**************************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of this opinion is the date the opinion was

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the

beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion

motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially

released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

This opinion is subject to revisions and editorial

changes, not of a substantive nature, and corrections

of a technical nature prior to publication in the

Connecticut Law Journal. ****************************************************************
IN RE PHOENIX A.*

(AC 44060)

Moll, Cradle and Lavery, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial

court terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor child. He

claimed, inter alia, that the court erred by finding that he was unable

or unwilling to benefit from reunification services provided by the

Department of Children and Families pursuant to the statute (§ 17a-112

(j) (1)) that requires a trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence

that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and

child unless it finds, instead, that the parent is unable or unwilling to

benefit from such efforts. The trial court also found, pursuant to § 17a112 (j) (1), that reasonable efforts were made by the department to

reunify the family. Held:

1. Because the respondent father, who did not challenge on appeal the trial

court’s finding that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify

him and the minor child, challenged only one of the two separate and

independent bases for upholding the court’s determination that the

requirements of § 17a-112 (j) (1) had been satisfied, there existed a

separate and independent basis for upholding the court’s determination,

and, therefore, even if this court agreed with the father’s claim, there

was no practical relief that could be afforded to him; accordingly, the

father’s claim was dismissed as moot.

2. The trial court properly found, in light of the evidence presented at trial,

that the respondent father had failed to achieve sufficient personal

rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that he could assume a

responsible position in the life of the minor child within a reasonable

time; the record contained sufficient evidence to support the court’s

conclusion that the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, had proven by clear and convincing evidence the alleged adjudicatory ground for termination of the respondent’s parental rights in that the

petitioner presented evidence that the respondent continued to struggle

with substance abuse and mental health issues throughout the department’s involvement, he had difficulty addressing the needs of the minor

child during visits right up until the time of trial despite participating

in several parenting education classes and he continued to engage in

criminal behavior, including violations of a protective order obtained

by the minor child’s mother.

3. The trial court’s determination that terminating the respondent father’s

parental rights was in the best interest of the minor child was not clearly

erroneous, the abundant evidence in the record having supported the

court’s determination: the court found that the father continued to struggle with substance abuse issues throughout the department’s involvement, had continuing involvement with the criminal justice system, and

had remained unable to implement into his daily functioning the skills

he had learned in the various programs in which he had participated;

moreover, testimony was offered that the minor child needed a stable

caregiver, the father would not be an appropriate caregiver and the

minor child needed permanency and to know who his caregivers were;

furthermore, testimony was offered that the minor child was happy with

his foster parents, and that he had a very close relationship with them

and was bonded with them.

Argued December 7, 2020—officially released February 22, 2021**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with

respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Litchfield at Torrington,

Juvenile Matters, where the matter was tried to the
court, Hon. Joseph W. Doherty, judge trial referee; judgment terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from

which the respondent father appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent father).

Deanna S. Levine, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Evan O’Roark, assistant attorney general, for

the appellee (petitioner).

Rebecca Mayo Goodrich, for the minor child.
Opinion

LAVERY, J. The respondent father, Ryan A.,1 appeals

from the judgment of the trial court terminating his

parental rights with respect to his minor child, Phoenix

A. (Phoenix). On appeal, the respondent claims that

the court erred by (1) finding that he was unable or

unwilling to benefit from reunification services, (2) finding that he had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of

personal rehabilitation, and (3) determining that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of

Phoenix. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history as set forth by the trial court in its

memorandum of decision or as otherwise undisputed

in the record. Phoenix was born to his parents, the

respondent and Leann C., who had a tumultuous, toxic,

and aggressive relationship. Leann C. obtained a protective order against the respondent on May 23, 2015.

Despite there being a full protective order in place, the

respondent continued to have contact with Leann C.

He violated the protective order five times and was

arrested for those violations on October 8, 2015, and

November 14, 2015.

The Department of Children and Families (department) first became involved with the respondent and

Leann C. in June, 2015, due to concerns with transiency,

domestic violence, and unaddressed mental health

issues. Phoenix came into the department’s care by way

of a ninety-six hour hold on November 18, 2015. On

November 20, 2015, the petitioner, the Commissioner

of Children and Families, initiated neglect proceedings.

An order of temporary custody was granted by the court

on November 25, 2015. In November, 2015, Phoenix was

placed in foster care with his maternal grandmother,

Norma C.

On July 20, 2016, Phoenix was adjudicated neglected

and committed to the care and custody of the petitioner.

The respondent also was issued court-ordered specific

steps to facilitate reunification on that day. Specifically,

the respondent was ordered, inter alia, to attend parenting counseling, submit to substance abuse evaluation

and treatment, refrain from using illegal drugs, attend

domestic violence programs, and refrain from getting

involved with the criminal justice system. Although

Phoenix initially resided with his grandmother, his

grandmother made it clear that she wanted to maintain

a grandmother type relationship with Phoenix, and that

she would take care of him only until the department

found a permanent placement for him. Accordingly,

Phoenix was placed in a nonrelative foster home after

approximately one year in his grandmother’s care.

Phoenix remained in this foster home during the pendency of his case, and his current foster parents have

represented that they are willing to adopt him. While
in foster care, Phoenix began exhibiting concerning

behaviors such as aggression toward the other children

in his foster home. He struggled with self-regulation and

often resorted to kicking, spitting, hitting, and throwing

objects when he was upset. Extensive efforts often were

required to get Phoenix ‘‘regulated’’ when he initiated

this combative behavior. Due to Phoenix’ behavioral

issues, he was referred to individual therapy in September, 2017. Although Phoenix continued to exhibit

aggressive and combative behavior while in foster care,

Phoenix became closely bonded with his foster family

and expressed a desire to stay with them.

While Phoenix was in foster care, the department

referred the respondent to numerous services to work

toward reunification. Specifically, the department

referred the respondent to parenting education services, individual therapy, psychological evaluations,

substance abuse treatment, and domestic violence programs. The respondent began participating in parenting

education programs in 2016 at Klingberg Family Centers. Despite completing this program, however, the

respondent briefly left Phoenix alone in the car while

going into stores on two separate occasions when Phoenix was approximately one and one-half years old. The

respondent then completed two series of parenting

classes at Family Strides. Although the respondent

made ‘‘significant progress’’ in the Family Strides program, Emil Renzullo, a caseworker at the program,

expressed concerns about the respondent’s vocalization of anger toward Patty Lorenzo, a social worker

with the department. Renzullo notified the department

about his concerns for Lorenzo’s safety.

In 2018, the respondent received additional parenting

education at Family and Children’s Aid. After completing this program, the respondent started the Reunification and Therapeutic Family Time program (RTFT) on

October 15, 2018. When the RTFT program ended, the

program’s providers did not recommend reunification

due to concerns about the respondent’s financial stability, his impulsivity, and his inability to safely parent

Phoenix. The respondent was discharged from the program in February, 2019. Following his discharge from

the program, the department did not recommend reunification due to inconsistencies in the respondent’s emotional regulation, impulsivity, being emotionally

affected when Phoenix began acting out during visits,

financial instability, and unpredictability during visits.

After the RTFT program ended, the department

referred the respondent to additional parenting education through The Guardian, LLC. The respondent participated in the program from March 2 to June 1, 2019.

He was unsuccessfully discharged from the program for

lack of progress and for poor achievement of treatment

goals. For example, it was reported that the respondent

did not implement modeled parenting skills, allowed
Phoenix to run the visits, and was unable to manage

Phoenix and address his needs.

In June and July, 2019, the department referred the

respondent to two new agencies for supervised visits.

The respondent was able to arrange visits with Phoenix

through Ahavah Family Services in August, 2019. During

one of those visits, Phoenix began to spit on, hit, and

bite the respondent. In response, the respondent covered Phoenix’ mouth, forcibly held back his head, and

covered Phoenix’ head with his shirt. Consequently, the

department remained concerned that the respondent

did not understand and did not implement the parenting

techniques being taught to him.

The department also referred the respondent to individual therapy and had him undergo several psychological evaluations throughout the case in order to address

his needs. Jessica Caverly, a clinical psychologist, diagnosed the respondent with antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality traits, and moderate cannabis use disorder. When she conducted her first

evaluation in March, 2016, she recommended that Phoenix remain in foster care because she felt that the

respondent was not ready for reunification. Her recommendation was based on the respondent’s significant

mental health concerns, substance abuse concerns, and

history of domestic violence.

To help address these issues, the respondent began

individual therapy with Holly Varanelli, a licensed clinical social worker. While in therapy, the respondent

worked on understanding the correlation between his

past trauma and dysfunctional relationships, as well as

‘‘crisis’’ work focused on the respondent’s criminal case

and risk of incarceration. Varanelli reported that the

respondent attended individual therapy on a consistent

basis, and that they were working on helping him identify positive community supports. He also began treatment at the Dual Diagnosis Intensive Outpatient Program at Charlotte Hungerford Hospital in June, 2016.

He started taking Rexulti daily as part of his treatment

and reported feeling stable while on medication.

Caverly evaluated the respondent a second time in

March, 2018. Her second evaluation focused on what

progress, if any, the respondent had made, along with

how Phoenix’ mental health issues were progressing.

At the time of the respondent’s second evaluation, the

respondent had been medicated for one year and he

appeared more stable than at the time of the first evaluation. As a result, Caverly recommended reunification

with close and careful observation from the department. She did state, however, that her recommendation

would change to termination of the respondent’s parental rights if the respondent was abusing substances or

if he stopped taking his prescribed medications.

Following Caverly’s second evaluation, the respon-
dent ceased taking his prescribed medication in July,

2018. Despite the therapy and parenting counseling that

the respondent received, Jamie Piccoli, a caseworker

for the department, reported that the respondent continued to have difficulty understanding the complexity

of Phoenix’ trauma and how it came to be. He always

attributed Phoenix’ trauma to someone else, such as

Leann C., the department, or Phoenix’ foster mother.

He showed little progress in learning how to parent to

Phoenix’ needs, and continued to demonstrate poor

judgment, impulsivity, and violent tendencies. For

example, the respondent was arrested for shoplifting

in November, 2018, and for breach of the peace and

threatening in August, 2019.

The respondent also continued to have problems with

substance abuse. The respondent admitted to smoking

marijuana as an adolescent and that he used cocaine

and became addicted to opiates after a snowboarding

accident. He also reported that he smoked marijuana

every day of his adult life. Due to the respondent’s

substance abuse issues, the department referred him

for a substance abuse evaluation in December, 2015,

with the McCall Foundation. After the respondent was

put on probation for a June 17, 2016 conviction of two

counts of violation of a protective order, he was also

required to submit to random urine tests, substance

evaluation and treatment, and to provide a medical marijuana certificate.

To comply with the conditions of his probation, the

respondent participated in substance abuse treatment

at the McCall Foundation and provided specimens

bimonthly to the Office of Adult Probation. His urine

specimens from July 9, 19, and 30, 2019, were determined to be ‘‘diluted,’’ indicating that he drank a large

amount of water prior to the test.2 Because the specimens were diluted, the tests were rendered inconclusive. The respondent’s specimen taken on August 9,

2019, was positive for marijuana. The positive test was

considered an illegal use of marijuana in light of the

respondent’s lack of a valid medical marijuana card.

Due to concerns regarding the respondent’s ongoing

substance abuse issues, Dawson recommended that the

respondent submit to a hair toxicology screen. Sara

Hodis, a social worker from the department, subsequently requested that the respondent schedule a hair

test. The respondent, however, failed to comply with

this request.

Finally, the department also referred the respondent

to domestic violence programs due to concerns about

his threatening behavior and violations of a protective

order. The respondent had a history of violent behavior

originating from before the department’s involvement

with Phoenix. Specifically, the respondent previously

had been incarcerated for aggravated assault following

an incident involving his mother in Pennsylvania. His
pattern of threatening behavior continued during his

relationship with Leann C. and remained a concern

while Phoenix was in the department’s care. Leann C.

obtained a protective order against the respondent on

May 23, 2015, but the respondent violated it five times

and consequently was arrested twice for his violations.

As a result, the department referred the respondent to

a domestic violence program at the McCall Center. The

respondent participated in that program and later was

enrolled in the Explorer Program at Catholic Charities,

which was a twenty-six week domestic violence

program.

Despite his participation in these domestic violence

programs, the respondent continued to demonstrate

intimidating and aggressive behavior throughout the

case. During his time in the Family Strides parenting

program, the respondent expressed anger toward

Lorenzo, a social worker with the department. A caseworker from the program notified the department about

the respondent’s expressed anger toward Lorenzo out

of concern for her safety. The respondent also became

more frustrated as the reunification process continued,

and often would become loud and verbally aggressive.

Several service providers and employees of the department reported that the respondent was explosive. The

department’s concern about the respondent’s aggression progressed to the point where a state police officer

began attending the respondent’s visits to the department’s offices. Additionally, the respondent had ongoing involvement with the criminal justice system, as he

was arrested in August, 2019, for breach of the peace

and threatening.

On November 7, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition

to terminate the parental rights of the respondent and

Leann C. pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3)

(B) (i) for their failure to achieve a degree of personal

rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that,

within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs

of Phoenix, they could each assume a responsible position in the life of Phoenix. Trial was held on August

26, August 27, and September 23, 2019. On the first day

of trial, Leann C. was defaulted for failing to appear and

the court rendered judgment terminating her parental

rights as to Phoenix.3 The petitioner then proceeded

with the case against the respondent. On the first day

of trial, Piccoli testified about her concerns with the

respondent’s progress. She testified that although the

respondent had participated in various services to help

achieve reunification, the department remained concerned about his ability to parent Phoenix. Specifically,

she stated that the respondent still had difficulty understanding the complexity of Phoenix’ trauma and showed

little progress in learning how to parent to Phoenix’

needs. Piccoli testified that although it is apparent that

the respondent loves Phoenix and cares about him,

Phoenix is a tough child to parent, and the respondent
had not shown the ability to understand and deal with

his behavior appropriately. She also expressed concern

over the respondent’s failure to take his prescribed

medication, as Caverly’s June, 2018 recommendation

for reunification was based on the fact that the respondent was medicated.

The June, 2018 recommendation for reunification

was further explored on the second day of trial when

Caverly testified. She testified that her recommendation

would change to termination of parental rights if the

respondent was abusing substances or was not medicated for his mental health issues. She further stated

that it would not be safe to place Phoenix with the

respondent if he was engaging in threatening behavior.

She also testified that due to Phoenix’ age, he needed a

stable caregiver. A caregiver who had untreated mental

health issues with continued significant legal involvement would be considered unstable and not an appropriate caregiver for Phoenix.

On January 21, 2020, the court issued its memorandum of decision and rendered judgment terminating

the respondent’s parental rights. In doing so, the court

made extensive findings of fact and concluded that the

petitioner had established that the adjudicatory ground

of failure to rehabilitate for termination existed and

that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was

in the best interest of Phoenix. From this judgment, the

respondent now appeals.

We begin by setting forth the legal principles that

govern our review. ‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental

rights are governed by § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provision], a hearing on a petition to terminate parental

rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase

and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory

phase, the trial court must determine whether one or

more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental

rights set forth in § 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and

convincing evidence. The [petitioner] . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove

one or more of the statutory grounds. . . . Also, as part

of the adjudicatory phase, the department is required

to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it has

made reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child with

the parent, unless the court finds . . . that the parent

is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Malachi E., 188 Conn. App. 426, 434,

204 A.3d 810 (2019).

‘‘If the trial court determines that a statutory ground

for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional

phase. . . . In the dispositional phase of a termination

of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine

whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [parent’s] parental

rights is not in the best interests of the child. In arriving
at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and

make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in . . . § [17a-112 (k)].’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Paul M., 154 Conn. App. 488, 494–95,

107 A.3d 552 (2014).

I

The respondent claims that the trial court improperly

found that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from

reunification services. Specifically, the respondent

argues that the court’s finding was erroneous because

he has demonstrated a willingness to cooperate and

engage in the services offered to him. In response, the

petitioner argues that the respondent’s claim is moot

because he challenges only one of the two separate

and independent bases for the court’s finding that the

petitioner has satisfied the reasonable efforts prong of

§ 17a-112 (j) (1). We agree with the petitioner.

We begin by setting forth established principles of

law and the standard of review. ‘‘Mootness raises the

issue of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .

Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be

determined as a threshold matter because it implicates

[a] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . We begin

with the four part test for justiciability . . . . Because

courts are established to resolve actual controversies,

before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution

on the merits it must be justiciable. Justiciability

requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between

or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the

interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the

matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated

by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination

of the controversy will result in practical relief to the

complainant. . . . [I]t is not the province of appellate

courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the

granting of actual relief or from the determination of

which no practical relief can follow. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant

in any way.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Natalia M., 190 Conn. App. 583,

587–88, 210 A.3d 682, cert. denied, 332 Conn. 912, 211

A.3d 71 (2019).

‘‘Section 17a-112 (j) (1) requires a trial court to find

by clear and convincing evidence that the department

made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and child

unless it finds instead that the parent is unable or

unwilling to benefit from such efforts. In other words,

either finding, standing alone, provides an independent

basis for satisfying § 17a-112 (j) (1).’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 588.

‘‘Accordingly, the [petitioner] must prove either that

[the department] has made reasonable efforts to reunify

or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable

to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112
(j) clearly provides that the [petitioner] is not required

to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is

sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.’’ (Emphasis

in original.) In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552–53, 979

A.2d 469 (2009).

In the present case, the trial court found by clear

and convincing evidence ‘‘that reasonable efforts were

made by the department to reunify this family. [The

department] made numerous, specific and repeated

referrals to various service providers. [The department]

made sufficient efforts to get [the respondent] to engage

in counseling and parenting classes as well as substance

abuse counseling. [The department] did all that was

reasonably necessary to reunite this family.’’ The court’s

determination that the department made reasonable

efforts at reunification thus satisfied the element enumerated in § 17a-112 (j) (1). The respondent, however,

does not challenge on appeal the court’s finding on the

reasonable efforts portion of § 17a-112 (j) (1). Because

the respondent argues only that the court erred in finding that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from

reunification services, even if we were to agree with

his claim, the fact that there is a second independent

basis for upholding the court’s determination renders

us unable to provide him with any practical relief with

respect to this claim on appeal. See In re Miracle C.,

201 Conn. App. 598, 605–606, A.3d (2020) (dismissing appeal because court could offer respondent

no relief when respondent challenged only one of two

separate and independent bases for court’s determination that requirements of § 17a-112 (j) (1) had been

satisfied); In re Daniel A., 150 Conn. App. 78, 98, 89

A.3d 1040 (declining to review respondent’s claim that

court erred in finding that he was unable or unwilling

to benefit from reunification efforts because it was

moot for same reason), cert. denied, 312 Conn. 911, 93

A.3d 593 (2014). We, therefore, dismiss as moot the

respondent’s claim that the court erred in finding that

he was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services.

II

The respondent next claims that the court erred by

concluding that he had failed to achieve a sufficient

degree of personal rehabilitation. Specifically, he argues

that the court erred because the department failed to

ensure that he was engaged in appropriate services to

aid his reunification with Phoenix and that it never

followed up with him to address any issues or concerns

it had with his behavior, individual therapy, and medication management. In response, the petitioner contends

that the department referred the respondent to appropriate services to address the issues impacting reunification and that he simply was unable to benefit enough

from those services in order to reunify with Phoenix.

We agree with the petitioner.
The legal principles that govern our review are well

established. Section 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) provides for

the termination of parental rights when the child ‘‘has

been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been

neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding

. . . and the parent of such child has been provided

specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child

to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed

to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as

would encourage the belief that within a reasonable

time, considering the age and needs of the child, such

parent could assume a responsible position in the life

of the child . . . .’’ ‘‘The trial court is required, pursuant

to § 17a-112, to analyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and

further . . . such rehabilitation must be foreseeable

within a reasonable time. . . . The statute does not

require [a parent] to prove precisely when [he or she]

will be able to assume a responsible position in [his or

her] child’s life. Nor does it require [him or her] to prove

that [he or she] will be able to assume full responsibility

for [his or her] child, unaided by available support systems. It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he or she]

has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would

reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date

[he or she] can assume a responsible position in [his

or her] child’s life.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Brian P., 195 Conn. App. 558, 568, 226 A.3d 159,

cert. denied, 335 Conn. 907, 226 A.3d 151 (2020). ‘‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)]

refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former

constructive and useful role as a parent. . . . [I]n

assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether

the parent has improved [his or her] ability to manage

[his or her] own life, but rather whether [he or she] has

gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the

child at issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

‘‘[The] completion or noncompletion [of the specific

steps], however, does not guarantee any outcome. . . .

Accordingly, successful completion of expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat a department claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient

rehabilitation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 568–69.

‘‘A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from

both the trial court’s factual findings and from its

weighing of the facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in

§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly . . . the appropriate

standard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency,

that is, whether the trial court could have reasonably

concluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative

effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . When applying this standard,
we construe the evidence in a manner most favorable

to sustaining the judgment of the trial court. . . . We

will not disturb the court’s subordinate factual findings

unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by

any evidence in the record or when there is evidence

to support it, but the reviewing court is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

made.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 569.

In its memorandum of decision, the court found ‘‘by

clear and convincing evidence that [the respondent] has

not achieved such a degree of personal rehabilitation

as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable

time, he will be in a position to assume parenting

responsibilities for his child, Phoenix . . . .’’ In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the respondent

had failed to offer evidence to refute the allegations in

the termination of parental rights petition regarding his

long-time and recurring substance abuse issues and had

failed to deny his criminal record or the multiple arrests

for violations of a protective order. Although the court

stated that the respondent had made efforts to achieve

the requisite degree of rehabilitation, the court concluded that his efforts had not been successful, and

that it had ‘‘little confidence that within a reasonable

time [the respondent] will be able to assume a responsible role in the child’s life.’’ Accordingly, the court found

that the petitioner had proven, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate

pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).

There is abundant evidence in the record from which

the court reasonably could have concluded that the

respondent failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. As the court stated in its memorandum of decision, the respondent failed to offer any

evidence refuting the allegation in the termination of

parental rights petition regarding his recurring substance abuse issues. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the respondent struggled with substance

abuse issues throughout the department’s involvement

with Phoenix, with the respondent testing positive for

marijuana as late as August, 2019, the month when trial

began. It is also undisputed that the respondent had

continuing involvement with the criminal justice system. The respondent was arrested for violations of a

protective order on October 8 and November 14, 2015.

He was also arrested for shoplifting in November, 2018,

and for breach of the peace and threatening in

August, 2019.

Moreover, although the respondent made progress

in his efforts to achieve the requisite degree of rehabilitation that would allow him to reunify with Phoenix, the

department still remained concerned about his ability

to address Phoenix’ needs. As Piccoli testified, Phoenix
is a difficult child to parent. He exhibits ‘‘emotional

and verbal aggression,’’ which has been attributed to

‘‘trauma and disrupted attachment.’’ Although the

respondent participated in numerous parenting education programs, Piccoli believed that the respondent

showed little progress in learning how to parent Phoenix’ needs. Piccoli testified, for example, that the

respondent struggled to implement the skills he was

being taught and had difficulty calming Phoenix down

when Phoenix’ behavior became escalated. He also left

Phoenix in the car unattended on two separate occasions and was unsuccessfully discharged from a parenting program that he participated in a few months prior

to trial for lack of progress and poor achievement of

treatment goals. The respondent’s difficulty with implementing the newly learned parenting skills became evident during an August, 2019 visit with Phoenix. During

this visit, Phoenix was particularly out of control and

became physically aggressive with the respondent. In

response, the respondent forcibly attempted to restrain

Phoenix by holding his forehead back and covering

Phoenix’ head with his shirt. This visit was ended early

due to safety concerns between Phoenix and the

respondent. The evidence presented at trial, therefore,

indicated that the respondent still had difficulty with

appropriately addressing Phoenix’ needs.

The petitioner also presented evidence about the

respondent’s struggle with mental health issues

throughout the department’s involvement. Although the

respondent underwent several psychological evaluations and participated in individual therapy to help

address his mental health issues, he continued to have

problems with his ‘‘emotional regulation . . . and his

demonstration of unpredictability for Phoenix in visits’’

that had delayed the respondent from moving further

along in the reunification process. He also ceased taking

his prescribed medication in July, 2018. This is particularly notable, as Caverly’s June, 2018 recommendation

for reunification was based on the assumption that the

respondent was not abusing substances and was medicated for his mental health issues. She testified that if

the respondent was testing positive for substances that

he was not prescribed or he was not taking his prescribed medication, her recommendation would change

to termination of parental rights.

Construing the record before us in the manner most

favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial court,

as we are obligated to do; see In re Brian P., supra, 195

Conn. App. 569; we conclude that the record contains

sufficient evidence to support the court’s conclusion

that the petitioner had proven by clear and convincing

evidence the alleged adjudicatory ground for termination of the respondent’s parental rights. As previously

observed, ‘‘[i]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical

issue is not whether the parent has improved [his or

her] ability to manage [his or her] own life, but rather
whether [he or she] has gained the ability to care for

the particular needs of the child at issue.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 568. Here, the petitioner

presented evidence that the respondent continued to

struggle with substance abuse and mental health issues

throughout the department’s involvement, and that he

had difficulty addressing the needs of Phoenix during

visits right up until the time of trial despite participating

in several parenting education classes. He also continued to engage in criminal behavior, with arrests in

November, 2018, and August, 2019. Accordingly, that

evidence supports the court’s determination that the

respondent’s efforts at rehabilitation had not been successful, and that he would be unable to assume a

responsible role in Phoenix’ life within a reasonable

time.

The respondent’s claims that the trial court erred in

finding that he failed to rehabilitate are unavailing. First,

the respondent appears to contend that the court based

its finding that he failed to rehabilitate on the fact that

he left Phoenix unattended in the car on two occasions,

and failed to consider that he was able to engage in

services following a second evaluation and further

reunification efforts. To the contrary, however, it is

clear from the court’s memorandum of decision that

it based its determination on the extensive evidence

presented at trial concerning the respondent’s substance abuse and mental health issues, continued

involvement with the criminal justice system, and difficulty with appropriately addressing Phoenix’ needs.

The respondent’s first argument is thus unpersuasive.

Second, the respondent claims that the petitioner

failed to offer evidence that the department worked

with his individual therapist to address any of its concerns about his behavior and that the department also

failed to ensure that the respondent was engaged in

proper medication management. The respondent, however, has failed to provide us with any authority for his

proposition that the department was required to work

with his therapist or to ensure that he was engaged in

proper medication management, nor are we aware of

any. Moreover, the department was not required to do

everything possible to facilitate the respondent’s rehabilitation. Cf. In re Jah’za G., 141 Conn. App. 15, 31,

60 A.3d 392 (department required only to do everything

reasonable, not everything possible, when attempting

to reunify child with parents), cert. denied, 308 Conn.

926, 64 A.3d 329 (2013). Here, it is undisputed that the

department referred the respondent to multiple services, including parenting education programs, individual therapy, substance abuse treatment, and domestic

violence programs. We are thus satisfied that the department adequately referred the respondent to services

to facilitate his rehabilitation. The respondent’s claim,

therefore, fails.
In light of the evidence presented at trial, we conclude

that there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s

finding that the respondent failed to achieve sufficient

personal rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief

that he could assume a responsible position in the life

of Phoenix within a reasonable time. Accordingly, we

conclude that the court properly found that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate.

III

Finally, the respondent claims that the court improperly found that termination of his parental rights was

in the best interest of Phoenix. Specifically, the respondent argues that the court erred in so finding in light of

his clear bond with Phoenix.4

In response, the petitioner

contends that the court properly found that terminating

the respondent’s parental rights was in Phoenix’ best

interest due to the evidence presented at trial concerning the respondent’s failure to rehabilitate and Phoenix’

needs for stability and permanency. We agree with

the petitioner.

We are guided by the following relevant legal principles and the standard of review. ‘‘In the dispositional

phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the

emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the

parent to the best interest of the child. . . . It is well

settled that we will overturn the trial court’s decision

that the termination of parental rights is in the best

interest of the [child] only if the court’s findings are

clearly erroneous. . . . The best interests of the child

include the child’s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [his

or her] environment. . . . In the dispositional phase of

a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court

must determine whether it is established by clear and

convincing evidence that the continuation of the

[respondent’s] parental rights is not in the best interest

of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is

mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven statutory factors delineated in [§ 17a-112 (k)]

. . . . The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for

the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need

to be proven before termination can be ordered. . . .

There is no requirement that each factor be proven

by clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Brian P., supra, 195 Conn.

App. 579.

The court considered and made findings under each

of the seven statutory factors of § 17a-112 (k) before

determining, by clear and convincing evidence, that

termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in

the best interest of Phoenix.5

In the dispositional portion of its memorandum of decision, the court emphasized that the department referred the respondent to

numerous services to facilitate his rehabilitation,
including referrals to substance abuse programs,

domestic violence programs, individual therapy for his

mental health issues, and parenting education programs. The court then found that, despite engaging in

these services, the respondent continued to demonstrate controlling and intimidating behavior, as well

as an inability to problem solve with managing daily

stressors and caring for Phoenix, that he had failed to

implement into his daily functioning what he had

learned from the services in which he participated, and

that he had been unable to stay out of the criminal

justice system. Although the court noted that Phoenix

appears to have enjoyed the time he spent with the

respondent on supervised visits, the court also found

that Phoenix has developed a bond with his foster family. Due to his age and needs, the court stated that

Phoenix is dependent on responsible, nurturing caregivers who can provide a safe, stable environment and a

consistent level of care and emotional availability. In

light of these considerations, the court concluded that

terminating the respondent’s parental rights was in

Phoenix’ best interest.

Here, there is abundant evidence in the record to

support the court’s conclusion that it was in the best

interest of Phoenix to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. As discussed in part II of this opinion, the

evidence presented at trial indicates that the respondent

continued to struggle with substance abuse issues

throughout the department’s involvement, had continuing involvement with the criminal justice system, and

had difficulty implementing the skills he learned at the

various programs he attended. Caverly testified that

Phoenix needs a stable caregiver, and that a caregiver

who has significant, untreated mental health issues, is

abusing substances, and has continued legal involvement would not be an appropriate caregiver. Moreover,

Piccoli and Norma C. testified during trial about Phoenix’ bond with his foster parents. Piccoli testified that

Phoenix was happy with his foster parents, and that he

would go to them if he needed comfort, and Norma C.

testified that Phoenix has a ‘‘very close relationship’’

with his foster family and that he is ‘‘very bonded’’

with them.

The respondent contends that the court erred

because he clearly has a relationship with Phoenix.

Although it is apparent that the respondent loves and

cares about Phoenix, that is not dispositive in determining whether termination was in Phoenix’ best interest.

‘‘As this court has explained, the appellate courts of

this state consistently have held that even when there

is a finding of a bond between [a] parent and a child,

it still may be in the child’s best interest to terminate

parental rights.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In

re Yolanda V., 195 Conn. App. 334, 356, 224 A.3d 182

(2020). Here, the court found that the respondent

remained unable to implement into his daily functioning
the skills he had learned in the various programs in

which he had participated. Moreover, Caverly testified

that Phoenix needs permanency and that it would be

traumatic for him not to have it. She further testified

that the current situation is very confusing to Phoenix,

and that he ‘‘needs to know who his caregivers are and

he needs to know that his needs are always going to

be met.’’ In light of these considerations, we conclude

that the evidence in the record supports the court’s

determination that terminating the respondent’s parental rights was in Phoenix’ best interest, and that its

determination was not clearly erroneous.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)

(2018); we decline to identify any party protected or sought to be protected

under a protective order or a restraining order that was issued or applied

for, or others through whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.

** February 22, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 Because only the respondent father has appealed from the judgment

terminating his parental rights; see footnote 3 of this opinion; our references

in this opinion to the respondent are to the father.

2 The respondent stated that these tests were diluted because he was

working as a roofer during the summer and that his water intake increased

as a result. Clarissa Dawson, the respondent’s probation officer, testified

during trial that his excuse did not make sense, as his urine test was conducted first thing in the morning.

3 At the start of trial, counsel for Leann C. informed the court that Leann

C. would not be attending because she had insisted that she was entitled

to a jury trial, despite being advised multiple times that there was no such

thing as a jury trial for termination of parental rights. Accordingly, the court

entered a default against Leann C. Later that day, the court made oral

findings on the termination of parental rights petition with regard to Leann

C. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the department had

made reasonable efforts to reunite Phoenix with Leann C., that termination

of her parental rights was in the best interest of Phoenix, and that Leann

C. had failed to rehabilitate. The court directed the court monitor to produce

a transcript of its oral findings for the court to sign in lieu of a written

memorandum of decision. Leann C. has not appealed from the termination

of her parental rights.

4 The respondent also argues that the court erred in concluding that it

was in Phoenix’ best interest to terminate his parental rights because he is

continuing to make progress with his rehabilitation. As discussed in part II

of this opinion, however, we already have determined that the court did

not err in concluding that the respondent had failed to achieve sufficient

personal rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that he could assume

a responsible position in the life of Phoenix within a reasonable time. To

the extent that the respondent is arguing that he should have been permitted

more time to rehabilitate before his parental rights were terminated, we

recently have noted that such an argument ‘‘is inconsistent with our Supreme

Court’s repeated recognition of the importance of permanency in children’s

lives.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ja’La L., 201 Conn. App.

586, 596, A.3d (2020), citing In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 494–95,

940 A.2d 733 (2008).

5 General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether to

terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and

shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent

of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child

by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2)
whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable

efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe

Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms of any

applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or

agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled

their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of

the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s

person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control

of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed

significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent

has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to

make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the

foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which

the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to

reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to

incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other

custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been

prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by

the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the

unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of

the parent.’’