policymakers perceived as Indiaís ìhostileî attitude. They 

viewed the antagonism between India and Pakistan as an extension 

of the distrust and conflict of goals between the Congress Party and 

the Muslim League in the pre-independence period as the latter 

demanded the establishment of a separate state for the Muslims. 

Pakistanís official and unofficial circles argued that having failed to 

stop the creation of Pakistan, the Indian leaders (the Congress Party) 

were creating maximum problems for Pakistan. The major disputes 

that spoiled their relations in the early years of independence 

included, inter alia, the problems of religious minorities, the river 

water dispute, the evacuee property issue, the concentration of 

Indian troops on the Punjab border in 1950, and the unilateral 
311

suspension of trade by India in 1950. It was generally believed in 

Pakistan that India did not want to solve these problems amicably in 

order to purposefully jeopardize the survival of the new state of 

Pakistan. The negative statements of Indian leaders strengthened 

these perceptions. Pakistanís policymakers were thus convinced that 

Pakistan was externally vulnerable and the search for security 

loomed large in their strategic considerations. 

Afghanistanís irredentist claims on Pakistanís territory 

intensified the latterís insecurity. When the Afghan government 

came to know in 1947 that the British had finally decided to wind up 

their rule over India and that the state of Pakistan would come into 

existence, it laid claims on North Western Frontier Province and 

parts of Balochistan. The Afghan government adopted divergent 

positions on its irredentist claim ranging from independence for the 

claimed territory or maximum autonomy within Pakistan to their 

absorption into Afghanistan.10 On the pretext of this territorial claim, 

Afghanistan opposed Pakistanís admission to the United Nations 

(UN) in September 1947. Intermittent border clashes between the 

two countries in the 1950s and the 1960s caused much concern to 

Pakistan, and their diplomatic relations were severed twice, in 1955 

and 1962.11 Afghanistan was a weaker military power, but what 

perturbed Pakistan most was Indiaís support of Afghanistanís claims 

on Pakistani territory. In 1955, the Soviet Union endorsed 

Afghanistanís demands on Pakistan.12 A large section of public 

opinion and the government in Pakistan feared a two-front war: 

armed clashes erupting simultaneously on the Pakistan-India and 

Pakistan-Afghanistan borders. 

A host of security handicaps accentuated Pakistanís insecurity. 

Pakistanís territory lacks depth and the main railroad link from 

south to north (Karachi to Peshawar) runs parallel to the IndiaPakistan border; at several points it is within 60 miles of the Indian 

border or the Line of Control in Kashmir. Three Pakistani cities 

(Lahore, Sialkot, Kasur) are situated very close to the border, and 
312

there are hardly any natural barriers like rivers and mountains on 

the India-Pakistan border, especially in the Punjab area. No Pakistani 

military airfield with the exception of Quetta is more than 150 miles 

from the Indian border. Such A situation creates serious handicaps 

for the security managers because an adequate defense of these 

population centers and communication lines calls for confronting the 

troops of the adversary right on the border or in the adversaryís 

territory. This requires a well-equipped, highly mobile and hardhitting army. Pakistan lacked such a defensive capability in the early 

years of independence. 

Opposition to India’s Regional Ambitions. Pakistanís civilian and 

military leaders have often expressed strong reservations about 

Indiaís efforts to assume a leadership and commanding role in South 

Asia because of its size, population, industrial and technological 

advancement, and military power. This is a long-cherished and often 

unstated goal whose roots go back to the days of Nehru. Indian 

leaders emphasized Indiaís commanding role in a more forceful 

manner after Pakistanís military debacle in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani 

war. 

Indiaís leadership model asserts that a strong and powerful India 

capable of projecting its power in the region and outside is a 

guarantee of security and stability of the whole of South Asia.13

Indiaís policymakers argue that Indiaís growing military power is no 

threat to any state in South Asia because it has nothing against them. 

They should coordinate their foreign and security policies with New 

Delhi so that India plays its role as the guarantor of regional security 

and stability in an effective manner. This strategy has two ìcore 

perceptions.î First, the neighboring states must coordinate their 

foreign policy with the imperatives of Indiaís centrality and security. 

Second, India does not favor any outside power supplying 

weaponry to or establishing a military presence in any neighboring 

state.14 Regional states should establish ties with other states within 

the parameters acceptable to New Delhi. In case a South Asian state 
313

is confronted with some internal problem, it must first approach 

India before seeking support from elsewhere. In addition to 

insulating the region from external penetration, India insists that the 

bilateral problems between it and any other South Asian state should 

be dealt with strictly at the bilateral level without involving any 

other state or international organization. India has always raised 

serious objections to the efforts of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal 

to raise their problems with India (i.e., Kashmir, river water, and 

trade and transit respectively) at the international level. Indian 

government circles and some scholars periodically argue that India 

reserves the right to intervene in the domestic problems of the 

bordering states if these have implications for Indiaís security, 

including internal consolidation.15 These policy orientations indicate 

that Indiaís security boundaries extend beyond its territorial 

boundaries; these coincide with the outer territorial boundaries of 

the adjacent states of South Asia.16 

Search for Security. 

The search for security emerged as the cardinal concern of 

Pakistanís policymakers that not only shaped their worldview and 

disposition towards regional and international politics but also 

served as an instrument of policy. It manifested itself in four major 

policy options: 1) opposition to Indiaís regional dominance agenda, 

2) augmentation of security by assigning the highest priority to 

defense needs, 3) weapons procurements from abroad, and 4) 

reliance on diplomacy, including military alignment, to overcome its 

military weakness vis-‡-vis militarily powerful India. 

Pakistanís policymakers and security managers strongly believe 

that a New Delhi-managed security model cannot serve as a basis for 

durable peace in South Asia. Such a power arrangement comes in 

conflict with the national aspirations of other states of South Asia. It 

also lacks flexibility to accommodate the divergent perceptions of 

peace and security held by the smaller states of the region. Pakistan 
314

advocates a pluralist power model, which emphasizes the principle 

of sovereign equality of all states, respect for each otherís national 

sensitivities and recognition of the right of each state to freely 

conduct its foreign and domestic affairs. Regional security 

parameters should evolve through dialogue and mutual accommodation rather than one state imposing its national priorities.17 

Indian leaders dismiss the fears of the neighboring states as 

baseless. They argue that the major cause of the problems between 

India and its neighbors, especially Pakistan, is their unwillingness to 

acknowledge Indiaís status. If they, especially Pakistan, abandon 

their efforts to mobilize support from the states situated outside of 

South Asia, the security situation in South Asia will improve. 

Pakistanís abhorrence to Indiaís commanding role in view of its 

historical experiences and the distrust of the latter is deeply 

ingrained into Pakistanís strategic culture. Pakistanís determination 

to protect its national identity and policy autonomy did not decline 

after the 1971 military debacle at the hands of India. If anything, its 

disposition stiffened. 

Defense requirements have enjoyed the top priority in Pakistan. 

No matter whether the government was being run by civilians or 

generals, defense was allocated the major share of the national 

budget. Pakistanís defense expenditure has ranged from about 73 

percent in 1949-50 to 24-25 percent of the total federal expenditure in 

2000-01. Its current ratio to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranges 

between 5 and 6 percent. This does not include covert expenditure 

on defense-related projects as well as weapons and equipment 

Pakistan obtained as grants from the United States in the mid-1950s. 

Pakistan can be described as a country where poverty of resources 

for human needs contrasts with the affluence under which military 

programs operate. 

Pakistan began weapons procurement from abroad soon after 

independence because of the acute sense of insecurity and a lack of 
315

indigenous defense industry. Pakistan purchased small weapons 

and equipment from Great Britain and other Commonwealth 

countries in the early years of independence. It was not until 

Pakistan joined U.S.- sponsored alliances in 1954-55 that Pakistan 

began to obtain weapons and military equipment for the three 

services in large quantity. Pakistan and the United States signed the 

Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty in May 1954, which facilitated 

U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan and military training of its personnel 

by U.S. experts. Pakistan was admitted to the Southeast Asia Treaty 

Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact 

(later renamed the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO) in 

September 1955. The fourth security-related arrangement with the 

United States was signed in March 1959; called the Bilateral 

Agreement of Cooperation, this was an executive arrangement not 

confirmed by the U.S. Senate. A separate agreement was signed in 

July 1959 allowing the United States to set up a communication 

facility, i.e., an air base, near Peshawar.18 

Pakistanís policymakers decided to join the American alliance 

system to overcome its security problems. As early as 1951, 

Pakistanís military authorities realized that Pakistan lacked the 

resources to upgrade its defense and obtain modern weapons from 

abroad. Therefore they were convinced that Pakistan must have ìa 

strong and reliable friendî who was willing to contribute to 

Pakistanís efforts to strengthen its defense.19 By joining the alliance 

system they were able to get the weapons, military equipment, and 

training facilities which they could not obtain otherwise. As they 

perceived an acute security problem for Pakistan, realism dictated a 

policy of alignment to cope with the immediate security problems, 

disregarding the diplomatic cost of aligning with the United States. 

Pakistanís policymakers were clear in their mind that they were 

working towards strengthening their security vis-‡-vis India and 

Afghanistan, rather than the Soviet Union, which was the American 

concern. 
316

Pakistan again leaned towards the West, especially the United 

States, in the aftermath of the Soviet military intervention in 

Afghanistan in December 1979. The United States pledged to 

underwrite Pakistanís security vis-‡-vis the Soviet Union, although 

no new defense treaty was signed. Despite the differences over 

Pakistanís nuclear program, the two countries developed a close 

security and diplomatic relationship with reference to the Afghan 

conflict. The first 6-year economic assistance and military sales 

package (1981-87) offered by the United States to Pakistan amounted 

to $3.2 billion. It was equally divided between economic assistance 

and a military sales credit facility. About 55 percent of economic 

assistance was provided as grants while the rest was in the form of 

soft-term loans. Military assistance was in the form of a credit 

facility, repayable at a 10-14 percent rate of interest. Pakistan also 

obtained 40 F-16 aircraft during 1983-86 through cash payments 

outside of the credit facility. The second assistance package (1987-93) 

amounted to $4.02 billion at concessional rates of interest. Out of 

this, $2.28 billion was allocated for economic assistance and $1.74 

billion was in the form of military sale credits. (The United States 

terminated this assistance package in October 1990.) 20 The United 

States and Pakistan contributed significantly to building and 

strengthening resistance to the Soviet military presence in 

Afghanistan spearheaded by militant Islamic-Afghan groups. This 

relationship began to lose its momentum after Soviet withdrawal 

from Afghanistan in 1989 and came to an end in October 1990 when 

the Bush administration invoked the Pressler Amendment (1985) 

against Pakistanís nuclear weapons program and halted all military 

sales and economic assistance. 

In the early 1970s, Pakistan adopted a different strategy to 

strengthen its security. It avoided alignment with the West and 

pursued nonalignment as a foreign policy strategy. The civilian 

leadership that assumed power after Pakistan lost the Bangladesh 

war to India (December 1971) had enough popular support to 

pursue a nonaligned foreign policy. 
317

Pakistan always attached importance to diplomacy for building 

international support for its policies, especially the Kashmir issue 

and other problems with India. It has traditionally given much 

attention to cultivating active ties with the Muslim countries. This 

relationship, especially with the oil-rich Arab states like Saudi 

Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Libya, and Iran, 

contributed significantly to rehabilitating Pakistan economically and 

diplomatically after the 1971 breakup of Pakistan. 

Strategic Doctrine. 

While mobilizing internal resources, procuring weapons from 

abroad and relying on astute diplomacy in order to ensure security, 

Pakistanís policymakers never aimed at military parity with India, 

which was neither possible nor desirable. They wanted to develop 

enough military capability to let India know that Pakistan could not 

only withstand Indiaís military pressures but also increase the cost of 

an armed conflict for that country. 

A conventional war with India in Kashmir or on the international 

border was considered a strong possibility. The strategy was to 

confront the opposing troops right on the borders or to take the war 

into the adversaryís territory because some of the Pakistani cities 

were situated close to the border. However, Pakistan could not carry 

on war for a long period of time due to the paucity of economic 

resources and a weak industrial base, especially the limited capacity 

of its weapons industry. 

Pakistanís policymakers believe that Pakistan must have the 

capability to raise the cost of the war to unacceptable limits for the 

adversary so as to deter the latter from engaging in military 

adventurism. A prerequisite for such a strategy is the maintenance of 

a highly professional, trained, and well-equipped military with 

strong fire-power and mobility. An effective air cover is much 
318

needed for such operations. Similarly, effective communication and 

transport systems are needed to quickly transfer troops from one 

sector to another sector. Pakistanís preferred option is to build 

pressure on India in Kashmir by engaging in limited military 

operations there or by extending clandestine military support to 

Kashmiri activists fighting against India. The latter strategy is less 

costly for Pakistan and ties a large number of Indian troops in 

Kashmir. 

Pakistan cannot pursue its strategic doctrine without external 

cooperation as it lacks sufficient domestic resources to develop the 

required capability. Therefore, it is not surprising that the military 

planners attached such importance to Pakistanís security relations 

with the United States. Pakistanís relations with the Peopleís 

Republic of China are no less significant because China is an important source for building Pakistanís defense capability. Pakistan began 

to obtain weapons and military equipment from China towards the 

end of 1965 (after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war) or in early 1966. Since 

then this relationship has expanded. China has supplied weapons 

and equipment for the three services and contributes significantly to 

building Pakistanís defense industry. It has also extended technical 

support to Pakistanís nuclear and missile programs. 

The deterrence approach developed for conventional defense 

applies equally to Pakistanís nuclear weapons program. Had India 

not gone for nuclear explosions in May 1998, Pakistan would have 

continued with the policy of ìnuclear ambiguity,î i.e., admitting to 

having a nuclear weapons capability but not going so far as to 

explode or make a bomb. Nuclear ambiguity served Pakistanís 

security goals as both India and Pakistan knew that each could make 

nuclear weapons and that if one country went ahead with weaponization, the other would do the same. This policy lost its operational 

relevance after India resorted to nuclear explosions in May 1998. 

Pakistan conducted nuclear explosions after 17 days to rectify the 

strategic imbalance in South Asia.21 Pakistanís nuclear explosions 
319

were neither meant to strengthen its claims for a global role nor to 

produce an ìIslamic bomb.î These nuclear explosions were reactive 

and were meant to counter what the policymakers described as 

Indiaís nuclear blackmail and its potential to engage in military 

action across the Line of Control in Kashmir. As a matter of fact, 

Pakistanís nuclear explosions have neutralized Indiaís superiority in 

conventional defense. Pakistan is not expected to accept any nuclear 

weapons restraint regime unless it takes into account its security 

concerns and offers a restraint framework that applies equally to 

conventional security arrangements. Pakistan does not accept Indiaís 

ìno first useî offer. Such a restraint is a disadvantage to the weaker 

power, i.e., Pakistan in South Asia. Therefore, Pakistan will welcome 

a comprehensive restraint regime that applies to conventional and 

nonconventional armaments. 

Islam and Strategic Culture. 

Islam is integral to Pakistanís strategic culture because it 

contributes to shaping societal dispositions and the orientations of 

the policymakers. Islam is closely associated with the establishment 

of the state and the constitution designates the state as an ìIslamic 

Republic,î with an emphasis on the Islamic character of Pakistani 

identity and a stipulation that no law can be enacted that violates the 

basic principles and teachings of Islam. Islam figures prominently in 

political and military discourse. All political parties with some 

popular standing recognize the centrality of Islam to the political 

process and highlight their commitment to Islam in their election 

manifestos and policy statements. Education at the primary, secondary, and college levels (the first 14 years of education) includes 

Islamic studies (principles and teachings of Islam) as a compulsory 

course of study at all levels for Muslim students. The historical 

narratives highlight the advent of Islam in India, glorify Muslim rule 

there, and define Pakistani identity with reference to Islam and the 

Muslim rule. These narratives also maintain that the Muslim 

interests and rights were threatened by an unsympathetic Hindu 
320

majority during the British rule, forcing the Muslims to first seek 

constitutional safeguards and then a separate state. If Islamic 

orientations and values are so deeply rooted in the society and the 

state, these are bound to influence the strategic culture of Pakistan. 

The Pakistani military emphasizes Islam in conjunction with 

professionalism, hierarchy, discipline, and service-pride as the 

cardinal principles of military organization. Islamic principles and 

teachings and Islamic history, especially Islamic battles and the 

Muslim generals, are included in the courses of study and training of 

military personnel. The Islamic notions shaheed (martyr), ghazi 

(victorious), and Jihad-e-fi-sibilallah (holy war in the name of God) are 

emphasized as the major sources of inspiration for the Pakistani 

military in war and peace. As Islam is closely associated with the 

establishment of Pakistan, its defense, especially vis-‡-vis India, is 

projected by civilian and military leaders as the defense of Islam. 

These notions and Islamic symbols were repeatedly invoked during 

the wars in 1965 and 1971 to galvanize the military personnel and to 

mobilize popular support for the war efforts. 

Islamic conservatism has increased in the military since the 1970s 

as the number of officers from the middle and lower-middle classes 

has risen. Invariably, they have come from conservative religious 

backgrounds. A number of other factors reinforced this trend in the 

1980s. 

First, the emphasis on Islam increased in the military during the 

period of General Zia-ul-Haqís rule (1977-88) . Facing a crisis of 

legitimacy, General Zia-ul-Haqís military regime invoked orthodox 

Islamic injunctions and mobilized orthodox Islamic groups in order 

to build support for his rule. This fit well with the changes in the 

orientation of the officers recruited in the 1970s and 1980s. The Zia 

regime encouraged the public display of religious orientation in the 

Army and allowed some of the orthodox religious groups to 

penetrate the Army. 
321

Second, the experience of the Afghanistan conflict (1979-89) 

reinforced Islamic conservatism among Army personnel. A good 

number of them worked in collaboration with the Islamic parties and 

Afghan resistance groups that were fighting against Soviet troops in 

Afghanistan. Some of the Pakistani Army personnel, especially those 

serving with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), were convinced that 

the Afghanistan experience could be replicated elsewhere, and that it 

offered an option to bring an end to non-Muslim domination of the 

Muslims. 

However, the top commanders draw a line between religious 

conservatism and activism in the name of Islam. The latter is 

disallowed because the top brass think that it undermines 

professional excellence, discipline, and the service ethos. They 

emphasize the age-old tradition of keeping Islam and military 

professionalism together, treating the former as a component of the 

latter. 

The Afghanistan experience created a nexus between Islamic 

militancy and Pakistanís foreign policy. An Islam-oriented Afghan 

resistance movement, often labeled as Afghan Mujahideen, cropped 

up as the Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan in December 1979, 

although its roots could be traced to an earlier period. They were 

ideologically inspired and viewed their resistance activities as a holy 

war against the occupying forces of a Godless Communist country 

(i.e., the Soviet Union). Pakistanís ISI and the U.S. Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) transferred weapons to Afghan resistance 

groups and advised them on strategy against Soviet troops in 

Afghanistan. The West, the conservative Arab rulers in the Middle 

East, and Pakistan glorified these Afghan ìholyî warriors as the 

heroes of the cause of freedom. Two other developments strengthened their position. First, most Muslim states and movements 

supported their cause. Some oil-rich Arab states (e.g., Saudi Arabia, 

the UAE) as well as some wealthy Arab individuals extended 
322

financial assistance to Afghan resistance groups. Egypt transferred 

an undisclosed quantity of Soviet weapons to these groups. Second, 

within a short span of time, the Afghan resistance movement turned 

transnational. A large number of Arabs and other Muslims joined 

them to fight the ìholy warî in Afghanistan. Some of these Arabs 

engaged in welfare activities for Afghan refugees in Pakistan while 

others got military training from different Afghan groups and fought 

against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. By the time Soviet troops 

withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, several thousand Muslim 

volunteers from Arab and non-Arab countries were attached to 

Afghan resistance groups. 

The courage and valor shown by Islam-inspired volunteers 

(Afghans and others) in Afghanistan impressed Pakistanís foreign 

policymakers. As already noted, some of the military and 

intelligence personnel associated with the Afghan resistance were so 

captivated by the Afghanistan experience that they felt this could be 

replicated elsewhere for advancing Muslims causes. The resistance 

groups were also elated by their success in Afghanistan and felt that 

they must carry forward the spirit of the Afghan Jihad (holy war) and 

help Muslims fight anti-Muslim forces anywhere in the world. They 

found a new cause in Indian-administered Kashmir where an 

insurgency had erupted in 1989. The initial links with the Kashmir 

insurgency were established in 1990 but their active involvement 

began after the collapse of the pro-Moscow Najib government in 

Kabul in April 1992. Their Pakistani counterparts joined them in this 

struggle. 

These developments were in line with the Islamic content of 

Pakistanís strategic culture and, therefore, Pakistanís policymakers 

were happy to find ideologically motivated Muslim volunteers who 

were prepared to facilitate the achievement of Pakistanís goals in 

Kashmiróthe building of military pressure on Indiaówithout incurring heavy material and manpower losses for the military. Recognizing the instrumental relevance of militant Islamic groups, the 
323

Pakistan military patronized them through its intelligence agency, 

the ISI. The ISI provided them funding and weapons and facilitated 

their induction into Indian-administered Kashmir. These militant 

groups engaged a large number of Indian military and paramilitary 

personnel as well as police and intelligence agencies. Pakistanís 

decision to support the operations of the Islamic militants in Indianadministered Kashmir reflects a combination of beliefs , values, and 

historical experience as well as expediency and a down-to-earth 

assessment of military disparity between India and Pakistan. 

The stepped up activities of militant Islamic groups created a 

host of problems for Pakistanís management of foreign policy and 

domestic affairs. These activities caused strains in Pakistanís 

relations with the West, especially the United States, because these 

Islamic groups were extremely anti-West, and often demanded that 

Pakistan delink itself from the United States. Domestically, the rise of 

militant Islamic groups increased religious and cultural intolerance, 

resulting in religious-sectarian killings and law and order problems. 

These developments undermined Pakistanís image abroad, discouraged foreign investment, and marred the prospects for Pakistanís 

early economic recovery, raising doubts about the capacity of the 

Pakistani state to continue performing its basic duties towards the 

citizenry. 

Pakistan found itself in an extremely difficult situation. It 

supported the militantsí role in Indian-administered Kashmir but 

wanted to control the adverse effects of their activities on Pakistanís 

domestic political scene and on its interactions with the United 

States and other Western countries. This dilemma was accentuated 

after the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, on 

September 11, 2001. U.S. President George W. Bush delivered a 

virtual ultimatum to Pakistan to join hands with the international 

community for containing the transnational terrorism spearheaded 

by Afghanistan-based al Qaeda. A realistic assessment of the situation led the government of Pakistan to cooperate with the United 
324

States for military action against al Qaeda and the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Pakistan also took action against some of the 

Pakistan-based militant Islamic groups. 

However, the military government allowed the militant Islamic 

groups active in Kashmir to carry on their activities in a low-keyed 

manner. These groups overplayed their hand by launching terrorist 

attacks on high-profile targets, such as the Indian parliament and an 

Indian military camp in Kashmir, placing Pakistan in an embarrassing situation in view of the assertion by its leaders that they had 

contained the activities of these groups. 

Availing itself of the post-9/11 global consensus for controlling 

terrorism, India moved its troops to the Line of Control in Kashmir 

and to the Pakistan borders in order to put an end to ìcross-border 

terrorismî from Pakistani territory. Pakistan responded by mobilizing its troops and threatened war if Indian troops entered Pakistanadministered Kashmir or Pakistani territory under the pretext of 

destroying the alleged terrorist camps. The United States and other 

Western countries advised restraint by both countries and applied 

strong diplomatic pressures on Pakistan to control the infiltration of 

Islamic groups into Indian-administered Kashmir. In another 

manifestation of realism, Pakistan agreed to take measures to cut off 

the infiltration, at least for the time being. 

Concluding Observations. 

Strategic culture is a useful concept for explaining the profile and 

behavior of the security policymakers of a state. It conditions their 

worldview, interpretation of political and military developments, 

perception of the adversary, and selection of policy options. The 

disposition of Pakistanís security managers is influenced by 

historical experiences, especially in the early years of independence, 

their perception of the regional security environment and Pakistanís 

security handicaps, and their threat perceptions. The major features 
325

of Pakistanís strategic culture can be summed up as follows: (a) An 

acute insecurity developed in the early years of independence due to 

troubled relations with India and problems with Afghanistan. (b) A 

strong distrust of India and a history of acrimonious Indo-Pakistani 

relations reinforced by the historical narratives of the preindependence period and the troubled bilateral interaction in the 

post-independence period. (c) Aversion to an India-dominated 

regional power arrangement for South Asia. (d) An active search for 

security to maintain its independence in deciding about foreign 

policy options and domestic policies. (e) A close nexus between 

Islam and strategic thinking, leading to connections between Islamic 

militancy and foreign policy. 

These attributes of Pakistanís strategic culture shaped Pakistanís 

security and foreign policy options. These included an advocacy of a 

pluralist power arrangement for South Asia, greater attention to 

external security, acquisition of military capacity to raise the cost of 

war for the adversary, liberal allocation of resources to defense, 

weapons procurement from abroad, and the use of diplomacy and 

alliance-building with other states, especially with the United States, 

for strengthening its position in the region. Other important 

strategies were the acquisition of an overt nuclear status in response 

to Indiaís nuclear explosions and the use of Islamic militancy to 

pursue foreign policy goals. 

However, the emphasis on strategic culture does not totally 

exclude the role of other considerations, such as realism, professionalism, and organizational imperatives. Many of Pakistanís securityrelated decisions involve the elements of more than one approach. 

As a professional and disciplined institution, the Pakistani military 

cannot be oblivious to realities on the ground. Realism and organizational imperatives have influenced their outlook and decisions on 

many occasions. At times, the dictates of different approaches 

conflict with each other and the policymakers may be unwilling or 

unable to make a clear-cut choice. This is the case with the approach 
326

of Pakistanís security managers towards the militant Islamic groups 

in the post-9/11 period. 

The strategic culture approach helps us understand the historical 

and psychological dynamics of decisionmaking. It highlights the 

impact of ideological and other societal variables on policymaking 

and offers a better understanding of the socio-cultural and political 

context within which the policymakers function. Any study of a 

stateís strategic profile and the possible reaction to security pressures 

requires, inter alia, a good appreciation of the strategic culture of the 

country concerned. This facilitates communication between the 

security policymakers and the outside actors, i.e., individuals, states, 

and organizations, on security-related issues and helps to identify 

ways and means to change their policy outputs. This is quite 

important for promoting arms control in conventional and nonconventional fields. 

ENDNOTES 

1. Alastair Iain Johnston, ìThinking About Strategic Culture,î International 

Security, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995, p. 46. 

2. Ibid. 

3. Scott D. Sagan, ìThe Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and 

Control systems,î in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable, Ithaca: Cornell University press, 2000, p. 30. 

4. For Jack Snyderís narration of strategic culture, see Michael C. Desch, 

ìCulture Clash,î International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998, pp. 141-170. 

5. Stephen P. Rosen, ìMilitary Effectiveness,î International Security, Vol. 19, 

No. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 5-31. 

6. Kenneth Boulding, ìNational Images and International Systems,î in 

Worlfram F. Hannrieder, ed., Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, New 

York: David McKay Co., 1971, p. 91. 

7. Dr. Muhammad Iqbalís presidential address to the Muslim League at 
327

Allahabad in December 1930. See Waheeduzzaman, Towards Pakistan, Lahore: 

Publishers United, 1969, p. 132. 

8. S. M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, Karachi: Oxford 

University Press, 1973, p. 55. 

9. Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political 

Economy of Defence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 38; see also 

Muhammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, Karachi: 

Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 19. 

10. For Afghanistanís official claim on Pakistani territory, see, Rehman 

Pazwak, Pakhtunistan, London: Afghan Information Bureau, n.d. 

11. Shirin Tahir-kheli, ìPakhtoonistan and its International Implications,î 

World affairs, Winter 1974-75, pp. 233-245; Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan, 

Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971, pp. 145-163. 

12. William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, New York: Praeger, 

1972, p. 124. 

13. Douglas C. Makeig, ìWar, No-War and the Indo-Pakistan Negotiation 

Process,î Pacific affairs, Vol. 60, No. 2, Summer 1987, pp. 271-294. 

14. George Tanham, ìIndian Strategic Culture,î Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15, 

No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 129-142. 

15. See Maya Chadda, Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in India, New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 11-22. 

16. See Tanham, ìIndian Strategic Culture,î p. 133. 

17. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment: A Study of 

Foreign Policy, New York: St. Martins, 1993, p. 21; see also idem, ìPakistanís Threat 

Perception and Weapons Procurement,î in W. Thomas Wander, Eric H. Arnett, 

and Paul J. Bracken, eds., The Diffusion of Advanced Weaponry: Technologies, Regional 

Implications, and Responses, Washington, DC: American Association for Advancement of Science, 1994, p. 197. 

18. The American U-2 aircraft that was shot down over Soviet territory in May 

1960, causing a crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, took off from this air base. This air 

base was closed down in 1969 on the expiration of the 1959 agreement. 
328

19. Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Karachi: Oxford 

University Press, 1963, p. 154. 

20. On the U.S.-Pakistan aid relationship, see the chapters by Herbert G. 

Hagerty and Arshad Zaman in Noor A. Husain and Leo E. Rose, eds., Pakistan-U.S. 

Relations: Social, Political, and Economic Factors, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian 

Studies, University of California, 1988, pp. 237-265; Agha Shahi, Pakistan’s Security 

and Foreign Policy, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988, pp. 217-219, 231-234. 

21. For a review of Pakistanís nuclear program, see Zafar Iqbal Cheema, 

ìPakistanís Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control,î in Lavoy, Sagan, 

and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, pp. 158-181; Munir Ahmad Khan, ìNuclearization of South Asia and its Regional and Global Implications,î Regional Studies 

(Islamabad), Vol. XVI, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 3-38 (the author is former 

Chairman, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission); and Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 

ìPakistanís Nuclear Testing,î Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 6, November-December 

2001, pp. 943-955. 328. 
329

CHAPTER 13 

ìCULT OF DEFENSEî AND ìGREAT POWER DREAMSî: 

THE INFLUENCE OF STRATEGIC CULTURE ON 

CHINAíS RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA 

Andrew Scobell 

INTRODUCTION 

Strategic culture should be considered a significant dimension in 

analyses of Chinaís security policy for two reasons. First, the subject 

of national cultures has become widely recognized as a key 

dimension in strategy, including in the impact of culture on a 

countryís tendency to use force.1 Indeed, the impact of culture is 

vital to understanding Chinaís military and security affairs. 

Particularly prevalent is the contention that contemporary Chinese 

international relations have been heavily influenced by an ancient 

and enduring civilization.2 

Second, scholars, analysts, and policymakers in the Peopleís 

Republic of China (PRC) frequently assert that past and present 

policy and behavior is conditioned by a unique traditional Chinese 

philosophy of international relations. One influential military 

thinker, Lieutenant General Li Jijun, former vice president of the 

Academy of Military Sciences, reasons that: 

Culture is the root and foundation of strategy. 

Strategic thinking, in the process of its evolutionary history, flows 

into the mainstream of a country or a nationís culture. Each 

country or nationís strategic culture cannot but bear the imprint of 

cultural traditions, which in a subconscious and complex way, 

prescribes and defines strategy making.3 
330

Indeed, the author of the above words and many others in the 

same Chinese elite community also perceive culture to exert a 

substantial impact on the strategic behavior of other countries.4

Furthermore, contemporary Chinese perceptions of other states are 

strongly colored by Chinaís interpretations of their assumed cultural 

proclivities. These cultural images of other countries, particularly the 

images of the strategic cultures of other countries, influence Chinaís 

assessment of threats and potential threats in the international 

environment. 

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first explains the 

two main interpretations of Chinese strategic culture and the nature 

and impact of strategic culture on Chinaís use of force. The second 

analyzes the Chinese image of Indian strategic culture. The third 

analyzes the implications of Chinese strategic culture and the 

Chinese image of Indiaís strategic culture. 

Definitions and Parameters. 

I define strategic culture as the fundamental and enduring 

assumptions about the role of war (both interstate and intrastate) in 

human affairs and the efficacy of applying force held by political and 

military elites in a country.5 These assumptions will vary from 

country to country. 

Also important are the perceptions prevalent among the elite 

within one country regarding the nature of another countryís 

strategic culture. The sum total of these assumptions tends to result, 

for example, in a composite image held by China of India. Borrowing 

from Allen Whiting, I define the strategic cultural image to be ìthe 

preconceived stereotype of the strategic disposition of another 

nation, state, or people that is derived from a selective interpretation 

of history, traditions, and self -image.î6 
331

Chinese elites are not of one mind on either the nature of their 

own strategic culture or on the images of these cultures in other 

countries. Chinaís self-image of its own strategic culture is 

essentially a Confucian one comprising a widely held and 

hegemonic set of assumptionsóalthough certainly not universal. 

However, Chinaís actual strategic culture is the result of 

interplay between Confucian and realpolitik strands. The outcome is 

what I call a ìCult of Defense,î where by Chinese elites believe 

strongly that their countryís strategic tradition is pacifist, nonexpansionist, and purely defensive but at the same time able to 

justify virtually any use of forceóincluding offensive and 

preemptive strikesóas defensive in nature.7 

Chinese perceptions of the strategic cultures of other states tend 

to be formed by military strategists and thus are skewed towards a 

negative imageóas in the case of India. 

Contrasting Depictions of Chinaís Use of Force. 

Culture has long been considered a critical dimension in Chinaís 

approach to strategy and warfare. While the term ìstrategic cultureî 

was not used until 1988,8 conventional thinking was that Chinaís 

Confucian tradition was a key determining factor in Chinese 

strategic thinking. Because of Confucianism, in this interpretation, 

China tends to favor harmony over conflict, and defense over 

offense.9 Other analysts, usually focusing on Sun Ziís Art of War, 

have stressed a Chinese predisposition for stratagem over combat 

and psychological and symbolic warfare over head-to-head combat 

on the battlefield.10 At the very least these interpretations of 

Confucius and Sun Zi created the image of a China whose use of 

force is cautious and restrained.11 More recently, analysts have 

argued that Chinaís leaders are actually influenced by a realpolitik 

(or parabellum) strand of strategic culture.12 According this 

interpretation, the elite has and continues to be quite willing to use 
332

force. 

Both of the two major interpretations of Chinaís strategic 

tradition (Confucius/Sun Zi and realpolitik) tend to assume its 

strategic culture is monistic and make no attempt to link it to 

domestic policy. It is a mistake to assume that a countryís strategic 

culture can be subsumed within a single tradition and to focus 

exclusively on interstate violence. Indeed, it is likely that there are 

multiple strands of strategic culture. And ignoring trends in 

intrastate and societal violence risks overlooking diverse and 

important values and beliefs about the use of force and violence.13 

A CHINESE CULT OF DEFENSE 

Two dominant strands of Chinese strategic cultureóa 

Confucius/Sun Zi one and a realpolitik oneóexist side by side. Both 

of these are operative and the interaction between the two strands 

produces a distinctive strategic culture: what I have dubbed the 

ìChinese Cult of Defense.î14 Most Chinese strategic thinkers believe 

that Chinese strategic culture is pacifistic, defensive-minded, and 

non-expansionist. However, at least in the contemporary era, these 

sincerely held beliefs are essentially negated, or twisted, by its 

assumptions that any war China fights is just and any military action 

is defensive, even when it is offensive in nature. Two further 

assumptions reinforce this: that threats to Chinaís national security 

are very real and domestic threats are as dangerous as foreign 

threats, and that national unification is a traditional Chinese core 

strategic cultural value. The combined effect of these beliefs and 

assumptions is paradoxical: while most of Chinaís leaders, analysts, 

and researchers believe profoundly that the legacy of Chinese 

civilization is fundamentally pacifist, they are nevertheless 

predisposed to deploy force when confronting crises. 
333

The ìConfucianî Elements. 

The Chinese are particularly smitten with what they view as 

Chinaís special gifts to the theory and practice of statecraft and 

international relations.15 While the leaders of most countries tend to 

believe they use military power in a strictly defensive manner,16 this 

cluster of beliefs seems to be particularly inviolable among the 

Chinese.17 Such beliefs are so prevalent among Chinese elites that it 

is rare to find civilian and military leaders who do not hold some or 

all of them.18 Each of the three ìConfucianî elements of Chinese 

strategic culture can be highlighted with reference to a phrase or 

saying. 

“Peace is Precious.” A deeply held belief in elite circles is that 

China possesses a pacifist strategic culture. Certainly majorities of 

people in most countries, including the United States, say they love 

peaceóindeed it seems a near universal human desire. What is 

striking in the case of China, however, is the extreme degree to 

which this is stressedóto the extent that Chinese civilization is 

viewed as being uniquely pacifist, totally distinct from other 

strategic traditions in the world. One of the most recent official 

articulations of this appears in Chinaís 1998 Defense White Paper: 

The defensive nature of Chinaís national defense policy . . . springs from 

the countryís historical and cultural traditions. China is a country with 

5,000 years of civilization, and a peace-loving tradition. Ancient Chinese 

thinkers advocated ìassociating with benevolent gentlemen and 

befriending good neighbors,î which shows that throughout history the 

Chinese people have longed for peace in the world and for relations of 

friendship with the people of other countries.19 

Numerous Chinese leaders and researchers in the Peopleís 

Republic of China contend that the Chinese people value peace. In 

1995, Admiral Liu Huaqing, then a Vice Chair of the Central Military 

Commission, told a pro-Communist Hong Kong news paper: 

China has consistently pursued a foreign policy of peace and insists that 
334

various countries should, in line with the charter of the United Nations 

and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence . . . maintain a peaceful 

international environment and that disputes between countries should 

be settled through negotiations.20 

Military researchers trace this preference for peace and harmony 

back in history. According to the General Xing Shizhong, 

Commandant of the National Defense University: 

The Chinese people have always dearly loved peace. Ö This historical 

tradition and national psychology have a profound influence on national 

defense objectives and strategic policies of the new socialist China.21 

According to Lt. Gen. Li Jijun, Deputy Director of the Academy of 

Military Sciences: 

Chinaís ancient strategic culture is rooted in the philosophical idea of 

ìunity between man and natureî (tian ren he yi), which pursues overall 

harmony between man and nature and harmony among men.22 

Researchers also frequently mention the Confucian saying ìpeace is 

preciousî (he wei gui).23 

Leaders and researchers stress that China pursues peaceful 

solutions rather than violent ones. Chinese civilian and military 

leaders repeatedly stress Chinaís adherence to the ìFive Principles of 

Peaceful Coexistenceî as Liu Huaqing does in the above quote.24

According to one civilian scholar, the ancient principle of ìtrying 

peaceful means before resorting to forceî (xianli houbing) has been a 

major influence on post-1949 China. Thus, while the ìleaders of 

Maoís generation were willing to use force to serve Chinaís security, 

and more broadly, foreign policy goals whenever necessary . . . in 

most cases China sent strong warnings or protests or engaged in 

negotiationsî prior to employing armed force.25 In a discussion of 

the military thought of Deng Xiaoping, two scholars observed: 

For many years we employed the thinking that, in whatever method we 
335

adopt to solve a problem, we should not use the means of war [ but 

rather] peaceful means.26

And Deng felt it important to stress that one of Chinaís three main 

missions for the 1980s was supporting world peace.27 Regularly cited 

to bolster this assertion is Beijingís policy on reunification with 

Taiwan. Chinaís preferred means of unifying China since 1979 is by 

non-military means.28 It is true that under Deng, Chinaís policy 

altered dramatically from liberation by force to peaceful unification. 

But it is also important to note that the change is more tactical than 

strategic. Indeed, Beijing has refused to renounce the use of force.29 

“Never Seek Hegemony.” A second deeply held belief is that China 

has never been an aggressive or expansionist state. According to 

many leaders and researchers, China has never fought an aggressive 

war throughout its long history. And China has not threatened other 

countries. In post-1949 China this has taken the form of constant 

pronouncements of the fact that ìChina will never seek 

hegemony.î30 Senior soldier Liu Huaqing told a Hong Kong 

interviewer in 1995: 

China is opposed to the use of force and to threatening with force. 

. . . China is against hegemonism and power politics in any form . . 

. China does not seek hegemony now, nor will it ever do so in the 

future.31 

And Deng Xiaoping asserted in 1980 that one of the main tasks for 

the decade of supporting peace was intimately linked to ìopposing 

hegemonyî (fanduibaquanzhuyi).32 Of course, at the time hegemony 

was code word for the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, 

it has come to mean U.S. domination. But the term hegemony (ba) 

has a deeper meaning in Chinese political thought. Badao or ìrule by 

forceî has extremely negative connotations in contrast to wangdao or 

ìkingly wayî or ìbenevolent rule.î33 

According to many Chinese analysts, when China goes to war, it 
336

does so only in ìself-defense.î These analysts assert that virtually all 

of the wars China has fought have been waged to protect itself from 

external threats or to unify the country. One prominent Chinese 

military scholar insists that virtually all of the approximately 3,700 to 

4,000 wars China has fought in more than 4,000 years of dynasties 

(ending with the collapse of the Qing in 1911) have been civil wars or 

wars to unify the country. And all of the eight ìmilitary actionsî 

since 1949, the scholar asserts, have been waged in ìself-defense.î34

When Chinese forces have ventured abroad, they have done so for a 

limited time and for non-expansionist purposes. According to one 

analyst: 

the facts are: There are no records showing Chinaís invasion of other 

countries or that China stations any soldiers abroad.35 

Researchers regularly cite Maoís statement: ìWe [China] do not 

desire one inch of foreign soil.î36 

Examples often cited to support this interpretation include the 

famous voyages of Ming dynasty admiral Zheng He. Chinese 

researchers emphasize these expeditions were non-military in 

nature, and no attempt was made by the Chinese armada to conquer 

or colonize the lands it visited. The imperial eunuchís travels to East 

Africa and South Asia seem to have been purely voyages of 

exploration. According to several scholars, unlike Western 

adventurers such as Christopher Columbus and Vasco Da Gama, 

Zheng did not attempt to establish colonies or use force against 

peoples with whom he came in contact.37 

“If Someone Doesn't Attack Us, We Won t Attack Them.” The third 

central tenet of this cult is that China possesses a purely defensive 

strategic culture. According to Lt. Gen. Li Jijun: ìThe Chinese are a 

defensive-minded people.î38 The classic illustration of this tendency 

regularly cited by Chinese scholars is, not surprisingly, the Great 

Wall. As noted by Li, ìChinaís Great Wall has always been a symbol 

of a defense, not the symbol of a national boundary.î39 In the 1990s 
337

some Chinese researchers have sought to validate this point by citing 

Western scholarship, notably the work of John Fairbank and Mark 

Mancall.40 They also seek to make their case by drawing a direct 

comparison between Western and Chinese strategic traditions. 

According to Major General Yao Youzhi, Director of the Department 

of Strategic Studies at the Academy of Military Sciences, Chinaís 

military tradition places ìcomplete stress on a defensive stanceî 

whereas, in contrast, Western military tradition ìemphasizes 

offense.î41 

Another example of the defensive nature of Chinaís strategic 

posture is the ìno first useî pledge regarding nuclear weapons.42

Chinese officials also point to the military reforms China has 

undertaken over the past two decades as proof of Chinaís purely 

defensive stance. Liu Huaqing said in 1995: 

As is known to all, China possesses a strategy of active defense, and cut 

its troops by 1 million several years ago, something no other country has 

thus far achieved. Our present military strength is of a defensive nature 

and the Chinese Government strictly limits defensive expenditure to the 

minimum level necessary to ensure national security.43 

Perhaps the most commonly touted evidence is Maoís admonition: 

ìIf someone doesnít attack us, we wonít attack them; however, if 

someone does attack us, we will definitely [counter] attackî (Ren bu 

fan wo, wo bu fan ren; ren fan wo, wo bi fan ren).44 This quote appears in 

Chinaís 1998 Defense White Paper. The late Marshal Xu Xiangqian 

also mentioned it in practically the same breath as he discussed 

Vietnamís invasion and occupation of Cambodia during a 1980 

interview.45 Significantly, Chinaís largest military conflict in the postMao eraóthe attack against Vietnam in February 1979ówas 

triggered by Vietnamís invasion of Cambodia. Although it was 

China that invaded Vietnam, Beijing officially labeled this war a 

ìself-defensive counterattackî (ziwei huanji). According to two 

military thinkers: ì. . . [A] strategic counterattack implies a strategic 

offensive.î The strategists continued: 
338

. . . [In] the February 1979 self-defense counterattack against Vietnam, 

from the military operational standpoint, offensive actions were 

employed. Nevertheless, the essence of this kind of offense was a selfdefense counterattack.46 

The same logic applied to Chinaís brief but bloody border wars with 

India in 1962 and with the Soviet Union in 1969. Both conflicts are 

labeled ìself-defense counterattacksî (ziwei fanji).47 

Guiding Principles for External Security. 

Counteracting these three core elements are four key strategic 

constants that justify the external use of military force. The concepts 

of just war, the value placed on national unification, the principle of 

active defense, and high threat sensitivity in practice negate the 

pacifying effects of the above core elements. 

Contemporary Chinese Just War Theory. There is considerable 

attention by Chinese strategic analysts to the concept of just war. 

Authors tend to stress that Chinese thinking about just or righteous 

war (yizhan) dates back thousands of years.48 The principle of just 

war seems to be a crucial element of Chinaís traditional approach to 

war in the view of many contemporary military researchers.49

Indeed it is ancient: Confucius adopted the concept and Mao later 

absorbed it.50 

The distinction is simple: just wars are good wars and unjust 

wars are bad ones. Just wars are those fought by oppressed groups 

against oppressors; unjust wars are ones waged by oppressors 

against the oppressed. In contemporary Chinese thinking, China has 

long been a weak, oppressed country fighting against powerful 

imperialist oppressors. Thus for many Chinese any war fought by 

their country is by definition a just conflictóeven a war in which 

China strikes first.51 This might include any war fought to ìrestore or 

protect national territory or to maintain national prestige.î52 The 
339

1979 border war China fought with Vietnam is viewed as a just 

conflict.53 Needless to say, virtually any war fought by a hegemonic 

power such as India is an unjust war. 

National Unification. National unification is a core value in 

Chinaís national security calculus on which no compromise is 

possible. It is an immutable principle in part because of Chinaís 

history of division and inability to stop exploitation and oppression 

by foreign powers. But it is also an emotional and unwavering public 

stand precisely because the leadership of the PRC seems to lack any 

other inviolable principles.54 According to Lt. Gen. Li Jijun, 

The most important strategic legacy of the Chinese nation is the 

awareness of identification and the concept of unification, and this is 

where lies the secret for the immortality of . . . Chinese civilization . . . [ 

s]eeking unification Ö [ is] the soul of Ö Chinese military strategy 

endowed by . . . Chinese civilization.55 

According to another analyst, ìhoping for unification, defending 

unification is a dimension of the Chinese peopleís . . . thought 

culture and is a special feature of its strategic thought.î56 

Threat Perceptions. Chinaís political and military leaders see 

threats everywhere. the full extent of the siege mentality of Chinaís 

leaders is not always appreciated. This paranoia results in elites 

viewing the foreign as well as domestic environments as treacherous 

landscapes filled with threats and conspiracies.57 The current 

campaign against corruption in China and the crackdown on the 

Falungong Sect suggest the depth of the regimeís fear of domestic 

threats.58 

This mindset may explain the need of the Chinese authorities 

during the Maoist era to come up with the seemingly innocuous 

phrase ìChina has friends all over the world.î59 By the same token, 

one would expect that China also had at least some enemies in the 

world. Indeed one is tempted to conclude that the slogan itself was 
340

prompted by Chinese insecurities. If a country indeed has many 

friendly states around the world, why is it necessary to recite this ad 

nauseum? And the reality was that in the late Maoist era China 

actually had few staunch friends: the handful that come to mind are 

Albania, North Korea, and (most significant for this chapter) 

Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that Maoist China believed itself 

surrounded by enemies. This was true of Dengís China, and also 

holds true for Jiang Zeminís China. 

Active Defense. The strategic principle of active defense is key to 

Chinese strategic thinkers. Most thinkers believe this is of central 

importance to Chinese strategy. According to the Peopleís Liberation 

Armyís (PLA) officer handbook, ìAll military experts, ancient and 

contemporary, Chinese and foreign, recognize the importance of 

active defense.î60 The tendency is for researchers and policymakers 

to broadly define defense as virtually anything, including a 

preemptive strike. Successive conflicts, including the 1962 border 

war with India, are labeled ìself-defense warsî or ìself-defense 

counter-attacksî (ziwei zhanzheng, ziwei fanjizhan or ziwei 

huanjizhan).61 

The idea of ìactive defenseî (jijifangyu) is a relatively recent 

concept in Chinese strategic thought. It is an idea that crops up 

frequently in spoken and written material by Chinese strategic 

thinkersóit is mentioned in the 1995 interview with Liu Huaqing 

quoted above, for example. While at least one scholar dismisses 

active defense as mere propaganda,62 the strategy appears to have 

real significance. Indeed it has been a key guiding principle in Maoís 

day, in Dengís time, and remains important at the dawn of the 21st 

century. Indeed, it figures prominently in Chinaís 1998 Defense 

White Paper. According to Deng Xiaoping: 

. . . [ A]ctive defense is not merely defense per se, but includes defensive 

offensives. Active defense includes our going out, so that if we are 

attacked we will certainly counter attack.63 
341

Senior Colonel Wang Naiming explains: 

[Active defense] . . . emphasizes that the nature of our military strategy is 

defensive, but also active in requirements. It requires the organic 

integration of offense and defense, and achieving the strategic goal of 

defense by active offense; when the conditions are ripe, the strategic 

defense should be led[ sic] to counterattack and offense.64 

The ìorganic integrationî between offense and defense is very 

much a part of the concept of ìabsolute flexibilityî (quanbian) 

highlighted by Iain Johnston.65 In a real sense then, the line between 

offense and defense is blurred. In the final analysis, “Active defense 

strategy does not acknowledge the difference . . . between defense and 

offense.î66 In fact, according to a researcher at the Academy of 

Military Sciences, active defense does not rule out a first strike: 

Our strategic principle of ìstriking only after the enemy has struckî 

certainly does not exclude sudden ìfirst strikesî in campaign battles or 

counterattacks in self-defense into enemy territory.67 

In sum, the impact of the Cult of Defense is a predisposition by 

Chinese elites to opt for force because they perceive its use by China 

as always defensive in nature. 

But the impact of strategic culture does not end here. The impact 

on Chinaís elites in this particular case is two-fold. First, the strategic 

culture of their own country (articulated above) affects how they 

think and act. What is also influential is the way in which these same 

elites perceive the strategic culture of a major rival poweróin this 

case India. 

CHINAíS STRATEGIC CULTURE IMAGE OF INDIA 

India, in the view of many Chinese analysts, is one of the worldís 

four great civilizations.68 Possessing one of the worldís largest 

conventional militaries, New Delhi also has a small but growing 

arsenal of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Once a glorious 
342

empire, India now seeks to reclaim its rightful place in Asia and the 

world after being exploited by imperialism for hundreds of years 

and then being held back by wrong-headed economic policies for 

decades. At the dawn of a new century the economy has been 

unleashed and its citizens are eager to achieve their countryís full 

potential. India also represents a looming strategic threat to China, 

albeit not one that provokes the high level of concern that the United 

States or Japan does. India is, in the words of John Garver, a ìmidlevel [ priority] rankingî for China.69 China sees itself as the rightful 

preeminent power in Asia and India as its major medium- to longterm competitor for this position. Indiaís long-term goal, according 

to a strategist at the National Defense University in Beijing 

interviewed in a November 2000 Guangming Ribao article, is to 

become a world power. According to this analyst, the goal may 

constitute an overreaching of Indiaís ambitions but it still remains 

cause for Chinese concern.70 

An article in the influential Chinese news paper Zhongguo 

Qingnian Bao quoted Indian Home Affairs Minister L. K. Advani as 

telling a domestic audience: ìThe 20th Century belonged to the west, 

China wants to become the world leader in the 21st Century, but the 

years at the end of the century will belong to our India.î71

Furthermore, in the view of many Chinese strategists, India 

possesses an ambitious, belligerent, and expansionist strategic 

culture. Of course there are less extreme views of India, but few if 

any of Chinaís strategic thinkers seem to hold warm or positive 

views of India for Chinaís future. Moreover, Chinese analysts tend to 

hold realpolitik views of the world and view Chinaís neighbors with 

wariness if not outright suspicion as the above articulation of 

Chinaís own strategic culture indicates. 

ìBig Country Dreams.î 

First of all, in Beijingís eyes New Delhi is extremely ambitious. 

India, Chinese analysts frequently insist, has “daguomeng.î72 Literally 
343

this means ìbig country dreamsî or in the lexicon of international 

relations ìgreat power aspirations.î According to one article 

appearing in a prominent official weekly primarily for foreign 

consumption, India had taken advantage of the ìpower vacuumî in 

South Asia since the end of the Cold War, and New Delhiís dream 

ìwhich had been held in check for many years, began to manifest 

itself .î73 China believes India wants to be the hegemon of South 

Asia and eventually a world power. Toward this end India aspires to 

become a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security 

Council, and to further develop its ìcomprehensive national power.î 

China is distinctly unenthusiastic about India raising its stature in 

the UN.74 

For India, this entails a more technologically sophisticated 

military with even greater power projection capability. According to 

one writer, Indiaís army is ìextremely strong,î its navy ranks 10th in 

the world, its air force ranks 12th, and its defense budget continues 

to grow.75 Chinese analysts note that India is buying hundreds of 

tanks from Russia, preparing to jointly produce Sukhoi fighters, 

indigenously build submarines capable of launching missiles, and 

build ballistic missiles capable of reaching ìmost targets in China.î76

India also is expanding its nuclear arsenal. According to one 

estimate, between 1986 and 2000 India was the worldís largest 

importer of weaponry, taking in an estimated US$18 billion.77 All of 

this leads a writer in the Beijing Review to ask: ìWhy is India 

expanding its military strength in such an urgent way?î78 

In addition to significant military power, India also is an 

economic power with tremendous growth potential. Although 

publicly Chinese analyses tend to stress the weaknesses of India, 

notably the abject poverty and significant ethnic and religious 

cleavages, they also recognize Indiaís considerable strengths.79 It 

possesses a large population, and a bright, well-educated, 

cosmopolitan elite. Moreover, its sizeable and growing hightechnology sector is Chinaís envy.80 The concluding sentence of the 
344

entry on ìIndian Military Thoughtî in the 1997 military 

encyclopedia compiled by the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences 

states: ìAt the turn of the century, at the same time that India strives 

to attain its goal of becoming a major economic power, it is working 

all-out on military modernization in order to achieve its goal of 

becoming a powerful country. . . .î81 All this, of course, leads 

Chinese analysts to the inevitable conclusion that India is Chinaís 

natural rival on the Asian mainland. 

Naturally, remarks such as those by Indiaís Defense Minister 

George Fernandes in early May 1998 that China is Indiaís ìpotential 

threat number oneî got considerable attention in Beijing. The phrase 

was translated by at least one PL A analyst as simply ìnumber one 

enemyî (touhao diren).82 Another version omits the prefix ìpotentialî 

and quotes Jawaharlal Nehru as saying ìThe conflict between India 

and China is fundamental whether or not it is expressed in war.î83

Furthermore, the U.S.-India rapprochement that occurred in the 

1990s had a military component that reinforced Chinaís suspicions 

about New Delhiís intentions vis-‡-vis Beijing.84 The visits to India of 

President Clinton in 2000 and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff 

General Hugh Shelton in 2001 merely heightened the concern.85 

The Bully of South Asia. 

Second, in the minds of many Chinese strategists, India 

possesses an extremely belligerent strategic culture. According to 

one PLA analyst: ìIndia has resorted to arms against neighboring 

countries more than 10 timesî since 1947.86 The Chinese observe that 

India has fought three wars with Pakistan in 1947, 1965, and 1971. 

This is not to mention the border war India fought with China in 

1962 in which New Delhi is seen as the aggressor. Moreover, India 

has used strong arm tactics to intimidate its Lilliputian neighbors 

into following Indiaís desires.87 Beijing perceives a record of ìwar 

adventuresî by New Delhi:88 intervention in the 1971 Pakistani civil 

war, which led to the creation of the independent state of 
345

Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) ; and military intervention 

during the 1980s in the Maldive Islands as well as the extended 

military presence in Sri Lanka (although at the invitation of the 

Columbo government).89 Perhaps the most recent manifestations of 

this belligerency, in Chinaís eyes, were the nuclear tests of May 1998 

and accompanying ìChina threatî rhetoric of Indian officials.90 

Expansionist India. 

Third, Indiaís strategic culture is seen as expansionistódating 

from Jawarharlal Nehruís desire to create a ìGreater Indian empireî 

according to several analyses. Not only has a recent Beijing Review 

story noted this desire,91 but the Jiefangjun Bao has similarly claimed 

that, ìsince independence, India has pursued a military expansionist 

line.î92 The term ìhegemonismî has also been used by China to label 

Indiaís efforts in South Asia. Widely used in the 1960s and 1970s, the 

word reappeared briefly in 1998 in the wake of the May nuclear 

tests.93 For example, a commentary in the May 19, 1998, Jief angjun 

Bao was titled: ìThe Ambition of Seeking Hegemony is Completely 

Exposed.î94 

China seems to have concluded that the Bharatiya Janata Party 

(BJP) government desires all of Kashmir and has made this a 

priority.95 Some analysts believe the BJP dreams of absorbing 

Bangladesh and Pakistan into a ìgreater India.î96 In addition, India 

gobbled up the former Portuguese colony of Goa and annexed the 

independent kingdom of Sikkim in the mid-1970s. One analysis by 

two PLA Air Force colonels likened Indiaís 1975 absorption of the 

Himalayan kingdom to Iraqís 1990 invasion of Kuwait.97 Of course 

territorial disputes along the Sino-Indian border underscore New 

Delhiís expansionist ambitions in Beijingís eyes. According to one 

strategist, from the date of Indiaís official recognition of the Peopleís 

Republic of China (December 30, 1949), it ìbegan to quietly nibble 

away at the Chinese territory along the Sino-Indian border.î98

During the 1980s and 1990s, according to the Chinese military 
346

encyclopedia, Indian strategic thought became more ambitious and 

shifted from a continental focus toward the Indian Ocean.99 China 

has also noted Indiaís increasing strategic interest in Southeast Asia, 

especially in the South China Sea.100 

But Chinaís primary alarm concerns New Delhiís perceived 

designs on Tibet. A 1998 article quotes a Lieutenant General Singh, 

identified as a former deputy Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, as 

saying: ìThe Indian Army cannot fundamentally guarantee Indiaís 

security unless it has the capacity to march into Tibet when 

required.î101 Many Chinese strategists seem to fear that India covets 

Tibet or at least covertly supports Tibetan splittists.102 New Delhi, in 

Beijingís view, supported the Tibetan insurrectionists in 1959.103 The 

official history of the 1962 Sino-Indian War published by the PLAís 

Academy of Military Sciences and another authoritative account 

both identify Indian designs on Tibet as the prime cause of the 

conflict.104 Chinese suspicions are raised by the continuing presence 

of the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala. In addition to 

playing host to the Dalai Lama, an estimated 110,000 Tibetan exiles 

call India their home away from home. And the Indian army also 

maintains a military force of mountain troops that is composed 

almost exclusively of ethnic Tibetans.105 What is the purpose of this 

military formation? Chinese analysts wonder. 

Mao reportedly told a visiting Nepalese delegation in 1964: ìIn 

the opinion of the Indian government, Tibet is theirs.î106 At the very 

least, according to one Chinese strategist writing in the late 1990s, 

Indiaís strategic objective is to ìsplit Tibet from Chinaî and create a 

buffer between the two powers.107 Chinaís extreme sensitivity 

regarding Tibet is suggested by the concern expressed over the 

possibility of an ìAsian Kosovoî emerging (i.e., an ethnic separatist 

region receiving external military protection). Even prior to Kosovo, 

some Chinese analysts voiced concern that an outside power could 

impose a ìno fly zoneî over Tibet in the event of widespread ethnic 

unrest there.108
347

ANALYSIS 

Given the negative image of India held by many strategic 

thinkers in China, the warming in relations between Beijing and 

New Delhi that has occurred since May 1998 may strike the reader as 

remarkable. Indeed, the improvement in ties is quite surprising.109

But beneath the diplomatic niceties and apparent desire for cordial 

interaction lurks the strong negative images Chinese hold of India 

(and vice versa).110 

Perhaps the issue where the two strategic cultures collide headon in Chinaís view is Tibet. From Chinaís perspective, the region is 

an inalienable part of the Chinese motherland. The deeply held 

Chinese belief in the importance of national unity comes to a head 

with the view of Chinese strategists that India covets Tibet, or at the 

very least seeks to turn the roof of the world into a buffer between 

the two Asian giants. In the rivalry or competition between China 

and India, John Garver concludes that Beijing has the stronger 

position, but, significantly, he notes that China is most vulnerable on 

the question of Tibet.111 

Geography tends to be conducive to peace since the terrain is so 

inhospitable and the border regions so remote that it is very difficult 

for opposing forces to find each other, let alone engage. From 

Chinaís perspective, ìThe mountains are high and India is far away.î 

Yet, as Paul Bracken notes, the facts of geography have been altered 

considerably by ìdisruptive technologiesî of weapons of mass 

destruction and their delivery systems, most notably ballistic 

missiles.112 As a result, it is far easier for countries like China and 

India to wage war than it was in 1962. The ease with which such a 

war can be fought is only likely to increase over time. 
348

CONCLUSION 

Perhaps the wariness with which many Chinese view India can 

be summed up in two poignant quotes. Decades ago, the Chinese 

writer and philosopher Hu Shi reportedly made the tongue-in-cheek 

observation that ìIndia conquered and dominated China culturally 

for 20 centuries [via Buddhism] without ever having to send a single 

soldier across her border.î113 More recently, Australian sinologist 

Gary Klintworth opined: ìChina perceives India to be an ambitious, 

overconfident yet militarily powerful neighbor with whom it may 

eventually have to have a day of reckoning.î114 

To conclude, if one combines Chinaís strongly negative image of 

Indiaís strategic culture with Chinaís own ìCult of Defense,î there is 

good reason to be concerned about the future of relations between 

New Delhi and Beijing. While open conflict between Asiaís two 

largest states is not preordained and indeed it is in their mutual 

interest to avoid a military contest, the analysis here is a sobering 

reminder of the simmering tensions present in their relations. 

ENDNOTES 

1. For discussion of strategic culture in general, see Alastair I. Johnston, 

ìThinking About Strategic Culture,î International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 

1995, pp. 32-64; Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security, New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1996; and Ken Booth and Russell Trood, eds., Strategic 

Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 

1999. For a recent critique of the approach, see Michael C. Desch, ìCultural Clash: 

Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,î International Security, Vol. 

23, Summer 1999, pp. 141-170. For discussion of the utility of strategic culture in 

security studies of China, see Robert S. Ross and Paul H.B. Godwin, ìNew 

Directions in Chinese Security Studies,î in David Shambaugh, ed., American 

Studies of Contemporary China, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, p. 144; and 

Samuel S. Kim, ìChina and the World in Theory and Practice,î in Samuel S. Kim, 

ed., China and the World, 3rd ed., Boulder: Westview Press, 1998, pp. 14-15. 

2. On the impact of culture on Chinaís international relations, see the writings 

of John K. Fairbank and Mark Mancall; on Chinaís military and security affairs, see 
349

Fairbank, ìIntroduction,î in Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank, eds., 

Chinese Ways in Warfare, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974. 

3. Li Jijun, ìLun zhanlue wenhuaî (On strategic culture), Zhongguo junshi 

kexue (China military scienceóhereafter ZGJSKX), No. 1, 1997, p. 8. See also Li 

Jijun, Traditional Military Thinking and the Defense Strategy of China, An Address to 

the United States War College [sic], Letort Paper No. 1, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, August 29, 1997. For the Chinese language version, see 

Li Jijun, ìZhongguo junshi sixiang chuantong yu fangyu zhanlue,î ZGJSKX, No. 4, 

Winter 1997, pp. 62-64. 

4. For example, see Ni Lexiong, Zhanzheng yu wenhua chuantong: duilishide ling 

yizhong guancha (War and cultural tradition: another perspective on history), 

Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe, March 2000. 

5. Jack Snyder formulated the term strategic culture in an effort to understand 

the nuclear strategy of the Soviet Union. Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: 

Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 

September 1977. The term of ten goes undefined. See, for example, two studies by 

Shu Guang Zhang: Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 

1949-1958, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992; and idem, ìChina: 

Traditional and Revolutionary Heritageî in Booth and Trood, eds., Strategic 

Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, pp. 29-50. For broad definitions, see Ross and 

Godwin, ìNew Directions in Chinese Security Studies,î p. 144. Rosita Dellios 

states: ìStrategic culture pertains to a peopleís distinctive style of dealing with and 

thinking about the problems of national security.î Rosita Dellios, ìë How May the 

World Be at Peace?í: Idealism as Realism in Chinaís Strategic Culture,î in Valerie 

M. Hudson, ed., Culture and Foreign Policy, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 203. 

For a focused and rigorous definition, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: 

Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in China History, Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1995. These examples are taken from the China literature, 

although their uses of strategic culture are not unique to China studies. 

6. Allen S. Whiting, China E yes Japan, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 

California Press, 1989. 

7. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the 

Long March, New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, 2003, chap. 2; 

Andrew Scobell, ìThe Chinese Cult of Defense,î Issues and Studies, Vol. 37, No. 5, 

September/October 2001, pp. 100-127. 

8. Chong-Pin Lin, China’s Nuclear Strategy: Evolution Within Tradition, 
350

Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1988. 

9. Fairbank, ìIntroduction,î in Kierman and Fairbank, eds., Chinese Way sin 

Warfare, pp. 1-26. For a similar type of argument which stresses the influence of 

Daoism, see Rosita Dellios, ìHow May the World Be at Peace?î 

10. Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of 

Force, 1840-1980, Taipei: Institute for International Relations, 1993; Howard L. 

Boorman and Scott A. Boorman, ìStrategy and National Psychology in China,î The 

Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Sciences, No. 370, March 1967, pp. 143-

155. Edward S. Boylan, ìThe Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare,î Comparative 

Strategy, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1982, pp. 341-366. 

11. See, for example, Davis B. Bobrow,ì Pekingís Military Calculus,î World 

Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1964, pp. 287-301; Steve Chan, ìChinese Conflict Calculus 

and Behavior: Assessment from the Perspective of Conflict Management,î World 

Politics, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1978, pp. 391-410; Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of 

Deterrence, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975; Melvin Gurtov and 

Byung-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 1982. 

12. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Grand Strategy in Ancient China, 

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995; Alastair I. Johnson, ìCultural Realism 

and Grand Strategy in Maoist China,î in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National 

Security. While the fullest articulation of the realpolitik approach by Iain Johnston 

discerns the presence of two strands of strategic culture (Confucian-Mencian and 

parabellum), he asserts that only the parabellum strand is operative. See also 

Thomas J. Christensen, ìChinese Realpolitikî Foreign affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4, 

September/October 1997, pp. 37-53; Mark Burles and Abraham N. Shulsky, 

Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings, Santa 

Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000. See in particular the appendix in this RAND 

monograph. 

13. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, chap. 2. 

14. This entire section on Chinaís strategic culture draws heavily on a larger 

study of Chinaís use of force funded by the Smith Richardson Foundation. See 

Scobell, ìThe Chinese Cult of Defense,î and Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, 

chap. 2. The cult of defense is a refinement of the ìCult of the Offensiveî concept. 

See Jack Snyder, ìCivil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 

1984,î International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1, Summer 1984, pp. 108-146; and Stephen 

Van Evera, ìThe Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,î 
351

International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1, Summer 1984, pp. 58-107. Unlike the conception 

of Snyder and Van Evera, which has bureaucratic/organizational origins, the 

Chinese Cult of Defense is grounded in a psycho-cultural mindset. The concept of 

a ìCult of Defenseî owes intellectual debts to the work of Stephen Van Evera, Jack 

Snyder, and Shu Guang Zhang. See Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: 

China and the Korean War, 1950-1953, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 

1995. 

15. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, chap. 2. 

16. Lawrence Freedman cited in Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American 

Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

1989, p. 6. 

17. The extent to which these ideas are prevalent throughout Chinese society, 

while important to ascertain, is not central to my analysis. Here I concentrate on 

Chinaís civilian and military elites. Nevertheless, such beliefs seem widespread 

within China. ìThe self-perception of China as a pacific, non-threatening country 

that wishes nothing more than to live in peace with its neighbors is extremely 

common in China, both among the elite and ordinary people.î John Garver quoted 

in Nayan Chanda, ìFear of the Dragon,î Far Eastern Economic Review, April 13, 

1995, p. 24. 

18. The cluster of beliefs outlined below appears to be held by a significant 

number of leaders in China. The cult of defense articulated here is derived from 

writings published primarily in the 1980s and 1990s and from interviews 

conducted in 1998 and 2000. 

19. ìWhite Paper on Chinaís National Defense,î Beijing Xinhua Domestic 

Service, July 27, 1998, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports: 

China Daily Report (hereafter FBIS-CHI), July 29, 1998. 

20. ìLiu Huaqing On the Stand of the Military Towards Taiwan,î Ta Kung Pao 

(Hong Kong), September 4, 1995, in FBIS-CHI, September, 7 1995. 

21. Xing Shizhong, ìChina Threat Theory May Be Forgotten,î Qiushi (Seeking 

Truth), No. 3, February 1996, in FBIS-CHI, February 1, 1996. See also Gao Jiquan, 

ìChina Holds High Banner of Peace,î Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), June 

27, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-133, July 12, 1996. 

22. Li Jijun, ìLun zhanlue wenhua,î p. 9. 
352

23. Ibid.; Chen Zhou, ìZhongguo xiandai jubu zhanzheng lilun yu Mei guo 

youxian zhanz heng lilun zhi butongî (Differences between Chinaís theory of 

modern local war and Americaís theory of limited war), ZGJSKX, No. 4, 1995, p. 

46; Interviews with civilian and military researchers in Beijing and Shanghai, MayJune 1998 (hereafter ìInterviews, 1998î) . 

24. The five principles, first outlined by Zhou Enlai in the 1950s, are mutual 

respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, noninterference in 

internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 

25. Wu Xinbo, ìChina: Security practice of a Modernizing and Ascending 

Power,î in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security practice: Material and Ideational 

Influences, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, pp. 121-122. 

26. Wang Zhongyan and Cui Haiming, ìDeng Xiaoping de junshi sixiang 

chutanî (Preliminary exploration of Deng Xiaopingís military thought), in Pan 

Shiying, chief editor, Dangdai zhongguo junshi sixiang jingyao (The Essence of 

Contemporary Chinese Military Thinking), Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1992, p. 

121. See also Peng Dehuai, ìJunshi jianshe gaikuangî (General situation of military 

construction), July 16, 1957, in Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Collected Military 

Works of Peng Dehuai), Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxi an Chubanshe, 1988, p. 588. 

27. Deng Xiaoping, ìMuqian de xingshi he renwuî (Present situation and 

tasks) (January 16, 1980), in Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, 1975-1982 (Selected Works of 

Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982), Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984, pp. 203-204. 

28. Wang and Cui, ìDeng Xiaoping de junshi,î p. 121; interviews, 1998. 

29. Another example offered is the way ethnic Chinese cooperated with the 

Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty. The Chinese, for instance, according to one 

military scholar, did not object to shaving their heads and wearing queues! 

Interviews, 1998. 

30. See the succinct discussion in Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The 

Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security, New York: W. W. 

Norton, 1997, p. 5. 

31. ìLiu Huaqing Refutes Argument,î p. 31. See also Xing Shizhong, ìChina 

Threat Theory May be Forgotten.î 

32. Deng Xiaoping, ìMuqi an de xingshi he renwu,î pp. 203-204. 
353

33. The importance of these concepts was stressed by Chinese researchers 

during interviews I conducted in May and June 1998. 

34. Li Jijun, ìLun junshi zhanlue siweiî (On military strategic thinking), 

ZGJSKX, No. 2, 1996, p. 78. 

35. Gao Jiquan, ìChina Holds High Banner of Peace.î 

36. Li Jijun, ìLun zhanlue wenhua,î p. 10; interviews, 1998. 

37. Li Jijun, ìLun junshi zhanlue siwei,î p. 78; Li Jijun, ìZhongguo junshi 

sixiang chuantong,î p. 62; interviews, 1998. 

38. Li Jijun, ìZhongguo junshi sixiang chuantong,î p. 63. 

39. Li Jijun, ìLun zhanlue wenhua,î p. 9. See also Li Jijun, ìZhongguo junshi 

sixiang chuantong,î p. 63. 

40. Li Jijun, ìLun zhanlue wenhua,î p. 9; interviews, 1998. 

41. Yao Youzhi, ìGudai Zhong-Xi junshi chuantong zhi bijiaoî (A comparison 

of Chinese and Western ancient military traditions), ZGJSKX, No. 3, 1995, pp. 93-

94. 

42. Authorís interviews with civilian and military researchers in Beijing and 

Shanghai, September 2000 (hereafter ìInterviews 2000î) . 

43. ìLiu Huaqing on Stand of Military Towards Taiwan.î 

44. Li Jijun, ìLun zhanlue wenhua,î p. 10; Chen Zhou, ìZhongguo xiandai 

jubu zhanzheng,î p. 45; Xing Shizhong, ìChina Threat Theory May Be Forgotten;î 

Gao Jiquan, ìChina Holds High Banner of Peaceî; Xiong Guangkai, ìZhongguo de 

guofang zhengceî (Chinaís national defense policy), Guojizhanlue yanjiu 

(International Strategic Studies), No. 55, January 2000, p. 4; interviews 1998. 

45. ìHuijian Yidali jizhe . . . de tanhua jiyaoî (17 August 1980) (Summary of a 

talk in an interview with Italian journalistÖ) in Xu Xiangqian Junshi Wenxuan 

(Selected Military Works of Xu Xiangqian), Beijing: Jief angjun Chubanshe, 1993, p. 

305. 

46. Zhang Jing and Yao Yanjin, Jiji fangyu zhanlue qianshuo (Introduction to 

Active Defense Strategy), Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1985, p. 137. 
354

47. See, for example, Junshi Kexueyuan Junshi Lishi Yanjiubu, ed., Zhongguo 

Renmin Jief angjun de qishinian (Seventy years of the Chinese Peopleís Liberation 

Army), Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 1997, pp. 541-547, 580-582. Moreover, 

Chinaís intervention in Korea in October 1950 was also a counterattack since in 

Beijingís view the United States had made the first aggressive moves against China 

on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. Song Shilun, Mao Zedong junshi 

sixiang de xingcheng jiqi fazhan (Formation and Development of Mao Zedongís 

Military Thought), Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 1984, p. 222. 

48. For a discussion of just war in the Confucian tradition, see Huang Pumin, 

“Rujia junshi sixiang yu Zhongguo gudai junshi wenhua chuantongî (Confucian 

military thinking and the military cultural tradition of ancient China), ZGJSKX , 

No. 4, Winter 1997, pp. 73-74. 

49. Wang Zhiping and Li Dezhou, ìZhong-Xi gudai junshililun de zhexue 

jichuî (Philosophical foundation of Chinese and Western military theories in 

ancient times), ZGJSKX, No. 4, 1995, pp. 30-31, 34-35; Yao Youzhi, ìGudai ZhongXi junshi chuantong,î pp. 95-96. 

50. Johnston, ìCultural Realism and Strategy,î pp. 231-232. The theme of just 

or righteous war was a significant one in many popular histories and novels that 

Maoóand other leadersóread. See Ibid., p. 247. 

51. A first strike is only just if China can claim that the attack was launched to 

preempt an attack being prepared by an opponent. 

52. Ted K. Gong, China: Tradition, Nationalism and Just War, Strategic Research 

Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, January 17, 1999, p. 23. 

53. Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun junguan shouce (lujun fence) (Chinese Peopleís 

Liberation Army officer handbook [landpower edition]), Qingdao: Qingdao 

Chubanshe, 1991, p. 221. 

54. See Bruce Cummings, Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East 

Asian Relations at the End of the Century, Durham: Duke University Press, 1999, 

p. 166. 

55. Li Jijun, ìInternational Military Strategy and Chinaís Security at the Turn 

of the Century,î Zhongguo Pinglun (Hong Kong), August 5, 1998, in FBIS-CHI, 

August 13, 1998. 
355

56. Fan Yihua, ìShi lun Zhongguo xiandai sixiang wenhua de xing chao 

jizhanlue quî (On the form and strategic trend of modern thought culture in 

China), ZGJSKX, No. 1, 1997, p. 26. 

57. See, for example, Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, New York: 

Random House, 1994; Liz Sly, ìA State of Paranoia,î Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, September/October 1999, pp. 38-43; Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the 

Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 

2000. 

58. On the corruption campaign, see John Schauble, ìChinaís Communists 

Fear the Enemy from Within,î Sydney Morning Herald, September 27, 2000, p. 8. 

See also more generally, Sly, ìA State of Paranoia.î 

59. For a recent use of this slogan, see Gao Jiquan, ìChina Holds High Banner 

of Peace,î Jiefangjun Bao, June 27, 1996, in FBIS-CHI, July 12, 1996. 

60. Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun junguan shouce (lujun fence), p. 199. 

61. The 1969 clash with the Soviet Union and the 1979 Vietnam conflict are 

similarly labeled. Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun junguan shouce (lujun fence), pp. 514-

515. 

62. Iain Johnston contends that the term ìdefenseî is employed for 

propaganda purposes so that every military action can be labeled as defensive and 

hence more justified than anything called ìoffensive.î See Johnston, ìCultural 

Realism and Strategy,î pp. 249-50, especially footnote 63. 

63. Chen Zhou, ìZhongguo xiandai jubu zhanzheng,î p. 46. See also 

MiZhenyu, ìZhongguo jijifangyu zhanlue fangzhenî (Chinaís strategic plan 

ofactive defense), in Shi Boke, ed., Zhongguo Daqushi (Megatrends China), Beijing: 

Hualing Chubanshe, 1996, p. 53. 

64. Senior Colonel Wang Naiming, ìAdhere to Active Defense and Modern 

Peopleís War,î in Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare, 

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997, p. 37. 

65. Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 102ff. 66. Jianxiang Bi, ìThe PRCís Active 

Defense Strategy: New Wars, Old Concepts,î Issues and Studies, Vol. 31, No. 11, 

November 1995, p. 94 (emphasis added). 

67. Chen Zhou, ìZhongguo xiandai jubu zhanzheng,î p. 46. See also Nan Li, 
356

ìThe PLAís Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, 1985-95: A 

Chinese Perspective,î The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996, pp. 443-463. 

68. See, for example, ìYindu wenhua te zhengî (Characteristics of Indian 

civilization), in Ji Xianlin Lun Yindu wenhua (Ji Xianlin on Indian culture), Beijing: 

Zhongguo Huaqiao Chubanshe, October 1994, pp. 274-281. 

69. John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth 

Century, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, p. 381. 

70. See Shao Zhiyong and Xu Xiangjun, ìInterview with Professor Hu Siyuan 

of NDU,î Guangming Ribao, November 15, 2000, in FBIS-CHI, November 20, 2000; 

Wu Hua, She Weili, Zheng Hong, Nanya zhi shi: Yindu (India: the lion of South 

Asia), Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 1997. 

71. Chen Tieyuan, ìPeople Are Concerned over Indiaís ë Dream of Becoming a 

Great Powerí,î Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (internet version), May 8, 2001, in FBISCHI, May 8, 2001. 

72. Wu Hua, et al., Nanya zhi shi: Yindu, chap. 9. 

73. See Shao Zhiyong, ìIndiaís Big Power Dream,î Beijing Review, April 12, 

2001, p. 10. 

74. On Chinese views of Indiaís aspirations to joining the UN Security Council 

as a permanent member, see Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 134-137; and ìZhang 

Qiyue Talks About Sino-Indian Relations,î Zhongguo Xinwenshe, May 30, 2000, in 

FBIS-CHI, May 30, 2000. On what Chinese analysts mean by comprehensive 

national power, see Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment. 

75. Chen Tieyuan, ìPeople Are Concerned over Indiaís ëDream of Becoming a 

Great Poweríî. 

76. Wu Junshao, ìWhere are Indiaís Missiles Menacingly Targeted At [sic]?î 

Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, June 8, 2001, in FBIS-CHI, June 13, 2001. See also Wu Hua 

et al., Nanya zhi shi: Yi ndu. 

77. Shao Zhiyong and Xu Xiangjun ìInterview with Professor Hu Siyuan.î 

78. Shao Zhiyong, ìIndiaís Big Power Dream,î p. 9. 

79. For one analysis that stresses Indiaís weaknesses, see Shao Zhiyong, 
357

ìIndiaís Big Power Dream.î For one that stresses Indiaís strengths, see Wu Hua et 

al., Nanya zhi shi: Yindu. 

80. Wu Hua et al., Nanya z hi shi: Yindu, pp. 303-306; Saritha Rai, ìChinese Race 

to Supplant India in Software,î New York Times, January 5, 2001. 

81. ìJunshi sixiangî (Military thought), Zhongguo junshi baike quanshu (Chinese 

military encyclopedia), Vol. 1, Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, July 1997, p. 324. 

82. Wu Fuzuo, Zhanzheng li women you duo yuan? (How far is war from us?), 

Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 1999, pp. 54-55. 

83. Yang Xiaojie, ìIndiaís Armed Forces and Chinaís Security,î Guangzhou 

Jinri Junshi (internet version), June 1, 1998, in FBIS-CHI, June 6, 1998. 

84. According to the military encyclopedia published in 1997, India was 

ìactively strengthening military cooperation with the United States.î Zhongguo 

junshibaike quanshu, p. 324. See also Yang Xiaojie, ìIndiaís Armed Forces and 

Chinaís Securityî; and Shao Zhiyong, ìIndiaís Big Power Dream,î p. 10. 

85. ìUnited States Intends to Befriend India to Contain China Militarily,î 

Guangzhou Ribao, (internet version), May 27, 2001, in FBIS-CHI, May 30, 2001. 

86. Wu Fuzuo, Zhanzheng li women you duo yuan? p. 48. 

87. Zhongguo junshibaike quanshu, p. 324. 

88. Dr. Liu Xuecheng, ìIf India, Pakistan Went to War, Which Side Would 

Emerge Victorious?î Zhongguo Pinglun, July 5, 1999, in FBIS-CHI, August 14, 1999. 

89. Yang Xiaojie, ìIndiaís Armed Forces and Chinaís Securityî; Wu Hua et al., 

Nanya zhi shi: Yindu. 

90. John W. Garver, ìThe Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity Following Indiaís 

Nuclear Tests,î The China Quarterly, No. 168, December 2001, pp. 866-870. 

91. Shao Zhiyong, ìIndiaís Big Power Dream.î 

92. Zhongguo Xinwenshe, May 19, 1998, in FBIS-CHI, May 20, 1998, citing Jief 

angjun Bao, May 19, 1998. 

93. Garver, ìThe Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity,î pp. 873-874. 
358

94. Cited in Zhongguo Xinwenshe, May 19, 1998, in FBIS-CHI, May 20, 1998. 

95. Dr. Liu Xuecheng, ìIf India, Pakistan Go to War, Which Side Would 

Emerge Victorious?î 

96. Zhang Wenmu, ìIssue of South Asia in Major Power Politics,î Ta Kung 

Pao, September 23, 1998, in FBIS-CHI, October 20, 1998. 

97. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Chao xian zhan (Unrestricted warfare), 

Beijing: Jiefangjun Wenyi Chubanshe, 1999, p. 140. 

98. Zhang Wenmu, ìIssue of South Asia in Major Power Politics.î 

99. Zhongguo junshibaike quanshu, p. 323. See also Wu Hua, et al., Nanya zhi shi: 

Yindu, chap. 7. 

100. Ma Jiali, ìIndiaís Strategic Position and Prospects for China-India 

Relations,î Zhongguo Pinglun, January 5, 2001, in FBIS-CHI, January 3, 2001; Shao 

Zhiyong and Xu Xiangjun ìInterview with Professor Hu Siyuan.î 

101. Yang Xiaojie, ìIndiaís Armed Forces and Chinaís Security.î 

102. Ma Jiali, ìIndiaís Strategic Position and Prospects for China-India 

Relations.î On the Tibet factor in bilateral relations, see Garver, Protracted Contest, 

chap. 2. 

103. Wu Hua, et al., Nanya zhi shi: Yindu, p. 108; Zhang Wenmu, ìIssue of 

South Asia in Major Power Politics.î 

104. Zhong-Yin bianjing saiwai fang zuozhan shi (History of Chinaís selfdefensive counter-attack with India), Beijing: Junshi Kexueyuan Chubanshe, 1994, 

pp. 37-41; Xu Yan, Zhong-Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang (The true history of the 

Sino-Indian border war), Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1993, pp. 27-28. 

105. The ìSpecial Frontier Forceî was established in 1962 following the SinoIndian War. See Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 63-64. 

106. Garver, Protracted Contest, p. 59. 

107. Zhang Wenmu, ìIssue of South Asia in Major Power Politics.î 
359

108. On the possibility of Tibet becoming an ìAsian Kosovo,î see Ai Yu, 

ìKosovo Crisis and Stability in Chinaís Tibet and Xinjiang,î Ta Kung Pao (Hong 

Kong), June 2, 1999, in FBIS-CHI, June 25, 1999. On the subject of a ìno fly zone,î 

see Zhang Wenmu, ì21 shijiz hongguo guoji zhengzhi jiandianî (Central issues of 

international politics for China in the 21st century), in Shi Boke, ed., Zhongguo 

daqushi, p. 32. 

109. Garver, ìThe Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity.î See also Mark W. 

Frazier, ìChina-India Relations Since Pokhran II: Assessing Sources of Conflict and 

Cooperation,î AccessAsia Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2000, pp. 5-36. 

110. This is one of the enduring themes of Garver, Protracted Contest. 

111. John W. Garver, ìThe Gestalt of the Sino-Indian Relationship,î in Carolyn 

Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2002, pp. 363-285. 

112. Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the 

Second Nuclear Age, New York: HarperCollins, 1999. 

113. Hu Shiís quote taken from http://www.quotesandsaying.com, accessed on 

September 10, 2001. 

114. Klintworth in J. Mohan Malik, ìSouth Asia in Chinaís Foreign Relations,î 

Pacifica Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, February 2001, p. 84. 
361

Part VI. 

ALLIANCE POLITICS IN ASIA 
363

CHAPTER 14 

INDIAíS ALLIANCES 2020 

Sumit Ganguly 

INTRODUCTION 

Indiaís foreign and security policies are in flux, their familiar 

moorings having been cast aside at Cold Warís end.1 For a significant 

portion of the Cold War the architects of Indiaís foreign policy 

professed a belief in nonalignment, Third World solidarity, state-led 

economic growth, and secularism.2 In practice, however, these 

professed commitments were only partially realized. The structural 

constraints of the international system, the exigencies of domestic 

politics, and the idiosyncratic roles of particular individuals made 

the pursuit, as well as the achievement, of these goals fitful at best. In 

terms of manifest behavior, most Indian foreign policy decisionmakers sought authoritative global regimes, especially in such 

sensitive areas as trade, foreign multilateral assistance, and the use 

of the global commons.3 In the realm of security policy, India 

pursued an ideational strategy for almost two decades. When this 

policy culminated in a significant military debacle at the hands of its 

principal adversary, China, however, India initially resorted to selfhelp and then sought American assistance, but without any strings 

attached. Subsequently, it forged a security alignment with the 

Soviet Union.4 This security relationship provided India with 

important dividends. Among other matters the Soviets proved to be 

a reliable supplier of high-technology weaponry at highly concessional rates. They also acted as a counterweight to the Peopleís 

Republic of China, a state with which India had an on-going border 

dispute. Finally, they also guaranteed India a veto on the United 

Nations Security Council on any adverse discussion of the Kashmir 

question. 
364

The end of the Cold War shattered the many comforting 

elements that had constituted Indiaís grand strategy. With the Soviet 

collapse, Indiaís foreign-policy decisionmakers have had to reassess 

the precepts on which the countryís policies had been based and 

recalculate their nationís goals, options, and strategies. The relationship with Russia, the principal successor state to the Soviet Union, 

was quickly transformed into little more than a weapons-supplier 

nexus. Indian foreign policy decisionmakers were also quick to 

realize that, unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War years, an 

enfeebled and debilitated Russia in the post-Cold War era could not 

serve Indiaís foreign and security policy interests. Most importantly, 

the Russians, unlike the Soviets, could not be relied upon to tie down 

China.5 Nor could they be counted on to use their veto in the United 

Nations Security Council to protect India from censure on the 

sensitive Kashmir issue. Finally, the adoption of a rough-and-tumble 

free-market economy in Russia also meant that the lucrative trade 

and barter relationship that had thrived for many years was now at 

an end. 

The Soviet collapse thus necessitated a fundamental shift in 

Indian grand strategy. All the central components of this strategy 

came under increasing attack from both external and internal 

sources. Nonalignment, as one astute Indian prime minister, I. K. 

Gujral, accurately stated, had ceased to have much meaning.6

Notions of Third World solidarity also withered along with the 

death of the ideological consensus that underlay it. At a domestic 

level, the Indian preference for a state-dominated economy also took 

a major battering: the Soviet failure had destroyed any idea that 

state-led economic growth could be a viable strategy for promoting 

economic development.7 The rise of chiliastic religious movements 

across the globe, and in Indiaís immediate neighborhood, also found 

some resonance within the country as disenchantment with Indian 

secularism grew apace.8 
365

Mostly freed from the straitjacket of these nostrums, 

governments of varying ideological persuasions started to craft a 

new set of Indian foreign and security policy alignments. Though 

much of the hoary rhetoric of the Cold War years continued to 

characterize Indian pronouncements, the Nehruvian idealism that 

had undergirded Indian foreign policy became an artifact of the 

past.9 Indian foreign policy slowly, but most assuredly, embraced 

realist precepts. This became evident from Indiaís pursuit of a 

limited but significant nuclear weapons program,10 its increasing 

willingness to use substantial force along (and within) its borders,11

and its commitment to devote substantial resources to national 

security. 

HAZARDOUS PREDICTIONS 

What will Indiaís alliances look like in 2020? The predictive 

power of social science leaves much to be desired, so any attempts to 

generate robust propositions about Indiaís likely alignments two 

decades from now are necessarily fraught with significant pitfalls. 

Nevertheless, it may be possible to make some informed conjectures. 

These conjectures, if they are to have any validity, must be based 

upon inferences drawn from past behavior, the existence of domestic 

ideational forces, and the structural constraints and opportunities 

that exist at regional and international levels. 

Resorting to Self-Help. 

Despite the dramatic shifts in the configuration of global power 

since 1989 and Indiaís fitful attempts to adjust to these new realities, 

one constant seems to undergird Indian foreign policy pronouncements and practices: the quest for decisionmaking autonomy in the 

sphere of foreign affairs. Often expressed in neuralgic terms during 

the Cold War, this desire for strategic autonomy is deeply embedded 

in nationalist assessments of Indiaís colonial heritage.12 Two 

generations of colonial and post-colonial nationalists in India have 
366

construed Indiaís history in a particular light. Both liberal and 

conservative analysts (in the pristine sense of both terms) have 

forcefully argued that India was repeatedly subjected to external 

domination. Liberals argue that such domination was possible 

because of Indiaís internal disunity. More conservative commentators contend that such domestic disarray, combined with a lack of 

military preparedness, led to foreign domination.13 As a consequence, both camps have insisted on preserving Indiaís ability to 

chart an independent course in world affairs, free from external 

influences and pressures. 

For much of the post-independence era the liberal camp was 

ascendent. Accordingly, in the realm of economic policymaking it 

adopted a singularly autarkic set of economic policies and cut India 

off from the global economy.14 In the arena of foreign policy the fear 

of external pressures coupled with a recognition of Indiaís material 

weaknesses led to the pursuit of nonalignment. And in the realm of 

defense policy, these imperatives manifested themselves in the oftenquixotic efforts to promote ìself-relianceî in the development and 

production of military hardware.15 

This drive to maintain autonomy will persist in Indian 

decisionmaking circles, despite the emergence of an increasingly 

ìglobalizedî world where a variety of social, economic, and political 

forces are increasingly buffeting state authority. The attempt to 

preserve some freedom of maneuver in the conduct of foreign policy 

will necessarily militate against alignment with a major power. The 

latter-day adherents of some variant of nonalignment will express 

unease about any inordinate reliance on a powerful external actor to 

guarantee Indiaís security. 

Yet the power and influence of liberal policymakers could well 

wane with generational change. At least two post-colonial 

generations have sought to tutor and socialize an emergent 

generation of policymakers about the wisdom of this quest for 
367

autonomy, but it is by no means clear that the emergent generation 

in India shares these received beliefs. They may well develop a 

markedly different ìoperational codeî as they confront the future.16 

Alliances. 

International forces may also reinforce these tendencies away 

from self-reliance. Russia has already made clear that it will not 

assist India as the Soviet Union did in the past. Consequently, India 

will need to court other major powers to ensure that its security 

interests are adequately safeguarded. 

However, the contours of the regional and global environments 

that India is likely to face in the year 2020 remain uncertain. What 

will be the principal sources of threat to Indiaís security? Which 

other powers will be the likely partners to help India cope with those 

threats? While much has changed in the global and regional 

international environments over the last decade and even the last 

several months, not everything has changed. In all likelihood Indiaís 

principal threats will stem from the same sources as those of the 

Cold War period though in markedly different forms. 

An Indo-Russian Alliance? The primary threat to Indiaís security 

will still emanate from the Peopleís Republic of China. Such a 

prediction is hardly unreasonable if one assumes that China will not 

implode as a consequence of the variety of social and economic 

pressures it faces nor will its internal political arrangements be 

fundamentally transformed in a democratic direction.17 Consequently, India will seek the assistance of other major powers with 

global reach to counter the threat posed by Chinese power. 

One possible alliance partner could be Russia. Apart from the 

Chinese threat, India could have other seemingly compelling reasons 

for aligning with Russia. India might align with Russia to oppose a 

number of U.S. initiatives and positions about which the two sides 
368

have important reservations. After all, both India and Russia have 

drawn censure from the United States on charges of human rights 

violations in the conduct of their military operations in Kashmir and 

Chechnya, respectively, both remain somewhat at odds with U.S. 

attempts to quarantine Iraq, and both share misgivings about the 

recent U.S. propensity to intervene unilaterally in regional conflicts. 

Additionally, there has been significant Indo-Russian military 

cooperation, despite the end of the Cold War. Of course, in large part 

this cooperation amounts to making a virtue out of necessity: the 

cash-strapped Russians need hard currency for their military 

hardware, and India, despite its long quest for ìself-reliance,î 

remains acutely dependent on external suppliers for a plethora of 

weapons systems.18 

Despite this apparent convergence of interests, it is unlikely that 

the two states can forge an effective alliance to balance American 

power. The post-Cold War Indo-Russian relationship lacks political 

and strategic symbiosis. Russia no longer needs India as a possible 

counterweight to China. India cannot count on Russian support on 

the vital Kashmir issue. 

Moreover, and perhaps most important, a marked shift has taken 

place in the past several years in Indo-American relations. The most 

dramatic demonstration thereof came in May 2001, when New Delhi 

provided a cautious and carefully worded endorsement of the 

George W. Bush administrationís plans for deploying a national 

missile defense (NMD) system, even though Russia had expressed 

grave reservations about its strategic implications.19 In years past 

New Delhi, far from endorsing the decision, would have 

unequivocally condemned it. Additionally, even with Indiaís fitful 

embrace of the market since 1991 and the emergence of a form of 

rough-and-tumble capitalism in Russia, the economic complementarities that had characterized the halcyon days of the Indo-Soviet 

relationship will not return. The Russians will no longer accept 

barter trade and have little or no interest in Indian consumer 
369

durables. Nor do they possess the ability to provide India with longterm, highly concessional credits for purchasing petroleum products 

and weaponry.20 The lack of convergence on vital issues of security 

and strategy and the declining complementarities of the two 

economies ensure that a realignment of Indo-Russian relations along 

the lines of the erstwhile Indo-Soviet relationship is most unlikely. 

A Sino-Indian-Russian Alliance? Could a Sino-Indian-Russian 

alliance form against the United States?21 In 1998, Russian Prime 

Minister Yevgeny Primakov suggested that the three countries might 

well form such a partnership. These three states appear to have a 

number of common grievances against the United States. All of them 

seem to resent overweening U.S. military power (and Washingtonís 

willingness to use it); the American propensity to compromise the 

sovereignty of weaker states, as evidenced in Iraq and the Balkans; 

Americaís selective application of human rights standards; and U.S. 

dominance of the emergent rules of the global trading order. Surely a 

broad convergence on such a range of issues could form the basis of 

an alliance designed to balance American power and prerogatives. 

Despite the seeming symmetry of views on these subjects, other 

differences will preclude the formation of such an alliance. India, 

despite its closeness to the Soviet Union during a significant portion 

of the Cold War, consistently rebuffed the Soviet suggestion that a 

system of ìcollective securityî be forged in Asia. The Indians 

correctly surmised that any such system would be directed against 

China and the United States. Despite differences with both states, 

Indian decisionmakers felt that participation in a Soviet-led ìcollective securityî system would further exacerbate strained relations 

with both China and the United States. Today, when relations with 

the United States are steadily improving despite differences on the 

nonproliferation front, India cannot afford to forge an anti-American 

coalition with China and Russia. More to the point, despite the 

apparent commonalities at the global level, India has profound 

differences with China. Briefly stated, they include the long-standing 
370

border dispute, Chinaís propensity to encourage Indiaís smaller 

neighbors to adopt foreign policy positions inimical or at least at 

odds with Indiaís interests, and its support for Pakistanís nuclear 

and ballistic missile programs. 

China, in turn, may loudly proclaim its hostility to ìAmerican 

hegemonyî in Asia and elsewhere but would not seek an alliance 

with two neighbors of varying strengths and disparate interests. 

Furthermore, despite their publicly professed sentiments about 

Third World solidarity, Chinaís decisionmakers are unwilling to 

accord India the status of a great power.22 Any alliance with India 

directed against the United States would, in the Chinese world-view, 

enhance Indiaís status. 

An Indo-American Alliance? India-U.S. relations, on the other 

hand, may change dramatically in the years and decades ahead. 

Such improvements, of course, would have to be predicated on a 

decline of Indiaís historical avoidance of close alliances. This 

intransigence has already begun to disappear in the wake of the 

September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, and in the years 

to come growing economic complementarities and strategic necessities may well drive India closer to the United States. 

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks the United States 

dramatically altered its policy toward Pakistan. Prior to these attacks 

Pakistan had all but been consigned to the status of a rogue state. 

The exigencies of prosecuting a war against Osama bin Ladenís al 

Qaeda and their hosts, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, led 

American policymakers to reestablish a more cordial and robust 

diplomatic and strategic relationship with Pakistan. U.S. 

policymakers, however, appeared cognizant that forging these new 

bonds with Pakistan could easily rent asunder their recent and 

tenuous efforts to build firmer ties to India. 

Toward this end the Bush administration appeared at pains to 
371

emphasize the common interest of India and Pakistan to combat 

terrorism. Accordingly, when on December 26 Secretary of State 

Colin Powell placed the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed 

on the list of foreign terrorist organizations, he was at pains to 

emphasize that these two entities were threatening the peace 

between India and Pakistan. Such a formulation, of course, stemmed 

from the exigencies of maintaining a working relationship with 

Pakistan. Even as Powell carefully sought to distance Americaís ally 

of convenience from these two noxious groups, reliable reports in the 

American media showed that they were still operating with 

impunity from within Pakistan.23 In large measure, the future of the 

American strategic relationship will be shaped by the U.S. ability to 

address Pakistanís obsession with Kashmir while simultaneously 

tackling Indiaís misgivings about Pakistanís ties to the most vicious 

insurgents operating within Indian-controlled Kashmir. 

The economic complementarities between India and the U.S. are 

obvious. Indiaís ability to promote economic development depends 

critically on its ability to attract foreign direct investment, not only in 

consumer durables and manufacturing but also in critical 

infrastructural sectors such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications. American firms can play a vital role in all three sectors, 

the still-unfolding energy-development debacle involving Houstonbased Enron notwithstanding.24 Even at its present rate of economic 

growth, which is hovering around 6 percent per annum, Indiaís 

energy needs are burgeoning. If the paucity of energy is not to 

remain a bottleneck for growth, India will have to seek investment in 

a range of new energy-efficient technologies, reform existing 

distribution mechanisms, and develop new sources of power.25 

The United States is already the principal source of foreign 

investment in India. Additionally, a number of prominent American 

manufacturing and service companies, ranging from General Electric 

to American Express, have a significant presence in India. Between 

April 1991 and May 2000, India approved a total sum of $60.3 billion 
372

in foreign direct investment, out of which $22 billion was of 

American origin.26 Despite this seemingly positive outlook, from the 

American standpoint, the India-U.S. economic relationship has yet to 

realize much of its potential. American investment in India as a 

percentage of global U.S. investment remains miniscule. 

Of course, if India can continue on the path to economic 

liberalization that it undertook in 1991, its potential can be realized 

in large measure. Such a prospect is hardly chimerical, but it will 

entail the reinvigoration of Indiaís mostly stalled economic reform 

program with a focus on labor laws, regulatory practices, and 

investment in the social sectors.27 Here, India must capitalize on its 

comparative advantages. Unlike China, India has three distinct 

advantages that can be effectively tapped if the present and future 

regimes can formulate and implement a more coherent economic 

policy environment. First, despite the legacies of the Nehruvian 

variant of Fabian socialism, popularly referred to as the ìlicense, 

permit, quota raj,î capitalist enterprise is hardly alien to India. 

Second, India does not lack in managerial and entrepreneurial talent. 

And finally, despite its glacial pace and corruption at lower levels, 

India does have a working judiciary; the rule of law in India, while 

imperfect, is a far cry from what prevails in China.28 

The other area in which U.S. and Indian interests converge 

relates to the future role of China in Asia.29 Contrary to a popular 

belief held in certain American academic and policymaking circles, 

China, not Pakistan, remains the principal bête noire of Indian 

security. Indiaís stated anxieties about China do not constitute mere 

boilerplate; any dispassionate assessment of the evidence inexorably 

leads to the conclusion that India harbors legitimate security 

concerns from a resurgent China. To begin with, the memories of the 

1962 border war still haunt the psyche of Indian elites, nor has the 

blatant Chinese support for the Naga and Mizo insurgents 

throughout the 1970s and early 1980s been forgotten. More recently, 

Indiaís leaders remain understandably concerned about Chinaís 
373

willingness to provide nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 

technologies to Pakistan.30 Finally, they also remain unsettled not 

simply by Chinaís refusal to settle the Himalayan border dispute but 

by Chinaís expanding claims in the eastern sector of the disputed 

border.31 

For a stretch of the Cold War both the United States and India 

saw China as a potential adversary. Their views diverged significantly after the U.S. decision to normalize relations with China in the 

1970s, when Washington made common cause with China to contain 

the Soviet Union. India, fearing a continued Chinese threat, aligned 

with the Soviets. The two sides found themselves particularly at 

odds during the Afghan war years, when both the United States and 

China, to varying degrees, assisted the Afghan mujahideen while 

India resorted to considerable semantic contortions to avoid a public 

condemnation of the Soviet invasion and occupation of 

Afghanistan.32 

U.S. relations with China, despite differences on a number of 

political and strategic issues including nonproliferation, global 

environmental change, trade, and human rights, remain mostly 

robust.33 On the other hand, despite two carefully calibrated agreements between India and China to maintain ìpeace and tranquilityî 

along their disputed border, the Sino-Indian relationship remains 

fundamentally adversarial. The divergence in Indiaís and the United 

Statesí respective relationships with China, however, may change in 

the future. 

Perceived strategic vulnerabilities and opportunities may also 

drive India and the United States closer despite the ideological 

baggage of the past. A debate is currently raging within the United 

States about how best to deal with a rising China. One school of 

thought suggests that conflict between China and the United States 

is all but inevitable.34 Another group suggests that planning for 

conflict with China may create a security dilemma for China and 
374

result in a self-fulfilling prophecy. This second group suggests that 

to avoid a clash with China it is necessary to enmesh it in a thick web 

of multilateral agreements, treaties, and normative frameworks.35

The current administration in Washington appears to have adherents 

of both camps in its midst. 

Those policymakers who fear a revanchist China would like to 

use India as a possible counterweight in Asia, even though they are 

extremely careful in stating as much for fear of arousing Indian 

anxieties.36 Apart from this concern about keeping watch on expanding Chinese power and the surrounding uncertainty about Chinaís 

long-term strategic goals, India and the United States share other 

strategic and material interests, including combating terrorism, 

reducing piracy on the high seas, and ensuring access to the sealanes 

to and from the vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf . Simultaneously, although India could benefit from U.S. assistance and 

cooperation in these areas, it could offer the U.S. military invaluable 

assistance derived from its extensive experience in global peacekeeping operations, jungle counterinsurgency, and high-altitude warfare.37 Cognizant of these possible areas of cooperation, the Bush 

administration has taken some steps to court India and has chosen to 

overlook the vexed issue of Indiaís pursuit of its nuclear and ballistic 

missile programs. This shift stands in marked contrast to the Clinton 

administration, for which the nonproliferation issue was virtually an 

idée fixe.38 

Yet the United States must proceed with a degree of 

circumspection in its attempts to court India. Few, if any, Indian 

decisionmakers would wish to serve as a strategic surrogate for the 

United States in Asia and participate in an overt attempt to contain 

Chinese power. The atavistic desire for autonomy at all costs will 

ensure that such an alignment does not materialize. These 

misgivings should not preclude the United States from playing the 

role of a reliable, ìoff shore balancer,î keeping Chinese threats at 

bay. Such a posture would be in keeping with the U.S. role as a 
375

powerful hegemon determined to prevent a new rival from 

dominating a significant portion of the Asian landmass.39 

This posture may well be acceptable to Indian elites. It is also 

consistent with the emerging military-to-military cooperation 

between India and the United States.40 Among other matters, in July 

2001, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry H. Shelton 

visited India to discuss the scope of increased military cooperation 

with India. He was the highest-ranking American defense official to 

visit India since the Pokhran nuclear tests of May 1998. During his 

visit, Shelton informed his Indian counterparts that the Bush 

administration was about to reinstate the Defense Policy Group 

(DPG), a forum for regular, senior military-to-military discussions 

that had been suspended after May 1998. 

The events of September 11 and its aftermath held the potential 

for unraveling the incipient military relationship with India. 

However, the Bush administration appeared determined to broaden 

military-to-military contacts with India despite its new relationship 

with Pakistan. Accordingly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 

visited India on November 5 and met with his Indian counterpart, 

George Fernandes.41 During this visit it is believed that Rumsfeld 

expressed a willingness to provide India with the long-embargoed 

GE-404 engines which India needs for its long-delayed Light Combat 

Aircraft project. On November 28, Admiral Dennis Blair, 

Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, traveled to India. 

During his visit he discussed the conduct of joint military exercises, 

cooperation on combating terrorism and increasing military contacts. 

Subsequent to his visit the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group met for 

the first time in 3 years in New Delhi. The DPG discussed such 

matters as the transfer of American weapons technology to India, the 

initiation of joint military exercises and nuclear proliferation.42 

Theoretical work in the field of international relations also 

provides modest support for an India-U.S. alignment in the future, 
376

especially as India contemplates an increasingly hostile China on the 

horizon. For India, China poses the greatest long-term threat along a 

variety of dimensions. More to the point, Chinaís increasing 

aggregate power, its geographic proximity, its growing offensive 

power, and its aggressive intentions all conspire to drive India 

toward aligning with the United States.43 In terms of aggregate 

power, India is considerably weaker than China. In 1999, its gross 

domestic product (GDP) was $440 billion and its per capita GDP in 

purchasing power parity terms was $1,800. The comparable figures 

for China were $732 billion and $4,000, respectively. 

In terms of military prowess, China also fares far better than 

India. The total manpower of the Indian army, for instance, is 1.1 

million as of 2001, whereas China fields an army of 1.7 million.44

Additionally, it should be underscored that the Indian army, unlike 

that of the Chinese, deploys a significant portion of its troops in 

counterinsurgency and border control operations in Kashmir 

(estimates run as high as 250,000), thereby degrading Indiaís 

defensive capabilities vis-‡-vis China. Other military indicators also 

favor China. India has no known deployed nuclear-missile delivery 

capabilities, although they are in the process of developing such 

capabilities.45 China, on the other hand, has at least 20 operational 

intercontinental ballistic missiles, more than 100 intermediate-range 

ballistic missiles, and a growing number of submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles.46 The program of military modernization that 

China has undertaken will steadily contribute to its offensive 

capabilities; this program may well be boosted in response to Indiaís 

modest but expanding nuclear capabilities, especially in the 

aftermath of the Pokhran tests.47 

It is not just Chinaís potential that Indians fear. Chinaís hostile 

actions and intractable negotiating posture send disturbing signals to 

its southern neighbor. In Indian calculations China stands in 

occupation of some 14,500 square miles of Indian territory that 

Chinese troops seized during the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. 
377

Additionally, China still claims a stretch of territory along the 

Tawang Tract in the eastern sector. And Chinaís aggressive 

intentions are hardly difficult to fathom from the Indian point of 

view. Given the tenacity with which China has pursued its other 

irredentist claims, ranging from Taiwan to the Spratly Islands, only 

the most sanguine Indian decisionmaker would be inclined to think 

that the day of reckoning on the disputed Himalayan territories can 

be indefinitely postponed. Indeed powerful fears of nuclear 

blackmail from China over the territorial disputes contributed to 

Indiaís decision to cross the nuclear Rubicon in 1998.48 

Potential Pitfalls. Apart from the residual misgivings of Indian 

elites, two other issues hang over a potentially closer Indo-American 

military-strategic relationship. The first, in a way the obverse of the 

Indian obsession with strategic and political autonomy, is somewhat 

amorphous but nevertheless significant. Key members of the U.S. 

strategic and diplomatic communities still deeply resent the Indian 

moral posturing and hypocrisy during the Cold War years. These 

individuals are still rankled by Indiaís unwillingness to support the 

U.S. anti-communist crusade during the Cold War. Yet these 

residual and atavistic misgivings can be dissipated if India shows a 

continuing dexterity in side-stepping contentious new bilateral 

issues. The Indian willingness to avoid needless acrimony over 

Washingtonís planned national missile defense system suggests that 

Indian diplomacy, long ham-handed, may finally have come of age. 

The other issue that still divides the two states is the question of 

nuclear nonproliferation. There is little question that the Bush 

administration has taken a markedly different view than its 

predecessor held of the nonproliferation issue in its quest to improve 

relations with India. In late August 2001 it signaled its willingness to 

lift a variety of sanctions that were imposed on India by the Clinton 

administration in the aftermath of the Pokhran tests.49 Nevertheless, 

this issue cannot be dismissed; powerful bureaucratic and political 

constituencies on both sides hold markedly different views on this 
378

subject and remain fairly intractable in their positions. 

Again, adroit diplomacy on both sides can bridge the 

nonproliferation divide. This may be especially possible during the 

Bush administration, which has shown little regard for strict 

compliance with a variety of multilateral arms-control treaties. If 

Indiaís pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles does not 

fundamentally threaten American interests, it may not be necessary 

to compel India to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which 

has long been a bugaboo in U.S.-India relations. Indeed, Indiaís longdecried policies now may even be seen as in concert with longerterm American interests.50 

CONCLUSION 

Given the external threats that India is likely to face in 2020 an 

alignment with the United States may well be the most attractive 

option to balance against such threats.51 Structural conditions, in all 

likelihood, will direct India toward an alignment with the United 

States. Nevertheless, other, domestic-level factors may vitiate the 

possibilities of the formation of such a relationship. From the 

standpoint of 2002 the positive trends in India-U.S. relations may 

appear obvious. Nevertheless, such trends may, for a variety of 

factors, not be sustained. 

Neorealist premises suggest that in the absence of adequate 

domestic resources states frequently seek to address threats through 

the creation of alliances. Nevertheless, Indian elites may decide, 

given their predilection for decisionmaking autonomy, that they 

would rather rely on self-help than court American support. They 

may also find the United States to be overly hasty, demanding, and 

overbearing. The United States, with its proclivity for quick results 

and rapid movement, may also find Indian decisionmaking to be too 

hesitant, slothful, dilatory, and ultimately tiresome.52 
379

Certain domestic groups within India, many of which are still 

moved by professions of Third World solidarity and remain 

slavishly pro-Chinese, may also seek to prevent a closer IndoAmerican relationship, especially in the military sphere.53 Ironically, 

the ideological left wing in India may make common cause with 

Hindu zealots in opposing an alignment with the United States. The 

Hindu fanatics are hostile toward an Indo-American alliance on the 

grounds of cultural nationalism. An Indian embrace of America, in 

their view, would corrode the pristine quality of Indiaís unique 

cultural ethos.54 All these caveats notwithstanding, the two sides 

remain poised for a possible dramatic breakthrough in relations that 

could lead them to an out-and-out alliance by 2020. 

ENDNOTES 

1. For a broader discussion, see Sumit Ganguly, ìSouth Asia After the Cold 

War,î Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4, Autumn 1992, pp. 173-84. Also see 

Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 

2001. 

2. Many of these themes are ably explored in Ramesh Thakur, The Politics of 

India’s Foreign and Economic Policies, London: C. Hurst, 1994. 

3. For an early discussion of the preference of authoritative regimes on the 

part of weaker states in the international system, see Stephen D. Krasner, Structural 

Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, Berkeley: University of 

California Press, 1985. 

4. The security alignment with the Soviet Union was not without cost. Many 

Indian commentators underscored that the relationship compromised nonalignment. For one such critique, see Surinder Nihal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear: Story 

of Indo-Soviet Relations, New Delhi : Allied, 1986. 

5. For the best discussion of Sino-Indian tensions and rivalry, see John W. 

Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, Seattle: 

University of Washington Press, 2001. 

6. ìIt is a mantra that we will have to keep repeating, but frankly whom are 

you going to be non-aligned against?î Interview with I. K. Gujral, New York City, 
380

1992. 

7. On this subject, see Jagdish Bhagwati, India in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon 

Press, 1993). 

8. See Rajeev Bhargava, ed., Secularism and Its Critics, New Delhi: Oxford 

University Press, 1998; also see Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War: Religious 

Fundamentalism Confronts the Secular State, Berkeley: University of California Press, 

1993. 

9. On this point, see Jaswant Singh, Defending India, New Delhi: Oxford 

University Press, 1999; also see Kanti Bajpai, ìIndia: Modified Structuralism,î in 

Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, 

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 

10. For a non-polemical account of the origins of the Indian nuclear weapons 

program, see Sumit Ganguly, ìIndiaís Pathway to Pokhran II: The Sources and 

Prospects of Indiaís Nuclear Weapons Program,î International Security, Vol. 23, No. 

4, Spring 1999, pp. 148-177. For a superb discussion of the likely future of the 

Indian nuclear weapons program, see Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear 

Posture: Between Recessed Deterrence and Ready Arsenal, Santa Monica: RAND, 2001. 

11. For Indiaís willingness to use force, see Cohen, India: Emerging Power. 

12. Perhaps the most acerbic formulations were those of V. K. Krishna Menon, 

a close confidant of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Indiaís defense minister 

until the debacle of the 1962 border war with China. On this point, see Michael 

Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World, New York: 

Praeger, 1968. 

13. For a liberal view, see Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, New York: 

John Day, 1946; for a conservative assessment that stresses Indiaís lack of military 

preparedness, see Singh, Defending India. 

14. On this point, see Francine Frankel, India’s Political Economy: The Gradual 

Revolution, 19 47-1977, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. 

15. On the Indian quest for ìself-relianceî in the realm of defense production, 

see Raju G. C. Thomas, The Defence of India: A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and 

Politics, Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1978. 

16. For the concept of the ìoperational code,î see Alexander George, ìThe 
381

Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to Decisionmaking,î in Frederic Fleron, 

Jr., Erik P. Hoffman and Robbin F. Laird, eds., Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy, 

New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991. 

17. For two useful discussions, see Edward Friedman and Barrett L. 

McCormick, eds., W hat if China Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace, 

Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2000; and David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds. 

China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism, London: Routledge, 1994. 

18. Arun Mohanty, ìIndia, Russia to step up defense cooperation,î India 

Abroad, June 15, 2001, p. 4. Indiaís dependence on the Russians is easily explainable. At the Cold Warís end, close to 85 percent of Indiaís naval assets were of 

Soviet origin. The two other branches of the Indian armed services were also 

dependent to varying degrees on continued supplies of Russian weaponry, again 

due primarily to the large existing inventories of Russian military equipment. See 

Jerome M. Conley, Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Lessons and 

Options for U.S. Policy in South Asia, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 

19. Aziz Haniffa, ìU.S. deputy secretary to explain NMD in New Delhi,î India 

Abroad, May 11, 2001, p. 4; also see Subhash Agrawal, ìNMD: Indiaís Curious 

Response,î Far Eastern Economic Review, June 14, 2001, p. 34. 

20. Linda Racioppi, Soviet Policy Towards South Asia Since 1970, Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 50-51. 

21. For one such discussion, see Stratforís Global Intelligence Update, ìAsian 

Alliance on the Horizon,î October 14, 1999, available at: http://www.stratfors.com. 

22. This was made amply clear by the Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs 

for Asia, during a briefing in Beijing to the author and a group of other American 

academics in July 2001. 

23. John F. Burns, ìKashmirís Islamic Guerillas See Little to Fear From U.S.,î 

New York Times, December 24, 2001, p. A1. 

24. Celia Dugger, ìU.S. Envoy Extols India, Accepting Its Atom Status,î New 

York Times, September 7, 2001, p. A7. 

25. Jaideep Singh and Teresita Schaffer, ìIndiaís Energy Outlook,î South Asia 

Monitor, No. 37, September 1, 2001. 

26. Embassy of India, ìIndia-U.S. Economic Relations,î August 2000, available 
382

at: http://www.Indianembassy.com. 

27. On this point, see Sumit Ganguly and T. N. Srinivasan, ìOpen Up to 

Competition,î Times of India, August 15, 2001. 

28. Craig S. Smith, ìChinese Fight Crime with Torture and Executions,î New 

York Times, September 9, 2001, p. 1. 

29. Jim Hoagland, ìRethinking Asia in Indiaís Favor,î Washington Post, July 1, 

2001, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com. 

30. J. Mohan Malik, ìChina-India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The 

Continuing Rivalry,î China Quarterly, No. 142, June 1995. 

31. The best account of perceived Indian strategic vulnerabilities can be found 

in Garver, Protracted Contest. 

32. For a useful discussion of the Indian position on the Soviet invasion of 

Afghanistan and its consequences for India, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan 

Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Power, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1987. 

33. David Murphy, ìBehind the Smiles,î Far Eastern Economic Review, August 

9, 2001, pp. 18-19. 

34. On this point, see Ross H. Munro and Richard Bernstein, The Coming 

Conflict with China, New York: Knopf, 1997; for a more nuanced and measured 

view, see Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand 

Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, Santa Monica: RAND, 2000; also see John J. 

Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W. W. Norton, 2001. 

35. David Bachman, ìThe United States and China: Rhetoric and Reality,î 

Current History, Vol. 100, No. 647, September 2001, pp. 257-262; also see the 

particularly strident critique of the Bush administrationís China policy in Lanxin 

Xiang, ìWashingtonís Misguided China Policy,î Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 

2001, pp. 7-23; and the thoughtful response from David Shambaugh, ìChina or 

America: Which Is the Revisionist Power?î Ibid, pp. 25-30. 

36. See Jane Perlez, ìU.S. Ready to End Sanctions on India to Build an 

Alliance,î New York Times, August 27, 2001, available at http://www.newyorktimes. 

com. 

37. Alan Sipress, ìU.S. Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India,î Washington Post, 
383

August 12, 2001, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com. 

38. For a forceful statement of the Clinton administrationís position on nuclear 

weapons and ballistic missiles in South Asia, see Strobe Talbott, ìDealing with the 

Bomb in South Asia,î Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, March/April 1999. 

39. For a discussion of the role of an ìoffshore balancer,î see Mearsheimer, 

Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 42. 

40. ìThaw in U.S.-Indian Military Ties,î Far Eastern Economic Review, May 17, 

2001, p. 10; and personal communication with Colonel Steven Sboto, American 

military student at the National War College, New Delhi, August 2001. 

41. Wade Boese,ì U.S., India Discussing Arms Deals, Military Ties,î Arms 

Control Today, Vol. 31, No. 10, December 2001, p. 25; also see Josy Joseph, ì7 US 

firms get OK for Arms Sales to India,î India Abroad, December 14, 2001, p.18. 

42. Joanna Slater and Murray Hiebert, ìAmericaís Other Friend,î Far Eastern 

Economic Review, December 20, 2001, pp. 16-17; also see Joint Statement of the U.S.-

India Defense Policy Group, December 5, 2001 available at: http://usinfo.state.gov. 

43. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of alliances, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 

1987, pp. 22-28. 

44. Figures derived from International Institute of Strategic Studies [ IISS], The 

Military Balance 2000-2001, London: IISS, 2001, pp. 168, 194. 

45. On this point, see the discussion in Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture. 

46. IISS, The Military Balance 2000-2001, p. 194. 

47. For a discussion of Chinese politico-military reactions to the Indian tests, 

see Ming Zhang, China’s Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian 

Nuclear Tests, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999. 

48. For a nuanced discussion of the Indian fears of Chinese nuclear blackmail, 

see Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, pp. 142-146. 

49. Aziz Haniffa, ìNo time frame for withdrawal of US sanctions,î India 

Abroad, August 24, 2001, p. 1. 

50. It is unlikely that the Bush administration would expend significant, if any, 
384

resources to urge India to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), given 

its own misgivings about the CTBT regime. 

51. On this point, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 

52. For a thoughtful discussion of potential pitfalls, see Scott Baldauf, ìU.S. 

and China Dance with India,î Christian Science Monitor, April 19, 2001, available at: 

http://www.csps.com. 

53. A quick perusal of the pages of two influential Indian periodicals, Frontline 

and the Economic and Political Weekly, would reveal the degree of rabid antiAmericanism that exists among the political left in India. 

54. A sampling of the sentiments of the Hindu cultural nationalists can be 

derived from The Organizer. See http://www.organizer.com. 
385

CHAPTER 15 

THE FUTURE OF THE SINO-PAKISTANI 

ENTENTE CORDIALE 

John W. Garver 

Introduction 

The strategic partnership between the Peopleís Republic of China 

(PRC) and Pakistan has been a remarkably enduring relationship. It 

was founded on an understanding reached by Chinese and Pakistani 

leaders at the Bandung conference of African and Asian nations in 

1955óa time when Pakistan was closely allied with the United States 

and China with the Soviet Union. The partnership solidified in the 

early 1960s as China and India moved toward war. It was first 

ìtested by adversityî during the India-Pakistan war of 1965. It was 

tested again, in a different fashion, during the 1971 partition of 

Pakistan by India during which China remained virtually inactive 

militarily. Nonetheless, the partnership not only survived, but was 

strengthened by large-scale Chinese assistance which helped 

Pakistan recover from the calamity of partition. The Sino-Pakistani 

entente emerged when China saw the U.S. as its major enemy, yet 

remained vital after the U.S. became Chinaís quasi-ally and the USSR 

became Chinaís global nemesis. Within Pakistan, both military juntas 

and elected civilian governments remained committed to the 

partnership with China and saw it as a key element of Pakistanís 

international policy. Within China, the partnership with Pakistan 

emerged during a period of ultra-radical Maoism, was carefully 

protected by Mao from the zeal of his Red Guard minions, and yet 

continued under the across-the-board retreat from revolutionary 

causes carried out under Deng Xiaoping. Pragmatic and 

development-oriented, Deng continued Chinaís covert support for 

Pakistanís nuclear weapons development efforts begun by 
386

revolutionary and upheaval-loving Mao Zedong. 

The questions addressed by this chapter are these. How has the 

Sino-Pakistani partnership changed as Sino-Indian rapprochement 

gained steam after 1988? Has the improvement of Sino-Indian 

relations meant evisceration of the Sino-Pakistani strategic 

partnership, or is it likely to? Similarly, has the emergence of Islamic 

terrorism, both before and after the attacks of September 11, 2001, led 

to a weakening of the Sino-Pakistani partnership? Finally, this 

chapter will speculate about whether the Sino-Pakistani entente will 

persist into the second decade of the 21st century, i.e., to the period 

circa 2020. 

To answer these questions, it is first necessary to specify exactly 

what is meant by the terms strategic partnership, entente cordiale, and 

ententeóterms that are used synonymously and interchangeably in 

the following discussion. The phenomenon that these terms refer to 

is the Sino-Pakistani relationship that developed between about 1964 

and at least 1988. There were three aspects of that relationship: 1) 

Chinese support for Pakistan in the latterís various conflicts with 

India; 2) Chinese support for Pakistani efforts to develop national 

strengthóincluding economic and military componentsóadequate 

to resist Indian domination; and 3) frequent high-level consultations 

essential to reaching and maintaining understanding between 

leadership elites. Understood in this fashion, the Sino-Pakistani 

entente can be operationalized to include the following elements: 

● Chinese political support for Pakistani initiatives directed 

against India, including those regarding Kashmir; 

● frequent military-to-military exchanges between China and 

Pakistan; 

● frequent high-level exchanges of civilian leaders; 
387

● Chinese transfer of critical military technologies to Pakistan; 

● Chinese support for development of Pakistanís militaryindustrial base; 

● Chinese support for expansion of Pakistanís regional links; 

● Chinese transfers of conventional arms to Pakistan; 

● deterrent support for Pakistan during confrontations with 

India. 

The question thus becomes: will relations between the Peopleís 

Republic of China (PRC) and Pakistan in these areas continue over 

the next two decades? This chapter approaches the problem in three 

ways. 

First, it will consider the impact of the U.S.-led war against 

terrorism on the Chinese-Pakistan relationship. Did the campaign 

against Islamic fundamentalist terrorism launched after the 

September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States foster trends that 

could either stabilize or destabilize the Sino-Pakistani entente? 

Assuming that trends set in motion by the events following 

September 11 will continue for some time, this chapter asks: will 

those trends work to undermine, or to reinforce, the Sino-Pakistani 

entente? For simplicityís sake, the complex of events beginning on 

September 11, 2001, will be referred to in this chapter simply as 

ì9/11.î 

Second, this chapter will analyze whether changes in world 

politics that unfolded after the end of the Cold War circa 1989 have 

undermined or are likely to undermine the strategic partnership 

between China and Pakistan. The premise underlying this approach 

is that the key political trends that have influenced Sino-Pakistani 

ties since the end of the Cold War will continue to do so into the 
388

period circa 2020. Two major post-Cold War trends are posited as 

relevant: 1) Sino-Indian rapprochement and, 2) increasing Islamic 

transnational militancy in Central Asia (a region defined here to 

include Afghanistan, the five post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, 

and Chinaís Xinjiang). Under the impact of these two trends, are we 

now witnessing, or will we soon witness, the withering away of the 

Sino-Pakistani entente? 

Third, this chapter will speculate about the Sino-Pakistani 

relationship circa 2020, and about how various factors might 

influence that relationship. The key assumption underlying this 

section is that it is China’s interests, and not those of Pakistan, that 

will be decisive. As the weaker partner in the Sino-Pakistani entente, 

and one locked in confrontation with a far more powerful India, 

Pakistanís interest in securing the greatest possible level of Chinese 

support is assumed to remain constant. Chinaís interests, however, 

will be assumed to be potentially far more variable. 

Finally, let me preview for the reader the hypothesis structuring 

the following analysis. My argument is that, while the Sino-Pakistani 

entente has been modified in important ways by post-Cold War 

developments, it remains stable at its core. Conceivably the 

conclusions of analysis along the three approaches outlined above 

could point in different directions. Happily this is not the case. 

Analysis along the three different approaches all point toward the 

same conclusion: the continuing durability of the Sino-Pakistani 

entente. The broad structure of the argument developed in the 

following pages can be schematically outlined as shown in Figure 1. 

Arrows represent inferred causation. 

This chapter argues against the proposition that the SinoPakistani entente cordiale has been fundamentally weakened by postCold War developments. It will argue that under a surface of everchanging political events there still remains an ineluctable 

congruence of Chinese and Pakistani geostrategic interests vis-‡-vis 
389

Figure 1. 

India, that leaders in both Beijing and Islamabad recognize this, and 

that there continues to be considerable stability in the Sino-Pakistani 

strategic partnership. Beijingís desire for rapprochement with New 

Delhi has indeed introduced new elements into the delicate relations 

of Beijing, New Delhi, and Islamabad. There have been some 

significant modifications in the Sino-Pakistani entente as Sino-Indian 

rapprochement has developed during the post-Cold War period. But 

the core of the old Sino-Pakistani partnership, convergent interests 

vis-‡-vis Indiaís position in South Asia, remains unchangedóand is 

likely to remain unchanged through 2020. 

The Sino-Pakistani Entente and the South Asian Balance of Power. 

The foundation of the enduring Sino-Pakistani entente is Chinaís 

interest in maintaining the existing balance of power in South Asia, 

that is, in maintaining a balance between Pakistan and India. 

Beijingís interests are best served by maintaining a fragmented 

structure of power in South Asia, by ensuring, in other words, that 

India remains confronted by an independent-minded Pakistan with 

aggregate national capabilities sufficient to defy India and pose 

significant security challenges to it. It is in Chinaís interest to keep 

Pakistan strong enough to remain independent of Indian 
390

domination, and independent-minded enough to challenge Indiaís 

domination of South Asia. This fundamental geostrategic interest has 

not changed with the end of the Cold War. Nor is it likely to change 

for the foreseeable future. 

Chinese analysts tend to frame this problem, and Chinese 

interests, in terms of Indiaís desire for regional hegemony over South 

Asia. According to this world view, India desires to establish its 

hegemony across the South Asian region, and therefore insists that 

the various countries of South Asia respect what India defines as its 

security interests in that region. Chinaís support for the antihegemony aspirations and struggles of Pakistan and other South 

Asian countries conforms to the highest principles of national 

sovereignty and independence, Chinaís leaders believe. It also 

conforms to Chinaís own national interests. Indian subordination of 

Pakistan would free Indian leaders from fears of, and the consequent 

need to plan for, a two-front war with China and Pakistan. Since 

1962 Indian military planners have had to operate on the basis of an 

assumption that Pakistan might decide to enter a major India-China 

war, or that China might similarly decide to come to Pakistanís aid 

in the event of a major India-Pakistan war. Effective Indian 

subordination of Pakistan would end this two-front concern, 

allowing India to concentrate its forces and attentions against China. 

The difficulties confronted by the PLA with the prospect of fighting 

a war across the Tibetan plateau are already quite substantial. 

Eliminating strong Pakistani forces from the order of battle facing 

India would further increase the PLAís difficulties. 

This proposition is not merely one inferred by this American 

analyst. It is one that appears repeatedly, in one fashion or another, 

in Chinese analyses. An article in the prominent Chinese neoconservative journal Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) in 

2001, for example, argued that although India aspired to become a 

great, global power, its circumstances were such that it would 

probably not achieve that goal. Fundamental conditions accepted by 
391

Indiaís own leaders at the time of Indian independence worked 

against Indiaís achievement of global stature. One of two fundamental mistakes made by Indiaís leaders in 1947 was acceptance ìof 

the division between India and Pakistan arranged by the English.î 

This partition had ìled to a state of long-term division and mutual 

exhaustion between India and Pakistan.î This, along with Indiaís 

other ìmistake,î acceptance of the British parliamentary style of 

democracy, constituted an ìalmost insurmountable obstacleî to 

realization of Indiaís dream.1 

Another article published in a PRC provincial paper at about the 

same time repeated the same idea. India viewed China as a latent 

strategic opponent and was locked into a stalemated territorial 

dispute with China, the paper argued. Yet it was unlikely that India 

would become aggressive toward China because, ìTo Indiaís west is 

the hated enemy Pakistan and Indiaís aggregate strength is not 

sufficient for a contest with Chinaî (songti guoli you wufa tong 

Zhongguo xiang kangheng). This, combined with Indiaís memory of its 

defeat in 1962, meant that Indiaís ìstrategic policyî toward China 

would probably continue to be a defensive one of ìprotecting 

present interests.î India wanted to delay the ìfinal contestî with 

China until its western problem of Pakistan had been solved.2

Addressing the issue of Chinese support for Pakistanís military 

development efforts, Beijing University South Asian specialist Han 

Hua commented that ìChina sees a weak Pakistan as destabilizing 

for the [South Asian] region.î3 

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraff the issue similarly during 

Premier Zhu Rongjiís May 2001 visit to Pakistan. In an exclusive 

interview with Xinhua News Agency on the eve of Zhuís visit, 

Musharraf said that by sending ìa strong signal of the continuing 

strength and durabilityî of Sino-Pakistan cooperation, the upcoming 

visit would have a positive impact on peace and stability in South 

Asia. Pakistan, and China worked together to contribute to regional 

peace and stability, Musharraf said.4 At a joint press conference after 
392

three hours discussion with Zhu, Musharraf said that despite 

whatever geostrategic and global political changes might occur, 

Sino-Pakistani friendship would remain strong and unbreakable. 

Responding to a question about India’s increasing defenses pending, 

Zhu Rongji replied ìvery forcefullyî that Sino-Pakistani cooperation 

in a number of fields, ìincluding military,î would continue.5

Musharraf framed the issue a bit more directly in a seminar on SinoPakistani friendship in the 21st century organized by Pakistanís 

Institute of Strategic Studies during Zhuís visit. To that seminar, 

Musharraf argued that Pakistanís interest lay in maintaining regional 

balance, and that it desired China to play an active role in this 

regard. ìRegional imbalanceî could threaten peace by encouraging 

regional hegemonistic tendencies. Chinaís ambassador to Pakistan, 

Lu Shulin, said that strengthening Pakistan was Chinaís established 

policy, and that this would not change.6 

Impact of the Post-9/11 War against Terrorism on the SinoPakistani Relationship. 

Post-9/11 events constituted a windfall for Chinaís interests in 

South Asia. First and foremost, Pakistan was brought out of 

deepening international isolation and back under the wing of U.S. 

patronage. By 2000, Pakistanís links with and support from the 

United States and its key allies had collapsed under the cumulative 

weight of Islamabadís nuclear weapons programs, its links with the 

Taliban, and the 1999 military overthrow of Nawaz Sharifís elected 

civilian government. The end to U.S. support combined with 

deepening economic and social problems within Pakistan to create a 

dangerous situation for China. Pakistanís comprehensive national 

strength might decline so precipitously that it would succumb to 

Indian domination. Were Pakistan to collapse economically, 

fragment along ethnic and regional lines, disintegrate into pervasive 

crime and/or religious extremism, or become unable to sustain 

defenses pending adequate to keep up with India, Pakistan might 

become unable to resist Indian pressure. Pakistan might be 
393

compelled to resign itself to living under Indiaís sway. The existing 

balance of power in South Asia between India and Pakistan would 

thus be overturned. 

Under pre-9/11 conditions, the burden of preventing this from 

happening by sustaining Pakistani capabilities to resist Indian 

domination fell largely on China. In the event of an India-Pakistan 

confrontation in which India seemed bent on a definitive 

subordination of Pakistan, Beijing would probably have given 

Pakistan all support short of belligerencyósupply of munitions, 

support in the United Nations and other world political fora, 

threatening words combined with ominous actions along the border, 

and so on. Were such moves inadequate to sustain Pakistan, Beijing 

would have faced a major dilemma: war with India, or overthrow of 

the existing South Asian balance of power favorable to China. Either 

course would have been costly and risky for China. A revolution in 

the South Asian balance via Pakistanís acceptance of Indian 

preeminence would have seriously adverse consequences for China. 

It would enhance Indian military capabilities and Indian strategic 

confidence regarding Tibet. It would strengthen Indiaís ability to 

compete with China on the global scene. And it would stunt the 

future development of Chinese ties with the other small countries of 

South Asia. The political lesson of Indian subordination of Pakistan 

would be: if even the most powerful South Asian nation other than 

India, Pakistan, could not resist New Delhi, what chance did smaller 

countries have? On the other hand, a war with India could easily 

become protracted, disrupt Chinaís economic development drive, 

and rouse apprehensions about China among all its neighbors. 

The renewal of U.S. patronage to Pakistan after September 11 

ended the previous period of dangerous Pakistani exclusive 

dependence on China and consequent Chinese vulnerability. Once 

again Pakistan became an important ally of the United States: it 

began receiving U.S. economic support and could call on a degree of 

U.S. political support. China was no longer Pakistanís only 
394

supporter among the major powers. This was an important if fortuitous gain for Beijing. It removed a lot of pressure which might 

otherwise have destabilized the Sino-Pakistani entente. 

U.S. re-engagement with Pakistan after September 11 also served 

Chinaís interest in keeping India away from alignment with the 

United States. By the end of 1999 Chinese analysts had perceived a 

major shift in U.S. South Asian policy, viewing the United States as 

tilting toward India as a way of containing China. President Bill 

Clintonís visit to India and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayeeís 

visit to the United States, in March and October 2000 respectively, 

were seen as reinforcing this development.7 U.S. re-engagement with 

Pakistan after 9/11 countered this dangerous trend of U.S. alignment 

with India. Moreover, renewal of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance angered 

India and created new problems for India-U.S. relations by putting 

the United States in the middle of India-Pakistan relations. It also 

made it more difficult for the U.S. to deny Pakistan support in the 

face of Indian pressure. In addition, the renewal of U.S. support for 

Pakistan eased the onus Beijing bore in New Delhi because of 

Chinaís support for Pakistan. Chinaís support for Pakistan was no 

longer an anomaly, but, Beijing could argue, part of a broad trend in 

the international community. How could New Delhi object to strong 

Chinese support for Pakistan when even the United States provided 

such support? Indian anger and pressure would thus be less focused 

on China and seem less reasonable. India would also have less 

incentive to move toward the United States as a way of punishing 

China for its support to Pakistan. Indeed, it might work the other 

way. U.S. re-engagement with Pakistan could create incentives for 

India to tilt toward China in retaliation for U.S. support for Pakistan. 

U.S. re-engagement with Pakistan also served Chinaís interest in 

checking the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in that country. 

More radical Islamicist elements within the Pakistan Army and 

Inter-Services Intelligence were ousted after 9/11, and some radical 

Islamicist organizations were also limited. Secular forces within 
395

Pakistanís elite may also be encouraged to roll back the rising tide of 

Islamicism. Moreover, the United States will do the dirty work in 

this regard; it was the United States that pushed Pakistan in these 

directions and thus bore the onus for ìinterfering in the internal 

affairs of a developing countryî by pushing Pakistan in a less 

Islamicist direction. This will further tarnish the image of the United 

States among the developing countries that China courts as a 

constituency able to constrain perceived hegemonist tendencies of 

the United States. 

The consequences of September 11 for China were not all 

positive. Most of the negative consequences for China had to do with 

Central Asia. Chinese analysts and leaders were deeply 

apprehensive of a possible long-term U.S. military presence in 

Central Asia as a result of 9/11.8 The new U.S. involvement in 

Central Asia also disrupted a carefully constructed structure of SinoRussian cooperation with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. 

Instituted as the ìShanghai Fiveî in April 1996, this structure of 

Chinese, Russian, and Central Asian cooperation was premised on 

common opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and cross-border 

terrorism. In June 2001 it was transformed into the Shanghai 

Cooperative Organization when Uzbekistan joined.9 After 9/11, 

however, the whole structure of the Shanghai Five-Shanghai 

Cooperative Organization seemed obsolete. The United States was 

now the major anti-terrorist partner of Russia, Uzbekistan, and 

perhaps even of China itself . The logical next step would be for the 

United States to join the ìShanghaiî forum, making it the ìShanghai 

Seven.î Beijing, of course, would see that as bringing another region 

of Chinaís periphery dangerously within the U.S. global imperium, 

raising the specter of U.S. encirclementóparticularly as Russia is 

again moving closer to the West after 9/11. This Chinese fear will 

reenter our discussion later when we consider Indiaís tilt toward the 

United States as a way of pressuring Beijing over its close links to 

Pakistan. 
396

Impact of Sino-Indian Rapprochement on the Sino-Pakistani 

Entente. 

The gist of the argument that the Sino-Indian rapprochement has 

undermined, or will undermine, the Sino-Pakistani entente is this: 

since the Sino-Pakistani entente was predicated on common hostility 

toward India, the improvement of Indian-Chinese relations during 

the 1990s along with the steady reduction of tension between India 

and China has made partnership with Pakistan far less important to 

Beijing. Moreover, since Beijing increasingly recognizes that close 

strategic cooperation with Pakistan is an obstacle to further 

improvements in Chinaís relations with India, in order to further 

promote Sino-Indian amity and cooperation, Beijing will continue to 

gradually distance itself from Islamabad. The hypothesis that SinoIndian rapprochement has led, is leading, or is likely to lead, to the 

atrophy of the Sino-Pakistani entente cordiale is schematically stated 

in Figure 2. 

It is indisputable that there has been substantial improvement in 

Chinese-Indian relations since the confrontations of the 1960s and 

1970s. As with most historical processes, one can trace the roots of 

Sino-Indian rapprochement back as far as one cares to go. Arguably 

the restoration of ambassadorial relations in 1976, or the visit by 

then-foreign minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to China in 1979 (the first 

visit in either direction by a high-level official since Zhou Enlaiís 

1960 visit to India), are appropriate starting points.10 But probably 

the best starting point for the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement is 

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhiís December 1988 visit to Beijing. In 

terms of its political-symbolic significance, Gandhiís 1988 visit was 

equivalent to Richard Nixonís 1972 visit or Mikhail Gorbachevís May 

1989 visit to China. Gandhiís visit was the first by a top-level leader 

between China and India since Zhou Enlaiís 1960 visit. Gandhiís visit 

was also based on an Indian decision to accept Beijingís 

longstanding proposition that the two sides should set aside the 

border dispute where the two sides continued to disagree, and 
397

Figure 2. 

move forward with relations in other areas where agreement was 

possible. In the decade after Gandhiís visit, exchanges between the 

two sides at all levels increased and became routine. Important 

agreements were signed in areas from economics, to cultural 

exchanges, to military-to-military relations, to cooperation on 

important interna-tional issues, to measures regulating the border 

dispute. In the years following Gandhiís visit, the symbolism of 

amity gradually replaced the symbolism of enmity in Sino-Indian 

relations. Taking, then, 1988 as the starting point for Sino-Indian 

rapprochement, our question thus becomes: has China in fact backed 

away from strategic partnership with Pakistan as Sino-Indian 

rapprochement gained steam after December 1988? If so, to what 

extent has this been the case? 

A simple but effective way of gauging the impact of Sino-Indian 

rapprochement on the Sino-Pakistani entente is to select several 

different time points, one before the onset of Sino-Indian 
398

rapprochement and two well into that process, and determine the 

degree of change in Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation between 

those time points. While any change cannot necessarily be attributed 

to Sino-Indian rapprochement (since many other factors may be 

operating and have caused that change), the absence of significant 

variation between the two time points would at least invalidate the 

hypothesis that Sino-Indian rapprochement has produced a weakening 

of the Sino-Pakistani entente cordiale. 

1982, 1994, and 2000 provide appropriate time points for 

comparison. 1982 was 6 years prior to the onset of Sino-Indian 

rapprochement with Rajiv Gandhiís 1988 visit, while 1994 was 6 years 

into the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement. For both years the 

annual indexes for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], 

Daily Report China published by NewsBank, Inc., up to mid-1996 

provide a convenient database for comparison. The addition of 2000 

lengthens the period of Sino-Indian rapprochement, thus addressing 

the possibility that 1994 was ìtoo soonî to show any influence of 

Sino-Indian rapprochement on the Sino-Pakistani entente. Unfortunately, the shift of FBIS to an on-line-only format in mid-1996 led to 

the discontinuation of a printed indexóor, indeed, of any index, for 

FBIS. Data for 2000 must therefore come from a search of FBISës online database via its various ìsearch engines.î On the other hand, 

there is no on-line database for 1982. Data for the three time-points 

is, thus, not strictly comparable, since different methods were used 

for 1982 and 1994 on the one hand and 2000 on the other. 

Nonetheless, the comparisons still all come from the same database, 

and are probably generally accurate. Comparisons of the operational 

dimensions listed at the outset of this chapter for these three time 

points are presented below. 

1) Chinese support for Pakistani initiatives directed against India. 

Regarding Chinese support for Pakistanís anti-Indian initiatives, 

including Kashmir, Beijing has clearly distanced itself from Pakistan as 
399

Sino-Indian rapprochement progressed. Beijing has attempted to 

disentangle itself from the India-Pakistan conflict. Beijing apparently 

concluded that close alignment with Pakistan against India would 

severely constrain the development of Chinese-Indian ties. Consequently, Beijing moved toward neutrality in important areas of the 

India-Pakistan conflict. Beijingís objective became development of 

cooperative, friendly ties with both India and Pakistan, and this 

precluded supporting one side against the other on several issues. 

This shift was manifested first and foremost in a shift in Beijingís 

position on the litmus-test issue of Kashmir. During the 1990 crisis 

over Kashmir and ìKalistanî/Punjab, Beijing responded to strong 

Indian pressure by dropping its long-time endorsement of a 

plebiscite in the Kashmir region in accord with United Nations 

resolutions of 1948-1949. Demand for such a plebiscite had long been 

and continued to be Pakistanís position regarding Kashmir. Between 

1964 and 1990 it was also Chinaís position. In 1990, however, Beijing 

shifted course: it stopped referring to the United Nations and its 

resolutions in the context of Kashmir (except when Beijing wanted to 

needle New Delhi, as, for example, in the aftermath of Indiaís ìChina 

threatî justification of its May 1998 nuclear tests) . Beijing instead 

began extolling peaceful settlement of the issue via talks between 

India and Pakistan.11 

With the onset of Sino-Indian rapprochement, Beijing also began 

expressing private disapproval and public non-endorsement of some 

of Islamabadís more assertive efforts to challenge India. During the 

1990 crisis, militants in Pakistan attempted to force their way across 

the border into India, and Indian forces responded by firing on them. 

Tension spiraled rapidly. In this situation, China urged moderation 

and abstention from violence on all sides. Beijing also declined to 

support Pakistani efforts to bring the Kashmir issue before the 

United Nations. Nine years later, in 1999, during the crisis created by 

Pakistanís seizure of mountain peaks on the Indian side of the 

Kashmir Line of Control and overlooking vital Indian road links 
400

with Leh in Ladakh, Beijing once again rejected Pakistanís efforts to 

bring the Kashmir issue before international fora. And again Beijing 

urged both Pakistan and India to abstain from using force, to deescalate the confrontation, and to resolve their disputes peacefully 

via discussions.12 

During roughly the same timeóbetween 1997 and 2001óBeijing 

also refused to support Islamabadís effort to create ìstrategic depthî 

in Afghanistan by supporting Taliban rule over that country. Beijing 

refused endorsement of and maintained a discrete distance from 

Pakistani actions in Afghanistan. While Beijing discretely explored 

the possibility of relations with the Pakistan-supported Taliban 

regime in Afghanistan in 2000 and early 2001, it declined to move 

forward with those relations. When September 11 came, Beijing still 

hosted an embassy of the Islamic State of Afghanistan headed by 

Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Northern Alliance. 

These post-Cold War shifts in Chinese policy came in the context 

of the continuation of several pre-existing Chinese steps toward 

disengagement from the Indo-Pakistani conflict. As Deng Xiaoping 

consolidated control over Chinese foreign policy in 1979, Beijing 

began urging improvement of India-Pakistan ties. Rather than taking 

Pakistanís side in that countryís disputes with India, as Beijing had 

done under Mao Zedong, Beijing began urging moderation on both 

sides. The rationale for this shift in 1979 was fear of Soviet 

encirclement via closer Indian association with Moscow, plus Dengís 

desire to create a stable environment for economic development by 

reducing tensions with all of Chinaís neighbors. But the policy of 

neutrality in Indo-Pakistani disputes continued with new meaning 

as Sino-Indian rapprochement gained steam after 1988. Yet another of 

Deng Xiaopingís post-1978 changes was to end the polemical war 

against India that Mao Zedong had ordered. Under Deng, Chinese 

references to Indian ìregional hegemonyî became far scarceró

although, again, Beijing still trundled out these rhetorical blasts 

when it was particularly unhappy with New Delhi. 
401

In sum, in terms of Chinese support for Pakistani political efforts 

against India in the South Asian regionówhether Kashmir, the 

achievement of ìstrategic depthî in Afghanistan, or the struggle 

against Indian ìhegemonismîóChina did, in fact, back away from 

Pakistan as Chinese-Indian rapprochement unfolded. 

2) Frequency of high-level military-to-military exchanges. 

Exchanges among high- and mid-level leaders have been far less 

affected by Sino-Indian rapprochement. Such exchanges have 

remained relatively frequent as Sino-Indian rapprochement has 

advanced. In 1982 there were five high-level military exchanges 

between China and Pakistan. In 1994 there were three high-level 

military exchanges. In 2000 there were again three exchanges. These 

are listed in Table 1. 

The diminution of high-level military interchanges from five in 

1982 to three in 1994 and 2000 may have been partially a function of 

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989. With Soviet 

withdrawal, China concluded that the fighting in Afghanistan had 

shifted from a war of national resistance against foreign occupation 

to an internal, civil war. Chinese support for the Afghan mujahadeen 

groups rapidly dried up. Consequently there was less need for 

Chinese and Pakistani militaries to coordinate activities in support of 

the Afghan mujahadeen. Nor was it any longer necessary in 1994 

and 2000, as it had been necessary in 1982, for China to extend 

deterrence support to Pakistan to counter Soviet pressure on frontline state Pakistan. 

3) Frequent high-level exchanges of civilian leaders. 

Offsetting the reduction of military exchanges between and 

1994/2000 was a slight increase in visits by high- level civilian 

officials: two in 1982 compared to three in 1994. In 2000 there were 
402

1982 

Mar.: PRC Vice Premier Ji Pengfei with delegation including 

Deputy PLA Chief of Staff Zhang Zhen to Pakistan. 

Apr.: Pakistan National Defense College delegation to PRC. 

May: Pakistan deputy chief of army staff to PRC. 

Sep.: Pakistan chairman of Joint Chiefs Staff Committee to PRC. 

Dec.: PLA military colleges and schools delegation to Pakistan. 

1994 

Feb.: Pakistan chief of army staff to PRC. 

Jul.: PRC minister of defense to Pakistan. 

Nov.: PLA military college delegation to Pakistan. 

2000 

May: Pakistan National Defense College delegation to PRC. 

May: Pakistan chief of naval staff to PRC. 

Nov.: PLA delegation to Pakistan for International Defense 

Exhibition. 

Table 1. PRC-Pakistan Military Exchanges in 1982, 1994, and 2000.

again two direct exchanges, plus a summit meeting in a third 

country. In 1982 Vice Premier Ji Pengfei and Vice Foreign Minister 

Han Nianlong visited Pakistan in March, while Pakistani President 

Zia ul Haq visited China in October. In 1994 Prime Minister Benazir 

Bhutto visited China in January, Vice Premier Qian Qichen visited 

Pakistan in February, and Pakistani President Farooq Ahmed Khan 

Leghari visited China in December. During these exchanges, Chinese 

leaders continued to state Chinaís support for Pakistanís efforts to 

uphold its sovereignty, independence, and territorial unity, while 

Pakistani leaders expressed their gratitude for and continuing 

confidence in Chinaís support. Both sides continued to affirm during 

the 1994 visits that the Sino-Pakistani relationship was an ìallweather one, tested by adversity.î That partnership would continue, 

Chinese officials insisted, ìregardless of changes in the international 
403

situation.î In plain speech that meant regardless of Sino-Indian 

rapprochement. In 2000, President Pervez Musharraf visited Beijing in 

January, and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visited Pakistan in July. 

Presidents Jiang Zemin and Musharraf also held discussions in New 

York City in September during a United Nations session. 

4) Chinese transfer of critical military technologies to Pakistan. 

Chinese transfer of critical technologies to Pakistan also 

continued unimpaired by Sino-Indian rapprochement. Arguably, they 

have even increased. Chinaís support for Pakistanís missile and 

nuclear energy program, and even for Pakistanís nuclear weapons 

program, continued in spite of strong U.S. and Indian objections. In 

both areas these transfers were cloaked in secrecy. The persistence of 

Chinese assistance in spite of strong international pressure probably 

contributed to sentiments of trust and reliability between China and 

Pakistan.13 

China gave very significant assistance to Pakistanís nuclear 

weapons program circa 1982. Chinese personnel during that year 

reportedly helped Pakistan overcome technical difficulties at the 

uranium enrichment plant at KahutaóChinese moves that created 

difficulties in U.S.-China relations.14 About the same time China 

reportedly gave Pakistan the design for a 25-kiloton nuclear weapon 

comparable to the successful design tried in Chinaís fourth nuclear 

test in October 1966.15 Still other reports asserted that China sold 

Pakistan tritium via a private German company.16 Tritium is an 

isotope of hydrogen used for enriching fission explosions to form a 

fusion reaction. The veracity of these reports was later broadly 

confirmed by U.S. officials testifying before the U.S. Congress. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Robert 

Einhorn later told the U.S. Senate that there was ìvery strong 

evidence ìthat China had assisted Pakistanís nuclear weapons 

program prior to Chinaís entry into the nonproliferation regime in 

1992.17 
404

Even after Chinaís entry into the NPT regime in 1993, it 

continued to openly assist Pakistanís civilian nuclear energy 

program. Chinese construction work on a 300-megawatt nuclear 

power plant at Chasma in western Pakistan continued throughout 

the 1990s. Begun in 1992, the plant finally began operation in August 

2000.18 The plant will produce a large amount of radioactive waste 

which could potentially be processed into plutonium. The United 

States urged Beijing to suspend all nuclear cooperation with Pakistan 

on the grounds that diversion of assistance from the civilian to the 

military sector was likely. Beijing rejected U.S. urging in this 

regardówhile accepting similar U.S. prompting regarding Iran. 

Regarding Pakistan, Beijing insisted that its assistance to that 

countryís civilian nuclear energy program was purely non-military 

and in accord with Chinaís obligations under the NPT. Direct 

Chinese assistance to Pakistanís nuclear weapons program 

apparently continued covertly for at least a year after 1993. In June 

1994, a Chinese company sold to Pakistan 5,000 ring magnets used in 

the production of highly enriched uranium. Acquisition of these 

magnets reportedly allowed Pakistan to double its production of this 

uranium.19 Ultimately, Beijing convinced the U.S. government that 

the Chinese government had not known about the sale.20 This 

analyst suspects, however, that these transfers were in line with 

Chinese policy, if not directly approved by Chinese leaders. In any 

case, by the time Chinese assistance to Pakistanís nuclear weapons 

programs ceased around 1994, Pakistan already had a self-sufficient 

indigenous nuclear capability. 

While direct Chinese assistance to Pakistanís nuclear weapons 

program apparently ceased circa 1994, Chinese assistance to 

Pakistanís missile development efforts continued unimpeded during 

the 1990s. In 1988 China reportedly agreed to help Pakistan develop 

an equivalent of Chinaís M-11 missileóa solid-fueled rocket with a 

185-mile range carrying a 1,100-pound warhead. (It is significant that 

this agreement came in the same year as Gandhiís visit and the onset 
405

of Sino-Indian rapprochement.) Under the agreement China was to 

train Pakistani personnel, transfer essential technology, and provide 

parts and equipment to assist Pakistanís effort. Over the next several 

years and continuing in our target year of 1994, cooperation under 

this agreement progressedóall under highly secret conditions, of 

course.21 In August 1994 Pakistan reportedly made a payment of $15 

million under the cooperation agreement to pay for missile 

components. China also reportedly agreed to send specialists to 

Pakistan to train personnel there in the operation of the new 

missile.22 Chinaís foreign ministry damned Western press reports 

about these activities as ìfictitious and irresponsibleîóalthough 

denials were carefully couched to specify that Chinaís activities had 

not violated the letter of the Missile Technology Control Regime 

(MTCR). Later that same year, in November 1994, China promised 

the United States that it would abide by the major provisions of the 

MCTRóan agreement that the U.S. believed would end Chinese 

assistance to Pakistanís M-11 program. In fact such assistance 

continued.23 During his visit to Beijing in December 1994, Pakistani 

President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari addressed the missile 

cooperation issue. The missiles and missile technology Pakistan had 

obtained from China, Leghari said, were within the MTCR. Pakistan 

had not acquired ìM-11 missilesî from China, Leghari said.24 It 

seems that both Beijing and Islamabad were using fine verbal 

distinctions and legalistic loopholes to continue their missile 

cooperation in spite of U.S., and probably Indian, objections. 

The November 1994 U.S.-PRC agreement did not end Chinaís 

assistance to Pakistanís missile development programs. In late 1995 

U.S. intelligence satellites detected construction north of Rawalpindi 

of a new facility very similar in layout to an existing M-11 factory in 

Hubei province, China. Intercepts of telephone transmissions from 

the facility indicated to U.S. intelligence that approximately twelve 

Chinese engineers from the China Precision Machine Import-Export 

Corporation had visited the site. The U.S. intelligence community 

concluded that the plant was designed to manufacture M-11 
406

missiles, that China was assisting in that effort, and that the plant 

would be operational by 1997.25 Still later, according to U.S. 

intelligence reports to the White House and Congress, China 

increased shipments of specialty steel, guidance systems, and 

technical assistance used for missiles following Indiaís nuclear tests 

in May 1998.26 The next year the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 

stated openly and unequivocally, for the first time, that China had 

transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan. This determination triggered 

the application of sanctions mandated by U.S. laws and thus led to a 

crisis in U.S.-PRC relations.27 Although the reported transfers had 

taken place several years earlier, the leaking of this information in 

1999 was probably linked to on going Chinese transfers to Pakistan. 

After a series of U.S. sanctions over cases of missile technology 

transfers to Pakistan by Chinese companies in 2000, in November of 

that year the United States and China reached a new agreement on 

the issue. According to that agreement, or at least the United States 

understanding of it (the text of the agreement has never been made 

public), China would cease export of all ìequipment, material and 

technology that can be directly used in missiles, as well as missilerelated dual use items.î28 Once again Chinese assistance to 

Pakistanís missile program continued in spite of whatever 

agreement was reached with the United States. Throughout the first 

half of 2001, U.S. spy satellites ascertained Chinese delivery of 

missile components to Pakistan by over-land truck and by ship. The 

Chinese materials were being used, again according to U.S. 

intelligence reports, for the production of a 465-mile range missile 

and develop-ment of a new missile with a 1,240-mile range. Both 

missiles could carry nuclear warheads.29 

It is clear that Chinaís transfer of critical missile technology to 

Pakistan continued into the early 2000s, unimpaired by the advance 

of Sino-Indian rapprochement. 
407

5) Chinese support for development of Pakistan’s military-industrial base. 

Chinese support for the development of Pakistanís military 

industrial base increased substantially between 1982 and 1994, and 

again between 1994 and circa 2001. Activity in this regard in 1982 (as 

indicated by the NewsBank FBIS indexes) included the May opening 

of a representative office in Beijing by the National Bank of Pakistan. 

This was the first such Beijing office by a Third World country 

bankóa significant symbolic gesture. When the office was opened, 

the head of Pakistanís National Bank lauded the very close and 

cordial relations between his bank and the Bank of China, and 

expressed confidence that the new office would further promote 

friendship between China and Pakistan. Then in July 1982 an 

agreement on border trade provided for an increase of 5 percent over 

the previous year. (Such border trade had been under way since 

1969.) In October the two countries signed an agreement establishing 

a joint committee to promote economic, trade, and science and 

technology cooperation. These were rather modest measures of 

Chinese support. 

Chinese support in 1994 for Pakistanís efforts to develop its 

military-industrial base was far more extensive. China agreed to 

build and supply heavy equipment for two 25-megawatt turn-key 

electric generating plants at Haripur, 60 kilometers from Islamabad. 

A Chinese-built heavy electrical equipment complex was 

inaugurated at Hattar in November of that year. Chinese engineers 

were supervising the construction of a copper, silver, and gold 

mining complex at Saindak on Pakistanís border with Iran. The 

projected output was to be sold to China and other countries to 

generate foreign currency. The China National Nuclear Corporation 

(CNNC) was also building a 300,000-kilowatt nuclear power plant at 

Cashma near Islamabad. This was the first nuclear power plant 

exported by China. In 1994 a group of 60 future Pakistani operators 

of the Cashma facility arrived in Beijing for training at the 

postgraduate school of CNNC. A China-Pakistan science and 
408

technology commission also held a 2-day session in Januaryóunder 

the protocol signed in 1982óand concluded an agreement on 

increasing science and technology cooperation. 

The increase in Chinese involvement in Pakistanís development 

efforts between 1982 and 1994 is best explained in terms of Chinaís 

far greater economic capabilities and openness at the latter point. 

China was much richer in 1994 and its more-marketized economy 

created incentives for firms to seek out foreign opportunities for 

profit making. Be that as it may, it is clear that Chinese support for 

Pakistanís efforts to develop its industrial base increased rather than 

declined as Sino-Indian rapprochement advanced. Even more 

ambitious Chinese support for Pakistanís national development 

efforts in 2001ócentered around Gwadar in western Baluchistanó 

will be discussed separately below. 

6) Chinese support for expansion of Pakistan’s regional links. 

Regarding Chinese support for expansion of Pakistanís regional 

links, during both 1982 and 1994 China worked to expand Pakistanís 

trans port links with Central Asia. In August 1982 the Khunjerab 

pass in the Karakorum Mountains was officially opened. India 

protested, and both Pakistan and China rejected these protests. In 

1994 China agreed to the initiation of weekly flights between Urumqi 

and Islamabad. It also agreed that Xinjiang could be used as a transit 

route for trade between Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan. This arrangement 

enabled Pakistani commerce and travelers to avoid unstable conditions in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and expand various sorts of 

contacts with post-Soviet Central Asia.30 Once again, these were 

modest manifestations of Chinese support for Pakistan. Far more 

ambitious support would come in 2001 when Beijing signed on to 

support a large-scale and long-term Pakistani effort to expand its 

regional links via Gwadar. Again, the Gwadar project will be 

discussed below. 
409

7) Chinese transfer of conventional weapons to Pakistan. 

Chinaís transfer of conventional weapons to Pakistan has been a 

mainstay of the strategic partnership between those two countries. 

One study found that during the period from 1966 to 1979 Pakistan 

was by far the major recipient of Chinese arms, with transfers to 

Pakistan considerably exceeding those to even North Vietnam.31 In 

order to capture a somewhat larger set of data, for this investigation 

I have expanded the time frame by 1 year on either side of our target 

years, thus encompassing the years 1981-1983, 1993-l995, 1998-

2000ó2000 being the most recent SIPRI Yearbook available at the time 

of writing. Reference to the listings of arms transfers published in the 

annual yearbooks of the Stockholm International Peace Research 

Institute indicates only slight variation between our three target 

periods. I have also both contracts signed and munitions delivered in 

those years. The results are presented in Table 2. 

While the data presented in this table are not strictly comparable, 

they do seem to show that there has not been a major reduction of 

Chinese conventional weapons transfers to Pakistan after the onset 

of Sino-Indian rapprochement.32 Changes in the composition Chinese 

weapons sales to Pakistan seem to have more to do with Pakistanís 

defense modernization needs than with placating India. 

8) Chinese deterrent support for Pakistan. 

A final dimension of the Sino-Pakistani entente has been Chinese 

support for Pakistan in the face of a threatened Indian attack in order 

to prevent such an attack, i.e., Chinese ìdeterrent supportî for 

Pakistan. Here I believe our time points must, once again, be a bit 

more flexible since international confrontations do not occur every 

year. Fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, there are four 

confrontations we can use to gauge Chinese deterrent support: 1) a 

Soviet campaign of 1983 to pressure India to take action against 

Pakistan in order to compel Pakistan to desist from providing 
410

1981-1983 

 150 T-59 main battle tanks 

 60 Q-5 FANTAN-A fighters, contracted 

 60 F-7 fighters, contracted 

 17 fast attack craft,contracted 

1993-1995 

20 trainer versions of F-7M AIRGUARD fighters 

 1992-96: 202 T-85-IIAP main battle tanks** 

 1994-96: 30 K-8 Karakorum-8 jet trainer aircraft 

 1989-93: 450 portable Anza anti-aircraft missiles 

 1990-93: 200 Red Arrow-8 anti-tank missiles 

1998-2000 

4 fire control radars for 37-mm guns on fast attack craft 

 34 C-Son/CSS-N-8 ship-to-ship missiles for fast attack craft 

 6 K-8 Karakoram-8 jet trainer aircraft 

 1994-2000: 550 portable surf ace-to-air QW-1 missiles 

 1990-2000: 7,600 Red Arrow-8 anti-tank missiles 

* Unless indicated as contracted, all entries refer to deliveries. 

** The inclusive time period given for this and several other deliveries over-lap 

with the three periods of our investigation. Entries without years fall squarely 

within our 3-year time perods, according to the SIPRI registers. 

Source: Registers of tranfer and licensed production of major conventional 

weapons: from SIPRI Yearbooks, 1982-84, 1994-96, 1999-2001. The last 3-year 

sequence is shifted earlier because later SIPRI Yearbooks were not available at time 

of publication of this article. 

Table 2. PRC Transfer of Conventional Weapons to Pakistan 

before and after the Onset of Sino-Indian Rapprochement. 

sanctuary for the Afghan mujahadeen; 2) the Indo-Pakistani 

confrontation of 1990 over ìKalistanî and Kashmir; 3) the IndoPakistan confrontation of 1998 over mutual overt nuclearization; and 

4) the Indo-Pakistani confrontation of 1999 over Kargil. For the sake 

of brevity and ease of comparison, I will present data from these four 

case studies in tabular form in Table 3. 
411

Two points emerge from comparison of these four episodes. First, 

the precise verbiage used by Chinese representatives became more 

vague and less pointed during the 1990s, as compared with the 1983 

episode. In 1983 Wu Xueqian spoke directly of ìwarî and possible 

ìforeign armed attackî on Pakistan. Chinaís choice of words in 1990 

and 1999 was far more elliptical, even though war was a very real 

possibility in both latter years. In 1990 Defense Minister Qin Qiwei 

spoke merely of continuing Chinaís traditional policy of ìsupporting 

the Pakistan . . . armed forces in safeguarding . . . state sovereignty 

and territorial integrity.î During the Kargil confrontation of 1999, 

PLA chief of general staff General Fu Quanyou merely stated that 

military cooperation between China and Pakistan was ìvitalî and 

would continue ìno matter how the world . . . situation might 

change,î i.e., even if war broke out between India and Pakistan. In 

1998 General Zhang Wannianís words were even more vague, 

though we should also recognize that the situation in post-nuclear 

test Indo-Pakistani relations was considerably less tense than in 

either 1990 or in 1999 during the Kargil confrontation. 

The change in verbiage between 1983 and 1990, 1998 and 1999 is 

significant. As Sino-Indian rapprochement advanced, Beijing began 

using less abrasive, more oblique words to express deterrent support 

for Pakistan. This analyst believes, however, that the words used in 

1990 and 1999, after the onset of Sino-Indian rapprochement, still 

effectively conveyed the same point: if India attacked Pakistan, 

China would support Pakistan. This is not to say that Beijing was 

extending open-ended support or a blank check to Islamabad. It 

clearly was not. But just as clearly, Beijing intended by these 

carefully chosen words to extend some degree of Chinese support to 

Pakistan if that country was attacked by India. Beijing was saying it 

would ìsupportî and ìstand withî Pakistan. It left unspoken exactly 

how and to what extent it would provide such support. Most 

probably, such ìsupportî would entail all means short of outright 

belligerency. Discussions by this author with Pakistani officials in 

Islamabad in 1990 conveyed the distinct impression that, at that 
412
413

juncture at least, those officials were quite understanding of Beijingís 

need to mince words for the sake of improved relations with New 

Delhi, while remaining confident that the underlying Sino-Pakistani 

strategic link remained strong. 

It must, of course, be noted that in 1983 it was ultimately the 

USSR that was being deterred, while in 1990, 1998, and 1999, India 

alone was the object of Chinese persuasive efforts. Nonetheless, the 

point still stands: Chinese verbiage became more elliptical. The 

second point to be made, however, is that China continued to render 

deterrent support to Pakistan even during the period of Sino-Indian 

rapprochement. In all three Indo-Pakistani confrontations of the 1990s, 

Beijingís comments effectively made the point that, if worse came to 

worst, Pakistan would have Chinaís support in the military security 

areasóat least materially and politically. 

The Balance of Change versus Continuity in the Sino-Pakistani Entente. 

What general conclusions are we then to draw from this survey 

of the several operational dimensions of the Sino-Pakistani entente

listed at the beginning of this chapter? In terms of Chinaís support 

for Pakistani initiatives against India, Chinese policy shifted 

fundamentally, and Beijing adopted a neutral position toward such 

efforts. Military-to-military exchanges were somewhat reduced after 

the onset of Sino-Indian rapprochement, but were still robust. Highlevel exchanges of civilian leaders continued unreduced. Transfers of 

critical, strategic technologiesónuclear and missileócontinued 

unimpeded, and perhaps at an even higher level and with an even 

greater level of trust deriving from the increasingly long record of 

cooperation in covering up these covert transfers. Chinese support 

for Pakistanís efforts to develop its military industrial base did not 

diminish, but increased. Chinese support for Pakistani efforts to 

expand its regional links increased (as the thrice-promised 

discussion of Gwadar will soon show). Sales of conventional 

weapons continuedóand probably increased as the United States 
414

bowed out of arms sales to Pakistan after 1990. Chinese deterrent 

support for Pakistan against foreign threats became more subtle, but 

continued in essence. Only in the areas of Chinese support for 

Pakistanís position on Kashmir and support for other Pakistani 

political-diplomatic initiatives against India does there seem to have 

been fundamental change. The conclusions drawn from these facts 

by analysts may vary. The conclusion drawn by this analyst is that 

China attempted to adopt a more neutral position in Indo-Pakistani 

conflicts, but remained solid in its support of Pakistanís efforts to 

defend its national security and sovereignty. In other words, the 

evidence, on balance, leads to a rejection of the hypothesis that SinoIndian rapprochement has led to a weakening of the Sino-Pakistani 

entente. 

The Gwadar Project: Strong Chinese Support for Pakistan in the 

21st Century. 

In 2001 China agreed to underwrite a massive development 

project in Pakistanís western Baluchistan province. Chinaís support 

was announced during Zhu Rongjiís May 2001 visit to Pakistan and 

ceremonially associated with the 50th anniversary of the 

establishment of Sino-Pakistani relations in May 1951. Chinese 

support for the first phase of the project was finalized in August 

2001 (just before 9/11) at nearly $400 million. Chinese leaders also 

promised similarly robust support for subsequent phases of the 

project. Chinaís support for the Gwadar project was a powerful 

manifestation of the continuing vitality of the Sino-Pakistani entente 

cordiale. 

Named after the small city on the Arabian Sea where the project 

was based, the Gwadar Development Project entails construction of 

a new, major deep-water port. The harbor is to be dredged, and 

eventually 23 deep-sea ship berths will be built, along with new 

wharves, warehouses, and other critical harbor facilities. The port 

will also have container and petroleum loading and unloading 
415

facilities. A new rail line is to be built northward from Gwadar, 

connecting with the main east-west rail line to Iran at Dalbandin. A 

modern highway will also be built east from Gwadar along the 

Mekran coast to Liari in the east. Both the Mekran highway and the 

rail line to Dalbandin will tie the Gwadar harbor into the existing 

road and rail networks of Pakistan. A new high-voltage electrical 

transmission line will also be built from Turbat to Gwadar. Through 

these efforts, a small fishing village will be transformed into a 

modern harbor with the capacity eventually expected to equal 

Karachi, which in 2001 carried 90 percent of Pakistanís seaborne 

trade.33 The contours of the Gwadar project are illustrated by Figure 

3. 

Gwadar had been the projected sea terminus of pipelines 

proposed by Pakistan during the mid- and late-1990s. During that 

period, Pakistani government agencies lobbied vigorously for new 

pipeline routes through Afghanistan and Pakistan to bring the vast 

but unexploited energy resources of the Caspian Sea region to world 

markets.34 

The implications of the Gwadar projectóshould it be completed 

substantially as projectedóare great. Establishment of Gwadar and 

Pakistan as key transit routes for Central Asian energy to reach 

world markets would have immense spillover effects for the fiscal 

resources of the Pakistani government and for Pakistani economic 

development. The resources available to Pakistanís government for 

its discretionary use would be far greater. Strengthening Pakistanís 

defense capabilities would certainly be one choice. Pakistanís 

involvement in the world economy, and consequent economic 

growth, would also be greatly facilitated by the doubling of 

Pakistanís harbor capacity. 

From a military standpoint, the creation of a second major 

seaport 450 kilometers further from the border of India than Karachi 

would substantially enhance Pakistanís strategic depth in the event 
416
417

of a war with India. This consideration seems to have been decisive 

in Pakistanís decision to move forward with the Gwadar project. 

During the end game of the Kargil incident of spring 1999, the Indian 

Navy had swiftly concentrated forces off the Karachi harbor. The 

swiftness of the Indian move had succeeded in trapping Pakistani 

naval forces inside the harbor, as well as threatening to close 

Pakistanís sole major seaport should the incident at Kargil continue 

unresolved. In the Indian view, the threatened blockade of Karachi 

played an important role in compelling the Pakistani military to call 

its infiltrators back behind the Line of Control at Kargil. Within two 

years of the Kargil mini-war, Pakistanís government decided to 

move forward with the Gwadar project in spite of objections from 

Pakistanís Planning Commission that the large cost of the project 

made it nonviable on economic grounds. Pakistanís government 

decided to move forward with the project on ìstrategic grounds.î 

The construction of new pipelines and rail links to a large harbor 

at Gwadar will also greatly boost Pakistanís influence throughout 

the Central Asian region. With Pakistanóand an Afghanistan 

friendly to Pakistanóserving as the conduit for the flow of Central 

Asian energy resources to the world as well as of the worldís 

manufactured goods to Central Asia, Pakistan would become a 

pivotal link in the emerging world order. A probable follow-on to 

the projected Chardzhou, Uzbekistan-Gwadar pipeline would be a 

spur eastward to deliver a portion of that oil to energy-hungry India. 

This would mean that Pakistan would control the spigot for this 

potentially substantial portion of Indiaís energy supply. It would 

also probably doom Indian-promoted projects for undersea pipelines 

between India and Iran, skirting Pakistani territorial control. In sum, 

Gwadar is an extremely ambitious project with wide-ranging 

regional implications. Chinese rhetoric at the time of the August 

2001 agreements likened the Gwadar project to construction of the 

highway over the Karakorum Mountains that linked China and 

Pakistan in the late 1960s. Given the wide-ranging implications of 

the Gwadar project, this comparison does not seem inappropriate. 
418

The Gwadar project is a powerful demonstration of Chinaís 

continuing interest in keeping Pakistan strong even as Sino-Indian 

rapprochement progresses. It is noteworthy that China undertook 

support of Gwadar shortly after the process of Sino-Indian 

rapprochement resumed following the chill in Sino-Indian relations, 

which was caused by Indiaís May 1998 nuclear tests with their 

explicit anti-China justification. Once again there is the pattern of 

Sino-Indian rapprochement advancing in tandem with continuing 

Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation. 

Limited Success of Indiaís Efforts to Pry China away from 

Pakistan. 

The current state of play in the India-China-Pakistan relationship 

is not China distancing itself from Pakistan for the sake of SinoIndian rapprochement. It is, rather, India mobilizing increasing 

pressure on China to distance itself from Pakistan, while Beijing has, 

thus far at least, tenaciously refused. This Indian campaign to 

pressure China began in 1998 with the Bharatiya Janata Partyís (BJP) 

assumption of power in New Delhi. Prior to that point, Indiaís China 

policy seems to have been dominated by residual Nehruvianism 

with its romantic vision of Sino-Indian cooperation on behalf of the 

Third World as at least the desirable goal of the Sino-Indian 

relationship. Prime Minister Vajpayee and his foreign affairs 

advisors Jaswant Singh and Brajesh Mishra (the Prime Ministerís 

Principal Secretary), along with coalition partner George Fernandes, 

gave a distinctly more pragmatic, realistic cast to Indiaís China 

policy.35 Whereas previous Indian governments had delinked SinoIndian rapprochement from Sino-Pakistani relations, the new 

government linked them, although only implicitly. Under the 

guidance of Vajpayee, Singh, Mishra, and Fernandes, India also 

began developing pressure points to make Beijing see the wisdom of 

winding down its entente cordiale with Pakistan. 

There were several elements to New Delhiís effort to pry Beijing 
419

away from Islamabad: explicit identification of Chinaóand 

especially the Sino-Pakistani entente cordialeóas the reason for 

Indian nuclearization in mid-1998; raising the issue of Sino-Pakistani 

relations in the newly initiated security dialogue; using Indiaís 

ìLook Eastî policy to expand Indian security ties with Chinaís 

neighbors; and establishing a strategic partnership with the United 

States as a way of repaying China in kind for its links to Pakistan. 

Pressuring China was not the only objective in any of these policy 

thrusts, but in each case it was one important objective. 

Explicitly and publicly associating the Sino-Pakistani entente 

cordiale with Indiaís need to openly acquire nuclear weapons in 1998 

was one way in which Indiaís new foreign policy team attempted to 

pressure Beijing. A letter sent by Prime Minister Vajpayee to world 

leaders at the time of Indiaís test, for example, explained that Indiaís 

ìdeteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear 

environment,î was linked to the combined threat of ìan overt 

nuclear weapons state on our borders, a state which committed 

armed aggression against India in 1962,î and a ìcovert nuclear 

weapons stateî that ìhad attacked India three times in the last fifty 

years.î36 It was the conjuncture between these two statesónot 

named in Vajpayeeís letter but clearly identifiable as China and 

Pakistanóthat required Indiaís explicit and overt acquisition of a 

nuclear deterrent. While Vajpayeeís letter was intended to remain 

private, high-profile public comments by other Indian officials at 

about that time made the same point.37 Although Indian leaders in 

effect apologized a few months later for openly calling China a 

threat to India,38 the Indian promulgation of those criticisms stands 

as one mechanism of Indian pressure on China over its strategic 

partnership with Pakistan. 

New Delhi also used its new security dialogue with China to lay 

out its demand for a winding down of the Sino-Pakistani entente. 

The first session of the dialogue met in March 2000. During that 

meeting, the Indian side made clear its view that continuation of the 
420

Sino-Pakistani security partnership constituted a threat to Indian 

security. In Indiaís view, development of genuine Indian-Chinese 

amity and cooperation required the end, or at least the very 

substantial limitation, of the Sino-Pakistani military partnership. 

India pressed China to end its assistance to Pakistanís nuclear and 

missile programs. Such assistance adversely affected regional 

stability, the Indian side said, and prompted an Indian response in a 

ìresponsible and restrained manner.î India asserted that sensitivity 

to each otherís security concerns was essential to a productive 

dialogue.39 Again at the second dialogue session in February 2002, 

New Delhi raised the issue of Chinese assistance to Pakistanís 

missile programs.40 

Indiaís ìLook Eastî policy was another mechanism of Indian 

pressure. Started in 1995 under the leadership of Prime Minister 

Narasima Rao, this policy had a largely economic rationale and was 

part of the deepening push to open the Indian economy. In 1998, the 

BJP government began giving the Look East policy a new strategic 

cast. By 2000 and 2001, the two years reviewed in Table 4, the 

expansion of Indian security links with countries all around China 

under the Look East policy was in high gear.41 

The expansion of Indiaís security relations with Japan, Taiwan, and 

Vietnam under the Look East policy is especially worthy of note, 

since they are of special concern to Beijing. Japan is, of course, 

Chinaís historic rival for pre-eminence in Asia and a Chinese foreign 

policy concern ranking only behind the States as of 2002. A JapanIndia defense dialogue at the defense minister level was initiated 

during Foreign Minister Yukihiki Ikedaís July 1997 visit to India. 

That dialogue was interrupted by Indiaís May 1998 nuclear tests. It 

was resumed, however, following the visit to India by Prime 

Minister Yoshiro Mori in August 2000 when the two countries 

proclaimed a ìglobal partnership.î42 The evolving India-Japan 

security relationship was manifested by an agreement for increased 

naval cooperation to counter piracy that was concluded during 
421

2000 

Jan. Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes visits Japan. 

Jan. Indian Army Chief of Staff V.P. Malik visits Myanmar. 

Feb. Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid visits India. 

Feb. Myanmarís SPDC Vice-Chair Maung Aye visits Shillong for 

talks with senior Indian officials. 

Mar. Defense Minister Fernandes visits Vietnam. 

Apr. Vietnamese naval delegation visits India. 

Jun. Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visits Singapore to 

participate in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and PostMinisterial Conference (PMC). 

Jul. Thai foreign minister visits India. Agreement to increase bilateral ties, including security links. 

Jul. Indian Army Chief of Staff Malik makes follow-up visit to 

Myanmar. 

Aug. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visits India. First such 

visit in 10 years. Japan and India proclaim ìglobal partnership.î 

Sep.- Indian Navy (IN) ships visit Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, 

Oct. Philippines, and China. 

Nov. Foreign Minister Singh visits Vietnam. High-level Myanmar 

government delegation visits India. India extends US $15 

million credit. Foreign Minister Singh visits Vientianne, Laos. 

Presides over founding of Mekong-Ganga Cooperation 

involving Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and India―but 

 not China. 

2001 

Jan. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visits Vietnam and 

Indonesia. In Vietnam, agreement signed on cooperation in 

nuclear energy. First such visit to Indonesia in 14 years. 

Agreement signed to increase Indonesia-India military 

exchanges. 

Table 4. Implementation of the Look East Policy. 
422

Feb. Foreign Minister Singh to Myanmar. First such visit since 

1987. 

Mar. IN and Singapore Navy conduct joint exercises (eighth such 

exercise since 1993). 

May Prime Minister Vajpayee visits Malaysia, calls for 

ìinstitutionalized dialogueî between India and ASEAN. 

Chinese Navy destroyer and supply ship visit Mumbai. IN 

warship visits Singapore. IN and Japanese Navy conduct joint 

exercises off coast of both countries. 

May- Indian Coast Guard ship visits Philippines and Vietnam. 

Jun. 

Jun. Foreign Minister Singh visits Australia for inaugural session of 

ìframework dialogue.î 

Jul. Planning Commission deputy head K. C. Pant visits Vietnam 

for ARF and PMC. First ever defense talks between Japan and 

India. India proposes expanded defense cooperation. 

Aug. Indian Navy ìobservesî watch Taiwan naval exercises. 

Foreign Minister Singh visits Australia. Indian Army Chief of 

Staff S. Padmanabhan visits Japan to initiate enhanced 

military exchanges. 

Sep. India and Indonesia sign further agreement to increase 

military exchanges. IN warships participate in Australian 

Fleet Review. Indian defense secretary to Australia to 

conclude agreement on intensifying defense cooperation and 

military contacts. 

Oct. Japanís ex-Prime Minister Mori to India for diplomatic talks. 

IN destroyer calls at Wellington, New Zealand. 

Nov. Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra visits India. 

Commander of Myanmar Navy visits India. 

Dec. IN and South Korean Navy conduct joint exercises in Arabian 

Sea. 

Dec. Prime Minister Vajpayee visits Japan. 

Table 4. Implementation of the Look East Policy (concluded). 
423

Defense Minister Fernandesí visit in January 2000, and by joint naval 

exercises carried out in October 2000 and again in May 2001.43 

 Indian links with Taiwan are also extremely sensitive. In this 

context, in January 2002 one of Taiwanís most reliable papers, Lianhe 

Bao, reported that Indian air force officials had secretly visited 

Taiwan, and that Taiwan and India had begun the exchange of 

military information. Taiwan has also reportedly begun posting a 

military liaison officer to New Delhi.44 

 Finally, Vietnam also is a recent nemesis of China, and one still 

deeply apprehensive of Chinaís growing power. A strategic 

understanding between India and Vietnam regarding China is not 

new, having existed in the early 1980s.45 Prime Minister Vajpayeeís 

government moved to revive this long-dormant partnership. During 

the 2 years of the Look East policy surveyed here, the March 2000 

visit to Vietnam by Defense Minister Fernandes led to an agreement 

on expanded security cooperation in countering piracy in the South 

China Sea. The next month a Vietnamese naval delegation visited 

India to discuss implementation of that agreement. Joint naval 

exercises in the South China Sea followed in September. Then in 

January 2001, New Delhi added a nuclear coloration to the 

developing India-Vietnam relationship by agreeing to assist 

Vietnamís efforts in the peaceful uses nuclear energy. It is 

understood, of course, that skills, technologies, and perhaps 

materials developed in civilian applications of nuclear power are 

intrinsically fungible into military areas, at least in the absence of 

very strict international monitoring. 

 Through its accumulation of strategic links with Chinaís 

neighbors, New Delhi has begun doing in East and Southeast Asia 

the same thing that China had been doing in South Asia: New Delhi 

is using counter-encirclement to deal with Chinese encirclement. 

Implicit in this is a proposed bargain: if China will respect Indiaís 

security concerns in South Asia, India is prepared to respect similar 
424

Chinese concerns in East and Southeast Asia. 

 Forging a strategic partnership with the United States was one of 

New Delhiís main instruments of pressure on Beijing. Indeed, it is 

probably fair to say that the emergence of the new India-U.S. 

partnership has placed great pressure on Beijing. An India-U.S. 

military-security relationship began to develop in January 1995 

when a visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry resulted in 

an agreement to expand military contact and cooperation. The latter 

included joint naval exercises and a high level consultative group on 

defense issues.46 The slowly developing India-U.S. military relation 

was aborted in the aftermath of the May 1998 tests. The substantial 

understandings reached through the talks between Foreign Minister 

Jaswant Singh and the U.S. State Departmentís Strobe Talbott in the 

second half of 1998 revived forward movement in the relationship. 

President Clintonís visit to India in March 2000 and Prime Minister 

Vajpayeeís reciprocal visit in September were further steps forward. 

The joint statement on ìA Vision for the 21st Centuryî issued during 

Clintonís visit resolved ìto create a closer and qualitatively new 

relationship between the United States and India.î It also provided 

that, ìIn the new century, India and the United States will be 

partners in peace, with a common interest in and complementary 

responsibility for ensuring regional and international security.î The 

two sides also ìagreed on a number of steps to intensify and 

institutionalize the dialogue between India and the United States.î 

Among these were dialogues on foreign policy and Asian security.47

The joint statement issued at the conclusion of Vajpayeeís visit 

agreed to further ìbroaden . . . cooperation in peacekeeping and 

other areas of UN activity, including shaping the future international 

security system.î48 

 The Bush administration that took office in January 2001 sought 

to dramatically upgrade the partnership between the United States 

and India. New Delhi responded positively. In May Deputy 

Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited India to present to 
425

Indiaís leaders the new administrationís thinking about a ìnew 

strategic frameworkî for India-U.S. ties. According to this ìnew 

framework,î the United States would view and treat India as a major 

strategic partner for dealing with global issues. Also in May 2001, 

India responded relatively positively to the Bush administrationís 

missile defense proposals, a sign that Washington noted 

approvingly. Then in November, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald 

Rumsfeld visited India to ask for a list of weapons and military 

equipment India wished to procure from the United States. That 

same month, Vajpayee visited the U.S. again for talks. A visit by 

Indiaís Defense Minister Fernandes to the United States in January 

2002 followed, and culminated in the signing of an agreement 

regarding the security of military information. This agreement paved 

the way for the transfer to India of sensitive military-related U.S. 

technology. By February 2002, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff General Richard Myers made a visit to India to finalize terms 

for the first major Indian purchase of U.S. military equipment since 

the 1998 tests. It was anticipated that Indiaís purchase of military 

equipment would shift substantially from Russia, France, and Israel 

to the United States with the lifting of U.S sanctions.49 One seasoned 

Indian analyst commented that ìFew could . . . have imagined that 

we would so soon see the day when there is an ever-expanding 

exchange of information and experiences between India and the 

United States in security-related matters.î50 

 By developing a military-security relationship with the United 

States, New Delhi presented Beijing with the specter of Indian 

participation in a U.S. effort to contain China. New Delhiís message 

to Beijing clearly implied that unless China wanted this to happen, 

China should become more sensitive to Indian concerns about 

Chinese activities in South Asia, starting with Chinaís ties to 

Pakistan. 

As indicated by the evidence presented earlier regarding the 

continuing robust nature of the Sino-Pakistani entente, China has 
426

thus far resisted Indian pressure. Indian efforts have had limited 

success in weakening the Sino-Pakistani partnership. Beijingís 

refusal to disengage militarily from Pakistan was forcefully stated by 

PRC Minister of Defense Chi Haotian during a 5-day visit to 

Pakistan in February 1999. Chiís visit came in the midst of a Chinese 

pressure campaign on New Delhi to retract its recent words about a 

ìChina threatî made at the time of Indiaís May 1998 nuclear tests. 

Such a retraction would ìuntie the knotî India had created in IndiaChina relations by using the China threat to justify Indian 

nuclearization, and restart the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement. 

ìPakistan and China sit in the same boat and have a common 

mission,î Chi said. ìThey have an all-weather friendship and have 

remained each otherís most trusted friends and will continue this 

friendship in the future. This friendship is a guarantee of peace not 

only in this region, but also the whole world, including South 

Asia.î51 Pakistani President Rafiq Tarar pointed out that Chiís visit, 

coinciding as it did with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayeeís historic 

visit to Pakistan, contained the important message that Pakistan and 

China would continue their cooperation in spite of changes 

occurring at the international and regional levels. 

 Beijing also rejected Indian assertions in the bilateral security 

dialogue that Chinaís links with Pakistan were in some way 

unacceptable or constituted a threat to India. The Chinese side 

assured India that Chinaís military cooperation with Pakistan was 

part of normal state-to-state relations and in accord with the Five 

Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.52 Further talks over this issue 

came during Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuanís July 2000 visit to New 

Delhi. On that occasion, Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh 

stressed concerns about Chinaís transfer of missile technology to 

Pakistan.53 Tang responded that China-Pakistan cooperation was 

part of normal state-to-state interaction, which was not directed 

against India or any other country. ìIt has been re-emphasized by 

the Chinese side that their relationship with Pakistan is a normal, 

bilateral and sovereign one and not directed toward any country, 
427

especially India,î Singh told the press following his talks with 

Tang.54 In other words, Chinese-Pakistani relations were a bilateral 

issue that were not the proper concern of New Delhi, and for India to 

presume to regulate those relations was an infringement on the 

sovereignty of Pakistan and China. Tangís visit to India was the first 

by a high-ranking Chinese official to India following the post-May 

1998 chill in Sino-Indian relations, and provided an opportunity for 

both sides to place key issues on the table. To underline the point 

that improvements in Sino-Indian relations would not lead to 

deterioration of Sino-Pakistani relations, following his one-day official 

visit to India, Tang paid a three-day official visit to Pakistan in July 

2000. Upon his arrival, Tang told reporters that Chinaís relationship 

with Pakistan was an ìall-weather relationshipî and that it was ìnot 

possible at all for the development and improvement of China-India 

relations to affect further development of China-Pakistan relations.î 

ìSino-Indian relations are Sino-Indian relations, and Sino-Pakistani 

relations are Sino-Pakistani relations,î Tang said.55 

 Beijing rejects the Indian proposition that Chinaís cooperation 

with Pakistan in various areas constitutes in any way a threat to 

India. For India to object to such cooperation between Pakistan and 

China is a manifestation of Indian hostility toward China, an 

expression of Indian aspirations of ìregional hegemony,î based on 

the erroneous premise of ìthe China threat,î inspired by sinister 

Western forces intent on creating problems in Chinaís relations with 

its neighbors, and a violation of the Five Principles of Peaceful 

Coexistence to which India has professed agreement. Indian leaders 

should purge all such thoughts from their minds and proceed to 

sincerely develop Sino-Indian cooperation independently of SinoPakistani links, Beijing argues. Sino-Pakistani and Sino-Indian ties 

should proceed on completely separate tracks. There was, and could 

be, no linkage between them. Chinaís objective is to develop allround, friendly, cooperative relations with both India and Pakistan. If 

India is unhappy with Sino-Pakistani military cooperation, Beijing is 

quite prepared to increase such cooperation with India. 
428

 Although Chinese analysts do not, as far as I know, use the term 

in regard to Sino-Pakistani-Indian relations, the concept of proper 

ìhandlingî or ìmanagement of contradictionsî very aptly describes 

Chinaís approach to that relationship. Beijing is pursuing 

substantially contradictory or incompatible objectives: maintaining a 

solid strategic partnership with Pakistan while developing a multidimensional cooperative relationship with India. Beijingís objective 

is to prevent these two policy strands from becoming an either/or 

choice, to prevent pursuit of one from becoming an obstacle to 

pursuit of the other. 

 In the first direct clash between Beijing and New Delhi over this 

issueóduring the 24 months after Indiaís May 1998 nuclear testsó

China won hands-down. Confronted by intense domestic, international, and Chinese pressure, New Delhi was forced to retract its 

direct and high-profile statements about China posing various 

threats to India, and resume the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement

under conditions that made clear Beijingís determination to continue 

its strategic, security partnership with Pakistan.56 New Delhi, in 

other words, was compelled to accede to Beijingís terms for the 

conduct of Sino-Indian-Pakistani relations. Sino-Indian rapprochement 

would continue parallel to the Sino-Pakistani entente cordiale. Will 

Beijing be able to adhere to this position over the next 18 years (to 

2020) in the face of continuing Indian pressure? As my introductory 

comments indicated, this analystís guess is that Beijing will continue 

to resist Indian pressure. Before engaging in that bit of futurology, 

however, it is necessary to assess the impact of transnational Islamic 

militancy on the Sino-Pakistani entente. 

Islamic Militancy/Separatism as a Factor Undermining the SinoPakistani Entente. 

Prior to September 11, the hypothesis that growing Chinese 

concern for Islamic separatism in the Xinjiang autonomous region 
429

was leading, or would lead, to Chinese disengagement from 

Pakistan had some currency. Though this idea has been considerably 

mooted by 9/11 and the subsequent (at least partial) disengagement 

of Pakistan from Islamic extremism, it is still worth considering for 

two reasons. First, it informs us about the dynamics of Sino-Pakistani 

relations for the decade of the 1990s. Second, the issue of 

transnational Islamic radicalism is by no means passÈ, and in looking 

to the future, it is well to consider whether that radicalism might 

undermine the Sino-Pakistani entente. The hypothesis that 

transnational Islamic radicalism will lead to Chinese disengagement 

from Pakistan is schematically shown in Figure 4. 

 The first point to be made here is that the empirical test 

conducted in the previous section is relevant here. There was not, on 

balance, a fundamental Chinese disengagement from Pakistan 

between 1982 and 2001. This being the case, as with the hypothesis 

regarding Sino-Indian rapprochement, we seem to have here a case of 

imputed causation without demonstrated change in the stipulated 

dependent variable. A second preliminary point regarding the 

syllogism offered above is that there is a crucial logical gap between 

the second and third elements, between mounting Chinese concern 

for Islamic separatism in Xinjiang and disengagement from Pakistan. 

Why would Chinese disengagement from Pakistan address Beijingís 

mounting concerns over ethnic separatism in Xinjiang? Why would 

Chinese disengagement from Pakistan improve rather than diminish 

Beijingís ability to deal with transnational Islamicist support for 

separatism in Xinjiang? Why would not having good, grateful 

Muslim friends in Islamabadóa very important Islamic country and 

the best friend of the Taliban regime in Kabulónot be more useful to 

Beijingís efforts to check foreign subversion in Xinjiang? The implicit 

argument here seems to be either: 1) Pakistan refuses to comply with 

Chinese wishes on this issue and Beijing responds by drawing away 

from Pakistan, or 2) Beijing concludes that a more isolated and 

weaker Pakistan will act more cautiously and/or be more responsive 

to Chinese concerns. We will return to these points below. 
430

Figure 4. 

 It is beyond dispute that the breakup of the USSR had a profound 

impact in China.57 The fate of the USSR became a negative lesson of 

what the PRC had to avoid at all costs. Although there were several 

other aspects of ìthe lesson of the USSRî of greater importance 

within China than that of ethnic separatism, it is that aspect which is 

of concern to our discussion here. According to Chinaís 1998 

statistical yearbook, 61.6 percent of Xinjiangís population were 

ethnic groups other than Han: Kazak, Uygur, Kirgiz, Tajik, and 

Mongol.58 Most of these non-Han people were of Islamic religious 

faith. China has long faced threats of ethnic separatism from the 

Islamic, largely Turkic peoples of Xinjiang province.59 These 

challenges increased during the late 1980s and early 1990s as the 

mujahadeen struggle in Afghanistan raged and then Soviet authority 

in Central Asia unraveled. China responded with increased domestic 

repression and controls, including especially increased supervision 

of religious institutions and activity in Xinjiang.60 

 As Islamicist separatist activity increased further in the mid- and 

late-1990s, Beijing responded with a three-pronged approach.61 First, 

Beijing intensified cooperation with Russia and the newly 

independent states of Central Asia. As noted earlier, by 1996 this 
431

cooperation was embodied in the Shanghai Cooperative 

Organization of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Tadjikistan. Second, Beijing began insisting that Pakistan take 

measures to end the training of Chinese citizens from Xinjiang in 

camps of Islamic schools in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. Third, 

Beijing began using carrots and sticks in an effort to persuade the 

Taliban regime to cease and desist all training for Muslims from 

Xinjiang. 

 It is the Pakistan component of this approach which most 

concerns us here. Pakistanís leverage with the Taliban was very 

important to Beijing. Indeed, M. E. Ahrari has concluded that this 

borrowed leverage gave China greater influence with the Taliban 

than either the United States or Russia.62 It seems clear that Pakistan 

acted in compliance with Beijingís demands for assistance. But it is 

equally clear that Islamabadís activity did not have the result Beijing 

desired. 

 During 1993 the U.S. had come very close to declaring Pakistan a 

terrorist state because of its activities in Kashmir.63 According to 

Ahmed Rashid, Islamabad averted this possibility by shifting 

responsibility for processing of Kashmir-bound terrorists to 

Pakistanís Islamic parties, and by moving the relevant training 

camps into eastern Afghanistan where the Jura tribal authorities 

were induced to take these camps under their protection. Then as the 

Taliban emerged on the scene, Pakistani entities gave that movement 

ever-greater support for a combination of strategic, economic, 

religious, and political reasons. Pakistani support for the Taliban was 

deep and broad. As Afghanistan became a center of transnational 

Jihadist terrorism, smuggling, and narcotics production under the 

Taliban, virtually all the countries of the region, from Iran through 

Russia and the new Central Asian states, became increasingly 

alarmed. China shared these concerns. 

 To what extent did Chinaís leaders know about Pakistanís 
432

support for transnational Islamic radicalism? A definitive answer to 

this question is currently unavailable, but Chinese intelligence 

almost certainly had at least a general understanding of what was 

going on between Pakistan, the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden. If 

Pakistani officials tried to mislead Chinese representatives, Beijing 

could have easily concluded that Pakistan was playing a dangerous 

two-faced game. If this were the case, Beijing might have concluded 

that China would be better served by joining the regional antiTaliban, anti-Pakistan coalition that was emerging by 2000 than by 

continuing to support Pakistan in the face of growing hostility by 

that regional coalition. On the other hand, if Pakistani leaders were 

forthright with Chinese leaders about Islamabadís policies and 

objectives, while assuring them that Pakistan would see to it that the 

emerging Islamicist forces would not target China, that could well 

point in another direction. Terrorist attacks against the United States, 

the West, and India were not necessarily contrary to Chinaís 

interests. From Beijingís perspective, the crucial question was this: 

How likely were the Islamicist forces being created by the Taliban 

and bin Laden to turn against China? 

 In late 1998 the PRC embassy in Islamabad complained to the 

Pakistani foreign ministry that PRC nationals from Xinjiang were 

being trained in guerrilla warfare in both Pakistanís northwest tribal 

area and in Afghanistan. The basis for the Chinese complaint was 

intelligence obtained from the interrogation of 37 PRC nationals 

from Xinjiang apprehended following their return to China after 

receiving such training. Pakistanís foreign ministry took Chinaís 

complaint as a very serious matter, and on October 3 asked the 

Interior Ministry to undertake intense efforts to determine whether 

this was in fact the case. Available news reports do not say whether 

the investigation by Pakistani security services turned up 

confirmatory evidence, or whether PRC nationals studying at Jihadoriented madras sahs in Pakistan were expelled or deported to China. 

Pakistani officials were quoted, however, as saying that such 

training was ìunthinkableî and incompatible with Pakistanís long 
433

and time-tested relationship with China. The Taliban, for its part, 

categorically denied that any foreign nationals were undergoing 

training in Afghanistan.64 

 Toward the end of 1999 China received intelligence that Osama 

bin Laden had convened a meeting in Kabul attended by 

representatives from Xinjiang separatist groups, the Islamic 

Movement of Uzbekistan, and senior members of the Taliban 

leadership. At that meeting bin Laden reportedly proposed that 

China-based groups cooperate with the Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan and proceed in an ìorganized fashionî in Xinjiang. Ties 

among various Xinjiang separatist groups were upgraded and 

intensified as a result of the meeting. Chinese intelligence also 

determined that Xinjiang groups were sending their ìbackbone 

membersî for training at bin Ladenís camps in Afghanistan. Many of 

these core cadres received actual combat experience in Afghanistan, 

Kashmir, Uzbekistan, or Chechnya.65 

 Again Beijing turned to Islamabad for help. Foreign Minister 

Tang Jiaxuan discussed the Afghanistan issue with Chief Executive 

Pervez Musharraf and President Rafiq Tarar during his 3-day visit to 

Pakistan in July 2000. As noted earlier, this visit came just after 

Tangís one-day visit to New Delhi signifying the restoration of SinoIndian comityóand the continuation of Sino-Pakistani military 

cooperation in that context. Tang discussed in Islamabad issues 

related to cooperation in missile development and Afghanistan. 

There is no evidence that there was an explicit link between these 

two issues (i.e., of Chinese support for Pakistanís missile 

development efforts being contingent on Pakistanís help with 

Xinjiangís internal security problems), but everyone engaged in 

those talks would have well understood the existence of an implicit 

linkage. Diplomatic sources in Islamabad reported tension in SinoPakistani relations over the Afghanistan issue and noted that Beijing 

would again ask Pakistan to moderate Taliban activities. Pakistan 

ought to keep a wary eye on developments in Afghanistan and 
434

ìmust not, in any way, be associated with something the Chinese 

perceive to be inimical to their interests,î Islamabadís The News 

warned.66 Tang Jiaxuan was apparently frank about Chinaís 

concerns over Islamicist subversion in Xinjiang. ìBeijing has been 

increasingly concerned about the negative impact of the violence in 

Afghanistan on its restive Moslem population in Xinjiang,î another 

Pakistani news paper reported.67 Tang Jiaxuanís Pakistani hosts 

responded to his concerns over Xinjiang by arranging a meeting 

between him and Taliban representatives in Islamabad. Those 

representatives assured Tang that Kabul ìwill not allow anyone to 

operate against China from Afghanistan.î In talks with the deputy 

director general of the Asian Department of Chinaís foreign 

ministry, Sun Guoxiang, who had accompanied Tang to Islamabad, 

the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan categorically rejected all charges 

that Chinese citizens were being trained in Afghanistan. ìSome 

foreign enemies of the people of Afghanistan and vested interests are 

bent upon creating misunderstandings and differences between the 

two friendly countries [China and Afghanistan] by leveling false and 

baseless allegations.î The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan would 

never allow anyone to operate against China from Afghanistan, the 

ambassador said.68 

 While using its Pakistan links to influence the Taliban, Beijing 

also worked with other powers to pressure Kabul to conform to 

international norms. In December 2000 China voted in favor of U.S.- 

and Russian-sponsored United Nations Security Council sanctions 

against Afghanistan. Shortly before the U.N. vote, a three-man PRC 

team headed by Chinaís ambassador to Pakistan, Lin Shulin, flew to 

Kandahar for talks with Taliban leader Mullah Mohammud Omar. 

Omar again denied that any people from Xinjiang were being 

trained in Afghanistan, and called for increased cooperation between 

China and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Taliban leaders also 

pleaded for a Chinese veto of the imminent U.N. sanctions. Lin 

Shulin explained why such a Chinese veto would not be 

forthcoming.69 
435

 It is clear from these events that Chinaís link with Pakistan was 

an important instrument for pressuring the Taliban, that is, for 

dealing with Chinaís internal security problems in Xinjiang. Using 

Pakistanís good offices did not bring satisfactory results for China, 

but Beijing did utilize those good offices. Indeed, it was one of 

Beijingís most important policy tools. What might have happened if 

the September 11 attacks on the U.S. had not occurred and the 

Taliban and bin Laden otherwise continued on their chosen course? 

It is conceivable that this might have led to Chinese actions designed 

to punish Pakistan. This did not occur, however, and the likelihood 

of such a development occurring in the future seems to have been 

substantially diminished by 9/11. 

 The logic of Pakistanís situation suggests that Pakistanís military 

leaders have been, and will continue to be, solicitous of Chinaís 

concerns about Xinjiang. If the guiding strategic concern of 

Pakistanís military leaders is securing ìstrategic depth,î that 

objective could not be achieved by alienating Pakistanís most 

important, most powerful backer. With the dissolution of the U.S.-

Pakistan alliance circa 1990, China became Pakistanís only backer 

among the major powers. As we have seen, China has given 

Pakistan, and continues to give, important strategic support. It 

would be extremely reckless for Pakistanís military leaders to 

alienate China by failing to respond to Chinese concerns about 

Xinjiang. Accomplishing Pakistani ìstrategic depthî requires 

retaining Chinese support while forging a solid Islamic alliance 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Meeting Beijingís requirements 

in Afghanistan without sacrificing Islamabadís objectives there was 

certainly a major political problem for Pakistanís military rulers. But 

finding ways of dealing with this tension, rather than resolving it in 

favor of forging a Pakistan-Afghanistan Islamic union, is probably 

the better problem for Islamabad to face. For Chinaís part, 

continuing warm relations and strategic partnership with Pakistan 

gave Islamabad incentive to respond to Beijingís concerns over 
436

Xinjiang. If Beijing disengaged from its strategic partnership with 

Islamabad, leaders in that capital would have fewer incentives to 

comply with Beijingís wishes regarding Xinjiang. 

Speculations about the Period to 2020. 

Today, in 2002, the Sino-Pakistani entente retains its vital force, 

and it remains substantial. While China has disengaged from IndiaPakistan conflicts to a significant degree for the sake of IndianChinese rapprochement, Beijing remains deeply committed to and 

supportive of Pakistanís efforts to sustain national power adequate 

to resist Indian domination. The high level of elite understanding 

between Islamabad and Beijing also remains unimpaired. Chinaís 

ìall-weatherî and ìadversity-testedî friendship still means that 

Chinaís support for Pakistan will continue in spite of Indian 

objections, and independent of whatever happens in India-Pakistan 

relations. This arrangement is unacceptable to India, and New Delhi 

is mobilizing various pressures to pry Beijing further away from 

Islamabad. Expanded Indian partnership with the United States 

raises for Beijing the specter of Indian participation in a U.S.-

sponsored containment of Chinaóunless Beijing becomes more 

sensitive to Indiaís concerns regarding Pakistan. The expansion of 

Indian security ties with Chinaís East Asian neighbors further raises 

the stakes for Beijing. Thus far Indian pressure has worked only at 

the margins of the Sino-Pakistani entente. The core, Chinaís support 

for Pakistanís national development efforts, remains vital. Assuming 

that Indian efforts to pry Beijing away from Pakistan will continue, 

will Beijing become more responsive to Indian demands and 

disengage from Pakistan over the next two decades? 

 Two considerations involving the United States will play an 

important role in determining the amount of pressure China will be 

subject to because of its continuing ties with Pakistan. One is the 

level of tension in U.S.-PRC relations. The second is the level of U.S. 

support for Pakistan. 
437

 Regarding the level of Sino-American tension, were U.S.-PRC 

relations to deteriorate badly, Beijing would, ceterius paribus, become 

more desirous of uncoupling India from the United States. The more 

fearful Beijing is of U.S. containment, or even of outright U.S. attack 

against China, the more willing it would be to meet Indian demands 

regarding Pakistan in order to disassociate India from a U.S.-led 

anti-China bloc. Yet disengaging from Pakistan to appease India 

would be a very risky move for Beijing. It would expose China to a 

possible Indian double-cross, leaving Beijing in an even worse 

situation. We will return to this matter below. 

 Regarding U.S.-Pakistan ties, greater levels of U.S. support for 

and engagement with Pakistan would diminish, or at least offset, 

Indian pressure on China generated by continuation of the SinoPakistani entente. Beijing would be able to argue that its support for 

Pakistan is in line with trends of the international community, and 

not some sort of unacceptable anomaly. Indian anger at U.S.-

Pakistan ties would also work against Indian alignment with the 

United States, and even make cooperation with China more 

attractive to New Delhi as a way of punishing Washington for its 

support for Pakistan. 

 Finally, the trajectory of Indian development over the next 18 or 

so years, especially relative to that of China, will be important. Ifó

and this is a very big ifóIndiaís economic reforms deepen 

substantially and succeed in attracting large volumes of foreign 

direct investment and in generating large export growth, and if this 

were juxtaposed with instability within China due to the insolvency 

of its banking system and/or the collapse of the loss-earning state 

enterprises, Chinaís incentives to appease India by sacrificing 

Pakistan would increase. 

 Several scenarios can be envisioned which could conceivably lead 

to Chinese disengagement from Pakistan. The most likely of these 
438

would entail deterioration of U.S.-China or perhaps ChineseJapanese relations, combined with Indian gestures effectively 

suggesting to Beijing the real possibility of Indian strategic 

alignment with the U.S. and/or Japan unless Beijing met New 

Delhiís demands. New Delhi might unequivocally demand Chinese 

disengagement from Pakistan as the price for Indian nonalignment 

with Chinaís American and/or Japanese foes to the east. Beijing 

might judge as too great the risks of noncompliance with New 

Delhiís demands, and draw away from Pakistan. This syllogism is 

outlined in Figure 5. 

 How likely are these situations to materialize in the period to 

2020? Regarding increased levels of Chinese tension with the United 

States and/or Japan, short of a Chinese decision to attack Taiwan, it 

is difficult to envision a major deterioration of relations and 

escalation of tensions. The trials and tribulations of the 1990s seem to 

have persuaded leaders in both Washington and Beijing that 

confrontation is too costly, of uncertain outcome, and does not serve 

national interests well. Estranged relations punctuated by periodic 

crises seem to be the likely course of U.S.-PRC relations for the 

foreseeable future, probably out to 2020. It is unlikely that there will 

be a major deterioration of Sino-American relations such as might 

require drastic Chinese action to uncouple India and the United 

Statesóonce again short of a Chinese decision to attack Taiwan. 

 Were a Sino-American war over Taiwan to occur, Indian 

neutrality secured at the cost to China of disengagement from 

Pakistan would not be adverse to U.S. interests. Indian involvement 

in the Sino-American war would probably not be decisive or even 

desirable from the U.S. point of view (if the strategy of limited war 

was again adopted). A post-war China that confronted and was 

constrained by an India with a far more powerful position in South 

Asia would, on the other hand, comport with U.S. interests. 
439

Figure 5. 

 Regarding Japan, while new tensions and conflicts have emerged 

in Sino-Japanese relations since about 1996, it is difficult to imagine 

those tensions escalating to a level which would make Chinese 

leaders genuinely fear Japanese-Indian strategic cooperation. The 

exception to this might be Japanese acquisition of long-range air 

attack and/or power projection capabilities. This too seems unlikely 

to occur over the next 18 years. 

 The quality of Indian diplomacy will also count for a lot. Indian 

diplomacy would have to be very skillful. New Delhi would have to 

make Beijing genuinely apprehensive of possible Indian alignment 

with the United States, without going so far as to convince Beijing 

that it was unwise for China to sacrifice its most effective instrument 

for countering India. There are still strong institutional barriers to 

effective diplomatic maneuver in India. Very strong sectors of the 

Indian academic and media elite believe that India cannot, and 

should not, align with the United States. Reasons given for this 

include: Indiaís tradition of non-alignment; the exploitative, 

capitalistic, aggressive, or hegemonistic nature of the United States; 

and Chinaís anticipated negative reaction to Indian alignment with 
440

the United States. Regarding the final reason, the line of argument is 

that Indian alignment with the United States would anger Beijing, 

thereby thwarting development of more friendly Sino-Indian 

relations. This was demonstrated, so the argument runs, by Chinaís 

strongly negative reaction to the BJP governmentís solicitation of 

U.S. ìunderstandingî for Indian nuclearization in May 1998. 

Improvement of Sino-Indian relations thus requires that India not 

get too close to Washington. This is a widespread view in India, one 

that Beijing encourages and courts with friendship diplomacy. 

 At least as common in India as suggestions that closer India-U.S. 

strategic cooperation would pressure China to disengage from 

Pakistan, is the argument that such cooperation is reckless and 

would backfire to Indiaís disadvantage. Chinese analysts are well 

aware of these strong trends in Indian thinking, and Chinaís 

diplomacy has become fairly adept at exploiting this line of Indian 

thought. Given the depth of divisions within Indian opinion, plus 

the effectiveness of Chinese diplomacy in courting Indian proChina/anti-Western sentiment, resolute and decisive Indian action 

that might actually scare Beijing into seeing some need to disengage 

from Pakistan seems unlikely. It seems more likely that Beijing 

would conclude that Indian threats to align with the United States 

and/or Japan are bluffs from which Indian leaders can be compelled 

to back away by the application of appropriate Chinese 

countermeasures. 

 If Chinese leaders were persuaded that India would actually 

align with the United States and/or Japan, the importance of 

Pakistan as a means for countering India would become even more 

vital to Beijing. This is a major conundrum for Indiaís efforts to 

pressure China away from Pakistan. To genuinely rouse Chinese 

concerns, to persuade Beijing that Indian threats of alignment with 

the United States are credible, New Delhi must move toward 

genuine cooperation with the United States. Yet by doing this, it 

makes Pakistan even more valuable to Beijing as a counter to India. 
441

 Under conditions in which actual Indian alignment with the U.S. 

seemed possible, Chinese disengagement from Pakistan would 

require firm Indian guarantees that New Delhi would not align with, 

or continue its alignment with, the United States subsequent to 

Chinese disengagement from Pakistan. Beijing would also require 

solid Indian guarantees that New Delhi would not seize the 

opportunity of Chinese disengagement from Pakistan to decisively 

subordinate Pakistan. Lacking either of these, Beijing would face the 

possibility of an Indian double-cross. New Delhi might move against 

a now-isolated Pakistan, a Pakistan without Chinese support. 

Decisive Indian subordination of an isolated Pakistan might then be 

followed by Indian alignment with the anti-China U.S.-Japan bloc. 

All of this seems exceedingly unlikely. It seems far more likely that 

Beijing would not risk the extremely powerful check on India 

constituted by a strong Pakistan able and willing to counter India. 

China will probably prefer to found its security in South Asia on an 

advantageous balance of power, rather than endanger that structure 

for the sake of Indian good will. 

ENDNOTES 

1. Zhang Wenben, ìShijie diyuan zhengzhi tixi you yindu weilai anquanî (The 

world geopolitical system and Indiaís future security), Zhanlue yu guanli, 2001, No. 

3, pp. 43-52. 

 2. ìYindu junshi yexin de baoguangî (Expose of Indiaís military ambitions), 

Hefei wanbao (Hefei Evening Daily), April 4, 2000, available at 

http://news.silversand.net/file/world/2000/04/04174836.htm. 

 3. Quoted in Robert Greenberger and Matt Forney, ìChina-Pakistan Missile 

Pact Shows Calculated Strategy,î Wall Street Journal, December 15, 1998, p. A14. 

 4. Xinhua, May 10, 2001, ìXinhua Interviews Pakistan Chief General Musharraf 

on PRC Zhuís Visit,î in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, China

(hereafter FBIS-CHI), FBIS-CHI-2001-0510. 

 5. ìPakistan, Chian [sic] Agree to Continue Cooperation in Nuclear and 
442

Defense Fields,î Islamabad Pakistan Observer, May 12, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0512. 

 6. Seyed Talat Hussain, ìChinese role key to South Asian peace: CE seeks help 

to maintain deterrence,î Dawn, Islamabad, May 16, 2001. Available at: 

http://www.dawn.com/2001/05/16/top1.htm. I would like to thank Dr. Ahmad Faruqui 

for bringing this source to my attention. 

 7. I discuss this in a forthcoming article, ìThe New Sino-Indian-U.S. Triangle.î 

 8. Authorís discussions with government and think-tank analysts in Beijing, 

October 2001. 

 9. Xia Yishan, ìThe Shanghai Co-Operative Organization As I See [sic],î 

Foreign Affairs Journal (Beijing), No. 61, September 2001, pp. 8-13. 

 10. A handy chronology of Sino-Indian relations is available in China’s Foreign 

Relations, A Chronology of Events (1949-1988), Beijing: Foreign Languages press, 

1989. 

 11. John W. Garver, ìSino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistani 

Entente,î Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 1112, No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 323-347. 

 12. Lakhsmi Ragagopo, ìChinaís Position during the 1999 India-Pakistan 

Kargil Confrontation,î Masters thesis, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, 

Georgia Institute of Technology, 2000. 

 13. Japan was the major provider of foreign development assistance to 

Pakistan until the suspension of such aid following Pakistanís May 1998 nuclear 

tests. Japan was very much concerned with Pakistani, Indian, Chinese, and North 

Korean nuclear weapons development efforts. 

 14. Judith Miller, ìU.S. Is Holding Up Peking Atom Talks,î New York 

Times,(NYT), September 19, 1982, p. 11. 

 15. Financial Times, August 14, 1984; Nucleonics Week, May 23, 1991, p. 1. These 

reports put the transfer in ìabout 1983.î 

 16. Gary Milhollin, Gerard White, ìA New China Syndrome: Chinaís Arms 

Bazzar,î Washington Post, May 12, 1991, pp. C1, C4. Aga in this event was said to 

have occurred ìabout 1983.î 

 17. Proliferation: Chinese Case Studies, Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
443

International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on 

Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 105th Congress, 1st Session, April 10, 

1997, pp. 8, 12. 

 18. Xinhua, January 5, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0105. 

 19. Nucleonics Week, February 8, 1996. 

 20. ìU.S. Wonít Push China Over Sale of Nuclear Gear,î NYT, May 11, 1996, p. 

A1. 

 21. Douglas Waller, ìThe Secret Missile Deal,î Time, June 30, 1997, p. 29. 

Robert Greenberger and Matt Forney, ìChina-Pakistan Missile Pact Shows 

Calculated Strategy,î Wall Street Journal, December 15, 1989, p. A14. India-Pakistan 

Nuclear and Missile Proliferation: Background, Status and Issues for U.S. Policy, 

December 16, 1996, Foreign Affairs and Defense (FAND), Library of Congress 97-

23F. 

 22. AFP, ìDenies U.S. Report on M-11 Sales,î FBIS-CHI, September 9 1994, p. 

F2. 

 23. Jane Perlez, ìChina to Stop Selling A-Arms Delivery Systems,î NYT, 

November 22, 2000, p. A10. 

 24. ìDenies M-11 Missile Purchase,î Islamabad Television Network, 5 

December 1994, in FBIS-CHI, December 6, 1994, pp. F7-8. 

 25. Waller, ìSecret Missile Deal.î 

 26. David Sanger, Eric Schmitt, ìChina Missile Aid to Pakistan Goes On, U.S. 

Suspects,î International Herald Tribune, July 3, 2001, p. 1. 

 27. Nayan Chanda, Susan Lawrence, ìFinal Deadline,î Far Eastern Economic 

Review (henceforth FEER), May 18, 2000, pp. 16-18. 

 28. Perlez, ìChina to Stop Selling A-Arms Delivery Systems.î 

 29. Craig Smith, ìFrustrating U.S., China Balks at Pact to Stem Nuclear Sales,î 

NYT, October 20, 2001, p. B4; Bill Gertz, ìBeijing Arms Pakistan,î Washington 

Times, August 6, 2001, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com. 

 30. Xinhua, ìPakistan, Kyrgystan to Open Road Links Through China,î FBIS-
444

CHI, December 12, 1994, p. 6. 

 31. Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers, 

McNair Paper 36, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 

University, February 1995, p. 8. 

 32. SIPRI data may well under-report Chinese arms sales to Pakistan since, 

beginning in 1997, China stopped reporting arms sales data to the United Nations 

in protest against that bodyís reporting of data regarding Taiwan as a category 

separate from the PRC. 

 33. Regarding the Gwadar project, see ìDaily Welcomes Chinaís Support for 

Pakistani Projects,î Pakistan Observer (Islamabad), May 14, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-

0514; ìPakistan: Economic Viability of Chinese-Aided Strategic Port Questioned,î 

The News (Islamabad), August 26, 2001, FBIS-Near East and South Asia (NES)-2001-

0826; ìPakistani Minister Says China-funded Gwadar Port to Be Operation [sic] in 

Three Years,î The News (Islamabad), August 16, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0816; 

ìPakistan: PRC Likely to Provide ëAt Leastí $400 million Credit for Two Projects,î 

The Nation (Islamabad), August 5, 2001, FBIS-NES-2001-00805. 

 34. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central 

Asia, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000. Rashid documents 

Pakistani lobbying on behalf of these pipeline routes, and argues that securing 

these routes was the key factor driving Pakistanís support for the Taliban. 

Information from his map on page xiv is added to the map constructed in Figure 1. 

 35. Shortly after the BJPís March 1998 election, Singh wrote a ringing manifesto 

critiquing Indiaís traditional lack of realism and calling for a more hard-headed, 

pragmatic policy of maneuver in pursuit of Indian interests. Defending India, New 

Delhi: Macmillan, 1999. 

 36. Vajpayeeís letter is in NYT, May 13, 1998, p. A12. 

 37. See, for example, Jaswant Singh, ìAgainst nuclear apartheid,î Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5, September-October 1998, pp. 41-52. 

 38. John W. Garver, ìThe Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity after Indiaís May 

1998 Nuclear Tests,î The China Quarterly, No. 168, December 2001, pp. 86 5-889. 

 39. ìIndia gives China a piece of its mind,î Times of India, March 9, 2000, 

available at http://www.timesofIndia.com/090300/09indi1.htm. 
445

 40. The Telegraph (Calcutta), January 21, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2000-0121. 

 41. A caveat is in order here. Countering Chinese encirclement is not the sum 

total of the Look East policyís rationale. That policy also has to do with a broad 

drive to enhance Indiaís international role, and with Vajpayeeís desire to use 

enhanced international standing to mobilize domestic voter support. 

 42. Rabindra Sen, ìTies on a New Footing,î The Telegraph (Calcutta), August 

24, 2000, in FBIS-NES-2000-0824. 

 43. The Hindu (Chennai), September 20, 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-0920. 

 44. Lianhe xinwen wang, January 1, 2002, available at 

http://udnnews.com/CB/NEWS/FOCUSNEWS/POLITICS/647735.html. 

 45. John W. Garver, ìIndian-Chinese Rivalry in Indochina,î Asian Survey, Vol. 

27, No. 1, November 1987, pp. 1205-1219. 

 46. Barbara L. LePoer, India-U.S. Relations, CRS Issue Brief, IB 93097, November 

2, 1998, pp. 8-9. 

 47. Joint India-U.S. Statement, March 21, 2000, available at 

http://www.Indianembassy.org. 

 48. Joint India-U.S. Statement, September 15, 2000, available at Ibid. 

 49. ìU.S. ready to resume arms sales to India,î Financial Times, February 19, 

2002, p. 3. 

 50. G. Parthasarthy, ìOn the fast track,î India Abroad, February 15, 2002, p. 32. 

 51. Rawalpindi Jang, February 24, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0225. 

 52. ìIndia gives China a piece of its mind.î 

 53. The Asian Age (New Delhi), July 23, 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-0723. 

 54. ìMore on Sino-Indian Border Talks, Tang Says PRC-Pakistan Ties Not 

Against India,î Deccan Herald (Bangalore), July 23, 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-0723. 

 55. ìChina Foreign Minister: Ties with India Not To Affect Pak-China 

Relations,î The News (Islamabad), July 24, 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-0724. 
446

 56. Garver, ìRestoration of Comity in Sino-Indian Relations.î 

 57. John W. Garver, îThe Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet 

Communism,î The China Quarterly, March 1993, No. 133, pp. 1-26. 

 58. Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1998 (China statistical yearbook, 1998), Beijing: 

China Statistical Publishing House, 1998, p. 43. 

 59. For a study of these challenges in the 1930s and the modalities of the 

assertion of Chinese authority over Xinjiang during World War II, see John W. 

Garver, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism, New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 

 60. Lillian Craig Harris, ìXinjiang, Central Asia, and the Implications for 

Chinaís Policy in the Islamic World,î The China Quarterly, No. 133, March 1993, pp. 

111-129. 

 61. This is adapted from M. Ehsan Ahrari, Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan, and 

the New Great Game, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, August 2001, pp. 32-33. 

 62. Ahrari, Jihadi Groups. According to Ahmed Rashid, Washington courted the 

Taliban until late 1997. Rashid, Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in 

Central Asia. Rashid also documents the extremely close relation between Pakistan 

and the Taliban. 

 63. This discussion is from Rashid, Taliban, p. 186. 

 64. The News (Islamabad), internet version, January 6, 1999, in FBIS-NES-99-

006. 

65. Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), August 10, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0810. 

 66. The News (Islamabad), internet version, July 22, 2000, in FBIS-NES-2000-

0722. 

 67. ìPakistan Daily Examines Beijing-Islamabad Relations,î The News

(Islamabad), July 27, 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-0727. 

 68. The Nation (Islamabad), internet version, July 26, 2000, in FBIS-NES-2000-

0726. 
447

 69. The Nation (Islamabad), internet version, July 4, 2001, in FBIS-NES-2001-

0704. Also, AFP, Hong Kong, December 19, 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-1219. 
449 

CHAPTER 16 

THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN ASIA1

Aaron L. Friedberg 

Over the course of the next several decades, there is a good 

chance that the United States will find itself engaged in an open and 

intense geopolitical rivalry with the Peopleís Republic of China 

(PRC). Such an outcome is not inevitable; few things in international 

politics are. But there are strong reasons to believe that it is at the 

very least plausible, and even quite likely. Indeed, there are reasons 

to believe it is already under way. 

 In what follows, my aim is to consider what such a SinoAmerican rivalry might look like, and how it could unfold. In doing 

so, I make three basic assumptions. The first is that, as a nation-state, 

China will continue to hang togetheróthat, however dramatically its 

economy and political system may change over the next several 

decades, they will not collapse. My second assumption is that, in the 

words of a recent U.S. Defense Department report, China ìwants to 

become the preeminent Asian power,î which necessarily means that 

it will seek ultimately to displace the U.S. as the preponderant power 

in the region. Third, I assume that the U.S., while seeking to satisfy 

Chinaís ambitions by at least to some degree acceding to its wishes, 

will not be willing to abandon its own present position of preponderance in Asia or to surrender pride of place to China. To permit a 

potentially hostile power to dominate East Asia would not only be 

out of line with current U.S. policy, it would also mark a deviation 

from the fundamental pattern of American grand strategy since at 

least the latter part of the 19th century. 

 The combination of growing Chinese power, Chinaís effort to 

expand its influence, and the unwillingness of the U.S. entirely to 
450 

give way before it are the necessary preconditions of a ìstruggle for 

masteryî in Asia (to adopt a phrase from the British historian A. J. P. 

Taylor). How, then, might that struggle arise? 

 The Sino-American relationship today contains a mix of 

cooperative and competitive elements. The two countries trade with 

each other, American businesses invest considerable sums in China, 

and many Chinese students come to study in the United States. 

Beijing and Washington engage in sporadic military-to-military dialogues and ongoing discussions of various regional and global 

issues, including the future of the Korean peninsula and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. At the 

same time, however, the U.S. and China have strong disagreements 

on a variety of matters, human rights and the Taiwan question being 

foremost among them. And in recent years the two sides have begun 

to regard each other as potential military rivals, although both are 

reluctant to acknowledge this openly. 

 It is precisely this mix of cooperative and competitive elements 

that may shift sharply in the competitive direction. In the new 

configuration of things, China and the U.S. would most likely 

continue some form of economic relationship, they would not be 

openly at war with one another, and they would maintain diplomatic ties. But flows of trade and investment would increasingly be 

distorted by strategic considerations, the two powers would be 

engaged in a much more open military competitionódesigning, 

deploying, and training their forces with an eye toward possible 

conflictóand this military rivalry would be accompanied by a 

political contest waged throughout the Asia-Pacific region and 

perhaps beyond. 

 Any number of pathways could lead from the present to this 

imagined future. Thus, a single catalytic event, such as a showdown 

over Taiwan, especially if it entailed a significant loss of life on either 

side, could transform the U.S.-China relationship virtually overnight. 
451 

Whichever side prevailed, the loser would look for ways to exact 

revenge, and each power would likely redouble its efforts to 

strengthen its military and diplomatic postures in Asia and undermine those of its rival. Or there could be a gradual deterioration in 

relations, an accumulation of lesser disputes and failed efforts to 

resolve them that would lead the U.S. and China to become 

increasingly suspicious and hostile. Or there might be some 

combination of these trendsósay, a period of gradual deterioration 

punctuated by one or a series of crises (like the one that followed the 

accidental American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia 

in the spring of 1999), no one of which might seem in itself to be of 

overwhelming importance but which, taken together, could culminate in a much more contentious relationship. 

 Regardless of how it arose, an intensified Sino-American rivalry 

would likely manifest itself in different spheres and along different 

dimensions. Let me take these in order, beginning with the 

economic. 

ECONOMIC RIVALRY 

 Ever since it began market reforms in the late 1970s, the PRC has 

become heavily dependent for its continued well-being on the 

outside world, and, in particular, on the U.S. Without heavy inflows 

of American capital and technology, and without access to the huge 

U.S. market, China would not have been able to progress as far and 

as fast as it has. Whether or not the U.S. could have used its position 

of relative economic advantage for strategic purposes during this 

period, the fact is that, for the most part, it did not try. Despite some 

efforts in the late 1980s and early 1990s to punish China for violations of human rights and arms proliferation, U.S. economic pressure 

was half-hearted and largely ineffectual. By the mid-1990s, the U.S. 

was lifting most sanctions, loosening or abandoning most controls 

on dual-use technology exports to China, and moving to grant it 

status as a normal trading partner. 
452 

 It did so based largely on the belief that trade leads to peace. 

Mutual economic exchange is assumed to forge a shared interest in 

good relations, and a powerful disincentive to conflict. According to 

advocates of ìengagementî with the PRC, international trade and 

investment will fuel economic growth, economic growth will speed 

democratization, and a democratic China will be far less likely to use 

force or threats against other democracies, including the U.S. 

 It is certainly possible that, if it continues to grow richer, China 

will also become, from the American perspective, more benign. But it 

is also conceivable that this may not happen. If it does not, the U.S. 

will be faced with a challenge with which it has not had to cope in 

over a century: a strategic rival that is economically and technologically dynamic, deeply engaged in the world economy, and whose 

total output may come eventually to approach Americaís own. 

 Will an era of more openly competitive relations be marked by 

renewed U.S. efforts to exert economic leverage on China? The 

answer will depend a great deal on how such an era begins. A 

sudden, severe crisis could galvanize American domestic opinion, 

overwhelm the objections of business groups and others with a 

strong vested interest in continued commercial contacts, and lead to 

the imposition of near-total restrictions on imports, exports, and 

capital and technology flows. But if the deterioration is gradual, a 

sufficient political consensus may not exist in the U.S. to support 

even limited sanctions. To the contrary, it is precisely when relations 

falter that arguments for keeping trade on an even keel will be 

advanced most strenuously. 

 As time passes, China will probably become even less susceptible 

to American economic pressure than it is today. Chinese exports to 

the U.S. may be large, but even now they are greatly overshadowed 

by Chinaís exports to its Asian neighbors. And as important as the 

U.S. is as a source of capital, it now comes in only third among the 
453 

five largest providers of direct foreign investment to China; the other 

four (Hong Kong, which serves as a conduit for Taiwanese investment on the mainland, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea) are all 

Asian players. In the future, the Chinese government will have a 

strong strategic incentive to encourage and expand such diversification, above all in order to lessen excessive dependence on the U.S. 

 In the long run, China will become relatively less reliant not only 

on the U.S. but on the outside world generally. Rising incomes will 

mean a growing pool of domestic savings and a declining reliance on 

foreign investment. In time, the technological advance of Chinese 

industry will be fueled more by indigenous developments and less 

by ideas, techniques, and machinery imported from abroad. The 

maturing of its vast domestic market will probably also mean that 

trade will diminish as a share of gross national product (GNP) and 

that China will become less dependent on exports and imports than 

it is today (though at least in the medium term it is likely to depend 

more heavily on certain critical imports, especially of food and fuel). 

 As China develops and becomes more deeply integrated into the 

global economy, it will not only be less susceptible to economic pressure from others but more capable of exerting economic pressure of 

its own. This pressure need not even be deliberate to be felt: as the 

experience of the U.S. in the Western hemisphere suggests, a big, 

dynamic economy can exert an almost gravitational pull on the 

smaller units that surround it. The analyst Ross Munro has noted in 

Orbis that the rapid growth of Chinaís economy has produced a 

significant expansion in its influence all along its interior land frontier, as its mostly poor neighbors in South, Southeast, and Central 

Asia have begun to look to it increasingly as a source of markets, aid, 

and business deals. 

 Beyond its immediate neighborhood, the sheer size of the potential Chinese market has also helped to create powerful business 

lobbies favoring good relations with the PRC. In the major industrial 
454 

powers, these groups can be expected to pressure their own governments in favor of policies that happen also to be in Beijingís interest: 

easing restrictions on exports of capital and technology, avoiding 

sanctions, tariffs, or other market-closing measures that might provoke Chinese retaliation, and, in general, doing whatever is possible 

to maintain good bilateral relations and a ìpositive business 

climate.î 

 The activities of pro-PRC lobbying groups may be perfectly 

legitimate and predictable; but in democratic societies they have 

nevertheless had the effect of dulling the reactions and limiting the 

strategic repertory of governments. These effects have been especially pronounced in the U.S. Barring some truly severe crisis, trade 

with China will continue to exercise its muffling influ-ence on 

American strategy. 

 Even if the U.S. should, at some point, adopt a more openly 

competitive stance, it would have great difficulty getting others to go 

along. This is not only because of genuine differences of perspective 

over how best to cope with Chinaís increasing power and 

assertiveness, but also because each of the members of a potential 

coalition will be subject to its own domestic pressures. To get some 

sense of this, imagine, during the Cold War, the debates on strategic 

policy that would have gone on within NATO if the members of the 

alliance had also been, to varying degrees, deeply engaged in 

economic exchange with the Soviet Union. As Andrew J. Nathan and 

Robert S. Ross conclude in their book, The Great Wall and the Empty 

Fortress (1997), ìIt is almost unthinkable that the rest of the world 

would unite to isolate China as the West did in the era of 

containment.î 

 In addition to what it gains passively, as it were, simply by 

engaging with the rest of the world, China has also been actively 

deploying its growing economic weight to shape the strategic 

behavior of others. First, and most obviously, Beijing uses access to 
455 

the Chinese market as a means of rewarding or punishing foreign 

firms and, through them, influencing their home governments. Ross 

Munro and Richard Bernstein relate in The Coming Conflict with China 

(1997) that PRC officials promoted an unusual array of business 

deals with American companies in the spring of 1994, just as the 

Clinton administration was considering revoking Chinaís mostfavored-nation status over human rights violations. Two years later, 

having headed off this threat, Prime Minister Li Peng announced 

that China would buy $1.5 billion worth of aircraft from Airbus 

Industrie rather than Boeing because, in his words, the Europeans 

did not ìattach political strings to cooperation with China, unlike the 

Americans who arbitrarily resort to the threat of sanctions or the use 

of sanctions.î 

 China has been especially assertive in attempting to exert direct 

economic influence over Taiwan. Following the election of Chen 

Shui-bian in the spring of 2000, the Beijing government began to 

warn Taiwanese companies with investments on the mainland that 

(according to a report in the New York Times) ìthey would be subject 

to unspecified sanctions if they advocated independence for 

Taiwan.î To drive home the point, the PRC has evidently begun to 

make examples of companies whose chief executives are associated 

with the cause of independence. (In one case, a large petrochemical 

concern whose chairman supported Chen found its facilities on the 

mainland subjected to numerous inspections.) Even more visible is 

the case of Ah-mei, a Taiwanese singer popular on the mainland 

who performed the national anthem at Chenís inauguration. Her 

music and videos have since been banned from Chinese statecontrolled media; in response to official pressure, Coca-Cola 

withdrew TV, radio, and billboard advertisements featuring her 

image. 

 Beijing clearly hopes to use economic threats and inducements, 

then, to discourage the U.S. from ever pursuing a more 

confrontational policy toward it. The same economic instruments 
456 

could also prove extremely important in efforts to affect American 

interests in Asia, discouraging Japan and Korea from participating in 

the development of theater missile-defense systems, for example, or 

persuading Singapore to abandon its present policy of permitting 

U.S. naval vessels to dock at its ports. The PRC could also do more 

than in the past to separate the U.S. from its European allies by 

shifting business from American firms to their EU competitors. 

 The PRC has begun to get into the financial-diplomacy game as 

well, if so far on a rather modest scale. In 1994, China stole a march 

on India by financing, building, and equipping a $200 million coal 

mine in Bangladesh. And during the summer of 1997, as the Asian 

financial crisis was reaching its depths, China joined the IMF and a 

group of much wealthier Asian countries in extending a financial 

bailout package to Thailandóthe first time that it had ever participated in such an effort. Eighteen months later, at the beginning of 

1999, Thailand surprised the U.S., its nominal ally, by signing a 

ìPlan of Action for the 21st Centuryî with Chinaóan agreement 

described by one Thai observer as ìa strategic move by China to seek 

an alliance to counter the influence of the U.S.î If the Thai example is 

any indication, economic assistance in various forms will probably 

become an increasingly significant means for China of winning 

friends and influencing people. 

 There are also other, more subtle financial instruments at its 

disposal. During the Asian crisis, China extracted the maximum 

diplomatic benefit from its (self-interested) decision not to devalue 

its currency despite sharp drops in the currencies of many of its 

smaller neighbors. It thereby earned plaudits as a responsible 

regional ìcitizen,î an upholder of stability, and, in contrast to Japan, 

a country able to take tough economic decisions. But Chinaís muchvaunted restraint may also have carried with it an implicit and more 

menacing message: the PRC is now, as one senior official of the 

Peopleís Bank put it at the time, ìa big player,î and what it does or 

fails to do in the economic realm can have large and potentially 
457 

devastating effects on the well-being of other, lesser players. 

 One final possibility: because China promotes exports while 

restricting imports, it has run substantial trade surpluses in recent 

years and accumulated large foreign-exchange reserves. In 1998, for 

example, the PRCís reserves stood at over $140 billion, second only 

to Japanís. If China continues to amass large reserves and if, as seems 

likely, the bulk of these are held in dollar-denominated assets, they 

could provide Beijing with an economic weapon against the U.S. By 

dumping its reserves at the right moment, China might hope to 

trigger a run on the dollar, an increase in U.S. interest rates, and 

perhaps a stock-market crash. It is true that such an attack, if it 

produced the intended immediate results, could also do serious 

damage to Chinaís economy; the mutually destructive effects of 

attempts at currency manipulation and financial coercion have 

caused some analysts to compare them with nuclear weapons. But 

the prospect of mutual devastation does not necessarily provide an 

ironclad guarantee that a weapon will never be used. 

 The bottom line is simple: one way or another, Chinaís economic 

growth will provide it with an increasing array of instruments with 

which to try to exert influence on other countries and, if it chooses, to 

carry forward a strategic competition with the U.S. 

MILITARY RIVALRY 

The second dimension of a possible struggle for mastery in Asia 

will be military. From the early 1970s until (at the latest) the early 

1990s, the U.S. and the PRC pursued what might be described as 

parallel rather than convergent military programs. While both 

countries were augmenting their capabilities and planning for future 

warfare, neither was explicitly or overtly focusing its activities on the 

other. Rather, for almost two decades, American and Chinese 

defense planners shared a common adversary: the Soviet Union. The 

weakening and subsequent collapse of the USSR removed the basis 
458 

for this tacit Sino-American alliance, and also freed the two countries 

to devote more of their military resources to other potential rivals. 

Over the course of the 1990s, they came increasingly to regard each 

other in just this light. 

 Starting in 1985, Chinaís armed forces, at the direction of their top 

political leaders, downgraded preparations for an ìearly, major, and 

nuclear warî with the Soviet Union and began to focus on the possibility of local, limited wars on Chinaís periphery. This change had 

the general effect of directing the attention of the Chinese military 

outwardóaway from the need to absorb a massive enemy nuclear 

attack and subsequent invasion and toward the problem of projecting power at least some distance from Chinaís frontiers. Then the 

1991 Gulf War heightened Chinese awareness of the military impact 

of new technologies and, partly as a result, caused Chinese planners 

to concentrate with new intensity on the possibility of a future 

conflict with the U.S. According to Allen Whiting, writing in the 

China Quarterly, ìwar games played against the American ëenemyí 

have been standard since 1991.î 

 For a variety of reasons, the U.S. has been slower to focus similar 

attention on China. During the early post-Cold War years, American 

armed forces were preoccupied first with fighting the Gulf War, then 

with managing reductions in their size and budget, and finally with 

carrying out a variety of operations, from peacekeeping missions of 

varying scale to a sizable air war in Kosovo. Throughout the 1990s 

and down to the present, there was also a strong political inhibition 

against considering China a future military rival. 

 The turning point probably came in 1995-96, when China fired 

ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Strait. Since then, as the Washington 

Post correspondent Thomas Ricks has reported, U.S. military 

planners have been devoting greater energy to potential Asian 

contingencies and, however reluctantly, thinking about a possible 

confrontation with China. If present trends continue, over the next 
459 

several years the U.S. and China will move toward an increasingly 

obvious military competition, with several facets. 

Offense vs. Defense. 

China has placed heavy emphasis on the development and 

deployment of missiles: short-, intermediate-, and long-range, 

nuclear and conventional, cruise and ballistic. 

 Since the mid-1990s, the PRC has added substantially to its 

arsenal of short-range conventional ballistic missiles (the DF-11s and 

DF-15 s), and by 2005 it is expected to have roughly 600 of these 

weapons within range of Taiwan.2 Older, liquid-fueled, intermediate-range missiles capable of striking targets throughout East 

and South Asia with nuclear weapons (DF-3As) are being 

supplemented with newer, more accurate, solid-fueled missiles (DF21As). Finally, Chinaís small force of fixed, liquid-fueled intercontinental-range rockets (DF-5s and DF-5As) is expected to be 

upgraded over the course of the next decade to include two new 

types of land-based mobile missiles (the DF-31 and DF-41, both of 

which may be capable of carrying multiple warheads) and one 

submarine-launched ballistic missile (the JL-2). If, as is widely 

assumed, some of these weapons are equipped with multiple 

warheads, the number of weapons deliverable against the U.S. will 

rise into the low hundreds. If the number of new launchers deployed 

is larger than expected, that total could grow to as many as 1,000. 

 Chinaís interest in missiles may be due in part to the fact that, as 

opposed to manned long-range aircraft, submarines, or surface naval 

vessels, they are relatively cheap, comparatively simple, and potentially very effective. While the Chinese air force and navy continue to 

work at acquiring and improving more traditional kinds of military 

systems, missiles, as the analyst Mark Stokes observes, ìare rapidly 

becoming the sole credible long-range firepower projection asset 

which the [military] has in its inventory, and this will remain likely 
460 

true for the foreseeable future." 

 At the same time that China has been augmenting its missile 

forces, the U.S. has been developing and moving toward the 

deployment of both national and theater ballistic-missile defense 

systems. Our intensified interest in defense was not driven initially 

by concern over China, but rather by the threat from ìrogueî states 

like North Korea and Iran. Nevertheless, at least since the 1995-96 

Taiwan Strait crisis, the question of the possible utility of defenses 

against Chinese missiles has inevitably arisen. For their part, and 

whatever American decisionmakers may say or believe, Chinese 

strategists probably assume that our missile-defense programs are 

directed in large measure at blunting their offensive forces. For the 

moment, PRC planners have reason to hope that American defensive 

deployments will be delayed by some combination of technical 

problems, budgetary concerns, domestic political developments, and 

diplomatic pressure. But they are unlikely to be so imprudent as to 

ignore the possibility that, sooner or later, some kinds of defenses 

will be deployed. Even a limited national missile-defense system 

could well be capable of intercepting all of the PRCís present ICBM 

force. If they cannot derail the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) 

program through diplomatic means, the Chinese will therefore want 

to be in a position to defeat it militarily, probably by deploying 

larger numbers of missiles, at least some of which will be capable of 

carrying either decoys or multiple warheads. (Another form of insurance might be submarines carrying long-range cruise missiles, or 

ballistic missiles that could be fired at depressed trajectories.) 

 Then there is the prospect that the U.S. may deploy theater missile 

defenses (TMD), either alone or in conjunction with its regional 

friends and allies. A working TMD system would decrease Chinaís 

confidence in its ability to intimidate other Asian countries by 

threatening to attack them with nuclear weapons; it might also 

seriously complicate Chinese hopes of disrupting American military 

operations in the western Pacific by quickly disabling a handful of 
461 

fixed bases and facilities. A Japan able to shelter behind a defensive 

shield might also feel freer to develop its own offensive capabilities, 

perhaps even including nuclear weapons. Last but not least, a TMD 

system deployed on or around Taiwan could blunt what is now 

Chinaís most potent threat against the island, perhaps opening the 

way for moves toward formal independence. 

 Chinaís options for responding to these possibilities are similar to 

those it has in dealing with NMD, although, because of the shorter 

distances involved, some countermeasures may be easier and less 

expensive to implement. Preventing deployment in the first place 

through diplomacy and intimidation would be an obvious first 

choice. Preparing to swamp a TMD system with ever-larger numbers 

of warheads would be another. Circumventing defenses by developing long-range cruise missiles or other means of attack would be a 

third. Finally, if the U.S. and its allies seemed to be developing 

defenses sufficiently capable to blunt a conventional missile attack, 

the Chinese might seek to up the ante by adding to their force of 

short- and intermediate-range missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. A defensive system able to shoot down 75 percent of the 

missiles fired against it might look very impressive against an allconventional attack, but much less so against one that could contain 

a mix of more and less destructive warheads. 

Projecting Power. 

The U.S. is today able to project conventional air and naval power 

virtually unimpeded anywhere in the western Pacific, including all 

along Chinaís eastern seaboard and, conceivably, hundreds of miles 

inland. American forces, brought to bear at long distances, and with 

the help of a handful of local friends and allies, pose the single 

greatest obstacle to any Chinese effort to establish itself as the 

dominant power in East Asia. Chinese planners must fear that, in a 

crisis or future conflict, the U.S. could close Chinaís ports, unleash 

precision conventional attacks with cruise missiles and stealthy 
462 

manned aircraft against targets on the Chinese mainland, and, by 

sinking Chinese submarines and surface ships, break an attempted 

blockade of Taiwan. If they are to displace the U.S. as East Asiaís 

dominant military power, Chinese strategists must come up with 

ways of countering American forces. 

 I have already mentioned one such way: the possible use of 

missiles against U.S. regional bases. At present and for the foreseeable future, the ability of the U.S. to sustain air and naval operations 

in the western Pacific depends heavily on access to a small number 

of facilities in Japan and South Korea. If these (plus a handful of 

others in Singapore, Australia, and perhaps in the Philippines and 

Guam) can be destroyed or rendered unusable, Americaís ability to 

project power will fall precipitously. 

 Next in order of technical difficulty for China would be acquiring 

weapons with which to sink American surface ships, and especially 

the aircraft carriers on which the U.S. now relies so heavily. In most 

conflicts involving U.S. and Chinese forces, these vessels would have 

to operate at the far western edge of the Pacific and might therefore 

be especially vulnerable to attacks by cruise missiles, torpedoes, and 

intelligent mines. 

 Such weapons could be unleashed in large numbers from swarms 

of relatively inexpensive platforms, including small submarines and 

surface ships, and remotely piloted aerial vehicles. Anticarrier 

attacks by land-based ballistic missiles are another possibility. 

 More challenging than sinking carriers but of potentially even 

greater benefit would be the capacity to disable American 

intelligence, communications, and navigation satellites and to 

disrupt U.S. information systems, both in the region and beyond. In 

contrast to China, which in conflicts close to home would enjoy the 

benefits of interior lines of communication, the U.S. would have to 

control its forces at great distances from home and across a vast 
463 

theater of operations. Even temporary disruptions could have 

devastating and potentially disastrous consequences. This is 

something that has not escaped the attention of Chinese observers. 

According to Mark Stokes, ìChinese strategists and engineers perceive U.S. reliance on communications, reconnaissance, and navigation satellites as a potential ëAchillesí heel,í" and they are looking for 

ways to attack it, including by means of ground-based lasers, 

jammers, and kinetic kill vehicles. 

 Defeating American power projection will also require defending 

Chinese territory against airborne attack. Toward this end China has 

apparently been devoting considerable resources to developing a 

nationwide air-defense system capable of locating, tracking, and 

intercepting aircraft and cruise missiles, including those with 

stealthy characteristics. Improved coastal defenses, perhaps including antisubmarine-warfare ships, attack submarines, and aircraft, 

could also force U.S. cruise-missile-launching submarines to operate 

at greater distances from Chinaís shores, thereby reducing the array 

of targets they could cover. 

 In this regard, and more generally, the thrust of Chinese programs will be to push American forces back and, at the very least, 

seriously complicate their efforts to operate in the western Pacific. 

Deterrence. 

For decades we have promised, explicitly or otherwise, to defend 

our Asian allies if they were attacked by China. Until very recently 

we have done so from a position of virtual immunity to direct 

Chinese attack on our own soil. The development of Chinese longrange strike capabilities and, in particular, a visible and substantial 

increase in Chinaís ability to hit the continental U.S. with nuclear 

weapons could raise profound questions in Asia about the continuing utility of the American nuclear ìumbrella.î 
464 

 Assuming for the moment that the U.S. does not go forward with 

a national missile defense system, the deployment by China of a 

fairly limited number of sea- and land-based mobile missiles will 

effectively guarantee it a secure second-strike capability. As things 

now stand, the small Chinese ICBM force would take hours to make 

ready for launch, and it could conceivably be destroyed in a 

preemptive American attack, perhaps one involving only the use of 

precision conventional weapons. A larger, more diverse, and more 

mobile force of solid-fueled rockets will be far less vulnerable. Such a 

force could conceivably also be used to conduct limited attacks on 

U.S. military targets rather than simply lobbing a few large and 

inaccurate warheads at a handful of American cities. 

 In certain respects, the next 10 to 15 years may thus come to 

resemble the early stages of the Cold War. In the late 1940s and well 

into the 1950s, the U.S. enjoyed a huge advantage in its nuclear 

competition with the Soviet Union. American forces operat-ing from 

bases around the Eurasian periphery (and, with the introduction of 

the B-52 bomber, from American soil) were poised to deliver nuclear 

weapons virtually anywhere in the USSR; for a long time, the Soviets 

had no comparable capability. Yet even the anticipated Soviet 

development of intercontinental bombers and ballistic missiles 

triggered major worries within the Western alliance. American 

policymakers were long preoccupied with convincing their NATO 

allies, the Soviets, and perhaps themselves that the U.S. would, 

indeed, intervene in a European war even if in doing so it risked 

nuclear attack on its own soil. 

 Much of what the U.S. did in Europeómaintaining and 

augmenting ground forces, deploying large numbers of tactical 

nuclear weapons, tolerating (and even encouraging) the acquisition 

of national nuclear forces by at least two key allies, and increasing 

the flexibility of American strategic nuclear forcesówas motivated 

by the desire to strengthen deterrence in the face of increasing Soviet 

intercontinental-strike capabilities. Until nearly the final moments of 
465 

the Cold War, the Soviets, for their part, tried to raise doubts about 

American resolve as a way of weakening the Western alliance. There 

is already some evidence that China may try to use similar tactics to 

undermine the U.S. position in Asia. 

 In 1995, a high-ranking Chinese official was widely quoted as 

having told a visitor that the U.S. would not come to Taiwanís rescue 

because, in the end, Americans cared more about Los Angeles than 

Taipei. More recently, during the run-up to the March 2000 

Taiwanese presidential election, Chinaís official armed-forces 

newspaper warned that, unlike Iraq or Yugoslavia, China is ìa 

country that has certain abilities of launching strategic counterattack 

and the capacity of launching a long-distance strike. . . . It is not a 

wise move to be at war with a country such as China, a point which 

the U.S. policymakers know fairly well also.î 

 These threats were evidently intended to give pause to anyone 

contemplating possible conventional strikes on Chinese forces or 

territory in the context of a fight over Taiwan. In the future, Chinese 

strategists may issue more generalized warnings, perhaps suggesting that the growth in their striking power means that the U.S. will 

have to contemplate sacrificing Washington to save Tokyo, or Seoul, 

or Sidney, or Manila, or Singapore. Such comments would be 

directed more at Asian than at American audiences, and their aim 

would be not so much to deter the U.S. as to raise questions about 

the ability of the U.S. to deter China. The ultimate aim would be to 

raise doubts in the minds of Asian observers as to the continuing 

value of American security commit-ments. 

POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC RIVALRY 

Any intensified military rivalry between the U.S. and China will 

be accompanied by a stepped-up competition in the political or 

diplomatic realm, which is the third dimension of a possible future 

struggle in Asia. The central issue of this particular contest would be 
466 

the making and breaking of alliances. 

 As in the military arena, the U.S. starts with a number of very 

considerable advantages: it enjoys good relations with most 

countries in East Asia and has alliance ties or other security 

connections with many of them, including most of the wealthiest 

and most powerful. China, on the other hand, has problematic 

relationships with a number of major players in both East and South 

Asia and its closest collaborators (North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan, 

and Russia) suffer from profound domestic liabilities. 

 The U.S. also benefits from what is, for the moment at least, a 

major geopolitical advantage: the possible threat posed by the sheer 

magnitude of its material power is offset to a degree by its 

remoteness from the heart of Asia. Because it is far away, the U.S. is 

less menacing than China, which is nearby and thus potentially 

overwhelming. Indeed, as Chinaís capabilities grow, there may be a 

strong tendency on the part of the other Asian states to draw closer 

to one another, and to the U.S., in order to counterbalance Chinese 

power and preserve their own independ-ence. 

 If power-balancing were automatic and inevitable, the U.S. could 

afford to sit back and let nature take its course. But the societies of 

Northeast and Southeast Asia also have long historical experience 

with Chinese preponderance, and they could choose to live with it 

again in the future, especially if the only alternative appeared to be a 

period of protracted and dangerous rivalry between China and the 

U.S. Moreover, if the U.S. appears weak and vacillating, or if its 

withdrawal from the region begins to seem inevitable, these 

countries may conclude that they have little choice but to cut the best 

deal they can. 

 The aim of Chinese diplomatic strategy, therefore, will be to turn 

Americaís geographical remoteness from an advantage to a disadvantage, weakening existing American relationships and prevent-
467 

ing the formation of new ones, feeding doubts about U.S. resolve 

and staying power, and making Chinaís rise seem both as inevitable, 

and as unthreatening, as possible. 

How might this be done? First, Chinese leaders could transform 

their countryís longstanding but largely rhetorical opposition to 

bilateral military alliances into a central feature of their foreign 

policy. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese were willing to accept 

that Americaís Asian alliances served the useful purpose of countering Soviet ìhegemonism.î During the 1990s, China preferred that 

Japan continue under American tutelage rather than being left free to 

expand its power and pursue its own objectives. But, as has already 

begun to happen, deteriorating U.S.-PRC relations and stepped-up 

efforts at U.S.-Japan security cooperation will cause Chinese strategists to reexamine their permissive position and ultimately to take a 

much tougher, anti-alliance stance. 

 Accompanying this shift could be the amplification of another 

persistent theme in Chinese diplomacy. As it works to displace the 

U.S. from Asia, China will intensify its campaign against ìhegemonyî by criticizing Americaís cultural and economic ìimperialismî 

and attacking its arrogance and intrusiveness. China will seek 

friends among those in Asia (and beyond) who feel they have 

suffered at the hands of U.S. corporations, American-led international institutions, and/or American efforts to enforce conformity 

with U.S. views on political liberties and human rights. At the same 

time that it seeks to gain the benefits of greater integration into the 

world economy, China could also emerge as a leading critic of the 

ills of globalization and a leading proponent of various kinds of 

regional (as opposed to global and hence American-dominated) 

institutions. Chinese policy may even take on a racial aspect, perhaps 

appealing to those who share ethnic and cultural characteristics 

across East Asia or, more generally, making the case against ìthe 

Westî and for ìAsia for the Asians.î 
468 

 As it has done in recent years, China will no doubt become an 

even more enthusiastic participant in multilateral security dialogues 

and other forums in Asia, using them to convey the image of a good 

international citizen and an open, unthreatening power. Active 

Chinese participation will also ensure that multilateral mechanisms 

cannot be used against the PRCís interests. As relations with the U.S. 

degenerate, China may also begin to advocate new institutions that 

will exclude ìnon-Asianî powers and seek ìlocalî solutions to 

regional economic, environmental, and security problems. 

 Its strictures against bilateral alliances notwithstanding, China 

will also attempt to develop its own ìstrategic partnerships,î both in 

Asia and beyond. In some cases (as in its current dealings with 

Russia, Israel, and a number of European countries), Chinaís goal 

will be to obtain military hardware and advanced technology. In 

others (as, most likely, with Pakistan) the PRC will be supporting the 

enemy of an enemy (India). 

 Next, in order to circumvent U.S. efforts to apply economic 

sanctions or technology controls, China may hope to cultivate a 

much closer relationship with a more independent and perhaps 

openly anti-American European Union. In the Persian Gulf region, it 

may align itself more openly with Iran as a way of deflecting 

American attention and scarce military resources from East Asia, 

and in order to ensure its own access to oil. In continental Southeast 

Asia (especially Myanmar and Thailand), it may use threats and 

inducements to gain access to facilities for its own military forces or 

to deny access to the forces of its rivals. In Central Asia, it may work 

to establish client regimes that will protect oil pipelines and control 

Islamist groups that might otherwise foment discontent among 

Chinaís own non-Han minorities. 

 Finally, while China will probably continue to shun any 

pretension to global power, it may provide assistance to states or 

nonstate actors around the world that see themselves as being 
469 

opposed to the U.S. Like the Soviet Union before it, albeit more for 

geopolitical than for ideological reasons, China could become a lowkey but important supporter of rebel movements, ìrogue states,î 

and terrorist groups throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and 

Central and Latin America. 

 But it is in East Asia, their main sphere of activity, that Chinese 

strategists will most want to focus attention. In order to do this, they 

will probably aim first to secure their continental ìrear areas.î 

Toward this end, China will work hard to maintain a good relationship with Russia and to avoid being drawn into debilitating conflicts 

in Central Asia. In South Asia, although China will probably opt to 

continue its present policy of supporting Pakistan to distract India, it 

could also try to take India out of the larger strategic equation by 

offering a spheres-of-influence arrangement that would leave India 

dominant on the subcontinent in exchange for its continued nonalignment. 

 In East Asia itself, China may seek to execute the diplomatic 

equivalent of a pincer movement, applying pressure from the north 

(the Korean peninsula) and the south (the South China Sea) in order 

to gain its primary objectives at the center: the acquisition of Taiwan 

and the neutralization of Japan. 

 Following the success of an initial gambit this past spring (2000), 

the Chinese will probably continue to press North Korea to negotiate 

with the South, while at the same time attempting to build themselves up as the indispensable intermediary. In return for its 

continued help in delivering North Korea, China may hope to gain 

some assurances from South Korea about the role of the U.S. on the 

peninsula. Even if Chinese strategists cannot extract much in the 

way of concrete promises, they may nevertheless come to believe 

that progress toward reunification will unleash popular forces in the 

South that will lead irresistibly to an American withdrawal. Continued improvement in North-South relations would also help to lull 
470 

Japan and undermine U.S. efforts to build support for theater missile 

defenses. 

 While these events are unfolding, the PRC will use a variety of 

tactics to aid the further extension of its influence in Southeast Asia. 

Here, in contrast to its role as peacemaker in Korea, it may show a 

harder, tougher face. An increase in piracy (perhaps supported 

covertly by China) could provide the justification for an expansion of 

naval activities in the South China Sea, enabling the PRC to assert its 

territorial claims in the area. China may also seek to encourage the 

activities of ethnic and religious separatist movements in Indonesia 

and the Philippines in the hope that, if these countries become 

wracked by civil unrest, they will be much less capable of acting to 

oppose the growth in Chinese power. After years of tolerating 

Singaporeís military cooperation with the U.S., China may also begin 

to press that country to choose sides or, at the very least, abandon its 

tilt towards the U.S. And if Chinese leaders feel the need to flex their 

muscles, and perhaps also to demonstrate the limits of American 

power and commitment, they may pick a fight they think they can 

win, most likely by provoking and then pummeling Vietnam in what 

their military planners have called a quick ìlocal war with high-tech 

characteristics.î 

 The consolidation of Chinaís position to its north and south will 

set the stage for the final resolution of the core strategic issues of 

Japan and Taiwan. With regard to the former, Chinaís goal must be 

to detach it from the U.S. without at the same time stimulating a 

resurgence of Japanese assertiveness and militarism. Despite their 

oft-expressed fears, Chinese strategies may become less worried 

about Japan as the countryís population ages, its political system 

continues to founder, and its economy fails to regain its former 

luster. A Korean settlement that results in a greatly reduced U.S. role 

on the peninsula could yield a corresponding increase in Japanese 

discomfort at being the last major remaining outpost of American 

military power in Asia. If so, the moment may have arrived for 
471 

China to offer Japan some kind of ìgrand bargain,î perhaps involving a mutual non-aggression pact and a pledge to maintain freedom 

of navigation in the South China Sea in exchange for a sharp 

curtailment or outright abrogation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. At this 

point, if not before, Taiwan would have little choice but to accept the 

PRCís terms for reunification. 

CONCLUSION 

These, then, are the main elements of the possible struggle to 

come in Asia. Of course, it is one thing for Chinese strategies to 

fantasize about easing the U.S. out of East Asia without firing a shot; 

actually doing so is another matter altogether. For one thing, if the 

PRC is impatient, if it underestimates the impact of its action on its 

opponents, if it is excessively high-handed or overly brutal, it could 

well wind up stimulating precisely the kind of determined, unified 

response that could foil its plans and block its ambitions. For another 

thing, it is conceivable that China will mellow with the passage of 

time, or suffer from domestic weaknesses that will prevent it from 

pursuing its objectives in a consistent and effective way. And most 

important of all, the U.S. could either adjust its current policies so as 

to make an open Sino-American confrontation less likely or, if 

conflict cannot be avoided, prepare for its eventuality while 

simultaneously preserving Americaís own position in Asia. 

 If I have purposely refrained from dwelling on American 

strategic options in the coming decades, it is hardly because we are 

without themówhether economic, military, or political. Rather, it is 

because the first order of business is to see the situation plainó

namely, that in several important respects a U.S.-PRC strategic 

competition is already under way, and there is a good chance that it 

is only going to become more intense and open. In recognizing these 

realities, the Chinese are well ahead of the U.S. 

 Militarily, the PRC will continue to do what it is already doing: 
472 

working to offset or neutralize current U.S. advantages, increasing 

its ability to target U.S. forces, facilities, and command-andcommunications systems in, around, and over the western Pacific 

while improving its capacity to deter or defend against American 

attacks on its own forces and territory. These military activities will 

likely be accompanied by an effort to break up the American-led 

alliance system in Asia and ultimately to detach the U.S. from most 

of its present partners and to push it as far back across the Pacific as 

possible. To this end, the PRC will use every instrument at its 

disposal, including especially its growing economic clout. 

 In this respect, what one needs to bear in mind is that China will 

be a very different kind of strategic competitor from the Soviet 

Union. The PRCís size, dynamism, and relative openness confer a 

much greater ability to shape the behavior of other countries, thus 

helping to dissuade the U.S. from confrontation, diminish-ing the 

effectiveness of any unilateral American attempt to use economic 

instruments against it, driving a wedge between the U.S. and the 

other advanced industrial nations, and enhancing Chinaís own 

capacity to exert influence over the countries in its region. The threat 

all this holds out to American interests can be countered, but first it 

must be acknowledged. 

ENDNOTES 

1. This chapter previously appeared in Commentary, Vol. 110, No. 4, November 

2000, pp. 17-26. 

2. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Chinese military also reportedly intensified 

its efforts to develop long-range land-attack cruise missiles. 
473 

CHAPTER 17 

CONCLUSION: STRATEGIC BALANCES AND 

ALLIANCES IN SOUTH ASIA IN 2020 

Michael R. Chambers 

 As this volume is being compiled in July 2002, South Asia 

remains in a precarious state. The intense crisis which seemed to 

have the region on the brink of nuclear war this spring has subsided. 

Through U.S. mediation, President Pervez Musharraf promised to 

ìpermanentlyî end the infiltration of Islamic militants from Pakistan 

into Indian Kashmir. A skeptical India has given Pakistan until 

October to make good on this pledge. Yet just one month after 

Musharrafís promise, India is claiming that terrorist infiltration is on 

the rise again after a brief lull.1 

 Despite President George W. Bushís announcement that 

ìeverything has changedî after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

it is clear that in South Asia much has stayed the same. In particular, 

India and Pakistan continue their periodic crises with Kashmir as the 

focus of the conflict. However, some things have also changed, 

including the high-level U.S. involvement to reduce tensions in the 

region. 

 Many changes have buffeted South Asia in the last 10-15 years. 

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union altered 

the global security environment and the relations India and Pakistan 

had with external actors, especially the superpowers. The rise of 

militant Islamic conservatismóand terrorismóand the 1998 

decisions by New Delhi and Islamabad to cross the nuclear threshold 

have also affected the regional dynamics. The purpose of this 

volume is to assess where South Asia is headed in the year 2020 so 

that the United States can devise forward-looking policies. In 
474 

particular, we have focused on the expected future strategic balances 

and alliances. 

 This chapter is intended to pull together the insights, analyses, 

and forecasts of the previous chapters in an attempt to project these 

anticipated balances and alliances. Before turning to this task, it is 

important to remind the reader of all the caveats and cautions in the 

preceding chapters. Many variables are at play in the region, and the 

expected future balances and alliances depicted here represent a slice 

of all the possible scenarios. Despite the uncertainties underlying this 

prediction, it is an effort worth attempting. 

 This chapter will proceed by drawing on alliance theory to 

provide a framework for the consideration of the anticipated 

patterns of security conflict and cooperation. It will then review the 

sources of security threats expected to face India and Pakistan in 

2020, and lay out the alliance patterns predicted to result. Finally, 

this chapter will draw out a number of policy recommendations for 

the United States as well as India and Pakistan. 

Balances, Alignments and Alliances. 

In trying to forecast the likely patterns of strategic balances and 

alliances in South Asia in 2020, this volume seeks to anticipate the 

patterns of cooperation and conflict that will exist among the 

regional states (and the extraregional states involved in South Asia), 

the patterns of amity and enmity that shape these relationships. 

Understanding the axes of enmity as well as the axes of amity is 

crucial, because balances and alliances are dual-natured concepts. As 

George Liska wrote, ì[C]onflicts are the primary determinants of 

alignments. Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone 

or something.î2 In order to explain or predict which countries will 

form a relationship of security cooperation, we need to comprehend 

and envision what security threats will provoke this cooperation. 
475 

 These patterns of security cooperation we are considering all fit 

within the general concept of ìalignment.î As Glenn Snyder has 

written, alignments amount to ìa set of mutual expectations between 

two or more states that they will have each otherís support in 

disputes or wars with particular other states.î3 When these mutual 

expectations are formalized and concretized in a written agreement, 

they become an alliance. In between the formalized alliance and the 

informal alignment based merely on mutual expectations are other 

types of relationships, one of which is an entente, or a specific 

understanding reached between two (or more) countries on how 

they will cooperate but without the formalization of a treaty of 

alliance. 

 As has been noted by many scholars, alignments and alliances are 

an integral part of the functioning of the balance of power.4 As one 

country feels threatened by another country, it has three basic 

options: to build up its own domestic capabilities to deal with the 

threat, to seek security cooperation with a third country similarly 

threatened by the second, or some combination of the two.5 Security 

cooperation with a third country takes the form of an informal 

alignment, a quasi-formal entente, or a formal allianceóor possibly 

some other point in between these three. What is important to keep 

in mind is that this security cooperation is triggered by a threat, and 

the cooperation is intended to help the aligned/allied countries 

counterbalance the common threat. 

 What causes one country to feel a threat from another that would 

lead it to seek an alignment with a third country? Stephen Walt has 

suggested that four factors contribute to the perception of a security 

threat: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and 

aggressive intentions.6 While not mimicking Waltís categories, this 

volume (and the original conference panels) similarly disaggregated 

key factors leading to the threats that can trigger counterbalancing 

alignments: the economic, political, and demographic factors that 

underlie fundamental power capabilities; nuclear weapons and their 
476 

role in the national power of the regional states; and the perception 

of threats and hostile intentions from other countries through the 

lens of strategic culture. Based on these factors, what are the likely 

patterns of enmity and threat in South Asia in the year 2020? 

South Asian Threat Patterns Circa 2020. 

The Distribution of Power Capabilities. Currently, India is the most 

powerful country in South Asia, with Pakistan in the second 

position. If we look at military capabilities, the Indian military is 

more than twice the size of Pakistanís armed forces, with 1.26 million 

troops compared to 620,000. India also out spends Pakistan, with 

defense expenditures of $14.7 billion in 2000 by New Delhi, $3.6 5 

billion by Islamabad. In terms of military equipment, India similarly 

outweighs Pakistan; for example, India has approximately 3,400 

main battle tanks compared to Pakistanís 2,300, 27 principal surface 

combat ships to 9, 16 submarines to 10, 1 aircraft carrier to 0 for 

Pakistan, and 738 combat aircraft compared to 353.7 India also 

possesses more nuclear weapons: India has produced enough 

weapons-grade plutonium to produce 50-90 nuclear weapons, and is 

believed to have approximately 30-35 nuclear warheads; Pakistan 

has enough weapons-grade material for 30-55 weapons, but it is 

unclear how many warheads have been assembled.8 The one 

capability in which Pakistan outpaces India is ballistic missiles. 

While there is some uncertainty in the numbers, Pakistan is believed 

to have 80 Hatf-1 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs),30-84 Hatf-3 

SRBMs (including 30 M-11 missiles acquired from China), 

approximately 12 medium-range Ghauri-1 missiles, and perhaps 5-10 

Ghauri-2 missiles. India is believed to have 20-50 Prithvi-1 SRBMs 

(but probably only 12 deployed, with 3-5 launchers), 25 Prithvi-2 

SRBMs, and perhaps 5 intermediate-range Agni-1 missiles, with 20 

Agni-2 intermediate-range missiles ordered.9 

 Economically, India also dominates the region. As noted by Vijay 

Kelkar in this volume, Indiaís economy comprises over three-
477 

quarters of the regional economy, and in 2000 India had a gross 

domestic product (GDP) of $479 billion, compared to Pakistanís 

$61.7 billion. In per capita terms, Pakistanís $470 barely outranked 

Indiaís $460, primarily because Indiaís population is more than 

seven times that of Pakistan.10 During the 1990s, Indiaís GDP grew at 

an annual rate of 5.62 percent, compared to Pakistanís 4.01 percent.11

And while Indiaís growth had slowed in 1999-2001, it picked up to 

5.4 percent in fiscal year 2001-02 (ended March 2002).12 Finally, India 

has a vibrant information technology sector to help lead its economy, 

while Pakistan does not. 

 Population is often seen as a power resource, and here also India 

has the upper hand. As noted by Kelkar and by Shripad Tuljapurkar, 

India has a much larger population than Pakistan, a more literate 

population, and a more highly educated population. However, India 

has a larger absolute number of poor than Pakistan. Still, as Kelkar 

notes, India was the only country in the region that improved its 

poverty ratio from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, and it also made 

tremendous strides in this area in the 1990s, dropping its poverty 

rate from 36 percent in 1993-94 to 26 percent in 1999-2000. 

 While military capabilities, economic prowess, and population 

are relatively easy power resources to measure, domestic politics and 

political stability are harder to get oneís hands on. Nevertheless, 

these are also considered important factors in calculating relative 

power between countries. Again, these factors favor India. Pakistan 

has not seen stability in its political system over the last 10-15 years. 

The 1990s saw much shifting between governments led by Benazir 

Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, with each capitalizing on the scandals and 

alleged corruption of the other to regain office. Finally, General 

Pervez Musharraf took power in a coup in 1999, ousting Sharif. 

Musharraf has been engaged in a number of steps to try to 

stabilizeóand centralizeópolitical power. There is also the 

uncertain role of Islamic militancy in Pakistan of late, with militant 

Islamic conservatism (supportive of the former Taliban regime in 
478 

Afghanistan) challenging the more traditional secular and modernist 

version of Islam. Meanwhile in India, despite the communal violence 

that erupted in Gujarat state in spring 2002, the continuing 

challenges of shifting from a quasi-statist to a more liberal economy, 

and the imperatives of operating a coalition government, India 

remains a relatively stable democracy. However, India does have 

one political liability that Pakistan can exploit: Kashmir. Islamabadís 

support for the Kashmiri separatist movement provides it a resource 

with which it can threaten Indiaís territorial integrity and the symbol 

of tolerance and inclusiveness of Muslims that many Indians hold 

dear. 

 How might these capabilities shift by 2020, with consequent 

impact on the threats that will shape alignments in the region? In 

terms of domestic politics and political stability, Teresita Schaffer 

notes that India will face a number of challenges between now and 

2020, including generational leadership changes in both the 

Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the impact of 

the increasing power of regional political parties, and improving the 

effectiveness of governance generally. Indian leaders will also have 

to deal with communal tensions. Nevertheless, it is not expected that 

India will be plagued by widespread political instability. Pakistan, 

on the other hand, is more of a question mark. Its political future was 

not addressed in detail by conference participants because many felt 

that it remains too volatile, and it is not possible to make reliable 

predictions about it circa 2020. As this is written, President 

Musharraf has been taking steps to bring stability to Pakistanís 

political system, including a recent proposal to radically reform 

Pakistani politics from a parliamentary system to a presidential one, 

with a consequent centralization of power. These reform proposals 

are being met with criticism.13 How long might the popular political 

parties put up with military dictatorship, and what might be the 

result of such tensions? In addition, there is the tension over 

Pakistanís Islamic identity. Thomas Simons suggests that we will 

likely see the more traditionalóand secular and modernistóvision 
479 

of Islamic identity win out, but this is not assured. What is assured, 

then, is that Pakistan has a greater likelihood for political instability 

circa 2020 than India. 

 Economically, India should maintain its dominance in the region. 

If India undertakes second-generation reforms along the lines 

spelled out by Kelkar, it is estimated to achieve a GDP of $3 trillion 

by 2020, with a South Asian regional GDP of possibly $4 trillion. 

Moreover, India would increase its share of global trade, its share of 

the global service sector, and of the IT sector in particular. It would 

also reduce its poverty levels further. Based on these developments, 

we should expect India to increase its economic role and influence in 

the region and in the world by 2020. Kelkar notes that Pakistan has 

been making some efforts at reforms to improve its economy, and 

the relaxation of U.S. sanctions and infusion of aid since September 

2001 have helped. Still, Pakistanís economy will remain behind 

Indiaís in terms of size and technological sophistication. And if 

Pakistan is wracked by political instability, this will further damage 

its economic growth prospects, particularly since foreign investors 

would be scared off. Thus, India will continue to possess greater 

economic capabilities than Pakistan in 2020. And with this situation, 

India will have greater economic resources (in terms of capital, 

technology, and skilled labor) to put toward military development. 

 Demographic trends reinforce these political and economic 

factors. While regional disparities may cause some problems, 

population trends in India over the next two decades should lead to 

favorable conditions for economic growth, with falling growth rates 

among young people freeing up resources for investments in 

literacy, education, and capital investment as well as resources for 

the military. India will benefit from this large but better trained work 

force. Pakistanís fertility rate will remain higher than Indiaís 

(although it is expected to fall), and its education rates will continue 

to lag, so that it will not receive the same type of demographic 

ìbonusî for economic growth that India will enjoy. 
480 

 India should also maintain its military advantages over Pakistan. 

Based on its economic growth, India is beginning a cycle of major 

military modernization that will significantly improve its land, sea, 

and air capabilities.14 India is also likely to enhance its nuclear 

capabilities and increase the number of nuclear warheads in its 

inventory. As Rajesh Basrur and Stephen Cohen note in their 

contribution to this volume, the exact size of Indiaís nuclear arsenal 

in 2020 could range from just below 100 warheads to over 250, 

depending on a number of variables. Following past practice, 

Pakistan should mimic the Indian increases. However, Islamabadís 

economic troubles and need to focus on its domestic economy would 

limit the funds it can put toward a military build-up. Moreover, as 

noted by Feroz Hassan Khan, Pakistan has decided to rely on 

nuclear deterrence to prevent Indian aggression, thereby mitigating 

the need to fully match the Indian modernization. Be that as it may, 

Indiaís military capabilities will continue to outstrip those of 

Pakistan. As a result, Pakistani security policymakers will perceive at 

least a potential threat from India based on these capabilities. 

 Because of its weaker capabilities, Pakistan will not pose a 

significant threat to India. The two principal caveats to this 

statement are, of course, Pakistanís nuclear arsenal and its ability to 

cause India trouble in Kashmir if that dispute is not resolved. The 

neighbor with the more worrisome capabilities for India will 

continue to be China. As discussed in several of the chapters in this 

volume, China already trumps India in terms of power resources: 

economically, with a GDP in 2000 of $1.08 trillion and per capita 

income of $840;15 demographically with higher literacy and 

education rates and lower poverty rates; and militarily with a larger 

armed forces and more numerous conventional and nuclear 

capabilities.16 

 In 2020, assuming that it avoids serious political instability and 

maintains reasonable economic growth, China should maintain its 
481 

advantages over India particularly in the economic and military 

realms. Economic forecasts predict the Chinese economy will be two 

to three times that of India, and news articles over the last few 

months have been touting China as the new workshop of the 

world.17 In the military realm, China is already engaged in a 

modernization drive that is significantly enhancing its capabilities 

and its reach.18 And Beijing is widely expected to increase the 

numbers and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal over the next two 

decades, particularly in response to the U.S. plans to build a national 

missile defense system. Just as Pakistan will worry about Indiaís 

greater capabilities, India will worry about Chinaís. 

Threat Perceptions in the Region. Capabilities plus intentions are 

what cause a security threat by one country against another. 

However, the intentions of a potential adversary are often unknown. 

Nevertheless, security policymakers will perceive the intentions of 

other countriesórightly or wronglyóand build these perceptions 

into their views of the regional security environment. 

 These perceptions of enmity and security threat are drawn in part 

from a countryís history of interactions with its neighbors. As they 

build up over time, such axes of enmity can become rather ìstickyî 

or durable, and are not directly influenced by shifts in the balance of 

power.19 With three major wars and several more crises in the 50 

years since independence, the enmity between India and Pakistan is 

likely to continue over the next 18 years, and to shape their 

perceptions of threat. 

 Such historical experiences of hostility with other countries get 

factored into the worldview of security elites in a country, helping to 

create the strategic culture of these policymakers. Drawing on the 

expositions of strategic culture in the preceding chapters, what can 

we expect about Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese perceptions of 

threat? 
482 

 The first point to consider is one raised by all three of the 

contributors to Part V of this volume: strategic cultures are durable 

and long-lasting, changing only slowly. We should expect to see 

many of the core elements of the strategic culture in a country today 

continuing through to 2020. 

 This is not good news for India. As Andrew Scobell explains, 

Chinese security elites see India as a potential rival and future threat, 

and they have a strongly negative perception of Indiaís own strategic 

culture. Pakistanís strategic culture is premised heavily on insecurity 

vis-‡-vis India, as Hasan-Askari Rizvi argues, and on a distrust of 

India and its regional ambitions. Thus, based on the durability of 

these elements of Pakistani and Chinese strategic cultures, Indiaís 

two largest neighbors will see itóalbeit to differing degreesóas a 

threat. 

 The second point to consider is that while strategic cultures and 

their threat perceptions are durable, this does not preclude gradual 

change. In fact, we see the potential for change in Pakistanís strategic 

culture, but it is to a more hard-line view of India based on the 

conservative Islam of the officers who joined the ranks in the 1970s 

and 1980s. As Rizvi notes, the top Pakistani commanders have 

drawn a line between conservative Islam and Islamic activism, 

believing that the latter will undermine the professionalism, 

discipline, and service ethos in the military. Thomas Simons also 

discusses the efforts of President Pervez Musharraf, a senior general 

himself, to return to the traditional view of Islam held by Pakistanís 

founding fathers. Nevertheless, if this more militant Islamic 

conservatism is such a strong element of the social-religious and 

strategic cultures of the middle officer corps, can the efforts of 

President Musharraf and the current senior military leadership truly 

halt the evolution of Pakistani strategic culture in this direction? 

 Indian strategic culture is already undergoing change, moving 

away from the Nehruvianism which guided Indian foreign and 
483 

security policy since independence. The question remains, however, 

toward which competing school or worldview is it evolving: 

neoliberalism or hyperrealism? In his contribution to this volume, 

Kanti Bajpai sees the trend since 1990 as moving toward 

neoliberalism, with its belief in the ability of India to negotiate 

mutually beneficial deals with other countries, even with Pakistan. 

However, he also notes that since September 11, and especially since 

December 13, Indian thinking is evolving in the direction of 

hyperrealism. In this school of strategic thought, force is seen as a 

necessary and useful tool of statecraft, and is claimed to be the only 

language that Pakistan understands. It also views China as the 

principal threat to India, and believes that the Chinese only respect 

power. Continued evolution in this direction could be very 

problematic for the region. Moreover, Indiaís hard-line position in 

the most recent crisis and Pakistanís concessions (under U.S. 

pressure and mediation) could add momentum to this trend. 

 To summarize then, China and Pakistan see India as a threat, 

albeit to different degrees. Pakistanís perception of threat from India 

could be very strong if the more militant Islamic conservatism wins 

the internal ideational struggle in that country. India will see these 

two neighbors as threats if hyperrealism comes to dominate, but less 

so if neoliberalism becomes the primary strategic guide. It is 

important to remember that strategic culture does not determine the 

security policy or actions of a country. It merely provides a set of 

assumptions, a lens through which to view the world. As Rizvi 

reminds us, other factors and forces can matter more than strategic 

culture, but strategic culture does matter. 

Alignments in South Asia: 2020. 

Based on the distribution of capabilities and the perceptions of 

threat derived from historical experiences and the strategic cultures, 

we can expect to see Pakistan and China continue their alignment to 

counter the threat from India. In his contribution, John Garver shows 
484 

us that none of the forces currently at work to separate these two 

partners is stronger than their common interests in maintaining the 

entente. Indiaís capabilities will be adequate to cope with the threat 

from Pakistan, but China should continue to be economically and 

militarily more powerful than India. (Indiaís ability to cope with 

China will depend in part on the growth of its nuclear arsenal.) 

Therefore, we can expect India to develop some relationship of 

alignment with the United States to counter the putative Chinese 

threat. The United States is increasingly viewing China as a strategic 

rivalóat least in Asiaóand the growth of Chinese economic and 

military capabilities will pose a potential threat to U.S. interests and 

forces in the region. However, as Sumit Ganguly warns, this 

alignment may be weak: Indiaís strong desire for policy autonomy 

and bilateral disagreements over the issue of nuclear proliferation 

are two major potential barriers. Nevertheless, structural factors will 

push India and the United States in this direction. 

 It is possible that India might form an alignment with other 

countries as well, although these alternatives are much less likely. 

The leading possibility among these would be an Indo-Russian 

alignment. However, as Ganguly argues in his analysis, the 

conditions to recreate the Indo-Soviet alignment do not exist and are 

not likely to. For this to occur, Beijing would have to radically 

change its policy and behavior to become aggressive toward both 

Moscow and New Delhi. 

 The main axes of South Asian alignment in 2020 then will likely 

be Pakistan and China on the one hand, and India and the U.S. on 

the other. The degree of polarization between these two axes remains 

uncertain, and may in fact be fairly weak. One mitigating factor is 

that the actual behavior of the relevant countries might not be as 

hostile and aggressive as some fear. Second, the strategic cultures of 

India and Pakistan may not evolve toward the more strident views 

discussed above. Finally, the role of the United States and the 

triangular relationship that it has formed with India and Pakistan 
485 

could prove crucial. 

 This triangular relationship is a recent development, dating only 

since September 11. In this triangle, the United States is in the pivot 

position, enjoying better relations with both India and Pakistan than 

they have with each other. If the United States can sustain this 

relationship until 2020, it will give Washington leverage with both 

New Delhi and Islamabad to dampen the conflicts between them, 

and possibly to push these neighbors toward resolving some of the 

issues between them. The United States would be able to pursue 

these objectives even through the implicit threat to side with one 

rival against the other. Of course, this will only work so long as good 

relations with the United States matter to the leaderships in New 

Delhi and Islamabadóand only so long as religiously tinged 

nationalism does not capture the leadership in one or both capitals. 

 If the United States does not maintain a policy of engagement 

with both India and Pakistan, particularly if it draws back again 

from Pakistan, we can expect greater polarization between the two 

axes of alignment. Lacking a constructive relationship with the 

United States, Pakistanís fear of India will be greater, and it will take 

actions to strengthen its security against that neighbor, including a 

closer relationship with China. 

 Even if the axes of amity and enmity creating these alignments 

become more polarized, we are not likely to see the creation of 

formal alliances. The Sino-Pakistani entente has functioned for 

nearly 40 years without being formalized into an alliance, and it is 

highly unlikely this will change. In large measure this will be due to 

Chinaís preference for less formal, more flexible relationships. 

Moreover, drawing on their experiences with the Soviets in the 

1950s, Beijing understands that formal alliances do not guarantee 

support from an ally. Nor do the Chinese want to be pulled into a 

war provoked by Pakistan; we saw Chinaís aversion to such 

ìentrapmentî in the 1965 and 1971 conflicts.20 The chances for a 
486 

formal U.S.-India alliance are greater, since the United States has 

often formalized such relationships in the past. Still, the creation of a 

formal alliance is not likely, as Gangulyís caveats (some of which are 

mentioned above) help to explain. 

 Thus, we should expect to see these two alignments characterized 

by less formal, more flexible arrangements of security cooperation, 

as Aaron Friedberg mentioned in his presentation at the conference. 

In the case of the Sino-Pakistani relationship, their entente is 

anticipated to continue. In the case of the United States and India, 

the term used by the member states may be something along the 

lines of ìstrategic partnership.î With this greater flexibility and 

reduced specificity of the obligations each state has to the other, we 

will have greater uncertainty on the part of India and Pakistan 

regarding the willingness of their allies to assist them in a given 

crisis. This being the case, the lack of formal alliances in South Asia 

could push India and Pakistan toward reliance on their own military 

capabilities for security, particularly their nuclear arsenals. 

Heightening the risk of nuclear conflict, there will be even greater 

need for a regional restraint regime along the lines proposed by 

Khan in this volume. 

Recommendations for the United States and South Asia 

Based on these regional strategic balances and alignments, and on 

the proposals offered by many of the conference participants, what 

policy recommendations can be made for the United States and for 

India and Pakistan? 

 (1) The United States should remain engaged in South Asia. South 

Asia matters to U.S. national interests, and particularly to our 

national security interests. As this region, and India in particular, 

grows economically, it should emerge as a major trading partner of 

the United States and location for American investment, with the 

benefits accruing to both sides. India is the largest democracy in the 
487 

world, with over one billion people; our political values and interests 

should make us strive to see this political system pros per and 

spread to other countries of the region. Moreover, potential security 

threats to the United States and to the international community 

emanate from South Asia. In particular, there is the threat that 

unsecured nuclear weapons from the region could fall into the hands 

of anti-American militants orówith a radical regime changeócould 

be proliferated to such groups intentionally. There is also the risk of 

a regional nuclear war, with its attendant spillover effects and the 

broader ramifications from the use of such weapons. Moreover, not 

being engaged greatly increases the chance of armed conflict in the 

region, even nuclear conflict. And as Sir John Thomson notes in his 

contribution, U.S. policies will greatly affect the future of South Asia. 

 While ìremain engagedî is of paramount importance for the 

United States with regard to South Asia, it is a rather broad 

enjoinder. The following recommendations add more specificity to 

this. 

 ï The United States should remain engaged with both India and 

Pakistan, and to maintain the pivot position in this triangular relationship. 

As mentioned above, the United States can use this pivot position in 

the triangle to dampen conflicts between India and Pakistan, and to 

promote resolution of the issues which separate them. In addition, 

maintaining the triangular relationship will prevent the polarization 

of the alignment patterns, thereby preventing the increased tensions 

that would ensue. Because of the political, economic, and strategic 

affinities developing between the U.S. and India, the greatest effort 

here may be for the United States to remain engaged with Pakistan, 

especially after the current campaign in Afghanistan is over. If we do 

not maintain this relationship, the prospects for Pakistan dim 

considerably; political instability, Islamic militancy, and economic 

collapse are all more probable. 

 ï The United States should provide benefits to India and Pakistan to 
488 

encourage their continued relationships with Washington. Such benefits 

could include aid, investment, political/diplomatic support, or 

military cooperation in specific areas. By providing such 

inducements, we could help to nudge the evolution of Indian 

strategic culture toward neoliberalism, and encourage Pakistani 

strategic culture to eschew an evolution toward the more militant 

Islamic conservatism. 

 ï The United States should maintain and further develop military-tomilitary relations with both India and Pakistan, including the International 

Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Such relationships 

have proved valuable in the past and in the present, and should 

continue to prove their worth in the future. These programs promote 

understanding between militaries, offer foreign militaries the 

opportunity to learn from the United States, and provide the U.S. 

armed forces insights into the workings and beliefs of other 

militaries. They also can facilitate access to key decisionmakers and 

nurture cooperation between militaries, which can speed entry to 

bases and other facilities during a crisis. Such relationships with 

South and Central Asian states proved extremely important in 

preparing the way for U.S. and allied military operations in 

Afghanistan after September 11, 2001. 

 ï The United States should provide technical advice and assistance to 

improve the security and safety of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear 

arsenals. Proliferation of nuclear weapons to these two countries has 

already occurred, and we cannot reverse it. However, our assistance 

to both countries can enhance the safety and security of these 

weapons in order to reduce the chances of accidental use by either 

side or of theft of these weapons. Such assistance is in our own selfinterest, since we could very well be the intended target of any stolen 

nuclear device. 

 These steps, as well as others detailed in the preceding chapters, 

elaborate the ways the United States can stay engaged in South Asia. 
489 

Most of the reasons for this American engagement pertain to benefits 

to us directly or to the region (and therefore to the United States 

indirectly). There is one additional reason of broader geostrategic 

import. If U.S.-China relations deteriorate over the next two decades, 

relations with India and Pakistan can help the United States contain 

China, or at least reduce Chinese influence in this region on its 

southwest border. Pakistan may not be willing to forsake its longtime ally, but if we play our cards right, it might be persuaded to at 

least remain neutral. 

 Besides these recommendations for the United States, at least two 

important suggestions need to be made for India and Pakistan. 

 (2) India and Pakistan should negotiate a restraint regime. While 

neither country desires nuclear war and will try to avoid it, both 

have recently been willing to play the nuclear card in an effort to 

push the other. Moreover, as Scott Sagan argues in his contribution 

to this volume, despite the rational fears of nuclear war, both 

countries have displayed evidence of organizational pathologies that 

could nonetheless take them into a nuclear conflict. It is thus 

incumbent upon New Delhi and Islamabad to negotiate a restraint 

agreement that would reduce the chances for and fears of accidents 

and blunders, that would promote stability and peace in the region. 

These objectives are necessary if both countries hope to achieve the 

economic dreams for their societies. Prosperity can only be built on 

peace and stability. The United States should also help in any way it 

can, with advice, technical assistance, etc. 

 (3) India and Pakistan should negotiate a resolution of the Kashmir 

conflict. This is the most contentious of the issues dividing these 

neighbors, and the one that has led them into armed conflict or crisis 

conditions on several occasions. Now that both are nuclear-armed 

states, these conflicts and crises could escalate to a scale of death and 

destruction heretofore unimagined. The United States should offer 

its good offices and willingness to help mediate this dispute since it 
490 

is one of the few countries that both India and Pakistan will trust in 

such a role. For their part, India and Pakistan should realize that 

they cannot solve this problem without external assistance, and be 

willing to accept such help. 

 Because India and Pakistan now are both nuclear weapons states, 

the pattern of crises that have characterized their relations over the 

last 15 years or so must be brought to an end. The risk of nuclear war 

is too great to allow these to continue. While we should expect to see 

the Sino-Pakistani entente countered by some degree of IndoAmerican alignment, it is possible to reduce the polarization of these 

axes so that conflict and tensions are less likely. The 

recommendations offered above can move South Asia in this 

desirable direction. 

ENDNOTES 

1. Rama Lakshmi, ìGuerrillas Again Entering Kashmir, India Says,î 

Washington Post, July 6, 2002, p. A14. 

 2. George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, Baltimore: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, p. 12. Liska is one of the most prominent 

early scholars of alliance theory. 

 3. Glenn H. Snyder, ìAlliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,î Journal of 

International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1, Spring/Summer 1990, p. 105. 

 4. See, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, ìAlliances in Theory and Practice,î in 

Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1959, p. 185. 

 5. A fourth potential option is to ìbandwagonî with, or appease, the 

threatening country. However, this is not the usual response and typically occurs 

only under certain conditions, such as when a weak country is threatened by a 

very powerful one, and it has no viable alignment options. This is unlikely to 

happen in South Asia. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of alliances, Ithaca: Cornell 

University Press, 1987, ch. 2. 

 6. Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp. 22-26. 
491 

 7. See International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 

2001-2002, Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2001, pp. 162-164, 167-168. 

 8. See ìIndia and Pakistanís Nuclear Capabilities,î available from the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peaceís Non-Proliferation Project website, 

http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/DeadlyArsenals/capabilitiesinasia1.htm. 

9. For the estimates of Indian and Pakistani ballistic missiles, see IISS, The 

Military Balance 2001-2002; ìNuclear Numbers,î available on the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peaceís website; and Michael D. Swaine with Lauren 

H. Runyon, ìBallistic Missile Development,î in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. 

Friedberg, eds., Strategic Asia 2001-02: Power and Purpose, Seattle: National Bureau 

of Asian Research, 2001, pp. 309-311,314-316. 

 10. World Bank, World Development Report 2002, Oxford and New York: Oxford 

University Press for the World Bank, 2001, pp. 232-233, 236-237. The per capita 

figures are per capita gross national income (GNI), which has replaced gross 

national product (GNP). 

 11. See Vijay Kelkar, ìSouth Asia in 2020: Economic Outlook,î in this volume, 

Table 2A. 

 12. See ìWorld Business Briefing: Asia,î New York Times, June 29, 2002. 

 13. Karl Vick, ìPakistani Leader Accused of Trying to Grab Power,î 

Washington Post, June 28, 2002, p. A18. 

 14. Ashley J. Tellis, ìSouth Asia,î in Ellings and Friedberg, eds., Strategic Asia 

2001-02, pp. 237-238, 258-261; and IISS, The Military Balance 2001-2002, pp. 152, 155-

157. 

 15. World Bank, World Development Report 2002, pp. 232-233, 236-237. 

 16. China spent an estimated $42 billion in 2000 on the Peopleís Liberation 

Army, which has over 2.3 million active forces, approximately 8,000 main battle 

tanks, 62 principal surface naval combatants, 69 submarines, and approximately 

2,900 combat aircraft. In addition, China has an estimated 410 nuclear weapons, 40 

of which are deployed on intercontinental or intermediate range ballistic missiles 

(i.e., with a range greater than 5,500 kilometers). See IISS, The Military Balance 2001-

2002, pp. 188-190; and ìNuclear Numbers,î on the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peaceís website. 
492 

 17. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that in 2020 the Chinese 

economy will comprise 20.8 percent of the $67.8 trillion world GDP (in 1990 

purchasing power parity, or PPP, U.S. dollars), while India will represent 5.9 

percent. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2000, Paris: Organization of Economic 

Cooperation and Development and IEA, 2000. Based on different sources and 

looking at 2015 rather than 2020, Ashley Tellis cites data showing Chinaís 

economy as twice the size of Indiaís. See Tellis, ìSouth Asia,î p. 239. For recent 

news articles on Chinaís economic emergence, see Clay Chandler, ìChinaís Rivals 

Slow to Grasp Export Might,î Washington Post, May 25, 2002, p. E1; and Jane 

Perlez, ìChina Races to Replace U.S. as Economic Power in Asia,î New York Times, 

June 28, 2002. 

 18. On Chinaís modernization efforts, in addition to Aaron Friedbergís chapter 

in this volume, see Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st 

Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

1999; and Zalmay M. Khalilzad, et al., The United States and a Rising China: Strategic 

and Military Implications, Santa Monica: RAND for Project Air Force, 1999, 

especially ch. 3. 

 19. For the role that relationships of amity and enmity play in the creation of a 

regional security complex, see Barry Buzan, ìA Framework for Regional Security 

Analysis,î in idem and Gowher Rizvi, eds., South Asian Insecurity and the Great 

Powers, New York: St. Martinís Press, 1986, p. 7. 

 20. Glenn Snyder views entrapment as one of the horns of the security 

dilemma in an alliance. See Snyder, ìThe Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,î 

World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4, July 1986, pp. 461-496. 
493 

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 

KANTI BAJPAI teaches at the School of International Studies, 

Jawarhalal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, and is a member of 

the Core Group for the Study of National Security at JNU. In 2000, he 

was Visiting Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International 

Peace at the University of Notre Dame as well as at the Brookings 

Institution. He has published numerous articles and chapters on 

Indian security and foreign policy, South Asian politics, arms 

control, and international relations theory, which have appeared in 

journals such as Asian Survey, Dissent, and the Harvard International 

Review. His most recent books include Kargil and Beyond: Challenges 

for Indian Policy and Human Security: Concept and Measurement. He is 

presently finishing a book on Indian grand strategic thought. Dr. 

Bajpai received his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois. 

RAJESH M. BASRUR is the Director of the Centre for Global Studies 

in Mumbai, India. He has been a Shastri Fellow at Simon Fraser 

University and a Fulbright Fellow at the University of Illinois, and 

during 2001-02 was a Visiting Fellow at the Henry Stimson Center, 

the Brookings Institution, and the Cooperative Monitoring Center, 

Sandia National Laboratories. Dr. Basrur has published numerous 

research papers andchapters on nuclear issues, and is the author of 

India’s External Relations: A Theoretical Analysis, and the editor of 

Perspectives on India’s Defence and Arms Control and Security in the 

New Millennium: Views from South Asia. Dr. Basrur received his Ph.D. 

from Mumbai University. 

MICHAEL R. CHAMBERS is Assistant Professor of Political Science 

at Indiana State University, where he specializes in international 

relations, Chinaís foreign relations, and the international politics of 

East Asia. He is currently at work on a book on Chinaís alliance 

behavior with its Asian neighbors. Dr. Chambers holds his Ph.D. 
494 

from Columbia University. 

STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN is Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy 

Studies program at the Brookings Institution and Director of the 

India/South Asia Project there. He is also Professor Emeritus of 

History and Political Science at the University of Illinois, where he 

was co-founder and director of the Program in Arms Control, 

Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS). In 1992-93 Dr. 

Cohen was Scholar-in-Residence at the Ford Foundation, New Delhi, 

and in 1985-87 he was a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the 

U.S. State Department, where he advised on matters pertaining to 

South Asia, security, and proliferation issues. He has testified before 

Congress, and made several dozen television and radio appearances. 

He has also served on study groups of the Asia Society and the 

Council on Foreign Relations, and has served as a consultant to 

various U.S. government agencies, including the Department of 

Defense and the Department of State. Dr. Cohenís publications 

include The Pakistan Army; The Indian Army; Brasstacks and Beyond: 

Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia (co-author); and 

India: Emergent Power? Dr. Cohen received his Ph.D. from the 

University of Wisconsin. 

AARON L. FRIEDBERG is Professor of Politics and International 

Affairs and Director of the Research Program in International 

Security at Princeton University. He is a research director of the 

National Bureau of Asian Researchís ìStrategic Asiaî project, and 

has served as a consultant to the CIA, Office of Net Assessment in 

the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. He 

also has been a fellow at Harvard Universityís Center for 

International Affairs, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars, and the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo, and in 2001-02 

he was the first occupant of the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign 

Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress. Dr. 

Friedberg is the author of two books, The Weary Titan: Britain and the 

Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, and In the Shadow of the 
495 

Garrison State: America’s Anti-Stalinism and Its Cold War Grand 

Strategy, and has written numerous articles and essays that have 

appeared in Commentary, International Security, The New York Times, 

Survival, and The Wall Street Journal, among other journals and 

newspapers. Dr. Friedberg holds his Ph.D. from Harvard University. 

SUMIT GANGULY is Professor of Asian Studies and Government at 

the University of Texas at Austin. He has been both a Visiting 

Scholar and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center 

for Scholars, and a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International 

Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. He is also 

a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York) and the 

International Institute of Strategic Studies (London), and serves on 

the editorial board of Asian Survey, Current History, and the Journal of 

Strategic Studies. His numerous articles and essays have appeared in 

journals and newspapers such as Asian Survey, Current History, 

International Security, and the Los Angeles Times. Dr. Gangulyís most 

recent books are The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace 

and Fearful Symmetry: Explaining the Indo-Pakistani Conflict 

(forthcoming). Dr. Ganguly received his Ph.D. from the University of 

Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 

JOHN W. GARVER is a Professor at the Sam Nunn School of 

International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is a 

member of the editorial boards of China Quarterly, the Journal of 

Contemporary China, and the Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 

and is a member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. 

Dr. Garverís more than 60 articles on Chinaís foreign relations have 

appeared in journals such as Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Issues and 

Studies, and Political Science Quarterly. He has written seven books, 

the most recent of which are Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in 

the Twentieth Century; Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s 

Democratization; and The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and 

U.S. Cold War Strategy in Asia. Dr. Garver received his Ph.D. from the 

University of Colorado. 
496 

VIJAY L. KELKAR is the Executive Director for India, Sri Lanka, 

Bangladesh, and Bhutan at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 

Before joining the IMF, Dr. Kelkar served as Finance Secretary in the 

Ministry of Finance, Government of India. He also headed the 

international trade program at the UN Conference on Trade and 

Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva, and has served as a Member of 

the Board of Governors of the Indian Institute of Technology, New 

Delhi, and the Center of Policy Research, New Delhi. Dr. Kelkar 

received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley. 

FEROZ HASSAN KHAN is a flag-level officer in the Pakistani Army 

with 30 years of distinguished service. Brigadier Khan was 

previously the Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs 

(ACDA) in the Strategic Plans Division, Joint Services Headquarters, 

where he helped to formulate Pakistanís security policy on nuclear 

and conventional arms control and strategic stability and restraint in 

South Asia. He has also represented Pakistan in several multilateral 

and bilateral arms control negotiations. Brigadier Khan has served as 

a visiting faculty member in the Department of Defense and 

Strategic Studies and in the Department of International Relations at 

Quaid-e-Azam University (Islamabad), and during 2001-02 was a 

Visiting Scholar at Stanford Universityís Center for International 

Security and Cooperation (CISAC), a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, and a Visiting Fellow at the 

Brookings Institution. He has also published analyses of Pakistanís 

security policies in the Pakistan Defense Review and other 

publications, and while at Stanford produced a study entitled 

ìPreventing Nuclear War in South Asia.î Brigadier Khan received 

his M.A. from Johns Hopkins Universityís School of Advanced 

International Studies (SAIS). 

HASAN-ASKARI RIZVI is an independent political and defense 

analyst. Until recently, he was a Professor of Political Science at the 

University of the Punjab, Lahore, and has served as a visiting 
497 

professor at Columbia Universityís School of International and 

Public Affairs (SIPA) and at Heidelberg University. He has 

published numerous articles and chapters on the Pakistani military, 

and regularly contributes political commentaries to Pakistanís 

national English-language dailies. His most recent books are 

Military, State and Society in Pakistan; Pakistan and the Geostrategic 

Environment; and The Military and Politics in Pakistan. Dr. Rizvi 

received his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. 

SCOTT D. SAGAN is Professor of Political Science and Co-Director 

of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford 

University. In 1984-85, he was a Council on Foreign Relations 

International Affairs Fellow, during which time he served as a 

special assistant to the Director of the Organization of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. Dr. Sagan is the author of Moving 

Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security and The Limits of Safety: 

Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; and co-author (with 

Kenneth N. Waltz) of The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate and The 

Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (forthcoming 2002). He 

is also a co-editor of Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will 

Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons. Dr. Sagan received his 

Ph.D. from Harvard University. 

TERESITA C. SCHAFFER is Director of the South Asia Program at 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ambassador 

Schaffer spent 30 years in the State Department, where she served as 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia (1989-92), Ambassador to 

Sri Lanka (1992-95), and Director of the Foreign Service Institute 

(1995-97). Earlier postings included Islamabad, New Delhi, and 

Dhaka, as well as a tour as Director of the Office of International 

Trade in the State Department. She has also served in adjunct 

teaching roles at American University and Georgetown University. 

Her publications include ìSri Lanka: Lessons from the 1995 

Negotiationsî in Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, two studies on women in 

Bangladesh, and numerous articles and commentaries in 
498 

publications such as the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Foreign 

Service Journal, SAIS International Review, and the Washington 

Quarterly. Ambassador Schaffer received her Bachelorís degree from 

Bryn Mawr. 

ANDREW SCOBELL is Associate Research Professor of National 

Security Affairs at the U.S. Army War Collegeís Strategic Studies 

Institute. He is a specialist on Asian political and military affairs, and 

has published articles and chapters on comparative communism and 

post-communism, civil-military relations, and strategic culture, 

which have appeared in such journals as Armed Forces and Society, 

China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, and Political Science Quarterly. 

He is also the author of the forthcoming book, China’s Use of Military 

Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March. Dr. Scobell received 

his Ph.D. from Columbia University. 

THOMAS W. SIMONS, JR., is a Consulting Professor to the 

Department of History at Stanford University and a member of 

Stanfordís Center for International Security and Cooperation. During 

his 35-year career in the U.S. Foreign Service, Ambassador Simons 

spent most of his tenure on East-West relations. He served as 

Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs (1981-85), as Deputy 

Assistant Secretary responsible for relations with the Soviet Union, 

Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia (1986-89), as Ambassador to Poland 

(1990-93), and as Ambassador to Pakistan (1996-98). He has served as 

a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow at the 

Hoover Institution and as an Adjunct Professor of History at Brown 

University. He is the author of two books, The End of the Cold War? A 

Brief History of East-West Relations and Eastern Europe in the Postwar 

World: A History of the Area’s Communist Period. Ambassador Simons 

received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. 

SIR JOHN THOMSON is a former British High Commissioner to 

India (1977-82) and a former Permanent Representative of the United 

Kingdom to the United Nations Headquarters (1982-87). During his 
499 

years in the British Foreign Service, he also served as Minister at 

NATO, Under Secretary for Defence and Disarmament, Chief of the 

Assessments Staff in the Cabinet Office, and Head of Policy 

Planning. He has served as a Director of Grindleys Bank, and is a 

Trustee of the Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage 

(U.K.). Sir John holds degrees from Aberdeen University and 

Cambridge University. 

SHRIPA TULJAPURKAR is Morrison Professor of Population 

Studies and Professor of Biological Sciences at Stanford University. 

He is also a Member of the Center on the Economics and 

Demography of Aging at the University of California at Berkeley, 

and a Member of the Science Board of the Santa Fe Institute. He has 

received the Mindel Sheps Award from the Population Association 

of America as well as a John Simon Guggenheim Foundation 

Fellowship, and he is a Fellow of the American Association of Arts 

and Sciences. Dr. Tuljapurkar also serves on the editorial boards of 

several scientific journals and on the review panels for national 

scientific agencies. He is the author or co-author of numerous articles 

and papers, the author of Population dynamics in Variable 

Environments, and a co-editor of Structured Population Models in 

Marine, Freshwater and Terrestrial Ecosystems. Dr. Tuljapurkar 

received his Ph.D. from Portland State University. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE 

Major General Robert R. Ivany 

Commandant 

***** 

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 

Director 

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. 

Director of Research 

Dr. Steven Metz 

Editor 

Dr. Michael R. Chambers 

Director of Publications 

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling 

Publications Assistant 

Ms. Rita A. Rummel 

***** 

Composition 

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell